OPPORTUNITY PARTNERS L P
DEFC14A, 1999-04-01
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                                                 Phillip Goldstein
                                                              60 Heritage Drive
                                             Pleasantville, NY 10570

                                                      March 31, 1999
    

Dear Fellow Shareholder of The Emerging Markets Infrastructure Fund:

         As a  long-term  shareholder,  I am  concerned  about our  Fund's  poor
long-term  performance and the persistent  discount from net asset value ("NAV")
at which its shares have  traded.  To give  shareholders  greater  influence  on
matters affecting the value of their investment in the Fund, at the 1999 Meeting
of  Shareholders  I intend to nominate  two persons for election as directors of
the Fund. I also intend to introduce  and/or support three  proposals for action
by shareholders.

         The persons I intend to nominate for  election as directors  are Gerald
Hellerman  and  myself.   Each  of  us  is  committed  to  exploring  fully  and
implementing  measures intended to improve the Fund's  performance and to reduce
or eliminate the discount from NAV. If elected,  the actions Mr. Hellerman and I
may urge the Board of Directors to consider and implement will include:

       Terminating the Fund's investment  advisory agreement with Credit
Suisse Asset Management and engaging a new investment advisor for the Fund;

      Converting the Fund from a closed-end fund to an open-end fund;

      Aggressively repurchasing the Fund's shares in the stock market;

       Conducting a self-tender  offer at a premium to the market price;
and

      Liquidating the Fund.

At the meeting,  the  following  proposals  will be  introduced  for approval by
shareholders:

   
      A  resolution  that I  submitted  calling for  shareholders  to be
afforded an opportunity to realize NAV for their shares;     

      A resolution terminating the investment advisory agreement between
the Fund and Credit Suisse Asset Management, the Fund's investment adviser.

      A  resolution  calling for the Fund to  reimburse  the  reasonable
proxy solicitation expenses of each "serious nominee" for director.

         The boards of directors of  closed-end  funds  managed by Credit Suisse
have a history of opposing  proposals to eliminate  the discount -- and ignoring
them when they are approved by the shareholders. Shareholders of two such funds,
The Emerging Markets Telecommunications


<PAGE>





Fund and The First Israel Fund, voted  overwhelmingly to open-end them but their
boards did not comply  with the  shareholders'  wishes.  Consequently,  one must
question whether those  directors,  some of whom are also directors of our Fund,
are  loyal to the  shareholders  they are  supposed  to  represent  or to Credit
Suisse.

   
         A few months ago, I submitted a proposal to afford  shareholders of our
Fund an  opportunity  to realize  NAV but I was  concerned  that our Board might
similarly  fail to act  despite  a clear  mandate  from the  shareholders.  At a
meeting with several of the directors, I asked whether the Board would commit to
implementing my proposal  (which is presented in the Fund's proxy  statement) if
shareholders  approved it by a margin of at least 2 to 1. The Board  declined to
make such a commitment.  As a result,  I have concluded that if the shareholders
of our Fund are to be afforded an  opportunity  to realize  NAV,  they will need
representatives on the Board who share that view.
    

         Additionally,  the link  between  Credit  Suisse  and the Board must be
severed so that there is no question  about where the loyalties of the directors
lie. I recognize  that some  shareholders  may be reluctant to vote to terminate
the advisory  contract with Credit Suisse but I firmly  believe that such action
is  necessary.  In my view,  Credit  Suisse is the main  impediment  to allowing
shareholders  to  realize  NAV  because  of its  concerns  that  its fees may be
adversely  impacted if  shareholders  are allowed to cash out at NAV.  This is a
conflict of interest that we need to eliminate. Once Credit Suisse is out of the
picture, I am convinced that any resistance to allowing  shareholders to realize
NAV will melt like a snowman in July.

         To  enable  me to vote  your  shares  in  favor of the  election  of my
nominees and the proposals noted above,  PLEASE MARK,  SIGN, DATE AND RETURN THE
ENCLOSED GREEN PROXY CARD IN THE ENCLOSED  POSTAGE  PRE-PAID  ENVELOPE.  You may
vote on all  proposals  contained on the Fund's proxy card by using the enclosed
GREEN proxy card.  Instructions for executing the GREEN proxy card are contained
in the enclosed  proxy  statement.  If you have already  returned the proxy card
sent to you by the Fund,  you may revoke that proxy and vote for my nominees and
all the  proposals by marking,  signing,  dating and mailing a later dated GREEN
proxy card. If you have any questions, please call me at (914) 747- 5262.

