PRELIMINARY PROXY STATEMENT
AS FILED WITH THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
ON MARCH 17, 2000
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SCHEDULE 14A INFORMATION
Proxy Statement Pursuant To Section 14(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
Filed by the Registrant [__]
Filed by a Party other than the Registrant [X]
Check the appropriate box:
[X] Preliminary Proxy Statement
[__] Confidential, For Use of the Commission Only (as permitted by Rule
14a-6 (e) (2))
[__] Definitive Proxy Statement
[__] Definitive Additional Materials
[__] Soliciting Material Under Rule 14a-12
DEXTER CORPORATION
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(NAME OF REGISTRANT AS SPECIFIED IN ITS CHARTER)
INTERNATIONAL SPECIALTY PRODUCTS INC.
ISP INVESTMENTS INC.
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(NAME OF PERSON (S) FILING PROXY STATEMENT, IF OTHER THAN THE REGISTRANT)
PAYMENT OF FILING FEE (CHECK THE APPROPRIATE BOX):
[X] No fee required.
[_] Fee computed on table below per Exchange Act Rules 14a-6(I) (1) and
0-11.
1) Title of each class of securities to which transaction
applies:
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2) Aggregate number of securities to which transaction applies:
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3) Per unit price or other underlying value of transaction
computed pursuant to Exchange Act Rule 0-11 (set forth the
amount on which the filing fee is calculated and state how it
was determined):
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NY2:\881389\10\54104.0016
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4) Proposed maximum aggregate value of transaction:
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5) Total fee paid:
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[_] Fee paid previously with preliminary materials:
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[_] Check box if any part of the fee is offset as provided by Exchange Act
Rule 0-11(a)(2) and identify the filing for which the offsetting fee was paid
previously. Identify the previous filing by registration statement number, or
the form or schedule and the date of its filing.
1) Amount previously paid:
2) Form, Schedule or Registration Statement No.:
3) Filing Party:
4) Date Filed:
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PRELIMINARY PROXY MATERIALS DATED MARCH 17, 2000
SUBJECT TO COMPLETION
[The information included herein is as it is expected to be when the definitive
proxy statement is mailed to shareholders of Dexter Corporation. This proxy
statement will be revised to reflect actual facts at the time of the filing of
the definitive proxy statement.]
No GOLD Proxy Card is included with these materials.
PROXY STATEMENT
OF INTERNATIONAL SPECIALTY PRODUCTS INC.
2000 ANNUAL MEETING OF THE SHAREHOLDERS
OF DEXTER CORPORATION
We are sending this proxy statement to you as one of the holders of
common stock, par value $1.00 per share, of Dexter Corporation, a Connecticut
corporation, in connection with our solicitation of your proxy for use at the
2000 Annual Meeting of the Shareholders of Dexter scheduled for 10:00 A.M.,
local time, on Thursday, April 27, 2000, at The Hartford Club, 46 Prospect
Street, Hartford, Connecticut and at any adjournments or postponements thereof.
We are International Specialty Products Inc. and its wholly owned subsidiary ISP
Investments Inc., each a Delaware corporation, and beneficially own 9.98% of
Dexter's outstanding shares of common stock.
We have proposed to Dexter a business combination in which all Dexter
shareholders would receive at least $45 per share in cash (the "ISP Proposal"),
subject to the execution of a mutually acceptable merger agreement. This price
represents a 38% premium over Dexter's closing price immediately prior to our
proposal and at that time was higher than the stock had ever traded on the New
York Stock Exchange (the highest stock price prior to our proposal was $43-15/16
per share on December 31, 1997). Dexter's Board rejected our proposal without
negotiation. Soon thereafter, Dexter offered to purchase our shares of Life
Technologies, Inc., a majority-owned subsidiary of Dexter, which offer we
rejected. We believe that Dexter made its offer in an attempt to deter us from
pursuing the ISP Proposal.
Following the public announcement of our proxy solicitation, Dexter
announced that it would allow us to review certain non-public information
concerning Dexter and Life Technologies to determine whether we would be willing
to increase our $45 per share proposal, but stated that "we have made no
decision to sell the Company and no one else will be invited into the data
room." Less than three weeks later, Dexter issued a press release in which it
announced that it would "institute a process in which we will survey all of the
Company's available options" and invite other parties into the data room, but
again emphasized that its Board "has made no decision to sell the Company at
this time."
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Unlike our nominees, Dexter's incumbent directors have not committed to
pursue the ISP Proposal or a superior proposal. We are now asking you - the
owners of the corporation - to elect our nominees and approve several proposals
intended to facilitate the ISP Proposal or a superior proposal. You should note
that there can be no assurance that the adoption of our proposals will ensure
the consummation of such a transaction.
OUR NOMINEE ELECTION PROPOSALS:
We are proposing to amend the Dexter Bylaws to increase the size of
Dexter's Board to seventeen directors and are nominating ten persons for
election as directors. Our nominees are committed to pursue the ISP Proposal or
a superior proposal and, if elected, would constitute a majority of Dexter's
Board. Our nominees, if elected, and Dexter's incumbent directors, if
re-elected, would each owe the same fiduciary duties to Dexter shareholders.
OUR SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS PROPOSALS:
We believe that Dexter shareholders - the owners of the corporation -
should be permitted to consider the merits of any offer for their shares.
Accordingly, we are proposing that the Dexter Bylaws be amended to require
Dexter's Board to implement any special resolution passed by Dexter shareholders
directing Dexter's Board to redeem the rights issued under Dexter's "poison
pill" shareholder rights plan (the "Rights Agreement") or to amend the Rights
Agreement to render it inapplicable to types of offers or transactions specified
in any such resolution. Furthermore, in connection with this Bylaw amendment, we
seek your approval of a special resolution directing Dexter's Board to amend the
Rights Agreement promptly to make it inapplicable to any offer to purchase all
shares of Dexter for at least $45 per share in cash. The Shareholder Rights
Proposals, if adopted, will also allow the Dexter shareholders to decide whether
Dexter's Board can adopt any future "poison pill" shareholder rights plans.
OUR VOTING RIGHTS PROPOSALS:
In order to minimize any attempt by Dexter's Board to frustrate the
consideration or implementation of our proposals, we are also proposing to
repeal any Bylaw amendments that may be unilaterally adopted by Dexter's Board
between February 26, 1999 and the date of the 2000 Annual Meeting. Finally, we
are proposing a resolution to set the order in which our proposals will be voted
upon at the 2000 Annual Meeting.
[THIS PROXY STATEMENT AND THE GOLD PROXY CARD ARE FIRST BEING FURNISHED TO
SHAREHOLDERS ON OR ABOUT MARCH __, 2000].
WE URGE YOU TO SIGN, DATE AND RETURN THE GOLD PROXY CARD IN FAVOR OF THE
ELECTION OF OUR NOMINEES AND THE ADOPTION OF THE PROPOSALS DESCRIBED IN THIS
PROXY STATEMENT.
IF YOU HAVE ALREADY SENT A WHITE PROXY CARD TO THE DEXTER DIRECTORS, YOU MAY
REVOKE THAT PROXY AND VOTE AGAINST THE ELECTION OF DEXTER'S NOMINEES AND
PROPOSALS BY SIGNING, DATING
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AND RETURNING THE ENCLOSED GOLD PROXY CARD. THE LATEST DATED PROXY IS THE ONLY
ONE THAT COUNTS. ANY PROXY MAY BE REVOKED AT ANY TIME PRIOR TO THE 2000 ANNUAL
MEETING BY DELIVERING A WRITTEN NOTICE OF REVOCATION OR A LATER DATED PROXY FOR
THE 2000 ANNUAL MEETING TO INNISFREE M&A INCORPORATED OR TO THE SECRETARY OF
DEXTER, OR BY VOTING IN PERSON AT THE 2000 ANNUAL MEETING. SEE "VOTING
PROCEDURES" ON PAGE 46.
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QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ABOUT THIS PROXY SOLICITATION
Q: WHO IS SOLICITING YOUR PROXY?
A: We are International Specialty Products Inc. ("ISP") and its wholly
owned subsidiary ISP Investments Inc. As of the date of this proxy
statement, we beneficially own 2,299,200 shares of Dexter's common
stock, representing approximately 9.98% of the outstanding shares. In
addition, on such date we, together with our reporting "group" for
Schedule 13D purposes, beneficially own 5,417,991 shares of common stock
of Life Technologies, representing approximately 21.7% of the
outstanding shares of Life Technologies. We are a leading multinational
manufacturer of specialty chemicals and mineral products. For more
information on participants in our proxy solicitation, please see
"Certain Information Concerning the Participants" on page 50.
Q: WHY ARE WE SOLICITING YOUR PROXY?
A: As Dexter's largest shareholder and an investor in the company's shares
since September 1998, we have been dissatisfied with Dexter's share
price performance and the recent conduct of Dexter's Board described
below. This has led us to engage in this proxy fight to protect the
value of our and your investment in Dexter. Although subsequent to the
public announcement of our $45 per share proposal and our proxy
solicitation, Dexter's Board appears to have moderated somewhat its
previous hard-line stance, Dexter's directors -- unlike our nominees --
have not committed to pursue the ISP Proposal or a superior proposal.
(1) On October 4, 1999, one week after we announced that we had
acquired 9.98% of the outstanding common stock of Dexter,
Dexter's Board amended the company's poison pill Rights
Agreement to lower the threshold of beneficial ownership that
will automatically trigger the defensive provisions of the
Rights Agreement from 20% to 11%.
(2) On December 3, 1999, we discussed with Dexter's
representatives our view that Life Technologies, with its
higher growth and higher margins, can better fulfill its
potential as an independent entity, or in combination with
another similarly strategically situated company, rather than
in combination with Dexter. We therefore recommended that it
would be in the best interests of both companies and their
respective shareholders if Dexter and Life Technologies were
independent corporate entities. Dexter rejected our
recommendation.
(3) After Dexter dismissed our recommendation, we proposed a
business combination in which all holders of Dexter common
stock would receive at least $45 per share in cash, subject to
the execution of a mutually acceptable merger agreement. This
price represents a 38% premium over Dexter's closing price
immediately prior to our proposal and at that time was higher
than the stock had ever traded on the NYSE (the highest stock
price prior to our proposal was $43-15/16 per share on
December 31, 1997). Dexter's Board rejected our proposal
without negotiation.
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By not approving the ISP Proposal, Dexter's Board has
effectively deprived you of the right to consider for yourself
whether or not to accept our acquisition proposal. It would be
uneconomical for us or any other person to make an offer
directly to the Dexter shareholders, due to the "poison pill"
rights (the "Rights") which would be automatically triggered
by a purchase of shares under such an offer unless, under a
recently-created exception described below, Dexter's Board or
its financial advisors take action. In addition, under
Connecticut law, in the absence of Board approval, a person
who acquires more than 10% of the outstanding voting stock of
a Connecticut corporation in a tender offer is prohibited from
effecting a merger to acquire the shares not tendered for a
five year period.
(4) On January 27, 2000, we informed Dexter that we believed that
the failure of Dexter's Board to encourage negotiation of the
ISP Proposal left us "with no choice but to take our proposal
directly to our fellow shareholders," and announced our
intention to present the proposals contained in this proxy
statement at the 2000 Annual Meeting.
(5) Following the public announcement of the ISP Proposal and our
proxy solicitation, on February 9, 2000, Dexter's Board took
the following actions:
(a) Dexter announced that it had amended its Rights
Agreement to make the poison pill Rights inapplicable
to any offer which is for all shares, is
substantially unconditional, remains available to
shareholders for 60 days, is supported by firm
financing commitments and is for a price which is, in
the opinion of Dexter's financial advisor, fair from
a financial point of view; and
(b) Dexter announced that it would allow us to review
certain non-public information concerning Dexter and
Life Technologies to determine whether we would be
willing to increase our $45 per share proposal, but
stated, "we have made no decision to sell the company
or to explore a sale of the company or to test the
market ... and no one else will be invited into the
data room."
(6) On February 28, 2000, Dexter announced that it would
"institute a process in which we will survey all of the
Company's available options" and invite other parties into the
data room. However, Dexter again emphasized that its Board
"has made no decision to sell the Company at this time." You
should know that Dexter has still refused to enter into
negotiations with us relating to the ISP Proposal.
In short, we believe that the actions recently taken by Dexter's Board
were taken only under the pressure of our proxy solicitation and
underscore the urgent need for the adoption of our proposals. In our
opinion, the changes to Dexter's poison pill are not satisfactory in
that they still do not permit shareholder choice, but leave the
decision as to whether shareholders should be permitted to consider an
offer in the hands of Dexter's Board or its hand-picked financial
advisors.
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In addition, Dexter's Board continues to state that the company is not
for sale. We are seeking your proxy to vote in favor of the adoption of
our Nominee Election Proposals, Shareholder Rights Proposals and Voting
Rights Proposals described in this document, because we believe that
each of these proposals will facilitate the ISP Proposal or a superior
proposal. If you grant us your proxy, we will also be entitled to vote
your shares in our discretion on matters incident to the conduct of the
2000 Annual Meeting and on other matters brought to a vote at the
meeting for which we have not yet been given notice.
Q: WHY ARE WE ASKING YOU TO INCREASE THE SIZE OF DEXTER'S BOARD AND ELECT
OUR NOMINEES?
A: We are soliciting your proxy in favor of increasing the size of
Dexter's Board so that you will have the opportunity to elect, as a
majority of Dexter's Board of Directors, persons who are committed to
pursue the ISP Proposal or a superior proposal. Dexter is currently
proposing that only three of the ten current directors will stand for
election at the 2000 Annual Meeting. We are proposing to increase the
number of directors from its current number of ten to seventeen, so
that a total of ten directors will be elected by Dexter shareholders at
the 2000 Annual Meeting. If all of our nominees are elected, a majority
of Dexter's directors would not be continuing incumbents and a lack of
continuity in Dexter's corporate policy and governance may occur.
However, our nominees, if elected, and Dexter's incumbent directors, if
re-elected, would each owe the same fiduciary duties to Dexter
shareholders.
Q: WHO ARE THE NOMINEES?
A: Our nominees include eight independent persons who are not affiliated
with ISP and two persons who are affiliates of ISP, all of whom are
well-respected members of the business and legal community. Our
nominees, unlike Dexter's incumbent directors, are committed to pursue
the ISP Proposal or a superior proposal. Two of our nominees, Samuel J.
Heyman and Sunil Kumar, are affiliates of ISP. Mr. Heyman is the
Chairman of the Board of ISP and Mr. Kumar is President and Chief
Executive Officer of ISP. If elected to Dexter's Board, Messrs. Heyman
and Kumar would not participate in any Board action relating to the ISP
Proposal or any other business combination transaction while our
acquisition proposal remains in effect, and would act in accordance
with their fiduciary duties to Dexter shareholders with respect to any
action they do take as directors. We have no reason to believe that any
of our nominees will be disqualified or unable or unwilling to serve if
elected. However, if any of our nominees are unable to serve or for
good cause will not serve, proxies may be voted for another person
nominated by ISP to fill the vacancy.
Q: WHY SHOULD SHAREHOLDERS DETERMINE IF THE POISON PILL RIGHTS AGREEMENT
SHOULD BE AMENDED OR REDEEMED?
A: In 1996, Dexter's Board adopted the Rights Agreement, dated as of
August 23, 1996, by and between Dexter and ChaseMellon Shareholder
Services, L.L.C. The poison pill Rights issued under the Rights
Agreement permit Dexter shareholders to
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purchase shares of Dexter common stock, or shares of an acquiring
company's common stock, at less than market prices, if, among other
things, persons not approved by Dexter's Board acquire beneficial
ownership of 11% or more of Dexter's common stock, unless the offer
falls within the recently-created exception requiring a fairness
determination by Dexter's financial advisor. No action is required to
trigger the exercisability of the Rights, once the threshold of
ownership has been passed. Currently, any person or group who acquires
beneficial ownership of 11% or more of Dexter's outstanding shares of
common stock without Board approval or a fairness determination by
Dexter's financial advisor and who cannot, like institutional investors
and certain other parties, take advantage of an exception in the Rights
Agreement applicable to "passive investors," will experience immediate
and substantial economic and voting power dilution, because the poison
pill rights issued to each other holder of Dexter common stock under
the Rights Agreement would become automatically exercisable to purchase
additional shares of common stock for each share then outstanding, at
one-half the current market price, from and after the date of such
threshold acquisition.
In its current form, we believe that the Rights Agreement is harmful to
your interests as a shareholder because it is a device that provides
Dexter's Board with the power to block a transaction which could be
economically beneficial to you, unless the offer falls within a
limited, recently-created exception requiring, among other things a
fairness determination by Dexter's financial advisors. Our proposed
Bylaw amendment would require Dexter's Board to follow the direction of
a majority of Dexter shareholders by redeeming the Rights or amending
the Rights Agreement to render it inapplicable to types of offers or
transactions specified by Dexter shareholders. In addition, Dexter's
Board would be required to seek shareholder approval prior to adopting
a new "poison pill" shareholder rights plan. As discussed below, we are
also proposing that you direct Dexter's Board to amend the Rights
Agreement now.
Proponents of poison pills claim that plans such as the Rights
Agreement provide boards of directors with time to respond to
unsolicited bids in an orderly manner and provide incentives for a
potential bidder to negotiate with the board, thereby potentially
leading to a higher price for shareholders. If our Bylaw proposal and
the shareholder resolution described below are adopted, the potential
benefits of the Rights Agreement will no longer apply to any proposal
for all shares for at least $45 in cash. However, we believe that you -
the owners of the corporation - should be permitted to consider for
yourself the merits of offers for your shares.
Q: WHY DO WE WANT DEXTER'S BOARD TO AMEND DEXTER'S POISON PILL RIGHTS
AGREEMENT NOW?
A: On December 14, 1999, we proposed a business combination in which
Dexter shareholders would receive at least $45 per share in cash,
subject to the execution of a mutually acceptable merger agreement.
This price represents a 38% premium over the closing price of Dexter's
common stock immediately prior to our proposal and at that time was
higher than the stock had ever traded on the NYSE (the highest stock
price prior to our proposal was $43-15/16 per share on December 31,
1997). Dexter's Board rejected our proposal without negotiation.
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Because Dexter's poison pill rights would be triggered by most
acquisitions of 11% or more of Dexter's shares, it would be
uneconomical for us or any third party to make an offer directly to
Dexter shareholders over the current Board's refusal, unless the offer
falls within a limited, recently-created exception requiring, among
other things, a fairness determination by Dexter's financial advisors.
It should be noted that Dexter's Board has rejected our $45 per share
proposal as inadequate, and Dexter has not disclosed what price
Dexter's financial advisors would deem fair.
We believe that the shareholder resolution we propose, which would
require Dexter's Board to amend the Rights Agreement to make it
inapplicable to any offer for all outstanding shares of Dexter for at
least $45 per share in cash, would send a clear message to Dexter's
Board that it should pursue offers of at least $45 per share and would
end the uncertainty as to the minimum bid required to make the poison
pill Rights inapplicable. However, you should be aware that adoption of
the shareholder resolution would mean that any protection provided by
the Rights Agreement would be inapplicable to any proposal to acquire
all Dexter shares for at least $45 per share in cash.
Q: WHAT WILL HAPPEN IF THE POISON PILL RIGHTS AGREEMENT IS INVALIDATED IN
COURT?
