PURE WORLD INC
8-K, 1996-01-24
NON-OPERATING ESTABLISHMENTS
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                       SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
                             Washington, D.C. 20549

                                    FORM 8-K

                                 CURRENT REPORT


     Pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934



     Date of Report:                                      January 24, 1996
     (Date of earliest event reported)                    January 8, 1996


                                Pure World, Inc.
             (Exact name of registrant as specified in its charter)


         Delaware                   0-10566                    95-3419191
        (State or other           (Commission                (I.R.S. Employer
        jurisdiction of           File Number)               Identification No.)
        incorporation)


           376 Main Street, P.O. Box 74, Bedminster, New Jersey 07921
               (Address of principal executive offices)(Zip Code)


       Registrant's telephone number, including area code: (908) 234-9220




<PAGE>


Item 5.  Other Events

     On January 8, 1996 American Industrial Properties REIT instituted a lawsuit
against Pure World,  Inc.  ("Pure  World").  Pure World  believes the lawsuit is
totally without merit and will be vigorously  defended.  A copy of the complaint
is attached as Exhibit 99 to this Form 8-K.

<PAGE>


                                   SIGNATURES


     Pursuant to the requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the
Registrant has duly caused this report to be signed on its behalf by the
undersigned hereunto duly authorized.

                                   PURE WORLD, INC.



                                   By:  /s/ Mark Koscinski
                                        Senior Vice President and
                                        Principal Accounting Officer

Dated: January 24, 1996





                      IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                       FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
                                DALLAS DIVISION


AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL PROPERTIES          :
REIT,                                   :
                                        :
        Plaintiff,                      :
                                        :
vs.                                     :    CIVIL ACTION NO.:396CV0068-H
                                        :                     -----------
                                        :    (Jury Trial Demanded)
PURE WORLD, INC. and PAUL O.            :
KOETHER,                                :
                                        :
        Defendants.                     :  


                                   COMPLAINT

     COMES NOW American  Industrial  Properties REIT (the "Trust") and complains
of Pure World,  Inc. f/k/a American  Holdings,  Inc., f/k/a Computer  Memories,
Inc. ("Pure World") and Paul Koether ("Koether")  (collectively,  "Defendants"),
as follows:

                                       I.
                                NATURE OF ACTION

1. Pure World is a corporation principally owned and controlled by Paul Koether,
a  sophisticated  investor with a reputation  of being a "corporate  raider" and
"greenmailer." His latest target is the Trust, a Dallas County-based real estate
investment trust. As explained more fully herein,  Koether,  by and through Pure
World and others, is impermissibly  seeking to seize control of and/or liquidate
the  Trust to  further  his own  hidden  agenda  through  the use of  false  and
misleading  Schedule 13Ds and proxy  statements  in violation of the  Securities
Exchange  Act of  1934,  as  amended,  and  rules  and  regulations  promulgated
thereunder by the Securities Exchange Commission (the  "SEC") (collectively, the
"Exchange  Act") and also in violation of state common and  statutory  law.  The
Trust  respectfully  petitions  the  Court  herein  for  relief  to  stop  these
violations  and to compel full and complete  disclosure  by Koether of his plans
and purposes in  accordance  with his  obligations  under federal and state law.
Additionally,  the Trust seeks an award of damages for the harm that Koether has
caused by his illegal  activities,  and certain  declaratory relief as set forth
herein.

                                       II.
                                     PARTIES

2. The Trust is a real estate investment trust (a "REIT") organized and existing
pursuant to the laws of the State of Texas, with its principal place of business
in Dallas County, Texas. The managers of the Trust are citizens of the States of
Texas and Montana, respectively.

3.  Pure  World  is a  Delaware  corporation  with its  principal  place of
business in New Jersey.  As set forth below,  Pure World  engages in business in
Texas,  but does not maintain a regular place of business or a designated  agent
for service of process in Texas. Accordingly,  under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code
ss.  17.041,  et seq.  and Fed. R. Civ.  P. 4(h),  Pure World may be served with
process by serving the Texas Secretary of State,  who will  immediately mail the
process to Pure World, directed to the attention of its president, Paul Koether,
at Pure World's home office address, 211 Pennbrook  Road, Far Hills,  New Jersey
07931.