                                            Sincerely yours,



                                            Phillip Goldstein

       
   
     IMPORTANT:  AFTER  SUBMITTING A GREEN PROXY CARD,  PLEASE DO NOT RETURN THE
FUND'S  PROXY CARD  (EVEN TO  WITHHOLD  AUTHORITY  FOR  MANAGEMENT'S  NOMINEES).
REMEMBER,  IF YOU WANT TO ELECT  DIRECTORS WHO ARE COMMITTED TO DELIVERING  NAV,
YOU MUST AFFIRMATIVELY DO SO BY RETURNING YOUR GREEN PROXY CARD.     


<PAGE>






                    PROXY         STATEMENT IN OPPOSITION TO SOLICITATION BY THE
                                  BOARD OF  DIRECTORS  OF THE  EMERGING  MARKETS
                                  INFRASTRUCTURE FUND, INC.

              ANNUAL MEETING OF SHAREHOLDERS (To be held on April 27, 1999)

         My name is Phillip Goldstein. I am sending this proxy statement and the
enclosed GREEN proxy card to holders of record on February 22, 1999 (the "Record
Date") of shares of Common Stock, par value $.001 per share (the "Common Stock")
of The Emerging Markets Infrastructure Fund, Inc (the "Fund"). I am soliciting a
proxy to vote your shares at the 1999 Annual Meeting of Shareholders of the Fund
and at any and all adjournments or postponements of the Meeting. Please refer to
the Fund's proxy soliciting material for additional  information  concerning the
Meeting and the matters to be considered by the shareholders.

   
         This proxy  statement and the enclosed GREEN proxy card are first being
sent to shareholders of the Fund on or about March 31, 1999.
    

                                                   INTRODUCTION

   
         There are five matters (or proposals) that the Fund has scheduled to be
voted upon at the meeting:
    

     1.       The election of two persons to serve as directors of the Fund;

     2. The ratification of the selection of  PricewaterhouseCoopers  LLP as the
     independent accountants of the Fund for the fiscal year ending November 30,
     1999;

     3. My shareholder proposal  recommending that the Board of Directors of the
     Fund take steps to afford  shareholders  an  opportunity to realize NAV for
     their shares (the "NAV Proposal");

     4. A shareholder  proposal to terminate the Fund's advisory  agreement with
     Credit Suisse Asset Management (the "Contract Termination Proposal");

     5. A shareholder proposal calling for the Fund to bear the reasonable proxy
     solicitation   expenses  of  each  "serious   nominee"  for  director  (the
     "Reimbursement Proposal").

         With  respect to these  matters,  I am  soliciting a proxy to vote your
shares IN FAVOR of the election of two persons  (including myself) 

     whom I intend to nominate for  election as  directors of the Fund;  and FOR
each of the shareholder  proposals.  I am making no recommendation on how shares
should be voted on the  ratification of the selection of the Fund's  independent
accountants.

         As discussed  below,  I believe  that the election of my nominees  will
help bring a fresh perspective to the Board's consideration of measures intended
to increase the NAV of the Fund's shares and to reduce or eliminate the discount
from NAV at which the Fund's shares have been trading. I also believe that these
goals will be  furthered  by  shareholder  approval  of each of the  shareholder
proposals.

How Proxies Will Be Voted

         All of the  proposals  scheduled  by the  Fund  to be  voted  on at the
meeting are  included on the enclosed  GREEN proxy card.  If you wish to vote IN
FAVOR  of my  nominees,  and FOR  the  shareholder  proposals,  you may do so by
completing and returning a GREEN proxy card.

         If you return a GREEN proxy card to me or to my agent, your shares will
be voted on each matter as you indicate.  If you do not indicate how your shares
are to be voted on a matter,  they will be voted IN FAVOR of the  election of my
nominees for director, and FOR each shareholder proposal. If you do not indicate
how to vote on the  ratification  of the  selection  of the  Fund's  independent
accountants, your shares will be voted TO ABSTAIN on that matter.


<PAGE>





         If you return a GREEN  proxy  card,  you will be  granting  the persons
named as proxies  discretionary  authority to vote on any other matters of which
they are not now aware that may come  before  the  meeting.  These may  include,
among other things, matters relating to the conduct of the meeting.

