<PAGE>
SCHEDULE 14A INFORMATION
Proxy Statement Pursuant to Section 14(a) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Amendment No. )
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Filed by a Party other than the Registrant / /
Check the appropriate box:
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/ / Definitive Proxy Statement
/ / Definitive Additional Materials
/X/ Soliciting Material Pursuant to Section 240.14a-11(c) or Section
240.14a-12
First Bank System, Inc.
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(Name of Registrant as Specified In Its Charter)
- --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(Name of Person(s) Filing Proxy Statement, if other than the Registrant)
Payment of Filing Fee (Check the appropriate box):
/X/ $125 per Exchange Act Rules 0-11(c)(1)(ii), 14a-6(i)(1), 14a-6(i)(2) or
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/ / $500 per each party to the controversy pursuant to Exchange Act Rule
14a-6(i)(3).
/ / Fee computed on table below per Exchange Act Rules 14a-6(i)(4)
and 0-11.
1) Title of each class of securities to which transaction applies:
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2) Aggregate number of securities to which transaction applies:
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3) Per unit price or other underlying value of transaction computed
pursuant to Exchange Act Rule 0-11 (Set forth the amount on which the
filing fee is calculated and state how it was determined):
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/ / Check box if any part of the fee is offset as provided by Exchange Act Rule
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<PAGE>
[LOGO] FIRST BANK SYSTEM, INC. [LOGO]
MERGER WITH
FIRST INTERSTATE BANCORP
NOVEMBER 17, 1995
<PAGE>
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The following material has been prepared by or on behalf of First Bank
System, Inc. ("FBS"). FBS and First Interstate Bancorp ("First Interstate")
have entered into an Agreement and Plan of Merger, dated as of November 5,
1995 (the "Merger Agreement"), pursuant to which First Interstate will be
merged with a wholly owned subsidiary of FBS. FBS is the holder of an
option to purchase 19.9% of the outstanding shares of First Interstate
common stock, which option is exercisable under certain circumstances. In
addition, FBS holds certain shares of First Interstate common stock in a
fiduciary capacity.
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<PAGE>
STRATEGIC RATIONALE
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<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
FIRST BANK SYSTEM WELLS FARGO
<S> <C>
BUILDING A FIRST-RATE FRANCHISE NO GROWTH, FINANCIAL ENGINEERING STRATEGY
- Expanding business lines: - Cutting Costs
- Corporate Card Rank 1st
- Purchasing Card Rank 1st - Buying back shares
- Merchant Processing Rank 5th
- ATM/POS Rank 1st - ..."much of the improvement from 1993
- Corporate Trust Rank 1st resulted from a lower loan loss provision
- Asset Management Rank 4th and the effect of share repurchases, not
from growth in our underlying operations."
- Employing technology to reduce expenses
and improve efficiency Wells Fargo & Company
1994 Annual Report, page 2
- Creating a highly efficient delivery structure:
- Product/Distribution Paradigm
- Telephone banking
- ATMs
- Supermarkets
</TABLE>
3
<PAGE>
FBS VS. WFC MERGER EVALUATION
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- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
- FBS offers superior value to FI shareholders
- WFC has overestimated cost takeout and underestimated revenue
losses. WFC California advantage is less than $100 million
- FBS has not included significant potential for additional revenue
growth
4
<PAGE>
FBS PROVIDES SUPERIOR EPS TO FI SHAREHOLDERS
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- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
1996 1997 1998
<S> <C> <C> <C>
Base FI EPS $10.99 $12.53 $14.31
FI EPS - WFC/FI Combination $9.77 $12.18 $14.72
Accretion vs. Base (11)% (3)% 3%
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FI EPS - FBS/FI Combination $11.92 $15.61 $17.74
Accretion vs. Base 8% 24% 24%
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