<PAGE>




4. Koether is a citizen of New Jersey.  As set forth below,  Koether  engages in
business  in Texas,  but does not  maintain  a regular  place of  business  or a
designated agent for service of process in Texas.  Accordingly,  under Tex. Civ.
Prac. & Rem. Code ss. 17.041,  et seq. and Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e),  Koether may be
served  with  process  by  serving  the  Texas  Secretary  of  State,  who  will
immediately mail the process to Koether at his home address, 211 Pennbrook Road,
Far Hills, New Jersey 07931.



                                      III.
                             JURISDICTION AND VENUE

5. This Court has subject matter  jurisdiction  over this action  pursuant to 28
U.S.C.  ss. 1331, as all or part of the claims  asserted  herein arise under the
laws of the United States.  Additionally,  this Court has jurisdiction  under 15
U.S.C.  ss. 78aa because the Trust is seeking to enforce  liabilities and duties
created  by  the  Exchange  Act  and  to  enjoin  future   violations   thereof.
Additionally, this Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ss. 1332 because
this  action  is  between  citizens  of  different  states  and  the  matter  in
controversy  exceeds the sum or value of  $50,000,  exclusive  of  interest  and
costs.

6. Venue in this district is proper pursuant to 15 U.S.C.  ss. 78aa and 28 U.S.C
ss. 1391 as  Defendants  transact  business  in this  district,  Defendants  are
subject to personal jurisdiction in this district, and all or a substantial part
of the events or omissions  which form the basis of the Trust's claims  asserted
herein, including tort claims, occurred in this district.


                                       IV.
                                      FACTS

PURE WORLD AND KOETHER

7. Pure World is a corporation  that is  substantially  owned and  controlled by
Koether.  Koether  is the  president  and CEO of Pure  World.  As he has done on
previous occasions,  Koether acquired control of Pure World as part of a hostile
takeover during the late 1980s.

KOETHER'S HISTORY OF GREENMAIL

8. Over the years,  Koether, in conjunction with his wife, Natalie Koether,  has
proven to be a "corporate raider" and "greenmailer,"  preying primarily on small
and medium-sized companies which do not have large institutional  investors with
the sophistication and wherewithal to adequately protect themselves.  See, e.g.,
"Matrix Board Tells  Shareholders  of Koether Group's Track Record," PR Newswire
(December 30, 1987), Ex. A; "Natalie  Koether:  The Lady is a Raider,"  Business
Week (February 23, 1987), Ex. B;  "Stater-Bros.  Chairman  Discloses  Background
about Craig Corp.,"  Business Wire (April 21, 1986),  Ex. C; "A New  Greenmailer
Swings into Action," Fortune (August 5, 1985), Ex D, each of which


<PAGE>



are incorporated  herein by reference.  The common pattern used by Koether is to
purchase,  directly or indirectly,  a large block of a company's  stock and then
either: (1) attempt to force the company to repurchase the shares at an inflated
price, threatening a takeover if the company does not do so (i.e., "greenmail");
or (2)  actually  take  control  of a company  and use its  assets" to engage in
self-dealing  transactions and support other  Koether-owned/controlled  business
ventures  through a complex pattern of  interlocking  ownerships and agreements.
See Exhibits A- D.

9. An example of Koether's  greenmail  activities  was explained by the Delaware
Court of Chancery in Emerald Partners v. Berlin,  W.L. 25269 (Del. Ch. 1988). In
that case,  Emerald  Partners,  a  partnership  owned and  controlled by Koether
("Emerald"),  was acquiring"  the stock of a corporation  that was attempting to
merge with another  corporation.  The court explained that although  Koether was
seeking to enjoin the merger  based on the guise of  exercising  his rights as a
shareholder,  Koether's  opposition appeared to be "based on motives" other than
the best  interests of [the target  corporation]."  Id. at *4. The court further
explained  that "Mr.  Koether  ...  apparently  threatened  that if [the  target
corporation] did not purchase Emerald's interest [at an approximately  $1.00 per
share  premium  over market  prices],  Emerald  would make it very  difficult to
complete the proposed merger." Id. Indeed,  the court  unequivocally  found that
"Emerald obviously deals in many forms of shareholder blackmail, i.e. greenmail,
in attempts to gain control of  corporations  or be bought out at a  substantial
premium." Id.

KOETHER'S HISTORY OF SELF-DEALING

10. In situations  where Koether does not stop at mere greenmail  attempts,  but
rather goes on to seize  control of a target  company,  Koether has  exhibited a
consistent  pattern of extensive  self-dealing.  See, e.g.,  "Matrix Board Tells
Shareholders of Koether Group's Track Record," PR Newswire  (December 30, 1987),
Ex. A; "Stater-Bros. Chairman Discloses" Background about Craig Corp.," Business
Wire (April 21, 1986), Ex. C.

