Liccardy v Daniel Payne t_as Sussex Inlet Pontoons Pty Ltd and Anor

Liccardy v Daniel Payne t/as Sussex Inlet

Pontoons Pty Ltd and Anor [2022] NSWDC 246 (5

July 2022)

Last Updated: 5 July 2022

District Court

New South Wales

Case Name:

Liccardy v Daniel Payne t/as Sussex Inlet Pontoons Pty Ltd and Anor

[2022] NSWDC 246

Medium Neutral

Citation:

Date of Orders:

Decision Date:

Jurisdiction:

Before:

5 July 2022

Civil

Judge Levy SC

See paragraph [295] for orders

Decision:

Catchwords:

TORTS – negligence – marine accident – plaintiff injured in the water

when a propeller under power came into contact with his left leg whilst

he was re-boarding a vessel after retrieving a hat from the water –

finding that the master of the vessel was negligent – finding that the

owner of the vessel is vicariously liable for the master’s negligence –

rejection of defences claiming volenti non fit injuria; obvious risk in

relation to dangerous recreational activity; intoxication; contributory

negligence – rejection of claim made pursuant to Australian Consumer

Law in respect of statutory warranties

DAMAGES – assessment of claimed heads of damage pursuant to the

provisions of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW)

Legislation

Cited:

Australian Consumer Law (Cth), ss 3, 60 and 67

Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), ss 5B, 5C, 5D, 5E, 5F, 5G, 5K, 5L, 5M,

5R, 5S, 13, 15, 16, 48 and 50

Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), s 60

Law Reform (Vicarious Liability) Act 1983 (NSW), s 7

Marine Safety Act 1998 (NSW), s 13

Cases Cited:

Allianz Australia Insurance Ltd v Cervantes [2012] NSWCA 244

Allianz Australia Insurance Ltd v Kerr [2012] NSWCA 13

Dasreef Pty Ltd v Hawchar (2011) 243 CLR 588; [2011] HCA 21

Daw v Toyworld (NSW) Pty Ltd [2001] NSWCA 25

Graham v Baker (1961) 106 CLR 340; [1961] HCA 48

Huynh v Minh Truong and Thi Thu Hoang Pham t/as Le Bon

Bakehouse [2018] WADC 39

Jefferson Ford Pty Ltd v Ford Motor Co [2008] FCAFC 60; [2008] 167

FCR 372

Makita (Australia) Pty Ltd v Sprowles (2001) 52 NSWLR 705; [2001]

NSWCA 305

Medlin v State Government Insurance Commission (1995) 182 CLR 1;

(1995) 127 ALR 180; (1995) Aust Torts Reports 81-322; [1995] HCA 5

Miller v Miller [2011] HCA 9

Modbury Triangle Shopping Centre Pty Ltd v Anzil (2002) 205 CLR

254; [2002] HCA 61

Paff v Speed [1961] HCA 14; (1961) 105 CLR 549

Penrith City Council v Parks [2004] NSWCA 201

Roads & Traffic Authority of NSW v Dederer (2007) 234 CLR 330;

[2007] HCA 42

Rootes v Skelton [1967] HCA 39; (1967) 116 CLR 383

State of New South Wales v Moss (2000) 54 NSWLR 536; [2000]

NSWCA 133

Strong v Woolworths Ltd (2012) 246 CLR 182; [2012] HCA 5

Tapp v Australian Bushmen's Campdraft & Rodeo Association Limited

[2022] HCA 11

Thompson v Woolworths (Qld) Pty Ltd [2005] HCA 19; (2005) 221 CLR

234

Jones v Dunkel [1959] HCA 8; (1959) 101 CLR 298

Principal judgment

Category:

Parties:

Plaintiff: Adam Liccardy

First Defendant: Daniel Payne t/as Sussex Inlet Pontoons Pty Ltd

Second Defendant: Derek Wayne Allred

Representation:

Counsel:

Plaintiff: Mr A Campbell

First Defendant: Mr I Griscti

Second Defendant: Mr D Eardley (24 May 2022) and then no

appearance thereafter

Solicitors:

Plaintiff: Law Partners Compensation Lawyers

First Defendant: James Tuite & Associates

Second Defendant: PJ Carey Solicitor

File Number(s): 2021/101380

Publication

Restriction:

None

JUDGMENT

Table of contents

Nature of case and parties

[1]-[3]

Facts not in dispute

[4]-[28]

[29]-[32]

[33]

Factual matters in dispute

Issues

Evidence overview

[34]-[37]

[38]-[53]

[39]

Credibility and reliability of oral testimony

- The plaintiff

- Mr Benade

[40]

- Mrs Bury

[41]-[42]

[43]-[45]

[46]-[50]

[51]-[53]

[54]-[77]

[55]-[65]

[66]-[69]

[70]-[77]

[71]-[75]

[76]

- Mr Tooth

- Mr Payne

- Absence of evidence from Mr Allred

Review of documentary evidence as to liability

- Report of Mr Jack Ellison – marine expert

- Report of Dr Michael Robertson – pharmacologist

- First defendant’s business documents

- Luxury boat hire agreement

- Rules for the Party Pontoon

- Safety Management Plan

Witness statements

[77]

[78]-[115]

[79]-[83]

[84]-[86]

[87]

- Witness statement of Bruce Mitchell

- Witness statement of William Mountford

- Witness statement of Julia Cross

- Witness statement of Daniel Payne

- Witness statement of Jayde Tooth

- Witness statement of Karl McCarthy

- Witness statement of Mitch Keogh

[88]-[89]

[90]-[93]

[94]-[96]

[97]-[98]

- Witness statement of Dale Berry

- Witness statement of Ben Laws

- Witness statement of Brad Dudley

[99]-[102]

[103]-[105]

[106]-[115]

Miscellaneous documents relating to the second defendant [116]-[118]

- Practical assessment record

[117]

- Eyesight test and medical fitness

[118]

Issue 1 – Findings on disputed matters of fact

Issue 2 – Agency and vicarious liability

Issue 3 – The relevant risk of harm

Issue 4 – Scope and content of duty of care owed

Issue 5 – Voluntary assumption of risk

Issue 6 – Negligence

[120]-[130]

[131]-[137]

[138]

[139]-[141]

[142]-[150]

[151]-[175]

[152]-[155]

[156]-[158]

[159]

- Particulars of negligence

- Statutory provisions

- Foreseeability: s 5B(1)(a) of the CL Act

- Significance of risk of harm: s 5B(1)(b) of the CL Act

- Precautions to be taken: s 5B(1)(c) of the CL Act

- Probability of harm occurring: s 5B(2)(a) of the CL Act

- Likely Seriousness of harm: s 5B(2)(b) of the CL Act

- Burden of taking precautions: s 5B(2)(c) of the CL Act

- Social utility of the activity: s 5B(2)(d) of the CL Act

- Conclusion

[160]

[161]-[166]

[167]

[168]

[169]-[171]

[172]-[173]

[174]-[175]

[176]-[180]

[177]-[178]

[179]

Issue 7 – Causation

- Factual causation: s 5D(1)(a) of the CL Act

- Scope of liability: s 5D(1)(b) of the CL Act

- Conclusion

[180]

Issue 8 – Contributory negligence

[181]-[196]

Issue 9 – Obvious risk and dangerous recreational activity [197]-[212]

Issue 10 – Defence of Intoxication

Issue 11 – Application of the Australian Consumer Law

Issue 12 - Assessment of damages

- Injuries

[213]-[219]

[220]-[227]

[228]-[265]

[229]

- Treatment

[230]-[233]

[234]-[243]

[235]

- Medical Assessments

- Dr Porteous – Occupational Physician

- Dr Keller – Occupational Physician

[236]-[239]

- Dr Vote – Orthopaedic Surgeon

- Disabilities that remain

- Economic effects

[240]-[243]

[244]-[250]

[251]-[252]

[253]

- Mitigation

- Plaintiff’s most probable circumstances

- Non-economic loss

- Past economic loss

[254]-[256]

[257]-[261]

[262]-[269]

[270]-[281]

[282]-[285]

[286]-[290]

[291]

- Future economic loss

- Future domestic assistance

- Future treatment expenses

- Past out-of-pocket expenses

- Summary of damages assessment

Disposition

[292]

[293]

Costs

[294]

Orders

[295]

Nature of case and parties

1. These personal injury damages proceedings claiming negligent navigation arise out of a

marine accident which occurred on 25 January 2020 during a leisure outing on the

water at Sussex Inlet, New South Wales. The proceedings invoke the liability and

damages schemes within the provisions of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) (“CL Act”)

and the consumer protection provisions of the Australian Consumer Law (Cth) (“ACL”).

2. The accident occurred when the plaintiff, Adam Liccardy, dived into the water from a

moving motorised vessel described as a pontoon to retrieve a hat blown into the water by

the prevailing strong wind. Whilst re-boarding the vessel using a fixed ladder at the stern

his left lower leg and knee became injured when he came into contact with the

submerged propeller of the vessel’s outboard motor.

3. The vessel was owned and operated by the first defendant, Daniel Payne, a sole trader

trading under the business name Sussex Inlet Pontoons Pty Ltd. At the time of the

accident, and at the behest of the first defendant, the vessel was under the control of the

second defendant, Derek Allred, as master. The plaintiff claims Mr Allred was Mr

Payne’s employee or agent. Mr Payne contests that claim.

Facts not in dispute

4. At about 2.30pm on the day in question, the plaintiff was one of a group of 10 friends

who were participating in a pre-arranged social outing on the water at Sussex Inlet on

the Australia Day holiday weekend. They were on the first defendant’s vessel identified

as PartyN2. A member of the group had made the booking with the first defendant and

paid a deposit. The first defendant charged a total fee of $750 for the charter of the

vessel for the day. The hiring cost was shared equally by the 10 participants. That cost

included the provision of a suitably skilled master for the vessel.

5. Initially, it was intended that the first defendant would be the master of the vessel for the

charter. After the first defendant took the booking, due to unforeseen family reasons, he

became unavailable on the day in question. Instead, he arranged to provide the group

with the services of the second defendant as master. The arrangement involved the

second defendant collecting the balance of the agreed hiring fee and passing the whole

amount on to the first defendant.

6. At the first defendant’s request, the second defendant had previously driven the first

defendant’s vessels on 4 or 5 occasions. Previously, the first defendant had observed and

satisfied himself as to the second defendant’s marine abilities during an earlier

commercial outing on the water. The first defendant had undertaken those earlier

observations in order to confirm that the second defendant appropriately interacted with

customers of the business. That assessment of the second defendant occurred in the

context where the first defendant was in the course of developing his newly formed

business and he had the intention of employing the second defendant in that business.

7. The two defendants had known each other for about 15 years in a marine context. In late

2019 the first defendant intimated to the second defendant that he would be employed

in the business when there was enough work for him. The business operated two charter

vessels at Sussex Inlet. In late 2019 the second defendant obtained relevant marine

licensing certificates. In December 2019 the first defendant met with the second

defendant and took him through a review of the safety management plan for the

business: Exhibit D1, Tab 10, pp 407 – 415; T113.20 – T113.32. At that time, the second

defendant had the relevant certificates and exemptions to permit him to master the first

defendant’s vessels: Exhibit D1, pp 5 – 6; pp 185 – 191.

8. At the time, Mr Allred had a boat licence, a Marine Rescue Master 3 licence which was

said to be equivalent to a coxswain’s licence, and a section 38 licence for operating a

vessel carrying paying customers: Exhibit A, Vol 3, p 976.

9. The plaintiff claims that the facts of this case compel the conclusion that at the time of

the accident the first defendant was the second defendant’s employer. The first

defendant denied any such relationship of employment, and instead asserted that at the

time of the accident the second defendant was simply engaged on an unpaid trial of

work. This raises a question of fact to be determined.

10. The documentary evidence shows that, from an early stage of the operation of the

business, within the business documentation, both the first and second defendants were

the persons nominated by the business to carry out safety briefings for passengers on the

vessel in question: Exhibit D, Vol 1, Tab 1; T116.14. This raises the suggestion that on

occasions, the second defendant would be employed by the first defendant.

11. There is a body of evidence to the effect that on this particular charter the first defendant

had not provided any form of safety briefing to the group, either at the time when the

outing commenced, or at any stage during the course of the outing. The plaintiff and

other persons who were on the vessel claim no such briefing occurred. That evidence was

not inherently improbable.

12. During the two hours or so before the accident, the plaintiff had consumed several

standard cans of full-strength beer and 2 lines of cocaine.

13. The plaintiff had consumed a meal at about 11.00am on the day in question. He had

consumed his first can of beer by about 11.30am. By about 2.15pm he had consumed 4

cans of beer, and he had partly consumed a fifth can, along with 2 lines of cocaine. He

had consumed the second line of cocaine about 30 to 40 minutes before the accident.

14. The unchallenged expert evidence was that, having regard to the plaintiff’s height,

weight, body mass index and assumed alcohol intake, and having regard to the time of

the accident, his blood alcohol content could have been in the range of between 0.05 to

0.11 grams of alcohol per 100ml of blood: Exhibit D1, p 416.

15. The unchallenged expert evidence was that the plaintiff’s ingestion of cocaine would not

have impaired his co-ordination (Exhibit D1, p 415), and that a blood alcohol content at

the lower and of the range identified above would not have impaired his co-ordination:

Exhibit D1, p 425.

16. However, and notwithstanding that evidence, the first defendant maintained the

plaintiff was relevantly intoxicated when he entered the water and, as a consequence,

submitted that this should be reflected in findings that support the intoxication defences

raised pursuant to ss 48 and 50 of the CL Act, and also in relation to the defence of

alleged contributory negligence.

17. The vessel in question is described as a recreational pontoon suitable for cruising on

inland waterways. It was about 6m to 7m in length, powered by a 150hp outboard motor

with a 3-blade propeller. It was fitted with a boarding ladder at the stern starboard side.

The ladder was designed to allow a person to climb on-board from the water. The

location of the ladder was on the stern at the same side as the master’s helm position on

the starboard side so that the master could maintain a line of sight to the person

climbing on-board using the ladder. The following photograph extracted from the

evidence portrays a general impression of the appearance of the vessel:

2022_24600.jpg

[Exhibit A, Vol 3, p 926]

18. The events leading to the plaintiff’s injury were that during the outing, an Akubra hat

belonging to one of the members of the group was unexpectedly blown into the water by

strong winds. The plaintiff then instinctively reacted by opening a gate at the starboard

side of the vessel and diving into the water to retrieve the hat. At that time the vessel had

slowed down to a degree.

19. The plaintiff said that beforehand, he had informed the master of the vessel (the second

defendant), that he was going to dive from the vessel to retrieve the hat. The vessel was

moving at the time. In the circumstances, it would seem unlikely that there would have

been any realistic or practical opportunity for the second defendant to seek to dissuade

the plaintiff from that chosen course.

20. Shortly after the plaintiff had dived into the water, the second defendant, knowing the

plaintiff had gone overboard, manoeuvred or looped the vessel to the port side and then

circled back to a point past the plaintiff’s position in the water in order to allow the

plaintiff to re-board. There is no dispute that in those circumstances the correct

maritime safety manoeuvre would have been to turn the vessel to starboard and then

circle back whilst at all times keeping the plaintiff in the master’s line of sight and away

from what was described in the evidence as the hazard zone constituted by the area of

the vessel’s propellor.

21. The plaintiff had intended to climb back on board by using the fixed ladder located at the

starboard side of the stern of the vessel. In those events, the second defendant was

unable to maintain his line of sight to the plaintiff. This was because his view had been in

part obscured by the location of the plaintiff in juxtaposition to his own position at the

helm of the vessel and possibly because of the presence and the location of the other

passengers on the vessel, one of whom was filming the plaintiff.