</TABLE>
- ---------------------------------------
- Based on "Street" estimates with normalized loss loss provision:
50 bp for First Interstate, 80 bp for Wells Fargo
- $85 million net cost takeout benefit for WFC
- Assumes acquisition date 1/1/96
5
<PAGE>
FBS PROVIDES SUPERIOR CASH EPS TO FI SHAREHOLDERS
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- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
1996 1997 1998
<S> <C> <C> <C>
Base FI Cash EPS $11.81 $13.40 $15.23
FI Cash EPS - WFC/FI Combination $12.35 $14.92 $17.65
Accretion vs. Base 5% 11% 16%
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FI Cash EPS - FBS/FI Combination $13.05 $16.81 $19.02
Accretion vs. Base 10% 25% 25%
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
</TABLE>
- ---------------------------------------------------
- Based on "Street" estimates, adjusted for amortization of goodwill and
intangibles, with normalized loss loss provision: 50 bp for First
Interstate, 80 bp for Wells Fargo
- $85 million net cost takeout benefit for WFC
- Assumes acquisition date 1/1/96
6
<PAGE>
EXCHANGE COMPARISON
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- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
<S> <C> <C> <C>
FBS 1996 Cash EPS $5.20 WFC 1996 Cash EPS $17.05
FI 1996 Cash EPS $11.81 FI 1996 Cash EPS $11.81
Breakeven Exchange 2.27 Breakeven Exchange 0.69
Actual Exchange 2.60 Actual Exchange 0.67
Premium/(Discount) 14.48% Premium/(Discount) (3.75)%
FI Ownership Percentage 58% FI Ownership Percentage 52%
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
FI Cash EPS - 1998 $19.02 --> Required WFC Exchange 0.76
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
</TABLE>
7
<PAGE>
VALUE PER FI SHARE
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- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
BASED ON BASED ON
BASED ON CONVERGENT CONVERGENT
TODAY'S CASH P/E REPORTED
PRICE MULTIPLE (a) P/E MULTIPLE (b)
<S> <C> <C> <C>
FBS/FI $135.85 $151 $156
WFC/FI $139.58 $134 $121
</TABLE>
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(a) - 1997 FBS Cash EPS estimate is $5.75, implying a current price
multiple of 9.1x based on a price of $52.25 at close of business
11/16/5
- 1997 WFC Cash EPS estimate is $19.46 implying a current price
multiple of 10.8x based on a price of $209.375 at close of
business 11/6/95
- Over time these multiples are expected to converge - breakeven
P/E for FBS would need to be 9.6x to match value with Wells P/E
of 10.8x
- A convergent multiple of 9x Cash EPS was used for this
computation
(b) - 1997 FBS reported EPS estimate is $5.15, implying a current price
multiple of 10.2x based on a price of $52.25
- 1997 WFC reported EPS estimate is $18.72, implying a current
price multiple of 11.2x based on a price of $209.375
- A convergent multiple of 10x on 1997 reported earnings was used
for this computation
8
<PAGE>
FBS HAS OUTPERFORMED WFC ON A TOTAL RETURN BASIS
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- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
This graph presents certain information regarding stock prices and CAGR for
FBS and WFC. It shows a six year low for FBS stock $10.63 on November 2, 1990,
and a six year low for WFC stock of $45.75 on September 28, 1990. It shows
a November 10, 1995 stock price of $53.13 for FBS and $215.38 for WFC. It shows
a five year total market return(1) as a percentage as CAGR of 42.9% for FBS and
39.7% for WFC.
1 Based on calculating total return for both companies from respective 6
year lows.
9
<PAGE>
FBS DELIVERS SUPERIOR KEY PERFORMANCE RATIOS
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- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Percent
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
FI FBS WFC
BASE @2.60 @.667
<S> <C> <C> <C>
Return on Assets (a) 1.56 2.02 1.61
Return on Equity (a) 23.2 27.0 12.4
1995 - 1996 EPS Growth (b) 13.1 22.6 0.4
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
</TABLE>
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(a) For the quarter ended September 30, 1995
Assumes normalized loan loss provision and full phase-in
of cost takeouts
(b) Assumes acquisition date 1/1/96
10
<PAGE>
WILL INVESTORS IGNORE REPORTED ROE?