11. For  example,  in 1987,  Paul and Natalie  Koether (the  "Koethers")  gained
control of Texas American  Energy  Corporation  ("TAE") through a hostile proxy
fight.  After  experiencing   approximately  two  years  of  Koether-controlled
management,  the remaining  shareholders  were forced to institute a shareholder
derivative  action  alleging,  inter alia, that the Koethers:  (1) caused TAE to
sell TAE's primary  asset for the  Koethers' own financial  benefit and to TAE's
detriment  through the use of false and misleading proxy  statements  soliciting
shareholder  approval for the transaction;  (2) sold 1.6 million of TAE's common
shares to entities  owned or controlled by the Koethers for $1.25 per share when
the  shares  were  trading at $1.44 per share;  (3)  purchased  972,000 of TAE's
common  shares from an entity owned or  controlled  by the Koethers at $2.50 per
share when the shares were trading at $1.62 per share; (4) caused TAE to use its
assets to participate in greenmail  transactions  to the benefit of the Koethers
and at the expense of TAE; and (5) caused TAE to pay Natalie Koether and her law
firm  $2  to $3  million  in  legal  fees  for  "documenting,  restructuring  or
implementing  the  self-dealing  transactions  described  herein"  See Abrams v.
Koether, 766 F. Supp. 237 (D.N.J. 1991)" ("Abrams I");


<PAGE>



Abrams v. Koether,  Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (D. N.J. 1992) (CCH) P.96,995,  p. 94,336
("Abrams II"). Ultimately,  shareholders were successful in forcing the Koethers
to  appoint   independent  directors  to a majority  of the board of  directors'
seats,   and  requiring  the   independent   directors  to  approve  any  future
related-party transactions by the Koethers with respect to TAE.

12.  One  tactic  of  Koether  appears  to be using the  assets  of an  acquired
corporation  to  generate  and  pay  for  exorbitant  fees  to  himself  and his
affiliates. For example, during 1992 alone, Koether caused Pure World to pay his
wife's  law firm over  $250,000  in legal  fees;  to pay  Koether  himself  over
$200,000 in salary and related  benefits;  and to pay affiliated  companies over
$200,000 for rental expenses,  office sharing  arrangements,  and brokerage fees
and  commissions.  Similarly,  from  1990-1992,  Koether  caused Kent  Financial
Services,  Inc. (the successor to TAE) to pay his wife's law firm  approximately
$2.5  million in legal  fees,  and to pay  himself  approximately  $1 million in
salary and commissions.  Upon information and belief, these are only examples of
a regular  pattern of  self-dealing  conduct  that  Koether has  exhibited  once
acquiring control of his target corporations.

KOETHER'S HISTORY OF FALSE AND MISLEADING DISCLOSURES

13. Upon information and belief, another pattern of conduct exhibited by Koether
in his  history of  hostile  takeovers  has been the use of false or  misleading
disclosures to hide his true  intentions and motivations in purchasing the stock
of target corporations and soliciting the proxies of other shareholders.

14. For example in 1984 the Koethers,  through use of a corporation  under their
control  called  Edudata  Corporation  ("Edudata"),  sought to gain  control  of
Scientific  Computers," Inc. ("SCI"). SCI alleged that Edudata "conspired,  with
the Koethers [and two other entities  substantially  owned and controlled by the
Koethers],  to take  over SCI  through a series of  fraudulent  disclosures  and
material  omissions  and  dilute  it of  its  assets".  Edudata  Corporation  v.
Scientific Computers, Inc., 599 F. Supp. 1084, 1087 (D. Minn. 1984). The alleged
omissions included failure to: (1) specify the Koethers' future plans concerning
SCI;  (2) identify  adequately  Edudata's  background  and  affiliates;  and (3)
specify  any  potential  liability  Edudata  may  have due to  misstatements  or
omissions of material fact made in its July 1984 public  offering.  Id. at 1086.
Despite being on notice that their  disclosures  were inadequate and misleading,
the  Koethers  failed to amend their tender  offer  materials  until after being
enjoined from  proceeding  with their tender offer by the District  Court and by
the Minnesota  Commissioner of Commerce.  Id; see also Abrams I, supra; Irvin E.
Schermer Trust et al. v. Sun Equities Corp. et al., Cause No. 4-86-122, D. Minn.
(filed  2/11/86)  (both alleging the Koethers and  affiliates  filed  misleading
statements  with the SEC,  and in both  cases,  the  Koethers  settled  with the
plaintiffs). Upon information and belief, the Koethers have regularly engaged in
a pattern of hiding their true  intentions  and secret  self-dealing  plans when
pursuing control of their target companies.



