CORTECH INC
SC 13D/A, 1998-05-29
PHARMACEUTICAL PREPARATIONS
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                       SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
                             Washington, D.C. 20549

                                  SCHEDULE 13D/A

                   UNDER THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934

                               (Amendment No. 7)*

NAME OF ISSUER:  Cortech, Inc.

TITLE OF CLASS OF SECURITIES:   Common Stock

CUSIP NUMBER:  22051J100000

NAME, ADDRESS AND TELEPHONE NUMBER OF PERSON AUTHORIZED TO
RECEIVE NOTICES AND COMMUNICATIONS:

     Natalie I. Koether, Esq., Rosenman & Colin LLP
     211 Pennbrook Road, P. O. Box 97
     Far Hills, New Jersey 07931                 (908) 766-4101

DATE OF EVENT WHICH REQUIRES FILING:    May 29, 1998


If the filing person has previously  filed a statement on Schedule 13G to report
the  acquisition  which is the subject of this  Schedule 13D, and is filing this
schedule because of Rule 13d-1 (b)(3) or (4), check the following: ________

     Check the  following if a fee is being paid with the  statement:  (A fee is
not required only if the reporting person:  (1) has a previous statement on file
reporting  beneficial  ownership  of more  than  five  percent  of the  class of
securities  described  in Item 1;  and (2) has  filed  no  amendment  subsequent
thereto reporting beneficial ownership of five percent or less of such class.)
(See Rule 13d-7.)

     Note: Six copies of this statement, including all exhibits, should be filed
with the  Commission.  See Rule 13d-1(a) for other parties to whom copies are to
be sent.

*The  remainder of this cover page shall be filled out for a reporting  person's
initial filing on this form with respect to the subject class of securities, and
for  any  subsequent   amendment   containing   information  which  would  alter
disclosures provided in a prior cover page.

The  information  required on the remainder of this cover shall not be deemed to
be "filed" for the purpose of Section 18 of the Securities  Exchange Act of 1934
("Act") or otherwise  subject to the  liabilities of that section of the Act but
shall be subject to all other provisions of the Act (however, see the Notes).

                         (Continued on following pages)


<PAGE>



CUSIP NO.:   300902103000


1.       NAME OF REPORTING PERSON:   Asset Value Fund Limited Partnership

2.       CHECK THE APPROPRIATE BOX IF A MEMBER OF A GROUP:
         (a)      (b) XX

3.       [SEC USE ONLY]

4.       SOURCE OF FUNDS:  WC

5.       CHECK BOX IF DISCLOSURE OF LEGAL PROCEEDINGS IS REQUIRED
         PURSUANT TO ITEMS 2(d) OR 2(e):   YES          NO   XX

6.       CITIZENSHIP OR PLACE OF ORGANIZATION:   New Jersey

7.       SOLE VOTING POWER:   2,000,000

8.       SHARED VOTING POWER:

9.       SOLE DISPOSITIVE POWER:  2,000,000

10.      SHARED DISPOSITIVE POWER:

11.      AGGREGATE AMOUNT BENEFICIALLY OWNED BY EACH REPORTING
         PERSON:   2,000,000

12.      CHECK BOX IF THE AGGREGATE AMOUNT IN ROW (11) EXCLUDES
         CERTAIN SHARES:   YES        NO  XX

13.      PERCENT OF CLASS REPRESENTED BY AMOUNT IN ROW (11):   10.80%

14.      TYPE OF REPORTING PERSON:   PN



<PAGE>

CUSIP NO.:   300902103000


1.       NAME OF REPORTING PERSON:   Mark W. Jaindl

2.       CHECK THE APPROPRIATE BOX IF A MEMBER OF A GROUP:
         (a)     (b) XX

3.       [SEC USE ONLY]

4.       SOURCE OF FUNDS:  PF

5.       CHECK BOX IF DISCLOSURE OF LEGAL PROCEEDINGS IS REQUIRED
         PURSUANT TO ITEMS 2(d) OR 2(e):   YES          NO   XX

