Fullowka v Royal Oak Ventures Inc., 2004 NWTSC 66 ()  
Date:  
2004-12-16  
CV 05408  
File number:  
Other  
citations:  
[2004] Northwest Terr Cases 66 — [2004] NWTJ No 64 (QL) —  
[2004] CarswellNWT 71 — 44 CCEL (3d) 1 — [2005] 5 WWR 420 —  
[2005] AWLD 614  
Citation:  
Most recent  
unfavourable  
mention:  
MLB Headnote and Topic Digests, 2021 CanLIIDocs 9620  
[…] Fullowka et al. v. Pinkerton's of Canada et al., [2004] Northwest Terr. Cases  
66 ; 2004 NWTSC 66 , revd. (2008), 2008 NWTCA 4 () , 433 A.R. 69 ; 2008  
NWTCA 4 () , 429 W.A.C. 69; 2008 NWTCA 4 , ad. 2010 SCC 5 () ,  
[2010] 1 S.C.R. 132 ; 2010 SCC 5 () , 398 N.R. 20; 2010 SCC 5 () , 474  
A.R. 1; […]  
Fullowka et al v. Royal Oak Ventures Inc. et al, 2004 NWTSC 66  
Date: 2004 12 16  
Docket: CV 05408  
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE NORTHWEST TERRITORIES  
BETWEEN:  
SHEILA FULLOWKA, DOREEN SHAUNA HOURIE, TRACEY NEILL, JUDIT PANDEV, ELLA MAY CAROL  
RIGGS, DOREEN VODNOSKI, CARLENE DAWN ROWSELL, KAREN RUSSELL and BONNIE LOU SAWLER  
Plaintiffs  
- and -  
ROYAL OAK VENTURES INC., (formerly Royal Oak Mines Inc.), MARGARET K. WITTE, also known as PEGGY  
WITTE, PROCON MINERS INC., PINKERTON’S OF CANADA LIMITED, WILLIAM J.V. SHERIDAN,  
ANTHONY W.J. WHITFORD, DAVE TURNER, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE NORTHWEST TERRITORIES AS  
REPRESENTED BY THE COMMISSIONER OF THE NORTHWEST TERRITORIES, NATIONAL AUTOMOBILE  
AEROSPACE, TRANSPORTATION AND GENERAL WORKERS UNION OF CANADA, Successor by  
Amalgamation to CANADIAN ASSOCIATION OF SMELTER AND ALLIED WORKERS, and the Said CANADIAN  
ASSOCIATION OF SMELTER AND ALLIED WORKERS, HARRY SEETON, ALLAN RAYMOND SHEARING,  
TIMOTHY ALEXANDER BETTGER, TERRY LEGGE, JOHN DOE NUMBER THREE, ROGER WALLACE  
WARREN, DALE JOHNSTON, ROBERT KOSTA, HAROLD DAVID, J. MARC DANIS, BLAINE ROGER  
LISOWAY, WILLIAM (BILL) SCHRAM, JAMES MAGER, CONRAD LISOWAY, WAYNE CAMPBELL, SYLVAIN  
AMYOTTE, and RICHARD ROE NUMBER THREE  
Defendants  
- and -  
ROYAL OAK VENTURES INC., (formerly Royal Oak Mines Inc.), HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT OF  
CANADA, THE MINISTER OF INDIAN AFFAIRS AND NORTHERN DEVELOPMENT, CANADA, AND THE  
MINISTER OF LABOUR, CANADA and THE ROYAL CANADIAN MOUNTED POLICE AS REPRESENTED BY  
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA and THE COMMISSIONER OF THE ROYAL CANADIAN MOUNTED  
POLICE  
Third Parties  
Docket: CV 07028  
AND BETWEEN:  
JAMES A. O’NEIL  
Plaintiff  
- and –  
MARGARET K. WITTE, also known as PEGGY WITTE, PROCON MINERS INC., ROGER WALLACE WARREN,  
PINKERTON’S OF CANADA LIMITED, WILLIAM J.V. SHERIDAN, ANTHONY W.J. WHITFORD, DAVID  
TURNER, LLOYD GOULD, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE NORTHWEST TERRITORIES AS REPRESENTED BY  
THE COMMISSIONER OF THE NORTHWEST TERRITORIES, CANADIAN ASSOCIATION OF SMELTER AND  
ALLIED WORKERS LOCAL 4, HARRY SEETON, CANADIAN ASSOCIATION OF SMELTER AND ALLIED  
WORKERS, ROSS SLEZAK, THE NATIONAL AUTOMOBILE, AEROSPACE, TRANSPORTATION AND  
GENERAL WORKERS UNION OF CANADA, BASIL E. HARGROVE, THE NATIONAL AUTOMOBILE,  
AEROSPACE, TRANSPORTATION AND GENERAL WORKERS OF CANADA LOCAL 2304, LISA EVOY as  
Administrator of the Estate of the late James Milton Evoy, deceased, DALE JOHNSTON, ROBERT KOSTA,  
HAROLD DAVID, BLAINE ROGER LISOWAY, WILLIAM (BILL) SCHRAM, JAMES MAGER, WAYNE  
CAMPBELL, SYLVAIN AMYOTTE, GORDON ALBERT KENDALL, EDMUND SAVAGE, JOE RANGER, ALLAN  
RAYMOND SHEARING, TIMOTHY ALEXANDER BETTGER AND TERRY LEGGE  
Defendants  
- and –  
ROYAL OAK MINES INC., HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN THE RIGHT OF CANADA, THE MINISTER OF  
INDIAN AFFAIRS AND NORTHERN DEVELOPMENT CANADA, AND THE MINISTER OF LABOUR CANADA,  
THE ROYAL CANADIAN MOUNTED POLICE AS REPRESENTED BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA  
and THE COMMISSIONER OF THE ROYAL CANADIAN MOUNTED POLICE, PINKERTON’S OF CANADA  
LIMITED  
Third Parties  
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT OF THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE A.M. LUTZ  
Counsel for the Plaintiffs:  
Sheila Fullowka, Doreen Shauna  
Hourie, Tracey Neill, Judit Pandev,  
Ella May Carol Riggs, Doreen  
Vodnoski, Carlene Dawn Rowsell,  
Karen Russell and Bonnie Lou  
Sawler J. Philip Warner, Q.C., Jeffrey B. Champion,  
W. Benjamin Russell and Lillian H. Riczu  
Counsel for the Plaintiff:  
James A. O’Neil James E. Redmond, Q.C.  
Counsel for the Defendants:  
Royal Oak Ventures Inc., Margaret  
K. Witte and William J.V. Sheridan Robert G. McBean, James T. Neilson and  
David P. Wedge  
Counsel for the Defendant/Third Party:  
Pinkerton’s of Canada Limited John M. Hope, Q.C., Norma J. Mitchell  
and Jennifer S. Jones  
Counsel for the Defendants:  
Government of the Northwest Territories,  
Anthony W. J. Whitford, David Turner  
and Lloyd Gould Peter Gibson, Christine Pratt and  
Randal Carlson  
Counsel for the Defendants:  
Canadian Autoworkers National and  
and Basil E. Hargrove Lyle S.R. Kanee and Patrick Nugent  
Counsel for the Defendant:  
Timothy Alexander Bettger S. Leonard Polsky and Heather Sanderson  
Counsel for the Defendant:  
Harry Seeton Austin F. Marshall and James Mahon  
Counsel for the Defendant:  
Roger Wallace Warren: James D. Brydon and Betty Lou McIlmoyle  
Allan Raymond Shearing: Unrepresented  
Counsel for the Third Parties:  
Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada  
and certain Federal Ministers James N. Shaw and Tracy King  
TABLE OF CONTENTS  
INTRODUCTION ACTION CV05408 FULLOWKA et al. 08  
THE PARTIES 10  
BACKGROUND 12  
FACTS  
The Giant Mine and Royal Oak Mines Inc. 13  
The Union Context 17  
Tentative Agreement Negotiations 19  
Pre Strike Preparation by Royal Oak 22  
a) Replacement Worker Arrangements 23  
b) Security Arrangements 26  
Pre Strike Preparation by the Union 28  
The Lockout on May 22, 1992 28  
Pre Bombing Strike Events  
a) May 30  
b) June 37  
c) July 46  
d) August 50  
e) September 53  
The Fatal Blast 57  
Post Bombing Strike Events 59  
The Entanglement of CAW National and CASAW National 61  
The Parties’ Negotiation Stance 68  
Arising Issues of Jurisdiction Between the Territorial and  
Federal Governments 71  
General Facts Relating to the Acts and Omissions of the Defendants  
a) Witte 75  
b) Sheridan 75  
c) Royal Oak 76  
d) Pinkerton’s 80  
e) The GNWT and its Officers 85  
f) The Unions 88  
g) Shearing and Bettger 94  
h) Seeton 94  
i) Warren 95  
The Victims and their Families  
a) Fullowka Family 95  
b) Hourie Family 99  
c) Neill Family 102  
d) Pandev Family 107  
e) Riggs Family 110  
f) Vodnoski Family 113  
g) Rowsell Family 116  
h) Russell Family 119  
i) Sawler Family 122  
THE PARTIES’ PLEADINGS 126  
The Plaintiffs’ Claims Against the Defendants 126  
Statements of Defence  
a) Witte and Sheridan 148  
b) Pinkerton’s 150  
c) Government of the Northwest Territories as  
represented by the Commissioner of the  
Northwest Territories, Whitford and Turner 151  
d) CAW National, successor by amalgamation to  
CASAW National, and CASAW National 152  
e) Seeton 153  
f) Shearing 153  
g) Bettger 154  
h) Warren 154  
Cross-Claims 155  
Third Party Proceeding of Pinkerton’s Against Royal  
Oak (both actions) 155  
Counterclaim of Pinkerton’s - Action CV 05408 (Fullowka) 155  
EXPERT EVIDENCE 156  
Liability Experts  
a) Dr. Peter W. Strahlendorf 156  
b) Andrew Christopher Lyle Sims Q.C. 159  
c) Ian Michael Plummer 162  
Economic Experts  
a) Gordon Smith 165  
b) Cara Brown 168  
c) Gerald Frederick Taunton 181  
LIABILITY OF THE PARTIES 187  
General Principles of Negligence 188  
a) Duty of Care 189  
b) Standard of Care 193  
c) Causation 194  
d) Remoteness 197  
e) Officers’ and Directors’ Liability 198  
f) Vicarious Liability 203  
The Defence of Novus Actus Interveniens 207  
APPLICATION OF PRINCIPLES OF NEGLIGENCE  
Sheridan 214  
Witte 216  
Royal Oak 223  
Pinkerton’s 241  
i) Third Party Notice by Pinkerton’s 245  
ii) Counterclaim by Pinkerton’s 247  
GNWT, Whitford, Turner and Gould 257  
The Unions  
a) Unions as Separate Entities 273  
b) Basil Hargrove 279  
c) CAW National 280  
Seeton 295  
Shearing 298  
Bettger 300  
Warren 306  
Adverse Inference 306  
DAMAGES  
Dependency Claims 313  
a) Projected Income Stream 313  
b) Longitudinal vs. Cross Sectional Surveys 316  
c) Personal Consumption Rates 318  
d) Divorce and Remarriage Contingencies 320  
e) Post-blast Common Law Relationships 320  
f) Survivor’s Own Loss 322  
Valuable Services Claims 326  
Tax Gross-up and Management Fees 326  
Relief Granted  
a) Fullowka Family 335  
b) Hourie Family 336  
c) Neill Family 336  
d) Pandev Family 337  
e) Carol Riggs 338  
f) Vodnoski Family 338  
g) Rowsell Family 339  
h) Russell Family 340  
i) Sawler Family 341  
INTRODUCTION - Action CV 07028 (O’Neil) 342  
POSITION OF O’NEIL 346  
POSITION OF THE DEFENDANTS 347  
CROSS-CLAIMS 349  
PINKERTON’S THIRD PARTY NOTICE TO ROYAL OAK 349  
FACTS 350  
EXPERT EVIDENCE RESPECTING THE CLAIM OF PTSD 370  
The Plaintiff’s Witnesses  
a) Dr. Richard Ross Wheeler 370  
b) Dr. William Alexander McCay 371  
c) Dr. Heike Juergens 372  
d) Dr. Richard Joseph Spelliscy 375  
e) Dr. Wanda Jean Crouse 376  
f) Dr. Donald Gregory Passey 377  
g) Dr. Christopher James 380  
The Defendants’ Witness  
Dr. Carl Arthur Blashko 380  
Conclusion 399  
THE LAW 401  
DAMAGES 405  
Management Fee – Tax Gross-up 406  
Relief Granted - O’Neil 412  
ALLOCATION OF FAULT – BOTH ACTIONS 413  
APPENDIX A - GLOSSARY OF MINING TERMS 417  
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT  
INTRODUCTION Action CV 05408 (Fullowka)  
On September 18, 1992, at 8:45 a.m., on the 750-foot level of the Giant Mine (“Giant”) in Yellowknife, Northwest  
Territories (“NWT”), a violent explosion blew nine miners apart, killing them. They were:  
(a) Vern Fullowka, aged 36, married with two children;  
(b) Norm Hourie, aged 53, married with four children;  
(c) Chris Neill, aged 29, married without children;  
(d) Joe Pandev, aged 55, married with five children and a grandchild;  
(e) Shane Riggs, aged 27, single, survived by his mother;  
(f) Robert Rowsell, aged 37, married with two children;  
(g) Arnold Russell, aged 41, married with four children;  
(h) Malcolm Sawler, aged 38, married with three children;  
(i) David Vodnoski, aged 25, married with two children.  
Roger Warren (“Warren”) has admitted his role in the deaths of the miners. The Plaintiffs in this action, CV  
05408, argued that the other Defendants’ acts and omissions provide ample grounds for finding them jointly and  
severally liable with Warren.  
The Court is obliged to make two assessments: the assessment of the damages suffered by the Plaintiffs; and the  
assessment of how those damages should be apportioned among the Defendants, according to the degrees to  
which they are respectively at fault.  
This action epitomizes the behavioural abnormality of a labour union local near Yellowknife, NWT, on strike,  
endeavouring to re-invent the harmony it perceived its membership enjoyed prior to the advent of their  
employment with Royal Oak Mines Inc. (now Royal Oak Ventures Inc., “Royal Oak”). Anger and ill-perceived  
strength drove the union almost immediately. Its collective agreement came up for renegotiation, and, following  
union rejection of a tentative agreement, a lockout was called by the company on May 22, 1992, followed by a  
strike the next day. This action illustrates the elasticity of demagoguery so readily apparent as the strike  
unfolded, opening a cavalcade of annoyances, intimidation fueling incitement to riot, and resulting violence; this,  
combined with the belief that these actions must become more elastic, perceptually to bring about anti-  
replacement worker legislation, fomented labour unrest and gave birth to the unpleasant human side of blinder’s  
belief where the sole focus was “might is right”. These union strikers forgot that they could not maintain their  
perceived dignity by standing on it. I will demonstrate this later in relation to the injudicious manner in which  
the union local’s executive officers dealt with their own members.  
As the strikers ramped up the rhetoric, Ross Slezak (“Slezak”), who on June 7, 1992, was the national president of  
the Canadian Association of Smelter and Allied Workers (“CASAW National”), in addressing a crowd assembled  
at the picket line, shouted that Margaret Witte (“Witte”) “can expect severe confrontation in regards to the scab  
issue”, prompting Conrad Lisoway (“Lisoway”) to quizzically muse, “Does somebody have to die before we get rid  
of these fucking scabs?” That query was answered by striker Warren who amongst others overheard this  
comment and agreed, responding thusly, “They do - and we better soon get it done!” He later proceeded to build  
and plant a bomb that on September 18, 1992, killed nine miners in the Giant underground. The deceased miners  
were working in the underground to enable the continuation of full operation at the mine during the labour strike.  
Warren was ultimately convicted of second degree murder and is currently serving a life sentence at the Stony  
Mountain Institution in Manitoba.  
Throughout the months leading up to the fatal blast, negotiations between the mine’s owner, Royal Oak, and its  
union, CASAW Local 4, were deadlocked. Each side insisted that the other agree to “pre-conditions” in order to  
advance the bargaining process.  
The objective of the union and its members from the outset was to disrupt production at the mine. Members  
committed innumerable acts of vandalism and violence throughout the strike. For example, they chased down  
and threatened anyone seen in the city who gave even the slightest appearance of being connected with Royal Oak  
or the security company, Pinkerton’s of Canada Limited (“Pinkerton’s”). Some children of striking workers were  
not allowed to continue their friendship with children of workers who crossed the picket line. The son of one of  
the nine miners killed was told by a fellow student that he was pleased that his father had died in the blast as the  
latter crossed the picket line. Fistfights throughout the city were a regular occurrence between strikers, their  
sympathizers and those who crossed the picket lines and their sympathizers. This malevolent behaviour  
consumed the entire Giant management and workers to the extent that the wife of a miner who crossed the picket  
line to work received a telephone call at her residence threatening gang rape. The activities, events and incidents  
that emanated from this labour unrest were not only focused on Giant and those persons connected with it; they  
permeated the city of Yellowknife, the Government of the Northwest Territories (“GNWT”) and at least three  
federal ministries.  
Through the courtesy of the Plaintiffs, a glossary of mining terms is appended to this judgment and marked as  
Appendix A.  
ACTION CV 05408 FULLOWKA et al  
THE PARTIES  
In this action, CV 05408, the eight widows and Carol Riggs, mother of Shane Riggs, claim against the Defendants  
for themselves and on behalf of their dependent children and/or grandchildren pursuant to the Fatal Accidents  
Act, R.S.N.W.T. 1988, c. F-3:  
2. Where the death of a person is caused by a wrongful act, neglect or default that, if death had not resulted,  
would have entitled the person injured to maintain an action and recover damages in respect of the injury, the  
person who would have been liable if death had not resulted is liable to an action for damages, notwithstanding  
the death of the person injured and although the death was caused under circumstances amounting in law to  
culpable homicide.  
3. (1) An action brought under this Act  
(a) shall be for the benefit of the spouse, parent or child of the person whose death was caused by a wrongful act,  
neglect or default; ...  
The parties in this action are as follows:  
The Plaintiffs  
(a) Sheila Fullowka;  
(b) Doreen Shauna Hourie;  
(c) Tracey Neill;  
(d) Judit Pandev;  
(e) Ella May Carol Riggs;  
(f) Doreen Vodnoski;  
(g) Carlene Dawn Rowsell;  
(h) Karen Russell;  
(i) Bonnie Lou Sawler.  
The Defendants  
(a) Royal Oak Ventures Inc., formerly known as Royal Oak Mines Inc. - the owner and operator of the Giant Mine;  
(b) Margaret K. Witte - the CEO of Royal Oak Ventures Inc.;  
(c) Pinkerton’s of Canada Limited - the security company hired by Royal Oak Ventures Inc.;  
(d) William J.V. Sheridan - solicitor and general counsel to Royal Oak Ventures Inc. as well as Secretary and  
Director thereof, and solicitor and general counsel to Pinkerton’s of Canada Limited as well as Director thereof;  
(e) Anthony W.J. Whitford - Minister of Safety and Public Services of the Government of the Northwest  
Territories, the governmental department responsible for mine safety in the Northwest Territories;  
(f) Dave Turner - employee of the Ministry of Safety and Public Services, Mine Safety Division, of the Government  
of the Northwest Territories;  
(g) The Government of the Northwest Territories as represented by the Commissioner of the Northwest  
Territories;  
(h) National Automobile Aerospace, Transportation and General Workers Union of Canada, successor by  
amalgamation to Canadian Association of Smelter and Allied Workers - a parent union that on July 1, 1994  
formally merged with Canadian Association of Smelter and Allied Workers;  
(i) Canadian Association of Smelter and Allied Workers - the parent of Canadian Association of Smelter and  
Allied Workers Local 4, holder of the bargaining rights of the employees of Royal Oak Ventures Inc.;  
(j). Harry Seeton - miner employed by Royal Oak Ventures Inc.;  
(k) Allan Raymond Shearing - miner employed by Royal Oak Ventures Inc.;  
(l) Timothy Alexander Bettger - miner employed by Royal Oak Ventures Inc.;  
(m) Roger Wallace Warren - miner employed by Royal Oak Ventures Inc.  
BACKGROUND  
The evidence will demonstrate that this action, CV 05408, is a tort-based negligence action in various forms that  
was born to the most menacing labour union strike in Canadian history, which began on Friday, May 22, 1992.  
On September 12, 1994, immediate family members of the nine deceased miners issued the Statement of Claim in  
this action. An Amended Statement of Claim was filed June 23, 1995, wherein certain Defendants were named by  
their correct names for the first time in substitution for the names Richard Roe Number One and Richard Roe  
Number Two. By Orders dated November 14, 2001, this Court dismissed this action against Dale Johnston  
(“Johnston”), Robert Kosta (“Kosta”), Harold David (“David”), J. Marc Danis (“Danis”), Blaine Roger Lisoway,  
William (Bill) Schram (“Schram”), James Mager, Conrad Lisoway, Wayne Campbell (“Campbell”) and Sylvain  
Amyotte on the basis that their addition was outside the two-year limitation period. The Plaintiffs have  
discontinued this action against Procon Miners Inc. (“Procon”) and Terry Legge (“Legge”).  
On March 26, 1997, the Plaintiffs commenced a companion action, CV 06964. This action was dismissed by  
Order of this Court against the Defendant Canadian Autoworkers Local 2304 on the basis that it was filed outside  
the limitation period. The Plaintiffs then discontinued it against all other parties.  
A third action, CV 07028, arising out of the same circumstances was commenced. By Order of Northwest  
Territories Supreme Court Justice J.Z. Vertes, granted June 4, 1998, CV 07028 was to be heard concurrently with  
this action. James O’Neil (“O’Neil”), the sole Plaintiff in this third action, was a fellow miner of the deceased  
miners, and claims damages for chronic Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (“PTSD”). This is said to have begun  
from his arrival at the scene of bodily carnage and the effects thereof, in part the loss of Chris Neill, his close  
friend whom he watched board the mancar minutes before the nine miners were blown apart by Warren’s  
incendiary device.  
The assertions of O’Neil are identical to those of the Plaintiffs in this action, namely, the Defendants were guilty of  
acts and omissions and breaches of duty owed to him and the deceased miners. By virtue of the concurrent  
hearing of this action and the O’Neil action and with the consent of counsel, it is understood that evidence in each  
action applies, mutatis mutandis, to the other. Thus, certain of the evidence is intermixed, though the findings of  
the Court will identify and separate the claims of one action from the other in the finalization of the claims in both  
actions, as the Defendants are not identical in each action.  
The Defendants’ position as the evidence will illustrate was one of reliance on, inter alia, the Limitation of Actions  
Act, R.S.N.W.T. 1988, c. L-8, and complete compliance with governmental regulations, supplemented by self-  
imposed security and safety measures and latterly through Pinkerton’s response to inappropriate behaviour by  
CASAW National and Local 4, the miners’ union at all material times, as well as the National Automobile,  
Aerospace, Transportation and General Workers Union of Canada (“CAW National”), the substituted union.  
Despite evidence of militant union leadership and out-of-control union membership, implosions through  
incitement to riot including almost unimaginable acts of destruction to Giant and replacement workers’ property,  
threats of and bodily infliction of injury to replacement workers’ families, and fellow miners who dared cross the  
picket lines and their families and threats of and infliction of bodily harm to Cambrian Alliance Protection Service  
(“Cambrian”, predecessor to Pinkerton’s) personnel forcing them to flee Yellowknife, on the heels of an attempt to  
inflict bodily injury or death to Bill Tolmie (“Tolmie”), Cambrian’s manager at Giant, the Defendants maintained  
the murders were clearly unforeseeable.  
FACTS  
The Giant Mine and Royal Oak Ventures Inc.  
Giant is a gold mine located approximately five kilometres from the city of Yellowknife. In 1992, Giant consisted  
of approximately 85 to 100 miles of underground tunnels, as well as administrative buildings, a refining plant and  
residences on the surface. The property is bisected by the Ingraham Trail, a public highway off which several  
roads lead to gateways onto the mine site. Approximately 80 staff workers and 240 hourly employees undertook  
open-pit and several other types of underground mining. At the material time, the perimeter of Giant was not  
completely or continuously fenced, nor was the perimeter protected by electronic surveillance measures. There  
were two shifts per day; the first was from 8:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. and the second was from 7:00 p.m. to 3:00 a.m.  
The central blast system was activated twice daily; the early morning blast was detonated around 3:15 a.m., a time  
when no one was underground. The high income earners at Giant received about $120,000 per annum,  
rendering miners in Yellowknife among the highest paid in Canada.  
Prior to Royal Oak assuming control, Giant had been owned and operated by several companies; Falconbridge,  
being one, was popular with its employees for providing a family atmosphere.  
By the end of 1990, Royal Oak Resources, for whom Witte was CEO and Chair of the Board of Directors, had  
acquired control of the Panmour Group of companies from its nearly bankrupt owner, thereby acquiring control  
of Giant. At this time, Giant was known to have both poor productivity and a poor labour climate. It had been  
producing gold for about 50 years, and had dwindling reserves. An analysis as to why Giant was losing money  
indicated that the productivity levels were significantly lower than the Canadian mining industry average.  
Furthermore, Giant had the worst safety record in the country, with the highest number of lost-time incidents.  
However, Giant was attractive due to the large amounts of gold that had been produced in the past and the  
existence of a skilled workforce. Royal Oak believed it could turn the operation around and make it profitable.  
Part of this turnaround plan included a 20% reduction in the workforce, which Witte testified was to come from  
the closure of the tailings retreatment plant (“TRP”). Some evidence suggested that some workers welcomed this  
acquisition by Royal Oak because the mine faced a possible closure.  
Not having access to the cash flow of its new acquisitions, Royal Oak Resources created shareholder value so as to  
facilitate an amalgamation, which occurred in the summer of 1991. Following the amalgamation, the resulting  
company was renamed Royal Oak Mines Inc. and was publicly traded on the New York and Toronto stock  
exchanges. Witte was elected as both Chair of the Board of Directors and president. Also on the Board was the  
Defendant William Sheridan (“Sheridan”), a partner at the law firm of Lang Mitchener in Toronto, who served as  
a director and secretary. Lang Mitchener provided legal services to Royal Oak, including general corporate work,  
but excluding labour and employment work. Royal Oak had other mining operations in the NWT, Ontario and  
Newfoundland, and had about 4,000 shareholders, including members of management and Witte.  
Witte was the only person who reported to the Board of Directors, and all employees reported either directly or  
indirectly to her. The Board was active; directors had input into decisions, aside from company negotiations.  
These decisions were then left in the hands of management, of which Witte had seniority. The operating budget  
for Giant was prepared and revised until Royal Oak senior management was satisfied. Following this, the  
proposed budget would go to the Board of Directors for approval. In addition to Witte, Royal Oak’s senior  
management team included human resource director John Smrke (“Smrke”) and vice-president of operations  
Michael Gross (“Gross”). The management hierarchy at Giant in 1992 included Terry Byberg (“Byberg”), who was  
superintendent until June 1992, when he assumed the position of acting manager on the departure of Michael  
Werner (“Werner”). Bob Steinke assumed the role of superintendent and Noel O’Sullivan (“O’Sullivan”) was  
foreman.  
On assuming control at Giant, it became a priority of Royal Oak management, as instructed by the Board, to run a  
safe mine. This was advanced by Witte, who was responsible for ensuring effective communication with  
management at Giant. Witte instructed Giant’s manager to make immediate changes to the safety department.  
This included dismissing some workers, replacing them with others, creating new positions such as an  
occupational health nurse and introducing the “Employee Improvement Policy”. Also known as the “step  
system”, this was a progressive system of discipline, loathed by some hourly workers while endorsed by others. It  
was explained to workers that, to achieve productivity, absenteeism and lost-time accidents had to be reduced,  
prompting a zero tolerance policy on things such as equipment damage, lateness and injury. Witte believed this  
reinstated management control over the operation, improving Giant’s safety record and productivity. One striker  
described the policy as akin to “cutting your own throat”; injured workers would not file reports for fear of  
penalty. However, one striker testified that he was unaware of any worker being disciplined for injuries arising  
out of an incident not caused by him.  
Byberg believed that the safety program at Giant was excellent, and has used it subsequently as a model in other  
mines. It was his observation that some workers were involved in frequent accidents, low production and missed  
shifts, and it was the goal of management to reverse negative attitudes. All lost-time incidents were reported to  
Royal Oak’s vice-president of operations, as well as Witte personally.  
Some workers testified that, as a result of Royal Oak’s new policies, safety was not improving. CASAW Local 4’s  
health and safety representative, Brian Drover (“Drover”), perceived Royal Oak’s commitment to safety was  
limited to minor issues, and that it was reluctant, for financial reasons, to remedy the substantial ones. Others  
stated that Royal Oak was proactive in the area of occupational health and safety. Some hourly workers hoped  
that this policy would remove ineffectual, lazy workers who would not be otherwise employed without the  
protection of the union.  
Royal Oak had staff responsible for occupational health and safety, under the direction of safety superintendent  
Brian Hagan (“Hagan”). There were training and safety coordinator positions created; David Power (“Power”)  
was responsible for the surface, while Curly Unrah was responsible for the underground. Their duties involved  
orienting new employees to workplace safety, conducting accident investigations, implementing security and  
ensuring the proper use of the “5 point safety system”. Referred to as the “Neil George” system, cards were filled  
out by workers as they inspected the entrances to their workplace and all equipment on beginning their shift.  
Supervisors were required to inspect these areas and the safety cards to ensure compliance. This process was  
audited by the Training and Safety Coordinators and senior management personnel. As well there were  
mandatory monthly inspection tours conducted by the mine manager and the occupational health and safety  
committee. Furthermore, Royal Oak required that all supervisors hold safety meetings once a month.  
Another procedure initiated by Royal Oak was lunch box searches performed to reduce loss. These were not well  
received by the hourly workers and contributed to an increasingly distant relationship with Royal Oak.  
Following countless changes to their work environment, the number of grievances filed by hourly workers  
increased. Shop steward, Harry Seeton (“Seeton”), constantly encouraged workers to flood management with  
grievances, one of his ways of annoying Royal Oak and frustrating the process. Royal Oak’s retort was to cause  
virtually every grievance to run the full gamut to arbitration. This put a financial burden on the union because it  
bore 50% of the arbitration costs, and increased the level of frustration and tension as hundreds of grievances  
accumulated at that stage. Some believed that the company was trying to break the union financially through this  
process.  
The Union Context  
In 1976, CASAW Local 4 became the certified bargaining agent for the hourly employees at Giant, whose interests  
had previously been represented by the United Steelworkers of America. In 1992, CASAW Local 4 represented  
approximately 300 employees at Giant, and was one of six other locals affiliated with CASAW National, the parent  
union based in Kitimat, British Columbia. CASAW National was funded on a per capita basis from the locals. At  
the material time, the president of CASAW National was Slezak.  
In 1980, CASAW Local 4 went on strike at Giant, the result of which was a generous wage increase of 60% for the  
workers, who had formerly been among the worst paid in the country. The union president at that time was Joe  
Donnelly (“Donnelly”), a respected and competent leader. The 1980 strike was described as fairly quiet and the  
relations between strikers and staff remained friendly. Some violence erupted, including an incident requiring  
the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (“RCMP”) to deploy a riot squad, but Donnelly was able to defuse the  
situation by asserting control over his membership. The circumstances during the 1980 strike were unlike those  
found in 1992, because the mine did not maintain production during the strike and the price of gold was high.  
In 1985, CAW National came into existence. CAW National currently has about 265,000 members comprising  
360 local unions, and approximately 2,000 individual collective bargaining agreements. CAW National is  
headquartered in Toronto, and there are 160 national representatives working out of offices across the country.  
Most of these staff members provide services to local unions, particularly expertise and support in collective  
bargaining, grievance solving, arbitration, community activism and lobbying.  
CAW National claims to be organized such that locals are autonomous organizations within the national  
organization. Locals are led by their own executive board and president, and each has a bargaining unit elected to  
be responsible for collective bargaining and problem-solving. The national representatives do not have a vote on  
the bargaining committee of a local union, but do provide advice, which the local is not bound to accept. In some  
cases, locals conduct their own bargaining without any assistance from CAW National. Nonetheless, the national  
and local entities are not separate and distinct. Locals are restricted to operating within the national constitution,  
members of a CAW local are automatically members of CAW National, and CAW National’s revenue originates  
entirely with its locals.  
The CAW National Council meets four times annually to determine the goals and objectives of the union. It  
consists of approximately 800 elected local leaders and 120 staff members from across the country. The National  
Executive Board (“NEB”) of CAW National consists of 14 “rank and file” local union members and three full-time  
National officers, namely, the president, secretary-treasurer and Quebec director. A separate council was created  
in Quebec due to the uniqueness of language, society, economics and politics.  
The Canadian Labour Congress (“CLC”) is the national umbrella for the labour movement in Canada, and most  
unions are members, including CAW National. Although it pays annual dues totaling $1 million, CAW National  
does not utilize CLC’s services but retains membership to support the broader workers’ movement across Canada.  
Each province and territory has a subordinate body to CLC that carries out campaigns across the country; the  
NWT Federation of Labour is one. Subordinate to the provincial or territorial body are approximately 130 local  
labour councils, comprised of elected members of local unions that prepare and distribute material on various  
issues.  
The Canadian Confederation of Unions (“CCU”) was an organization created in the late 1960s, to give an option to  
the majority of workers who were members of American-based unions to have membership in a Canadian labour  
body. On the creation of CAW National in 1985, CCU was no longer necessary. Therefore, merger discussions  
were initiated between CAW National and CCU affiliates, including the Canadian Association of Industrial  
Mechanical and Allied Workers (“CAIMAW”) and CASAW National.  
In 1992, CAW National continued an interest in pursuing mergers with other unions. It was Basil Hargrove  
(“Hargrove”), who was assistant to the national president of CAW National until June 27, 1992, when he was  
elected as national president, who was responsible for engaging other unions in merger discussions. In the spring  
of 1991, Hargrove attended at CASAW National headquarters to initiate merger discussions with Slezak, who was  
unreceptive at that time. This was revisited by Hargrove at the end of 1991, yielding the same response. By this  
time Hargrove’s appetite for a merger was whetted.  
On or around January 1, 1992, CAIMAW officially merged with CAW National. As a result of this merger, some  
CAIMAW staff, including Jess Succamore (“Succamore”), Roger Crowther (“Crowther”) and Peter Smith  
(“Smith”), became CAW National employees. Succamore, previously the national secretary-treasurer of  
CAIMAW, assumed the role of transition officer to assist in the shift to the new structure, following which he was  
appointed area director for British Columbia and Alberta. The CAIMAW Mining Council, that had consisted of  
CAIMAW mining locals and CASAW Local 4, was renamed the CAW Mining Council on June 14, 1992. There was  
a Mutual Defence Pact among members of the Mining Council, such that funding would be provided to a union  
that went on strike. As early as February 1992, the Mining Council was discussing CASAW Local 4’s “difficult  
battle” with its employer. In 1992, Smith, now a CAW National representative, was the executive secretary of the  
Mining Council. Unlike the delegates of each union local, Smith did not have a vote in council affairs. It was his  
responsibility to coordinate the funds coming from the Mining Council to the union local in need. The funds  
could be used as the local deemed necessary. Although Smith reported directly to Succamore, CAW National  
claims to have no role in directing the Mining Council and maintains that the Mining Council was administered  
by the unions themselves.  
Tentative Agreement Negotiations  
The collective agreement for the hourly workers at Giant was due to expire on March 31, 1992. In preparation for  
negotiations, the union elected both bargaining and steering committees. The bargaining committee comprised,  
inter alia, Schram, Jim Gauthier (“Gauthier”) and Bruce Bannister (“Bannister”); as well, Slezak participated in  
some of the sessions. The steering committee was composed of representatives from various departments, one of  
whom was Allan Shearing (“Shearing”). Royal Oak’s bargaining committee included Byberg, Kim Cornwell  
(“Cornwell”), Gross and Smrke, who acted as chief negotiator.  
Smrke and lawyer, Michael Coady (“Coady”), provided Witte with information on labour relations, specifically the  
collective bargaining process. Royal Oak’s starting position for negotiations was one of union concessions due to  
the reduction in the price of gold, but it was prepared to confirm the package in the previous agreement. The  
major issues for the company included eliminating frivolous expenses such as excessive overtime rates of pay.  
The union was adamant about attaining a particular status quo clause, which later became a non-issue.  
Bargaining was difficult, but the parties remained amicable throughout. A tentative collective agreement was  
reached on April 18, 1992, and contained minor concessions by both parties. Included in the agreement was a  
“gold escalator clause”, under which an increase in the price of gold would lead to an increase in miners’ wages.  
A meeting was held at the Yellowknife Inn to present the tentative agreement to the membership; however, it  
escalated to “strike talk” and the use of replacement workers. There was no evidence of the agreement having  
been reduced to text; however, when it was first presented orally, Schram, as a member of the union bargaining  
committee, favoured accepting it as did the rest of the bargaining committee. After it was presented, the radical  
members of the union, particularly Johnston and CASAW Local 4's vice-president Seeton, were expressly  
opposed. After coercing, intimidating and threatening miners who were in favour of acceptance, Schram, a weak  
leader, fell into the clutches of the radicals. Strong attitudes in favour of striking were reactions to Royal Oak’s  
desire to streamline the operation, by allowing the company to transfer workers from one area to another in the  
mine. This was referred to as job reclassification and was perceived as ultimately having the effect of reducing the  
number of jobs. Furthermore, the radicals resisted any overall cooperation with Royal Oak because Witte was an  
American and a woman. That seemed to be the depth of their reasoning.  
There was a second meeting held where Seeton re-asserted dominant views to reject the tentative agreement.  
Guards were posted at the doorway and Keith Murray (“Murray”), who was representative of many wanting to  
avoid a strike, testified that, although he was paying union dues, he was prevented from entering because he was  
working part-time as a shift boss for Royal Oak. The union suspected that Royal Oak management was trying to  
tamper with the membership’s vote.  
The union membership ultimately rejected the tentative agreement. The totally ineffectual and cowardly  
leadership of the union executive was a factor. There were several meetings where members had little conception  
through a confused voting format that was deliberately devised to thwart acceptance. This was evident from such  
witnesses as Rick Titterton, George Samardzija and Milan Tuma (“Tuma”), whose evidence to that effect, I  
accept. Furthermore, these witnesses advised that those who tried to speak out against the views of the radical  
members were prevented from doing so. At one meeting, Campbell, wearing a motorcycle helmet and swinging a  
bat, threatened any “non believers”. Byberg and Witte were aware of such threats. Furthermore, CASAW Local 4  
put out a monthly publication known as “Fool’s Gold” which promoted ridicule of safety issues and management.  
Designed to be an irritant to Royal Oak, it contributed to a bad labour relations environment. It is an example of  
the dishonesty of the union executive with its members.  
Witte corresponded with the union membership on April 28, 1992, outlining the financial difficulties the company  
endured, which left it unable to alter the package that was unanimously recommended by the bargaining  
committee. The company therefore was not prepared to return to the bargaining table. To convince CASAW  
Local 4 that the company had nothing further to offer, Royal Oak suggested a union-appointed auditor review the  
company’s audited financial statements. Even though it claims to have no involvement in labour relations, the  
GNWT offered to pay for a respected financial analyst to independently review the company’s financial position.  
Although such an audit was done prior to the strike, it is unclear who bore the financial burden. The audit  
revealed the poor financial condition Witte had earlier pleaded. That, too, fell on deaf ears. Witte did not believe  
that the union would go on strike given the economics of the situation. Similarly, Slezak felt strongly that CASAW  
Local 4 was not in a position to endure a long strike and therefore had serious concerns about any work stoppage.  
Furthermore, he believed that the tentative agreement was the maximum that could be extracted from the  
employer.  
Hargrove considered Royal Oak to have been in a comfortable position and uninterested in bargaining. He  
believed that senior management had not given the union enough time to ratify the contract and that there was  
another agenda of trying to destroy the union. Thus, in his opinion, a lesson had to be taught to Royal Oak.  
On May 6, 1992, Schram advised several of the GNWT officials, namely, Anthony Whitford (“Whitford”), Lloyd  
Gould (“Gould”) and Dennis Patterson (“Patterson”), that Royal Oak would use replacement workers in the event  
of a strike. He also warned that, if this was the case, there would be a very good chance of violence on the picket  
lines. Schram’s warning fell on deaf ears.  
At some point before the strike, Johnston participated in a meeting between bargaining committees with Bill  
Lewis, a conciliator. It was perceived by CASAW Local 4's executive that, because Johnston had been part of the  
contract negotiations in previous years, he would have an understanding of the contract language.  
On or about May 11, CASAW Local 4 voted to strike. Many union members cast their votes believing that, if they  
voted in favour of a strike, it would allow the bargaining committee to renegotiate a better deal. They were led to  
believe by the union executive that there would be an “eleventh hour settlement”.  
Pre-Strike Preparations by Royal Oak  
Royal Oak believed that it had four options available in the event of a strike. Firstly, it could cease production and  
only conduct daily maintenance. However, the standby costs were assessed at $600,000 per month, and it was  
determined that its treasury could not support this expense. Secondly, it could close the mine, allowing it to  
flood, and endure the cost of re-opening at the end of the labour dispute. The GNWT Mine Safety Division  
(“MSD”) however had concerns about the dangers of arsenic if the mine was flooded. Thirdly, it could operate  
with management and staff from its other operations to produce about half of the normal tonnage. This was  
discarded as the skill level of available employees was not sufficient for the company to survive financially.  
Fourthly, it could operate at full production levels with the use of replacement workers. The decision was left to  
senior management and it was decided that it was in the best interest of the shareholders to operate at a normal  
production level with replacement labour. By March 18, 1992, strike contingency planning was underway by  
Royal Oak.  
On May 9, 1992, Royal Oak’s Board of Directors met. It was reported by Witte that the union had rejected the  
tentative agreement and was planning a strike. She advised that the company had developed a contingency plan  
to continue operations. The Board was aware of the options available to the company, but it did not give any  
instructions, or an opinion about the chosen option. In consultations between Witte and Sheridan, potential  
environmental liabilities, risk of contracting replacement workers versus shutting down the mine, long-term  
labour implications at other mines owned by Royal Oak and the potential views of shareholders, many of whom  
might be union members themselves, were explored. Witte did not believe that workers at other Royal Oak mines  
would be concerned about her use of replacement workers at Giant since those working at Giant received a 50%  
higher wage. Sheridan testified that he appreciated that the union would be unhappy with the use of replacement  
workers but assumed that the company would be in a stronger bargaining position. He further testified that he  
did not contemplate his own personal liability beyond environmental issues in consideration of the options  
available to the company. His view was that the company would suffer financially if the mine closed either  
permanently or temporarily. Sheridan was the most knowledgeable member on the Board with respect to general  
corporate matters.  
In addition to its concerns about a potential flooding of the mine, the GNWT was concerned about the socio-  
economic impact of a closedown at Giant. The mine was a major economic contributor in the NWT and the  
GNWT enjoyed no revenue royalties. Thus, the income tax revenues from employees were significant as there  
were high income earners at Giant. On May 19, 1992, an Information Item was prepared to advise Cabinet  
members of occupational health and safety concerns in the event of a strike at Giant.  
a) Replacement Worker Arrangements  
Royal Oak conducted research sufficient only to conclude that replacement workers were being used in other  
situations, thus it was not breaking new ground. However, it was not common at this time to use replacement  
workers during strikes at Canadian mines. Witte received some information about the use of contract labour  
during a strike from John May and Conrad Lavigne, both members of the Board of Directors. None of her  
immediate sources of information had strike experience where an entire replacement workforce was brought in.  
Witte was uninterested in researching the impact of replacement workers; only the economic consequences on the  
operation of a mine captured her interest. Royal Oak became aware of other strikes where replacement workers  
were used and serious confrontation ensued, such as the Phelps Dodge strike in Arizona. Regardless, it informed  
the unionized workers prior to the strike that replacement labour would be sought. Furthermore, there was a sign  
posted at the mine weeks before the strike started, warning workers that acts of sabotage or violence would not be  
tolerated, and could lead to suspension, termination and criminal and civil actions.  
The GNWT Department of Safety and Public Services was aware prior to the strike of several historical instances  
of difficult and violent situations arising as a result of the use of replacement workers. Further, it believed that  
the mining industry would be worse due to the toughness of hard-rock miners. It was determined and  
maintained that MSD would not take sides in the dispute but rather continue with business as usual.  
Concerns were expressed by members of Royal Oak management about the decision to continue operations.  
Byberg, who became mine manager early in the strike, was concerned because it was unheard of in the Canadian  
mining industry. Furthermore, he had no personal experience operating a struck facility with the use of  
replacement workers. Power, who was similarly concerned, suggested to Gross that the company consider a  
cooling off period. He worried that the initial stages of the strike would be heated and the presence of  
replacement workers would be aggravating. That wise advice was rejected by Gross, who said Royal Oak would be  
bringing in the workforce immediately. Similar advice was advanced by Michael Ballantyne (“Ballantyne”),  
Yellowknife Member of the Legislative Assembly and Speaker of the Legislative Assembly, to Werner, who  
managed Giant until June 1, 1992. Werner responded that there had already been a tentative agreement and the  
union had responded irresponsibly to it; this, combined with the economic difficulties experienced by the  
company, compelled it to go ahead with its plan. At this time, Ballantyne also spoke with Schram, who was angry  
with Royal Oak’s decision. He told Ballantyne that bringing in replacement workers would be an act of  
provocation and the union would not be interested in bargaining.  
In order to facilitate full operations, Royal Oak made the necessary arrangements with staff personnel, union  
members who wished to continue working and contract miners. Before the strike, Byberg spoke with some of the  
men he knew would not go on strike, including Norm Hourie, assuring them that they would be secure.  
A contract was established with Procon to provide the required additional personnel at Giant. Rick Allan  
(“Allan”), Chief Mine Engineer, and Chris Serin, (“Serin”), Chief Financial Officer for Royal Oak, were involved in  
the arrangements, which began on April 29, 1992. Representatives of Procon, including Jim Dales (“Dales”),  
toured Giant on May 1, 1992, and met with mine personnel including Serin and Werner. As a result of this  
meeting, Procon understood that a labour dispute was possible and that Royal Oak was seeking contractors to  
benchmark, a workforce that operates independently from the hourly workers. The size of the complement was  
determined to be about 30 men, sufficient to allow Procon to be independent for both the mining and mechanical  
services in its area.  
Procon personnel revisited Giant on or around May 13. Unaware that the union had voted in favour of a strike,  
Procon was informed shortly after this meeting that its proposal had been selected. Understanding that it would  
be doing the benchmark work as discussed, Dales informed a colleague on May 15 that it would be supplying 25 to  
30 workers for the job. About four days later, Dales met with Royal Oak personnel, including Witte, and  
understood that 60 workers were now required. Agreements were drafted and exchanged by both Royal Oak and  
Procon, but none were signed before the fatal blast. Procon was not informed at this time of the lockout deadline  
of May 22, although it was generally aware of the possibility of a lockout.  
Workers hired by Procon and who were part of the initial complement, were told that they would be working as  
miners likely doing benchmarking in a lockout situation. Those who were hired after the strike began, such as  
Malcolm Sawler, understood they were replacement workers. Prior to their arrival at Giant, the Procon workers  
were held in Edmonton to allow for appropriate onsite accommodation and for safety induction. The first  
complement of 13 or 14 men arrived on May 22. Within about a week and after the arrival of Pinkerton’s, the  
second complement arrived. There was never any segregation of Procon miners from Royal Oak miners during  
the strike. Byberg expressed concern about the need to protect the identities of Procon workers, fearing that their  
safety would be jeopardized. Procon was apprehensive that common knowledge of the identities of these workers  
might affect their ability to secure employment in the future. At some point, the names of all employees were  
revealed.  
The initial target for production was 1,000 to 1,200 tonnes of ore per day, which was consistent with Giant’s  
capacity of 1,200. This target remained the same for the duration of the strike, and it was mandated that Procon  
supply sufficient workers to consistently achieve this production level. On May 15, 1992, Royal Oak made a  
request to acting chief mine inspector Gould for a variance of s. 7(1)(a) of the Mining Safety Act, R.S.N.W.T. 1988,  
c. M-13, since repealed, to extend the lengths of shifts. Gould interpreted this request as an effort to gain  
leverage, or economic advantage, in the upcoming strike and negotiations. This request was denied because  
Gould believed that the proposed schedules might be dangerous to the health and safety of underground miners.  
John Quirke (“Quirke”), then Deputy Minister of Safety and Public Services, was advised of Royal Oak’s request  
and why it was denied; specifically, fatigue, stressful work conditions and the unfamiliarity of replacement  
workers with the site would enhance the possibility of a serious or fatal accident. Royal Oak repeated this request  
on May 22, 1992. On receiving the same response, Werner advised that he would appeal to the Minister if the  
current schedule was not profitable.  
b) Security Arrangements  
Anticipating a potential strike, Royal Oak commissioned a safety survey and strike preparation plan by Cambrian.  
This had been conducted by Tolmie, who arrived at Giant for the first time in November 1991, under the guise of  
an insurance broker. Cambrian was subsequently retained by Royal Oak to provide security services in the event  
of a strike. Royal Oak did not include security services as an expenditure in its 1992 budget, which required Witte  
to authorize all spending in this regard. Her knowledge and interest was limited to the cost implications, thus she  
was not involved in selecting the initial security provider, nor did she view the contract itself.  
An internal outline of strike preparation was drafted by Power on March 18, 1992, and discussed at meetings  
attended by Giant’s senior management on May 13 and 14, 1992. A list of the major security risks was included in  
this initial plan, including environmental concerns arising out of mischief from unauthorized entry. Particular  
areas of concern were those left fairly exposed or close to the highway. Akaitcho was among those listed as a risk  
because of a power line feeding the underground pump that controls water flow through the Supercrest ore body.  
Pervasive preventative measures were suggested, including covering windows and changing door locks in many  
buildings, adding gates, increasing lighting, utilizing both static posts and roving guards to detect and deter acts  
of violence and vandalism, adopting a radio communication system and covering the company van and bus with  
Plexiglas to enable them to pass through the picket gates without suffering damage. Various management  
personnel were assigned responsibilities for these measures.  
Several days prior to the lockout, Power raised the need to have the escape manways secured from the inside. He  
also advised that gates were locked at portal entrances, and secure, such that someone could not climb over or  
underneath. Further, the locks on all buildings at Akaitcho were changed and secure, and the window on the  
northeast side of the collar house was covered with a piece of plywood. Moreover, lock cores on all buildings and  
gates were changed before the strike started. However, no improvements were ever made to the dismal lighting at  
Akaitcho prior to the fatal blast.  
Before the strike began, representatives of the GNWT discussed the vulnerability of the mine site to acts of  
sabotage and the safety risks to persons onsite. An Issue Paper prepared by the GNWT and dated May 15, 1992,  
highlighted these concerns. Furthermore Patterson, GNWT Minister of Justice and Safety and Public Services,  
had a concern about the ability of union officers to maintain control over “out of hand” members. At the earliest  
stage, representatives of the GNWT noted these risks as matters solely within police jurisdiction.  
Acts of vandalism to mine property were discovered by Royal Oak staff prior to the beginning of the strike.  
Specifically, a bomb threat was received at the home of the mine manager and an underground vehicle had sugar  
poured into its fuel tank.  
Before the beginning of the strike, the RCMP assigned Staff Sergeant Ernie Defer (“Defer”), the plainclothes  
commander for the Yellowknife headquarters, to act as liaison with the union and the company. His duties  
included regular visits to the union hall to meet with members of the executive and to the mine to meet with  
management and security personnel. Royal Oak was advised by Defer that incidents ought to be reported to the  
detachment as they occurred, and an RCMP investigation would ensue and, if appropriate, charges would be laid.  
He also forewarned Royal Oak that minor occurrences on the picket lines were to be expected and would not be  
pursued by police. In pre-strike communications, CASAW Local 4's president Schram informed Defer that the  
union would be a law-abiding group on the picket line. However, Schram accentuated the difficulty in controlling  
some “hot-heads”, leading Defer to surmise that the union was anticipating some violence. Initially, RCMP  
expected that only minor matters would arise as a result of the labour dispute; however, this changed as the strike  
unfolded.  
Defer met with Gary Fandrick, who operated CIL Explosives located on Giant property, to discuss improvements  
to the storage of explosive material before the onset of the strike. On his return to inspect the premises, Defer  
observed that the explosives were securely stored, rendering access unlikely.  
Some time before the strike, Defer met with security personnel at Giant and received a security plan, which  
included no use of yellow school buses for anything strike-related. Defer testified that this was a significant  
feature because there were both union and non-union families living on the property, thus it would avoid risk to  
children attending school.  
Two days prior to the strike, Sergeant Bill Code (“Code”) and 11 other RCMP members were seconded to form an  
arrest team in the event that this would be required for strike-related incidents. This team was based at the  
RCMP airport hangar where they remained for months.  
Pre-Strike Preparations by the Union  
There was very little organization or leadership before the beginning of the strike. CASAW Local 4 did not have a  
strike fund. The inexperienced members of the union executive acknowledged and demonstrated a lack of  
competence and confidence to deal with what they anticipated would be a severe confrontation with Royal Oak.  
Consequently, on or around May 17, 1992, they approached Johnston, a former experienced union member and  
Giant miner, for assistance. Johnston was bitter towards Royal Oak, as he perceived it had cancelled company  
benefits to which he was entitled. This was his opportunity to even the score, with no regard to circumstances of  
active miners and their concerned families, should the strike persist.  
The Lockout on May 22, 1992  
Witte deemed that a strike was inevitable on or about May 21, 1992, following a telephone conversation with  
Seeton. On May 22, 1992, Royal Oak received a letter from Schram suggesting that the company extend the  
existing contract until a new agreement could be reached. He indicated that this would allow the union to give  
further consideration to the financial information reported by the auditor. Royal Oak had previously offered this  
to the union, and, because it had declined, this was interpreted as a delay tactic.  
On May 22, 1992, the unionized employees of Royal Oak were advised that they would be paid for four hours and  
were sent home. They were given garbage bags and instructed to empty their lockers before leaving. The  
scheduled night shift was cancelled, as they had been required to take their belongings with them after completing  
their second to last shift. Some union members did not perceive it to be unusual or unexpected while others were  
caught by surprise. On learning that he was to be sent home, Edmund Savage “Savage” physically threatened a  
fellow worker who crossed the picket line early in the strike. Royal Oak’s rationale for locking the employees out  
was that it feared damage would be done to equipment on the last shift.  
Before leaving Giant on May 22, 1992, Shearing was fired by Werner. Werner had received information from  
another worker that sometime in the previous week Shearing had displayed ball bearings that he had for a  
slingshot. Werner asked Byberg to accompany him as a witness so he could question Shearing about the ball  
bearings and warn him not to engage in violent acts. After workers were advised of the lockout, Shearing,  
accompanied by Seeton, met with Werner. When Werner insisted that Seeton leave the meeting, Shearing  
refused to remain even when repeatedly warned that he would be discharged for insubordination. It was the  
practice of Royal Oak that a shop steward or union representative be present with an individual who is being  
disciplined, although Royal Oak did not consider this a disciplinary action. The termination of Shearing’s  
employment was the subject of protest at Giant’s main gate for the remainder of the day.  
Early acts of intimidation by the strikers were not limited to the mine site and picket lines. On May 22, 1992,  
after receiving a radio communication that a car bearing Ontario licence plates had driven past Giant, Legge  
accompanied by another striker pursued it through town, suspecting the occupants were replacement workers,  
ultimately forcing it to stop. Byberg’s son and two other young males were the occupants of the vehicle. A  
confrontation ensued, the result of which was a criminal conviction against Legge on the charge of mischief. He  
received a fine that was paid by the union.  
Pre-Bombing Strike Events  
a) May  
The strike began at midnight on May 22, 1992. As a result of an evening of violence, vandalism and intrusions  
onto the mine site, Royal Oak obtained a Court Injunction on May 23, 1992, to limit the number of picketers to  
five per gate.  
For picket line crossers, Royal Oak made arrangements as to how they would be transported onto the mine site at  
the onset of the strike. For example, Norm Hourie was driven to a rendezvous point by his wife where they were  
unexpectedly confronted by a speeding truck with two men in the truck’s bed wearing helmets and holding chains,  
clinging to the roll bar. As a result of this act of intimidation, the Houries returned to their home, called Byberg  
and were advised of an alternate plan. Once Norm Hourie arrived onsite, he remained there.  
The union executive were unprepared for the strike when it began; however, the organization improved somewhat  
with time. Duty rosters and event logs were prepared, and radio communications were monitored. There were  
picket captains assigned to maintain order on the picket lines, ensure shifts were covered and prevent both the  
consumption of alcohol and possession of weapons. There was at least one meeting in which picket captains,  
including Shearing and Vern Fullowka, met. However, as a result of the bizarre behaviour of his fellow picket  
captains, Vern Fullowka decided to remove himself from this position. Not all striking union members performed  
picket duty, including Joe Pandev, who was warned that he would be blackballed as a result.  
In the early morning of May 23, 1992, the union hall was found in disarray and no one from the executive was  
there. Recognizing this, O’Neil began to respond to radio communications. At this time, the picket lines were  
becoming violent, with escalating rock-throwing and confrontations with security. O’Neil received a call from  
mine management reporting a tailings line leak or possible vandalism on the west side of the property causing a  
discharge of cyanide-laden water. Unable to cross the picket line to gain access to the affected area, Royal Oak  
requested permission from the union to cross. Both the RCMP and MSD officials had been alerted but refused to  
intervene. Interestingly, at some point they both placed calls to the union hall and threatened charges.  
Eventually the strikers allowed passage, and management discovered that the valve that had been open was  
closed.  
The union learned that supplies would be airlifted from the airport to the mine on the first day of the strike. Some  
strikers, including Legge, trespassed onto airport property, where the company helicopter was being loaded, and  
engaged in threatening and obstructionary behaviour. The strikers vacated on hearing that the police had been  
called.  
At sunrise on the first day of the strike, Chris Neill advised O’Neil that he had spoken to Byberg and that the  
company was prepared to negotiate and that dramatic differences existed between what the union told its  
members and what Byberg advised. Chris Neill and O’Neil notified members of the union executive, including  
Seeton and Schram, that the company was receptive to discussions. Refusing to entertain talks, Schram warned  
that if they undertook discussions with mine management they ought to report back to him rather than directly to  
the membership. Following their conference call the next day with Byberg and Werner, Royal Oak provided  
written assurance of its preparedness to hear any proposal from the union. Thereafter, O’Neil learned that the  
bargaining committee had been aware that the company was willing to bargain but that the union executive had  
prevented any further talks. Noting Schram’s disinterest, Chris Neill and O’Neil decided that the membership  
ought to be informed, and conducted two radio interviews. They asked the membership to cease the violence  
because the company was willing to talk. They received death threats. On the advice of the RCMP, O’Neil left  
town for one week, returning out of concern for his family’s safety.  
By the second day of the strike, the strikers had assumed total control of the west side of Giant property. The two  
Cambrian security guards who had initially been installed in that area had their trucks burnt and therefore  
withdrew across the highway to the east side.  
On May 24, 1992, the GNWT, through Patterson, asked Commissioner Inkster of the RCMP to increase their  
strength in Yellowknife to deal with strike-related matters. Virtually all officers of the Yellowknife division  
(approximately 30) had been seconded to deal with strike-related occurrences at this time. As a result, and  
because of the apprehension of violence, local RCMP recommended that a special task force be sent to  
Yellowknife and that additional resources would be required to prevent injury to or loss of life. The issue of who  
would absorb the additional cost of the increased police force was not addressed by the GNWT at this time,  
although it was a concern.  
On or about May 25, 1992, Pierre Alvarez (“Alvarez”), head of the GNWT Executive Council, received a complaint  
from Witte that a chain had been thrown over a transformer, knocking out the hoist thereby leaving 20 men  
trapped underground. Gould, who was of the view that, because there were several ways to exit the underground,  
and as no one was trapped, decided the matter was the responsibility of the RCMP. However, Quirke instructed  
Gould to respond because the RCMP had refused, leaving potential risks to the safety of the workers, which would  
then trigger the enforcement of the Mining Safety Act. Curiously, Quirke swiftly changed his mind and directed  
Gould to take no action.  
On May 26, Gould asked Royal Oak to provide the MSD with evidence that an occupational health and safety  
committee was functioning and a list of all new employees and their respective levels of experience and training.  
Both of these orders were pursuant to statutory requirements, and Royal Oak complied. However, no evidence  
was provided to indicate that MSD received minutes from the mandatory committee meetings as required by  
statute.  
On May 26, 1992, what came to be referred to as “Black Tuesday”, striking miners entered the property, assumed  
total control and committed numerous illegal acts. At some point, Royal Oak staff and two Cambrian security  
guards boarded a yellow school bus and unsuccessfully attempted to cross the picket line. A window of the bus  
was smashed with a piece of lumber, rocks were thrown and persons lay in front of the bus and used nail boards  
to prevent it from advancing. Murray, who was on the bus, suspected that the bus was used as a diversion while  
Royal Oak brought in a truckload of mattresses through the crusher gate. Believing the mattress truck to be  
carrying replacement workers, strikers broke through the fence to search the truck.  
In another area of the mine site, a trespassing truck careened at high speeds. Responding to reports of the  
unauthorized vehicle, Tolmie, accompanied by a security guard and Power, blocked the road with their truck. The  
trespassing vehicle then charged towards them and ploughed into their vehicle twice. The bandit driver, armed  
with an iron bar in his hands, exited his vehicle in pursuit of Tolmie and other guards who had attended the  
scene. He subsequently smashed the window of another company truck with his weapon, before re-entering his  
truck and ramming into other company vehicles. At some point during this incident, a passenger striker exited  
the offending vehicle and was struck by a security truck. Tolmie suffered injuries and required hospitalization as  
a result of the assault.  
Other acts of violence and vandalism that transpired on Black Tuesday included fires, rock-throwing, damaging  
company vehicles, and entering the C-Dry building where those on the mine site had locked themselves in for  
protection. Armed with a pick handle, Murray went to the hoist room where strikers arrived shouting insults and  
throwing rocks. Murray guarded this area for the rest of the night.  
The events of Black Tuesday led to the retreat of Cambrian personnel. As a result, Witte called Sheridan to seek  
advice. Sheridan contacted Paul St. Amour (“St. Amour”), president and CEO of Pinkerton’s, offering a brief  
overview of the situation. Sheridan was a director of several of Pinkerton’s Canadian companies and provided  
them with legal advice. To avoid a potential conflict of interest due to his professional involvement with both  
companies, Sheridan distanced himself from the contractual negotiations. Before speaking with Witte, St. Amour  
made strike related inquiries to the RCMP, obtained a copy of the Mining Safety Act and directed his employees to  
research the legislative scheme in the NWT pertaining to security companies. Knowing that the mine was  
operating with the use of replacement labour and that the strike had been volatile, culminating in property  
damage and employees being barricaded in a building, St. Amour advised that Pinkerton’s could handle the  
situation. In written communication dated May 26, 1992, from St. Amour to Smrke, Pinkerton’s confirmed that  
six officers had been assigned on conditions as follows:  
It is understood that Pinkerton is not an insurer; that any insurance will be obtained by the client, if any is  
desired. Pinkerton’s makes no guarantee implied or otherwise that no loss or damage will occur or that the  
services provided will avert or prevent occurrences or losses.  
Pinkerton’s, founded in 1899, had 250 offices around the world, located in 84 countries including Canada. In  
1992, it had 17 offices across the country and was the largest privately-held security company in Canada. It  
earned $60 million in 1992, providing guard service and investigation, consulting, intervention services,  
technology and product sales, identification and access control, cash in transit and psychological testing.  
Specifically, it was the largest supplier for labour conflict, having provided assistance in over 100 Canadian  
strikes. Part of its experience included doing risk management and risk analysis of a strike situation, which it  
believed to be a part of its due care and diligence to protect its client. It was Pinkerton’s standard practice at a  
struck facility where there was a risk of violence to identify vulnerable areas, such as where the power and gas are  
located. In 1992, Pinkerton’s had “special events departments”, consisting of personnel with specialized previous  
experience, including labour disputes.  
The initial view of Pinkerton’s from those at Giant was that they were a professional security firm, well organized,  
akin to military format and not likely to be intimidated. The union, however, stated that Pinkerton’s brought with  
it a reputation of being ruthless. It had a volatile historical reputation of being a strikebreaker in the United  
States, dating back to the 1870s. For this reason, Hargrove believed that the arrival of Pinkerton’s was consistent  
with his conclusion that Witte was trying to break the union.  
On May 27, 1992, six Pinkerton’s security guards arrived at Giant to find Royal Oak personnel taking refuge in the  
C-Dry building from the invasion the previous night. Within the initial Pinkerton’s complement, Gerry Shaw  
(“Shaw”) and Chris Morton (“Morton”) appeared to be in positions of authority and were provided with  
information about the site and a tour. Byberg believed Shaw to be aware of the storage of explosives underground  
as he was familiar with mines, and did not recall Pinkerton’s expressing concern any time before the fatal blast  
that strikers had access to explosives. Pinkerton’s direct contact with Royal Oak management was through  
Byberg, who was instructed by Witte to manage security effectively. Witte was provided with verbal reports from  
Byberg on the status of security at the mine and the relationship with Pinkerton’s. Power testified that, when  
Pinkerton’s arrived, he no longer had any involvement in day-to-day security.  
On its arrival, Pinkerton’s advised Royal Oak that there was a need for preventive security. There was an initial  
meeting where Pinkerton’s informed Giant that it would secure the site employing the means necessary to do so.  
It was the understanding of some who attended this meeting that Pinkerton’s would render the site safe for  
workers.  
As a result of perceived pandemonium in Yellowknife and at the mine site, the GNWT acting chief mine inspector  
Gould, director of the MSD Ron McRae (“McRae”) and fire marshal Kit Bell (“Bell”), outlined their concerns in a  
memo to Quirke dated May 27, 1992. A meeting was held to discuss their recommendation that “[i]t would be  
appropriate for the Minister to request the Chief Inspector to order the mine to cease operations under the  
provisions of the sections cited.” The confidence of the MSD in the ability of mine management to safely operate  
the mine had eroded as a result of continual violence, vandalism and arson, the inability of Royal Oak to secure  
the site, the uncertainty of the qualifications and training of the replacement workers, the potential for a massive  
environmental disaster, and the risk of injury to emergency response persons when responding to violent strike  
related incidents and long hours of work. Prior to this, Gould had never sought support from the Minister to issue  
any order; however, he questioned his jurisdiction believing the situation to be inherently criminal. Patterson  
refused to provide advice because he considered that issuing closure orders at a policy or ministerial level to be  
political interference; any order must be made at the operational level by those entrusted with statutory authority.  
Furthermore, it was possible that Patterson as Minister would hear an appeal of the order.  
Gould forwarded a proposed order, drafted by GNWT legal counsel to Patterson on May 28, 1992, concluding that  
the occupational health and safety of the employees was endangered. In order for the mine to be re-opened,  
Gould had concluded that mine management would have to demonstrate the physical security of the mine site  
and all integral and ancillary installations, including propane tanks, electrical switching, explosives factors, power  
installations, communications and mine entrance portals. Patterson reminded Gould of his authority under ss. 41  
and 42 of the Mining Safety Act, under which he was empowered to take such action as he considered necessary  
for ensuring the health and safety of persons employed in or about a mine. Gould did not interpret Patterson to  
be advising him that he had the authority to close the mine by virtue of the statute. Moreover, Gould received  
advice from acting Deputy Minister of Justice, Jeff Gilmour (“Gilmour”), that, if an order was issued to close  
Giant, Royal Oak would be successful in overturning it in a matter of hours. All of these considerations were  
discussed at a meeting the same day, following which Gould decided that, if the level of occurrences continued  
over night, he would issue the order the following day. He ultimately decided not to intervene, for reasons  
aforementioned and in part due to discussions that he had with Gilmour about ongoing initiatives such as  
arbitration and mediation.  
In late May, the “Interagency Strike Committee” was created, including representatives from all levels of  
government and the RCMP. Recognizing that this was a complicated situation because of overlapping  
jurisdiction, it was an attempt to voluntarily ensure cooperation and information-sharing among those with  
responsibility. This committee met at least once per day in the early days of the strike, and attendance varied at  
each meeting. Ballantyne acted as liaison between the committee and the union, and alerted CASAW Local 4's  
executive of their responsibility to curtail violence and to be reasonable in their approach to mediation. He  
reported to the committee at the end of May that the union perceived the police favoured the company, that the  
union regarded Witte as a symbol of bad corporate America and the union demonstrated a lack of strategy and  
was unreasonably requesting that the GNWT pass anti-replacement worker legislation. Also discussed before the  
end of May in committee meetings was the enforcement of the Injunction and the concern of political  
interference, that is, that in deploying the RCMP tactical squad the GNWT would be perceived to be siding with  
the company.  
Within the first week of the strike, Royal Oak staff were aware that striking miners were gaining access to the  
underground. The words “scabs beware” were found on the underside of an ore pass door. To ensure that  
striking union members were not entering through the remotely-located Akaitcho shaft, O’Sullivan made visits to  
this area to monitor its security, a practice he did not employ before the strike. In early discussions about security  
with Royal Oak, Procon advised that it would not supply additional workers until security was heightened. At  
this time, work could not be done at any portal entrances, and no one working at the mine was permitted to cross  
the picket line.  
By the end of May there were 52 Pinkerton’s guards on site, a combination of static posts and roving guards and  
an emergency response team that was engaged in the event of a significant accumulation of picketers in a  
particular area or the discovery of trespassers. Both Royal Oak and Pinkerton’s provoked the strikers by  
reciprocating rock-throwing in the infancy of the strike. Also during this period, the picket lines were active at all  
gates, including at the town site, which surprised Royal Oak and upset the families residing onsite. Rallies were  
also held throughout the city of Yellowknife and at Giant, involving strikers, families and supporters. Significant  
acts of violence and vandalism were committed: power poles cut down, power outages, suspicious structural fires,  
damage to security trucks and rock-throwing. A Royal Oak employee reported to management that he was struck  
on the back of the neck by a ball bearing shot by a slingshot, thereby suffering a welt. On another occasion early  
in the strike, Pinkerton’s personnel attempted to pick up a truck and a bus in town. They understood that the  
union had given permission, yet they were a marked target and encountered a parade of locals. Unable to return  
with the truck and bus, they were flown to the mine property by helicopter.  
b) June  
Early June saw numerous instances of strikers preventing access to and from the mine site, even in cases when  
Schram had given permission for passage. Royal Oak management advised CASAW Local 4 that it was gathering  
evidence regarding incidents of damage and illegal trespassing, that individuals would be held responsible and  
subject to disciplinary action, including discharge, and that Royal Oak would hold the union responsible for the  
actions of its agents who may not be employees of the company or officials of the union. Also at this time, Gould  
spoke to Byberg about a bomb threat, articulating his expectation that all persons onsite be advised of this risk  
and oriented with emergency contingency plans. Gould never followed up on his instructions; however, Byberg  
did advise workers and Pinkerton’s of the threat. Interagency Strike Committee meetings in early June involved  
the union’s expression of aggravation and lack of options with the situation, the subject of explosives and  
weapons, and the GNWT’s apprehension about violence and the potential for injury or death.  
The RCMP were the recipients of strikers’ violence in early June, while they endeavoured to quell picket line  
misconduct. This arose when Royal Oak and Pinkerton’s staff discovered a trespassing striker attempting to  
vandalize the property with an axe, and, when the offender was joined by additional armed strikers, the police  
were called. On the arrival of RCMP officers, the strikers believed them to be Pinkerton’s staff and began pelting  
them with rocks. This led to the RCMP firing warning shots into the air. Following this incident, RCMP  
Superintendent Watt spoke with Schram and Witte and then reported to the Interagency Strike Committee that  
he was concerned that someone could be killed in this type of confrontation. The next day, an explosion at an  
electrical substation blew a Pinkerton’s guard off his feet from a distance of 1,500 metres from the blast.  
Within days of the RCMP finding approximately 40 picketers breaching the Injunction at Gate 6, a general  
membership meeting of CASAW Local 4 was held at Giant on June 7, 1992, again in obvious breach of the  
Injunction. The strikers knew that contract talks had disintegrated, and that the replacement workers would  
remain at Giant. In addition to Seeton and Schram addressing the membership, Slezak, who some viewed as not  
supportive of the strike, also spoke. He informed the membership that the union had broken off negotiations and  
they could expect severe confrontation, which resulted in disappointment and frustration among the crowd.  
Striker, Lisoway, yelled out, “Does somebody have to die here before we get rid of these fucking scabs?” Warren  
replied, “They do - and we better soon get it done!” After the meeting and Warren’s notorious comment, a group  
of strikers went down to the guard shack, shouting and shaking the fence. Within days of this congregation,  
Schram and Seeton met with Minister Patterson and expressed frustration and concern about the violence and  
escalation of strike related problems, which was discussed the same day by the Interagency Strike Committee.  
Additionally, the committee canvassed the concerns that Schram was unable to control his members and that an  
unlawful or violent event was on the horizon. By this time, the GNWT was aware of 29 incidents occurring at the  
mine, including environmental spills, unauthorized incursions, vandalism causing power outages, arson, and  
other various acts of vandalism. The GNWT understood that negotiations had disintegrated.  
On June 8, 1992, Pinkerton’s provided an updated Confirmation of Order, as part of an agreement with Royal Oak  
for its services. In addition to adjusting its hourly rate, Pinkerton’s outlined that the number of security  
personnel assigned to Yellowknife would vary on demand. Several days later, Byberg sought assistance from the  
Courts for enforcement of the Injunction, noting that the majority of workers were restricted to the mine property  
due to fear for their safety. Byberg believed the RCMP were assisting the union and frustrating the Court’s  
Injunction by ordering Royal Oak to refrain from exercising its rights, such as moving workers across the picket  
line by bus. Furthermore, Pinkerton’s received information that the strikers had acquired explosives and  
intended to blow up either the head frame, mill or vent shaft.  
In his inspection on or about June 10, 1992, Gould found “booby” traps, such as tripping devices, installed on a  
surface stairway by Pinkerton’s and authorized by mine management to stop intruders. Gould’s concern was for  
those who were working in this area, and he ordered the removal of these devices. He also learned on this day  
that Royal Oak had been working extended hours, contrary to his denial of its earlier request to do so.  
Consequently, he suspended members of Royal Oak management, prompting Royal Oak to hire lawyers to appeal  
this decision to the Minister. Moreover, the same day, Royal Oak’s headquarters in Vancouver were subject to  
vandalism by union supporters. A demonstration was staged outside the building, until a crowd of approximately  
100 people gained access to the front hall, stairway and reception area. Royal Oak staff barricaded themselves in  
the office area, while union supporters damaged furniture and flooded the washrooms until the arrival of police.  
By the middle of June, the nature of threats heard by Pinkerton’s, the police and Royal Oak from union members  
had escalated from “scabs go home” to “I’m going to kill you”. Pinkerton’s speculated that “someone was going to  
come in late at night and try to either blow up the mine or cause extensive damage”. Also, there was a progression  
towards increasingly personal threats, such as their warning to Norm Hourie that he would not leave alive. Norm  
Hourie also heard progressively louder threats directed towards workers’ families and as a result, he made  
arrangements for his stepson to live with another family and for his wife to move onto the mine site.  
Furthermore, police had received complaints that Pinkerton’s was reciprocating with threats, which concurred  
with their prior concern that Pinkerton’s would be overly aggressive towards picketers.  
The Court Injunction was purposefully breached again on June 14 when a planned rally called by CASAW Local  
4's executive erupted into a violent riot at the mine site. Originally, the plan had been to enter the mine site and  
occupy the C-Dry building with the intention of reclaiming the property. The inspiration came as a result of a  
similar incident at Nova Scotia’s Clearwater fish plant, which gained national attention. The membership had  
planned to wear helmets, hockey gear and carry sticks in anticipation of having to use force in confrontations with  
Pinkerton’s. The rally was held at Giant’s main gate, where large numbers of strikers, supporters and media  
assembled. After hearing from several speakers, strikers and supporters then tore down a portion of the fence in  
close proximity to the main gate. Rather than going to the C-Dry building as planned, some strikers went to the  
cookhouse where Norm Hourie and his wife were. The strikers began to pelt the exterior of the cookhouse with  
rocks and gained access to the interior. One striker, in close proximity, threw a rock at Doreen Hourie hitting her  
in the throat.  
The events of the riot lasted for several hours, as strikers perceived they had free rein to commit illegal acts with  
impunity. Their union, whose only advice was “don’t get caught”, supported them. Regardless of the presence of  
their aggressive dogs, Pinkerton’s personnel were subject to assault by trespassing strikers; some had their batons  
taken and used against them. Rock-throwing showdowns ensued between strikers and security guards. At times  
Pinkerton’s personnel felt as though they were outnumbered as much as three to one, and some feared for their  
own safety, having witnessed the assaults on their co-workers. As a result of the violent riot, many Pinkerton’s  
employees suffered injuries, three of whom were taken to hospital. In total, eight Pinkerton’s guards filed injury  
claims with the NWT Workers’ Compensation Board (“WCB”); however, St. Amour believed the injuries could  
have been far worse given that the level of violence exceeded all expectations.  
Police had heard rumours that something was brewing and were aware of the situation at the Clearwater fish  
plant in Nova Scotia; consequently, the RCMP arrest team, riot squad and emergency response personnel were on  
hand. Some responding officers deployed tear gas, and Inspector Massey discharged several warnings with his  
firearm when he found a Pinkerton’s guard restrained on the ground by strikers. Scared and shocked by Massey’s  
response, all but one union supporter left the property as ordered, and the RCMP apprehended the lingerer.  
Johnston, obviously in charge as he directed the membership with a bullhorn, inquired about making a deal with  
the RCMP about releasing those arrested. The RCMP agreed but advised that charges would be laid, which was  
done. Strikers who encountered legal troubles as a result of their actions were guaranteed legal assistance by the  
union. Several days after the riot, the RCMP held a discussion with Royal Oak and Pinkerton’s management  
about the potential for housing 15 RCMP members onsite, in preparation for a repeat incident.  
Patterson, who had been afraid to attend at Giant, acknowledged that, had the RCMP riot squad not attended,  
there could have been loss of life. Gould voiced his concern after the riot, that the mine manager could not  
control the events on his property.  
The RCMP received strong backlash from the union following the riot. These were accusations that they were  
supporting the company in the strike. Striker Savage asserted that, if Inspector Massey had not fired his gun,  
there would be no replacement workers remaining at Giant. The RCMP consequently understood that the  
potential for violence continued, and the union felt threatened by the presence of the RCMP riot squad. This was  
supported by the comments made by other union members that death or violence was the catalyst in other  
provinces for governments to legislate anti-replacement worker laws, a theme elaborated on later.  
Vern Fullowka had participated in the riot and returned home with blood on his clothing, which he told his family  
was that of a dog. Similarly, Shane Riggs suffered a burn on his back from police stun grenades and felt distressed  
and deceived because he understood that he would be attending a union meeting that day. This caused Shane  
Riggs to break away from the union, and he returned to work in August when his criminal charges were resolved.  
Warren, also involved in the events of the riot, had been provided with a can of bear spray by Johnston and was  
later harassed by fellow union members for not using it.  
The CAW Mining Council met in Yellowknife as a show of solidarity on June 14, the details of which are provided  
later. However, it should be noted at this juncture that the riot was witnessed by most of the delegates attending  
the meeting. Some were quite surprised and disturbed by the level of violence. Furthermore, they were aware  
that there was an Injunction in place at the time.  
Normal operation resumed at Giant by 6:00 p.m. on the day of the riot. Procon understood that Royal Oak  
“beefed up” security in response. As a result of the atrocious level of violence that erupted, Byberg pursued  
injunctive relief from the Supreme Court of the Northwest Territories. Witte understood that the riot  
permanently affected the emotional and mental state of the staff, including women at the mine site, who  
subsequently slept with guns under their beds out of fear. Moreover, shortly after the riot, Norm and Doreen  
Hourie spent a night at Byberg’s home, located on the mine site. Byberg produced a rifle and ammunition and  
instructed them to use the rifle if necessary over night.  
After the riot, Royal Oak formally terminated the employment of approximately 40 strikers for misconduct.  
Witte, along with members of her executive team, set the criteria for discharge and sought legal advice in this  
regard. To be discharged, a striker must have been seen to cause damage, injury or trespass on mine property.  
There were videotapes of the event, and some staff were asked to identify those involved. Vigilance was taken by  
management personnel to ensure consistency with the Employee Improvement Policy and past discipline and to  
certify that their documentation would be secure through arbitration. Royal Oak senior management reviewed all  
files and letters drafted to terminate workers’ employment and throughout the following months maintained that  
the terminations were permanent.  
Royal Oak’s reaction furthered the already intense anger that the strikers had towards it, which was subject to no  
consideration by the company. Royal Oak believed it was responding as it had warned at the outset. Warren was  
among the group of terminated strikers, the justification being his conduct in the riot on June 14, that of carrying  
a weapon resulting in criminal charges, and his breaching the Injunction on at least one other occasion. Warren  
was devastated by this and believed it to be backlash from comments he directed to Byberg that, as a Canadian  
involved in mining, he should be ashamed to be part of a strike that employed replacement labour. Warren  
testified that his employment’s termination had a stronger impact on him than he had ever admitted.  
Strikers who were criminally charged in connection with the riot were not permitted to be on the picket lines until  
the matters were resolved. In order to receive strike pay, they formed a unit for “in town picketing”, calling  
themselves the “Wounded Eagles”. Some members believed secondary picketing to be fruitless but complied for  
financial reasons.  
In mid-June Byberg was advised, by Pinkerton’s onsite supervisor Ralph Sinke (“Sinke”), that the acts of violence  
and death threats towards Pinkerton’s by those on the picket lines were increasing in both frequency and severity.  
Byberg was further advised that the evening trespasses by picketers testing Pinkerton’s security measures were  
also increasing and were committed by a group who referred to themselves over the radio system as the “sneakers  
and crawlers”. This group of strikers, dressed in black retreated only when discovered by security officers and  
carried weapons such as hunting slingshots with ball bearings, glass marbles and stones as projectiles. Guards  
expressed great concern as they believed that the picketers were capable of violence. Furthermore, Pinkerton’s  
had acquired gas masks in anticipation of the utilization of tear gas by police in future incidents. By mid-June  
Byberg considered that the Injunction which Royal Oak believed the RCMP had only begun to enforce, was  
completely ineffective in controlling the situation, as limiting the number of picketers on the picket lines would  
not have any impact on trespassing. Interestingly, around this time discussions between Witte and Byberg turned  
to reductions in the size of the Pinkerton’s complement as a measure of cost reduction. At this time, Pinkerton’s  
viewed the labour dispute at Giant as atypical, the difference being the amount of violence carried out by union  
members, its location, the apparent “yahoo” mentality and the fact that there was a full RCMP riot squad assigned  
to Yellowknife.  
On June 17, 1992, Gould became aware of a power outage as a result of chains being thrown over the high voltage  
transmission lines, a vandalous cut of a 30-foot section of a 30,000 volt cable that supplied power to the tailings  
line pumps and cuts to water lines which impacted the mine’s ability to treat its waste water. The Interagency  
Strike Committee discussed these numerous complaints the next day. By June 19, the union activities of  
criminality had spiraled out of control, and the committee acknowledged that picket captains were having  
problems controlling their members. The incidents of power outages multiplied, some cutting power to the entire  
city of Yellowknife.  
On June 19, 1992, Royal Oak directors met and were provided with an update on the events of the strike. At this  
meeting, Sheridan provided a report to the Board on the legal matters pertaining to the strike; specifically, his  
firm was supporting counsel in Yellowknife who were working on the Injunction proceedings. This was the final  
Board meeting before the fatal blast. Several days thereafter, Witte received an interim report of investigations,  
which she had authorized on Pinkerton’s recommendation. This report included details of a suspicion that an  
active union member was on the mine payroll, the results of the electronic sweep to determine if privacy was  
compromised, and a list of the 78 criminal charges that had been laid to date and against whom they were laid.  
In late June, RCMP believed a serious threat to life and property existed after Royal Oak and Pinkerton’s onsite  
management advised that they heard rumours that union executive had a recent meeting to plan a “surprise party  
for the scabs” involving explosives. Also on this date, the RCMP set up a task force to deal solely with strike-  
related complaints.  
On June 29, 1992, Shearing, Tim Bettger (“Bettger”) and another striker obtained access to the underground at  
Giant through an open window in the collar house at the Akaitcho head frame. Commonly referred to as the  
graffiti run, its purpose was to send the message that the mine was accessible, interrupt production, intimidate  
those people who were working in the underground and indicate safety violations occurring in the underground  
workings of the mine. Other union members had knowledge of this planned event, including one who consulted  
the union’s lawyer regarding potential repercussions of these actions. The union subsequently absorbed legal fees  
for this consultation.  
The Akaitcho shaft was selected because it was located in a remote part of the property, known to be inactive at  
the time, and considered unprotected. At all times material up to the killings on September 18, 1992, Akaitcho  
had little or no attention by anyone, at most subject to a “drive by”. Witte, who acknowledged she knew of all  
means of access to the active areas of the underground at Giant, expressed no concern for access points to areas  
not actively being mined.  
On entering the underground, Shearing et al proceeded to spray paint graffiti in various locations and take  
pictures of the resulting vandalism. Words such as “scabs beware” and “Molly McGuires” were left in white paint,  
and some messages identified specific workers. A list of Mining Safety Act violations was prepared by the  
trespassers and ultimately forwarded to the GNWT. Also, the strikers exited the underground possessing  
explosives taken from a powder bench and left a burnt miner’s lamp behind. The incursion lasted about six  
hours. Shearing told other union members, including Vern Fullowka, about the ease of this incursion.  
The photographs taken by the trespassers were left on Schram’s desk and later circulated around the union hall  
and union recreational gathering establishments such as the Polar Bowl. They were also dispersed at the CASAW  
National Convention held on July 25 and 26, 1992, in Kitimat, British Columbia. On viewing the photos,  
members attending this convention praised Shearing and Bettger for their actions. One of the first persons made  
aware of the incursion was David, strike coordinator sent by the CAW. David testified that he told Schram that it  
had been a dumb stunt that served no useful purpose; however, he did not say anything to Shearing to discourage  
him from these types of activities. When David became aware of the photos, he seized them from Schram and  
provided them to lawyers outside the jurisdiction.  
On discovery of the graffiti, Byberg instructed the maintenance department to inspect all equipment. Pinkerton’s  
was notified and attended the area to take photographs and review its security plans. Royal Oak inspected portal  
accesses, and filled under some gates where ruts had deepened from vehicular traffic. However, it is uncertain as  
to which of the possible points of access were inspected, including Akaitcho. Royal Oak management believed  
that the means of access for the graffiti run was likely the UBC portal as it was conveniently located and was the  
most frequently used. Akaitcho was discounted as a possibility because of its remote location, the general  
unfamiliarity with the area and complexity of the tunnel system. However, the point of access was not  
determined with certainty before the fatal blast.  
Royal Oak advised MSD officials and the RCMP of the graffiti and proceeded to investigate the incident through  
to July 31, 1992. This was the first instance where the RCMP learned of incursions in the underground. Noticing  
an explosive cache, which was not subject to inventory, the RCMP voiced concern to Byberg that no one would  
notice the disappearance of a small quantity of explosives. Following this incident, Royal Oak put locks on the  
portal gates and workers were to lock them going in and out, and the tops of the gates were reinforced to prevent  
someone from climbing over.  