22. The vessel circled back and had stopped in the vicinity of where the plaintiff was located

in the water. The plaintiff said that at that time he did not hear the sound of the engine

running: T69.1. He therefore assumed that the motor had been switched off. A factual

question arises as to whether the engine was on, and the propeller was engaged and

turning under motive power, whether the engine had been placed in the neutral position

or whether it had in fact been switched off. At that time, in addition to the effect of the

windy conditions, the alcohol fuelled general ambient atmosphere on the vessel was

noisy because the group were entertaining themselves by partying, including by playing

music very loudly.

23. After the plaintiff retrieved the hat, whilst he was still in the water, he approached the

vessel and swam around and across its stern towards the starboard side with the

intention of re-boarding by means of the ladder. That area was known in maritime

parlance as the hazard zone. He would not have had to swim across that zone if the

second defendant had beforehand turned the vessel to starboard and then circled back

towards the plaintiff. That manoeuvre would have kept the plaintiff away from the

hazard zone of the propeller whilst it was under motive power and the master could have

maintained a line of sight to the plaintiff in the interests of safety.

24. As the plaintiff prepared to re-board the vessel, he felt two knocks to his left leg in the

area of his left knee. He took hold of the fixed ladder at the stern of the vessel and

proceeded to climb aboard after throwing the retrieved hat on board. At the time, a

member of the group was filming these events using the camera function on his mobile

phone. Those images show the plaintiff slowly emerging from the water as he ascended

the ladder.

25. As the plaintiff ascended the steps of the ladder, a large deep laceration became evident

just below his left knee. The audio that accompanied the images contemporaneously

includes a loud and shocked exclamatory verbal reaction. In fact, the plaintiff had

suffered two lacerations, about 20mm apart, consistent with having had contact with a

spinning or rotating propeller.

26. The following photograph extracted from the evidence portrays a general impression of

the out-of-water appearance of the motor and the propeller at the stern of the vessel:

2022_24601.jpg

[Exhibit A, Vol 3, p 970]

27. The plaintiff was given immediate first aid by two members of the group using a towel

with a rope serving as a tourniquet. The vessel was driven to a nearby jetty. An

ambulance met the vessel there, and the plaintiff was promptly taken to Shoalhaven

Hospital for emergency treatment. He later had a series of operations to repair his

severely damaged leg.

28. Pursuant to s 13 of the Marine Safety Act 1998 (NSW), the second defendant was

subsequently convicted on a charge of negligent navigation in relation to the incident. At

the hearing of the present proceedings the first defendant said that as a result of that

conviction, he felt that he was unable to employ the second defendant in his business.

Factual matters in dispute

29. There is a factual dispute as to whether, on the evidence, a relevant relationship of

employment or agency and vicarious liability existed between the first and second

defendants. There are also disputes as to what liability consequences should follow from

the plaintiff’s action of diving into the water having regard to his earlier consumption of

alcohol and from his use of cocaine.

30. As to the circumstances surrounding the accident itself, the essential factual questions in

dispute are whether the plaintiff had informed the second defendant of his intention to

dive into the water before doing so, and whether whilst re-boarding the vessel, the

engine was on and the propeller was engaged and turning under motive power at the

time of the injury.

31. The first defendant relied upon defences denying negligence, alleging voluntary

assumption of risk, contributory negligence, and raised the CL Act defences of

intoxication, the alleged existence of an obvious risk, and the plaintiff’s alleged

engagement in dangerous recreational activity which, it was claimed, involved the

materialisation of an obvious risk. All of those defences were contested by the plaintiff.

32. In addition to framing his case against the defendants in negligence, as against the first

defendant the plaintiff also relies upon statutory warranties claimed to arise pursuant to

the consumer protection provisions of ss 60 and 67 of the ACL. The first defendant

contests the applicability of those provisions to the facts of this case.

Issues

33. On my review of the pleadings, the evidence, the submission of the parties, and the

applicable legal principles, the essential issues for determination in this case may be

conveniently identified in the following order:

(1) Findings on matters of fact in dispute;

(2) The legal characterisation of the relationship between the first defendant and

the second defendant, including whether employment, agency, and vicarious

liability have been established;

(3) Identification of the relevant risk of harm for the purposes of the consideration

of the application of s 5B of the CL Act;

(4) The scope and content of the duty of care owed by the respective defendants;

(5) Whether, by his actions, the plaintiff voluntarily assumed the risk of injury;

(6) Whether the plaintiff has satisfactorily proven that either of the defendants had

breached the duty of care owed to him so as to sustain a finding of negligence

against them according to the requirements of s 5B of the CL Act;

(7) Whether, in terms of s 5D of the CL Act, the plaintiff’s injuries were relevantly

caused by the negligence of the defendants;

(8) Whether and to what extent there was contributory negligence on the part of

the plaintiff, and whether such contributory negligence was a relevant cause of the

plaintiff’s injury;

(9) Whether the plaintiff’s injuries occurred as a result of the materialisation of an

obvious risk per se within the meaning of ss 5F and 5G of the CL Act, and whether

the plaintiff had allegedly engaged in a dangerous recreational activity that

resulted in the materialisation of an obvious risk within the meaning of ss 5K and

5L of the CL Act;

(10) Whether the plaintiff was intoxicated so as to engage an application of the

statutory defences the first defendant raised pursuant to ss 48 and 50 of the CL

Act;

(11) Whether the consumer protection provisions of the ACL apply to the

circumstances as claimed by the plaintiff;

(12) The assessment of the plaintiff’s entitlement to damages.

Evidence overview

34. The plaintiff prepared a 3 volume Court Book (Exhibit A, pp 1 – 1056). The first

defendant prepared a 1 volume Court Book (Exhibit 1, pp 1 – 464). This included video

footage of the incident. Reference will be made to the content of those materials where

relevant. The material in the Court Books includes a series of non-contemporaneous

investigatory statements prepared in relation to the prosecution of the second

defendant.

35. Whilst some of the witnesses who gave statements in the course of the RMS

investigation were called and cross-examined in these proceedings, others were not

called, and their statements were therefore not tested by cross-examination. In those

circumstances, the latter category of statements was assessed as being of lesser weight

on critical matters in dispute compared to the direct oral evidence which was tested.

36. Oral evidence was given by the plaintiff on the liability and damages issues (T31 – T83;

T108 – T109). Oral evidence was also given by Dirk Benade, the operations manager of

Weigh-More Solutions, the plaintiff’s workplace at the time of the accident, (T89 – T93);

Mrs Jeanette Bury, the plaintiff’s mother, who is also the sole director of Weigh-More

Solutions (T94 – T99); Mr Jayde Tooth, the organiser of the outing on the day of the

accident (T101 – T106); and Mr Daniel Payne, the sole director of the first defendant

company, Sussex Inlet Pontoons Pty Ltd (T110 – T121).

37. The second defendant filed an appearance and a defence in the proceedings, but he only

appeared by means of the brief presence of his counsel on the first day of the hearing,

and not thereafter. Neither he nor his legal representatives took any other active part in

the proceedings despite being aware that the case was proceeding.

Credibility and reliability of oral testimony

38. In the paragraphs that follow, I set out my impressions concerning the credibility and

reliability of the witnesses who gave oral evidence.

The plaintiff

39. The plaintiff’s evidence on the liability and damages issues in dispute will be referred to

in the necessary detail when considering those issues. At this point it is appropriate to

state that I was impressed with the stoic reasonableness of the plaintiff’s evidence and

the open manner in which he answered questions. He gave due consideration to his

responses. Without hesitation, he made fair concessions when these were due, including

concessions that were in some parts against his interests in the litigation. I considered

him to be a credible witness and I have accepted his evidence in its entirety.

Mr Benade

40. Mr Benade was the service manager of the plaintiff’s former employer Weigh-More

Solutions. He was the person who, seven years earlier, had engaged the plaintiff’s

services as a service technician. He spoke highly of the plaintiff’s technical skills. He

described having to make work adjustments on account of the plaintiff’s reduced post-

injury physical capacity before the plaintiff left the employment of Weigh-More

Solutions to start his own business shortly before the hearing. He confirmed the plaintiff

had good inter-personal skills in his dealings with customers and that he was intelligent

and articulate. There were no challenges to Mr Benade’s evidence. I found Mr Benade to

be a credible witness and I have accepted his evidence.

Mrs Bury

41. Mrs Bury is the plaintiff’s mother. Notwithstanding that relationship, I consider that she

gave her evidence with restraint and objectivity. She is now the sole director of Weigh-

More Solutions, the company that employed the plaintiff at the time of his accident. She

had observed his advancement in the job since the age of 17 years. The business is

specialised, and the plaintiff developed valuable skills in that business. Before the

plaintiff’s accident she had hoped he would take on a greater or senior management role,

or take over the business at some future date.

42. Mrs Bury described the plaintiff’s post-injury return to work as being on extremely light

duties compared to his pre-accident duties. She described his departure from this

employment with the company with some regret as it left a skills gap within the

company. She accepted that it was necessary for the plaintiff to leave his position with

the company as the work was taking a toll on him, including with regard to him

experiencing depression. The plaintiff’s history of pre-accident anxiety and depression

was not explored in her evidence. She understood that he left his employment because

he felt he was letting the company down. She said that, in the circumstances, she

understood his decision to leave in order to set up his own business. I found Mrs Bury to

be a credible witness. Her evidence was not the subject of material challenge and I have

accepted her evidence.

Mr Tooth

43. Mr Tooth was a friend of the first defendant, Mr Payne. In addition to giving oral

evidence, Mr Tooth also provided a statement to the Roads & Maritime Services

appointed investigator: Exhibit A, Vol 3, pp 915 – 923. That statement will shortly be

reviewed separately. Mr Tooth was the person who had made the hiring arrangements

for the charter of the vessel for the outing in question by paying the deposit. He had sent

a text message to the group of friends concerning the arrangements inviting the

participants to the outing: Exhibit C. He gave his evidence via an AVL connection. He

was the person who had collected the balance of the first defendant’s agreed $750 hiring

fee for the charter. He had not been privy to the subsequent arrangements made

between the first and the second defendant as to who would master the vessel on the day

in question.

44. At the time of the accident, Mr Tooth had been standing on the vessel. He had witnessed

the plaintiff dive from the starboard side of the vessel into the water whilst the vessel

was still moving. He said he could not recall hearing the plaintiff say anything to the

second defendant before diving into the water. This was understandable given that the

group was partying and playing loud music on board and having regard to the windy

conditions that prevailed. He said that after the plaintiff’s dive into the water the vessel

then travelled “full steam ahead” for a relatively short distance before turning around to

collect the plaintiff.

45. Mr Tooth said that shortly before the plaintiff emerged from the water, he heard a

“clunk” which indicated to him that the outboard motor on the vessel had been placed in

neutral at a point about 15 metres from where the plaintiff was located. His expertise for

making that last cited observation was not apparent. I found Mr Tooth to be a credible

witness and I have accepted his evidence except in relation to that last cited matter of

whether the outboard motor was in neutral at the time the plaintiff was injured.

Mr Payne

46. In addition to giving oral evidence, Mr Payne also provided a statement to the RMS

appointed investigator: Exhibit A, Vol 3, pp 911 – 913. That statement will shortly be

reviewed separately. Mr Payne described how the second defendant, Mr Allred, came to

be in charge of the vessel on the day in question. He said he was satisfied that Mr Allred

had appropriate navigation experience to take the vessel out on the charter. This was in

the context where he had known Mr Allred to have had work experience in the marine

industry over the course of a considerable number of years.

47. Mr Payne claimed that Mr Allred had taken the boat out on a “dry hire” and something

of a work trial on this particular occasion. I found that characterisation of the events to

be questionable and implausible on a consideration of the evidence as a whole. He said

he formed that view in “hindsight”. In that arrangement, he said Mr Allred had paid him

the fee that had been collected from the group for the outing in circumstances where Mr

Allred did not receive or retain any form of payment for taking the vessel out on this

occasion.

48. Mr Payne said Mr Allred had acquired the necessary first aid and coxswain certificates

(T117.33, T117.49). That evidence was in tension with his earlier evidence in which he

claimed Mr Allred was not qualified: T114.34. In that earlier evidence, it is possible that

perhaps he had meant to convey the meaning that in the past Mr Allred had not held the

requisite certificates but he in fact held them at the time the plaintiff was injured.

49. Mr Payne said that he expected (and here I interpolate, assumed without evidence) that

on the day in question, Mr Allred would have included in his safety briefing the request

that passengers not jump overboard whilst the vessel was moving (T116.25 – T116.37).

Mr Payne confirmed he was satisfied with Mr Allred’s capability to safely take the vessel

out on the water: T117.49. He said that if he had felt otherwise, he would not have

permitted him to take the vessel out that day.

50. Mr Payne said that in hindsight he regarded Mr Allred’s involvement as the master on

the day to be something of an unpaid work trial: T118.5 – T118.15. He also sought to re-

characterise his arrangement with Mr Allred in hindsight as a “dry hire”: T114.34. I

considered such characterisations to be unlikely to be correct. I had reservations about

the credibility and reliability of that attempt by Mr Payne to re-characterise those

arrangements after the event.

Absence of evidence from Mr Allred

51. Mr Allred filed a formal appearance and a defence as the second defendant in the

proceedings. He also filed a defence to the plaintiff’s amended statement of claim on 23

May 2022 at 4:08pm, this being the afternoon prior to the commencement of the

hearing. He had retained a solicitor and counsel to appear for him in the proceedings.

His counsel appeared for a short time during the course of opening addresses on the first

day, and he then left the courtroom. The second defendant’s solicitor did not attend the

hearing at any stage. No evidence was called or tendered to support the second

defendant’s defence.

52. The unexplained absence of the second defendant from the proceedings meant that there

was no challenge to the plaintiff’s evidence on factual matters that Mr Allred might have

been expected to comment upon if there was a basis for any challenges. I infer from Mr

Allred’s absence that it was unlikely that he could have contradicted the factual account

given by the plaintiff where that account was not otherwise inherently or glaringly

improbable: Jones v Dunkel [1959] HCA 8; (1959) 101 CLR 298.

53. Mr Allred was interviewed at length by the RMS appointed investigator. That record of

interview is in evidence in these proceedings as an annexure to the investigator’s

statement: Exhibit A, Vol 3, pp 974 – 1046.

Review of documentary evidence as to liability

54. In the paragraphs that follow I set out a review of the material documentary evidence

located within the Court Books.

Report of Mr Jack Ellison – marine expert

55. The plaintiff retained Mr Jack Ellison, a professional boat driver, as an expert witness.

His expert report is dated 19 November 2021: Exhibit A, Vol 1, pp 56-178. The annexures

to Mr Ellison’s report, which were compendious, included his letter of instruction, his

CV, the video film of the plaintiff’s accident, the NSW Transport Maritime Handbook,

the NSW Maritime Safety Regulation, and a publication entitled the “ABC Boat and

PWC Guide” published by an entity identified as the Australian Boating College: Exhibit

A, Vol 1, pp 179 – 483.

56. Mr Ellison’s qualifications, experience, and his expertise, were not the subject of

challenge and he was not required for cross-examination. Mr Ellison reviewed the

circumstances of the plaintiff’s injury when his left leg came into contact with the

propeller of the vessel. He expressed the opinion that Mr Allred had driven the vessel in

a manner that was not in conformity with standard and competent practice regarding

the retrieval of an overboard person from the water. Those views formed the basis of the

plaintiff’s claim of negligence and lack of due skill and care on the part of Mr Allred.