A: We have commenced litigation seeking to invalidate the Rights Agreement
under Connecticut law. If the Rights Agreement is invalidated, it will
no longer be an obstacle to stock accumulations or offers at any price
and no longer would provide the protections referred to above, as
advocated by poison pill proponents. If the Rights Agreement is
judicially invalidated prior to the 2000 Annual Meeting, we will
withdraw our Shareholder Rights Proposals.
Q: IS ISP PREPARED TO ACQUIRE DEXTER?
A: We are prepared to promptly negotiate and execute a mutually acceptable
merger agreement with Dexter. ISP has received from Chase Securities
Inc. a letter, dated January 20, 2000, pursuant to which Chase has
informed ISP that, based on the information provided to Chase and
then-current conditions in the bank syndication market, Chase is highly
confident in its ability to arrange senior credit facilities to, among
other things, finance the acquisition of Dexter and refinance
indebtedness of ISP and Dexter following the acquisition. A highly
confident letter is not a binding commitment to provide funds. We have
not yet sought a binding commitment (which would involve the payment of
commitment fees) because our proposal has been rejected by Dexter's
Board. However, we are confident, based on our discussions with Chase,
that we could promptly obtain binding commitments if Dexter's Board
accepts the ISP Proposal.
Q: WHY ARE YOU PROPOSING TO REPEAL BYLAWS ADOPTED BY DEXTER'S BOARD?
A: We propose to repeal any Bylaw amendments adopted by Dexter's Board
between February 26, 1999 and the date of the 2000 Annual Meeting. We
are not aware of any amendments made between February 26 and now. We
believe that any Bylaw
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amendments adopted by Dexter's Board prior to the 2000 Annual Meeting
are likely to be aimed at frustrating our proposals and therefore are
not likely to be in the best interests of the Dexter shareholders. Any
Bylaw amendments validly adopted by Dexter's Board prior to the Annual
Meeting would remain in effect unless and until our proposal to repeal
such Bylaws is adopted. If Dexter's Board adopts any such Bylaw
amendments before the 2000 Annual Meeting, it will have an opportunity
to inform shareholders of the benefits of these amendments and to
attempt to persuade shareholders to vote against this proposal.
Q: WHO CAN VOTE AT THE 2000 ANNUAL MEETING?
A: If you owned Dexter shares on February 25, 2000 (the "Record Date"),
you have the right to vote at the 2000 Annual Meeting. We believe that
as of the close of business on the Record Date, there were 23,058,969
shares of common stock of Dexter issued and outstanding and entitled to
vote. Shareholders have one vote for each share of common stock they
own with respect to all matters to be considered at the 2000 Annual
Meeting.
Q: HOW MANY SHARES MUST BE VOTED IN FAVOR OF THE PROPOSALS TO EFFECT THEM?
A: Assuming that a quorum, defined as holders of not less than a majority
of the shares of Common Stock outstanding and entitled to vote, is
present in person or by proxy at the 2000 Annual Meeting, our proposals
can be adopted by the following votes:
Nominee Proposals -- Election of our nominees will require the
affirmative vote of a plurality of the votes cast. The election of our
nominees for seven newly-created directorships will not be effective
unless our proposed Bylaw amendment increasing the size of Dexter's
Board is adopted.
Proposals Requiring Bylaw Amendments -- We believe that our proposals
involving amendments to the Dexter Bylaws will be approved if the votes
cast for the respective proposal exceed the votes cast against the
respective proposal. Accordingly, our Bylaw amendment proposals could be
approved by less than a majority of the issued and outstanding shares of
common stock once a quorum is present at the 2000 Annual Meeting. We
have received the opinion of our Connecticut counsel, Levett Rockwood
P.C., that, to the extent the Dexter Bylaws may require a two-thirds
supermajority shareholder vote for an amendment, such provision is
invalid under Connecticut law. Levett Rockwood P.C. has consented to the
use of its name and the reference to its opinion in this Proxy
Statement. We have also instituted litigation seeking to have any such
supermajority amendment requirement held ineffective. See "Certain
Litigation." If the Bylaws are held to contain an effective
supermajority shareholder voting requirement, our proposals involving
Bylaw amendments would each require the affirmative vote of the holders
of two-thirds of the issued and outstanding shares of common stock.
Proposals Not Requiring Bylaw Amendments -- Adoption of our shareholder
resolution requiring Dexter's Board to amend the Rights Agreement and
our Omnibus Proposal providing the order for voting at the 2000 Annual
Meeting will
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be approved if the votes cast for the respective proposals exceed the
votes cast against the respective proposals. Accordingly, these
proposals could be adopted by less than a majority of the issued and
outstanding shares of common stock once a quorum is present at the 2000
Annual Meeting. The shareholder resolution as to the Rights Agreement
will not be effective unless our related Bylaw amendment is adopted.
Q: WHAT WILL HAPPEN IF DEXTER SUCCESSFULLY INVALIDATES CERTAIN OF OUR
PROPOSALS IN COURT?
A: Dexter has asserted that our proposals to increase the size of Dexter's
Board and elect seven additional directors at the 2000 Annual Meeting
are invalid. Dexter also has asserted that our Shareholder Rights
Proposals are invalid, and that it will not implement these proposals
even if they are adopted by the Dexter shareholders. In connection with
our proposals, we have filed a complaint with the United States
District Court for the District of Connecticut in which we are seeking,
among other things, a declaratory judgment that our Nominee Election
Proposals, Shareholder Rights Proposals and Voting Rights Proposals are
valid under Connecticut law. See "Certain Litigation." While there is a
lack of controlling case law in Connecticut to either directly
substantiate or directly contradict the validity of our proposals under
Connecticut state law, we believe, based on the case law of other
jurisdictions and our interpretation of the Connecticut Business
Corporation Act and the Dexter Certificate of Incorporation, that all
of our proposals are valid. We intend to present all of our proposals
at the 2000 Annual Meeting. If any of our proposals were to be finally
adjudicated as invalid under Connecticut law, such proposal, even if
adopted, would then not be effective.
Q: WHAT SHOULD YOU DO TO VOTE?
A: Sign, date and return the enclosed GOLD Proxy card TODAY in the
envelope provided. For more information on how to vote your shares,
please see "Voting Procedures" on page 31.
Q: WHO DO YOU CALL IF YOU HAVE QUESTIONS ABOUT THE SOLICITATION?
A: Please call Innisfree M&A Incorporated toll free at (888) 750-5834.
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IMPORTANT
PLEASE REVIEW THIS DOCUMENT AND THE ENCLOSED MATERIALS CAREFULLY. YOUR
VOTE IS VERY IMPORTANT, NO MATTER HOW MANY OR HOW FEW SHARES YOU OWN.
1. If your shares are registered in your own name, please sign, date and
mail the enclosed GOLD Proxy Card to Innisfree M&A Incorporated in the
postage-paid envelope provided today.
2. If you have previously signed and returned a WHITE proxy card to
Dexter, you have every right to change your vote. Only your latest
dated card will count. You may revoke any WHITE proxy card already sent
to Dexter by signing, dating and mailing the enclosed GOLD Proxy Card
in the postage-paid envelope provided. Any proxy may be revoked at any
time prior to the 2000 Annual Meeting by delivering a written notice of
revocation or a later dated proxy for the 2000 Annual Meeting to
InnisFree M&A Incorporated or the Secretary of Dexter, or by voting in
person at the 2000 Annual Meeting.
3. If your shares are held in the name of a brokerage firm, bank nominee
or other institution, only it can sign a GOLD Proxy Card with respect
to your shares and only after receiving your specific instructions.
Accordingly, please sign, date and mail the enclosed GOLD Proxy Card in
the postage-paid envelope provided. To ensure that your shares are
voted, you should also contact the person responsible for your account
and give instructions for a GOLD Proxy Card to be issued representing
your shares.
4. After signing the enclosed GOLD Proxy Card, do not sign or return the
WHITE proxy card unless you intend to change your vote, because only
your latest dated proxy card will be counted.
If you have any questions about giving your proxy or require
assistance, please call:
Innisfree M&A Incorporated
501 Madison Avenue, 20th Floor
New York, New York 10022
Call Toll-Free: (888) 750-5834
Banks and Brokerage Firms Call Collect: (212) 750-5833
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REASONS FOR THE SOLICITATION
The purpose of our proposals is to facilitate the ISP Proposal or a
superior proposal, in which you would receive at least $45 per share in cash,
although there can be no assurance that the adoption of our proposals will
result in the consummation of such a transaction. Our nominees to Dexter's
Board, unlike Dexter's incumbent directors, are committed to pursue the ISP
Proposal or a superior proposal. Another reason for our proposals is to permit
Dexter shareholders to consider, on their own, the merits of offers for their
shares by permitting them to issue instructions to Dexter's Board as to the
manner in which the Rights Agreement will be applied to particular offers. In
addition, we urge you to direct Dexter's Board now to make the Rights Agreement
inapplicable to offers of at least $45 per share in cash for all shares.
As the largest Dexter shareholder and an investor in the company's
shares since September 1998, we have been dissatisfied with the share price
performance of Dexter's common stock. Specifically, on December 3, 1999, we
discussed with representatives of Dexter our view that Life Technologies, with
its higher growth and higher margins, can better fulfill its potential as an
independent entity or in combination with another similarly strategically
situated company, rather than in combination with Dexter. We therefore
recommended that it would be in the best interests of both companies and their
respective shareholders if Dexter and Life Technologies were independent
corporate entities. Dexter rejected our recommendation. Therefore, on December
14, 1999, we proposed to Dexter a business combination in which Dexter
shareholders would receive at least $45 per share in cash, subject to the
negotiation of a mutually acceptable merger agreement. This price represents a
premium of 38% over Dexter's closing price on the day immediately prior to our
proposal and at that time was higher than the stock had ever traded on the NYSE
(the highest stock price prior to our proposal was $43-15/16 per share on
December 31, 1997). On December 23, 1999, Dexter's Board rejected our proposal
without negotiation. Then, on January 20, 2000, Dexter, in what we believe was
an attempt to deter us from pursuing the ISP Proposal, offered to purchase our
shares of Life Technologies for $49 per share, which offer we rejected. On
January 27, 2000, we announced our intent to commence this proxy solicitation.
Following the public announcement of our proxy solicitation, Dexter's
Board announced on February 9, 2000 that it would allow us to review certain
non-public information concerning Dexter and Life Technologies to determine
whether we would be willing to increase our $45 proposal. Dexter stated "[d]o
not misread the Board's decision or its intentions: we have made no decision to
sell the Company or to explore a sale of the Company or to test the market for a
possible sale of the Company, and no one else will be invited into the data
room." Less than three weeks later, on February 28, 2000, Dexter announced that
it would "institute a process in which we will survey all of the Company's
available options" and that "third parties will be invited to sign
confidentiality agreements, review comprehensive data room materials and receive
Dexter management presentations." However, Dexter emphasized that its Board "has
made no decision to sell the Company at this time." We note that Dexter has not
entered into negotiations with us relating to the ISP Proposal.
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Based on the statements and conduct of Dexter's Board referred to
above, we do not believe that the incumbent Dexter directors have committed to
pursue the ISP Proposal or a superior proposal. Our nominees, unlike Dexter's
incumbent directors, are committed to pursue the ISP Proposal or a superior
proposal. All determinations made by our nominees, if elected, as well as those
made by Dexter's incumbent directors, if re-elected, will be subject to their
fiduciary duties to Dexter shareholders. Two of our nominees, Samuel J. Heyman
and Sunil Kumar, are affiliated with ISP and, if elected to Dexter's Board,
would not participate in any Board action relating to the ISP Proposal or any
other business combination transaction while our acquisition proposal remains in
effect, and would act in accordance with their fiduciary duties to Dexter
shareholders with respect to any action they do take as directors.
We are prepared to promptly negotiate and execute a mutually acceptable
merger agreement with Dexter. ISP has received from Chase Securities Inc. a
letter dated January 20, 2000 pursuant to which Chase has informed ISP that,
based on the information provided to Chase and then-current conditions in the
bank syndication market, Chase is highly confident in its ability to arrange
senior credit facilities to, among other things, finance the acquisition of
Dexter, refinance indebtedness of ISP and Dexter, pay anticipated expenses and
provide working capital for the combined companies following the acquisition. A
highly confident letter is not a binding commitment to provide funds. We have
not yet sought a binding commitment (which would involve the payment of
commitment fees) because our proposal has been rejected by Dexter's Board.
However, we are confident, based on our discussions with Chase, that we could
promptly obtain binding commitments if Dexter accepts our proposal. We have also
engaged Chase Securities Inc. to serve as our financial advisor in connection
with any business combination transaction involving Dexter.
In connection with our proposals, we have filed a complaint with the
United States District Court for the District of Connecticut in which we are
seeking, among other things, (1) a declaratory judgment that our Nominee
Election Proposals, Shareholder Rights Proposals and Voting Rights Proposals are
valid under Connecticut law, that any supermajority voting requirement contained
in Dexter's Bylaws is invalid, and that the Rights Agreement is invalid, and (2)
an order requiring that the 2000 Annual Meeting be held no later than April 30,
2000. While there is a lack of controlling case law in Connecticut to either
directly substantiate or directly contradict the validity of our proposals under
Connecticut state law, we believe, based on the case law of other jurisdictions
and our interpretation of the Connecticut Business Corporation Act and the
Dexter Certificate of Incorporation, that our proposals are valid. However, if
any of our proposals were to be finally adjudicated as invalid under Connecticut
law, such proposal, if adopted, would then not be effective. See "Certain
Litigation."
We are soliciting your proxy to vote in favor of the following
proposals at the 2000 Annual Meeting:
THE NOMINEE ELECTION PROPOSALS
(1) The election of our slate of nominees to replace the three
directors whose terms expire at the 2000 Annual Meeting (the
"Director Election Proposal");
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(2) A Bylaw amendment that would increase the size of Dexter's
Board to permit our nominees for directorships, if elected, to
constitute a majority of Dexter's Board (the "Board Size Bylaw
Proposal");
(3) The election of our slate of nominees to fill the vacancies
created by the increased number of directorships (the
"Additional Directors Election Proposal");
THE SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS PROPOSALS
(4) A Bylaw amendment that would require Dexter's Board to make
certain amendments to Dexter's "Poison Pill" Rights Agreement
or redeem the Rights issued thereunder if Dexter shareholders
instruct Dexter's Board to do so by majority vote, and not to
adopt a new rights agreement without shareholder approval (the
"Poison Pill Bylaw Proposal");
(5) A shareholder resolution directing Dexter's Board to amend the
Rights Agreement promptly to make it inapplicable to any offer
for all outstanding shares of Dexter for at least $45 per
share in cash (the "Poison Pill Amendment Proposal");
THE VOTING RIGHTS PROPOSALS
(6) A shareholder resolution repealing any and all amendments made
by Dexter's Board of Directors to the Bylaws after February
26, 1999 (the "Bylaw Repeal Proposal"); and
(7) A resolution providing the order for voting at the 2000 Annual
Meeting (the "Omnibus Proposal").
EACH OF OUR PROPOSALS IS SEPARATE AND DISTINCT FROM EACH OTHER
PROPOSAL. YOU MAY APPROVE OR VOTE SEPARATELY ON ANY OR ALL OF THE PROPOSALS, BUT
THE ADDITIONAL DIRECTORS ELECTION PROPOSAL WILL NOT BE EFFECTIVE UNLESS THE
BOARD SIZE BYLAW PROPOSAL IS ADOPTED AND THE POISON PILL AMENDMENT PROPOSAL WILL
NOT BE EFFECTIVE UNLESS THE POISON PILL BYLAW PROPOSAL IS ADOPTED. DEXTER HAS
ASSERTED THAT CERTAIN OF OUR PROPOSALS ARE INVALID. IF ANY PROPOSAL IS ADJUDGED
INVALID UNDER CONNECTICUT LAW, IT WILL THEN NOT BE EFFECTIVE. SEE "CERTAIN
LITIGATION."
BY ADOPTING OUR PROPOSALS YOU WILL BE GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY TO ELECT
NOMINEES TO FORM A MAJORITY OF DEXTER'S BOARD WHO ARE COMMITTED TO PURSUE THE
ISP PROPOSAL OR A SUPERIOR PROPOSAL, AND YOU WILL BE GIVEN THE RIGHT TO DECIDE
WHETHER DEXTER'S POISON PILL RIGHTS AGREEMENT SHOULD APPLY TO SUCH A
TRANSACTION. YOU SHOULD NOTE THAT THERE CAN BE NO ASSURANCE THAT THE ADOPTION OF
OUR PROPOSALS WILL ENSURE THE CONSUMMATION OF SUCH A TRANSACTION. WE RECOMMEND
THAT YOU SIGN, DATE AND RETURN THE GOLD PROXY CARD TODAY IN FAVOR OF OUR
PROPOSALS.
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CERTAIN LITIGATION
On January 27, 2000, we commenced a lawsuit against Dexter and seven
members of Dexter's Board of Directors in the United States District Court for
the District of Connecticut. International Specialty Products Inc. and ISP
Investments Inc. v. Dexter Corporation, et al., Civil Action No. 3:00 CV 157
(SRU). The Dexter directors who are named as defendants are K. Grahame Walker,
Henrietta Holsman Fore, Robert M. Furek, Edgar G. Hotard, Peter G. Kelly,
Jean-Francois Saglio and George M. Whitesides.
Count I of the Complaint alleges that Article X of the Dexter bylaws,
to the extent it requires a two-third supermajority vote of Dexter shareholders
to amend Dexter's bylaws, is invalid under ss. 33-807 of the Connecticut
Business Corporation Act, which permits supermajority voting provisions only if
expressly authorized by the certificate of incorporation. The Complaint alleges
that Dexter's certificate of incorporation does not authorize a supermajority
provision in the bylaws and therefore any two-thirds voting requirement in
Article X constitutes an ultra vires act of the board of directors and may not
be enforced. Accordingly, the Complaint seeks a declaratory judgment that: (i)
if Article X of the Dexter bylaws imposes a supermajority voting requirement,
then it is invalid, void and of no effect under Connecticut law; and (ii)
Dexter's shareholders may alter, amend or repeal any Dexter bylaw or bylaws
without a supermajority vote. The Complaint also seeks preliminary and permanent
injunctive relief barring enforcement of a supermajority voting requirement in
Article X of Dexter bylaws.
Count II of the Complaint alleges that Dexter's poison pill shareholder
rights plan violates ss. 33-665(a) of the Connecticut Business Corporation Act,
which states, in relevant part, that "[a]ll shares of a class shall have
preferences, limitations and relative rights identical with those of other
shares of the same class." The Complaint alleges that Dexter's poison pill
violates ss. 33-665 because it impermissibly discriminates among shares of the
same class of stock by entitling all holders of Dexter common stock, except
shareholders owning 11 percent or more of Dexter's outstanding shares who do not
file a Schedule 13G with the SEC stating that their ownership position has been
acquired without any intent to change or influence control of Dexter, to
exercise the right under certain circumstances to obtain additional shares of
Dexter common stock in exchange for one-half of the then current market price of
Dexter common stock. Accordingly, the Complaint seeks a declaratory judgment
that Dexter's poison pill violates Connecticut law and is ultra vires, invalid,
void and of no effect. The Complaint also seeks preliminary and permanent
injunctive relief barring enforcement of Dexter's poison pill.