<PAGE>

KOETHER'S HIDDEN AGENDA FOR THE TRUST

15.  Beginning  in December  1993,  Koether,  through  Pure World (then known as
American Holdings,  Inc.), began acquiring shares of the Trust. In January 1994,
Pure World's ownership interest exceeded five percent of the Trust's outstanding
shares,  and Pure World's most recent public  disclosures state that it now owns
9.785% of the  Trust's  outstanding  shares.  Beginning  in February  1994,  and
continuing to this day, Koether,  through Pure World, has stated in Pure World's
public  disclosures,  including its Schedule 13Ds, that Pure World "has acquired
[its interest in the Trust] for capital  appreciation."  Koether has also stated
in the past that the Trust should be liquidated. The Trust has recently learned,
however, that the Trust's shares are not all that Koether has been attempting to
acquire, but that Koether also has an undisclosed ulterior motive for seeking to
liquidate the Trust.

16. More particularly, at the same time Koether was acquiring the Trust's shares
and  proposing  to take  control of the  Trust,  and near the time  Koether  was
proposing  to  liquidate   the  Trust,   Koether  was  also  engaged  in  secret
negotiations with the Trust's largest creditor, The Manufacturers Life Insurance
Company ("MLI"),  to acquire the Trust's debt to MLI at a discount from its face
value for  his/Pure  World's own benefit.  Specifically,  beginning in mid-1994,
Koether began negotiations with MLI to purchase at a discount  approximately $45
million in promissory  notes (the "Notes") held by MLI.  Koether also  discussed
with MLI the  possibility  of  pursuing  a scheme by which  Koether  would  gain
control of the Trust and give MLI a substantial equity stake in the Trust. Later
in 1994, Koether and/or Pure World did, in fact, make a secret offer to purchase
the Notes at a discount from face value, with an alternative proposal of issuing
new shares and giving MLI an equity  stake in the Trust.  Koether and Pure World
have continued their contact with MLI and, more recently, inquired as to whether
MLI would sell the Notes if Koether or someone  connected  with him provided MLI
with an  indemnity.  Koether  and Pure World,  however,  have failed to disclose
these  negotiations and their attempts to buy the Notes in their  disclosures to
the Trust and the public,  including the Schedule 13Ds and proxy statements they
have filed with the SEC.  Upon  information  and belief,  Koether's  undisclosed
efforts to obtain the Notes at a discount are coupled with his efforts to obtain
control  of the Trust  through a proxy  contest so that  Koether  and Pure World
could  obtain the discount  for  themselves  instead of on behalf of the Trust's
shareholders.  Upon information and belief,  it continues to be Koether's secret
plan,  through Pure World,  to: (1) seize control of the Trust; (2) concurrently
and secretly acquire the Trust's Notes for himself or an affiliated company at a
substantial  discount from their face value; and then (3) liquidate the Trust to
pay off the Notes at their  full  face  value  prior to  maturity,  all  without
disclosing his hidden interest in the Notes.

KOETHER'S ATTEMPTS TO IMPLEMENT HIS HIDDEN AGENDA

17. The Trust is managed by trust  managers  in  accordance  with the Texas Real
Estate  Investment  Trust Act (the "Texas REIT Act").  Under the Texas REIT Act,
"all powers"  necessary or  appropriate to effect any or all of the purposes for
which the real estate  investment  trust is organized  shall be vested in one or
more trust manager(s) named in the declaration of trust or successor(s) selected
in accordance  therewith.  At least a two-thirds vote of the Trust's outstanding
shares is required for the shareholders to elect a successor trust manager under
the bylaws of the Trust and in accordance with the Texas REIT Act.

<PAGE>

18. Beginning in the fall of 1994, Koether, by and through Pure World, attempted
to implement  his hidden agenda and seize control of the Trust through a hostile
proxy  contest.  The annual  meeting  of the  Trust's  shareholders  was held in
Dallas,  Texas on November 21,  1994.  Pure World and Koether did not obtain the
two-thirds vote required to elect their own nominees.