GNWT officials understood prior to the graffiti run that strikers could get past security and gain access to the  
underground and knew that some were trespassing with the intent to damage property. David Turner (“Turner”)  
learned of the graffiti run immediately after he assumed the role of chief mine inspector in early July, and he  
discussed controlling unauthorized access with Gould and Byberg. Ironically, on the day of the graffiti run, Witte  
asked Byberg for a schedule to reduce the number of security personnel. She was advised of the discovery of  
graffiti and what it depicted.  
Warren, like the other striking miners, was aware of the graffiti run and that the Akaitcho shaft had been the  
means of entrance. At some point Warren spoke with Quirke, whom he believed to be a person of influence, and  
warned him that no one was guarding the mine and it should be shut down before something happened.  
At the end of June, a letter from Schram was received by both Gould and Patterson outlining safety deficiencies in  
specific pieces of equipment in use at Giant, and urging a vigorous inspection and severe consequences to the  
violators. An inspection was conducted by Gould, who perceived Royal Oak to be upset, believing that the  
equipment had been tampered with by the trespassers.  
At some point in June, O’Sullivan removed the top ladder of the Akaitcho manway with the intention to deter  
unauthorized access to the underground by strikers. Similarly, at another manway, O’Sullivan chained down the  
steel grate door from the underside. Warren was to later admit that the removal of the ladder was no deterrent to  
him.  
In the last week of June, discussions between Royal Oak and Pinkerton’s were focused on downsizing. Byberg  
believed that the activity and violence was decreasing; consequently, the security force and its excessive cost could  
be reduced, as mandated by Witte. Pinkerton’s was not in favour of any downsizing and was on record that no  
forces be withdrawn. St. Amour consulted with Shaw who said that, if the complement were reduced below 20, he  
would remove all personnel, believing it would be unsafe. Discussions took place between St. Amour and Witte,  
and it was decided that effective July 19, 25 security guards would remain.  
c) July  
At the beginning of July, Turner assumed the role of chief mine inspector and was briefed by his acting  
predecessor, Gould. Turner understood that the MSD had credibility problems, specifically favouring  
management. However, he was impressed with the inspectors in the department, including Gould, who had been  
assigned to inspect Giant throughout the strike. Around this time, Gould responded to a call from the union that  
there had been an environmental spill. When he attended at Giant, he found a number of holes in pipelines  
running to and from the tailings pond, clearly acts of vandalism.  
On July 2, 1992, Shaw advised St. Amour that the security complement would be reduced by 13 officers on July 6  
if no further problems arose. This followed a conversation that Witte had with Shaw, advising him that it  
appeared the strike would continue indefinitely and there was the possibility of a long-term contractual  
relationship. The RCMP was advised of the decrease and notified Royal Oak that the RCMP was also downsizing  
the number of officers in Yellowknife because they believed the violence had reduced, and that the RCMP would  
not provide security to private property. At this time, Royal Oak was able to move across the picket line relatively  
easily and employees were taking their own vehicles to work.  
On attending at the union hall in early July, Defer noted the ardent frustration of the membership. He asked  
what could be done to lessen the probability of violence and was told that the police needed to vacate to enable the  
strikers to occupy the mine. Defer was advised that the union had considered eliminating the police by  
outnumbering them, but this was not perceived as a threat because he was simultaneously told that the union did  
not want to harm the police. Defer determined that he no longer enjoyed a good relationship with the union;  
thus, he brought in Sergeant Code (“Code”) to replace him. From mid-June to mid-July, the mood at the union  
hall was one of increasing frustration with the police, as the union believed that they were supporting the  
company. They were not seen as impartial. It was hoped that Code would provide a fresh start with the union.  
As of July 9, 1992, Patterson ceased to be Minister of Justice, and was succeeded by Whitford. Whitford received  
briefing notes on strike-related events.  
On July 10, 1992, Byberg advised Defer that the RCMP special task force’s departures from Yellowknife was not  
promising from his perspective, even though he had extra Pinkerton’s personnel on standby if needed. On or  
about July 14, RCMP officers who had been seconded from other jurisdictions were released, leaving the  
Yellowknife divisional force to handle further strike-related matters. Upon the departure of the special task force,  
Shaw did not request that Pinkerton’s increase the size of its force at Giant. Shaw did express concern to Byberg  
about the entries onto the mine site, but these areas of concern did not include the north end of the site near  
Akaitcho. Of more concern was the B-3 pit, which had an open gate going underground (I-38 portal), which was  
monitored around the clock. At this time, the I-38 portal had a locked gate over it, and surveillance was always  
done from the TRP. When the RCMP downsized, they removed the daytime surveillance of this area and replaced  
it with canine unit patrols and left a static guard on the TRP post at night. This continued until September 18,  
1992.  
Further, by mid-July, changes took effect in the staffing of the RCMP command centre. At this time, the RCMP  
had become aware of a fire at the garbage dump leaving the switch house burnt and a financial loss of between  
$2,000 and $3,000. This building was located approximately 800 feet from the Akaitcho head frame. There was  
another fire in a pump house, also in close proximity to Akaitcho; however, this was caught before damage was  
done.  
On July 16, Pinkerton’s advised Witte of the further amendment to its Confirmation of Order dated June 8, 1992;  
effective July 19, the on-site effect would be 25 security officers, which would include four dog handlers and one  
investigator. Furthermore, Witte believed that, as Byberg was able to manage the situation, he would implement  
a more long-term routine for Pinkerton’s, including decreasing the number of officers and negotiating a new rate.  
Within days of this decrease, the RCMP learned that Pinkerton’s officers had been sleeping while on duty and so  
notified Byberg.  
On July 21, 1992, Byberg provided the RCMP with the revised terms of employment for anyone wishing to return  
to work. However, this was not made available to the miners who had been terminated by the company. Instead,  
Byberg advised that they would have to go through arbitration or something similar.  
On July 21, 1992, Shearing and Bettger gained access to Giant’s property and set a bomb that blew a watermelon-  
sized hole through a satellite dish located on a cliff directly above the town site. In the week prior to this  
explosion, Bettger had loosened the bolts that secured the satellite dish to the property. In setting the blast, they  
used explosive material that had been stored by strikers on the picket line.  
When the blast went off, there was a great deal of confusion and panic among union members. This was because  
the satellite dish was located very close to one of the picket gates and could have seriously injured some of the  
picketers. Many union members believed that the blast had been set by the company to scare them and discredit  
the union. The blast was not detected by Royal Oak when it occurred but was discovered the morning after. Witte  
was advised of this damage and believed the blast to be a scare tactic. This incident led to concern about the use  
of explosives and Procon understood that this was subject to investigation by Pinkerton’s, Royal Oak and the  
RCMP. Byberg was particularly concerned because the blast was set with the use of tape fuse, which was banned  
in the NWT. It was especially dangerous because, on lighting tape fuse, there is significant delay until the time  
that the explosive detonates. Byberg believed it was possible that a child could have climbed up towards the  
satellite dish and found himself or herself upon an explosion. Norm Hourie spoke to Byberg the following day.  
Not satisfied with their discussion, he went to examine the blast site. Pinkerton’s believed the satellite dish  
explosion was intended to threaten those in the town site, and could have been far worse given its theory that the  
bolts had been loosened with the intention of causing serious damage. In reaction to this event, Pinkerton’s  
began to visit the area with a canine patrol several times per night.  
The RCMP were aware that Giant was not secure and they had concerns that explosives were being stolen. The  
satellite dish explosion validated their suspicion that the strikers had explosives. Consequently they discussed  
that issue with the union. Although it did not deny that it possessed explosives, the union maintained that it did  
not condone the use of them. MSD officials learned of this explosion but did not inquire as to what kind of  
explosives had been used. Turner, however did speak with Byberg about controlling unauthorized access.  
On July 20, Bill Twerdun (“Twerdun”), Pinkerton’s vice-president of operations and technology, visited Giant and  
was provided with a tour. He was sent to Yellowknife by St. Amour after Witte’s request to reduce its manpower.  
He was to conduct a needs-based assessment to bolster the protection services that were already in place.  
Essentially, Pinkerton’s was looking to supplement manpower with technology. Twerdun testified that he visited  
Akaitcho on his tour and understood it to be an old mine site only used as an escape way from the underground.  
When Twerdun visited Akaitcho, the wooden cover over the manway was open and the steel grate was closed.  
Before leaving Yellowknife, Twerdun concluded that there were several security deficiencies, including a lack of  
physical deterrence and access control. He discussed his findings with Byberg, and subsequently prepared a  
report detailing his recommendations. Twerdun perceived that Byberg was not receptive to his recommendations  
for electronic support as he was not happy with equipment previously supplied, such as night vision equipment,  
an obvious waste in Byberg’s view due to the lengthy daylight hours. It was Twerdun’s routine to prepare an  
initial report onsite, which was later followed by an improved presentation. Twerdun’s report included reference  
to the use of electronic hardware, and it was noted that research focusing on the effectiveness of such technology  
in northern climates was being performed and that the results would allow Pinkerton’s to “design a total  
protection package which will accommodate immediate and future needs of the mine site”. Pinkerton’s did not  
advise Royal Oak at this time that the equipment was available and ready to install. Byberg claimed to have never  
received this report, nor does he recall receiving any information about electronics being used at the TRP, or that  
control of access was believed to be virtually impossible, or that alarm systems needed to be improved. I accept  
the evidence of St. Amour that he discussed the results of the site survey with Byberg, but that they were rejected.  
By the end of July, CASAW Local 4's executive acknowledged that they were “drowning”. The atmosphere at  
Giant appeared much less tense and anxious, with quieter picket lines and fewer, although more dangerous,  
disturbances. Some strikers, including Legge, observed a significant decrease in the levels of community support.  
As a result, he engaged in media banter, by way of letters to the editor. Also around this time, the RCMP received  
a complaint from Power that a striker had made numerous threats involving firearms towards security guards.  
Incredibly, this was the 199th complaint related to the strike at Giant received by the RCMP and was not  
investigated further.  
Before the end of July, employees at Giant found a miner’s lamp underground that was not the type used at Giant,  
but rather utilized at the Nerco Con Mine until July 1, 1992.  
Also, at some time in July, the window of the collar house at the Akaitcho shaft was no longer covered, as it had  
been in the early days of the strike.  
Malcolm Sawler, one of the victims of the fatal blast, was hired by Procon on July 31, 1992. On his arrival at  
Giant, he had told his family that crossing the picket line had been intimidating. There had been many people  
crowding around the bus and yelling.  
d) August  
An understanding was reached between Royal Oak and Pinkerton’s, at the beginning of August, that 20 guards  
could ably maintain and monitor the site, as doubling up guards at the gates and the presence of an emergency  
response team was deemed unnecessary. St. Amour authorized the reduction with the caveat that the decrease be  
compensated by the use of technology. Morton, apprehensive about downsizing, outlined his concerns in writing  
to St. Amour on August 1, 1992. These included the departure of the RCMP tactical unit, increased hours of  
darkness, higher frequency of flares and rock-throwing, the return of those picketers previously charged and the  
detailed knowledge the strikers possessed over the activities of security. Morton stated that the current staff, who  
were experiencing a depressed morale, supported a reduction in the agreed pay structure to ensure the retention  
of the larger force. He was worried that his officers would transfer out of Yellowknife if the downsizing continued,  
due to their safety concerns. He further advised that Byberg was no longer responsive to Pinkerton’s and its  
manpower was too low to cover all security risks, and this would be easily detected by strikers. After sending his  
memo to St. Amour, Morton advised Witte that downsizing should not happen and made it clear that if its  
complement went to 20, Pinkerton’s would pull out. Morton had regular conversations with RCMP officers, and  
conveyed that the apparent quietness on the picket lines was deceiving, and that the size of the Pinkerton’s  
complement as suggested by Royal Oak would not be effective.  
In a letter dated August 7, 1992, to Witte, referred to as the “quiet before the storm letter”, St. Amour highlighted  
his concern with respect to management’s continued downsizing of security staffing levels. He identified  
Pinkerton’s legal responsibility to notify the client if it believed it was not supplying sufficient security personnel  
to adequately protect life and property, to highlight any security deficiencies and recommend alternate security  
measures to be adopted. As a result of its audit, St. Amour advised that downsizing to a level lower than 20  
officers would increase risks and liability exposure in respect of its own protective security operations at the mine.  
St. Amour further acknowledged that the “[f]ailure of the company or contract security agency to accept the  
responsibility for providing an adequate level of security could lay the foundation for lawsuits involving the failure  
to provide proper security” and that Royal Oak had assumed all liability in exchange for a reduction in hourly  
rates. He recommended the use of electronic security systems and technology to support staffing level reductions.  
Royal Oak did not respond to these recommendations before the fatal blast, as Byberg had understood  
Pinkerton’s to have articulated that a good plan existed, but to further decrease would be problematic.  
Furthermore, Royal Oak interpreted Pinkerton’s remaining on site as indicative of its approval of the current  
system. Witte refused to return St. Amour’s numerous phone calls, which contributed to Pinkerton’s desire to  
terminate its services. St. Amour made unsuccessful inquiries in search of a replacement company to assume the  
contract, fearing that Witte would sue for non-service otherwise.  
In early August, many strikers crossed the picket line to return to work, including some who were highly  
respected. Groups secretly met to discuss a potential return to work; one, consisted of Vern Fullowka, O’Neil,  
Chris Neill, Shane Riggs, David Vodnoski and Joe Pandev. Chris Neill had made an earlier attempt to return to  
work, however, worried about his wife’s safety, he waited until he could drive across the picket line daily. Those  
contemplating a return to work liased with Byberg, who had assured them that the mine was secure, and that  
security was available to assist off property. The physical crossing of the picket line was the primary concern;  
however, Byberg stressed that, once they were on the property, there was no reason to worry. However, Vern  
Fullowka remained disturbed as he was fully cognizant of the vandalism and harassment towards workers, and  
that union members had easily accessed the underground. Some line crossers bought scanners to monitor the  
strikers’ radio transmissions. On her husband’s first day returning to Giant, Sheila Fullowka heard the strikers  
remark over the radio, “That’s our fucking picket captain.” On his return to work at Giant, Vern Fullowka was  
interrogated by both Royal Oak and the RCMP as to his involvement in the incidents that had occurred, to  
determine whether he was a spy for the union.  
In late August, the RCMP continued their response to numerous concerns with respect to intimidation and  
threats perpetrated by CASAW Local 4 members. For example, a 60-year-old Royal Oak employee quit his job  
after he was threatened with harm by several strikers at the grocery store. Similarly, Bettger threatened a Royal  
Oak summer student operating a company vehicle in town. Also at this time, the RCMP learned that the mine  
had acquired night vision equipment and increased their patrols to the west area where many power poles were  
located. This was necessitated by numerous power outages, one lasting 21 hours and affecting the entire city,  
including the operating room at the hospital. Interestingly, Witte offered a cash reward for anyone with  
information about this incident, and metal strips were placed on all power poles to make them more difficult to  
sever.  
In late August, the RCMP continued to be a target for a great deal of ridicule, verbal abuse and intimidation. For  
example, on entering the union hall on one occasion, Code was grabbed by an individual, ordered to sign in, and  
referred to as “fucking scum”, which appeared to be applauded by others. As levels of hostility, frustration and  
desperation rose, the union was willing to use any means to bring attention to itself. The RCMP recorded  
escalated activity at the mine, such as the frequent presence of more picketers than permitted by the Injunction,  
increased verbal abuse towards mine employees, and a lack of trust and attribution of blame towards the police.  
Seeton was identified by the RCMP as provoking this distrust as he was becoming more paranoid and was not a  
leader. In fact, Code warned fellow members to be cautious when dealing with him, citing his unstable emotional  
state due to strike-related stress and marital problems. At the same time, the RCMP observed that the security  
guards were increasing their presence and using intimidation tactics, provoking confrontation with CASAW Local  
4. Strangely, by the end of August, the RCMP decided that they would reduce the patrols at Giant, as those in  
power believed the police presence to be unnecessary and that they were in fact a catalyst. Code, who had daily  
interaction with the company and union, thought this was a mistake.  
On or about August 30, 1992, Don Miller (“Miller”) assumed the position of Pinkerton’s site supervisor,  
understanding that his responsibility was to ensure the continuation of the current security plan. Shaw provided  
him with a briefing, outlining his concerns, particularly the union’s increased activity. Surprisingly, Miller was  
not provided with any written materials besides a map. He did, however, have daily contact with Byberg  
throughout his tenure, reviewing incidents and discussing concerns. At this time, Pinkerton’s had 20 guards on  
site, 15 assigned to the night shift and five assigned to the day shift.  
By the end of August, union support was starting to crumble with more members crossing the line and returning  
to work. Many were beginning to feel the financial consequences of the strike, and were becoming emotionally  
devastated, now realizing that Royal Oak’s train would continue full steam ahead as it had maintained from the  
outset. Warren, who had been prohibited from being on the picket line after the riot, was permitted to return. He  
testified that the negative environment, namely, that the mine was operating while they were striking, caused  
feelings of depression. The gravity of the situation was also recognized by Seeton, who became concerned in  
August that someone might get killed due to a lot of tension, fighting and fear.  
At the end of August, Royal Oak witnessed four trespassers at the dump which was located about 800 feet from  
Akaitcho.  
e) September  
In early September, the RCMP became aware of threats that, if the strike was not over by the end of September,  
the strikers would blow up the head frame and other buildings. Both Code and Byberg agreed that this sort of  
threat was heard throughout the summer.  
Seeton believed that there were fewer options available for the union to explore and it consequently was clinging  
to the involvement of the Federal Minister of Labour. He perceived that the situation had become increasingly  
out of control as union members became more fearful and unsure how to achieve their end. Members became  
paranoid that the RCMP, Pinkerton’s, the Federal Government, the GNWT, the media and the Courts were  
conspiring with Royal Oak to frustrate their efforts to bring about a successful resolution to the labour dispute.  
The vent shaft was an area that many identified as vulnerable, as it provided fresh air to the underground. Thus,  
sabotage to it could possibly shut the mine down. Dressed in dark clothing, Shearing, Bettger, Legge and Conrad  
Lisoway entered the mine site on August 31 to set a bomb in the vent shaft. Some time prior, the security patterns  
of Pinkerton’s had been studied in order to plan the timing of this incursion. The bomb did not explode as  
planned that evening, but was successfully reset and detonated at 12:46 a.m. on September 2. When the  
explosion occurred, its impact caused the back window of a Pinkerton’s vehicle to be blown out while occupied by  
a guard and canine. Cement was blown across the road, and nearby structures were peppered with small rock  
holes. Damage totaling $97,625 was done to the air heaters at the ventilation facility, and the mine was evacuated  
as a result.  
The purpose in setting the blast had been to send a message to the company that the union was capable of  
shutting down operations, and to frighten the replacement workers. Furthermore, it was anticipated that the  
explosion would generate attention and revive negotiations. The chosen point of access onto mine property  
enjoyed no more than roving security and was not fenced. Between the time of the satellite dish explosion and  
vent shaft blast, Royal Oak and Pinkerton’s had received warnings from the RCMP to increase security. Believing  
this to mark a serious turn of events in the strike, Miller adjusted security such that a static post was permanently  
moved to the vent shaft. Unfortunately, Miller had no authority to increase the number of guards onsite, even  
though he believed that Pinkerton’s did not have enough men to keep the mine secure before this bombing. The  
effect of this modification was to increase the already vast area covered by the roving patrols. Subsequent to the  
blast, the RCMP spoke with union executive, including Seeton, who expressed concern and agreed to circulate a  
bulletin condemning such tactics.  
Witte personally viewed the damage, but does not recall the event being portrayed as one that could have  
seriously injured or killed someone in the vicinity. Byberg believed the force of the blast was sufficiently strong to  
have killed or seriously wounded someone nearby on the surface, yet did not admit that a risk existed to those  
underground. The MSD was of the view that the explosion could have caused a major fire which would have  
pumped high concentrations of smoke and noxious gases into the mine workings, potentially endangering the  
lives of the 40 men working in the underground at the time. Turner and Gould articulated their concerns in an  
Issue Paper dated September 3, 1992. While aware that unknown persons had accessed the site and committed  
such acts, thereby raising the safety risk to the miners, the MSD did not issue an Order to close the mine, nor was  
any investigation conducted. Instead, both Gould and Turner spoke to Byberg about increasing security, and  
were advised that Royal Oak was addressing it. Whitford, then Minister of Safety and Public Services, had the  
same concerns but took no action.  
The strikers perceived the company was brushing this warning aside, which increased their level of frustration,  
and led to their conclusion that a more serious stunt would be needed to advance the union’s position.  
There was no consistency in what the underground workers were told about the explosion at the ventilation  
facility. Some understood that it had been a “flub up” with little damage done, which consequently did not cause  
concern. Chris Neill shared this understanding and believed that this type of incident would not occur again as  
the necessary precautions would be taken. There were other workers who were cognizant of the potential  
seriousness of the situation due to the threat of carbon monoxide poisoning, while another group had no  
knowledge of the blast. Responding to allegations that Royal Oak was irresponsible with regard to the safety of  
those onsite, Byberg advised that they were facing “bats, rocks, flares, and bombs being used daily” against those  
on site, and that Royal Oak “has been doing [its] utmost to ensure the safety of not only Royal Oak employees, but  
the citizens of the community as well”.  
In early September, Pinkerton’s observed an increase in the frequency of incursions on the east side of the road in  
close proximity to the C-dry building. As a result, additional surveillance was assigned. Also around this time,  
two Pinkerton’s guards were parked at the OK Economy store in a company truck when Shearing threw a stick at  
the truck striking one of the guards.  
On September 9, 1992, Pinkerton’s delivered to Royal Oak’s headquarters a security survey outlining alterations  
that could facilitate manpower reductions on a long-term or permanent basis. Pinkerton’s was considering long-  
term plans at Giant because it wanted to expand its northern operation; it was aware that Royal Oak had several  
operations, and would therefore be a good permanent client. Electronic security measures were suggested, but  
research and testing were again highlighted as necessary to ensure that Arctic conditions would not impede their  
effectiveness. Perimeter barriers were identified as in need of immediate attention, area security in general  
warranted attention in the near future and electronic security measures were noted as a matter for future  
consideration. The most serious safety concern at Giant was found to be the controls exercised over the deliveries  
to, storage of and retrieval from the inventory of explosives.  
Although the results of this audit were forwarded directly to Witte, she did not review the document until after the  
fatal blast. Byberg, as onsite liaison with Pinkerton’s, was unsure as to whether he was aware of this survey before  
the fatal blast, and denies being advised of the deficiencies as indicated by Pinkerton’s. Byberg did, however,  
authorize a security audit to be done by Royal Oak staff security, who found that some gates and fences were in  
need of repair. Miller was not advised of these deficiencies, and it remains uncertain as to whether these repairs  
were conducted. By mid-September, the decision was made to transfer the Royal Oak security officers from the  
first aid room to the gatehouse. Effective September 22, this would have freed one Pinkerton’s guard from his  
duties in the gatehouse.  
In mid-September, knowing the police patrols were eliminated entirely, Pinkerton’s and Royal Oak requested  
increased police presence from midnight to 3 a.m. Miller indicated that his officers were becoming frustrated  
with the increased rock-throwing, slingshot incidences and verbal exchanges. In particular, they complained  
about employees being pelted with rocks when driving to and from work. Both Pinkerton’s and Royal Oak  
management believed something to be brewing as it had been “too quiet”. They referred to the continued  
incursions onto the property and their intention to put security in the bushes. Code suggested that onsite security  
patrols be increased in several areas including the north end of the property towards Akaitcho, as it allowed  
access to the underground.  
At the same time, the union was reporting to the RCMP that security continued to be provocative, including  
following strikers into town. Both Seeton and Schram projected a continuing mood of “total distrust and  
frustration when dealing with the police”. The lack of any response from the union led Code to conclude that  
CASAW Local 4 members had been brainwashed and were convinced they had a legal right to resort to tactics of  
violence because they were on strike.  
On September 16, a rally was held in protest of perceived police misconduct and Shearing’s jailing. Between 300  
to 400 people marched from the union hall to the RCMP headquarters where Seeton made a speech and  
demanded Shearing’s release.  
On or about September 17, Smrke visited Giant and requested a nighttime tour of the property by security. He  
wore night vision equipment and surveyed the property for a couple of hours with one of the roving guards in a  
vehicle, but neglected to visit the Akaitcho area. As of this date, Byberg believed that Royal Oak had a quality  
security system in place and further that he was protecting the workers across the picket line, in town, at their  
worksites and in their homes. He also believed he was protecting equipment in the buildings, the mill, tailings  
lines and main lines carrying fuels and water on the site.  
The Fatal Blast  
In the week prior to September 18, 1992, Warren began reconnoitering on Giant property, for two to three hours  
at a time. Satisfying his boredom on the picket line, Warren’s ventures towards the Akaitcho area became  
increasingly unconcealed as he recognized that, even after the graffiti run, that locality was not subject to strict  
security as he anticipated. He had understood Akaitcho to have been the access point employed by Shearing and  
Bettger for the graffiti run. On one of these missions, Warren gained access to the collar house and surveyed the  
manway, discovering it to be accessible and desirable because of its remote location and inactivity. Also, prior to  
September 18, Warren walked around the I-38 pit area which ultimately served as his point of exit after setting  
the fatal blast. In contemplating gaining access to the mine to disrupt production, he left supplies in a ditch less  
than a mile from Akaitcho, including blasting caps obtained on the picket line.  
Warren arrived for picket duty at midnight on September 18, 1992. At about 2 a.m. he gained access to the  
underground through the open window of the collar house located at the Akaitcho head frame. The window itself  
had no covering on it; there was a drum located directly under it, which served to assist his entry. Once inside the  
collar house, he removed the plywood covering to the manhole, lifted the steel grate and descended the ladder  
system to the 750 foot level of the mine. The ladder closest to the surface of the manway had been removed as a  
precaution by O’Sullivan in June 1992. However, Warren testified that this was of little consequence to him, as he  
easily slid down the cables that stretched to the first landing. He then walked almost one mile underground to an  
active area of the mine, where miners were finishing their shift. He concealed himself until they left, following  
which the central blast was detonated, filling the underground with white smoke. Warren operated a front-end  
loader (“scoop”) to transport explosives from an unlocked storage area to a small electric locomotive (“loki”),  
which then carried the materials to the location where he set the bomb. Feeling ill-effects of breathing smoke, he  
wanted “to get something done and get out of there” while trying “not to blow himself up” in the process.  
Warren exited the underground through the 712 tunnel system to the I-38 portal, an active opening to the mine’s  
underground. He drove part of the way up the ramp system and then climbed the remaining 3,000 to 4,000 feet  
on foot. When he reached a locked gate at the surface, he crawled through the opening under the gate. Arriving  
on the surface, Warren was startled by a patrol vehicle whose truck wheels were spinning. Undetected, he  
returned to the picket line having been underground for approximately four hours.  
The bomb set by Warren was detonated at approximately 8:45 a.m. on September 18, 1992, when a mancar  
carrying the nine deceased men triggered it. Six of the deceased, Vern Fullowka, Norm Hourie, Chris Neill, Joe  
Pandev, Shane Riggs and David Vodnoski, had each been a member of CASAW Local 4, before crossing the picket  
line to accept employment by Royal Oak. The three other deceased, Robert Rowsell, Arnold Russell and Malcolm  
Sawler, were replacement workers provided to Royal Oak by Procon. Their bodies were in parts and, in the case  
of most, unrecognizable. Ironically, that morning before venturing underground, Neill was obviously distressed  
and told some fellow miners that the strikers were going to kill them.  
Warren admitted that his unlawful act was intended to frighten the replacement workers and cause those in  
authority to force them out of the mine, thereby preventing operations and bringing the strike closer to  
resolution. Warren was first interviewed by the RCMP on September 25, 1992, and following 38 interviews he  
confessed on October 15, 1993. He subsequently recanted his confession but was convicted of second degree  
murder on January 20, 1995. In discovery proceedings for this action, Warren re-affirmed his role in setting the  
explosion that killed the nine men. His recent confession was given at a time when his case had been accepted by  
the Association in Defence of the Wrongly Convicted.  
On September 18, 1992, the GNWT closed the mine pursuant to s. 42(1)(b) of the Mining Safety Act, and  
maintained that the closure would remain in effect until it was satisfied that “security conditions at the mine  
[were] such that will ensure the safety of persons working there”. Although he believed he was lacking the  
jurisdiction, Turner issued the order to satisfy himself that the security conditions were such that nobody else  
could gain access.  
Post-Bombing Strike Events  
On learning of the explosion, emotions were strong among union members, including Legge who stated that they  
should “set another explosion and get the rest of them”. A press conference was held two days after the bombing  
at the union hall where both David and Seeton were defensive in responding to the accusation that the deaths had  
been murders. Many union members voiced their opinion that the blast had been accidental and held this view  
for some time, including David who accused the RCMP of covering up facts.  
After the fatal blast, Miller asked Pinkerton’s guards to provide him with an outline of their activities. He  
subsequently learned that the night supervisor had roved less than normal on the night of September 17.  
On Byberg’s request, all mine openings were identified and a plan to provide security from unauthorized entry  
was prepared. It included sealing those areas that were not in use, reconstructing buildings and manways,  
improving the gated arrangements to the active entrances and filling inactive ones with waste rock. Some areas  
were identified by Allan as requiring a considerable amount of work and would therefore need constant  
surveillance until the work was complete. Previously, there had been concern about welding Akaitcho shut  
because it was a valid escape way from the underground in the event of an emergency, yet it was done.  
Pinkerton’s had not been provided with a list of mine openings prior to September 18, 1992.  
On September 21, 1992, Turner met with Byberg and Witte, and was provided with a draft security proposal that  
required modifications. The next day, Witte questioned Turner’s authority for issuing the closure order, and what  
conditions must be met in order to lift it. Turner responded that his authority was pursuant to s. 41 of the Mining  
Safety Act, and that Royal Oak’s security plan must provide for two guards, rather than one, regularly walking the  
areas. He further advised that Royal Oak only notified the MSD of one infiltration to the underground that  
caused equipment damage and graffiti, and that he had become aware of numerous others. He advised Witte that  
if the MSD had been aware of these other infiltrations it “could have addressed the security issue at a much earlier  
date and possibly prevented loss of life”. This was but a cover-up for the shortcomings of the chief mine inspector  
throughout. Royal Oak provided the MSD with a final security plan, consisting of static guard positions, mobile  
patrols and a communications network; Giant resumed operations on September 25. There was an increase in  
the number of security personnel at Giant for a short time after the fatal blast.  
Before the security plan was sent to Witte, Miller forwarded it to St. Amour and advised him that he had serious  
questions as to Pinkerton’s liability in the fatal blast. In outlining the security patrol areas, Miller relied on the list  
of 23 openings to the underground that he had been provided by Royal Oak after the fatal blast. Miller also  
identified the areas in which Pinkerton’s staff required further training. These included protective security patrol  
procedures, patrol and observation, field note taking and report writing. There is no evidence of any previous  
security outline prepared by Pinkerton’s.  
Four days after allowing operations to resume at Giant, Turner advised Byberg that, pursuant to s. 42(1)(c) of the  
Mining Safety Act, details of each of the various infiltrations of the mine since the onset of the strike must be  
provided in addition to the reasons for the failure to report them to the MSD. Running for cover, Turner stated  
that the purpose was to ensure that the method used for the unauthorized persons to get underground had been  
adequately addressed by Royal Oak or its security forces so as to prevent any recurrence.  
The Entanglement of CAW National and CASAW National  
Both CASAW National and CAW National embedded themselves in the strike with their offers of solidarity.  
Hargrove conceded that the popular union term “solidarity” referred to union people and sometimes the  
community working together for a common cause. It was an extension of support to people who are being  
challenged by an employer or by government, and can be financial support, picket line support or supportive  
correspondence. Therefore, it was his view, in the summer of 1992, that the labour movement should unite to  
prevent the use of replacement workers because it would lengthen the dispute and increase the risk of violence.  
By the beginning of June, they had each made contributions of $12,000 and $2,500 respectively. At the end of  
July, CASAW National forgave CASAW Local 4’s debt and advised that its per capita payments would be  
postponed until January 1993. By November 19, 1992, CAW National and some locals had contributed almost  
$19,000 to CASAW Local 4’s strike fund, and almost $30,000 to the “Adopt a Family” program. In addition,  
approximately $180,000 was contributed by the CAW mining locals under the Mutual Defence Pact from June 1,  
1992, to November 19, 1992. Hargrove testified that it was not unusual for them to make early donations and  
denied any CAW National expectation for control over the strike; rather, all contributions were to be on behalf of  
social unionism. In total, CAW National admits to having contributed more than $1 million to the strike, and  
concedes that, without its financial assistance, CASAW Local 4 would have lost the dispute much earlier.  
The CAW Mining Council, of which Schram was a part, met in Yellowknife as a show of solidarity on June 14, and  
brought with it $14,000. Although there were no medical premiums required in the NWT, CASAW Local 4 was  
advised that it would be forwarded financial support from the medical fund, to be used for whatever purpose  
CASAW Local 4 deemed appropriate. The majority of the discussions at this meeting centered on the labour  
dispute at Giant, and strong emotions were evoked among delegates, including one who stated, “Your struggle  
here is also ours, should they be successful, the use of scabs could well spread.” Most of the delegates attending  
these meetings including Smith, the executive secretary of the Mining Council and staff member of CAW  
National, visited the picket lines over the noon hour and returned in the evening to witness the riot. Smith  
testified that they were surprised and disturbed to witness the high level of violence during the riot; consequently,  
he met with Johnston and Schram and warned against the type of conduct exhibited as it would lead to more  
difficulties and more violence. Erroneously, he suggested that an occupation of the administration building,  
particularly by women, would be more appropriate. Smith informed Succamore of what he had witnessed, and  
the two met with Lynn Kraeling (“Kraeling”), an RCMP member who was a labour liaison officer in British  
Columbia, seeking his intervention. A short time after the riot, a press release was offered by CAW National in  
which Smith said “[T]he importation of American tactics of utilizing Scab Labour in Canadian mines will be  
halted here at Royal Oak Mines in Yellowknife.”  
In late June or early July 1992, Crowther, who was authorized by Hargrove, spent five days in Yellowknife to deal  
with the “mass confusion”. Succamore, who also had offered his assistance to the strike effort, received  
Hargrove’s authorization for Crowther’s visit.  
In a letter dated July 6, 1992, to Hargrove, Schram stated that they were “engaged in a fierce battle against the  
scabbing and police-state tactics of [their] employer, Royal Oak Mines” and that they had a “very real  
apprehension that someone is going to die here before it all ends”. He further requested a small per capita  
contribution on an ongoing basis rather than a lump sum, which Hargrove testified was an unusual request at this  
stage of a dispute. This was followed by a request from Johnston, then strike coordinator, for the assistance of an  
experienced CAW National member. Hargrove agreed to send someone to Yellowknife on the condition that  
CASAW National be consulted. As neither of the first two choices were available, David was contacted in mid-  
July to go to Yellowknife to assist in meeting with the federal mediator.  
Hargrove, with tongue in cheek, sought to have the Court believe that he understood David to be well-respected,  
with long-term union experience and capable of assisting with picket line organization and providing strike  
support. David had been on the CAIMAW NEB and was a proud labour activist, who had had a stress breakdown  
in 1992 prior to his involvement in the dispute at Giant. Although David had been involved with unions and  
labour relations since the 1960s, he had never been involved in a strike where there were arrests or violence. He  
had been paid by three unions on five or six different occasions to help with strikes in addition to his own labour  
activism as an employee and union member. In one case, he was involved in a long-standing dispute that was  
never settled and that resulted in the closure of the facility and loss of pensions for all workers. David’s previous  
“bungled” efforts in labour disputes were not a concern to Hargrove, as he trusted the advice given to him by  
Succamore, even though Succamore had received a 25-year suspension for picket line violence. David reported to  
Succamore, who neglected to forward the details to Hargrove. Hargrove did, however, receive briefings as to the  
situation in Yellowknife from Succamore and follow media reports. He testified however, that he was unaware of  
the graffiti run and satellite dish explosion. Following the fatal blast, Hargrove received more frequent reports of  
the dispute from Hemi Mitic (“Mitic”), who was then assigned to become involved.  
Royal Oak investigated David’s background and concluded that he had a track record of harassing management.  
It was Witte’s view that David displayed 1950s-style union behaviour, including no concessions or trust toward  
any information provided by the company. At some point, Witte met with Hargrove to gain an understanding of  
who he was and where he stood with respect to the strike, and to inform him of her position. Witte believed that  
having CAW National representing Giant employees would be positive as it had the resources to provide proper  
advice and representation.  
On July 21, 1992, David arrived in Yellowknife. After touring the picket lines, he met with the union executive  
and outlined his terms, including that he be the sole spokesperson at the mediation session and be answerable  
only to the local union, not Slezak. David put forth the union’s position of no concessions to the mediator, and he  
continued to advocate to members that they should not negotiate with Royal Oak. He further advised union  
members that they should avail themselves of their already earned unemployment credits from Royal Oak, and he  
suggested that they go out and find other jobs, so that if they were then laid off they could make UIC claims.  
CASAW Local 4's executive found David helpful in preparing and presenting their position; consequently, they  
requested that he continue to assist with their campaign beyond the initial visit. Hargrove agreed to this request  
and advised Succamore to make the necessary arrangements. David continued regular visits to Yellowknife to  
serve as strike coordinator and spokesperson.  
At a union meeting in August, David responded to the concerns and frustration of striking CASAW Local 4  
members and their spouses, including how to prevent banks from foreclosing on their mortgages. The  
membership understood him to be a representative of CAW National and perceived him to be in charge. He told  
members that the entire Canadian labour force supported them and that it was “a historic dispute; an attempt to  
introduce U.S. style union busting into Canadian mining”, which had not occurred for decades. Tuma, a striking  
union member, testified that David made a comment that the strikers could get even underground with those who  
crossed the picket line, which Tuma interpreted as promoting violence. David denied this comment, testifying  
that he advised them to employ shunning towards those who had crossed the line. Though David denied it, I  
accept Tuma’s evidence in this regard. Also around this time, David told union members that they ought to be  
prepared for a long strike, and suggested that they construct winterized shelters on the picket lines. At some  
point, David made attempts to get O’Neil’s wife fired, to prevent them from being able to pay the mortgage on  
their home.  
Some witnesses testified that David did not condone violence and communicated his feelings about events such as  
the graffiti run and the satellite dish explosion to the executive, suggesting that such conduct might cost the union  
its picket line. However, he testified that he heard only retroactively about incidents of violence and vandalism  
and never followed up on them. He claimed to be unaware that members of the union were making incursions  
onto the mine site routinely, nor did he know that picketers were armed with slingshots. This is not surprising,  
considering he visited the picket line only once before the fatal blast.  
Slezak had concerns about David, particularly due to failed efforts in previous labour disputes. He believed that  
David did not share his strike philosophy and feared that David would want to assume total control. David’s  
feelings toward Slezak were equally negative. David supported CASAW Local 4’s position that Slezak should not  
be part of negotiations, as he did not respect him, nor did he think he was capable of leading a union. In fact,  
David threatened to leave if Slezak had any involvement. Interestingly, CASAW Local 4 did not want Slezak  
involved, as it unconventionally dealt with CAW National itself rather than communicating through its National.  
Consequently, in mid-August, Slezak advised Hargrove that he could not accept the terms of David’s involvement,  
specifically, that he wanted to be the sole spokesperson and make all decisions. In August, CAW National advised  
that David would be removed from Yellowknife until such time as CASAW Local 4 made the request and  
determined his role and that endorsement was given by CASAW National. In joint correspondence, Seeton and  
Slezak accepted the offer of assistance to provide David, agreeing that he would act as spokesperson and  
coordinator as directed by CASAW Local 4 in conjunction with CASAW National. Thus, CASAW Local 4 would  
retain its autonomy, yet have input from both David and CASAW National, neither of whom would have voting  
rights. CASAW Local 4 retained the option of delegating an individual to act as spokesperson on certain issues.  
In mid-September, on one of his visits to Yellowknife, David reported to the membership that things were moving  
in a positive direction, as the Federal Government was going to appoint another mediator, the unfair practices  
complaint was being launched and the unions in the southern jurisdictions were sending funds. David was  
viewed by some to have made the most significant impact on fundraising programs, by canvassing nationally and  
in the United States. It was the view of the RCMP that David was attentive to their direction but that he appeared  
to be attempting to obtain as much information as possible in the process. David misrepresented what he learned  
from Code and that was a factor in keeping the union members agitated, frustrated and angered as the weeks  
passed.  
He continued to be involved in the strike at Giant until January 1993, when CAW National would no longer cover  
the expense. As stated by Hargrove on August 16, 1993, David was sent at the request of CASAW Local 4 to  
support the strikers, organize the picket lines and help people “keep a good strike going”. “In other words [they]  
put him in there just to ram the God damned hell out of the scabs.” He said, again with tongue in cheek, that his  
definition of a “good strike” is one that is violence-free, one that tries to defend the members’ interests but does  
not get the union in a lot of trouble.  
In October 1992, Mitic, special assistant to Hargrove, was sent to Yellowknife on Slezak’s request to assist with the  
bargaining of a new collective agreement with Royal Oak. The report from these mediated sessions was  
forwarded to Hargrove.  
The ugliness the strike at Giant caused in the Yellowknife community was the traction for CAW National to  
succeed in its quest for anti-replacement worker legislation, which would enhance its position in the House of  
Labour. As early as May 28, 1992, Succamore, then special coordinator for CAW National, suggested to Hargrove  
that the use of replacement workers at Giant and “the violence it spawns could help get decent legislation in  
Ontario”. Hargrove testified that by this time the bill was already in the House and the argument phase had  
concluded. However, he conceded that, from the time it was tabled in early June to the time it was passed,  
American multi-national corporations fought to reverse it, causing concern for the union. In fact, CAW National  
filed materials with the Ontario Legislature on August 18, confirming that its lobbying efforts were in full swing  
during the summer of 1992. In his letter of support to CASAW Local 4 in early June, Hargrove noted that the “use  
of scabs by Royal Oak is a despicable and unacceptable action to most Canadians”, and that the labour dispute in  
Yellowknife “highlights the need for such legislation in all jurisdictions in Canada”.  
At the beginning of June 1992, Hargrove wrote to Territorial Leader, Nellie Cournoyea (“Cournoyea”), setting  
forth his views of replacement workers and seeking immediate legislation to prohibit their use. He stated that the  
company had hired “scabs” to “steal the jobs of Royal Oak Miners who are exercising their legal right to strike”  
and further that “there is no greater crime than stealing a worker’s ability to feed, clothe and house their family”.  
He highlighted the violence occurring at Giant, and noted that other jurisdictions either had legislation in place to  
ban the use of replacement workers, like Quebec, or were considering such measures, as in Ontario and British  
Columbia. After realizing that the GNWT did not have jurisdictional authority over labour matters, Hargrove sent  
an identical request to Marcel Danis, then Federal Minister of Labour. He testified that these were sentiments  
that he had expressed in the past to government leaders and believed it was his duty as national president to do  
so. Marcel Danis eventually responded that the priority focus of the parties ought to be on settlement of the  
dispute and that the federally-appointed mediator would assist in that regard. Feeling ignored, Hargrove  
responded in early September, arguing that the situation was “insane” and settlement would not be achieved in  
the normal course of collective bargaining as Marcel Danis had suggested. He further advised that CAW National  
and the labour movement in Canada were going to provide the necessary support to CASAW Local 4 until the  
situation was resolved. He concluded with the request that the government remove the RCMP because they were  
assisting the employer, and enact retroactive anti-replacement worker legislation.  
In early July, Hargrove wrote a letter to the president of CLC seeking its support for a resolution that was passed  
by the NEB of CAW National. The resolution outlined that CAW National would demand the federal Solicitor  
General stop the RCMP strikebreaking activities, call on the Federal Government to introduce anti-replacement  
worker legislation upon the recall of Parliament, demand the federal government direct the Canadian mint not to  
accept “scab” produced gold should any such gold be produced and make a financial appeal in support of the  
strikers.  
At CAW Council meetings between August 21 and 23, 1992, it was recommended that the locals continue to  
support the Ontario Government’s legislative reforms. Furthermore, David addressed the meeting with regard to  
the strike at Giant as follows:  
What we need here in this legislation that the campaign against the Ontario government has been the most  
relentless campaign in the history, in my recollection, in Canada. If we could just get the gov’t here to say, “I do  
not want a YK in my province and I am going to pass anti-scab legislation. And if it was said exactly that way,  
then the “Yellowknife” would be synonymous with that obscenity that none of us want.¼ And if you can say in  
your campaigns, in your briefs and what you’re writing and all of the things you’re saying, “I don’t want a YK in  
my province, pass anti-scab law” then you will have done the biggest service for those people up in YK and you  
will also have done a service for all working men and women in this country.  
In his report of these meetings, Hargrove agreed that there is no better example than the situation in Yellowknife  
as to what “anti-scab” legislation means and that the need to lobby exists not only in Ontario but also in  
Manitoba, British Columbia and Saskatchewan. CAW National was clear in its mandate to secure anti-  
replacement worker legislation to the extent that CASAW Local 4 was to become the engine, even if it had to be  
sacrificed in the process, the latter not known or appreciated by CASAW Local 4’s inept executive. CAW  
National’s mandate would be enhanced significantly if CAW National took over CASAW Local 4, which ultimately  
occurred.  
By May 8, 1993, CASAW Local 4 was in a financial crisis, with large debts outstanding for legal fees, thus the need  
to expedite a merger was realized. Slezak received an offer from CAW National that it would assume CASAW  
National’s legal obligations if a tentative merger were entered into. Feeling this to be a pressure tactic, Slezak did  
not want to merge under such circumstances. Instead CASAW National initiated a merger with the Pulp and  
Paper Workers, which was ultimately rejected by the membership. On learning this, Hargrove reiterated his  
proposal, which Slezak agreed to consider with his NEB. It was understood by CAW National that Slezak was  
seeking more authority over his local unions and that without this power CASAW National could not survive and  
a merger would be likely. At some point, CAW National also believed that CASAW National wanted to rid itself of  
CASAW Local 4 only, which prompted Hargrove to advise that he would only consider a merger with the entire  
union, otherwise CAW National would inherit disaster.  
On or about June 20, 1994, CASAW National and CAW National concluded a Merger Agreement, effective July 1,  
1994. CAW National did not get copies of CASAW National documents on the merger; however, the members of  
CASAW National automatically became members of CAW National. Similarly, officers of the CASAW locals  
became officers of the CAW locals. CAW National waived the per capita payments from mid-1994 to January  
1995 for CAW Local 2304, CASAW Local 4’s successor. CAW National denied that the legal bills or loans owed by  
CASAW National were paid by CAW National on August 19, 1994. CAW National also denied that it paid any of  
the outstanding debts of CASAW Local 4. Unfortunately for CAW National, the evidence was quite the contrary.  
The Parties’ Negotiation Stances  
At the onset of the strike, the union’s mandate shifted to changing labour laws to prevent the use of replacement  
workers rather than furthering negotiations with Royal Oak. At the end of May, Schram prepared and sent a  
letter to all replacement workers, guaranteeing their safety if they left the mine.  
Royal Oak was uncertain in May as to who was representing the union, consequently it communicated directly  
with the membership. Smrke was the vice-president of human resources, and the chief negotiator during the  
strike, yet he did not recall that Slezak was the CASAW National president, nor did he know that there was more  
than one Local CASAW union. Smrke admitted that the company should not do anything antagonistic towards  
the union at any time during a labour dispute.  
In early June, Slezak met with Witte and Smrke, and outlined CASAW Local 4’s preconditions to bargaining.  
These included:  
(a) Scabs will be removed from the mine site.  
(b) No punitive action will be taken against any member or officer of CASAW Local 4 for actions arising from the  
strike.  
(c) Royal Oak will not proceed with any legal action against:  
(i) any member of CASAW Local 4;  
(ii) officers of CASAW Local 4 or the National Union or supporters of any affiliated union or other organizations;  
(iii) the employee whose employment was terminated on the day the strike commenced, who will be fully  
reinstated.  
By this time, Royal Oak had issued a public statement that the existing tentative agreement was no longer “on the  
table” due to the strike-related financial losses suffered by the company. Moreover, any future offer would  
include further concessions to enable the company to recuperate these losses, but 210 of the 240 bargaining unit  
employees would be given an opportunity to return to work if a satisfactory agreement could be reached.  
On June 6, 1992, Royal Oak and CASAW Local 4 engaged in mediation with federally-appointed mediator Bill  
Lewis. The union presented its proposal first. Royal Oak was shocked because it had understood that the union’s  
issues were not monetary, and this proposal added an exorbitant cost to the company. Royal Oak’s proposal  
included the permanent termination of delinquent strikers’ employment and an acknowledgment of company  
losses totaling $1.5 million, to be paid through payroll deductions or by employees working Saturdays without  
remuneration. Byberg believed these conditions would inflame the union; regardless, Royal Oak held a press  
conference following the mediation session. “You are talking killing out there” were words expressed by Byberg  
while Witte maintained that Royal Oak was not intending to break the union by using replacement workers. After  
the mediation session, CAW National was of the view that the company was raising the bar to ensure that there  
was no settlement.  
By the end of June, Royal Oak notified the union that it would be held responsible for not only property damage  
but also additional costs, such as security, before a new collective agreement could be negotiated. The impact that  
this kind of communication would have on union members was not a consideration for Royal Oak, which  
demonstrated that it was as inept at labour contract negotiation as CASAW Local 4.  
In early July, CASAW Local 4 had autonomy and Slezak was no longer the contact person for the mediator or the  
company. This became the sole responsibility of CASAW Local 4 president Schram. Under the constitution, the  
local was required to be the contact person to facilitate any bargaining; the national could not impose settlement.  
Slezak, however, continued to act as a consultant.  
The second mediation occurred on or about July 22 and 23, 1992, and was not productive as there was little  
change in the bargaining positions of the parties. There were some changes to the union’s representatives, with  
David acting as sole spokesperson. Time constraints prevented David from going through the details of the  
previous collective agreement and what had transpired with negotiations to date, yet he believed that was of no  
consequence. Bill Lewis announced that both parties had to be willing to retreat from their positions, referring to  
the union’s position as a “healthy agenda after nine weeks”. David responded that this strike was “nothing in  
mining strikes, nine weeks is just a walk. These people are tapped into the mining council. They’re not alone,  
they have backing.” He forewarned that the line crossers would not be there when the strike was over because  
they had committed a “cardinal sin” against the union. David’s actions totally thwarted any hope of negotiations  
with his abject refusal to even discuss any concessions on behalf of the union. He was entirely focused on running  
a strike.  
Strong views were perpetuated among union members that, if they were to succeed in the dispute with the  
company, they would have to attract significant outside attention. This coincided with the union’s perception that  
the two sides were getting further apart and that Witte was trying to eliminate the union. During this period, the  
union executive considered retaining Sergeant Kraeling, due to his particular expertise in labour relations  
matters, but this never materialized. However, legal expertise was sought before the fatal blast. The McGrady law  
firm was retained by CASAW National, and Gina Fiorillo was counsel assigned, who then spent time in  
Yellowknife. She was retained to work on all legal issues arising and was available for the local executive to call on  
and discuss matters at any time. It was she who initiated the unfair labour practice complaint with the Canada  
Labour Relations Board against Royal Oak on September 17, 1992, on the argument of bad faith bargaining.  
Royal Oak advanced and maintained the position that it would not reinstate employees who had committed acts  
of mischief or damage to the company. Prior to September 18, 1992, the company had no intention of taking back  
the employees who had been dismissed.  
Witte had never been CEO of a company that had a labour dispute, and in this case she believed the union to be  
radical. She gave an interview to Peter Gzowski in January 1993 regarding the dispute. When he suggested to her  
that it did not seem to be about money, Witte responded:  
Yes it is, it definitely is. And the main central portion or main central issue is control. It’s control of the mine.  
Over the last, I guess, 12 to 14 years after CASAW raided Steel Workers, CASAW has been a very radical Canadian  
based union, a small non-mainstream union without support, without a lot of members.  
Witte was referring to the number of incidents that CASAW National had been involved in up to this time,  
including the union president saying in the first meeting that “they weren’t going to deal with any fuckin’  
Americans”.  
In mid-August 1993, Hargrove was becoming frustrated with the negotiation behaviour of CASAW Local 4. He  
testified that he was furious after having learned that the significant progress in negotiations that had been  
achieved was in jeopardy because CASAW Local 4 was backing away from is previous position and asserting that  
it must have everything. He contemplated at this time ceasing Mitic’s involvement in the dispute.  
Arising Issues of Jurisdiction Between the Territorial and Federal Governments  
Jurisdiction over labour relations in the NWT resides with the Federal Ministry of Labour. However, the GNWT  
took action relating to labour relations, such as the Pollard Initiative, launched early in the strike by Acting  
Premier John Pollard. Its goal was to bring the impasse to a successful conclusion.  
At the end of May, Patterson spoke with Marcel Danis regarding the conditions at Giant and sought the  
appointment of a seasoned mediator. As Minister of Safety and Public Services, Patterson was more concerned  
about the issue of violence and law and order than he was about mine safety at this time. Immediately thereafter,  
Marcel Danis offered the appointment of a federal mediator to Royal Oak and the union. The union notified  
Marcel Danis that it objected to Royal Oak hiring replacement workers and alleged that the RCMP were assisting  
replacement workers to cross picket lines. It was requested that the Minister end the use of federal forces to assist  
the employer and that he appoint the best available mediator. On June 1, 1992, a mediator was appointed.  
However, Patterson was disappointed with the choice as he hoped for someone with a high profile, because both  
parties to the dispute held strongly to their positions and the use of replacement workers was unprecedented in  
the mining industry.  
On June 1, 1992, Ballantyne sent a letter to Cournoyea indicating his belief that an unusual danger existed at  
Giant and that the fundamental issue preventing resolution was the use of replacement workers by Royal Oak. He  
stated that the NWT needed to assume responsibility for labour relations and bring in anti-replacement worker  
legislation or force the Federal Government to do so. Ballantyne testified that he did not believe the NWT had the  
jurisdiction or the expertise to deal with a strike like this. Patterson was in close contact with Ballantyne about  
this issue and was aware of his frustration.  
Ballantyne then notified Marcel Danis that the use of replacement workers left the company with no incentive to  
settle and that the union felt desperate and forced to break the law, thereby provoking escalated violence. He  
further advised that there was a lack of jurisdiction on the part of the GNWT to deal with labour or mining. The  
same day, Patterson expressed to Marcel Danis that the GNWT felt helpless and without tools to deal with a  
labour relations problem. He asked for a Federal Government representative to come to Yellowknife and view the  
situation first-hand. Patterson had been briefed on the tools available to Marcel Danis under the Canada Labour  
Code, R.S.C. 1985, c.L-2, and was advocating that he employ his statutory authority.  
On June 4, GNWT Leader Cournoyea sent correspondence to the Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern  
Development. She suggested that “[b]ecause the Federal Government has jurisdiction in both the labour and  
mining regulations in the Northwest Territories, the GNWT [was] powerless to influence the course or length of  
the strike”, and therefore sought assistance in paying for the extraordinary policing costs. At issue was whether  
the reason for the extra police force was a territorial or federal responsibility under the federal-territorial policing  
agreement. The GNWT argued that it was a federal responsibility because the need arose directly out of the  
labour dispute.  
After the June mediation session between Royal Oak and the union, Cournoyea met with the federal mediator.  
On June 10, 1992, Patterson and Ballantyne met with Marcel Danis and felt “encouraged” as a result. The options  
they proposed to him included: anti-replacement worker legislation, voluntary binding arbitration, legislated  
binding arbitration or an industrial disputes inquiry. Marcel Danis rejected all of the options but agreed to  
consider arbitration. Reports of this meeting were forwarded to the media as a result of the perceived public  
pressure on the GNWT to be “doing something”. Alluding to Marcel Danis’ meeting that day with Ballantyne and  
Patterson, Witte conveyed to Marcel Danis the company’s perspective with respect to the use of replacement  
workers. She highlighted the benefits to the North, the industry and unemployed miners across the country who  
were seeking employment at the time, and she suggested he review the current challenges facing the Canadian  
mining industry. She concluded by requesting that the Federal Government not intervene but allow the existing  
process for handling labour disputes to run its course.  
On June 16, 1992, after having learned that the Federal Government would not legislate against the use of  
replacement workers, Patterson advised Marcel Danis that the situation at Giant had worsened since their  
meeting on June 10. Citing the riot on June 14, Patterson asked for urgent and immediate intervention. In fact,  
the next day a resolution was adopted in the Northwest Territories Legislative Assembly to request the Federal  
Minister of Labour to immediately take the necessary steps to introduce and secure the passage of binding  
arbitration legislation concerning the strike at Giant. Ballantyne forwarded a copy of this to Marcel Danis, who  
replied that the Federal Government had considered the request and decided that legislative action would not be  
appropriate. Marcel Danis further replied that the mediator “has maintained close contact with both parties but  
his effectiveness ha[d] been hampered by representations from those not directly involved in the dispute”. This  
was upsetting to Patterson because he believed the GNWT had made significant efforts. As a result of this  
response, some members of the Interagency Strike Committee asked federal representatives not to participate.  
In late June at an Interagency Strike Committee meeting, the cost of the enlarged RCMP force was discussed,  
including notifying the Federal Government that they no longer wanted the tactical squad in Yellowknife, with the  
hope that this would force them to accept fiscal responsibility. They opted to advise that they wished the removal  
of the troops unless the Federal Government would pay, even though Patterson conceded that viewing the video  
of the riot made him think that the presence of the squad prevented serious injury or death. Consequently, on  
June 30, 1992, Patterson wrote to the Solicitor General of Canada, Doug Lewis, suggesting that the “extraordinary  
policing costs associated with this labour dispute [were] exclusively within areas of federal responsibility”. A copy  
of this letter was also forwarded to the Federal Minister of Labour, the Commissioner of the RCMP and the  
Federal Justice Minister. This was in response to the Federal Government’s position that these were emergency  
policing services, made available on Patterson’s request. Patterson articulated that there was no longer an  
emergency in the NWT and the additional police reinforcements ought to be removed by July 6, 1992. RCMP  
Commissioner Inkster responded to Patterson that Patterson’s appreciation of whether or not an emergency  
situation existed was not accurate.  
In his correspondence dated September 14, 1992, Smrke advised Marcel Danis that the strike situation  
experienced in June, best described as violent and confrontational, no longer existed. Instead he noted an  
“obvious calming effect taking place in Yellowknife” as seen by fewer power outages, lessening severity of mischief  
incidences and the return of many striking employees to work. He also highlighted some mine safety statistics,  
indicating that the injury frequency at Giant had dropped drastically and was above the industry average. Smrke  
had met and exchanged correspondence with Marcel Danis on several occasions.  
Shortly after the fatal blast, there was a motion passed by the NWT Legislative Assembly to urge the Federal  
Minister of Labour to come to Yellowknife and immediately develop a strategy to resolve the labour dispute. A  
frustrated Ballantyne impressed on Marcel Danis that he ought to get involved. The options that had been  
presented to Marcel Danis during their earlier meeting were reiterated, and he was reminded that he chose not to  
take any action at that time. A copy of this correspondence was also sent to Prime Minister Mulroney.  
Following the fatal blast, Marcel Danis met with the parties and then announced the appointment of new  
mediators, namely, Vince Ready and Don Munroe. Following their failed attempts to mediate with the parties,  
they recommended establishing an industrial disputes commission, which was ultimately conducted by them.  
General Facts Relating to the Defendants’ Acts and Omissions of the Defendants  
The atmosphere that existed in September 1992 was recognized by many as resembling a war zone. Even those  
who had legitimate complaints would not talk to the police who came to be distrusted by the striking miners and  
many townspeople as well. The city by this point had become swept up in the tension. The “mayhem”, as  
Sergeant Nancy Defer described it, had permeated the entire city, including stores, parking lots, social gatherings  
and, sadly, families. Given that this was the atmosphere at this juncture, it is appropriate to outline some of the  
general acts or omissions of each Defendant.  
a) Witte  
Witte’s ambition was to be a CEO of a large publicly-traded company, and in this pursuit she acquired existing  
gold mining properties such as Giant. Specifically, rather than just wanting to be at the helm of a large publicly-  
traded company, she wanted to have shares in a company that appreciated significantly in value by strategic  
financial decisions. Acquiring a mining prospect from the discovery stage through to commercial production was  
the directive of the Board of Directors, but it also was consistent with and complimentary to Witte’s own  
ambition. To achieve this mutual goal, Giant had to make a profit. The shares that Witte owned in Royal Oak  
were those acquired before the amalgamation and were never a controlling block. The original set of shares was  
purchased for $0.25 per share, while some were bought later for $0.90 to $0.95 per share. She sold 500,000 of  
her shares in May 1992 for $1.75 per share in the public markets of common stock. Witte had discussed the  
impact of a strike or shutdown of Giant on the value of the shares with the Board of Directors.  
From the outset, Witte was informed daily by her hirelings of incidents as they occurred. She also had the benefit  
of external advice, such as that from GNWT personnel. Said hirelings were being funnelled information by  
Pinkerton’s, the RCMP, the union and other entities, destined for delivery to her. Witte and Smrke, however,  
denied receipt or knowledge of the same. Witte was, as she said, too occupied as the CEO of her huge  
corporations to give attention to or have recall of all occurrences. It is indisputable that her sole interest was the  
financial bottom line.  
b) Sheridan  
Sheridan was paid to serve as a Director for Royal Oak. He billed his services on an hourly basis as he did for his  
legal practice. Sheridan was generally aware of the violence and vandalism that was occurring at Giant including  
the denial of access to and egress from the property, rock-throwing, equipment and vehicle damage, fires,  
physical assaults, toxic fluid leaks, cut power poles and trespassing. Further, he understood that minor injuries  
occurred from these strike-related incidents. His participation was limited to forming a small legal team to assist  
Royal Oak’s legal team in Yellowknife with the Injunction proceedings. In fact, following the Board’s meeting on  
June 19, 1992, Sheridan had very little personal involvement in matters pertaining to the strike. He was unaware  
of the graffiti run, the satellite dish explosion or the vent shaft blast.  
There is no evidence adduced to even suggest that Sheridan initiated, promoted, encouraged, participated in or  
omitted to do anything in relation to any of the events that led to any criminal activity or to the hardship or  
damages suffered by the Plaintiffs. It never occurred to him that he should satisfy himself that Royal Oak was  
taking steps to protect the safety of the employees working in the mine; he believed it to be a management issue.  
At no time did Sheridan take into account the possibility of any personal liability as a Director. However, he  
conceded that, as a Director, he owed a duty and obligation to the employees of the company to ensure their  
safety.  
c) Royal Oak  
Royal Oak’s level of awareness as to the volatility of the situation was well documented throughout the strike.  
Although some witnesses testified to a lesser frequency of incidents in the weeks before the fatal blast, Royal Oak  
acknowledged the continuing turbulence in material that it publicly released as late as September 16, 1992. The  
material highlighted that employees had been attacked with clubs, slingshots armed with ball bearings and flare  
guns. Furthermore, the material admitted that families had received death threats, that the mine site had been  
subject to arson and dynamite attacks and that frequent power outages at the mine and throughout Yellowknife  
risked the lives of innocent people. Royal Oak virtually predicted the fatal blast in its comments only days before.  
Prior to September 18, Byberg had the specific concern that someone might be killed by bombs set on the surface.  
There were numerous bomb threats received by Royal Oak, including one for Werner’s home, one for the mill and  
another that required the mine to be evacuated. In mid-summer, these were no longer threats as demonstrated  
by an explosion on the tailings line that caused a spill, the satellite dish explosion and the vent shaft blast. Witte  
admitted to a progression in the type of incidents occurring at the mine site, and she believed the dispute took a  
serious turn with the use of explosives. In fact, she had heightened concerns for her own safety, having received  
death threats by mail and over the phone. Such concerns were not unsubstantiated as Byberg had been attacked  
verbally and physically by stones, Tolmie was hospitalized with serious injuries and another staff member was  
struck in the back of the head by a ball bearing. Furthermore, shift bosses and Royal Oak management were  
concerned about strikers getting underground and this was discussed at safety meetings. Although he managed  
the operation, Byberg claimed to be unaware of significant matters such as whether or not the portals and other  
entrances had been secured. This wilful blindness did not prevent him offering assurances to those working  
underground that they were safe.  
Evidence suggested that aside, from the first week, Royal Oak maintained its safety program throughout the  
strike, such as weekly safety meetings attended by all workers. Also, a new occupational health and safety  
committee was formed, although it was not representative because it contained no replacement workers.  
Training and safety coordinators performed continual safety orientations, as the rate of workers commencing at  
Giant was high, and many workplace safety audits were conducted. Strangely, although Hagan had  
responsibilities with respect to workplace and mine safety, he was never consulted by Royal Oak management  
with regard to any safety considerations.  
Although preaching its commitment to safety and compliance with territorial regulations, Royal Oak’s actions fell  
short. Before the replacement workers arrived onsite, Royal Oak and Procon made a request to the MSD to  
extend work hours. This was due to the fact that the majority of workers would live onsite and wanted to work  
longer hours and was part of Royal Oak’s pre-strike planning contingency to achieve increased production. This  
request was denied by the MSD; however, Royal Oak disregarded the ruling and permitted its workers to work  
longer shifts. Ultimately caught in defiance, Royal Oak endured charges for its violation.  
Royal Oak identified and attended to some of the security concerns that proved to be vulnerable; unfortunately,  
its efforts were lacking. The I-38 portal entrance to the underground was considered to be vulnerable because it  
provided access to the B ramp system. Consequently, it was watched 24 hours per day by a fixed security guard  
up to September 18. However, no one ever saw Warren exit through this portal after setting the blast. Similarly,  
there was some vigilance in placing locks on portals, securing gates, chaining manways closed from the inside and  
removing ladders, such as that found in the Akaitcho manway. However, none of these impeded Warren.  
Respecting the ladder removal, Royal Oak witnesses conceded that access was not restricted, particularly given  
that many strikers were experienced with mine rescue and the use of ropes.  
There were also issues that ought to have presented concern to Royal Oak but were not addressed. For instance,  
there was a period of time during the strike when the central blast was not going off on the 750 foot level. The  
frequency of this occurring was sufficient for it to be considered a problem, and, although it reached the attention  
of Byberg, it never was brought to the attention of the chief mine engineer. In hindsight, it appeared to be  
suspicious. In addition, explosive storage areas located underground were unlocked at all times, and no thought  
was ever given to securing them by Royal Oak or any of the GNWT departments. Furthermore, there was no  
requirement that Royal Oak keep an inventory of explosive material, and none was kept, effectively making it  
impossible to know if any explosives had been seized by striking miners. An internal company work order for  
Royal Oak at the end of August identified a request to install passive infrared light detectors to provide additional  
lighting as the amount of daylight was decreasing. These were never installed. During the first month, Royal Oak  
did not check all the openings to the underground every shift, as it had been advised to do by the RCMP.  
The most obvious oversight on Royal Oak’s part was the lack of security at the Akaitcho area. The RCMP spoke  
with both Byberg and Shaw about this area prior to the fatal blast, as they were aware that this site was not  
subject to much security and there was an explosives site located in close proximity. Not only were no security  
increases ever made to this area, but also the assigned roving guards had their territory enlarged as a result of the  
repositioning of static guards after the vent shaft blast. Others examples of Royal Oak’s struggle to properly  
secure the property include its inability to regain control from the strikers over the entire west side of the property  
until early to mid-June. During this time, no work could be done at the portal areas.  
Rather than increasing security to deal with the identified weaknesses, Byberg and Witte began to discuss the  
reductions in manpower in early June. This was following the receipt of the first invoice from Pinkerton’s, which  
included a charge for equipment that was unnecessary and had not been used, as well as billing for longer hours  
than those worked by guards.  
Some evidence suggested that the relationship between Royal Oak and Pinkerton’s was tainted beyond the  
incompatibility between Witte and St. Amour. However, Royal Oak continued to maintain its own small security  
force throughout the strike, albeit without involvement in day-to-day security beyond the first week. There was  
daily communication between the mine manager and Pinkerton’s supervisor, and Morton and Shaw were in  
regular contact with Witte, as she tended to call for incident briefings. Also, there was daily contact between  
Byberg and Witte or Smrke. During these discussions, Byberg notified Witte of violent occurrences, security  
arrangements, day-to-day operations, production and union negotiation. Witte occasionally received information  
from others onsite, including Allan and Hagan.  
Royal Oak justified its decision to remain in operation as beneficial to the community as well as itself. Continued  
support of the community, including its “payment of municipal and territorial taxes”. In mid-September, Royal  
Oak released a plea to the community asking whether it was time to ...  
“confront and rebuke those strikers and their allies who appear ready to destroy Giant Mine, and the jobs and  
revenue it provides for Yellowknife and the Northwest Territories, to make a point, satisfy personal grudges or use  
the Giant dispute to advance their own interests? Who issue death threats to workers’ families, vandalize non-  
strikers’ property and threaten those who do business with the mine?” Who seem neither to care about nor  
realize the horrible toll their actions could take”?  
Obviously, Royal Oak believed that lives were in danger.  
The pattern that was perceived by Byberg in the months leading up to the fatal blast was that striking workers  
were damaging equipment rather than harming people. He believed that violence was decreasing, that the  
majority of threats had not materialized and that the union had not succeeded in shutting the mine down. Royal  
Oak was one step behind; it welded Akaitcho shut after the fatal blast, it increased patrols around the townsite  
after the satellite dish explosion and it repositioned one guard after the vent shaft blast, an event it feared could  
have caused fatalities.  
It must have been evident, however, that from the first explosions that occurred after the strike began, though not  
required by law, the dynamite and related items should have been secured. Royal Oak ought to have known that  
some were being stolen from the underground caches, that advice to lock down or better patrol Akaitcho should  
have been a priority and that reducing Pinkerton’s personnel by one-half by July 19 was wrong in the face of  
ominous increasing criminal activity. It was inappropriate to adopt the stance that Pinkerton’s personnel as the  
professionals would virtually guarantee safety for Royal Oak personnel and equipment, to ignore concerns of  
Pinkerton’s and the RCMP, to provoke the strikers with inflammatory public commentaries and to believe the  
RCMP would pick up any slack from Pinkerton’s and the mine inspectors. No matter how well Royal Oak staff,  
Pinkerton’s and the RCMP executed their mandates, it became clear that Royal Oak was into minimal spending  
for safety and security. It matters not whether you ascribe omission or wilful blindness to Royal Oak as far as its  
conduct is concerned. Unfortunately, the safety of workers was trumped by the financial bottom line.  
d) Pinkerton’s  
Pinkerton’s had extensive experience providing security during strike situations and conceded that the potential  
for violence increased when replacement workers were used. When Shaw learned that replacement workers were  
going to be used at Giant, he acknowledged that, to effectively secure the site, Pinkerton’s would have to take  
steps to prevent unauthorized entry to the underground. Pinkerton’s witnesses testified that their experience had  
identified a pattern in strikes often beginning with active picket lines, followed by an Injunction and further  
negotiations. At some point the negotiations tend to break down and there is a resulting quiet or lull in the  
strikers’ reaction on the picket line, giving clients a false sense of security. This leads to attempts by the client to  
reduce manpower, which is often recognized by the union, which then responds with violence. Such a pattern  
emerged in this case.  
The arrival of Pinkerton’s brought with it the perception that it used American-style tactics, which in the minds of  
the strikers brought visions of free use of batons, spray, dogs and violence against recalcitrant strikers. On the  
surface however, I accept a statement of St. Amour respecting Pinkerton’s motives on its arrival at Giant “to  
ensure the security of people and protect the client’s premises”. There were no limitations made to this mandate  
by Royal Oak. Throughout the strike, however, the RCMP found some challenge in dealing with Pinkerton’s; it  
often made complaints but was not cooperative in providing sufficient information.  
Pinkerton’s had two general concerns during the strike: incidents at the picket gates, and intrusions onto mine  
property. By late August and early September, picket line incidents were no longer the major concern; rather, the  
majority of its efforts were directed towards controlling incursions and access to the underground. Acts of  
violence and sabotage on the mine site were continual, some weeks consisting of daily reports of striking miners  
trespassing. Pinkerton’s also received regular death threats and took them seriously, conveying each to Witte.  
These were learned through radio transmissions that were continually monitored and logged. Numerous  
confrontations between strikers and Pinkerton’s ensued, including some initiated by Pinkerton’s itself. For  
example, on one occasion a Pinkerton’s truck purposefully blocked the exit of strikers inside a picket shack.  
Pinkerton’s also had a concern about the storage of explosives underground prior to September 18, 1992. Both St.  
Amour and Shaw spoke with Royal Oak regarding these concerns, including a request to view their storage  
underground, which was denied. The only involvement underground of Pinkerton’s was to assist in  
investigations. Byberg relied on Pinkerton’s to monitor where the strikers were on the surface only. On one  
occasion, Randy Brown, a Pinkerton’s guard, found a trespasser near the arsenic plant holding an axe and  
refusing to retreat. The RCMP were called, and after Inspector Massey discharged a warning shot from his gun,  
the individual was apprehended.  
Pinkerton’s maintained a library of material related to industry standards and practices in security. These  
materials were produced by both outside sources and Pinkerton’s itself, and distributed among its offices across  
the country. Of particular significance, Pinkerton’s devised and followed a protocol entitled “Strikes, Guidelines  
for Law Enforcement Agencies”. This document outlines that labour strikes “take place in tension filled  
atmospheres in which true issues are distorted by emotion” generating a high potential for violence, “which  
means destruction”. It further outlines that they “are manifestations of collective behaviour in which individual  
norms of conduct simply do not apply and cannot be enforced; ¼ law enforcement action are confined to a strict  
minimum, which therefore, cannot prevent violence”. Also, “an employer is virtually left alone for preventative  
security” which is “absolutely necessary for effective coping with labour strikes such as vandalism, sabotage,  
mischief, bombs, terrorism, kidnappings, assault, intimidation, espionage and similar threats”. Finally, “strikes  
always represent emergency situations as far as the employer is concerned”. Pinkerton’s policy was to inform  
clients of critical situations. In this case, Royal Oak did not receive disclosure of the aforementioned.  
When Pinkerton’s entered into a contractual relationship with Royal Oak, it was expected to provide security on  
the west side of the property, which on its arrival was dominated by strikers. Its first attempt to gain control was  
not successful. It transported six guards by helicopter across the highway and was confronted on foot by strikers  
awaiting the guards. By June 8, Pinkerton’s had regained control of the west side and was endeavouring to  
provide security over the entire mine site. In terms of portal security, Royal Oak had locked the portal gates 24  
hours per day until early June when it locked gates only between shifts. This was later altered such that portals  
were locked at all times when not in instant use, illustrating an increasing trend in measures taken to prevent  
incursions into the underground.  
Pinkerton’s had been advised of all means of access to the underground, including the Akaitcho shaft.  
It never received specifics about it, but understood it to be an unused entry and not an important security point.  
However, the RCMP had discussed the area with Shaw, as they believed it did not receive sufficient attention and  
an explosives site was located in close proximity. Similarly, Royal Oak had discussed the issue of security at  
remote access points such as Akaitcho with Miller of Pinkerton’s. Prior to the fatal blast, random roving security  
inspections of the Akaitcho shaft area was the method employed. However, Randy Brown, a security guard who  
patrolled this area, testified to his distinct routine, in which he generally did not get out of his vehicle. On a 12-  
hour shift, he passed Akaitcho eight to ten times, leaving a maximum of 1.5 hours between visits. Knowing  
Akaitcho to be a means of access to the entire underground, on occasion he had peered through the screened door  
on the collar house, but he had never observed the doorway to the manway, or the manway itself. Pinkerton’s  
never suggested that there should be any additional fixed posts at this location. In general, when Pinkerton’s  
made recommendations, Royal Oak management or employees typically carried them out. In particular,  
Pinkerton’s had made recommendations with respect to the I-38 portal and took initiative following the vent shaft  
blast to give additional vigilance to the critical areas. It did not feel the need to seek approval from Royal Oak for  
such measures; it redeployed manpower in accordance with what it believed was a new threat or new possibility  
of penetration.  
Access points to active parts of the underground that were in regular use and subject to steady surveillance also  
received questionable levels of security. For example, on one occasion O’Sullivan accessed the UBC portal and  
observed that the posted guard, who was only 50 feet away, was unaware of his presence. O’Sullivan told the  
guard that he was ineffective, and the response from the Pinkerton’s employee was that he had set up “booby  
traps” with tin cans and string to signal the presence of intruders. O’Sullivan advised the guard that his chosen  
method was inadequate as it had obviously failed to detect him.  
In 1992, it was standard practice to keep accurate, thorough, complete records of the evidence of events that  
occurred during a strike in anticipation of litigation. However, no details were advanced by Pinkerton’s, such as  
which guards were posted at the I-38 portal on September 18, because no records were ever kept. Furthermore,  
Pinkerton’s did not offer any written instructions to its guards at Giant, all instructions being provided verbally.  
Miller, who became site supervisor, had no knowledge as to whether his guards kept logs, but he did receive  
verbal reports each morning detailing the night’s events. A written security plan existed but consisted only of a  
single page outlining the posting of guards; it did not indicate what equipment was being employed, the frequency  
of patrols or the names and responsibilities of the guards.  
St. Amour and Witte had tainted communication early in their relations, as St. Amour testified that he was  
unwilling to “roll over to her demands”; consequently, the two ceased to directly communicate with respect to  
rates, service reductions or the provision of electronic equipment. Morton and Shaw were in regular contact with  
Witte, as she called on several occasions for incident briefings regarding acts of vandalism and arrests. Morton  
also had occasion to meet with her in August when she was onsite. Pinkerton’s did not want Royal Oak security  
officers to be roaming the property; consequently, they were delegated to first aid duties. However, on occasion,  
Power accompanied Pinkerton’s on its patrols for the purpose of identifying strikers. It was as a result of such  
patrols that Power alerted Pinkerton’s supervisor about the need to patrol the north end of the property, which he  
was advised was already subject to regular patrols.  
The pressure to downsize the security complement was well documented in the evidence. As a result, Pinkerton’s  
believed the provision of electronics was a priority but did not receive a response from Witte. Eventually the  
equipment was sent without authorization as it felt more secure with it onsite. Morton regularly expressed his  
concern to the RCMP that the security complement suggested by Royal Oak was not going to be effective in doing  
the job it was asked to do. Guards had expressed feelings of constant exhaustion due to the insufficient  
manpower. Steps were taken by Pinkerton’s to remove itself from Giant, but St. Amour did not withdraw the  
services for fear that Witte would sue for non-service, and due to outstanding invoices and his belief that there  
was progression in the negotiations. Instead, Pinkerton’s maintained that it could not reduce below 20 guards.  
However, on the day of the vent shaft blast in September, evidence suggested that there were 19 on duty. With its  
complement size decreased to 25 and then 20 officers, Morton considered its services to continue to be  
preventative, such as patrol vehicles monitoring the number of persons at the picket gates, so that there were not  
more strikers than legally allowed.  
There was a high turnover rate among Pinkerton’s personnel at Giant. There were four different site supervisors  
from the beginning of the strike to the time of the fatal blast, namely, Shaw, Morton, Sinke and Miller. Shaw had  
no prior experience providing security to a struck facility where replacement workers were used. He was aware of  
the tendency for violence on the picket lines during strikes generally, and he anticipated it would be more severe  
with the employment of a replacement workforce. Furthermore, he understood that violence would escalate the  
longer a facility continued to successfully operate. Sinke, who insisted he be called “Major Sinke”, or “The Major”,  
was found by some RCMP to be arrogant and difficult to deal with and was avoided for this reason. Instead, they  
chose to deal with Byberg and Shaw. Sinke was known to employ intimidation tactics such as leading riot drills  
with his officers at the main gate in full view of the strikers. Miller, who assumed the role of site supervisor  
effective August 30, had not attained the experience of his predecessors. Further, his “hand off” period by Shaw  
was very brief, and not all of the information obtained by Pinkerton’s was provided to him, including its  
knowledge that as early as June 10 strikers possessed explosives and expressed intent to blow up the head frame,  
mill or vent shaft. He did know these areas to be of concern, but he was unaware of Twerdun’s security audit, St.  
Amour’s “calm before the storm” letter sent to Witte in August, or any deficiencies that were brought to Royal  
Oak’s attention prior to the fatal blast.  
St. Amour, highly experienced, had been a leader in the main drive towards establishing a certification procedure  
for the Federal Government with regard to various government tenders of security providers. Through this  
process, a 40-hour training course was established and was expanded to include supervisory techniques.  
Surprisingly, Pinkerton’s employed persons to provide security services at Giant with no security-related training  
and no previous strike experience. For example, Randy Brown was hired by Pinkerton’s and did two tours of duty  
during the summer of 1992. He had been in the real estate field when hired and had previously worked in  
licensed establishments as a “bouncer”. He immediately assumed security duties on his arrival at Giant,  
beginning by accompanying the nighttime supervisor on his vehicle patrols of the property. However, Randy  
Brown was promptly provided with his own patrol vehicle to provide relief to guards at static posts and to  
investigate reports of intruders on the mine site. The extent of his training on arrival was limited to riot squad  
skills, such as how to use a shield and baton; he never received or viewed any written materials related to security.  
He was provided with a facility tour but no specifics, such as where the main power lines to the property were  
located. The remainder, he testified, to be “common sense”. Another illustration of questionable staff employed  
by Pinkerton’s was an individual who, unilaterally, began to undertake searches of the site for explosives. He was  
not hired for this purpose but held himself out as an explosives expert and sought increased wages. Deemed to be  
a problem employee, his employment was ultimately terminated.  
e) The GNWT and its Officers  
Throughout the strike, the MSD of the NWT conducted periodic and event-related inspections at Giant. It was  
almost daily that the inspector visited the mine, and if a tour was required then a committee member from the  
occupational health and safety committee was assigned to attend. From the beginning of the strike until the fatal  
blast, the MSD conducted 11 official inspections at Giant. Reports were always completed onsite and required the  
signature of the manager, and, when necessary, the inspector discussed his findings and any required remedies.  
On occasion, both the RCMP and mine inspectors responded to specific incidents. When it was determined that  
an event was not accidental, the RCMP assumed full responsibility for the investigation. By the end of May,  
Gould was concerned that interlopers could gain access virtually at will to the mine site and commit acts of  
vandalism, which raised risk to the safety of the people working on the mine site. However, the MSD maintained  
this to be the exclusive jurisdiction of the police and not matters of occupational health and safety, reasoning  
repeatedly advanced by the MSD officials with regard to their inactivity.  
When the strike began, Gould was the acting chief mining inspector and was uncomfortable with this role because  
of its political and bureaucratic nature. Turner assumed responsibility for this position in July. He aspired to  
make significant changes to the department’s methods, including getting occupational health and safety  
committees functioning correctly as an Internal Responsibility System (“IRS”), which would effectively reduce the  
frequency of inspections by the MSD. Also in July, there was a Cabinet shuffle, the result of which was that  
Patterson ceased to be Minister responsible for both Justice and Safety and Public Services and became Minister  
of Health and Social Services. In his role as Minister of Safety and Public Services, he had been involved in  
reviewing and reforming the Mining Safety Act and its Regulations, as well as ruling on appeals. Consequently,  
he felt the need to preserve the independence of his office. Whitford was his successor as Minister of Safety and  
Public Services in the shuffle.  
In addition to attending at Giant to conduct statutory inspections, the GNWT was involved in external efforts to  
rectify the bitter dispute. As previously discussed, these included the Pollard Initiative, meetings and  
correspondence with the Federal Ministers and participation in the Injunction proceedings. Near the end of June  
1992, Minister Patterson’s concentration was focused on arguing over who should pay for the additional RCMP  
costs. Though the GNWT spoke of concerns for the evident violence, it either was sidetracked politically with the  
promise that only Ottawa had power to intervene or it was pressured by the union to see to the enactment of anti-  
replacement worker legislation. When the GNWT’s demands were not met, Patterson surrendered by taking the  
position that there was no problem despite being informed on a prompt and regular basis of these ugly incidents  
as they occurred at the mine site and in town. Patterson is deemed to know, for example, that Seeton was  
grinding out regular bulletins irresponsibly characterizing Witte as “Miss Piggy”, the RCMP tactical unit as  
“goons”, Gauthier as “a low life scum bag”, the strike breakers as “people of little principle and of very weak  
character”, and the dispute as a “war” or a “battle”. The effect of which was blatant: to deliberately incite  
criminality.  
Throughout the strike, explosives located underground were kept in unlocked storage areas. No thought was ever  
given by MSD officials to require increased security, nor did they entertain any notions of keeping an inventory.  
Consequently, both Royal Oak and the MSD could not have known whether explosive material had been subject to  
theft by striking union members. Furthermore, Turner testified to being unaware prior to the fatal blast that  
there were 23 openings to the underground, and paid particularly scant attention to Akaitcho. His knowledge  
about Akaitcho generally is suspect, as he said on one occasion that he believed it to be a vent shaft with no means  
of access to the underground, yet on another he stated that he was aware it provided underground access.  
Despite the withdrawal of the additional RCMP troops, no GNWT official advised Royal Oak of the need to  
provide adequate security, so as not to rely on the RCMP to carry out Royal Oak’s responsibility, nor was there  
ever any request for Royal Oak to provide a security plan. Similarly, no GNWT official alerted Pinkerton’s of the  
need to provide adequate security at Giant, nor was Pinkerton’s directly notified when the RCMP tactical unit was  
released. Patterson stated, however, that there were regular discussions with mine management pertaining to the  
appropriate roles of the police and the company. In fact, the MSD was apprised of the reductions in the number  
of security personnel at Giant and understood this to be for the purposes of reducing costs. Turner made security  
inquiries to Byberg following the graffiti run and understood that the company was increasing patrols; he  
revisited these concerns following both the satellite dish and vent shaft blasts.  
Immediately following each of the ugly incidents that occurred throughout the strike, the GNWT and its officials,  
at all levels, had no appetite to “do something”, leaving MSD personnel to exercise their own discretion in  
ultimately taking the position that orders should come from Patterson. Gould, for example, at the end of May  
proposed to make an order to close the mine but did not carry through. Turner, as chief inspector, had  
inspections done but took the position that the onus for safety was on mine management. Turner, however, was  
endeavouring to implement the IRS that experts Dr. Strahlendorf and Ian Plummer (“Plummer”) endorsed at  
trial, which, while commendable, ignored the real issue, that is, the violence, the threats and the bombings many  
or most of which impacted on mine safety, the very mandate of the MSD. Not to sell the GNWT totally short on  
lack of reaction, however, one must not overlook the efforts by Ballantyne, who worked tirelessly to calm down  
the rhetoric, the comments and the threats by working with and advising affected parties, endeavouring to secure  
support.  