Counts III, IV and V of the Complaint allege that ISP's Nominee
Election Proposals, Shareholder Rights Proposals and Voting Rights Proposals are
each valid under Connecticut law, consistent with Dexter's certificate of
incorporation and may be voted upon at Dexter's 2000 annual meeting. The
gravamen of these claims is that Dexter's shareholders have the authority to:
(i) amend the bylaws in order to create
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(and then elect directors to fill) new directorships; (ii) amend the bylaws to
require directors to modify poison pills and prevent the board from adopting a
new poison pill without shareholder approval; and (iii) amend or repeal bylaws
and bar directors from vetoing shareholder determinations to amend or repeal
bylaws.
Accordingly, the Complaint seeks a declaratory judgment that: (i)
Dexter's shareholders have the lawful right to increase the size of Dexter's
Board by amending the bylaws and to fill all newly created directorships by
majority vote at the 2000 annual meeting; (ii) that Dexter's shareholders have
the lawful right to amend the bylaws to require that Dexter's Board amend the
poison pill or redeem the rights issued under the rights plan and to prevent the
board from adopting further poison pills without shareholder approval; and (iii)
that the Nominee Election Proposals, Shareholder Rights Proposals and Voting
Rights Proposals are valid under Connecticut law and consistent with Dexter's
certificate of incorporation, are the proper subjects for action by Dexter's
shareholders and may be voted upon by shareholders at Dexter's 2000 annual
meeting. The Complaint also seeks preliminary and permanent injunctive relief
permitting a shareholder vote on these proposals at Dexter's 2000 annual
meeting.
Count VI of the Complaint alleges that Dexter's directors have breached
their fiduciary and other legal obligations to the company and its shareholders,
including ISP, by, among other things, amending Dexter's poison pill in October
1999 to apply to 11 percent shareholders who do not file a Schedule 13G with the
SEC stating that their ownership position has been acquired without any intent
to change or influence control of Dexter, refusing to consider with the care,
loyalty and good faith required by law ISP's proposal to purchase all of
Dexter's shares at a price of $45 per share, seeking to entrench themselves in
office and failing to pursue opportunities and transactions that would benefit
Dexter's shareholders and which are in the company's best interests.
The Complaint seeks a declaratory judgment that Dexter's directors may
not breach their fiduciary obligations by acting to impede or block an offer for
Dexter shares at a price of $45 per share or more in cash either by utilizing
Dexter's poison pill or refusing to approve the transaction under ss. 33-844 of
the Connecticut Business Corporation Act (which prohibits certain transactions
with interested shareholders for a five-year period unless approved by the
board). The Complaint also seeks preliminary and permanent injunctive relief
barring Dexter's directors from acting to impede or block such an offer for
Dexter's shares either by utilizing the poison pill or refusing to approve the
transaction under ss. 33-844 of the Connecticut Business Corporation Act. In
addition, the Complaint seeks injunctive and declaratory relief preventing
Dexter's directors from conducting Dexter's 2000 annual meeting of Dexter's
shareholders after April 30, 2000. Furthermore, the Complaint seeks money
damages arising from the directors' breach of their legal obligations.
On or about March 9, 2000, Dexter and the individual director
defendants filed a motion for partial summary judgment seeking dismissal of
Count III of ISP's Complaint, which concerns ISP's proposed bylaw amendment to
increase the size of Dexter's board of directors. ISP intends to oppose this
motion.
None of ISP's nominees are named parties to the litigation. Two of
ISP's nominees, Samuel J. Heyman and Sunil Kumar, however, are affiliated with
ISP and ISP
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Investments Inc., which are the named plaintiffs in the litigation. Mr. Heyman
is also the beneficial owner (as defined in Rule 13d-3) of approximately 76% of
the capital stock of ISP.
BACKGROUND AND RECENT EVENTS
We began purchasing shares of Dexter and Life Technologies common stock
in September 1998 because we believed that the shares of both companies were
substantially undervalued. As the largest Dexter shareholder and an investor in
the company's shares since September 1998, we have been dissatisfied with the
share price performance of Dexter's common stock. Specifically, we have
discussed with representatives of Dexter a recommendation with respect to the
separation of Life Technologies and Dexter. Dexter rejected our recommendation.
Therefore, on December 14, 1999, we proposed a business combination in which
Dexter shareholders would receive at least $45 per share in cash, subject to the
negotiation of a mutually acceptable merger agreement. Set forth below is a
summary of events leading up to and following our proposal.
Life Technologies is the surviving corporation of a merger in 1983 of
Bethesda Research Laboratories, Inc. with a Dexter-owned subsidiary. Dexter
owned approximately 52% of the outstanding stock of Life Technologies in 1998.
On July 7, 1998, Dexter proposed to purchase the remaining 48% of the
outstanding shares of Life Technologies that it did not already own, at a
purchase price of $37 per share in cash. The proposal was made subject to, among
other things, the approval of the Board of Directors of Life Technologies, and,
since a majority of the Life Technologies Board was affiliated with Dexter, the
approval of the Life Technologies Board's unaffiliated directors. Following
receipt of Dexter's proposal, Life Technologies's Board of Directors formed a
special committee of independent directors (the "Special Committee") to consider
and respond to the proposal. Thomas H. Adams, Ph.D., Frank F. Samuel, Jr. and
Iain C. Wylie were appointed as the members of the Special Committee, with Dr.
Adams to act as chairman. The Special Committee retained outside counsel and a
nationally recognized investment banking firm to assist in their analysis of
Dexter's proposal.
After a comprehensive valuation of Life Technologies and its prospects
by the Special Committee and its advisors, on October 27, 1998, the Special
Committee reported to the Life Technologies Board that it would be unable to
recommend that Life Technologies shareholders accept Dexter's offer of $37 per
share of Life Technologies stock. Among its findings, the Special Committee
reported that:
A. it did not believe that Dexter's proposal adequately reflected
the value of the prospects of Life Technologies; in
particular, the Special Committee noted that Dexter's proposal
did not adequately address the value of Life Technologies's
research and development pipeline;
B. it had received inquiries from a third party interested in
acquiring all of Life Technologies at a price in excess of
Dexter's $37 per share offer, but was unable to respond to
such offer because Dexter had advised that it was not
interested in disposing of its controlling block of Life
Technologies shares; and
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C. Dexter's proposed purchase price of $37 per share of Life
Technologies common stock was substantially below the $50+
range which the Special Committee considered an appropriate
price range for shares of Life Technologies at that time.
In response to the Special Committee's findings, K. Grahame Walker,
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Dexter and Chairman of the Board of Life
Technologies, proposed that the Life Technologies Board disband the Special
Committee. Mr. Walker also announced that Dexter was withdrawing its original
proposal and would make an offer directly to the shareholders of Life
Technologies to tender their shares for $37 per share in cash. All five of the
directors affiliated with Dexter, representing a majority of the Life
Technologies Board, voted in favor of a resolution to disband the Special
Committee, while all three members of the Special Committee voted against the
resolution. A few days thereafter, two of the three independent Life
Technologies directors who served on the Special Committee (Messrs. Samuel and
Wylie) resigned as directors of Life Technologies in protest of the disbanding
of the Special Committee.
In his resignation letter, dated November 3, 1998, to the Life
Technologies Board, Frank E. Samuel, Jr. stated that Dexter's proposal "ignored
important components of Life Technologies's overall value, including the value
of the products in Life Technologies's R&D Pipeline." Mr. Samuel further
characterized Dexter's Proposal as "heavyhanded" and as a "coercive attempt to
buy out the [Life Technologies] public stockholders at a price which, I believe,
deprives these stockholders of the significant inherent values to which they are
rightfully entitled." Iain C. Wylie, in his resignation letter to the Life
Technologies Board, echoed Mr. Samuel's concerns with respect to Dexter's
proposal.
Despite the Special Committee's findings, on November 2, 1998, Dexter
commenced a tender offer for the outstanding shares of Life Technologies at $37
per share. Dexter also announced its intention to acquire any shares not
purchased in the tender offer through a second-step merger in which the
remaining shareholders would receive the same share price paid in the tender
offer.
On November 16, 1998, Life Technologies filed a Schedule 14D-9
Solicitation/Recommendation Statement in which Life Technologies disclosed that
the Life Technologies Board would remain neutral and express no opinion with
respect to Dexter's tender offer, since a majority of the Life Technologies
Board was affiliated with Dexter. However, Life Technologies included in the
Schedule 14D-9 the view of the Special Committee that the shareholders should
reject Dexter's tender offer and not tender their shares, along with the
analysis by the investment banking firm hired by the Special Committee which
detailed its finding that Dexter's offer price was inadequate to Life
Technologies shareholders.
On December 7, 1998, Dexter amended its tender offer by increasing the
purchase price from $37 per share to $39.125 per share and dropping the
condition that Dexter acquire at least 80% of the outstanding shares of Life
Technologies following the
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consummation of the tender offer. Upon the completion of the tender offer,
Dexter owned approximately 71% of the outstanding shares of Life Technologies.
Shortly after the commencement of Dexter's tender offer, in November
1998, we filed a Schedule 13D with respect to our beneficial ownership of shares
of Life Technologies. On November 25, 1998, we signed an agreement with Bear,
Stearns & Co. Inc., The Frederick R. Adler Intangible Asset Management Trust,
The Cohen Revocable Trust and Annie Chang, each of whom is a shareholder of Life
Technologies, to form a group (the "Life Technologies Group") for purposes of
Section 13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the "Exchange
Act"). The agreement was for a term of six months and provided for, among other
things, each party not to sell or otherwise dispose of its Life Technologies
shares without the consent of the other parties to the agreement. Thereafter,
we, together with the other members of the Life Technologies Group, filed an
amendment to our Schedule 13D reporting our group ownership of Life Technologies
shares. On December 2, 1998, each of York Capital Management, L.P., JGD
Management Corp. and York Investment Limited became members of the Life
Technologies Group, and on December 18, 1998, each of Idoya Partners, Prescott
Associates, Prescott International Partners, L.P., Thomas W. Smith as Trustee
for the Jack McKenzie Trust Under Agreement Dated April 12, 1992, Thomas W.
Smith as Trustee for the Leo Carroll Wolfensohn Trust Under Agreement Dated
March 9, 1994 and Thomas W. Smith (collectively, the "Prescott Entities") joined
the Life Technologies Group, in each case by entering into similar agreements
with the other existing members of the Life Technologies Group. Additional
amendments to our Schedule 13D were filed to reflect the additional members of
the Life Technologies Group, so that, as of December 23, 1998 we, together with
the other members of the Life Technologies Group, owned approximately 26.2% of
the outstanding shares of Life Technologies. On that date, ISP individually
owned approximately 14.75% of the outstanding shares of Life Technologies.
On February 1, 1999, the common stock of Life Technologies was delisted
from the Nasdaq Stock market because of Life Technologies's inability to remain
in compliance with certain maintenance standards required for continued listing,
including the number of shareholders and public float requirements, as a result
of Dexter's completed tender offer for Life Technologies's stock. Life
Technologies currently remains a reporting company under the Securities and
Exchange Commission rules and its common stock is available for quotation on the
OTC Bulletin Board.
On July 26, 1999, Life Technologies announced that its Board had
decided to discontinue regular quarterly dividends on its common stock.
On September 27, 1999, pursuant to an amended Schedule 13D filing, we
disclosed that we beneficially owned approximately 9.98% of the outstanding
common stock of Dexter. Soon thereafter, on October 4, 1999, Dexter's Board
amended the Company's Rights Agreement to lower the threshold of beneficial
ownership that will trigger the defensive provisions of the Rights Agreement
from 20% to 11% of the outstanding common stock of Dexter, applicable to any
shareholder who does not file a Schedule 13G with the SEC stating that its
ownership position has been acquired without any intent to change or influence
control of Dexter.
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On December 3, 1999, representatives of ISP and Dexter met to discuss
our dissatisfaction with Dexter's share price performance. At such meeting, we
expressed our belief that Life Technologies, with its higher growth and higher
margins, can better fulfill its potential as an independent entity or in
combination with another similarly strategically situated company, rather than
in combination with Dexter, for reasons detailed in Mr. Heyman's letter to Mr.
Walker on December 14, 1999. Our representatives noted that there are no
apparent synergies between Dexter and Life Technologies that would justify
Dexter's continued control of Life Technologies and, as an independent company,
Life Technologies would likely have greater access to the capital markets and
receive a higher level of analyst coverage. We therefore recommended that it
would be in the best interests of both companies and their respective
shareholders if Dexter and Life Technologies were independent corporate
entities. We further offered to work with Dexter to try to develop a tax
efficient strategy, subject to a proper business purpose, to separate Dexter and
Life Technologies.
On December 6, 1999, pursuant to an amended Life Technologies 13D
filing, we disclosed that our initial group agreements with other Life
Technologies shareholders, which had been renewed and extended on May 10, 1999,
had been further extended until September 30, 2000 by all of the members of the
Life Technologies Group other than the Prescott Entities. Currently, the
continuing members of the Life Technologies Group beneficially own approximately
21.7% of the outstanding shares of Life Technologies.
After receiving no response to our proposal made during the December 3,
1999 meeting, on December 14, 1999, Samuel J. Heyman, Chairman of the Board of
ISP, sent the following letter to Mr. Walker proposing to acquire all of the
shares of Dexter not owned by ISP for a price of $45 per share:
Dear Grahame:
It was nice meeting with you, John Thompson, and Bruce Beatt on
December 3rd.
As Kumar Shah and I indicated to you, our interest is in the
realization of shareholder values for all Dexter Corporation and Life
Technology shareholders. In this connection, based on our analysis, we
believe that Life Technologies, with its higher growth and higher
margins, can better fulfill its potential as an independent entity, or
in combination with another similarly strategically situated company,
rather than in combination with Dexter Corporation. We also believe
that it will be in the best interests of both companies and their
respective shareholders if Dexter Corporation and Life Technologies
were separate corporate entities.
The overriding reason for this conclusion stems primarily from
the fact that there are practically no overlaps and the companies add
no value to each other. Specifically, Dexter Corporation's R&D, product
development and manufacturing technology have no interface, and lack
any synergy, with Life Technologies. Furthermore, we believe that
Dexter Corporation has restrained Life Technologies' growth by limiting
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Life Technologies' R&D expenditures, new product development and new
product introductions. Marketing, sales and distribution likewise
provide no crossover benefits for the two companies. In addition to the
operational issues, we note that Dexter Corporation management has
little or no experience in the life science field.
From a financial perspective, as an independent company, Life
Technologies would have much greater access to the capital markets,
without the constraints of Dexter Corporation's financial profile. Life
Technologies, as a pure play on which analysts and shareholders can
more clearly and easily focus, would attract a high level of Wall
Street coverage, providing the opportunity to achieve P/E multiples
similar to those achieved by others, who serve the same market. This
would enable Life Technologies to consummate attractive stock
acquisitions and mergers in the emerging life science field, which you
acknowledge has been constrained under your ownership.
Finally, as an independent company, or as part of a high
technology company serving the biotechnology industry, Life
Technologies would be in a position to provide greater incentives for
its executives. Through making available stock options with a
significant upside potential to all key-operating employees, Life
Technologies would be providing a better opportunity to attract, hire,
and most importantly, retain quality personnel to insure and maximize
its continued profitable growth.
As a substantial shareholder of both Dexter Corporation and Life
Technologies, it is our position that, for the foregoing reasons, there
is value to be realized in the separate corporate existence of these
two entities. At our meeting, while I was pleased that you appeared to
share our view that there are few, if any, synergies between Dexter
Corporation and Life Technologies, I had hoped that you would be more
receptive to our proposal. However, since that time, by your lack of
response and your recent comments to security analysts, it appears that
you disagree with our approach to maximizing shareholder value nor do
you appear to have in mind any alternative strategy for accomplishing
the same goal.
As long term shareholders of both Dexter and Life Technologies,
we think we have been more than patient. Our Board has therefore
decided to propose acquiring all of the Dexter Corporation common stock
not owned by ISP and its affiliates for a price of $45.00 per share
subject to the execution of a mutually acceptable merger agreement.
Such a price represents a 38% premium over where Dexter Corporation
closed last night (32-9/16), and is higher than the stock has ever
traded. In addition, if you would provide us additional information on
Dexter Corporation and Life Technologies that justifies an increased
price we would be willing to pay more. We would be willing to enter
into a confidentiality agreement in connection therewith (but not any
such agreement that would limit our rights as shareholders).
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We and our advisors are available to move quickly to consummate
this transaction. Grahame, please let me know how you and your Board
would like to proceed.
Sincerely,
/s/ Samuel J. Heyman
On December 14, 1999, Dexter issued a press release indicating that it
has received ISP's December 14 letter and that Dexter's Board would consider
ISP's proposed offer, but noting that the December 14th letter did not mention a
source of funds for ISP's cash offer.
In response to Dexter's press release, on December 16, 1999, Mr. Heyman
sent the following letter to Mr. Walker:
Dear Grahame:
I note from Dexter's news release yesterday your mention that our
letter "contained no information concerning the source of funds for its
proposal."
In this regard, we intend to finance with bank borrowings and
will provide commitments for such financing as appropriate.
As I indicated in yesterday's letter, we stand ready with our
advisors to meet with you as soon as possible regarding all aspects of
the proposed merger agreement.
All the best.
Sincerely,
/s/ Samuel J. Heyman
On December 23, 1999, Mr. Walker sent the following letter to ISP
rejecting ISP's offer to purchase the outstanding shares of Dexter:
Dear Mr. Heyman:
On behalf of Dexter's Board of Directors, I am replying to your
letter of December 14.
The Board has carefully considered your proposal to negotiate an
acquisition of Dexter at a price of $45 per share. It has discussed the
proposal as well as the strategic initiatives mentioned in your letter
with the company's management and its advisors - Lehman Brothers and
Skadden, Arps. The Board has received an opinion from Lehman Brothers
that $45 per share is inadequate from a financial point of view to the
stockholders of Dexter. It is the unanimous view of the Board of
Directors that your proposal is both inadequate and contrary to the
best interests of the stockholders of Dexter. Accordingly, it is hereby
rejected.
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We noted with interest the research comment on your proposal
published by Merrill Lynch the same day you made it. Merrill Lynch
said, "... the bid is too low. It appears that ISP could be just trying
to put Dexter in play." The comment also noted: "Interestingly, ISP's
total bid for Dexter is only slightly larger than Dexter's bid for Life
Technologies - an offer that was deemed as too low by ISP management."
New Vernon Associates, an institutional research firm, was even more
definitive in its characterization of the ISP proposal. "Mr. Heyman is
clearly playing the role of arbitrageur here. There is little or no
strategic fit between ISP and either Dexter or Life Technologies." Yet
a third report published by Schroders on December 15 was to a similar
effect.
The Board has thoroughly reviewed the company's present
circumstances in light of your public proposal to acquire Dexter for an
inadequate price, ostensibly to separate Dexter and Life Technologies.
In consequence of that review, they have asked me to share the
following additional thoughts with you.
The Dexter Board is committed to its business strategy of
maximizing the long-term growth of Dexter through its investment in
Life Technologies. It will continue these efforts, despite any attempt
on your part to divert their benefits for ISP's short-term interests,
as you have done in numerous other cases in which you purchased shares
of a company - purporting to espouse stockholder interests - and
subsequently sold out your position at a profit.