Voting Requirements

   
         The presence, in person or by proxy, of the holders of more than 50% of
the  outstanding  shares of Common  Stock  entitled to vote at the meeting  will
constitute a quorum for the transaction of business.  If a quorum is not present
at the meeting, or if a quorum is present but sufficient votes to approve any of
the proposals are not received,  the persons named as proxies may propose one or
more adjournments of the meeting to permit further  solicitation of proxies. The
proxies may propose an adjournment  for other reasons.  If an adjournment of the
meeting is proposed,  the persons  named as proxies on the GREEN proxy card will
vote for or against such  adjournment in their  discretion.  Please refer to the
Fund's proxy statement for the voting requirements for each matter.
    

Revocation of Proxies

         You may  revoke any proxy you give to  management  or to me at any time
prior to its exercise by (i)  delivering a written  revocation  of your proxy to
the Fund; (ii) executing and delivering a later dated proxy to me or to the Fund
or to our  respective  agents;  or  (iii)  voting  in  person  at  the  meeting.
(Attendance  at the meeting will not in and of itself  revoke a proxy.) There is
no limit on the number of times you may revoke your proxy prior to the  meeting.
Only the latest dated, properly signed proxy card will be counted.

Information Concerning the Soliciting Shareholder

         The  shareholder  making this  solicitation  is Phillip  Goldstein,  60
Heritage  Drive,  Pleasantville,  NY 10570.  I am an  independent  investor  and
investment manager who presently manages investment  portfolios having assets in
excess of $50 million. Since December 1, 1992, I have been the president and 50%
shareholder  of a  company  that  serves  as the  general  partner  of a private
investment  partnership.  That  partnership is a shareholder in the Fund.  Since
1996, I have taken an active role in urging the management of certain registered
closed-end  investment  companies,  including the Fund, to take various  actions
that I believe would benefit those companies and their shareholders.

         As of March 15,  1999, I owned of record 1 share of Common Stock of the
Fund. I am also deemed to be the  beneficial  owner of 276,600  shares of Common
Stock held in brokerage accounts by my clients and me. Combined,  these personal
and client holdings total 276,601 shares, representing approximately 1.8% of the
outstanding Common Stock.  Exhibit 1 to this proxy statement contains a schedule
showing my purchases and sales of Common Stock within the past two years.

                                       REASONS FOR THE SOLICITATION

   
         Since the Fund commenced operations more than five years ago the market
value of its  shares  has  declined  by about 50%.  In the  fiscal  year  ending
November 30, 1998,  the NAV  declined by 30%. For this  "accomplishment"  Credit
Suisse Asset  Management  "earned"  over $2.6 million in advisory  fees.  What's
wrong with this picture?  While  emerging  markets have  recovered this calendar
year,  the  Fund's  NAV is  lagging,  up less than 1% as of March 26,  1999.  In
addition,  the  shares of the Fund have  traded at a large  discount  to NAV for
years.  Until  late last year when it  announced  a modest  repurchase  program,
management had not taken any  meaningful  action to enhance  shareholder  value.
Most  importantly,  the Board has made no commitment to afford  shareholders  an
opportunity  to realize NAV for their  shares  regardless  of the outcome of the
shareholder vote on the NAV Proposal.

         I believe that the Board's  belated  share  repurchase  policy will not
provide a long-term  solution to the discount problem.  More meaningful  actions
are  required  if  shareholders  wish to  realize  NAV.  For this  reason,  I am
soliciting your vote to elect Mr. Hellerman and me to the Board of Directors and
to approve various shareholder proposals that I believe will enhance shareholder
value. Mr. Hellerman and I are committed to
    


<PAGE>





honoring  the wishes of the  shareholders  as  expressed  at this  meeting as to
whether or not they should have an opportunity to realize NAV for their shares.

         Until now,  all of the Fund's  directors  served on the boards of other
funds  advised by Credit  Suisse Asset  management.  Our  election  will provide
shareholders with two independent voices on important matters affecting the Fund
and will give the Board of Directors a fresh perspective about measures intended
to benefit  shareholders.  The approval of the three shareholder  proposals will
also further these goals to the extent that they may result in:

       implementation  of  new  investment  advisory  arrangements  with

     an investment adviser that is committed to enhancing shareholder value;
and

       greater  independence  of the  Board,  enhancing  its  ability to

      act in the best interests of shareholders.

         If you share these  goals,  I urge you to vote for my nominees  and for
the shareholder proposals, using the enclosed GREEN proxy card.