The GNWT appreciated from the outset that individuals in the union and mine management were volatile. It was  
aware of the union’s warnings prior to the strike that violence could break out on the picket line if replacement  
workers were employed and that the safety of the people at the mine was an issue because the site was vulnerable  
to unauthorized access. It also discussed whether national or local union officers were able to rein in members  
who were out of hand. During the strike, the GNWT sought the assistance of the Federal Government in dealing  
with the violent situation at Giant. Citing the fact that labour relations are the exclusive jurisdiction of the  
Federal Government, it was urged that the Federal Minister of Labour take measures such as enacting legislation  
prohibiting the use of replacement workers. In short, apart from the order of June 10th respecting booby traps,  
no real efforts beyond lacklustre inspections occurred, except the closure order issued on September 18, 1992, to  
be effective September 19, 1992.  
f) The Unions  
Union members turned a blind eye to the improper activities committed by others throughout the strike. The  
union motto was “don’t get caught”. This contributed to an understanding for many that their actions were  
acceptable and advantageous to the collective interest. Strikers knew that illegal acts were committed by their  
brothers, but they often did not inquire as to who was doing them. Picket line discourse quickly evolved to  
suggest that people would have to die in order to end the strike. Common references were made to blowing up the  
mine or using explosives with the combined desire to cause massive damage to the plant and injury to the  
replacement workers. It was common for the strikers to sit around and discuss how they would regain their jobs.  
This included Warren who, although he generally kept his thoughts to himself, stated that if he wanted to he could  
get underground and could probably set a blast that would scare the replacement workers sufficiently to force  
them to leave. Others did not think anything of this rhetoric because of its prevalence. A further irritant and  
topic of oratory for the strikers was the company helicopter that regularly flew on and off the mine site; there was  
an avidity to put it out of commission.  
Materials were circulated at the picket lines and in the union hall, including the “Mohawk Valley Strategy” that  
outlined how to break a union and render it impotent. Furthermore, the union put out daily strike bulletins,  
which were prepared and vetted by the union executive, including Seeton as well as CAW National representative  
David. The language utilized in these bulletins characterized the labour dispute as a war, which Seeton stated was  
a tactic to achieve solidarity amongst strikers. The replacement workers were always referred to by the  
dehumanizing and derogatory term “scab”, and those who had crossed the line were considered to be “of little  
principle and very weak character”. Seeton conceded that this was his personal opinion but that he was  
characterizing the replacement workers in a way that he believed the membership wanted to see. Seeton admitted  
that he had a strong dislike for replacement workers as he believed them to be traitors betraying a democratic  
vote. He admitted that some of these comments were irresponsible and too harsh, including his reference to a  
line crosser as a “low life scumbag”.  
Seeton conceded that he believed that union members would be influenced by the bulletins. He admitted that the  
references to replacement workers were sometimes cruel and mean-spirited and that this was leadership by  
example, although not the best example. There were also illustrations that depicted violence towards replacement  
workers and Royal Oak employees. Furthermore, the bulletins also printed rumours and untruths about what  
was going on at Giant, including allegations that the company was framing the union for various conduct. David  
testified that the strike bulletins were depressing as they broadcasted to the company that the union members  
were suffering; consequently, he suggested that they inject some humour.  
Pervasive negative effects and disillusionment resulted from union discourse. Strikers developed a paranoia so  
enhanced that they perceived there was a conspiracy between Royal Oak, the RCMP, all levels of government, the  
media and the Courts. Union members believed that Pinkerton’s guards would antagonize the strikers while the  
RCMP waited to apprehend any who retaliated and that their own reports to the RCMP were ignored. This  
perception contributed to the union’s view that the laws were meaningless, thereby providing no deterrence for  
illegal conduct. In fact, some of the strikers, uninformed as to criminal activities of their striking colleagues such  
as Shearing and Bettger, became more and more angered, believing that some of these activities were arranged by  
Royal Oak to frame the strikers. This was another exacerbation of the war they perceived existed between the  
union and Royal Oak. The union also continually reinforced to its members that they were not allowed to believe  
that under any circumstances it was acceptable to use replacement workers.  
Due to the union’s distrust towards the police, it became general practice for the RCMP when investigating an  
incident not to interview members at the union hall, as it was a hostile environment. Also, it was necessary to  
isolate individuals for questioning, which became a challenge at the union hall. Furthermore, RCMP officers  
noticed a distinct difference in behaviour when dealing with an individual alone, rather than within his peer  
group. Similarly, Ballantyne found there to be a dynamic at the union hall when a number of members were  
present, rendering it difficult to get a reasonable approach because of collective anger and frustration. He, too,  
found strikers to be far more receptive when alone.  
Strikers’ anger and acts of intimidation were strongest towards replacement workers. Statements were  
continually made that replacement workers were not human beings and did not deserve to live. Some members,  
including Shearing and Seeton, held the view that those CASAW Local 4 members who crossed the picket lines to  
return to work were subordinate to replacement workers. Even after the fatal blast, some, including Shearing and  
Legge, held no remorse for those who died. In January 1993, Legge made the following statement to the media:  
I hate every one of them. They’re scabs and bastards. All they care about is themselves. I don’t have any  
sympathy for those bastards who got blown up. If they hadn’t been in there scabbing, they wouldn’t be dead¼.  
We’re in a war.  
Even those who supported the union in a non-active way, opting not to picket, were subject to degrading  
treatment, including David Vodnoski. Before he crossed the picket line, he was called a “scab” in public, and in  
the presence of his stepson. Those who considered a return to work were advised against it by their union  
brothers, threatening that they “could blow up that place any time they wished”. However, those who crossed felt  
safer when underground than anywhere else. This was true partially because they did not have to contend with  
the harassment from those on the picket lines, and because of the presence of Pinkerton’s.  
Replacement workers did however prepare themselves for confrontation with the strikers. For protection, those  
working inside the mine had constructed weapons such as steel balls with track spikes, chains with pieces of pipe  
added on and homemade hatchets. To protect their homes from vandalism, guard dogs were acquired, and video  
surveillance and security devices were promptly installed. Some union members, including Bettger, spent hours  
at a time stalking the homes of those who had returned to work. Many purchased scanners to track the events of  
the strikers, hoping to have some warning of plans to visit their residences. Property damage was commonplace  
when the identities of those who crossed the line became known. For example, the day after David Vodnoski  
returned to work, his vehicle had “scab” painted on it. Threatening phone calls were also received at workers’  
homes, even after the fatal blast. Carol Riggs, for example, answered the phone to hear someone scream that the  
“traitors deserved to die”. Similarly, Doreen Vodnoski was subject to intimidation by strikers after her husband’s  
death. In 1993, the tire of her vehicle was slashed, and an intentional fire was set under her trailer. Fearing for  
the lives and safety of her children and herself, she packed up all of her belongings and left Yellowknife. On July  
7, Pinkerton’s received information that a woman who lived on the mine site had been followed into town by  
strikers. On her way home she had to pull her vehicle off the road because a wheel had been loosened to the edge  
of the wheel bolts. Strikers also extended their intimidation to others in the community, threatening anyone who  
assisted the mine, such as the fuel supplier.  
Most union members did not leave their homes without weapons such as bear spray, bats and sticks, although  
Shearing and Bettger generally carried knives. Not expressly told to be armed, it was the strikers’ perception that  
they should have protection in the event of confrontation. Ball-bearing slingshots were frequently available and  
used on the picket lines. As well, there were caches of explosives, the whereabouts of which were common  
knowledge to the strikers, as they were generally hidden in culverts, bushes, vehicles and campers and under  
rocks. Shearing observed that they were regularly being used because the quantity was continually diminishing.  
Union sympathizers also made sporadic deliveries of explosive material to those on the picket lines.  
Strikers had radios to communicate with each other on the picket lines and at the union hall. The union devised a  
system of using nicknames and coded language so that members could not be identified. “What a beautiful night  
for crawling boys” was the alert provided by Shearing before trespassing onto the mine site. This was also an  
indication to the union members to be attentive and notify him if he was going to be detected by security or  
company personnel. Shearing’s nickname over the radio was “Night Crawler”, and it was general knowledge  
among the membership that he was routinely accessing mine property, usually three to four times per shift, and  
was generally unconcerned about detection by security personnel as he was cognizant of their patterns of  
surveillance. His incursions were continuous until his arrest in September and resumed after his release. He  
indicated to some fellow strikers that he had frequently been in the underground and that he had caused graffiti  
on more than one occasion. Bettger was also regularly accessing mine property, in many instances accompanying  
Shearing. On one occasion, Shearing and Bettger walked down to the I-38 portal and on to the lunchroom  
without being detected. Other times, the two set up trip wires that would release a flash of light when triggered,  
and served as a warning that Pinkerton’s guards were nearby.  
Regular disruptions to the power at Giant were attributed to union members during the strike. Bettger and  
Shearing, in particular, frequently used metal cables with weights tied onto the ends to throw over power lines to  
disable them. This occurred approximately 40 times, as it was believed by the strikers that the only way to harm  
the company was to cause financial harm. Cutting down power poles was yet another sport for the strikers and  
continued even following warnings from the RCMP that some power poles serviced the local hospital operating  
room. Fires were also a common occurrence and were often used by strikers as diversions. Another tactic was the  
daily use of flares, shot at people, buildings and vehicles.  
Threats about the use of explosives were rampant, such as Bettger’s reported threat to blow up the mine or use  
cyanide gas. However, as the strike progressed, the threats were accompanied by actual bombings. In addition to  
explosions at the tailings line, satellite dish and vent shaft, a company truck had its windows blown out.  
Furthermore, strikers were well aware that their brothers either possessed or had unfettered access to explosives;  
both Bettger and Shearing personally witnessed explosives in the possession of other strikers. The use of  
explosives was understood by strikers to be an effective method of generating attention. A strong view was  
perpetuated among union members that, if they were to succeed in the dispute with the company, they would  
have to attract significant outside attention. Bettger and Shearing had concluded that trip wires, which they used  
to signal the presence of security, would also function with explosives. In particular, discussions and experiments  
were initiated, mimicking a land mine scenario, using a trip wire to set off a charge that would cause a truck to  
roll; fortunately, the testing failed.  
The lack of effective leadership within CASAW Local 4 was obvious. As predicted by many, president Schram had  
significant difficulties asserting his authority over the union. At a meeting before the strike, he made a statement  
warning against the use of violence on the picket lines. However, this statement was couched in insincere words  
and glamour. At all times material, Schram stood virtually mute for all intents and purposes, while Johnston and  
Seeton harangued members with threats, purportedly from the executive, that those who crossed the picket line  
would be permanently terminated from the union and their families would be physically, mentally and financially  
endangered. At the charades termed as “meetings”, while Schram was at the helm, members paraded about  
wearing snowmobile helmets, baseball bats and knee pads in a menacing manner, designed to frighten anyone  
who even contemplated accepting the tentative agreement or crossing the picket line. It was the view of some that  
Schram served as a puppet, acting according to what others dictated. This was most effectively illustrated with his  
initial recommendation that the membership accept the tentative agreement, and then his change of mind. This  
demonstrated that he lacked the courage of the convictions he should have held, was inept and cowardly, and  
above all violated his moral and legal responsibility to the union’s membership by deception and untruthfulness.  
Despite the ongoing and increasingly severe destructive behaviour demonstrated by its members, no disciplinary  
proceedings were ever brought by either CASAW National or CAW National or their locals, nor were there ever  
any discussions by them about discouraging such acts. Instead, lawyers, whose fees were paid by the union, were  
made available to those members who were criminally charged as a result of their conduct during the strike. The  
union also paid for fines that were imposed.  
Ironically, Hargrove counselled union leadership at conventions with respect to their behaviour on the picket  
lines, specifically with respect to violence. He testified that CAW National was opposed to violence in all forms  
and said his own zero tolerance of violence is on record many times over. However, CAW National and its locals  
have never laid any charges under the constitution for violence on the picket line because they believe this issue is  
properly dealt with by the Courts. Interestingly, there have been charges laid by a local under the constitution for  
union members who crossed the picket line. As for legal fees, CAW National or a local generally cover these  
expenses, he said, because they believe it to be their duty to represent their members, and the presumption of  
innocence demands fair representation. Furthermore, David understood that he was sent to Yellowknife as a  
professional strike organizer and CAW National representative. As such, he understood it to be his responsibility  
to be diligent to prevent violence and not to turn a blind eye to misbehaviour of strikers. However, he testified  
that he had no authority to discipline any CASAW Local 4 member, nor was he in a position to remove members  
from the picket line. He testified that he would have turned in some union members to the police if he learned of  
illegal conduct, if he thought they deserved it; however, when he did learn of illegal conduct, he did nothing.  
g) Shearing and Bettger  
Shearing and Bettger were radicals from the outset, determined to disrupt and destroy Royal Oak and Witte, at  
the union meetings, on the picket line and in town, and took advantage of every opportunity to incite others to  
accomplish this goal. Outside the union hall and picket line, Bettger, Shearing and others did the graffiti run on  
June 29, the satellite dish explosion on July 21 and finally the vent shaft blast on August 31. Eventually they were  
convicted of crimes committed in connection with the strike and incarcerated.
 
The actions of these men were  
designed to frighten those thinking of returning to work and those who had done so and to encourage other  
striking miners to follow their example, and they obviously succeeded.  
h) Seeton  
Seeton had been vice-president to Schram and, on Schram succumbing after his period of totally ineffectual and  
incompetent tenure, became president. From the outset, he, on the one hand, reacted to the strike by pretending  
to be encouraging the members of the union to be law-abiding; however, by allowing the radicals to dominate  
union meetings and activities, he became part of the criminal milieu like Bettger and Shearing, so that his motto  
and advice became “don’t get caught”. Thereafter, he became paranoid and unstable through pressure of the  
strike and personal marital difficulties, deliberately used inflammatory language and generally became totally  
irresponsible by his own admission. He then turned on his own members, such as O’Neil, by threatening them  
with sanctions if they crossed or had crossed the picket line. Moreover, O’Neil testified that Seeton said on more  
than one occasion that he would kill wives or children, destroy homes or do whatever he needed to do to have  
their cause taken seriously. He went further by demanding things he knew were not possible to accomplish, such  
as insisting the GNWT enact anti-replacement worker legislation. By August, he appreciated that the tension had  
elevated to such a level that there was fear that someone was “going to be killed”. That, however did not slow him  
down, so that his conduct, like that of his companions Bettger and Shearing, shamefully furthered the destructive  
mentality that encouraged and led up to Warren’s act of terror on September 18, 1992.  
i) Warren  
Suffice it to say Warren became caught up in the frustration of the failure of the union to succeed in bringing  
Royal Oak to heel and with the incitement by other radicals. His brain tripped him into carrying out his earlier  
response to the question of whether someone had to die in order for the replacement workers to be removed.  
Warren was known to be passionate about his desire to get back to work throughout the strike. In September, he  
believed that Royal Oak had outsmarted the union executive and recognized that a lot of the striking union  
members were crippled financially, which contributed to his thinking that he needed to “get something done”.  
Warren testified that setting the blast was an insane act that was against everything he believed in, especially  
working around mines. Its purpose was to frighten those in the mine and result in an investigation, and Warren  
believed it was “his turn to do a stunt”. He testified that he had not had any prior pre-strike negative experience  
with the company but that he was frustrated by the fact that there were replacement workers and no negotiations.  
It was Warren’s evidence that the situation on the picket line was one of mass hysteria, inciting rational men to  
get caught up in the environment. Initially, Warren found himself trying to prevent other strikers from  
misconduct, but later he underwent a metamorphosis and found himself caught up in the atmosphere of defiance  
and lawlessness that was prevalent, and thereby became capable of committing a terrorist act. Furthermore,  
there was a sense of impending doom. There was also a dehumanizing factor with respect to the replacement  
workers, with frequent talk of people dying or being killed. Undoubtedly, it was a war mentality.  
The Victims and their Families  
a) Fullowka Family  
Vern Fullowka was born in Canora, Saskatchewan, in 1956. He was one of six children raised on a farm. His  
father was diagnosed with prostate cancer, but continues to survive, and his mother has kidney problems. None  
of Vern’s siblings have any health problems.  
Vern was a miner from the time he left school in grade 11 and worked fairly steadily at mines from the mid-1970's  
to 1982. He was unemployed for some of 1982 and all of 1983. From 1984 to 1991 he worked continually with a  
couple of months of unemployment between jobs in Manitoba, British Columbia, Ontario and the Northwest  
Territories. On October 22, 1991, Vern was hired by Royal Oak as an underground miner. He had certificates for  
safety, survival and mine rescue, blasting, operating underground diesel equipment and dangerous goods and  
hazardous materials. Vern was known by those with whom he worked to be very dependable and a competent  
miner. He enjoyed good health, though he had two minor injuries on the job, but encountered no problems as a  
result.  
Sheila Fullowka was born in Calgary, Alberta, in December 1956; her parents, who were both deaf, raised her and  
her sister. Sheila’s mother died in a car accident in 1986, and her father currently fights prostate cancer. Her  
grandmother lived to be 101 years old.  
Sheila has a grade 11 education. She worked as a secretary for one year when she was 18 and also has experience  
as a teacher’s aide to the hearing-impaired. From the time her first child was born, until her family moved to  
Yellowknife in 1991, she did not work outside the home.  
Vern and Sheila were married in 1982. They had two children, Karen, born in 1984, and Steven, born in 1987.  
They bought a home in Campbell River, British Columbia, to which Vern had done some renovations including  
electrical work, plumbing and landscaping. This house was subsequently sold and they bought a five-acre  
property in Black Creek, on which Vern built a barn. This property was eventually sold when Vern was hired at  
Giant and they moved to Yellowknife in 1991.  
It was not their plan for Sheila to work outside the home; however, in February 1992, she took a job as a janitor to  
assist with the family finances when the strike was looming. The Fullowkas had loved their life in British  
Columbia and planned to retire there. They discussed earning sufficient income so that they could leave  
Yellowknife and Vern could secure a non-mining job. It was likely that they would have stayed in Yellowknife at  
least until Steven graduated from high school.  
Learning that there had been an explosion at Giant on September 18 that caused the death of her husband, Sheila  
retained only intermittent memories from that day. After Vern’s death, she moved to her parents’ home in  
Saskatchewan, then settled in Campbell River. Using the funds from Vern’s life insurance policy and with the  
assistance of her father, she bought a house. Sheila’s father moved into the Campbell River home and assisted her  
with the cleaning, yard work and cooking. She paid all grocery and utility expenses. After Vern’s death, Sheila  
received two years of counseling and had a prescription for anti-depressant and sleeping medication. At some  
point, she was involved in a brief relationship, which offered no financial benefit to her.  
Karen became very withdrawn and fearful after her father’s death. She began sleeping with her mother as of the  
night her father died and, at age 19, that continues. Like her mother, she has limited memory from the time  
immediately following her father’s death up to and including his funeral. A few years ago Karen attempted  
suicide and has seen mental health professionals. She has been diagnosed with anxiety and depression stemming  
from the death of her father and is currently medicated for these disorders.  
Sheila was unemployed for about five years after Vern’s death. For income, she purchased vending machines and  
a rental property, which she later sold. In 1997, she worked at a flower shop until being laid off in May or June  
1998. By September 1998, she found employment at a flower shop in Red Deer, and the family moved. In August  
2000, she took a position as a sales clerk at Wal-Mart until August 2003. From June 30, 2003, to the present,  
she has worked at a call center for phone service.  
Sheila’s income information is as follows:  
Year  
Taxable Income  
Non-Taxable Income  
Deductions  
Total Income  
Employment & Business Income  
1991  
0.00  
0.00  
0.00  
0.00  
0.00  
1992  
16,346.00  
6,450.00  
5,327.00  
28,123.00  
13,210.00  
1993  
10,444.00  
22,800.00  
2,195.00  
35,439.00  
2,030.00  
1994  
8,191.00  
22,800.00  
0.00  
30,991.00  
0.00  
1995  
-14,882.00  
22,800.00  
334.00  
8,252.00  
0.00  
1996  
11,459.00  
22,800.00  
30.00  
34,289.00  
0.00  
1997  
14,735.00  
23,214.00  
0.00  
37,949.00  
2,645.00  
1998  
24,679.00  
23,628.00  
3,230.00  
51,537.00  
8,018.00  
1999  
11,709.00  
25,975.00  
11,180.00  
48,864.00  
12,442.00  
2000  
19,744.00  
20,282.00  
13,114.00  
53,140.00  
9,421.00  
Vern’s income information is as follows:  
Year  
Taxable Income  
Non-Taxable Income  
Deductions  
Total Income  
Employment & Business Income  
1988  
73,679.00  
0.00  
7,823.00  
81,502.00  
80,725.00  
1989  
82,468.00  
0.00  
1,342.00  
83,810.00  
83,025.00  
1990  
68,548.00  
0.00  
2,809.00  
71,357.00  
70,558.00  
1991  
69,821.00  
0.00  
10,661.00  
80,482.00  
79,668.00  
1992  
58,313.00  
0.00  
15,326.00  
73,639.00  
72,902.00  
Vern and Sheila regularly made RRSP contributions and had over $30,000 in RRSPs before Vern’s death. This  
was to be used for a comfortable retirement and the children’s education. Vern and Sheila had a joint account,  
and Sheila assumed the responsibility for attending to the finances.  
When Vern was not working, his household contribution included meal preparation, cleaning, laundry and  
gardening. He was competent at household maintenance, such as fixing a cracked foundation. During his  
unemployment in 1982 and 1983, he did woodworking, making shelves, a rocking chair and a crib. Vern was  
proficient with car repairs and was committed to his children, regularly helping them with their homework.  
Sheila currently lives in Red Deer, Alberta. She was diagnosed with ovarian cancer and had a complete  
hysterectomy in 2001, and there has been no sign of recurrence since. She also had ganglion cysts in her wrists  
which continually resurface.  
b) Hourie Family  
Norm Hourie was born in 1939, in Grand Maria, Manitoba, as one of nine children. His mother was diagnosed  
with diabetes at age 40, and his oldest brother died from lung problems as a result of work hazards.  
Norm completed grade 11, and became a miner in Thompson, Manitoba, in or around late 1962. From 1975 to  
1980 he was employed as a miner in Ontario, following which he spent the next 10 years, from 1981 to 1991, as a  
contract miner for various companies. The longest period that he was unemployed, for reasons other than  
injuries, was three weeks. While contracting, he tended to be away working for two or three week segments and  
then would return home for a week or two. He had many certificates related to his career in mining. These  
included blasting and first aid certification and a “shifter’s ticket”, which allowed him to supervise others.  
Norm was not a smoker, rarely consumed alcohol and had no history of health problems. He did suffer some  
work-related injuries, beginning in 1979, when he broke an ankle. In 1980, he permanently lost the sight in one  
eye as a result of a piece of steel puncturing his eye. He received ongoing workers’ compensation payments for  
this injury. He underwent carpal tunnel surgery on both of his hands at some point; however, this had no long-  
term effect on his ability to work.  
Norm was first married in 1962 and had two children. He was divorced in 1974 or 1975 and within a couple of  
months of their separation secured custody of his children.  
Doreen Hourie was born in 1957, in Bissett, Manitoba, and is the youngest of nine children. Three of her siblings  
are no longer alive; one died as a young child, another due to a brain tumor and another from emphysema. Her  
father died of bowel cancer in 1974, and her mother died of throat cancer in 1990.  
She has a grade nine level of education. She was married to her first husband in 1974 and had two children. Her  
son John was born in 1974, and Jimmy was born in 1976. Her husband left their home in 1979, and they were  
divorced in 1980 or 1981. Her ex-husband paid monthly child support in the amount of $100 for each boy until a  
couple of months after Norm died when the boys were 17 and 19 respectively. Doreen worked as a cook for a time  
at Giant during this period.  
Norm and Doreen moved in with one another in 1980 and were married in 1985. Both of Doreen’s boys lived with  
them, as did Norm’s son for a two and one half year period. Both of Doreen’s sons had their last name legally  
changed to “Hourie” and were 16 and 18 years old respectively when Norm died.  
In 1991, the Houries were planning a move to Australia, where Norm would continue mining. They liquidated all  
assets in preparation for this move, but, due to difficulties arranging the children’s education, they remained in  
Canada.  
On October 8, 1991, Norm began full-time hourly work at Giant and planned to continue for at least a year. He  
found the work environment to be relaxed and that there was significant earning potential. In February 1992,  
Doreen and her son Jimmy moved to Yellowknife, following which she obtained a job as wait staff at the  
Parachute Restaurant. From June to September 1992, Doreen worked at Giant, responsible for housekeeping and  
operating a commissary.  
Norm did not go on strike with other CASAW Local 4 members; instead, he continued to work at the mine. At the  
end of August, he received his shift boss certificate and became part of Royal Oak management. He had decided  
that, if the strike had not ended by Christmas, he and his family would leave Yellowknife and he would return to  
contract mining. Had the strike ended by Christmas, Norm planned to return to full-time development mining at  
Giant rather than remain in his management position. In terms of leaving the mining field, he had been  
approached by the British Columbia Workers’ Compensation Board in 1989 to do inspections at British Columbia  
mines. However, he expressed his reluctance to leave mining at that time. He had not set an age for retirement;  
rather, he intended to mine as long as he was physically fit to do so. If he were to suffer an injury that prevented  
him from mining, he had expressed that he would pursue management or supervisory work.  
Doreen has no memory from the morning of the fatal blast until April 1993. During the criminal trial of Warren,  
Doreen was taken aside by Sergeant Nancy Defer and a doctor at the hospital who advised her that they were  
going to have her committed because they feared she was suicidal. She was not hospitalized and ceased to take  
prescribed anti-depressant and sleeping medication.  
Doreen was not employed in 1993 and 1994 but resumed employment at A&W in August 1995, which continued  
until 2000. She also took summer employment on a road crew. Further income was received from Norm’s life  
insurance policy. She acquired a rental property, which ultimately was sold at a loss. In April 2003, she assumed  
a position at a fruit and garden centre in Vernon, British Columbia.  
Doreen’s income information is as follows:  
Year  
Taxable Income  
Non-Taxable Income  
Deductions  
Total Income  
Employment & Business Income  
1988  
4,195.00  
0.00  
0.00  
4,195.00  
1,795.00  
1989  
Unknown  
0.00  
0.00  
0.00  
0.00  
1990  
3,168.00  
0.00  
0.00  
3,168.00  
3,168.00  
1991  
7,054.00  
0.00  
500.00  
7,554.00  
5,154.00  
1992  
23,859.00  
0.00  
1,381.00  
25,240.00  
11,517.00  
1993  
14,850.00  
29,250.00  
1,000.00  
45,100.00  
0.00  
1994  
12,047.00  
22,812.00  
0.00  
34,859.00  
0.00  
1995  
16,361.00  
22,800.00  
432.00  
39,593.00  
4,408.00  
1996  
16,037.00  
23,216.00  
1,100.00  
40,353.00  
11,221.00  
1997  
14,530.00  
17,189.00  
900.00  
32,619.00  
12,113.00  
1998  
20,712.00  
14,344.00  
2,325.00  
37,381.00  
19,091.00  
1999  
20,005.00  
17,858.00  
1,209.00  
39,072.00  
17,409.00  
2000  
26,585.00  
18,068.00  
1,200.00  
45,853.00  
20,714.00  
2001  
20,215.00  
18,488.00  
1,200.00  
39,903.00  
22,235.00  
Norm’s income information is as follows:  
Year  
Taxable Income  
Non-Taxable Income  
Deductions  
Total  
Income  
Employment & Business Income  
1987  
37,402.00  
0.00  
0.00  
37,402.00  
Unknown  
1988  
Unknown  
Unknown  
Unknown  
Unknown  
Unknown  
1989  
22,602.00  
0.00  
0.00  
22,602.00  
29,525.00  
1990  
68,497.00  
0.00  
0.00  
68,497.00  
68,497.00  
1991  
55,965.00  
0.00  
0.00  
55,965.00  
55,969.00  
1992  
70,656.00  
1,829.00  
4,915.00  
77,400.00  
76,035.00  
In 1992, up to the date of the fatal blast, Norm’s earnings reflected a substantial amount of overtime earnings.  
Norm provided financial support to his parents, as well as Doreen’s mother. Norm and Doreen had joint accounts  
from the time they began to live together, and Doreen assumed the responsibility for all financial matters.  
When at home, Norm assisted with household tasks such as cooking, canning, doing dishes, grocery shopping,  
lawn mowing and snow removal. He was a keen gardener and took ownership of a productive vegetable garden.  
Although neither a carpenter nor an electrician, Norm was capable of doing extensive home renovations,  
including plumbing, framing and drywalling. He was also proficient with vehicle maintenance and major repairs.  
He took an active involvement in the children’s sports and helping them with schoolwork.  
Doreen currently lives in Vernon, British Columbia. Her health is stable, other than some nervousness and  
anxiety she has been experiencing since her husband’s death. She is currently involved in a relationship with a  
man, although she has no plans to marry. They do not live together and this relationship offers no financial  
benefit to her.  
c) Neill Family  
Chris Neill was born in 1963, in Oshawa, Ontario. His father died in a mine when he was young, leaving Chris, his  
brother and two sisters behind.  
Chris left home at age 16 and moved in with his godparents, whose daughter  
he eventually was married to for a short time. After high school, he pursued studies in geology and welding. He  
then began to work in mining, attracted to the field because of the earning potential. Chris found employment at  
mines in northern Ontario, then moved to Yellowknife around the fall of 1988 and was hired as an underground  
miner at Nerco Con Mine. He left Yellowknife in August 1989, as he was unsure if he wanted to remain, but he  
returned shortly thereafter. He then obtained employment at Giant, ultimately training others to become miners.  
He had taken the common core mining courses and had a blasting certificate.  
While in Yellowknife, Chris was also a volunteer with the fire department. He had mine rescue experience and  
had been the captain for the team at Giant and a judge in rescue competitions. He also performed high level  
rescue. Continually motivated to improve his rescue skills, he had acquired many books and equipment. He had  
both first aid and CPR training.  
Before crossing the picket line, Chris did not do picket duty. He continued with the fire department until he was  
required to take a leave of absence following an incident at Giant, when strikers refused access to fire trucks if he  
was aboard. Instead, he obtained work at the Ptarmigan Mine for a brief period before returning to Giant.  
Chris was in excellent health when he died. He suffered two minor injuries; fractured ribs in July 1991, resulting  
in a loss of a few work days, and a broken tooth which did not cause any lost time at work. In March 1992, he  
began to experience some stiffness in his back, although it was not serious.  
Tracey Neill was born in Edmonton, Alberta in 1969. She has one brother.  
In 1986, after completing high school, Tracey spent a summer in Yellowknife working at the Hudson’s Bay  
Company. She then did 10 months in college studying legal terminology and secretarial work. Following that she  
returned to Yellowknife and secured a secretarial position at Nerco Con Mine, which she held for almost one year.  
In June 1988, she began a job as a legal secretary at a law firm and acquired two additional jobs. In 1989, she  
accepted a position as a legal secretary with Justice Canada until September 1990. From September 1990 to  
November 1991, she worked as a paralegal to the Northwest Territories Director of Justice Canada.  
Chris and Tracey met in 1989 and began to cohabit that fall. They bought a trailer in October 1990, and were  
married in 1990. In the spring of 1992, they bought a $220,000 home. They made improvements to the  
driveway, fence and deck and did some landscaping and interior decorating.  
Chris would have continued to work as a miner as long as he could, and the couple had planned to remain in  
Yellowknife and have children. Following the fatal blast Tracey sold their home and left Yellowknife. There was a  
life insurance policy on the mortgage. Tracey resided with her parents in Rocky Mountain House, Alberta, until  
she bought her own home in 1993.  
Tracey’s income information is as follows:  
Year  
Taxable Income  
Non-Taxable Income  
Deductions  
Total Income  
Employment & Business Income  
1988  
27,214.00  
0.00  
5,955.00  
33,169.00  
33,169.00  
1989  
32,289.00  
0.00  
5,816.00  
38,105.00  
38,105.00  
1990  
38,718.00  
0.00  
3,901.00  
42,619.00  
42,499.00  
1991  
41,735.00  
0.00  
5,263.00  
46,998.00  
46,702.00  
1992  
37,670.00  
4,477.00  
9,949.00  
52,096.00  
43,307.00  
1993  
17,782.00  
15,675.00  
12,240.00  
45,697.00  
20,094.00  
1994  
5,905.00  
15,675.00  
0.00  
21,580.00  
0.00  
1995  
32,864.00  
15,675.00  
2,053.00  
50,592.00  
27,344.00  
1996  
31,380.00  
15,675.00  
5,642.00  
52,697.00  
32,225.00  
1997  
29,682.00  
15,960.00  
3,343.00  
48,985.00  
33,025.00  
1998  
16,153.00  
16,244.00  
3,993.00  
36,390.00  
20,146.00  
1999  
21,103.00  
17,858.00  
1,813.00  
40,774.00  
22,816.00  
2000  
17,731.00  
18,068.00  
5,448.00  
41,247.00  
17,532.00  
2001  
257.00  
18,488.00  
0.00  
18,745.00  
18,745.00  
Chris’ income information is as follows:  
Year  
Taxable Income  
Non-Taxable Income  
Deductions  
Total Income  
Employment & Business Income  
1987  
38,636.00  
0.00  
5,711.00  
44,347.00  
43,010.00  
1988  
52,699.00  
0.00  
108.00  
52,807.00  
52,748.00  
1989  
67,934.00  
0.00  
5,625.00  
73,559.00  
73,559.00  
1990  
69,720.00  
2,132.00  
8,289.00  
80,141.00  
78,010.00  
1991  
87,344.00  
0.00  
12,544.00  
99,888.00  
99,888.00  
1992  
58,747.00  
0.00  
2,402.00  
61,149.00  
61,139.00  
Chris and Tracey maintained joint finances throughout their marriage and Tracey assumed responsibility of the  
family finances at all times except during the strike. Chris’ household contributions included cooking, cleaning,  
laundry and vacuuming. He also did some home improvements including fence and deck upgrading and  
landscaping.  
In November 1992, Tracey returned to her job. She was seeking a full-time permanent position with the Federal  
Government, but there were none available. Wanting to retain her status on the priority list with the Federal  
Government, she did not formally apply for anything else. She took a cruise in November 1993, immediately  
followed by travel in Australia, New Zealand and Fiji.  
While travelling in early 1994, Tracey began a relationship with Sergio Sartori (“Sartori”), a traffic assessment  
technician for a municipal government. She began residing with him in August 1994, and eventually sold her  
home, placing the profit in an investment plan. Their child was born in 1997. They have no plans to have more  
children.  
In March 1995, Tracey obtained employment with the Federal Department of Justice in Calgary, Alberta, and  
remained there until May 2000. Eventually she regained the classification level she had previously attained in  
Yellowknife.  
In 1997, Tracey and Sartori built a house in Calgary. Funds used for this venture included her profit of $150,000  
from the sale of her home and the profit of between $200,000 and $250,000 from the sale of Sartori’s home, and  
the remaining $100,000 was borrowed from his father. The total cost of this home was $550,000 and was sold  
for $640,000 when they moved to Kelowna in May 2000.  
In October 2000, Tracey bought a home in Kelowna for $250,000 for which she used a line of credit. Sartori  
bought an auto detailing shop and a house for $135,000. She also purchased two rental properties jointly with  
Sartori, who also owns other properties of which Tracey has limited knowledge. Sartori refused to disclose details  
of his contribution to the family since moving to Kelowna in 2000.  
After she had her baby, Tracey returned to 60% full-time work in April 1998. Sergio’s parents looked after their  
daughter when she was working. In May 2000, on moving to Kelowna, B.C. she was unemployed for two years.  
In May 2002, Tracey assumed a part-time job as a clerk with an independent tribunal that hears unemployment  
insurance appeals.  
In March or April 2003, Tracey sold her house in Kelowna.  
Sartori was unemployed for two to three years until securing employment recently. He was temporarily hired by  
the City of Kelowna.  
Sartori’s income since cohabitating with Tracey, from the years 1995 to 2002, was $50,000, $52,000, $55,000,  
$54,000, $51,000, $56,000, $13,000 and $19,000 respectively. In 2001, Sartori sold his business for which he  
paid $50,000 and was to receive monthly payments for the sale.  
Tracey has a joint account with Sartori, and he assumes full responsibility for all financial matters. In fact, she  
does not have access to the account, although she does have a credit card. Sartori monitors her personal  
purchases and does the entire household shopping but he contributes nothing else to the household tasks.  
Tracey is in good health. In 1990, she had a thyroid operation. Subsequently she has had no further problems.  
She currently lives in Kelowna, British Columbia, in a home which she and Sartori jointly own. It was the  
evidence of Tracey that they have difficulties with their relationship and the future is uncertain.  
d) Pandev Family  
Joe Pandev was born in 1937, in Yugoslavia and moved to Canada in 1957. He had two brothers and one sister.  
Joe started working in Canada picking tobacco, followed by employment at a coal mine. He came to Yellowknife  
in 1963 and worked as an underground miner at Giant until his death in 1992. He welcomed overtime work, most  
often working at least two weekends per month. He had an impeccable reputation and safety record at Giant. Joe  
was a very experienced long-time miner.  
Joe was first married in 1964, and they had three children; Joe Jr., Maria and Ivan born in 1967, 1968 and 1972  
respectively. In Yellowknife, he and his first wife started a janitorial business while he was working at Giant. She  
died in 1983 due to heart problems.  
Judit Pandev was born in Hungary in 1942 and came to Canada in 1957. She has a brother and a sister. Her  
father died at age 86 from dementia but was healthy otherwise. Her mother is 83 and physically well but has  
problems with her mental health.  
Judit was first married in 1959 and had four children. Her first child was born in 1959 but died when he was 10  
years old. Her other children were born in 1963, 1973 and 1978 respectively. Her husband moved to Yellowknife  
in 1963, and she followed one year later. In 1974, Judit’s first husband was killed in the 750 foot level at Giant.  
Following her husband’s death, Judit left Yellowknife and moved to Windsor, Ontario, where she held various  
jobs such as selling cemetery lots, picking apples and cleaning. Judit had a fifth child in 1978, Tim, whose father  
was absent thereafter.  
Judit returned to Yellowknife in 1980 and secured employment cleaning and working at a hardware store. She  
began working for Joe and his first wife’s janitorial business in 1980. She left her job at the hardware store and  
began to work at the Hudson’s Bay Company in 1986, while cleaning buildings in the evenings and on weekends.  
After Joe’s first wife died, Judit assumed control of the business. In October 1991, she began to work at Woolco  
because of the impending strike and continued working at Woolco until the fatal blast.  
In 1985, Judit and Joe were married. She moved into his home with her four children, Joey, Ivan, Tammy and  
Tim. Tammy moved out in 1988, followed by Ivan in 1991. However, Tammy returned to live with Joe and Judit  
in the spring of 1992, as she was expecting a child. They planned to support her and her baby so that she could  
complete her education. Joe’s two children, Thomas and Maria, left upon Judit and Joe’s marriage; however, Joe  
continued to assist them financially.  
Joe did not do any picket duty during the strike; instead, he assisted Judit with her cleaning business and  
renovated some parts of their home. He returned to work at Giant on August 15, 1992.  
Generally, Joe enjoyed good health aside from poor hearing. A year before his death, he suffered back problems  
but did not miss any work as a result thereof.  
It was the Pandevs’ plan that, when Joe retired from mining, they would continue with the janitorial business and  
he would shovel snow or possibly pan for gold. This would be supplementary income as his pension was expected  
to be $1,500 per month. He would have reached normal retirement age in March 2002 and had the option of  
early retirement on July 15, 1993, upon which he would receive a pension of $1,100 per month. They had decided  
that the pension he was entitled to on early retirement would not be sufficient, thus he planned to continue to  
work at least until Tammy finished her education. Following his retirement, they would likely have settled in  
British Columbia or Alberta.  
Since Joe’s death, Judit has blamed herself for allowing him to return to work. She was prescribed high blood  
pressure, sleeping and anti-depressant medication. Her daughter Tammy was very distraught and was unable to  
nurse her baby after the fatal blast. Filled with fear that someone would come and attack the family, Tammy slept  
with a knife under her bed. Judit described her son Tim as a “mental case”, and he was often found wandering  
around the house at night. He was diagnosed with high blood pressure and was treated. Judit has not had any  
contact with Joe Jr., Ivan or Maria after Joe’s death, and she believes they blame her for Joe’s death.  
In June 1993, Judit, Tim, Tammy and her fiancé and child, Kayla, left Yellowknife and moved to Waterdown,  
Ontario. She and Tammy started a daycare shortly after the move and they looked after 12 children until 1996.  
Tammy married in 1996, and Judit kept her four-year-old granddaughter Kayla with her and Tim. In 1998, Kayla  
went to live with her parents. At some point, Judit took a job at Zeller’s for six months.  
Joe’s income information is as follows:  
Year  
Taxable Income  
Non-Taxable Income  
Deductions  
Total Income  
Employment & Business Income  
1988  
79,153.00  
0.00  
10,664.00  
89,817.00  
86,848.00  
1989  
81,363.00  
0.00  
10,820.00  
92,183.00  
92,028.00  
1990  
98,796.00  
0.00  
10,868.00  
109,664.00  
106,630.00  
1991  
100,300.00  
0.00  
13,482.00  
113,782.00  
111,212.00  
1992  
61,330.00  
2,833.00  
7,090.00  
71,253.00  
66,366.00  
Joe's RRSP contributions were as follows: $3,000 in 1988, $3,000 in 1990, and $6,000 in 1991.  
Judit’s income information is as follows:  
Year  
Taxable Income  
Non-Taxable Income  
Deductions  
Total Income  
Employment & Business Income  
1988  
11,779.00  
0.00  
264.00  
12,043.00  
11,683.00  
1989  
6,558.00  
0.00  
0.00  
6,558.00  
4,600.00  
1990  
Unknown  
Unknown  
Unknown  
Unknown  
Unknown  
1991  
7,720.00  
0.00  
0.00  
7,720.00  
7,720.00  
1992  
14,301.00  
6,156.00  
1,560.00  
22,017.00  
9,648.00  
1993  
21,197.00  
19,237.00  
16,260.00  
56,694.00  
0.00  
1994  
15,566.00  
19,237.00  
0.00  
34,803.00  
0.00  
1995  
15,897.00  
19,237.00  
0.00  
35,134.00  
0.00  
1996  
17,335.00  
19,237.00  
0.00  
36,572.00  
1,891.00  
1997  
21,283.00  
19,587.00  
0.00  
40,870.00  
5,835.00  
1998  
18,613.00  
19,936.00  
0.00  
38,549.00  
77.00  
1999  
15,579.00  
21,916.00  
0.00  
37,495.00  
0.00  
2000  
18,862.00  
101,877.00  
0.00  
120,739.00  
0.00  
On September 13, 1993, Judit received a letter from Royal Oak indicating that her pension would be reduced from  
around $900 per month to $500, effective March 2002.  
Joe’s household contributions included washing dishes, vacuuming, gardening, painting, home renovations,  
mowing the grass, snow removal and minor vehicle maintenance. He was also involved in helping Judit’s  
children with their homework and attending PTA meetings at the children’s schools. He also took care of the  
family finances and those for Judit’s business. They shared all expenses during their marriage.  
Since Joe’s death, Judit has been diagnosed with insulin-dependent diabetes and angina. During Warren’s  
preliminary hearing, Judit suffered a silent heart attack, which lasted for one day and a half, and requires ongoing  
medication. She also has arthritis, which has become progressively worse since 1992, as well as vascular disease  
rendering her unable to walk at times.  
Judit has lived in Waterdown, Ontario, for the past 10 years. She currently lives alone.  
e) Riggs Family  
Carol Riggs was born in Kirkland Lake, Ontario, in 1944, and had two siblings. She was first married in 1961 and  
had three children; Peter, Shane and Linda were born in 1963, 1965 and 1967 respectively. Carol divorced in 1969  
and married Lawrence Riggs in 1979.  
In 1973, she had a child with Lawrence. Before Lawrence died in 1982, they had begun to legally change her  
children’s last names to “Riggs”. Carol Riggs testified that she struggled financially after her husband’s death and  
throughout the 1980s.  
After high school in June 1984, Shane was employed doing cedar shake blocking for one year and a half. He then  
moved to Yellowknife and secured employment with Arctic West Drilling, where he learned how to drill holes and  
put pilings in, his ultimate goal to be a miner. In April 1988, he obtained a job at Giant, hired initially to do some  
carpentry work, and then moved to operating air truck drills. Shane had mine rescue training, first aid, blasting  
and scoop tram operating certificates. In 1991, he won an internal mine rescue competition at Giant.  
Carol was employed in a corner store, as a cook in a restaurant and as a housekeeper in a hotel. She also  
participated in a government program for unemployment insurance called “evapping”. On moving to Yellowknife  
in 1992, she secured a job with Inflight Services for a couple of months, following which she cleaned offices. At  
some point in time, she suffered a back injury at work and received workers’ compensation.  
In August 1982, Carol Riggs bought a house. There was a mortgage on the property, and Shane helped her make  
the payments when she did not have sufficient funds. In 1986, he sent her money to cover the $365 mortgage  
payment a total of seven times. In 1987, he paid her mortgage six times. In 1989 and 1990, she did not need his  
contributions. In 1991, he forwarded her almost $1,000. Shane covered his mother’s travel expenses on her move  
to Yellowknife in 1992 and assisted her with her mortgage and groceries for the month of July that year. He also  
contributed money to his half-brother Lawrence, totaling approximately $1,000 per year. Shane also made  
household contributions when he visited her home, including car repairs, grass cutting, cleaning the yard and  
house repairs.  
Shane’ income information is as follows:  
Year  
Taxable Income  
Non-Taxable Income  
Deductions  
Total Income  
Employment & Business Income  
1990  
0.00  
0.00  
1,500.00  
1,500.00  
n/a  
1991  
77,227.00  
0.00  
4,740.00  
81,967.00  
n/a  
1992  
35,773.00  
0.00  
1,982.00  
37,755.00  
n/a  
After his death, Carol sold Shane’s truck and obtained $10,000. She was also named as beneficiary on Shane’s  
RRSPs which were valued at around $4,000.  
Carol began a relationship with Mike Harrison, who moved into her home in 1991. It has been a volatile  
relationship; there have been some brief separations, yet they have remained together. Mike is currently  
employed although has not been throughout their cohabitation. They have retained separate finances throughout  
their relationship, but, when unemployed Mike contributes to the household tasks, while she covers the expenses.  
Her financial burden was eased by this living arrangement with Mike.  
Carol currently suffers from rheumatoid arthritis. She was unable to work for one year and a half prior to moving  
back to Yellowknife in September 2003. She is currently working; however, her stiffness appears to be  
resurfacing.  
In 1993, Carol had no income. In 1995, she unsuccessfully promoted a sports clothing line, named after Shane.  
In 1995, she began working for Best Western and this continued for about seven years. Her annual income from  
1997 to 2001 was approximately $16,000.  
Carol’s income information is as follows:  
Year  
Taxable Income  
Non-Taxable Income  
Deductions  
Total Income  
Employment & Business Income  
1986  
0.00  
2,227.00  
0.00  
2,227.00  
n/a  
1987  
0.00  
1,855.00  
0.00  
1,855.00  
n/a  
1988  
14,691.00  
930.00  
0.00  
15,621.00  
n/a  
1989  
7,503.00  
0.00  
0.00  
7,503.00  
n/a  
1990  
5,305.00  
0.00  
0.00  
5,305.00  
n/a  
1991  
3,426.00  
865.00  
0.00  
4,291.00  
n/a  
1992  
6,270.00  
5,774.00  
2,745.00  
14,789.00  
n/a  
1993  
5,157.00  
999.00  
0.00  
6,156.00  
n/a  
1994  
-4,871.00  
19,212.00  
0.00  
14,341.00  
n/a  
1995  
4,296.00  
0.00  
0.00  
4,296.00  
n/a  
1996  
6,466.00  
0.00  
0.00  
6,466.00  
n/a  
1997  
18,326.00  
0.00  
0.00  
18,437.00  
n/a  
1998  
17,275.00  
0.00  
4,912.00  
22,187.00  
n/a  
1999  
23,038.00  
0.00  
0.00  
23,038.00  
n/a  
2000  
21,960.00  
0.00  
0.00  
21,960.00  
n/a  
2001  
19,527.00  
0.00  
0.00  
19,527.00  
n/a  
2002  
6,300.00  
0.00  
0.00  
6,300.00  
n/a  
f) Vodnoski Family  
David Vodnoski was born in 1967, in Carrot River, Saskatchewan, and was one of six children. David’s father died  
of cancer and one of his brothers has diabetes.  
David completed grade 12 and then began to work in the trucking industry. He bought his own gravel truck and  
also drove a logging truck. He moved to Yellowknife in or around 1988 and worked for Ed’s Trucking. He was  
hired as a miner’s helper on July 21, 1988, at Giant and was employed there until his death in 1992. Before  
crossing the picket line during the strike, he worked for Ed’s Trucking for part of the summer to earn additional  
income. He returned to work at Giant on August 6, 1992. He aspired to become a miner.  
Doreen Vodnoski was born in Nipawin, Saskatchewan, in 1964, and was one of nine children. Her mother was  
diagnosed with diabetes, and her sister is a breast cancer survivor. Doreen married Robert Harker in 1983 and  
had two children. Dwight was born in 1981, and Wesley was born in 1985. She left the marriage in 1989, and her  
sons remained with their father during this time. She paid $1,000 per month in child support.  
In 1983, Doreen was employed at a gas station until she moved to Yellowknife in 1989. After this move she found  
employment at a bar and, in January 1990, she was hired at YK Motors. She began as a gas attendant, was  
promoted to secretary, and then accounting clerk.  
Doreen and David began living together sometime before October 1989, when her ex-husband arrived with her  
children. From this time onward, Doreen’s sons lived with her. Their father exercised access only sporadically.  
An attachment quickly formed between David and Doreen’s sons, particularly Wesley. Her ex-husband had  
agreed that, after Doreen and David had their first anniversary, he would consent to David adopting them. They  
also had planned to have a child of their own and decided to remain in Yellowknife because of the employment  
opportunities and the education benefits for the children.  
After learning of her husband’s death, Doreen had few memories of September 18, 1992. She left Yellowknife  
three or four days after the fatal blast but returned in mid-October in an attempt to regain some normalcy for her  
sons. She resumed her job at YK Motors at this time. In her attempts to deal with David’s death, Doreen  
increased her alcohol consumption, becoming dependent on it for sleep. She was eventually terminated at YK  
Motors in January 1993, as she was unable to deal with the public, particularly those who were members of  
CASAW Local 4. Moreover, one of her co-workers held a different opinion than Doreen about the strike, which  
caused friction between them.  
She left Yellowknife in April 1993, after a fire was set to her trailer. Not long after living with her parents, Doreen  
purchased an acreage in White Fox, Saskatchewan, in early May 1993, which she sold in May 1997.  
Doreen worked sporadically at a window and glass shop, following which she worked at Northlands Inn, assisting  
in the beverage room for about four months. In 1998, she trained the wait staff at George’s Café for a three-  
month period, but her employment was terminated. She then obtained a position at the River Inn sporadically  
for a six-month period and then at the White Fox Hotel for about seven months. It was her evidence that since  
her termination at YK Motors she has been unable to maintain steady employment because she struggles to  
properly interact with others.  
Doreen’s income information is as follows:  
Year  
Taxable Income  
Non-Taxable Income  
Deductions  
Total Income  
Employment & Business Income  
1988  
4,539.00  
0.00  
1,019.00  
5,558.00  
5,558.00  
1989  
12,106.00  
0.00  
0.00  
12,106.00  
113,210.00  
1990  
26,834.00  
0.00  
0.00  
26,834.00  
26,035.00  
1991  
31,566.00  
0.00  
0.00  
31,566.00  
30,052.00  
1992  
26,042.00  
6,450.00  
6,575.00  
39,067.00  
26,630.00  
1993  
33,643.00  
22,800.00  
2,542.00  
58,985.00  
15,991.00  
1994  
11,354.00  
22,800.00  
0.00  
34,154.00  
1,999.00  
1995  
4,161.00  
22,800.00  
0.00  
26,961.00  
0.00  
1996  
0.00  
22,800.00  
0.00  
22,800.00  
111.00  
1997  
7,376.00  
23,214.00  
0.00  
30,590.00  
2,926.00  
1998  
7,732.00  
47,256.00  
0.00  
54,988.00  
3,428.00  
1999  
7,630.00  
25,975.00  
0.00  
33,605.00  
3,287.00  
2000  
4,412.00  
26,282.00  
0.00  
30,694.00  
0.00  
David’s income information is as follows:  
Year  
Taxable Income  
Non-Taxable Income  
Deductions  
Total Income  
Employment & Business Income  
1989  
54,238.00  
0.00  
3,884.00  
58,122.00  
57,502.00  
1990  
54,679.00  
0.00  
9,208.00  
63,887.00  
63,670.00  
1991  
62,814.00  
0.00  
13,194.00  
76,008.00  
76,008.00  
1992  
40,504.00  
0.00  
19,608.00  
60,112.00  
60,112.00  
David’s 1992 income includes his employment at Giant from January to May, one month of trucking while he was  
on strike and income earned after crossing the picket line from August until September 18. David dealt with the  
family finances, and, although they initially had separate accounts, after David purchased their trailer at the end  
of 1988, their incomes were combined.  
David’s household contributions included preparing meals, cleaning, grocery shopping, yard maintenance, snow  
removal and some laundry. He was also proficient with home repairs as he insulated and drywalled the porch of  
their trailer. David performed all maintenance work on their vehicles, unless it was a repair covered under  
warranty.  
In late 1994 or early 1995, Doreen became romantically involved with Bob Harrison (“Bob”), a divorced farmer  
who owned 14 quarters of land in White Fox, Saskatchewan. He had joint custody of his two children with his  
wife, and exercised access every other week. In the spring of 1997, Doreen and her children moved in with Bob, in  
a house that he built.  
Doreen’s ex-husband participated in her sons’ lives for the first year and a half after David’s death, but his contact  
has been sporadic ever since. Dwight is currently 22 years old and pursuing an education. Wesley is 18 years old  
and continues to blame Doreen for David’s death. When he was in grade seven, she found him in the fetal  
position under his bed saying that he wanted to die. He has seen many counsellors, was hospitalized for one week  
and diagnosed with bi-polar disorder. Wesley has also been involved with drug use and was in the penal system  
following theft charges when he was 16 years old.  
Doreen and Bob do not currently have a joint account, although they did at one time, nor do they have access to  
each other’s accounts. Her income covers her car costs, her son’s car payment and groceries for the house. She  
pays for the fall school supplies and some clothing for her children as well as for Bob’s. Bob pays all the  
household expenses, including mortgage, gas, utilities and beef products. When Doreen sold her home in 1997,  
she retained the profit entirely. Although she has no ownership in the house, Doreen does some improvements,  
for which she pays. As a couple, they rent a lot at a nearby lake to spend time on the weekends with all four  
children.  
Doreen does all of the grocery shopping, cleaning and finances, while Bob performs all major maintenance  
required in the house. She also contributes to his farm, specifically assisting with seed breeding trials. This took  
her two to three hours every second day from the end of June to the end of August each year, except for the recent  
fall when she ran the combine for 80 acres. She also prepares lunches for Bob and his hired hand.  
Doreen has assumed the role of step-parent to Bob’s children, who are 15 and 13 years old, such as assisting with  
their homework and accompanying them to sports activities. Doreen and Bob were engaged in February 2001,  
but she does not plan to marry him at this time.  
g) Rowsell Family  
Robert Rowsell was born in 1955, in Harrington Harbour, Quebec. He had two brothers and one sister, who are  
all believed to be living healthily. His grandparents lived into their 80s and 90s.  
Robert obtained a grade 11 level of education in Quebec, following which he worked as a barn painter and did  
some welding and construction. He then obtained his “class A” commercial trucking licence and took a loan to  
purchase a large commercial rig. From March 1980 to 1988, he was a self-employed owner-operator, hauling a  
variety of goods. He had contracts with such companies as Highland Transport, Kingsway and Arnold Brothers.  
He did many of the minor repairs and maintenance on his own truck.  
Ready for a career change, Robert got into mining in 1988. He took a common core course, as well as training in  
transportation and handling of dangerous goods and driver improvement. He also completed the principles of  
safety course in November 1988 from the Mines Accident Prevention Association of Ontario. His first job was  
with Citadel Gold Mines in Wawa from whom he obtained a company home. He was given a grant to put a down  
payment on a home and over $7,000 of it was forgiven in 1991. Further courses were taken by Robert through  
Citadel Gold Mines in 1988. He became very involved in mine rescue training and was a health and safety  
representative, as he had training in first aid. He had competed in mine rescue and had received the advanced  
seal for mine rescue from the Ontario Government. Robert worked as a timberman, trammer, scoop operator and  
jackleg miner.  
Between 1989 and May 1992, he worked at various mines. At one point, he worked in a non-mining job for a  
three-month period. At times, Robert found himself unemployed for months at a time. On September 4, 1992, he  
was hired by Procon to work at Giant. He believed it to have the potential to become full-time employment; if so,  
the family planned to relocate to Yellowknife. His longest gap in employment was four months.  
Robert’s health was generally good. He experienced slight bronchitis or asthma, although it did not interfere with  
his ability to work. In 1991, he suffered a leg injury at work and was hospitalized but missed less than one month  
of work. In March 1992, he suffered a neck injury, which entitled him to receive Workers’ Compensation  
payments. He did not lose any work time as a result of this injury. He was a smoker.  
Carlene Rowsell was born in Port Arthur, Ontario, in 1953. She has three sisters and one brother, all of whom are  
alive and healthy. Her mother is still alive but receives medication for bronchial problems. Her father died of  
lung cancer four years ago; he was a smoker. One grandparent, also a smoker, died of esophagus cancer, while  
another has Lou Gehrig’s disease. When Carlene was 16, she was diagnosed with Bell’s Palsy, leaving half of her  
facial muscles paralyzed and a loss of balance control. Carlene smokes a pack of cigarettes per day.  
Before finishing grade 11, Carlene left school. Her work experience began as a clerk in a store, then in  
construction and as a babysitter, housekeeper and cook. After her first child was born, she did not work outside  
of the home but started a small business.  
The Rowsells were married in 1977. They had two children, born in 1985 and 1991, respectively. They had  
planned to support their children through college or university and shared joint bank accounts throughout their  
marriage.  
Robert’s income information is as follows:  
Year  
Taxable Income  
Non-Taxable Income  
Deductions  
Total Income  
Employment & Business Income  
1989  
45,330.00  
0.00  
0.00  
45,330.00  
45,330.00  
1990  
56,169.00  
0.00  
727.00  
56,896.00  
54,961.00  
1991  
74,491.00  
0.00  
758.00  
75,249.00  
67,550.00  
1992  
37,289.00  
0.00  
0.00  
37,289.00  
36,713.00  
Carlene’s income information is as follows:  
Year  
Taxable Income  
Non-Taxable Income  
Deductions  
Total Income  
Employment & Business Income  
1989  
Unknown  
0.00  
0.00  
0.00  
0.00  
1990  
Unknown  
0.00  
0.00  
0.00  
0.00  
1991  
Unknown  
0.00  
0.00  
0.00  
0.00  
1992  
1,247.00  
6,450.00  
0.00  
7,697.00  
0.00  
1993  
5,653.00  
22,800.00  
0.00  
28,453.00  
0.00  
1994  
4,310.00  
22,800.00  
0.00  
27,110.00  
0.00  
1995  
4,332.00  
22,800.00  
0.00  
27,132.00  
0.00  
1996  
4,410.00  
22,800.00  
0.00  
27,210.00  
0.00  
1997  
4,476.00  
23,214.00  
0.00  
27,690.00  
0.00  
1998  
4,561.00  
23,628.00  
0.00  
28,189.00  
0.00  
1999  
4,602.00  
25,975.00  
0.00  
30,577.00  
0.00  
2000  
4,676.00  
26,282.00  
0.00  
30,958.00  
0.00  
2001  
4,796.00  
26,891.00  
0.00  
31,687.00  
0.00  
Robert’s household contributions included doing dishes and grocery shopping. He was an excellent carpenter,  
having refinished an entire bathroom in their home. He also did larger renovations, such as building stairs and  
modifying the walls.  
Since her husband’s death, Carlene has not worked. She was concerned about their eldest daughter and sought  
counseling for her.  
Carlene began a relationship with Darren Dasilva (“Dasilva”), and they cohabited from June 1993 until December  
1999. They had a child together in 1994. During their relationship, she bought a summer cabin on a land lease  
where she home schooled their child. Dasilva tended to leave the family from time to time for periods of three to  
four days, but while home he contributed to the household significantly.  
Carlene maintained a bank account in her name throughout this relationship, and Dasilva forwarded his  
paycheques to her. He worked sporadically and contributed financially to the family when he was employed.  
These contributions tended to be between $800 and $1,000, four to six times per year.  
As a result of Dasilva’s heavy drinking, there was friction in the relationship. He left in December 1999, and does  
not pay child support.  
In 2001, she moved in with her brother and his wife, paying for one half of the hydro and groceries until August  
2002. She currently lives in Manitouwadge, Ontario.  
h) Russell Family  
Arnold Russell was born in Bathurst, New Brunswick, in 1951. He has 13 siblings, one of whom died of a heart  
attack. The remainder are alive and healthy. His mother died of cancer when he was 13 years old, and his father  
died at age 72.  
Arnold completed grade eight, after which he worked in a tire shop. He began to work underground in the mining  
industry in 1970 at a gold mine. He worked in sanitation for one year in Quebec, then returned to work in tire  
shops from the mid-1970's until about 1986. Periodically, he also worked part-time for the Department of  
Transport clearing trees. Around 1986, Arnold succeeded in finding work in his preferred field of mining. He  
worked for contracting companies underground as a scoop tram operator until November 1988, when he took a  
brief period of time off. Arnold resumed work as a miner until the end of 1990, when he found himself  
unemployed for one year and a half. During this period, he performed “odd jobs” as available and found a brief  
opportunity with a mine.  
On June 17, 1992, Arnold was hired by Procon to work underground at Giant. This was a temporary arrangement  
as the family had no intention of moving to Yellowknife. In fact, it was his plan to complete the six-week term and  
return home as he was no longer feeling safe at Giant. He had considered returning to Giant after the strike was  
over.  
Arnold enjoyed relatively good health, sustaining a few broken bones throughout his career. None of these had  
any long-term impact on his employability. He also endured an eye injury when a piece of steel entered his eye;  
however, no long-term damage was done. Arnold was a regular smoker throughout the duration of his marriage.  
Karen Russell was born in Bathurst, New Brunswick, in 1954. She is one of seven siblings, all of whom continue  
to be healthy. Her mother died of ovarian cancer when Karen was 11 years old, and her father died when he was  
72.  
She received a grade 10 level of education and began to work after her youngest child was in school. This was in  
1982, when she worked as a cook at a restaurant for a couple of years. She then returned to the workforce in  
1988, as a sales associate at Town & Country, where she worked until 1992. Beginning in 1990, Karen also  
worked for the Bathurst Labour Union as a summer holiday replacement for their secretary. This continued as a  
two-week term each year, until Karen was hired full-time in 2002.  
The Russells met in 1968 and were married in 1971. They had four children born in 1971, 1973, 1974 and 1976  
respectively. In 1987, Karen’s father came to live with them as he had a stroke and was paralyzed on his left side.  
He continued to live with them until 1993.  
Karen has few memories of the day of the fatal blast. She was unable to sleep in the room she shared with her  
husband; it was not until they moved in 1993 that she stopped sleeping on the couch. Their son was silent  
following his father’s death, and he subsequently became involved in drug use, violence and problems with the  
law. On one occasion, as a result of his anger, he caused physical damage to the family home. He has begun to  
put his life together in the last two years and has returned to school.  
Subsequent to the fatal blast, Karen re-entered the workforce. She worked at Reitmans from 1993 to 1995, and  
then, from 1998 to 2000, she worked at Cotton Ginny as a sales associate. Since June 2002, she has worked full-  
time with the Bathurst Labour Union. It had been her intention, prior to Arnold’s death, to continue to work in  
various jobs.  
Arnold’s income information is as follows:  
Year  
Taxable Income  
Non-Taxable Income  
Deductions  
Total Income  
Employment & Business Income  
1988  
39,335.00  
0.00  
0.00  
39,335.00  
37,781.00  
1989  
31,404.00  
0.00  
0.00  
31,404.00  
Unknown  
1990  
40,524.00  
0.00  
0.00  
40,524.00  
39,325.00  
1991  
16,852.00  
0.00  
0.00  
16,852.00  
15,767.00  
1992  
30,938.00  
0.00  
0.00  
30,938.00  
30,311.00  
Karen’s income information is as follows:  
Year  
Taxable Income  
Non-Taxable Income  
Deductions  
Total Income  
Employment & Business Income  
1987  
761.00  
0.00  
23.00  
784.00  
n/a  
1988  
3,500.00  
0.00  
0.00  
3,500.00  
n/a  
1989  
4,543.00  
0.00  
0.00  
4,543.00  
4,543.00  
1990  
7,035.00  
0.00  
0.00  
7,035.00  
7,035.00  
1991  
9,834.00  
0.00  
0.00  
9,834.00  
9,834.00  
1992  
10,316.00  
7,458.00  
0.00  
17,774.00  
9,940.00  
1993  
10,568.00  
26,362.00  
0.00  
36,930.00  
5,136.00  
1994  
17,817.00  
25,768.00  
0.00  
43,585.00  
14,042.00  
1995  
4,553.00  
19,831.00  
0.00  
24,384.00  
759.00  
1996  
11,127.00  
19,237.00  
0.00  
30,364.00  
7,490.00  
1997  
11,832.00  
19,587.00  
0.00  
31,419.00  
8,826.00  
1998  
13,105.00  
19,936.00  
0.00  
33,041.00  
10,042.00  
1999  
879.00  
18,534.00  
0.00  
27,326.00  
5,702.00  
2000  
12,729.00  
18,068.00  
0.00  
30,797.00  
9,589.00  
2001  
15,204.00  
18,488.00  
0.00  
33,692.00  
8,316.00  
2002  
18,366.00  
19,052.00  
138.00  
37,556.00  
8,496.00  
The Russells filed for bankruptcy in early 1992. They had joint accounts throughout their marriage.  
Arnold’s contributions to the household included cooking and all types of housework, except for laundry. He  
performed all vehicle maintenance, including major repairs. He was competent with various home renovations  
and repairs including painting, dry walling, framing and plumbing. The Russells had planned to travel with a  
motor home in their retirement.  
In 1988, Karen was diagnosed with ovarian cancer. Initially, she had an ovary removed, later undergoing an  
entire hysterectomy. She has smoked since the age of 13.  
She has lived in Bathurst for her entire life. Karen has dated since her husband’s death. One relationship lasted  
for about eight years; however, they never cohabited, nor was there any financial benefit to her.  
i) Sawler Family  
Malcolm Sawler was born in 1954, in Western Shore, Nova Scotia. He had no contact with his biological father  
and lived in foster care for most of his childhood. When his mother married his stepfather, Malcolm lived with  
them. He has two sisters and two brothers, all of whom are alive with no known health problems.  
Malcolm obtained a grade nine level of education. His first job was with Inco as an underground miner at age 18,  
following which he worked in a factory. Not satisfied with that type of work, he returned to mining and worked  
steadily as both a company and contract miner. He had obtained a blasting certificate and was trained in  
hazardous materials and first aid, and at some point he received the Ontario designation of “Miner 2".  
Malcolm was first married in 1975 and had two children from this marriage: Paul, born in 1975, and Pam, born in  
1978. This marriage ended in 1984. Malcolm did not pay child support initially but had monthly access to his  
children.  
Bonnie Lou Sawler was born in Renfrew, Ontario, in 1957. She has two sisters, one of whom died at age six.  
Bonnie Lou’s mother is still alive at age 80 and has a form of dementia, arthritis and Raynaud’s Syndrome. Her  
father has early onset diabetes and is insulin-dependent. He also endured triple bypass surgery in 1990.  
Bonnie Lou has a diploma in dental assisting and has been employed as a dental and chair side assistant since  
1977. She also taught part of the dental program in a business college and currently is doing some management.  
After Malcolm and Bonnie Lou married in 1986, they moved to Yellowknife in 1987, as a result of Malcolm’s  
search for employment as a company miner. Bonnie Lou worked as a dental assistant in Yellowknife during this  
period. They moved a few weeks later because Malcolm had not been successful finding work. In 1989, Bonnie  
Lou had a son, following which she ceased her employment. In 1987, Malcolm worked sporadically until he  
secured a job operating a jackleg drill and scooptram at the Nerco Con Mine in Yellowknife. He left Nerco in 1989  
because it appeared as though he would not have the opportunity to advance in his career. They left Yellowknife  
again in the spring of 1989, after Malcolm had secured another job.  
From the spring of 1989, he worked as an underground miner at various mines in Ontario, doing both contract  
and company work. The mining industry in Ontario in 1992 was not strong, and he was laid off in April 1992. On  
July 31, 1992, Malcolm was hired by Procon. He was subsequently offered a permanent position with Royal Oak  
as an underground miner.  
Malcolm never suffered any serious injuries, although he broke his arm but was able to continue with light duties.  
He had a thyroid problem, but this did not interfere with his ability to work.  
The Sawlers had planned to start increasing the size of their family in 1992. Furthermore, Malcolm had hoped to  
retire at age 55. Bonnie Lou’s plans were to continue to work as a dental assistant or a dental assistant instructor  
indefinitely.  
Malcolm’s income information is as follows:  
Year  
Taxable Income  
Non-Taxable Income  
Deductions  
Total Income  
Employment & Business Income  
1989  
31,074.00  
0.00  
14,182.00  
45,256.00  
45,043.00  
1990  
53,683.00  
0.00  
10,012.00  
63,695.00  
63,295.00  
1991  
58,918.00  
0.00  
11,710.00  
70,628.00  
70,628.00  
1992  
42,251.00  
0.00  
3,835.00  
46,086.00  
45,668.00  
Bonnie Lou’s income information is as follows:  
Year  
Taxable Income  
Non-Taxable Income  
Deductions  
Total Income  
Employment & Business Income  
1987  
8,700.00  
0.00  
4,574.00  
13,274.00  
n/a  
1988  
28,640.00  
0.00  
0.00  
28,640.00  
27,891.00  
1989  
18,935.00  
0.00  
0.00  
18,935.00  
18,619.00  
1990  
9,094.00  
0.00  
1,004.00  
10,098.00  
9,354.00  
1991  
11,504.00  
0.00  
2,402.00  
13,906.00  
13,584.00  
1992  
11,134.00  
5,442.00  
14,005.00  
30,581.00  
12,500.00  
1993  
18,340.00  
19,237.00  
8,726.00  
46,303.00  
13,201.00  
1994  
20,671.00  
21,018.00  
5,704.00  
47,393.00  
10,356.00  
1995  
21,108.00  
22,800.00  
2,827.00  
46,735.00  
5,389.00  
1996  
27,742.00  
22,800.00  
3,705.00  
54,247.00  
12,909.00  
1997  
26,532.00  
21,401.00  
2,100.00  
50,033.00  
12,659.00  
1998  
19,351.00  
19,936.00  
693.00  
39,980.00  
573.00  
1999  
19,437.00  
21,916.00  
75.00  
41,428.00  
12,914.00  
2000  
24,430.00  
22,175.00  
3,950.00  
50,555.00  
13,840.00  
2001  
31,143.00  
22,689.00  
1,575.00  
55,407.00  
11,116.00  
Malcolm had a life insurance policy, and the couple had begun to make RRSP contributions in February 1990.  
They contributed $3,500 in 1990, and again in 1991. Throughout their relationship, they had joint accounts.  
Bonnie Lou and Malcolm shared all household responsibilities, although Malcolm tended to do all of the yard  
work. He did repairs around the house including painting and putting up sheet rock, as well as minor  
maintenance on the vehicles.  
Following her husband’s death, Bonnie Lou took one month off work and then returned to teaching. Malcolm’s  
children, Pam and Paul, had a difficult time dealing with his death, and, when she was 16, Pam moved in with  
Bonnie Lou. Pam has undergone counseling since her father’s death. Paul began to drink at age 17 and has been  
in residential rehabilitation programs for alcohol recovery. On Malcolm’s death, Bonnie Lou continued to make  
the child support payments that Malcolm had been making for his children. She made payments for Paul until he  
reached 21 and for Pam until she came to reside with her.  
Bonnie Lou and Malcolm’s child Nathan was three years old when his father died. He plans to attend university  
after High School with the financial assistance of Bonnie Lou, who has contributed to his RESP. He also benefits  
from a trust fund for children of the victims of the fatal blast.  
Bonnie Lou is currently engaged to and living with Michael Buzzi (“Buzzi”). They began living together in 1996 in  
her home, which at that time no longer had a mortgage. He is divorced with two adult daughters and a teenaged  
son who reside with their mother. Buzzi pays $400 per month in child support for his son.  
Buzzi was employed with the Lakehead Association of Community Living, a center for adults with mental or  
physical disabilities. After suffering a back injury in 2000, he has received $1,600 workers’ compensation per  
month, as he is currently unable to work. Buzzi’s income had been approximately $30,000. He had a medical  
benefit plan, from which Bonnie Lou enjoys coverage. He has made no attempt to find alternative employment.  
Before his injury, Buzzi contributed to the household tasks, but since the injury he is unable to do outdoor work.  
However, his contributions to some household tasks have increased as he spends more time in the home.  
For the past four years, Bonnie Lou has worked four days per week as a dental assistant. Prior to this position,  
she had been teaching at an institution that went into receivership. She upgraded her education to become a level  
2 dental assistant in Ontario, and returned to work in the field.  
Buzzi and Bonnie Lou have maintained separate accounts for the duration of their cohabitation. Buzzi  
contributes between $400 and $600 per month to living expenses. Bonnie Lou believes this to be a long-term  
relationship and she regards Buzzi as a replacement father for Nathan.  
Bonnie Lou has been living in Thunder Bay, Ontario, for the past 13 years. She recently found a lump in her  
breast, but it was found to be benign. This condition continues to be monitored. She used to smoke regularly but  
considers herself an occasional smoker.  
THE PARTIES’ PLEADINGS  
The Plaintiffs’ Claims Against the Defendants  
The following claims were advanced in their statement of claim:  
(A) Sheila Fullowka, widow of the late Lavern Michael Fullowka, deceased:  
(i) Loss of the comfort and society of her late husband - $50,000.00;  
(ii) Extreme grief, mental anguish and bereavement - $50,000.00;  
(iii) Loss of the value of housekeeping and parenting contributions to the maintenance and upkeep of the family  
home - $100,000.00;  
(iv) Loss of the financial contributions (including fringe benefits) that her late husband would have made during  
the remainder of their marriage toward her maintenance, necessities of life and comfort - $1,900,000.00;  
(v) Loss of pension benefits which otherwise would have accrued - $500,000.00;  
(vi) Loss of the increase in value of her inheritance from her late husband’s estate - $285,000.00;  
(vii) Out-of-pocket expenses related to or arising out of her late husband’s death (e.g. long distance telephone  
expenses, moving expenses, travel expenses) - $25,000.00*  
(viii) Funeral Expenses - $10,000.00.*  
(B) Karen Fullowka, daughter of the late Lavern Michael Fullowka, deceased:  
(i) Loss of lifetime care, guidance and companionship of her late father - $50,000.00;  
(ii) Extreme grief, mental anguish and bereavement - $50,000.00;  
(iii) Loss of the financial contributions (including fringe benefits) that her late father would have made until she  
established her independence for her maintenance, necessities, comfort and education - $620,000.00;  
(iv) Loss of the increase in value of her inheritance from her late father’s estate - $145,000.00.  
(C) Steven Fullowka, son of the late Lavern Michael Fullowka, deceased:  
(i) Loss of lifetime care, guidance and companionship of his late father - $50,000.00;  
(ii) Extreme grief, mental anguish and bereavement - $50,000.00;  
(iii) Loss of the financial contributions (including fringe benefits) that his late father would have made until he  
established his independence for his maintenance, necessities, comfort and education - $710,000.00;  
(iv) Loss of the increase in value of his inheritance from his late father’s estate - $145,000.00.  
(D) Doreen Shauna Hourie, widow of the late Norman Willard Hourie, deceased:  
(i) Loss of the comfort and society of her late husband - $50,000.00;  
(ii) Extreme grief, mental anguish and bereavement - $50,000.00;  
(iii) Loss of the value of housekeeping and parenting contributions to the maintenance and upkeep of the family  
home - $100,000.00;  
(iv) Loss of the financial contributions (including fringe benefits) that her late husband would have made during  
the remainder of their marriage toward her maintenance, necessities of life and comfort - $930,000.00;  
(v) Loss of pension benefits which otherwise would have accrued - $500,000.00;  
(vi) Loss of the increase in value of her inheritance from her late husband’s estate - $325,000.00;  
(vii) Out-of-pocket expenses related to or arising out of her late husband’s death (e.g. long distance telephone  
expenses, moving expenses, travel expenses) - $25,000.00*  
(viii) Funeral Expenses - $10,000.00.*  
(E) Joseph John Robert Hourie, son of the late Norman Willard Hourie, deceased:  
(i) Loss of lifetime care, guidance and companionship of his late father - $50,000.00;  
(ii) Extreme grief, mental anguish and bereavement - $50,000.00;  
(iii) Loss of the financial contributions (including fringe benefits) that his late father would have made until he  
established his independence for his maintenance, necessities, comfort and education - $215,000.00;  
(iv) Loss of the increase in value of his inheritance from his late father’s estate - $55,000.00.  
(F) Jimmy Dale Hourie, son of the late Norman Willard Hourie, deceased:  
(i) Loss of lifetime care, guidance and companionship of his late father - $50,000.00;  
(ii) Extreme grief, mental anguish and bereavement - $50,000.00;  
(iii) Loss of the financial contributions (including fringe benefits) that his late father would have made until he  
established his independence for his maintenance, necessities, comfort and education - $290,000.00;  
(iv) Loss of the increase in value of his inheritance from his late father’s estate - $55,000.00.  
(G) Tracey Neill, widow of the late Christopher Dean Neill, deceased:  
(i) Loss of the comfort and society of her late husband - $50,000.00;  
(ii) Extreme grief, mental anguish and bereavement - $50,000.00;  
(iii) Loss of the value of housekeeping and parenting contributions to the maintenance and upkeep of the family  
home - $100,000.00;  
(iv) Loss of the financial contributions (including fringe benefits) that her late husband would have made during  
the remainder of their marriage toward her maintenance, necessities of life and comfort - $3,730,000.00;  
(v) Loss of pension benefits which otherwise would have accrued - $500,000.00;  
(vi) Loss of the increase in value of her inheritance from her late husband’s estate - $1,200,000.00;  
(vii) Out-of-pocket expenses related to or arising out of her late husband’s death (e.g. long distance telephone  
expenses, moving expenses, travel expenses) - $25,000.00*  
(viii) Funeral Expenses - $10,000.00.*  
(H) Judit Pandev, widow of the late Josef Pandev, deceased:  
(i) Loss of the comfort and society of her late husband - $50,000.00;  
(ii) Extreme grief, mental anguish and bereavement - $50,000.00;  
(iii) Loss of the value of housekeeping and parenting contributions to the maintenance and upkeep of the family  
home - $100,000.00;  
(iv) Loss of the financial contributions (including fringe benefits) that her late husband would have made during  
the remainder of their marriage toward her maintenance, necessities of life and comfort - $1,190,000.00;  
(v) Loss of pension benefits which otherwise would have accrued - $500,000.00;  
(vi) Loss of the increase in value of her inheritance from her late husband’s estate - $155,000.00;  
(vii) Out-of-pocket expenses related to or arising out of her late husband’s death (e.g. long distance telephone  
expenses, moving expenses, travel expenses) - $25,000.00*  
(viii) Funeral Expenses - $10,000.00.*  
(I) Judith Tammy Timar, daughter of the late Josef Pandev, deceased:  
(i) Loss of lifetime care, guidance and companionship of her late father - $50,000.00;  
(ii) Extreme grief, mental anguish and bereavement - $50,000.00;  
(iii) Loss of the financial contributions (including fringe benefits) that her late father would have made until she  
established her independence for her maintenance, necessities, comfort and education - $360,000.00;  
(iv) Loss of the increase in value of her inheritance from her late father’s estate - $50,000.00.  
(J) Timothy Timar, son of the late Josef Pandev, deceased:  
(i) Loss of lifetime care, guidance and companionship of his late father - $50,000.00;  
(ii) Extreme grief, mental anguish and bereavement - $50,000.00;  
(iii) Loss of the financial contributions (including fringe benefits) that his late father would have made until he  
established his independence for his maintenance, necessities, comfort and education - $360,000.00;  
(iv) Loss of the increase in value of his inheritance from his late father’s estate - $50,000.00.  
(K) Kayla Cathleen Judith Timar, granddaughter of the late Josef Pandev, deceased:  
(i) Loss of lifetime care, guidance and companionship of her late grandfather - $50,000.00;  
(ii) Extreme grief, mental anguish and bereavement - $50,000.00;  
(iii) Loss of the financial contributions (including fringe benefits) that her late grandfather would have made until  
she established her independence for her maintenance, necessities, comfort and education - $360,000.00;  
(iv) Loss of the increase in value of her inheritance from her late grandfather’s estate - $50,000.00.  
(L) Ella May Carol Riggs, mother of the late Shane Aaron Riggs, deceased:  
(i) Loss of the comfort and society of her late son - $50,000.00;  
(ii) Extreme grief, mental anguish and bereavement - $50,000.00;  
(iii) Loss of the financial contributions (including fringe benefits) that her late son would have made during the  
remainder of her life toward her maintenance, necessities of life and comfort - $590,000.00;  
(iv) Loss of the increase in value of her inheritance from her late son’s estate - $500,000.00;  
(v) Out-of-pocket expenses related to or arising out of her late son’s death (e.g. long distance telephone expenses,  
moving expenses, travel expenses) - $25,000.00*  
(vi) Funeral Expenses - $10,000.00.*  
(M) Carlene Dawn Rowsell, widow of the late Robert Rowsell, deceased:  
(i) Loss of the comfort and society of her late husband - $50,000.00;  
(ii) Extreme grief, mental anguish and bereavement - $50,000.00;  
(iii) Loss of the value of housekeeping and parenting contributions to the maintenance and upkeep of the family  
home - $100,000.00;  
(iv) Loss of the financial contributions (including fringe benefits) that her late husband would have made during  
the remainder of their marriage toward her maintenance, necessities of life and comfort - $1,280,000.00;  
(v) Loss of pension benefits which otherwise would have accrued - $500,000.00;  
(vi) Loss of the increase in value of her inheritance from her late husband’s estate - $150,000.00;  
(vii) Out-of-pocket expenses related to or arising out of her late husband’s death (e.g. long distance telephone  
expenses, moving expenses, travel expenses) - $25,000.00*  
(viii) Funeral Expenses - $10,000.00.*  
(N) Rachel Lindsay Rowsell, daughter of the late Robert Rowsell, deceased:  
(i) Loss of lifetime care, guidance and companionship of her late father - $50,000.00;  
(ii) Extreme grief, mental anguish and bereavement - $50,000.00;  
(iii) Loss of the financial contributions (including fringe benefits) that her late father would have made until she  
established her independence for her maintenance, necessities, comfort and education - $415,000.00;  
(iv) Loss of the increase in value of her inheritance from her late father’s estate - $75,000.00.  
(O) Camilla Fawn Rowsell, daughter of the late Robert Rowsell, deceased:  
(i) Loss of lifetime care, guidance and companionship of her late father - $50,000.00;  
(ii) Extreme grief, mental anguish and bereavement - $50,000.00;  
(iii) Loss of the financial contributions (including fringe benefits) that her late father would have made until she  
established her independence for her maintenance, necessities, comfort and education - $570,000.00;  
(iv) Loss of the increase in value of her inheritance from her late father’s estate - $75,000.00.  
(P) Karen Russell, widow of the late Arnold Russell, deceased:  
(i) Loss of the comfort and society of her late husband - $50,000.00;  
(ii) Extreme grief, mental anguish and bereavement - $50,000.00;  
(iii) Loss of the value of housekeeping and parenting contributions to the maintenance and upkeep of the family  
home - $100,000.00;  
(iv) Loss of the financial contributions (including fringe benefits) that her late husband would have made during  
the remainder of their marriage toward her maintenance, necessities of life and comfort - $1,140,000.00;  
(v) Loss of pension benefits which otherwise would have accrued - $500,000.00;  
(vi) Loss of the increase in value of her inheritance from her late husband’s estate - $365,000.00;  
(vii) Out-of-pocket expenses related to or arising out of her late husband’s death (e.g. long distance telephone  
expenses, moving expenses, travel expenses) - $25,000.00*  
(viii) Funeral Expenses - $10,000.00.*  
(Q) Jennifer Evelyn Russell, daughter of the late Arnold Russell, deceased:  
(i) Loss of lifetime care, guidance and companionship of her late father - $50,000.00;  
(ii) Extreme grief, mental anguish and bereavement - $50,000.00;  
(iii) Loss of the financial contributions (including fringe benefits) that her late father would have made until she  
established her independence for her maintenance, necessities, comfort and education - $75,000.00;  
(iv) Loss of the increase in value of her inheritance from her late father’s estate - $90,000.00.  
(R) Shelley Ida Russell, daughter of the late Arnold Russell, deceased:  
(i) Loss of lifetime care, guidance and companionship of her late father - $50,000.00;  
(ii) Extreme grief, mental anguish and bereavement - $50,000.00;  
(iii) Loss of the financial contributions (including fringe benefits) that her late father would have made until she  
established her independence for her maintenance, necessities, comfort and education - $90,000.00;  
(iv) Loss of the increase in value of her inheritance from her late father’s estate - $90,000.00.  
(S) Lori Ann Russell, daughter of the late Arnold Russell, deceased:  
(i) Loss of lifetime care, guidance and companionship of her late father - $50,000.00;  
(ii) Extreme grief, mental anguish and bereavement - $50,000.00;  
(iii) Loss of the financial contributions (including fringe benefits) that her late father would have made until she  
established her independence for her maintenance, necessities, comfort and education - $115,000.00;  
(iv) Loss of the increase in value of her inheritance from her late father’s estate - $90,000.00.  
(T) Jeffrey Arnold Russell, son of the late Arnold Russell, deceased:  
(i) Loss of lifetime care, guidance and companionship of his late father - $50,000.00;  
(ii) Extreme grief, mental anguish and bereavement - $50,000.00;  
(iii) Loss of the financial contributions (including fringe benefits) that his late father would have made until he  
established his independence for his maintenance, necessities, comfort and education - $130,000.00;  
(iv) Loss of the increase in value of his inheritance from his late father’s estate - $90,000.00.  
(U) Bonnie Lou Sawler, widow of the late Malcolm Sawler, deceased:  
(i) Loss of the comfort and society of her late husband - $50,000.00;  
(ii) Extreme grief, mental anguish and bereavement - $50,000.00;  
(iii) Loss of the value of housekeeping and parenting contributions to the maintenance and upkeep of the family  
home - $100,000.00;  
(iv) Loss of the financial contributions (including fringe benefits) that her late husband would have made during  
the remainder of their marriage toward her maintenance, necessities of life and comfort - $1,265,000.00;  
(v) Loss of pension benefits which otherwise would have accrued - $500,000.00;  
(vi) Loss of the increase in value of her inheritance from her late husband’s estate - $190,000.00;  
(vii) Out-of-pocket expenses related to or arising out of her late husband’s death (e.g. long distance telephone  
expenses, moving expenses, travel expenses) - $25,000.00*  
(viii) Funeral Expenses - $10,000.00.*  
(V) Malcolm Paul Sawler, son of the late Malcolm Sawler, deceased:  
(i) Loss of lifetime care, guidance and companionship of his late father - $50,000.00;  
(ii) Extreme grief, mental anguish and bereavement - $50,000.00;  
(iii) Loss of the financial contributions (including fringe benefits) that his late father would have made until he  
established his independence for his maintenance, necessities, comfort and education - $36,000.00;  
(iv) Loss of the increase in value of his inheritance from his late father’s estate - $65,000.00.  