6.       CITIZENSHIP OR PLACE OF ORGANIZATION:   U.S.A.

7.       SOLE VOTING POWER:   250,000

8.       SHARED VOTING POWER:

9.       SOLE DISPOSITIVE POWER:  250,000

10.      SHARED DISPOSITIVE POWER:

11.      AGGREGATE AMOUNT BENEFICIALLY OWNED BY EACH REPORTING
         PERSON:   250,000

12.      CHECK BOX IF THE AGGREGATE AMOUNT IN ROW (11) EXCLUDES
         CERTAIN SHARES:   YES        NO   XX

13.      PERCENT OF CLASS REPRESENTED BY AMOUNT IN ROW (11):   1.35%

14.      TYPE OF REPORTING PERSON:   IN

<PAGE>

CUSIP NO.:   300902103000


1.       NAME OF REPORTING PERSON:   Frederick J. Jaindl

2.       CHECK THE APPROPRIATE BOX IF A MEMBER OF A GROUP:
         (a)     (b)  XX   

3.       [SEC USE ONLY]

4.       SOURCE OF FUNDS:  PF

5.       CHECK BOX IF DISCLOSURE OF LEGAL PROCEEDINGS IS REQUIRED
         PURSUANT TO ITEMS 2(d) OR 2(e):   YES          NO   XX

6.       CITIZENSHIP OR PLACE OF ORGANIZATION:   U.S.A.

7.       SOLE VOTING POWER:   520,000

8.       SHARED VOTING POWER:

9.       SOLE DISPOSITIVE POWER:  520,000

10.      SHARED DISPOSITIVE POWER:

11.      AGGREGATE AMOUNT BENEFICIALLY OWNED BY EACH REPORTING
         PERSON:   520,000

12.      CHECK BOX IF THE AGGREGATE AMOUNT IN ROW (11) EXCLUDES
         CERTAIN SHARES:   YES       NO XX  

13.      PERCENT OF CLASS REPRESENTED BY AMOUNT IN ROW (11):   2.80%

14.      TYPE OF REPORTING PERSON:   IN

<PAGE>


Item 1.  SECURITY AND ISSUER

     This  Amendment No. 7 relates to the Schedule 13D filed on October 15, 1997
in connection with the ownership by Asset Value Fund Limited Partnership ("Asset
Value")  of shares of common  stock,  par value  $.002 per share  ("Shares")  of
Cortech,  Inc.,  a  Delaware  corporation  (the  "Company"  or  "Cortech").  The
capitalized terms used in this Amendment,  unless otherwise defined,  shall have
the same meaning as in the original Schedule 13D.


Item 4.  PURPOSE OF TRANSACTION.

     In a letter  dated May 29,  1998 (the  "Asset  Value  Letter")  Asset Value
responded  to a letter dated May 28, 1998 from Bert  Fingerhut,  Chairman of the
Board of Directors and Acting Chief Executive Officer of Cortech (the "Fingerhut
Letter").

Item 5.  INTEREST  IN  SECURITIES  OF THE ISSUER.

     (a) As of the close of  business  on May 29,  1998,  Asset  Value  owned an
aggregate  of 2,000,000  Shares or  approximately  10.80%,  Mark Jaindl owned an
aggregate  of 250,000  Shares or  approximately  1.35% and Fred Jaindl  owned an
aggregate of 520,000 Shares or approximately 2.80%. Asset Value, Mark Jaindl and
Fred Jaindl disclaim the beneficial ownership of each other's shares.

     (b) Asset  Value,  Mark  Jaindl and Fred Jaindl have the sole power to vote
and dispose of 2,000,000 Shares (or  approximately  10.80%),  250,000 Shares (or
approximately 1.35%) and 520,000 Shares (or approximately 2.80%), respectively.

     Percentage ownership is based upon the total Shares reported as outstanding
in the Company's Form 10-Q for the quarter ended March 31, 1998.

<PAGE>

(b)  The information presented in Items 7 through 10 of the cover sheet to this
Schedule 13D is incorporated herein by reference.

Item 7.    MATERIAL TO BE FILED AS EXHIBITS.

     Exhibit D - The Asset Value Letter.

     Exhibit E - The Fingerhut Letter.


<PAGE>

                                   SIGNATURE
                                   ---------


     After  reasonable  inquiry and to the best of my  knowledge  and belief,  I
certify that the information  set forth in this statement is true,  complete and
correct.