57. Mr Ellison’s reasons for those opinions were expressed in clear terms that were critical

of Mr Allred. These are summarised as follows:

(1) He failed to provide an appropriate pre-departure safety briefing;

(2) He failed to keep a proper lookout whilst retrieving the plaintiff and a related

failure to recognise the risk of the plaintiff having to swim in the hazard zone at the

stern of the vessel because of the manner of approach of the vessel to retrieve the

plaintiff;

(3) He incorrectly placed the vessel in juxtaposition to the plaintiff so that the

plaintiff was required, at great risk to himself, to cross behind the motorised

propeller in the hazard zone to reach the ladder in order to climb on-board. He

described this as an incorrect maritime rescue technique;

(4) He failed to approach the plaintiff on the starboard side to maintain a line of

sight to him where that approach would have allowed the plaintiff to re-board on

the starboard ladder without encountering the risk of coming into contact with the

propeller in the hazard zone;

(5) He failed to approach the plaintiff at a safe and reduced speed that would have

allowed him to come alongside the plaintiff and stop the vessel in an appropriate

juxtaposition to allow the plaintiff to safely re-board on the starboard side;

(6) He failed to place the engine of the outboard motor in neutral and turn off the

engine prior to the plaintiff swimming into the hazard zone around the propeller;

(7) He inappropriately selected reverse gear whilst the plaintiff was in the hazard

zone and in close proximity to the propeller with the result that the turning of the

propeller was not readily apparent to the plaintiff at that time.

58. Mr Ellison was asked to consider whether, if a person in the position of the plaintiff had

come into contact with a standard propeller when the motor was in neutral, an injury

would have resulted. Mr Ellison was of the opinion that as the propeller was relatively

blunt, and can spin freely (such as by the force of a current), a minor injury may have

resulted in such circumstances.

59. However, in this case, Mr Ellison considered that given the plaintiff received two deep

lacerations on his leg in close proximity, approximately 20mm apart, it was more likely

that the engine was running and engaged in gear, with the propeller spinning at speed.

He was of the opinion the plaintiff’s injuries were caused by a spinning propeller under

power. That view was consistent with the medical assessment of Dr Vote, the first

defendant’s orthopaedic expert, which I will refer at a later point in these reasons.

60. In that regard, Mr Ellison concluded that the plaintiff’s injury occurred when the engine

was in reverse gear as the second defendant was trying to stop the forward momentum

of the vessel. He came to that view because the video evidence shows that at the time the

plaintiff was swimming towards the vessel and into the hazard zone behind the motor,

the vessel was still moving forward.

61. Mr Ellison also considered that the speed of the vessel was unsafe at that time. He said

there was no visual evidence of turbulence in the water. Significantly, this indicated to

him that the engine was operating in reverse gear, and that all turbulence from the

spinning propeller was not visible because it was directed forward and under the hull of

the vessel. He was plainly using his experience and expertise in interpreting the

contemporaneous video evidence. His opinion was not challenged.

62. On that basis, I find it more probable than not, that at the time, in the circumstances

that prevailed, the plaintiff would have been misled into believing that the propeller was

disengaged, and was not operating under motive power when he entered the hazard

zone.

63. In his report, Mr Ellison identified the general proposition that a safe speed would have

been one at which the vessel could be stopped in time to avoid any danger that arises. To

enable the vessel to stop in that manner, the master must keep a proper lookout, and in

this case, the second defendant would not have been in a position to do so because of his

decision to turn the vessel to port and not to starboard.

64. Mr Ellison identified the correct technique for manoeuvring the vessel for retrieving the

plaintiff. This involved maintaining a line of sight to the plaintiff in the water, keeping

him on the starboard side, keeping the vessel facing into the wind and the current at all

times, and on approach to the plaintiff, placing the engine into reverse to stop the

forward momentum, and then bringing the vessel to a complete stop with the propeller

turned off to allow safe re-boarding without the need for the plaintiff to enter the hazard

zone in order to access the ladder. He concluded that in the circumstances of this case,

contrary to those requirements, the plaintiff was avoidably placed in a dangerous

situation in having to swim past the operating propeller whilst the engine was running.

65. In my view, the video sequence of the event, as seen in Exhibit “B”, provided ample

evidence to support and justify the opinions summarised above. There was no evidence

or convincing argument that contradicted Mr Ellison’s conclusions.

Report of Dr Michael Robertson – pharmacologist

66. For his defence, Mr Payne relied upon an expert forensic toxicology and pharmacology

opinion of Dr Michael Robertson. The opinion was dated 7 March 2022: Exhibit D1, Tab

11, pp 416 – 443. Dr Robertson annexed his CV (pp 428 – 435) and the several letters of

instruction that had been provided to him for the purpose of preparing his report (pp

436 – 443). There was no issue as to his qualifications, experience, or professional

expertise.

67. In essence, Dr Robertson was of the opinion that at the time of the accident, the plaintiff

had a blood alcohol concentration of at least 0.05 if not 0.11 depending on the strength

of the beer he had consumed. He concluded from those estimates that it was more likely

than not the plaintiff was impaired by the effects of his prior alcohol consumption in

combination with his use of cocaine. He expressed the general opinion that it was likely

the plaintiff was experiencing mild euphoria, sociability, increased self-confidence, with

decreased inhibition. He concluded this was likely to be associated with a reduction in

the exercise of care and caution on his part.

68. Dr Robertson also concluded that depending upon the level of blood alcohol

concentration, it was possible the plaintiff had mild muscular incoordination that may

have reduced his coordination and skill, which he said may have contributed to the

circumstances of the plaintiff coming into contact with the propeller. I considered the

latter view involved undue and unsupported speculation.

69. Whilst Dr Robertson’s opinions were relevant, and within his area of expertise, those

opinions require evaluation as to their acceptability in his case: Makita (Australia) Pty

Ltd v Sprowles (2001) 52 NSWLR 705; [2001] NSWCA 305; Dasreef Pty Ltd v Hawchar

(2011) 243 CLR 588; [2011] HCA 21.

First defendant’s business documents

70. A number of documents in the first defendant’s Court Book related to his pontoon hire

business.

Luxury boat hire agreement

71. On 25 January 2020, the first defendant and the second defendant Mr Allred appear to

have entered into a pro-forma pontoon hire agreement providing for a 7 hour hire

between 12 noon and 7pm at the stated cost of $750. That characterisation did not sit

well with the evidence of Mr Tooth’s agreement with Mr Payne. There is no evidence to

suggest that the plaintiff knew of the fact of that hiring agreement with Mr Allred at the

time he boarded the vessel.

72. By that agreement, Mr Allred agreed to be responsible for the safe operation of the vessel

during the hire period, including the requirement that all guests remain within the

railings whilst the vessel is underway. The document stated “Safety Briefing carried out

by Danny/Wayne” which suggested Mr Allred was a relevant actor in the business. The

agreement concluded with the following terms agreed to by Mr Allred: “I hereby

indemnify Sussex Inlet Pontoons and its employees of (sic) any loss or damage of

personal property OR injury or loss of life during the hire period”: Exhibit D1, Tab 1, p

1.

73. In any event, although Mr Allred was not being paid to master the first defendant’s hired

vessel on the day in question, the indemnity issue does not impact adversely on the

liability components of the plaintiff’s claim against the first defendant where the plaintiff

claims that Mr Allred was the employee and the agent of Mr Payne. The indemnity issue

is therefore not relevant to any issue to be determined in the plaintiff’s case against the

defendants.

74. In considering the issue of whether Mr Allred was employed in Mr Payne’s business on

this particular occasion, I have not overlooked the fact, or the content of the hiring

agreement dated 25 January 2020: Exhibit D1, Tab 1, p 1. Two matters of relevance

emerge from that agreement.

75. First, there was no contractual consideration for that agreement flowing between Mr

Payne and Mr Allred, where Mr Allred was not being paid for his services. It is doubtful

that the agreement is a binding contract. Secondly, if I be found to be wrong in respect of

that conclusion, the asserted matter of an indemnity must be read subject to the

overriding provisions of the Law Reform (Vicarious Liability) Act 1983 (NSW).

Rules for the Party Pontoon

76. The vessel carried a sign onboard which set out 8 rules for its use, the eighth of which

stated: “8. ALL GUESTS TO REMAIN INSIDE THE BOAT AT ALL TIMES WHILST

BOAT IS IN MOTION”: Exhibit D1, Tab 2, p 2. There is no evidence that the plaintiff saw

or acknowledged the existence of that rule before he dived from the vessel.

Safety Management Plan for Sussex Inlet Pontoons

77. Mr Allred was familiar with the terms of the Sussex Inlet Pontoons Safety Management

Plan: Exhibit D1, Tab 10, pp 407 – 415. That document stated the obvious, namely that

the master would carry ultimate responsibility for the passengers and the navigation and

operation of the vessel (p 407); risks including in dealing with persons overboard,

should be approached with common sense (p 408); the persons overboard procedures

should be implemented, including fixing the location of the person in the water,

informing passengers of the need to look out, to throw out a life jacket, and to commence

safe rescue manoeuvres and retrieval.

Witness statements

78. The first defendant relied upon a series of investigatory statements that had been

prepared for the prosecution of Mr Allred by Roads & Maritime Services.

Witness statement of Bruce Mitchell

79. Mr Bruce Mitchell, the Transport, Roads & Maritime Services Marine Rescue NSW

Regional Operations Manager for the Illawarra region prepared a witness statement with

annexures on 29 July 2020. That statement was made in preparation for the hearing of

the negligent navigation charge against Mr Allred: Exhibit D1, Tab 3, pp 4 – 183.

80. Mr Mitchell identified the applicable principle of safety in instances where a person has

gone overboard. The requirement was that the person in charge of the vessel must be

vigilant in relation to the position of the person in the water at all times, and not place

the person in the water near the propeller of a vessel and must keep the person in the

water on the starboard side of the vessel and maintain constant vision when

manoeuvring the vessel around that person.

81. Mr Mitchell confirmed from records that on 12 October 2015, Mr Allred obtained a

Marine Rescue Crew certificate, and on 27 May 2016 he was officially observed to have

competently completed a “man over-board” retrieval.

82. Mr Mitchell annexed a copy of an application form to his statement, apparently

completed by Mr Allred, in which Mr Allred described himself as an engineer: Exhibit

D1, Tab 3, p 163.

83. Mr Mitchell cited records to show that on 12 December 2014, Mr Allred was assessed as

being appropriately skilled in dealing with persons overboard procedure, and he was

certified as having fulfilled the requirements for his Marine Rescue NSW rating: Exhibit

D1, Tab 3, pp 171 – 172.

Witness statement of William Mountford

84. Mr William Mountford, the Director of Jervis Bay Sea School since 2014, prepared a

witness statement with annexures on 27 July 2020. That statement was made in

preparation for the hearing of the negligent navigation charge against Mr Allred: Exhibit

D1, Tab 4, pp 185 – 382.

85. Mr Mountford stated that in November 2019 he took part in a certification process in

relation to the training Mr Allred received in Marine Safety procedures. That aspect of

training covered extraction from the water procedures. This included not placing the

engine in astern when rescuing a person in the water; and the need to maintain vision of

the person in the water; not to allow the person in the vicinity of the engine; and the

possible need to retake the turning of the vessel for a safe rescue manoeuvre. Mr Allred

was assessed as having completed the required tasks to the appropriate standard, albeit

having demonstrated some resistance to learning aspects of the required procedures.

86. Mr Mountford cited records which showed that on 27 November 2019, Mr Allred was

issued with a Sea School International certificate of satisfactory completion involving an

“Exemption 38 Marine Safety (Low Complexity Duties) Exemption 2019” boating

licence: Exhibit D1, Tab 4, p 200.

Witness statement of Julia Cross

87. Ms Julia Cross, a co-trainer at Sea School Jervis Bay prepared a witness statement. That

statement was made in preparation for the hearing of the negligent navigation charge

against Mr Allred: Exhibit D1, Tab 5, pp 394 – 396. She described her participation, in

conjunction with Mr Mountford, in training Mr Allred in person overboard procedures

on 15 November 2019. She identified the applicable procedure as being first, the

propellers must be turned away from the person overboard, downwind at least 2 – 3

boat lengths away, before adjusting speed and then placing the engine in neutral before

reaching the person overboard, without losing sight of the person, and redoing the

turning procedure if necessary, in the interests of safety before approaching and

providing a flotation life ring to assist the person overboard.

Witness statement of Daniel Payne

88. On 25 March 2020, the first defendant, Daniel Payne, signed a witness statement that

had been prepared for the hearing of the negligent navigation charge against Mr Allred:

Exhibit A, Vol 3, pp 911 – 913.

89. In his statement, Mr Payne confirmed that his friend, Mr Tooth, had made the booking

and made the deposit for the hire. He also confirmed that he arranged for Mr Allred to

master the vessel due to his own unavailability. He did not recall seeing Mr Allred on the

day he collected the vessel, although he said he used to see him on a daily basis. His

statement said, “Wayne is not an employee of Sussex Inlet Pontoons but he helps us out

driving for the business when required” without payment. That statement raises a

dispute which will be determined in the consideration of Issues 1 and 2.

Witness statement of Jayde Tooth

90. On 8 April 2020, Jayde Tooth, a horticulturist, signed a witness statement with

annexures that had been prepared for the hearing of the negligent navigation charge

against Mr Allred: Exhibit A, Vol 3, pp 915 – 923.

91. Mr Tooth confirmed he had paid Mr Payne a deposit of $200 to secure the booking

which was limited to 10 passengers. He described how Mr Allred greeted him on the day

at the agreed meeting point instead of Mr Payne. He stated that Mr Allred did not give

anyone in the group a safety briefing before departure, and he did not receive any

documents outlining any rules for the charter, nor did he see any safety-related signage.

92. Mr Tooth saw the wind blow the hat into the water and he then saw the plaintiff dive

into the water to retrieve the hat. He said he did not hear or see the plaintiff have a

conversation with Mr Allred before the dive and claimed if there was such a conversation

it could have been heard. That latter aspect of his evidence seemed to be of doubtful

correctness given that the atmosphere on the vessel was noisy and given the effects of

the prevailing wind, which he described as increasing at 15 – 20 km per hour from the

East South East direction.

93. Mr Tooth described having given first aid to the plaintiff together with Mr Dale Berry,

who had been filming the plaintiff in the water until the injury became evident. The

annexures to his statement comprised diagrams and a photograph of the vessel in

question.

Witness statement of Karl McCarthy

94. On 8 April 2020, Mr Karl McCarthy, who worked in the field of floor technology, signed

a witness statement with annexures that had been prepared for the hearing of the

negligent navigation charge against Mr Allred: Exhibit A, Vol 3, pp 924 – 934.

95. Mr McCarthy was one of the members of the charter party on the day in question. He

described the prevailing wind on the water on that day as “howling” from East South

East. He also described the music level as being “as loud as it could be” and he was well

please to say this as he was in control of it. He saw the plaintiff “jump” overboard to

retrieve the hat. He said he had not seen or heard any conversation taking place between

the plaintiff and Mr Allred before the plaintiff entered the water. However, he saw Mr

Allred change the direction of travel of the vessel following which both he and Mr Allred

lost sight of the plaintiff in the water.

96. Mr McCarthy had observed the plaintiff to have two “pretty bad” deep cuts, just under

his left knee. His statement annexed some diagrams and a photograph of the vessel. He

made the observation that to him, the plaintiff’s cuts “don’t look like he banged his leg

up against something”. He said the leg looked like it had been sliced open by something

sharp.

Witness statement of Mitch Keogh

97. On 18 April 2020, Mr Mitch Keogh, a plumber, signed a witness statement with

annexures prepared for the hearing of the negligent navigation charge against Mr Allred:

Exhibit A, Vol 3, pp 935 – 943.

98. Mr Keogh described how the hat had been blown into the water whilst he was talking

with the plaintiff. He described seeing the plaintiff dive into the water after the hat. He

said he did not hear the plaintiff say anything to anyone beforehand. He said the music

was on and expressed the opinion that it was not so loud due to the effect of the wind.

His statement annexed some diagrams and a photograph of the pontoon.

Witness statement of Dale Berry

99. On 28 April 2020, Mr Dale Berry, a company director, signed a statement, with

annexures, prepared for the hearing of the negligent navigation charge against Mr

Allred: Exhibit A, Vol 3, pp 944 – 954. The annexures comprised some diagrams and a

photograph of the pontoon.

