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The following is a transcript of a video that was posted on PaineWebber's
website on October 6, 2000
-----------------------------------------------------------
JOE GRANO: This morning, a gentleman by the name of Lugman Arnold
is going to speak to us. Lugman is currently the Chief Financial Officer for
UBS AG. Let me begin by telling you that when we were in the early days of our
discussions with UBS, and evaluating if we, as a firm, saw merit in a
consolidation with their fine organization. As I've discussed with you in the
past, the more we spoke, the more it became apparent that if we were going to
prepare ourselves for the new world five years from now, and this evolving
trend of regionalization, and globalization going on, we needed a partner.
But, as you can also expect, when you're a fervently independent firm, and
you're dealing with all the issues of a merger, I must tell you that the
gentleman you're going to hear from this morning, probably had more to do with
getting closure on both sides. Not only did he express an inordinate amount of
enthusiasm for the transaction, was very knowledgeable - he did his homework
on us, trust me - and, more importantly, he took on an air of can-do, with a
flair of compromise where compromise was warranted. I don't believe, frankly,
that we'd be here today if it weren't for his efforts. Let me tell you a
little bit about his background, he actually started out in the American
model, going back to a bank in Dallas, and spent some time with Mannie Hannie
in Honk Kong, Singapore,
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2
and other parts of the world. But then he went, from 1983-1992, to work for
Credit Suisse First Boston, first as a managing director, and later as a
member of the firm's operating committee. In 1993, he joined Bank Pariba,
where he served as a member of their executive committee, management
committee, and their board. Lugman has been working for UBS and its
predecessor since 1996. Through the years he has assumed various roles, he
served as Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of their Asia Pacific
operation, Chief Operating Officer of Warburg Dillon Read, and currently, as I
suggested, Chief Financial Officer for the whole group, and reports to the
group executive board of UBS AG. Lugman, we are pleased to have you here, and
so everybody knows we're going to record this, we understand that everybody is
an employee shareholder, and not all of our employees are here, so we will
videotape this transaction and this discussion, we will have a Q&A, and then
we will also pass out a hard copy to everyone who has attended, of the
discussion. Without further ado, Lugman Arnold. [applause]
LUGMAN ARNOLD: Good morning everyone, and thank you very much for
those kinds words, and also for the opportunity for being here and talking to
everyone here today. We had hoped to actually hand out the presentation which
I'll be giving today, the lawyers advised us that we have to wait to for the
F-4 to be delivered to you. If
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3
they arrive by the end of this session, we'll make sure you can get both the
F-4 and the presentation on your way out, otherwise, I think we'll make sure it
gets delivered to you personally, as soon after this as we can. As in most
presentations, the following discussion contains forward-looking statements,
and our actual results may differ materially from those discussed here.
Additional information concerning factors that could cause such a difference
can be found in our second quarter 2000 report, which is available here today,
and other publicly-disclosed financial reports, all of which are always posted
on our web. Partnership can be powerful. On July 1, 1879, a pair of ambitious
young gentlemen, Charles Cabot Jackson and Franz Curtis, opened an office on
Congress Street in Boston. The firm, known as Jackson & Curtis, was created in
the words of its founders, "to conduct the business of brokerage and banking."
Just over a year later, on the first of October, another pair of ambitious
young people, William Paine, and Wallace Webber, opened the brokerage house on
Congress Street, just a few doors down from Jackson & Curtis. Their firm was
called Paine & Webber, and was capitalized at $24,000. For more than 60 years,
the two companies competed and prospered side by side. Then, in 1942, they
merged to become Paine Webber Jackson & Curtis. The merger papers were signed
at the broker private club, which, as you probably know, still exists here on
54th
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4
Street, and by that time the capitalization of the combined firms was more
than $4 million. There were 30 partners and 23 offices, and the new company
was on its way to becoming one of the giants of the brokerage business. I
mention that bit of history because this says a lot about PaineWebber, its
culture, and about the roots of its success. It says a lot, too, about the
power of partnership, which has remained central to PaineWebber's philosophy,
from its merger with [Barron Fitch North] in the 60's, to Kiddder Peabody in
the 90's, and most recently Bradford, and now UBS. In much the same way, UBS
is a company that has succeeded through the power of partnership. Like
PaineWebber, UBS was formed through the merger of two competing firms, Union
Bank of Switzerland, and Swiss Bank Corporation in 1998. As you can see from
this slide, the roots of the two banks go back to 1862 and 1872, respectively,
pretty much around the time that Paine & Webber was formed. Both banks
expanded over these years through acquisitions and mergers, and in 1946, just
a few years after the creation of Paine Webber Jackson & Curtis, the Union
Bank of Switzerland opened its first office in New York. When I speak of
partnership, I do not just mean the merging of two businesses. I refer to the
marrying of cultures. The firm cannot succeed in the long run, and certainly
cannot be a great firm, unless it also has a great culture. At UBS we make our
share of mistakes, sorry, that's life. But, what we do understand is the value
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5
of diversity, the value of culture, the importance of culture. And, let me
give you just three examples from our recent past: first, I would like to
mention O'Connor. At the time that O'Connor came together with Swiss Bank
Corporation, it was a very powerful derivatives machine in Chicago, very
strong partnership culture, with about a couple hundred people. Much, much
smaller than Swiss Bank Corporation, which had in its offices, at that time,
tens of thousands already. But, O'Connor brought quite a few things, the first
was an affinity for technology, which has remained with us ever since.