                                                       CERTAIN CONSIDERATIONS

         In deciding  whether to give me your  proxy,  you should  consider  the
following:

         Even if my nominees  are elected and my  proposals  are approved by the
shareholders,  there can be no assurance  that the full Board of Directors  will
take any actions  that we may  advocate  or that such  actions,  if taken,  will
achieve their intended goals.  My nominees will, if elected,  represent only two
of the Fund's seven directors.

   
         Implementation  of  certain  Board  actions  may  require   shareholder
approval,  and no assurance can be given that such approval will be obtained. In
addition, various costs, which would be borne indirectly by shareholders, may be
associated with certain  actions,  including but not limited to those associated
with holding a special  meeting of  shareholders.  I believe that such costs are
far  outweighed  by the  benefits  to most  shareholders  of these  actions.  In
addition, certain actions may have tax consequences that cannot be quantified at
this time.
    

         I believe that all shareholders of the Fund will benefit if any actions
taken to improve  shareholder  value or to reduce or eliminate the discount from
NAV are successful. However, I am paid fees by my clients who hold shares of the
Fund.  These fees will be greater  if the value of the Fund's  shares  increases
and, in some cases, are based upon a share of the profits the client earns.

         I and companies  with which I am affiliated  are parties to two pending
legal actions involving closed-end funds. These actions are described in Exhibit
2. In these  actions,  the  closed-end  funds  alleged  that I violated  certain
provisions of the Federal securities laws in connection with the solicitation of
proxies.

                                                        ELECTION OF DIRECTORS

         At the  meeting,  I will  nominate  Gerald  Hellerman  and  myself  for
election as directors for a term expiring in 2002. Information about my nominees
is as follows:










Name, Business Address, Age                  Principal Business Occupation(s)



<PAGE>





Gerald Hellerman (Age 61)        Since 1993, Mr. Hellerman has served
10965 Eight Bells Lane           as the managing director of Hellerman
Columbia, Maryland  21044        Associates, which provides financial
                                 consulting and litigation support services in
     government related matters.  From 1976 to 1993,  Mr.Hellerman was the Chief
Financial Analyst for the Antitrust  Division of the United States Department of
Justice.  He a trustee of Third Avenue Trust which  consists of a series of four
registered  open-end  investment  companies.  He is a director  of The  Clemente
Global Growth Fund, a registered closed-end investment company.

Phillip  Goldstein (Age 54)    Since 1992, Mr. Goldstein has managed investments
60 Heritage Drive              for a limited number of clients and has served as
Pleasantville,  NY 10570       the portfolio manager of a private investment
                               partnership. He is president of the general 
                               partner of that investment partnership.  Mr.
Goldstein has been a private  investor in closed-end  investment  companies
since 1974 and an advocate for shareholders' rights since 1996. He is a director
of Clemente Global Growth Fund, a registered closed-end investment company.

         As previously noted, I am deemed to own beneficially  276,501 shares of
Common Stock,  representing  approximately 1.8% of the shares outstanding on the
Record Date. Mr. Hellerman does not own,  beneficially or of record,  any shares
of Common Stock of the Fund.

         Other  than  fees  that may be  payable  by the Fund to its  directors,
neither nominee named above has any arrangement or understanding with any person
with  respect to any future  employment  by the Fund or by any  affiliate of the
Fund. I will  indemnify Mr.  Hellerman for certain  liabilities  he may incur in
connection with this proxy solicitation.

         The persons  named as proxies in the enclosed  GREEN proxy card intend,
in the absence of contrary  instructions,  to vote all proxies they are entitled
to vote IN FAVOR of the election of the two nominees  named above.  Each nominee
has consented to stand for election and to serve if elected.  If either  nominee
is unable to serve, an event not now anticipated,  the proxies will be voted for
such other person, if any, as is designated by the persons named as proxies.

                                                        SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS

         The  following  shareholder  proposals are expected to be introduced at
the Meeting. Each proposal along with the shareholder's supporting statement and
the Board's opposition statement is contained in the Fund's proxy statement.

   
Proposal  No.  3 (NAV  Proposal):  Given  its  poor  long-term  performance  and
persistent  discount,  I believe shareholders who want to cash out at NAV should
be  able  to  do  so.  The  Fund's  proxy  statement   discusses  some  possible
disadvantages of open-ending.
  In addition, there may disadvantages associated with certain measures designed
to afford  shareholders  an opportunity to realize NAV, e.g.,  costs and adverse
tax consequences incurred by non-redeeming  shareholders but I believe these are
far outweighed by the benefit of narrowing the discount.