19.  Undeterred  by his  defeat  in 1994,  Koether  continued  his  campaign  of
deception, misrepresentation and fraudulent omissions in 1995, again launching a
hostile  proxy  contest to  replace  the  current  trust  managers  with his own
nominees.  Even  though they  solicited  proxies  based on false and  misleading
information,  including  the filing of false and  misleading  Schedule  13Ds and
proxy statements, Koether and Pure World, at the Trust's 1995 meeting in Dallas,
did not come close to obtaining the two-thirds  required to elect their proposed
trust  managers.  Koether  and Pure  World  continued  to conceal  their  secret
negotiations  with MLI to acquire the Notes for their own benefit at a discount,
and they  continued to conceal  their hidden agenda to pay off the Notes in full
shortly after  Koether  could acquire them from MLI for a substantial  discount.
Notwithstanding  this second defeat,  Koether's  efforts to implement his secret
plan are continuing and ongoing.

KOETHER'S FAILURE TO DISCLOSE HIS "GROUP"

20. Upon information and belief, Koether and Pure World have been acting in
concert  with an  undisclosed  syndicate  or group (the  "Group") for the common
purpose of acquiring,  holding, voting or disposing shares of the Trust. Koether
and Pure World, however, have not disclosed the existence, identity, background,
ownership interests, purposes, or agreements of the Group in any of their public
disclosures,  including  Pure World's  Schedule  13Ds, as required by applicable
federal and state securities laws.

KOETHER'S WRONGFUL ACQUISITION OF EXCESS SHARES

21. Under the Internal  Revenue  Code,  the Trust's tax status is  endangered if
five or fewer  shareholders  obtain  ownership  of fifty  percent or more of the
Trust's outstanding shares.  Accordingly, to ensure that this requirement is not
violated,  and in accordance with industry practice,  the Trust's bylaws provide
that no person, including natural persons,  corporations,  trusts,  partnerships
and other  entities  "shall at any time directly or indirectly  acquire or hold
beneficial  ownership of shares with an aggregate value in excess of 9.8% of the
aggregate value of all outstanding  shares". The bylaws further provide that any
transfer of shares in excess of the 9.8% limitation is void ab initio,  and the
purported  transferee  is not  entitled  to vote the  excess  shares or  receive
dividends for the excess shares,  unless waived by the Trust.  The Trust has not
granted any such waivers to Koether or Pure World.

22. Upon information and belief, Koether and Pure World, by themselves and/or in
concert  with  others,  have  secretly  acquired  beneficial  ownership of Trust
shares, directly or indirectly,  in excess of 9.8% of the aggregate value of the
Trust's outstanding shares


<PAGE>



(the "Excess  Shares")  notwithstanding  the bylaws  restrictions  on ownership.
Additionally,   upon"  information  and  belief,  Koether  and  Pure  World,  by
themselves and/or in concert with others, have wrongfully collected dividends on
the Excess  Shares to which they are not entitled,  and they have  impermissibly
used  the  Excess  Shares  in  their  attempts  to take  over  the  Trust.  This
information has not been disclosed in any of Pure World's public disclosures.

DAMAGE TO THE TRUST AND ITS SHAREHOLDERS

23. In  addition  to  harming  the  Trust's  past and  present  shareholders  by
artificially  suppressing  the price of the Trust's  shares and impairing  their
right to be accurately and fully informed in deciding whether to give Pure World
and  Koether  their  proxies  and  to  buy/sell  their  shares,  the  misleading
statements  and omissions  described  above have caused,  and are  continuing to
cause,  substantial and irreparable damage to the Trust, and are threatening the
continued  viability  of the  Trust's  business,  by: 

          (1)  Interfering with the Trust's ability to restructure its 
               capitalization;  

          (2)  Disrupting the Trust's normal business operations by forcing
               the Trust to respond to and oppose the Defendants' misleading
               Schedule 13Ds and proxy statements;   

          (3)  Creating uncertainty about the Trust's future that has impaired,
               and will continue to impair, investor, creditor, and customer 
               confidence; and 

          (4)  Causing the Trust to pay Koether/Pure World dividends on the 
               Excess Shares to which they are not entitled.

24. All conditions  precedent to the Trust's  bringing this action and obtaining
the relief sought herein have occurred or have been waived.