Secondly, a trading approach which remains core to our trading approach today.
But, the most extraordinary thing about it was the reverse cultural revolution
that O'Connor brought to Swiss Bank Corporation. And, this was quite
deliberate on both houses parts, because effectively, Marcel Ospel handed them
the keys to Swiss Bank Corporation to allow him to do that. And, it did
transform Swiss Bank Corporation, and help it move into the modern age in a
very dramatic way. The second example I would like to use, again, is a US
example, its Brinson Partners, Gary Brinson. When Brinson and Swiss Bank
joined, a similar approach was taken. Gary was told, "here are the keys to the
entire institutional asset management business we have, please could you run
it globally, and transform it." And he did. And, if there's been problems with
the asset management business, they've been driven by
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6
what's happened in the market, and the difficulty price value management has
had in the new economy world, as a value style. But, what is indisputable is
that Gary transformed the investment process and professionalism of the
institutional asset management business. And, the final example I'd like to
use is Warburg. Warburg itself was, again, a very strong culture, originally
partnership, and aggressive, competitive, and very strong on the institutional
plan franchise. What happened was that, the combination of this institutional
plan franchise, and the trading and technology of what was then Swiss Bank/
O'Connor, created a very powerful global institutional business. There are
many other examples, both in the States and Europe, but also in places like
Australia, where these firms had a very big impact. And, it's not the size of
the firm that has made the difference, it's the culture and the strength of
that culture. Because otherwise, how could a couple hundred people from
O'Connor or Brinson and have such a big impact on a group this size? What we
have is that openness towards encouraging that cultural change, because we
know if we're going to survive in this very competitive industry, we're not
going to survive unless we change. And, the more we can change, the more we
can import better cultures, better ways of doing business, better insights,
the more we have a chance together of competing. Today, UBS is one of the top
ten banks and securities firms in the
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world, in the basic market capitalization, as well as the second largest in
Europe. Our ultimate goal has never been size alone, size is not an end in
itself, size does not have much to do with vision, size is not a strategy. We
are a global integrated investment services firm, and in Switzerland, the
leading bank. I know that everyone hates this tag, but if you can come up with
a better one, we'd be very happy to adopt it. The issue here is that in
Switzerland, we are the leading bank, and it is a very important part of our
roots. We are a universal bank in Switzerland, in effect. Now, we don't want
to be universal bank anywhere else in the world. What we don't like about
universal banking is the reliance on balance sheet, is the credit, is the
really, really retail business. And, that's why we call ourselves a global
investment services firm. It's a distinction, if you like, between Morgan
Stanley and Merrill Lynch, whom we view as peer competitors, and HSBC, which
we believe want to be global universal banks, which we do not want to be.
That's why we're stuck with this tag and, as I say, I'd be very happy if one
of you comes up with the better tag, I think we'd be very happy to adopt it.