100. Mr Berry described the wind as “blowing pretty hard” onto the front of the vessel when

the hat went into the water. When he saw the plaintiff react to this by diving into the

water from the “left (port) side (sic)”, he started to video the plaintiff in the water.

101. Mr Berry stated that after Mr Allred had circled the vessel back to retrieve the plaintiff,

he did not provide any clear directions to anyone on how to help retrieve the plaintiff. In

those events, he said that after the vessel had stopped, he saw the plaintiff swim towards

the boarding ladder, but in order to do so, he had to swim behind the outboard motor

and, in order to reach the ladder on the starboard side, had to dangle his legs behind the

motor which was on and running.

102. Mr Berry stopped filming during the plaintiff’s ascent up the ladder when he realised the

plaintiff had been injured. He then used his first aid training to assist the plaintiff.

Witness statement of Ben Laws

103. On 27 July 2020, Mr Ben Laws, a roofer, signed a witness statement, with annexed

diagrams and a photograph prepared for the hearing of the negligent navigation charge

against Mr Allred: Exhibit A, Vol 3, pp 1047 – 1056.

104. Mr Laws described the strong windy conditions that prevailed during the outing on the

day in question as “blowing pretty hard”. He described the plaintiff’s reaction to the hat

blowing overboard in the wind. He said the plaintiff walked past him and before going

overboard he said “can you get the guy to stop”. That request proved to be superfluous,

as by then Mr Allred was already turning the vessel to port. He said that at no stage did

Mr Allred say anything during the circumstances that had unfolded.

105. Mr Laws described how Mr Allred circled the vessel back and manoeuvred it to a stop

about 20 metres from where the plaintiff was located in the water. He said he then saw

the plaintiff swim to the vessel on the portside, by which time the vessel was then slowly

moving forward. He described the plaintiff as having to swim behind the motor in order

to reach out to take hold of the boarding ladder.

Witness statement of Brad Dudley

106. On 4 May 2020, Mr Brad Dudley, a boating safety officer employed by Transport, Roads

& Maritime Services, prepared a witness statement in which he described the sequential

details of his official investigation of the circumstances surrounding the plaintiff’s injury.

His statement annexed a series of photographs of the vessel, its layout and images of the

propeller, and also annexed a transcript of his record of interview of Mr Allred which he

carried out on 21 April 2020. That record of interview contained Mr Allred’s answers to a

series of 727 questions: Exhibit A, Vol 3, pp 955 – 1046.

107. Mr Dudley’s investigation of the incident commenced on the receipt by RMS, of Mr

Berry’s video images of the plaintiff’s accident. His interpretation of the events shown in

those images was as follows:

“On the 3 February 2020, I receive a phone video clip... containing footage of a

male person swimming in water. I observed the male swimmer swim behind a

black Suzuki 150 horse power outboard motor. I observed a male, who I now know

as the victim, Adam LICCARDY, in the water swimming towards a vessel. I

observed the victim swimming on the port side of the vessel and to the aft of the

vessel. The victim has crossed behind the motor which was in the water. I observed

the victim throw an item up onto the rear deck of the vessel and then look back

towards the motor. I saw the victim climb the rear ladder and observed he had

received injuries to his left leg. I replayed the video again at the part where the

victim looked back towards the motor and observed the motor shutter at the same

point when the victim looks back. The shutter of the motor and the victim looking

back to the motor indicated to me this was the point where the victim’s leg has

possibly come into contact with the vessels motor resulting in the injury to victim’s

left leg. This video clip was taken by a male passenger on board the vessel at the

time of the incident who I now know as, Dale BERRY. I knew the vessel involved in

this incident is owned and operated by a local business called Sussex Inlet

Pontoons...”

[Exhibit A, Vol 3, pp 956 – 957]

108. Mr Dudley subsequently attended the moorings where the vessel was berthed. He

inspected the operation of the vessel, the outboard motor and the propeller, both in and

out of the water, and found no issue of concern. He then made arrangements to

interview the witnesses whose statements have been summarised in the preceding

paragraphs. He also conducted an interview with Mr Allred, the details of which are

summarised in the paragraphs that now follow.

109. Mr Dudley’s record of the interview with Mr Allred contained the following explanations

of the arrangements Mr Payne made with him:

“Q 112. Yeah. All right. So on the day of the 25th that’s what we’re investigating

today, so in your words, Wayne, what – what from the very start of the day, even

before that, how you got to be working on PartyN2 and going right up until the

incident happened but in your words what – what went on on 25 January 2020?

A. Danny rang me up and asked me what I was doing. He said, Can you do me a

favour

Q 113. Yeah.

A. I said, Yeah. It’s not a problem. What do you want? And he said boys wanted to

hire the boat but they wanted to get on the piss.

Q 114. Yeah.

A. And he said, I’m busy. He says, Is there any chance you can do it for them? I

said, Yeah, I suppose so, I’m not doing anything much today. I said, I don’t mind

helping you out. And I said, It saves them getting booked for – for being on the

turps.

Q 115. Yeah.

A. I said, Yeah.

Q 116. Busy day.

A. I said, Yeah, I said, I’ll help the boys out. I said, I don’t want anything for it. I

said, I’ll just do it, you know, it gives me a day out - - -

Q 117. Yeah.

A. - - - a day out on the water.”

[Exhibit A, Vol 3, p 985]

110. In that record of interview, Mr Allred described the conditions on the day in question as

being windy with the presence of white cap water due to the prevailing rough conditions:

Q&A 131 to Q&A 132.

111. In his interview, Mr Allred described the events of the plaintiff’s accident in the

following terms:

“Q 138. Yeah.

A. And then basically heading across one of them, you know, they had a radio

blaring up loud and what have you but next thing you know there was a hell of a

commotion and I sort of turned around to see what was going on and they were

yelling out, A hat, a hat. Next thing you know obviously one of the boys straight out

over the side.

Q 139. What side was that?

A. It was on the right-hand side.

Q 140. Mm-hmm.

A. And I said, What the hell is going on? He’s getting his hat. All right. So I just

treated that as a man overboard.

Q 141. Mm-hmm.

A. Just carried on up a bit further, looped around and the way that the sea was

running and the wind was running, I thought, well, I’ll come in on that side and the

two – just let the wind and the thing just bring us together instead of actually

trying to get close to him.

Q 142. Yeah.

A. Yeah, and then next thing you know there was a commotion again and oomph.

He was hurt.

Q 143. Yeah.

A. I’d actually pulled up and taken everything out of gear, as I said, just let the

wind and the – and the sea work together - - -

Q 144. Yeah.

A. - - - to try and bring us both together. You know, if they had said to me, Look,

hang on, we’ve lost a hat, Don’t worry about it. I’ll do a loop around, get a bale

hook and fish it out which I’ve done I don’t know how many times before.

Q 145. Yeah.

A. There’s no need to even jump over the side.

Q 146. Yeah.

A. But they did without even asking.

Q 147. Yeah.

A. They told me about it as soon as I turned round. By that stage it was too late. He

had already gone.

Q 148. Yeah.

A. I didn’t have a chance to say, Yes, you can. No, you can’t.

Q 149. Yeah.

A. Looking at it, he was a fairly strong swimmer, I could see that part of it so it

wasn’t too perturbed. (MOBILE PHONE RINGS) I’ll get back to you, Danny. Yeah.

Yeah, so, but looking at it now I thought I was doing the right thing at the time.

Q 150. Mm-hmm.

A. Maybe I probably would have been better off coming back round the other way

possibly.

Q 151. What way did you turn when you said you went down a bit further?

A. I actually went to my right and then come back round to my left and come round

in behind (indistinct)

Q 152. So he fell over the - - -

A. He went out on the right.

Q 153. On the starboard?

A. On the starboard side, well, starboard side. Carried on probably about another

40, 50 metres, went to the starboard and then come back round to the port and

come round in behind.

Q 154. Yeah. I’ll just go – and so he’s in the water and then you heard another

commotion and that’s when you’ve - - -

A. Found out he was hurt.

Q 155. Yeah, and you saw - - -

A. I didn’t actually see the actual accident happen.

Q 156. Yeah.

A. It wasn’t until I actually went to the back because he was still sitting there. One

other guy was trying to help him get up onto the ladder and spotted him, his leg.”

[Exhibit A, Vol 3, pp 988 – 990]

112. In the interview, Mr Allred made the point that he had been engaged to drive the vessel

on the day as a favour to Mr Payne without financial benefit to himself: Q&A 116; Q&A

180 to Q&A 185.

113. In that interview, Mr Allred also said that, in the lead up to the plaintiff’s injury, he saw

the plaintiff in mid-air after he had jumped off the vessel from the starboard side

without prior conversation: Q&A 208 to Q&A 215. He said that after he had turned and

brought the vessel near the location of the plaintiff for retrieval, he had disengaged the

gears but the vessel nevertheless moved “a little bit” because of the wind and the tide

(Q&A 283 to Q&A 280). He admitted the plaintiff was on the port side and claimed he

had sight of the plaintiff, who he considered was not in need of assistance in re-boarding

until he lost sight of him: Q&A 285 to Q&A 296. Mr Allred claimed the gears were in the

neutral position with the motor running: Q&A 298 to Q&A 304.

114. When Mr Allred was questioned on the matter of whether he was Mr Payne’s employee,

he gave the following rambling, and at times unclear, answers to questions:

“Q 471. Okay. Would you state you’re an employee of the business?

A. No, not – I wouldn’t say. Initially we got it to be an employee eventually but with

things that have happened - - -

Q 472. What do you mean by that statement?

A. Well, we haven’t been able to get under way the way that he wanted to set it up

because you’ve had the fires, no tourists; had the floods, no tourists. You’ve got

coronavirus, no tourists.

Q 473. What do you mean by that? You said sort of an employee. What was the

arrangement between the owner of Sussex Inlet Pontoons, Daniel Pain [sic], and

yourself that made you think you were an employee?

A. If things got off the ground the way that he wanted it to and he needed a hand

would I work for him. I said yeah.

Q 474. So you were offered employment?

A. If – if the opportunity arose.

Q 475. So were you promised employment - - -

A. No.

Q 476. - - - or were you considered an employee?

A. No.

Q 477. But you just stated to me then that if things got off the ground and stuff like

that you would be employed?

A. He – he would use me if he needed to.

Q 478. In a paid role?

A. Possibly.

Q 479. Have you ever received payment from Daniel?

A. No. No.

Q 480. So everything you’ve done has been voluntarily?

A. Yeah.

Q 481. Okay. Have you ever discussed with Daniel a future prospect of

employment?

A. We have talked about it.”

[Exhibit A, Vol 3, pp 1020 – 1021]

115. When Mr Allred was questioned about his own actions after the plaintiff had gone

overboard, he gave some vague and at times off-hand answers, as follows:

“Q 554. Which way did you turn?

A. To my right.

Q 555. So you looked out the starboard side?

A. Mm.

Q 556. And what did you see?

A. Did I turn right or left? No, it would have been, sorry, I turned that way. If I’m

going looking forward I’ve turned around that way, turned a complete 180.

Q 557. So you’ve turned and looked out the port side?

A. Yeah. I can’t remember whether I went left or right but I turned a complete 180.

Q 558. So you were aware that Adam was in the water on the port side, the left side

of your vessel?

A. Yeah. Left or right side, I can’t bloody remember now, to be honest. I’m just

trying to think. I can’t remember whether it was left or right. All I know is he went

over the side.

Q 559. Well, there’s a lot of side of the vessel. I don’t mean to sort of criticise your

answers but we need to be specific as to what your observations on that day were.

A. Mm.

Q 560. You’ve looked out – I’m going to use right and left – you’re on the right side

of the vessel at the controls of the vessel and Adam, according to your version and

the version from the witnesses, has gone off on the left side of the vessel. When did

you become aware that Adam was on the left side of your vessel and had jumped in

– and was in the water?

A. When I heard the commotion and turned around to look – to see what the

commotion was.

Q 561. And you turned to your left and saw him in the water?

A. I can’t remember whether I went left or right but I did a complete 180.

Q 562. At any time was Adam on the same side as the helm?

A. Well, yeah, he would have been when he was getting on the boat.”

[Exhibit A, Vol 3, p 1027 – 1028]

Miscellaneous documents relating to the second defendant

116. The first defendant also relied upon some miscellaneous documents that related to Mr

Allred, as identified below.

Practical assessment record dated 15 November 2019

117. On 15 November 2019 Mr Allred underwent an Australian Maritime Safety Authority

practical assessment by Mr William Mountford in Jervis Bay and completed assigned

assessments for vessel management, passenger safety, and person overboard retrieval:

Exhibit 1, Tab 6, pp 397 – 399.

Mr Allred’s eyesight test and medical fitness

118. On 6 November 2019, Mr Allred passed a Maritime Safety Authority Eyesight test that

indicated he satisfied the certification criteria to operate a vessel without visual aids:

Exhibit 1, Tab 7, p 400. On that same date he was medically certified as having met the

licensing requirements of the Australian Maritime Safety Authority: Exhibit D1, Tab 8,

pp 403 – 404.

119. I now turn to the issues for determination as identified at paragraph [33] above.

Issue 1 – Findings on disputed matters of fact

120. The charter arose in the context that at the time, Mr Payne’s pontoon hiring business

was in its early stages of operation. Mr Payne had known Mr Allred for about 15 years in

a marine context. A relationship of employment had been contemplated between them

from the outset of the commencement of the business. The employment of Mr Allred

was to be dependent upon the availability of work, which was a judgment call to be made

by Mr Payne.

121. In those events, Mr Payne had scrutinised Mr Allred’s certification status and his efforts

in achieving full certification whilst he was receiving Centrelink benefits. He was

confident that Mr Allred was a capable mariner: T117.42. He had observed Mr Allred

taking out one of his vessels as master on some earlier occasions. He would not have

allowed someone to take his vessel out on this particular hiring in his stead if he thought

that person was not competent and capable: T117.49. Plainly, from an early stage, Mr

Payne was intending to employ Mr Allred in the future as he had two pontoons to

operate in his charter business: T118.3.

122. Mr Payne claimed, contentiously, that Mr Allred was not employed by him on the day in

question. He said that prior to the accident on 25 January 2020 he gave Mr Allred “a bit

of cash” for his efforts. I infer from that evidence, that this involved payment from time

to time for Mr Allred’s efforts in the course of business activity for Mr Payne’s business.

123. I do not accept Mr Payne’s evidence which was given in answer to leading questions to

the effect that on the day in question he sent Mr Allred out on a “work trial” as a “dry

hire”: T117.24 – T117.29. Mr Allred was sent out on the charter unsupervised because he

was, from Mr Payne’s observations, capable for the task and it provided a financial

benefit to Mr Payne’s business. The arrangements had all the characteristics of

employment except for the matter of payment on the day in question. This appears to

have been withheld as a result of the accident. There was a history between Mr Payne

and Mr Allred, of cash payment on other occasions.

124. I find that on this particular day Mr Allred was the master of Mr Payne’s vessel as an

employee of the business. As such, Mr Allred was Mr Payne’s employee and not an

independent contractor. This raised the spectre of agency.

125. That conclusion is supported by the fact that the charter involved the used an expensive

piece of equipment that belonged to the first defendant, the first defendant charged and

received a hiring fee for the provision of both the vessel and its master, notwithstanding

that Mr Allred, received no financial benefit from the charter. He did not use any of his

own equipment in the arrangements. To my mind, those matters indicate a relationship

of employment. In coming to that view, I have not overlooked Mr Allred’s contested

assertion that he was doing Mr Payne a favour without payment: Exhibit A, Vol 3, pp.

1020 – 1021; Q&A 477. I gave little weight to that assertion in the absence of his oral

evidence.