<PAGE>

                                CAUSES OF ACTION
                       COUNT I: VIOLATION OF SECTION 13(D)

25. Paragraphs 1-24 are adopted by reference.

26. Koether and Pure World have violated,  and are continuing to violate Section
13(d) of the Exchange Act,  including  without  limitation rules 13d-1 and 13d-2
promulgated  by the SEC  thereunder,  by filing  with the SEC and sending to the
Trust a materially  false and misleading  Schedule 13D and amended Schedule 13Ds
that:

     (1)  Misrepresent  that their  purpose in  acquiring  the Trust's  shares 
          is for capital  appreciation  when,  in fact,  their true  purpose is 
          to allow  Koether and/or Pure World to gain  control of the Trust and 
          engage in the self-dealing described above; 

     (2)  Fail to disclose their  negotiations with MLI regarding the Trust's 
          Notes,  and fail to disclose their hidden agenda regarding the Notes 
          and the proposed  liquidation as described above; 

     (3)  Fail to disclose the identity and existence of the Group and the 
          purposes,  understandings,  and agreements of the Group;  and 

     (4)  Fail to disclose that their beneficial  ownership  interest, and/or
          the beneficial ownership interest held by Koether, Pure World, and 
          others acting in concert with them,


<PAGE>



          exceeds  9.8% of the  aggregate  value  of the  Trust's  outstanding
          shares  in violation of the Trust's bylaws.

27. In  addition  to  harming  the  Trust's  past and  present  shareholders  by
artificially suppressing the price of the Trust's shares, Defendants' misleading
Schedule 13D and amended Schedule 13Ds have caused, and are continuing to cause,
irreparable damage to the Trust, and threatening the continued  viability of the
Trust's business, as set forth above.

                      COUNT II: VIOLATION OF SECTION 14(A)

28. Paragraphs 1-27 are adopted by reference.

29.  Koether and Pure World have violated,  and are  continuing to violate,  ss.
14(a)  of  the  Exchange  Act  by  filing  and  sending  to the  Trust  and  its
shareholders materially false and misleading proxy statements that:

     (1)  Misrepresent  that their  purpose in  acquiring  the Trust's  shares 
          is for capital  appreciation  when,  in fact,  their true  purpose is
          to allow  Koether and/or Pure World to gain  control of the Trust and
          engage in the self-dealing described above; 

     (2)  Fail to disclose their  negotiations with MLI regarding the Trust's
          Notes, and fail to disclose their hidden agenda regarding the Notes 
          and the proposed  liquidation as described  above; 

     (3)  Fail to disclose the identity and existence of the Group and the 
          purposes,  understandings,  and agreements of the Group;  and 

     (4)  Fail to disclose that their beneficial  ownership  interest, and/or
          the beneficial ownership interest held by Koether, Pure World, and 
          others acting in concert with them,  exceeds 9.8% of the aggregate 
          value of the Trust's outstanding shares in violation of the Trust's 
          bylaws.

30. In  addition  to  harming  the  Trust's  past and  present  shareholders  by
artificially  suppressing  the price of the Trust's  shares and impairing  their
right to be accurately and fully informed in deciding whether to give Defendants
their proxies,  Defendants'  misleading  proxy  statements have caused,  and are
continuing  to cause,  substantial  and  irreparable  damage to the  Trust,  and
threatening the continued viability of the Trust's business as set forth above.

                                COUNT III: FRAUD

31. Paragraphs 1 through 30 are adopted by reference.

32. Koether and Pure World have committed, and are continuing to attempt to
commit, fraud in at least the following ways:

     (1)  Misrepresenting  that their purpose in acquiring the Trust's  shares 
          is for capital  appreciation  when,  in fact,  their true  purpose is 
          to allow  Koether and/or Pure World to gain  control of the Trust and 
          engage in the self-dealing described above; 

     (2)  Failing to disclose their negotiations with MLI regarding the Trust's 
          Notes, and failing


<PAGE>



          to disclose their hidden agenda regarding the Notes and the proposed 
          liquidation as described  above;  

     (3)  Failing to disclose the identity and  existence of the Group and the
          purposes,  understandings,  and  agreements of the Group;  and 

     (4)  Failing  to  disclose  that  their  beneficial  ownership  interest, 
          and/or the beneficial ownership interest held by Koether, Pure World,
          and others acting in concert  with  them,  exceeds  9.8%  of  the  
          aggregate  value  of  the  Trust's outstanding shares in violation of
          the Trust's bylaws.

33. The foregoing  misrepresentations and omissions were of material facts, were
made knowingly or with reckless  disregard for the truth, and were made with the
intention that the Trust and its shareholders rely on the misrepresentations and
omissions. The Trust and its past and present shareholders,  to their detriment,
have  relied  on  the  foregoing  misrepresentations  and  omissions,  and  as a
proximate result thereof, have suffered the damages described above.

