<PAGE>
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20549
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SCHEDULE 14A
(Rule 14a-101)
INFORMATION REQUIRED IN PROXY STATEMENT
SCHEDULE 14A INFORMATION
PROXY STATEMENT PURSUANT TO SECTION 14(a) OF THE
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
-------------
[x] Filed by the Registrant
[_] Filed by a Party other than the Registrant
Check the appropriate box:
[_] Preliminary Proxy Statement
[_] Confidential, for Use of the Commission Only (as permitted by Rule
14a-6(e)(2))
[_] Definitive Proxy Statement
[x] Definitive Additional Materials
[_] Soliciting Material Pursuant to Rule 14a-11(c) or Rule 14a-12
REXENE CORPORATION
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(Name of Registrant as Specified in Its Charter)
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(Name of Person(s) Filing Proxy Statement, if other than the Registrant)
PAYMENT OF FILING FEE (Check the appropriate box):
[x] No fee required
[_] Fee computed on table below per Exchange Act Rules 14a-6(i)(4) and
0-11.
1) Title of each class of securities to which transaction applies:
2) Aggregate number of securities to which transaction applies:
3) Per unit price or other underlying value of transaction computed
pursuant to Exchange Act Rule 0-11 (Set forth the amount on which
the filing fee is calculated and state how it was determined.):
4) Proposed maximum aggregate value of transaction:
5) Total fee paid:
[_] Fee paid previously with preliminary materials.
[_] Check box if any part of the fee is offset as provided by Exchange Act
Rule 0-11(a)(2) and identify the filing for which the offsetting fee
was paid previously. Identify the previous filing by registration
statement number, or the Form or Schedule and the date of its filing.
1) Amount Previously Paid: $
2) Form, Schedule or Registration Statement No.:
3) Filing Party:
4) Date Filed:
<PAGE>
REXENE CORPORATION
MANAGEMENT PRESENTATION
FEBRUARY 1997
<PAGE>
AGENDA
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A. Management's Track Record
B. What Really Happened
C. Management's Initiatives to Preserve and Enhance Shareholder Value
<PAGE>
MANAGEMENT'S TRACK RECORD
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y/e 1993 y/e 1996
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Stock Price $2.88 $13.63
(Repesents 68% Compound Annual Growth Rate)
Net Worth (in millions) ($5.0) $169.0
(An Increase of $58 Million Per Year)
Debt to Total Capital 100.00% 58.00%
(A Significantly More Flexible Balance Sheet)
E.P.S. ($2.40) $1.55E
(Greatly Improved Profitability)
<PAGE>
MANAGEMENT'S TRACK RECORD
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[Graphic Material Omitted: Pursuant to Rule 304 of Regulation S-T the
tabular data description of this graphic material is presented on the previous
page under the heading "Management's Track Record."]
<PAGE>
HISTORY OF DISCUSSIONS WITH HUNTSMAN
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o Huntsman's first proposals: $14 in July; raised bid to $15 in August
- Rexene offered to meet with Huntsman immediately following the
first offer. He refused.
o July through December 1996, the Company and its advisors:
- Engaged in numerous discussions with Huntsman
- Met with Huntsman on two separate occasions in Salt Lake City
- Carefully evaluated Huntsman's proposals and other strategic
alternatives
o During October 1996, Huntsman was urged to perform due diligence on the
Company
o Six other parties signed confidentiality agreements, received
information and performed due diligence
HUNTSMAN REFUSED TO SIGN A CONFIDENTIALITY AGREEMENT AND PERFORM DUE
DILIGENCE
<PAGE>
HISTORY OF HUNTSMAN'S $16 OFFER
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o On October 29, 1996, Huntsman proposed a merger transaction at $16 per
share, specifying that the proposal was unconditional with respect to
financing and due diligence.
o Despite the Board's belief that $16 is at the bottom of the range of
fair value, the Board agreed to pursue the proposal further and
requested a merger agreement.
o Contrary to the October 29 proposal, Huntsman's draft merger agreement
was highly conditional and:
- Provided no assurances that a deal would be completed
- Placed limitations on operations and put the business at risk
- Had no financing in place, nor did it represent that it had
financing
<PAGE>
HUNTSMAN'S $16 OFFER FOR THE COMPANY WAS NOT REAL
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o The Board directed Andy Smith to ask for a tender offer structure
o The Board sought a tender offer structure to:
- Confirm Huntsman's commitment to a transaction
- Guarantee shareholders timely payment
- Eliminate financing risk
o Huntsman abruptly refused to negotiate any aspect of his merger
proposal
- ". . . by the time I reached the bottom of page one, . . . I was
sure the letter must be some kind of joke..., and I threw it in
the wastebasket."