126. Turning to the facts of the accident, I accept that, before the plaintiff dived into the

water, he had informed the second defendant of his intention to do so. That said, in the

rapidly evolving circumstances, I consider that it was unlikely that at that time Mr Allred

could have persuaded the plaintiff not to proceed to dive into the water from the moving

vessel.

127. The finding that the plaintiff advised Mr Allred of his intention to dive from the moving

vessel is supported by Mr Allred’s described response, as related in the evidence of Mr

Tooth, whereby Mr Allred promptly turned the vessel in a loop to port in order to circle

back and proceed to the plaintiff’s location in the water to allow him to re-board.

128. The evidence discloses that other than manoeuvring the vessel close to the plaintiff’s

location, Mr Allred took no further steps to advise, assist, or to guide the plaintiff in re-

boarding the vessel, with buoyancy aids or otherwise. This seems surprising and is

perhaps possibly explained by Mr Allred’s own earlier consumption of alcohol during the

charter.

129. I find that neither before nor after the trip started, did Mr Allred provide the group with

any form of a safety briefing. There is no reliable evidence to suggest that at the outset of

the trip he had drawn their attention to the document entitled Rules for The Party

Pontoon, particularly Rule 8, which required that all guests remain inside the boat at all

times whilst the boat is in motion: Exhibit D1, Tab 2, p 2.

130. Mr Payne made the point that he has not employed Mr Allred since the accident because

of the criminal proceedings against him that resulted from the plaintiff’s injury. Those

matters are not relevant to a consideration of the issues in this case and therefore that

evidence does not require any further examination or determination.

Issue 2 – Agency and vicarious liability

131. Mr Payne operated his pontoon charter business at Sussex Inlet. In December 2019, he

was contacted by Mr Tooth about this particular charter. A charter fee of $750 was

negotiated and agreed upon. Due to unexpected family commitments on the day, Mr

Payne was unable to personally take the vessel out for the charter and he therefore

arranged for Mr Allred to be the master in his stead. In my view, that arrangement

suggested a relationship of agency between Mr Allred and Mr Payne concerning the use

of the vessel. Mr Allred, as Mr Payne’s employee, was the person approved by Mr Payne

to be the master for the purposes of the business use of the vessel.

132. The evidence of Mr Payne, as cited above, satisfies me that there was a relevant

relationship of employment and agency between Mr Payne and Mr Allred. On the first

defendant’s case, the asserted fact of the second defendant being on a “work trial” which

resulted in a profit for the first defendant’s business, where the second defendant was

required to exercise his professional skills for the benefit of the first defendant, should in

this case result in a finding that a relevant relationship of agency existed as was

discussed in Huynh v Minh Truong and Thi Thu Hoang Pham t/as Le Bon Bakehouse

[2018] WADC 39.

133. I am satisfied that the cited detail which underpinned that relationship establishes the

basis for the plaintiff’s claim of vicarious liability because Mr Payne gave Mr Allred

permission to use the vessel for the purpose of his business when Mr Allred took the

charter on Mr Payne’s behalf in the course of the latter’s business.

134. In those events, Mr Payne was satisfied that Mr Allred had the necessary qualifications

and experience to operate the vessel on the charter. He asked Mr Allred to fulfill an

obligation that he could not have personally fulfilled: T117. In my opinion it is of no

consequence to any issue in this case that Mr Payne did not pay Mr Allred for his efforts

on this occasion. In my opinion the evidence justifies the conclusion that there was a

sufficient business connection to establish a relationship of agency and vicarious liability

for any acts, neglects, and defaults on Mr Allred’s part in connection with his use of the

vessel in question.

135. I do not accept Mr Payne’s hindsight and self-serving characterisation suggesting that

the arrangement was an unpaid “work trial” by which he sought to downplay the nature

of Mr Allred’s engagement on the day in question.

136. Relevantly, s 7 of the Law Reform (Vicarious Liability) Act 1983 (NSW) provides:

“7 Vicarious liability of masters

Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, a master is vicariously liable in respect of

a tort committed by the master’s servant in the performance or purported

performance by the servant of an independent function where the performance or

purported performance of the function:

(a) is in the course of the servant's service for his or her master or is an

incident of the servant's service (whether or not it was a term of his or

her contract of service that the servant perform the function), or

(b) is directed to or is incidental to the carrying on of any business,

enterprise, undertaking or activity of the servant's master.”

137. Consequently, I find that the vicarious liability provisions within s 7 of that Act are

engaged in the described circumstances. It follows that Mr Payne must be held liable for

Mr Allred’s acts, neglects, and defaults as his employee/agent, where such actions have

led to the plaintiff’s injury.

Issue 3 – The relevant risk of harm

138. In this case, the parties accept that, the appropriate level of generality without obscuring

the true scope of potential injury, the relevant risk of harm may be conveniently

identified as being that if a person in the water came into contact with the moving

propeller of a motorised vessel, injury from the propeller might occur: Tapp v

Australian Bushmen's Campdraft & Rodeo Association Limited [2022] HCA 11, at

[106].

Issue 4 – Scope and content of duty of care owed

139. It is indisputable that each of the defendants owed the plaintiff a duty to take reasonable

care to avoid foreseeable risk of injury: Modbury Triangle Shopping Centre Pty Ltd v

Anzil (2002) 205 CLR 254; [2002] HCA 61 at [13].

140. In the case of the first defendant, that duty arose because of the existence of a sufficient

commercial relationship in which the first defendant was being paid to provide a service

to a contemplated group of persons who would share the cost. The scope of the first

defendant’s duty of care extended to providing a competent and qualified master for the

vessel for the outing, knowing that if the master was not competent, multiple persons

could be placed at unnecessary and avoidable risk of injury.

141. In the case of the second defendant, as the designated master in charge of the vessel, and

therefore, responsible for the safety of its passengers, his duty to take reasonable care

extended to the need to make reasonable ad hoc judgments and take reasonable steps to

avoid needlessly placing his passengers at risk of injury from the consequences of his

own imprudent navigational and operational actions or decisions whilst he was in charge

of the vessel with its passengers in his care.

Issue 5 – Voluntary assumption of risk

142. The first defendant relies upon a defence that the plaintiff had voluntarily assumed the

risk of incurring injury loss and damage when he dived into the water from the moving

vessel: volenti non fit injuria.

143. The question of whether the plaintiff was volens to the risk because of his alleged

knowledge of the risk, a subjective matter, is a question of fact that the first defendant

must prove: Rootes v Skelton [1967] HCA 39; (1967) 116 CLR 383, at 396; s 5E of the CL

Act.

144. The plaintiff was a strong swimmer. There is no reliable evidence to suggest his

swimming ability was relevantly impaired. He knew the waters in which he had dived.

The risk of injury from the propeller was not apparent to him at the time he dived into

the water. He could not have known that the master of the vessel would behave

negligently.

145. The first defendant’s submissions inviting acceptance of the volenti non fit injuria

defence invite error by engaging in the dangerous lure of a hindsight analysis: Tapp v

Australian Bushmen's Campdraft & Rodeo Association Limited, supra, at [51].

146. All aspects of the circumstances must be considered when determining whether a

defence of volenti non fit injuria applies: Miller v Miller [2011] HCA 9, at [6].

147. Those considerations include allowing for the possibility that despite the expectation

that the passengers would exercise reasonable care for their own safety, it was possible

that one or more of them might be inattentive or act negligently, depending on the

circumstances, which here, included the party atmosphere, the consumption of alcohol,

and drugs: Roads & Traffic Authority of NSW v Dederer (2007) 234 CLR 330; [2007]

HCA 42, at [45]; following Thompson v Woolworths (Qld) Pty Ltd [2005] HCA 19;

(2005) 221 CLR 234, at [35].

148. If, for example, the plaintiff had dived into waters known to be shallow and in doing so

injured himself by coming into contact with a submerged object, a volenti defence would

most likely be available. However, the circumstances under present consideration are

very different to examples such as that.

149. When the plaintiff dived off the moving vessel he did so in relatively deep water where

any such risk was remote. He remained in relatively deep water whilst Mr Allred brought

the vessel close to him for his retrieval. In doing so, at that point, the plaintiff became

exposed to the risk of injury by contact with the propeller because the engine had not

been shut down and the propeller was operating under power in reverse gear. In those

events, Mr Allred created that danger after the plaintiff had entered the water.

150. In my opinion, the plaintiff was therefore not volens to the risk of injury from contact

with the propeller at that point because he did not know the engine was still on and

operating, and that the propeller was engaged in reverse as he was preparing to re-board

the vessel. At that time, there was no visible indication of propeller turbulence in the

water to suggest otherwise to the plaintiff. He had no actual knowledge or indication that

he was in what was considered to be a hazard zone. I therefore reject the defence of

volenti non fit injuria.

Issue 6 – Negligence

151. To succeed in his claims of negligence against the respective defendants, the plaintiff

must satisfy the mandatory pre-requisites of s 5B of the CL Act.

Particulars of negligence

152. The plaintiff has pleaded the following particulars of negligence as against the first

defendant:

(a) Failed to adequately train the second defendant.

(b) Failed to prevent the plaintiff from jumping into the water.

(c) Failed to turn to the starboard side thereby requiring the plaintiff to pass across

of the stern of the boat to access the ladder.

(d) Failed to shut down the motor before the plaintiff came near the stern of the

boat.

(e) Failed to keep a proper lookout.

153. Allegation (a) of failure by the first defendant to provide adequate training to the second

defendant appears to be misplaced as the second defendant had all the necessary

certificates to qualify him to take the charter. Additionally, the first defendant had

previously observed the second defendant and assessed him as being capable. Allegation

(b) of a failure to prevent the plaintiff from jumping in the water also seems to be

misplaced given the immediacy of the plaintiff’s instinctive reaction was to dive in to

retrieve the hat. Allegations (c), (d) and (e) relating to safe navigation require

consideration in conjunction with the expert evidence and the applicable maritime

regulations.

154. The plaintiff pleaded the following particulars of negligence as against the second

defendant:

(a) Failed to prevent the plaintiff from jumping into the water.

(b) Failed to turn to the starboard side thereby requiring the plaintiff to pass across

of the stern of the boat to access the ladder.

(c) Failed to shut down the motor before the plaintiff came near the stern of the

boat.

(d) Failed to keep a proper lookout.

155. Allegation (a) of failure by the second defendant to stop the plaintiff from “jumping” into

the water seems to be misplaced as the plaintiff was plainly determined to enter the

water in order to rescue the hat. In my view, it is unlikely that the plaintiff could have

been dissuaded from his chosen course and in the circumstances that prevailed it was

not feasible for the second defendant to leave the controls of the moving vessel in order

to seek to physically restrain or otherwise prevent the plaintiff from diving into the water

as in fact occurred. Allegations (b) and (c) relating to safe navigation require

consideration in conjunction with the expert evidence. Allegation (d) is axiomatic and

generic in nature.

Statutory provisions

156. Section 5B of the CL Act provides:

“5B General principles

(1) A person is not negligent in failing to take precautions against a risk of harm

unless—

(a) the risk was foreseeable (that is, it is a risk of which the person knew

or ought to have known), and

(b) the risk was not insignificant, and

(c) in the circumstances, a reasonable person in the person's position

would have taken those precautions.

(2) In determining whether a reasonable person would have taken precautions

against a risk of harm, the court is to consider the following (amongst other

relevant things)—

(a) the probability that the harm would occur if care were not taken,

(b) the likely seriousness of the harm,

(c) the burden of taking precautions to avoid the risk of harm,

(d) the social utility of the activity that creates the risk of harm.”

157. A consideration of claims of negligence in a case of this nature must also take into

account section 5C of the CL Act, which provides:

“5C Other principles

In proceedings relating to liability for negligence—

(a) the burden of taking precautions to avoid a risk of harm includes the

burden of taking precautions to avoid similar risks of harm for which

the person may be responsible, and

(b) the fact that a risk of harm could have been avoided by doing

something in a different way does not of itself give rise to or affect

liability for the way in which the thing was done, and

(c) the subsequent taking of action that would (had the action been

taken earlier) have avoided a risk of harm does not of itself give rise to

or affect liability in respect of the risk and does not of itself constitute

an admission of liability in connection with the risk.”

158. I now turn to a consideration of those statutory elements, commencing with the

mandatory requirements of s 5B(1) of that Act.

Foreseeability: s 5B(1)(a) of the CL Act

159. As to the element of foreseeability, both defendants ought to have foreseen that in the

course of a charter of this kind there was a risk of harm from injury from a variety of

sources, including due to the potential for contact between a person in the water and the

propeller of the vessel or some other object in the water whether submerged or not. The

prospect of a person going overboard during the course of the charter was not a remote

consideration. That much is evident from the warning notice that was displayed on the

vessel containing the warning to passengers not to jump in the water whilst the vessel

was moving: s 5B(1)(a) of the CL Act. In my view, a warning of that kind should have

been drawn to the attention of passengers before the trip commenced.

Significance of risk of harm: s 5B(1)(b) of the CL Act

160. As to the element of the significance of the risk, the risk of injury to a person whilst in

the water was, to use the words of the statute, “not insignificant”. The risk of a person

overboard drowning could have foreseeably materialised, as could the risk of injury from

contact with the propeller, whether it was under motive power or not. Such risks could

increase where the behaviour of passengers could possibly have been influenced by the

known consumption of alcohol or other substances that had the potential to affect their

judgment and behaviour. This was in circumstances where Mr Allred had been made

aware that the group had consumed alcohol, as had he, and that some had used cocaine:

s 5B(1)(b) of the CL Act.

Precautions to be taken: s 5B(1)(c) of the CL Act

161. As to the element of the precautions that a reasonable person would have taken in the

circumstances, both defendants ought to have exercised common sense and

implemented well known and understood maritime precautions that a reasonable

person in their respective positions would have taken: s 5B(1)(c) of the CL Act.

162. A reasonable person in the position of the first defendant ought to have provided a

competent master for the charter. A master of that calibre was required to be sufficiently

trained, experienced, and licensed, so as to be able to recognise and prudently respond

to any emergent dangers that could pose a risk of harm to passengers.

163. The evidence shows that the first defendant took those precautions in that he was

satisfied that the second defendant was appropriately qualified and experienced, and

could appropriately manage the required tasks whilst in charge of the vessel and its

passengers. In that context, the first defendant’s expectation was that Mr Allred would

follow and appropriately implement necessary safety procedures, and provide a safety

briefing to passengers at the outset.

164. Accordingly, any liability of the first defendant must be extended to that which arises

vicariously in respect of the actions of the second defendant as his designated master for

the charter.

165. In the case of the second defendant, the common-sense precautionary tasks that were

required of him were not unduly onerous for him to implement given the magnitude of

the range of risks of injury that could have foreseeably arisen. The unchallenged expert

evidence indicates that the precautions required of a reasonable person in the position of

the second defendant included:

(1) Providing appropriate and timely safety warnings to passengers before the trip

commenced, including the specific warning not to jump into the water from the

vessel whilst it was moving;

(2) Refraining from consuming alcohol and other substances that might have the

effect of impairing navigational and safety judgments whilst passengers were in his

care as the responsible master for the charter;

(3) Providing appropriate supervision of the activities of his passengers including

reminding passengers to remain on-board and not enter the water from the vessel

whilst it was moving;

(4) Responding safely and appropriately to foreseeable occurrences that required

responses in the interests of passenger safety, including where a person was known

to have gone overboard;

(5) Ensuring that during the retrieval process, a person in the water (such as the

plaintiff), was warned not to swim into the hazard zone behind the vessel whilst

the engine and propeller were engaged and operating;

(6) Ensuring that safe person overboard retrieval procedures were followed and

adhered to, including providing appropriate situational safety advice to a person in

the water awaiting retrieval and re-boarding;

(7) Providing and deploying appropriate buoyancy aids and to assist the plaintiff to

re-board the vessel;

(8) Adherence to known and applicable navigational safety standards and

requirements.