Last year, in pursuit of its shareholder value growth strategy,
Dexter decided to strengthen its focus on life sciences. Among other
initiatives, it sought to acquire the public minority shares of Life
Technologies. Your company opportunistically intervened to frustrate
this objective and bought 15% of the outstanding shares in the open
market, while Dexter was proceeding with its tender offer at a price
that was available to every LTI stockholder. Our Board's plan was to
realize synergistic benefits and cost savings from 100% ownership of
LTI, in addition to securing our platform for growth in life sciences.
The Dexter stockholders have been denied those benefits and the related
stockholder value enhancement by your actions, not by any inadequacy in
our basic strategy.
The second phase of your opportunistic strategy was an
open-market purchase program in Dexter shares which purported to be
"for investment purposes only." Immediately after you assembled a 10%
block, you dropped your pretense of being a passive investor. You
invited yourself to a meeting with management, asserted Dexter and Life
Technologies should be separated, waited 11 days and then made a public
unsolicited acquisition proposal at an inadequate price benefiting only
ISP and not all Dexter stockholders. Your disregard for the interests -
indeed welfare - of Dexter stockholders is especially exemplified by
the fact that both Moody's and Standard & Poor's have now put Dexter on
credit watch with negative implications expressly as a result of the
apprehension that ISP will over-leverage in order to combine with
Dexter.
25
<PAGE>
You have also made some factual assertions about Dexter and Life
Technologies which are simply wrong and which are potentially damaging
to one or both companies. Dexter has not been a restraining influence
on LTI's R&D spending. Indeed, you sought to elicit such a statement
from the Life Technologies management in your meeting with them but
they declined to provide it. Nor is there any basis for your claim that
Dexter's ownership of LTI shares makes it difficult to attract, hire
and retain quality management. Quite simply, that has not been the
case. Your contention further implies that the current management of
LTI is not first rate, a similarly baseless suggestion.
You have mischaracterized the relationship between Dexter and
Life Technologies, and your position is internally inconsistent. You
affirmatively asserted in our conversation on December 3 that Life
Technologies has no place with ISP. We agree. However, it is illogical
and self-contradictory for you to suggest that you wish to acquire
Dexter in order to spin off Life Technologies in some unspecified
transaction likely to have adverse tax consequences to all
participants. Second, and more important by far, we are convinced that
both Dexter and Life Technologies have bright future prospects which
justify a valuation of Dexter shares significantly in excess of what is
reflected in the current market price. We fervently hope (and strongly
recommend) that you return your managerial focus to your own companies,
leaving the stewardship of Dexter and LTI where it belongs - with their
respective Boards.
Sincerely
/s/ K. Grahame Walker
In a complaint filed in Connecticut Superior Court dated January 18,
2000, Lee Brennan and Ellis Investments LTD. asserted claims on behalf of
themselves and a putative class consisting of all Dexter shareholders (other
than the defendants and any person or entity affiliated with them) against
Dexter, Mr.Walker and the directors of Dexter, asserting claims which were
previously brought separately in the Delaware courts. In their complaint, such
shareholders allege, among other things, that "[i]n rejecting the ISP offer,
reducing the threshold for activation of the shareholder rights plan and failing
to make any attempts to negotiate with ISP, [Dexter, Mr. Walker and Dexter's
Board] have acted wrongfully to the detriment of Dexter public stockholders."
On January 20, 2000, Dexter announced that it had sent a letter to Life
Technologies proposing to acquire for $49.00 per share the 28.5% of Life
Technologies that Dexter does not own in a merger transaction. Dexter asked for
"appropriate indications of support" for the merger from ISP and the other
members of the 13D group.
On January 27, 2000, Mr. Heyman sent the following letter to Mr.
Walker:
Dear Grahame:
In view of ISP's $45 all cash offer and our stated willingness to
pay more if additional information justified a higher price, I was
disappointed that your
26
<PAGE>
Board did not decide to encourage negotiations with a view toward
increasing shareholder value for Dexter shareholders. Its refusal to do
so leaves us no choice but to take our proposal directly to our fellow
shareholders.
We are today delivering to your Corporate Secretary a notice of
our intention to present a series of resolutions at your April Annual
Meeting. The effect of the resolutions is to elect ten of our nominees
to the Dexter Board, including eight directors independent of ISP, who
are committed to considering and pursuing ISP's offer or a superior
proposal. We are also proposing a by-law amendment and a resolution
requiring Dexter's Board to remove its "poison pill" in favor of offers
for all shares of at least $45 per share in cash. We intend to solicit
proxies in favor of these resolutions.
Your December 23rd letter questioned the seriousness of ISP's
intent. First, as you know, ISP currently holds a stake in Dexter which
is more than five times that held by Dexter's entire Board. Second, so
that there should be no doubt as to our ability to finance the
acquisition, Chase Securities Inc. advised us, confirmed in writing,
that they are highly confident in their ability to arrange the credit
facilities for this acquisition.
There are so many inaccuracies and mischaracterizations in your
letter that I find it difficult to know where to start. By way of just
one example, your heavy reliance upon security analysts to defend your
rejection of our proposal is misplaced. For instance, in comparing
ISP's offer to Dexter's bid last year for Life Technologies, the
Merrill Lynch report contained an error of almost $300 million by
ignoring the value of the minority interests. Also, you failed to quote
a relevant section of the New Vernon Associates report you cited, which
states the following: "there is little or no interplay between the
company's [Dexter's] industrial and life sciences businesses," "we do
find merit in his [Mr. Heyman's] initiative to separate the company's
[Dexter's] disparate assets," and "in our view Dexter's ownership of
LTEK is constraining the latter company's ability to recruit and retain
key employees." With regard to the last point, it should be made clear
that we indeed view the management of Life Technologies as first rate.
However, your attempted squeeze-out of the minority shareholders more
than a year ago resulted in the elimination of meaningful stock
incentives for Life Technologies executives, which ultimately impacts
the ability to retain and recruit key personnel.
As you know, Life Technologies' shareholders have rejected
Dexter's recent belated $49 per share offer. Parenthetically, it should
be noted that Dexter's own shareholders appear to have rejected its
business strategy as well, as Dexter's stock price has declined
substantially since the company's rejection of our offer and its
decision to attempt to acquire 100% of Life Technologies. It is
apparent from the timing of Dexter's offer for our Life Technologies
shares, coming on the heels of ISP's $45 per share offer for Dexter,
upon which many of Dexter's shareholders have relied, seeks to divert
ISP from a course of action designed to maximize shareholder values for
all Dexter shareholders. In this connection, we believe that Dexter's
attempt to deter us by providing benefits to ISP not available to other
Dexter shareholders is simply not appropriate.
27
<PAGE>
Grahame, I just do not think it would be productive at this time
to respond to your mischaracterizations and attempts to impugn our
motives - which by the way I do not appreciate. The real issue here,
however, is the maximization of shareholder value for all Dexter
shareholders, and I believe that shareholders will more likely benefit
from a dialogue along this line. In fact, I would be willing to appear
with you before any group of Dexter shareholders to discuss the merits
of Dexter's proposed course of action vs. ISP's offer.
All the best.
Sincerely,
/s/ Samuel J. Heyman
Also on January 27, 2000, we gave formal written notice to Dexter of
our intention to bring our proposals before the 2000 Annual Meeting. On that
same day, we filed a complaint against Dexter and seven members of Dexter's
Board in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut. The
Dexter directors who are named as defendants are K. Grahame Walker, Henrietta
Holsman Fore, Robert M. Furek, Edgar G. Hotard, Peter G. Kelly, Jean-Francois
Saglio and George M. Whitesides. See "Certain Litigation." These developments
were reflected in an amended 13D filing with respect to our Dexter shares on the
same day.
On January 28, 2000, we, together with the other members of the Life
Technologies Group, amended our 13D filing to reflect the group's rejection of
Dexter's offer to purchase shares of Life Technologies. Also on January 28, we
demanded a copy of Dexter's shareholder list and certain other corporate
information to which we are entitled under the Connecticut Business Corporation
Act, by no later than February 7, 2000.
On February 4, 2000, Dexter acknowledged its receipt of our written
notice to bring our proposals before the 2000 Annual Meeting. Shortly
thereafter, by letter dated February 7, 2000, Dexter's counsel, Skadden, Arps,
Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, acknowledged its receipt of our demand for a copy of
Dexter's shareholder list and certain other corporate information. In its
February 7 letter, Dexter's counsel stated that ISP needed to provide Dexter
with a certified check in the amount of $1,454.86 to cover expenses incurred by
Dexter in providing the requested materials before such materials would be made
available, and a check was forwarded by ISP to Dexter promptly thereafter.
Certain, but not all, of the materials requested were received on February 11,
2000.
On February 8, 2000, Dexter's Board amended the Rights Agreement,
causing the poison pill Rights to be inapplicable to any offer which is for all
shares, is substantially unconditional, remains available to shareholders for 60
days, is supported by firm financing commitments and is for a price which is, in
the opinion of Dexter's financial advisor, fair from a financial point of view.
On February 9, 2000, Mr. Walker sent the following letter to ISP
responding to ISP's notice of its intention to present its proposals and
director nominations at the 2000 Annual Meeting:
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<PAGE>
Dear Mr. Heyman:
Just last month ISP disclosed that your company's 4th quarter
operating results would be 40% to 57% below analysts' estimates and
that full fiscal year operating results would be 19% to 20% below
analysts' estimates. You publicly attributed ISP's disappointing
performance to "substantial unabsorbed manufacturing costs" and to
"competitive pressures." With evidence of this kind of managerial
dereliction so recently emerging, we are incredulous that you have
apparently launched a campaign that deflects the focus from
concentrating on improving your own poor results to one that will
inevitably harass and distract Dexter's Board and its management at
this crucial time in our company's history. We think ISP's stockholders
have a right to expect undivided and more effective attention to ISP's
obvious strategic and operational deficiencies. We think they are
entitled to expect that you would not spend hundreds of thousands of
dollars - to say nothing of the time, effort and managerial distraction
ISP will devote to matters unrelated to its immediate business problems
- to run a spurious and legally defective proxy campaign in support of
your invitation to negotiate that has been rejected.
However, since you are anxious to pursue a course of action that
can be harmful to our shareholders and to yours, you leave us with no
reasonable alternative but to deal with you in the most responsible
manner that we can. To that end, our Board has authorized the following
actions:
1. Specifically to address your claim of "[ISP's] stated
willingness to pay more [than $45 per share] if additional information
justified a higher price," we are prepared to make available a due
diligence data room containing detailed and comprehensive information
relating to both Dexter and Life Technologies. Because our Board and
its advisors believe that your offer is inadequate from a financial
point of view, we are inviting ISP to send representatives into the
data room for the purpose of ascertaining whether you are indeed
willing to pay more. If you wish, you are welcome to bring
representatives of your lender Chase Securities Inc. with you. We are
prepared to respond to reasonable requests for additional information
and we will make appropriate members of senior management available for
presentations and question/answer sessions that should provide you with
more than adequate "additional information." We accept your offer of a
confidentiality agreement in this connection. We accept in principle
your limitation that the agreement not "limit your rights as
shareholders" by which we mean one which will not prevent you from
making a tender offer to Dexter stockholders, proceeding with your
proxy campaign or making a proposal to the Board of Dexter.
Do not misread the Board's decision or its intentions: we have
made no decision to sell the company or to explore a sale of the
company or to test the market for a possible sale of the company, and
no one else will be invited into the data room. It is simply the
Board's firm belief that Dexter's stockholders should not be victimized
by your disingenuous suggestion that your price could be higher but for
reasons beyond
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your control. We offer you the opportunity to conduct a reasonable due
diligence so that you can honestly, forthrightly and candidly tell our
stockholders what your proposal is - not that it might be higher if ...
2. Our Board has amended Dexter's stockholder rights plan. As a
consequence of the amendment, the rights will not be triggered by and
the plan will pose no obstacle for any offer to our stockholders for
all shares which Dexter's financial advisor opines is fair from a
financial point of view, is supported by liquid funds on hand or by
fully committed financing, is substantially unconditional and has been
open to Dexter stockholders for at least 60 calendar days. Although we
believe your rights plan proposals for our stockholder meeting are
illegal and unenforceable, we have elected to preempt this issue. We
believe our stockholders' interests will be better served if we relieve
them of the burden of a lot of rhetorical sound and fury from ISP
designed to obfuscate its plan and intention to seize control of Dexter
without paying a fair price for the company.
3. We will address your proposals for Dexter's 2000 Annual
Meeting of Stockholders separately. However, on the subject of electing
directors, Dexter accepts the nomination of yourself, Mr. Kumar and Mr.
Peller as timely in accordance with the By-laws.
You claim Chase Securities Inc. has advised ISP in writing "that
they are highly confident in their ability to arrange credit facilities
for this acquisition." If that were true, we think ISP owes it to the
Dexter stockholders to make an honest, forthright and candid public
disclosure of the letter text. We think ISP's failure to do so is yet
another instance of its disregard for the federal securities laws which
we believe required disclosure of ISP's contracts, arrangements,
understandings and relationships with Chase Securities promptly after
it received their assurances. We also think ISP's disclosure is legally
deficient for failing to describe the transactions in which the funds
will be borrowed and the names of the parties thereto.
In December you said that the impetus for your takeover proposal
was, among other things, your belief that it was in the best interests
of both Dexter and Life Technologies and their stockholders "if Dexter
Corporation and Life Technologies were separate corporate entities." In
our meeting you stated that you would support a pro-rata spinoff of the
LTI shares owned by Dexter to Dexter stockholders and you stated that
such a transaction could be effected on a tax-free basis. We are
advised to the contrary. We should provide our stockholders an honest,
forthright and candid assessment of this issue. In order to achieve
that, we invite you to help us arrange a meeting among our respective
tax advisors to reach a common analytical conclusion. We think the
Dexter stockholders are entitled to know whether or not there is any
possibility that such a transaction could be effected without incurring
material tax liabilities at Dexter or for the account of the
stockholder recipients of the spinoff.
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<PAGE>
There is another allegation in your letter relating to LTI which
I feel I must briefly address. You keep talking about Dexter's ability
to retain and recruit key personnel at LTI. We have been a majority
stockholder of LTI for nearly two decades without any problems either
in recruiting or retaining key personnel, and if it were not for the
uncertainty that your tactics have introduced we are confident that
would continue. I think it particularly telling on the subject of
executive retention that, in contract to ISP, LTI has retained its
entire senior management team (except the CFO who retired to teach and
remains a director of LTI).
Your letter claims "[a]s you know, Life Technologies'
shareholders have rejected Dexter's recent belated $49 per share
offer." As you know, this statement is false. First, as of this very
moment, neither you nor any other member of your current 13D group has
spoken or written a word to Dexter in response to our good faith $49
proposal. Second, a former member of your 13D group who owned more than
825,000 shares (about 3.3% of LTI and over 13% of the shares owned by
your former 13D group) responded favorably to our proposal, and we
acquired those shares for $49 each. Moreover, you also know our offer
was in no way an attempt to provide benefits to ISP not available to
other Dexter stockholders - it was an offer to buy LTI shares from LTI
stockholders, whether or not they were Dexter stockholders. In fact, it
was an honest, forthright and candid attempt to resolve a difficult
situation created by ISP solely for its own selfish purposes. Although
obvious from the terms of our offer, we repeat here for the record
there was no condition associated with ISP's reaction to our proposal.
As we clearly stated, we were perfectly willing to discuss our proposal
with any other stockholders of Life Technologies who wished to do so,
and we in fact did that very thing.
Mr. Heyman, your campaign to anoint yourself as the savior of
Dexter stockholders is misleading because, ultimately, it is ISP's own
selfish interests which drive your program. The shareholders will
understand that. Moreover, it appears that your hand-picked nominees
lack the necessary experience in corporate governance and in our
industry and none owns a single share of Dexter stock. By contrast, the
Dexter Board has demonstrated its independence and commitment to
serving the Dexter shareholders. We will continue to forthrightly and
clearly articulate our program for value enhancement for our
stockholders to consider. I am confident that our stockholders will
understand it, agree with it and act accordingly.
Sincerely,
/s/ K. Grahame Walker
On February 9, 2000, Mr. Heyman sent the following letter to Mr. Walker
in response to Dexter's offer to allow ISP to conduct a due diligence review of
the business, finances and operations of Dexter and its subsidiaries:
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<PAGE>
Dear Grahame:
We are in receipt of your letter today and, while not commenting
on the host of ancillary issues raised, we agree that the central focus
should be whether Dexter's shareholders are able to maximize the value
of their investment. We take at face value your statement that Dexter
is willing to enter into substantive discussions with us regarding
ISP's proposal and are delighted that you have taken this step. I have
asked our legal counsel to prepare a confidentiality agreement and
advise you that we are in a position to move very promptly.
All the best.
Sincerely,
/s/ Samuel J. Heyman
On February 9, 2000, Mr. Walker sent the following letter to Mr. Heyman
in response to Mr. Heyman's letter of the same date:
Dear Mr. Heyman:
Your letter this afternoon suggests that you need to reread my
letter of this morning. Please have your counsel contact ours on the
subject of a confidentiality agreement. I believe they are
well-acquainted.
Sincerely,
/s/ K. Grahame Walker
On February 23, 2000, ISP and Dexter entered into a confidentiality
agreement which provided for ISP to conduct a review of non-public information
relating to the business, finances and operations of Dexter and its subsidiaries
and which did not contain any standstill provisions. On February 24, 2000, ISP
commenced a review of certain information made available by Dexter in a data
room.
On February 28, 2000, Dexter issued a press release in which it
announced that it would "institute a process in which we [Dexter] will survey
all of the Company's available options." Dexter stated in its press release that
although Dexter's Board "has made no decision to sell the Company at this time,"
it would explore "every available alternative - including a merger or sale of
the Company, a financial restructuring, or a spin-off or sale of one or more of
the Company's businesses." Dexter further stated in its press release that
"third parties will be invited to sign confidentiality agreements, review
comprehensive data room materials and receive Dexter management presentations."
On March 1, 2000, Dexter filed its preliminary proxy statement with the
SEC. Mr. Heyman sent the following letter to Mr. Walker addressing Dexter's
February 28 press release and the filing:
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<PAGE>
Dear Grahame:
With regard to your February 28th announcement that your Board
"has decided to institute a process in which we will survey all of the
Company's options," we would hope that this move was indeed designed
with the view toward maximizing shareholder value for all Dexter
shareholders as we have been urging for quite some time now. As you
know, while your Board has made no decision to sell Dexter at this
time, our nominees are committed to pursue ISP's $45 per share merger
proposal or a superior proposal.
We also note Dexter's statement that it will consider a "spin-off
or sale of one or more of the Company's businesses." In this
connection, we would remind you that ISP's interest continues to be in
the acquisition of Dexter as a whole and therefore trust that, before
considering any such dismemberment, Dexter will enter into discussions
with ISP concerning our acquisition proposal.
Although we are pleased that you have started to provide us with
information, we will need certain additional technical, financial and
operating data. We are compiling a separate list concerning these
requirements which we will furnish shortly to your representatives, and
I would very much appreciate your cooperation with regard to these
requests.
Finally, we have just received your preliminary proxy statement
that was filed with the SEC for the first time today. We were shocked
and surprised by your decision to selectively choose among the ISP
proposals to be presented to Dexter shareholders at this year's Annual
Meeting scheduled for April 27 - and especially by your attempt to deny
Dexter shareholders the right to vote on our proposal to increase the
size of the Dexter Board. We believe this proposal is legal,
appropriate, and was timely made, and ISP intends to present this
proposal at the Annual Meeting and take all necessary legal action to
cause its implementation if passed. We also do not understand your
position that Dexter will refuse to follow the wishes of its
shareholders in the event that they adopt ISP's Rights Plan proposals.