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- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
3Q95 Book ROE ------------------------------------------------
Percent 1. Wells Fargo 30.4
------------------------------------------------
FIRST BANK SYSTEM - PRO FORMA 27.0
------------------------------------------------
2. First Interstate 25.8
3. CoreStates 23.4
4. Norwest 21.5
------------------------------------------------
5. First Bank System 21.4
------------------------------------------------
6. Fifth Third 18.5
7. NationsBank 18.4
8. Northern Trust 18.3
9. KeyCorp 18.2
10. Fleet Financial 18.1
11. First Union 17.9
12. U.S. Bancorp 17.8
13. National City 17.7
14. Wachovia 17.5
15. Bank of Boston 17.3
16. Mellon 17.2
17. Banc One 17.2
18. Comerica 16.8
19. Barnett Banks 16.5
20. NBD 15.9
21. First Security 15.6
22. Shawmut 15.3
23. BankAmerica 15.2
24. SunTrust 14.1
25. PNC 13.5
26. Bancorp Hawaii 12.7
------------------------------------------------
WELLS FARGO - PRO FORMA 12.4
------------------------------------------------
Source: Montgomery Securities
FBS & WFC pro forma alternatives are third quarter annualized earnings
adjusted for normalized provision, full cost takeouts and acquisition entries
11
<PAGE>
WILL INVESTORS IGNORE EPS GROWTH?
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- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1995 - 1996 EPS Growth
Percent
1. PNC 18.3
2. First Union 16.6
3. CoreStates 15.6
4. Mellon 13.5
5. Norwest 13.5
-------------------------------------------------
6. FIRST BANK SYSTEM - PRO FORMA & ACT. 13.2
-------------------------------------------------
7. Fifth Third 13.0
8. NBD 12.6
9. Northern Trust 12.5
10. Banc One 11.9
11. Shawmut 11.8
12. BankAmerica 11.4
13. NationsBank 11.3
-------------------------------------------------
14. WELLS FARGO 10.4
-------------------------------------------------
15. Fleet Financial 10.2
16. Barnett 10.2
17. SunTrust 10.2
18. First Security 9.5
19. KeyCorp 9.3
20. Wachovia 9.3
21. Bank of Boston 8.8
22. Comerica 8.8
23. Bancorp Hawaii 8.0
24. U.S. Bancorp 6.8
25. National City 6.4
26. First Interstate 2.3
--------------------------------------------------
WELLS FARGO - PRO FORMA (0.1)
--------------------------------------------------
Source: First Call 1995 and 1996 EPS estimates
FBS and WFC pro forma alternatives are 1996
estimates adjusted for normalized provision
and partial cost takeouts
Assuming acquisition date 1/1/96
12
<PAGE>
EXPENSE SAVINGS COMPARISON
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- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
FIRST BANK SYSTEM WELLS FARGO
<S> <C>
- - Cost reductions from FBS transaction - Major takeouts in occupancy and retail
are revenue neutral and can be are inconsistent with revenue loss
obtained quickly assumptions. Takeouts in Commercial
and Trust relationship businesses are
not credible
- - Back office, systems, and staff cuts - Branch consolidations cause revenue
have minimal revenue impact loss. Cost reductions from branch
consolidations are slower to realize
- - Common FBS/FI Hogan deposit system - Home-grown software impedes timely
accelerates takeouts technology conversion
- - Multi-state bank experience - Single-state, single-bank experience
- - Proven record of extracting costs from - No significant bank acquisition since
acquisition integration (22 in 4 years) Crocker (1986)
</TABLE>
13
<PAGE>
EXPENSE TAKEOUT COMPARISON
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- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
$ Millions FI FBS WFC
------------ ------------------------------------- ---------------------------------
WFC vs. FBS
1996 BASE TAKEOUT TAKEOUT INCREMENTAL TAKEOUT TAKEOUT INCREMENTAL INCREMENTAL
EXPENSE DOLLARS PERCENT EXPENSE DOLLARS PERCENT EXPENSE DIFFERENCE
<S> <C> <C> <C> <C> <C> <C> <C> <C>
Staff/Executive $ 172 $ 114 66% $ 58 $159 92% $ 13 (45)
Data Processing 214 83 39 131 110 51 104 (27)
Operations 439 110 25 329 123 28 316 (13)
Occupancy/F&E 394 39 10 355 170 43 224 (131)
Business Lines:
Retail 682 100 15 582 288 42 394 (188)
Payment Systems 55 27 50 28 29 53 26 (2)
Commercial 168 18 10 150 92 55 76 (74)
Trust 79 9 10 70 29 37 50 (20)
------ ---- --- --- ---- -----
Total Business Lines 984 154 16 830 438 44 546 (284)
Goodwill 60 0 0 60 0 0 60 0
------ ---- --- --- ---- -----
Total Expense $2,263 $500 22% $1,763 $1,000 44% $1,263 (500)
------ ---- ------ ----- ----- -----
------ ---- ------ ----- ----- -----
Marginal Efficiency Ratio 45% 35%
</TABLE>
14
<PAGE>
FTE TAKEOUT COMPARISON
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- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------
HOW CAN WFC RUN FI WITH JUST OVER HALF OF FI'S HEADCOUNT
WHEN WFC HAS NO PRESENCE OUTSIDE CALIFORNIA?