(W) Ramonia Pamela Sawler, daughter of the late Malcolm Sawler, deceased:  
(i) Loss of lifetime care, guidance and companionship of her late father - $50,000.00;  
(ii) Extreme grief, mental anguish and bereavement - $50,000.00;  
(iii) Loss of the financial contributions (including fringe benefits) that her late father would have made until she  
established her independence for her maintenance, necessities, comfort and education - $306,000.00;  
(iv) Loss of the increase in value of her inheritance from her late father’s estate - $65,000.00.  
(X) Nathan Howard Sawler, son of the late Malcolm Sawler, deceased:  
(i) Loss of lifetime care, guidance and companionship of his late father - $50,000.00;  
(ii) Extreme grief, mental anguish and bereavement - $50,000.00;  
(iii) Loss of the financial contributions (including fringe benefits) that his late father would have made until he  
established his independence for his maintenance, necessities, comfort and education - $540,000.00;  
(iv) Loss of the increase in value of his inheritance from his late father’s estate - $65,000.00.  
(Y) Doreen Vodnoski, widow of the late David Vodnoski, deceased:  
(i) Loss of the comfort and society of her late husband - $50,000.00;  
(ii) Extreme grief, mental anguish and bereavement - $50,000.00;  
(iii) Loss of the value of housekeeping and parenting contributions to the maintenance and upkeep of the family  
home - $100,000.00;  
(iv) Loss of the financial contributions (including fringe benefits) that her late husband would have made during  
the remainder of their marriage toward her maintenance, necessities of life and comfort - $2,070,000.00;  
(v) Loss of pension benefits which otherwise would have accrued - $500,000.00;  
(vi) Loss of the increase in value of her inheritance from her late husband’s estate - $495,000.00;  
(vii) Out-of-pocket expenses related to or arising out of her late husband’s death (e.g. long distance telephone  
expenses, moving expenses, travel expenses) - $25,000.00*  
(viii) Funeral Expenses - $10,000.00.*  
(Z) Dwight Harker, son of the late David Vodnoski, deceased:  
(i) Loss of lifetime care, guidance and companionship of his late father - $50,000.00;  
(ii) Extreme grief, mental anguish and bereavement - $50,000.00;  
(iii) Loss of the financial contributions (including fringe benefits) that his late father would have made until he  
established his independence for his maintenance, necessities, comfort and education - $500,000.00;  
(iv) Loss of the increase in value of his inheritance from his late father’s estate - $250,000.00.  
(AA) Wesley Harker, son of the late David Vodnoski, deceased:  
(i) Loss of lifetime care, guidance and companionship of his late father - $50,000.00;  
(ii) Extreme grief, mental anguish and bereavement - $50,000.00;  
(iii) Loss of the financial contributions (including fringe benefits) that his late father would have made until he  
established his independence for his maintenance, necessities, comfort and education - $580,000.00;  
(iv) Loss of the increase in value of his inheritance from his late father’s estate - $250,000.00.  
Note: (*) connotes sums subject to 7% GST.  
The Plaintiffs plead that this Court find that the conduct of the Defendants and each of them was shocking and  
deserving of sanction by way of an award of punitive, aggravated and exemplary damages and costs on an  
indemnity or solicitor-client basis.  
The Plaintiffs claim such further and other loss, expense and damage as may be proved at the trial.  
Further, in the prayer of their Amended Statement of Claim the following relief was sought.  
Wherefore:  
(A) The Plaintiffs Sheila Fullowka, Doreen Shauna Hourie, Tracey Neill, Judit Pandev, Ella May Carol Riggs, and  
Doreen Vodnoski claim against each of the Defendants (except Royal Oak) jointly and severally:  
(a) General damages aggregating $1,400,000.00;  
(b) Pecuniary damages aggregating $21,415,000.00;  
(c) Special damages aggregating $150,000.00;  
(d) Funeral expenses aggregating $60,000.00;  
(e) Punitive damages aggregating $600,000.00;  
(f) Goods and Services Tax at 7% on all applicable out-of-pocket expenses plus such further and other loss  
expense and damage as may be proved at trial;  
(g) Interest pursuant to the Judicature Act, R.S.N.W.T., c.J-1;  
(h) Costs on an indemnity or solicitor/client basis.  
(B) The Plaintiffs Carlene Dawn Rowsell, Karen Russell and Bonnie Lou Sawler claim against each of the  
Defendants (except Procon) jointly and severally:  
(a) General damages aggregating $1,200,000.00;  
(b) Pecuniary damages aggregating $9,172,000.00;  
(c) Special damages aggregating $75,000.00;  
(d) Funeral expenses aggregating $30,000.00;  
(e) Punitive damages aggregating $300,000.00;  
(f) Goods and Services Tax at 7% on all applicable out-of-pocket expenses plus such further and other loss  
expense and damage as may be proved at trial;  
(g) Interest pursuant to the Judicature Act, R.S.N.W.T., c.J-1;  
(h) Costs on an indemnity or solicitor/client basis.  
The basis of the Plaintiffs’ claims in their Amended Statement of Claim may be summarized as follows: The  
explosion and resulting injuries and deaths of the nine miners were caused by the combined negligence of each of  
the Defendants or any one or more of them, particulars of which are as follows:  
(A) As to Royal Oak:  
(i) despite the lockout and strike, Royal Oak enticed certain striking miners to cross the CASAW Local 4 picket  
line and employed replacement contract miners from Procon to assist it in the continuance of production;  
(ii) A commitment was made to the nine miners that their safety was of paramount concern and would not be  
jeopardized, and that commitment was ignored with full knowledge of the consequences that followed;  
(a) Failing to secure all means of access to the Giant Mine so as to ensure that only those persons invited by Royal  
Oak would be upon the Giant Mine;  
(b) Failing to cause the Akaitcho headframe to be securely fenced or obstructed with boulders and the means of  
entry thereat to be welded shut or otherwise prevented prior to September 18, 1992, especially when Royal Oak  
knew or ought to have known prior to September 18, 1992, that the Akaitcho headframe offered a means of access  
to the Giant Mine and that threats of violence and acts of sabotage had been directed against miners who crossed  
the picket line and in particular, one or more of the nine miners;  
(c) Failing to increase the level and type of security in place at the Giant Mine prior to September 18, 1992, after  
explosions had been set off at the Giant Mine by persons not invited by Royal Oak to be upon the Giant Mine or  
whom Royal Oak knew or ought to have known were not then authorized to be setting off explosions;  
(d) Alternatively, failing to discover prior to September 18, 1992, that the Akaitcho headframe offered a means of  
access to the Giant Mine when graffiti amounting to threats of violence against replacement workers and  
members of the Union who returned to work was found inside the Giant Mine;  
(e) Failing to warn persons invited to be upon the premises of the Giant Mine, including the nine miners, that  
Royal Oak had not sealed or guarded all means of access to the Giant Mine to the extent required to ensure that  
no unauthorized persons could enter upon the Giant Mine and including failing to warn such persons of the  
incursions into the Mine and the graffiti-spraying aforesaid;  
(f) Operating and continuing to operate the Giant Mine without being careful whether any circumstances or  
conditions related to or arising out of the lockout and strike made the Giant Mine not safe to be upon or could  
lead to mortal injury to and death of those invited upon the Giant Mine including the nine miners;  
(g) Failing to follow the advice or precautions recommended by Procon or Pinkerton’s or either of them  
particularly after the previous incursions into the Mine and the graffiti-spraying incident as aforesaid or in  
continuing to permit Procon or Pinkerton’s or either of them to continue to purport to provide the services which  
they had agreed or were under a duty to provide;  
(h) Leaving their supplies of ammonium nitrate and diesel fuel and Magnafrac freely accessible to any person who  
entered upon the Giant Mine;  
(i) Leaving their supplies of devices capable of detonating the ammonium nitrate and diesel fuel and Magnafrac  
freely accessible to any person who entered upon the Giant Mine;  
(j) Leaving any scoop tram fully accessible and capable of being used by any person who entered upon the Giant  
Mine;  
(h) Failing to thoroughly inspect all passages of the Giant Mine travelled by miners, especially those customarily  
travelled by man-car before permitting any miners in a man-car to travel them since they were last inspected to  
ensure that they were free of any conditions which could cause mortal injury to and death of such persons;  
(i) Conducting their labour relations with the Union both before and during the lockout and strike in such a  
fashion as to create a foreseeable and unreasonable risk of harm to all persons invited to be upon the Giant Mine  
to continue operating the same during the lockout and strike including the nine miners.  
(B) As to Pinkerton’s:  
(i) That they agreed to assist Royal Oak to keep the subject mine operating and agreed or was otherwise under a  
duty of care to provide a security plan for the mine, together with security guards and dogs and supervisory  
personnel;  
(a) Failing themselves to undertake all reasonable safety precautions including those which Royal Oak neglected  
to carry out as outlined in subparagraphs (a) through (m) of paragraph (A) hereof.  
(b) Failing to ensure that Royal Oak made the Giant Mine safe to be upon and free of any and all conditions which  
could cause mortal injury to and death of persons invited to be upon the Giant Mine;  
(c) Participating with Royal Oak in labour relations conducted by Royal Oak both before and during the lockout  
and strike including encouraging Royal Oak to use Pinkerton’s services in connection with the need for additional  
security and conducting themselves in their relations with striking members of the Union in such a fashion as to  
inflame an already dangerous environment producing threats of violence and acts of sabotage against  
replacement workers and members of the Union who returned to work without also being careful that the Giant  
Mine was safe to be upon and that no conditions were created thereby which could lead to mortal injury to and  
death of those invited upon the Giant Mine including the nine miners.  
(C) As to Witte:  
She undertook and made known that she held as sacred her responsibility during the lockout and strike for the  
safety and welfare of miners invited to be on Giant property and their respective families.  
(D) As to Sheridan:  
As Secretary and Director of Royal Oak and Director of Pinkerton's, he played a leading role in assisting Royal  
Oak in keeping Giant operating with non-union members and CASAW Local 4 members that Royal Oak had  
induced to cross the picket line and return to work.  
(E) As to Sheridan and Pinkerton’s:  
In keeping the mine open using Pinkerton’s security plan, guards, workers, dogs and supervisory personnel, and  
using union and non-union miners, Sheridan and Pinkerton’s agreed or were under a duty of care to ensure that  
mine security would be maintained in accordance with all lawful requirements so those invited on Giant property  
as aforesaid would not be exposed to any risk of injury or death related to the lockout and strike.  
(F) As to Witte and Sheridan:  
(a) Leading or participating with Royal Oak in the labour relations conducted by Royal Oak both before and  
during the lockout and strike;  
(b) Encouraging Royal Oak to keep the Giant Mine operating during the lockout and strike by using non-striking,  
non-union miners and non-striking members of the Union;  
(c) Using Pinkerton’s services in connection with the need for additional security;  
(d) Permitting Pinkerton’s to conduct themselves in their relations with the striking members of the Union in  
such a fashion as to inflame an already dangerous environment producing threats of violence against the  
replacement workers and members of the Union who returned to work without being careful whether any  
circumstances or conditions related to or arising out of the lockout and strike made the Giant Mine not safe to be  
upon or could lead to mortal injury to and death of those invited upon the Giant Mine including the nine miners;  
(e) Encouraging any unauthorized persons who entered the Giant Mine on September 18, 1992, including Roger  
Wallace Warren, to conduct themselves in a manner that could create an unreasonable and foreseeable risk of  
harm by their respective failures generally in advance of September 18, 1992, to take meaning and visible steps to  
enhance the level of security at the Giant Mine in the face of threats of violence and acts of sabotage or conveying  
the impression thereby to Roger Wallace Warren or others that it was necessary to carry out the acts or to fail to  
carry out the acts referred to in paragraph (E) hereof in order to carry out his duty as a striking member of the  
Union.  
(G) As to Whitford, Turner and the GNWT as represented by the Commissioner of the NWT:  
(i) At all material times, Whitford was Minister of Safety and Public Services and Turner was Chief Inspector of  
Mines within the said Ministry of the GNWT;  
(ii) The GNWT as represented by the Commissioner of the NWT (In this summary of claims hereinafter called the  
“Commissioner”), had entered the field of regulating and controlling all aspects of mine safety and mine  
operations in the NWT, and, at the operational level, he appointed or retained Whitford and Turner in the  
capacities aforesaid, by reason of which he is liable vicariously for all their acts or failures to act;  
(iii) Prior to September 18, 1992, the Commissioner adopted a policy of inspections and operational procedures  
backed up by the legislative authority necessary to prevent any members of the public including the nine miners  
from being on Giant property unless invited by Royal Oak and unless Giant property was and remained safe to  
be on and free of any and all conditions which could cause mortal injury to and death of such invitees;  
(iv) In permitting Giant to operate during the lockout and strike or in permitting non-union miners and miners  
who were members of CASAW Local 4 who had been induced or permitted by Royal Oak to cross the picket line  
and return to work, the Commissioner, Whitford and Turner and each of them owed a private law duty of care to  
the nine miners to implement such policies and procedures, or, in the alternative, to adopt such (further) policies  
and procedures and implement same as were rationally necessary to attain and maintain safe working conditions  
at Giant.  
(H) As to Whitford and Turner:  
(a) Failing to inspect the Giant Mine or to cause the Giant Mine to be inspected properly in accordance with  
established policies or failing to carry out all such policies or to formulate appropriate policies so as to ensure the  
health and safety of all persons invited upon the Giant Mine by Royal Oak including the nine miners;  
(b) Failing to ensure that all entrances to abandoned workings of the Giant Mine, or entrances to shafts where  
work had been discontinued, were filled up with boulders, welded shut, securely fenced or otherwise protected;  
(c) Failing to order Royal Oak to properly secure the entrances to abandoned workings of the Giant Mine or to  
properly secure the entrances to shafts where work had been discontinued;  
(d) Failing to order the immediate cessation of work in the Giant Mine until such time as Royal Oak had:  
(i) Adequately secured the various entrances to the mine workings so as to prevent unauthorized persons from  
entering the Giant mine;  
(ii) Posted guards or watchmen at the various entrances to the mine workings so as to prevent unauthorized  
persons from entering the Giant Mine;  
(iii) Secured its underground explosives magazine or properly stored its explosives to prevent access to the same  
by unauthorized persons; or  
(iv) Completed any combination of the above matters especially where they knew or ought to have known there  
had been prior incursions into the underground workings of the Giant Mine by unauthorized persons, prior acts  
of vandalism and sabotage against the property of Royal Oak and miners engaged by them to keep the Giant Mine  
operating during the lockout and strike, prior acts and threats of violence against such miners and prior death  
threats against such miners.  
(e) Allowing or permitting Royal Oak and those whom Royal Oak invited to be upon the Giant Mine including the  
nine miners to consider that such security measures as Royal Oak had taken prior to September 18, 1992, were  
reasonable or sufficient generally and by permitting the Giant Mine to continue to operate;  
(f) Failing to warn all persons invited by Royal Oak to be upon the Giant Mine including the nine miners that all  
entrances to abandoned workings of the Giant Mine had not been secured or otherwise been protected against  
unauthorized entry;  
(g) Failing to ascertain that unauthorized access to the Giant Mine had been gained prior to September 18, 1992,  
and in connection therewith, that threats of violence or acts of sabotage had occurred directed toward persons  
whom Royal Oak had invited to be upon the Giant Mine.  
(I) As to the Commissioner:  
(a) Failing to cause Whitford and Turner to carry out those acts referred to in subparagraphs (a), (b), (c) and (d)  
of paragraph (H) hereof;  
(b) Not prohibiting Whitford and Turner from conducting themselves as alleged in paragraphs (e), (f) and (g) of  
paragraph (H) hereof;  
(c) Failing to adopt and implement such further policies and procedures as were rationally necessary to attain and  
maintain safe working conditions in the Giant Mine especially in the face of threats of violence and acts of  
sabotage.  
(J) As to CAW National, successor by amalgamation to CASAW National, and CASAW National:  
CASAW National amalgamated with and continued thereafter under the name of CAW National which thereby  
succeeded to and became responsible for all assets and liabilities of CASAW National. Such amalgamated union  
is in this summary of claims hereinafter called the “Union”.  
(K) As to Shearing and Bettger:  
Shearing and Bettger assisted Warren to gain access to Giant or to find his way from the Akaitcho head frame to  
the point on the 750 drift tunnel where Warren placed certain substances or did any of the acts or failed to do any  
of the acts identified with Warren. Specifically:  
(i) They carried out in concert with Warren or caused Warren to carry out any of the activities identified with  
Warren, including inciting Warren to carry out said activities that resulted in the deaths of the nine miners;  
(ii) They failed to carry out alone or in concert with Warren any of the activities identified with Warren which the  
said Warren failed to carry out;  
(iii) They assisted Warren in gaining access to the point where Warren placed the substances referred to in the  
mine or in manufacturing the device referred to or in assembling or teaching Warren how to assemble the said  
device with the said substances;  
(iv) They failed to advise Warren as to adequate warnings to any persons who might come into proximity with the  
device and substances referred to;  
(v) They permitted Warren to carry out or failed to prevent Warren from carrying out or failing to carry out any of  
the acts or omissions referred to in subparas. (i) through (iv) hereof;  
(vi) They generally conducted themselves in such a negligent fashion as to cause the mortal injury to and deaths  
of the nine miners.  
(L) As to Warren:  
Warren was a striking union member on September 18, 1992, when he entered on Giant property and moved a  
substance stored at Giant composed of ammonium nitrate and diesel fuel and one or more sticks of a substance  
known as Magnafrac to a point in the main 750 drift tunnel in close proximity to the track along which miners  
working in that mine area were regularly transported in mancars. Specifically:  
(a) Placing along a passageway in the Giant Mine regularly travelled by miners, the said substance, in close  
proximity to a substance capable of causing the ammonium nitrate and diesel fuel and the Magnafrac to explode,  
without taking care to determine whether the combination of some or all of those substances was explosive and  
thereby created a foreseeable and unreasonable risk of harm;  
(b) Manufacturing a device utilizing a switch, battery and pieces of wire, attaching the device to the one or more  
substances referred to in subparagraph (a) hereof, and placing the device and substances along a passageway in  
the Giant Mine regularly travelled by miners, without taking care to determine whether the device attached to the  
said substances and placed along the said passageway created a foreseeable and unreasonable risk of harm;  
(c) Failing to warn or adequately warn any persons including the nine miners who might come into proximity  
with the device and substances referred to in subparagraph (b) hereof of the danger present and which he created;  
(d) Utilizing a sufficient quantity of the one or more substances referred to in subparagraph (a) hereof in the  
circumstances described in subparagraph (b) hereof without taking care to determine whether they could cause  
mortal injury to and death of any person who came into close proximity thereto and that persons could and would  
be likely to come into close proximity thereto unless he gave adequate warnings;  
(e) Failing to prevent any persons including the nine miners from proceeding down the passageway in question  
before the substances referred to in subparagraph (a) hereof were removed or disconnected from the device  
referred to in subparagraph (b) hereof;  
(f) Accepting the assistance of Allan Raymond Shearing, Timothy Alexander Bettger, Terry Legge or John Doe  
Number Three in gaining access to the point where he placed the substances referred to in subparagraph (a)  
hereof in the Giant Mine or in manufacturing the device referred to in subparagraph (b) hereof or in assembling  
of learning how to assemble the said device with the said substances;  
(g) Failing to accept the advice of Allan Raymond Shearing, Timothy Alexander Bettger, Terry Legge or John Doe  
Number Three in relation to giving any warning to any persons including the nine miners from proceeding down  
the passageway in question before the substances referred to in subparagraph (a) hereof were removed or  
disconnected from the device referred to in subparagraph (b) hereof or accepting the advice of any of Allan  
Raymond Shearing, Timothy Alexander Bettger, Terry Legge or John Doe Number Three as to the adequacy of  
such things as Roger Wallace Warren did to give a warning to said persons;  
(h) Generally, conducting himself in such a negligent fashion as to cause the mortal injury to and death of the  
nine miners.  
(M) As to the Union, Shearing and Bettger:  
In exercising or attempting to exercise significant influence and control over Warren or the state of security at  
Giant, in permitting significant influence and control to be exercised or attempted to be exercised, or in assisting  
Warren to do any of the things attributed to Warren, the Union, Seeton, Shearing, Bettger, Legge, John Doe  
Number Three, Johnston, Kosta, David, Danis, Blaine Roger Lisoway, Schram, James Mager, Conrad Lisoway,  
Campbell, Sylvain Amyotte, and Richard Roe Number Three owed a duty of care to all persons, including the nine  
miners, who were lawfully on Giant property to avoid conduct which they or any of them knew or ought to have  
known could create an unreasonable and foreseeable risk of harm to all such persons, including causing others to  
consider it acceptable, reasonable, justifiable or necessary to conduct themselves in a manner that could create an  
unreasonable and foreseeable risk of harm to some or all persons, or a positive duty to warn all persons including  
the nine miners who were lawfully on Giant property of such risk of harm.  
(N) As to Seeton:  
Seeton was a senior officer of the Union during the lockout and strike and in that capacity he exercised and was  
permitted by the Union to exercise significant influence or he ought to have had significant influence and control  
over striking members of the Union, including Warren.  
(O) As to the Union and Seeton:  
(a) Causing Roger Wallace Warren to conduct himself or to fail to conduct himself in any of the ways referred  
herein by threatening replacement workers or others seen as strike breakers with violence or death;  
(b) Failing to sanction Harry Seeton, James Evoy, Dale Johnson, Robert Kosta, Harold David, J. Marc Danis,  
Blaine Roger Lisoway, William (Bill) Schram, James Mager, Conrad Lisoway, Wayne Campbell, Sylvain Amyotte  
and Richard Roe Number Three from threatening persons as aforesaid or failing to take care to ensure that all  
persons over whom they exercised or should have exercised substantial influence or control including Roger  
Wallace Warren understood and agreed that it was not acceptable, reasonable, justifiable or necessary to cause  
mortal injury and death to or to create any fear of mortal injury or death in any persons while upon the Giant  
Mine at the invitation of Royal Oak;  
(c) Using their executive position with the Union or permitting any of them to use their executive position with  
the Union to further the creation of foreseeable and unreasonable risk of harm to all persons invited to be upon  
the Giant Mine including the nine miners during the lockout and strike as referred to in subparagraphs (a) and  
(b) hereof and generally;  
(d) Failing to intervene to prevent Roger Wallace Warren from doing or failing to do any of his acts referred to  
herein;  
(e) Failing to prevent any persons including the nine miners from proceeding down the passageway in question  
before the substances referred to herein were removed or disconnected from the device identified with Roger  
Warren;  
(f) Failing to warn all persons including the nine miners who were lawfully upon the Giant Mine of the risk of  
harm which their conduct had caused or contributed to;  
(g) Generally, conducting themselves in such a negligent fashion as to cause the mortal injury to and death of the  
nine miners.  
In the alternative, the Plaintiffs alleged that as the nine miners were contractually entitled and required to enter  
on Giant property or, in the alternative, as they were invited to be on Giant property and as Royal Oak, Witte,  
Pinkerton’s and Sheridan, and each of them, were in positions of substantial influence and control over the safety  
conditions in or for entry into Giant at all material times, Royal Oak, Witte, Pinkerton’s and Sheridan and each of  
them had an obligation and duty of care to supervise, inspect, control, prevent or warn against the entry and  
conduct of parties not obliged to enter or invited on Giant property (by the very nature and purpose of whose  
entry, injury was likely to be caused) by means of the highest standard possible in light of the known, created,  
inflamed and apparent risks of harm and unusual dangers related to the lockout and strike. Thus, the Plaintiffs  
say, the occurrence of the mortal injuries and deaths of the nine miners is conclusive evidence without more that  
Royal Oak, Witte, Pinkerton’s and Sheridan and each of them breached their obligations and duties of care to the  
nine miners and their dependants and caused such mortal injuries and deaths in whole or in part.  
The Plaintiffs further pleaded that, as a direct and natural result of the negligence of the Defendants and the  
deaths of the nine miners, the respective wives, children, grandchild or mother of the nine miners have suffered  
and will continue to suffer loss, expense and damage (including funeral expenses), and the Plaintiffs accordingly  
claim all damages proportional to the injuries resulting from the death of the nine miners.  
Summarized Statements of Defence  
a) Witte and Sheridan  
The following is a summary of the defences by Witte and Sheridan:  
(a) They deny that they directed or procured the commission of any wrongful acts or omissions, and the say that  
they both acted within the scope of their authority as Directors of the corporations of which they were Directors.  
(b) They deny that the Statement of Claim discloses any cause of action against them.  
(c) They deny the alleged negligence and duty of care or that they agreed to or undertook the particular duty of  
care as alleged.  
(d) They say that they did not cause or contribute to the deaths of the nine miners.  
(e) They deny that they are liable in their personal capacities, and, in any event, they say they took appropriate  
care to ensure the nine miners’ safety.  
(f) They say that the deaths were caused solely by the independent, intentional act of Warren or, alternatively,  
Warren’s act could not have been reasonably foreseen, thus, novus actus interveniens applies.  
(g) They say that, alternatively, if Warren’s acts were foreseeable, they were foreseeable by all co-Defendants and  
all nine miners. Specifically:  
(i) The negligence of the co-Defendants and the nine miners caused or contributed to the deaths of the nine  
miners.  
(ii) The nine miners accepted and assumed the risk and volenti non-fit injuria applies.  
(iii) Alternatively, the nine miners are guilty of contributory negligence.  
(h) They say that the acts of Warren are severable from the acts of Witte, Sheridan and Royal Oak and, but for  
Warren’s acts, no injury or damages would have been sustained by the nine miners.  
(i) They deny that keeping Giant open should have or did increase the risk of foreseeable harm to the nine miners.  
(j) They say that Royal Oak at all times operated Giant in accordance with all laws, regulations and governmental  
directions, and RCMP guidelines.  
(k) They say that at all times material, Giant was operated in accordance with the prevailing practice within the  
applicable industry in Canada and further say the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has no application thereto.  
(l) Royal Oak pleads s.12(2) of the Workers’ Compensation Act, R.S.N.W.T. 1988, c.W-6, as the nine miners were  
workers and, as such their claims are statute-barred.  
(m) They say this action is not maintainable against them.  
(n) They say that the Plaintiffs’ claims for loss of spousal comfort and society and for extreme grief, mental  
anguish and bereavement are non-sustainable claims in law.  
(o) They say that their conduct was not so shocking or deserving of sanction to merit punitive, aggravated or  
exemplary damages or costs on a solicitor-client basis.  
(p) These parties claim contribution and indemnity as aforesaid on grounds set forth in their Statements of  
Defence.  
(q) Cross-claims are advanced on grounds set forth for their Statements of Defence.  
b) Pinkerton’s:  
The following defences are advanced by Pinkerton’s:  
(a) It specifically denies assisting Royal Oak to keep the mine operating or closed. Rather, that was done by  
officers and employees of Royal Oak.  
(b) It specifically and generally denies a duty of care to ensure the security of Giant.  
(c) It denies contributory or any negligence and the Plaintiffs’ losses or damages.  
(d) It says that there was a contract with Royal Oak to provide information, personnel and equipment that  
evidenced its only duty, which was to Royal Oak only.  
(e) It says that the explosion and deaths were not reasonably foreseeable or preventable by it.  
(f) It says any negligence is not its negligence but the negligence of other Defendants.  
(g) It says, if it was negligent, the sole and proximate cause of the explosion and resulting damages was a criminal  
and deliberate act of another.  
(h) It says volenti non fit injuria applies to the deceased miners.  
(i) It denies that its conduct is deserving of sanction in punitive, aggravated or exemplary damages.  
(j) Should Pinkerton’s be found to be a joint tortfeasor they seek a declaration of several liability, as they would  
have an entitlement to, had the Plaintiffs’ claims not been subrogated.  
(k) Pinkerton’s claim contribution and indemnity on grounds set forth in their Statement of Defence.  
(l) Pinkerton’s cross-claims as aforesaid are on grounds set forth in its Statement of Defence.  
c) GNWT as represented by the Commissioner of the NWT, Whitford and Turner:  
The following defences are advanced by the GNWT as represented by the Commissioner of the NWT, Whitford  
and Turner:  
(a) They say that the nine miners were killed by the independent criminal act of Warren, acting alone or in  
concert with others, and that the act was deliberate, independent, intentional and unforeseeable.  
(b) They say Warren’s act is severable from and independent of anything done or not done by them.  
(c) They say that they did not contribute to the deaths and always acted reasonably, prudently and in good faith  
within the jurisdiction, authority and resources available to them and that they did not breach any duty of care.  
(d) They deny that the losses and damages suffered by the Plaintiffs were caused or contributed to by them and  
say the losses and damages were remote and unforeseeable.  
(e) They say that their conduct is not deserving of sanction by way of punitive, aggravated or exemplary damages.  
(f) These Defendants cross-claim as other defendants aforesaid on grounds set forth in their Statements of  
Defence.  
d) CAW National, successor by amalgamation to CASAW National, and CASAW National:  
The following defences are advanced by CAW National and CASAW National:  
(a) They say that they are not legal entities capable of being sued.  
(b) They say that Royal Oak supported by Pinkerton's assured all miners Giant was safe and it would take all  
necessary steps to maintain safe working conditions for all miners during the strike.  
(c) They deny there was an amalgamation and say CASAW National merged with CAW National but CAW  
National did not become responsible for all assets and liabilities of CASAW National.  
(d) They say that, prior to the merger, CAW National provided assistance and collective bargaining expertise in  
mediation and, with other unions, provided financial assistance to the CASAW Local 4 strike fund.  
(e) They deny that they exercised any influence or control over Warren or could have known Warren’s action was  
foreseeable.  
(f) They deny that they owed any duty to the nine deceased miners or were negligent.  
(g) They deny that they participated in any unlawful activities during the labour dispute at Giant.  
(h) They say that the nine miners are the authors of their own misfortune, knowing of unlawful activities that  
preceded their return to work during the strike.  
(i) They rely on the Contributory Negligence Act, R.S.N.W.T. 1988, c. C-18.  
(j) CAW National and CASAW National cross-claim as aforesaid on grounds set forth in their Statements of  
Defence.  
e) Seeton:  
The following defences are advanced by Seeton:  
(a) Denies he engaged in conduct that created a foreseeable and unreasonable risk of harm to others or that he  
caused others to believe violence or threatening injury and death was acceptable behaviour.  
(b) He denies he was in a position of influence or control over the behaviour of others, including Warren, but, if  
he was, he did so as president of CASAW Local 4 and in a lawful and peaceful manner with the purpose of  
promoting a successful resolution of the strike/lockout for members of CASAW Local 4.  
(c) He denies he owed any duty of care to the nine deceased miners.  
(d) He pleads novus actus interveniens respecting Warren.  
(e) He says that the Plaintiffs are statute-barred by s.12 of the Workers’ Compensation Act.  
(f) Seeton claims contribution and indemnity as aforesaid on grounds set forth in his Statement of Defence.  
f) Shearing:  
The following defences are advanced by Shearing:  
(a) He relies on s.2(1)(d) of the Limitation of Actions Act.  
(b) He denies any responsibility for the deaths of the nine miners.  
(c) He says that the deaths of the nine miners were caused by their failure to exercise due care for their own  
safety.  
(d) Shearing has been noted in default.  
g) Bettger:  
The following defences are advanced by Bettger:  
(a) He relies on s.2(1)(d) of the Limitation of Actions Act.  
(b) He denies any responsibility or duty of care that resulted in the deaths of the nine miners.  
(c) He says that the nine miners died as a result of their failure to exercise due care for their own safety.  
h) Warren:  
Warren denies any liability for the deaths of the nine miners.  
Cross-Claims  
The following tables outline the Defendants who have filed Cross-claims and against whom:  
Fullowka Action  
Defendants  
Cross-claims Filed Against  
Royal Oak, Witte, Sheridan  
Pinkerton’s, Whitford, Turner, GNWT, CAW National, CASAW National, Seeton, Shearing, Bettger, Warren  
Pinkerton’s  
Witte, Sheridan, Whitford, Turner, GNWT, CAW National, CASAW National, Seeton, Shearing, Bettger, Warren  
GNWT, Whitford, Turner  
Royal Oak, Witte, Sheridan, Pinkerton’s, CAW National, CASAW National, Seeton, Shearing, Bettger, Warren  
CAW National  
Royal Oak, Witte, Sheridan, Pinkerton’s  
Seeton  
Royal Oak, Witte, Sheridan, Pinkerton’s, Whitford, Turner, GNWT  
Third Party Proceedings of Pinkerton’s Against Royal Oak Action (both actions)  
Pinkerton’s claims that, by agreement with Royal Oak, Royal Oak agreed to indemnify Pinkerton’s and hold it  
harmless from all claims and costs that might be incurred as a result of the agreement and that Royal Oak would  
secure insurance to protect Pinkerton’s.  
Counterclaim of Pinkerton’s - Action CV 05408 (Fullowka)  
Pinkerton’s counterclaim against the Plaintiffs is for the express purpose of claiming set-off. The basis thereof is  
as follows:  
(a) Should Pinkerton’s be found to be a joint tortfeasor in this, a subrogated proceeding, it may be denied the  
right to claim contribution and indemnity from Royal Oak who is immune from suit by the Plaintiffs by virtue of  
the Workers’ Compensation Act.  
(b) If by the operation of the Workers’ Compensation Act, Pinkerton’s remedy of contribution and indemnity  
pursuant to the Contributory Negligence Act, is extinguished, it would be unjust and inequitable to allow the  
Plaintiffs to recover from Pinkerton’s more than an amount for which it was actually found at fault.  
Pinkerton’s seeks the following relief:  
a. A declaration that the right to contribution and indemnity established by the Contributory Negligence Act, has  
not been extinguished by the Worker’s Compensation Act, even though the remedy itself is no longer available.  
b. A declaration of the proportionate degrees of fault, if any, of Pinkerton’s and Royal Oak.  
c. Equitable set-off against any Judgment the Plaintiffs may obtain of any amounts related to the fault of Royal  
Oak in this action, which is not attributable to any fault on the part of Pinkerton’s.  
d. Alternately, a declaration that s.12(2) of the Workers’ Compensation Act, which prohibits an action against an  
employer or a worker, acts as a statutory release, releasing all other joint tort-feasors.  
EXPERT EVIDENCE  
Liability Experts  
a) Dr. Peter W. Strahlendorf  
Dr. Strahlendorf, called by the Plaintiffs, was qualified as an expert to give opinion evidence in the following  
areas:  
Prevailing industry standards and accepted practices in the late 1980s and early 1990s regarding occupational  
health and safety practices in Canada.  
Prevailing standards and accepted practices in providing adequate personnel safety in the workplace at a struck  
industrial facility at which full scale (pre-strike) operations are maintained using replacement workers.  
Generally accepted practices and standards in 1992 for maintaining adequate personnel safety in the workplace  
through implementation of the Internal Responsibility System (IRS).  
Generally accepted practices and standards in 1992 for maintaining adequate personnel safety in the workplace  
through implementation of an occupational health and safety management system, and through integrating  
security with health and safety through the philosophy of total loss control.  
Applicable community awareness of and prevalent practices and procedures in 1992 for understanding risks  
associated with violence in the workplace, and implementation of appropriate countermeasures.  
Dr. Strahlendorf has the following formal educational background:  
B.E.S. Bachelor of Environmental Studies, University of Waterloo (1997)  
S.J.D. Doctor of Juridical Science, Faculty of Law, University of Toronto (1991)  
LL.M. Master of Laws, Faculty of Law, University of Toronto (1987)  
(C)O.H.S. Certificate in Occupational Health and Safety, Ryerson Polytechnical Institute (1986)  
LL.B. Bachelor of Laws, Faculty of Law, Queen’s University (1980)  
B.Sc. Bachelor of Science, Honours Biology, First Class, Queen’s University (1977)  
Dr. Strahlendorf struggled to find anything concrete that Royal Oak and Pinkerton's did that would be  
complimentary to them under the Ontario practice, which was his focus.  
I thought it peculiar that, despite curbing his areas of expertise during the qualification process, he insisted on  
returning to the forbidden areas, even to the point of panning, or passing over, existing Royal Oak practices such  
as the Employee Improvement Policy and procedures implemented by Turner who, in 1992, was promoting the  
IRS; procedures that in particular fit within the IRS which Dr. Strahlendorf defined as good management  
practice. The IRS was, he said, “an approach to health and safety that engages each individual person in the  
organization in health and safety, gets them thinking about what they should be doing, how they should be doing  
it”.  
Speaking for governmental participation, he said health and safety is a personal responsibility. “It’s not the  
government’s job to do health and safety for you directly, they simply audit this internal activity”.  
He further said, “It’s the personal responsibility of everybody, everybody is engaged in doing health and safety  
and they know how to think about risks and figure out what the reasonable thing to do is in the circumstances.”  
Dr. Strahlendorf had duties so extensive for each person in the chain, from the CEO down to the workers, that  
there was little likelihood of any time remaining for production, bearing in mind time consumption for  
documenting flow of information, meetings, auditing, solving emerging problems and dealing with the weak links  
at surface from time to time, all designed to “drive down risk”.  
On the issue of the engagement of labour relations and health and safety simultaneously, Dr. Strahlendorf’s  
theory of peaceful co-existence collapsed.  
Dr. Strahlendorf was obsessed with the Ontario “Ham Report”, which the Court did not have the benefit of and  
which on the face of the evidence was a generic model with little or no practical application respecting Giant, as  
Dr. Strahlendorf held little knowledge of the mining industry. It was clear from his evidence that he believed that  
each industry is different, as obviously is each mine, and a struck mine endeavouring to maintain full production  
with replacement workers created yet another and different milieu.  
On the issue of the relationship of security to the IRS, Dr. Strahlendorf said: “Security is one of the subjects you  
need to know something about without being an expert in the security and you can certainly see the connection  
with emergency response plans within a management system.”  
He further said, “On the one hand, while everything in the workplace must be envisaged as under one umbrella,  
labour relations, when conflict occurred with health and safety, the former would be considered second to health  
and safety.” My retort is, that to have told that to CASAW Local 4 during the 1992 strike/lockout would have  
generated no interest in health and safety, when in the midst of the violent and childlike behaviour of the strikers  
there was little concern for the safety of the replacement workers or their fellow miners and certainly no feeling  
even for the deaths of many of them by many of the strikers.  
Any attempt to form a committee of all parties with an interest, as the “Ham Report” and the IRS suggest, is not  
even a ripple in a windstorm but rather a theory divorced from reality, as the sole objective of the striking Giant  
miners was to shut down the mine, at any cost, the striking miners not appreciating that outside forces brought in  
to assist were using them to bolster benefits in other provinces, a subject I will detail later.  
As I listened to Dr. Strahlendorf’s evidence and latterly studied his report, I was driven to focusing on his lack of  
objectivity and practicality. To illustrate, after commenting on facts and documents that had been provided to  
him and from which he purported to make his analysis, he said of Royal Oak and Pinkerton's, “Well actually what  
really impressed me was like that old Sherlock Holmes story, the dog that didn’t bark, is what’s not here”. That  
became the sole theme throughout his testimony. In short, he did not want to acknowledge the effects of a struck  
mine as it related to the IRS or that anything that was done to foster good health and safety and security should be  
credited to Royal Oak or Pinkerton's.  
His conclusion was that “looking through the documents, we seem to be missing a sign that there’s a health and  
safety management system in place, that there’s a good IRS (internal responsibility system) functioning”.  
In the result, Dr. Strahlendorf’s evidence was a collection of anachronisms and clichés; an academic approach  
with little or no application to Giant at the relevant time, directed solely to criticism of Royal Oak’s operation, all  
of which demonstrated little value and assistance to the Court because of its utopian viewpoint.  
b) Andrew Christopher Lyle Sims, Q.C.  
Andrew Sims (“Sims”) is a barrister and solicitor in Edmonton, Alberta, who was qualified to give expert opinion  
in the areas of labour relations, labour disputes and their regulation and resolution, trade union structure and  
organization and collective bargaining and the duties associated therewith.  
It was his opinion that strike-related violence is “pretty common on the picket line, particularly in the first week  
or two of the strike”.  
I set forth a summary of his evidence, interspersed with direct quotes. He testified that there is more serious  
violence in labour history in North America and that violence is almost always a result of “pent up feelings”. He  
testified:  
Where there is a confrontational workplace there is a confrontational strike. The more head to head  
confrontation is the more likely that the response will be violent. There is a frustration seeing persons rushed  
through the line or with strong security, that brings frustration and a reaction to it. There is anger in being locked  
out.  
. . . .  
In the first week or so, spirits and tempers are high. Media causes sleepy hollow picket lines to get in motion to  
make it look like something really is happening. And you get big heads, loud mouths, people yelling at one  
another. Sometimes you get confrontation between a foreman and a striker who have been working together -  
pent up dislike. Serious violence is less common on the picket line. As for union leadership, “good leaders  
exercise moral suasion with the people they represent.” Their leaders tend to echo caricature what they think the  
group wants to do. Sometimes these are the most vocal, most radical. Its quite significant to have a local union  
leadership reject a proposal.  
Regarding the control and discipline of members engaged in violent behaviour, Sims could not recall a union  
doing that during a strike for picket line misbehaviour. He noted that it is said that:  
A union, by law, had a duty to represent its members. If a union disciplines, the same union may have to  
represent the employee in protecting the employment interest. Allegations made after for tactical reasons,  
sometimes they are true, sometimes not.  
Violence is a public issue, that the police ought to look after. Striking employees should have a right to resume  
their work at the end of a strike. A striker is no more deterred by a criminal charge or the threat of a loss of a job  
than being brought before a union trial committee. [For what it’s worth¼I disagree] It’s not the purpose to  
which unions’ constitutions are customarily put. Controlling violence is by moral suasion, training.  
. . . .  
Once certified, there is a duty to bargain in good faith, not sham, i.e. serious intent. They should meet only if they  
have something to say. Pre-conditions are O.K. so long as they are indicating not of an expression of your  
legitimate interest but become proof that you don’t really want a collective agreement. Financial support of other  
unions is common. Not succeeding over a strike or lockout is bad for all other unions. Providing any kind of  
support is not with the expectation of some control over the strategy of the dispute. The exception - weak control  
is centered very much in the international union. Mining industry is susceptible to the influence of stockpile.  
They should always keep trying to negotiate, i.e. union should call management to see if anything could be done.  
A company should know that bringing replacement workers in is provocative and inflammatory. And to get rid of  
the union (in some cases), and that changes the union anger focus from the dispute to the job stealers and strike  
breakers (in part). Sometimes leaders encouraged violence on the picket line. Sometimes they use strikers as  
examples to support their potential demands. Violence need not be an inevitable consequence of the use of  
replacement workers.  
. . . .  
Bargaining in good faith is the most significant section of the Labour Relations Act. It gives life and substance to  
the rights of employers and employees. Good faith bargaining duty exists because it induces an element of public  
interest. Imposing pre-conditions before bargaining is O.K. but insisting on them to the point of impasse is  
indicative of a breach of the duty. Witte’s insistence on refusing to take back the fired strikers is a breach of duty  
to negotiate.  
Sims testified that employees identify with their jobs.  
Their employment is “an essential component of their sense of identity, self-worth and emotional well being.”  
The union’s three pre-conditions were:  
1. Reversal of the firing of Al Shearing;  
2. General amnesty for all strikers; and  
3. Removal of all replacement workers from the mine.  
Royal Oak could hang on to the first two, to the point of impasse, Sims said. On the third pre-condition, it was  
different as they were already at impasse.  
Sims testified that he has “no patience with personal violence”, referring to what happened to Tolmie. Both sides  
must take responsibility for the acts of its leaders and members in a general sense. Sims agreed with Bora  
Laskin’s statement that a union’s responsibility involves “exertion of discipline or control over members  
otherwise there can be no substance in collective bargaining relations and no stability in Collective Agreements”.  
Sims also stated that union leadership can influence the behaviour and that irresponsible leadership can inflame a  
situation.  
Some sanctions available to union leaders for criminal conduct are:  
1 Send the member home;  
2. Ban the member from the picket line;  
3. Deny the member strike pay while banned; and  
4. Threaten the member with sanction if he won’t behave himself.  
Sanctions in most constitutions is engaged in any conduct that brings the union into disrepute, and committing  
crimes would do that.  
Sims could not remember that happening.  
This then, was Sims’ evidence in summary form. He was impressive in knowledge of the subjects about which he  
was called to testify and objective in his comments when evidence was put to him in seeking his opinion.  
As I apply Sims’ views to facts proven herein, my views as evidenced by my findings are reinforced as they relate  
to CAW National, CASAW National, CASAW Local 4, their officers and members. The same can be said of Royal  
Oak and its conduct in labour relations.  
c) Ian Michael Plummer  
Plummer was qualified as an expert in the following areas:  
Prevailing industry standards and accepted practices in 1992 for occupational health and safety in Canadian  
mines.  
Prevailing standards and accepted practices regarding the Internal Responsibility System in Canadian mining in  
1992.  
Generally accepted practices and standards for maintaining workplace safety in 1992 in Canadian mines.  
Currently, Plummer is a mine safety and health training consultant. His expressions of opinion were, in his words  
“based on acceptable standards and the general practices of the mining industry in 1992".  
His curriculum vitae includes, by way of formal education, Royal School of Mines, London, U.K.: 3-year Bachelor  
of Science and Engineering, in Mining Engineering and Master of Science in Engineering. His work experience  
was impressive.  
Plummer opined that, in 1992, “it was unprecedented to continue mining operations with replacement workers,  
especially trying to achieve full capacity”. This he said was based on a number of factors, most important of which  
was unfamiliarity of replacement workers and staff workers doing the manual work, especially in face of strikers  
who would be endeavouring to impede production.  
The IRS was to Plummer “the Bible”, as it was to Dr. Strahlendorf, and applied, he said, to the whole chain of  
command, “from the chief executive officer right down to the worker”. He said the CEO was responsible for the  
establishment and continuation of the Health and Safety Committee, with all parties concerned, including the  
workers being a part of it, which demonstrated, as it did with Dr. Strahlendorf, the fallacy of that part of the IRS  
in a situation such as at Giant, on strike.  
The status in 1992 of the IRS in Canada was, Plummer said, a mixed bag; for example, every company in Ontario  
at that time had its own interpretation of IRS. In the NWT, he believed “they” were trying to work through an IRS  
and he was aware of Turner being quoted as saying that “he wanted to make sure that the Internal Responsibility  
System was working especially here in the mines”.  
Plummer said this:  
[T]he essential features and principles of the internal responsibility system as it was commonly understood in  
1992 in the mining industry in Canada ... was a sharing of knowledge and a sharing of responsibility between all  
levels in an organization. The principal - although it was to be set up and made possible by the chief executive  
officer; the principal players were always down there in the workplace. The workers and their supervisors were  
the principal players in the internal responsibility system at all stages.  
... the basis was that in pursuing safety, it would be an open, contributive process.  
Workers would feel - under a fully operating internal responsibility system ... empowered to do things for  
themselves to make their workplace safe for themselves and their colleagues. They would tell a supervisor what  
they’d done. If they didn’t have the resources to make it - make those corrections that they saw necessary, they  
would be able to turn to their supervisor who would help them get the resources and help them get it put right.  
And so on up the chain as necessary.  
He acknowledged as one element of the IRS Royal Oak’s five-point safety system which had been in use for 40  
years in Canada by 1992. He explained the IRS is designed to generate a lot of paper, none of which he found.  
Plummer testified that the numerous acts of vandalism from May 22 to June 9, 1992, during the strike/lockout  
“should have signified, based on acceptable practice in the mining industry, an increased level of awareness and  
heightened security because many of these incidents ¼ could have led to injuries”. There should have been  
some active participation by the company security and mining inspectors and recorded as such, he said. He also  
believed that the bomb threat on May 16, 1992, to the mine manager’s residence should have been reacted to by  
Royal Oak and some senior mine management so that an inquiry could be focused on the security and availability  
of explosives to the strikers. Plummer’s response to the use of explosives in June and July to damage mine  
property led to his opinion that higher security levels should have been implemented. As well, mining inspectors  
“should have been issuing orders to Giant to have secure underground storage” and to keep an explosives  
inventory. His response to the graffiti incident was that security should have been increased following its  
occurrence. In these areas, Plummer’s conclusion was that there needed to be a full record of this type of activity  
and the reaction of the company, security and mining inspectors.  
Finally, Plummer believed strongly that the occupational health and safety committee involving everyone should  
be more active during a strike, including drawing the workers, including strikers, in, although he recognized the  
lack of cooperation of the strikers; at Royal Oak, he saw little recorded evidence of an operating joint health and  
safety committee.  
It is clear from the above extracts that Plummer at least, unlike Dr. Strahlendorf, recognized the futility of any  
endeavour to have a health and safety committee involving the strikers. That concluded the examination-in-chief  
of Plummer and, when the cross-examination began, his assistance to the Court took somewhat of a downhill  
spiral. On a rigorous cross-examination, Plummer agreed that his opinions on steps that he believed should have  
been taken by Royal Oak were not based on any body of industry knowledge, since maintaining operations during  
a strike with replacement workers was an unprecedented event.  
He further agreed that a tally system on explosives underground was not an industry standard in 1992. As acting  
director during a strike at Placer Dome in 1990, he did not issue the type of orders he testified should have been  
issued during the strike at Giant. Although incidents of vandalism and a threat to a member’s life during the  
Placer Dome strike were brought to Plummer’s attention, he had no recollection of issuing or causing the issuance  
of orders to secure explosives.  
In the result then, Plummer entertained somewhat the same utopian view of Dr. Strahlendorf, about which I need  
not re-iterate my views again. More importantly, however, and as a result of the excellent cross-examination of  
Plummer, it is apparent he did not, when in a position to do so, when employed by the Government of Ontario,  
practise what he preaches. Thus, I was not comfortable with his evidence as to those practices the Plaintiffs  
would like me to give credence to in the health and safety areas about which Royal Oak, Pinkerton's and mining  
inspectors would, or should, have been concerned with.  
Economic Experts  
a) Gordon G. Smith  
Gordon G. Smith was qualified to give opinion evidence in the areas of forensic accounting and economic loss,  
including tax gross-up and management fees.  
Gordon Smith agreed with the Cara Brown model for calculating the tax gross-up, so that he focused on  
management fees only. He explained the purpose of management fees but said basically that “the ultimate  
purpose is to ensure that the money is expended in a prudent way over time”. He said management fees assist  
persons who receive lump sum awards and need help in preserving the money, and further explained the type of  
services available to assist in controlling their expenditures.  
On a prepared schedule, Gordon Smith calculated the equivalent seven-year annual distribution at present value  
at June 30, 2004, for a $50,000 award, based on the prescribed discount rate. He then calculated the  
management fees for a Minor Child’s Trust managed by the Office of the Public Trustee, by drawing down the  
total award (including the management fee gross-up) by the inflation-adjusted equivalent seven-year annual  
distribution and management fees net of interest earnings at the nominal interest rate. He determined that the  
required management fee gross-up for management by the Office of the Public Trustee to be $2,521 as at June 30,  
2004.  
Based on his research as to the fees charged by financial planners, it was his opinion that a management fee of  
$5,000 per survivor is appropriate, summarized as follows:  
LaVerne (Vern) Fullowka  
Sheila Fullowka 5,000.00  
Karen Sandra Fullowka 5,000.00  
Steven Paul Fullowka 5,000.00  
$15,000.00  
Norman Williard Hourie  
Doreen Shauna Hourie $5,000.00  
Joseph John Robert Hourie 5,000.00  
Jimmy Dale Hourie 5,000.00  
$15,000.00  
Christopher Dean Neill  
Tracey Neill $5,000.00  
$5,000.00  
Josef Pandev  
Judit Pandev $5,000.00  
Tammy Timar 5,000.00  
Timothy Pandev 5,000.00  
Kayla Pandev 5,000.00  
$20,000.00  
Robert Rowsell  
Carlene Dawn Rowsell $5,000.00  
Rachel Lindsay Rowsell 5,000.00  
Camilla Fawn Rowsell 5,000.00  
$15,000.00  
Arnold Russell  
Karen Russell $5,000.00  
Shelley Ida Russell 5,000.00  
Lorie Ann Russell 5,000.00  
Jeffrey Arnold Russell 5,000.00  
$20,000.00  
Malcolm Sawler  
Bonnie Lou Sawler $5,000.00  
Nathan Sawler 5,000.00  
$10,000.00  
David Vodnoski  
Doreen Vodnoski $5,000.00  
Dwight Vodnoski 5,000.00  
Wesley Vodnoski 5,000.00  
$15,000.00  
Shane Aaron Riggs  
Ella May Carol Riggs(mother) $5,000.00  
$5,000.00  
TOTAL $120,000.00  
Gordon Smith noted that the $5,000 for each dependant was for initial consultation only.  
On the issue of tax gross-up, Gordon Smith opined that it would apply only to the widow dependants, so that the  
management award to each widow would be $5,000 plus a tax gross-up of $5,000. A summary thereof as set  
forth on p. 3 of his report.  
In summary as detailed in his report, he calculated reasonable management fees required by the surviving  
dependants as a result of the September 18, 1992, explosion to be (all amounts present valued at June 4, 2002):  
No Remarriage & Divorce (Schedule 4)  
Remarriage - Known Partner (Schedule 5)  
Remarriage - No Known Partner (Schedule 6)  
Management Fees  
120,000.00  
120,000.00  
120,000.00  
Income Tax Gross-Up  
3,476.00  
3,881.00  
3,317.00  
Total  
123,476.00  
123,881.00  
123,317.00  
Divorce (Schedule 7)  
Divorce - Known Partner (Schedule 8)  
Remarriage & Divorce (Schedule 9)  
Management Fees  
120,000.00  
120,000.00  
120,000.00  
Income Tax Gross-Up  
3,388.00  
3,961.00  
3,308.00  
Total  
123,388.00  
123,961.00  
123,308.00  
The above estimate equates to $5,000 per dependant for which management fees have been claimed. I find  
Gordon Smith’s suggested sums for management awards, if recoverable, to be fair and reasonable.  
b) Cara Brown  
Cara Brown (“Brown”), qualified by the Court to give opinion evidence as a forensic economist with experience in  
the calculation of economic loss, testified from November 18 to November 21, 2003, inclusive.  
Counsel for the Plaintiffs began by introducing a voluminous summary of Brown’s evidence, unaccompanied by 9  
of the 18 ultimately produced voluminous binders as well as a separate report for the Plaintiff Carol Riggs.  
Brown testified she made some assessments of the damages that the families of the Plaintiffs had incurred as a  
result of the fatal blast. Unfortunately and for some reason not proffered, these assessments did not include all of  
the Plaintiffs’ damages. She did not calculate loss of care, guidance and companionship; Rather, she quantified  
loss of dependency for each family, and included whether the survivor had a potential loss of income due to a  
changed career path or not, together with valuable services, (i.e. loss of household contribution) and tax gross up.  
The estimated damages were calculated in an unnecessary and non-helpful number of scenarios for nine families,  
24 of 27 survivors being dependent for the purposes of her calculations.  
Before embarking on her own calculations, Brown was quick to indicate that Gerald Taunton (“Taunton”), the  
Defendants’ expert in a like field to hers, looked at dependency and loss of valuable services only. There were, she  
said, some six areas of disagreement with Taunton:  
(a) Potential income paths or career profiles of the deceased, i.e., what would have happened to the deceased if  
they had lived (what would they have earned as miners).  
(b) Personal consumption, i.e., deduction of living expenses for the deceased.  
(c) The amount of time the deceased would have spent on valuable services or the amount of time that is now  
supposedly saved with their absence from the families; valuable services being unpaid work, housekeeping  
around the house and yard, meal preparation, indoor and outdoor cleaning, maintenance of the home, vehicle  
repairs, childcare and shopping.  
(d) Widows’ companions. Tracey Neill, Bonnie Lou Sawler and Doreen Vodnoski, each who had companions they  
did not marry, were treated by Taunton as being married. Brown weighted the contributions she found the  
companions made to the households by the probability that the widows eventually marry according to remarriage  
statistics. I note at this juncture a total disregard of the evidence at trial that none of the widows had remarried  
and resolutely testified they would not and had not following the deaths of their husbands in 1992.  
(e) Widows’ projected income. Excepting those who had not worked since 1992, Taunton relied on what the  
widows would have continued to earn as opposed to what they actually earned. Brown testified she looked at both  
of these income streams.  
(f) Tax gross-up. Only Brown did tax gross-up. Gordon Smith adopted Brown’s calculation in this respect, and I  
find her calculations to be appropriate, if recoverable.  
In her main report identified as the “Summary”, Brown offered up every possible contingency imaginable in her  
calculation of Family Summary of Losses, when only one scenario could prevail based on the evidence. Later in  
the trial long after Brown’s evidence was given and cross-examined on, the Plaintiffs produced Exhibit 1037, a  
further 24-page Family Summary of Losses, which varied considerably from the summary in her Exhibit 662.  
The Court was given extensive background information on every imaginable type of mining information,  
contingency, scenario and occasionally actual information based on real evidence, in the determination of loss of  
earnings.  
For each miner except Joe Pandev, Brown used two scenarios in her calculation, which she agreed was not  
apparent from her report. Once again, these scenarios did not blend with the facts proven at the trial and thus  
were not helpful or reliable.  
Brown did attempt to project an income stream for each miner until retirement, looking at 1992 earnings and  
pre-1992 average earnings for eight of the deceased miners, excepting Shane Riggs, where she calculated a  
dependency only for Riggs’ mother based on certain assumptions. This translated to not basing Carol Riggs’ loss  
on what he was earning. The information compiled to formulate the loss of income, in the consideration of fringe  
benefits, disability and the like, was reasonable, but again the Court was bombarded with every imaginable  
scenario, only one of which was relevant. The assumed retirement age was 62, randomly chosen from statistical  
data that convinced Brown the average retirement age for miners was 61-67 years. Only Arnold Russell had  
substantial Unemployment Insurance attributed to him as he had a history in that respect.  
A great deal of reliance was placed on Statistics Canada information.  
For the purpose of her calculations, Brown assumed that productivity calculation included the Northwest  
Territories mandated discount rate of 2.5%. Inflation for 1992-2003 was ignored. Another component of  
productivity factor considered was real wage growth or, as she characterized it, industrial-specific or occupation  
wage growth. The deceased miners were treated individually in this respect. For example, Norm Hourie and Joe  
Pandev, being older, were assumed to have peaked by 1992, so that no real wage growth was attributed to them.  
Respecting deductions, Brown imposed standard labour market contingencies on an individual basis such as  
unemployment, disability and mortality. From time to time in her evidence, Brown actually relied on evidence  
given in the trial. For example, she assumed the deceased miners would be non-participants, i.e., that they would  
not choose not to work because “we had no evidence that these miners had ever worked part-time as miners  
voluntarily or were going to do that”. Unemployment was not considered.  
Brown added fringe benefits, for example, medical, dental, disability and life insurance, in her equation for each  
miner, this being 4.6% contributed by the employer. Pension benefits of 3.8% were likewise added, but it is to be  
noted this was based on a survey of Watson Wyatt done in 2001, not on actual available information.  
Personal consumption rates (“PCR”), being variable expenses the deceased consumed when alive, were  
considered. Brown explained that a PCR is the sum that is deducted from the family income, with the residual left  
being the family’s dependency on the family income. Certain things were left intact following death; for example,  
the surviving spouse would require the whole refrigerator, stove, car, and house, and the full expense of operating  
the house would not change on death. When income is shared, as Brown assumed, the deceased’s PCR is  
assumed to be a percentage of the total of the combined incomes. It must be noted that PCR calculation is fraught  
with uncertainty, as Brown suggested since families on the whole do not “maintain adequate records”.  
Brown used a formula to determine dependency loss, being:  
Dependency loss = {[1 -PCR] X deceased’s disposable income - PCR X survivor’s hypothetical disposable income}  
This was a formula never explained, mostly incomprehensible and of little use to the Court. PCRs are determined  
by economists from large consumer expenditure surveys, Brown said. Brown’s formula for determining a PCR  
has, as she testified, changed over the years, and she has developed her own tables from use of others. This  
included the assumption that the deceased’s PCR would decrease as the family increases. As well, she testified  
that, as the family’s income increases, the PCR decreases as she assumed more is spent on transportation,  
retirement funds and savings. Brown used American statistics though agreed that it is difficult to compare with  
Canadian numbers because of differences in such things as currency levels, taxation levels and the like. The  
demographics are obviously different.  
Comparing her PCR calculations with Taunton’s, Brown said that, other than for the Russell family, hers were “a  
bit higher”. The difference in end result numbers between Brown and Taunton derives from different  
assumptions with information often from the same source. That was not comforting to the Court.  
In adjusting the widows’ loss, there was no remarriage contingency used for some. However, for Tracey Neill,  
Bonnie Lou Sawler and Doreen Vodnoski, the presence of the companion was considered, where the information  
was available. There was an assumption that, if these three married their companions, their incomes would be  
pooled; for the other widows, it was assumed that if they married they would marry a man in the same  
circumstances as the deceased husband and with the same income stream. Taunton did the same, but, for the  
three with companions, he for some unexplained reason assumed they were married. The evidence here was  
three of the four with companions did not pool their incomes. Taunton assumed they did and that they shared  
expenses.  
Where there was information on the companions’ incomes or contributions, Brown and Taunton used it, to some  
extent but in part in their reports ignored it. For example, Dasilva lived with Carlene Rowsell for six years;  
Taunton dealt with Dasilva in terms of valuable services, but not in terms of financial contribution. In some cases  
where there was no information on financial contribution and valuable services, or where the information was  
incomplete, a calculation was made in any event.  
Brown purported to utilize two scenarios for each widow, the hypothetical would-have-been scenario and the  
actual scenario. Why the former was utilized mystified the Court. It is interesting to note that, in dealing with  
Carlene Rowsell, a third scenario crept into the discussion with Brown on the stand, which was not delineated  
properly.  
Each of the widows was similarly considered, with the Court being taken through tables, studies, assumptions,  
contingencies and dizzying calculations.  
Brown was prompted to and did testify ad nauseam on the subject of valuable services even though she said “but  
in truth we just don’t always know what that division of labour is”.  
On tax gross-up, Brown said that, if no tax gross-up is awarded, “the amount of tax on the interest income erodes  
the total award”. Brown applied the tax gross-up only to the widow’s part of the dependency award, not the  
children’s portion. For the widows, it was calculated two ways, with the widow’s projected 1992 earnings and her  
actual earnings, each without the survivor’s loss included.  
Collateral sources of income, such as WCB pension and Canada Pension income were not considered in the  
assessment of dependency loss, as they are not taxable.  
In the gross-up calculation, the 2.5% mandated discount rate was used. Added to this 2.5% was an inflation  
connection resulting in the creation of a “normal rate”. Here, Brown chose 4.55%.  
Some specific economic assumptions were made that were integral to tax gross-up calculations. For example, an  
$1,800 retirement pension was ascribed to Tracey Neill. Brown collaborated with Gordon Smith in determining  
the tax gross-up for all Plaintiffs. Personal taxes for all Plaintiffs were calculated.  
Brown then took the earning history of each family, using one or more scenarios to calculate the losses, noting  
that the survivors’ loss is the same regardless of the PCR scenario. She testified that the total award can never be  
more than the deceased’s potential income less his consumption.  
Valuable services calculated on an annual basis for each Plaintiff were set forth for each, beginning with Exhibit  
662, Table 5-2, p.108. The calculations were grounded on multiple assumptions, with some factual basis and  
some statistical data gleaned from studies utilized. For example, for Vern Fullowka, Brown ascribed a lump sum  
of $230,952 for loss of valuable services.  
According to Brown, Norm Hourie enjoyed four scenarios in his calculations at 60 years for retirement with the  
dependency loss at $511,213. For Chris Neill, there were two income scenarios employed, and a dependency loss  
calculated at $1,927,109.  
Brown noted, for example, there would be no wage growth for miners like Joe Pandev, as he had peaked because  
of age, but there would be for those such as Vern Fullowka, aged 36, and Chris Neill, aged 29 years. For Joe  
Pandev, two scenarios were developed, with one income level but two different retirement scenarios.  
For Arnold Russell, Malcolm Sawler and David Vodnoski, losses were calculated with assumptions peculiar to  
their situations.  
Different retirement scenarios were attributed to each based on their particular circumstances.  
Shane Riggs, a single person, was assessed, based on his $10,380 per year support of his mother.  
O’Neil Claim  
Mr. Redmond examined Brown respecting O’Neil’s potential loss of income.  
Brown testified that loss calculations for O’Neil referenced gross income before taxes and deductions, as opposed  
to fatality losses where taxes are deducted. Exhibit 665 set forth a summary of estimates showing potential loss of  
income to ages 62 and 56 years.  
Brown created two scenarios as to O’Neil’s earnings; if the incident had not happened, and a third scenario  
assuming the incident did happen, all three beginning with May 1995. Some scenarios considered O’Neil’s work  
as a pilot and two, also without incident, with average earnings at Royal Oak, one with real wage growth and one  
without.  
Once again, Brown’s report contained multiple scenarios, many of which had no application whatsoever to the  
evidence at trial. It was quite incomprehensible and the epitome of convolution. As well, the numerous  
contingencies distorted the reality of O’Neil’s circumstances. In fairness, however, some of the contingencies and  
assumptions employed for the nine deceased miners were properly utilized for O’Neil.  
WCB benefits that O’Neil received were not to be deducted as they were assumed collateral. However “collateral”  
when used for the widows’ WCB pensions meant they were not taxable, and Brown could not explain why  
collateral did not mean the same thing for O’Neil as for the widows except to relate collateral for the latter to tax  
gross-up.  
At the conclusion of the calculations, Brown arrived at a pre-trial loss of $550,500; with real wage growth, the loss  
increase to $571,000 for O’Neil. In scenario three, with O’Neil as a pilot, the loss would be $357,000. Brown  
then calculated future loss and arrived at varying figures, depending on which scenario she employed for the  
period after October 15, 2003.  
Brown’s report summarized O’Neil’s loss of income with retirement ages of 62 and 56 as follows:  
Total Loss of Income  
Table VII---4 summarizes Mr. O’Neil’s total loss of income with retirement at age 62.  
Table VII-10  
James O’Neil’s Potential Total Loss of Income  
Without-Incident Scenarios  
With-Incident Scenarios  
Potential Loss of Income  
Pre-Trial*  
Future  
Total  
A1: Average earnings at Royal Oak Mines Inc.  
B1: Not competitively employable  
$550,500  
$845,000  
$1,395,500  
A2: Average earnings at Royal Oak Mines Inc. with real wage growth  
$571,000  
$922,000  
$1,492,500  
A3: Pilot from 1996 onwards  
$357,000  
$802,500  
$1,159,500  
A1: Average earnings at Royal Oak Mines Inc.  
B2: Full-time minimum wage earner  
$550,500  
$611,000  
$1,161,500  
A2: Average earnings at Royal Oak Mines Inc. with real wage growth  
$571,000  
$688,000  
$1,259,000  
A3: Pilot from 1996 onwards  
$357,000  
$568,500  
$926,000  
*Inclusive of pre-judgment interest to the assumed date of valuation of October 15, 2003.  
Table VII -11: Potential Income Losses with Retirement at Age 56  
Without-Incident Scenarios  
With-Incident Scenarios  
Potential Loss of Income  
Pre-Trial*  
Future  
Total  
A1: Average earnings at Royal Oak Mines Inc.  
B1: Not competitively employable  
$550,500  
$623,000  
$1,173,500  
A2: Average earnings at Royal Oak Mines Inc. with real wage growth  
$571,000  
$679,500  
$1,250,500  
A1: Average earnings at Royal Oak Mines Inc.  
B2: Full-time minimum wage earner  
$550,500  
$450,000  
$1,000,500  
A2: Average earnings at Royal Oak Mines Inc. with real wage growth  
$571,000  
$507,000  
$1,078,000  
*Inclusive of pre-judgment interest to the assumed date of valuation of October 15, 2003.  
In Brown’s comparison with Taunton’s analysis and calculations, she noted that he “cuts off the potential loss  
estimates at other time periods”. Thus, Taunton secures different resulting numbers.  
In addition, Brown noted that Taunton assumed a higher income and did not consider O’Neil as a pilot; rather, he  
used earnings by education level as another scenario. Further, she said Taunton attributed income to O’Neil that  
he did not earn; Brown used income tax return information.  
Concerns - Both Actions  
On cross-examination, Brown, who referenced the text book of her mentor and long-time friend and colleague,  
disagreed with several statements made in the text that ran counter to a pivotal area in which she testified,  
notably, dependency rates.  
In addition, Patton and Nelson, researchers heavily relied on by Brown was criticized by Boudreau in the  
respected Journal of Forensic Economics in the area of PCRs. Ajwa, Vauoulis and Martin, also heavily relied on  
by Brown, disagreed with attribution of PCR amounts. Thus, it appears there is little agreement among the  
experts on these important issues on which Brown based her opinions.  
Brown bolstered her evidence in part with a 1986 Toronto study on the cost of raising a child. Taunton, she  
noted, likewise relied on an outdated Vancouver Social Planning Council of British Columbia (“SPARC”) study to  
support his position in part on the minimum sum of money required for subsistence. This type of information,  
like Brown’s use of 1995-1997 divorce statistics, is in my view of little help when one is applying today’s standards  
in that field. In cross-examination, she contradicted herself.  
The cross-examination likewise revealed semantical impasses and column labeling errors, disabling a reader to  
understand certain tables relied on by Brown to support her calculations. See the Vodnoski calculations, as an  
example.  
Brown was critical of Taunton’s 17.9% probability of divorce compared to her 21.34%, but, when queried on  
whether it mattered in the calculations she made, she said “it doesn’t make a lot of difference”.  
The fragility of Brown’s evidence became more pronounced when referencing Tracey Neill’s circumstances, in  
that, although financial and other information on Neill’s companion Sartori was available, in part at least it was  
not factored into the calculations, except in the valuable services area.  
Brown’s Statistics Canada input was up to 1997, and, although on November 20, 2003, that agency published  
updated information on marriage and divorce statistics, no attempt was made or suggested by Plaintiffs’ counsel  
to revise her calculations.  
I note that some of the evidence was flawed. For example, in calculations of real wage growth for Vern Fullowka  
and Robert Rowsell, with a one year difference in age, the factor applied was 73 and 1.28 respectively. That  
prompted Brown to feel uncertain of the table’s contents. On having an opportunity to re-check calculations,  
Brown, through re-juggling the data on Vern Fullowka and Robert Rowsell, believes she had extricated herself as  
she was then able to bring her calculations to heel to the subject table calculations.  
In further cross-examination respecting earnings of the deceased miners, Brown sometimes used actual and  
sometimes averaged and in addition would make assumptions that would distort the income. This left the Court  
with little confidence in the accuracy aspect. For example, Brown assumed Joe Pandev and Norm Hourie would  
reduce their overtime after age 55, but the same did not apply to the other seven, with no explanation.  
Brown failed to utilize Statistics Canada information that was available to her on the probability of births to  
certain of the widows, yet she used Statistics Canada information on marriage and divorce in her dependency and  
other calculations.  
A great deal of information relied on by Brown came from plaintiffs’ counsel and was not always given through  
sworn testimony, in particular in relation to valuable services. In other words, it was often unverified, with no  
review of examination for discovery transcripts or sworn evidence at trial.  
In terms of dependency calculations, Brown testified she assumed full replacement by the companion, where  
there was one; however, she did not do that in every case. Further, those replacement credits were not considered  
in some of the calculations of the widows’ losses in some of the scenarios promoted because “they were not  
married”.  
Though I am critical of the type of evidence proffered and manner of presentation by Brown and Taunton, I do  
not want my comments to be construed as an attack on Brown’s or Taunton’s qualifications. They enjoy a very  
high status in the Courts in their fields, and I have the greatest respect for their intelligence, expertise and  
honesty.  
The perception and presumption of a trier of fact must be that Brown and Taunton, like all experts, are instructed  
by counsel in a certain way and are appropriately expected to be creative but within the bounds of factual  
evidence tendered. It was here that Brown gave the appearance that there was little relevance. This was then  
trumped with multiple differing assumptions, contingencies, adjustments, unworkable formulas, self created  
factual foundations, and reliance on texts and studies, whose authors were never authenticated, culminating in  
some of her evidence being well settled into a totally enigmatic state.  
Opinion evidence is deemed necessary where the Court requires expertise to assist in decision-making, that is,  
when a trier of fact would not know or have difficulty understanding non-everyday technical concepts and some  
areas in highly specialized fields known to but a few. Facts would be proven, the expert would apply his or her  
expert knowledge to only those facts and render an opinion for the benefit of the Court.  
We have over the years strayed from that, in part as more information has been made available and experts have  
become more specialized and knowledgeable in their fields, so that currently, as in this case, the traditional  
methodology of handling the expert is not so strictly employed. Here, Brown was for the most part asked to  
assume facts, not always the facts proven, however. Then, with an overload of information gathered from  
statistical studies, graphs, tables and texts, she made assumptions and created factors, formulas and  
contingencies together with scenarios, some of which bore little or no resemblance or relevance to anything  
factual to date in the trial, on which her opinion was rendered. From that, she created some self-serving graphical  
designs and created scenarios.  
Included in her evidence was a main binder, which was helpful (Exhibit 662, involving companion Exhibit 663 as  
well). However, the 18, five to six-inch additional binders and a further small dossier are examples of overkill in  
the extreme insofar as correlation and reference to the main binder was concerned. This information overload  
and overkill became an endurance test for the Court in ease of connection to Exhibit 662.  
Judges are not to be relegated to technocracy. Here, assessing damages was made more complex given the  
incomprehensibility of connecting the material in the additional 18 binders with the information in the main  
binder (Exhibit 662) and the relevant evidence. This Exhibit 662, supposedly a summary, was obscured by  
innumerable scenarios, studies (many outdated), graphs, texts, columns of numbers used to create numbers, and  
tables in almost unimaginable proportions and in as convoluted a manner as I have ever seen.  
This led to embarrassment for Brown when she agreed that sometimes, whether one utilized her or Taunton’s test  
in a particular area, it made little or no difference. The difference is reflective of but one thing: despite these two  
experts being qualified as educated in essentially the same field, each secured the results they desired by utilizing  
different assumptions, scenarios, factors and statistics, creating a numerical nightmare for a trier of fact, when, as  
here, so little of the self-created results have little or no relationship to the facts proven and to which the trier of  
fact must apply the expertise.  
Much of the information in the 18 additional binders is irrelevant, impractical, and of little or no use in the  
function the Court must perform. For example, how relevant is a 1997 Vancouver SPARC study on the  
subsistence level of a family and a 1986 Toronto study on the cost of rearing a child, especially where the latter, I  
am urged to find, is preferable to the former, particularly where the factors employed were dissimilar? Would  
there be a difference between the amounts, the sums determined by Taunton and Brown? Of course. Is that  
helpful? No.  
Also of concern is Brown’s use of Statistics Canada data on marriage and divorce but not on birth rate  
information, which, on a good cross-examination by Ms. Sanderson was demonstrated to alter the PCR and  
dependency calculations and increase or decrease the amount of the award to the family. In relation to Norm  
Hourie, Brown testified “What they were doing right at the time of this incident is a better assumption than what  
they might have done at some time in the future”. An excellent illustration of this can be seen if one compares  
that with the application of Statistics Canada data on marriage and divorce that was applied to the testimony of  
the widowed Plaintiffs.  
In short, a reality check is needed when experts are retained. The time is arriving, in my view, when the Courts  
must impose some rules on what it receives, other than regulating experts with the sanction of denial of costs.  
c) Gerald Frederick Taunton  
Taunton was called on behalf of Royal Oak and Pinkerton’s.  
He was qualified as an expert in economics with expertise in the assessment of fatal accident dependency claims  
and personal injury claims, and he was retained to give opinion evidence respecting valuation of claims of the  
nine plaintiffs for loss of dependency and loss of household services or valuable services.  
In his report dated June 10, 2003, he provided a valuation of past and future loss of financial support and  
household or valuable services for the eight Plaintiffs, and for Carol Riggs a valuation for loss of dependency and  
valuable services only. Following this June report he provided amendments to reflect 2004 tax rates; 2001 census  
data (from 1996), the effect of which was to increase the losses claimed; changes in Giant wage rates, because of a  
change on January 1, 2003, though they actually changed in November 2002; and a revised household services  
valuation (from General Social Survey of 1992 of Statistics Canada for 1998). The latter increased household  
services by 73 hours per year.  
He testified that, for four of the miners, average earnings had gone upwards. He introduced discrete amounts of  
support flowing from common law partners to Doreen Vodnoski and Bonnie Lou Sawler.  
For dependency calculations, he estimated what a deceased would have earned absent the blast on a pre-tax basis  
and on a disposable income basis. For the widows who were employed, similar calculations were made. Next, he  
estimated from a survey of household spending the percentage of total family income that should be allocated to  
the divisible expenses of the deceased. The estimate of the percentage was then multiplied by total family  
disposable income, and this was the estimate of funds allocated to the exclusive benefit of the deceased.  
To determine the loss of dependency calculation, Taunton took the deceased’s contribution to the disposable  
family income and subtracted those subject expenses; the difference was the loss to the family.  
For the valuation of household services claim, he said:  
We first start with an estimate of the total amount of time that a deceased miner, based upon statistical sources in  
this particular case, would have spent either in domestic work, shopping, or in primary childcare. We have then  
made adjustments or deductions from those totals to reflect any time that the average male in those domestic  
circumstances would have spent to their exclusive benefit. We’ve made another deduction where we estimate the  
savings to the spouse from services that she would have otherwise provided to the exclusive benefit of the  
deceased and we essentially come up with a net figure of the net loss in hours per year under various  
circumstances for the miner. Then we apply a replacement wage value to that to obtain an annual loss and from  
there it’s a simple mathematical calculation of determining the loss with interest in the past period and  
discounting the future stream using the discount rate mandated here in the Territory.  
Taunton then provided his assumptions for each of the deceased miners’ and their dependants, based in part on  
the evidence from testimony given at trial, and, where there was a paucity or total lack of evidence, relied in part  
on texts, studies and statistics as did Brown. The fallibility in such sources, especially the most revered source,  
Statistics Canada , is that they are for the most part, self-reporting. I endorse the comment of Goodfellow J. of the  
Supreme Court of Nova Scotia, Cashen v. Donovan (1999), 1999 NSSC 86 (), 173 N.S.R. (2d) 87 at para.  
154:  
There seems to be a growing practice of assuming that blind reliance can be placed upon Statistics Canada or  
other statistical information that is not tested by cross-examination. Often, the statistical information is based  
upon surveys that are advanced and collected in part, to advance political agendas.... [Hence] some caution  
should be exercised into readily accepting Statistics Canada and other sources as gospel and in replacement of an  
evidentiary base in each case.  
That fallibility is enhanced when, despite the Court’s comment in this respect, no counsel produced any  
authentication of the authors of the texts, studies and articles relied on, leaving the Court to question the accuracy  
of analysis. Even Statistics Canada’s information is a random sampling of 20%. The sine que non of appropriate  
assessment in the subject area must surely be the validity of information relied on by the experts.  
Unfortunately Taunton, like Brown, created numerous contingencies, many of which were unrealistic, confusing  
and not relevant or helpful. The same can be said for the mathematical errors discovered as he went through his  
analysis of the dependants. Taunton made certain adjustments for each dependant and for the deceased’s  
circumstances of age and areas of income, which was averaged, and brought to 1992 dollars, and, where he  
believed it necessary, applied a nominal or wage growth factor and considered taxes in the subject province or  
territory, depending on where his assumption placed them for the purpose of his analysis. In his overload of  
contingencies Taunton built in a part-time factor where he believed it applicable, but then compounded the  
overkill and in my view the inaccuracy by incorporating the Labour Market Contingency (“LMC”) that he defined  
as unemployment and part-time. The difficulty in this area was that miners are so rarely unemployed and part-  
time (see Brown’s evidence, supra), so that utilizing the LMC had to distort the results produced. Added to that  
was the mathematical inaccuracy in the tables. See Table 2A - Fullowka.  
The frailty in the economists’ evidence is demonstrated in an exchange between Taunton and the Court:  
The Court: Well, let me ask you this then. If you assume that he worked as a miner until that time, why do you  
build in E.I. benefit at all? What’s the significance of that?  
The Witness: Only in the period after the mine reopened. We don’t know for certainty that he would have been  
hired back so he may have faced some risk of unemployment after that period of time.  
The Court: Where did you get that information from?  
The Witness: That he wouldn’t be hired back?  
The Court: Yes.  
The Witness: We don’t have any information that he would have been, I guess it’s sort of a default.  
Brown performed the same calculations even though they both assumed full-time, full year earnings as miners.  
Respecting Sheila Fullowka, Taunton assumed that, while in Yellowknife and after she moved away, she would or  
would not work outside the home and calculated her earnings and disposable income accordingly. Her record of  
employment was provided in every detail before he took the witness stand, so there was no need to use statistical  
data, assumptions, contingencies and formulas to assess her earnings and disposable income.  
On family consumption calculations, Taunton opined that the primary purpose was to try to estimate the  
percentage of the income that would go to the deceased’s divisible expenses. This carried with it certain new  
assumptions and reliance on Statistics Canada’s survey of household spending, including calculations for children  
and, on counsel’s instruction, assumptions on when they would cease to be dependent. In this respect, reliance  
on consumption estimates came from the SPARC, again with no background on this entity. Speaking generally in  
this area as in other areas spoken of, he characterized Brown’s contingencies and assumptions and external  
information utilized as being designed to secure higher losses, and his the lowest.  
In calculating the statistical household claims, Taunton agreed that his assumption as to the time an employed  
male spends on domestic work and shopping services was guesswork or, as he preferred to characterize it, “an  
educated guess”.  
On occasion, Taunton used Brown’s report, for example, assumptions used to calculate Tracey Neill’s earnings  
stream in the absence of the accident. For Tracey Neill, Taunton did calculations based on Sartori’s divorce-  
adjusted support value, while at the same time acknowledging he had been told the couple were never married.  
Taunton, and Brown were often critical of each others assumptions, contingencies and sources. However, the  
evidence that accompanied and supported those criticisms was often as bereft of relevance, accuracy and  
authenticity as the sources utilized by the person leveling the attack, and, on occasion, no source was given at all,  
for, without evidence respecting the authenticity of the source, it was impossible to determine the validity of the  
criticism.  
Speaking of the evidence of both economists, the sheer volume and complexity leaves little doubt why trials  
involving personal injury and fatalities are marathon-like.  
In assessing the Vodnoski claims, Taunton used the Canadian age learning profiles for underground miners.  
Brown used an age earning profile for miners resident in the Yukon and the NWT, including Nunavut. Taunton’s  
criticism was that Brown’s sample was too small to draw on.  
Taunton did not do tax gross-up as there was uncertainty as to whether a tax gross up was required. He had been  
instructed that the real plaintiff was the WCB, and thus no tax gross-up calculation was required.  
Taunton elaborated on the areas where he believed he and Brown differed; those that were most significant he  
said were:  
(a) Personal consumption rates. Taunton said that “it’s a matter of definition”. Taunton used current  
consumption, but Brown included savings therein.  
(b) Support for remarriage or co-habitation. Taunton believed it irrelevant whether or not parties are married.  
(c) Assumptions pertaining to employment and province or territory of residence.  
Brown assumed all miners would remain in Yellowknife; that, said Taunton, would “increase the loss”. Brown  
contradicted her own tenet that one should not include earnings after the accident in the calculation of the  
average, and she used industry earnings, not just earnings of miners. Her source was Human Resources  
Development Canada - Taunton used education-based rates and considered only actual earnings.  
Disability contingency was also an area of disagreement. Brown said it went down with age, whereas Taunton  
testified that was a misapplication of the statistics.  
O’Neil Claim  
On potential loss of income, assumptions made were:  
(a) O’Neil in the absence of the blast would have remained employed as a miner to retirement or, alternatively,  
enjoyed earnings of the average Canadian male of his education level.  
(b) That as a result of the blast, O’Neil was limited in his ability to earn employment from May 15/95 to 6 certain  
dates.  
These six dates are as follows:  
(i) May 15, 1995 - Aug 31, 1995 - when Dr. Blashko acknowledged there were documented PTSD symptoms;  
(ii) June 30, 1998 - Dr. Copus’ report;  
(iii) June 30, 1999 - Dr. Gervais’ report;  
(iv) August 31, 1999 - Dr. Hartman’s report;  
(v) January 31, 2000 - when the WCB terminated O’Neil’s support;  
(vi) September 30, 2000 - when O’Neil began working as a recreational vehicle (“RV”) salesman.  
Taunton did a full-time, full year earnings profile. His approach was to apply standard contingency allowances  
with no tax calculations. He then determined average earnings applying:  
Nominal wage growth in line with collective agreement changes.  
Allowed for real wage growth for Canadian underground miners.  
Built in a standard allowance for benefits from Royal Oak.  
Built in LMC - though no part time was built in.  
Assumed retirement at age 65.  
It was abundantly clear throughout the entirety of the evidence of the economists that so much of their evidence  
was based on speculation or, as Taunton said, “guesswork”. I am prepared to concede that may be the nature of  
that type of information, and, if that is the perception, it surely behooves them to furnish the Court with authored  
foundation of their sources so that a more accurate analysis of the evidence can be made.  
LIABILITY OF THE PARTIES  
Warren admitted his role in the deaths of the miners. As I will illustrate herein, some of the Defendants’ acts and  
omissions provide ample grounds for finding them at fault jointly and severally with Warren.  
The Plaintiffs are the families of the nine deceased miners, and they bring their claims under the Fatal Accidents  
Act, which provided at the material time:  
2. Where the death of a person is caused by a wrongful act, neglect or default that, if death had not resulted,  
would have entitled the person injured to maintain an action and recover damages in respect of the injury, the  
person who would have been liable if death had not resulted is liable to an action for damages, notwithstanding  
the death of the person injured and although the death was caused under circumstances amounting in law to  
culpable homicide.  
3.(1) An action brought under this Act . . .  
(a) shall be for the benefit of the spouse, parent or child of the person whose death was caused by a wrongful act,  
neglect or default; . . .  
Before discussing the general principles of negligence and liability of each party, it is appropriate to set forth now  
those defences pleaded in the Defendants’ Statements of Defence in both actions that were abandoned and need  
not be further referenced herein. Firstly, the defence volenti non fit injuria was abandoned by all Defendants who  
defended by way of evidence called or argument. Secondly, all Defendants (except Seeton) abandoned  
contributory negligence. Thirdly, the GNWT abandoned the defence of extinguishment of the cause of action as a  
consequence of the occupational health and safety facet of the MSD being subsumed within the WCB (para. 11).  
Fourthly, CAW National abandoned the defence that it is not a legal entity capable of being sued. Fifthly, Bettger  
did not pursue his defence pleaded pursuant to s.2(1)(d) of the Limitation of Actions Act. Sixthly, Seeton’s claim  
for immunity pursuant to s. 12 of the Workers’ Compensation Act, was abandoned.  
Those arguments raised in oral and written form not specifically referenced herein were not found to have an  
evidentiary foundation or a known basis in law and thus were found to be without merit.  
