United States
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
Washington, D.C.
FORM 8-K CURRENT REPORT
Pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of The Securities Exchange Act of 1934
Date of Report (Date of earliest event reported) October 7, 1999
Coastal Caribbean Oils & Minerals, Ltd.
(Exact name of registrant as specified in its charter)
Bermuda 1-4668 None
(State or other jurisdiction (Commission (IRS Employer
of incorporation) File Number) Identification No.)
Clarendon House, Church Street, Hamilton HM DX, BERMUDA NONE
(Address of principal executive offices) (Zip Code)
Registrant's telephone number, including area code (441) 295-1422
(Former name or former address, if changed since last report.)
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COASTAL CARIBBEAN OILS & MINERALS, LTD.
FORM 8-K
Item 5. Other Events
On October 6, 1999, - Florida's First District Court of Appeal ruled that
Florida's Department of Environmental Protection has the authority to deny
Coastal Petroleum Company's drilling permit for its St. George Island prospect,
provided that Coastal receives just compensation for what was taken.
A press release relating to this development and the related court opinion are
filed herewith as exhibits and incorporated herein by reference.
Item 7. Financial Statements, Pro Forma Financial Information and
Exhibits
(c) Exhibits
(99) Additional Exhibits
(a) Press release of the registrant dated October 7, 1999.
(b) Opinion of Florida's First District Court of Appeal Case 98-1998 Coastal
Petroleum Company v. Florida Wildlife Federation et al.
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SIGNATURES
Pursuant to the requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the
registrant has duly caused this report to be signed on its behalf by the
undersigned thereunto duly authorized.
COASTAL CARIBBEAN OILS & MINERALS, LTD.
(Registrant)
By /s/ Benjamin W. Heath
Benjamin W. Heath
President
Date: October 7, 1999
EXHIBIT 99(a)
COURT RULES ON COASTAL'S PERMIT APPLICATION
APALACHICOLA, FL, October 7, 1999, - Coastal Petroleum Company said Florida's
First District Court of Appeal ruled yesterday that Florida's Department of
Environmental Protection (DEP) has the authority to deny Coastal's drilling
permit for its St. George Island prospect, provided that Coastal receives just
compensation for what was taken.
Coastal, which has an 800,000-acre offshore leasehold along the Gulf Coast, has
been seeking a permit to drill the highly regarded prospect since 1992. This is
the third time DEP has had its denial of this permit reviewed by the Court. In
the previous two rulings, the Court ruled that the denials were unlawful.
Although the Court upheld DEP's action this time, the Court held that "[t]here
is no dispute that [Coastal] has a viable contract with the State of Florida,"
and DEP's interpretation "effectively prevents [Coastal] from exercising its
rights under the contract. DEP's action would be unconstitutional only if just
compensation is not paid for what is taken. ... This is a matter to be resolved
in the circuit court."
Phillip W. Ware, Coastal's president, said that Coastal is considering its
options. Coastal Petroleum Company is a majority held subsidiary of Coastal
Caribbean Oils & Minerals, Ltd. (Boston: CCO-B; CCO-BN).
Contact: Phillip W. Ware, at (850)653-2732
EXHIBIT 99(b)
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA
COASTAL PETROLEUM COMPANY,
Appellant,
V.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED.
FLORIDA WILDLIFE
FEDERATION, INC.; SIERRA
CLUB, FLORIDA CHAPTER;
FLORIDA AUDUBON SOCIETY,
INC.; ROBERT A.
BUTTERWORTH, ATTORNEY
GENERAL; ST. GEORGE ISLAND
CIVIC CLUB; and DEPARTMENT
OF ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION,
Appellees.
CASE NO. 98-1998
_________________________/
Opinion filed October 6, 1999.
An appeal from an order of the Division of Administrative Hearin9s.
John K. Aurell of Ausley & McMullen, Tallahassee, Susan W. Fox of
Macfarlane, Ferguson & McMullen, Tampa, and Robert J. Angerer and
Robert J. Angerer, Jr. of Angerer & Angerer, Tallahassee, for
Appellant.