   Proposal No.4 (Contract Termination  Proposal):  In its opposition statement,
the Board asserts that the Fund's performance has been satisfactory. In light of
the huge losses the Fund has incurred over the past five years, one wonders just
how bad the performance  would have to be to induce it to take action?  Approval
of this  proposal  will  send a  message  that poor  long-term  performance  and
persistently wide discounts will no longer be tolerated.
    


<PAGE>






          If this  proposal  is  approved by the  shareholders,  the  investment
advisory  agreement  with the Fund's  investment  advisor,  Credit  Suisse Asset
Management  will terminate in 60 days. I believe that Credit Suisse has been the
primary  impediment to enhancing  shareholder  value because it does not want to
jeopardize  its fees which are now based on captive  assets and that approval of
this proposal is critical to eliminating the discount. Although approval of this
proposal would not immediately  result in enhancing  shareholder value, it will,
in my opinion, encourage the Board of Directors to seek a new investment adviser
who is more committed than Credit Suisse to enhancing shareholder value.

         In the event this  proposal  is approved  by  shareholders,  it will be
necessary for the Board of Directors,  including a majority of the directors who
are not  "interested  persons"  (as  defined  by the 1940 Act) of the  Fund,  to
approve an investment advisory agreement with a new investment adviser to assure
continuity of services to the Fund.  This new advisory  agreement will also have
to be approved by shareholders of the Fund prior to its effectiveness.  If a new
advisory agreement is not approved by shareholders and directors and implemented
prior  to the  effective  date  of the  termination  of the  present  investment
advisory  agreement,  it is possible  that there will be a period of time during
which the Fund will not have an independent  investment adviser  responsible for
the management and supervision of its investment portfolio.

     Proposal 5  (Reimbursement  Proposal):  I believe  the  Board's  opposition
statement  includes  a number  of  incorrect  statements  about  this  proposal.
Specifically,
   
         1. I disagree  with the Board's  position  that the law may preclude it
         from reimbursing a shareholder's  reasonable  solicitation  expenses if
         the  shareholders  vote to do so. The shareholders own the Fund and the
         directors are merely their  agents.  If the  shareholders  approve this
         proposal, I believe the Board has a fiduciary duty to implement it.

         2. While it is the duty of the Board to oversee the  management  of the
         ordinary  business  and affairs of the Fund,  how can anyone agree that
         the  Board  is  "best  positioned  to make  the  case-by-case  analysis
         required under applicable law prior to approving any  reimbursement [of
         insurgents]?"  As a  contestant  in a proxy  contest,  the Board has an
         inherent conflict of interest that may affect its objectivity.

         3. Contrary to the Board's self-serving assertion that approval of this
         proposal  "would  confer a direct  economic  benefit" upon me, it would
         merely level the playing  field for all serious  nominees for director.
         Reimbursement  of my reasonable  expenses is not an economic benefit to
         me. The Board could have saved the shareholders  money by including all
         serious  nominees in the Fund's proxy  statement.  It refused to do so,
         effectively requiring me to initially incur solicitation  expenses. Ask
         yourself why?

         4. The Board's  suggestion that approval of this proposal could lead to
         dramatically  higher  expenses is baseless.  My expenses will amount to
         less than 1/5 of a cent per share.  Meanwhile,  the  directors  seem to
         have few qualms about spending three times as much on high-priced proxy
         solicitors and lawyers.  It is particularly ironic that this same Board
         authorized  payment to Credit  Suisse of $2.6  million  for losing more
         than $70  million of  shareholder  value yet is so  concerned  about my
         miniscule solicitation expenses.
    

         In an article entitled Expenses of Corporate Proxy Contests,  Daniel M.
Friedman  put  forth  a  persuasive  rationale  for  granting  reimbursement  to
insurgents.

         [A] full and fair  presentation of the issues in a contested  corporate
         election cannot be made if the  stockholders are given only one side of
         the picture.  And since the management  whose policies are under attack
         naturally  feels called upon to justify them, its version of the issues
         is more than likely to be colored to play up the favorable  aspects and
         mitigate or ignore the unfavorable aspects.  Presentation of the latter
         is therefore left mainly to the opposition.

         Accordingly,  the very  reason  that  originally  moved  the  courts to
         authorize  management  expenditures  --  the  need  for  informing  the
         stockholders -- further requires that minority stockholders be accorded
         similar


<PAGE>





         rights. For it is only through knowledge of both sides of the question,
         including  development  of all the  arguments  pro and  con,  that  the
         stockholders  will be placed in a position to make an informed judgment
         as to what course of conduct is in the best interests of the company.