General Principles of Negligence  
The law of negligence cares not about intentions; instead, liability will be imposed if conduct is found to have  
fallen below acceptable standards under the given circumstances. In order for a cause of action in negligence to  
be substantiated, the following must exist:  
(a) Duty of care;  
(b) Breach of that duty by breaching the standard of care;  
(c) Proof of resulting damage;  
(d) Causal connection between the alleged negligent conduct and the damage; and  
(e) Damage must not be too remote, must be foreseeable.  
Some general comments on the legal principles of negligence are provided below as they are applicable to all  
Defendants. For issues that were raised relevant to a particular Defendant only, the law will be canvassed in later  
sections dedicated to the evidence respecting each Defendant.  
a) Duty of Care  
The modern conception of duty of care in tort law is founded in the neighbour principle, as articulated by Lord  
Atkin in M’Alister (Donoghue) v. Stevenson, 1932 536 (FOREP), [1932] A.C. 562 at 580 (H.L.):  
The rule that you are to love your neighbour becomes in law, you must not injure your neighbour; and the  
lawyer’s question, Who is my neighbour? receives a restricted reply. You must take reasonable care to avoid acts  
or omissions which you can reasonably foresee would be likely to injure your neighbour. Who, then, in law is my  
neighbour? The answer seems to be - persons who are so closely and directly affected by my act that I ought  
reasonably to have them in contemplation as being so affected when I am directing my mind to the acts or  
omissions which are called in question.  
The House of Lords then enunciated a test to establish a prima facie duty of care in Anns v. Merton London  
Borough Council (1977), [1978] A.C. 728, which was subsequently adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada. In  
Anns, Lord Atkins’ neighbour principle was distilled by Lord Wilberforce into a two-step test at 751-752:  
[T]he position has now been reached that in order to establish that a duty of care arises in a particular situation, it  
is not necessary to bring the facts of that situation within those of previous situations in which a duty of care has  
been held to exist. Rather the question has to be approached in two stages. First one has to ask whether, as  
between the alleged wrongdoer and the person who has suffered damage there is a sufficient relationship of  
proximity or neighbourhood such that, in the reasonable contemplation of the former, carelessness on his part  
may be likely to cause damage to the latter — in which case a prima facie duty of care arises. Secondly, if the first  
question is answered affirmatively, it is necessary to consider whether there are any considerations which ought  
to negative, or to reduce or limit the scope of the duty or the class of person to whom it is owed or the damages to  
which a breach of it may give rise. . . .  
The Anns test was first adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada in Kamloops (City of) v. Nielsen, 1984 21  
(SCC), [1984] 2 S.C.R. 2, and then recently reformulated in Cooper v. Hobart, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 537, 2001 SCC 79.  
In Cooper, the Court, per McLachlin C.J. and Major J. held that the two-step Anns test requires a policy analysis  
at both the first and second stages. If no duty has been recognized in the jurisprudence, then Cooper suggests the  
modified Anns test be applied to determine if a duty of care ought to be recognized. The test was articulated as  
follows at paras. 30-31, 37:  
At the first stage of the Anns test, two questions arise: (1) was the harm that occurred the reasonably foreseeable  
consequence of the defendant’s act? and (2) are there reasons, notwithstanding the proximity between the parties  
established in the first part of this test, that tort liability should not be recognized here? The proximity analysis  
involved at the first stage of the Anns test focuses on factors arising from the relationship between the plaintiff  
and the defendant. These factors include questions of policy, in the broad sense of that word. If foreseeability  
and proximity are established at the first stage, a prima facie duty of care arises. At the second stage of the Anns  
test, the question still remains whether there are residual policy considerations outside the relationship of the  
parties that may negative the imposition of a duty of care .¼  
On the first branch of the Anns test, reasonable foreseeability of the harm must be supplemented by proximity.  
The question is what is meant by proximity. Two things may be said. The first is that “proximity” is generally  
used in the authorities to characterize the type of relationship in which a duty of care may arise. The second is  
that sufficiently proximate relationships are identified through the use of categories¼.  
. . . .  
This brings us to the second stage of the Anns test. As the majority of this Court held in Canadian National  
Railway Co. v. Norsk Pacific Steamship Co., 1992 105 (SCC), [1992] 1 S.C.R. 1021 at p. 1155, residual policy  
considerations fall to be considered here. These are not concerned with the relationship between the parties, but  
with the effect of recognizing a duty of care on other legal obligations, the legal system and society more generally.  
Does the law already provide a remedy? Would recognition of the duty of care create the spectre of unlimited  
liability to an unlimited class? Are there other reasons of broad policy that suggest that the duty of care should  
not be recognized? [Emphasis in original.]  
Furthermore, Cooper, supra at para. 34, provides some assistance when examining a relationship to determine if  
sufficient proximity exists to justify the finding of a duty of care at para. 34:  
Defining the relationship may involve looking at expectations, representations, reliance, and the property or other  
interests involved. Essentially, these are factors that allow us to evaluate the closeness of the relationship  
between the plaintiff and the defendant and to determine whether it is just and fair having regard to that  
relationship to impose a duty of care in law upon the defendant.  
See also a more recent summarization by Iacobucci J., for the Supreme Court of Canada, in Odhavji Estate v.  
Woodhouse, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 263, 2003 SCC 69. At para. 48, Iacobucci J. discusses the concept of proximity,  
noting that the Court in Cooper, supra, clearly stated that for a duty to arise there must be reasonable  
foreseeability of harm “plus something more”. Furthermore, he noted that the Court in Cooper concluded:  
[T]his “something more” is proximity: in order to establish that the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of care,  
the reasonable foreseeability of harm must be supplemented by proximity. It is only if harm is a reasonably  
foreseeable consequence of the conduct in question and there is a sufficient degree of proximity between the  
parties that a prima facie duty of care is established. The question that thus arises is what precisely is meant by  
the term proximity. [Emphasis in original)  
Canadian Courts have repeatedly noted that the neighbour principle enunciated in Donoghue, supra, does not  
impose a duty of care to the world at large. In Dobson (Litigation Guardian of) v. Dobson, 1999 698  
(SCC), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 753 at para. 59, Cory J., for the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada, enunciated:  
The Court of Appeal also referred to a “general duty of care” in articulating its test for maternal tort liability. With  
respect, there can be no such duty owed to the public at large. As a matter of tort law, a duty of care must always  
be owed by one person to another. Negligence cannot exist in the abstract. There must be a specific duty owed to  
a foreseeable plaintiff, which is breached, in order for negligence to arise. A “general duty of care” does not exist.  
Moreover, in Odhavji Estate, supra at para. 45, Iacobucci J. commented:  
It is a well-established principle that a defendant is not liable in negligence unless the law exacts an obligation in  
the circumstances to take reasonable care. As Lord Esher concluded in Le Lievre v. Gould, [1893] 1 Q.B. 491  
(C.A.), at p. 497, “[a] man is entitled to be as negligent as he pleases towards the whole world if he owes no duty to  
them.”  
In defining the class to whom a duty is owed, the Court in Cooper, supra, noted at para. 31 that “sufficiently  
proximate relationships are identified through the use of categories. The categories are not closed and new  
categories of negligence may be introduced. But generally, proximity is established by reference to these  
categories”. Some categories recognized by the Courts were then outlined at para. 36:  
First, of course, is the situation where the defendant’s act foreseeably causes physical harm to the plaintiff or the  
plaintiff’s property. This has been extended to nervous shock¼. Yet other categories are liability for negligent  
misstatement ¼ and misfeasance in public office. A duty to warn of the risk of danger has been recognized .¼  
Again, a municipality has been held to owe a duty to prospective purchasers of real estate to inspect housing  
developments without negligence.¼ Similarly, governmental authorities who have undertaken a policy of road  
maintenance have been held to owe a duty of care to execute the maintenance in a non-negligent manner¼.  
Relational economic loss (related to a contract’s performance) may give rise to a tort duty of care in certain  
situations, as where the claimant has a possessory or proprietary interest in the property, the general average  
cases, and cases where the relationship between the claimant and the property owner constitutes a joint  
venture.¼ When a case falls within one of these situations or an analogous one and reasonable foreseeability is  
established, a prima facie duty of care may be posited.  
In terms of policy considerations to be taken into account in applying the Anns test, limitation of liability has been  
identified as an important one. In London Drugs Ltd. v. Kuehne & Nagel International Ltd., 1992 41  
(SCC), [1992] 3 S.C.R. 299, the two defendants were employees at a warehouse who had damaged a transformer  
owned by the plaintiff, who had signed a contractual limitation of liability as between itself and the employer, the  
language of which did not extend to the employees in their personal capacities. Iacobucci J., for the majority of  
the Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the claims against the employees by extending the contractual limitation  
to the employees. McLachlin J., as she then was, concurred, reaching the same result on the basis that the  
employees in their personal capacities did not owe a duty of care to the plaintiff. In her view, the existence of the  
limitation on liability was an important policy consideration, as stated at 460:  
The principles of tort set out in Anns v. Merton London Borough Council, [1978] A.C. 728, and repeatedly applied  
by this Court permit, and indeed require, the court to take into account all relevant circumstances in assessing the  
duty of care which a particular defendant owes to a particular plaintiff. The existence of a limitation on liability,  
whether contractual or otherwise, may affect the ambit of that duty of care. In this case, the majority of the Court  
of Appeal, applying these principles, concluded that the duty of care of the defendants was limited to damage  
under $40, the plaintiff having accepted all risk of damage over that amount. I would affirm that conclusion.  
b) Standard of Care  
The determination of whether the conduct of a defendant in any particular situation is negligent is a question of  
mixed fact and law. See Housen v. Nikolaisen, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 235 at para. 31, 2002 SCC 33, quoting from  
Galaske v. O’Donnell, 1994 128 (SCC), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 670 at 690.  
The ultimate question to be answered is whether a particular defendant’s conduct, be it active or passive or a  
combination of both, reasonable. See Allen M. Linden, Canadian Tort Law, 7th ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 2001)  
at 119.  
In Stewart v. Pettie, 1995 147 (SCC), [1995] 1 S.C.R. 131, Major J., for the Supreme Court of Canada,  
offered the following at para. 50:  
One of the primary purposes of negligence law is to enforce reasonable standards of conduct so as to prevent the  
creation of reasonably foreseeable risks. In this way, tort law serves as a disincentive to risk-creating behaviour.  
To impose liability even where the risk which materialized was not reasonably foreseeable is to lay a portion of the  
loss at the feet of a party who has, in the circumstances, acted reasonably. Tort law does not require the wisdom  
of Solomon. All it requires is that people act reasonably in the circumstances.  
Locke J., Taschereau J. concurring, in Jones v. Shafer Estate, 1948 32 (SCC), [1948] S.C.R. 166, provided  
the following at 175:  
The learned trial Judge in finding that the appellant had been guilty of negligence causing the accident said that  
he was satisfied that “the defendant could have done more than he did” but, with respect, this is hardly the true  
test in deciding the question of his liability: it was the duty of the defendant to take reasonable care under the  
circumstances to avoid acts or omissions which he could reasonably foresee would be likely to cause injury to  
persons driving upon the highway. The dangers which the defendant was required to take steps to avert were  
those which, in the language of Lord Wright in Hay v. Young, [[1943] A.C. 92] at p. 111, “the reasonable  
hypothetical observer could reasonably have foreseen”: or, as expressed by Blackburn, J. in Smith v. London &  
South Western Ry. Co. [(1870) L.R. 6 C.P. 14] at p. 21, what the defendant ought to have anticipated as a  
reasonable man. The question is not whether the appellant did everything that was possible but rather whether  
he omitted to do something which a reasonable man guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the  
conduct of human affairs would have done or did something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do  
(Blyth v. Birmingham Water Works [(1856) 11 Ex. 781]), at 764, Alderson, B.  
c) Causation  
If there is a breach of the standard of care, the Plaintiffs must prove on a balance of probabilities that the  
Defendants’ alleged breaches caused the damage or loss. The Plaintiffs must establish that what was done or  
omitted to be done created the situation that resulted in the harm suffered by the Plaintiffs. See A.M. Linden,  
supra at 323:  
[T]he losses or injuries incurred by the plaintiffs must not be “too remote” a consequence of the act.  
It is for the Plaintiffs to demonstrate causation, not for the Defendants to disprove it. Furthermore, as stated by  
Sopinka J. in Snell v. Farrell, 1990 70 (SCC), [1990] 2S.C.R. 311 at para. 326, “[c]ausation is an expression  
of the relationship that must be found to exist between the tortious act of the wrongdoer and the injury to the  
victim in order to justify compensation of the latter out of the pocket of the former”.  
It is trite to say that, where tortious conduct causes or materially contributes to a plaintiff’s injury, the defendant  
will be liable to the plaintiff. “The legal or ultimate burden remains with the plaintiff”, as Sopinka, J. noted in  
Snell, supra, “but in the absence of evidence to the contrary adduced by the defendant, an inference of causation  
may be drawn”.  
Snell, supra, was followed by Athey v. Leonati, 1996 183 (SCC), [1996] 3 S.C.R. 458, where Major J.’s  
comments, for the Supreme Court of Canada, at paras. 12, 14-15, 17, 19 are instructive:  
It has long been established that a defendant is liable for any injuries caused or contributed to by his or her  
negligence. If the defendant’s conduct is found to be a cause of the injury, the presence of other non-tortious  
contributing causes does not reduce the extent of the defendant’s liability.  
....  
The general, but not conclusive, test for causation is the “but for” test, which requires the plaintiff to show that the  
injury would not have occurred but for the negligence of the defendant: Horsley v. MacLaren, 1971 24  
(SCC), [1972] S.C.R. 441....  
....  
The “but for” test is unworkable in some circumstances, so the courts have recognized that causation is  
established where the defendant’s negligence “materially contributed” to the occurrence of the injury¼  
....  
It is not now necessary, nor has it ever been, for the plaintiff to establish that the defendant’s negligence was the  
sole cause of the injury. There will frequently be a myriad of other background events which were necessary  
preconditions to the injury occurring.¼ As long as a defendant is part of the cause of an injury, the defendant is  
liable, even though his act alone was not enough to create the injury. There is no basis for a reduction of liability  
because of the existence of other preconditions: defendants remain liable for all injuries caused or contributed to  
by their negligence.  
....  
The law does not excuse a defendant from liability merely because other causal factors for which he is not  
responsible also helped produce the harm¼. It is sufficient if the defendant’s negligence was a cause of the  
harm.¼ [Emphasis in original]  
See also Fontaine v. British Columbia (Official Administrator), 1998 814 (SCC), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 424, where  
a man and his friend had been driving in the mountains of British Columbia and never returned home. Years  
later their truck was found down an embankment with the men’s bodies inside. Major J., for the Supreme Court  
of Canada, considered whether inferences ought to be drawn from situations where the evidence may not be of  
scientific precision and suggested the following at para. 24:  
Should the trier of fact choose to draw an inference of negligence from the circumstances, that will be a factor in  
the plaintiff’s favour. Whether that will be sufficient for the plaintiff to succeed will depend on the strength of the  
inference drawn and any explanation offered by the defendant to negate that inference. If the defendant produces  
a reasonable explanation that is as consistent with no negligence as the res ipsa loquitur inference is with  
negligence, this will effectively neutralize the inference of negligence and the plaintiff’s case must fail. Thus, the  
strength of the explanation that the defendant must provide will vary in accordance with the strength of the  
inference sought to be drawn by the plaintiff.  
Major J. continued at para. 27, referring to the situation where the evidence on causation is not clear:  
That evidence is more sensibly dealt with by the trier of fact, who should weigh the circumstantial evidence with  
the direct evidence, if any, to determine whether the plaintiff has established on a balance of probabilities a prima  
facie case of negligence against the defendant.  
I have drawn adverse inferences against the Defendants herein for their failure to call certain witnesses and it is,  
in part, as a result of the same that I draw an inference of causation against those Defendants. This is but a  
portion of the evidence that supports appropriate causation herein, as I take a “robust and pragmatic approach to  
the . . . facts”: Sopinka J. Snell, supra at 330, quoting Lord Bridge in Wilsher v. Essex Area Health Authority,  
[1988] 2 W.L.R. 557 at 569 (H.L.). Sopinka J. was there referring to where “some evidence to the contrary is  
adduced by the defendant”, as was the case here.  
It is in this context that I adopt Lord Mansfield’s comment in Blatch v. Archer (1774), 98 E.R. 969 at 970:  
It is certainly a maxim that all evidence is to be weighed according to the proof which it was in the power of one  
side to have produced, and in the power of the other to have contradicted.  
d) Remoteness  
The test for remoteness is an objective one that asks whether or not the damage or injury was foreseeable through  
the eyes of a reasonable person at the time of the activity in question, without the benefit of hindsight. In The  
Wagon Mound (No. 1), [1961] A.C. 388 (P.C.), Viscount Simonds stated that the foresight of the reasonable man  
alone can determine responsibility.  
In Hughes v. Lord Advocate, [1963] A.C. 837, the House of Lords held that it is no defence that loss was caused in  
a way that could not have been foreseen, if the loss was of the same general class or character as the loss  
foreseeable.  
The Wagon Mound (No. 2), [1967] 1 A.C. 617 (P.C.), is authority for the principle that the damage suffered need  
only be a possible, rather than a probable, consequence of the negligence of the defendants.  
The foreseeability of intervening action is considered in Home Office v. Dorset Yacht Co., [1970] 2 All E.R. 294  
(H.L.), per Lord Reid at 300:  
[W]here human action forms one of the links between the original wrongdoing of the defendant and the loss  
suffered by the plaintiff, that action must at least have been something very likely to happen if it is not to be  
regarded as novus actus interveniens breaking the chain of causation. I do not think that a mere foreseeable  
possibility is or should be sufficient....  
Hughes, supra, has been applied in Assiniboine South School Division No. 3 v. Hoffer (1971), 1971 959  
(MB CA), 21 D.L.R. (3d) 608 (Man. C.A.), (1973), 1973 1313 (SCC), 40 D.L.R. (3d) 480 (S.C.C.), a case  
involving a snowmobile which ran out of control and fractured a gas pipe, causing an explosion. The Manitoba  
Court of Appeal, per Dickson J.A., as he then was, held that the explosion met the test for a foreseeable result of  
negligently starting the snowmobile. He stated the following at 614:  
It is enough to fix liability if one could foresee in a general way the sort of thing that happened. The extent of the  
damage and its manner of incidence need not be foreseeable if physical damage of the kind which in fact ensues is  
foreseeable.  
Dickson J., as he then was for the Supreme Court of Canada, restated the test in Ontario (Minister of Highways) v.  
Côté (1974), 1974 31 (SCC), [1976] 1 S.C.R. 595 at 604:  
It is not necessary that one foresee the “precise concatenation of events”; it is enough to fix liability if one can  
foresee in a general way the class or character of injury which occurred....  
e) Officers’ and Directors’ Liability  
A plaintiff may bring an action based on negligence against an executive officer of his or her employer. In Berger  
v. Willowdale A.M.C. et al. (1983), 1983 1820 (ON CA), 41 O.R. (2d) 89, leave to appeal refused (1983), 41  
O.R. (2d) 89n (S.C.C.), the Ontario Court of Appeal found an executive officer personally liable for injuries  
suffered by a company employee, when she slipped and fell on snow and ice while leaving her place of  
employment.  
It was held that the president knew or ought to have known that the snow and ice were present and that that  
created a dangerous situation. The majority of the Court, per Cory J.A., grounded its finding on the neighbour  
principle. The risk of injury was said to be readily foreseeable, and, in the circumstances, negligence by omission  
constituted a breach of the duty of care. Cory J.A. characterized the defendant executive officer as being in “total  
control” of the situation and easily able to rectify the danger by having the snow and ice removed. He further held  
that there was no policy reason to deny an employee’s right of action against a president. An employer owes a  
duty to its employee to provide and maintain a safe working environment, and this duty can co-exist in both  
employer and president. Cory J.A. provided the following at 98:  
It is true that an employer owes a duty to its employee of providing and maintaining a safe working place  
including the means of reaching that working place: see Hurley v. J. Sanders & Co., Ltd. et al, [1955] 1 All E.R.  
833. There is no reason why this duty of care cannot co-exist in both the employer and Hans Falkenberg. Mr.  
Falkenberg had personal knowledge of the dangerous situation, he had control over and had the means available  
for readily rectifying the situation¼. The fact that the duty co-exists in the employer and the executive officer  
should not and does not constitute a bar to the plaintiff’s action.  
He went on to say at 99:  
The president of a corporation has great power over his employees. He should exercise that power responsibly  
with due regard for their safety. He cannot ignore a dangerous condition of which he is aware or should be. This  
is true particularly if he is in control of the situation and has available the means to rectify it.  
See also Lewis v. Boutilier (1919), 1919 535 (SCC), 52 D.L.R. 383 (S.C.C.), Medina v. Danbury Sales (1971)  
Ltd., [1991], O.J. No. 2225 (Gen. Div.); Nairne v. Wagon Wheel Ranch Ltd., [1995] O.J. No. 1234 (Gen.Div.), aff’d  
[1998] O.J. No. 533 (C.A.); Drysdale v. Progressive Restaurants Inc., (1985), 5C.P.C. (2d) 214 (Ont. Dist. Ct.), aff’d  
[1985] O.J. No. 630 (H.C.J.).  
Personal liability has also been ascribed to directors and employees of corporations, as well as officers.  
Furthermore, it has been well established that liability for losses experienced by a plaintiff through his or her  
dealings with a corporation will not be visited on the corporation’s directors or officers unless their conduct is  
tortious in itself or exhibits a separate identity or interest from that of the corporation so as to make the conduct  
complained of those of the directing minds.  
This principle is explained by the Ontario Court of Appeal in ScotiaMcLeod Inc. v. Peoples Jewellers Ltd. (1995),  
1995 1301 (ON CA), 26 O.R. (3d) 481, at 490-491, leave to appeal refused [1996] 3 S.C.R. viii:  
The decided cases in which employees and officers of companies have been found personally liable for actions  
ostensibly carried out under a corporate name are fact-specific. In the absence of findings of fraud, deceit,  
dishonesty or want of authority on the part of employees or officers, they are also rare. Those cases in which the  
corporate veil has been pierced usually involve transactions where the use of the corporate structure was a sham  
from the outset or was an afterthought to a deal which had gone sour .¼ Absent allegations which fit within the  
categories described above, officers or employees of limited companies are protected from personal liability  
unless it can be shown that their actions are themselves tortious or exhibit a separate identity or interest from  
that of the company so as to make the act or conduct complained of their own.  
.¼ Considering that a corporation is an inanimate piece of legal machinery incapable of thought or action, the  
court can only determine its legal liability by assessing the conduct of those who caused the company to act in the  
way that it did. This does not mean, however, that if the actions of the directing minds are found wanting, that  
personal liability will flow through the corporation to those who caused it to act as it did. To hold the directors of  
Peoples personally liable, there must be some activity on their part that takes them out of the role of directing  
minds of the corporation. In this case, there are no such allegations.  
See also Normart Management Ltd. v. West Hill Redevelopment Co. (1998), 1998 2447 (ON CA), 37 O.R.  
(3d) 97 (C.A.).  
Personal liability has been attributed to such persons even when their conduct was “directed in a bona fide  
manner to the best interests of the company”: ADGA Systems International Ltd. v. Valcom Ltd. (1999), 1999  
1527 (ON CA), 43 O.R. (3d) 101 at 107 (C.A.), leave to appeal refused [2000] 1 S.C.R. xv. In ADGA, the  
Ontario Court of Appeal considered a lower Court’s decision to strike allegations against a director and two  
employees of Valcom for inducing breach of fiduciary duty. In so doing, the Court, per Carthy J.A clearly set forth  
the current Canadian law in the subject field. At 104-106, 9 Carthy J.A. said:  
My first observation is that I recognize the policy concern expressed by the Divisional Court, and other General  
Division judges, over the proliferation of claims against officers and directors of corporations in circumstances  
which give the appearance of the desire for discovery or leverage in the litigation process. This is a proper  
concern because business cannot function efficiently if corporate officers and directors are inhibited in carrying  
on a corporate business because of a fear of being inappropriately swept into lawsuits, or, worse, are driven away  
from involvement in any respect in corporate business by the potential exposure to ill-founded litigation. That  
being said, it is not appropriate to extend the reasoning of Scotia McLeod beyond its intended application by  
reading it as protecting all conduct by officers and employees in pursuit of corporate purposes. The common law  
should not develop on an ad hoc basis to put out fires. When a policy issue arises, here from modern business  
realities, the courts must proceed on a principled basis to establish a framework for further development which  
recognizes the new realities but preserves the fundamental purpose served by that area of law. For this reason I  
intend to analyze the development of law in this field from its beginnings.  
That beginning is found in the House of Lords’ decision in Salomon v. Salomon & Co.Ltd., [1895-9] all E.R. rep.  
33 (H.L.), which established that a company, once legally incorporated, must be treated like any other  
independent person, with rights and liabilities appropriate to itself. From time to time, litigants have sought to  
lift this “corporate veil”, by seeking to make principals of the corporation liable for the obligations of the  
corporation. However, where, as here, the plaintiff relies upon establishing an independent cause of action  
against the principals of the company, the corporate veil is not threatened and the Salomon principle remains  
intact.  
The distinction between an independent cause of action and looking through the corporation was confirmed by  
the subsequent case of Said v. Butt, [1920] 3 K.B. 497. This is a King’s Bench decision but has been adopted in  
Canada and throughout the United States. (See, for instance, Kepis v. Tecumseh Road Builders, (1987), 18  
C.C.E.L. 218 at p. 222, 23 O.A.C. 72; and Golden v. Anderson, 64 Cal. Rptr. 404 (1967) at p. 408.).  
In Said v. Butt, the plaintiff was engaged in a dispute with an opera company which refused to sell him tickets to a  
performance. The plaintiff purchased a ticket through an agent and when he appeared at the opera the  
defendant, an employee of the opera company recognized him and ejected him. The plaintiff sued the employee  
for wrongfully procuring the company to break a contract made by the company to sell the plaintiff a ticket.  
The court held that there was no contract because the company would not knowingly have sold a ticket to the  
plaintiff. Nevertheless, on the assumption that there was a contract, the court considered the implications to the  
defendant employee. McCardie J. stated at p. 504:  
It is well to point out that Sir Alfred Butt possessed the widest powers as the chairman and sole managing director  
of the Palace Theatre, Ld. He clearly acted within those powers when he directed that the plaintiff should be  
refused admission on December 23. I am satisfied, also, that he meant to act and did act bona fide for the  
protection of the interests of his company. If, therefore, the plaintiff, assuming that a contract existed between  
the company and himself, can sue the defendant for wrongfully procuring a breach of that contract, the gravest  
and widest consequences must ensue.  
After detailing the mischief that would flow from permitting such claims to be made McCardie J. concluded at p.  
506:  
I hold that if a servant acting bona fide within the scope of his authority procures or causes the breach of a  
contract between his employer and a third person, he does not thereby become liable to an action of tort at the  
suit of the person whose contract has thereby been broken . . . . Nothing that I have said to-day is, I hope,  
inconsistent with the rule that a director or a servant who actually takes part in or actually authorizes such torts as  
assault, trespass to property, nuisance, or the like may be liable in damages as a joint participant in one of such  
recognized heads of tortious wrong.  
I draw no distinction between contractual and tortious vulnerability in accordance with the authorities as it  
applies here.  
One must be vigilant to attempts to escape liability by labeling, for example, through use of such words as  
“separate”, “unrelated” and “independent”. In ADGA, supra at 108 Carthy J.A. referred to the Supreme Court of  
Canada’s ruling on the issue of an employee’s liability for acts done in the course of his duties on behalf of his  
employer in London Drugs, supra:  
The plaintiff delivered a transformer to a warehouse company for storage. An employee of the warehouse  
company negligently permitted the transformer to topple over, causing extensive damage. Even though there was  
a contractual relationship between the company and the customer, the majority held in favour of the claim against  
the employee.  
Iacobucci J. stated at pp. 407-408:  
There is no general rule in Canada to the effect that an employee acting in the course of his or her employment  
and performing the “very essence” of his or her employer’s contractual obligations with a customer does not owe a  
duty of care, whether one labels it “independent” or otherwise, to the employer’s customer....  
. . . . The mere fact that the employee is performing the “very essence” of a contract between the plaintiff and his  
or her employer does not, in itself, necessarily preclude a conclusion that a duty of care was present.  
One must be aware, however, of the caution sounded by Carthy J.A. in ADGA, supra at 110:  
Although the jurisprudence on this subject has followed a very straight path since the decisions in Salomon v.  
Salomon and Said v. Butt, in recent years in this jurisdiction judges hearing motions to dismiss claims have  
tended to smudge these principles, inspired, in my view, and as expressed by them, by the legitimate concern as to  
the number of cases in which employees, officers, and directors are joined for questionable purposes. The  
assumption has filtered into reasons for judgment that the employee is absolved if acting in the interests of the  
corporation, the employer, even in cases that do not raise the Said v. Butt defence.  
The thread of wisdom in that evolved from the decision of McCardie J. in Said v. Butt, [1920] 3 K.B. 497, as  
recited in ADGA, supra at 106, by Carthy J.A.:  
For present purposes, I extract the following from McCardie J.’s reasons. First, this is not an application of  
Salomon. That case is not mentioned anywhere in the reasons. Second, it provides an exception to the general  
rule that persons are responsible for their own conduct. That exception has since gained acceptance because it  
assures that persons who deal with a limited company and accept the imposition of limited liability will not have  
available to them both a claim for breach of contract against a company and a claim for tortious conduct against  
the director with damages assessed on a different basis. The exception also assures that officers and directors, in  
the process of carrying on business, are capable of directing that a contract of employment be terminated or that a  
business contract not be performed on the assumed basis that the company’s best interest is to pay the damages  
for failure to perform. By carving out the exception for these policy reasons, the court has emphasized and left  
intact the general liability of any individual for personal conduct.  
Therefore, I endorse the following conclusion offered by Carthy J.A. in ADGA, supra at 109:  
These Canadian authorities at the appellate level confirm clearly that employees, officers and directors will be  
held personally liable for tortious conduct causing physical injury, property damage, or a nuisance even when  
their actions are pursuant to their duties to the corporation.  
For more recent decisions, see Brodie v. Thomson Kernaghan & Co. (2002), 27 B.L.R. (3d) 246 (Ont. S.C.J.); and  
United Canadian Malt Ltd.v. Outboard Marine Corp. of Canada (2000), 2000 22365 (ON SC), 48 O.R.  
(3d) 352 (S.C.J.).  
f) Vicarious Liability  
Any discussion of vicarious liability must be in the context of the statements by Major J., for the Supreme Court of  
Canada, in 671122 Ontario Ltd. v. Sagaz Industries Canada Inc., [2001] 2 S.C.R. 983 at paras. 25-26, 2001 SCC 59:  
Vicarious liability is not a distinct tort. It is a theory that holds one person responsible for the misconduct of  
another because of the relationship between them¼.  
In general, tort law attempts to hold persons accountable for their wrongful acts and omissions and the direct  
harm that flows from those wrongs. Vicarious liability, by contrast, is considered to be a species of strict liability  
because it requires no proof of personal wrongdoing on the part of the person who is subject to it. As such, it is  
still relatively uncommon in Canadian tort law.  
In John Doe v. Bennett, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 436 at paras. 20-21, 2004 SCC 17, the Supreme Court of Canada, per  
McLachlin C.J., summarized the test for vicarious liability that was established by Bazley v. Curry, 1999  
692 (SCC), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 534, as follows:  
In Bazley, the Court suggested that the imposition of vicarious liability may usefully be approached in two steps.  
First, a court should determine whether there are precedents which unambiguously determine whether the case  
should attract vicarious liability. “If prior cases do not clearly suggest a solution, the next step is to determine  
whether vicarious liability should be imposed in light of the broader policy rationales behind strict liability”:  
Bazley, at para. 15; Jacobi, at para. 31. Vicarious liability is based on the rationale that the person who puts a  
risky enterprise into the community may fairly be held responsible when those risks emerge and cause loss or  
injury to members of the public. Effective compensation is a goal. Deterrence is also a consideration. The hope is  
that holding the employer or principal liable will encourage such persons to take steps to reduce the risk of harm  
in the future. Plaintiffs must show that the rationale behind the imposition of vicarious liability will be met on the  
facts in two respects. First, the relationship between the tortfeasor and the person against whom liability is  
sought must be sufficiently close. Second, the wrongful act must be sufficiently connected to the conduct  
authorized by the employer. This is necessary to ensure that the goals of fair and effective compensation and  
deterrence of future harm are met....  
In determining whether there is a sufficient connection in the case of intentional torts, factors to be considered  
include, but are not limited to the following (Bazley, supra, at para. 41):  
a) the opportunity that the enterprise afforded the employee to abuse his or her power;  
b) the extent to which the wrongful act may have furthered the employer’s aims (and hence be more likely to have  
been committed by the employee);  
c) the extent to which the wrongful act was related to friction, confrontation or intimacy inherent in the  
employer’s enterprise;  
d) the extent of power conferred on the employee in relation to the victim;  
e) the vulnerability of potential victims to wrongful exercise of the employee’s power.  
According to the Supreme Court of Canada, then, the first step in determining whether a defendant is vicariously  
liable is to see if case precedent exists.  
Bazley, supra, is interesting and applicable from another aspect. The Supreme Court of Canada said that Courts  
should also consider the two policy reasons for holding an organization vicariously liable for an individual’s  
intentional torts, namely, compensation and deterrence.  
Respecting compensation, the Supreme Court of Canada said that intentional torts can sometimes be expected to  
arise because of the nature of the enterprise carried on by an organization, particularly where friction and  
confrontation are inherent in the enterprise and where the intentional tort furthers the aims of the enterprise. In  
such cases, it is just to impose vicarious liability because the enterprise contributes to the risk that produces the  
tort. Also, the organization is typically well-situated to spread the generally foreseeable costs of the enterprise  
through, for example, prices. Regarding the second policy reason, deterrence, the Court said that the  
organization is typically able to reduce the risks of intentional torts through, for example, proper supervision.  
Vicarious liability could and should be imposed where there is a “connection” between an enterprise and an  
intentional tort, such that the enterprise materially contributes to the risk of the tort, or the tort is a generally  
foreseeable consequence of the enterprise.  
The majority of the Supreme Court of Canada, per McLachlin C.J., in K.L.B. v. British Columbia, [2003] 2 S.C.R.  
403, 2003 SCC 51, stated the test as follows at paras. 19, 21-22:  
To make out a successful claim for vicarious liability, plaintiffs must demonstrate at least two things. First, they  
must show that the relationship between the tortfeasor and the person against whom liability is sought is  
sufficiently close as to make a claim for vicarious liability appropriate.¼ Second, plaintiffs must demonstrate  
that the tort is sufficiently connected to the tortfeasor’s assigned tasks that the tort can be regarded as a  
materialization of the risks created by the enterprise.¼  
....  
¼.The inquiry is ¼ a functional one: “what must always occur is a search for the total relationship of the  
parties”.¼ In Sagaz, the Court held that the “central question” in this functional inquiry “is whether the person  
who has been engaged to perform the services is performing them as a person in business on his own account”....  
This way of putting the question reflects the type of enterprise that Sagaz was concerned with — namely, a for-  
profit enterprise. In the case at bar, we are concerned with a non-profit enterprise.¼ In this context, the focus  
of the inquiry will be simply on whether the tortfeasor was acting “on his own account” or acting on behalf of the  
employer.  
Which factors are relevant in making this determination? As the Court held in Sagaz, “the level of control the  
employer has over the worker’s activities will always be a factor”.¼ Control is not, however, the sole  
consideration.¼ Other relevant factors include, as the Court noted in Sagaz, “whether the worker provides his  
or her own equipment”, “whether the worker hires his or her own helpers” and whether the worker has  
managerial responsibilities....  
Torts committed by a person who “controls” an artificial person are deemed to be the artificial person’s own torts.  
In such a case the artificial person will be directly liable to the victim, not vicariously liable. R.F.V. Heuston &  
R.A. Buckley write in Salmond and Heuston on the Law of Torts, 21st ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1996) at  
406-408:  
Inasmuch as a corporation is an artificial person distinct in law from its members, it is not capable of acting in  
propria persona, but acts only through its agents or servants. All the acts, and therefore all the wrongful acts, of a  
body corporate are in fact the acts of its agents or servants, though imputed in law to the corporation itself. But  
this does not mean that the liability of a body corporate is therefore in all cases a vicarious liability for the acts of  
other persons.¼  
....  
.... Every act done, authorised, or ratified on behalf of a corporation by the supreme governing authority of that  
corporation, or by any person or body of persons to whom the general powers of the corporation are delegated, is  
for the purpose of the law of torts the act of the corporation itself, ¼ and the corporation is liable accordingly for  
that act or for any tort committed in respect of it by any agent or servant of the corporation within the scope of his  
authority or employment.  
J. Anthony VanDuzer similarly writes in The Law of Partnerships and Corporations, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Irwin Law  
Inc, 2003) at 176:  
The corporation may be directly liable for a tort if the person committing the tort is not merely an employee but  
can be considered the directing mind and will of the corporation in such a way that the acts done are the acts of  
the corporation itself. Direct liability has been imposed on essentially the same basis as described above for the  
imposition of criminal liability.  
For example, direct liability was imposed on a corporation where the boilers of a ship owned by the corporation  
proved defective and the cargo was lost. The English House of Lords held that the person who was negligent in  
not knowing about the defective boilers was the responsible manager of the ship. Since this person was the  
directing mind and will of the corporation for the purposes of taking care of the ship, the corporation was held  
liable to the owner of the cargo for its loss.  
Direct liability for an intentional tort was found in Nelitz v. Dyck. An insurer made an appointment for an  
insured person to visit a chiropractor in connection with the resolution of the person’s claim against the insurer.  
The insurer directed the person to submit to an examination from the chiropractor, but neither the insurer nor  
the chiropractor sought or obtained her consent to the treatment or advised her that she had a right to refuse the  
treatment. She sued the chiropractor and the insurance company for battery. The Ontario Court of Appeal held  
that the insurance company was not vicariously liable for the actions of the chiropractor because he was an  
independent contractor. The court did find, however, that the insurer could be held directly liable on the basis  
that it had retained the chiropractor to commit the tort. In the end, the insurer avoided liability because the court  
found that the insured person had consented to the examination.  
Not only are artificial persons directly liable for the acts of their leaders, they can be and are vicariously liable for  
the acts of their leader and those farther down the hierarchy.  
The Defence of Novus Actus Interveniens  
Before dealing with the liability of each party, I turn now to the defence raised by most Defendants, that being  
that Warren’s act constituted a novus actus interveniens. The argument that harm was caused by an independent  
and intervening act is tied into the negligence criteria of causation and remoteness. There are a number of  
authorities with varying factual backgrounds up to and referenced in Jones, supra, where Estey J., Rinfret C.J.  
concurring, offered the following at 170-171:  
The foregoing authorities emphasize again the principle that the intervening conscious act of a third party will  
break the line of causation and relieve the party who may be otherwise negligent of liability, unless to a reasonable  
man in the same circumstances that conscious act would have been foreseeable.  
Lord Reid in Dorset Yacht, supra, put the defence in perspective when he said at 300:  
[W]here human action forms one of the links between the original wrongdoing of the defendant and the loss  
suffered by the plaintiff, that action must at least have been something very likely to happen if it is not to be  
regarded as novus actus interveniens breaking the chain of causation. I do not think that a mere foreseeable  
possibility is or should be sufficient, for then the intervening human action can more properly be regarded as a  
new cause than as a consequence of the original wrongdoing.  
The law with respect to intervening intentional and criminal conduct is well illustrated in Linden, supra, at  
372-373:  
Negligent actors may be liable for damage caused by intervening intentional and criminal conduct if their acts  
created an unreasonable risk of such loss. In Stansbie v. Troman, [[1948] 2 K.B. 48] a decorator left in charge of a  
dwelling departed for nearly two hours without locking the door. When some articles were stolen while the  
decorator was gone, he was made liable because he failed to take care to “guard against the very thing that  
happened”.  
In further reference to Stansbie v. Troman, [1948] 2 K.B. 48 (C.A.) Linden, supra, provides at 376:  
[I]f an arsonist or murderer had entered the house left unattended by the decorator in Stansbie v. Troman and  
had burned or killed, no liability would have been imposed, because such consequences are just too uncommon  
and too disproportionate to the negligence of the defendant. It might be otherwise, however, if a distinct risk of  
fire or murder existed, as where an arsonist or a murderer was known to be in the vicinity. [Footnote omitted].  
See also Walker v. De Luxe Cab Ltd., 1944 362 (ON SC), [1944] 3 D.L.R. 175 (Ont. H.C.).  
Lord Oliver discussed the challenges involved in determining whether criminal activity was foreseeable in Lamb  
v. London Borough of Camden, [1981] 2 All E.R. 408 at 418 (C.A.):  
Few things are less certainly predictable than human behaviour, and if one is asked whether in any given situation  
a human being may behave idiotically, irrationally or even criminally the answer must always be that that is a  
possibility, for every society has its proportion of idiots and criminals. It cannot be said that you cannot foresee  
the possibility that people will do stupid or criminal acts, because people are constantly doing stupid or criminal  
acts. But the question is not what is foreseeable merely as a possibility but what would the reasonable man  
actually foresee if he thought about it, and all that Lord Reid seems to me to be saying is that the hypothetical  
reasonable man in the position of the tortfeasor cannot be said to foresee the behaviour of another person unless  
that behaviour is such as would, viewed objectively, be very likely to occur.  
See also P. Perl (Exporters) Ltd. v. Camden London Borough Council, [1983] 3 All E.R. 161, where the English  
Court of Appeal affirmed its earlier decision in Lamb, supra, and held at 166 per Waller L.J. that: “the  
foreseeability required to impose a liability for the acts of some independent third parties requires a very high  
degree of foreseeability”. And in Smith v. Littlewoods Organisation Ltd., [1987] A.C. 241 (H.L.), Lord Mackay  
concluded at 261:  
The more unpredictable the conduct in question, the less easy to affirm that any particular result from it is  
probable and in many circumstances the only way in which a judge could properly be persuaded to come to the  
conclusion that the result was not only possible but reasonably foreseeable as probable would be to convince him  
that, in the circumstances, it was highly likely. In this type of case a finding that the reasonable man should have  
anticipated the consequence of human action as just probable may not be a very frequent option. Unless the  
judge can be satisfied that the result of the human action is highly probable or very likely he may have to conclude  
that all that the reasonable man could say was that it was a mere possibility. Unless the needle that measures the  
probability of a particular result flowing from the conduct of a human agent is near the top of the scale it may be  
hard to conclude that it has risen sufficiently from the bottom to create the duty reasonably to foresee it.  
The principle that the intentional criminal acts of others are reasonably foreseeable only if they are “very likely”  
has been considered in several Canadian cases. See Trevison v. Springman (1995), 1995 182 (BC SC),  
[1996] 4 W.W.R. 760 (B.C.S.C.), aff’d [1997] B.C.J. No. 2557 (C.A.), where Spencer J. found the defendants had  
breached their duty of care, yet contemplated whether the resulting damage was foreseeable. He held at para. 32:  
[T]he doctrine of foreseeability is not so wide as to embrace the situation in the case at bar where the means and  
type of injury caused to the plaintiffs was of a totally different type from anything the son had done before and  
anything which the defendants could have had in contemplation.  
See also Doe v. Metropolitan Toronto (Municipality) Commissioners of Police 1998 14826 (ON SC), 1998,  
39 O.R. (3d) 487 (Gen. Div.), where rape of the plaintiff was held to be foreseeable to the defendants because of  
prior knowledge of prior like incidents. Other noteworthy authorities that illustrate the law in this area in  
different factual situations are Q v. Minto Management Ltd. (1985), 1985 2103 (ON SC), 49 O.R. (2d) 531  
(H.C.J.), aff’d (1986), 1986 2518 (ON CA), 57 O.R. (2d) 781 (C.A.); and Allison v. Rank City Wall Canada  
Ltd. (1984), 1984 1887 (ON SC), 45 O.R. (2d) 141 (H.C.J.).  
Turning now to Warren, he is an inveterate self-confessed fabulist and an open book.  
He was not alone with thoughts of killing; Terry Legge was another who felt the pressure, frustration and anger in  
what he described as:  
... a ... there was no system there, there were no law(s), there was no rules . . . what we done, somebody could have  
got hurt. Roger Warren was just unlucky. I was lucky that I didn’t kill somebody when that explosion at the vent  
shaft went off.  
This was typical of many others’ comments, such as comments by Shearing. Talk of injuring the replacement  
workers, their families and Pinkerton’s guards was common at union meetings, on the picket line and wherever  
the strikers met. Sergeant Nancy Defer summed it up correctly when she said that “it appeared that any action  
could be justified because of the strike. It was mayhem.”  
Warren’s act, on September 18 is not disputed and was a reaction to the negligent acts of other strikers, including  
Seeton, Shearing, Bettger, Legge and others referenced herein. He got caught up in the strikers’ rhetoric,  
incitement on the line and strike bulletins, and, fueled by the union’s aberrant urgings to cause the mine to shut  
down whatever the price that must be paid, he finally deciding that something significant had to happen to  
accomplish that end. His act carried out the wishes of his fellow strikers and was for many of them a  
commendable deed.  
CASAW Local 4's president Schram, for example, said that, “we will do whatever we have to win, no matter who  
or what gets in our way”. When Warren learned there would be no more offers or even negotiating, he became  
very depressed and angry. Then at the rally on June 7th, Slezak in addressing the crowd with Schram and Seeton,  
said Witte could expect severe confrontation on the “scab” issue. It was at this public rally that Warren made his  
threat in response to Conrad Lisoway’s query. He became a pawn between Royal Oak and his union and his  
killing remark on June 7 was the beginning of a formulation of a plan that took shape as time wore on. Few paid  
any attention to Warren’s remark, and some around him then would have described it as rhetoric, if asked.  
Five days later Warren asked Byberg how he could be associated with what Royal Oak was doing. There was the  
riot on June 14th. Then, his employment was terminated and that took its toll on him. He came to believe he was  
fired for his comment to Byberg.  
Warren just wanted to return to work as he identified with his job, like most miners; Sims and Hargrove made  
that point in their evidence. He had no interest in the anti-replacement worker legislation. He loved being a  
miner and he was one of the best.  
Depression from the negativity set in and as, he saw men like Vern Fullowka, Joe Pandev and Chris Neill  
returning when he could not, he came to feel depressed like the others. Support for the strike was wavering and  
they all believed anything they did was justified.  
Warren was apprised virtually daily of the activities of union members, on the picket line, on the street and at the  
Union Hall. His duty of care was to refrain from conducting himself in a way that could increase the risk of injury  
to replacement workers. That included, as the Plaintiffs argued, refraining from acts of encouragement of  
violence by others against replacement workers.  
It is appropriate at this juncture to comment on a remark by Hargrove about inflammatory language of which he  
was dismissive as he endeavoured to trivialize the importance of his comment “ram the God damn hell out of the  
scabs” as just “strike talk”. Warren carried through on his comment of June 7 and, on reflection, I suspect  
Hargrove regretted this later remark. I do not accept that the inflammatory comments that permeated strikers’  
conversations throughout the strike can be dismissed as just “strike talk”. They were disgusting, dehumanizing  
and degrading to fellow human beings. They are reminiscent of the oft-repeated British slogan of WW II, “Loose  
Lips Sink Ships”. Although this British expression was in the context of military secrets, there exists a parallel  
here. The radical strikers “loose lips” encouraged their fellow strikers to engage in unacceptable egregious  
conduct towards Royal Oak, Pinkerton’s guards and the replacement workers. They were generous with  
spreading the word among themselves and the townsfolk as they did these acts. Those very strikers appreciated  
after September 18, 1992, that they should have chosen their words somewhat more carefully as Warren’s  
comment was not just “strike talk”.  
Dealing directly with arguments raised by counsel, I note that Royal Oak argued thusly:  
Roger Warren’s act of murder was of an entirely different nature and kind of act than the acts of harassment and  
intimidation that preceded it. Murder was not the type of act that anyone, including the employees of Royal Oak,  
had (or, we submit, ought to have had) in their contemplation.  
I disagree. Warren’s act was but an elevation of other criminal acts committed by others, including property  
damage, sabotage and infliction of unlawful acts on others engaged in this strike milieu and was an act that was  
very likely to happen. How was Warren’s act one of an entirely different nature when one of these preceding acts  
was blowing up the vent shaft which carried necessary fresh air to the underground miners, and which many  
witnesses testified could have been lethal?  
Pinkerton’s strenuously argued that Warren’s act was the “unusual danger” type of activity, citing Birch v. New  
Brunswick Command Canadian Legion (1972) 1972 1677 (NB CA), 5 N.B.R. (2d) 64 (S.C.(A.D.)). This is  
not the appropriate test in law. As previously stated, I adopt the test of foreseeability in Dorset Yacht, supra at  
300, that, to be foreseeable, an “action must at least have been something very likely to happen if it is not to be  
regarded as novus actus interveniens breaking the chain of causation. I do not think that a mere foreseeable  
possibility is or should be sufficient”.  
In the case against Pinkerton’s, serious personal injury to or death of mine workers as a result of strike-related  
misconduct in this case was the precise risk against which appropriate security measures needed to be taken.  
Pinkerton’s was at Giant to guard against “the very thing that happened” as was the case in Stansbie, supra. Not  
only was it foreseeable, but it was actually foreseen, as captured in the letter from Pinkerton’s to Witte dated  
August 7, 1992, that stated the following:  
Following our review of the current situation and upon hearing of management’s (Royal Oak) intentions to  
downsize security coverage at this time, we are somewhat concerned with the matter of personal safety and your  
increasing liability exposures.... There is an expectation from employees of both Royal Oak Mines and  
Pinkerton’s that management professionals will take measures to prevent incidents and injuries particularly when  
such dangers are foreseeable under circumstances within our knowledge....  
Based on the result of our recent security audit and on-going “situational analysis”, there is every indication our  
risks and exposures will increase in the foreseeable future.  
Was Warren’s act reasonably foreseeable to the CASAW Local 4 and CAW National? Certainly. Infliction of  
injury, threats and attempts to inflict injury, particularly to the reviled replacement workers, had been a constant  
theme amongst the strikers and CASAW Local 4 from the moment they learned that replacement workers were to  
arrive.  
Counsel for the GNWT urged the Court to look to one cause, Warren, but acknowledged that a plaintiff is not  
confined to one cause alone for sufficiency in meeting the civil law burden. It was further argued that Warren’s  
act was so out of character, an inference I disagree with as indicated herein, that it was impossible to determine  
what his motivation was, so no one could have determined what would have deterred him, thus no basis for  
causation has been proven. I do not accept that the only evidence to support a causative link was provided by  
Warren. In the case of the GNWT Defendants, had they discharged their statutory obligations, as illustrated in  
more detail below, alone or together with discharge of their co-Defendants’ obligations, Warren would have been  
deterred.  
In conclusion, as the strike unfolded, and as more and more anger and frustration was exhibited, with increased  
sabotage with near death implications, all known as each occurred, the only reasonable and objective conclusion a  
reasonable man could reach was that an act such as Warren’s would result. The deaths of the miners was but  
another unlawful act, elevated from earlier unlawful acts involving progressive illegal activities including physical  
injuries inflicted on persons, death threats, explosions that could have resulted in deaths, property damage,  
sabotage and the like. Equally important was the perception on the mine site and around town that someone was  
going to die. In that context, what could be more foreseeable than that as the obvious anger and frustration  
among the strikers grew as time wore on, a Warren would appear. The “harm that occurred” was a reasonably  
foreseeable consequence of the cumulative acts of other Defendants, namely, those who I find negligent as  
delineated in the following sections.  
APPLICATION OF PRINCIPLES OF NEGLIGENCE  
Sheridan  
Plaintiffs’ counsel argued that Sheridan should be held liable in negligence for the failure to adequately secure the  
mine so as to provide a safe workplace for the workers in the mine. It was alleged that Sheridan was wilfully blind  
as to whether adequate security steps were taken to ensure the safety of the workers. Also, it was alleged that he  
took no steps to seek information about or to question what was being done by Witte or those working under her  
to ensure that the mine was secure and that the replacement workers were not at risk. Further, it was alleged that  
he raised no questions and made no suggestions regarding continuing the operation of the mine, nor did he seek  
information about the state of the strike.  
As previously outlined, to find a director, officer or employee negligent, his or her conduct must be found tortious  
in itself, or to exhibit a separate identity or interest from that of the corporation so as to make the acts or conduct  
complained of his or her own. I do not find that Sheridan’s conduct exhibited a separate identity from that of  
Royal Oak, thus the analysis proceeds to determine whether Sheridan’s conduct was tortious in itself.  
a) Duty of Care  
The first issue that arises in considering the claims against Sheridan is whether a duty of care existed between him  
and the deceased miners, requiring an application of the modified Anns test. At the first stage of the Anns test,  
considering whether the harm that occurred was the reasonable consequence of Sheridan’s actions requires both  
foreseeability and proximity considerations. Sheridan was a Director and Board Secretary for Royal Oak, a large  
corporation with a significant management structure. Sheridan believed that as a Director he owed a duty and an  
obligation to the employees of the company to ensure a safe workplace and the safety of persons working in the  
workplace. Sheridan also appreciated that the use of replacement workers would likely inflame the striking union  
and the strikers’ feelings toward those who crossed the picket line to work. Furthermore, he introduced  
Pinkerton’s to Royal Oak as it enjoyed, to his knowledge, the highest of reputation as security specialists and quite  
properly and promptly absented himself from the scene as he felt compromised as a Director of both Royal Oak  
and Pinkerton’s. I note at this juncture that this fact is critical as it limited Sheridan’s ability to make security  
inquiries or recommendations, contrary to the Plaintiffs’ submissions. Thus, this directly impacts the proximity  
between Sheridan and the deceased with regard to workplace safety and the provision of security services.  
There was insufficient evidence in support of the Plaintiffs’ argument that Sheridan was negligent because he did  
not keep as informed during the strike as he might have or that he was guilty of wilful blindness. Furthermore,  
unlike the situation in Berger, supra, there was no evidence that Sheridan alone exercised or could exercise  
control over Royal Oak. Consequently, there is insufficient proximity between Sheridan, a Board member, and  
the deceased miners to give rise to a duty of care in tort.  
Similarly, with respect to the foreseeability aspect at the first stage of the Anns test, the evidence establishes that  
Sheridan heard little of any events subsequent to the Board meeting in mid-June. Although he was generally  
aware of the problems on the picket line in the early stages of the strike, Sheridan did not attend at the mine at  
any time prior to September 18, 1992; therefore, he could not have possessed the same knowledge of matters  
relating to the day-to-day operations of the mine as those onsite. Certainly Sheridan’s law firm was providing  
litigation advice and assistance to Royal Oak’s Yellowknife counsel on the Injunction proceedings, but he did not  
have specific knowledge of what was transpiring. For example, there is no evidence that he had any knowledge of  
the damage caused to the satellite dish or the vent shaft by explosives. Consequently, it was reasonable for  
Sheridan to assume that the appropriate steps were being implemented by management to secure Giant, utilizing  
the services of Pinkerton’s.  
Therefore, on application of the modified Anns test, there was no duty of care as between Sheridan and the  
deceased miners, thus no finding of negligence against him is made.  
Witte  
Like the claim against Sheridan, the Plaintiffs asserted that Witte should be held liable in negligence for the  
failure to adequately secure the mine so as to provide a safe workplace for the workers in the mine. More  
specifically, it was advanced that Witte knew or ought to have known of the risk of potential injury to the workers  
whom she chose to put into the mine to keep it operating. It was alleged that she owed a duty to see that the  
workplace was safe, or to remove the workers if it was not.  
Also akin to Sheridan, there is no evidence to suggest that Witte’s conduct exhibited a separate identity from that  
of Royal Oak. Consequently, tortious conduct remains to be considered. Whether a duty of care existed must be  
the first consideration.  
a) Duty of Care  
Applying the modified Anns test to Witte, it is necessary to first consider whether the harm that occurred was the  
reasonably foreseeable consequence of Witte’s actions. Witte’s alleged negligent acts can be grouped into two  
categories: participation in labour relations, and encouraging Royal Oak to continue operations. However, as I  
will demonstrate, these areas are not mutually exclusive.  
It is unnecessary to canvass each of the particulars of negligent conduct, as the focus of the examination is the  
relationship between Witte and the deceased men. Counsel for Witte highlighted particular alleged negligent acts  
of Witte, such as her comment during a mediation meeting that the striking workers could work Saturdays  
without pay to return the company’s losses, and argued that the harm was not foreseeable as arising out of such a  
comment. The problem with this method of analysis in this case is that one cannot examine each allegation in  
isolation or a vacuum. Clear patterns of behaviour emerged in the evidence, not only with Witte’s actions but  
those of many others as well. Thus, to ignore the relationship between acts would prevent recognition of relevant  
context and render it impossible to arrive at a meaningful conclusion.  
I will begin the determination of whether a duty of care existed between Witte and the deceased miners with  
consideration of her encouraging Giant to continue operations. On the first branch of the Anns test, I find that  
there was a reasonable forseeability of harm to those who were working at the struck facility as a result of the  
decision to continue operations at Giant. She knew that the union would retaliate against this decision, thus  
creating a risk to those onsite. Witte, being at the helm of Royal Oak, who ultimately decided that Giant would  
operate with the use of replacement workers and line-crossers, was therefore sufficiently proximate to the  
deceased miners. I find no policy concerns at the first stage of the test that would negate this finding.  
The second branch of the Anns test leads to consideration of residual policy considerations outside the  
relationship between Witte and the deceased miners. The law certainly entitled Royal Oak to continue operations  
with the use of replacement labour; however, it does not go so far as to preclude a finding of a duty of care.  
As for whether Witte owed a duty of care to the deceased in her involvement in labour relations, that too is  
answered in the affirmative. Counsel for Witte suggested that alleging negligence in the conduct of labour  
relations is a novel cause of action, not yet considered by Canadian Courts. Considered alone, that may be;  
however, as I stated earlier, Witte’s conduct in labour relations cannot be considered alone, without proper  
context. Therefore, I distinguish this case from Martel Building Ltd. v. Canada, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 860, 2000 SCC  
60, cited by counsel for Witte, an economic negligence case, wherein the plaintiff advanced a claim alleging  
negligence in the conduct of commercial negotiation. In that case, assuming but not deciding that there was  
proximity between the parties that would give rise to a prima facie duty of care, the Supreme Court of Canada, per  
Iacobucci and Major JJ., held that a number of ancillary policy considerations necessitated precluding the  
extension of the tort of negligence into commercial relations. The first consideration cited was that the goal of  
commercial negotiations is often to realize a financial gain at the expense of the other party. The Court  
recognized that, in the commercial context, people can do this and advocate their own interest without a tort  
obligation being imposed from the other party to the negotiation. Witte’s argument that this principle would  
extend to a tort obligation toward a stranger to negotiations fails as it does not contemplate the  
interconnectedness of the alleged negligence by Witte in encouraging Royal Oak to maintain operations at Giant,  
and, more generally, the general allegations of negligence against all Defendants at large.  
Witte argued that there is a lack of foreseeability that bodily injury could result out of potentially negligent labour  
negotiations. I reiterate that, given all of the evidence, including Witte’s actions in a labour relations context, the  
harm was foreseeable, such that Witte owed a duty of care to the deceased miners. For example, articulating that  
the union could work Saturdays to allow the company to recover its losses, albeit a perfectly legal statement, was  
action that foreseeably could incite already violent union members. Moreover, the issue of proximity between  
Witte and the deceased is easily met as was outlined earlier, as she was in a position of control over Royal Oak and  
was in daily contact with onsite management, her decisions flowing out of this daily contact.  
I find no policy reasons at either the first or second stage of the Anns test that warrant against finding that Witte  
owed a duty of care to the deceased with regard to her actions in a labour relations context. However, I must  
address a policy consideration advanced by Witte, applicable to her actions generally. This argument deals with  
the second stage of the Anns test, and the effect of Witte being personally named as a Defendant in this action by  
the WCB, pursuant to its interpretation of its enabling legislation that was “probably wrong”. Counsel for Witte  
argued that the existence of a limitation of liability is an important policy consideration to take into account in  
applying the Anns test, for which he cited London Drugs, supra.  
Witte noted that the Northwest Territories Court of Appeal in Witte v. Northwest Territories (Workers’  
Compensation Board) (1999), 185 D.L.R. (4th) 485, 1999 NWTCA 1, leave to appeal refused [2000] 2 S.C.R. xv,  
has indicated that the legally correct interpretation of the Workers’ Compensation Act, applied to Witte, is  
probably that she was a worker who was entitled to immunity from this action. Côté J.A. stated in his  
concurring reasons at para. 85:  
The Board was acting as the judge in a very important issue in its own lawsuit, and was setting a precedent for  
future lawsuits by itself. It found in favour of itself on a question of interpretation of a public statute, and (in my  
respectful view) was probably wrong in that interpretation. Yet current Canadian case law directs me to accord  
the widest possible deference to that decision, a deference sometimes greater than that which the courts often  
accord to legislative bodies or to other courts. A citizen who loses a contest with such a board under such  
circumstances may well feel that though the scales were heaped with social engineering, justice was not weighed  
at all.  
The majority of the Court, while less direct, similarly held that a determination that an action against Witte was  
statutorily barred was preferable to that made by the WCB and stated at para. 80 that “[i]t is less easy to fathom  
how the overall purpose of the Act is served when the employer’s chief executive officer is liable to suit by a  
worker or his dependants”.  
Accordingly, Witte submitted that, on a correct interpretation of the Workers’ Compensation Act, supra the WCB,  
suing in the name of six families and O’Neil, is barred from attempting to obtain compensation from Witte  
personally.  
The Plaintiffs asserted that, in raising this policy consideration, Witte was attempting to relitigate whether or not  
she was immune from this action. Witte responded that it was in fact the WCB that was attempting to relitigate  
an issue, as it ruled (in its own cause) that Witte was not immune from suit, and the Northwest Territories Court  
of Appeal has since held that, even though the WCB’s interpretation was “probably wrong”, it was unable to rectify  
the WCB’s decision because the standard of review was patent unreasonableness. Further, Witte suggested that it  
is now my task to determine what duty of care Witte owed in this matter, and whether she is liable to the WCB in  
this subrogated action. I agree with her counsel that it is this Court, not the WCB, who determines who is liable,  
and who is not. However, to revisit a decision of the WCB dealing with the definition of “worker” under the  
Workers’ Compensation Act, a decision also ruled on by the Northwest Territories Court of Appeal, is not an issue  
properly before this Court. For this reason, I will not consider it, even as an issue of policy on the second branch  
of the Anns test to negate finding that a duty of care existed.  
In summary, applying the modified Anns test, in consideration of all of the evidence, the death of the nine miners  
was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the personal actions alleged against Witte. Further, there was  
sufficient proximity between Witte and the Plaintiffs. Finally, there are no policy factors to militate against  
imposing a duty of care in the circumstances of this case, most particularly that relating to the WCB’s decision  
that Witte was not immune from this action, a decision that was confirmed by the Northwest Territories Court of  
Appeal.  
b) Standard of Care  
The determination of whether Witte’s conduct was negligent is a question of whether it was reasonable in the  
circumstances of this case. Referring to Witte’s participation, I begin this analysis by noting that a corporation  
because of its very nature can only act through its officers and directors. There is a veil that offers a certain  
protection to officers and directors. Unquestionably, a director is vulnerable on the principles set forth in the  
authorities herein, such as the neighbour principle in Berger, supra, and, where the risk is readily foreseeable,  
omission may constitute breach of a found duty.  
It would be strange indeed if the president of a national or international corporation was held liable for every act  
purportedly done in the name of the corporation, without more, and the authorities herein bear witness to that  
postulation. The authorities referenced herein clearly circumscribe an officer’s liability.  
I will deal with each of the Plaintiffs’ allegations against Witte as follows:  
(a) Leading or participating with Royal Oak in the labour relations conducted by Royal Oak both before and  
during the lockout and strike;...  
Witte did not play the lead role with regard to labour relations on behalf of Royal Oak. There is no doubt that she  
had significant involvement in the position held by the company, and articulated this position on occasion, as  
would be expected of the CEO during a strike. However, the chief negotiator throughout the strike was Smrke,  
experienced in labour relations, and there has been no evidence to suggest that this responsibility was shirked by  
Smrke, or that Witte’s, expressing the company’s hard-line position was negligent in itself. It may be that the  
bargaining position and tactics employed by Royal Oak throughout the negotiations were negligent, but this must  
be dealt with separately as alleged against Royal Oak and not Witte personally.  
An example of this was the decision made by Royal Oak to terminate the employment of those employees who  
were involved in the June riot. Although Witte was involved in the process, she relied heavily on Royal Oak  
management staff and legal advisors. There is nothing in the evidence to show that Witte’s actions in this regard  
were in themselves negligent.  
(b) Encouraging Royal Oak to keep the Giant Mine operating during the lockout and strike by using non-striking,  
non-union miners and non-striking members of the union;....  
One must view Witte’s conduct as Officer and Director objectively. There is no doubt that she was the directing  
mind of Royal Oak, so much so that she alone reported to the Board of Directors. The Board considered  
alternative courses of action in face of the impending strike. Although I acknowledge she was well aware of the  
personal liability of the Directors from the environmental point of view, she chose a course of action with Board  
support that was legal in all respects, and not negligent.  
(c) Using Pinkerton’s services in connection with the need for additional security;  
(d) Permitting Pinkerton’s to conduct themselves in their relations with the striking miners of the union in such a  
fashion as to inflame an already dangerous environment producing threats of violence against the replacement  
workers and members of the union who returned to work without being careful whether any circumstances or  
conditions related to or arising out of the walkout and strike made the Giant Mine not safe to be upon or could  
lead to mortal injury to and death of those invited upon the Giant Mine including the nine miners;....  
There is no evidence to suggest that Witte herself chose Pinkerton’s to provide security. She contracted  
Pinkerton’s when Royal Oak’s current security company fled, based on advice she considered reliable and likewise  
based on urgent need to protect persons and property at Giant. Furthermore, Pinkerton’s was not the initial  
security provider. It was brought in as an experienced security force, after Cambrian was chased out of town by  
the violence of union members, a reasonable response under the circumstances.  
Moreover, the evidence does not support the contention that Witte permitted Pinkerton’s to conduct itself in a  
provocative manner in its relations with the striking miners of the union. Assuming, for the purpose of this  
analysis, that Pinkerton’s did inflame an already dangerous situation, there is no evidence to suggest that Witte  
was aware of this fact, or was wilfully blind to this fact, and that she permitted its continuance. Instead, the  
responsibility in dealing with Pinkerton’s was delegated to the onsite manager, Byberg, who reported to Witte. If  
Byberg believed Pinkerton’s to be provoking the strikers, he had the responsibility to take necessary action. This  
management mechanism for dealing with matters as they arise is part of the Royal Oak company structure, of  
which Witte is one part. There is nothing in the evidence to suggest that the corporate veil ought to be pierced to  
find that Witte was personally negligent in her actions or inaction pertaining to Pinkerton’s.  
(e) Encouraging any unauthorized persons who entered the Giant Mine on September 18, 1992, including Roger  
Wallace Warren, to conduct themselves in a manner that could create an unreasonable and foreseeable risk of  
harm by their respective failures generally in advance of September 18, 1992 to take meaning[ful] and visible  
steps to enhance the level of security at the Giant Mine in the face of threats of violence and acts of sabotage or  
conveying the impression thereby to Roger Wallace Warren or others that it was necessary to carry out the acts or  
to fail to carry out the acts referred to in paragraph (e) hereof in order to carry out his duty as a striking member  
of the union.  
The evidence does not bear out a finding that Witte encouraged Warren to set the fatal blast, nor is there  
sufficient evidence to find that Witte is liable personally for failing to increase the level of security at Giant.  
Furthermore, because the actions of the strikers took a course sideways, does that make her personally liable? I  
think not. In comparing the facts in Berger, supra, with the facts herein, the distinguishing feature, apart from  
the defendant being the sole owner-operator of the corporation as a small local entity, is the element of control.  
Witte could not control the actions of miners legally on strike in her personal capacity. Furthermore, unlike the  
defendant executive officer in Berger, supra, Witte was not present at Giant on a daily basis; rather, she relied on  
information relayed to her by onsite management personnel.  
Her actions therefore cannot be said to be attributed to benefiting only her for the evidence does not bear out that  
interpretation. There was no conduct on the part of Witte that was tortious itself or exhibited a separate identity  
or interest from that of Royal Oak such as to make the acts or conduct complained of those of Witte. Royal Oak  
was not a one-shareholder-owned entity. Witte had an obligation to her Board of Directors, who had an  
obligation to a group of shareholders, whose interests were traded on a public stock exchange. Far too often,  
corporate principals are joined in proceedings with a perceived view to secure strength in a plaintiff’s cause and  
sometimes for reasoned purposes, for example, to examine a particular director or officer who might not be  
produced for examination for discovery. Sometimes facts are discovered securing strength for a plaintiff. If  
nothing is found, the remedy of costs is a small price to pay. Sometimes a principal is joined mischievously, for  
differing reasons, most commonly for the public attention, where it is hoped it will bring about immediate  
settlement discussions to avoid a lengthy process up to and including trial, the object being that the principal  
would prefer not to be spotlighted any longer than necessary.  
Witte, on the evidence before me, like Sheridan, did not step outside her corporate governance box and,  
accordingly, will not bear any personal liability.  
Royal Oak  
The Plaintiffs’ claim in this action is structured and argued as it relates to the three Procon miners, for whom  
Royal Oak had no immunity from suit, on an employer-employee relationship, and to all miners on an occupier’s  
liability basis. The distinction for the purpose of this action is one without a difference. In the case of O’Neil, he  
was clearly an employee and in relation to him Royal Oak enjoyed immunity.  
As I move to consider the alleged negligence of Royal Oak, having dismissed personal negligence against both  
Witte and Sheridan, it must be highlighted that their actions are relevant to this consideration as they were  
actions of the corporation, and therefore will be referenced as such.  
a) Duty of Care  
Pursuant to the concept of occupier’s liability rooted in common law, Royal Oak owed a duty of care to its invitees,  
including the Procon miners, namely Robert Rowsell, Arnold Russell and Malcolm Sawler, that being “the  
exercise of reasonable care by the occupier to prevent damage from unusual danger of which the occupier knows  
or ought to know”: Indermaur v. Dames, [1861-73] All E.R. Rep. 15 at 21 (C.P.), aff’d [1861-73] All E.R. Rep. 15 at  
23 (Exch. Ch.).  
Lord Denning defined “occupier” in Wheat v. E. Lacon & Co., [1966] A.C. 552 (H.L.), where at 578 he said:  
[W]herever a person has a sufficient degree of control over premises that he ought to realise that any failure on  
his part to use care may result in injury to a person coming lawfully there, then he is an “occupier” and the person  
coming lawfully there is his “visitor”: and the “occupier” is under a duty to his “visitor” to use reasonable care. In  
order to be an “occupier” it is not necessary for a person to have entire control over the premises. He need not  
have exclusive occupation. Suffice it that he has some degree of control. He may share the control with others.  
Two or more may be “occupiers”. And whenever this happens, each is under a duty to use care towards persons  
coming lawfully on to the premises, dependent on his degree of control. If each fails in his duty, each is liable to a  
visitor who is injured in consequence of his failure, but each may have a claim to contribution from the other.  
In addition to that duty as occupier that arose from the control aspect by Royal Oak, there was the employer-  
employee duty at common law, characterized as a “special duty”, also a duty of care, and a higher duty than that  
as occupier. G.H.L. Fridman, The Law of Torts in Canada, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 2002) at 595-599.  
However, I do not find that this special duty goes so far as to find that Royal Oak was an insurer over the safety of  
those invited to be on its premises. Jacobsen v. Nike Canada Ltd. (1996), 1996 3429 (BC SC), 133 D.L.R.  
(4th) 377 (B.C.S.C), illustrates the effect of the control factor over employees.  
The very nature of the employment relationship makes employees visitors on the premises of their employers and  
thereby attracts, at a minimum, the duty owed by any occupier toward its invitee; however, rather than paralleling  
the duty owed to an ordinary visitor, the duty owed by an employer to its employee is a greater, more onerous  
one. See Fridman, supra at 595-599.  
In short, a defendant employer owes a special duty where:  
(a) the defendant is in a position of authority over the plaintiff;  
(b) the defendant exercised control over the situation giving rise to the injury;  
(c) the defendant created the risk which ultimately resulted in injury to the plaintiff; or  
(d) there is an economic benefit accruing to or burden imposed on the defendant which is a consequence, direct  
or indirect, of the risk created.  
b) Standard of Care  
Employers have long owed a duty to their employees that includes ensuring that their premises are “reasonably  
safe”. In Naismith v. London Film Productions Ltd., [1939] 1 All E.R. 794 at 798, Lord Goddard of the English  
Court of Appeal described the duty as requiring the employer “to make the place of employment . . . as safe as the  
exercise of reasonable skill and care would permit”. In The Law of Torts, 9th ed. (Sydney: LBC Information  
Services, 1998) at 559-560, John G. Fleming described the duty as follows:  
Today it is well settled that an employer . . . owes an overriding managerial responsibility to safeguard them [his  
or her employees] from unreasonable risks of personal injury in regard to the fundamental conditions of  
employment — the safety of the plant, premises and method of work. The relevant standard of care exacted from  
employers is high and over many years tended to increasing stringency. [Footnote omitted].  
See also Allison, supra; and McGinty v. Cook (1989), 1989 4298 (ON SC), 68 O.R. (2d) 650 (H.C.J.), aff’d  
(1991) 1991 7288 (ON CA), 2 O.R. (3d) 283 (C.A.).  
In Crocker v. Sundance Northwest Resorts Ltd., 1988 45 (SCC), [1988] 1 S.C.R. 1186 at 1193-1194, the  
Supreme Court of Canada per Wilson J., recognized that the employer-employee relationship is one type of  
“special relationship” which brought about a higher standard of care.  
As Linden notes in his text on, Canadian Tort Law (3rd ed. 1982), at p.304:  
There is a growing group of special relations which import an obligation to engage in positive conduct for the  
benefit of another. Normally, there is some element of control or some economic benefit inuring to the person as  
a result of the relation, which justifies the creation of the duty. For example, if there is a contract or a bailment, a  
failure to act may be actionable . . . . [A] master may be obliged to provide aid to one of his servants in peril, a  
shopkeeper to his invitee, a school to a pupil, and a shipmaster to a passenger. Obligations to take positive action  
are also imposed upon occupiers of premises to make their property safe for the reception of certain entrants and  
for passersby on the highway. A policeman may owe a civil duty to report dangerous road conditions.  
Institutions which have custody over people, such as hospitals, jails, and the like, may be obliged to take  
reasonable steps to protect those under their care. There will undoubtedly be additions to this list of special  
situations in the years ahead.  
Where a person is responsible for creating a risk, the duty owed will be greater than that owed by someone who  
simply walks into a situation already fraught with risk. The higher duty is not thrust upon an unwilling party, but  
arises because he or she has assumed a position of control, or a benefit.  
The Plaintiffs further argued, and I agree, that Royal Oak owed this special duty to the miners because:  
1. They were in a position of authority over the nine miners;  
2. They owned and/or controlled the premises; and  
3. They controlled the risk (for their own economic benefit, Royal Oak and Witte increased the risk, by taking  
unreasonable bargaining positions and by bringing in replacement workers to continue production during the  
strike).  
Three of the deceased miners were not employees of Royal Oak in the traditional sense. Nevertheless, Royal Oak  
owed them this special standard of care, for Royal Oak supervised their work, and they were subject to Royal  
Oak’s authority over and control of the workplace. Because Royal Oak exercised substantial control over activity  
at Giant and its workers and, as this was deemed to be an inherently dangerous situation, Royal Oak could be  
expected to ensure that the highest standard of care was met to make certain the known risk did not materialize.  
It did not and its degree of blameworthiness was high because of the nature of the duty owed for the safety of  
miners who would work underground during the expected strike. According to Fleming, supra, the main blame  
must fall on the person who created the danger and brought to the accident the dangerous subject matter since  
that person was, in a sense, the master of the situation.  
For example, Royal Oak appreciated that, by using replacement workers during a particularly heated and highly-  
charged labour strike, it would inflame the labour dispute, and then, by adopting and maintaining completely  
unreasonable bargaining positions, Royal Oak materially increased the risk of violence to the replacement  
workers. This risk was created for the express purpose of enlarging its economic benefit. This and other aspects  
will be analyzed in the following sections applying the test of reasonableness to determine if Royal Oak breached  
its duty of care to the three Procon miners. The following three categories were used to capture the various  
particulars of negligence alleged by the Plaintiffs in their Amended Statement of Claim each of which will be dealt  
with in turn:  
i) Maintaining operations yet failing to secure and warn;  
ii) Occupational health and safety;  
iii) Labour relations.  
i) Maintaining Operations yet Failing to Secure and Warn  
Royal Oak’s foray into Yellowknife brought extensive financial benefits to local government and businesses.  
Overawed perhaps with power, Royal Oak overlooked equating human governance with corporate governance,  
and ultimately it can be said that the injuries and loss of life of those who were the underbelly of Royal Oak lay at  
its feet.  
Royal Oak deliberately ignored or was wilfully blind to the clear and present dangers underground when the  
threat of a strike appeared imminent after the collapse of the tentative agreement in April 1992. It was clear that  
Witte sensed a strike/lockout would occur and on March 18, and through Power, had chief mine engineer Allan  
concoct a strike security plan. Royal Oak did, however, in advance of the strike deadline, make it clear to CASAW  
Local 4, the mine inspectors and the RCMP that it intended to exercise its legal right to use replacement workers;  
this came with a warning to CASAW Local 4 and its members that criminal and civil actions would flow from acts  
of sabotage and violence, following suspension and termination of employment. The first suspension was  
Shearing on May 22 for insubordination. Adding to the strikers’ anger was a series of Injunctions and subsequent  
Enforcement Orders beginning on May 23 and the deployment of an RCMP tactical team. Despite this, Royal Oak  
failed to acknowledge that this plan that envisaged the use of replacement workers would cause resentment  
among the strikers. Royal Oak, for some inexplicable reason, failed to take any preventative measures but for  
engaging Pinkerton’s, who came with a good reputation as an international security firm; this entry by Pinkerton’s  
followed but a few days of security by Cambrian, who was, as a result of threats and personal injuries by strikers,  
unceremoniously driven out of Yellowknife. Regrettably, Royal Oak omitted to cause Pinkerton’s to be duly  
familiar with the mine site’s portals of entrances and exits. Regrettably also, as I will later illustrate, Pinkerton’s  
did not fully familiarize itself with knowledge of said portals.  
Royal Oak’s concentration was restricted throughout to the bottom line, the economic benefit accruing to it; the  
company minutes bore this out. Of the options open to Royal Oak, the one that would financially benefit it and  
not harm it financially was chosen. Although surrounded by legal talent, including Sheridan and his eminent  
Toronto law firm, Lang Michener, and an experienced business-talented Board of Directors, it chose to ignore the  
clearly existing statement of law, for example, Fleming, supra at 559-560.  
While under oath, several of Royal Oak’s senior management personnel, including Witte, Smrke and Byberg,  
were evasive and selective respecting Witte’s knowledge of what was happening on the mine site during the  
strike. I say at the outset that I was not comfortable with Witte’s evidence in particular, for some of her cocoon of  
minions, from Smrke through Werner, Serin, Byberg, Power, Allan and O’Sullivan to name but a few, and others  
were in daily contact with her; she had a formal reporting regime in place. As well, the same can be said of her  
evidence that she gave Byberg full financial rein to keep Royal Oak’s mining operations alive. Byberg disagreed  
with that statement when put to him, and I accept his evidence in that respect, for that complemented her bottom  
line focus. As well, she had knowledge from the media, various levels of government and CASAW Local 4, and so  
in face of that she cannot pass off intimate knowledge, particularly given her admission that she was concerned  
with what was happening at Giant. Her memory was clear of incidents at the mine that affected production. It  
must be said that, despite advice of dangers that were said to be given birth during this strike, her management  
personnel gave assurances of safety and security to those who were contemplating crossing the picket line and to  
those who had done so, including the contracted miners who were treated as Royal Oak’s own. Her words, in  
effect to her detractors, suggesting the use of replacement workers was a dangerous tool for maintaining  
production throughout, were “JUST WATCH ME”.  
Byberg, in particular, went further in assurances; these assurances were given in face of Chris Neill’s and O’Neil’s  
lives being threatened on May 24 on the heels of their plea that Royal Oak was willing to negotiate changes to the  
tentative agreement. In addition there was the attempt on the life of Tolmie whose pickup was rammed on May  
26 by strikers, hospitalizing him, in underscoring the personal safety; Byberg’s assurance in essence was that  
because of the presence of Pinkerton’s, the property was secure and safe for them to go back to work; and this in  
face of his belief before September 1, that he was concerned someone could be killed, and his letter of September  
16 to The Yellowknifer newspaper expressing concern that “innocent lives are put at risk”. These assurances  
continued even following serious incidents such as the vent shaft explosion. I note, however, that no one from  
Royal Oak informed their workforce that they could not determine how those involved in the graffiti run gained  
entry to the site.  
It cannot be said that Royal Oak treated its obligation to protect its workers with gay abandon. It did as its  
counsel argued; inter alia, it engaged Pinkerton’s for security when Cambrian was driven from town by the  
strikers, enhancing security of buildings onsite and entrance ways to the mine. In response to a greater level of  
activity than was anticipated, it increased its security force and, when it perceived, though incorrectly, a later  
decreased level of activity, reductions were made, in consultation with Pinkerton’s. Unfortunately, it did too little  
and for the most part it was always too late or too poorly done to withstand the strikers’ determination to “bring  
the company down”. Often, measures were directed to be done, but no one checked later to see that they were.  
Furthermore, more often than not, little or no real investigation of some incidents was done. Pinkerton’s and  
Royal Oak personnel often assuaged each others expressed concerns about security, and the evidence clearly  
indicated each relied on the other’s assurances to the detriment of those affected, as the real truth was not being  
passed on.  
If the incidents appeared to be criminal in nature, the RCMP were called. Occasionally the mining inspector of  
the day paid a visit. As the strike wore on, Royal Oak became less communicative with Pinkerton’s to the point  
where Witte would not acknowledge St. Amour’s telephone calls and letters. At the same time, Royal Oak had  
forced Pinkerton’s to reduce security to a dangerous level and refused to allow new technology to be acquired or  
considered; non-economic consequences were never of interest to Royal Oak.  
Counsel for Royal Oak argued that there was a general calming after June 14, attributable in part to the RCMP  
enforcement of the May 23 Injunction on June 12. This was a perception that was ill-founded; the strikers were  
busy plotting while those concerned and affected had been lulled into a sense of relief. The evidence of what then  
occurred told the story. The RCMP sergeant in charge disagreed with his superiors’ removal of their additional  
resources by July 15 and the downsizing of other resources, and, by September, nighttime RCMP patrols were  
abandoned.  
Although the hiring of Pinkerton’s was lauded as the answer to control the rowdy strikers as the former was  
perceived to be the largest, best-equipped security company on this continent, its performance was, as I will later  
indicate, dismal. Its lack of records was a shocking reminder that it believed its presence alone was sufficient to  
discharge its contractual obligations, and no record keeping was required. By late July, Byberg convinced  
Pinkerton‘s to reduce the guards to 20. That was the beginning of the downward spiral. Royal Oak was even  
more focused on the bottom line and began ignoring Pinkerton’s recommendations for electronic security.  
As incidents of threats and vandalism increased, including theft and use of explosives in different areas, such as  
the vent shaft, the satellite dish and the tailings pipe, there were either no changes or no appreciable changes  
made or some of the too few Pinkerton’s guards were sometimes shifted to the newly vandalized sites, all of this in  
face of Pinkerton’s urgings that security was inadequate, particularly when the many incursions of the likes of  
Shearing, Bettger and Legge, to name but a few, was so well broadcast around town. Even Warren found such a  
lack of security; he took extreme delight in roaming about at night and being enabled to do so when he so easily  
determined the roving schedule of Pinkerton’s. Warren’s escape route, the I-38 portal, was as poorly guarded as  
Akaitcho, enabling Warren to exit unnoticed. One would think that Akaitcho, remote, prominent and an easy  
entry to the 750-foot level, would and should have been sealed, not subject to roving patrols. It was suggested  
that B-138 had a locked gate; however, Warren slid out under it. By September 18, 1992, it would be the height of  
naivety to suggest it would have been impossible that someone would, as Warren did, go to such lengths to  
perform vandalism underground in light of these similar acts that preceded it.  
Given the above, I find that Royal Oak’s conduct fell short of that which was prudent and reasonable in its failure  
to secure Giant while maintaining operations, and subsequently failing to warn its invitees that it had not  
reasonably secured the underground.  
ii) Matters of Occupational Health and Safety  
Once in control of Giant, Royal Oak configured some new practices and procedures; some were necessary for  
better workplace control, and some were designed for better safety for the workers. Respecting the latter,  
although there was some resentment, those miners who were conscientious were unaffected for the most part by,  
inter alia, this “step system” formally referred to as the “Employee Improvement Policy”, which from Royal Oak’s  
perception was designed to improve safety and reduce lost-time accidents. CASAW Local 4 viewed the policy as  
an attempt by Royal Oak to rid itself of troublesome employees and to de-unionize the mine. This resulted in a  
large number of grievances, which for the most part Royal Oak powered to arbitration, bearing in mind that the  
union and Royal Oak each shared one half of the cost thereof. Those who were affected were workers who were  
lethargic troublemakers, who later represented a radical group from within, and whose highest level of criticism  
of Witte was that she was a woman and an American. I speak of Shearing, Bettger and Seeton, to name three who  
are Defendants.  
Statutory duty elevated the obligations on Royal Oak and its officers, director and agents. Under the occupational  
health and safety legislation, they were obliged to develop and involve all of their personnel, as an integral part of  
their daily work schedule, in a system that maintained a safe workplace, the “IRS”).  
As part of the IRS, the Safety Act, R.S.N.W.T. 1988, c. S-1, provided:  
4. Every employer shall  
(a) maintain his or her establishment in such a manner that the health and safety of persons in the establishment  
are not likely to be endangered;  
(b) take all reasonable precautions and adopt and carry out all reasonable techniques and procedures to ensure  
the health and safety of every person in his or her establishment: . . .  
The Mining Safety Act, since repealed and replaced, had more detailed requirements with respect to the IRS. Its  
keystone, however, was the Mine Occupational Health and Safety Committee contemplated by s. 37. Under s. 38,  
the Committee was required to conduct monthly inspections and make additional inspections of “any conditions  
that could result in serious injury or loss of life”. The Mining Safety Act imposed duties on management (ss. 2, 3),  
including its officers, directors or agents (s. 46), to ensure that the IRS was working properly. Notwithstanding  
this, there was no statutorily prepared record produced that the Committee at Giant met as required during the  
strike.  
The said Mining Safety Act, in conjunction with its Regulations, also contained many specific safety requirements  
and imposed a duty on Royal Oak and its management as follows:  
2.(1) The manager . . . shall take all reasonable measures to enforce this Act and the rules and regulations and to  
ensure their observance by all persons working in or about the mine or those persons under his or her charge, as  
the case may be.  
3....  
(3) The owner shall ensure that the manager is provided with the necessary means to conduct the operation of  
the mine in full compliance with this Act and the rules and regulations.  