166. The evidence shows that the second defendant fell well short of those requirements in

this instance.

Probability of harm occurring: s 5B(2)(a) of the CL Act

167. As to the element of the probability of harm occurring if appropriate precautions were

not taken, there was a high risk of injury if a person in the water was required to swim

towards the ladder on the vessel from the stern whilst the engine and the propeller were

still engaged and operating: s 5B(2)(a) of the CL Act.

Likely Seriousness of harm: s 5B(2)(b) of the CL Act

168. As to the element of the likely seriousness of the harm that could occur if precautions

against risk of harm were not taken, the range of possible serious injury was wide and

potentially very serious: s 5B(2)(b) of the CL Act.

Burden of taking precautions: s 5B(2)(c) of the CL Act

169. As to the burden of taking precautions against the risk of harm, the precautions

identified at paragraphs [160] above, were not particularly onerous or burdensome for

the second defendant as the master in respect of this particular charter, or at all.

170. As a reasonable pro-active precautionary step, it was vitally important that the

passengers received an appropriate safety briefing before the trip commenced. It was no

less important for the master to remain appropriately vigilant and responsive to

untoward events that could occur during the trip, including the possibility of a person

going overboard for whatever reason, and therefore requiring safe retrieval and re-

boarding onto the vessel.

171. Furthermore, it was no less important that standard maritime safety procedures be

adhered to in relation to the process of retrieval and re-boarding of persons overboard,

where there were potentially injurious dangers the master ought to have reasonably

foreseen, and for which he had been trained to respond. This was so particularly where

the trip was a commercial booking taken by the first defendant who then delegated to

the second defendant, who was responsible for the safety of the vessel and its

passengers: s 5B(2)(c) of the CL Act.

Social utility of the activity: s 5B(2)(d) of the CL Act

172. As to the element of the social utility of the activity, the context was that the defendants

were facilitating a social leisure outing where the participants were each paying their

share of a commercial fee, which carried with it the obligation to take reasonable care,

and to comply with maritime safety protocols, especially in an environment where it was

known to the master that alcohol was on board and was being consumed. There was no

social utility in not adhering to the required standard of reasonable care in such

circumstances: s 5B(2)(d) of the CL Act.

173. The expert opinions expressed by Mr Ellison, and the maritime safety considerations,

principles, and regulations that he cited, compel the view that the identified precautions

should have been taken by the second defendant: s 5C(a) of the CL Act. That view

accords with a prospective common-sense analysis: ss 5C(b) and 5C(c) of the CL Act.

Conclusion

174. In light of the foregoing considerations, I find that the negligence of Mr Allred has been

established. The plaintiff has satisfied the mandatory prerequisites of s 5B(1) of the CL

Act and the ancillary elements of ss 5B(2) and 5C of the CL Act to justify the conclusion

that the second defendant, Mr Allred, was negligent in the circumstances of the

plaintiff’s injury.

175. The plaintiff has also established that the first defendant, Mr Payne, should be found to

be vicariously liable for Mr Allred’s negligence as he was Mr Payne’s authorised agent, if

not his employee, in relation to the events in question.

Issue 7 – Causation

176. To perfect his claim for damages, the plaintiff must satisfy the factual and scope of

liability requirements of s 5D of the CL Act, which provides:

“5D General principles

(1) A determination that negligence caused particular harm comprises the

following elements—

(a) that the negligence was a necessary condition of the occurrence of

the harm (“factual causation”), and

(b) that it is appropriate for the scope of the negligent person's liability

to extend to the harm so caused (“scope of liability”).

(2) In determining in an exceptional case, in accordance with established

principles, whether negligence that cannot be established as a necessary condition

of the occurrence of harm should be accepted as establishing factual causation, the

court is to consider (amongst other relevant things) whether or not and why

responsibility for the harm should be imposed on the negligent party.

(3) If it is relevant to the determination of factual causation to determine what the

person who suffered harm would have done if the negligent person had not been

negligent—

(a) the matter is to be determined subjectively in the light of all relevant

circumstances, subject to paragraph (b), and

(b) any statement made by the person after suffering the harm about

what he or she would have done is inadmissible except to the extent (if

any) that the statement is against his or her interest.

(4) For the purpose of determining the scope of liability, the court is to consider

(amongst other relevant things) whether or not and why responsibility for the

harm should be imposed on the negligent party.”

Factual causation: s 5D(1)(a) of the CL Act

177. In this case the factual causation requirements of s 5D(1)(a) of the CL Act are met and

satisfied by the plaintiff because, but for the negligence of the second defendant, for

which the first defendant is vicariously liable, the plaintiff’s injury would not have

occurred: Strong v Woolworths Ltd (2012) 246 CLR 182; [2012] HCA 5 at [32].

178. Mr Allred had the opportunity and the obligation to take steps seeking to avoid the

plaintiff’s injury by appropriately positioning the vessel in juxtaposition to the plaintiff

on the starboard side and then turn off the engine to de-activate the propeller. In my

opinion, the plaintiff’s injury would not have occurred but for Mr Allred’s failure to take

those steps.

Scope of liability: s 5D(1)(b) of the CL Act

179. In my view, in this case, it is entirely appropriate that the scope of the liability of both

defendants extend to the circumstances of the plaintiff’s injury as the injury occurred in

the context of the business operation of the first defendant’s commercial enterprise,

which included a monetary gain for his business, and where his assigned agent, the

second defendant, was expected to observe appropriate safety measures in accordance

with his training and his licence. There are no exceptional circumstances that would

operate to engage the limiting provision of s 5D(2) of the Act.

Conclusion

180. I therefore conclude that the plaintiff has satisfied the causation requirements of s 5D of

the CL Act to sustain a negligence finding.

Issue 8 – Contributory negligence

181. The first defendant pleaded the following particulars of contributory negligence as

against the plaintiff:

(a) Voluntarily diving overboard.

(b) Voluntarily diving overboard without seeking the permission of the Second

Defendant.

(c) Swimming and engaging in aquatic activities in the vicinity of an operating

motorised vessel.

(d) Swimming near a propeller.

(e) Swimming and engaging in aquatic activities in circumstances where he was

intoxicated following the consumption of alcohol and cocaine.

(f) Swimming and engaging in aquatic activities in circumstances where his blood

alcohol concentration was in the order of 0.11g/100mm (sic) and not less than

0.05g/100mm (sic).

(g) Voluntarily consuming alcohol and cocaine to an extent where he was impaired

from exercising reasonable care and skill.

(h) Failing to heed the warning provided by way of a sign on the vessel, to remain

inside the boat at all times whilst the boat was in motion.

182. The first defendant has also relied upon the maxim volenti non fit injuria as an

allegation of contributory negligence. That defence has already been examined and

rejected in the consideration of Issue 5 above.

183. It is for the defendants to prove that if there was contributory negligence on the part of

the plaintiff, any such negligence was a relevant cause of the harm suffered by the

plaintiff: ss 5D and 5E of the CL Act.

184. In relation to contributory negligence allegations (a), (b) and (f) above, I consider that,

of themselves, they have no causative relevance in this case. There is no satisfactory

evidence that the plaintiff’s activity in swimming towards the vessel in order to re-board

it was in any way impaired such that he was at increased risk of injury by being in the

water. He did not dive towards the propeller, or the hazard zone, and he was entitled to

assume that Mr Allred, as the master, was taking due care for his safety whilst in charge

of the vessel. He was unaware that the engine and the propeller were actively engaged in

reverse gear at the time he proceeded to re-board the vessel.

185. Section 5R of the CL Act provides:

“5R Standard of contributory negligence

(1) The principles that are applicable in determining whether a person has been

negligent also apply in determining whether the person who suffered harm has

been contributorily negligent in failing to take precautions against the risk of that

harm.

(2) For that purpose—

(a) the standard of care required of the person who suffered harm is

that of a reasonable person in the position of that person, and

(b) the matter is to be determined on the basis of what that person

knew or ought to have known at the time.”

186. Section 5S of the CL Act provides:

“5S Contributory negligence can defeat claim

In determining the extent of a reduction in damages by reason of contributory

negligence, a court may determine a reduction of 100% if the court thinks it just

and equitable to do so, with the result that the claim for damages is defeated.”

187. In an appropriate case, it may be just and equitable to find that contributory negligence,

if established, could possibly be assessed at 0% where such contributory negligence had

no causative potency in respect of the occurrence of the plaintiff’s injury.

188. To sustain contributory negligence, the first defendant must firstly satisfy the mandatory

requirements of s 5B(1) and (2) of the CL Act.

189. On the expert evidence of Dr Robertson, there is little room for doubt that the plaintiff’s

intake of alcohol, if not also cocaine, was influential in his judgment and in his

instinctive or impulsive reaction to dive into the water to retrieve the hat. That action on

his part was capable of sustaining a contributory negligence finding in that it was

foreseeable that an injury could occur from a variety of causes whilst he was in the water.

190. In that regard, if the plaintiff had been injured by coming into contact with a submerged

object located near the vessel when he dived into the water, or if he had suffered an

injury from a near drowning event, the question of contributory negligence would be a

relevant consideration.

191. However, in this case, the source of the plaintiff’s injury was different, in that it was

relevantly caused by the decisions and the actions of Mr Allred, who was in a position to

make a material difference to the outcome if he had acted with due skill and care in his

responses to the plaintiff’s presence in the water. The defence has not established a

relevant causal nexus between any alleged contributory negligence of the plaintiff and

the injuries he suffered.

192. The first defendant submitted that the plaintiff was engaged in something in the nature

of “a frolic” when he was injured. I do not accept that submission. The circumstances

were that Mr Allred brought the danger to the plaintiff. The plaintiff had not placed

himself in the hazard zone. He acted reasonably in seeking to re-board the vessel. He

had no choice but to adopt the approach of swimming across the hazard zone by reason

of Mr Allred’s actions in manoeuvring the vessel, where the plaintiff was unaware that

the engine and the propeller had remained activated.

193. In those circumstances, on two bases, the defence of alleged contributory negligence is

not sustained. First, any want of care on the part of the plaintiff for his own safety did

not involve foreseeing that the engine and the propeller would remain engaged and

operating whilst he was re-boarding the vessel.

194. Secondly, having regard to the question of factual causation, if Mr Allred had acted

appropriately by correctly positioning the vessel to starboard to allow the plaintiff to re-

board safely without having to traverse or swim across the hazard zone, and if Mr Allred

had stopped the engine and the propeller to safely facilitate that re-boarding process

instead of placing the propeller in reverse, the plaintiff’s injuries would not have

occurred: s 5D(1)(a) of the CL Act; Strong v Woolworths, supra.

195. If Mr Allred had disengaged the propeller, and if the propeller had simply made contact

with the plaintiff’s leg by reason of the force of water current causing it to turn, any

resultant injury would most probably have been minor, in the nature of de minimis non

curat lex. It is not necessary to further consider this possibility because if Mr Allred had

followed proper standard procedure and enabled the plaintiff to re-board from the

starboard side, any such inadvertent contact with the propeller would not have occurred.

196. The defendants have not satisfied the mandatory requirement of s 5B(1)(a) of the CL Act

to sustain a contributory negligence defence. In that sense, I find that the negligence of

Mr Allred was 100% responsible for the plaintiff’s injury, without any percentage of

contribution from the plaintiff’s actions. Accordingly, I reject the defence alleging that

there was contributory negligence on the plaintiff’s part.

Issue 9 – Obvious risk and dangerous recreational activity

197. The pleaded defence of obvious risk claimed that the plaintiff was engaged in a

dangerous recreational activity requires consideration. The defence of obvious risk

involves a series of inter-related statutory provisions: ss 5F, 5G, 5K, 5L and 5M of the CL

Act.

198. Section 5F of the CL Act provides:

“5F Meaning of "obvious risk"

(1) For the purposes of this Division, an "obvious risk" to a person who suffers

harm is a risk that, in the circumstances, would have been obvious to a reasonable

person in the position of that person.

(2) Obvious risks include risks that are patent or a matter of common knowledge.

(3) A risk of something occurring can be an obvious risk even though it has a low

probability of occurring.

(4) A risk can be an obvious risk even if the risk (or a condition or circumstance

that gives rise to the risk) is not prominent, conspicuous or physically observable.”

199. Section 5G of the CL Act provides:

“5G Injured persons presumed to be aware of obvious risks

(1) In proceedings relating to liability for negligence, a person who suffers harm is

presumed to have been aware of the risk of harm if it was an obvious risk, unless

the person proves on the balance of probabilities that he or she was not aware of

the risk.

(2) For the purposes of this section, a person is aware of a risk if the person is

aware of the type or kind of risk, even if the person is not aware of the precise

nature, extent or manner of occurrence of the risk.”

200. Section 5K of the CL Act provides:

“5K Definitions

In this Division—

dangerous recreational activity means a recreational activity that involves a

significant risk of physical harm.

obvious risk has the same meaning as it has in Division 4.

recreational activity includes—

(a) any sport (whether or not the sport is an organised activity), and

(b) any pursuit or activity engaged in for enjoyment, relaxation or

leisure, and

(c) any pursuit or activity engaged in at a place (such as a beach, park or

other public open space) where people ordinarily engage in sport or in

any pursuit or activity for enjoyment, relaxation or leisure.”

201. Section 5L of the CL Act provides:

“5L No liability for harm suffered from obvious risks of dangerous

recreational activities

(1) A person (“the defendant”) is not liable in negligence for harm suffered by

another person (“the plaintiff”) as a result of the materialisation of an obvious risk

of a dangerous recreational activity engaged in by the plaintiff.

(2) This section applies whether or not the plaintiff was aware of the risk.”

202. If the plaintiff was engaged in a dangerous recreational activity then the effect of s 5M(1)

of the CL Act is to disapply any duty of care that the first defendant might have otherwise

owed to the plaintiff if the plaintiff had been warned of a risk involved in the activity.

203. Section 5M of the CL Act provides:

“5M No duty of care for recreational activity where risk warning

(1) A person (“the defendant”) does not owe a duty of care to another person who

engages in a recreational activity (“the plaintiff”) to take care in respect of a risk of

the activity if the risk was the subject of a risk warning to the plaintiff.

(2) If the person who suffers harm is an incapable person, the defendant may rely

on a risk warning only if—

(a) the incapable person was under the control of or accompanied by

another person (who is not an incapable person and not the defendant)

and the risk was the subject of a risk warning to that other person, or

(b) the risk was the subject of a risk warning to a parent of the

incapable person (whether or not the incapable person was under the

control of or accompanied by the parent).

(3) For the purposes of subsections (1) and (2), a risk warning to a person in

relation to a recreational activity is a warning that is given in a manner that is

reasonably likely to result in people being warned of the risk before engaging in the

recreational activity. The defendant is not required to establish that the person

received or understood the warning or was capable of receiving or understanding

the warning.

(4) A risk warning can be given orally or in writing (including by means of a sign or

otherwise).

(5) A risk warning need not be specific to the particular risk and can be a general

warning of risks that include the particular risk concerned (so long as the risk

warning warns of the general nature of the particular risk).

(6) A defendant is not entitled to rely on a risk warning unless it is given by or on

behalf of the defendant or by or on behalf of the occupier of the place where the

recreational activity is engaged in.

(7) A defendant is not entitled to rely on a risk warning if it is established (on the

balance of probabilities) that the harm concerned resulted from a contravention of

a provision of a written law of the State or Commonwealth that establishes specific

practices or procedures for the protection of personal safety.

(8) A defendant is not entitled to rely on a risk warning to a person to the extent

that the warning was contradicted by any representation as to risk made by or on

behalf of the defendant to the person.

(9) A defendant is not entitled to rely on a risk warning if the plaintiff was required

to engage in the recreational activity by the defendant.

(10) The fact that a risk is the subject of a risk warning does not of itself mean—

(a) that the risk is not an obvious or inherent risk of an activity, or

(b) that a person who gives the risk warning owes a duty of care to a

person who engages in an activity to take precautions to avoid the risk

of harm from the activity.