                                                 THE SOLICITATION

         I am making this solicitation  personally.  Persons  affiliated with or
employed by the general partner of the investment  partnership that I manage may
assist me in the  solicitation  of  proxies.  They will not  receive any special
compensation for their services.  Banks,  brokerage houses and other custodians,
nominees and  fiduciaries  will be requested to forward this proxy statement and
the enclosed GREEN proxy card to the beneficial owners of shares of Common Stock
for whom they hold shares of record.  I will reimburse these  organizations  for
their reasonable out-of-pocket expenses.

   
         Initially,  I will personally bear all of the expenses  related to this
proxy  solicitation.  Because I believe that the shareholders  will benefit from
this  solicitation,  I intend to seek  reimbursement  of these expenses from the
Fund. I estimate  that my expenses will not exceed  $25,000,  which is less than
1/3 of the $82,900 that  management is scheduled to spend for its  solicitation.
As of March 26, 1999,  my expenses  have been  approximately  $200.  If I am not
reimbursed by the Fund, I may seek  reimbursement from one or more of my clients
or from the general partner of the Partnership that I manage.

         I am not  and,  within  the  past  year,  have  not been a party to any
contract,  arrangement  or  understanding  with any person  with  respect to any
securities of the Fund. In addition,  there is no arrangement  or  understanding
involving  either myself or any affiliate which relates to future  employment by
the Fund or any future transaction with the Fund.
    

         If you have any questions  concerning  this proxy  solicitation  or the
procedures  to be followed  to execute  and  deliver a proxy,  please call me at
(914) 747-5262.

                                                    ADDITIONAL PROPOSALS

         I know of no business that will be presented for  consideration  at the
meeting  other  than that set forth in this  proxy  statement  and in the Fund's
proxy statement.  If any other matters are properly  presented for consideration
at the  meeting,  it is the  intention  of the  persons  named as proxies in the
enclosed GREEN proxy card to vote in accordance  with their own best judgment on
such matters.


   
DATED: March 31, 1999
    







     EXHIBIT 1:  SECURITIES  OF THE FUND  PURCHASED  OR SOLD WITHIN THE PAST TWO
YEARS BY THE SOLICITING SHAREHOLDER

         Except as disclosed in this proxy statement,  neither Mr. Goldstein nor
Mr.  Hellerman  has,  or had,  any  interest,  direct or  indirect,  by security
holdings or  otherwise,  in the Fund.  The  following  table sets forth  certain
information with respect to purchases and sales of shares of Common Stock of the
Fund within the past two years by Mr.  Goldstein and by accounts  holding shares
as to which he is  deemed  to be the  beneficial  owner  (the  "Accounts").  Mr.
Hellerman does not own of record or beneficially  any shares of Common Stock and
has not owned any Common Stock within the past two years. The shares are held in
margin  accounts,  together with other securities owned by Mr. Goldstein and the
Accounts.  Therefore,  a portion of the  purchase  price and market value of the
shares may from time to time be represented by margin borrowings, depending upon
the net debit balances, if any, of the margin accounts, which fluctuate daily.


<PAGE>




<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
<S>     <C>    <C>    <C>    <C>    <C>    <C>



    Date          Shares Purchased            Date       Shares Purchased             Date                Shares Sold
   3/11/99              7800               10/30/98            7200                  9/8/98                  5000
   3/9/99               1400               10/28/98            17000                 9/3/98                  5000
   3/5/99               5000                5/12/98            28000
   3/3/99               8000                5/11/98            25000
   3/1/99               6000                4/27/98            50000
   1/26/99              5000                4/9/98             5000
   1/15/99              5000                4/8/98             5000
   1/4/99               3800                4/7/98             6600
  12/31/98              9200                4/6/98             1400
  12/29/98              5000                3/4/98             5200
  12/28/98              8000                3/3/98             3700
  12/21/98              5000                3/2/98             1300
   12/2/98              5000                2/27/98            18800
  11/17/98              5000                2/26/98            2200
  11/13/98              2500                8/12/97            2200
  11/12/98              800                 8/11/97            11500
   11/3/98              3400                7/1/97              900
   11/2/98              800

</TABLE>


        EXHIBIT 2: PENDING LITIGATION INVOLVING THE SOLICITING SHAREHOLDER

         The  soliciting  shareholder  and  entities he is  affiliated  with are
involved in the following pending litigation  relating to closed-end funds. Each
action is pending in U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York.