Dated: May 29, 1998


                                        ASSET VALUE FUND LIMITED PARTNERSHIP

                                        By: Asset Value Management, Inc.
                                        General Partner


                                        By: /s/ John W. Galuchie, Jr.
                                        --------------------------------
                                        John W. Galuchie, Jr.
                                        Treasurer and Secretary



                                        /s/ Mark W. Jaindl
                                        --------------------------------
                                        Mark W. Jaindl

                                        

                                        /s/ Frederick J. Jaindl
                                        --------------------------------
                                        Frederick J. Jaindl


<PAGE>

                                   EXHIBIT D

                   Letter to Bert Fingerhut dated May 29, 1998

                      ASSET VALUE FUND LIMITED PARTNERSHIP
                                 376 Main Street
                                  P. O. Box 74
                          Bedminster, New Jersey 07921
                                 (908) 234-1881
                               (908) 234-9355 Fax


                                           May 29, 1998



Mr. Bert Fingerhut
Chairman
Cortech, Inc.
6850 North Broadway
Suite G
Denver, Colorado 80221

Dear Mr. Fingerhut:

     I had a deja vu reading your letter,  the tone of which is  distinctly  the
same as the letter sent to me by Kenneth R. Lynn on  December  1, 1997.  Clearly
this is your  lawyer's  letter,  not yours or the Board's and clearly the letter
evinces  your true  agenda  which is to maintain  the status  quo. We  genuinely
believe that leaving control of Cortech in the hands of individuals  tethered to
an unsuccessful past would not be in the interests of the  stockholders,  and we
do not believe that the  addition of two or three new voices  would  necessarily
add up to new leadership  for the company.  Instead  conflicting  opinions among
Board members could leave the Company  directionless  at a crucial  crossroad in
its history.

     We are pleased at your support of stockholder  democracy,  even if belated.
We also concur that Cortech should avoid a costly proxy contest.  Therefore,  we
offer the following proposal which we believe will satisfy all of the issues set
forth in your letter. Let Cortech  stockholders  decide all of these matters: 1)
the poison pill; 2) the classified Board; 3) the standards for calling a special
meeting; and 4) the members of the newly constituted Board.



<PAGE>



Mr. Bert Fingerhut
Chairman
May 29, 1998
Page 2

     Cortech and Asset Value would submit to  stockholders  one proxy  statement
which would  present each of these  questions.  In  addition,  Cortech and Asset
Value would each propose a slate of nominees to fill all of the current seats of
the Board if  stockholders  agree to declassify  the Board,  or two seats if the
Board  remains  classified.  Each side would be entitled to set forth a position
within a set word  limit for each  proposal.  Although  no side would be able to
censor the words of the other side, we would have a common  understanding not to
make personal attacks.  Each side would be responsible for negotiating text with
the Securities  and Exchange  Commission.  One ballot would be submitted  giving
each  stockholder  the ability to vote on every issue and to split a vote in the
election of directors. Asset Value would agree to pay a share of the cost of the
proxy material.  An independent inspector of election would be jointly appointed
to receive and count proxies.

     If this proposal is agreeable, we are prepared to discuss the details.

                                           Sincerely yours,


                                           /s/ Paul O. Koether
                                           -----------------------
                                           Paul O. Koether
                                           President

cc:      Dr. Charles Cohen
         Dr. Donald Kennedy
         Dr. Allen Misher


<PAGE>

                                   EXHIBIT E

                  Letter to Paul O. Koether dated May 28, 1998

                                  Cortech, Inc.
                               7000 North Broadway
                             Denver, Colorado 80221
                                 (303) 650-1200
                               Fax (303) 650-5023


May 28, 1998

Via Fax (908-234-9355) and FedEx                                  [Cortech logo]

Mr. Paul O. Koether
Asset Value Fund Limited Partnership
376 Main Street
P.O. Box 74
Bedminster, New Jersey 07921

Re:      Cortech, Inc.
         -------------

Dear Mr. Koether:

As I indicated  during our two telephone  conversations on Monday and Tuesday of
this week, I am  disappointed  by your stated  position that no purpose would be
served by a meeting amongst yourself,  Cortech Board member Charles Cohen and me
unless the Cortech Board of Directors first capitulates on four demands of Asset
Value Fund Limited  Partnership  (which are outlined  below).  Your  response is
particularly  troublesome  since (i) I indicated that each of your demands is an
appropriate  subject for  discussion,  and that the Cortech Board is open on how
best to accommodate the legitimate interests of all stockholders,  and (ii) your
demands appear to have doubled within a very short period (i.e.,  as reported to
me, you identified only TWO firm demands in your last  conversation with Kenneth
Lynn, formerly Cortech's Chairman and CEO, a little over two weeks ago).

To recount the  circumstances of our discussion,  last week a representative  of
Cortech's special counsel contacted one of your lawyers, indicating that I would
be  calling  you this week.  The  announced  purpose of my call was to  initiate
discussion of a potential  slate of nominees for election to the Cortech  Board.
As you know, the current Board embraces your call for stockholder  democracy and
has a genuine interest in avoiding a costly proxy fight.