Provisions of the Mining Safety Regulations, R.R.N.W.T. 1990, c.M-16, made under the Mining Safety Act, that  
Royal Oak and Witte arguably breached or allowed to be breached included the following:  
4. No person shall engage in any . . . fighting . . . or similar conduct at a mine that may create or constitute a  
hazard to himself or herself or to any other person.  
15.(1) No person shall enter any building, place or works except for the purposes of his or her employment or  
except when authorized to do so by the manager or a person authorized by the manager.  
136.(1) A manager shall designate one or more persons whose duty it shall be to make a thorough weekly  
inspection of all explosives magazines. . . .  
(2) A person designated under subsection (1) shall make a report, in writing, to the manager stating that the  
examination has been made and certifying the conditions found.  
(3) A manager shall take immediate steps to correct any unsuitable conditions found at a mine. . . .  
138. No person shall take away from any mine any explosive, fuse, detonator, blasting cap or explosive device of  
any kind without the written permission of the manager. . . .  
183.(1) No person, other than a worker on shift, an inspector or a person authorized by the manager, shall enter a  
mine.  
184. No person shall enter or leave any part of a mine except by a means authorized by the manager.  
186.(1) A manager shall designate a competent person whose duty it shall be to inspect escape exits at least once a  
month.  
(2) The person performing the inspection shall make a record, in writing, of the inspections and the  
conditions found to the manager and the manager shall maintain such records.  
234(1) The top of every shaft must be securely fenced or protected by a gate or guard-rail. . . .  
No discussion of whether the appropriate standard was breached here is complete without discussion of any  
existing statutory duty, if any, and whether it was breached or not.  
Counsel for Royal Oak went to great lengths in the final submissions to illustrate occupational health and safety  
measures implemented by Royal Oak:  
141. Royal Oak implemented an effective occupational health and safety program, which was endorsed by  
management and employees alike. Any allegations that Royal Oak failed to comply with reasonable occupational  
health and safety practices, or statutory requirements, are unfounded. Further, they are not alleged in the  
pleadings. Finally, it is submitted that the Plaintiffs failed to show any causal connection between their  
occupational health and safety allegations, and Roger Warren’s act of murder.  
142. When Royal Oak purchased the Giant Mine, one of the reasons for its financial performance was an  
extremely poor safety record; as a result, Royal Oak’s turnaround plan for the mine included improving safety  
performance. Safety was priority for Royal Oak, and Michael Gross, vice-president of operations, and Mike  
Werner, Mine Manager, were instructed to put together a plan to improve safety.  
. . . .  
143. Terry Byberg, who began working at Giant in February 1991, testified that accidents are a key to high costs in  
mining, as a result of which Royal Oak took steps to reduce the accident rate. He described the safety program at  
Giant as an “excellent program”, which he has since used as a guideline elsewhere . . . Dave Power, the Safety  
Supervisor at Giant testified that Royal Oak took safety “very seriously”, and implemented changes that he found  
positive. . . .  
144. Royal Oak’s occupational health and safety program at the Giant Mine included various elements, including:  
An occupational health and safety committee, consisting of management and worker representatives;  
Orientation of new employees, including safety and emergency procedures;  
Investigation of accidents, to prevent recurrence;  
Use of the five-point safety system, under which employees were required to inspect their workplaces, to ensure  
that they were safe. The employees were required to complete checklist cards on a daily basis, which were  
subsequently reviewed by the safety and training coordinator, and senior management, to ensure that concerns  
were addressed;  
Monthly formal safety meetings, at which supervisors discussed various subjects, and held a question and answer  
session with their employees;  
Weekly ‘muck pile talks’, at which supervisors discussed safety topics with their workers individually;  
Required safety audits by supervisory personnel, who were responsible for remedying any hazards or problems;  
Providing written safety procedures, which were approved by the occupational health and safety committee;  
Introduction of a discipline system, called the Employee Improvement Action Report, which enabled  
management to use discipline, if needed, to enforce safe working practices;  
Introduction of a requirement that, in the event of a lost-time accident, the general manager had to report it to the  
vice-president of operations, and to the chief executive officer, along with an explanation of why the accident  
occurred, and what was being done to prevent a recurrence; and  
Inspections of the employees’ work places, by senior management, once everyone had left the mine at the  
conclusion of the shift. Shortly before the strike, such an inspection found no safety infractions.  
. . . .  
145. The foregoing elements in Royal Oak’s safety program continued throughout the strike; in fact, the deceased  
miners attended a safety meeting shortly before they were murdered, and Mr. Russell had a five-point safety card  
on his person at the time. When Pinkerton’s assumed security responsibilities at the Giant Mine, Dave Power  
(Royal Oak’s Safety Supervisor) was able to devote more time to his safety responsibilities, which now included  
orientations for replacement workers, and more regular safety audits.  
146. Royal Oak’s efforts at improving health and safety were recognized not only by some of the Plaintiffs’  
witnesses, but by the Plaintiffs themselves. Evidence from the Plaintiffs and their witnesses in this regard  
included:  
. . . .  
Tracey Neill testified that her husband was ‘very, very much into safety’, and that he liked the changes that Royal  
Oak introduced. He liked Royal Oak’s safety program, and thought it would force people to be more careful.  
. . . .  
Terry Legge testified that Royal Oak brought in a system to discipline people who were involved in unsafe work  
practices, and that he was not aware of anyone who was disciplined for being injured through no fault of their  
own.  
Keith Murray testified about Royal Oak having weekly safety meetings, at which the workers were encouraged to  
bring forward concerns, on which action would be taken.  
. . . .  
155. Over the summer of 1992, Royal Oak’s rate of lost-time injuries decreased dramatically.  
The evidence establishes that there was some reasonable occupational health and safety programs in place before  
and during the strike. However, the disappearance of the Mine Occupational Health and Safety Committee in the  
months leading up to the fatal blast was negligence.  
Plaintiffs’ counsel argued that Royal Oak and Witte breached or allowed to be breached certain of the Mining  
Safety Regulations made under the Mining Safety Act. Counsel for Royal Oak argued that these provisions also  
targeted persons engaged in the impugned conduct, not just mine management. Royal Oak had an obligation to  
be aware and to secure explosives underground in light of clear evidence of theft. At worst, it was wilfully blind as  
it was common street knowledge that the underground explosives were being stolen through incursions and being  
used or their use being threatened.  
Section 186 of the Mining Safety Regulations stated:  
186.(1) A manager shall designate a competent person whose duty it shall be to inspect escape exits at least once a  
month.  
(2) The person performing the inspection shall make a record, in writing, of the inspections and the  
conditions found to the manager and the manager shall maintain such records.  
Royal Oak submitted that there is no evidence that this did not take place; however, no record was produced that  
it did take place, something one might have expected in the premises.  
Section 234(1) of the Mining Safety Regulations stipulated, “The top of every shaft must be securely fenced or  
protected by a gate or guard-rail .” Counsel for Royal Oak argued that every shaft was secured by measures that  
far exceeded the security afforded by a guard-rail; in fact, all of the shafts were enclosed in sealed structures. That  
statement is not supported by the evidence, and I reference Akaitcho; respecting the I-38 portal, I accept  
Warren’s evidence that he slid out under the gate.  
These breaches of occupational health and safety legislation were blatant acts of negligence.  
The seemingly good efforts demonstrated by some occupational health and safety measures survive the visual  
test, but that begs the real question as to the enforcement of the Mining Safety Act and its Regulations. In that  
regard, Royal Oak failed in three respects. Firstly, it was Royal Oak’s obligation to strictly enforce the Mining  
Safety Act and its Regulations, but it did not, particularly in the area of keeping unauthorized persons from  
entering the mine. Secondly, Royal Oak failed in not securing and tallying the underground explosives. Thirdly,  
it failed in not adequately securing the mine entrances, such as Akaitcho and the I-38 portal.  
Against this backdrop, the evidence of the misbehaviour and breaches of Royal Oak reveal Royal Oak’s failure to  
safeguard the occupational health and safety of the mine workers. I agree with the Plaintiffs argument; Royal  
Oak’s action and inaction reveal a total ignorance of the depth of its obligations, and how empty its words were  
that it held “sacred” its obligations to the mineworkers and their families.  
iii) Labour Relations  
Respecting labour relations, I reference my comments and findings in discussing CAW National, infra, where I  
delineate Royal Oak’s conduct in that regard and need not repeat them here. Suffice it to say, Royal Oak’s  
position was clear: it was totally dismissive of its obligation to negotiate under s.50 of the Canada Labour Code,  
which read:  
50. Where notice to bargain collectively has been given under this Part,  
(a) the bargaining agent and the employer . . . shall  
(i) meet and commence, or cause authorized representatives on their behalf to meet and commence, to bargain  
collectively in good faith, and  
(ii) make every reasonable effort to enter into a collective agreement; ¼  
Sims, an expert in labour relations called by CAW National, testified, and I accept his evidence, that the duty to  
bargain in good faith is the cornerstone of the legislation; its purpose, he said, includes the interest of third  
parties who would be affected if parties fail to bargain in good faith.  
Throughout the strike Royal Oak did not bargain at all. Attempts to mediate and negotiate in June and July were  
met with frustration and failure, as Royal Oak was as inflexible as CASAW Local 4 and CAW National to which I  
will allude later. Royal Oak imposed pre-conditions that it had to know would not take flight; they were as  
unhelpful to the process as the union’s pre-conditions, making it apparent that neither side wished to negotiate.  
Royal Oak felt no need to negotiate; it was in full production. From the union point of view, once CAW National  
became involved, particularly when David was parachuted into Yellowknife, the union likewise had little interest  
in a return to a good faith bargaining setting.  
By the use of replacement workers and in face of common sense, Royal Oak is deemed to know the labour dispute  
would be inflamed. The expert opinions of Dr. Strahlendorf, Sims and Plummer supported the same.  
The majority of the Supreme Court of Canada, per Cory J., in Royal Oak Mines Inc. v. Canada (Labour Relations  
Board), 1996 220 (SCC), [1996] 1 S.C.R. 369 said this at paras. 40, 45-46:  
The third violation found by the Board was the most serious. It concluded that the appellant [Royal Oak]  
demonstrated a failure to bargain in good faith when it refused to agree to a provision for any type of arbitration  
or consideration of questions arising from its discharge of the 49 employees. The Board found that this outright  
refusal to discuss the issue completely blocked the bargaining process. . . .  
. . . .  
. . . . The grounds on which an employer may dismiss an employee is of fundamental importance for any  
association of employees. For an employer to refuse an employee a grievance procedure or some form of due  
process, by which the employee can challenge his or her dismissal on the ground that it was not for just cause, is  
to deny that employee a fundamental right. . . .  
To echo the finding of the Canada Labour Relations Board in Iberia Airlines of Spain (1990), 80 di 165, at p. 203,  
the appellant’s [Royal Oak’s] bargaining position, in the case at bar, was “inflexible and intransigent to the point  
of endangering the very existence of collective bargaining”.  
This conduct of Royal Oak, on Sim’s evidence, which I accept, is “typical” evidence of the intention not to bargain  
in good faith. Although the subject position occurred after September 18, 1992, it was but an extension of conduct  
and attitude during the strike.  
Further, the Plaintiffs argued at para. 258 of their final submissions:  
[A]n employer cannot enter into negotiations with the intent of ridding itself of the union. So if Royal Oak was  
trying to “break the union” (and the Plaintiffs suggest that there is ample evidence to suggest that it was), then  
that in itself was an element of bargaining in bad faith.  
I am not satisfied Royal Oak was endeavouring to “break” CASAW Local 4. I understood Royal Oak’s position to  
be one of contentment if it could hold its position of not being required to re-hire the employees whose  
employment had been terminated.  
iv) Conclusion  
In the result, I am satisfied that Royal Oak breached its duty and is subject to claims made against it. It was in full  
production, and, with assurances by it and Pinkerton’s to the replacement workers that they were being properly  
cared for underground, it had control of the mine, in theory at least, and saw no reason as a company to invest  
time bargaining with a union who, as Slezak told Witte in his Vancouver hotel room in the spring, was going to  
bring the company down. All of this, despite Royal Oak’s urgings to the contrary, was just another irritant and  
frustration to CASAW Local 4 and CAW National that contributed to Royal Oak’s negligence.  
It is ludicrous to advance a view, as Royal Oak persisted in doing, that no reasonable person viewing these scenes  
at Giant was able to appreciate the foreseeability of a death. The strike talk was permeated with it; the RCMP  
entertained it, as did Turner and Ballantyne. It was certainly on the mind of Byberg in his affidavit of early June  
in support of an injunction application, and for good reason. There were physical injuries inflicted, threats,  
property damage, watching and besetting replacement workers’ homes, and, more importantly, sabotage with  
such incidents as the vent blast and the satellite dish explosion to name but two of several. There were also  
incidents of theft of explosives from the mine and their use on the site and of cutting off power, some of which ran  
the local hospital. It would have been astounding if someone had not been killed. The ugly incidents permeated  
the entire city. They affected school children and sank so low a line-crosser’s wife received a telephone call that  
she would be gang raped. In the result, the very act of Warren was an act that was very likely to happen, and it  
did.  
c) Causation  
Having found that Royal Oak’s efforts breached the requisite standard of care, I turn to the test in law for  
determining causation. As previously outlined, the current test for causation is whether the Defendant’s  
negligence materially contributed to the injury or loss.  
I find that for reasons given herein, Royal Oak’s negligence, grouped into the categories of i) maintaining  
operations yet failing to secure and warn, ii) occupational health and safety, and iii) labour relations, “materially  
contributed” to the Plaintiffs’ injuries. The reasoning therefore is fully outlined in the discussion pertaining to  
standard of care, supra and will not be repeated. Furthermore, I have discussed the drawing of adverse inferences  
for failure to call witnesses in a separate section of this judgment and will not repeat it here.  
Remoteness  
Flowing from the previous discussions, I similarly find that the deaths of the miners caused by the reckless act of  
Warren was foreseeable at the time that the negligent conduct occurred. A more detailed discussion on this point  
can be found in the section dealing with novus actus interveniens, supra.  
Pinkerton’s  
a) Duty of Care  
Pinkerton’s argued that, if it owed a duty of care to the deceased miners, it could only arise out of the terms of the  
contract between Pinkerton’s and Royal Oak based on the neighbour principle. Furthermore, Pinkerton’s stated  
that it had no obligation to Royal Oak to be mindful whether the accesses to the underground were secure and  
therefore had no obligation to the deceased miners in this regard. It circumscribed its mandate thusly, “to ensure  
the security of people and protect the client’s premises”. I do not accept Pinkerton’s was, as its counsel delineated  
it, “strictly a supplier of goods and services to Royal Oak”. Further, this marks a denial that Pinkerton’s was an  
occupier of Giant property.  
Pursuant to the principles articulated by Lord Denning in Wheat v. Lacon & Co., supra, I find that Pinkerton’s was  
operating under the guise of one with certain control, with obligations that flow with those of Royal Oak.  
Pinkerton’s is deemed to appreciate that any failure on its part to take reasonable care might result in a threat to  
the well-being of those invited to be on Giant property. I highlight that it is not necessary to find that Pinkerton’s  
had exclusive control in order to find that it was an occupier at the relevant time. Pinkerton’s owed a duty of care  
to the deceased miners, as did Royal Oak, and it is unnecessary to apply the modified Anns test.  
b) Standard of Care  
Pinkerton’s provided authority for the appropriate standard of care that is owed by occupiers, Kopen v. 61345  
Manitoba Ltd. (1992),1992 12994 (MB QB), 79 Man.R. (2d) 250 (Q.B.), aff’d (1993), 1993 14794  
(MB CA), 83 Man.R. (2d) 239 (C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused, [1994] 1 S.C.R. viii. This case dealt with  
snow removal at a shopping mall, and it was found that the conditions were unusual and difficult for the occupier.  
Krindle J. stated at para. 20:  
I am satisfied that the occupier in this case took such care as, in all circumstances, was reasonable to see that  
persons would be reasonably safe while on the lot. To demand more is to demand that occupiers insure the safety  
of persons using their lot, as opposed merely to taking reasonable steps to see to their safety.  
The standard of reasonable care followed in Kopen, supra, simply reinforces that which was stated in the earlier  
English decision of Indermaur, supra. I do not find that the extent of the duty owed by Pinkerton’s was that of an  
insurer, rather the test of reasonableness applies.  
To now consider whether Pinkerton’s satisfied this duty, I need not address each particular of negligence.  
However, I do note at this stage the Plaintiffs’ allegation that Pinkerton’s was negligent in “[p]articipating with  
Royal Oak in the labour relations conducted by Royal Oak both before and during the lockout and strike” forms  
no part of this discussion as there is no evidential basis for this allegation.  
It can be said that Pinkerton’s had time to react and assess the precarious situation it contracted into, even though  
it came on the site quickly. However, it omitted to do its corporate required mandatory prescribed site plan and  
survey before it assumed its mantle, which was particularly necessary considering the Giant property included  
isolated, rural areas covering thousands of hectares of open space, without protective perimeter. So confident was  
Pinkerton’s that it could perform appropriately that, when O’Sullivan vented his concerns that the site was too  
large to monitor, Shaw and Morton assured him it could do the job, even though Pinkerton’s personnel had  
learned that strikers had explosives in hand.  
As the incidents of vandalism began to unfold on and under the surface as early as the first two weeks in June,  
Royal Oak was leaning on Pinkerton’s for ways to decrease costs of security. At the same time, June 10, Royal  
Oak personnel, to Pinkerton’s knowledge, were swearing affidavits saying that the majority of the 180 employees  
feared for their safety. From the site survey of Pinkerton’s, eventually performed by Twerdun in July, until St.  
Amour’s letter of August 7 to Witte urging her not to downsize, it was apparent that a volatile milieu was  
identified by Pinkerton’s. I am satisfied that Witte received the letter dated August 7, 1992, but was totally  
dismissive of St. Amour’s recommendations to halt the increasing threats of the strikers with new technological  
aids, as her sole interest continued to be cost. St. Amour’s words of “don’t downsize” and “be aware of your risks”  
fell on deaf ears.  
Nonetheless, Pinkerton’s assumed responsibility throughout its tenure. It does not lie in its mouth to repeat that  
its obligation was to surface security only, as implicit in its surface control was security to all the openings  
underground. The fact that incursions occurred suggests it failed to properly protect those underground by failing  
to exercise control at all of the openings.  
While there was conflicting evidence of Pinkerton’s personnel’s knowledge of the structure of Akaitcho, no one,  
including Royal Oak, paid much heed to it. Pinkerton’s had an obligation to know, as common sense would  
dictate, that removing a ladder was hardly preventative; in fact, amongst the strikers were mine rescue workers  
who could shinny down the cables just as Warren did. The same common sense would likewise dictate that  
Akaitcho’s remote location from the main site and the unchained entry down to the levels below would raise  
concern. Roving patrols, which for the most part were drive-bys, were not sufficient. In this, I accept Warren’s  
evidence of the lack of security at Akaitcho and the ease with which he traveled down to the 750 foot level and  
beyond.  
Pinkerton’s was ensnared in adopting the stance of Royal Oak. Even in face of not executing its standard  
practices, it began to assure replacement workers of their safety and it assured Royal Oak personnel that their  
expressed concerns from time to time were in good hands out of pride for the good reputation it wished to  
portray. There was no evidence that its written instructions, policies or procedures were maintained. There was  
no written security plan, audit or survey even though some of their witnesses testified that its practice was to do  
the same before assuming a contract for a new client. When the onsite Pinkerton’s manager changed, the new  
person got little or nothing from the departing representative. As time wore on, with pressures to downsize, the  
best that could be done was to shift guards from less sensitive sites to more suspect sites, knowing that was an  
inadequate satisfaction of its mandate. It was on the line each day and night and had first hand, and the best,  
information of what was happening and was passing it on to Royal Oak. In the end Pinkerton’s became but a  
group of scheduled rovers whose schedules the strikers easily and quickly identified.  
Miller and Randy Brown were called as witnesses by Pinkerton’s. Their evidence revealed they knew little about  
Giant’s surface, its openings and where to watch; no logs, records or written instructions or policies were available  
because they were not kept. Randy Brown, for example, who worked on the evenings of September 17 and 18, was  
a Calgary realtor, with no security training, who was passing time, awaiting a rebound of the real estate market.  
The final assault on Pinkerton’s was being convinced by Witte’s request to cut to 17 or 18 guards and to ultimately  
settle on a reduction to 20. In doing so, it was satisfied it could do the job as St. Amour gave his blessing to this  
reduction. However, he was obviously feeling insecure with this and that was evidenced by his wish to abandon  
Giant, and, when he later failed to secure a replacement security firm, he continued. He testified that to abandon  
Royal Oak might cause it to “sue for non-service”; also, outstanding invoices and his perception that there was  
progress in labour negotiations were factors in St. Amour’s decision to remain at Giant.  
Pinkerton’s argued that it did not know what the strikers were doing from time to time about the mine site. To a  
certain extent that may be so; however, the obligation of Pinkerton’s was to keep the entrances to the  
underground blocked from the strikers’ access. Pinkerton’s failure in this respect to take the level of care alluded  
to, which would have been reasonable in the circumstances, supra, was its negligence.  
It gives the Court little comfort to entertain Pinkerton’s argument that it should not be held to the same standard  
of care as law enforcement personnel or government officials, given the difference in training, when no evidence  
was presented on training of these two supposedly diversely trained groups. Pinkerton’s was equally front-line  
with Royal Oak and, I reiterate, assumed responsibility for safety and care for those to whom it was in close  
proximity, namely, persons in and about the mine site, including the deceased miners.  
Notwithstanding the above, Pinkerton’s negligence was never more brilliantly portrayed than when, as a result of  
the site sweep and survey of the entire mine following the bombing on September 18, to satisfy the Chief Mining  
Inspector’s requirements for re-opening, 23 openings were accounted for. It was clear that Pinkerton’s was  
unaware of more than approximately 13, and the evidence indicates Royal Oak was no better informed. Even the  
obvious, such as Akaitcho, received insufficient attention before September 18.  
Pinkerton’s was to protect Royal Oak property and persons who frequented the mine site, including the miners,  
by ensuring that the entrances were properly guarded to avoid the many incursions with consequent damage to  
property that were made from the date Pinkerton’s arrived until September 18, 1992, and to the completion of its  
contract with Royal Oak. In that, it failed to exercise reasonable care.  
c) Causation  
There is no question there was a duty of care owed and breached, as delineated, supra, and I find that the breach  
materially contributed to the deaths of the nine miners for which Pinkerton’s is responsible.  
Furthermore, I have discussed the drawing of adverse inferences for failure to call witnesses in a separate section  
of this judgment and will not repeat it here.  
d) Remoteness  
Flowing from the previous discussions, I similarly find that the deaths of the miners caused by the reckless act of  
Warren were foreseeable at the time that the negligent conduct occurred. A more detailed discussion on this  
point can be found in the section dealing with novus actus interveniens, supra.  
Third Party Notice by Pinkerton’s  
Pinkerton’s issued a Third Party Notice against Royal Oak on September 20, 1996. The Third Party Notice is a  
study in contrasts when compared, and even not compared, with the position taken by counsel for Pinkerton’s.  
It claims contribution and indemnity in the normal way as follows:  
If the Defendant Pinkerton’s is in any way liable to the Plaintiff, then it claims to be entitled to full contribution or  
indemnity from you upon the following grounds:  
1. In or about the month of June A.D. 1992, Pinkerton’s and Royal Oak Mines Inc. (“Royal Oak”) entered into an  
agreement whereby Pinkerton’s agreed to provide to Royal Oak certain services (“the security services”) as  
requested by Royal Oak from time to time.  
2. The said security services included, inter alia, the provision of personnel and equipment by Pinkerton’s to  
Royal Oak at certain specified charges.  
3. During the period between June 8, 1992 and September 18, 1992, the numbers and expertise of personnel and  
the equipment provided by Pinkerton’s was reduced by Royal Oak, against the advice of Pinkerton’s.  
4. Additionally, during the period from June 8, 1992 to September 18, 1992 the specified charges to be paid for  
personnel and equipment was reduced by Royal Oak, against the advice of Pinkerton’s.  
5. It was a term of the agreement, as amended from time to time that:  
a.) Royal Oak would indemnify from, and hold Pinkerton’s harmless against any and all loss or damage that might  
be claimed against Pinkerton’s as a result of its agreement with Royal Oak, and;  
b.) Royal Oak would indemnify from, and hold Pinkerton’s harmless against any and all legal costs it might incur  
as a result of its agreement with Royal Oak, and;  
c.) Royal Oak would obtain insurance as required by the circumstances to cover Pinkerton’s.  
WHEREFORE THE DEFENDANT PINKERTON’S CLAIMS against the Third Party, Royal Oak:  
a) Contribution and indemnity against any liability in respect of any Judgment that may be given in this action  
against Pinkerton’s, including Judgment for costs;  
b) Contribution and indemnity as to any costs incurred by these Defendants in defending this action;  
c) Costs of these proceedings.  
In argument, somewhat circular I felt, counsel for Pinkerton’s and Royal Oak distinctly asked the Court not to  
deal with the contractual relationship between them as it relates to the Third Party proceeding. The Third Party  
Notice for contribution and indemnity is grounded solely on an alleged contract. In evidence, however, there are  
other contractual matters between them that relate to other issues with which the Court must deal. I leave  
Pinkerton’s to settle its contractual and financial differences with Royal Oak on its alleged contract for  
contribution and indemnity in a different forum at another time, and adjourn the hearing on the Third Party  
Notice.  
Pinkerton’s inability to obtain relief sought on its counterclaim because of Royal Oak’s immunity should not in my  
view be laid at the feet of the Plaintiffs. Should Pinkerton’s succeed later on its Third Party Notice it will secure  
the very relief it seeks in its counterclaim. I will, when dealing with the counterclaim, demonstrate that there is  
no proper basis to assert that the immunity from suit provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act, supra  
somehow override the clear language and intent of s. 3 of the Contributory Negligence Act.  
Counterclaim by Pinkerton’s  
The counterclaim by Pinkerton’s in this action was, on oral argument, advanced for the purpose of procedurally  
claiming set-off in the event Pinkerton’s is found to be a joint tort-feasor. However, a study of the counterclaim  
indicates much more in-depth consideration. Pinkerton’s purports to seek relief for all other Defendants as well  
who may be found to be joint tort-feasors.  
I reproduce the salient parts thereof, which read as follows:  
16. Pinkerton’s denies it is jointly liable to the Plaintiffs, or any of them.  
17. All or part of the Plaintiffs’ claims are subrogated claims of the Workers’ Compensation Board to which the  
Workers’ Compensation Act R.S.N.W.T. 1988 c.W-6 applies, and in particular Sections 12 and 13 of the Act.  
18. If Pinkerton’s is a joint tort-feasor, which is denied, and if the Plaintiffs had commenced this action in their  
own right, Pinkerton’s would be able to claim contribution or an indemnity from Royal Oak Mines Inc. (“Royal  
Oak”) and Procon Miners Inc. (“Procon”) pursuant to Section 3(2) of the Contributory Negligence Act R.S.N.W.T.  
1988 c.C-18  
19. If the operation of the Workers’ Compensation Act extinguishes Pinkertons’ remedy of contribution or  
indemnity pursuant to the Contributory Negligence Act, which is not admitted, the Act has not extinguished its  
right and it would be unjust and inequitable to allow the Plaintiffs to recover from it, more than an amount for  
which it was actually found at fault.  
20. Pinkerton’s pleads and relies upon the Judicature Act R.S.N.W.T. 1988 c.J-1, in particular sections 24, 26, 27,  
28, 45 and 48.  
WHEREFORE THE PLAINTIFF BY COUNTERCLAIM (DEFENDANT) CLAIMS.  
a. A declaration that the right to contribution and indemnity established by the Contributory Negligence Act  
R.S.N.W.T. 1988 c.C-18 has not been extinguished by the Workers Compensation Act R.S.N.W.T. 1988 c.W-6  
even though the remedy itself is no longer available.  
b. A declaration of the proportionate degrees of fault, if any, of Pinkerton’s, Royal Oak and Procon.  
c. Equitable set-off against any Judgment the Plaintiffs may obtain of any amounts related to the fault of the  
Royal Oak or Procon in this action, which is not attributable to any fault on the part of Pinkerton’s.  
d. Alternately, a declaration that section 12(2) of the Workers Compensation Act R.S.N.W.T. 1988 c.W-6, which  
prohibits an action against an employer or a worker acts as a statutory release, releasing all other joint tort-  
feasors.  
Pinkerton’s submission was as follows:  
VI) JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY - COUNTERCLAIM  
127. Pinkerton’s has, by paragraph 15 of its Statement of Defence, and its Counterclaim, claimed a right of set-off  
against some of the Plaintiffs for any percentage of liability that might be assessed against Royal Oak. This  
counterclaim applies only in respect of the 6 deceased miners who were employed by Royal Oak and therefore  
unable to sue Royal Oak because of the provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act.  
128. The Plaintiffs claim against all of the Defendants jointly and severally, so that if the Plaintiffs succeed against  
any or all of the Defendants they can collect their judgment from whatever source they wish, leaving the  
Defendants to seek contribution and indemnity amongst and between themselves.  
129. Pinkerton’s respectfully submits that with respect to any award of damages made in favour of the 6 deceased  
miners, any proportionate share of liability apportioned against Royal Oak, ought to be declared a several liability,  
and the Plaintiffs ought to be precluded from collecting that amount of any judgment from Pinkerton’s or indeed,  
from any other Defendant.  
130. The argument is based on the fact that by virtue of the Workers’ Compensation Act, the 6 deceased miners  
are prevented from suing their employer Royal Oak. Similarly, the Act prevents Royal Oak from being third  
partied for contribution and indemnity pursuant to the Contributory Negligence Act by Pinkerton’s and the other  
Defendants.  
Izzard Estate v. Lyle [1992] N.W.T.J. No. 84, No. CH00315 1992 14317 (NWT CA), [1992] N.W.T.R. 205.  
The subject provisions of the relevant statutes provided:  
Workers’ Compensation Act  
RIGHTS OF ACTION AND SUBROGATION  
12. (1) No action lies for the recovery of compensation, and all claims for compensation shall be determined by  
the Board.  
(2) This Act and the regulations are in place of all rights and causes of action, statutory or otherwise, to  
which a worker or his or her legal personal representative or dependants are or might become entitled against  
(a) the employer by whom he or she was employed at the time of the accident, or  
(b) any worker in the employ of such employer,  
by reason of personal injury to or the death of the worker caused by an accident to the worker that arises out of  
and in the course of his or her employment, and no action in respect of such personal injury or death lies against  
any employer or worker mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b).  
(3) Any party to an action may, on notice to any other parties to the action, apply to the Board for  
adjudication and determination of the question of the plaintiff’s right to compensation and the adjudication and  
determination is final and conclusive.  
(4) Where an accident happens to a worker in the course of employment and compensation under this Act is  
paid in respect of the accident and the circumstances of the accident are such as to also entitle the worker, his or  
her legal personal representative or his dependants to an action against a person other than a person mentioned  
in paragraph (2)(a) or (b), the Board is subrogated to the cause of action of the worker, his or her legal personal  
representative or his or her dependants against such other person for or in respect of the personal injury to or  
death of the worker. 1977(1), c.7,s.12: 1985(1),c.4,s.9.  
13. (1) Where the Board has become subrogated to the rights of a worker or his or her legal personal  
representative or his or her dependants under section 12,  
(a) no payment to or settlement with the worker or his or her legal personal representative or dependants shall be  
made for or in respect of any claim, cause of action or judgment arising from that except with the consent of the  
Board, and any payment or settlement made in contravention of this section is void;  
(b) an action against any person arising out of injury to or death of a worker may, with the consent of the Board,  
be taken by the worker or his or her legal personal representative or his or her dependants, or the action may be  
taken by the Board in the name of the worker or his or her legal personal representative or his or her dependants,  
as the case may be, without the consent of the person in whose name the action is taken;  
(c) if an action is taken by the Board it shall indemnify and save harmless the worker, his or her legal personal  
representative or his or her dependants from and against all costs or damages incurred in respect of the action,  
including costs or damages awarded by the court to the defendant, but excluding any costs that have been  
incurred by the worker, his or her legal personal representative or his or her dependants without authority of the  
Board; and  
(d) the Board may at any time, where action has been taken by the Board or the worker or his or her legal  
representative or dependants and whether or not judgment has been given in such action, effect a settlement of  
the claim for such amount as it considers advisable.  
(2) Where in any action in which the Board is subrogated to the rights of the worker, his or her legal personal  
representative or his or her dependants, payment into court is made pursuant to the Rules of the Supreme Court,  
the Clerk of the Supreme Court, on receipt of notice by the Board of its subrogation in the matter, shall not make  
payment out of court except with the consent of the Board.  
(3) Notice to the Clerk of the Supreme Court under subsection (2) may be made in the same manner as is  
provided in the Rules of the Supreme Court for service by registered mail.  
(4) Where money is received by the Board because it is subrogated to the rights of a worker or his or her legal  
personal representative or dependants,  
(a) the Board may accept the money and give a receipt for it and, where the money is accepted in full settlement,  
may release the person paying the money or on whose behalf the money is paid from liability in respect of the  
personal injury to or death of the worker resulting from the accident;  
(b) if the judgment of the court under which the money is received clearly indicates that a portion of the award is  
for pain and suffering suffered by the worker and resulting from the injury, the Board may pay to the worker,  
from the money remaining in its hands after payment of all legal costs incurred in recovering that money, an  
amount that bears the same proportion to the money remaining in its hands as to the portion of the award  
attributable to pain and suffering bears to the total award;  
(c) if the money is received as a result of an action taken or negotiations carried on behalf of the worker or his or  
her legal personal representative or his or her dependants, the Board may pay to that person, from the money  
remaining in its hands after payment of all legal costs incurred in recovering the money, an amount equal to 25%  
of the gross amount received by the Board, but where payment is made to the worker under paragraph (b),  
payment to the worker under this paragraph shall be made only to the extent to which 25% of the money received  
exceeds the payment made to the worker under paragraph (b); and  
(d) if the balance of the money remaining in the Board’s hands after payment of all legal costs incurred in  
recovering the money and after payment of such amounts, if any, as are required to be paid under paragraphs (b)  
and (c), exceeds the costs of the accident to the Board, including the capital costs of any pension award, the excess  
shall be paid over to the worker, his or her legal personal representative or his or her dependants, as the case may  
be.  
The Contributory Negligence Act  
2.(1) Subject to subsections (2) and (3), where by the fault of two or more persons damage or loss is caused to one  
or more of them, the liability to make good the damage or loss is in proportion to the degree in which each person  
was at fault.  
(2) Where, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, it is not possible to establish different degrees of  
fault, the liability shall be apportioned equally.  
(3) Nothing in this section renders a person liable for damage or loss to which his or her fault has not  
contributed.  
3.(1) Where damage or loss has been caused by the fault of two or more persons, a judge or a jury, as the case may  
be, shall determine the degree in which each was at fault.  
(2) Where two or more persons are found at fault under subsection (1), they are jointly and severally liable to  
the person suffering damage or loss, but as between themselves, in the absence of any contract express or implied,  
they are liable to make contribution to and to indemnify each other in the degree in which they are respectively  
found to have been at fault.  
4. The liability for costs of the parties in an action under this Act is in the same proportion as their respective  
liability to make good the damage or loss, unless a judge otherwise directs.  
Pinkerton’s relied on the following authorities to support the relief claimed.  
Pinkerton’s endeavoured to find solace in Izzard Estate v. Lyle, [1992] N.W.T. R. 205 (C.A.). The facts succinctly  
set forth in the headnote are as follows:  
Both the plaintiff driver and the plaintiff passenger worked for the plaintiff, a Manitoba trucking company. They  
both resided in Manitoba and generally drove for the plaintiff trucking company in Manitoba, although their  
employment required them to drive both within and beyond Manitoba. While driving on company business in the  
Northwest Territories, they were killed in a motor vehicle accident with the individual defendant who was  
employed by and driving a vehicle owned by the defendant company. Three actions were brought against the  
defendants. The actions were consolidated and the defendants applied for leave to amend their defence and issue  
third party notices against the plaintiff driver’s estate and the plaintiff trucking company, the purpose being to  
seek contribution for damages owed to the plaintiff passenger if both the driver and the individual defendant were  
found to have been negligent. The passenger’s estate had applied for and been awarded compensation under  
Manitoba’s Workers Compensation Act. Issues arose as to whether either the Manitoba Act or the Northwest  
Territories Workers’ Compensation Act operated to bar the issuing of the third party notices the defendants  
sought. A chambers judge ruled neither legislation applied, and granted leave to issue the notices. The plaintiffs  
appealed.  
In a carefully crafted decision, Major J.A., as he then was, writing for the Northwest Territories Court of Appeal,  
allowed the appeal. The third party notice was dismissed, as the Court held that the proposed third parties could  
not be held liable to the plaintiffs, and could not be made parties pursuant to then s. 3 of the Contributory  
Negligence Act, R.S.N.W.T. 1974, c. C-13, which read:  
3. Where damage or loss has been caused by the fault of two or more persons, a judge or a jury, as the case may  
be, shall determine the degree in which each was at fault, and where two or more persons are found at fault they  
are jointly and severally liable to the person suffering damage or loss, but as between themselves, in the absence  
of any contract express or implied, they are liable to make contribution to and to indemnify each other in the  
degree in which they are respectively found to have been at fault.  
Although this decision is binding authority for this Court, it does not assist Pinkerton’s as it does not address the  
issue raised by Pinkerton’s in its counterclaim. Izzard Estates, supra, dealt with a non-immune defendant  
attempting to recover contribution from a defendant immune from suit respecting damages awarded for which  
the immune defendant was not liable. In particular, the Court did not consider the issue of joint and several  
liability making whole the damages awarded to the plaintiff, which remains between all at-fault defendants. The  
substantive claim here has been removed by legislation. Royal Oak, by virture of Izzard Estate,, remains immune  
from suit. Although the declaration by Pinkerton’s seeking “severance” liability in lieu of joint and several liability  
was advanced on behalf of all co-Defendants, one of them, namely, GNWT, responded thusly:  
On the issue of the severance of any liability that the Court might have otherwise found against Royal Oak with  
respect to its own employees were it not for the suit bar provisions in the Workers’ Compensation Act, the GNWT  
Defendants concur with the submissions of Messrs. Hope, Nugent and Polsky.  
Royal Oak’s response was this:  
Firstly, with respect to the issues raised by Pinkerton’s in its Counterclaim, we do support the position taken by  
Pinkerton’s with respect to converting “joint and several” liability to “several” liability. However, other than the  
authorities cited by Pinkerton’s counsel in their brief, we are not aware of authorities to the effect that a statutory  
bar, such as that found in the Workers’ Compensation Act, has the effect of converting the liability of defendants  
from “joint and several” to “several”.  
With respect to the issue of whether a non-immune defendant can claim contribution or indemnity from an  
immune defendant, we submit that the Izzard Estate case is the applicable and authoritative decision in the  
Northwest Territories. Its effect, we submit, is that a defendant cannot properly claim contribution or indemnity  
against a defendant which is immune (in this case, Royal Oak), from a plaintiff’s claim pursuant to the statutory  
bar found in the Workers’ Compensation Act.  
It is noteworthy that Izzard Estate, supra, references County of Parkland No. 31 v. Stetar (1974), 1974 198  
(SCC), [1975] 2 S.C.R. 884. That decision upheld joint and several liability amongst at-fault parties,  
notwithstanding an at-fault defendant could not obtain contribution from another at-fault defendant.  
Pinkerton’s urged Brink’s Express Co. of Canada Ltd. v. Plaisance (1975), 1975 198 (SCC), [1977] 1 S.C.R.  
640, on the Court. There, Plaisance, a City of Montreal fireman, was injured in a collision between a van in which  
he was a passenger and a Brink’s armoured truck. Plaisance secured compensation under the Workmen’s  
Compensation Act, R.S.Q. 1964, c.159, ss. 7 and 8, which barred any claim against the City of Montreal or the  
driver of the City’s vehicle. The trial Court held the appellant Brink’s responsible to pay the total damages even  
though the appellant’s and the City’s drivers were equally liable, which was upheld by the majority of the Quebec  
Court of Appeal.  
Only one question was raised in the Court of Appeal: considering the equal division of fault, should appellant be  
ordered to pay respondent only half the additional damages of $25,200?¼  
The headnote reads:  
Initially, appellant had asked this Court only to reduce the damages payable to Plaisance. However, since this  
Court ordered the City of Montreal to be a party to the action, it must now rule on the following two questions: (1)  
can appellant, whose driver was only half responsible for the accident, be required to pay respondents an amount  
larger than half the common law damages? Â¼  
Held: The main conclusions of the appeal should be dismissed but the additional conclusions allowed.  
The Supreme Court of Canada, per de Grandpré J. said this, at 644:  
To resolve the first question, it must be determined whether the rules of joint and several liability apply so as to in  
some way make appellant liable to pay more than half the common law damages. I should say at once that in my  
opinion there is no joint and several liability between Brinks and the City as regards respondent Plaisance’s  
damages. I feel that in an accident such as the one before the Court, caused both by the fault of a third party and  
of a fellow employee of the victim, no joint and several liability can arise. Under the terms of the relevant sections  
of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, in particular ss. 3, 13 and 15, the employee injured in the course of his work  
has no claim at common law against his employer, and s. 9 of the Act extends this prohibition to his fellow  
employee; even when the employer and the fellow employee have been negligent, the injured party may not  
invoke the general rules of civil liability. His only claim at common law is against a third party whose fault may  
have caused the accident or contributed to it (ss. 7 and 8 of the Act). In such circumstances, art. 1103 of the Civil  
Code which prescribes the conditions for the existence of joint and several liability is not applicable, and  
consequently art. 1106 of the Civil Code may not be relied on either against a third party who is partly responsible  
for the incident. If there is no joint and several liability between the City on the one hand and appellant on the  
other, the latter definitely cannot be required to pay more than the part of the damages corresponding to the  
percentage of the fault of its driver.  
The relevant articles of the Civil Code read:  
1103. There is a joint and several obligation on the part of the codebtors when they are all obliged to the same  
thing, in such manner that each of them singly may be compelled to the performance of the whole obligation, and  
that the performance by one discharges the others toward the creditor.  
1106. The obligation arising from the common offence or quasi-offence of two or more persons is joint and  
several.  
Brinks, supra, does not assist Pinkerton’s. Firstly, there are sufficient differences between the Quebec Civil Code  
and the Workers’ Compensation Act, supra, and the NWT legislation, namely, the Contributory Negligence Act  
and the Workers’ Compensation Act. Secondly, factually Brink’s is distinguishable. Thirdly, the articles that  
preceded and followed articles 1103 and 1106, if applied, would distort the Northwest Territories legislative intent  
evinced in the Workers’ Compensation Act and the Contributory Negligence Act.  
Pinkerton’s sought comfort in two further cases. The first of those cases was Buchanan v. United Geophysical Co.  
of America (1982), 36 A.R. 45 (N.W.T.S.C.). Pinkerton’s argued that, although Brink’s, supra, was not applied in  
Buchanan, it was not necessary on the facts to do so. Clearly, however, Tallis J. In Buchanan refers to Brink’s, and  
the principle therein, notwithstanding that Brink’s was founded on Quebec law.  
The second case was that of Mitrunen v. Anthes Equipment Ltd. (1985), 1985 566 (BC CA), 17 D.L.R. (4th)  
567 (B.C.C.A.). Mitrunen is not directly applicable because of the differences between legislation in British  
Columbia and the NWT. In Mitrunen, Gould J. examined Brink’s, supra, and the applicable provisions of the  
Quebec Civil Code, and Pinkerton’s suggested that Gould J. indicated that the principles relating to joint and  
several liability in Quebec and British Columbia are “sufficiently similar” so that the Brink’s principle applies to a  
common law jurisdiction like British Columbia or, it was argued, the NWT.  
I am not comfortable that Gould J. was as clear as Pinkerton’s argued; I note, for example, that Gould J. appeared  
not to have had the advantage of Quebec’s Workmen’s Compensation Act referred to in Brink’s, supra.  
Secondly, in Mitrunen, Gould J. relied on s.10(7) of the British Columbia Workers Compensation Act, R.S.B.C.  
1979, c.437, for which there is no counterpart in the NWT.  
Counsel for Bettger urged the Court to find support for Pinkerton’s in Hunter J.’s observations in MacLeod v.  
Canada Post Corp. (2003), 230 Sask R. 79, 2003 SKQB 86. Her observations, however, about joint and several  
liability are obiter dicta and form no part of her findings. Hunter J. held that the plaintiff had failed to prove any  
case against the Defendants. She further relied on the Saskatchewan Workers’ Compensation Act 1979, S.S. 1979,  
c. W-17.1, for which there is no counterpart in the NWT.  
In dismissing the counterclaim, I note that Pinkerton’s acknowledged that the NWT is devoid of statutory  
provisions converting joint and several liability to several liability.  
Finally as both Royal Oak and Pinkerton’s sought and the Court granted an adjournment of the Third Party  
Notice of Pinkerton’s against Royal Oak, it may be that, if successful, Pinkerton’s has contractually protected itself  
from the very concerns it seeks a remedy for in its counterclaim. This, I believe, answers Pinkerton’s argument  
that it would be unjust and inequitable to allow the Plaintiffs to recover from the former more than that for which  
it was actually found to be at fault.  
I have dealt with novus actus interveniens and adverse inference elsewhere in this judgment and will not repeat  
my comments here.  
GNWT, Whitford, Turner and Gould  
In dealing with the allegations of negligence advanced by the Plaintiffs against the GNWT Defendants, I will deal  
with all of the particulars under a single umbrella of failing to enforce mine safety legislation.  
a) Duty of Care  
The Plaintiffs submitted that a private law duty of care is owed by the GNWT, Whitford, Turner and Gould arising  
out of the Mining Safety Act and the common law. The Defendants argued that the relationship between the  
GNWT Defendants and the deceased did not satisfy the proximity requirement outlined in the Anns test to find  
that a duty of care existed. The GNWT Defendants conceded that, for a relationship of proximity to exist between  
a public authority and another, it must be rooted in the statute. I highlight that proximity embraces the “close  
and direct” relationship Lord Atkin described in Donoghue, supra at 581. Furthermore, I recite the learned  
comments of the Supreme Court of Canada in Cooper, supra at para. 34:  
Defining the relationship may involve looking at expectations, representations, reliance, and the property or other  
interests involved. Essentially, these are factors that allow us to evaluate the closeness of the relationship  
between the plaintiff and the defendant and to determine whether it is just and fair having regard to that  
relationship to impose a duty of care in law upon the defendant.  
Counsel for the GNWT Defendants argued that there is nothing in common on the facts in Just v. British  
Columbia, 1989 16 (SCC), [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1228, and the instant case. On the facts, that is correct; yet in  
law, there is. See also Brown v. British Columbia (Minister of Transportation and Highways), 1994 121  
(SCC), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 420, and Swinamer v. Nova Scotia (Attorney General), 1994 122 (SCC), [1994] 1  
S.C.R. 445. In Just, supra, the obligation to maintain a road was for the benefit of users of that road. In this case,  
I ask the question: for whose benefit is the mine safety legislation, if not for those who work underground? The  
obvious answer is that it is for those very persons who were killed on September 18, 1992.  
Counsel for the GNWT Defendants cited Holtslag v. Alberta (2004), 24 C.C.L.T. (3d) 137, 2004 ABQB 268, where  
the legislation clearly dealt with the pine shakes that were at dispute in the lawsuit. Belzil J. held that it did not  
create a duty of care for the plaintiffs for the matter of which they complained. He asked whether the legislation  
was concerned with the failure of the shingles and the resulting economic loss that was advanced by the plaintiffs  
and noted that the object of the legislation did not go to such matters. It did not go to a warranty of the product  
or the longevity of materials or to the economic losses that were suffered; rather, it went to the minimal health  
and safety requirements for the occupants of buildings. Counsel for the GNWT Defendants argued that it is not  
enough that there be some relationship between the public authority and the Plaintiffs; it has to be a relationship  
that has as its content the matters that are at issue in the lawsuit, otherwise, of course, the relationship would be  
irrelevant. I agree.  
Counsel for the GNWT Defendants also cited Bell Canada v. Quebec (Commission de la santé et de la  
sécurité du travail), 1988 81 (SCC), [1988] 1 S.C.R. 749, to support their position as to the  
appropriate analysis in occupational health and safety legislation cases. There, the Supreme Court of Canada, per  
Beetz J., at 797-798:  
None of the counsel disputed, and I do not think anyone could dispute, that the aim sought by the legislator in the  
Act is, as indicated in s. 2, “the elimination, at the source, of dangers to the health, safety and physical well-being  
of workers”. In constitutional terms, however, the ultimate purpose of legislation, in this case the health and  
safety of the worker, does not suffice to justify the specific means used to attain that purpose. To take an obvious  
and perhaps simplistic example, a province could not constitutionally, for a health and safety purpose, impose an  
import tax on products or equipment it thought to be dangerous. Clearly, the constitutionality of the Act is not in  
question here. The only question is as to its application to federal undertakings. However, in entering the field of  
prevention of accidents in the workplace, as the legislator has the power to do, and in using, as probably could not  
be avoided in prevention matters, means such as the right or refusal, protective re-assignment, detailed  
regulations, inspection and remedial orders to “establishments” within the meaning of the Act - that is, “all the  
installations and equipment grouped on one site and organized under the authority of one person or of related  
persons in view of producing or distributing goods or services.¼” - the legislator could not fail to enter directly  
and massively into the field of working conditions and labour relations on the one hand and, on the other —  
though these are two elements of the same reality — into the field of the management and operation of  
undertakings. In so doing, the legislator precluded itself from aiming at and regulating federal undertakings by  
the Act.  
This decision centered on a constitutional issue. The reference to occupational health and safety was but in  
passing; however, in speaking of the aim of the legislation, the court noted “the elimination, at the source, of  
dangers to the health, safety and physical well-being of workers”. It is foolhardy on the part of the GNWT  
Defendants to believe that there was no obligation on them to engage in anything preventative; it however, is in  
keeping with the umbrella of uncertainty under which they operated and their inability to carry out their statutory  
obligations, whatever they perceived them to be. I refer again to Turner’s post-blast memo, where he recognized a  
preventative obligation, although he confused it with security, an area in which he had no jurisdiction.  
I observe with great respect that, while the GNWT Defendants seemed to argue that there was no preventative  
aspect to their obligations under the statutory regimes, at para. 39 of their final submissions they said:  
In summary, the risks of harm identified in provisions of both the Act and the Regulations support the conclusion  
that the proper object and scope of this legislative regime is the prevention of accidents and industrial disease in  
the workplace.  
Swanson v. Canada (Minister of Transport) (1991), 1991 8226 (FCA), [1992] 1 F.C. 408, is a decision on  
point where the Federal Court of Appeal found Transport Canada jointly liable with a pilot and Wapiti Aviation  
for an airplane crash resulting from breaches of safety regulations. The Court, per Linden J.A., stated at 427-428,  
433-434, 436:  
The standard of care required of these inspectors, like every other individual engaged in an activity, is that of a  
reasonable person in their position. What is required of them is that they perform their duties in a reasonably  
competent way, to behave as would reasonably competent inspectors in similar circumstances, no more and no  
less.... In the end, the Court must determine whether the employees of the defendant lived up to or departed from  
the standard of care demanded of them, in the same way as in other negligence cases....  
....  
The need for strict compliance with safety standards underscores the obvious importance of passenger safety.  
The defendant is responsible for the certification of each carrier and their inspection, airworthiness of the  
equipment and its maintenance. Not only is the granting of the licence the job of this department, but also the  
need to monitor the airlines to ensure that they remain qualified....  
....  
Transport Canada’s failure to take any meaningful steps to correct the explosive situation which it knew existed at  
Wapiti amounted to a breach of the duty of care it owed the passengers. Transport Canada officials negligently  
performed the job they were hired to do; they did not achieve the reasonable standard of safety inspection and  
enforcement which the law requires of professional persons similarly situated.... It is incomprehensible that a  
professional inspector of reasonable competence and skill would choose not to intervene in a situation which one  
of his own senior staff predicted was virtually certain to produce a fatal accident....  
....  
In this case, it is clear that Vogel [the pilot] was a cause of the crash. It is equally obvious that Wapiti contributed  
to the accident by its preference for profit over safety and by its failure to operate its airline in a careful fashion....  
It is clear ¼ that Transport Canada’s negligence was a cause of the crash.  
The objective of the relevant statutes in Just, supra, and Swanson, supra, is the same as here, namely the  
promotion of safety through standards and practices intended to reduce the risk of accidents.  
It is trite law that failure to employ legislation is evidence of negligence. See Canada v. Saskatchewan Wheat  
Pool, 1983 21 (SCC), [1983] 1 S.C.R. 205; and Galaske, supra. See also Swanson, supra. It goes without  
saying that the relevant legislation, infra, that identifies a breach of statutory duty by the GNWT also  
demonstrates a breach of statutory duty by Royal Oak, just as the breach of s.50 of the Canada Labour Code, by  
Royal Oak and CASAW Local 4 carry like earmarks of negligence.  
Health and safety legislation is a unique system of responsibility. It is properly set forth in the Plaintiffs’ final  
submissions, beginning at para. 74:  
Under Occupational Health and Safety legislation, two “systems” are supposed to ensure workplace safety. First,  
employers and their management are supposed to develop and involve all their personnel in a system that  
maintains a safe workplace as an integral part of daily work (the “Internal Responsibility System”). Second, the  
government is required to ensure that workers are adequately protected (the “External Responsibility System”).  
Thus Occupational Health and Safety legislation imposes duties on:  
C Royal Oak and its management, with respect to the “Internal System”, and  
C The Government of the Northwest Territories and its inspectors, with respect to the “External System”.  
As part of the “Internal System”, the Safety Act, R.S.N.W.T., 1988 provides:  
4. Every Employer shall  
(a) maintain his or her establishment in such a manner that the health and safety of persons in the establishment  
are not likely to be endangered;  
(b) take all reasonable precautions and adopt and carry out all reasonable techniques and procedures to ensure  
the health and safety of every person in his or her establishment. . .  
The Mining Safety Act (since repealed and updated) had more detailed requirements with respect to the “internal  
Responsibility System”. Under that Act, the keystone of the “Internal Responsibility System” was the Safety  
Committee contemplated by section 37 of the Act. Under section 38, the Safety Committee was to conduct  
monthly inspections, and make additional inspections of “any conditions that could result in serious injury or  
loss of life”. The Act imposed duties on management (sections 2,3), including its “officers, directors or agents”  
(section 46), to ensure that the Internal System was working properly. But there was no record that the Safety  
Committee at the Giant Mine met during the strike.  
The Mining Safety Act and its Regulations also contained many specific safety requirements, and imposed a duty  
on Royal Oak and its management to make sure they were observed:  
2(1) The manager¼ shall take all reasonable measures to enforce this Act and the rules and regulations and to  
ensure their observance by all persons working in or about the mine or those persons under his or her charge, as  
the case may be.  
3(3) The owner shall ensure that the manager is provided with the necessary means to conduct the operation of  
the mine in full compliance with this Act and the rules and regulations.  
Regulations under the Mining Safety Act that Royal Oak breached or allowed to be breached included the  
following:  
4. No person shall engage in any ¼fighting¼or similar conduct at a mine that may constitute a hazard to  
himself or herself or to any other person.  
15(1) No person shall enter any building, place or works except for the purposes of his or her employment or  
except when authorized to do so by the manager or a person authorized by the manager.  
125(10) Every explosives magazine must be kept securely locked at all times when the attendant is not present¼  
136(1) A manager shall designate one or more persons whose duty it shall be to make a thorough weekly  
inspection of all explosives magazines¼  
(2) A person designated under subsection (1) shall make a report, in writing, to the manager stating that the  
examination has been made and certifying the conditions found.  
(3) A manager shall take all immediate steps to correct any unsuitable conditions found at a mine¼  
138. No person shall take away from any mine any explosive, fuse, detonator, blasting cap or explosive device of  
any kind without the written permission of the manager¼  
183. No person, other than a worker on shift, an inspector, or a person authorized by the manager, shall enter a  
mine.  
184. No person shall enter or leave any part of a mine except by a means authorized by the manager.  
186 (1) A manager shall designate a competent person whose duty it shall be to inspect escape exits at least once a  
month.  
(2) The person performing the inspection shall make a record, in writing, of the inspections and the  
conditions found to the manager and the manager shall maintain such records.  
234 (1) The top of every shaft must be securely fenced or protected by a gate or guard-rail¼  
With respect to the External Responsibility System, the Mining Safety Act, supra provided:  
42(1) An inspector shall  
(a) make the examinations and inquiries that the inspector considers necessary to ascertain whether this Act and  
the rules and regulations are being complied with;  
(b) order the immediate cessation of work in and removal of persons from a mine or portion of a mine that the  
inspector considers unsafe or require the precautions that the inspector considers necessary to be taken before  
persons are allowed to return to or continue working in a mine;  
(c) Exercise such other powers as the inspector may consider necessary for ensuring the health and safety of  
persons employed in or about a mine¼  
43(1) An inspector shall give notice in writing to the manager of the particulars of any matter, thing or practice in,  
about or concerning the mine or mining that, in the opinion of the inspector, is dangerous, defective or contrary  
to this Act or the rules and regulations, and require the matter thing or practice to be remedied within the time  
stated in the notice.  
The GNWT and its inspectors had a free rein at all times to be in the mine. Neither the union nor Royal Oak could  
impede the execution of their statutory mandate. It was their duty to ensure compliance by Royal Oak, and  
indirectly Pinkerton’s, with relevant statutes and regulations so that a safe workplace was maintained. They were  
required to be more vigilant during this strike, knowing day-by-day of the antics of all the parties involved. They  
failed, and their negligence is by omission.  
Further, I note that the Mining Safety Act, supra, as it was in 1992, and the provisions that were particularly  
relevant under s.42 were copied and attached to Gould’s letter, Exhibit 762. The purport of those provisions  
obliged the inspectors to act. It was not discretionary. If they considered that there was an unsafe condition, the  
Mining Safety Act mandated them to act.  
Counsel for the GNWT Defendants submitted that there were no authorities finding liability in circumstances  
such as these, suggesting I assume that Courts must blindly follow a path only where there is direct precedent;  
otherwise, a claim must not succeed. Counsel for these Defendants, at para. 12 of their final submissions, said  
this:  
There are two significant aspects which make the case at hand a case of first instance. The first is that the  
legislation in question, whether it is considered at the specific level of mine safety legislation or more broadly as  
occupational health and safety legislation, has never been found by any Canadian Court to give rise to such a duty.  
The second is that the private law duty which must be found in order to justify any imposition of liability in this  
case is one to protect against the intentional, and independent, criminal act of a third party - a form of duty that  
has never been found to exist for public authorities other than those, such as police members, whose business is  
clearly and directly related to such conduct.  
If there is a right, a legitimate remedy that flows from that right must not be denied simply because a plethora of  
supportive authorities or a single supportive authority cannot be found. There is a connection between the  
purpose, the context of the Mining Safety Act and the matters that are in issue in this action; thus, I find that  
there is sufficient proximity of the GNWT and its officers named as Defendants.  
Counsel for the GNWT Defendants then advanced an argument that the foreseeability requirement at the first  
stage of the Anns test was not fulfilled. It is argued that the Plaintiffs’ onus here is to “establish that the Mining  
Safety Act, supra has, as its object or goal, the prevention of the kind of activity which resulted in the loss which,  
again, we know was an intentional criminal act”. This, of course, raises the issue of causation as well. I reiterate  
once again that, with the imputed knowledge of these Defendants of the activities by the strikers, the killing by an  
unlawful act is but an elevation or extension of the threats to kill, the physical assaults occasioned on replacement  
workers, on Tolmie and Pinkerton’s security and the explosions carried on, particularly of the vent shaft and  
satellite dish, any of which could have caused deaths.  
In other words, the killing was the very kind of thing that was likely to happen as I have illustrated herein. It is no  
defence that the accident was caused in a way that could not have been foreseen if the loss was of the same  
general class or character as the loss foreseeable. Further, Turner’s statement of September 18,1992, expressed  
his feelings that supported that, if some one or more of the Defendants had acted differently, Warren might not  
have committed murder. Counsel for the GNWT Defendants suggested that we do not know what Warren’s  
motivation was. We do know — it was as he expressed it — to do something significant to shut the mine.  
This secures the foreseeability aspect the Plaintiffs must establish; more importantly, the Mining Safety Act was  
to ensure safety for those very kind of workers the deceased miners were and from whoever the tortfeasors were.  
This legislation was their physical safety net. Thus, the aim of the legislation was clear as I have illustrated herein.  
Moving to the second stage of the Anns test I turn to Cooper v. Hobart, supra; the GNWT Defendants argued that  
there are significant policy considerations, “not concerned with the relationship between the parties, but with the  
effect of recognizing a duty of care of other legal obligations, the legal system and society more generally”, that  
militates against the recognition of the duty of care as alleged by the Plaintiffs.  
They cited reasons of Marceau J. in Alberta (Minister of Public Works, Supply and Services) v. Nilsson (1999),  
246 A.R. 201 at para. 108, 1999 ABQB 440 to illustrate the nature of the problem:  
[T]he appropriate test for abuse of public office in Canada can be stated as follows:  
Has there been deliberate misconduct on the part of a public official? Deliberate misconduct is established by  
proving:  
1. an intentional act, which is either:  
(i) an intentional use of statutory authority for an improper purpose; or  
(ii) actual knowledge that the act (or omission) is beyond statutory authority; or  
(iii) reckless indifference, or willful blindness to the lack of statutory authority for the act;  
2. intent to harm an individual or a class of individuals, which is satisfied by either:  
(i) an actual intention to harm; or  
(ii) actual knowledge that harm will result; or  
(iii) reckless indifference or willful blindness to the harm that can be foreseen to result.  
This decision was upheld on appeal at (2002), 320 A.R. 88, 2003 ABCA 283, leave to appeal refused [2003] 2  
S.C.R. xi, and has been cited with approval by the Manitoba Court of Appeal in Uni-Jet Industrial Pipe Ltd. v.  
Canada (Attorney General) (2001), 198 D.L.R. (4th) 577, 2001 MBCA 40, with both cases being cited by the  
Supreme Court of Canada in its discussion on the nature of the tort of misfeasance in public office in Odhavji  
Estate, supra, at para. 25.  
See also LaPointe v. Canada (Minister of Fisheries and Oceans) (1992), 51 F.T.R. 161 (F.C.T.D.) F.C.T.D.; White  
Hatter Limousine Service Ltd. v. Calgary (City) (1993), 1993 7182 (AB QB), 144 A.R. 379 (Q.B.).  
The GNWT Defendants’ argument proceeded thusly at para. 85 of their final submissions:  
In this case, and whether the orders contemplated are ones to impose specific steps and measures on Royal Oak  
that are not justified by any standard in the regulations to close the whole mine until it was rendered intruder-  
proof, there can be no doubt given the evidence before the Court that such orders would have been undertaken,  
whether by Lloyd Gould or Dave Turner, with either actual knowledge that such orders were beyond their  
authority or with recklessness or willful blindness as to their authority. It is also plainly evident that such orders  
would impose significant, and perhaps crippling, costs on Royal Oak, which would satisfy the second element of  
actual knowledge, reckless indifference or willful blindness concerning the resulting harm.  
In making this policy argument, the Defendants were merely extending their previous argument that there was no  
authority under the Mining Safety Act to take action. As I find that, indeed the GNWT and its officers had  
legislative authority to take positive action, I need go no further than rejecting this argument on that basis.  
To conclude, I find that the GNWT, Whitford, Turner and Gould each owed a duty of care to the deceased miners.  
b) Standard of Care  
The claim against the GNWT Defendants involves negligence in the private law duty of care forum with a  
standard of care of reasonableness as in Just, supra.  
These Defendants, like Pinkerton’s whose negligence followed that of Royal Oak or was concurrent with that of  
Royal Oak, had time to react and assess the precarious situation they encountered. Though well-intentioned, they  
either stumbled along in an atmosphere of uncertainty about what to do, were wilfully blind, or believed they  
could pass their obligations on to Royal Oak, Pinkerton’s, the RCMP or the union.  
It was clear that Patterson and Ballantyne had concerns in advance of the strike. Their focus, due to enormous  
pressure from virtually every quarter, was to resolve the dispute through what they perceived to be the only  
sensible route, namely, to convince the Federal Government to enact anti-replacement worker legislation. They  
endeavoured also to convince Slezak and CASAW Local 4 to abandon pre-conditions and continue bargaining. By  
mid-June 1992, it was clear they faced failure on both fronts, and the then Federal Minister was accusatory to  
them by suggesting that mediator Bill Lewis’s “effectiveness had been hampered by representations from those  
not directly involved in the dispute ¼ these representations have directed the attention of the parties away from  
the bargaining table in anticipation that some other process would resolve their dispute.”  
Subsequently Patterson, insulted by the Federal Minster’s response, asked as Minister of Justice and Safety and  
Public Services, that the RCMP special task force be withdrawn. Not only was that request out of sync with the  
illegal activity momentum fomenting at the mine, it set back bargaining until after the blast and further frustrated  
the union’s hopes.  
I reiterate that, meanwhile, Gould, acting chief inspector, who in May 1992, out of concern for the safety of miners  
underground had been unsuccessful in getting any sought-after support for his proposal to shut down the mine  
from the Deputy Minister and Minister of Safety and Public Services after citing to them 13 safety violations from  
May 23 to May 27, informed Patterson that “the mine is not secure and that the occupational health and safety of  
employees is endangered”. The first hurdle Gould faced was the refusal of the then Minister to provide any  
direction since orders of the nature Gould sought, if appealed, were appealable to the Minister, and that, said the  
Minister, would put him in a conflict of interest situation. For some inexplicable reason, the Deputy Minister,  
who lacked any reasonable excuse for choosing not to aid Gould, remained mute, passing Gould over to  
departmental counsel, on whose advise it was that such order would be promptly and successfully appealed.  
Turner fancied any request to his department to aid safety in the mine as one only of security, which he  
determined was not his responsibility. Secondly, he firmly believed that he could not be perceived as being  
neutral if he took any steps to rein in any of the parties, even if it was to better the safety of the miners whose  
personal well-being was, to his knowledge, in jeopardy. His “not in my back yard” attitude was so robust that he  
ignored the jurisdiction his department enjoyed to move under his preventative statutory options which might  
well have prevented fatalities at the mine. Part of those options was the Mining Safety Act’s provision to make  
certain that Royal Oak prohibited anyone from being in the mine who was not authorized to be there. As well, he  
too suffered from an innate fear that any order that his department could issue would be promptly and  
successfully appealed.  
Finally in September, Turner found courage and issued an order to shut the mine down, the very day the nine  
miners died. At that juncture, he demanded to learn of all the incursions to date and for the first time had a  
sweep and a complete survey audit concluded for the express purpose of enabling the mine to re-open. This  
immediately followed Turner’s correspondence after the blast, where he wrote:  
It appears that there were numerous incidents of infiltration of which we were not informed. Had we known of  
these, we could have addressed the security issue at a much earlier date and possibly prevented loss of life.  
Turner’s Counsel argued that it was but rhetoric. I disagree. A guilty conscience overcame him as he faced the  
nine deaths, knowing his department dithered when it should have reacted. The inspectors were very much  
aware throughout of what was happening; to deny that flies in the face of their counsel’s argument that they were  
frequently at the mine, carrying out their mandated duties. Finally, I say this of Turner; even on September 18, he  
clung to the word “security” as he had done from the beginning of his tenure as chief inspector, so he could, if  
required, always say that security was not within his department’s jurisdiction. He experienced difficulty  
injecting the word “safety” into his vocabulary.  
In short, however, Ballantyne and the entire GNWT cabinet of the day were aware through their Interagency  
Strike Committee, as were the MSD bureaucrats, before and after the strike began, of the unauthorized  
incursions, threats, injuries and illegal activities.  
In the GNWT Defendants’ taking issue with the Plaintiffs, two questions must be asked:  
1. Were the relevant provisions and standards of the Act and Regulations breached by Royal Oak and are these  
Defendants liable for failing to respond?  
2. Is there a separate or higher standard of care by reason of the Internal Responsibility System approach to  
occupational health and safety, which would justify the imposition of orders on Royal Oak?  
I will answer the second question first, and the answer is in the negative.  
On the first question, the GNWT Defendants selected certain legislative provisions and endeavoured to  
demonstrate that compliance was contemplated under the Mining Safety Act by strangers, not Royal Oak,  
overlooking relevant provisions such as ss. 2(1) and 3(3) of the Mining Safety Act, supra. It was the responsibility  
of these Defendants to ensure compliance with these provisions. They did not. Further, the entire legislation had  
to receive consideration to give life to its intentions and purpose.  
Gould fully appreciated in June that closure was required. For reasons given earlier herein, it did not happen  
until the day the miners died, and in the interim the illegal activities escalated and exacerbated, which Gould  
knew and Turner was dismissive of and while those above them pursued means to bring about the union’s wish to  
secure anti-replacement worker legislation.  
Counsel argued that Gould and Turner could not be negligent, as they believed they did not have the jurisdiction  
to implement safety measures as the Plaintiffs suggested. That is of no consequence, and certainly is no answer.  
They had the tools, but they declined to use them.  
In the final submissions of the GNWT Defendants at para. 117 were the following incredulous statements:  
[A]s the evidence actually shows, the inspectors were concerned to avoid taking actions or issuing orders which  
were improper and which would be overturned - orders which would not only be ineffective but would actually  
diminish the credibility of the Division and thereby their ability to be effective in doing their jobs. As set out in  
Lloyd Gould’s notes for a letter in response to a suggestion received that summer that the Division should order  
the mine closed:  
The charges the lady makes are completely speculative and would never hold up in court if we were to attempt to  
close the mine over them. This would cost the G.N.W.T. money and credibility - a most irresponsible reaction  
would be to make an order we cannot have the courts enforce.  
This fortifies my view that the entire MSD was so incompetently operated, that negligence was rampant  
throughout its tenure during the strike. Thus, I find that the GNWT Defendants who were in positions of control  
breached the standard of care owed to the nine miners. Turner, as chief mine inspector, Gould, as acting chief  
mine inspector and Whitford, as Minister of Safety and Public Services, were in positions of seniority, and thus  
were responsible for the effective enforcement of the mine safety legislation. Their stature within the GNWT  
MSD was akin to that of officers of a corporation and must be treated as such. The reasoning and analysis  
respecting Witte and Sheridan has, mutatis mutandis, equal application here. I note as well that no Crown  
immunity issue was raised respecting the GNWT and/or Whitford.  
In the case of Gould, however, he took reasonable steps to seek support and guidance from those who were senior  
to him. The evidence clearly shows that he was well-intentioned and that the negligent structure of the MSD  
failed him. Therefore, under the circumstances, there is no finding of negligence towards Gould as his actions  
met the standard of reasonableness.  
The argument is raised by counsel for the GNWT Defendants that “the mine inspectors cannot be found liable for  
having held a different understanding of their proper authority and jurisdiction in light of the evidence and  
circumstances before the Court.” Furthermore, they asserted that the MSD was “concerned to avoid taking  
actions or issuing orders which were improper and which would be overturned - orders which would not only be  
ineffective but would actually diminish the credibility of the Division and thereby their ability to be effective in  
doing their jobs.” For the reasons provided, supra, this rationale was thrust upon Gould, the front line inspector  
at Giant during the strike. However, if it is not the responsibility of the chief mine inspector, and ultimately the  
Minister responsible for mine safety, to understand their proper authority and jurisdiction, then who is  
accountable? To state that they were under a mistaken belief as to their legal authority is no defence. I find it  
quite incredible th at persons in the important positions held by these parties gave little confidence that they  
perceived their obligations as set forth statutorily; they were either confused as the Plaintiffs asserted, were  
frightened of legal attack by Royal Oak, passed the buck to another agency or were wilfully blind, for the statutory  
obligations were clear.  
Therefore, I find that the GNWT, Whitford and Turner breached the standard of care.  
c) Causation  
The GNWT Defendants said that, even if a duty of care in neg ligence is presumed, there is no causal link between  
such activities and the deaths.  
Pursuant to the detailed reasons set out above, failing to enforce the Mining Safety Act, supra, materially  
contributed to the deaths of the nine miners.  
The Court might have been enlightened considerably had the GNWT Defendants called witnesses against whom I  
have drawn adverse inferences, referenced herein. On this issue, these Defendants complained that, as they were  
not forewarned the Plaintiffs would seek such relief, they have precluded themselves from laying any evidentiary  
foundation of the necessary premises and from providing any evidence to rebut any insinuations that the said  
witnesses were available and under the exclusive control of those against whom the Plaintiffs asked inferences to  
be drawn. No authority is cited for such a proposition and I find no merit to it.  
d) Remoteness  
As stated in the section dealing with novus actus interveniens, the reckless act of Warren was foreseeable at the  
time that the negligent conduct and omissions occurred.  
e) Direct and Vicarious Liability  
Given that Whitford and Turner have been found to have been negligent, I must consider whether these “officers”  
ought to bear the responsibility personally, or whether this falls on the GNWT.  
Firstly, I note that no authorities have been put before me which unequivocally indicate that this is a case which  
should attract vicarious liability. In these circumstances there cannot be such a finding.  
In considering the closeness of the relationship between Whitford, Turner and the GNWT, there is no doubt that  
the proximity aspect is easily satisfied in both cases. Flowing from that, it must then be determined whether their  
tortious conduct is sufficiently connected to the conduct authorized by the employer. There is no doubt that the  
opportunity that the GNWT afforded both Whitford and Turner is one that inherently bears a tremendous  
amount of discretion; in that, they both failed to exercise their discretion in a reasonable manner; yet, I cannot  
ignore the hierarchy and structure of the GNWT at the relevant time. In July 1992, a time when the challenges  
facing the MSD by the strike at Giant were on the rise, there was a significant restructuring which introduced both  
Whitford and Turner to their respective positions. These are two individuals who are ultimately accountable for  
the failures of the MSD, and both are thrown into the midst of an already explosive situation. This fact is one that  
clearly increased the risks to which the GNWT was exposing itself. As a result of the transitions that were  
occurring within the hierarchy, the system in place was not one of competence and authority as it should have  
been at such a critical time.  
In conclusion, I highlight the fact that both of these officers were in positions of control and were directing minds  
of, and within the GNWT, but like Witte and Sheridan there is no evidence to suggest that Turner and Whitford’s  
acts exhibited tortious conduct; also, like Witte and Sheridan’s circumstances their conduct did not exhibit a  
separate identity or interest from that of GNWT such as to make the acts or conduct complained of those of  
Turner and Whitford. Not having stepped outside of their legislated governance, they will not bear any personal  
liability; however, their actions are relevant to the established negligence of GNWT and are referenced herein as  
such.  
CAW National and Hargrove  
I begin my discussion of CAW National with the hard-fought issue of whether the parent and local union are  
separate legal entities.  
a) Unions as Separate Entities  
Notwithstanding the aberrant manner of describing the various unions in the styles of cause when the Statements  
of Claim were issued and, in the case of this action, then amended on June 23, 1995, and the prior change of name  
of National Automobile Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers Union of Canada to National  
Automobile, Aerospace, Transportation and General Workers Union of Canada, referenced throughout the trial as  
CAW Canada or CAW National, the last mentioned was the sole entity on whose behalf a defence was launched.  
It was common knowledge that, at the beginning of the strike, there was but one union at Giant, a parent union,  
namely, Canadian Association of Smelter and Allied Workers, or CASAW National, and CASAW National’s  
chartered local union, CASAW Local 4, that held the bargaining rights for the hourly workers at Royal Oak’s Giant  
Mine.  
I reiterate that, in December 1991, at Kitimat, British Columbia, the initial glimmer of merger between CAW  
National and CASAW National was given birth. Shortly after the strike at Giant began, in May 1992, CAW  
National became keenly interested in the same and assumed responsibility for the only two relevant issues of  
CASAW Local 4, namely, strike co-ordination and labour negotiation; David, on behalf of CAW National assumed  
responsibility for those issues in July 1992, with Hargrove’s blessing. While Hargrove would have the Court  
believe CAW National’s interest was only an interest as a fellow labour union member, it was readily apparent  
that the interest was seen as an opportunity to feed CAW National’s frenzied appetite for growth. There was a  
bonus here in that CASAW Local 4, financially vulnerable, could and did become a tool in CAW National’s arsenal  
for greater benefits in securing anti-replacement worker legislation in other parts of Canada, in particular Quebec  
and Ontario, where the most significant number of members functioned. CASAW National was beneficially  
absorbed by CAW National during the strike, solidified in great part with David’s debut.  
Articles 1 and 2 of the Merger Agreement effective July 1994, are of materiality:  
Article 1 - Assets and Other Rights Remain with the Locals  
i) the assets, deeds, records and financial accounts, including the “strike fund” of any and all established  
C.A.S.A.W. locals at the effective date of merger, shall remain the exclusive property of the local(s) as local(s) of  
CAW respectively. Any and all bargaining rights of the C.A.S.A.W. shall, as a result of this merger and on the  
effective date of the merger, be automatically transferred to the CAW together with all rights, privileges and duties  
of C.A.S.A.W. under any applicable statute of collective agreement.  
ii) In addition to the merged CASAW local(s) rights to assets, deeds, financial accounts, obligations and all  
records, the merged CASAW locals will retain any and all other rights herein attained on behalf of the merged  
CASAW local(s) agreement, into any amalgamation, annexation or to any freely chosen successor to the merged  
CASAW local(s).  
Article 2 - Union Charters  
Upon ratification of the merger, local union charters will be issued by the C.A.W. to the local(s) of C.A.S.A.W. and  
each of the CAW locals so created (the merged locals) shall, subject to the terms of this agreement, become  
merged with and the successors to C.A.S.A.W. Local Unions respectively, and each merged local, shall acquire all  
of the rights, privileges and duties (including bargaining rights) of the C.A.S.A.W. local to which it has succeeded.  
I adopt the following comments from the Plaintiffs’ Final Submissions beginning at para. 306:  
The Merger Agreement states that “CASAW will merge with and become part of the CAW”.  
Subsequent provisions in the Merger Agreement set out what is to happen with respect to local operations:  
C The CAW will issue charters to create CAW locals, and the new locals will “become merged with and successors  
to CASAW Local Unions respectively, and each merged local shall acquire all of the rights, privileges and duties  
(including bargaining rights) of the CASAW local to which it has succeeded”. (Article 2)  
C The bylaws of the CASAW locals, within the succeeding three years, are to conform to the CAW Constitution.  
(Article 3)  
C All CASAW local union officers will remain in office after the merger. (Article 4(ii))  
C A merged local may secede from the CAW, but only on the conditions set out in the Agreement, and only after a  
year has passed from the date of the merger. (Article 16)  
Pursuant to the Merger Agreement, the members of CASAW automatically became members of the CAW, and the  
members of CASAW Local 4 automatically became members of CAW Local 2304.  
The Merger Agreement thus determined the fates of the local officers and affairs. That is completely inimical to  
the contention that the nationals and the locals were “separate legal entities”. (A contract between A and B  
cannot affect the rights or duties of two separate legal entities, C. and D.) And of course, no agreement between  
CASAW and CAW can diminish or affect the rights of the Plaintiffs.  
Finally, and pursuant to the merger agreement, the members of CASAW automatically became members of the  
CAW and the members of CASAW Local 4 automatically became the members of Local 2304. The only  
reasonable conclusion flowing from that is that there are two entities that have merged.  
With that backdrop, I turn now to the entity issue raised by CAW National. It is contained in para. 18 of its  
Statement of Defence in the O’Neil action and para. 15 of the Statement of Defence in this action. They  
respectively are as follows:  
18. In reply to the Statement of Claim as a whole, and paragraphs 27, 28, 29, 30, 31 and 32 in particular, this  
Defendant states that C.A.W. - Canada, CAW Local 2304, C.A.S.A.W. and C.A.S.A.W. Local 4, are each separate,  
distinct and autonomous legal entities, and that while C.A.S.A.W. Local 4 was the certified bargaining agent for  
the unionized employees of Royal Oak at the Giant Mine, this Defendant held no bargaining rights in respect of  
said employees.  
15. In reply to all references to “the Union” in the Amended Statement of Claim as a whole, and paragraphs 4 and  
16 in particular, this Defendant states that C.A.W.-Canada, C.A.S.A.W. and C.A.S.A.W., Local 4, are each separate,  
distinct and autonomous legal entities, and that while C.A.S.A.W., Local 4 was the certified bargaining agent for  
the unionized employees of Royal Oak at the Giant Mine, this Defendant held no bargaining rights in respect of  
said employees. The Plaintiff’s assertion that there is an entity known as “the Union” and all reference thereto  
throughout the Amended Statement of Claim are specifically denied.  
CAW National’s alternate response to its alleged liability is as referenced in its Pre-trial Brief:  
The Plaintiffs are attempting to hold CAW-National responsible for the intentional actions of the Defendant  
Warren. Warren was not an employee, officer or agent of CAW-National. Warren was not a member of CAW-  
National. CAW-National had no control or authority over Warren. CAW-National had no prior knowledge of the  
actions of Warren. Warren does not attribute his actions to anything that CAW-National did or said. CAW-  
National is a legal stranger to Warren, the nine miners and the Plaintiff O’Neil.  
CAW National argued strenuously that, short of Warren being found to be an agent of CAW National, the latter  
could not be liable to the Plaintiffs as alleged. Secondly, CAW National argued that, if CASAW National was not  
responsible for the liabilities of CASAW Local 4, CAW National could not have assumed any liability on the  
merger of CASAW National and CAW National.  
In Mackenrick v. National Union of Dock Labourers in Great Britain and Ireland (1910), 48 Scot. L.R. 17, the  
Court found that a union is liable for the actions of its local branches. The Court stated at 20, per Lord Johnston:  
My view, while I admit that the question is surrounded with difficulty, from the anomalous position which trades  
unions have been allowed to assume, is that the obligation of the Branch, competently undertaken, is the  
obligation of the Union, and enforceable to the extent of the funds not merely of the Branch but of the Union,  
which can only be made furthcoming by proceeding against the Union in which they are vested and its Executive.  
If the Union has power to call on other branches to supplement the funds of the Branch in question, it can be  
compelled to do so.  
at 21, per Lord Cullen:  
The constituent parts of the Union organisation are (1) the various local branches, embracing all the individual  
members, by whose contributions the funds of the Union are provided; and (2) a central “Executive”, which  
receives a small portion of the contributions to defray Executive expenses.  
and at 27, per Lord Salvesen:  
I entertain no doubt that the Union is answerable for all obligations properly undertaken by the branches in  
connection with the objects of the Union in so far as these are not contrary to its rules.  
And see United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America Local 1338 v. Bradley (1999), 1999  
35046 (PE SCTD), 174 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 104 (P.E.I.S.C.) and Re Civil Service Association of Alberta et al v. Farran  
et al (1977), 1976 1132 (AB CA), 68 DLR (3d) 338 (Alta. S.C.A.D.).  
I subscribe to the view of the Plaintiffs as to the nature of union infrastructure. It is that in 1992 there were two  
unions, CAW National and CASAW National, both with locals. These were the two that merged in 1994 and  
became one.  
The nature of membership in a union is one of contract, whereby the member has a contract with the union and  
agrees to be bound by the union constitution, which governs the internal affairs of the union. See Berry v. Pulley,  
[2002] 2 S.C.R. 493, 2002 SCC 40.  
By joining, which is done through a local, the new member becomes a member in both that local and the national.  
The internal constitution consists of, by way of infrastructure, several noticeable components, such as an  
integrated financial structure and an integrated disciplinary structure, to name but two.  
Most so-called parent and local unions, including CAW National and its locals and CASAW National and its locals  
are inextricably connected. For example, a disciplinary decision by a local of a member is appealable to a board  
composed of national officers. The infrastructure of both CAW National and its locals and CASAW National and  
its locals is typical of structures of unions generally. See Michael MacNeil, Michael Lynk & Peter Englemann,  
Trade Union Law in Canada, looseleaf (Aurora, Ont.: Canada Law Book, 2003) at c. 5. For example, the CASAW  
National president is an exofficio member of all committees within the union. A union is thus but a two-tiered  
structure of one entity.  
On this issue of separate identity, one must distinguish between authorities that pre-date and post-date Berry,  
supra, as well as between labour board cases and Court decisions; they each reference different considerations.  
As I said in Amalgamated Transit Union v. Independent Canadian Transit Union (1997), 1997 14764 (AB  
QB), 195 A.R. 161 at para. 107 (Q.B.):  
I note that in their argument the defendants cite a number of labour arbitration cases on topics such as union-  
busting and the right to strike. These are of little application since they tend to deal with union differences vis a  
vis the Canada Labour Code, with which we are not concerned here.  
See also International Union of Bricklayers and Allied Craftsmen Locals 6, 7, & 25 v. Brick and Allied Craft Union  
of Canada, [2000] O.L.R.B. Rep. September/October 891 (Ont. L.R.B.). The Ontario Labour Relations Board  
made similar comments in Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union, Canadian Service Sector Division of  
the United Steelworkers of America, Local 414 v. The Great Atlantic & Pacific Company of Canada, Limited,  
[1993] O.L.R.B. Rep. September 885.  
Courts have rejected the notion that parents and locals are distinct legal entities. In Bradley, supra, DesRoches J.  
of the Prince Edward Island Supreme Court Trial Division stated at para. 46:  
The Charter of Local 1338 is the legal instrument which gave “a body of qualified Workmen”, the right to form a  
local of the UBC, subject to the UBC’s Constitution which is an integral and inseparable part of Local 1338’s legal  
status. A local union enjoys no [independent] legal status; Local 1338 could have no existence other than as a  
local of the UBC (see, for example, McPherson v. Grand Council Provincial Workmen’s Association., [ 1914  
70 (SCC), [1914] 50 S.C.R., 157, at pp. 164-6 and Orchard v. Tunney 1957 57 (SCC), 1957, 8 D.L.R. (2d) 273  
(S.C.C.), at pp. 281-2).  
In Farran, supra, the Civil Service Association of Alberta and one of its local branches both applied for standing to  
bring proceedings for certiorari to challenge grievance proceedings. The majority of the Alberta Supreme Court,  
Appellate Division, granted standing to the Association, but not its local branch, stating at 343:  
As to the position of the Branch, s. 7 of the Civil Service Association of Alberta Act provides that the C.S.A. may  
make by-laws respecting the formation of branches and sub-branches. In my view there is nothing to indicate  
that the Branch is more than an organ of the C.S.A. which the latter has the power to establish through by-laws.  
However, these arguments beg the question in CAW National’s zeal to demonstrate that each union, be it national  
or local, is a separate legal entity. I find they are not.  
b) Hargrove  
Before considering the alleged negligence against CAW National, the allegations against Hargrove, named only in  
the O’Neil action, will be discussed. Essentially, it was alleged by O’Neil that Hargrove played a role in inciting  
the membership so as to create risk to those persons invited to be on Giant property, and failed to control the  
membership from creating a risk to those invited to be on Giant property.  
As was the case with Witte, Sheridan and others, to find a director or officer negligent, his or her conduct must be  
found tortious in itself, or to exhibit a separate identity or interest from that of the corporation so as to make the  
acts or conduct complained of his or her own. Similar to certain other Defendants named in their personal  
capacity, I do not find that Hargrove’s conduct exhibited a separate identity from that of CAW National, thus the  
analysis proceeds to determine whether his conduct in itself was tortious.  
i) Duty of Care  
To determine if Hargrove, as leader of CAW National, is personally liable to O’Neil, it must first be found that he  
owed a duty of care to all of those invited to be on Giant property, including O’Neil. As there has been no similar  
duty recognized in the jurisprudence, I will apply the modified Anns test to determine if the circumstances are  
appropriate for such recognition.  