UBS is not a holding company, our company is made up of a portfolio of
complementary businesses, managed together for optimal shareholder value. Six
key strategies drive all of our business groups: be global, in the future
every single UBS client will be global in outlook, whether as a result of
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8
global presence, or through global investments. The affluent investors are
increasingly global investors, that's why, as Don Marron has said, this is the
right merger with the right partner at the right time. Global is not an
option, it's a necessity, and every single one of our businesses must compete
on the global scale; pursue scale and scope, because proper scale in all our
key businesses will enable us to deliver the full spectrum of services, or
scope, of maximum efficiency; put advice at the center - our client philosophy
is advice-driven -- as Joe Grano consistently emphasizes, "serious money will
never, ever be wholly delegated to the computer." At UBS, we share this
PaineWebber philosophy, and we have stolen Joe's quote for our brochures. Now,
there's an obvious link between distribution and product choice. By having
distribution, we will bring our content excellence to an ever-broader client
base, adding distribution, be it organically through acquisition merger, or
strategic partnership, and we are flexible in how we go about it. Clearly,
this strategy was a core element of why PaineWebber and UBS started speaking
in the first place. Equally important is the capacity to attract and retain
those client franchises through the power of opening product choice. Choice,
after all, is central to enhancing our client offerings, and we believe that
we can remain the anchor supplier to our distribution franchises, but that we
have to support the in-house range with a quality stream
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selection of third-party products if we want to offer true value to our
clients, and to be competitive in the marketplace. No doubt, this is a single
biggest strategic and mental shift that UBS had to make over the last 18
months. It made it because we saw the writing on the wall, and quite clearly
what was happening in the U.S. market, in particular. But, we have made that
change, and we're totally committed to it, and that's your distribution and
franchise. And finally, leveraging technology excellence. We are fully
committed to being a part of the technologically elite. Technology will enable
us to extend our reach to clients and markets we could not have accessed
before. Technology will enable us to perfect our clients experience, and to
increase the number of products and services they buy from us. In short, the
shared wallet. Technology will also enable us to minimize the production cost
of our services. We do not see e-commerce as a business, per se. It is, quite
simply, integral to all of our business lines, and everything that each of us
does everyday. I think, again, there's a pretty close relationship to the
PaineWebber philosophy. We like to believe that for an organization our size,
that our group structure is simple. I've heard from some of your colleagues
that they beg to differ, but it is a large organization, and we do try to keep
it as simple a we can. We only have three key business groups, each with
separate business units. We
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10
track and report each one of these separately, which results in a granularity
of disclosure, which is exceptional in our industry, including in our industry
all of our American competitors. Our group focuses on four key targets, and I
would say here that we are very, very careful about forward statements,
differential disclosure, and all of these things. We are very careful not to
overcommit in terms of targets, we don't see the upside. However, our return
on equity for the second quarter was slightly beneath the figure recorded in
the first quarter, but still well above our target range of 15-20%. Our basic
earnings per share grew 139% between the second quarter of 1999 and 2000,
exceeding our target of double-digit growth. The group cost/income ratio is
well below that of the second quarter '99, but has increased slightly since
the first quarter 2000, as market related revenues fell slightly. And, after
positive starts to the year net new money in the private banking units we're
slightly negative in the second quarter, against a more muted market
background for asset growth, compared to the first quarter. I'm not talking
about assets under management, just the net new money, which excludes divided
flows and interest flows. I don't propose to go into detail on a lot of the
financials, you're very welcome to ask me questions about it, but I thought we
should leave more time for questions at the end, so I'll be very brief. Here,
the main story is that the less volatile interest and fee and
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11
commission lines were compounded annual growth rate, over the past 18 months
they've been 24%. Compared to last year, the growth in our cost base would be
more than offset by our revenue growth. We have very firmly established cost
controls, and you see this in the Swiss numbers, in particular. This is
interesting because it shows you where the earnings come from, and you can see
that it's pretty evenly balanced between what we call UBS Switzerland, and
what we call UBS Warburg. I should say that this is not a geographical source
of earnings chart, because UBS Switzerland has a lot of clients, or revenues,
that are effectively international in origin, and equally, UBS Warburg has a
lot of revenues which are Swiss in origin. But, it does show you that these
are the two big business machines. UBS Asset Management, in relative terms, is
small, in profit contribution terms, but this is very important to us
reputationally, and also in terms of the content they provide. So, we
obviously pay as much attention to this as to any of the other two business
groups. On a global basis, every single one of our groups is in the top
echelon of its particular business, and in the future, we are committed to
enhancing the competitive position on each one, globally. All of our business
groups work together in an integrated fashion. Products flow from the
wholesale business unit, which you see on the left of the chart here, to the
individual client units, in a way
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which significantly and favorably benefits both franchises, the wholesale and
the private clients. We believe that the current round of consolidation
proves, more than ever before, that the product-based content businesses, and
client-based distribution businesses cannot thrive separately, they need each