------------------------------------------------------------
<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
FI FBS WFC*
--------- ---------------------------- --------------------------
1986 FTE PERCENT FTE PERCENT
BASE REDUCTION TAKEOUT REDUCTION TAKEOUT
<S> <C> <C> <C> <C> <C>
Staff/Executive 1,244 850 68 % 1,186 95 %
Data Processing 896 450 50 596 67
Operations 7,946 2,280 29 2,549 32
Business Lines:
Retail 13,216 1,830 14 2,551 42
Payment Systems 498 250 50 263 53
Commercial 2.900 290 10 1,635 56
Trust 1.300 130 10 459 35
------ ----- ------
Total Business Lines 17,914 2,500 14 7,908 44
------ ----- ------
Total Expense 28,000 6,080 22 % 12,239 44 %
------ ----- ------
------ ----- ------
</TABLE>
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* Estimated by applying FBS' ratio (FTE takeout %/total cost takeout %) to WFC
total cost takeout %
15
<PAGE>
WFC NUMBERS ARE NOT CREDIBLE
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- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
$ Millions
<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
<S> <C> <C> <C>
COST TAKEOUT ASSUMPTIONS
WFC $1,000
FBS 500
------
Difference $500
------
------
EXPENSE SAVINGS*
----------------------
TOTAL ASSUMES ASSUMES
EXPENSE ALL BRANCHES 75% BRANCHES
WFC ADVANTAGE VS. FBS: BASE CLOSED CLOSED
CALIFORNIA BUSINESS LINE OVERLAP
Personnel Expense $290 $115 $84
Occupancy/Equipment Expense 130 130 94
Other Expense 75 30 22
------ ------ ------
Total Expense $495 $275 $200
------ ------ ------
------ ------ ------
</TABLE>
- --------------------------------------------------
* 100% savings in occupancy/equipment, 40% in
personnel and other expense in closed branches
16
<PAGE>
FBS VS. WFC - THE REAL GAP
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- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
$ Millions
<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
PRETAX
INCOME
<S> <C> <C>
CALIFORNIA CLOSED/MERGED BRANCHES: (75% OF BRANCH/OFFICES)
Expense Savings 200
Revenue Loss: $2.2 billion, 15% deposit attrition* (110)
------
Net Closed/Merged Branches 90
CALIFORNIA MARKETING/ADVERTISING: (50% OF FI TOTAL) 20
DIVESTED BRANCHES: (15 BRANCHES/$900 MILLION)
Expense Savings 30
Revenue Loss (55)
------
Net Divested Branches (25)
----
Total Gap 85
----
</TABLE>
- ----------------------------------------
* Deposit Attrition Revenue Loss = 3.5% net interest income,
1.0% deposit service charge, 0.5% all other income
17
<PAGE>
WFC ESTIMATE OF REVENUE LOSSES RESULTING FROM THE MERGER IS UNDERSTATED
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
- Front-office branch closings in order to justify the substantial
cost savings will generate significant fall-off in customer revenues
in those branches
- Other California in-market acquisitions have resulted in 15-40%
deposit attrition (BAC/SecPac, Great Western/Home Fed,
Wells/Crocker)
- Required divestiture of approximately $900 million in deposits is
grossly understated: further review may require $1.6 billion of
divestitures with much more revenue loss
- A hostile transaction is likely to result in some of the depositors
taking sides, which is likely to result in further revenue attrition
18
<PAGE>
RETAIL CROSS-SELL OPPORTUNITY
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- --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
<S> <C>
FBS Cross-sell Ratio(a) 3.9
FI Cross-sell Ratio 2.6
-----
Cross-sell Ratio Opportunity 1.3 accounts/HH
-----
-----
Number of FI Core Households 2.9 million
Cross-sell Ratio Opportunity x 1.3
-----
New Product Opportunity 3.77 million
Weighted Average Pretax Income
per New Account(b) x $237
-----
Pretax Income Opportunity $893 million
-----
-----
</TABLE>
_________________________
(a) Cross-sell ratio based on products sold to core transaction account
households
(b) Based on FBS' current product profitability data
19
<PAGE>
FUNDING ADVANTAGES
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- --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
$ MILLIONS
<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
REVENUE
IMPACT
<S> <C>
- - Initial replacement of $4 billion of wholesale funding at FBS
