UNIVERSAL SEISMIC ASSOCIATES INC
DEFA14A, 1997-01-21
OIL & GAS FIELD EXPLORATION SERVICES
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                       UNIVERSAL SEISMIC ASSOCIATES, INC.
                        16420 Park Ten Place, Suite 300
                           Houston, Texas 77084-5051

               SUPPLEMENT TO PROXY STATEMENT OF DECEMBER 18, 1996

                         ANNUAL MEETING OF STOCKHOLDERS

                      To Be Held Tuesday, January 28, 1997

     This  supplement to the December 18, 1996 Proxy Statement of the Company is
intended to supplement certain points therein.

     Recently,  you  have  received  several  items  from the  Company  and "the
Shareholders'  Committee" (which was formed by two  shareholders,  Robert Kecseg
and Michael T. Kanarellis). The "Shareholders' Committee" wants to resurrect the
Suelopetrol merger which the Company and its management  determined not to be in
the best interests of the Company earlier this year.

     THE BOARD DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT THE COMMITTEE  PROXY  SOLICITATION  NOR THE
COMMITTEE  CONSENT  SOLICITATION  IS IN THE BEST INTEREST OF THE COMPANY AND ITS
SHAREHOLDERS.  THE BOARD  URGES  YOU NOT TO  EXECUTE  ANY  PROXIES  OR  CONSENTS
SOLICITED  BY THE  COMMITTEE.  PLEASE  RETURN  ONLY THE WHITE  PROXY CARD IN THE
ENCLOSED ENVELOPE.

     Mr.  Kanarellis' latest letter to you dated January 8, 1997 states that the
Company has given you false information  about  management,  the Company and the
proposed Suelopetrol merger.

                         A FEW FACTS ABOUT THE COMPANY

     Despite Mr.  Kanarellis'  statements  and opinions to the  contrary,  these
basic facts are true and many are a matter of public record.

1.   The Company had record earnings and revenues in the second quarter of 1996.
     This is a matter of public record. [Press release dated January 9, 1997]

2.   Current  senior  management  members and RIMCO have  substantial  ownership
     positions directly or through trusts and partnerships.  Collectively,  they
     own more than 38% of the outstanding shares of the Company's stock. This is
     a matter of public record. Thus, current management has a substantial stake
     in the performance of the Company,  contrary to Mr. Kanarellis' assertions.
     [See the Company's SEC Schedule 14A filed on December 24, 1996]

3.   Contrary,  to Mr. Kanarellis' claims, UNEXCO remains an important long-term
     project.

4.   The  Company's  advisors  did give  management  their views of the proposed
     Suelopetrol  merger as  structured  within  the  scope of their  respective
     engagements.  Their input reinforced the Board of Directors'  decision that
     the  pending  proposal  was  grossly  unfair to the  Company  and  required
     significant changes in the structure of the transaction. These changes were
     mandated  in large part by  substantial  variances  in actual  values  when
     compared  to  projected  values  in the  originally  proposed  deal.  These
     substantial  variances  were  discovered  by the Company's  advisors  while
     conducting due diligence  review of the proposed  transaction.  Because the
     due  diligence  process was  terminated  by  Suelopetrol  and the Company's
     mutual agreement, Raymond James and Associates


<PAGE>


     could not issue a formal  opinion  regarding  the  fairness of the proposed
     transaction. The scope of the Company's engagement of Coopers & Lybrand did
     not involve the issuance of an opinion regarding fairness of the originally
     proposed transaction; however, Coopers & Lybrand was engaged to examine the
     operating results of Suelopetrol for the twelve month period ended June 30,
     1996 and did discover significant  variances between the results originally
     represented  to the  Company  and actual  operating  results  for the audit
     period.  These variances  materially affected the proposed  transaction and
     substantially   impacted   managements'   view  of  the   fairness  of  the
     transaction. None of the Company's advisors, other than Mr. Kanarellis, has
     ever  recommended  that it enter into the originally  proposed  transaction
     with Suelopetrol.

5.   BOTH the Company's Board of Directors and Suelopetrol terminated the merger
     negotiations. Both entities agreed to terminate negotiations with no impact
     on future  discussions.  As stated in its original proxy  statement and its
     letters  to you,  management  is still  interested  in a  combination  with
     Suelopetrol, but only if it is beneficial to the Company.

6.   Mr.  Kanarellis  and Mr. Kecseg have now filed suit against the Company and
     several  members of its management  and Board in Federal  District Court in
     Delaware  seeking  to  postpone  the  shareholders'  meeting  so that their
     lawyers  can take  depositions  of  numerous  witnesses  involved  with the
     Suelopetrol  negotiations.  The  plaintiff's  claim  that the  Company  has
     misrepresented  the facts  concerning the  Suelopetrol  negotiations in its
     proxy  materials.  One of the principal  complaints in the suit is that the
     Company  has  failed  to state  its  reasons  for not  going  forward  with
     Suelopetrol.  The Company stated that it determined the transaction was not
     in the best  interests of the Company.  That decision was based in material
     part  on the  financial  aspects  of the  transaction.  Unfortunately,  the
     Company is bound by a  confidentiality  agreement with  Suelopetrol  not to
     disclose its financial information without its consent. The Company has not
     been able to obtain  Suelopetrol's  consent to release that  information to
     date.

     Mr.  Kanarellis  is trying to take the  decision  as to who should run your
Company our of your hands and into the courtroom.

ALL DULY  EXECUTED  PROXIES WILL BE VOTED IN  ACCORDANCE  WITH THE  INSTRUCTIONS
THEREON.  SHAREHOLDERS WHO EXECUTE PROXIES,  HOWEVER, RETAIN THE RIGHT TO REVOKE
THEM AT ANY TIME BEFORE THEY ARE VOTED.  THE  REVOCATION  OF A PROXY WILL NOT BE
EFFECTIVE  UNTIL WRITTEN  NOTICE  THEREOF HAS BEEN GIVEN TO THE SECRETARY OF THE
COMPANY,  UNLESS THE  SHAREHOLDER  GRANTING  SUCH  PROXY  VOTES IN PERSON AT THE
ANNUAL MEETING.


                              By the order of the Directors,



                              /s/ Vicki D. Humphrey
                              ---------------------
                              VICKI D. HUMPHREY, Secretary
     
Houston, Texas
January 21, 1997


          If you have any questions about how to vote your proxy card,
                        please call our proxy solicitor,
      Corporate Investor Communications, Inc., toll free at (800)346-7885.


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