All the best.
Sincerely,
/s/ Samuel J. Heyman
On March 9, 2000, in response to Mr. Heyman's March 1 letter, Mr.
Walker sent a letter to Mr. Heyman in which he reiterated Dexter's rejection of
the ISP Proposal, stating that "[t]here is nothing to discuss or negotiate." Mr.
Walker also stated that Dexter is continuing to conduct its previously announced
process to explore its alternatives. Finally, Mr. Walker defended Dexter's
refusal to present at the 2000 Annual
33
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Meeting ISP's proposals to increase the size of Dexter's Board and elect
additional directors to fill the vacancies created by such increase.
34
<PAGE>
THE PROPOSALS
We are soliciting your proxy in favor of adopting the following three
sets of proposals at the 2000 Annual Meeting, in opposition to Dexter's Board of
Directors: (1) the Nominee Election Proposals, (2) the Shareholder Rights
Proposals and (3) the Voting Rights Proposals. The full text of shareholder
resolutions to effect each proposal are contained in the respective Annexes to
this proxy statement.
EACH OF OUR PROPOSALS IS SEPARATE AND DISTINCT FROM EACH OTHER PROPOSAL. YOU MAY
APPROVE OR VOTE SEPARATELY ON ANY OR ALL OF THE PROPOSALS, BUT THE ADDITIONAL
DIRECTORS ELECTION PROPOSAL WILL NOT BE EFFECTIVE UNLESS THE BOARD SIZE BYLAW
PROPOSAL IS ADOPTED, AND THE POISON PILL AMENDMENT PROPOSAL WILL NOT BE
EFFECTIVE UNLESS THE POISON PILL BYLAW PROPOSAL IS ADOPTED.
If each of our proposals is adopted, the overall result would be that
the intended effect of certain of Dexter's anti-takeover measures - the
classified board of directors and the "poison pill" Rights Agreement - could be
neutralized. In addition, you should know that our nominees are committed to
pursue the ISP Proposal or a superior proposal. If our nominees are elected as a
majority of Dexter's Board, the anti-takeover measures mentioned above, as well
as the Connecticut statutory anti-takeover devices described in the discussion
of Proposal No. 4 below, could be potentially removed by Dexter's Board in
connection with any approval of the ISP Proposal or a superior proposal -
regardless of the outcome of the vote on our Shareholder Rights Proposals. Any
action taken by our nominees, if elected as directors, will be subject to their
fiduciary duties to you. In addition, note that we are seeking to have the
Rights Agreement judicially invalidated. See "Certain Litigation." If the Rights
Agreement is judicially invalidated prior to the 2000 Annual Meeting, we will
withdraw our Shareholder Rights Proposals.
THE NOMINEE ELECTION PROPOSALS
PROPOSAL NO. 1: THE DIRECTOR ELECTION PROPOSAL
According to publicly available information, Dexter currently has ten
directors, divided into three classes having staggered terms of three years
each. The terms of one class of incumbent directors, consisting of Charles H.
Curl, Peter G. Kelly and Jean Francois Saglio, will expire at the 2000 Annual
Meeting. Accordingly, at the 2000 Annual Meeting, you will be asked to elect
three persons to fill the directorships in this class for a three-year term
continuing until the 2003 Annual Meeting and the election and qualification of
each person's respective successor. The following persons are our nominees for
election as directors in such class:
<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
Name and Business Present Principal Occupation and Five Year
Address Age Employment History Class
- ------- --- ------------------ -----
<S> <C> <C>
Samuel J. Heyman 61 Mr. Heyman has been a director and Chairman of ISP 2003
1361 Alps Road since its formation and served as its Chief Executive
Wayne, New Jersey 07470 Officer from its formation until June 1999. He has
35
<PAGE>
also been a director, Chairman and Chief Executive
Officer of GAF Corporation ("GAF"), and certain of
its subsidiaries for more than five years. GAF's
primary business is conducted through Building
Materials Corporation of America ("BMCA"), an
indirect, approximately 97%-owned subsidiary of GAF
which is primarily engaged in the commercial and
residential roofing business. Mr. Heyman has been a
director and Chairman of BMCA since its formation,
and has served as Chief Executive Officer of BMCA
since June 1999, a position he also held from June
1996 to January 1999. He is also the Chief Executive
Officer, Manager and General Partner of a number of
closely held real estate development companies and
partnerships whose investments include commercial
real estate and a portfolio of publicly traded
securities.
Sunil Kumar 50 Mr. Kumar has been a director, President and Chief 2003
1361 Alps Road Executive Officer of ISP since June 1999. Mr. Kumar
Wayne, New Jersey 07470 has also been President and Chief Executive Officer
of certain subsidiaries of ISP, including ISP
Investments Inc., since June 1999. Mr. Kumar was a
director, President and Chief Executive Officer of
BMCA from May 1995, July 1996 and January 1999,
respectively, until June 1999. He was Chief Operating
Officer of BMCA from March 1996 to January 1999. Mr.
Kumar also was President, Commercial Roofing Products
Division, and Vice President of BMCA from February
1995 to March 1996. From 1992 to February 1995, he
was Executive Vice President of
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., a retail distributor and
manufacturer of tires and provider of automobile
services.
Philip Peller 60 Prior to his retirement on November 30, 1999, Mr. 2003
Peller was a partner of Andersen Worldwide S.C. and
Arthur Andersen LLP, a role he had held since 1970.
He served as Managing Partner - Practice Protection
and Partner Affairs for Andersen Worldwide during the
period 1998 to 1999 and as Managing Partner -
Practice Protection from 1996 to 1998. During the
period 1995 to 1996, he was the Managing Director -
Quality, Risk Management and Professional Competence
for Arthur Andersen's global audit practice.
</TABLE>
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<PAGE>
Each of the nominees has consented to serve as a director until the
expiration of his respective term and until such nominee's successor has been
elected and qualified or until the earlier resignation or removal of such
nominee. We have no reason to believe that any of the nominees named above will
be disqualified or unable or unwilling to serve if elected. However, if any of
the nominees are unable to serve or for good cause will not serve, proxies may
be voted for another person nominated by ISP to fill the vacancy.
The nominees understand that, if elected as directors of Dexter, each
of them will have an obligation under Connecticut law to discharge his duties as
a director in good faith, consistent with his fiduciary duties to Dexter and its
shareholders.
WE STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT YOU VOTE
"FOR" THE ELECTION OF OUR NOMINEES
PROPOSAL NO. 2: THE BOARD SIZE BYLAW PROPOSAL
We are proposing a Bylaw amendment that would require additional
directors to be elected at the 2000 Annual Meeting so that Dexter's Board will
consist of seventeen directorships, rather than its current ten directorships.
If our Board Size Bylaw Proposal is adopted, Dexter shareholders would be
entitled to elect, in addition to the three directors under Proposal No. 1
above, seven additional directors, for a total of ten directors at the 2000
Annual Meeting. The Board Size Bylaw Proposal would allow Dexter shareholders to
elect a majority of Dexter's Board at the 2000 Annual Meeting.
The Board Size Bylaw Proposal provides that the seven additional
directorships proposed will be allocated to the classes with terms expiring at
the 2001 Annual Meeting and the 2002 Annual Meeting, unless the additional
nominees are allocated to the class with a term expiring at the 2003 Annual
Meeting by Dexter's Board, consistent with its duties under Connecticut law to
allocate directors among the three classes so that all classes are equal in size
to the extent possible. We believe, based on our interpretation of Connecticut
law and the Dexter Certificate of Incorporation, that either the current Dexter
Board could make such an allocation, contingent on the approval of Proposal Nos.
2 and 3 by the shareholders, or the new Dexter Board could make such an
allocation following the 2000 Annual Meeting.
The Board Size Bylaw Proposal will allow you to elect a majority of
Dexter's Board of Directors at the 2000 Annual Meeting. The adoption of our
Board Size Bylaw Proposal would have the effect of neutralizing the impact of
Dexter's classified Board of Directors, which is divided into three classes
serving staggered, three-year terms. Opponents of classified boards, like
Dexter's, believe that they help entrench the incumbency of the current board
and therefore deter change in control transactions which may be beneficial to
shareholders, because ordinarily at least two annual meetings - rather than one
- - would be required before a change in control of the board could be effected.
However, proponents of classified boards argue that the device encourages a
party seeking to obtain control of a company to negotiate with the board, and
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<PAGE>
that it provides continuity and stability to a company and its business and
operational strategies. If all of our nominees are elected, a majority of
Dexter's directors would not be current incumbents and a lack of continuity in
Dexter's corporate policy and governance may occur. However, our nominees, if
elected, and Dexter's incumbent directors, if reelected, would owe the same
fiduciary duties to Dexter shareholders. Given the refusal of Dexter's current
board to commit to pursue the ISP Proposal or a superior proposal - we believe
now is an appropriate time to create a new majority on Dexter's Board.
The proposed Bylaw amendment provides that the new Bylaw provision
cannot be unilaterally repealed or altered by Dexter's Board. This means that a
shareholder vote - with the votes cast "for" exceeding the votes cast "against"
- - will be required to amend or repeal the Bylaw provision, if it is adopted.
Ordinarily, Dexter's Board can unilaterally amend, adopt or repeal Bylaws.
Connecticut law permits the board's rights to amend or repeal bylaws to be
limited if so provided by the shareholders in connection with adopting any Bylaw
amendment. If the Board Size Bylaw is adopted, Dexter's Board elected at the
2000 Annual Meeting will still be able to change the size of Dexter's Board from
and after the date of the meeting. The full text of the Bylaw amendment to
effect the Board Size Bylaw Proposal is contained in Annex I to this proxy
statement.
Dexter has asserted that our Board Size Bylaw Proposal and Additional
Directors Election Proposal are invalid. In connection with our proposals, we
have filed a complaint with the United States District Court for the District of
Connecticut in which we are seeking, among other things, a declaratory judgment
that our Nominee Election Proposals are valid under Connecticut law. On or about
March 9, 2000, Dexter and the individual director defendants filed a motion for
partial summary judgment seeking dismissal of this portion of our complaint. We
intend to oppose this motion. See "Certain Litigation." While there is a lack of
controlling case law in Connecticut to either directly substantiate or directly
contradict the validity of our Board Size Bylaw and Additional Directors
Election Proposal under Connecticut state law, we believe, based on our
interpretation of the Connecticut Business Corporation Act and the Dexter
Certificate of Incorporation, that such proposals are valid. We intend to
present all of our proposals at the 2000 Annual Meeting. If our Board Size Bylaw
and Additional Directors Election Proposal are finally adjudicated as invalid
under Connecticut law, such proposals, even if adopted at the 2000 Annual
Meeting, would not then be effective.
WE STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT YOU VOTE
"FOR" THE BOARD SIZE BYLAW PROPOSAL
PROPOSAL NO. 3: THE ADDITIONAL DIRECTORS ELECTION PROPOSAL
If the Board Size Bylaw Proposal is adopted, we nominate the following
persons to Dexter's Board to fill the newly-created directorships. Our proposal
provides that our nominees will be assigned to classes as indicated below,
unless the additional nominees are allocated to the class with a term expiring
at the 2003 Annual Meeting by Dexter's Board, consistent with its duties under
Connecticut law.
38
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<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
Name and Business Present Principal Occupation and Five Year
Address Age Employment History Class
- ------- --- ------------------ -----
<S> <C> <C>
Alan Meckler 54 Mr. Meckler has been the Chairman and Chief 2002
501 Fifth Avenue Executive Officer of Internet.com Corp., a
New York, NY provider of global real-time news and
10017 information resources for the internet
industry, since December 1998. He was
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of
Mecklermedia Corp., a provider of internet
information, from June 1971 to November 30,
1998.
Dan Ogden 52 Mr. Ogden has been the President and Chief 2002
Yokohama Tire Operating Officer of Yokohama Tire
Corporation Corporation, the North American marketing
601 S. Acacia arm of Yokohama Rubber Company, a worldwide
Fullerton, CA tire manufacturer, since August 1997. From
92834-4550 September 1996 until August 1997, Mr. Ogden
was engaged in private investment
activities. He was President and Chief
Operating Officer of EMCO Enterprises, Inc.,
a diversified manufacturer primarily of
storm and screen doors, from December 1992
until August 1996.
Morrison DeSoto Webb 52 Mr. Webb has been an attorney in private 2002
120 Rye Ridge Road practice since January 2000. He was
Harrison, NY 10528 Executive Vice President - External Affairs
and Corporate Communications at Bell
Atlantic Corporation from August 1997 until
December 1999. From May 1995 until August
1997, Mr. Webb was Executive Vice President,
General Counsel and Secretary of NYNEX
Corporation. He was Vice President - General
Counsel of New England Telephone and
Telegraph Company, a subsidiary of NYNEX
Corporation, from 1991 until 1995 and Vice
President - General Counsel of New York
Telephone Company, a subsidiary of NYNEX
Corporation from 1994 until 1995.
Robert Englander 57 Mr. Englander has been the Chairman of the 2002
75 Holly Hill Lane Board and Chief Executive Officer of Belvoir
Greenwich, CT 06830 Publications, a publisher of aviation,
marine, electronic, equestrian and other
special interest books, videos and
publications, since February 1973.
John Droney 53 Mr. Droney has been an attorney with Levy & 2001
74 Batterson Park Road Droney, P.C. since February 1988. Mr. Droney
Farmington, CT 06032 was also Chairman of the Democratic State
39
<PAGE>
Central Committee of Connecticut and a
member of the Democratic National Committee
from 1986 to 1992.
Anthony T. Kronman 54 Mr. Kronman has been Dean and Professor of 2001
127 Wall Street Law at Yale Law School since 1994 and 1978,
New Haven, CT 06511 respectively.
Vincent Tese 56 Mr. Tese has been the Chairman of Wireless 2001
Wireless Cable Cable International Inc., a cable television
International, and wireless communications service
Inc. c/o Bear provider, since April 1995. Mr. Tese was
Stearns & Co. Chairman of Cross Country Wireless Inc.,
Inc. also a cable television and wireless
245 Park Avenue communications service provider, from
New York, NY October 1994 to July 1995. Mr. Tese was the
10167 Director of Economic Development for the
State of New York from June 1987 to December
1994 and also served as the Chairman of the
Urban Development Corporation in New York
from 1985 to 1994. Mr. Tese currently serves
as a director of Allied Waste Industries,
Inc., Bear Stearns Companies Inc., Bowne &
Co., Inc., Cablevision Systems Corp.,
Keyspan Corp. and Mack-Cali Realty Corp.
</TABLE>
Each of the nominees has consented to serve as a director until the
expiration of his respective term and until such nominee's successor has been
elected and qualified or until the earlier resignation or removal of such
nominee. We have no reason to believe that any of the nominees named above will
be disqualified or unable or unwilling to serve if elected. However, if any of
the nominees are unable to serve or for good cause will not serve, proxies may
be voted for another person nominated by ISP to fill the vacancy.
The nominees understand that, if elected as directors of Dexter, each
of them will have an obligation under Connecticut law to discharge his duties as
a director in good faith, consistently with his fiduciary duties to Dexter and
its shareholders. The full text of a shareholder resolution to effect the
Additional Directors Election Proposal is contained in Annex II to this proxy
statement.
WE STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT YOU VOTE
"FOR" THE ELECTION OF OUR ADDITIONAL NOMINEES
TO FILL THE NEWLY-CREATED DIRECTORSHIPS
40
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THE SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS PROPOSALS
PROPOSAL NO. 4: THE POISON PILL BYLAW PROPOSAL
We are proposing an amendment to the Bylaws which would require
Dexter's Board to redeem the Rights, or to amend the Rights Agreement to make
the Rights inapplicable to transactions or offers specified by Dexter
shareholders, if shareholders adopt a special resolution requiring Dexter's
Board to do so. Such a resolution could be adopted at any duly organized
shareholder's meeting where a quorum is present if the votes cast for the
resolution exceed the votes cast against the resolution. In addition, our
proposed amendment would require Dexter's Board to obtain shareholder approval
prior to adopting any new shareholder rights plan, rights agreement or any other
form of "poison pill" which is designed to or has the effect of making
acquisitions of large holdings of Dexter's shares of stock more difficult or
expensive. The complete text of our proposed Bylaw amendment to effect the
Poison Pill Bylaw Proposal is included as Annex III to this proxy statement.
Our Poison Pill Bylaw Proposal would allow Dexter shareholders to make
their own decision with respect to proposed offers or transactions, by requiring
that Dexter's Board follow the direction of Dexter shareholders with respect to
the amendment or replacement of the Rights Agreement or the redemption of the
Rights issued thereunder. If our proposed Bylaw amendment is adopted, in order
for Dexter shareholders to mandate Dexter's Board to redeem the Rights or amend
the Rights Agreement, Dexter shareholders will, in instances where an annual
meeting is not pending, face the procedural necessity of calling a special
meeting of shareholders, an action which requires the written request of the
holders of not less than 35% of the issued and outstanding shares of Dexter
common stock. As described below, our Poison Pill Amendment Proposal proposes
the adoption of a special shareholder resolution requiring Dexter's Board to
amend the Rights Agreement to make it inapplicable to any offer for all
outstanding Dexter shares of common stock at a price of at least $45 per share
in cash. Our Poison Pill Bylaw Proposal and Poison Pill Amendment Proposal,
taken together, will cause the Rights Agreement to remain in effect to deter
unsolicited proposals for less than $45 per share in cash for all shares, for
partial offers, and for non-cash transactions. However, if our proposals are
adopted, the Rights Agreement will no longer apply to any proposal for all
shares at a price of at least $45 per share. As described in "Certain
Litigation" we are seeking to have the Rights Agreement invalidated in its
entirety. If the Rights Agreement is invalidated, it will no longer be an
obstacle to stock accumulations or offers at any price. If the Rights Agreement
is judicially invalidated prior to the 2000 Annual Meeting, we will withdraw our
Shareholder Rights Proposals.
Dexter's Certificate of Incorporation and Connecticut law provide
significant impediments to many forms of unsolicited offers for Dexter, in
addition to the Rights Agreement. The Certificate provides that: (1) directors
serve staggered terms, preventing any independent shareholder or group of
shareholders from gaining a majority of the seats on Dexter's Board in a single
year, absent an amendment to the Bylaws approved by Dexter shareholders, and (2)
Dexter has authorized for issuance a "blank check" preferred stock that can be
used to dilute the ownership or voting power of a bidder not approved by
Dexter's Board. Connecticut law provides that: (a) certain transactions with a
beneficial owner of more than 10% of Dexter's voting stock, including mergers,
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are subject to approval by Dexter's Board, 80% of the voting power of the
outstanding shares and 66-2/3% of voting power of the disinterested
shareholders, unless certain "fair price" requirements are met and (b) business
combinations with a beneficial owner of more than 10% of Dexter's voting stock
are prohibited for five years, unless approved by Dexter's Board. In addition,
Connecticut law requires directors in exercising their fiduciary duties to
consider, in addition to the interests of shareholders, the interests of the
corporation, its employees, customers, creditors and suppliers, and the
interests of the community and society. Our nominees are committed to pursue the
ISP Proposal or a superior proposal. If our nominees are elected as a majority
of Dexter's Board, they could potentially neutralize these anti-takeover devices
by participating in Dexter's Board's approval of the ISP Proposal or a superior
proposal.