other. UBS Switzerland comprises our private banking and private and corporate
client units, and bring together all our businesses based in Switzerland,
integrating the finest tradition in Swiss banking. In a very fragmented
industry, UBS is, indisputably, the world's largest private bank. Because we
understand the business, we respect and value what PaineWebber's achieved, and
hope that your leadership will help us to compete better and smarter in this
base, globally. Private banking revenues derive approximately 70% from asset
base fees and advisory services, and 30% from transaction fees. Our strategy
is clearly to increase the asset base and advisory fees, and to reduce a
percentage of the transaction base fees, and we are working on this, and it is
succeeding. Our strategy centers on the client advisor. Here we combine
strong, personal relationships with a comprehensive range of products and
services, designed specifically for the wealthy clients, and supplemented and
enabled by leading edge technology. Again, pretty similar to the PaineWebber
philosophy. Scope and scale both matter, and they're closely related. Scope is
our bank's ability to provide the full range of products and
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13
services from the commodity product to the exotic product, in an integrated
fashion. Size comes in because the cost base required to develop the scope of
services is significant. This slide simply shows you that in Switzerland, PCC,
which is the private and corporate part of the business in Switzerland, is
really dominant in Switzerland. It has 27% market share, the next largest is
Credit Swiss with 11%. These are important roots for business, they are also
important sources of revenues for all of our business groups. Here you can see
the improving trends of cost income lines, and this is partly attributable to
the merger and the benefits in Switzerland, in particular. And just to show
you that Switzerland is not that backward, since the merger, which was the end
of June, '98, we've closed 200 branches, or nearly 40% of the entire combined
retail network. So, we have moved quickly to achieve the benefits on both the
cost side, but also the revenue side, in Switzerland. I think we can move
quickly through these, so you'll get all the slides, I think I won't spend a
lot of time on this. Our e-bank metrics look like all e-bank metrics should
look, and now we come, really, to the UBS Asset Management, and I only have
one comment to make on UBS Asset Management, but I'm happy to take questions
later, and that is that when Brinson joined with UBS, and they made Gary
Brinson responsible for the institutional asset management globally, we moved
the
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headquarters of that business to Chicago, where Brinson was based. Since then,
we've added the entire mutual fund business, which is, by the way, the largest
in Europe, and the important thing to recognize is that that business is still
headquartered in Chicago. And, we believe that that is the right place to be
because a lot of the asset management trends start in the States, and if, by
being here, we're more on top of what's happening. So, that's headquartered in
Chicago, the investment bank is headquartered in London, it is global group in
that sense too. Despite the tough times that price value management has had
within the new economy world, the institutional business is still at the top
five globally, by assets. I would just like to stress that, even though the
price value part of the business has been challenged because of the new
economy, they are still amongst the best in that style, and that is both
Brinson and Philips & Drew. They also have significant strength and good
performance in a number of other styles, including high-yield emerging
markets, fixed- income, and alternative investment styles like capital
preservation, hedge funds, private equity, oil and gas, timber, real estate.
But, what has happened is that the problems of the price value style, in the
current markets, mean that the loss of assets from those portfolios, which
means equity and balance portfolios in the U.S. and U.K., has more than offset
the growth in the other styles, and the
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funds managed in the other styles. That trend is now improving, and obviously
the most important thing for us is to see a stronger performance of price
value management as a result of the changed economic circumstances this year.
Because the questions over some of the technology areas, for example, has
meant that more money is coming back to value-based investment, which helps
Brinson and Philips & Drew. Again, I think I'll skip through the key
investment funds, and move onto Warburg. Although Warburg will naturally be
transformed by the addition of PaineWebber, the foundation stone of this deal,
which is a step we already took earlier this year, in bringing our on-shore
private client businesses outside Switzerland, together with our securities
businesses. The point here is that the private bank, which in UBS Switzerland,
provides a classic Swiss banking model for private clients who may be in
Switzerland or abroad. What we have done there, is to say that the private
client business of Warburg should include all of the domestic private banking
businesses, we are doing in Germany, or doing in France, or Japan, what
PaineWebber does in the States. And, that is all part of Warburg, and as you
will see later, actually, now a part - going forward - of PaineWebber. Lead
table positions are not the whole story, nor are they a particularly good
measure of profitability. But, Warburg has certainly made steady progress this
year, especially in completed M&A that led the August rankings
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globally. But, the real motor of all those businesses is the institutional
client franchise, especially the equities business, which is gaining market
share across all regions, including the U.S. And, this is a business that
really benefited from bringing together, if you like, the cultures and client
franchises of Warburg, with the culture and technology and trading prowess of
O'Connor - it really did work. These top class client franchises have driven
Warburg to record level of profitability this year. The second quarter results
only fractionally below their first quarter equivalents, despite much quieter
markets. In fact, we believe this to be the best second quarter on first
quarter performance of any of our major competitors. The strategies of the
corporate institutional clients unit are based on the more of the same,
meaning that we will continue to invest in, for example, Sector expertise, but
necessary to increase the content, and supplies of products for our investors.