David G. Guest, and S. Ansley Samson, Earthjustice Legal Defense Fund,
Tallahassee, for Appellees Florida Wildlife Federation, Inc., Sierra Club,
Florida Chapter, and Florida Audubon Society, Inc.; Barbara Sanders,
Apalachicola, for appellee St. George Island Civic Club; Maureen M. Malvern,
Senior Assistant General Counsel, and Andrew J. Baumann, Senior Assistant
General Counsel, Office of General Counsel, and Jonathan A. Glogau, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee Department of Environmental Protection; and
Monica K. Reimer, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for appellee Robert
A. Butterworth, Attorney General.
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BARFIELD, C. J.
In what may be one of the final chapters in the continuing saga of the
appellant's quest to extract oil from beneath the Gulf of Mexico, it challenges
an order of the Florida Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) denying its
application for a drilling permit, ostensibly because oil extraction is
potentially too dangerous to the environment. The appellant contends that the
order must be reversed because DEP's interpretation of the applicable statute
will result in an unconstitutional taking of its property. We affirm the order.
The decision in this case turns on the interpretation of section 377.241,
Florida Statutes (1997):
Criteria for issuance of permits.
The division, in the exercise of its authority to issue permits as hereinafter
provided, shall give consideration to and be guided by the following criteria:
(1) The nature, character and location of the lands involved, whether rural,
such as farms, groves, or ranches, or urban property vacant or presently
developed for residential or business purposes or are in such a location or of
such a nature as to make such improvements and developments a probability in the
near future.
(2) The nature, type and extent of ownership of the applicant, including such
matters as the length of time the applicant has owned the rl9hts claimed without
having performed any of the exploratory operations so granted or authorized.
(3) The proven or indicated likelihood of the presence of oil, gas or related
minerals in such quantities as to warrant the exploration and extraction of such
products on a commercially profitable basis.
The appellant asserts that in the past, DEP has issued permits when each
criterion of section 377.241 "has been met," but that when DEP announced its
intention to issue a drilling permit in this case, a
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group of environmental organizations challenged the decision, arguing that DEP
was wrongly interpreting the statute, which requires the agency to "weigh" the
criteria of section 377.241, balancing environmental interests against the right
to explore for oil. Following an evidentiary hearing and the issuance of an
order in which the hearing officer recommended granting the permit with a
multi-million dollar surety, DEP reconsidered its past practice and agreed with
the environmental petitioners that "meeting" each criterion was not legally
sufficient. It then "balanced" the criteria and determined that issuance of a
drilling permit was too dangerous to the coastal environment.
The appellant contends that DEP cannot "change its mind" about how to interpret
the law without notice and rulemaking procedures, especially when the result is
an unconstitutional taking of its property. We find that the appellant had
adequate opportunity to be heard on the issue of the proper interpretation of
section 377.241. DEP correctly determined that its previous practice was not
consistent with the proper interpretation of the permitting statute and
adequately explained its determination. Section 120.68(12), Fla. Stat. (1997).
Cf. Dept. of Administration V Albanese, 445 So.2d 639 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984)
(Agency possesses only such authority as is specifically delegated to it by
statute and cannot promulgate rules that go beyond that grant of authority or
are contrary to the intent of the legislature)
With respect to the constitutional challenge to DEP's interpretation of the
statute, the issues of contract impairment and taking go hand-in-hand. There is
no dispute that the appellant has a viable contract with the State of Florida to
explore for and extract oil from submerged sovereignty lands. DEP's
interpretation and application of the permitting statute, based on its
determination that there is a compelling public purpose in not allowing the
appellant to drill off shore, effectively prevents the appellant from exercising
its rights under the contract. DEP's action would be unconstitutional only if
just compensation is not paid for what is taken. Fla. Const. Art. X, Sec 6. This
is a matter to be resolved in the circuit court.
AFFIRMED.
BOOTH and WOLF, JJ., CONCUR.