                  COUNT IV: VIOLATION OF TEXAS SECURITIES LAWS

34. Paragraphs 1 through 33 are adopted by reference.

35.  Koether and Pure World have  committed,  and are continuing to commit,
violations of the Texas  Securities Act,  including TEX. CIV. STAT. ART. 581-33,
by,  interalia,  buying and  selling the  Trust's  shares  based on at least the
following material misrepresentations and omissions:

     (1)  Misrepresenting  that their purpose in acquiring the Trust's  shares 
          is for capital  appreciation  when,  in fact,  their true  purpose is
          to allow  Koether and/or Pure World to gain  control of the Trust and
          engage in the self-dealing described above; 

     (2)  Failing to disclose their negotiations with MLI regarding the Trust's
          Notes,  and failing to disclose  their hidden agenda  regarding the
          Notes and the proposed  liquidation as described  above; 

     (3)  Failing to disclose the identity and  existence of the Group and the
          purposes,  understandings,  and agreements  of the Group;  and 

     (4)  Failing to disclose that their beneficial ownership interest, and/or
          the beneficial  ownership interest held by Koether, Pure  World, and
          others  acting in  concert  with  them, exceeds 9.8% of the aggregate
          value of the Trust's  outstanding  shares in violation of the Trust's
          bylaws.

36. In  addition  to  harming  the  Trust's  past and  present  shareholders  by
artificially  suppressing  the price of the Trust's  shares and impairing  their
right to be accurately and fully informed in deciding whether to give Defendants
their proxies,  Defendants'  misleading  proxy  statements have caused,  and are
continuing  to cause,  substantial  and  irreparable  damage to the  Trust,  and
threatening the continued viability of the Trust's business as set forth above.



<PAGE>


                               COUNT V: CONSPIRACY

37. Paragraphs 1 through 36 are adopted by reference.

38. Koether,  Pure World,  and others acting in concert with them have conspired
with each other to commit fraud and  violations  of the Exchange  Act, the Texas
Securities  Act and the  Trust's  bylaws,  as  described  above,  and they  have
committed one or more acts in Dallas County in furtherance of their  conspiracy.
Their  wrongful  acts have  directly and  proximately  damaged the Trust and its
present and past  shareholders as described  above,  and continue to threaten to
cause substantial and irreparable damage to the Trust.

                         COUNT VI: DECLARATORY JUDGMENT

39. Paragraphs 1 through 38 are adopted by reference.

40.  Pursuant to Texas Civil  Practice and Remedies  Code Chapter 37 et seq. and
the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, the Trust requests a declaration regarding
the status of the Excess Shares. More particularly, a dispute exists between the
Trust and  Koether/Pure  World regarding  whether they, by themselves  and/or in
concert with others, have acquired beneficial ownership of Excess Shares, and if
so, the rights they have with respect to the Excess  Shares.  The Trust contends
that  Koether/Pure  World,  by  themselves  and/or in concert with others,  have
secretly  acquired  beneficial  ownership of Excess  Shares.  The Trust  further
contends that Koether/Pure  World have no voting,  dividend or other rights with
respect  to these  Excess  Shares  except  as set forth in the  Trust's  bylaws.
Koether  and Pure World,  however,  disagree.  This  dispute is  continuing  and
ongoing, and it is ripe for resolution by this Court.

              COUNT VII: MONEY HAD AND RECEIVED: UNJUST ENRICHMENT

41. Paragraphs 1 through 39 are adopted by reference.

42. Without knowing that  Koether/Pure  World,  by themselves  and/or in concert
with others, had secretly acquired beneficial ownership of more than 9.8% of the
value of the Trust's  outstanding  shares, the Trust has paid Koether/Pure World
dividends on the Excess Shares  which,  under the Trust's  bylaws,  Koether/Pure
World  were not  entitled  to  receive.  Koether/Pure  World  would be  unjustly
enriched  if they were  permitted  to keep  these  dividends,  which  justly and
rightly  belong to the Trust,  and the Trust demands that Koether and Pure World
return these dividends to the Trust. Under principles of equity, including money
had and received and unjust enrichment,  the Trust requests that the Court order
Koether/Pure  World to return to the Trust the amount of  dividends  paid on the
Excess Shares.