Poison pills are considered extremely potent corporate takeover defense
mechanisms, and Dexter's existing Rights Agreement may be viewed as being
aligned with shareholder interests. Proponents of poison pills assert that
rights plans, such as the Rights Agreement, enable the board to respond in an
orderly manner to unsolicited bids by providing sufficient time to carefully
evaluate the fairness of an unsolicited offer and the credibility of the bidder,
and thereby giving the board the flexibility to explore alternative strategies
for maximizing shareholder value. It has been argued that poison pills deter
abusive takeover tactics. Proponents of poison pills also assert that rights
plans provide incentives for a potential bidder to negotiate in good faith with
the board, and that such negotiations are likely to maximize value for
shareholders by soliciting the highest possible price from the bidder. Studies
have been reported that support these positions, including studies of the
investment banking firm J.P. Morgan Securities, proxy solicitor Georgeson, and
professors Robert Comment and G. William Schwert of the William E. Simon School
of Business at the University of Rochester, each of which concluded that poison
pills often result in the payment of higher premiums to selling shareholders in
takeovers. Removal of a poison pill could make the accomplishment of a given
transaction, such as a tender offer, easier even if it is unfavorable to the
interests of shareholders and could make the removal of management easier, even
if such removal would be generally detrimental to shareholders. Our Poison Pill
Bylaw Proposal and Poison Pill Amendment Proposal, taken together, would in
effect remove Dexter's poison pill with respect to any offer for all outstanding
Dexter shares for at least $45 per share in cash.
Shareholders have opposed poison pills on the grounds that poison pills
force potential investors to negotiate potential acquisitions with management,
instead of making their offer directly to the shareholders. Such opponents to
poison pills assert that poison pills can pose such an obstacle to a takeover
that management becomes entrenched. We believe that such entrenchment and the
consequential lack of management accountability to shareholders adversely
affects shareholder value and that poison pills can deter desirable acquisition
offers that would be in the shareholders' best interests. We believe that poison
pills insulate management from the threat of a change in control because they
provide a board, which is generally advised by and includes representatives of
management, with veto power over change in control bids, even when shareholders
believe that such bids are in their best interests. As described below, in
recent years, shareholders of other public companies have demonstrated, through
the shareholder proposal process, a growing consensus opposed to adoption of
rights plans by management. According to a 1999 report by the Investor
Responsibility Research Center, a provider of corporate research ("IRRC"),
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<PAGE>
voting in favor of shareholder resolutions to redeem or require a shareholder
vote on poison pill rights plans has steadily increased from an average of less
than 30% in 1987 to 57.4% in 1998. Voting in favor of such shareholder
resolutions further increased to an average of 61.9% in 1999 according to a 2000
report by the IRRC. Georgeson Shareholder Communications, Inc., a proxy
solicitor that monitors proposals sponsored by institutions and shareholders
("Georgeson"), in a 1999 report, reported 1999 voting (at an interim point in
the year) was 59% in favor of such proposals.
The 2000 IRRC report indicates that shareholders submitted 43 anti-pill
proposals in 1999 (of which 28 were put to a vote of shareholders), resulting in
then-record support by an average of 61.9 percent of shares voted. This report
indicated that, as of early 2000, 36 anti-pill proposals had been submitted for
2000. Georgeson's 1999 report indicates that among the 17 poison pill rescission
votes that it monitored in 1999, results were available in 16, and 13 were
approved by shareholders. On average, 59 percent of votes cast were in favor of
the proposals to rescind the pills. According to a 1999 report of the IRRC, in
1998, proposals to redeem or permit shareholder voting on poison pills were put
to a vote at 14 companies and passed at 9. According to the 2000 IRRC report, in
1999, proposals to redeem or permit shareholder voting on poison pills were put
to a vote at 28 companies and passed at 18.
The proposed Bylaw amendment provides that the new Bylaw provision
cannot be unilaterally repealed or altered by Dexter's Board. This means that a
shareholder vote - with the votes cast "for" exceeding the votes cast "against"
- - will be required to amend or repeal the Bylaw provision, if it is adopted.
Ordinarily, Dexter's Board can unilaterally amend, adopt or repeal Bylaws.
Connecticut law permits the board's rights to amend or repeal bylaws to be
limited if so provided by the shareholders in connection with adopting any bylaw
amendment. The full text of the Bylaw amendment to effect the Poison Pill Bylaw
Proposal is contained in Annex III to this proxy statement.
Dexter has asserted that our Poison Pill Bylaw Proposal and our Poison
Pill Amendment Proposal are invalid. In connection with our proposals, we have
filed a complaint with the United States District Court for the District of
Connecticut in which we are seeking, among other things, a declaratory judgment
that our Shareholder Rights Proposals are valid under Connecticut law. We
recognize that the Connecticut courts have not considered the validity of our
proposed amendment or any similar bylaw and, therefore, have not resolved the
extent to which shareholder-adopted bylaws may limit the authority of the board
of directors to oppose, or to adopt or employ defensive measures against,
takeover bids favored by a majority of the shareholders. See "Certain
Litigation." While there is a lack of controlling case law in Connecticut to
either directly substantiate or directly contradict the validity of our
Shareholder Rights Proposals under Connecticut state law, we believe, based on
our interpretation of the Connecticut Business Corporation Act and the Dexter
Certificate of Incorporation, that such proposals are valid. We intend to
present all of our proposals at the 2000 Annual Meeting. If our Poison Pill
Bylaw Proposal and our Poison Pill Amendment Proposal are finally adjudicated as
invalid under Connecticut law, the proposals, even if adopted at the 2000 Annual
Meeting, would not then be effective.
43
<PAGE>
WE STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT YOU VOTE
"FOR" THE POISON PILL BYLAW PROPOSAL.
PROPOSAL NO. 5: THE POISON PILL AMENDMENT PROPOSAL
In connection with the Bylaw amendment in Proposal No. 4 above, we are
proposing the adoption of a special shareholder resolution. The resolution will
require Dexter's Board to amend the Rights Agreement to make it inapplicable to
any offer for all outstanding Dexter shares of common stock at a price of at
least $45 per share in cash. The effect of our Poison Pill Bylaw Proposal and
our Poison Pill Amendment Proposal, if each is adopted, would be to render the
Rights Agreement inapplicable to any offer for at least $45 per share in cash
for all shares. The Rights Agreement would remain in full force and effect with
respect to all offers for less than $45 per share, offers for less than all
shares and non-cash offers, unless we are successful in having the Rights
Agreement judicially invalidated. We are proposing a $45 per share threshold
solely because the ISP Proposal is for at least $45 per share. You should be
aware that Dexter has rejected our $45 per share proposal as being inadequate.
In addition, it can be argued that a $45 level is inappropriate because the
value of a Company is constantly changing, or you could conclude that you
believe that the minimum premium for control of Dexter should be higher.
However, we believe that the adoption of our proposal would send a clear message
to Dexter's Board that it should pursue offers of at least $45 and would end the
uncertainty as to the minimum bid required to make the defensive provisions of
the Rights Agreement inapplicable. The full text of a resolution implementing
the Poison Pill Amendment Proposal is included as Annex IV to this proxy
statement.
WE STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT YOU VOTE
"FOR" THE POISON PILL AMENDMENT PROPOSAL.
THE VOTING RIGHTS PROPOSALS
PROPOSAL NO. 6: THE BYLAW REPEAL PROPOSAL.
Article X of the Dexter Bylaws provides that Bylaws may be repealed by
Dexter shareholders. We propose to repeal any Bylaw amendments adopted by
Dexter's Board between February 26, 1999 and the date of the 2000 Annual
Meeting. The purpose of this proposal is to prevent Dexter's Board from
interfering with the implementation of the proposals being acted upon by Dexter
shareholders pursuant to this proxy solicitation. The complete text of our
proposed shareholder resolution to effect the Bylaw Repeal Proposal is included
as Annex V to this proxy statement.
We believe that any Bylaw amendments adopted by Dexter's Board prior to
the 2000 Annual Meeting are likely to be aimed at frustrating our proposals and
therefore are not likely to be in the best interests of the Dexter shareholders.
We are not aware of any Bylaw amendments adopted by Dexter's Board since
February 26, 1999. Any Bylaw amendments validly adopted by Dexter's Board prior
to the Annual Meeting would remain in effect unless and until our proposal to
repeal such Bylaws is adopted. If Dexter's Board adopts any such Bylaw
amendments before the 2000 Annual Meeting, it will have an opportunity to inform
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shareholders of the benefits of these amendments and to attempt to persuade
shareholders to vote against this proposal.
WE STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT YOU VOTE
"FOR" THE BYLAW REPEAL PROPOSAL.
PROPOSAL NO. 7: THE OMNIBUS PROPOSAL
In addition, Dexter shareholders will be asked at the 2000 Annual
Meeting to consider the Omnibus Proposal, which sets forth the following order
in which our proposals will be voted upon by Dexter shareholders:
1. The Omnibus Proposal;
2. The Bylaw Repeal Proposal;
3. The Director Election Proposal;
4. The Board Size Bylaw Proposals;
5. The Additional Directors Election Proposal;
6. The Poison Pill Bylaw Proposal; and
7. The Poison Pill Amendment Proposal.
The full text of a shareholder resolution to effect the Omnibus
Proposal is contained in Annex VI to this proxy statement.
WE STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT YOU
VOTE "FOR" THE OMNIBUS PROPOSAL.
OTHER MATTERS TO BE CONSIDERED
AT THE 2000 ANNUAL MEETING
RATIFICATION OF APPOINTMENT OF INDEPENDENT AUDITORS
As set forth in Dexter's Proxy Statement, at the 2000 Annual Meeting,
Dexter shareholders will be asked to ratify the appointment by Dexter's Board of
PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP as Dexter's independent auditors for the year 2000.
We are not making any recommendation on this proposal.
OTHER PROPOSALS
Except as set forth above, we are not aware of any proposals to be
brought before the 2000 Annual Meeting. However, we have notified Dexter of our
intention to bring before the 2000 Annual Meeting such business as may be
appropriate, including without limitation nominating additional persons for
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directorships, or making other proposals as may be appropriate to address any
action of Dexter's Board not publicly disclosed prior to the date of this proxy
statement. Should other proposals be brought before the 2000 Annual Meeting, the
persons named as proxies in the enclosed GOLD proxy card will vote on such
matters in their discretion.
VOTING PROCEDURES
In order to ensure that your views on the proposals are heard by Dexter
and your vote represented at the 2000 Annual Meeting, we urge you to sign and
date the enclosed GOLD Proxy Card and return it to Innisfree M&A Incorporated,
501 Madison Avenue, 20th Floor, New York, New York 10022, in the enclosed
postage paid envelope TODAY. Execution of the GOLD Proxy Card will not affect
your right to attend the 2000 Annual Meeting and to vote in person.
You are eligible to execute a GOLD Proxy only if you owned the Common
Stock on the Record Date. Dexter's Board has set February 25, 2000 as the Record
Date for determining those shareholders who will be entitled to notice of and to
vote at the 2000 Annual Meeting. You will retain the right to execute a proxy
card in connection with this proxy solicitation even if you sell your shares
after the Record Date. Accordingly, it is important that you vote the Shares
held by you on the Record Date, or grant a proxy to vote such Shares on the GOLD
proxy card, even if you sell such shares after the Record Date.
We believe that as of the close of business on the Record Date, there
were 23,058,969 shares of common stock of Dexter issued and outstanding and
entitled to vote. Shareholders will have one vote for each share of common stock
they own with respect to all matters to be considered at the 2000 Annual
Meeting.
In order for your views on the above-described proposals to be
represented at the 2000 Annual Meeting, please sign and date the enclosed GOLD
proxy card and return it to Innisfree M&A Incorporated in the enclosed prepaid
envelope TODAY. Execution of the GOLD proxy card will not affect your right to
attend the 2000 Annual Meeting and to vote in person. Any proxy may be revoked
at any time prior to the 2000 Annual Meeting by delivering a written notice of
revocation or a later dated proxy for the 2000 Annual Meeting to Innisfree M&A
Incorporated or the Secretary of Dexter, or by voting in person at the 2000
Annual Meeting. ONLY YOUR LATEST DATED PROXY WILL COUNT.
Unless otherwise indicated, the GOLD Proxy authorizes the persons named
in the proxy to vote, and such persons will vote, properly executed and duly
returned proxies FOR the Nominee Election Proposals, FOR the Shareholder Rights
Proposals and FOR the Voting Rights Proposals, all of which are described in
this proxy statement. If no marking is made on your GOLD Proxy with respect to
the ratification of the appointment of Dexter's independent auditors, you will
be deemed to have given a direction to abstain from voting on such matter.
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VOTE REQUIRED
Based on currently available public information, a quorum will exist at
the 2000 Annual Meeting if holders of not less than a majority of the shares of
Dexter common stock outstanding and entitled to vote at the 2000 Annual Meeting
are present in person or by proxy. If a quorum is present, our proposals can be
adopted by the following vote:
o NOMINEE PROPOSALS: Election of nominees for directorships will require
the affirmative vote of a plurality of the votes cast. Consequently,
only shares that are voted in favor of a particular nominee will be
counted toward such nominee's attaining a plurality of votes. The
election of our nominees for the seven newly-created directorships will
not be effective unless our Board Size Bylaw Proposal is adopted.
o PROPOSALS REQUIRING BYLAW AMENDMENTS: We believe that our proposals
involving amendments to the Dexter Bylaws, namely our Board Size Bylaw
Proposal, Poison Pill Bylaw Proposal and Bylaw Repeal Proposal, will be
approved if the votes cast for the respective proposal exceed the votes
cast against the respective proposal. Accordingly, our Bylaw amendment
proposals could each be approved by less than a majority of the issued
and outstanding shares of common stock once a quorum is present at the
2000 Annual Meeting. We have received the opinion of Levett Rockwood
P.C., our Connecticut counsel, that, to the extent the Dexter Bylaws
may require a supermajority shareholder vote for an amendment, such
provision is invalid under Connecticut law. Levett Rockwood P.C. has
consented to the use of its name and the reference to its opinion in
this Proxy Statement. We have also instituted litigation seeking to
have any such supermajority amendment requirement held ineffective. See
"Certain Litigation." If the Dexter Bylaws are held to contain an
effective supermajority provision, our Board Size Bylaw Proposal,
Poison Pill Bylaw Proposal and Bylaw Repeal Proposal would each require
the affirmative vote of the holders of two-thirds of the issued and
outstanding shares of common stock.
o PROPOSALS NOT REQUIRING BYLAW AMENDMENTS: Adoption of our Poison Pill
Amendment Proposal and Omnibus Proposal will be approved if the votes
cast for the respective proposal exceed the votes cast against the
respective proposal at the 2000 Annual Meeting. Accordingly, these
proposals could be adopted by less than a majority of the issued and
outstanding shares of common stock once a quorum is present at the 2000
Annual Meeting. Our Poison Pill Amendment Proposal will not be
effective unless our Poison Pill Bylaw Proposal is adopted.
WE STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT YOU
VOTE IN FAVOR OF EACH OF THE PROPOSALS DESCRIBED
IN THIS PROXY STATEMENT.
METHOD OF COUNTING VOTES
The holders of not less than a majority of the number of shares of
Dexter common stock outstanding and entitled to vote at the 2000 Annual Meeting
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must be represented in person or by proxy in order to constitute a quorum for
the transaction of business. Abstentions will be included for purposes of
determining whether a quorum exists, but broker non-votes will not. After a
quorum is determined to exist at the 2000 Annual Meeting, abstentions or broker
non-votes with respect to particular proposals brought to a vote or nominees
proposed for election will have no effect on the outcome of the vote on such
proposal or election. Broker non-votes occur when brokers do not receive voting
instructions from their customers on non-routine matters and consequently have
no discretion to vote on those matters. Accordingly, if your Dexter shares are
held in the name of a brokerage firm, bank nominee or other institution, you
should contact the person responsible for your account and give instructions for
a proxy card to be issued so that your shares will be represented at the 2000
Annual Meeting.
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
The principal executive offices of Dexter Corporation are at One Elm
Street, Windsor Locks, Connecticut 06096-2334. Dexter is a global specialty
materials supplier, principally serving the worldwide aerospace, electronics,
food packaging and medical markets. Except as otherwise noted herein, the
information concerning Dexter has been taken from or is based upon documents and
records on file with the SEC and other publicly available information. Although
we do not have any knowledge that would indicate that any statement contained
herein based upon such documents and records is untrue, we do not take any
responsibility for the accuracy or completeness of the information contained in
such documents and records, or for any failure by Dexter to disclose events that
may affect the significance or accuracy of such information.
The principal executive offices of ISP are at 300 Delaware Avenue,
Wilmington, Delaware 19801. We are a leading manufacturer of specialty chemicals
and mineral products.
We are subject to the informational requirements of the Exchange Act,
and, in accordance with the Exchange Act, file reports, proxy statements and
other documents with the SEC relating to our business, financial condition and
other matters. These reports, proxy statements and other documents can be
inspected and copied at the public reference facilities of the SEC at 450 Fifth
Street, N.W., Washington, DC 20549, and at the regional offices of the SEC
located at Seven World Trade Center, 13th Floor, New York, New York 10048 and
Citicorp Center, 500 West Madison Street, Suite 1400, Chicago, Illinois 60661.
Copies of ISP's filings with the SEC can also be obtained by mail for a fee by
writing to the SEC's principal office at 450 Fifth Street, N.W., Washington, DC
20549. You can also get electronic copies of our filings with the SEC for free
on the SEC's Internet web site at http://www.sec.gov. Copies of our filings with
the SEC are also be available for inspection at the offices of the New York
Stock Exchange, 20 Broad Street, New York, New York 10005.
PROXY SOLICITATION; EXPENSES
This proxy statement and the accompanying GOLD Proxy Card are first
being furnished to shareholders on or about March ___, 2000. Executed proxies
may be solicited in person, by mail, advertisement, telephone, telecopier,
telegraph or similar means. Solicitation may be made by directors, officers,
investor relations personnel and other employees of ISP and their affiliates,
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none of whom will receive additional compensation for such solicitation. Proxies
will be solicited from individuals, brokers, banks, bank nominees and other
institutional holders. We have requested banks, brokerage houses and other
custodians, nominees and fiduciaries to forward all solicitation materials to
the beneficial owners of the shares they hold of record. We will reimburse these
record holders for their reasonable out-of-pocket expenses.
In addition, ISP has retained Innisfree M&A Incorporated to provide
consulting and analytic services in connection with any proposal by us to
acquire Dexter in opposition to Dexter's Board. Among other things, Innisfree
has agreed to solicit proxies on our behalf in connection with the 2000 Annual
Meeting. Innisfree will employ approximately 75 people in its efforts. We have
agreed to reimburse Innisfree for its reasonable expenses and to pay to
Innisfree fees not to exceed $130,000.