with First Interstate core funding (80 basis points) $32
- - Funding of FBS 1996 loan growth of $1.5 billion with
First Interstate core funding instead of wholesale funding
(80 basis points) $12
----
$44
----
----
</TABLE>
20
<PAGE>
REDUCED RISK THROUGH DIVERSIFICATION
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FIRST BANK SYSTEM WELLS FARGO
- - Risk diversified across 21 states - Risk is further concentrated in
versus current 13 states California and territory remains
limited to 13 states
- - Top 3 ranking in 10 states - Top 3 ranking in only 4 states
- - 30% of assets located in California - 70% of total assets and 78% of
real estate loans located in
California
21
<PAGE>
SUMMARY
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- --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
- FBS offers superior value to FI shareholders
- Higher exchange premium 14.5% vs. (3.8)%
- Higher ownership 58% vs. 52% to FI shareholders
- Higher 1997 EPS accretion 24% vs. (3)% and cash EPS accretion 25%
vs. 11%
- Higher share value
- WFC has overestimated cost takeout and underestimated revenue losses
- WFC California advantage is less than $100 million
- Additional divestitures likely
- FBS has not included significant potential for additional revenue
growth
- Retail cross-sell
- Funding advantages
- FBS/FI is the stronger franchise
- Better geographic diversification
- Growing high value business lines
- Proven multi-state technology
22
<PAGE>
Contact: John R. Danielson Wendy Raway
Investor Relations Media Relations
First Bank System, Inc. First Bank System, Inc.
(612) 973-2261 (612) 973-2429
FIRST BANK SYSTEM STATEMENT ON WELLS FARGO OFFER
Minneapolis, November 13, 1995. . .First Bank System, Inc. (NYSE:
FBS) issued the following statement today relative to the
announcement made earlier this morning by Wells Fargo (NYSE:
WFC); FBS Chairman, President and CEO, John F. Grundhofer, said,
"We are frankly startled by some of the assumptions used by Wells
in justifying their revised proposal. We remain fully convinced
that our $500 million cost takeout projections are attainable,
but we are incredulous that Wells believes that it could operate
First Interstate with $500 million less in expenses than we
could. Given that the only advantage they have in terms of cost
takeouts is California branch overlap and only one-fourth of
First Interstate's $2.2 billion expense base is located in
California, it is hard to see how these savings can be achieved.
They'd have to close every First Interstate branch in California!
Even if this expense reduction were achievable, how could the
revenue loss be only $100 million?
Even so, the Wells numbers assume that they could
achieve higher levels of efficiencies in staff, data processing
and operations than we could, despite Wells having no multistate
operating experience and a very limited recent acquisition
history. We, on the other hand, have had a highly successful
string of 23 acquisitions in recent years.
MORE...
<PAGE>
FBS/PAGE TWO
We also believe it is extremely important for the First
Interstate shareholders to focus on the fact that First
Interstate shareholders would hold 58% of a combined FBS/First
Interstate, as opposed to only 52% of a Wells/First Interstate
combination. This means there is much more long-term value for
the First Interstate shareholders under our proposal. With our
offer, the cash accretion to First Interstate's shareholders
would be 25% in 1997, versus 14% under the Wells offer.
Wells' analyst presentation today valued its bid based
on a Wells stock price of $230 per share--a price their stock
hasn't approached in weeks. In fact, based on the current Wells
price of $210.50, the actual value to First Interstate
shareholders is only $140.33 as opposed to the $153 stated by
Wells.
We remain wholly committed to moving ahead with our
definitive agreement, and plan to take our proposal to the First
Interstate shareholders as soon as possible. In this regard, we
filed with the Minneapolis Fed on Friday, and we intend to file
our proxy statement with the SEC soon. This deal will close as
planned."
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