The Emerging Germany Fund Litigation

         Phillip  Goldstein,  an  investment  partnership  that he manages  (the
"Partnership"),  and  the  general  partner  of the  Partnership  (the  "General
Partner") (of which Phillip Goldstein is a 50% owner) were named defendants in a
federal  court  action  for  injunctive  relief  filed on  April 8,  1998 by The
Emerging  Germany  Fund,  Inc.  ("FRG").  FRG filed this action on April 8, 1998
immediately  after  canceling  its 1998 annual  meeting  scheduled for April 27,
1998,  and  stated  that it would  not  schedule  an  annual  meeting  until the
litigation was resolved.

         In its action,  FRG alleged that the  defendants  solicited  proxies in
violation of Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange
Act") in  connection  with  certain  postings  by Mr.  Goldstein  on an Internet
bulletin board in order to promote a "concerted scheme . . . to convert [FRG] to
an open-end fund." FRG also alleged that Mr. Goldstein, the Partnership, and two
other defendants,  Ronald Olin and Deep Discount Advisors,  Inc., were a "group"
within the meaning of Section  13(d) of the  Williams  Act, and failed to file a
Schedule 13D.

         All  defendants  moved to dismiss  FRG's  complaint.  In addition,  the
Partnership filed a related action against FRG and its directors for declaratory
and injunctive  relief alleging that FRG's management  violated Section 14(a) of
the Exchange Act and took actions,  including the adoption of an advance  notice
by-law and  cancellation of the annual  meeting,  for the purpose of entrenching
management and depriving the shareholders of their right to vote.

         On October 6, 1998, FRG announced that the 1998 annual meeting would be
held on January 26, 1999,  and on November 6, 1998,  it announced  that it would
recommend  that  shareholders  vote to open-end  the Fund.  On January 26, 1999,
FRG's shareholders voted  overwhelmingly to open-end the Fund. On March 9, 1999,
the court indicated that it will grant the defendants'  motions to dismiss FRG's
complaint as moot.

         All issues in the above  actions  have been  resolved  except as to the
amount,  if any,  of legal  expenses to which the  parties  are  entitled.  This
remaining  issue is the  subject  of  settlement  discussions  and/or  potential
litigation.


<PAGE>






The Emerging Mexico Fund Litigation

         On June 10,  1998,  the  Partnership  filed a federal  court action for
declaratory and injunctive relief against The Emerging Mexico Fund, Inc. ("MEF")
and its directors  alleging that the  defendants  violated  Section 14(a) of the
Exchange Act and Section 36 of the Investment Company Act of 1940 Act (the "1940
Act") by, among other things, precluding the Partnership from presenting certain
proposals   and  nominees  for  election  as  directors  at  MEF's  1998  annual
shareholders' meeting. The complaint alleged that the defendants improperly used
MEF's advance notice by-law to eliminate any challenge to  management,  and that
MEF made  misleading  statements in its proxy  statement with respect to certain
shareholder proposals. The action sought to nullify any election of management's
nominees for director, and to compel MEF to hold a meeting at which shareholders
may present nominees for director, as well as other proposals.

         MEF has answered the  Partnership's  complaint and filed  counterclaims
against the Partnership,  Phillip  Goldstein and the General  Partner,  alleging
that Goldstein solicited proxies via a posting on an Internet bulletin board and
comments   solicited   by  financial   journalists   for  the  election  of  the
Partnership's  nominees  (which MEF had  determined  could not be elected at the
annual  meeting) in violation of Section 14(a) of the Exchange  Act.  Goldstein,
the General Partner and the Partnership moved to dismiss MEF's claims.

   
         On January 6, 1999 the parties entered into a settlement agreement that
provides that MEF use its best efforts to secure shareholder  approval of a plan
of liquidation and for payment of plaintiffs'  attorneys' fees and expenses. The
court  has  scheduled  a  hearing  for  April  6,  1999 on the  fairness  of the
settlement and the request for fees and expenses.
    

                                                       * * *

All of the above  actions  were filed in the Federal  District  Court,  S.D.N.Y.
Copies of all  pleadings  in the above  actions are  available  upon  request to
Gregory  E.  Keller  of the law firm of  Silverman,  Harnes,  Harnes,  Prussin &
Keller, 750 Lexington Avenue, New York, New York 10022, Tel. (212) 754-2333.


