Chase Securities, Inc. is acting as our financial advisor in connection
with any proposed business combination transaction involving Dexter, and is
assisting us in connection with the financing of any such transaction. For its
financial advisory services, Chase Securities will receive from ISP a fee of $1
million upon the consummation of any such transaction, plus an additional amount
based on Chase Securities' performance, to be determined by ISP and paid in
ISP's sole discretion. Chase will also receive reimbursement of its reasonable
and documented expenses. In addition, ISP has agreed to indemnify Chase
Securities and related persons against certain liabilities arising out of the
engagement. In its capacity as our financial advisor, Chase Securities has
agreed, among other things, to assist us at our request in contacting (in
person, by telephone or otherwise) shareholders of Dexter identified to Chase
Securities by us and in soliciting their proxies in favor of such a transaction
on our behalf. Chase Securities will not receive any separate or additional fee
for, or in connection with, any such solicitation activities. Chase Securities
and its affiliates are engaged in providing a full range of banking, securities
trading, market making and brokerage services to institutional and individual
clients. In the normal course of its business Chase Securities and its
affiliates may have provided, and may in the future provide, subject to certain
contractual and conflict of interest limitations, financial advisory, investment
banking or other such services to Dexter, ISP or their respective affiliates,
and may trade securities of Dexter, ISP or their respective affiliates for its
own account and the accounts of its customers and, accordingly, may at any time
hold a long or short position in such securities.
The entire expense of our proxy solicitation is being borne by ISP. In
the event that our nominees are elected to Dexter's Board, we may seek
reimbursement of such expenses from Dexter. ISP does not intend to seek
reimbursement for the stipend it pays to its nominees and does not intend to
seek shareholder approval of reimbursement of its other expenses. In addition to
the engagement of Innisfree and Chase Securities described above, costs related
to the solicitation of proxies include expenditures for printing, postage, legal
and related expenses and are expected to be approximately $___. Total payment of
costs to date in furtherance of our proxy solicitation is approximately $___.
49
<PAGE>
CERTAIN INFORMATION CONCERNING THE PARTICIPANTS
ISP, ISP Investments, our nominees for directorships and the following
officers of ISP may be deemed to be "participants" (as defined in Instruction 3
to Item 4 of Rule 14a-101 of the Exchange Act) in this proxy solicitation:
Randall Lay, Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer; Kumar Shah,
Senior Vice President-Corporate Development; Susan B. Yoss, Senior Vice
President and Treasurer; Christopher Nolan, Vice President-Corporate Development
and Investor Relations; Jared Landaw, Vice President-Law; and Ben Stoller,
Manager-Corporate Finance. Information relating to the beneficial ownership of
common stock of Dexter by the participants in this solicitation and certain
other information relating to the participants is contained in Annex VII to this
proxy statement and is incorporated in this proxy statement by reference. In
addition, see "Certain Litigation" for a description of legal proceedings in
which ISP and ISP Investments have a material interest adverse to Dexter. None
of the participants in this solicitation are party to any commercial dealings
with Dexter or its subsidiaries required to be discussed pursuant to Schedule
14A promulgated under the Exchange Act, which governs the disclosure contained
in this proxy statement. As described below under "Certain Interests in the
Proposals and with Respect to Securities of Dexter", ISP and its affiliates
beneficially own shares of Life Technologies, Dexter's majority owned
subsidiary. We have no knowledge of any commercial dealings between Life
Technologies and Dexter, other than information that may be disclosed in the
public filings of Life Technologies and Dexter.
CERTAIN INTERESTS IN THE PROPOSALS AND
WITH RESPECT TO SECURITIES OF DEXTER
To the knowledge of ISP, there are no contracts, arrangements,
understandings or relationships (legal or otherwise) among ISP or its associates
with respect to any securities of Dexter.
Between November 25, 1998 and December 18, 1998, ISP entered into agreements
(the "Group Agreements") with Bear, Stearns & Co. Inc., The Frederick R. Adler
Intangible Asset Management Trust, The Cohen Revocable Trust, Annie Chang, York
Capital Management, L.P., JGD Management Corp., York Investment Limited and the
Prescott Entities with respect to such parties' ownership of common stock of
Life Technologies, a majority owned subsidiary of Dexter. Pursuant to the terms
of the Group Agreements, ISP and the other parties thereto agreed (i) not to
sell or otherwise dispose of any shares of Life Technologies common stock unless
all of the parties mutually agreed (subject to certain exceptions), (ii) to bear
its own costs and expenses incurred in connection with its ownership of Life
Technologies shares, the Group Agreements or any transactions entered into
pursuant to the Group Agreement (subject to certain exceptions for expenses
incurred for the benefit of all the parties thereto), (iii) to join with ISP in
a Schedule 13D filing and any required amendments thereto and (iv) not to enter
into any other contract, arrangement, understanding or relationship with any
other person with respect to the equity securities of Life Technologies. The
initial Group Agreements provided for a term of six months, but subsequent
agreements were entered into ultimately extending the term through September 30,
2000 for all but the Prescott Entities. As of January 27, 2000, ISP owned
beneficially 3,506,270 Life Technologies shares which represented approximately
14.05% of the outstanding shares of common stock of Life Technologies. As of
50
<PAGE>
such date, the continuing parties to the Group Agreement (including ISP)
beneficially owned, in the aggregate, 5,417,991 Life Technologies shares,
representing approximately 21.7% of the outstanding shares of common stock of
Life Technologies.
Each of our nominees (other than Messrs. Heyman and Kumar) will receive
a stipend of $50,000 from ISP for his service as a nominee. This stipend is not
refundable in any manner in connection with the outcome of our proxy
solicitation or otherwise. The Nominees are each party to an indemnity agreement
with ISP (the "Director Indemnity Agreements"). In accordance with the terms of
the Director Indemnity Agreements, ISP has agreed to indemnify and hold harmless
each of the nominees from and against, among other things, all expenses,
liabilities and losses, including reasonable attorney's fees, related to any
action, suit or proceeding to which such nominee is made a party or threatened
to be made a party by reason of such nominee's action or inaction while serving
as a nominee.
51
<PAGE>
SECURITY OWNERSHIP OF DIRECTORS
AND MANAGEMENT OF DEXTER
The following table presents, as of December 31, 1999, based solely on
information contained in Dexter's 2000 Proxy Statement, the common stock
beneficially owned (as that term is defined by the SEC) by all directors and
named executive officers of Dexter, and the directors and executive officers of
Dexter as a group. This beneficially owned common stock includes shares of
common stock which they had a right to acquire within 60 days of such date by
the exercise of options granted under Dexter's stock option plans.
Except as otherwise noted in a footnote below, each director, nominee
and executive officer has sole voting and investment power with respect to the
number of shares of common stock set forth opposite his or her name in the
table.
<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
SHARES OF PERCENTAGE OF
COMMON STOCK COMMON
BENEFICIALLY STOCK
SHAREHOLDERS OWNED(1) OUTSTANDING(1)
- ------------ -------- --------------
<S> <C>
K. Grahame Walker.............................................. 229,681 *
Kathleen Burdett............................................... 63,668 *
John D. Thompson............................................... 38,241 *
Bruce H. Beatt................................................. 34,744 *
David G. Gordon................................................ 42,579 *
Charles H. Curl................................................ 4,165 *
Henrietta Holsman Fore......................................... 5,626 *
Bernard M. Fox................................................. 4,973 *
Robert M. Furek................................................ 4,510 *
Martha Clark Goss.............................................. 4,274 *
Edgar G. Hotard................................................ 3,148 *
Peter G. Kelly................................................. 8,301 *
Jean-Francois Saglio........................................... 3,201 *
George M. Whitesides........................................... 4,381 *
All Directors and Executive Officers of Dexter as a Group (24
persons)....................................................... 638,727 2.77
</TABLE>
- ------------------------------------------
(1) The shares reported above as beneficially owned by the following persons
include vested stock options granted under the Dexter's stock option plans.
The shares reported above also include shares of restricted stock issued to
the following persons pursuant to the 1994 Long Term Incentive Plan (the
"1994 Plan") and the 1999 Long Term Incentive Plan (the "1999 Plan"): K.
Grahame Walker - 51,434; Kathleen Burdett - 21,142; John D. Thompson -
14,976; Bruce H. Beatt - 13,972; David G. Gordon - 11,460; and "All
Directors and Executive Officers of Dexter as a Group" - 171,233. Shares of
restricted stock issued pursuant to the 1994 Plan and the 1999 Plan are
subject to forfeiture, but may be voted by the holders thereof unless and
until forfeited. Percentages of common stock of less than 1% are indicated
by an asterisk.
52
<PAGE>
PRINCIPAL SHAREHOLDERS OF DEXTER
The following table sets forth, based solely, except as otherwise
described herein, on information contained in Dexter's 2000 Proxy Statement, the
number and percentage of outstanding shares of common stock beneficially owned
by each person known to ISP (other than ISP) as of such date to be the
beneficial owner of more than five percent of the outstanding shares of common
stock. The information with respect to ISP has been provided by the members
thereof as of ____ __, 2000.
<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
SHARES OF PERCENTAGE OF
COMMON STOCK COMMON
BENEFICIALLY STOCK
SHAREHOLDERS OWNED OUTSTANDING
- ------------ ----- -----------
<S> <C> <C> <C>
ISP
ISP Investments Inc.
ISP Opco Holdings Inc.
c/o ISP Management Company, Inc.
1361 Alps Road, Wayne, New Jersey 07470........................ 2,299,200 9.97(1)
FMR Corp., 82 Devonshire Street Boston, Massachusetts 02109
(Fidelity Managed Funds)....................................... 1,703,300 9.8(2)
Mary K. Coffin, c/o Dexter Corporation, One Elm Street, Windsor
Locks, Connecticut 06096....................................... 1,290,000 5.6(3)
</TABLE>
(1) ISP Investments Inc. (through ISP Investments Grantor Trust) has the
sole power to vote, direct the voting of, dispose of and direct the
disposition of the shares. ISP Opco Holdings Inc., by virtue of its
indirect ownership of all of the outstanding capital stock of ISP
Investments Inc., may be deemed to own beneficially (solely for
purposes of Rule 13d-3) the shares. ISP, by virtue of its ownership of
all of the outstanding common stock of ISP Opco Holdings Inc., may be
deemed to own beneficially (solely for purposes of Rule 13d-3) the
shares. Samuel J. Heyman, by virtue of his beneficial ownership (as
defined in Rule 13d-3) of approximately 76% of the capital stock of
ISP, may be deemed to own beneficially (solely for purposes of Rule
13d-3) the shares.
(2) Share holdings as of December 31, 1999, as reported on the Schedule 13G
most recently filed by such shareholder.
(3) Of the 1,290,000 shares shown in the table as owned by Mary K. Coffin,
990,000 are held by Fleet Bank, N.A., trustee of a trust the
beneficiary of which is Dexter D. Coffin, Jr. Mary K. Coffin is a
trustee of this trust and shares the power to vote and dispose of
shares owned by the trust. The power to vote and dispose of the shares
owned by this trust is held by a majority of its three individual
trustees. The remaining shares shown in the table are held by Mary K.
Coffin through a living trust.
53
<PAGE>
SHAREHOLDERS' PROPOSALS IN DEXTER'S PROXY STATEMENT
The Dexter's Bylaws require that notice of nominations to Dexter's
Board of Directors proposed by shareholders be received by the Secretary of the
Dexter, along with certain other specified material, not less than 75 nor more
than 125 days prior to the first anniversary of the prior year's annual meeting;
provided, however, that in the event that the date of the annual meeting is
advanced by more than seventy five days from such anniversary date, notice by
the shareholder to be timely must be so delivered not later than the fifteenth
day following the day on which public announcement of the date of such meeting
is first MADE. Any shareholder who wishes to nominate a candidate for election
to Dexter's Board should obtain a copy of the relevant section of the Bylaws
from the Secretary of the Dexter.
Pursuant to Rule 14a-8(e)(2) under the Exchange Act, any proposal by a
shareholder at the 2000 Annual Meeting, to be included in the Dexter's proxy
statement, must be received in writing at the Dexter's principal executive
offices not less than 120 calendar days in advance of the date of the Dexter's
proxy statement was released to security holders in connection with its 1999
Annual Meeting of Shareholders. However, if the date of the meeting is changed
by more than 30 days from the date of the previous year's meeting, then the
deadline is a reasonable time before the Dexter begins to print and mail its
proxy materials.
Proposals should be addressed to the Corporate Secretary, Dexter
Corporation, One Elm Street, Windsor Locks, Connecticut 06096.
WE URGE YOU TO SIGN, DATE AND RETURN THE GOLD PROXY CARD IN FAVOR OF THE
ELECTION OF OUR NOMINEES AND THE ADOPTION OF THE PROPOSALS DESCRIBED IN THIS
PROXY STATEMENT.
Dated: March __, 2000
Sincerely,
Your Fellow Shareholders:
INTERNATIONAL SPECIALTY PRODUCTS INC.
ISP INVESTMENTS INC.
54
<PAGE>
ANNEX I
BOARD SIZE BYLAW PROPOSAL
RESOLVED, that the Bylaws of Dexter Corporation be, and they hereby
are, amended, effective at the time this resolution is approved by the
shareholders of Dexter Corporation, by:
(i) deleting the fourth of Article III, Section 1, which reads
"[e]ach class of directorships shall consist of not less than
one nor more than five directorships", in its entirety;
(ii) adding a new fourth and fifth sentence of Article III, Section
1 as follows:
"At the annual meeting of the shareholders of the corporation
held in 2000, additional directors shall be elected so that
the Board of Directors shall consist of seventeen
directorships. The additional directorships thereby created
shall be allocated to the classes with terms expiring at the
annual meeting of the shareholders of the corporation to be
held in 2001 or 2002, unless otherwise allocated by the Board
of Directors consistent with Section 33-740 of the Connecticut
Business Corporation Act"; and
(iii) adding a new final sentence of Article III, Section 1 as
follows:
"The fourth sentence of this Section 1 may be altered, amended
or repealed only with the approval of the shareholders of the
corporation entitled to vote thereon in the manner set forth
in Section 33-709(c) of the Connecticut Business Corporation
Act."
A-1
<PAGE>
ANNEX II
THE ADDITIONAL DIRECTORS ELECTION PROPOSAL
RESOLVED, that each of the following persons be elected a director of
Dexter Corporation to fill the new directorships on the Board of Directors of
Dexter Corporation resulting from the adoption of the resolution amending
Article III, Section 1 of the Bylaws to increase the size of the Board, for a
term commencing at the time this resolution is adopted by the shareholders of
Dexter Corporation and shall be allocated into classes with terms continuing
until the annual meeting of the shareholders of Dexter Corporation to be held in
the year indicated below, and until the election and qualification of his
respective successor or until his earlier resignation or removal:
Alan Meckler 2002
Dan Ogden 2002
Morrison DeSoto Webb 2002
Robert Englander 2002
John Droney 2001
Anthony T. Kronman 2001
Vincent Tese 2001
; provided, that the Board of Directors may instead allocate certain of such
directorships to a different class, consistent with Section 33-740 of the
Connecticut Business Corporation Act.
A-2
<PAGE>
ANNEX III
THE POISON PILL BYLAW PROPOSAL
RESOLVED, that the Bylaws of Dexter Corporation be, and they hereby
are, amended, effective at the time this resolution is approved by the
shareholders of Dexter Corporation, by adding the following Section 7 to the end
of Article II:
"Section 7. Rights Agreements.
The Board of Directors, in exercising its rights and duties with
respect to the administration of the Rights Agreement, dated as of
August 23, 1996, as amended, by and between the corporation and Chase
Mellon Shareholder Services L.L.C., as Rights Agent (the "Rights
Agreement") will carry out a resolution authorizing (i) the partial or
complete redemption of the rights issued pursuant to the Rights
Agreement (the "Rights"), or (ii) an amendment to the Rights Agreement
making the Rights inapplicable to offers or transactions or types of
offers or transactions specified in such resolution, if such resolution
is authorized and approved by the shareholders of the corporation
entitled to vote thereon in the manner set forth in Section 33-709(c)
of the Connecticut Business Corporation Act. In addition, the Board of
Directors shall not adopt any new shareholder rights plan, rights
agreement or any other form of "poison pill" which is designed to or
has the effect of making acquisitions of large holdings of the
corporation's shares of stock more difficult or expensive, unless such
plan is first approved by the shareholders of the corporation entitled
to vote thereon in the manner set forth in Section 33-709(c) of the
Connecticut Business Corporation Act. This Section 7 may be altered,
amended or repealed only with the approval of the shareholders of the
corporation entitled to vote thereon in the manner set forth in Section
33-709(c) of the Connecticut Business Corporation Act."
A-3
<PAGE>
ANNEX IV
THE POISON PILL AMENDMENT PROPOSAL
RESOLVED, that the shareholders of Dexter Corporation hereby exercise
their right under Article II, Section 7 of the Bylaws of Dexter Corporation, as
amended on the date hereof, to require the Board of Directors to promptly amend
the Rights Agreement, dated as of August 23, 1996, as amended, by and between
Dexter Corporation and ChaseMellon Shareholder Services, L.L.C. (the "Rights
Agreement") to provide that the acquisition of beneficial ownership of shares of
common stock, par value $1.00 per share, of Dexter Corporation ("Common Stock")
pursuant to any offer for all outstanding shares of Common Stock for
consideration of at least $45 per share net to the seller in cash shall
constitute a "Qualifying Offer" within the meaning of Sections 11(a)(ii) and
13(d) of the Rights Agreement.
A-4
<PAGE>
ANNEX V
THE BYLAW REPEAL PROPOSAL
RESOLVED, that any and all amendments made by the Board of Directors of
Dexter Corporation to the Bylaws of Dexter Corporation on or after February 26,
1999, be, and the same hereby are, repealed, and that, without the approval of
the shareholders of Dexter Corporation, the Board of Directors may not
thereafter amend any section of the Bylaws affected by such repeal or adopt any
new Bylaw provision which serves to reinstate any repealed provisions or any
similar provisions.
A-5
<PAGE>
ANNEX VI
THE OMNIBUS PROPOSAL
RESOLVED, that each of the proposals of International Specialty
Products Inc. and ISP Investments Inc. shall be voted upon by the shareholders
of Dexter Corporation at the 2000 Annual Meeting in the following order:
1. This Omnibus Proposal;
2. The Bylaw Repeal Proposal;
3. The Director Election Proposal;
4. The Board Size Bylaw Proposals;
5. The Additional Directors Election Proposal;
6. The Poison Pill Bylaw Proposal; and
7. The Poison Pill Amendment Proposal.
A-6
<PAGE>
ANNEX VII
INFORMATION CONCERNING INTERNATIONAL SPECIALTY
PRODUCTS INC. AND OTHER PARTICIPANTS
IN THE SOLICITATION
Information is being given herein for (i) International Specialty
Products Inc., a Delaware corporation ("ISP"), (ii) ISP Investments Inc., a
Delaware corporation ("ISP Investments"), (iii) Samuel J. Heyman, a natural
person and nominee for the Board of Directors of the Company, (iv) Sunil Kumar,
a natural person and nominee for the Board of Directors of the Company, (v)
Philip Peller, a natural person and nominee for the Board of Directors of the
Company, (vi) Alan Meckler, a natural person and nominee for the Board of
Directors of the Company, (vii) Dan Ogden, a natural person and nominee for the
Board of Directors of the Company, (viii) Morrison DeSoto Webb, a natural person
and nominee for the Board of Directors of the Company, (ix) Robert Englander, a
natural person and nominee for the Board of Directors of the Company, (x) John
Droney, a natural person and nominee for the Board of Directors of the Company,
(xi) Anthony T. Kronman, a natural person and nominee for the Board of Directors
of the Company, (xii) Vincent Tese, a natural person and nominee for the Board
of Directors of the Company, (xiii) Randall Lay, Executive Vice President and
Chief Financial Officer of ISP ("Lay"), (xiv) Kumar Shah, Senior Vice
President-Corporate Development of ISP ("Shah"), (xv) Susan B. Yoss, Senior Vice
President and Treasurer of ISP ("Yoss"), (xvi) Christopher Nolan, Vice
President-Corporate Development and Investor Relations of ISP ("Nolan"), (xvii)
Jared Landaw, Vice President-Law of ISP ("Landaw"), and (xviii) Ben Stoller,
Manager-Corporate Finance of ISP ("Stoller" and together with Lay, Shah, Yoss,
Nolan and Landaw, the "ISP Participants"), who are each a "participant in a
solicitation" as defined under the proxy rules (collectively, the
"Participants").
