SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
Washington, D.C. 20549
Form 8-K
CURRENT REPORT
Pursuant to section 13 or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934
Date of Report (Date of earliest event reported) 19 December 1995
General Dynamics Corporation
(Exact name of registrant as specified in charter)
Delaware 1-3671 13-1673581
(State or Other (Commission (IRS Employer
Jurisdiction of File Number) Identification No.)
Incorporation)
3190 Fairview Park Drive, Falls Church, Virginia 22042-4523
(Address of Principal Executive Offices) (Zip Code)
(703) 876-3000
Registrant's telephone number, including area code
INFORMATION TO BE INCLUDED IN REPORT
Item 5. Other Events
On December 19, 1995, the United States Court of Federal
Claims filed the order attached as an exhibit hereto in
the matter of McDonnell Douglas Corporation and General
Dynamics Corporation vs. United States of America. Such
exhibit is incorporated herein in accordance with General
Instruction F to Form 8-K.
Item 7. Financial Statements and Exhibits
(c) Exhibits.
99 - Court Order
SIGNATURES
Pursuant to the requirements of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, the registrant has duly caused this report to be signed
on its behalf by the undersigned hereunto duly authorized.
Date 8 January 1996
GENERAL DYNAMICS CORPORATION
(Registrant)
By /s/ J.W. SCHWARTZ
J.W. Schwartz
Controller
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF FEDERAL CLAIMS
McDonnell Douglas Corporation and
General Dynamics Corporation,
No. 91-1204C
Plaintiffs,
Filed: December 19, 1995
vs.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant.
ORDER
We ruled last December that the Navy's decision to terminate
the A-12 contract for default was improper. Defendant argued
that the United States should be permitted to show that
plaintiffs were so egregiously in default that converting the
termination to one of convenience to the Government would create
a "windfall" for plaintiffs. We held extensive discussions
during ensuing months concerning the types of evidence that might
support such an exception to the general guidance of SCHLESINGER
V. UNITED STATES, 182 Ct. Cl. 571 (1968). It is now clear that
the United States cannot make a showing that would justify such
an exception.
After three weeks of trial, we have heard no credible
evidence that the Navy was unaware of critical information at the
time of termination. We have not heard evidence that the
contractors concealed or withheld information from the Navy or
provided misleading information to the Navy that would have
changed its attitude toward the aircraft. No credible evidence
in the record permits us to infer any support whatsoever for
defendant's case.
While defendant disagreed with the framework that we
established for trial in November, it assured the court
repeatedly that the government could meet the standards set forth
in a January 31 Order. We suggested on several occasions that if
defendant did not have evidence to support its burden as the
court defined it, the case should not proceed; "it would be
pointless to continue."
We heard from eleven witnesses during three weeks of trial.
Eight of them were employees of the contractors, including their
Chief Engineers on the A-12 - both acknowledged experts in the
sensitive and highly technical field of Stealth technology.
Defendant's case ultimately depends on one witness, a NAVAIR
weights engineer, whom government counsel described as "uniquely
situated" to testify about aircraft weight. That witness
attempted to show that information of which the Navy supposedly
was unaware would have altered the weight calculations that he
developed for NAVAIR. In fact, his weight calculations were
based on little more than whimsey. To the extent that his
testimony was offered to support allegations of "concealment," it
was entirely discredited on cross-examination.
When it becomes manifestly clear that a party cannot sustain
its burden of proof, the court may invoke discretionary power to
ensure the orderly disposition of its cases. ERIE CONDUIT CORP.
V. MAPA, 102 F.R.D. 877 (E.D. N.Y. 1984), AFF'D, 765 F.2d 135 (2d
Cir. 1985). No witness supported defendant's argument that
information was concealed from the Navy, or that the Navy lacked
crucial knowledge about plaintiff's progress. The Navy was
apprised of all information that could have made a difference in
its attitude toward the A-12. Indeed, Navy officials and
technical experts worked closely with the contractors on this
complex research and development project. It is manifestly clear
that defendant cannot prove its case.
It is not necessary to hear additional witnesses. Most can
only provide cumulative testimony. Others will be asked to
speculate on the basis of assumptions that are insupportable
because of evidence already in the record. Even if witnesses
whom defendant seeks to call could support the proposed findings
of fact for which their testimony is offered, it would not
matter. Such testimony could not overcome defendant's utter
failure of proof in the central theory of its case.
Having no basis for finding an exception to SCHLESINGER, we
must convert defendant's termination of plaintiffs' contract for
default to termination for convenience of the government. No
later than January 5, the parties will propose a schedule for
addressing damages. We will issue detailed findings of fact and
conclusions of law on Count 17 and other counts related to this
ruling in an Opinion that will be released in the near future.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 19th day of December, 1995.
/s/ Robert H. Hodges, Jr.
Robert H. Hodges, Jr.
Judge