                          COUNT VIII: INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

43. Paragraphs 1 through 42 are adopted by reference.


<PAGE>




44. As set forth above, Defendants,  upon information and belief, are attempting
to seize control and force a liquidation of the Trust based on materially  false
and  misleading  statements  and  omissions,  including SEC filings.  Defendants
attempts to do so have caused, or are likely to cause, permanent and irreparable
injury to the Trust. Accordingly, the Trust requests a preliminary and permanent
injunction  restraining  Defendants  from  attempting to seize control of and/or
liquidate the Trust, and from further  attempting to acquire the Notes from MLI,
until the disclosures required under federal and state securities laws have been
made.  Additionally,  the Trust requests a preliminary and permanent  injunction
restraining Defendants, and all others acting in concert with them, from further
acquiring  Excess Shares and from further  voting or otherwise  using the Excess
Shares in their efforts to seize control of and/or liquidate the Trust.

                            COUNT IX: ATTORNEYS' FEES

45. Due to the dispute that exists between the Trust and  Defendants,  the Trust
has  retained  the Law Firm of  Liddell,  Sapp,  Zivley,  Hill & LaBoon,  L.L.P.
("Liddell Sapp") to represent it and to prosecute this action on the Trust's
behalf.  The  Trust  has  further  agreed  to pay  Liddell  Sapp its  reasonable
attorneys'  fees and costs for doing so.  Pursuant to Texas Civil  Practice  and
Remedies  Code ss.  37.009,  the  Securities  Exchange  Act of 1934,  the  Texas
Securities  Act, and any other  applicable  law, the Trust seeks an award of its
costs and reasonable and necessary attorneys' fees from Defendants.

                                  RELIEF SOUGHT

46. Paragraphs 1-45 are adopted by reference. 

47. The Trust  respectfully  requests that Defendants be summoned to appear and
answer herein, and that the Court:

     (1)  Issue preliminary and permanent injunctions ordering Defendants to 
          make the disclosures  required by Sections  13(d) and 14(a) of the  
          Exchange  Act and the Texas  Securities Act as discussed more fully 
          above,  and to cease their attempt to  acquire  the  Notes  from MLI
          until the  disclosures  are  made;  

     (2)  Issue preliminary and permanent injunctions  prohibiting  Defendants 
          from acquiring or trading any  additional  shares of the Trust until 
          the required Section 13(d) disclosures and the Texas Securities Act
          disclosures  discussed herein are made;

     (3)  Issue  preliminary  and permanent  injunctions prohibiting Defendants
          from further  soliciting any proxies or exercising any proxies already
          obtained until they provide full and adequate  disclosure  under  
          Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act and the Texas  Securities  Act as
          discussed  more  fully  above;  

     (4)  Issue preliminary  and  permanent  injunctions  enjoining  Defendants
          from taking any further action in furtherance of their  conspiracy,
          as discussed  above,  until full and adequate  disclosure of the 
          conspiracy is provided pursuant to Sections 13(d) and 14(a) of the  
          Exchange  Act and the Texas  Securities  Act;  

     (5)  Issue preliminary  and  permanent  injunctions  enjoining  Defendants,
          and all others acting in concert  with them,  from  further acquiring
          Excess  Shares and from voting or otherwise using the Excess Shares in
          their efforts to seize control of and/or liquidate the Trust;

<PAGE>


     (6)  Enter judgement  awarding the Trust its actual damages, as set forth
          herein,  against  Defendants,  jointly  and  severally;  

     (7)  Enter judgment  against  Defendants  awarding the Trust a declaration
          of rights as set forth  herein;  

     (8)  Enter  judgment  against  Defendants  awarding  the Trust a recovery
          of dividends  paid on the Excess Shares as set forth herein;  

     (9)  Enter judgment  for the Trust  against  Defendants,  jointly  and  
          severally,  for the Trust's   reasonable   costs  and  attorneys'  
          fees  incurred  in  bringing  and prosecuting this lawsuit;  

     (10) Enter judgment for the Trust against Defendants, jointly and 
          severally,  for prejudgment and postjudgment interest to the maximum
          extent allowed by law; and (11) Award the Trust such other and further
          relief to which it may be entitled at law or in equity.

                                      VII.

                                   JURY DEMAND

48. The Trust hereby demands a trial by jury.



Respectfully submitted,

LIDDELL, SAPP, ZIVLEY, HILL & LaBOON, L.L.P.

By: ________________________
Craig L. Weinstock
State Bar N. 21097300
Kirte Kinser
State Bar No. 11489650
900 Texas Commerce Tower
2200 Ross Avenue
Dallas, Texas 75201
(214) 220-4800 (Telephone)
(214) 220-4899 (Telecopier)

ATTORNEYS FOR AMERICAN
INDUSTRIAL PROPERTIES REIT







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