Information is also given for each of the entities listed on Schedule A
to this Annex VII, each of which is an "associate", as defined under the proxy
rules, of the Proponents.
Each of ISP and ISP Investments is a Delaware corporation. Each of ISP
and ISP Investments has its principal place of business at 300 Delaware Avenue,
Wilmington, Delaware 19801. The business address of each of the ISP Participants
is c/o ISP Management Company, Inc., 1361 Alps Road, Wayne, New Jersey 07470.
The address of each of the entities listed on Schedule A to this Annex VII is
c/o ISP Management Company, Inc., 1361 Alps Road, Wayne, New Jersey 07470.
The Participants may be deemed to have beneficial ownership of the
Company's Common Stock and the common stock, par value $.01 per share ("LTI
Common Stock"), of Life Technologies, Inc. ("LTI") as set forth immediately
below. Except as set forth below, no associates of any of the Participants owns
any Common Stock or LTI Common Stock.
A-7
<PAGE>
<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
APPROXIMATE MARGIN
NUMBER OF SHARES OF THE NUMBER OF SHARES INDEBTEDNESS WITH RESPECT
NAME COMPANY'S COMMON STOCK OF LTI'S COMMON STOCK TO COMMON STOCK
- ---- ---------------------- --------------------- ---------------
<S> <C> <C> <C>
ISP Investments Inc. 2,299,200 3,384,600 (5)
(direct ownership)(1) (direct/indirect ownership)(2)(3)
ISP Opco Holdings Inc. 2,299,200 3,384,600 (5)
(indirect ownership)(1) (indirect ownership)(2)(3)
ISP Ireland 0 452,000 (5)
(direct ownership)(3)
International Specialty 2,299,200 3,506,270 (5)
Products Inc. (indirect ownership)(1) (direct/indirect ownership)(2)(3)(4)
Samuel J. Heyman 2,299,200 3,506,270 (5)
(indirect ownership)(1) (indirect ownership)(2)(3)(4)
Sunil Kumar 0 0 $ 0
Philip Peller 0 0 $ 0
Alan Meckler 0 0 $ 0
Dan Ogden 0 0 $ 0
Morrison DeSoto Webb 0 0 $ 0
Robert Englander 0 0 $ 0
John Droney 0 0 $ 0
Anthony T. Kronman 0 0 $ 0
Vincent Tese 0 0 $ 0
Randall Lay 0 0 $0
Kumar Shah 0 0 $0
A-7-1
<PAGE>
Susan B. Yoss 0 0 $0
Christopher Nolan 0 0 $0
Jared Landaw 0 0 $0
Ben Stroller 0 0 $0
</TABLE>
(1) ISP Investments (through ISP Investments Grantor Trust) has the sole
power to vote, direct the voting of, dispose of and direct the
disposition of the Common Stock. ISP Opco Holdings Inc. ("ISP Opco"),
by virtue of its indirect ownership of all of the outstanding capital
stock of ISP Investments, may be deemed to own beneficially (solely
for purposes of Rule 13d-3) the Common Stock owned by ISP
Investments. International Specialty Products Inc. ("ISP"), by virtue
of its ownership of all of the outstanding common stock of ISP Opco,
may be deemed to own beneficially (solely for purposes of Rule 13d-3)
the Common Stock owned by ISP Investments. Mr. Heyman, by virtue of
his beneficial ownership (as defined in Rule 13d-3) of approximately
76% of the capital stock of ISP, may be deemed to own beneficially
(solely for purposes of Rule 13d-3) the Common Stock owned by ISP
Investments.
(2) ISP Investments (directly and through ISP Investments Grantor Trust)
has the sole power to vote, direct the voting of, dispose of and
direct the disposition of 2,932,600 shares of LTI Common Stock. ISP
Opco, by virtue of its indirect ownership of all of the outstanding
capital stock of ISP Investments, may be deemed to own beneficially
(solely for purposes of Rule 13d-3) all of the LTI Common Stock owned
by ISP Investments. ISP, by virtue of its ownership of all of the
outstanding common stock of ISP Opco, may be deemed to own
beneficially (solely for purposes of Rule 13d-3) the LTI Common Stock
owned by ISP Investments. Mr. Heyman, by virtue of his beneficial
ownership (as defined in Rule 13d-3) of approximately 76% of the
capital stock of ISP, may be deemed to own beneficially (solely for
purposes of Rule 13d-3) the LTI Common Stock owned by ISP
Investments.
(3) ISP Ireland has the sole power to vote, direct the voting of, dispose
of and direct the disposition of 452,000 shares of LTI Common Stock.
ISP Investments, by virtue of its indirect ownership of all of the
outstanding capital stock of ISP Ireland, may be deemed to own
beneficially (solely for purposes of Rule 13d-3) all of the LTI
Common Stock owned by ISP Ireland. ISP Opco, by virtue of its
indirect ownership of all of the outstanding capital stock of ISP
Investments, may be deemed to own beneficially (solely for purposes
of Rule 13d-3) all of the LTI Common Stock owned by ISP Ireland. ISP,
by virtue of its ownership of all of the outstanding common stock of
ISP Opco, may be deemed to own beneficially (solely for purposes of
Rule 13d-3) the LTI Common Stock owned by ISP Ireland. Mr. Heyman, by
virtue of his beneficial ownership (as defined in Rule 13d-3) of
approximately 76% of the capital stock of ISP, may be deemed to own
beneficially (solely for purposes of Rule 13d-3) the LTI Common Stock
owned by ISP Ireland.
(4) ISP has the sole power to vote, direct the voting of, dispose of and
direct the disposition of 121,670 shares of LTI Common Stock. Mr.
Heyman, by virtue of his beneficial ownership (as defined in Rule
13d-3) of approximately 76% of the capital stock of ISP, may be
deemed to own beneficially (solely for purposes of Rule 13d-3) the
LTI Common Stock owned by ISP.
(5) In the ordinary course of its business, ISP Investments Inc.
purchases securities for its investment portfolio with funds obtained
from the working capital of ISP Investments, loans from affiliates
and borrowings pursuant to standard margin arrangements. Because the
securities from multiple investments are pooled in one account, the
amount of margin indebtedness incurred by ISP in connection with its
purchases of Dexter Common Stock, which purchases were numerous and
made over many months, is impossible to determine with any degree of
certainty.
A-7-2
<PAGE>
Other than as set forth immediately below, to the best of the knowledge
of the Participants and their associates, none has been, within the past year, a
party to any contract, arrangement or understanding with any person with respect
to any securities of the Company, including but not limited to joint ventures,
loan or option arrangements, puts or calls, guarantees against loss or
guarantees of profits, division of losses or profits, or the giving or
withholding of proxies:
On November 25, 1998, ISP entered into an agreement (the "Group
Agreement") with certain other persons with respect to such parties' ownership
of LTI Common Stock. Pursuant to the terms of the Group Agreement, ISP and the
other parties thereto agreed (i) not to sell or otherwise dispose of any shares
of LTI Common Stock unless all of the parties mutually agreed (subject to
certain exceptions), (ii) to bear its own costs and expenses incurred in
connection with its ownership of LTI Common Stock, the Group Agreement or any
transactions entered into pursuant to the Group Agreement (subject to certain
exceptions for expenses incurred for the benefit of all the parties thereto),
(iii) to join with ISP in a Schedule 13D filing and any required amendments
thereto and (iv) not to enter into any other contract, arrangement,
understanding or relationship with any other person with respect to the equity
securities of LTI. The initial Group Agreement provided for a term of six
months, but subsequent agreements were entered into ultimately extending the
term through September 30, 2000 for all but one of the original members of the
group.
No Participant or associate owns any securities of the Company of
record but not beneficially.
Neither ISP nor ISP Investments has any special arrangements with any
of the ISP Participants in connection with this proxy solicitation.
None of the Participants and none of their associates has any
arrangement or understanding with any person with respect to (i) any future
employment with the Company or (ii) any future transactions to which the Company
or any of its affiliates may be a party, except as set forth in the letter,
dated December 14, 1999, from Mr. Heyman to the Company's Chairman and Chief
Executive Officer, in which ISP proposed to purchase all of the Company's
outstanding Common Stock for $45 per share in a merger transaction, which
proposal was subsequently rejected by the Company's Board by correspondence
dated December 23, 1999. No family relationships exist among the Proponent's
Nominees or between any Company director or executive officer and any of the
Proponent's Nominees.
The following is a summary of all transactions in Company securities by
the Participants over the last two years.
DATE OF TRANSACTION NATURE OF TRANSACTION NUMBER OF SHARES
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
09/15/98 Buy 37,000
09/17/98 Buy 440,000
09/21/98 Buy 64,700
09/23/98 Buy 5,400
A-7-3
<PAGE>
09/25/98 Buy 10,000
09/30/98 Buy 10,600
10/01/98 Buy 100
10/02/98 Buy 25,000
10/05/98 Buy 600
10/06/98 Buy 14,200
10/07/98 Buy 18,400
10/09/98 Buy 55,500
10/16/98 Buy 169,100
10/19/98 Buy 75,000
11/11/98 Buy 47,500
11/12/98 Buy 69,600
12/01/98 Sell (50,000)
12/02/98 Sell (25,000)
12/04/98 Buy 106,500
12/09/98 Buy 11,600
12/10/98 Buy 15,600
12/11/98 Buy 18,500
12/14/98 Buy 14,000
12/15/98 Buy 6,000
02/17/99 Buy 5,000
03/31/99 Buy 7,500
05/07/99 Sell (25,000)
05/13/99 Buy 10,000
05/14/99 Buy 20,000
05/17/99 Buy 17,100
05/18/99 Buy 21,600
05/19/99 Buy 2,500
05/21/99 Buy 10,000
05/24/99 Buy 11,400
05/25/99 Buy 20,500
05/26/99 Buy 20,000
05/27/99 Buy 19,000
05/28/99 Buy 2,000
06/01/99 Buy 19,000
06/02/99 Buy 22,500
06/03/99 Buy 6,200
06/07/99 Buy 5,500
06/08/99 Buy 1,900
06/09/99 Buy 31,500
06/10/99 Buy 1,300
06/15/99 Buy 10,000
06/24/99 Sell (25,000)
07/13/99 Sell (2,900)
07/22/99 Buy 9,600
07/23/99 Buy 5,000
A-7-4
<PAGE>
07/26/99 Buy 4,700
07/28/99 Buy 7,700
08/03/99 Sell (6,300)
08/05/99 Buy 3,500
08/06/99 Sell (3,500)
08/09/99 Buy 248,400
08/10/99 Buy 11,400
08/11/99 Buy 12,700
08/19/99 Sell (5,300)
08/20/99 Buy 56,000
08/23/99 Buy 94,900
08/24/99 Buy 28,900
08/25/99 Buy 12,300
08/27/99 Buy 12,000
08/30/99 Buy 13,000
08/31/99 Buy 7,500
09/03/99 Buy 84,300
09/07/99 Buy 48,600
09/08/99 Buy 9,900
09/13/99 Sell (1,000)
09/14/99 Sell (1,400)
09/15/99 Sell (2,000)
09/17/99 Buy 46,300
09/20/99 Buy 76,000
09/21/99 Buy 31,400
09/22/99 Buy 15,000
09/23/99 Buy 34,000
09/24/99 Buy 47,600
09/27/99 Buy 46,500
-----------
2,299,200
===========
A-7-5
<PAGE>
SCHEDULE A TO ANNEX VII
Associates of International Specialty Products Inc.
---------------------------------------------------
ISP Opco Holdings Inc.
Belleville Realty Corp.
ISP Alginates Inc.
ISP Management Company, Inc.
ISP Chemicals Inc.
ISP Minerals Inc.
ISP Technologies Inc.
ISP Mineral Products Inc.
ISP Environmental Services Inc.
Bluehall Incorporated
ISP Realty Corporation
ISP Real Estate Company, Inc.
International Specialty Products Funding Corporation
ISP Newark Inc.
ISP Van Dyk Inc.
ISP Fine Chemicals Inc.
ISP Freetown Fine Chemicals Inc.
Verona Inc.
ISP Global Technologies Inc.
ISP International Corp.
ISP Marl Holdings GmbH
ISP Holdings (U.K.) Ltd.
ISP Ireland
ISP (Puerto Rico) Inc.
ISP Marl Gmbh
ISP Acetylene Gmbh
ISP Alginates (U.K.) Ltd.
ISP (Great Britain) Co. Ltd.
ISP Andina, C.A.
ISP Argentina S.A.
ISP Asia Pacific Pte Ltd.
ISP (Australasia) Pte Ltd.
ISP (Belgium) N.V.
ISP (Belgium) International N.V.
ISP do Brasil Ltda.
ISP (Canada) Inc.
ISP Ceska Republika Spol S.R.O.
ISP (China) Limited
ISP Colombia Ltda.
ISP Freight Service N.V.
ISP Global Operations (Barbados) Inc.
ISP Global Technologies (Belgium) S.A.
ISP Global Technologies (Germany) Holding Gmbh
A-7-6
<PAGE>
ISP Customer Service Gmbh
ISP Global Technologies Deutschland Gmbh
International Specialty Products ISP (France) S.A.
ISP (Hong Kong) Limited
ISP (Italia) S.r.l.
ISP (Japan) Ltd.
ISP (Korea) Limited
ISP Mexico, S.A. de C.V.
ISP (Norden) A.B.
ISP (Osterreich) G.m.b.h.
ISP (Polska) Sp.z. o.p.
ISP Sales (Barbados) Inc.
ISP Sales (U.K.) Limited
ISP (Singapore) Pte Ltd.
ISP (Switzerland) A.G.
ISP (Thailand) Co., Ltd.
Chemfields Pharmaceuticals Private Limited
A-7-7
<PAGE>
[PRELIMINARY COPY]
PROXY
DEXTER CORPORATION
PROXY SOLICITED ON BEHALF OF INTERNATIONAL SPECIALTY
PRODUCTS INC., ISP INVESTMENTS INC. AND THE OTHER PARTICIPANTS IDENTIFIED IN
THE PROXY STATEMENT FURNISHED HEREWITH ("ISP") FOR THE ANNUAL MEETING
OF SHAREHOLDERS, _____ __, 2000 AT ___ .
The undersigned shareholder of Dexter Corporation ("Dexter") hereby appoints
____________ and ______________ and each of them, as attorneys and proxies, each
with power of substitution and revocation, to represent the undersigned at the
Annual Meeting of Shareholders of Dexter Corporation to be held at
________________, _______________, __________ on ______ __, 2000 at _____, local
time, and at any adjournment or postponement thereof, with authority to vote all
shares held or owned by the undersigned in accordance with the directions
indicated herein.
Receipt of the Proxy Statement furnished herewith is hereby
acknowledged.
THIS PROXY WHEN PROPERLY EXECUTED WILL BE VOTED IN THE MANNER DIRECTED BY THE
UNDERSIGNED SHAREHOLDER. ON MATTERS FOR WHICH YOU DO NOT SPECIFY A CHOICE, YOUR
SHARES WILL BE VOTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE RECOMMENDATION OF ISP. YOU MAY
APPROVE OR VOTE SEPARATELY ON ANY OR ALL OF THE PROPOSALS, BUT PROPOSAL NO. 3
WILL NOT BE EFFECTIVE UNLESS PROPOSAL NO. 2 IS ADOPTED, AND PROPOSAL NO. 5 WILL
NOT BE EFFECTIVE UNLESS PROPOSAL NO. 4 IS ADOPTED.
(CONTINUED AND TO BE SIGNED ON THE REVERSE SIDE)
<PAGE>
<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
ISP RECOMMENDS A VOTE "FOR" THE NOMINEES LISTED BELOW.
<S> <C> <C> <C> <C> <C>
1. Election of Directors
FOR all nominees listed on the right (except WITHHOLD AUTHORITY to vote for NOMINEES: Samuel J. Heyman, Sunil Kumar,
as marked to the contrary hereon). all nominees listed to the Philip Peller (Instructions: To withhold
right. authority to vote for any individual
nominee, write that nominee's name in the
space provided below.)
[_] [_]
----------------------------------------
ISP RECOMMENDS A VOTE "FOR" PROPOSAL 2.
FOR AGAINST ABSTAIN
2. THE BOARD SIZE BYLAW PROPOSAL [_] [_] [_]
ISP RECOMMENDS A VOTE "FOR" THE NOMINEES LISTED BELOW.
3. Election of ADDITIONAL Directors TO FILL VACANCIES FROM INCREASED BOARD
SIZE
FOR all nominees listed on the right (except WITHHOLD AUTHORITY to vote for NOMINEES: Alan Meckler, Dan Ogden, Morrison
as marked to the contrary hereon). all nominees listed to the DeSoto Webb, Robert Englander, John Droney,
right. Anthony T. Kronman, Vincent Tese.
(Instructions: To withhold authority to vote
[_] [_] for any individual nominee, write that
nominee's name in the space provided below.)
----------------------------------------
ISP RECOMMENDS A VOTE "FOR" PROPOSALS 4, 5, 6 and 7.
FOR AGAINST ABSTAIN
4. THE POISON PILL BYLAW PROPOSAL [_] [_] [_]
FOR AGAINST ABSTAIN
5. THE POISON PILL AMENDMENT PROPOSAL [_] [_] [_]
FOR AGAINST ABSTAIN
6. THE BYLAW REPEAL PROPOSAL [_] [_] [_]
FOR AGAINST ABSTAIN
7. THE OMNIBUS PROPOSAL [_] [_] [_]
<PAGE>
ISP MAKES NO RECOMMENDATION ON
THE FOLLOWING MATTERS TO BE VOTED ON
AT THE 2000 ANNUAL MEETING
FOR AGAINST ABSTAIN
A. RATIFICATION OF INDEPENDENT AUDITORS [_] [_] [_]
IN THEIR DISCRETION, THE PROXIES ARE AUTHORIZED TO VOTE UPON SUCH OTHER BUSINESS
AS MAY PROPERLY BE PRESENTED TO THE MEETING OR ANY ADJOURNMENT OR POSTPONEMENT
THEREOF.
P Dated: _____________, 2000
R -------------------------------------------
(Signature)
O -------------------------------------------
(Signature if held jointly)
X -------------------------------------------
Title:
Y
Please sign exactly as name appears hereon. When
shares are held by joint tenants, both should sign.
When signing as attorney, executor, administrator,
trustee, or guardian, please give full title as such.
If a corporation, please sign in full corporate name
by president or other authorized officer. If a
partnership, please sign in partnership name by
authorized person.
</TABLE>