                                               PROXY CARD

PROXY SOLICITED IN OPPOSITION TO THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF THE EMERGING MARKETS
                     INFRASTRUCTURE FUND, INC. BY PHILLIP GOLDSTEIN

               ANNUAL MEETING OF SHAREHOLDERS TO BE HELD ON APRIL 27, 1999


<PAGE>






         The undersigned hereby appoints Steven Samuels,  Rajeev Das and Phillip
Goldstein,  and each of them, as the undersigned's  proxies,  with full power of
substitution,  to attend the  Annual  Meeting of  Shareholders  of The  Emerging
Markets  Infrastructure  Fund,  Inc.(the  "Fund")  to be held at the  offices of
Wilkie Farr & Gallagher,  787 Seventh  avenue,  38th Floor,  New York, New York,
10019, on April 27, 1999, at 11:00 a.m. (the "Meeting"),  and any adjournment or
postponement  thereof,  and to vote on all  matters  that  may come  before  the
Meeting and any such  adjournment or postponement  the number of shares that the
undersigned  would be entitled to vote, with all the power the undersigned would
possess if present in person,  as specified below. The proxies may vote in their
discretion  with  respect to such other matter or matters as may come before the
Meeting and with respect to all matters incident to the conduct of the Meeting.

(INSTRUCTIONS:  Mark votes by placing an "x" in the appropriate [ ].)

     1.       ELECTION OF DIRECTORS.

         FOR all  nominees  listed  below [ ] WITHHOLD  AUTHORITY [ ] (except as
         indicated to the contrary below) to vote for all nominees listed below

                  GERALD HELLERMAN
                  PHILLIP GOLDSTEIN

         If you  wish to  withhold  authority  to vote for the  election  of any
individual nominee, write the name of that nominee below:



     2.   To   ratify   the   selection   by   the   Board   of   Directors   of
     PricewaterhouseCoopers  LLP as the Fund's  independent  accountants for the
     fiscal year ending November 31, 1999:

     FOR [   ]        AGAINST [   ]              ABSTAIN [   ]


     3. Shareholder  proposal  recommending that the shareholders be afforded an
     opportunity to realize NAV for their shares.

       FOR [   ]              AGAINST [   ]            ABSTAIN [   ]

                                                      (OVER)
     4. The  investment  advisory  agreement  between the Fund and Credit Suisse
     Asset Management shall be terminated.

        FOR [   ]             AGAINST [   ]             ABSTAIN [   ]

     5.  Shareholder  proposal  recommending  that the Fund bear the  reasonable
     proxy solicitation expenses of each "serious nominee" for director


<PAGE>




       FOR [   ]             AGAINST [   ]              ABSTAIN [   ]


IMPORTANT - - PLEASE SIGN AND DATE BELOW. YOUR SHARES WILL BE VOTED AS DIRECTED.
IF NO  DIRECTION  IS MADE,  THIS PROXY WILL BE VOTED IN FAVOR OF THE ELECTION OF
ALL  NOMINEES  NAMED  ABOVE  IN ITEM 1 AND FOR  PROPOSALS  3, 4,  AND 5 AND WILL
ABSTAIN FROM VOTING ON PROPOSAL 2. THE UNDERSIGNED HEREBY  ACKNOWLEDGES  RECEIPT
OF THE  PROXY  STATEMENT  DATED  MARCH  [--],  1999 OF  PHILLIP  GOLDSTEIN.  THE
UNDERSIGNED  HEREBY  REVOKES ANY PROXY  HERETOFORE  EXECUTED BY THE  UNDERSIGNED
RELATING  TO THE SUBJECT  MATTER  HEREOF AND  CONFIRMS  ALL THAT THE PROXIES MAY
LAWFULLY DO BY VIRTUE HEREOF. (IMPORTANT - PLEASE FILL IN DATE)

This proxy card is provided by Phillip Goldstein, a shareholder of the Fund.

Please sign exactly as your name appears  hereon.  When shares are held by joint
tenants, both should sign. When signing as an attorney, executor, administrator,
trustee or guardian,  please give full title as such. If a  corporation,  please
sign in full corporate name by the President or other duly  authorized  officer.
If a partnership,  please sign in partnership name by authorized person.  Please
return promptly in the enclosed envelope.


SIGNATURE(S)______________________________________      Dated: _______________

 .


<PAGE>


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