(11) This section does not limit or otherwise affect the effect of a risk warning in

respect of a risk of an activity that is not a recreational activity.

(12) In this section—

“incapable person” means a person who, because of the person's young age or a

physical or mental disability, lacks the capacity to understand the risk warning.

“parent” of an incapable person means any person (not being an incapable person)

having parental responsibility for the incapable person.”

204. In light of my finding that the plaintiff was not given an oral warning or had his

attention drawn to any warning signage as contemplated by s 5M(3), (4) and (5) of the

CL Act, s 5M does not operate to disentitle the plaintiff to claim damages for his injuries.

205. The first defendant claims the plaintiff came into contact with the propeller and

sustained injury as a result of an obvious risk. Although the first defendant relied upon

the defence of obvious risk within the meaning of s 5K of the CL Act, which appears in

Division 5 of that Act, as that section defines “obvious risk” to have the same meaning as

appears in Division 4 of the Act, for completeness, it becomes relevant to examine

whether the defence of obvious risk within the meaning of ss 5F and 5G of the CL Act is

available to the defendants in this case.

206. In my opinion the defence of obvious risk within the meaning of Division 4 of the CL Act

is not available to the defence in this case for the following reasons.

207. First, at the time the plaintiff dived into the water, he had no intention of placing himself

anywhere near the propeller of the vessel. Secondly, for as long as he kept himself clear

of the vessel, he did not court or invite any obvious risk of harm from the submerged

propeller. Thirdly, it was the second defendant who juxtaposed the vessel and its

activated propeller to where the plaintiff was located in the water. He did so in such a

manner that in order to re-board the vessel the plaintiff had to swim past the submerged

and operating propeller in the hazard zone.

208. I find that on the balance of probability, at the time the plaintiff swam towards the

ladder at the stern of the vessel he was not aware of the risk of coming into contact with

the moving propeller because he could not see it, or see evidence of it operating, and he

was entitled to assume that it was not operating as he did not hear any relevant noise

and saw no turbulence from the propeller. Therefore, the circumstances did not

constitute a foreseeable risk to a reasonable person in his position at that time.

209. In my view the defence based on s 5L of the CL Act does not apply in the circumstances

of this case because the plaintiff was not engaged in recreational activity, dangerous or

otherwise, within the meaning of s 5K of the CL Act.

210. That is so because the definition of recreational activity contains three cumulative

elements as identified in s 5K(a), (b) and (c) of the Act.

211. None of those factual elements apply in the plaintiff’s circumstances. He was not

engaged in a sport. The activity of diving into the water to retrieve the hat was not an

engagement in enjoyment, relaxation or leisure. The fact that the events occurred in a

place where people ordinarily engage in sport or activity for enjoyment, relaxation or

leisure, of itself, without the inclusion of the other two elements identified in s 5K(a) and

(b), indicates the defence of materialisation of an obvious risk of a dangerous

recreational activity as provided by s 5L of the CL Act, is not available to the defendants

in this instance.

212. In my opinion, section 5K does not operate as a defence to the plaintiff’s claim. In my

view, retrieving a windblown hat from the water should not be characterised as a

dangerous recreational activity in this case. The activity in which the plaintiff was

engaged, namely diving from the vessel to retrieve a hat, and then re-boarding the vessel

could have been dangerous if due care was not taken, and if he could not swim because

his capacity to swim had been so impaired by the substances he had taken. However, the

evidence does not demonstrate that to have been so.

Issue 10 – Defence of Intoxication

213. The first defendant claims the plaintiff was intoxicated at the time of the accident and

therefore submitted that fact should operate as a defence to this claim. Section 48 of the

CL Act provides:

“48 Definition of “intoxication”

A reference in this Part to a person being intoxicated is a reference to a person

being under the influence of alcohol or a drug (whether or not taken for a

medicinal purpose and whether or not lawfully taken).”

214. The pharmacological opinion of Dr Robertson serves to satisfactorily establish that the

plaintiff was under the influence of alcohol and cocaine at the time of his injury.

However, those facts of themselves do not provide the defendants with a defence to the

present claim. A consideration of s 50 of the CL Act is required for such a defence to

apply.

215. Section 50 of the CL Act provides:

“50 No recovery where person intoxicated

(1) This section applies when it is established that the person whose death, injury

or damage is the subject of proceedings for the recovery of damages was at the time

of the act or omission that caused the death, injury or damage intoxicated to the

extent that the person’s capacity to exercise reasonable care and skill was

impaired.

(2) A court is not to award damages in respect of liability to which this Part applies

unless satisfied that the death, injury or damage to property (or some other injury

or damage to property) is likely to have occurred even if the person had not been

intoxicated.

(3) If the court is satisfied that the death, injury or damage to property (or some

other injury or damage to property) is likely to have occurred even if the person

had not been intoxicated, it is to be presumed that the person was contributorily

negligent unless the court is satisfied that the person’s intoxication did not

contribute in any way to the cause of the death, injury or damage.

(4) When there is a presumption of contributory negligence, the court must assess

damages on the basis that the damages to which the person would be entitled in

the absence of contributory negligence are to be reduced on account of

contributory negligence by 25% or a greater percentage determined by the court to

be appropriate in the circumstances of the case.

(5) This section does not apply in a case where the court is satisfied that the

intoxication was not self-induced.”

216. In my opinion, the plaintiff’s injury could have occurred even if he was not intoxicated: s

50(2) of the CL Act. That is so because it was the second defendant’s action in

positioning the vessel near the plaintiff and leaving the engine and the propellor to

operate in reverse which had the effect of disguising the water turbulence from the

turning propellor that injured the plaintiff.

217. In my opinion, for the reasons identified in the preceding paragraph, the plaintiff’s

intoxication did not contribute to his injury: s 50(3) of the CL Act.

218. Whilst the pharmacological evidence of Dr Robertson raises the possibility of the

plaintiff’s impairment and the consumption of alcohol, in my opinion that evidence falls

well short of establishing that the plaintiff was intoxicated to the extent that his capacity

to exercise reasonable care and skill was impaired: s 50(1) of the CL Act.

219. That finding is supported by the fact that the plaintiff was able to successfully dive in the

water and retrieve the hat without difficulty, and then swim to the vessel and climb

aboard by using the ladder at the stern. Nothing in those events bespeaks any

impairment due to intoxication on his part. On the evidence, it is not necessary to try to

calculate the plaintiff’s blood alcohol content using the different parameters adopted in

the submissions of the parties. The fact he was injured by the rotating propeller was due

to his unawareness the engine was engaged, which meant that the propeller was turning

under power. Therefore, subsections (4) and (5) of s 50 of the CL Act do not apply in this

case. Accordingly, I reject the claimed defence of intoxication.

Issue 11 – Application of the Australian Consumer Law

220. The plaintiff seeks to imply statutory warranties as provided by the ACL.

221. The plaintiff claims that the first defendant was providing a service. “Services” are

defined in the ACL as follows:

““services” includes:

(a) any rights (including rights in relation to, and interests in, real or personal

property), benefits, privileges or facilities that are, or are to be, provided, granted

or conferred in trade or commerce; and

(b) without limiting paragraph (a), the rights, benefits, privileges, or facilities that

are, or are to be, provided, granted or conferred under:

(i) a contract for or in relation to the performance of work (including

work of a professional nature), whether with or without the supply of

goods; or

(ii) a contract for or in relation to the provision of, or the use or

enjoyment of facilities for, amusement, entertainment, recreation or

instruction; or

(iii) a contract for or in relation to the conferring of rights, benefits or

privileges for which remuneration is payable in the form of a royalty,

tribute, levy or similar exaction; or

(iv) a contract of insurance; or

(v) a contract between a banker and a customer of the banker entered

into in the course of the carrying on by the banker of the business of

banking; or

(vi) any contract for or in relation to the lending of money;

but does not include rights or benefits being the supply of goods or the

performance of work under a contract of service.”

222. The plaintiff claimed he was a consumer within the meaning of s 3 of the ACL as he had

acquired the services for personal consumption: s 3(3).

223. He takes that position because the amount of his share of the hiring fee, which he paid to

Mr Tooth, namely $75, did not exceed $40,000: s 3(3)(a)(i) of the ACL. He therefore

claims to be entitled to the statutory presumptions provided by s 3(10) of the ACL, and

he claims that the first defendant has not discharged his onus of showing otherwise:

Jefferson Ford Pty Ltd v Ford Motor Co [2008] FCAFC 60; [2008] 167 FCR 372, at

[90]-[102].

224. Section 60 provides a consumer with a guarantee that the services supplied will be

rendered with due care and skill. The terms of s 60 are as follows:

“60 Guarantee as to due care and skill

If a person supplies, in trade or commerce, services to a consumer, there is a

guarantee that the services will be rendered with due care and skill.”

225. The first defendant denies he agreed to provide the plaintiff with services within the

meaning of the ACL and denies the plaintiff was a relevant consumer.

226. In my view, the first defendant’s denial as to the applicability of the ACL has substance

in that the agreement to provide the services in question was between Mr Payne and Mr

Tooth on behalf of unnamed members of a group and not specifically with the plaintiff.

The subsequent agreement between Mr Tooth and the other participants must be seen to

be separate from the services which Mr Payne agreed to provide to Mr Tooth, and which

Mr Payne delegated to Mr Allred.

227. In those circumstances, in my view, the plaintiff is unable to successfully invoke the

statutory warranties that he claims as against the first defendant in respect of that

defendant’s vicarious liability for the acts, neglects and defaults of Mr Allred.

Accordingly, the plaintiff’s claim under the ACL must fail.

Issue 12 - Assessment of damages

228. In the paragraphs that follow, I set out my findings on the nature of the plaintiff’s

injuries, the treatment he received for those injuries, the details of his medical

assessments, his remaining disabilities, the economic and other effects he has

experienced, his most probable circumstances but for his injury, followed by my

assessment of his entitlement to damages according to the provisions of the CL Act

alone, as I have found that the ACL does not apply in this case.

Injuries

229. The plaintiff sustained 6cm deep and 15cm long open transverse lacerations to the

anterior lateral aspect of his left leg below the knee. The hospital notes record that he

experienced some loss of blood due to active arterial bleeding. He also sustained a

transverse fracture of the anterior fibular head at the margin with associated anterior

displacement and bruising within the compartment of his left knee. He was shocked and

in considerable pain as a result of the accident and suffered psychologically.

Treatment

230. After the plaintiff received first aid whilst still on the vessel he was transported to the

nearest jetty, where ambulance personnel provided him with intravenous morphine and

other drugs, and he was also given the green whistle for immediate pain relief. At

Shoalhaven Hospital he was treated by the orthopaedic team led by Dr Jarman.

231. An emergency surgical washout of the plaintiff’s wounds was carried out in the operating

theatre due to wound exposure to the marine environment. The plaintiff underwent a

number of surgical procedures. He had an arthroscopy carried out on his left knee along

with some ligament repairs effected by placing drill holes in his bones to secure remedial

sutures. This also involved some meniscal trimming. His fibular fracture was repaired

and fixed into position with screws. The plaintiff’s wounds were sutured. His left leg was

immobilised to ensure an enforced restricted range of motion in a brace to promote

healing.

232. The plaintiff was provided with patient-controlled analgesia using Fentanyl. He

underwent several debridement procedures whilst in hospital. He remained in hospital

for 3 days. He was discharged on non-weight bearing crutches which he used for the

following 6 weeks. This was followed by intensive physiotherapy treatment.

233. Dr Jarman’s final assessment of the plaintiff, on 5 October 2020, was that, in view of his

inability to run due to a jolting sensation in the left knee and ongoing soreness in that

area, he has continued functional instability in his left knee which may give rise to a

need to consider a postero-lateral corner reconstruction: Exhibit F.

Medical Assessments

234. The plaintiff underwent a series of specialist medical assessments for the purposes of his

litigation.

Dr Porteous – Occupational Physician

235. On 7 June 2021, at the request of his solicitor, the plaintiff was assessed by Dr Andrew

Porteous, an occupational physician: Exhibit A, Vol 2, pp 700-707. In his report of 18

June 2021, Dr Porteous noted that on his examination the plaintiff walked with a limp

and he had complaints of ongoing chronic left proximal leg pain and associated

restrictions with activities such as standing, walking, and his evidence of aggravation on

activity. He also noted associated pain and some frustration at his reduced activities. Dr

Porteous expressed appropriately reasoned opinions on the nature, extent and progress

of the plaintiff’s injuries. Those opinions will be referred to in due course.

Dr Keller – Occupational Physician

236. On 6 September 2021, at the request of Mr Payne’s solicitor, the plaintiff was assessed by

Dr Andrew Keller, an occupational physician in a Zoom teleconference which meant the

physical examination component of the assessment was somewhat limited compared to

the more detailed assessment carried out by Dr Porteous. Dr Keller issued his report of

that examination on 7 September 2021: Exhibit D1, Tab 12, pp 444 – 456.

237. Dr Keller’s report concerning the plaintiff’s presenting problems was in my view heavily

qualified by his use of the opaque general adjective description of “significant”. This

rendered his opinion difficult to interpret, especially as he seems to have based his

opinion “entirely upon the objective findings today” (p 445), which suggests he has

placed little if any weight or credence upon the plaintiff’s subjective complaints of pain,

discomfort and restricted activity. It is not clear as to what Dr Keller regarded as

“significant” in determining the plaintiff’s “persisting knee pain”. For that reason, I

discount Dr Keller’s opinions and prefer those of Dr Porteous instead.

238. In that regard, Dr Keller’s comment that the plaintiff “appeared” to have minimal

restriction of flexion in the right knee seems to be of limited value as the examination of

the plaintiff was not carried out with “hands on” and in person. Dr Keller’s comment

which referred to the plaintiff not having any “significant” weakness in his leg requires

discount for the same reason, as does his conclusion that it “is likely that he could return

to some level of walking and/or running and may return to climbing in a graduated

fashion” (p 450). It is difficult to interpret that statement in view of its adjective

qualifying preface. I consider Dr Keller’s stated prognosis for likely full recovery to be in

the same discounted category.

239. I consider that Dr Keller’s opinion to the effect that he could see no evidence of lasting

pathology to the plaintiff’s left knee that could be expected to deteriorate, should not be

accepted as it failed to engage with Dr Porteous’ opinion that post-traumatic changes can

be expected in the future. Similarly, I discount Dr Keller’s opinion that the plaintiff has

“no formal work restrictions” (p 452) and no need for future treatment (pp 453 - 455)

and his opinion (at p 455) that the plaintiff will not need any future domestic assistance.

There are inadequately reasoned and therefore unacceptable sweeping statements in the

form of the ipse dixits that were the subject of criticism in Makita (Australia) Pty Ltd v

Sprowles, supra.

Dr Vote – Orthopaedic Surgeon

240. On 9 September 2021, at the request of Mr Payne’s solicitor, the plaintiff was

orthopedically assessed by Dr James Vote. Dr Vote’s report of that assessment is dated

16 September 2021: Exhibit D1, Tab 13, pp 457 – 464.

241. Dr Vote considered the mechanism of the plaintiff’s injury and expressed the opinion

that the propeller was most likely operating to cause the two lacerations that were

incurred by the plaintiff.

242. Dr Vote’s physical examination revealed the plaintiff to have weakness in the right

quadriceps muscles with some laxity of the lateral ligament complex. That clinical

finding provided a very different impression to that which was described by Dr Keller

who “examined” him by means of a Zoom connection a week earlier. Dr Vote’s responses

to particular questions will be referred to in relation to particular damages issues.