o During telephone conversations, Huntsman indicated that he was not
committed to complete a transaction
- "I am relieved" - that we are no longer proceeding with a
transaction
- "The (Huntsman) family was not unanimous in its support of a
deal"
<PAGE>
BOARD INITIATIVES TO INCREASE SHAREHOLDER VALUE
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o The Board remains open to a $16 per share transaction
o Since July 1996, the Board and management have been pursuing and
evaluating other means of enhancing shareholder value
- Identifying and approaching potential buyers of the Company
- Examining possible recapitalization alternatives
o The Board and management of Rexene are, and always have been, committed
to enhancing shareholder value through long term strategic and
financial improvements
<PAGE>
WYSER-PRATTE WILL ADD NO SHAREHOLDER VALUE
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o Overview of Wyser-Pratte:
- Arbitrageur and short term stock speculator
- No proven record of creating shareholder value
- No experience managing a chemical company
- May be forced to sell the Company at a "fire sale" price
- History of wasting corporate time and money with frivolous legal
battles and proxy contests
o The Board is not entrenched
- No staggered Board - Removal with or without cause
- Shareholder right to call special meetings and
- Right to take action by written consent
- Shareholder ability to amend By-laws
o The Board has publicly stated that it is open to the sale of Rexene
<PAGE>
YOUR QUESTIONS FOR WYSER-PRATTE
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o Who will they find to buy the Company and at what price?
o What happens to Rexene and the value of your investment under
Wyser-Pratte's management?
o Most recent arbitrageur analogy is Hills Stores Company
- Since Dickstein & Co. replaced the Hills Stores' Board of
Directors, the stock has fallen from $24 per share to $2.75
per share or 88.5%.
<PAGE>
Profile of Hill Stores Proxy Contest
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[Graphic Material Omitted: Pursuant to Rule 304 Regulation of S-T the tabular
data description of this graphic material is presented in the table below]
<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
Hills Stores Co New
Price/Volume Analysis
Weekly: March 15, 1995 to January 31, 1997
----------------------------------------------------------------
High Low Closing
Date Price Price Price
---- ----- ----- -----
<S> <C> <C> <C>
17-Mar-95 21.000 19.625 21.000
24-Mar-95 20.750 19.875 20.000
31-Mar-95 20.500 19.875 20.250
07-Apr-95 20.250 19.500 19.500
14-Apr-95 19.500 19.250 19.250
21-Apr-95 19.250 18.250 18.500
28-Apr-95 20.250 18.500 20.125
05-May-95 24.000 20.125 23.000
12-May-95 24.125 22.875 24.000
19-May-95 23.875 22.750 23.125
26-May-95 24.250 23.000 23.375
02-Jun-95 23.875 23.250 23.500
09-Jun-95 23.875 23.125 23.750
16-Jun-95 24.875 23.625 24.750
23-Jun-95 24.750 24.250 24.250
30-Jun-95 24.750 23.875 24.000
07-Jul-95 24.250 23.250 23.375
14-Jul-95 23.375 22.250 22.250
21-Jul-95 22.000 18.125 18.750
28-Jul-95 19.250 18.125 18.250
04-Aug-95 18.125 16.375 16.625
11-Aug-95 17.000 16.375 16.625
18-Aug-95 16.750 16.125 16.750
25-Aug-95 17.250 13.125 13.375
01-Sep-95 14.375 12.250 13.375
08-Sep-95 13.500 11.625 12.125
15-Sep-95 12.750 11.000 12.375
22-Sep-95 12.375 11.250 11.375
29-Sep-95 11.500 10.625 11.375
<CAPTION>
Hills Stores Co New
Price/Volume Analysis