Considering the foreseeability and proximity requirements at the first stage of the Anns test, I note that Hargrove  
assumed the role of president of CAW National, a swelling Canadian labour union, in June 1992. The evidence  
shows that Hargrove never attended at Giant prior to the fatal blast, although he did meet with persons related to  
the labour dispute, including Witte. The evidence also shows that Hargrove considered Royal Oak to have been in  
a comfortable position, uninterested in bargaining, and to have had an ulterior motive to destroy the union.  
Therefore, he was of the view, in the summer of 1992, that a lesson had to be taught to Royal Oak. Hence the  
demonstration of “solidarity” by CAW National, notably in the form of expertise and financial support, as he  
believed the labour movement should unite to prevent the use of replacement workers.  
I do note, however, that although Hargrove led CAW National in a demonstration of loyalty to the “cause”, he did  
so at significant distance. For example, he did authorize sending David to Yellowknife; however, David reported  
to Succamore. The evidence suggests that the details provided to Succamore were not always forwarded to  
Hargrove; rather, his information was limited to Succamore’s briefings and media reports. Specifically, Hargrove  
testified that he was unaware of the graffiti run and satellite dish explosion. I find that Hargrove purported to be  
involved at “arms length” at the relevant time, which is not surprising as he did not wish to be perceived as the  
sole driving source directing the hourly workers at Giant at that time; rather it was CASAW Local 4. For Hargrove  
to delegate responsibility to those beneath him in the hierarchy would be expected considering the supportive role  
that CAW National embarked on prior to the fatal blast. Consequently, I find that the requirements of proximity  
and foreseeability have not been established on the evidence; thus, Hargrove owed no duty.  
I do note, however, that Hargrove’s conduct as a directing mind of CAW National like that of Witte of Royal Oak is  
relevant to the allegations against CAW National and will form part of that discussion. His conduct must be  
referenced likewise.  
c) CAW National  
i) Duty of Care  
To determine whether or not a duty of care was owed by CAW National, I first consider whether such a duty has  
been recognized in relevant jurisprudence. I am unaware of any authority applicable to the facts of this case, thus  
an application of the modified Anns test is warranted.  
Before embarking on the issue of whether the harm was foreseeable, I must first address one matter. To find that  
CAW National owes an identical duty of care as would CASAW National (if it were not extinct), the Plaintiffs need  
only to show, as they have, that CAW National absorbed CASAW Local 4 and CASAW National, thereby becoming  
one. It was on June 20, 1994, that CAW National formally merged with CASAW National and became the legal  
owner of the latter, beneficial ownership having occurred as a result of CAW National’s involvement in the strike.  
Counsel for CAW National discussed at length the various permutations and combinations that could subsist  
between the parent and its local and argued that CAW National could not be responsible for liabilities of CASAW  
Local 4. I reiterate that, while no union constitution mirrors every other union constitution, to join a local of  
either CASAW National or CAW National is to join both the parent and the local. When CAW National assumed  
management of CASAW Local 4 during the strike, they secured de facto control of CASAW Local 4 as well. Given  
that, the analysis of whether a duty of care exists, shifts to consider the series of acts of CASAW National, CASAW  
Local 4 and CAW National.  
Counsel for CAW National argued that it was not reasonably foreseeable that its actions, “if carried out carelessly,  
would cause harm to the miners working at the mine”. They raise the following argument in support of this  
position:  
The cases that the plaintiffs rely upon in respect to duty involve allegations, I submit, of single acts of negligence  
by a defendant; for instance, the failure to install proper fire doors, starting the ignition of a snowmobile, failing  
to yield at a stop sign, failing to sand or clear a driveway.  
In each of those cases the Court, when inquiring whether a duty exists, would ask this question: When the  
defendant committed that alleged substandard act, did it owe a duty to the plaintiffs? Was it reasonably  
foreseeable that it failed to take care in carrying out that particular act, that the class to which the plaintiffs belong  
could be harmed? And as is obvious from the manner in which the test is framed, sir, the inquiry must be made  
in relation to the time that the alleged act or omission occurs. It is not reasonable to hold the defendant liable if  
the likelihood of harm is only apparent in retrospect, after the act is taken.  
Now in respect to the CAW National, sir, the plaintiffs do not point to a single act. They talk about a series of acts  
that began before the strike and continued until September 18th, and we submit, sir, that that’s not the proper  
way to assess duty. Because there is no special relationship, you need to look at each act and when it was  
undertaken and ask the question whether it was reasonably foreseeable that harm would occur to the plaintiffs’  
class if an act of that nature was carried out carelessly.  
I reject that argument. In my opinion, whether it was a single act or a series of progressive acts is of no  
consequence. Otherwise, when one applies a principled approach to a set of facts in a situation deserving of  
redress, a proper claim could be defeated, short of appropriating each act. When there is a series of acts,  
interconnected with the same motivation, as the series of progressive acts were in this instance, the acts can be  
properly assessed in tandem as connected, then cumulatively.  
Given that, the essence of the claim against CAW National is that it incited or failed to control the union  
membership, the effect of which placed the well-being of those invited to be at Giant, at risk. It is clear that the  
target of the union’s wrath was both Royal Oak and anyone assisting it. By assuming a war-like mentality against  
the company, the union cannot argue that harm to those who were employed by Royal Oak to maintain  
production was not foreseeable. Furthermore, the evidence is uncontroverted that there was an intense hatred by  
the union and its members specifically towards those who were line-crossers or replacement workers. In fact, this  
hatred fuelled the increasingly severe acts of violence and vandalism targeted towards those invited to be at Giant.  
This effectively demonstrates not only that harm was foreseeable, but also that the proximity requirement is easily  
met in this case. Furthermore, I find no policy considerations at either the first or second step of the Anns test to  
negate finding that a duty of care existed between CAW National and the deceased miners for the reasons detailed  
herein.  
I note at this juncture that not only was a duty of care owed by CAW National as a result of its merger with  
CASAW National (because CASAW National owed a duty of care), but the relationship between CAW National  
itself and the deceased miners was sufficient to give rise to such a duty at the relevant time. Sending David as a  
strike “expert” and providing funding are but two illustrations of CAW National’s conduct to connect it to the  
series of progressive acts which form the alleged negligence in this case. Thus, I need not apply the Anns test to  
those acts that were directly carried out by CAW National, as the result is identical to that outlined above.  
ii) Standard of Care  
Having found that a duty of care existed with CAW National, I move now to consider whether it acted reasonably  
in the circumstances, so as to fulfill its duty to the deceased miners. As stated in the section dealing with  
Hargrove, the particulars of negligence as alleged by the Plaintiffs in their Amended Statement of Claim can be  
summarized as follows:  
(a) inciting the membership so as to create risk to those persons invited to be upon the Giant Mine property; and  
(b) failing to control its membership thereby contributing to the risk to those invited to be upon the Giant Mine  
property.  
These two categories capture both the alleged conduct of CAW National directly, and that carried out by CASAW  
Local 4 and CASAW National, subsequently absorbed by CAW National. Throughout this analysis, I consider the  
conduct of both CASAW Local 4 and CAW National cumulatively as they are interrelated in many instances and as  
CAW National is the party ultimately responsible. References to the evidence in support of the findings below  
deal with the unions’ conduct relating to labour relations, internal management (i.e., condoning violence) and  
lobbying efforts for anti-replacement worker legislation.  
CASAW Local 4 was inexperienced in leading a strike and in labour relations. Schram, the president throughout  
the early stages of the dispute, was an abject failure as a leader and his conduct can only be described as a total  
betrayal of his fellow union members. He was an integral part of the bargaining committee process. On reaching  
a tentative agreement on April 18, 1992, he undertook to the committee to recommend acceptance of this  
agreement to the union. So confident were the other members of the committee, both union and company, that  
they did not press him to consider Smrke’s offer to accompany him and assist in presenting the agreement to the  
union. Little did they know that he would promptly do a total about face immediately as he faced his fellow  
unionists. There was no evidence that the full text of the agreement was ever presented to the membership. This  
betrayal was the beginning of the ugliness that was to follow.  
Throughout the bargaining, money was not an issue for the union, nor was safety, while job re-classification was.  
However, David, unaware of this, unemployed, in the midst of a mental breakdown, not preferred by CASAW  
National president Slezak as a result of an earlier failed attempt elsewhere where workers even lost their  
pensions, was parachuted in to lead the strike and to be chief negotiator. From the moment of David’s arrival,  
CASAW Local 4 and its members were completely enslaved. He was involved in vetting the strike bulletins  
published by the union, took over from Johnston as strike coordinator and became the union’s sole spokesman in  
negotiations; the latter was a condition of David’s being there. His position as he began his duties was a total  
resolve to concede nothing. Witte may have delineated the real issue when she said that “the central issue was  
control of the mine”. Witte’s conclusion was supported by comments made to her by Slezak that the union’s  
objective was “to take the company down”.  
The mediation on June 6 and 7 faced union pre-conditions, which were met with company pre-conditions. Later,  
at the mediation on July 22 and 23, progress was scuttled by David, who was an inflexible negotiator and “entirely  
focused on running the strike” instead of negotiating a settlement. David said that he told Royal Oak and the  
mediator that the union would make no concessions, knowing that it was “going to basically put a full stop to  
negotiations”.  
David was looked to by CASAW Local 4's executive for leadership. Seeton’s evidence of his relationship with  
David was as follows:  
Q And I understand that the national ultimately was agreeable to allowing Harold David to act as strike and  
negotiations coordinator, provided it was fully understood by everyone that Harold David would be fully  
subordinate to the local and the national, and that Harold David would take his instructions from the national  
and the local, correct?  
A I don’t know. I would hate to think that I instructed Harold David to do anything. It would be the other way  
around.  
Evidence that neither the union nor the company had the desire to negotiate during the strike crystallized after  
September 18 when the Canada Labour Relations Board found that the union bargained in bad faith. Later the  
Supreme Court of Canada made the same finding against Royal Oak. Both were guilty of the following  
misconduct: (a) receding horizons bargaining, and (b) improperly insisting on a condition to the point of impasse.  
Mid-strike, Seeton succeeded Schram as president. He was as ineffective as Schram; additionally he suffered  
from suicidal ideation resulting from mental and marital problems and extreme frustration from lack of union  
success on the picket line. Nevertheless, both Schram and Seeton not only encouraged violence to line crossers  
and their families, they promoted it through addresses to members, strike bulletins and any medium they could  
locate. Then they trumped it by causing strikers who committed criminal acts to have counsel and fines paid for  
by the union. Never once did the union or any member of its executive even consider discipline for the aberrant  
behaviour, even the criminal conduct, of its members. Furthermore, they had in their midst, one Shearing, who  
needed little encouragement and he too was on the union executive. He was typical of the model of union  
executive that Schram and Seeton promoted. Shearing and Bettger together and sometimes with others dragged  
the union into the fray of negligence and condoned the illegal acts with but one axiom; “don’t get caught”. In face  
of that approval, the provision of lawyers and funds to pay fines and no threat of union sanctions, the strikers  
believed that they could commit no wrong and carried out their in terrorem populi in relation to Royal Oak and  
the replacement workers.  
Hargrove, self-described as a person with a significant profile nationally and internationally, asked the Court to  
accept that, because of his exalted position, he, like Witte, was not fed details of the threats, vandalism and  
sabotage occurring during the strike and had no time for such minutiae. Perhaps that is so, but CAW National is  
deemed to have known that that, together with inadequate leadership and inflammatory statements, which  
Hargrove passes off as “strike talk” (in my opinion, wrongly), made CASAW Local 4, CASAW National and CAW  
National vicariously liable for the deviant acts of the strikers, including Warren. CAW National in the beginning  
did not enjoy a special relationship with the replacement workers, but it was a relationship on basic neighbour  
principles. Yet CASAW Local 4, CASAW National and CAW National executives displayed a total lack of human  
decency and respect towards the replacement workers. One could hardly imagine how persons in a civilized  
society could treat others, some of whom were friends, the way that some of the leaders and members  
dehumanized replacement workers. Though CASAW Local 4 would have been unable to continue the strike  
without the financial support and expertise of CAW National, CAW National never indicated that it would  
withdraw them if the violence did not stop.  
I note that CASAW Local 4 and the aberrant behaviour of its radical element combined with the recalcitrant  
attitude of Royal Oak provided the perfect setting for CAW National to subsume the membership, sacrifice them if  
necessary, but use them as a cudgel to secure anti-replacement worker legislation in Ontario and Quebec. This  
was most notably where CAW National’s power base and strength lay with multi-thousand memberships, where  
there could be real thrust with errant employers. It was never better exemplified than this address on the subject  
by David at a CAW Council meeting in August 1992, as follows:  
I wanted to address the council and I want to do it in such a way as to give you a preview what it’s going to look  
like if we don’t get this legislation....  
....The campaign against the Ontario government, the NDP government has been the most relentless campaign in  
history, in my recollection in Canada. If we could just get the government here to say, “I do not want a  
Yellowknife in my province and I am going to pass anti-scab legislation.” And if that was said exactly that way,  
then “Yellowknife” would be synonymous with that obscenity, that none of us want¼  
And if you can say in your campaigns, in your briefs and what you’re writing and all the things you’re saying, “I  
don’t want a Yellowknife in my province, pass anti-scab law” then you will have done the biggest service for those  
people up in Yellowknife and you will also have done a service for all working men and women in this country.  
That is when CAW National became committed to Warren and his fellow strikers and CASAW Local 4. The  
manner is which CAW National subsumed CASAW National can only be assumed to be akin to an airtight  
purchase of it. CAW National wanted the good because it served its ends; it had to take the bad and the ugly that  
followed with the good. CASAW National never did re-surface, except as a nugget to be encased fully by CAW  
National in 1994.  
It is to be remembered that David was retained and paid solely by CAW National, and as Hargrove said (at a later  
date) of David’s presence at Giant, he was there to “keep a good strike going”, and to “ram the God damned hell  
out of the scabs”.  
Part of the support of a finding of negligence against CAW National was the payment of lawyers accounts and  
fines when levied. By itself, this would not be an issue except for the assurance that accompanied it, that the  
strikers were encouraged to do what they wished to meet the objective — as Slezak told Witte “to bring the  
company down” — and those acts were, for the most part, criminal acts. This was one way CAW National  
condoned the illegal behaviour, and, from the moment CAW National assumed the mantle, CASAW National  
became redundant and CAW National was in full control. CAW National did nothing to stop the illegal activity;  
that, in turn, made CAW National liable for the conduct of CASAW Local 4 and its members.  
Counsel for CAW National raised the issue of its lobbying for anti-replacement worker legislation, and no one can  
take umbrage with this goal per se. The same can be said for the importance of the role played by unions in  
societal debate. In raising that issue, reference was made to a plethora of decisions, such as Lavigne v. Ontario  
Public Service Employees Union, 1991 68 (SCC), [1991] 2 S.C.R. 211, and U.F.C.W., Local 1518 v. KMart  
Canada Ltd., 1999 650 (SCC), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 1083. These and authorities referred to therein illustrate  
the importance of participation by unions in societal debate.  
CAW National must, as a responsible entity in the House of Labour, be deemed to appreciate its obligations to its  
members and to third parties; exertion of discipline or control over members is of utmost importance. See  
Canadian General Electric Co. Ltd. in re United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America, Local 507  
(1951), 2 L.A.C. 608; and Georgia Pacific Canada Inc. v. International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, Iron  
Shipbuilders, Blacksmiths, Forgers and Helpers, Local Lodge No. D513 (1999), 243 A.R. 219, 1999 ABQB 182.  
See also News Group Newspapers Ltd. v. Society of Graphical and Allied Trades’ 1982 (1986), (No. 2), [1987]  
I.C.R. 181, a decision of the English Queen’s Bench Division, where a union was found vicariously liable for its  
members’ torts. Stuart - Smith J. stated at 217 - 219:  
[The plaintiffs] alternative submission is that where a defendant [union] continues to organise events, which in  
the light of experience amount to a nuisance or other torts and in the knowledge or presumed knowledge that  
such nuisance or torts are being committed by those whom they organise, they may be taken to have authorised  
the commission of the nuisance or torts or to have continued the nuisance, particularly where the defendant can  
control the event and the conduct of those taking part, but fails to take any or adequate steps to do so; and that  
notwithstanding that the particular defendant does not encourage the tortious conduct and indeed condemns it.  
....  
As to control, it seems to me that the defendant unions can exercise substantial control over their members, and  
in the ultimate event if they cannot control them they may have to desist from organising the activity in  
question....  
....  
The unions have substantial powers of disciplining their members¼.  
There is no evidence that use of disciplinary powers has even been threatened against those who step out of line,  
let alone used.  
The issue then of whether CAW National breached the standard of care is clearly demonstrated positively through  
the activities of the union leaders and strikers and the participation of CAW National as alluded to herein.  
iii) Causation  
“Causation is an expression of the relationship that must be found to exist between the tortious act of the  
wrongdoer and the injury to the victim in order to justify compensation of the latter out of the pocket of the  
former”: Snell, supra, at 326. Counsel for CAW National submitted that CAW National did not cause Warren to  
do what he did, and cited Fleming, supra at 218-219:  
If such a causal relation does not exist, that puts an end to the plaintiff’s case: to impose liability for loss to which  
the defendant’s conduct has not in fact contributed would be incompatible with the principle of individual  
responsibility on which the law of torts has been traditionally based.  
¼.  
.... The formula [the “but for” test] postulates that the defendant’s fault is a cause of the plaintiff’s harm if such  
harm would not have occurred without (but for) it. [Emphasis in original. Footnote omitted.]  
I have no disagreement with Fleming’s proposition, nor do I disagree with the “but for “ test of Stewart, supra,  
and that of “material contribution” articulated in Athey, supra,.  
Counsel for CAW National argued that Warren had limited or no knowledge of the activities of the strikers or the  
role of CAW National; a consideration of all the facts indicates that both are incorrect. Warren was aware at all  
times of the mediations referenced herein. He read strike bulletins virtually daily, in which CAW National had  
involvement. Furthermore, how can CAW National make the second statement on the very heels of testimony by  
Warren of his discussions with and impression of David?  
In the beginning, there was no direct connection between the CAW National and Warren but CAW National saw  
opportunity as aforesaid and it seized on it, securing de facto control of CASAW Local 4. This occurred with  
significant funding to see CASAW Local 4 through the strike and by injecting CAW National’s personnel into the  
matrix, to assume leadership, to “keep a good strike going” and to assist in labour relations.  
It was also suggested that all that CAW National can be identified with is writing to the Minister and providing  
financial support to CASAW Local 4. However, this is not in accord with the facts. I reiterate, it is the cumulative  
effect and the progression of the acts of negligence of all the Defendants, including CAW National, as delineated  
herein, that materially contributed to Warren’s act.  
iv) Remoteness  
It would be the height of naivety not to have foreseen, as the strike unfolded, with the progression of  
inflammatory language, injury and death threats, infliction of personal injury, watching and besetting of homes of  
replacement workers, property damage and sabotage, and the pervasive view that someone was going to be killed,  
that a Warren act would happen. CAW National was current with this throughout the strike. David told the  
strikers that “the only way that anti-replacement worker legislation was achieved in Quebec was through death”,  
which was repeated to Defer. Tuma testified that in a meeting at the Yellowknife Inn in August 1992, David  
advocated “getting even” with replacement workers underground. This was the very kind of thing that was likely  
to happen.  
Counsel for CAW National referenced several authorities dealing with the issue of remoteness, both Canadian and  
American: Robertson v. A.(A.) (2000), 2 C.C.L.T. (3d) 120, 2000 BCSC 1189; Wenden v. Trikha (1991), 1991  
13111 (AB QB), 116 A.R. 81 (Q.B.), supp’d (1991), 118 A.R. 319 (Q.B.), aff’d (1993), 1993 ABCA 68 (),  
135 A.R. 382 (C.A.), leave to appeal refused [1993] 3 S.C.R. ix; Sanders v. Acclaim Entm’t, Inc., 188 F.Supp. 2d  
1264 (Colo. 2002); James v. Meow Media, Inc., 300 F.3d 683 (6th Cir. 2002); and Davidson v. Time Warner,  
1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21559 (S.D. Tex. 1997). These authorities are so clearly distinguishable on their facts.  
For a more detailed analysis of both causation and remoteness, see the section devoted to the defence of novus  
actus interveniens, supra.  
v) Vicarious Liability  
I am satisfied that the acts and omissions of the “principal organs” of the union (i.e., the union leadership,  
including the leadership of both CAW National, CASAW Local 4 and CASAW National) fell well below the  
standard of reasonableness in the circumstances, and thus caused or contributed to the deaths of the nine miners.  
Hence, I find that CAW National is directly liable for these acts and omissions. What remains to be considered is  
whether CAW National is vicariously liable for the acts and omissions of union members (i.e., Warren and  
Bettger), who I find to have been negligent, for reasons provided, infra.  
Pursuant to the authority provided by the Supreme Court of Canada in Bazley, supra, and recently recited in  
Bennett, supra, the first step in determining whether a defendant is vicariously liable is to see if existing case  
precedent exists.  
In Leroux v. Molgat (1985), 1985 229 (BC SC), 67 B.C.L.R. 29 (S.C.), McLachlin J., as she then was, found  
a union vicariously liable for the torts of an unknown agent. Similarly, in Matusiak v. British Columbia and  
Yukon Territory Building and Construction Trades Council, [1999] B.C.J. No. 2416, Cohen J. Of the British  
Columbia Supreme Court said at paras. 75, 95, 137:  
The Plaintiffs were threatened, intimidated and constantly harassed by the [defendant unions’] members while  
their representatives, who clearly had knowledge of their members’ activities, either participated in the activities,  
or took no active steps to stop their members’ conduct. In these circumstances I agree with plaintiffs’ counsel that  
it is not credible to suggest, as the defence does, that the defendants did not condone or authorize the conduct of  
their members toward the plaintiffs¼.  
....  
In my opinion, the evidence overwhelmingly establishes the defendants’ vicarious liability to the plaintiffs¼.  
....  
[In an earlier decision, McEachern C.J.] said, as follows:  
The law exists, I think, to prevent violence. That is its principal function, and the public and the Court deplore  
any form of violence. I wish I could find a magic solution to the tendency that seems to exist in labour disputes  
where they seem to progress sometimes gradually, but usually suddenly from a lawful expression of one’s views to  
ugly confrontations including violence such as occurred in this case, but there is no magic formula. I have to say,  
however, that the Court takes the strongest possible view of violence.¼  
Vicarious liability could and should be imposed where there is a “connection” between an enterprise and an  
intentional tort, such that the enterprise materially contributes to the risk of the tort, or the tort is a generally  
foreseeable consequence of the enterprise.  
Following from the discussion of policy considerations that ought to be assessed when considering vicarious  
liability found in Bazley, supra, I subscribe to the comments of the Plaintiffs in their final submissions, where they  
said:  
These policy considerations apply strongly to the union. Friction and confrontation were inherent in the strike  
(they furthered the union’s interest in stopping production). Intentional injury to replacement workers was  
“generally foreseeable” - it was in fact foreseen. The union is well-situated to spread the resulting losses (directly  
to its members, through union dues, and indirectly to the public, through increased prices). Further, the CAW,  
and unions generally, can prevent a recurrence of similar torts in the future (e.g., by supervising and disciplining  
their members).  
CAW National argued strenuously that the union-member relationship is not the type of relationship that should  
attract vicarious liability. This argument flies in the face of precedent. I reiterate the statement of the majority of  
the Supreme Court of Canada in K.L.B., supra, stated the test as follows at paras. 19, 21-22:  
To make out a successful claim for vicarious liability, plaintiffs must demonstrate at least two things. First, they  
must show that the relationship between the tortfeasor and the person against whom liability is sought is  
sufficiently close as to make a claim for vicarious liability appropriate.¼ Second, plaintiffs must demonstrate  
that the tort is sufficiently connected to the tortfeasor’s assigned tasks that the tort can be regarded as a  
materialization of the risks created by the enterprise....  
....  
¼.The inquiry is ... a functional one: “what must always occur is a search for the total relationship of the  
parties”¼. In Sagaz, the Court held that the “central question” in this functional inquiry “is whether the person  
who has been engaged to perform the services is performing them as a person in business on his own account”....  
This way of putting the question reflects the type of enterprise that Sagaz was concerned with — namely, a for-  
profit enterprise. In the case at bar, we are concerned with a non-profit enterprise.... In this context, the focus of  
the inquiry will be simply on whether the tortfeasor was acting “on his own account” or acting on behalf of the  
employer.  
Which factors are relevant in making this determination? As the Court held in Sagaz, “the level of control the  
employer has over the worker’s activities will always be a factor”.... Control is not, however, the sole  
consideration.... Other relevant factors include, as the Court noted in Sagaz, “whether the worker provides his or  
her own equipment”, “whether the worker hires his or her own helpers” and whether the worker has managerial  
responsibilities....  
In a supplementary final submission filed, counsel for CAW National referenced the comments of Bora Laskin, as  
he then was, in a 1958 labour arbitration case, Re Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers & Polymer Corp. (1958), 10  
L.A.C. 31 at 33-34:  
Counsel for the company urged, with some vigour, that art. 8.01 involved an automatic liability of the union under  
each agreement upon mere proof of the occurrence of a strike. For the reasons given in the C.G.E. award, where  
the board had to construe a clause couched in somewhat similar terms, this board cannot accept the argument of  
automatic liability. On the other hand, it must equally reject the contention of the respondents herein that  
liability arises only if there is an official strike, that is one called or sanctioned under the prescriptions of the  
union constitution and by-laws. No doubt that is one way in which a union may become liable under a clause of  
the kind found in art. 8.01. But it is not the only way and the reason lies, of course, in the scope of the obligation  
which art. 8.01 imposes.  
In the C.G.E. award the board of arbitration acknowledged the reality of a trade union’s separate existence where  
it was certified under compulsory collective bargaining legislation, or where it was properly party to a collective  
agreement which under such legislation was binding on employer, trade union and employees in the specified  
bargaining unit. This is the position under the Industrial Relations and Disputes Investigation Act, and especially  
under s. 18 thereof, and it is a position applicable to the respondent unions in the present case. They are then  
juridical entities in respect of obligations undertaken in their collective agreements with the company. Their  
obligations are not necessarily those of their membership, nor are the obligations of members who are employees  
necessarily obligations of the unions. A union may contract (and for arbitration purposes a collective agreement  
is a contract) to accept liability for the conduct of a member but if it does so its ensuing responsibility does not  
arise under any principle of vicarious liability but by virtue of a contractual obligation. A union normally has  
officers and employees who, under varying circumstances, may implicate it in vicarious liability for tort and in so-  
called personal liability in contract. But members of a union are not, as members only, either employees or  
servants of a union, or its agents, and their actions are not the actions of the union for which the latter must  
respond either in tort or in contract. A union member cannot, as such, bind the union in contract or make it liable  
vicariously for his tortious conduct merely by representing that he is acting for the union. Apart from principles  
of estoppel and kindred doctrines, upon which it is unnecessary to dilate here, his acts are no more the acts of his  
union than the acts of a mere shareholder in a corporation are the acts of the corporation.  
With that authority, counsel for CAW National argued that unions are not vicariously liable for the acts of mere  
members. That decision is, firstly, not binding on this Court. Secondly, it does not decide the same issue.  
Thirdly, it clearly illustrates that the actions and behaviour of the members in question have to be examined in  
each factual situation to determine the responsibility of the union.  
In that particular case, there was discussion of a provision of a collective agreement with the following clause:  
8.01 The union agrees that during the life of the agreement there will be no strike and the company agrees that  
there will be no lockout.  
The issues were identified at 32:  
1. What is the scope of the obligations imposed by art. 8.01?  
2. What is meant by or who is “the union” under that article?  
3. Do the facts adduced in evidence disclose a violation by the union of the obligation which is assumed under art.  
8.01?  
The question before the Board then became whether the conduct of certain low-level functionaries purporting to  
represent their union could bind the union. Laskin said this at 39:  
If the stewards or committeemen join the strikers in any demonstration, such as a picket line march, this would  
be evidence which might show, unless explained away, that the union was encouraging a continuation of the  
strike. Much would depend on the duration and other circumstances of the participation of the stewards or  
committeemen in the demonstration. Secondly, the presence of stewards or committeemen among the strikers at  
any mass demonstration would invite immediate action by union executive officers to procure their withdrawal as  
a tangible sign that the union is not supporting the unlawful strike. Spontaneous strikers who find stewards or  
committeemen in their midst, apparently acting with them and doing nothing to induce them to return to work or  
terminate any demonstration in which they may be engaged, may reasonably believe that they are enjoying  
official union support.  
The fallout flowing from this is that the circumstances dictate whether or not vicarious liability is available. Thus,  
the blanket statement that unions are not vicariously liable for the acts of mere members is an incorrect  
interpretation of this decision.  
Here, CAW National was driving the “mere members” such as Warren to help see its mission accomplished and  
thus must be responsible for the said members’ acts. There can be no question but that the proximity  
requirement for vicarious liability is satisfied as Warren and Bettger were members acting in furtherance of the  
union’s cause to seek and destroy; in return, strike pay was paid to all strikers. The strike had barely begun when  
CASAW Local 4 became insolvent; from then on, the sole source of funding to pay inter alia, strike pay, came from  
outside CASAW Local 4, and the primary source was CAW National. Furthermore, as I have found, the union  
breached the standard of care by inciting its membership (including Warren and Bettger) so as to create risk to  
those persons invited to be on Giant property, and by failing to control its membership thereby contributing to the  
risk to those invited to be on Giant property; both of these breaches were sufficiently connected to the negligence  
of both Warren and Bettger.  
In the case of Warren, CAW National argued that it issued no authorization to him. Authorization need not be a  
defining moment, or any moment, to find the subject liable. The Archdiocese in Bennett, supra, did not authorize  
the priest to sexually molest altar boys, but was nevertheless found vicariously liable when he did so. In any  
event, in the instant case, authorization can be identified for example, in the union’s failure to sanction its  
members for acts of violence and vandalism or the union’s covering of fines of its members convicted of criminal  
offences. These acts and omissions were common knowledge among the membership and, as such, serve as  
authorization in the circumstances of this case.  
On the authorities herein, I find CAW National to be directly liable for the acts of Shearing and Seeton as  
members of the CASAW Local 4's executive and vicariously liable for CASAW Local 4 members’ conduct,  
particularly that of Warren and Bettger. Respecting Warren, Bettger, Seeton, Shearing and others who  
committed the aforesaid illegal activities, it can be said, and I find, that in the beginning CASAW’s interest was  
being served. Once CAW secured de facto control, mid strike, CAW’s interest began and continued to be served.  
Seeton  
Applying the concepts of directors’ and officers’ liability to Seeton differs somewhat from the analyses provided  
for other Defendants such as Witte, Turner and Hargrove. That is because I find there is sufficient evidence to  
support a finding not only that Seeton was negligent when acting pursuant to his duty as an officer of the union  
but also that he was acting in furtherance of his own interest, as will be demonstrated herein.  
i) Duty of Care  
Seeton was vice-president of CASAW Local 4 when the strike began and became president midway through the  
summer of 1992. The particulars of negligence alleged against Seeton are akin to those alleged against CAW  
National, namely, inciting or failing to control the membership so as to create risk to the well-being of those  
invited to be on the Giant property.  
As no authority has been advanced to show that a duty of care has been recognized in similar circumstances, I  
must apply the modified Anns test to analyze the relationship between Seeton and the Plaintiffs.  
The reasoning applied to CAW National, as it pertains to CASAW Local 4’s negligence (which CAW National  
absorbed on the merger), applies equally to Seeton. As both vice-president and president, Seeton led CASAW  
Local 4 in its endeavour, the targets of which were Royal Oak and anyone assisting it. Seeton himself possessed a  
war-like mentality against the company and those affiliated, and incited the same in others. One example of  
Seeton’s own disdain toward the company is demonstrated by his pre-strike practice of encouraging the abundant  
filing of grievances against Royal Oak, to cause both frustration and financial loss to the company. After the strike  
began, Seeton’s feelings intensified and were directed not only to the company, but also to those who were line-  
crossers or replacement workers. In fact, Seeton’s own views served as fuel to the increasingly severe acts of  
violence and vandalism by union members. This effectively demonstrates not only that harm to those invited to  
be on Giant’s property was foreseeable, but also that the proximity requirement is easily met. Furthermore, I find  
no policy considerations at either the first or second stage of the Anns test to negate finding that a duty of care  
existed between Seeton and the deceased miners.  
ii) Standard of Care  
Seeton was a disinterested miner who loathed Royal Oak, Witte, Pinkerton’s and particularly the replacement  
workers. His personal feelings of disdain towards the company were evident prior to the strike, as I referenced  
above with his involvement in the grievance procedure. Not only was his work in the mine permeated with acts of  
sabotage, he encouraged others to do likewise. This pattern of behaviour intensified when the prospect of a strike  
was looming. In the lunchroom before the strike, Seeton swore he would “kill scabs, wives, children, destroy  
homes, whatever he had to do to make sure the cause is taken seriously”.  
Seeton, along with Johnston, torpedoed the tentative agreement. On June 7, he breached the Injunction. His  
strike bulletins were later acknowledged by him to be irresponsible, mean-spirited and dehumanizing. He did  
nothing to encourage bargaining, he carried on the tradition of encouraging illegal activity and paid lawyers and  
the strikers’ fines from union funds. Seeton’s most complicit behaviour lay with the discharge of his duties for  
CASAW Local 4; he gladly found brotherhood and solidarity with Shearing on the union executive, which gave  
them both strength to seek and encourage destruction of property of Royal Oak and to frighten the replacement  
workers and their families.  
Seeton would have one believe that he should be viewed differently than the likes of Shearing, Bettger and Legge,  
for example, but his threats to injure, kill and destroy as well as his encouragement of savage behaviour towards  
replacement workers made him no less culpable. This is particularly true given that he utilized the union facilities  
to accomplish those ends, appreciating the frustration and anger in his fellow strikers that he was deemed to  
know would explode any day.  
Counsel for Seeton argued that he should bear no responsibility for the union’s demeaning and insulting signs  
that were about the mine site and around town, for they were union decisions. Nowhere is there any evidence  
that Seeton, who was in a position of control, did anything to slow down the threatening rhetoric or criminal  
activity of the union. Instead, Seeton encouraged criminal behaviour.  
In that respect I refer again to News Group, supra, at 217-219:  
[The plaintiffs’] alternative submission is that where a defendant [union] continues to organise events, which in  
light of experience amount to a nuisance or other torts and in the knowledge or presumed knowledge that such  
nuisance or torts are being committed by those whom they organise, they may be taken to have authorised the  
commission of the nuisance or torts or to have continued the nuisance, particularly where the defendant can  
control the event and the conduct of those taking part, but fails to take any or adequate steps to do so; and that  
notwithstanding that the particular defendant does not encourage the tortious conduct and indeed condemns it.  
....  
As to control, it seems to me that the defendant unions can exercise substantial control over their members, and  
in the ultimate event if they cannot control them they may have to desist from organising the activity in  
question.¼  
The unions have substantial powers of disciplining their members.¼  
There is no evidence that use of disciplinary powers has even been threatened against those who step out of line,  
let alone used.  
I conclude by stating that Seeton stepped outside the boundaries of his delegated authority and misused his  
position by utilizing the union’s facilities to encourage the strikers’ illegal activities. Consequently, I find that his  
conduct fell below the acceptable standard in the circumstances.  
iii) Causation  
Having found that Seeton’s conduct breached the standard of care, I turn to the test in law for determining  
causation. As previously outlined, the current test for causation is whether the defendant’s negligence materially  
contributed to the injury or loss.  
For the reasons discussed above, and those provided in the section dealing with the liability of CAW National, I  
find that Seeton’s conduct materially contributed to Warren’s act. Furthermore, I have discussed the drawing of  
adverse inferences for the failure to call witnesses in a separate section of this judgment and will not repeat it  
here.  
iv) Remoteness  
Warren’s reckless act that caused the deaths of the nine miners was foreseeable at the time that the negligent  
conduct occurred. A more detailed discussion on this point can be found in the section dealing with novus actus  
interveniens, supra.  
Shearing  
Shearing, who became known as the “Night Crawler”, filed a Statement of Defence, was unrepresented by counsel,  
appeared from time to time during the trial and declined to testify when asked.  
My findings as they pertain to Shearing mirror those of Seeton in many ways. However, in the case of Shearing,  
there is insufficient evidence to find that, as a member of CASAW Local 4's executive, he acted in furtherance of  
his own interest. Instead, I must look to whether his conduct, although “directed in a bona fide manner to the  
best interest” of the union, was negligent in itself.  
i) Duty of Care  
The particulars of negligence alleged against Shearing are the same as those alleged against Seeton. Along with  
Seeton, Shearing led the membership toward increasingly severe acts of violence and vandalism towards the  
company and those affiliated. Also, as an officer of CASAW Local 4, I find that Shearing owed a duty of care to the  
deceased miners, for the same reasons as Seeton did, and will not repeat those reasons here.  
ii) Standard of Care  
Though he was a member of CASAW Local 4's executive, the evidence is glaring that Shearing had no respect for  
life, limb, property or his position as a member of the union executive and the responsibility that went with that  
office.  
Shearing’s incursions and destruction of Royal Oak property were legendary during the strike, as was his  
derogatory view of line-crossers, which he and others testified under oath “didn’t deserve to live”. I find that his  
actions and views were well-known among the membership.  
In oral argument, counsel for the Plaintiffs summarized some of Shearing’s behaviour as follows:  
He threatened to use ball bearings and a slingshot, planned and participated in the June 14th riot, used the  
union’s radio communication system to coordinate incursions on the mine property, knowingly defied Court  
injunctions limiting the number of strikers and by trespassing on the mine property, constant use of slingshots,  
trespassed on the mine property virtually every picket shift, sometimes several times per night, conducted  
surveillance of Pinkerton guards from on mine property, harassed Pinkerton guards and dogs, set fire to a power  
pole, planned and participated in the incursion into the underground that became known as the graffiti run of  
June 29th, trespassed into - - and this is a long list - A-shaft, C-shaft hoist room, B-138 portal, UBC portal, C-dry,  
trespassed into the B-vent shaft in July with the objective of throwing a scaling bar into the blades, taking out  
power to the mine approximately 40 times, stole explosives from the mine during the graffiti run, threw rocks at  
Pinkerton’s guards, dogs, and replacement workers, planned and participated in setting of an improvised  
explosive device on the satellite dish, planned and participated in the bombing of the B-vent shaft facility, built  
and experimented with the use of land mines and placed them near the B-138 open pit, assaulted two Pinkerton’s  
guards with a stick at a shopping centre parking lot, lied to the police, set up wires attached to flash bulbs on mine  
property, purchased materials that were ultimately used in a bomb.... And, again, I reiterate that this was at the  
time that Mr. Shearing continued to act as a member of the executive.  
I accept those as facts proven, and I find that Shearing, as a member of the executive of CASAW Local 4, breached  
the requisite standard of care.  
iii) Causation  
Having found that Shearing’s conduct did not satisfy the test of reasonableness in the circumstances, the matter  
of causation must be addressed. Pursuant to the reasons discussed, supra I find that Shearing’s conduct  
materially contributed to Warren’s act. Furthermore, I have discussed the drawing of adverse inferences for the  
failure to call witnesses in a separate section of this judgment and will not repeat it here.  
iv) Remoteness  
Warren’s reckless act that caused the deaths of the nine miners was foreseeable at the time that the negligent  
conduct occurred. A more detailed discussion on this point can be found in the section dealing with novus actus  
interveniens, supra.  
Bettger  
Bettger was a member of CASAW Local 4, but not on the executive as were Seeton and Shearing. Therefore, the  
analysis pertaining to his alleged negligence differs somewhat from the analysis pertaining to them. Bettger’s  
conduct, in most instances, mirrored that of Shearing; consequently, I find that his conduct was directed towards  
the perceived best interest of the union, rather than demonstrating a separate interest.  
i) Duty of Care  
Bettger, like Shearing, declined to testify at the trial. He was another radical union member who complained that  
he had been continually provoked by the actions of Pinkerton’s, Royal Oak and the RCMP. It was his belief that  
he and his fellow strikers “had [their] back up against the wall”; further, he believed that the criminal acts of  
which he was convicted were acceptable to the union and its members.  
Applying the modified Anns test to the relationship between Bettger and the Plaintiffs, I must first consider the  
requirements of foreseeability and proximity. Bettger’s acts of violence, vandalism and sabotage were thoroughly  
canvassed in the evidence at trial. The satellite dish explosion and vent shaft blast were but two examples of his  
conduct in furtherance of the union’s “cause”, both bearing the risk of serious personal injury or death to invitees  
at Giant (including the nine deceased miners). Furthermore, Bettger knew and encouraged other union members  
to commit similar acts, thereby increasing the risk to those at Giant.  
It is argued, and I agree, that Bettger’s control over Warren was unlike Seeton’s or Shearing’s, the latter being  
officers of CASAW Local 4; however, in defining the class to whom a duty is owed, the Court in Cooper, supra,  
noted at para 31 that “sufficiently proximate relationships are identified through the use of categories. The  
categories are not closed and new categories of negligence may be introduced. But generally, proximity is  
established by reference to these categories”. The following discussion of existing categories at para. 36 offers  
assistance: I reiterate,  
First, of course, is the situation where the defendant’s act foreseeably causes physical harm to the plaintiff or the  
plaintiff’s property. This has been extended to nervous shock.... Yet other categories are liability for negligent  
misstatement ... and misfeasance in public office. A duty to warn of the risk of danger has been recognized....  
Again, a municipality has been held to owe a duty to prospective purchasers of real estate to inspect housing  
developments without negligence.... Similarly, governmental authorities who have undertaken a policy of road  
maintenance have been held to owe a duty of care to execute the maintenance in a non-negligent manner....  
Relational economic loss (related to a contract’s performance) may give rise to a tort duty of care in certain  
situations, as where the claimant has a possessory or proprietary interest in the property, the general average  
cases, and cases where the relationship between the claimant and the property owner constitutes a joint  
venture.... When a case falls within one of these situations or an analogous one and reasonable foreseeability is  
established, a prima facie duty of care may be posited.  
Bettger falls within two of these categories, namely, where: (a) the defendant’s act foreseeably causes physical  
harm to the plaintiff; and (b) a duty to warn of the risk of danger has been recognized.  
He, like the other radicals, was aware of what each was doing, and participated in many of these progressive  
illegal activities. Furthermore, he is deemed to have the requisite foreseeability to appreciate that a fatality would  
occur sooner or later. As such, there was a duty to warn. The striking miners’ objective was to cause sufficient  
destruction and fear that the replacement workers would flee, whether from the threats and criminal activities or  
from Royal Oak being disabled sufficiently to cease operation. I am satisfied that a prima facie duty of care is  
clearly established, as the requisite foreseeability and proximity existed. Furthermore, I find no policy reasons to  
limit the duty at the first stage of the Anns test. Suffice it to say there are no considerations existing that limited  
Bettger’s duty to the underground miners who were in the vicinity of his acts as measured by time, distance and  
relationship, or to negate any duty to them.  
I turn now to the second branch of the Anns test, that being residual policy reasons to limit or exclude duty of  
care. Counsel for Bettger argued that he should not be found liable due to the WCB’s findings, which was a pre-  
condition to this action, that, firstly, he was not a “worker”, and secondly, his “alleged acts and omissions” were  
not so related to the course and scope of his employment with Royal Oak so as to permit him to rely on the  
immunity provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act. A similar argument was raised by counsel for Witte, and  
I reiterate that to revisit a decision of the WCB dealing with the definition of “worker” under the Workers’  
Compensation Act is not an issue properly before this Court. Yet, counsel for Bettger goes further to argue the  
following:  
In the face of the W.C.B.’s determinations that Bettger was neither a worker nor engaged in the course of  
employment, the Plaintiffs can not now be heard to invoke Bettger’s previous employment or his status as a  
‘worker’ engaged at the Giant Mine to establish a relationship of proximity between himself and the Underground  
Miners.  
I reject this argument and note that the essence of my finding that sufficient proximity existed between Bettger  
and the nine miners is linked to the fact that Bettger was carrying out the Union’s mandate of destruction against  
Royal Oak and Pinkertons and the replacement and line-crossing workers and that his conduct was criminal,  
obviously not employment-related, and created a risk to the very same persons whose lives were lost through  
Warren’s act. Furthermore, not only did Bettger have the knowledge that his fellow brothers’ conduct also  
threatened the well-being of those at Giant, but he encouraged others to do the same, particularly by example.  
Thus, I find the connection between proximity and foreseeability easily made and that Bettger owed a duty of care  
to the nine miners.  
ii) Standard of Care  
The standard to which I must measure Bettger’s conduct is that of reasonableness.  
Like Shearing, Bettger had no respect for life, limb or property, and his acts of violence, vandalism and sabotage  
were well-known among the membership. The Plaintiffs’ summary of the misbehaviour of Bettger that he has  
admitted through his read-ins or on which other admissible evidence has been produced is as follows:  
Planned and participated in the June 14th riot, used the union’s radio communication system to coordinate  
incursions on the mine property, knowingly defied Court injunctions limiting the number of strikers and by  
trespassing on the mine property, conducted surveillance of Pinkerton’s guards from on mine property, planned  
and participated in the excursion into the underground that became known as the graffiti run of June 29th,  
trespassed into the B-138 portal, taking out power to the mine, stole explosives from the mine during the graffiti  
run, threw rocks at Pinkerton’s guards, dogs, and replacement workers, planned and participated in setting of an  
improvised explosive device on the satellite dish, planned and participated in the bombing of the B-vent shaft  
facility, built and experimented with the use of land mines and placed them near the B-138 pit, set up trip wires  
attached to flash bulbs on mine property, conducted surveillance at the Akaitcho head frame, trespassed above  
the town site to loosen bolts on the satellite dish, planned to set a trip wire to be detonated by a truck driving over  
it, disposed of explosives at the union hall on September 18th, purchased material in Vancouver with Mr.  
Shearing that were ultimately used for a bomb.  
I accept those as facts proven. Furthermore, like Shearing, it cannot be said that Bettger exercised reasonable  
care towards those at Giant. Consequently, I find that he breached the standard of care.  
iii) Causation  
Counsel for Bettger sought to convince the Court that one must isolate Bettger’s activity that could have  
influenced Warren to his participation in the graffiti run and satellite dish and vent shaft explosions. On this  
issue, that cannot be the case; one must consider all of Bettger’s activities. The aberrant behaviour of Bettger in  
combination with aberrant behaviour of others progressively incited Warren to do his act. It would be naïve to  
believe that, with the background of facts found herein, the strikers were unaware of what any of them were doing  
or threatening throughout the strike, as I illustrated earlier in this judgment.  
Bettger’s counsel, on the heels of arguing that Warren was an inveterate liar, submitted that I then should accept  
Warren’s statement that he had not told Bettger “or a number of other individual defendants about his murderous  
plans”. Whether or not Bettger was aware of Warren’s plan to plant a bomb is irrelevant as that alone does not  
absolve Bettger.  
Counsel for Bettger further submitted that there was no evidence that Bettger could have influenced Warren. I  
disagree. As I illustrated herein, Bettger, like all other strikers who committed criminal acts, threatened to and  
did inflict injury, watched and besetted the O’Neil residence and chased down and threatened Steven Starkes, a  
university student seeking summer employment at Giant. This type of activity by Bettger and others was all well  
known and talked about with pride among the strikers, at the union hall, on the picket line and in the bars.  
It is to be noted that Warren also said:  
All I can say is if it was totally inadvertent, you know, it just like in the normal course of a fairly violent strike.  
There was a lot of things that probably influenced a lot of people and I’m not going to say I wasn’t influenced by  
something.  
I accept that statement by Warren as truthful.  
Warren was current throughout the strike to the criminal acts of personal injury, threats to persons and property  
damage as they occurred. Bettger’s criminal activity and his boasts with others contributed to Warren  
appreciating that his turn must arrive since the acts of others had not succeeded in meeting the union’s objective  
of shutting down the mine. Despite Defendants’ counsel’s protestations that this riot mentality was not affecting  
the strikers, particularly the radical element of which Bettger was a part, the argument backfires when one  
reviews Bettger’s plea of leniency when he faced sentencing by Vertes J. of this Court. Here is my exchange with  
counsel for Bettger:  
The Court: O’Neil bought a gun and carried it so he said. That’s how concerned he was. When Peggy Witte took  
to the airwaves and said that there’s going to be a big injury or death, whatever she said, I forget, something of  
one of the two, this is a responsible person. And the comments of the Defers and Code about what they were  
hearing. They were responsible people. And then you heard your man over trying to get a lighter sentence from  
Vertes and saying, as you said, “my gyroscope” was failing or whatever. Unless he was lying, he was affected.  
Mr. Polsky: Absolutely, sir, and he was affected the same way that others were affected and they felt, rightly or  
wrongly and I would submit wrongly, that it was all right to commit property damage.  
Mr. Polsky’s attempt to isolate Warren’s act and argue that it be treated singly does not accord with the evidence.  
It was but a part of a series of connected criminal activities. If, for example, one of Bettger’s criminal acts caused  
a death, as it easily could have, would the same argument have been advanced? I doubt it.  
For reasons herein, I find that Bettger’s conduct meets the material contribution test required to find a sufficient  
causal connection.  
iv) Remoteness  
I disagree with the argument that Warren’s act was not “the very kind of thing which is likely to happen” as  
discussed at length in the section dealing with the defence of novus actus interveniens, supra. I repeat that,  
firstly, there was talk of killing among the Defendants, particularly strikers, from the inception of the strike.  
Secondly, acts such as blowing up the satellite dish and vent shaft could have caused death. Thirdly, Warren’s act  
was but an elevated crime in the hierarchy of criminal code offences that the strikers were committing virtually  
daily, no less or no more criminal than the offences that Bettger and Shearing committed and for which they were  
imprisoned. It was from the onset of the strike that there was fear in the minds of many that someone could be  
killed, and, later in the strike, that some would be.  
With what was happening about them, Bettger, like the other Defendants, particularly the co-strikers, are not only  
deemed to know there was a Warren out there, who would strike a significant blow sooner or later, but they failed  
to slow down the rhetoric, violence and sabotage, an obligation they each owed to their fellow men underground  
and their frightened families.  
In the result, I find that Bettger owed a duty of care and breached that duty to the Plaintiffs, and is therefore  
liable.  
Warren  
The detailed analysis as provided for each Defendant dealing with duty of care, standard of care, causation and  
remoteness is unnecessary in dealing with the liability of Warren. I accept that Warren set the fatal blast that  
took the lives of the nine miners as this is clearly established by his own admission and adequately supported by  
other evidence. Therefore, I find Warren negligent.  
ADVERSE INFERENCE  
The Plaintiffs in both actions asked that the Court draw adverse inferences against certain witnesses not called by  
the Defendants.  
The failure of a party to lead evidence can, in and of itself, lead to certain inferences, and a trial Judge is entitled  
to make certain findings which are adverse to the defence by considering the fact that the defence called no  
evidence, “expert or otherwise”, to refute the evidence of the plaintiff. See Erdelyi, v. Lafontaine Rish Medical  
Group Ltd. [2003] O.J. No. 4383 (C.A.), leave to appeal refused [2004] S.C.C.A. No. 1.  
See also Wood v. Bonnell (1993), 105 Nfld. & P.E.I. R. 243 at paras. 31, 33 (P.E.I.S.C.(A.D)) where Carruthers C.J.,  
for the Courts, discussed some relevant authorities related to the trial Judge’s conclusion that Mark Bonnell did  
not testify “in favour of his father because he knew it was not actually the truth”:  
[The respondent] refers to Sopinka and Lederman, The Law of Evidence in Civil Cases, 1974, where it states on  
pp. 535-536 under the heading Effect of Failure to Call Witness or Party:  
In Blatch v. Archer (1774), 1 Cowp. 63, at p. 65, Lord Mansfield stated:  
‘It is certainly a maxim that all evidence is to be weighed according to the proof which it was in the power of one  
side to have produced, and in the power of the other to have contradicted’.  
“The application of this maxim has led to a well-recognized rule that the failure of a party or a witness to give  
evidence, which it was in the power of the party or witness to give and by which the facts might have been  
elucidated, justifies the court in drawing the inference that the evidence of the party or witness would have been  
unfavourable to the party to whom the failure was attributed”.  
....  
Mr. Justice Pigeon of the Supreme Court of Canada applied the rule in Levesque v. Comeau and Levesque, 1970  
4 (SCC), [1970] S.C.R. 1010, when he states on pp. 1012-1013:  
“. . . Appellant Lola Levesque’s expert examined her for the first time more than a year after the accident, and  
after she had consulted several doctors and undergone different examinations in the meantime. She alone could  
bring before the court the evidence of those facts and she failed to do it. In my opinion, the rule to be applied in  
such circumstances is that a court must presume that such evidence would adversely affect her case”.  
See also:  
Cluney and Cluney v. Peck and Peck (1980), 38. N.S.R. (2d) 368; 69 A.P.R. 368 (C.A.)  
Bilusack et al. v. Jackson and Johnston (1986), 1988 4986 (SK QB), 69 Sask. R. 255 (Q.B.)  
Peterson v. South Hill Builders Ltd. (1981), 9 Sask. $. 414 (Dist.Ct.)  
Kamitomo et al. v. Pasula et al. (1983), 1983 1132 (AB QB), 50 A.R. 280; 29 Alta. L.R. (2d) 375 (Q.B.)  
The Plaintiffs asserted that there are three categories of Defendants to which the principles of adverse inference  
ought to apply:  
1) Defendants who did not testify nor call evidence;  
2) Defendants for whom Rule 326 witness statements were prepared and served, and yet who chose not to call  
those witnesses to testify at trial; and  
3) Defendants who did not call witnesses, they might be expected to call, to explain matters arising in the trial.  
Dealing first with CAW National, the Plaintiffs asked the Court to draw an adverse inference in its case for not  
calling certain prospective witnesses. Those witnesses identified by the Plaintiffs were: Succamore, Johnston,  
Slezak, Schram, Seeton, Shearing, Bettger, Crowther and Kosta.  
I endorse the Plaintiffs’ submission that the evidence before the Court is virtually undisputed, and establishes  
that:  
C No-one acting on the union’s behalf (not Slezak, David, Schram, Seeton nor anyone else) seriously tried to  
negotiate a settlement of the strike with Royal Oak; instead, they insisted to the point of impasse on the pre-  
conditions, in breach of the duty to bargain in good faith.  
C Strikers engaged in countless acts of vandalism and violence, while their leaders acquiesced to, condoned,  
incited, lent material support to, and participated in such acts.  
C Warren, caught up in this maelstrom, followed the example of his leaders, and set the fatal blast.  
The Plaintiffs argued that these enumerated persons are persons to whom significant reference was made in the  
evidence and some of whom were not called on, as their evidence would have been adverse to CAW National.  
Specifically referencing Bettger, Shearing and Seeton, the Plaintiffs suggested that an adverse inference could be  
drawn, as their evidence was indefensible and materially contributed to the atmosphere that had such an impact  
on union members, including Warren.  
Pivotal to knowledge that Hargrove, Mitic, Succamore, Slezak, Crowther, Kosta and others at CAW National were  
receiving from time to time during the strike was determining the effect that knowledge had on the directions  
given by these men throughout the strike. CAW National downplayed that knowledge and the resulting directions  
given, and the impact on the behaviour of the strikers. This was pivotal to the theory of the Plaintiffs in both  
actions. Excepting Hargrove, the evidence not called by CAW National from these persons, other than those who  
were examined for discovery on behalf of CAW National that was binding on CAW National, would have better  
put CAW National’s participation in perspective and elucidated facts material to this action, in particular, the  
impact on CASAW Local 4 members, including Warren. I exclude Kosta, as there was insufficient evidence to  
indicate any participation by him in anything material before the Court.  
Thus, I have no hesitation in drawing adverse inference against CAW National respecting Succamore, Slezak and  
Crowther.  
The same can be said of Johnston and Schram whose participation respecting the fallout from the rejection of the  
tentative agreement and events respecting labour relations and strikers’ conduct was vital to the beginning of the  
incitement of the said strikers, and the aberrant conduct that followed.  
Bettger, Seeton and Shearing as Defendants, the first two represented by counsel at trial, were likened by  
Plaintiffs’ counsel to the statement in Such v. RW-LB Holdings Ltd. (1993), 1993 7237 (AB QB), 147 A.R.  
241 at para. 84, (Q.B.) where Mason J. said:  
Wolfgang Such did not take the stand to testify on his own behalf during these proceedings. Although he was  
present throughout, I am entitled and do draw the adverse inferences that he cannot refute the allegations of  
mismanagement which I have found to be unfairly prejudicial to the plaintiffs. I need refer only to one authority.  
Mr. Justice Kryczka summarized the law on this point in Kamitomo v. Pasula (1983), 50 A.R. 280; 29 Alta. L.R.  
(2d) 375 (Q.B.) at 390 ff....  
In Kamitomo v. Pasula (1983), 50 A.R. 280 at paras. 69-71 (Q.B.), Kryczka J. said:  
The principles of law on adverse inference are well known. The leading statement is to be found in Wigmore,  
Evidence in Trials at Common Law, 1979 (Chadbourn Rev.) at vol. 2, 285, page 192.  
The failure to bring before the tribunal some circumstances, documents, or witness, when either the party himself  
or his opponent claims that the facts would thereby be elucidated, serves to indicate, as the most natural  
inference, that the party fears to do so; and this fear is some evidence that the circumstance or document or  
witness, if brought, would have exposed facts unfavourable to the party. These inferences, to be sure, cannot  
fairly be made except upon certain conditions; and they are also open always to explanation by circumstances  
which make some other hypothesis a more natural one than the party’s fear of exposure. But the propriety of  
such an inference in general is not doubted.  
See also: Barnes v. Union Steamships Ltd. (1954), 1954 450 (BC SC), 13 W.W.R. 72; affirmed, 1955  
305 (BC CA), 14 W.W.R. 673 (B.C.C.A.), adopting and citing Wigmore:  
It is certainly a maxim that all evidence is to be weighed according to the proof which it was in the power of one  
side to have produced, and in the power of the other to have contradicted.  
Per Lord Mansfield, Blatch v. Archer, [1895] A.C. 310, at 316; see also Sopinka & Lederman: The Law of Evidence  
in Civil Cases, 1979, Butterworths, at 535:  
If the opposite party has it in his power to [rebut] it by evidence, and yet offers none, then we have something like  
an admission that the presumption is just.  
The test set forth in determining whether the adverse inference is to be drawn is: Could the witnesses who were  
not produced have offered much enlightenment?  
The Plaintiffs’ submissions respecting Bettger, Seeton and Shearing were that they did not take the stand because  
they could not defend their actions.  
Seeton, Shearing and Bettger were Defendant parties, two of whom were represented by counsel in attendance  
throughout the trial. Shearing, at the trial on two occasions, declined to testify at my invitation. All three were  
produced to be examined for discovery at length by all who were adverse in interest. Counsel for the Plaintiffs  
took full advantage of that opportunity and, although their evidence in each case is against each of them only,  
their acts and conduct, comments and participation in the strike were an open book viewed and in great part  
heard and observed by other witnesses; little or no enlightenment would be proffered by their taking the witness  
stand, and thus I do not draw an adverse inference as to these three Defendant parties.  
Additionally, as to Seeton, the Plaintiffs submitted:  
There was evidence during the trial from Bill Code and Don Miller to the effect that Seeton had been spotted on  
the picket line during the night of the vent shaft blast, tending to show that Mr. Seeton had foreknowledge of the  
pending blast. Seeton had counsel who sat through the trial and heard the allegations and the inferences that  
were going to be sought in relation to that, and yet Seeton did not come to court to rebut it.  
The Plaintiffs failed to meet the appropriate civil test that Seeton was on the picket line at the material time.  
Similarly, Royal Oak prepared witness statements on behalf of Hagan and Robert Moore (“Moore”) but did not  
call them to testify. The GNWT prepared Rule 326 statements in relation to Alvarez, Bell and McRae but did not  
call them to testify. The Plaintiffs submitted that the “obvious inference” to be drawn by their failure to testify is  
that they could not defend the actions of the respective parties or that their evidence would either help the  
Plaintiffs or harm the Defendants. I endorse this statement as it relates to Royal Oak’s Hagan and Moore; safety  
was their focus.  
Bell as fire marshal and McRae as director of the MSD of the Department of Safety and Public Services shared  
Gould’s concern at the material time and so, as with Hagan and Moore, I draw an adverse inference as it relates to  
Bell and McRae as sought by the Plaintiffs. Alvarez, in my opinion, could add nothing untold that would be of  
assistance.  
Respecting prospective witnesses not called by Pinkerton’s, namely, Harold Pountney (“Pountney”), Eddie  
Zembryzcki (“Zembryzcki”) and Matt Rombough (“Rombough”), the two latter men were guards patrolling the  
mine site on the night of September 17, 1992. One would assume they had evidence to rebut allegations of porous  
security, as would Sinke, Shaw and Morton, who were supervisors on-site prior to Miller, and who were also not  
called to testify. Plaintiffs’ counsel said this of Shaw:  
Counsel for Pinkerton’s alluded to some medical documentation but put no evidence before the Court. The  
Plaintiffs submit that the Court should therefore draw the inference that none of their evidence would support the  
positions taken by Pinkerton’s.  
The Plaintiffs suggested that the reason Pinkerton’s did not call them was that their evidence would not support  
its position. That, in my view, is a correct analysis as far as Zembryzcki, Rombough, Sinke and Morton are  
concerned. The first two could have elucidated for the Court how patrols were carried out, and Sinke and Morton  
could have elucidated the nature of instruction given to them and that which they passed on to their successors,  
since no records were produced in that respect. Pountney could not have contributed more than that received  
from St. Amour in evidence. See Guarantee Co. of North America v. Beasse (1992), 1992 14154 (AB QB),  
124 A.R. 161 (Q.B.). Respecting Shaw, the Plaintiffs did not seek an order to compel his attendance and I assumed  
they were satisfied with the submission of counsel for Pinkerton’s that he was medically incapacitated at the  
material time. Accordingly, I draw an adverse inference respecting the prospective witnesses of Pinkerton’s as  
indicated.  
Finally, GNWT employees Gilmour and Quirke were involved in the process of the strike. These men were, on my  
understanding, because of the positions they held, deemed to be intimately knowledgeable about the relevant  
statutory obligations of mining safety; this was one of the very material issues that had to be addressed during the  
strike and which, including enforcement of the relevant statutes and regulations, was the subject of obfuscation,  
wilful blindness and demonstrated lack of leadership. In other words, they had useful evidence, and as such  
should have been called to testify.  
Thus, I draw an adverse inference, as sought, as I am satisfied their evidence would not support the GNWT’s  
position in this action that it had reacted appropriately to Gould’s concern and to other information imparted to it  
in a like vein.  
DAMAGES  
The issue requires that two assessments be made: the assessment of the damages suffered by the Plaintiffs; and  
the assessment of how those damages should be apportioned among the Defendants, according to the degree to  
which they are respectively at fault.  
The Plaintiffs led evidence of dependency claims and valuable services. Thereafter, economists were called on  
behalf of both the Plaintiffs and Defendants. Their ultimate estimates differed significantly as a result of  
divergent methodologies, data and assumptions. Although neither economic expert, Brown nor Taunton, offered  
a perfect scenario in any case, I have chosen the preferable estimates as applicable to each individual claim. In  
doing so, the Court is left to accept the inherent flaws in a given methodology, as each is inherently premised in  
great part on conjecture.  
Dependency Claims  
The majority of the Supreme Court of Canada, per Dickson J., as he then was, provided insight into how  
dependency claims should be assessed in Keizer v. Hanna, 1978 28 (SCC), [1978] 2 S.C.R. 342 at 351-352:  
The appellant is entitled to an award of such amount as will assure her the comforts and station in life which she  
would have enjoyed but for the untimely death of her husband. If one is speaking of contingencies, I think it is  
not unreasonable to give primary attention to the contingencies, and they are many, the occurrence of which  
would result in making the award, in the light of events, entirely inadequate. An assessment must be neither  
punitive nor influenced by sentimentality. It is largely an exercise of business judgment. The question is whether  
a stated amount of capital will provide, during the period in question, having regard to contingencies tending to  
increase or decrease the award, a monthly sum at least equal to that which might reasonably have been expected  
during the continued life of the deceased.  
The approaches endorsed by the respective economic experts differed as they pertained to assessing the  
dependency claims, although there was broad agreement as to the appropriate methodology. The hypothetical  
incomes of both spouses were projected over the balance of their working lives, but for the explosion, labour  
market contingencies were applied, assumptions were made as to the amount that the deceased would have  
personally consumed and contingencies for such matters as remarriage and divorce were considered. However,  
the specifics of each economic expert’s approach differed on closer examination and are discussed in more detail  
below.  
a) Projected Income Streams  
In projecting the income streams of the deceased miners beyond the date of the blast, Brown extrapolated from  
the 1992 actual earnings while Taunton used average earnings over several years prior to 1992, unless he observed  
an increasing trend. There is some unreliability to Brown’s method because of the inconsistency of 1992 earnings  
with prior years as a result of the strike. For some miners, significant periods of overtime or unemployment were  
realized during the strike. Regarding fringe benefits, both experts agreed that surviving members received benefit  
from these, although Taunton did not provide values for the benefit accrued. Thus, Brown’s values are accepted  
as uncontested.  
In terms of projecting real wage growth, each economist relied on different census data, neither of which is ideal.  
Firstly, each sample relied on by the experts is a cross-sectional survey which examines income for various age  
brackets at one point in time. Both experts agreed that longitudinal studies which track a particular person’s  
income over time are preferable to extract trends; however, no such studies exist. Consequently, I am left to  
choose between the method employed by Brown, which relies on 1996 census data for miners in the NWT and the  
Yukon, and the method employed by Taunton, which is based on the 1996 census data for Canadian miners  
generally. Brown’s data is problematic because of its small sample size but is favourable for its geographic  
specificity. Taunton’s data is problematic because of its geographic generality, yet favourable for its significant  
sample size. Although the Defendants argued that Brown’s data may produce skewed results due to a limited  
sample in some of the age cohorts, I find her method preferable to Taunton’s. It is impossible to predict with  
absolute certainty the income the deceased would have earned but for their deaths. Rather, I must rely on  
statistics combined with reason and the evidence advanced at trial to arrive at a reasonable estimate.  
Furthermore, the evidence was uncontroverted that, in the mining industry, miners’ incomes vary significantly  
depending on their motivation to work overtime hours, as well as their motivation to achieve bonuses. To prefer  
the data relied on by Taunton, which has the effect of lowering the income streams, also would ignore the fact that  
miners in the North, particularly those employed at Giant, were significantly higher income earners than their  
counterparts across the country. This fact alone accounts for why families such as the Fullowkas, Houries and  
Vodnoskis remained in Yellowknife as they did, and planned to remain for some time, a reality that ought not be  
ignored. Consequently, Brown’s method with regard to income profiles is preferable.  
Similar to the methodology employed with regard to income profiles, Brown applied an industry-specific  
unemployment contingency. Taunton, however, applied rates based on age and education, the effect of which is  
to increase the award in some cases. However, in concert with the reasons above, I prefer the specialized  
approach used by Brown. Part-time and non-participation contingencies are also accounted for by Brown, who  
applied a disability contingency to reduce the award but, unlike Taunton, did not apply any deduction for the  
contingency that the deceased may have worked part-time or have voluntarily chosen not to work. Brown’s  
reasoning for not applying both of these contingencies was due to a lack of evidence that the deceased would  
choose not to work, or work part-time only. I agree with this reasoning, and note that, although periods of  
unemployment were illustrated, there is no evidence of any of the deceased working part-time in mining at any  
time prior to their deaths. For these reasons, there is no basis on which to deduct for part-time or non-  
participation contingencies as Taunton did.  
In terms of setting an estimated retirement age for the deceased, Brown referenced Statistics Canada data in her  
evidence. She testified that the average retirement age ranged from 61 to 67 years for miners or workers in  
primary industry with the same characteristics as the deceased, and generally set 62 as the retirement age in all  
cases, except for Norm Hourie and Joe Pandev who were 53 and 55 years old respectively at the time of their  
deaths. In these two cases, because they were at a later stage in their mining careers, the evidence pertaining to  
their retirement intentions was meaningful. Taunton assumed a retirement age of 65 for all of the deceased and  
then applied a non-participation rate for the later years, which resulted in a retirement date of 61.4 years. I prefer  
the evidence of Brown as it more closely conforms to the evidence heard at trial.  
With respect to RRSP contributions, there is evidence that in all cases, except that of the Russell family,  
contributions had been made. Brown’s calculations included examination of previous income information (tax  
returns) to determine what the contribution history to RRSPs was in each case, on which an average of the income  
percentage contributed was assumed and applied. In cases where there were no contributions made or where a  
meaningful history could not be obtained from the available information, Brown assumed a 5% contribution rate.  
In terms of the calculations pertaining to taxes, assumptions must be made as to where the miners would have  
resided for the balance of their working lives. Brown assumed that each family would have resided in the NWT,  
while Taunton examined each situation individually, as I will do below.  
Brown assessed post-retirement income for all of the deceased, while Taunton opted only to provide these  
calculations for the two oldest miners, Joe Pandev and Norm Hourie, as he was unable to provide calculations for  
the others for lack of evidence pertaining to post-retirement loss. I cannot imagine what evidence could have  
been led on this issue, given that most of the deceased were 25 to 30 years from retirement. However, making a  
calculation using the projected income stream would be prudent as otherwise the dependency claim is  
significantly understated. Therefore, Brown’s values are preferable.  
The career paths of each of the respective miners will be dealt with individually. It can be noted at this juncture  
that there were significant differences between the economists, which has a dramatic impact on the value of their  
respective estimates. After considering those factors discussed, supra, which I find to be the most significant, I  
generally prefer the method employed by Brown for projecting income streams, although some deviation is  
necessary for some claims.  
b) Longitudinal v. Cross-sectional Surveys  
This issue is another example of filler by the economists. Brown was critical of Taunton respecting his use of  
cross-sectional surveys to predict real wage growth, being applicable to miners’ income. She praised the  
superiority of longitudinal surveys. Their use does, on the face of how they function, provide more reliable  
information, as they track a given person’s income over time.  
Taunton, using cross-sectional surveys, compared one person’s income with a different person’s income at the  
same moment in time, testifying that that almost invariably shows a person’s income does rise year after year and  
that the nine miners’ income would flat-line after age 35.  
Brown testified that cross-sectional surveys are but snapshots that show circumstances of a number of individuals  
at one point in time. For example, a cross-sectional survey taken in 1990 might show the incomes (as of the  
survey date) of a number of different individuals of different ages.  
She then testified that a longitudinal survey follows specific individuals over time. For example, a survey might  
be taken of the incomes of a group of individuals in 1990, then of the incomes of the same individuals in 1995,  
then of the incomes of the same individuals in 2000, and so on, hence the superiority of the longitudinal survey.  
Brown further testified that “longitudinal studies generally confirm that earnings increase over time, until they  
level off between ages 45 and 60 (they do not decrease)”.  
The discussion of longitudinal surveys was very educational, however, there are no available longitudinal studies  
so any such discussion is of little use.  
Brown said that, according to Statistics Canada, cross-sectional surveys cannot be used to predict an individual’s  
earnings profile. She said that cross-sectional surveys can give a mistaken impression that earnings are level for a  
variety of reasons. For example, a young worker (such as Chris Neill) and an older worker (such as Joe Pandev)  
might have started from different entry level wages, or the higher income earners could withdraw from the survey  
group by going into management or by retiring.  
She then purported to explain that she used cross-sectional surveys, but her use differed from Taunton’s in the  
application. She said that she reviewed cross-sectional surveys in a more complicated way than Taunton had and  
her study compared a cross-sectional survey taken in 1985 of a group of 35 to 44 year olds. Assuming that the  
surveys represented the same group of individuals, she said that she found that the wages definitely increased  
over time, with no “flat-lining” at age 35, and that it was invalid for Taunton to infer from the cross-sectional data  
that the income profiles of the miners would flat-line at age 35.  
Taunton, in his reports, assumed real wage growth commensurate with that experienced by Canadian males  
working as Underground Production and Development Miners from the 1996 census data. As shown by Exhibit  
1042, this census surveyed roughly 9,175 miners.  
Brown assumed as the basis for her computations the 1996 census data for NWT and Yukon miners, a much  
smaller sample (280 respondents).  
An aura of confusion swept over both economists initially as they both were in error as to the sample percentage  
size. Once they extricated themselves from this, Taunton believed Brown’s sample size was too small. Brown was  
critical of Taunton’s results.  
Brown, despite leaving the Court with the impression that she compared the cross-sectional surveys taken in 1985  
with those in 1995, apparently did not do this; rather, her base was the 1996 NWT census data, adopting the  
method of one Chris Lewis from the Journal of Forensic Economics; and, as counsel for the Defendants said:  
There is no evidence with respect to whether Mr. Lewis’s study was American or Canadian or to what employment  
groups his study referred. In any event, Ms. Brown did not use that method in deriving the real wage growth  
assumptions set out in her report.  
Despite the Court’s admonition that those authors relied on to support the witness’s testimony required  
underpinning so the Court could determine their qualifications, rarely was the same provided.  
I agree with Defendant’s counsel’s comment about Chris Lewis. In addition, I find Brown’s sample too small, her  
“more complicated” cross-sectional survey out of time with her objective, her discussion of longitudinal survey of  
no assistance, her criticism of Taunton’s methodology and results obtained unfounded and her failure to utilize  
the available 2001 NWT data inappropriate; consequently, I find Brown’s evidence on this subject to be  
unreliable.  
Although Taunton’s use of that data, which he testified demonstrated that earnings peak at 35-39 years taxes my  
common sense, I adopt his analysis and results in this real wage growth area.  
c) Personal Consumption Rates  
The PCR is calculated and applied to the income streams to determine what portion would have been consumed  
solely by the deceased. Although both experts ultimately relied mainly on a survey of household spending  
produced by Statistics Canada in 2000, their analyses differed markedly. While Brown arrived at consumption  
rates ranging from 10.9-12.3% for a two-person family, Taunton’s figures for the same scenario were  
30.61-31.01%. The fundamental difference is that Brown’s PCRs vary significantly by income level, and Taunton’s  
do not. Taunton’s calculations reflect differing income level, albeit minimally, because of his reliance on the  
Statistics Canada data, which breaks down spending according to income level. Brown has developed a new  
method, which I accept, for the calculation of Canadian PCRs based on the relatively recent methodology  
employed in the United States. The tables used by some American economists have shifted from focusing on  
family size only, to focusing on both family size and income level. Consequently, Brown applied the American  
methodology to Canadian data offered by Statistics Canada and developed new Canadian tables. Brown agreed  
with Taunton who testified that, when income levels increase, the amount that the deceased would have  
consumed increases as well. However, according to Brown, this is true in terms of dollar amounts, yet, as a  
percentage of income, it is actually a declining trend. Furthermore, with regard to savings, Brown testified that,  
as income rises, the income that is allocated to savings increases in both dollar amounts and percentage of family  
income. The effect of the increase in savings is to increase the net worth of the family; net worth is the value of  
the family’s income that is not consumed but could be liquidated. It might be used for indivisible items such as  
children’s education, purchase of property or bequests, for example. Therefore, Brown’s calculations reflect an  
inverse trend; as family income increases, the PCR decreases, and, as family size increases, the PCR decreases.  
These figures mark a departure from those accepted by Canadian Courts in the past; however, having considered  
all of the evidence, particularly that with regard to Brown’s research, I find that her PCR tables are preferable to  
those of Taunton. Brown demonstrated tremendous depth into her data analysis toward the development of her  
PCR tables, the result of which has merit in my view.  
Another significant distinction between the experts’ calculation of PCRs was their treatment of savings. Brown’s  
methodology assumed that the deceased would not have consumed savings in the same proportion as family  
income; instead, she assumed the consumption would have been 2-3%. The Defendants were critical of this, and  
argued that the assumption should be made that each deceased would have consumed the same proportion of  
savings as he would have consumed of the family income. However, Brown made a good point which was that at  
the time of the death, the savings had not been spent, but rather saved, so it is reasonable to assume that the  
savings would not be spent in the same proportion as family income. Furthermore, Brown referenced literature  
that suggests that a large proportion of family savings is spent on indivisible items such as children’s education or  
a second home.  
Taunton said that Brown’s derivations are flawed and underestimate the deceased’s consumption. Furthermore,  
the Defendants argued that it defies logic to assume that the deceased would not have consumed any significant  
amount of these savings, a view with which I do not agree.  
d) Divorce and Remarriage Contingencies  
After the income streams are projected and the family dependency rates are determined through the application  
of PCRs, there are several potential contingencies that can be applied, such as the possibility of divorce and  
remarriage. This applies to the marriage between the widow and deceased, as well as to the widow’s future. The  
differences between the experts with regard to the effect of divorce are that Brown factored in spousal support  
while Taunton assumed none. The divorce and remarriage contingencies will be dealt with in more detail for each  
Plaintiff; however, some further comments can be made at this juncture.  
Pertaining to the remarriage contingencies, the Defendants suggested that the Court take the statistical  
remarriage contingency as a starting point (using the average between the two experts when they differ) and  
increase or decrease the figure depending on factors such as whether the surviving spouse has been involved in  
relationships since the death of her spouse, and individual attributes such as age and personality. The 1995 to  
1997 Statistics Canada data, relied on by Brown for these calculations, report information according to prior  
marital status, which Brown noted to be an important consideration because widows have a lower likelihood of  
remarriage than those who are divorced. Taunton on the other hand based his probabilities on dated statistics  
(1984 to 1986 data), the reliability of which is questionable given the date of publication and the potential impact  
of the 1985 divorce legislation.  
e) Post-blast Common Law Relationships  
The Plaintiffs argued that common law relationships of the three widows create circumstances that should be  
ignored in the dependency analysis because these women have not received any financial benefit from their recent  
partners, or, if any benefit is realized, these are collateral benefits that are not deductible from their losses. In  
each of Brown’s estimates, for all scenarios offered, she makes no deduction but does factor in the potential that  
each may marry their current companions. Taunton, however, reduced the dependency claim to account for the  
common law relationship and then applied the divorce rate to these figures, which Brown argued to be  
inappropriate given the statistical evidence that the rate of dissolution of a common law relationship is  
significantly higher than that of a marriage.  
In considering what effect a common law relationship has on a widow’s claim, the Defendants offered some  
authority supporting their position. In Andani Estate v. Peel (Regional Municipality), 1989 CarswellOnt 1646  
(H.C.J.), aff’d (1993), 66 O.A.C. 137 (C.A.), leave to appeal refused [1994] 1 S.C.R. x, Arbour J., as she then was,  
considered the impact of a three-year common law relationship on a widow’s dependency claim. As in the case at  
bar, the widow testified that she had no intention of entering into a legal marriage with her new partner. In  
reducing the dependency portion of the claim, Arbour J. offered the following reasons at para. 98:  
Laura Bannon’s relationship with Wallace Banks appears to be a stable one. Even though she has expressed an  
intention not to remarry, Laura Bannon is currently living under a family arrangement which creates mutual  
financial obligations. This factor must be taken into account in the determination of her pecuniary loss resulting  
from the death of her husband.  
Similarly, the presence of a common law spouse can have the effect of reducing or negating a widow’s claim for  
loss of valuable services. This was found in Naeth Estate v. Warburton (1993), 116 Sask. R. 11 (C.A.), Sherstobitoff  
J.A., for the Court, stated at paras. 2-5, 7:  
[2] As to damages, the only issue in contention was the entitlement of the husband and child of the deceased to  
damages for loss of the homemaking and domestic services of the deceased from and after April, 1986, when the  
husband began living with Ms. Benson. It is common ground that she provided these services from that time  
until the date of the trial. The husband had a child with her and gave evidence that they would likely marry. The  
respondents concede that there should have been no award for damages under this head from April, 1986, to date  
of trial, but say that both the husband and child, and particularly the child, should be entitled to damages for  
future loss of homemaking and domestic services.  
[3] The authorities are clear that a remarriage of a spouse who is a plaintiff in a fatal accident action is something  
which must be taken into account in determing damages. The same applies to a common law relationship such as  
we have here. The extent to which damages will be affected is a question of fact depending on all of the  
circumstances and must be dealt with on a case by case basis.  
[4] In this case, given that the new relationship appears to be solid and permanent, and given that both the  
husband and child have been awarded substantial damages under other heads which are not contested on the  
grounds of the new relationship, and considering the amount of these damages globally, it is our view that the  
husband and child have not established any loss, actual or potential, of value of homemaking and domestic  
services from April, 1986.  
[5] The amount of the loss of homemaking and domestic servies from date of death to April, 1986, is fixed at  
$20,000. This amount is based on the evidence of the actuary as to the value of these services with an additional  
allowance for the disruption and disturbance involved in having to replace the services which would have been  
supplied by the deceased.  
.¼  
[7] In summary, the amount awarded for past homemaking and domestic services is reduced from $50,340 to  
$20,000, the amount awarded for future homemaking and domestic services is reduced from $112,345 to $0, and  
the award of prejudgment interest is set aside. In all other respects the appeal is dismissed and the judgment  
below is confirmed.  
I endorse the views of both authorities cited, supra, the details of which will be discussed further in each  
applicable case.  
f) Survivor’s Own Loss  
In the course of computing the Plaintiffs dependency losses, the Plaintiffs claim a “survivors’ loss” for each widow.  
This concept of survivors’ loss is a subject of disagreement between the parties. It was argued by the Plaintiffs  
that, in accordance with the Fatal Accidents Act, supra, the Court must begin an assessment by considering the  
“comforts and station of life that the families would have enjoyed, but for the untimely death of the deceased”.  
This is achieved, and conceded by both Plaintiffs and Defendants as appropriate by first considering what the  
total family income would have been, less the portion that would have been consumed solely by the deceased.  
The remainder is considered to be the “comforts and station in life” that the survivors would have enjoyed, and  
are entitled to recover. However, the Defendants suggested that survivor’s loss is not part of the dependency  
claim, but rather is a separate claim for loss of income. Furthermore, they argued that the Plaintiffs are not  
entitled to recover due to a lack of factual basis for such a claim; additionally it was not sought in the Amended  
Statement of Claim. Instead, the Defendants proposed that the comforts and station in life that the families  
would have enjoyed (but for the deaths) be compared with the comforts and station in life that the families will  
enjoy (with the blast), assuming that the widows now earn exactly what they would have if they continued in their  
pre-blast job. The Plaintiffs, however, argued that to bring them up to the comfort and station in life that they  
would have enjoyed but for the fatal blast, it is essential to examine what station in life the family actually  
experiences. It is difficult to conceive how ignoring the clear, cogent evidence pertaining to the actual  
circumstances of the survivors could render any award meaningful.  
Brown expressed the loss as being the difference between the widow’s dependency assuming that she continued  
her pre-blast job and the widow’s dependency assuming her actual income. Brown testified that “her calculation  
is but a subtraction of the actual earnings of the widows from the ‘but for’ or hypothetical earnings of the widows”.  
The difference in approach between the Plaintiffs and Defendants is as set forth in the Plaintiffs’ final submission.  
The Plaintiffs opened this claim by arguing that when assessing damages it is common ground for the Court to  
begin by considering the situation the families would have been in, but for the deaths; and it is also common  
ground that in doing so the Court must first consider the total family income (including both the husband’s  
income and the wife’s income), and then deduct the portion that the deceased would have personally consumed.  
The Plaintiffs and Defendants each subscribed to a different formula in computing the dependency, the difference  
being this: the Defendants’ formula assumes that the wife’s income in the actual situation is the same as it would  
be if the husband had not died, while the Plaintiffs’ formula assumes it is different.  
The Plaintiffs argued that the difference between the parties’ positions is not complicated, as the Plaintiffs  
compared the lives that the widows would have enjoyed but for the blast with the lives they are actually living.  
The Defendants do not even consider the widows’ actual situations, but assume, contrary to fact, that each widow  
now earns exactly what she would have earned if she had continued in her pre-blast job.  
The Defendants argued:  
The “actual” earnings of a surviving spouse (whether they be greater than or less than the projected earnings) are  
not relevant to the calculation of a dependency loss. A surviving spouse may choose to work more than, or less  
than, he or she would have worked but for the death of his or her spouse. If he or she earns more than he or she  
likely would have earned in the “but for” scenario, those extra earnings do not operate so as to decrease the loss.  
If she or she earns less, they do not operate to increase the loss.  
The Defendants cited Lamont v. Pederson 1981 1997 (SK CA), [1981], 2 W.W.R. 24 (Sask. C.A.), where the  
Court, per Brownridge J.A., held that a widow’s subsequently acquired employment is not a contingency to be  
taken into account to reduce her dependency award. The Court decided that to reduce a claimant’s dependency  
award because she has a job would have the unjust effect of penalizing a claimant for obtaining employment.  
Specifically, the Court reasoned at 31-32:  
At the date of her husband’s death, the widow was not working outside the home. The fact that she is now  
working in gainful employment is prima facie irrelevant in the absence of any evidence that she would probably  
have taken employment and contributed to the family income even if her husband had not been killed.... [S]he  
had the right to remain a homemaker after her husband’s death and she should not be penalized for going to  
work.  
Further, the Defendants submitted that the Plaintiffs make this claim under the guise that the surviving spouse  
sustained her own injury, a psychological or nervous type of injury, and this resulted in her inability to earn, thus  
the “survivor’s own loss”. However, as the argument proceeded, it was said that there is an “almost complete  
absence of any evidence” resulting in any diminished earning capacity. The Defendants also argued that such a  
claim is not pleaded.  
The upshot of Brown’s evidence is that, although both experts, quite properly and in accordance with accepted  
principles, calculate the dependency losses based on the hypothetical earnings streams, Brown then adds a loss  
of earnings claim. Defendants’ counsel submitted:  
During oral argument, we submitted that the Plaintiffs’ counsel’ statement in paragraph 26 of the February 20  
Submissions to the effect that Ms. Brown’s “survivors loss” is the “difference between the widow’s dependency  
assuming she continued at her pre-blast job and the “widows dependency (assuming her actual income)” is “just  
wrong”. We stand by that statement. Notwithstanding the mathematical gyrations introduced by Plaintiffs’  
counsel in Appendix B of their Final Submissions, an indicated earlier, nowhere in her calculations does Ms.  
Brown calculate a dependency claim based on actual income figures.  
I agree.  
The Plaintiffs argued that Ruiz v. Mount Saint Joseph Hospital (2001), 150 B.C.A.C. 161, 2001 BCCA 207,  
supported their position. In that case, the Court found that, as a result of the loss of their mother, the children  
were unable to stay in Canada and were deprived of a Canadian secondary school education, and, on the evidence,  
the children had suffered a quantifiable pecuniary loss by reason of their mother not remaining alive which arose  
from the loss of her guidance and support that would have enabled them to remain in Canada. The pecuniary  
effect of the delay in their permanent settlement in Canada was the subject of economic evidence, and it was  
established that there was a reduction in earning capacity of the children as a result of their foreign education and  
delayed entry into the workforce in Canada. This, however, was a case not for loss of dependency on income but  
for “assessment of the damages the girls suffered when they lost the benefit of their relationship with their  
mother” (para. 74).  