243. Dr Vote recorded a history of the plaintiff’s current experience of localised occasional

sharp pain at the injury site, particularly on contact. He also noted the plaintiff’s

complaints of left knee weakness and a tendency to collapse, and progressive discomfort

on weightbearing, with related inability to fully squat, run, jump and engage in sporting

activity, such as surfing, rock climbing, and golf. In light of these comments, I do not

accept Dr Vote’s conclusion that the plaintiff is “a perfectly fit young man” (p 459).

Disabilities that remain

244. As I have found the plaintiff to be a credible witness, in addition to the matters referred

to in his oral evidence, I propose to treat his complaints of disability as recorded by the

reviewing medical assessors as evidence of his ongoing disabilities: Daw v Toyworld

(NSW) Pty Ltd [2001] NSWCA 25 at [70]; s 60, Evidence Act 1995 (NSW).

245. The plaintiff underwent extensive and painful physiotherapy to regain strength in his

leg. He was off work for about 3 months during his post-injury rehabilitation. In that

time, he needed assistance with some domestic and personal care tasks.

246. The plaintiff continues to experience knee pain on most days. Walking on uneven

ground is difficult for him. He cannot squat. He walks with a limp and his walking

tolerance is limited. He can no longer engage in his favoured sporting past times of golf,

surfing and rock climbing. He has altered gait and spine problems. He continues to

pursue alignment treatment with a chiropractor.

247. The plaintiff’s ongoing disabilities include slight wasting of the muscles of the left thigh;

an 11cm purple discoloured and disfiguring scar to the anterior left leg with some areas

of keloid depression, an area of hypersensitivity and changed sensation to his anterior

left lower leg which has raised the suggestion of the presence of a neuroma; a reduced

range of motion in the left knee, with pain and tightness.

248. The plaintiff walks with a slight limp which causes him to experience back pain and he

favours his left leg because of difficulties with weight bearing. He can no longer run

without experiencing discomfort. He has restrictions in activities requiring frequent or

constant kneeling or crouching. He is restricted with activities requiring heavy lifting,

pushing, pulling, or carrying. He faces the likelihood of developing post traumatic

osteoarthritis in his left knee and related likely left knee replacement surgery. He also

faces further restriction in his activities such as kneeling, crouching, walking and

standing as his condition deteriorates with age.

249. These disabilities, which I accept, do not support the conclusions expressed by Dr Keller

and Dr Vote as to the plaintiff’s fitness and fitness for work, and I therefore reject their

opinions that are to the contrary.

250. The plaintiff had some pre-accident problems with depression and anxiety when he was

in a relatively dark place, as he described it. He obtained treatment for these problems.

They substantially resolved. The effects of the subject accident would sometimes cause

him to experience dark days in addition to any underlying pre-disposition to anxiety and

depression. Those matters did not feature large in the evidence and there is no sound

basis for inferring that the plaintiff’s anxiety and depression was materially exacerbated

by the effects of the accident. However, in that regard, the defendants must take the

plaintiff as he is found.

Economic effects

251. Dr Porteous expressed some opinions on the plaintiff’s restricted work options, and he

predicted earlier than otherwise expected post-traumatic changes in the knee and

further disabling long term restrictions. He pointed to the need for the plaintiff to pursue

sedentary light work. He also identified further treatments including a possible scar

revision procedure, a knee replacement, pain relief for flare-ups, and occupational

therapy aimed at limiting pain and aggravation: Exhibit A, Vol 2, pp 705 – 706.

252. For the reasons identified at paragraphs [237] to [239] above, I do not accept Dr Keller’s

opinions to the effect the plaintiff will have no future work restrictions and I do not

accept that he is “a perfectly fit young man” as has been stated by Dr Vote.

Mitigation

253. The defendants did not assert that the plaintiff had unreasonably failed to mitigate his

loss. I find that post-accident, after receiving treatment, the plaintiff pursued

appropriate treatment and rehabilitation and he sought an early return to work. In my

view, he has taken reasonable steps to mitigate his loss.

Plaintiff’s most probable circumstances

254. In cases where future economic loss is claimed, it is relevant to consider what would

have been the plaintiff’s most probable circumstances but for the fact of his injury: s 13

of the CL Act.

255. Before his injury the plaintiff had no physical restrictions in his ability to actively pursue

a full range of physical tasks in the exercise of his earning capacity, either in his pre-

accident work, or as a competitor on the open labour market. There is no evidence that

his pre-injury experience of anxiety or depression was a significant limitation on his

ability to exercise his earning capacity. He was capable of deriving at least average

weekly earnings.

256. In the paragraphs that follow, I set out my reasons for assessment of the plaintiff’s

damages as required by the CL Act.

Non-economic loss

257. On behalf of the plaintiff, it was submitted that his damages for non-economic loss

should be assessed at 32 per cent of the most extreme case pursuant to s 16 of the CL

Act. In contrast, the first defendant submitted that these damages should be assessed at

27 per cent of a most extreme case.

258. The disabilities as described in paragraphs [244] to [250] above, and as also described in

the histories recorded by the medical examiners indicate that, in addition to the cosmetic

defect in his scarred leg, the plaintiff has and will continue to suffer significant pain,

discomfort and loss of the amenity of his life. Due to his pain and discomfort, he has also

had to abandon the niche work he has enjoyed. He has a long life expectancy ahead of

him. These matters call for a significant assessment of damages for non-economic loss.

259. The assessment of damages for non-economic loss is an evaluative exercise. As I have

already observed, the plaintiff has stoically understated the effects of his injury. His

predisposition in that regard should not serve to reduce his entitlement to damages. In

my assessment, the first defendant’s submission that non-economic loss should be

assessed at 27 per cent of a most extreme case is manifestly inadequate. That assessment

does not represent fair compensation for the deleterious effects of the accident that the

plaintiff has endured and will continue to endure. In my view, the plaintiff’s submission

of an assessment of 32 per cent is reasonable and appropriate in the circumstances.

260. I decline to assess damages pursuant to the ACL in light of my findings in respect of

Issue 11.

261. Therefore, pursuant to s 16 of the CL Act, I assess the plaintiff’s non-economic loss at 32

per cent of a most extreme case. This is the monetary equivalent of $208,000.

Past economic loss

262. On behalf of the plaintiff, it was submitted that his damages for past economic loss

should be assessed in the buffer amount of $35,000. The first defendant conceded that

the plaintiff was entitled to damages for past economic loss during the period he was

unable to work as a result of his injuries. The conceded amount was of the order of

$20,000.

263. The plaintiff’s claim for past economic loss comprises two elements. First, the loss of

income during the initial post-accident period of recuperation, as conceded by the first

defendant, and secondly, the diminution in his earning capacity since April 2022, which

is the time when the plaintiff left his pre-accident employment in order to set up his own

business.

264. In assessing the plaintiff’s loss of earning capacity generally it must be recognised that

the level of his pre-accident earnings did not necessarily reflect his earning capacity

because after the accident his income increased by reason of pay increases, some

overtime, and other benefits.

265. In the period of a few weeks since April 2022, and up until the hearing, the plaintiff set

up his own business, incurring costs of the order of $45,000 for a mobile workshop, with

limited other overheads. That undertaking included the plaintiff’s involvement in

contracts involving 3 pool installations in association with another company belonging

to a friend. There is no direct evidence of loss of income between April and May 2022.

The evidence does not permit a monetary assessment of any loss of income for the

limited period between April and May 2022.

266. The evidence of his post-injury absence from work was imprecise, this being “around the

three months”: T54.25. In his time off work he received Centrelink benefits and took a

payout of $16,000 from his superannuation to “stay afloat”. The first defendant

concedes that the net loss for that period should be in the vicinity of $20,000.

267. That assessment was based on an assumed annual salary of $70,000 gross, noting that

in the pre-accident year, his taxable income was $71,882 (Exhibit A, p 726; T72.33),

which, after deduction of tax assessed at $14,908.65, resulted in net earnings of $56,974,

or $1,095 per week net.

268. In March 2021, the plaintiff’s income increased to $80,000 per annum gross: T72.37.

This was because by then he had acquired two new licenses for instrument verification

and for driving trucks after pursuing further courses and study. The plaintiff was on a

salary of $80,000 per annum or $1,538 per week before tax by the time he left his job to

set up his own business.

269. In light of the evidence summarised above, the first defendant’s concession in respect of

past economic loss and past loss of earning capacity seems patently reasonable. In my

view, the plaintiff’s claim for past loss of earnings should be assessed as being limited to

the post-accident closed period during which he was unable to work and along the lines

submitted by the first defendant. I assess the plaintiff’s damages for past economic loss

in the amount of $20,000.

Future economic loss

270. The evidence does not identify a specific continuing weekly economic loss in the form of

a sum that is capable of actuarial projection over the plaintiff’s remaining working life.

Nevertheless, the plaintiff has suffered and will continue to suffer a significant and

undoubted impairment in his future earning capacity.

271. To establish entitlement to damages for future loss of earning capacity the plaintiff must

show that his reduced capacity is likely to be productive of a financial loss: Graham v

Baker (1961) 106 CLR 340; [1961] HCA 48; Medlin v State Government Insurance

Commission (1995) 182 CLR 1; (1995) 127 ALR 180; (1995) Aust Torts Reports 81-322;

[1995] HCA 5.

272. Pre-accident, the plaintiff had specialised technical skills associated with installing and

maintaining heavy vehicle weighbridges. This work at times involved working in

confined spaces in awkward conditions, including crawling into spaces in underground

pits. He also had skills that involved working on rooves to install solar heating systems

for pools. He had no restrictions or limits on the exercise of an earning capacity that

required his physical strength and dexterity. That position changed significantly after his

injury.

273. Dr Porteous has identified the plaintiff as having a reduced capacity for work as a result

of his ongoing disabilities. In that regard, he requires an assistant with some significant

commonplace work tasks. He undoubtedly has a reduced capacity to compete for

employment on the open labour market. Furthermore, his condition is likely to

deteriorate to the point where he will only be able to undertake light sedentary work.

274. After returning to work following the accident, the plaintiff experienced difficulty in

carrying out some of his previous work tasks, and he therefore required the provision of

assistance with those tasks: T54.44; T55.1. That position is unlikely to improve.

275. Those tasks involved walking on uneven ground, with and without equipment; difficulty

pushing trolleys laden with heavy equipment; inability to climb ladders; inability to

carry or manipulate heavy components; difficulty standing for prolonged periods;

favouring the right leg when walking with loads; driving manual vehicles causes him

difficulty, as does the effect of long drives which he undertakes for his work.

276. All of these changes in his abilities and the limitations involved represented a significant

impairment in his ability to work and justify a significant award for future loss of earning

capacity. His earning capacity, uninjured, was a significant capital asset. His impaired

earning capacity requires that he be compensated for the described change to his

earning capacity.

277. In the circumstances, the appropriate approach is to make a significant allowance for

this head of damage by way of a buffer sum: Paff v Speed [1961] HCA 14; (1961) 105 CLR

549, at 566 Penrith City Council v Parks [2004] NSWCA 201, at [5]; State of New South

Wales v Moss (2000) 54 NSWLR 536; [2000] NSWCA 133, at [72]. Such an allowance

may be substantial in an appropriate case: Allianz Australia Insurance Ltd v Kerr

[2012] NSWCA 13, at [7]; Allianz Australia Insurance Ltd v Cervantes [2012] NSWCA

244, at [33] – [45]; [50]. In my view, this is an appropriate case for an approach along

these lines.

278. On behalf of the plaintiff, it was submitted that damages for future economic loss should

be assessed in the buffer amount of $250,000. In contrast, the first defendant conceded

$50,000 as being the appropriate amount for this head of damage.

279. At the age of 31 years, the plaintiff has a remaining working life of at least 36 years, if not

more, in which to bear the burden of his restricted earning capacity. One of the

vicissitudes to be taken into account, not only against the plaintiff, but also against the

defendants, is the possibility that the plaintiff may not be able to sustain self-

employment as his condition deteriorates and because he needs assistance with some

work tasks. If his new business fails, he will be at a great disadvantage in competing for

employment on the open labour market.

280. In those circumstances, I consider a substantial compensatory buffer is required to

reflect the impairment in the plaintiff’s future earning capacity.

281. I therefore assess the plaintiff’s damages for future loss of earning capacity in the buffer

amount of $200,000.

Future domestic assistance

282. On behalf of the plaintiff, it was submitted that there should be a general allowance

made for the cost of future domestic assistance in the buffer sum of $50,000. Earlier, the

plaintiff received past domestic assistance for an initial period of three months following

the accident. That level of assistance does not meet the statutory threshold for a

monetary assessment: s 15 of the CL Act.

283. The medical evidence does not suggest that the plaintiff has a current need for readily

identifiable domestic assistance, however, it suggests that the plaintiff would have

difficulty with low down activity. In these circumstances, a discounted buffer approach is

the most appropriate method by which to compensate the plaintiff for this component of

his claim.

284. As identified by Dr Porteous, the plaintiff will have difficulty with some domestic tasks

which will require him to engage in “low down” activity. On the evidence, the timing,

incidence, duration, and likely costs involved remain as imponderable factors.

285. Doing the best I can to be fair to the plaintiff and not unfair to the defendants, I assess

the plaintiff’s damages for future domestic assistance over his remaining lifetime as a

consequence of his injury in the discounted buffer amount of $15,000.

Future treatment expenses

286. On behalf of the plaintiff, it was submitted that his damages should include an amount

that would go towards meeting the cost of likely future medical and allied treatment. It

was submitted that amount should be assessed in the buffer amount of $40,000.

287. In contrast, the first defendant submitted that the plaintiff’s damages for future

treatment expenses should be restricted to an allowance for “some medication and the

prospect of removal of hardware in the next 1 – 2 years”. No allowance was made for

the other items claimed as outlined in the report of Dr Porteous.

288. Dr Porteous has identified a likely need for the plaintiff to have plastic surgery to seek to

reduce long term pain in the left knee. He has estimated the cost at between $5,000 and

$7,000. He has identified the need for an occupational therapy assessment at a cost of

$1,000 and about $600 per annum for occasional pain relief when flare-ups occur. He

has also identified the likely cost of knee replacement surgery in the next 15 to 30 years

at about $35,000.

289. In my view, Dr Porteous’ opinion is appropriately reasoned and it should be accepted in

preference to the opposing opinions of Dr Keller to the contrary. However, the

assessment must include a discount to reflect the likely delay in the plaintiff incurring

the identified expenses.

290. Doing my best to be fair to the plaintiff and not unfair to the defendants, I assess the

plaintiff’s damages for future treatment expenses in the discounted buffer amount of

$20,000.

Past out-of-pocket expenses

291. On behalf of the plaintiff, it was initially submitted that damages for past out-of-pocket

expenses should be assessed in the amount of $1,977.52. Subsequently, on 14 June 2022,

the parties came to an agreement that out-of-pocket expenses were in the amount of

$1,773.25. Therefore, I assess the plaintiff’s damages for past out-of-pocket expenses in

the agreed amount of $1,773.25.

Summary of damages assessment

292. My assessment of the plaintiff’s damages is summarised as follows:

Head of damages

(a) Non-economic loss

(b) Past economic loss

(c) Future economic loss

Assessment

$208,000

$20,000

$200,000

(d) Future domestic assistance $15,000

(e) Future treatment expenses $20,000

(f) Past out-of-pocket expenses $1,773.25

Total

$464,773.25

Disposition

293. The plaintiff has succeeded in his claims against both defendants. Under the CL Act he is

entitled to compensatory damages assessed in the sum of $464,773.25.

Costs

294. As the plaintiff has succeeded in his claim against both defendants, he should have his

costs of proceedings paid by the defendants on the ordinary basis unless a party can

show a basis for a different costs order.

Orders

295. I make the following orders:

(1) Verdict and judgment for the plaintiff in the amount of $464,773.25;

(2) The defendants are to pay the plaintiff’s costs on the ordinary basis unless a

party can establish the basis for some other costs order;

(3) Liberty to apply for further or other costs orders if required;

(4) The exhibits are to be returned to the parties.

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