Weekly: March 15, 1995 to January 31, 1997
---------------------------------------------------------------
High Low Closing
Date Price Price Price
---- ----- ----- -----
<S> <C> <C> <C>
06-Oct-95 $11.875 $11.375 $11.750
13-Oct-95 11.750 9.375 9.625
20-Oct-95 10.375 8.875 9.750
27-Oct-95 9.875 8.000 8.188
03-Nov-95 9.375 7.125 9.250
10-Nov-95 10.250 9.250 9.250
17-Nov-95 10.125 9.000 10.000
24-Nov-95 10.750 10.000 10.625
01-Dec-95 12.000 10.250 11.875
08-Dec-95 12.000 11.000 11.750
15-Dec-95 11.750 10.250 10.375
22-Dec-95 10.250 8.625 9.750
29-Dec-95 10.000 9.125 9.875
05-Jan-96 11.125 9.125 10.375
12-Jan-96 10.500 10.125 10.375
19-Jan-96 10.500 10.000 10.250
26-Jan-96 10.750 10.250 10.500
02-Feb-96 10.500 10.000 10.125
09-Feb-96 10.500 9.250 9.250
16-Feb-96 9.250 7.875 8.500
23-Feb-96 9.000 7.875 8.875
01-Mar-96 9.125 8.625 8.750
08-Mar-96 10.625 8.625 9.875
15-Mar-96 11.750 9.125 11.625
22-Mar-96 12.625 11.375 11.375
29-Mar-96 11.875 11.250 11.750
05-Apr-96 12.625 11.875 12.500
12-Apr-96 13.750 11.750 13.750
19-Apr-96 13.625 12.625 13.125
26-Apr-96 13.250 12.625 13.000
03-May-96 13.125 12.750 13.000
10-May-96 12.875 12.125 12.375
17-May-96 12.625 12.000 12.125
24-May-96 12.750 11.125 12.625
31-May-96 12.750 11.625 12.125
07-Jun-96 12.125 11.000 11.125
14-Jun-96 11.125 10.250 10.750
21-Jun-96 10.875 9.500 10.125
28-Jun-96 10.125 8.125 8.875
<CAPTION>
Hills Stores Co New
Price/Volume Analysis
Weekly: March 15, 1995 to January 31, 1997
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High Low Closing
Date Price Price Price
---- ----- ----- -----
<S> <C> <C> <C>
05-Jul-96 $9.750 $9.000 $9.125
12-Jul-96 9.250 7.750 7.875
19-Jul-96 8.125 7.125 7.875
26-Jul-96 7.750 7.375 7.500
02-Aug-96 7.625 6.875 7.625
09-Aug-96 8.250 6.875 6.875
16-Aug-96 8.875 7.000 8.750
23-Aug-96 8.750 8.000 8.000
30-Aug-96 8.000 7.625 7.750
06-Sep-96 7.875 7.500 7.500
13-Sep-96 8.125 7.500 8.000
20-Sep-96 8.125 7.625 7.625
27-Sep-96 7.875 6.750 7.125
04-Oct-96 8.000 7.125 7.625
11-Oct-96 8.000 7.500 7.750
18-Oct-96 7.750 7.250 7.250
25-Oct-96 7.250 6.750 6.750
01-Nov-96 6.875 6.750 6.750
08-Nov-96 7.750 6.750 7.375
15-Nov-96 7.500 6.875 6.875
22-Nov-96 7.125 6.625 6.750
29-Nov-96 6.875 6.500 6.625
06-Dec-96 7.250 6.500 6.625
13-Dec-96 6.625 6.250 6.250
20-Dec-96 6.625 6.125 6.125
27-Dec-96 6.250 5.875 6.000
03-Jan-97 6.000 4.750 4.875
10-Jan-97 5.000 2.750 3.500
17-Jan-97 3.750 3.000 3.125
24-Jan-97 3.125 2.750 2.875
31-Jan-97 2.875 2.750 2.750
</TABLE>
Source: IDD Information Services/Tradeline
ISSUES
------
o Management planned to spend up to $70 million a year to open 15 to 20
stores a year. Management thought the expansion would help them compete
against the likes of K-Mart, et al.
o Dickstein believed that the expansion plan was too risky and that the
market was not receptive to the plan.
CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS
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Takeover/Proxy Contest
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May 3, 1995: Dickstein Partners, Inc. offers to buy Hills Stores for $25 a
share in cash in an effort to force the sale of the company.
Stock closes at $23.50.
May 15, 1995: Hills Stores rejects Dickstein's offer as both
inadequate and unfinanced. Stock closes at $23.75.
May 16, 1995: Dickstein announces that it will solicit proxies in
an effort to elect its slate of nominees to the board of
directors. Stock closes at $23.88.