<PAGE>



May 28, 1998
Page 2

In our first  conversation  this week, you identified the following four demands
which must be met before you would agree to a meeting:

         (1)      Election of three  representatives  of Asset Value Fund to the
                  Cortech  Board   (constituting   a  majority  of  the  current
                  five-person Board);

         (2)      Elimination of the current classification of the Cortech Board
                  (thus  opening all Board  positions to election at each Annual
                  Meeting of Stockholders);

         (3)      Provision of the right for any ten percent stockholder to call
                  a special meeting of Cortech's stockholders; and

         (4)      Elimination  of  Cortech's   stockholder  rights  plan  (which
                  presently  acts to  prevent  a  stockholder,  or any  group of
                  stockholders  acting together,  absent prior approval from and
                  action by the  Cortech  Board,  from  owning  more than 15% of
                  Cortech's stock).

I did not agree to requests (1), (3) or (4) during our  conversations,  and I do
not so agree now.

However, I did acknowledge a willingness to discuss an overall RECONSTITUTION of
the Cortech Board at the forthcoming Annual Meeting of Stockholders,  as well as
a  declassification  of the Board,  and I hereby  reaffirm such  willingness.  A
reconstituted  Cortech Board,  following the Annual Meeting,  COULD THEN EXAMINE
YOUR DEMANDS, as well as the broad range of issues facing Cortech, and embark on
whatever  course the new Board felt best served the legitimate  interests of all
stockholders.

As I told  you,  several  substantial  stockholders  I have  spoken  with do not
endorse  your  demands.  However,  I tried  to  explain  to you  that all of the
subjects you have raised are open for discussion.  I also made it clear that the
present  Cortech Board has neither a desire to  perpetuate  unduly its influence
over Cortech's destiny nor a willingness to expend  needlessly  substantial sums
in a counter-productive  proxy  fight.   Nonetheless,  you were unmoved in  your
insistence  that no meeting would occur  without an immediate and  unconditional
capitulation with respect to your demands.

After our first  conversation  on  Monday,  I called  you back on  Tuesday  in a
further  attempt to engage you in a meeting with  Charles  Cohen and me (I'm not
used to  groveling,  but on behalf of Cortech's  best interest I believe I did).
You again refused to meet, absent prior capitulation on your four demands.  This
is unfortunate since I believe we might have accomplished a great deal.


<PAGE>


May 28, 1998
Page 3

Since you have refused to meet with representatives of the Cortech Board, let me
tell you, in writing, some of what Charles and I would have reviewed with you at
a meeting:

         ---      First,  as I've indicated  above,  we could agree that (i) all
                  Cortech  directorships  be opened for  election  this year and
                  (ii) the Cortech  Board could  reasonably be  declassified  by
                  amendment of the Cortech Certificate of Incorporation;1 and

         ---      Second,  the Cortech  Board could agree on a slate of nominees
                  for the  reconstituted  Cortech Board which would be filled by
                  individuals      representing      significant     stockholder
                  constituencies.

I think the foregoing positions  epitomize the "stockholder  democracy" you have
espoused.

Again, aside from these positions,  I strongly think the balance of your demands
are better left for resolution by a  reconstituted  Cortech Board.2 Having tried
to engage  you in a  dialogue  over what  appeared  to be our  mutual  desire to
provide significant stockholder  constituencies,  such as Asset Value Fund, with
appropriate  representation on a reconstituted Cortech Board, we are prepared to
let your devout  interest in  stockholder  democracy,  like ours,  determine the
course of future events.

Very truly yours,


/s/ Bert Fingerhut
- -------------------------
Bert Fingerhut, Chairman


cc:      Charles Cohen, Ph.D., Cortech Board Member
         Donald Kennedy, Ph.D., Cortech Board Member
         Allen Misher, Ph.D., Cortech Board Member
         David Snyder, Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro LLP

- ----------------------------------------------------

1        As you know,  amendment  of the Cortech  Certificate  of  Incorporation
         requires  action by the  Cortech  Board of  Directors  and the  Cortech
         stockholders.

2        While the Cortech Board believes that the  stockholder  rights plan and
         limitations  on the  category  of  parties  able to call a  stockholder
         meeting  can have  served the  interests  of  stockholders  broadly (as
         opposed to the interests of only a few stockholders), the Cortech Board
         can understand how a reconstituted Board, under certain  circumstances,
         could see its way to  eliminating  the  stockholder  rights plan and/or
         expanding the category of parties able to call a stockholder meeting.






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