More global clients whether the merger with PaineWebber helps enormously in
diversifying the global clients private client footprint. And more technology
innovation. Bear in mind that Warburg already boasts one of the industry's
most highly-regarded on-line presences, IBOL, short for investment banking on
line. The clients can access all its content and execution services through a
single electronic gateway, and through a single application at the pass. UBS
Capital is the private equity arm of Warburg, and we believe
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this to be an attractive asset class for UBS, and continue to build a
portfolio towards a ten billion target. We also believe this is a very
important asset class for our private clients, and if you look at the funds
raised externally, the bulk of that was, indeed, raised from private clients.
PaineWebber will take over running the existing private client franchise, as
well as the e-services initiative, will transform the Warburg on-shore private
client business we have. And, the result of the merger is that 2/3's of the
whole of Warburg's employees will be in the United States. In the future,
PaineWebber's private client and asset management businesses will remain
together under their existing management and brand names. Honestly, the only
real risk we run is if we ask PaineWebber and your leadership, and all of you,
to do more than is reasonable, because we want to support acceleration of our
development, your development in the United States, and simultaneously, to ask
for your help in growing our private client business globally. At least it
should be challenging, it should be exciting, and hopefully rewarding for all
of us. PaineWebber - that is all of you - bring growth in the most attractive
affluent market in the world. The firm cannot claim to be global today, if it
is not a major factor in a most important, most dynamic marketplace, which is,
of course, the USA. And the U.S. is also important, because it is a source of
new ideas and trends, and if you're not here, and you're not on top of
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those trends, you're not going to be able to react soon enough to compete
effectively outside the U.S. globally. We are very committed to the
PaineWebber leadership, in seeking to build the PaineWebber franchise further
in the United States. We want to compete effectively with, and frankly, to
beat, Morgan Stanley, Merrill Lynch, which are two of the peer groups, against
which we benchmark UBS and all its businesses. As you know, you bring an
up-scale focus on the high end of that market, significantly outstripping your
biggest rivals in average account size. You bring experience and success in
combining new technologies for the advisor relationship, as you have proven so
successfully with the Edge product. So, let me talk a little bit about the
rationale behind the UBS PaineWebber deal, certainly as far as UBS has seen it
in our discussions. First, it is obviously the marriage of content and
distribution. Secondly, it is achieving access to your private clients,
prowess, to help us achieve global leadership in this area. And finally, to
the cultural factors, which I mentioned earlier. The strategic fit, between
our business and your business, is compelling and right. It is the right
market for us, which is the United States, the right business, which is asset
gathering, and the right segment within that business, which is the core
affluent. Together, our combined firms obviously comprise the premier private
client business globally, and in addition, there are quite a few
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other very important factors which came to consideration. PaineWebber lends
significant U.S. muscle to the Warburg institutional franchise, certainly in
U.S. equity research, but not only. The new firm boasts unique distribution,
which is the path for corporate finance calling cards, but something which
they can really leverage globally. The visible commitment to the U.S. market
considerably augments our combined hiring platform and, as we know, success in
this business is partly a war for talent, for attracting talent, for
invigorating talent, and for keeping talent. And above all, our culture and
business philosophy fit hand-in-hand. This chart shows clearly the unique
affluent and high net-worth client base that UBS will possess. No competitor
will have similar global private client distribution power, or a footprint
that is so perfectly balanced. We will, together, have 2% of investable assets
in the U.S., 2% in Europe, and 2% in Asia Pacific, just a coincidence, but
it's also the fact. 2%, actually, is a very low market share for a global
leadership position, which is what we have, and therefore, in the
consolidating industry we would hope that together we could significantly
increase that market share to something more typical of a leadership position
in the global marketplace, which is a huge opportunity for us all. In some
respects, PaineWebber's multiple and share price could not reach the
stratosphere without two key elements in place, which was
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the global reach, and the investment banking side. The combination of content
and distribution is now positioned to secure re-rating, and Morgan Stanley
Dean Witter demonstrated the immense power of joining premier content and
private client distribution. We plan and mange our portfolio businesses
exclusively for the long-term maximization of shareholder value. At UBS, we
pride ourselves on strong capitalization and ratings. As two key parts of the
value proposition, we offer both to clients, and to shareholders. We're also
committed, both now and in the future, to active capital management. Earlier
this year, for example, in the space of around five months, we bought back
4.5% of our own shares. That's quite a sizable percentage in U.S. terms, it's
extraordinary in European terms. We do not view buying back shares as a
strategy, by the way, it's a capital management technique, so we only do it if
we really don't see terrific opportunities to achieve better returns on
investing our capital. And, we hope with you, we will have those opportunities
- certainly in the U.S., and hopefully elsewhere -- to invest our cash flow.