May 24, 1995: Dickstein increases its offer for Hills to a nominal value of
$27 per share ($22 cash and $5 of a new debt security payable
in five years). Stock closes at $23.88.
June 23, 1995: Dickstein Partners wins all seven seats of Hills Stores' board
of directors at annual meeting. Stock closes at $24.25.
July 5, 1995: Hills Stores' new board of directors elects Mark
Dickstein chairman. Michael Bozic and five other senior
managers resign. Stock closes at $24.00.
July 20, 1995: Dickstein Partners drops its offer to purchase Hills Stores.
Stock closes at $19.13.
<PAGE>
REXENE'S BUSINESS STRATEGY
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o A customer-focused, solutions driven company
o Concentrate on niche segments of the market
o Maximize operating cash flow and profitability
- Optimize existing assets
- Increase capacity in key specialty products
- Reduce manufacturing costs
- Limit exposure to chemical cycle
OBJECTIVE: ENHANCE SHAREHOLDER VALUE!
<PAGE>
SHAREHOLDER VALUE ENHANCING INITIATIVES
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REXflex(R)
f p o
o Revolutionary new product
o Already receiving strong market response
o Premium priced
o Expect incremental EBITDA of $35-$44 million by 1999
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*Estimates only. Involves risks and uncertainties as described in the Company's
Third Quarter Form 10-Q.
<PAGE>
LLDPE ETHYLENE DERIVATIVE UPGRADE
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o Olefin plant expansion has increased Ethylene capacity from 540 to 800
million pounds
o DSM LLDPE - 220 million pounds
o Superior product properties
<PAGE>
TROUGH EBITDA
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($ in Millions)
[Graphic Material Omitted: Pursuant to Rule 304 of Regulation S-T the tabular
data description of this graphic material is presented in the table below]
1993 Pro Forma 1993 Pro Forma
1985 1993 @1997E Capacity @ 1999P Capacity
---- ---- --------------- ----------------
$8 $32 $64 $108
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*Estimates only. Involves risks and uncertainties as described in the Company's
Third Quarter Form 10-Q.
<PAGE>
EBITDA - Annualized
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($ in Millions)
[Graphic Material Omitted: Pursuant to Rule 304 of Regulation S-T the tabular
data description of this graphic material is presented in the table below]
1991-1995 Pro Forma 1991-1995 Pro Forma
1991-95 Annualized @1997E Capacity @1999P Capacity
------------------ --------------- ---------------
Styrene Contract $ 0 $ 2 $ 2
REXflex 0 12 35
PE/PP/APOA 0 11 11
LLDPE 0 0 34
Olefin Cost Savings 0 0 20
Base EBITDA 69 69 69
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TOTAL $ 69 $ 94 $ 171
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*Estimates only. Involves risks and uncertainties as described in the Company's
Third Quarter Form 10-Q.
<PAGE>
CAPITAL EXPENDITURES
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($ in Millions)
1997-1999
---------
Major Projects
REXflex $12
Olefin Modernization/Expansion* 56
PE Expansion* 82
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Total Major Projects $150
========
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*Estimate subject to definitive engineering studies.
<PAGE>
PROJECTED INCREMENTAL EBITDA(1)
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Rexene's capital expenditure initiatives are expected to generate significant
incremental EBITDA over the near term.
($ in Millions)
1997 1998 1999
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REXflex $10-15 $22-30 $35-44
Olefin Cost Savings 1-2 3-7 22-25
LLDPE -- 5-8 22-44
Other 1 5 5
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Total $12-18 $35-50 $84-118
=========== =========== =========
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(1) Estimates only. Involves risks and uncertainties as described in the
Company's Third Quarter Form 10-Q. Assumes REXflex(R), LLDPE and Olefins start
ups and operations occur as planned. Also assumes that product demand,
competitive pricing and production capacities, operating rates and feedstock
costs remain within anticipated ranges as forecast by CMAI.
<PAGE>
SUMMARY
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o Management has and will continue to create significant value for
shareholders
o Huntsman's $16 per share offer for the Company was NOT REAL
o Rexene has publicly stated that it will facilitate any fully financed offer
at $16 per share
o The Wyser-Pratt proposal does not offer shareholders anything that Rexene's
Board and Management is not already providing
o A Wyser-Pratte proxy victory may put your investment at significant risk
WHO DO YOU WANT RUNNING REXENE?
VOTE NO TO WYSER-PRATTE!
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