One of the interesting points is, "why do we have such a strong cash flow?"
because there are other people with the same profits who don't have that cash
flow. And, the reason is that we really manage our businesses, we really look
at risk/reward, and we don't blow out the balance sheet unless we're getting
paid for it. So, the result is that, it's not
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just a matter of generating the excess capital, it's also a matter of not
utilizing it in inefficient, or uneconomic ways. That is why we have such a
strong cash flow. And, when we you look at our first half return of equity at
over 30%, please keep in mind that this is on a very high capitalization, so
it's not even comparable to some competitors who make similar numbers on lower
capital. The tier one ratio is a measure of capitalization which is used in
the banking system, and the minimum required for this by the BIS is 4%. Most
major competitors with good ratings have around 8%. At the end of June, we had
12%, despite having gone through the share buy-back approach. So, to make a
30% return in conjunction with maintaining a very strong capitalization,
obviously says something about how the first half went. We are very aggressive
in our approach to increasing the transparency in both our reporting and
analysis. And UBS has a commitment to set a new sector benchmark for
transparency and quality of analysis, and I don't just mean for Europeans, I
mean globally, including our U.S. competitors. And, we're very happy to stand
up and be compared in terms of that disclosure, that transparency, and
granularity of what we disclose, with any U.S. competitor. So, how does the
market view UBS? I think it's fair to say that while market sentiment has been
very positive, both towards our strategic direction, and the PaineWebber
merger, that the stock has not fully made up the discounts to what
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we consider to be our closest peer group. The positive of this is that we
still have room. Regardless of sentiment, the share price has enjoyed a decent
run, relative to sector index this year, and I'd like to also comment on the
fact that we have very strong downside protection quality, because if times
are difficult, or things uncertain, and there's a flight to quality, we
represent that type of quality to which there is a flight. So, under relative
terms, we probably do well in a situation like that. Obviously, in absolute
terms, we would rather not have difficult times, but at least we have that
downside protection quality. To let me conclude with what we are, not in terms
of size, but in terms of strength, first, we enjoy a leading industry position
in all of our core businesses. We enjoy the strong ratings and capitalization
and cash flow. We have a unique client franchise and brand, with an unmatched
record of technological innovation. We're known for excellence in risk
management. We have proven expertise in mergers, acquisitions, and
integration, as a glimpse of our history has shown you. But most of all, we
have a culture that genuinely embraces change. Now, we add to that all of the
strengths of PaineWebber, an organization that shares a number of those same
success factors, while adding many more. And, in a marketplace which has
fulfilled now the promise of globalization, this is, indeed, the right merger,
the right partner, the right time. I mentioned
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earlier the impact of previous mergers on our group's culture, and I wanted
really to say that everybody at UBS is really proud and excited by this
merger. I have to stress this, and this even applies to small branches in
Switzerland, which are not that affected by the merger. They're really proud
of this association that we're forging together. And, because we have an open
culture, because we embrace change, and because we want our new partners to
affect how we do things, we are welcoming, we are looking forward to the
changes that all of you will bring to UBS, the contribution you'll make both
to our business, and to our culture. So, I'd like to thank you very much for
listening to this. I'm very happy to take any and all questions. If there are
limitations, what I can say they're only SEC imposed, unless they're really
line management issues, in which case I have very good support from Joe to
help me out with those, because I'm not the line manager. Thank you very much,
indeed.