It is correct, as Defendants’ counsel has argued, that:  
No evidence has been led by the Plaintiffs to suggest that any widows’ earning capacity has been lessened as a  
result of their relocating from Yellowknife to say Alberta, British Columbia or Saskatchewan. Neither, it is  
submitted, did the Plaintiffs attempt to lead any medical or other expert evidence to suggest that there is any  
medical or psychological cause for any decreased earnings.  
A review of sums claimed for survivor’s own loss looks to this conclusion respecting each widow:  
(a) Sheila Fullowka - claim abandoned;  
(b) Doreen Hourie - $29,000 claimed;  
(c) Tracy Neill - $780,000 claimed;  
(d) Judit Pandev - $110,000 claimed;  
(e) Carlene Rowsell - no claim advanced;  
(f) Karen Russell - no claim advanced;  
(g) Bonnie Sawler - no claim advanced;  
(h) Doreen Vodnoski - $87,000 claimed.  
I reject this survivor’s own loss claim, as I am of the opinion that it can only be viewed as a new cause of action,  
not pleaded or delineated in the Amended Statement of Claim. Secondly, these claims are compensatory claims  
for the inability to work giving rise to loss of earnings. The evidence at trial failed to demonstrate any medical  
evidence to support the same. In these circumstances, I accept the Defendants’ submission that the actual  
earnings are not relevant to the assessment of a dependency loss, for, if the widow earns more than she likely  
would have earned in the “but for” scenario, these extra earnings should not go to decrease the loss, and, if she  
earns less, it should not operate to increase the loss. The ratio decidendi of Lamont, supra, at 31-32, is  
compelling.  
Valuable Services Claims  
There are differences between the experts as to the calculation of valuable services, arising primarily out of their  
lack of consensus in how much time the deceased contributed prior to their deaths, and the amount of time that is  
now reduced as a result of their absence in the families. This difference arises out of the respective reliance on  
differing available data. I accept the calculations provided by Brown as her statistical information is more current  
and therefore more reliable than that of Taunton. It should be noted that at trial Taunton provided amendments  
to his valuable services calculations, by adjusting his calculations (approximating them to use Taunton’s words)  
so as to increase the award. Nevertheless, I generally endorse the more precise methodology that Brown has  
employed in using statistics as a benchmark, and further considering the trial evidence, which was not done by  
Taunton. However, it was necessary to reject the estimates provided by Brown in some cases, as she ignored the  
highly significant impact of common law partners to a claim for loss of valuable services.  
Tax Gross-up and Management Fees  
Each of the Plaintiffs claims tax gross-up and management fees in varying amounts. The Defendants dispute the  
Plaintiffs’ right in law to recover the same. I will deal with assessment of the amounts sought later herein. The  
issue between the parties is whether tax gross-up and management fees are available to the Plaintiffs as this is a  
Workers’ Compensation Act subrogated action, and the WCB is not liable for taxes; as well, some or all of the  
damages recovered might remain with the WCB.  
Respecting management fees, as there is no certainty that the award recovered will end up in the hands of the  
Plaintiffs, there is no requirement to manage the same, and, absent that certainty at this stage, the Plaintiffs’  
according to the Defendants, cannot establish an entitlement in law to the same. I repeat (for convenience) the  
relevant provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act:  
12.(1) No action lies for the recovery of compensation, and all claims for compensation shall be determined by the  
Board.  
(2) This Act and the regulations are in place of all rights and causes of action, statutory or otherwise, to which a  
worker or his or her legal personal representative or dependants are or might become entitled against  
(a) the employer by whom he or she was employed at the time of the accident, or  
(b) any worker in the employ of such employer,  
by reason of personal injury to or the death of the worker caused by an accident to the worker that arises out of  
and in the course of his or her employment....  
(3) Any party to an action may, on notice to any other parties to the action, apply to the Board for adjudication  
and determination of the question of the plaintiff’s right to compensation and the adjudication and determination  
is final and conclusive.  
(4) Where an accident happens to a worker in the course of employment and compensation under this Act is  
paid in respect of the accident and the circumstances of the accident are such as to also entitle the worker, his or  
her legal personal representative or his dependants to an action against a person other than a person mentioned  
in paragraph (2)(a) or (b), the Board is subrogated to the cause of action of the worker, his or her legal personal  
representative or his or her dependants against such other person for or in respect of the personal injury to or  
death of the worker.  
13.(l) Where the Board has become subrogated to the rights of a worker or his or her legal personal representative  
or his or her dependants under section 12,  
(a) no payment to or settlement with the worker or his or her legal personal representative or dependants shall be  
made for or in respect of any claim, cause of action or judgment arising from that except with the consent of the  
Board, and any payment or settlement made in contravention of this section is void;  
(b) an action against any person arising out of injury to or death of a worker may, with the consent of the Board,  
be taken by the worker or his or her legal personal representative or his or her dependants, or the action may be  
taken by the Board in the name of the worker or his or her legal personal representative or his or her dependants,  
as the case may be, without the consent of the person in whose name the action is taken;  
(c) if an action is taken by the Board it shall indemnify and save harmless the worker, his or her legal personal  
representative or his or her dependants from and against all costs or damages incurred in respect of the action,  
including costs or damages awarded by the court to the defendant, but excluding any costs that have been  
incurred by the worker, his or her legal personal representative or his or her dependants without authority of the  
Board; and  
(d) the Board may at any time, where action has been taken by the Board or the worker or his or her legal  
personal representative or his or her dependants and whether or not judgment has been given in such action,  
effect a settlement of the claim for each amount as it considers advisable.  
(2) Where in any action in which the Board is subrogated to the rights of the worker, his or her legal personal  
representative or his or her dependants, payment into court is made pursuant to the Rules of the Supreme Court,  
the Clerk of the Supreme Court, on receipt of notice by the Board of its subrogation in the matter, shall not make  
payment out of court except with the consent of the Board.  
(3) Notice to the Clerk of the Supreme Court under subsection (2) may be made in the same manner as is  
provided in the Rules of the Supreme Court for service by registered mail.  
(4) Where money is received by the Board because it is subrogated to the rights of a worker or his or her legal  
personal representative or dependants,  
(a) the Board may accept the money and give a receipt for it and, where the money is accepted in full settlement,  
may release the person paying the money or on whose behalf the money is paid from liability in respect of the  
personal injury to or death of the worker resulting from the accident;  
(b) if the judgment of the court under which the money is received clearly indicates that a portion of the award is  
for pain and suffering suffered by the worker and resulting from the injury, the Board may pay to the worker,  
from the money remaining in its hands after payment of all legal costs incurred in recovering that money, an  
amount that bears the same proportion to the money remaining in its hands as the portion of the award  
attributable to pain and suffering bears to the total award;  
(c) if the money is received as a result of an action taken or negotiations carried on behalf of the worker or his or  
her legal personal representative or his or her dependants, the Board may pay to that person, from the money  
remaining in its hands after payment of all legal costs incurred in recovering the money; an amount equal to 25%  
of the gross amount received by the Board, but where payment is made to the worker under paragraph (b),  
payment to the worker under this paragraph shall be made only to the extent to which 25% of the money received  
exceeds the payment made to the worker under paragraph (b); and  
(d) if the balance of the money remaining in the Board’s hands after payment of all legal costs incurred in  
recovering the money and after payment of such amounts, if any, as are required to be paid under paragraphs (b)  
and (c), exceeds the costs of the accident to the Board, including the capital costs of any pension award, the excess  
shall be paid over to the worker, his or her legal personal representative or his or her dependants, as the case may  
be.  
The general rule in fatal accident cases is that there must be an allowance assessed for the impact of any income  
tax from investment of damages for future pecuniary losses. See Ken Cooper-Stephenson, Personal Injury  
Damages in Canada, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1996) at 707-709.  
The Defendants’ position put succinctly in their final submissions was:  
329. It is important to understand the role of the Board in an action such as this. A review of the Act  
demonstrates that the Board has complete control of the action. For example:  
(1) The Board is subrogated to the cause of action of the worker or his personal representative (s.12(4)).  
(2) The Board has the right to bring the action without the consent of the worker. On the other hand, a worker  
can only bring an action if the Board consents (s.13(1)(b)).  
(3) Unless the Board consents to any settlement, it is void (s.13(1)(a)).  
(4) It is only the Board that can effect a settlement (s.13(1)(d)).  
(5) If money is received by the Board, it is only the Board that can release the person paying the money  
(s.13(4)(a)).  
(6) It is only after the Board receives money and after it has paid all of its legal costs incurred in recovering the  
money, that the Board may decide to pay 25% of the gross amount received to the worker or his representative.  
(13 (4) c)  
330. It is submitted that to calculate a tax gross-up which entirely ignores the reality of this legislative scheme is  
not appropriate.  
One must note that an analysis of the Workers’ Compensation Act makes it clear that its objective is not to inject  
as much of the damages as possible into the hands of the Plaintiffs; rather, it is a scheme designed to compensate  
injured workers in accordance with a pre-determined formula.  
Further, the Defendants stated in their final submissions:  
112. Even if the statutory scheme had been reversed and the monies in the first instance were payable to the  
individual plaintiffs who were then required by statute to pay over a certain amount to the Board, the result would  
be the same. It is generally recognized that where the plaintiff will be required to immediately pay over a portion  
of the lump sum award to third parties pursuant to a subrogated claim, this amount should not be subject to a tax  
gross-up since it will not be invested by the plaintiff, and will not generate income which is subject to tax.  
S.M. Waddams, The Law of Damages, supra, p. 3-63 - 3-64, para 3.1180. K. Cooper-Stephenson, Personal Injury  
Damages in Canada, supra, p. 465 and p. 708. [footnotes omitted].  
C.L. Brown, Damages, Estimating Pecuniary Loss, looseleaf (Aurora: Canada Law book, October 2002) at 7-48.18  
The Defendants relied on Daigle v. Cape Breton Crane Rentals Ltd. (1987), 1987 7832 (NB CA), 91 N.B.R.  
(2d) 189 (C.A.), where Rice J.A., for the Court, stated at para. 21:  
It was established that of the amount awarded the sum of $145,000.00 is to be paid to the Workers’  
Compensation Board. Pursuant to the provisions of the Income Tax Act, S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 63, and the Workers’  
Compensation Act, R.S.N.B. 1973, c. W-13, the Workers’ Compensation Board does not pay taxes on its earnings  
from such funds. In addition, benefits paid by the Workers’ Compensation Board to Mrs. Daigle do not incur tax  
in her hands. In these circumstances, it is my opinion that neither the Workers’ Compensation Board nor Mrs.  
Daigle should receive any allowance for income tax on this portion of the award.  
Plaintiffs’ counsel sought to distinguish Daigle, supra, saying this:  
In that action, the Court allowed the tax gross-up on the individual plaintiff’s award for the future income loss.  
However, the Board also had a claim of its own as a named plaintiff, and the Court denied a tax gross-up on the  
actuarially determined present worth value of the future WCB pension part of the award. Note: the legislation in  
New Brunswick was different from the NWT Act, in that in New Brunswick, the WCB was given the right to bring  
an action in its own name as a plaintiff in the action. The Board was not advancing a subrogated claim. Thus, the  
Court made separate awards to the individual plaintiffs and to the Board. The Court could delineate between  
amounts recovered by the plaintiffs and those recovered by the Board in its own name and right. After examining  
what the claim of the board was and how much the loss of future income claim of the widow and her children was,  
the Court directed:  
That being said, calculation of the gross-up on the portion of the award to be paid to Mrs. Daigle is necessary.  
My colleague Vertes J. in Fullowka v. Royal Oak Mines Inc., 1998 5226 (NWT SC), [1998] N.W.T.R. 217  
(S.C.), said this at paras. 14-16:  
Counsel referred me to the judgment in Daigle v. Cape Breton Crane Rentals Ltd. (1987), 91 N.B.R. (2d) 189  
(N.B.C.A.). The pertinent part of that case involved an appeal from the assessment of damages awarded to a  
widow and the New Brunswick Workers’ Compensation Board. The trial judge had awarded a collective lump  
sum to the two parties and had included within that amount a sum as an adjustment for the impact of tax. The  
total award was $254,200 of which the sum of $145,000 was to be paid to the Board, $72,800 was to be paid to  
the widow, and $36,400 was the tax gross-up. The problem, being the calculation of the gross-up only on the  
widow’s share, was described by Rice J.A. (at page 203):  
It was established that of the amount awarded the sum of $145,000.00 is to be paid to the Workers Compensation  
Board. Pursuant to the provisions of the Income Tax Act, S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 63, and the Workers’ Compensation  
Act, R.S.N.B. 1973, c. W-13, the Workers’ Compensation Board does not pay taxes on its earnings from such  
funds. In addition, benefits paid by the Workers’ Compensation Board to Mrs. Daigle do not incur tax in her  
hands. In these circumstances, it is my opinion that neither the Workers’ Compensation Board nor Mrs. Daigle  
should receive any allowance for income tax on this portion of the award.  
That being said, calculation of the gross-up on the portion of the award to be paid to Mrs. Daigle is necessary.  
However, the evidence before the court does not allow an extrapolation from the known figures of $36,400.00 as  
gross-up on an investment of $217,800.00 to a proportionate sum representing a gross-up amount on a  
$72,800.00 investment.  
As a result, instead of sending the matter back for a new hearing on the calculation of the gross-up, the court did  
its own assessment of the gross-up on the widow’s share.  
Plaintiffs’ counsel argued that somehow the New Brunswick legislation was different than the Northwest  
Territories statute. I examined the extracts provided by counsel and I fail to discern a significant difference.  
Under the relevant New Brunswick statute the Board is subrogated to the rights of the claimant, the Board may  
maintain an action in the name of the claimant, and the excess amount recovered over and above the Board’s  
entitlement is paid over to the claimant. In substance the scheme is the same.  
I was not told whether the tax treatment of such funds in the Northwest Territories is the same. But, it is common  
in fatal accident actions that a plaintiff’s future dependency loss will attract a gross-up calculation since account  
must be taken of the fact that income tax will be payable on the interest earned on any award by the court. It  
seems to me, therefore, that the information sought by these defendants may be relevant and helpful to an  
assessment of the overall potential liability since, with this information, an educated calculation can be made of  
the likely tax gross-up on that part of the award that will attract the gross-up. This does not predetermine what  
portion of the award that will be nor does it create some tax-free benefit to the defendants that does not exist in  
law. It will merely aid the defendants and eventually the trial judge, in making a complete and accurate  
assessment of damages.  
Any discussion about subrogation must begin with its appropriate definition, which can be found in Castellain v.  
Preston (1883), 11 Q.B.D. 380 at 388 (C.A.), per Lord Brett:  
In order to apply the doctrine of subrogation, it seems to me that the full and absolute meaning of the word must  
be used, that is to say, the insurer must be placed in the position of the assured. Now it seems to me that in order  
to carry out the fundamental rule of insurance law, this doctrine of subrogation must be carried to the extent  
which I am now about to endeavour to express, namely, that as between the underwriter and the assured the  
underwriter is entitled to the advantage of every right of the assured, whether such right consists in contract,  
fulfilled or unfulfilled, or in remedy for tort capable of being insisted on or already insisted on, or in any other  
right, whether by way of condition or otherwise, legal or equitable, which can be, or has been exercised or has  
accrued, and whether such right could or could not be enforced by the insurer in the name of the assured by the  
exercise or acquiring of which right or condition the loss against which the assured is insured, can be, or has been  
diminished.  
The Plaintiffs argued that costs recovered by the WCB play an important part of the award and thus the sum to  
eventually go into the Plaintiffs’ pockets. That is so. It is also answered in that it is the WCB, not the individual  
family members, that has property in any award and costs recovered. It is the only entity that can accept the  
award, or provide a Release for it. What it ultimately does with the award is within its discretion.  
The Plaintiffs relied on Townsend v. Kroppmanns, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 315, 2004 SCC 10; however, lack of the issue of  
subrogation distinguishes it from this case. It is authority for the proposition that a Court should not embark on  
an inquiry as to how a plaintiff might utilize funds recovered after judgment since, as the plaintiff has property in  
the award, she is free to do with it as she wishes and a Court must not factor in where the funds go after judgment  
or how a plaintiff will spend that which she receives. See also Duncan Estate v. Baddeley (1997), 1997  
11516 (AB CA), 196 A.R. 161 (C.A.), leave to appeal refused [1997] 3 S.C.R. v.  
I reiterate that it is only the WCB who has property in the award here. Two things must be noted at this juncture:  
firstly, the WCB is the beneficial plaintiff under the statute; and, secondly, depending on legal fees and costs  
recovered, the Plaintiffs might recover little or nothing under s. 13(4) of the Workers’ Compensation Act. The  
costs issue will not be determined until after judgment is rendered. The statute renders it impossible to  
determine the compensation payable. As Vertes J. said in Fullowka, supra, at para. 18:  
It is also no answer to say, as plaintiffs’ counsel said to me, that the compensation payable by the Board is easily  
determined from the formula established by the statute. That presumes that the statute contains all of the factors  
that go into the calculation of payments. I am not satisfied that it does nor do I think that these defendants  
should have to assume that and guess at the figures.  
Some or all of the future dependency losses could be paid as future WCB pensions, and that would not attract tax.  
That said, the Plaintiffs appeared to have some expectation that, in the assessment of damages, the Court should  
calculate a tax gross-up. On the other hand, they argued that “the Court should give no consideration to what will  
be done with the award post-trial”. They said this in their final submissions:  
Indeed, following these authorities, if the Board’s reimbursement is paid only out of the Plaintiffs’ portion of the  
past losses, then the Plaintiffs may receive their full future losses, thus requiring the award to be grossed up. This  
demonstrates the legal logic of not ‘looking behind’ what will happen to an award after judgment. Moreover,  
pursuant to s.26(3), the Board may enter into an agreement with any claimant to commute the future pension  
benefits. Were the Board to do that with any claimant in this case (obviously after all legal costs have been  
determined and the judgment has been collected), then the claimant would receive more out of the damage award  
assessed, but give up the periodic pension payments.  
The Plaintiffs argued that support for this argument is found in Townsend, supra.  
The Plaintiffs relied on the “collateral benefits” decisions found in Cunningham v. Wheeler; Cooper v. Miller;  
Shanks v. McGee, 1994 120 (SCC), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 359. Those decisions do not assist, as the Defendants  
do not say that they wish to deduct any WCB subrogated amounts.  
The Plaintiffs also relied on Desrochers Estate v. Simpson Air (1981) Ltd., [1995] N.W.T.J. No. 121 (S.C.), as  
authority that the Court should not consider the presence of the WCB herein. However, that case did not consider  
the tax gross-up issue; secondly, Vertes J. in Fullowka supra, distinguished Desrochers Estate, on that basis. The  
same response can be made in respect of Rossignol v. Hart, 1956 66 (SCC), [1956] S.C.R. 314.  
In the result, the Plaintiffs cannot recover amounts for gross-up. Management fees must thus receive like  
treatment.  
Should I have erred in these findings, I would award the sums claimed by the Plaintiffs for management fees and  
the sums claimed for tax gross-up for each Plaintiff, the former as calculated by Gordon Smith.  
Relief Granted  
a) Fullowka Family  
I accept Brown’s assessment for Vern Fullowka, which sets his base income at $101,900, agreeing that to use an  
average earnings calculation would understate this base value because it would not adequately reflect the higher  
earnings Vern would have enjoyed in the NWT, as the family had only relocated to the North less than one year  
prior to his death. Brown also assumed that Vern would have retired at age 62, and that the Fullowkas would not  
have divorced, nor will Sheila Fullowka remarry in the future. I accept each of these assumptions as being  
reasonable and supported by the evidence. An assumption that was subject to significant disagreement by the  
Defendants was that the Fullowka family would have remained in Yellowknife indefinitely. I acknowledge that  
the Fullowkas had planned to return to British Columbia, but it was Sheila’s evidence that they had planned to  
retire there and would remain in Yellowknife at least until their son finished high school, essentially planning to  
remain in Yellowknife for about 12 years. However, it also must be noted that the purpose for relocating to the  
North was for Vern’s employment, to earn sufficient savings so that they could eventually retire to British  
Columbia. Considering all of the evidence, in my view the Fullowkas would have remained in Yellowknife  
indefinitely as the more generous income would have enabled a more comfortable retirement. Furthermore, for  
the reasons aforementioned, I accept Brown’s calculation for loss of valuable services.  
Therefore, the award for the Fullowka family is $1,865,589 for dependency losses and $230,952 for valuable  
services losses. The claim for care, guidance and companionship is set, by agreement of the parties, at $80,000,  
as are special damages at $19,692.41.  
b) Hourie Family  
I accept Brown’s suggested scenario which sets Norm Hourie’s base income at $106,000, to be projected until an  
assumed retirement age of 65. Furthermore, although Doreen Hourie testified that they had planned to leave  
Yellowknife if the strike had not ended by Christmas, and Norm would have sought employment in contract  
mining, I agree with the Plaintiffs that this plan was formulated as a result of volatility caused or contributed to by  
the negligence of the Defendants. But for the nature of the strike leading to Norm’s death, I find that the Houries  
would have remained in Yellowknife indefinitely, thereby rejecting the Defendants’ argument that Norm would  
have earned an annual income of $75,943 (almost a 30% reduction in earnings) in British Columbia as a contract  
miner beginning in December of 1992. Brown’s scenario does not include a reduction for a potential divorce  
between the Houries, nor is there a reduction for the possibility that Doreen will remarry in the future. In light of  
Doreen’s evidence these are appropriate assumptions.  
Therefore, the award for the Hourie family is $922,974 for dependency losses and $124,254 for valuable services  
losses. The awards for special damages and care, guidance and companionship are, as agreed, $11,495.59 and  
$70,000 respectively.  
c) Neill Family  
The situation with calculating the Neill claim is complicated by the post blast common law relationship that  
Tracey Neill has entered into with Sartori. The two have been together for approximately 10 years and have a  
child together. Furthermore, their incomes and expenses have been, and continue to be, pooled. Although Tracey  
Neill testified that she does not intend to marry Sartori, this relationship is clearly one of dependency, and is  
accounted for as such in the award. Unfortunately, income information for Sartori was sparse, but I accept the  
proposal of the Defendants to assume that Sartori’s annual income continues to be $50,000 as it was proved to be  
between $50,000 and $56,000 in the period from 1995 to 2000. Thus, I accept the estimate provided by Taunton  
for dependency loss, which assumes the above-stated income for Sartori, and also builds in a divorce contingency  
for this relationship, although it may be understated. Furthermore, Taunton’s calculation applied a divorce  
contingency for the marriage between Tracey Neill and the deceased, which I find to be appropriate given their  
ages, and the infancy of their marriage at the time of Chris Neill’s death. Moreover, Taunton appropriately  
applied a modest divorce contingency of one-half of the statistical rate, which I accept.  
As for valuable services, however, I find that Sartori does not replace the deceased in any significant manner, and  
therefore is not a factor to justify a reduction in the valuable services claim. Therefore, I prefer the estimate  
provided by Brown in this regard.  
The award for Tracey Neill is valued at $723,831 for dependency losses, and $239,238 for valuable services losses.  
The special damages award is set as agreed, at $15,402. There is no award for care, guidance and companionship.  
d) Pandev Family  
A highly significant difference between Brown’s assessment for Joe Pandev’s projected earnings and that offered  
by Taunton is the retirement age applied to their scenarios. Taunton assumed that Joe Pandev would have retired  
two years after the blast, while Brown assumed that he would have worked for ten years to retire at age 65.  
Although the Pandevs had originally planned an early retirement, the arrival of their granddaughter was one  
factor that altered this plan. On consideration of all of the evidence, I find that it would be unreasonable to  
assume that Joe would have retired in 1994, but rather it was likely that he would have continued in mining in  
Yellowknife until the age of 65. Furthermore, I note that Brown did not apply any reduction for the potential for  
divorce or remarriage, which is also appropriate.  
The Pandev family award is $996,953 for dependency losses and $196,887 valuable services losses. The special  
damages and those for care, guidance and companionship are, as agreed, $16,308.89 and $35,000 respectively.  
e) Carol Riggs  
The dependency calculations for Carol Riggs are not based on Shane Rigg’s income, but rather based on the  
amount of his contribution to her prior to his death. Taunton assumed that Carol received an accelerated  
inheritance of $4,000 from an RRSP and $10,000 from the sale of Shane’s truck which reduces her loss of  
dependency. Taunton then made his calculations on the assumption that Shane would have provided his mother  
with $1,684 annually, adjusted to correspond with inflation and unemployment contingencies, until he reached  
65 years of age. Conversely, Brown’s assessment is grossly overestimated as it assumed that Shane would have  
provided his mother with $10,380 per year. There is no evidence that Shane ever contributed anything remotely  
close to this figure, thus it would be absurd to accept this assumption.  
As for valuable services, Brown’s calculations reflect the assumption that Shane would have contributed 68 hours  
per year. I find this to be reasonable, particularly in light of the fact that Carol had moved to Yellowknife in 1992,  
and then returned in 2003 hoping to improve her arthritic condition. Therefore, I find that, had Shane lived,  
Carol would have remained in Yellowknife indefinitely. It is therefore reasonable to assume that Shane would  
have contributed 68 hours per year in valuable services to her, as the evidence demonstrated that tendency.  
Therefore, the dependency award for Carol Riggs is $30,623, and the valuable services award is $24,007. Special  
damages are as agreed, $9,574.63.  
f) Vodnoski Family  
The significant difference between the assessments provided by the Plaintiffs and the Defendants with regard to  
the Vodnoski claim is the manner in which Doreen Vodnoski’s common law relationship with Bob Harrison is  
regarded. Because Doreen and Bob are not married, the Plaintiffs only “factor” Bob in through the assumption  
that Doreen might get married in the future. The Defendants, however, assume that Doreen has received and will  
continue to receive pecuniary benefits arising out of the relationship. As found in aforementioned claims, on  
examination of all of the evidence, I find that Doreen has received benefit from this relationship and the claim  
ought to be reduced to reflect this reality as it pertains to both dependency and valuable services. Therefore, the  
scenarios proposed by Taunton are more applicable than those offered by Brown.  
The scenario proposed by Taunton properly assumed that the Vodnoskis would have remained in Yellowknife  
indefinitely and that David Vodnoski would have continued his employment at Giant. Furthermore, Taunton  
assumed that Bob has replaced the financial support offered to Doreen by David with regard to shelter,  
household operation, furnishings and contributions towards food. Given the evidence provided by Doreen, I  
agree with these adjustments. Furthermore, in consideration of the valuable services losses, I reject the  
assessment provided by Brown, which clearly overstates the loss by ignoring Bob’s contribution since their  
cohabitation from 1997. I also find it appropriate in this case to consider, as Taunton did, the possibility of  
divorce and remarriage in the Vodnoski marriage, as their relationship, like that of the Neills, was in a youthful  
stage.  
Therefore, the Vodnoski family is awarded $924,983 for dependency losses, and $88,896 for valuable services  
losses. The special damages are, as agreed, at $21,620.34 and the agreed amount for loss of care, guidance and  
companionship is $80,000.  
g) Rowsell Family  
Although Robert Rowsell had some background in trucking, I find that he would have continued in mining had he  
lived. Moreover, he would have secured full-time employment and his family would have relocated to  
Yellowknife. Therefore, I accept the scenario proposed by Brown which sets Robert Rowsell’s base income at  
$64,437 and his assumed retirement age at 62. Further, in consideration of all of the evidence, I find that the  
Rowsells would not have divorced, nor will Carlene Rowsell remarry in the future, requiring no reduction for  
these contingencies to the dependency award.  
The presence of a common law spouse residing with Carlene from 1993 to 1999 was conceded by the Defendants  
to be of no financial benefit to Carlene. However, the Defendants argued that Carlene’s common law partner,  
Dasilva, is a factor that ought to reduce the claim for valuable services losses. The Plaintiffs denied any benefit in  
this regard. I agree that for the 6 ½-year period that Dasilva lived with her, Carlene received benefit in the form  
of valuable services from him, thus I accept the estimate offered by Taunton.  
Therefore, the award for the Rowsell family is $1,265,428 for dependency losses and the valuable services losses  
are calculated at $95,000. The damages for care, guidance and companionship are, as agreed, at $80,000, and  
no special damages are sought.  
h) Russell Family  
I accept Brown’s scenario which sets Arnold Russell’s base income at $42,802 and assumes a retirement age of  
62. The Defendants argued that it is unrealistic to assume that Arnold would have continued to work at Giant, as  
he was on his “last run” at the time of his death. Furthermore, the evidence was clear that the Russell family had  
no intention of moving to Yellowknife. I cannot ignore the evidence of Karen Russell that, although her husband  
had planned to leave Giant after his six-week term was over, he was open to returning after the strike had ended.  
Furthermore, given that they were planning to travel in their retirement, I find that, having established mining  
connections in Yellowknife, it is reasonable to assume that Arnold would have secured full-time employment in  
this area so as to enjoy the higher wages and opportunities available. Furthermore, I do not find it necessary to  
assume that a miner’s geographic location for employment is contingent on where his family resides; therefore, I  
find that the Russell family would have continued to live in Bathurst, New Brunswick. For these reasons, I  
endorse Brown’s methodology which does not utilize the Northwest Territories’ statistics for the evaluation of  
valuable services, but rather reduces the calculation significantly. I do not find that there is any basis for applying  
divorce and remarriage contingencies for the Russell marriage.  
Therefore, the award for the Russell family for dependency losses is $753,774 and for valuable services losses is  
$182,345. The claims for special damages and care, guidance and companionship are, as agreed, $7,013.47 and  
$70,000 respectively.  
i) Sawler Family  
I accept Brown’s assessment that utilizes $81,268 as a base income for Malcolm Sawler and assumes a retirement  
age of 62. Although Malcolm had hoped that he would be able to retire at age 55, I find that this would have been  
highly unlikely given their plans to start a family in 1992.  
Bonnie Lou Sawler has been in a common law relationship with Buzzi since 1996, and they are currently engaged.  
The two have maintained separate accounts, and Buzzi lives with Bonnie Lou in her home and contributes  
between $400 and $600 per month to the household expenses. The Plaintiffs argued that Buzzi’s financial  
contribution matches his expenses, thereby offering no financial benefit to Bonnie Lou, and I agree. However,  
with regard to valuable services, Buzzi’s presence is beneficial. Bonnie Lou testified that Buzzi is a replacement  
father for her son, and that he is currently unemployed and unable to perform outdoor work but contributes  
increasingly to indoor tasks. Therefore, I find that Buzzi replaces all of Malcolm’s household services during the  
period of time that Bonnie Lou and Buzzi have cohabitated and for the period of time that they will likely cohabit  
in the future.  
Therefore, I accept the calculation offered by Taunton of $69,772 for valuable service losses, and award  
dependency losses in the amount of $1,383,265. Special damages are, as agreed, $6,794.61, as are damages for  
care, guidance and companionship at $90,000.00.  
Summary of Relief Granted  
The following table offers a breakdown of the relief granted for all claims in the Fullowka action (CV 05408):  
Family  
Dependency  
Valuable  
Services  
Care, Companionship, Guidance  
Special Damages  
Total  
Fullowka  
$1,865,589.00  
$230,952.00  
$80,000.00  
$19,692.41  
$2,196,233.41  
Hourie  
$922,974.00  
$124,254.00  
$70,000.00  
$11,495.59  
$1,128,723.59  
Neill  
$723,831.00  
$239,238.00  
$0.00  
$15,402.00  
$978,471.00  
Pandev  
$996,953.00  
$196,887.00  
$35,000.00  
$16,308.89  
$1,245,148.89  
Riggs  
$30,623.00  
$24,007.00  
$0.00  
$9,574.63  
$64,204.63  
Vodnoski  
$924,983.00  
$88,896.00  
$80,000.00  
$21,620.34  
$1,115,499.34  
Rowsell  
$1,265,428.00  
$95,000.00  
$80,000.00  
$0.00  
$1,440,428.00  
Russell  
$753,774.00  
$182,345.00  
$70,000.00  
$7,013.47  
$1,013,132.47  
Sawler  
$1,383,265.00  
$69,772.00  
$90,000.00  
$6,794.61  
$1,549,831.61  
TOTAL  
$8,867,420.00  
$1,251,351.00  
$505,000.00  
$107,901.94  
$10,731,672.94  
Total = $10,731,672.94  
In addition, the Plaintiffs are entitled to the following relief:  
(a) Interest pursuant to the Judicature Act, R.S.N.W.T. 1988, c. J-1, where applicable;  
(b) Goods and Services Tax, where applicable; and  
(c) Costs to be spoken to.  
INTRODUCTION - Action CV 07028 (O’Neil)  
The Plaintiff O’Neil alleges that he, as a result of having come upon the scene of the fatal blast on September 18,  
1992, shortly after it had occurred, and having seen the horrifying sights of the destruction and carnage at the  
scene, including multiple bodies and body parts of his co-workers particularly those of his very close friend Chris  
Neill, has suffered and continues to suffer from PTSD, symptoms which include depression, recurring nightmares  
and sleep disorders, anxiety and panic attacks, survivor’s guilt and suicidal tendencies, repeated visions of the  
aftermath and destruction related to the explosion, loss of concentration and inability to focus and loss of  
enjoyment of life.  
Further, O’Neil alleges that he has been unable to work and has incurred and will continue to incur general and  
pecuniary damages for loss of earnings and earning capacity, employer sponsored-benefits, loss of future  
employment opportunities and other losses.  
The allegations against the Defendants in the Statement of Claim in the O’Neil action concerning their liability for  
the damages claimed by O’Neil are essentially similar to those in the Fullowka action, outlined therein, and those  
that pertain to this subrogated companion action will be set forth herein.  
There are a few differences in the Defendants in the two actions. Royal Oak is not a Defendant in the O’Neil  
action by reason of the provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act. There are two Defendants remaining in the  
O’Neil action who were not or are not now Defendants in the Fullowka action. Gould is named as a Defendant in  
this action and was not named in the Fullowka action. Secondly, the Fullowka action was discontinued against  
the Defendant Hargrove, but he has not been discontinued against in the O’Neil action.  
The basis for liability of the Defendants is the same in both actions, and I make the same findings on liability here,  
mutatis mutandis, as in the Fullowka action.  
One hardly requires scientific indicia to appreciate that the threats, acts of violence, vandalism and  
encouragement of others to engage in such conduct by those identified, supra, that did not result in fatalities was  
because of good chance or incompetence or carelessness in preparation of incendiary and other devices. They  
were, however, no less dangerous. Those identified, supra, knew a Warren act would eventually occur and  
predicted the same. That so many strikers were so involved satisfies me that each of the unions, their executives  
including Hargrove, Slezak, Schram, Seeton and Shearing, certain rank and file members including Bettger, and  
CAW National interlopers such as David, incited and inflamed the members of CASAW Local 4 and must share  
the blame for this conduct as I will set out herein. It does not lie in their mouths to now deny knowledge of what  
the others were doing, for the evidence clearly establishes that they did know, and, because they did know, they  
owed a duty to the workers at Royal Oak and their families, which they breached and attempted to hide from  
behind various rubrics, the most common being that the oral transmission of threats of bodily injury, death and  
destruction of property was mere rhetoric, or just “strike talk” to use Hargrove’s definition. I do not under any  
circumstances, believe that those who espouse such hallucinatory urgings as excuses for damage to other human  
beings and others’ chattels is acceptable, for a person is deemed to know the natural consequences of his or her  
acts.  
I now detail the O’Neil action.  
O’Neil brought their action against the following Defendants:  
(a) Margaret K. Witte - The CEO of Royal Oak Ventures Inc., the employer of O’Neil;  
(b) Pinkerton’s of Canada Limited - The security company hired by Royal Oak Ventures Inc.;  
(c) William J.V. Sheridan - Solicitor and general counsel to Royal Oak Ventures Inc. as well as secretary and  
director thereof, and solicitor and general counsel to Pinkerton’s of Canada Limited as well as director thereof;  
(d) Anthony W.J. Whitford - Minister of Safety and Public Services of the Government of the Northwest  
Territories, the governmental department responsible for mine safety in the Northwest Territories;  
(e) David Turner - Employee of the Ministry of Safety and Public Services, Mine Safety Division of the  
Government of the Northwest Territories;  
(f) Lloyd Gould - Employee of the Ministry of Safety and Public Services, Mine Safety Division of the Government  
of the Northwest Territories;  
(g) The Government of the Northwest Territories as represented by the Commissioner of the Northwest  
Territories;  
(h) Canadian Association of Smelter and Allied Workers Local 4 - A local labour union, and bargaining agent for  
the employees of Royal Oak Ventures Inc., of which O’Neil was a member;  
(i) Canadian Association of Smelter and Allied Workers National - The parent of Canadian Association of Smelter  
and Allied Workers Local 4, holder of the bargaining rights of the employees of Royal Oak Ventures Inc.;  
(j) The National Automobile, Aerospace, Transportation and General Workers Union of Canada - A parent union  
that on July 1, 1994, merged with Canadian Association of Smelter and Allied Workers National;  
(k) Basil E. Hargrove - The president of The National Automobile, Aerospace, Transportation and General  
Workers Union of Canada from June 1992 onward;  
(l) The National Automobile, Aerospace, Transportation and General Workers Union of Canada Local 2304 - The  
National Automobile, Aerospace, Transportation and General Workers Union of Canada local that subsumed  
Canadian Association of Smelter and Allied Workers Local 4 upon the above mentioned merger;  
(m) Harry Seeton - Co-worker and fellow miner employed by Royal Oak Ventures Inc.;  
(n) Roger Wallace Warren - Co-worker and fellow miner employed by Royal Oak Ventures Inc.;  
(o) Allan Raymond Shearing - Co-worker and fellow miner employed by Royal Oak Ventures Inc.;  
(p) Timothy Alexander Bettger - Co-worker and fellow miner employed by Royal Oak Ventures Inc.  
The Statement of Claim prays for the following relief:  
(a) General non-pecuniary damages for nervous shock, pain, suffering and loss of the enjoyment of the amenities  
of life in the amount of $50,000;  
(b) General pecuniary damages for past, present and future loss of earnings and earning capacity, employer-  
sponsored benefits and future employment opportunities in the amount of $1,330,000;  
(c) General pecuniary damages for past, present and future cost of care, loss of housekeeping services capacity,  
taxation and GST gross-up and investment management fee in the amount of $500,000;  
(d) Punitive, aggravated and exemplary damages in the amount of $50,000;  
(e) Special and subrogated claims, out-of-pocket expenses and other losses, and expenses in the amount of  
$50,000;  
(f) Such further and other general non-pecuniary, general pecuniary, special damages and subrogated claims as  
may be proven at trial;  
(g) Interest pursuant to the Judicature Act, R.S.N.W.T. 1988, c .J-1;  
(h) Costs on an indemnity or solicitor and his own client basis.  
O’Neil, a mine rescuer, came upon the dismembered bodies of nine fellow miners, murdered by Warren, a fellow  
miner, and alleges that this resulted in his contracting the PTSD that has disallowed him gainful employment  
since May 1995. He alleges the breach of a duty of care by the said Defendants as a result thereof.  
POSITION OF O’NEIL  
Specifically, O’Neil’s allegations of breach of duty by the Defendants are as follows:  
(a) That Witte and Sheridan induced O’Neil and others to cross the picket lines to work with replacement workers  
hired by Royal Oak with assurances by Royal Oak that Pinkerton’s would protect them from harm, knowing it  
would cause an escalation of violence and sabotage, and failing to cause Royal Oak to cease operations when it  
became foreseeable that harm would befall the underground miners;  
(b) That Warren manufactured and planted an incendiary device intended to kill and/or personally injure  
underground miners without warning to those who he knew would be affected;  
(c) That Pinkerton’s failed to properly secure the Giant mine entrances to ensure that only authorized persons  
would be permitted underground and warn miners thereof;  
(d) That Whitford, Turner, Gould and the Government of the Northwest Territories as represented by the  
Commissioner of the Northwest Territories failed to adopt and implement policies requiring Whitford, Turner,  
Gould and others in their jurisdiction to discharge their statutory duties including inspections, preventing  
unauthorized persons from entering the underground and failing to warn miners of the dangers thereof;  
(e) That Seeton, CASAW Local 4, CASAW National, CAW National, CAW Local 2304 and Hargrove used their  
influence to inflame a volatile environment and condoned escalated threats of violence and acts of sabotage  
against Royal Oak and replacement workers, knowing the foreseeable risk of harm to the workers, without  
warning them or intervening to prevent Warren and other strikers from the said violence, threats and acts of  
sabotage;  
(f) That Bettger and Shearing, through their aberrant conduct, knowingly encouraged Warren to conduct himself  
as indicated and failed to warn Royal Oak thereof or intervene, including sanctioning Warren for illegal conduct  
prior to September 18, 1992.  
POSITIONS OF THE DEFENDANTS  
The following positions are advanced by the Defendants:  
(a) Witte and Sheridan denied they knew or could have foreseen acts such as Warren’s and acted under the scope  
and authority of and in the best interests of Royal Oak, who at all material times operated in accordance with all  
standards and procedures then prevailing in the Canadian mining industry. In addition, these Defendants plead  
and rely on Warren’s novus actus interveniens and the Limitations of Actions Act, R.S.N.W.T. 1988, c.L-8;  
(b) Warren failed to file a Statement of Defence and was noted in default;  
(c) Pinkerton’s denied it owed any duty of care to O’Neil and relies on its contract with Royal Oak to be a supplier  
of information, personnel and equipment to Royal Oak as requested from time to time. In addition, they plead  
and rely on Warren’s novus actus interveniens and the Limitations of Actions Act, R.S.N.W.T. 1988, c.L-8;  
(d) Whitford, Turner, Gould and the Government of the Northwest Territories as represented by the  
Commissioner of the Northwest Territories denied liability on grounds their actions were taken in good faith and  
in accordance with their jurisdiction, authority and resources entitled to them. Additionally, they plead and rely  
on Warren’s novus actus interveniens and the Limitations of Actions Act, R.S.N.W.T. 1988, c.L-8;  
(e) CAW National plead that any liability rests with CASAW Local 4 only and that the sole function of CAW  
National was to promote financial assistance in collective bargaining to CASAW Local 4; that these Defendants  
neither condoned nor caused the alleged illegal activities and are not guilty of negligence. Additionally, they plead  
and rely on Warren’s novus actus interveniens and the Limitations of Actions Act, R.S.N.W.T. 1988, c.L-8;  
(f) Seeton denied CASAW or CASAW Local 4 or he as an officer, exercised or had any ability to exercise influence  
or control except in relation to peaceful activities on behalf of its members and promoting a successful resolution  
of the strike/lockout for CASAW Local 4; that any explosion was caused by the negligence of Witte, Sheridan,  
Whitford, Turner, Gould and the Government of the Northwest Territories. Additionally, this Defendant pleads  
and relies on Warren’s novus actus interveniens and the Limitations of Actions Act, R.S.N.W.T. 1988, c.L-8, the  
Workers’ Compensation Act, R.S.N.W.T. 1988, c.W-6, and amendments thereto, and the Contributory Negligence  
Act, R.S.N.W.T. 1988, c.L-18, and amendments thereto;  
(g) Hargrove denied he caused, influenced or had knowledge of Warren’s illegal activity, as his sole function was  
to provide financial and other assistance and collective bargaining expertise for and at the request of CASAW  
Local 4. Additionally, he pleaded reliance on Warren’s novus actus interveniens and the Limitations of Actions  
Act, R.S.N.W.T. 1988, c.L-8, and the Contributory Negligence Act, R.S.N.W.T. 1988, c.L-8;  
(h) Shearing denied the ability to exercise any influence and control over Warren or any duty of care to O’Neil.  
Additionally, he pleads and relies on the aforesaid Limitations of Actions Act, R.S.N.W.T. 1988, c.L-8, and the  
Workers’ Compensation Act, R.S.N.W.T. 1988, c.W-6;  
(i) Bettger denied any ability to exercise significant influence or control over Warren or that he had any duty of  
care to O’Neil, and that any injuries, loss and damages are attributable to the explosion. Additionally, this  
Defendant relies on the aforesaid Limitations of Actions Act, R.S.N.W.T. 1988, c.L-8, the Workers’ Compensation  
Act, R.S.N.W.T. 1988, c.W-6;  
CROSS-CLAIMS  
The following table outlines the Defendants who filed Cross-claims and against whom:  
Defendant(s)  
Cross-claims Filed Against  
Witte, Sheridan  
Pinkerton’s, Whitford, Turner, Gould, GNWT, CAW National, CAW Local 2304, CASAW National, CASAW Local  
4, Hargrove, Seeton, Shearing, Bettger, Warren  
Pinkerton’s  
Witte, Sheridan, Whitford, Turner, Gould, GNWT, CAW National, CAW Local 2304, CASAW National, CASAW  
Local 4, Hargrove, Seeton, Shearing, Bettger, Warren  
Seeton  
Witte, Sheridan, Pinkerton’s, Whitford, Turner, Gould, GNWT  
CAW National, Hargrove  
Witte, Sheridan, Pinkerton’s  
The cross-claimants all claim contribution and indemnity as set forth in their Statements of Defence.  
PINKERTON’S THIRD PARTY NOTICE TO ROYAL OAK  
Pinkerton’s denies its liability to O’Neil and says, if it is in any way liable to him, then it claims to be entitled to  
full contribution or indemnity from Royal Oak, grounds for which are that Pinkerton’s was a supplier of security  
services only to Royal Oak, the Third Party, which services the Third Party unilaterally reduced against  
Pinkerton’s advice in the period from June 8 to September 18, 1992. Interestingly, the Third Party Notice in this  
action is identical to the Third Party Notice in the Fullowka action and in this action is accompanied by the  
Statement of Claim from the Fullowka action, not the Statement of Claim from this action. The disposition of the  
Third Party proceeding here is as it was, mutatis mutandis, dealt with in the Fullowka action.  
FACTS  
Currently, O’Neil is 43 years of age, resides on Vancouver Island, is unemployed and enjoys an income from the  
WCB.  
O’Neil’s employment history includes a Grade 10 education in Ontario followed by employment in a variety of  
labouring positions. These included cheese-making, teaching swimming and life-guarding.  
On his move to Yellowknife in 1980, he was coordinator for a swimming pool, which involved training a  
competitive lifeguard team, organizing Red Cross programs and teaching first aid. He quite properly as a result of  
extensive training and personal experiences, perceived himself as having had professional experience conducting  
rescues in life-threatening situations. An example of this was witnessing three fatalities as a result of a plane  
crash in the late 1980s.  
Pivotal to O’Neil’s claim is his infatuation with unions. His interest began with an unsuccessful attempt to  
organize a union while he was a cheese-maker. His employment and union experiences are vital to an  
understanding of the nature and underpinnings of his claims herein.  
Subsequent to O’Neil’s foray as a swimming pool coordinator, he secured a job for one and one-half years with  
Pacific Western Airlines (“PWA”) as a ramp attendant and was required to join the Canadian Airlines Employees  
Association (“CALEA”), a small professional union. Prior to CALEA’s merger with CAW National, O’Neil was the  
representative for the northern district, as well as the occupational health and safety chair. His duties involved  
organizing safety committees and representatives throughout the North. It was through this role that he had his  
first exposure to CASAW Local 4's executive. He encountered Johnston, who was dismissive of him because of  
CALEA’s affiliation with American unions, while CASAW National was loyal to a separatist movement under CCU.  
Johnston regarded CASAW National as a radical breakaway union, while O’Neil’s own views were more in line  
with the mainstream labour movement.  
Following his employment with PWA, O’Neil began taking flying lessons and doing maintenance work. In  
December 1983, he bought his own plane and eventually got both his private and commercial pilot’s licences. In  
April of 1984, he began employment at Giant as a mill labourer. He worked at Giant until 1995, assuming many  
roles, including labourer in the mill, trammer, scoop operator, miner’s helper and later working in the shaft areas  
in all capacities. As a result, he was qualified to drive trucks in the underground and had both underground and  
surface blasting certificates. At one time, he was responsible for activating the central blast system in the mine.  
He also took an active role as a mine rescuer.  
In 1986, he spent the summer as a co-pilot, and in 1989 joined Venture Air Limited (“Venture”) as a pilot, flying  
when not employed at Giant. From time to time thereafter he took leaves of absence or holidays to fly full-time.  
He also served as marketing director for Venture.  
In 1988, O’Neil began to probe into his suspicion that CASAW National was raising funds for a political purpose  
in Nicaragua. He spoke to CASAW National president Rodriguez, who threatened him to “keep [his] mouth shut  
or get [his] legs broken”. This was the genesis of a disobliging attitude and behaviour of CASAW National’s  
executive toward him, which increased in intensity until O’Neil ceased employment with Royal Oak in 1995.  
On joining Giant, O’Neil became a member of CASAW Local 4. He noted a difference between CASAW National  
and CALEA at an early stage when a fellow CASAW Local 4 member told him that he need not exert himself at  
work. This left him with the perception that the union had control, rather than management. O’Neil declined any  
involvement in the union as he considered the relationship between the union and management to be toxic.  
However, he unsuccessfully suggested that CASAW Local 4 consider some of the methods used by CALEA.  
Friction was evident between O’Neil and Seeton. He was approached on several occasions by Seeton to become  
involved in the union. He declined as he disagreed with Seeton’s philosophy of filing excessive grievances and  
aberrant behaviour toward their employer. The two never agreed on labour relations business. However, when  
O’Neil’s employment was terminated in 1985 for being unable to work after suffering an elbow injury, Seeton  
assisted him in preparing a grievance which was successful at the mine management level. O’Neil also filed other  
grievances. One addressed his working at a higher classification level without appropriate remuneration, while  
another pertained to discrimination. Seeton successfully assisted him with both of these grievances. O’Neil  
believed, however, that Seeton cared little about the mining operation and engaged in sabotage. For example,  
O’Neil observed on many occasions that Seeton would ensure the cage was not serviceable at the time when  
workers were to be brought to the surface. This would result in the workers having to remain underground after  
their shift, mandating the company to pay overtime. In cross-examination, O’Neil testified that Seeton had told  
him that if he did not want to be part of the union then he ought to cease complaining about those who did.  
Seeton had a proclivity to say and do things to annoy O’Neil and others who did not share the amusement of his  
antics and his union philosophy.  
In 1989, O’Neil met Mitic, who was involved in expanding the membership of CAW National. Mitic sought  
information relating to the structure of CASAW National and Local 4, including the national and local  
constitution and the collective bargaining agreement with Royal Oak. O’Neil raised the issue of a potential  
merger at a union meeting of CASAW Local 4 but was shouted down and asked to leave. He then had discussions  
with a representative of the Union of Northern Workers, through which he hoped to connect with a United Steel  
Workers of America representative. That failed to materialize.  
In the summer of 1990, O’Neil met with his namesake uncle, who was secretary treasurer for CAW National. They  
discussed the labour relations problem at Giant, specifically regarding O’Neil’s perception that workers were not  
being fairly represented. He told his uncle that they had a good collective agreement at Giant but a lot of union  
pressure existed. At this meeting, a merger was discussed. O’Neil left with a box of CAW National paraphernalia  
which he slowly passed on to CASAW Local 4 members, including Seeton and Schram.  
In April 1992, O’Neil learned from his uncle that CAW National was more aware of the contract negotiations  
between CASAW Local 4 and Royal Oak due to CAW National’s merger with CAIMAW who had controlled  
CASAW Local 4’s strike fund through the Mining Council. At this time, his uncle informed him that CAW  
National would be supporting the impending strike.  
O’Neil voted in favour of both the tentative agreement and the strike. Regretfully, he fell victim to the deceptive  
rantings and untruths peddled by the union executive and the radical segment of the membership that influenced  
the course taken by the union thereafter.  
By the end of May with the strike underway, O’Neil felt duped by his union brothers and participated in radio  
interviews to inform the membership that the union executive were preventing further negotiations. In addition,  
he engaged in a media debate through letters to the editor of the local newspaper. He began to receive death  
threats that caused him distress, which led to his leaving Yellowknife for a week as recommended by police. On  
his return, he absented himself from the union hall and picket lines for an additional week. In early June, he  
spoke with his uncle from CAW National. As a result, he contacted a labour lawyer and received advice, but did  
not take any action. Instead he became involved in a petition to have another vote on the tentative agreement,  
which was initiated by several other strikers. As a result of this initiative, further death threats were made. On  
June 18, 1992, he signed a statutory declaration outlining personal violence threats made by Seeton to union  
detractors and their family members.  
Due to these failed efforts, O’Neil took a job with a flying company and was not in Yellowknife until July 31, 1992.  
On his return, he spoke with Chris Neill, who suggested that they return to work, which they did on August 4.  
O’Neil believed the strike was cooling, as others had crossed the picket line before him. He thought if additional  
union members returned to work it might be a matter of electing a new bargaining committee to resume  
negotiations. At this time, Byberg assured him that his home would be monitored by roving Pinkerton’s security,  
that security was available at the gates when people entered and exited the mine property and that he could either  
cross in his own vehicle or in a bus provided by the company. He chose the former.  
Shortly after he returned to work, O’Neil’s home and vehicles were the subject of vandalism. It was common  
knowledge that he had returned and he appreciated this likelihood. His name was also plastered on signs at the  
picket lines, some reading, “yes, Jim you are scab of the year” and “what does your Mom think Jim?”  
Although in the beginning of the strike O’Neil expected confrontations on the surface, he never expected any  
problems underground. It had not occurred to him at that time that an underground miner would kill other  
miners, although later he was aware that the vent shaft blast could have resulted in fatalities. He spoke to Byberg  
about this potential for loss of life. Byberg instructed him that the RCMP would investigate and that the situation  
was being looked after very carefully. As for the level of security, Byberg told him that he had no control over it as  
it was a decision made by head office; nonetheless, he assured O’Neil that it was safe to continue working.  
On the morning of September 18, 1992, O’Neil attended work as usual. Early in his shift, he was asked to  
investigate impaired air pressure. He encountered Murray, who advised him that there had been damage to a  
ventilation door and the phone system. Together they continued to investigate and encountered miner George  
Coombs (“Coombs”), who accompanied them to the 750-foot level of the mine. As they were walking along the  
drift with only their miners’ lamps to light the way, a worker ran past them yelling, “Everybody’s dead.” Coombs  
pursued this distressed worker while O’Neil and Murray continued down the drift. They reached the ventilation  
door which was found twisted and mangled, the bolts that held it into the wall pulled out. With very poor  
visibility, they then found the steel remains of the mancar; the wooden parts appeared to have been blown off.  
There was nothing recognizable as human, although O’Neil saw hardhats and a lunchbox.  
O’Neil testified that, at this point he lost a sense of conscious reality. He described going into a state where he  
thought he was an old man from the 1800s looking on a mock mining disaster. Realizing that he must do  
emergency response, he shifted into reality and began to check for signs of life. He found a set of red coveralls,  
but then discovered that there were legs in them but no upper body. He noted that this sight made him feel a  
little “shaky”. He then realized that he was standing on a large piece of human flesh. An intact body was  
uncovered which he realized to be his close friend Chris Neill. At this moment O’Neil briefly lost conscious reality  
again. He testified that he rolled Chris Neill’s body over to discover that “his face was all pushed in, kind of like a  
pumpkin”. There was no prospect of revival for Chris Neill, nor was there for the other intact body that was  
found. Given the lifeless reality, O’Neil then guarded the north end of the blast site until he was told he could  
leave the scene. He stated that when he returned to the surface, he was in shock and had some difficulty walking  
and speaking.  
The day after the blast, O’Neil was involved in assembling additional lighting so that the underground could be  
checked for bombs. Three days after the blast, he assisted in bringing the deceased miners’ body parts to the  
surface.  
Immediately following the blast, it was O’Neil’s view that the bomb had been set by the union for the purpose of  
forcing anti-replacement worker legislation, the then focus of the union. He described becoming infuriated with  
CASAW Local 4 and being unable to let go of the murders. He began to research the possibility of starting up an  
employees association at Giant to replace CASAW Local 4. This idea had been previously floated by the deceased  
Chris Neill, who had been a member of one in the past. O’Neil drafted others to become involved, including the  
widow of David Vodnoski, one of the miners killed in the fatal blast. Meetings were held in secret, outside of  
town, and eventually the group formed a constitution and a set of by-laws and filed the required paperwork under  
the Societies Act, R.S.N.W.T. 1988, c. S-11. By January 1993, an application was filed with the Canada Labour  
Relations Board seeking certification to become the bargaining agent for the hourly workers at Giant. At this  
time, O’Neil’s initiative became public knowledge. He was elected chair of what became known as the Giant Mine  
Employees Association (“GMEA”). The hearing was held in March 1993, and those who attended in opposition  
demonstrated significant tension and hostility. After the hearing, the Canada Labour Relations Board panel ruled  
that GMEA was an employer-dominated or influenced organization and that the bargaining unit for Giant  
included replacement workers. O’Neil did not enjoy majority support after the hearing and needed to gain further  
support to become certified. An appeal was launched to the Federal Court of Appeal, but there were no funds to  
pursue it. During an industrial dispute inquiry pertaining to the ongoing labour relations dispute at Giant, GMEA  
was granted intervenor status. O’Neil appeared on its behalf, gave evidence and made representations. He  
testified that this entire process with GMEA caused him a great deal of tension and emotional stress. He also  
admitted that the failure to get GMEA certified was a personal blow for him.  
Throughout this entire period, O’Neil was continuing to work full-time at Giant. He also undertook a position as  
occupational health and safety representative during the strike. He described being very fatigued and losing focus  
on his family life during this period. He had little contact with his infant daughter, yet his wife continued her  
support.  
In late 1993, a strike settlement was imposed by binding arbitration and a tentative agreement was ratified in  
November 1993. O’Neil continued to work at Giant during the period when strikers returned to work, while some  
replacement workers remained. He testified that there was tension in his dealings with returning strikers as there  
existed a distinct division between those who had crossed the picket line and those who had not. For example, in  
March 1994, O’Neil found that his pay stub had “scab” written on it. He held a supervisory position and therefore  
met a great lack of co-operation, making it difficult to perform his duties. Further, he felt insecure in both his  
home and the community for the duration of his employment at Giant.  
On October 21, 1993, after hearing that Warren had been charged with murder, O’Neil received a memo from  
Sharon Kerr (“Kerr”), a nurse at Giant, regarding stress management and a group support session being offered.  
Kerr had outlined some of the symptoms associated with a strong stress reaction, and further outlined the  
importance of seeking counseling. There was a single counseling session made available through the Stanton  
General Hospital in Yellowknife, which O’Neil attended.  
Early in 1995, O’Neil and his wife were having marital problems, and she suggested that he seek medical  
attention. It was watching the television coverage of the Oklahoma City bombing that took place on April 19,  
1995, that, he testified, triggered memories of the fatal blast. He said that before this he had been reminded of the  
blast scene when he found a piece of the mancar about one year after the fatal blast. On May 12, 1995, he sought  
medical attention for flashbacks that he had been experiencing, his tendency to constantly search for bombs at  
work and his inability to sleep. In particular, he described experiencing panic attacks, increased heart beat,  
difficulty concentrating, agitation, fearfulness, difficulty focusing, hyper-vigilance and a general inability to work  
in the mine due to memories of the fatal blast.  
The first medical practitioner that O’Neil met with was Dr. Wheeler, a physician at the Stanton General Hospital  
in Yellowknife. O’Neil’s wife attended this appointment with him and assisted with the explanation of his  
difficulties. Dr. Wheeler prescribed medication to O’Neil, opining that he was suffering from PTSD, referring him  
to Dr. McCay, a psychiatrist, for a second opinion. Dr. McCay concurred with Dr. Wheeler’s diagnosis.  
A couple of days after O’Neil saw Dr. Wheeler, his wife and child moved out of the family home. This event was  
emotionally upsetting for him. He was hospitalized on two occasions in the summer of 1995, the first time for two  
weeks and the second time for approximately one week.  
He did not return to work at Giant from May 1995 onward. He did, however, apply for WCB benefits, which were  
granted. Barbara Barnet (“Barnet”) became O’Neil’s vocational rehabilitation counselor in 1995. The adjudicator  
at this time was Linda France (“France”), who accepted his claim as he had a diagnosis of PTSD from two doctors  
who advised him not to return to work as a miner. It was further understood by the WCB that O’Neil was  
continuing to receive counseling. The “delayed onset” qualification of O’Neil’s diagnosis was directed by the WCB  
to its medical advisor to determine if it was reasonable. Specifically, the medical advisor was to determine  
whether the PTSD could manifest itself two years and eight months after the traumatic event and also to consider  
the impact of O’Neil’s deteriorated marriage. The medical advisor for the WCB, Dr. Denson, confirmed the  
potential for delayed onset of symptoms and believed that O’Neil’s marital breakdown might affect the prognosis  
but was not likely the cause.  
In late August 1995, O’Neil moved to Edmonton after receiving a referral for a 12-week treatment program  
involving participation in group therapy sessions conducted by Dr. McKenna. Although he continued sometimes  
sporadically, with Dr. McKenna until 1998, he did not continue in group therapy. He was advised that private  
sessions were preferable for him as his behaviour was found to be dominant and intrusive in the group context.  
Consequently, he received individual therapy until early 1996 with Dr. McGuire, a general practitioner who had  
some counseling experience in PTSD.  
In September 1995, he took a part time job with a retail outlet, “The Art of Animation” located in the West  
Edmonton Mall. The WCB notified O’Neil that it viewed this employment as a “work assessment” program and  
therapeutic to his recovery. He discontinued this employment after a couple of months when he perceived it to be  
too stressful.  
A report dated October 16, 1995, was sent to the WCB from Dr. McGuire, who had been providing weekly  
individual psychotherapy to O’Neil. She confirmed PTSD as her diagnosis and said that he would be unfit to  
return to work at the mine, but noted that he was capable of doing some work. In fact, it was her opinion that it  
would be counter-productive for him not to be involved in some kind of work activity.  
O’Neil underwent a vocational evaluation in December 1995, by Kim McIsaac (“McIsaac”) of the Canadian  
Paraplegic Association (“CPA”) as arranged by the WCB. The purpose was to determine O’Neil’s current level of  
education, interests, aptitudes and options for suitable employment. The results of his testing were inconclusive  
as they could not predict vocational potential because his condition was not stationary. He demonstrated a lack of  
concentration and short-term memory loss, which adversely affected the evaluation results. It was concluded that  
until a clearer picture of O’Neil’s prognosis was available, it would be difficult to set any long-term goals. McIsaac  
recommended that O’Neil be referred to a qualified professional who specialized in PTSD.  
In April 1996, O’Neil began to see Dr. Juergens, a psychologist specializing in anxiety disorders. He reported  
symptoms including panic attacks, flashbacks by triggers, fatigue, weight loss, tremors, numbness in his arms,  
poor short-term memory and poor concentration. Respecting the tremors, he testified that he had been examined  
by a neurologist who concluded that there were no neurological problems and he was advised to continue with  
physical exercise. On the recommendation of his caseworker at the Counseling and Vocational Rehabilitation  
Services (“CVRS”), he continued to see Dr. Juergens regularly for about one year and a half and then as needed  
thereafter. During this time, a film was released by the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation on the Giant  
explosion. Following several therapy sessions with Dr. Juergens, he was able to view it. On the advice of Dr.  
Juergens, O’Neil increased his exposure to physical and social activities. Overall, O’Neil found that Dr. Juergens  
effectively assisted his desensitization. In March 1997, he understood that Dr. Juergens no longer believed he  
needed psychological help; rather, the focus should be directed to vocational rehabilitation. She formally notified  
the WCB of this on May 21, 1997.  
Ellen Wybrow-Howes (“Wybrow-Howes”), was O’Neil’s job development officer with CVRS. His assigned  
caseworker was Clancy White (“White”), who assisted him in finding volunteer positions as part of a “work  
hardening” program, geared to controlling his symptomology and allowing him to resume regular employment.  
The WCB was provided with monthly progress reports from CVRS. In a report dated February 6, 1996, White  
raised some questions regarding O’Neil’s condition. These included whether his PTSD symptoms were limiting  
his ability to realistically return to work, whether a volunteer position would be more appropriate, whether  
vocational pursuits would affect his progress in therapy and whether physical activity would be beneficial.  
In early 1996, O’Neil hired a fitness consultant, secured a gym membership and attended three to four times per  
week. Contemporaneous with the increase in physical exertion, O’Neil experienced an increase in the occurrence  
of tremors and numbness. Consequently, he hired a sports medicine consultant.  
At some point, O’Neil also enrolled in a creative writing course, which he attended once a week. He wrote  
between 15 and 20 children’s stories, six of which were illustrated and accepted by a publisher.  
In March 1996, White arranged for O’Neil to be involved at the John Jansen Nature Centre working on  
educational programs for children. Also around this time, O’Neil found a volunteer position with the Canadian  
National Institute for the Blind (“CNIB”) and took a course to improve his ability to interact with the blind.  
Through this volunteer position, he spoke with children in schools and wrote a children’s book which he  
understands will become an educational tool for the CNIB. He was also involved in other volunteer activities with  
this position, such as walking guide dogs.  
In 1996, considering placement at a tourist type company, O’Neil prepared a business plan. However, he testified  
he did not have the stamina to support it.  
On a referral from Dr. Juergens, O’Neil was assessed by Dr. Spelliscy, a psychologist specializing in psychological  
assessment and consultation. The purpose of this evaluation was to identify his current intellectual functioning  
and specific learning strengths and weaknesses, so as to enable the development and implementation of a  
vocational plan. The report prepared by Dr. Spelliscy, dated August 8, 1996, was received by the WCB. It  
understood that O’Neil’s test results were consistent with a generalized anxiety disorder or PTSD and that he  
should be reassessed in 12 to 18 months.  
In the summer of 1996, White placed O’Neil with Alberta Fish and Wildlife, to conduct a fish study. He  
participated for three to four weeks, then found that he did not have the stamina to fulfill the duties and  
experienced stress in dealing with people who were fishing illegally. He reported symptoms of tremors, shakes  
and numbness in his arm similar to those experienced in December 1995. As a result, White advised the WCB  
that O’Neil began to realize that his rehabilitation was going to take longer than originally expected. White  
provided him with supportive counseling to ease his frustration and promote optimism and noted that O’Neil had  
a tendency to take on too much, which led to his feeling overwhelmed. White’s strategy was to maintain a gradual  
progression.  
Before the end of 1996, O’Neil’s divorce was finalized. Dr. Juergens advised the WCB that O’Neil was doing three  
hours of semi-structured activity five times a week. She also noted that he continued to have negative  
ruminations but was endeavouring to redirect these feelings towards a positive future. In response to an inquiry  
by Barnet in December 1996, Dr. Juergens reported that a gradual progression building confidence and stamina  
was essential, and that she believed O’Neil to be highly motivated and cooperative.  
Also in December 1996, O’Neil was placed with the Alberta Vocational Centre as a volunteer teacher’s aid,  
working up to two hours per day, five days a week. He found that this aggravated his symptoms as there were  
some labour relations problems which triggered his recall of the events at Giant. Although both O’Neil and the  
WCB were advised that he had been doing well, he ceased this placement in March 1997. The WCB understood  
that he had attended every day and displayed extraordinary commitment to his work. Further, it understood that  
Dr. Juergens had recommended he increase his hours, which he attempted while expressing concern.  
In the spring of 1997, O’Neil worked one day as a shipper-receiver for Quantum Environmental Group, but could  
not continue because the stress brought a return of his symptoms, including shaking, fatigue and feelings of being  
overwhelmed. On March 10, 1997, he took a volunteer position at a farm owned by Mel Kartz, as part of his “work  
hardening” program. He was optimistic about this outdoor position and believed that his duties of calving and  
feeding would enhance his physical strength. On May 29, 1997, it was reported to the WCB that O’Neil enjoyed  
this placement but was working much longer hours than advised, leading to an increase in his symptoms.  
Wybrow-Howes expressed concern to O’Neil and advised him to be vigilant in ensuring that he put in no more  
than the time that had been recommended. To relieve some of the fatigue, he moved closer to the farm, thereby  
lessening travel time. At some point, O’Neil assumed the “hired man’s” position but found that he could not  
continue due to his symptomology, particularly fatigue. He testified that his witnessing the afterbirth of calving  
significantly triggered numbness and excessive tremors; nonetheless, he formed an attachment to the family who  
owned the farm and continues to be involved in this farm on occasion.  
At some point, O’Neil was a volunteer at an aviation museum. They were restoring aircraft at this time, but there  
was no opportunity for full-time employment.  
After two months of working as a volunteer at a golf course in July 1997, O’Neil reported that he was experiencing  
less symptomology and was comfortable working four hours a day, five days a week. However, when asked to sort  
through the recycling, O’Neil testified that the events at Giant resurfaced on reaching into the bags to pick out tin  
cans. This aggravation of his PTSD symptoms caused him to flee this placement. Again, positive work reports of  
this placement were given to the WCB; however, he was identified as exhibiting poor short-term memory.  
In November 1997, O’Neil made a request to the WCB to fund the cost of a physical trainer. This was approved  
for 12 sessions to allow him to learn the skills required to perform his own fitness program.  
Sometime in the fall of 1997, Shawn Roper (“Roper”) became O’Neil’s vocational rehabilitation counselor while  
White acted as his case manager. O’Neil expressed to Roper his interest in eco-tourism and possibly becoming a  
farrier. John Petryshen (“Petryshen”), his assigned job development officer, discussed with O’Neil the possibility  
of becoming involved in trades such as cabinet making and electrical work.  
On November 4, 1997, O’Neil, Roper, Dr. Juergens and Barnet engaged in a conference call about finding  
appropriate employment for O’Neil. Barnet opined that she had problems with O’Neil telling his doctors one  
thing and Roper another and a meeting with all support persons involved would ensure consistency among them.  
Part of the problem that Barnet was having with O’Neil’s file was that the complaints were subjectively his. She  
also wanted to address whether another evaluation should be conducted by Dr. Spelliscy. At this time, O’Neil’s  
vocational focus was toward the airline industry where union membership would not be required. After this  
conference call, Roper suggested that O’Neil continue to see Dr. Juergens, who had advised that his long-standing  
PTSD symptoms following physical exertion appeared to be symptoms which might never resolve.  
Through Roper, O’Neil obtained paid employment with Air Canada following his successful completion of an  
interview, exam, driving test and medical assessment. He was to participate in a training program to become a  
station attendant, loading and unloading aircrafts. He was excited about this opportunity. He was advised by the  
WCB that it would give him time to determine if he was able to handle this position, by “topping off” his net wage  
to the equivalent of what he would earn on full benefits for a period of three months ceasing on April 10, 1998. At  
some point, he had advised Barnet that with Air Canada he would be earning 40% of what he currently received  
through WCB payments.  
He began the training with Air Canada on January 19, 1998, but in the first few days he was required to join a  
union. He signed the union card but was unable to sleep that night because it had triggered memories of Giant.  
The next day he called his training officer and said he was unable to attend work and was told that, without his  
attendance he would not retain his job. He did not return. He had previously been advised through Roper that  
the WCB would not continue to support him if he were to accept this job and then abandon it. He stated in cross-  
examination that due to the levels of stress, travel time and home study during the three days with Air Canada, he  
required two days of sleep to recover. He also stated that he was very disappointed that he had lost an almost  
perfect job due to his sensitivity to the unionized environment. In his journal, it was revealed that, as of January  
21, 1998, he felt he had recovered from the loss of this position, and was elated to have done so this rapidly. In a  
letter dated January 23, 1998, to Air Canada Personnel and Employee Relations, O’Neil noted that he had been  
unable to continue because of unfortunate circumstances with his health. He had not consulted with any doctors  
before writing this letter.  
As a result of the need to obtain specific information about O’Neil’s status and prognosis following the  
unsuccessful placement with Air Canada, the WCB hired Dr. Gervais, a psychologist, and Dr. Copus, a  
psychiatrist, to conduct evaluations. The WCB understood that it was the opinion of Dr. Gervais that O’Neil  
continued to experience PTSD but it was improving and that O’Neil might not be stable enough to work as a  
commercial pilot but that ground-based duties might be appropriate. The WCB also received a report from Dr.  
Copus who offered a concurring diagnosis of PTSD, as a result of the traumatic events at Giant, and considered  
the prognosis to be good if O’Neil received proper assistance in dealing with his workplace anxiety. Dr. Copus  
highlighted that the social situation in Yellowknife had been tense and adversarial, which was an important factor  
in the perpetuation of his PTSD.  
In correspondence dated September 1, 1998, to France, the adjudicator for the WCB, Dr. McKenna stated that  
O’Neil had been compliant with his treatment, many of his symptoms had abated, his mood had been good, he  
was active; his sleep and energy levels were good, he was taking Tryptophan before bed as prescribed, the panic  
attacks and nightmares were rare and, as a result of his improved condition, he would be returning to work in the  
fall. It was noted that a careful choice of job and psychotherapeutic support would be needed.  
As a result of the reports of Drs. Gervais and Copus, it was the opinion of the WCB medical advisor that it was not  
evident that O’Neil continued to experience all the diagnosis criteria for PTSD. O’Neil received a letter dated  
October 29, 1998, from Barnet from which he understood that there would be an increased emphasis on  
vocational rehabilitation. Consequently, he was advised that it would support him in a training program to  
increase stamina and offer an incentive to potential employers to overcome any reservations they may have due to  
his WCB status. The ultimate goal was to secure ground-based duties for a non-unionized airline. It was  
recommended that he have psychotherapeutic support, specifically assistance with stress management  
counseling, incorporating biofeedback-assisted relaxation training. As a result of this advice by the WCB, he saw  
Dr. Gervais on May 19, 20 and 21, 1998. He also saw Dr. Copus, as a specialist in occupational psychiatry, on  
June 22, 1998. At sometime in 1998, O’Neil returned to his work on the Kartz’s farm.  
In January 1999, the WCB received a report from Dr. Gervais that O’Neil had experienced anxiety and flashbacks  
when he had been called for a job interview with only 30 minutes’ notice. Furthermore, O’Neil was aware that his  
benefits would be reduced. Dr. Gervais stated that O’Neil remained willing to explore options to return to work,  
and that recent assessments indicated a significant improvement. However, Dr. Gervais reckoned that O’Neil was  
trying to create a favourable impression. It was only within this report that any objective criterion on O’Neil’s  
condition was ever recorded, which was an elevated heart rate. Barnet spoke with Dr. Gervais on February 24,  
1999, and was advised that O’Neil believed that his PTSD symptoms had resolved. As a result of this  
conversation, Barnet thought that O’Neil needed to advance rather than put up barriers. Consequently, on March  
3, 1999, she consulted with Roper and Petryshen, as she understood that O’Neil had said that he was stressed out,  
tired of seeing Dr. Gervais as had been recommended by Roper, and wanted to be left alone. Barnet called Dr.  
Gervais, who told her that he did not know what to do with O’Neil, because he was the first patient that he had  
seen manifesting this degree of symptoms.  
On March 10, O’Neil received a letter from Barnet in which she outlined his responsibilities as well as the  
responsibilities of CVRS personnel, who had been contracted to assist him with his return to work. At this time,  
Barnet advised him that Roper and Petryshen felt unable to assist him due to existing barriers, including his fear  
of having a lack of stamina. Barnet stated that she observed that stamina was not a problem in other situations  
where there are no production or performance expectations, such as hiking. Furthermore, she reminded him that  
his anxiety and fear of work situations was the reason for referring him to Dr. Gervais for counseling, and that he  
must be prepared to take the next step if the WCB were to continue to help him. She offered mid-April 1999, as a  
deadline for progress, beyond which the WCB would conclude that rehabilitation was impossible due to self-  
imposed barriers, and its assistance would cease.  
O’Neil contacted the Strathcona Flight School and learned that there were no employment opportunities there.  
He became aware of employment possibilities as a labourer with CN but did not pursue this because it was  
seasonal, unionized and unsuitable. He also considered contacting National Geographic, Butterfield & Robinson  
and Blythe & Company, but did not. However, he secured an opportunity with a travel agency, Cruise Holidays,  
commencing at the end of March 1999. He understood this position to have the potential to become a full-time,  
paid position. Cruise Holidays was seeking someone to market to large groups of people, and he prepared a  
proposal.  
O’Neil’s vocational counselor, Roper, became involved in his work with Cruise Holidays as disagreements  
between O’Neil and his boss emerged, causing him stress. When it was suggested to O’Neil that he increase his  
hours per week from 9 to 15, he voiced concerns about his stamina. He left this position on June 8, 1999, and the  
WCB was advised the same day. On June 11, 1999, the WCB received a report from Dr. Gervais that O’Neil was  
coping well with the situation at Cruise Holidays. It was also noted in his WCB file that he had a talent for  
marketing and sales and was advised by Roper that he should further develop his skills in this area. Following his  
leaving Cruise Holidays, Roper advised the WCB that O’Neil had experienced a great deal of anxiety and stress,  
leaving him emotionally and physically drained for an entire week. Roper stated that O’Neil was nonetheless  
appreciative for the experience he had gained working in an office environment.  
O’Neil expressed an interest in becoming a truck driver. However, he testified that he did not have the proper  
licence and was unable to pass the driver’s exam after three attempts due to problems with his short-term  
memory. He stated that his pilot’s exams, taken before the fatal blast, had been more difficult, yet he had no  
problem with those. Throughout the summer of 1999, O’Neil ruled out a vast range of trucking-related vocations  
suggested to him by his vocational support team for reasons including unsuitable hours, physical demands and  
potential union involvement. He stated in cross-examination that his ideal job at this time was driving on  
secondary graveled rural roads, where he had minimal contact with people and the flexibility to begin with part-  
time hours gradually building up to full-time. Another potential job was with an egg farm, discarded by O’Neil as  
he deemed it to be too far from his residence.  
In a letter dated August 11, 1999, Roper advised the WCB that, if O’Neil was unable to find employment or make  
progress in either milk truck delivery or as a ranch hand feedlot attendant, CVRS would close the file, given that  
CVRS had been assisting O’Neil for four years. On August 26, 1999, Roper advised Barnet that the relationship  
between CVRS and O’Neil had been tainted and CVRS was unable to assist him further. Shortly thereafter, O’Neil  
advised that he would not continue with Zimmerman, the job developer at CVRS, because he believed that  
Zimmerman would not be effective in helping him achieve his goals, due to their personality conflicts. As a result,  
his CVRS file was closed.  
Through the WCB, O’Neil was referred for a three-day neuropsychological evaluation and personality testing in  
August 1999, with Dr. Hartman, a neuropsychologist in Chicago. This arose from Barnet’s inquiry to the WCB’s  
medical advisor as to the ongoing difficulties of O’Neil following through with his rehabilitative plan. She was  
unsure if the challenges were as a result of his PTSD or personality traits. Dr. Hartman had been retained by the  
WCB for prior difficult cases. Dr. Hartman reported that O’Neil had no psychological or psychiatric disorder to  
prohibit him from a return to full-time work. It was also Dr. Hartman’s opinion that O’Neil was not reflective or  
thoughtful, thereby limiting his insight and judgment. It was his view that O’Neil preferred clear-cut situations  
and was unable to deal with ambiguity, novelty and change. Further, he seemed to have developed an  
unrealistically narrow criteria for work that limited his options in finding a satisfying occupation. Dr. Hartman  
suggested that this might cause resistance towards other placements, and opined that, at most, O’Neil had mild  
depression and mild self-focus in relation to some hypochondriacal concern and did not meet a PTSD diagnosis.  
He recommended a support program to enable his return to the workforce, which had been extensively endorsed  
by the WCB in preceding years.  
In a letter dated October 19, 1999, Barnet advised O’Neil of Dr. Hartman’s findings that he was no longer  
exhibiting symptoms of PTSD and that no barriers remained to prevent his return to work. She informed him  
that he would be placed on job searching benefits for a 13-week period.  
In his report dated October 25, 1999, Dr. Gervais advised the WCB that O’Neil’s concerns with his PTSD had  
largely resolved and were no longer problematic. Furthermore, significant progress had been achieved with  
regard to his physical fitness and stamina. It was Dr. Gervais’ conclusion that the primary barrier remaining for  
O’Neil was his general hesitancy to commit himself to any one challenge for fear of not having chosen the best and  
most satisfying occupation.  
On October 30, 1999, O’Neil told the WCB that Dr. Hartman’s report did not accurately address the issues related  
to his current psychological status, and he requested a second opinion from Dr. Juergens. Furthermore, he stated  
that he needed progressive activities with clear goals, autonomy and support.  
In December 1999, O’Neil sought the assistance of Voc-Aid Disability Management as arranged by the WCB to  
satisfy his wish for a different case manager. Brian Hawrelak (“Hawrelak”) was assigned and O’Neil was advised  
that this would be the WCB’s final effort. Hawrelak contacted Barnet by letter dated January 17, 2000, informing  
her that O’Neil’s preferences for jobs included part-time work in the mornings, in locations out of the city, in a  
non-union environment, with sufficient autonomy and without office related duties. He was offered an  
opportunity with the University of Alberta’s recycling program, which would have paid in excess of $12 per hour.  
This was not pursued because his hours of work were not to be in the morning, it was located in the city and the  
environment was unionized. Similarly, at some point he obtained a job with Quantum Resources, but  
discontinued this position after one day because he had safety concerns with the handling of asbestos, and his  
training was to be held at a union hall. Hawrelak suggested several alternatives to him including furniture  
assembly, landscaping and snow removal.  
On January 18, 2000, O’Neil advised Hawrelak that he no longer needed his services because he was relocating to  
Ontario. However, a week later he informed Hawrelak that he had reconsidered his move to Ontario and would  
be seeing Dr. Passey. Furthermore, he advised that he had been in contact with someone from Alberta  
Vocational College with regard to upgrading his education. Hawrelak advised Barnet of these developments in a  
letter dated January 28, 2000, stating that O’Neil had convinced himself that he was only employable on a very  
minimal basis.  
Barnet acknowledged that the WCB had tried to put together a program to reintegrate O’Neil into the workforce,  
but all attempts failed. She believed that every time the WCB found a placement for him, O’Neil reported  
symptoms. Consequently, his WCB benefits were terminated in February 2000. Unable to afford the apartment  
he had been living in, O’Neil moved into his truck camper.  
In the fall of 2000, O’Neil moved to Vancouver Island and obtained a job selling RVs at Arbutus RV Sales. He  
testified that he was often its best salesman. He stated that the workdays were long, and fatigue was an issue.  
However, he ultimately had a conflict with the company owner as a result of increased pressure for sales, and  
resigned in May 2001. He returned to this job, and again succeeded in his sales which allowed him to upgrade his  
RV and move to a campground. However, at the campground he met a mentally ill woman who expressed to him  
that she wanted to kill people. On one occasion, he saw her with a knife. This incident, combined with the  
pressures he experienced selling RVs, was perceived to be sufficient to push him over the edge.  
He went to Vancouver to see Dr. Passey, who was a psychiatrist with expertise in PTSD. He understood Dr.  
Passey’s diagnosis to be PTSD that was chronic and severe, caused by the events of September 18, 1992. At this  
time, O’Neil was struggling financially; he had bought his RV on a line of credit and the bank had foreclosed on  
him. O’Neil submitted a request to reopen his WCB file on July 14, 2001, advising that his PTSD symptoms had  
recurred resulting in unpredictable and chronic symptoms. He also provided the names of the medical  
practitioners he had consultations with, including Drs. Martin, Crouse and Passey. On his behalf, Dr. Passey  
communicated his findings to the WCB and the Canada Pension Plan.  
On September 30, 2001, the WCB received Dr. Passey’s report which stated that O’Neil had a chronic life-long  
condition, which he defined as severe, and chronic PTSD and depression that waxed and waned depending on his  
exposure to major triggers. Furthermore, Dr. Passey advised the WCB that O’Neil needed ongoing care and was  
too symptomatic to be working. He noted that, with further therapy and support, O’Neil could return to some  
sort of employment in the future. However, Dr. Passey opined that there would be times when even with ideal  
treatment and support O’Neil would be temporarily out of work.  
In late 2001, Barnet received an assessment summary from Dr. Crouse, a psychiatrist with experience in the  
assessment and treatment of anxiety disorders. She confirmed the diagnosis of PTSD and advised that she was  
going to provide O’Neil with short-term support. The WCB received a report dated November 17, 2001, from  
O’Neil’s physician, containing a diagnosis of untreated PTSD, and the opinion that O’Neil was not capable of  
working, nor was rehabilitation appropriate at the time. Furthermore, it was noted that O’Neil might never  
recover.  
On her reassessment of O’Neil’s claim, Barnet spoke directly with Dr. Passey. He advised her that the information  
in Dr. Hartman’s report regarding standardized testing was not the best way to make a determination about  
PTSD. It was Barnet’s view that O’Neil was suffering from symptoms of PTSD resulting from the mine explosion  
in 1992. Consequently, in April 2002, he was awarded a temporary partial disability payment and given  
payments retroactive to June 13, 2001, the date he was diagnosed by Dr. Crouse. In consideration of whether  
there was a permanent disability, O’Neil was assessed by Dr. Karlinsky, a psychiatrist. The WCB decided that it  
would continue to pay O’Neil partial disability payments and reassess him once the instant litigation is resolved.  
In efforts to rehabilitate himself, O’Neil testified that he wakes up each day with an agenda, including exercise as  
was recommended. He expressed his continued interest in finding some employment with an outdoor element  
where he can work alone. He also expressed his desire to fly again. Prior to the fatal blast, it had been his goal to  
pursue a job in aviation. He testified that working at Giant enabled him, through good remuneration, to buy an  
airplane and afford the necessary training. Furthermore, it was his intention to acquire his IFR rating. He stated  
that if he had been unable to secure a career in aviation, he would have continued working at Giant. Some of his  
employment efforts subsequent to the fatal blast were aviation-related, such as Air Canada, Canadian Helicopters  
and Bristol Instruments at the Edmonton Municipal Airport. In the summer of 2000, O’Neil pursued a single  
opportunity to fly a plane, accompanied by an instructor.  
O’Neil testified that his memories of the fatal blast continue to be triggered by graphic images of war. Therefore,  
he avoids movies and television, particularly the news. Symptoms arising from these triggers generally persist for  
a number of days. Furthermore, he testified to the persistent struggle he faced with any situation related to  
unions. For example, this has extended to being unable to care for a friend’s cat because the residence was owned  
by a CAW local representative.  
O’Neil’s income information is as follows:  
Year  
Taxable Income  
Deductions  
Total Income  
1988  
$38,475.00  
$4,248.00  
$42,724.00  
1989  
$52,101.00  
$3,388.00  
$55,489.00  
1990  
$51,004.00  
$6,693.00  
$57,697.00  
1991  
$62,167.00  
$5,570.00  
$67,737.00  
1992  
$43,178.00  
$7,927.00  
$51,105.00  
1993  
$55,415.00  
$5,207.00  
$60,622.00  
1994  
$43,393.00  
$7,298.00  
$50,691.00  
1995  
$18,913.00  
$26,278.00  
$45,189.00  
1996  
$4,786.00  
$35,503.00  
$40,214.00  
1997  
$640.00  
$38,748.00  
$39,388.00  
1998  
$0.00  
$37,241.00  
$33,497.00  
1999  
$0.00  
$34,594.00  
$32,163.00  
2000  
$4,150.00  
$3,797.00  
$7,947.00  
2001  
$17,252.00  
$2,235.00  
$19,487.00  
EXPERT EVIDENCE RESPECTING THE CLAIM OF PTSD  
Expert witnesses were called by O’Neil and the Defendants. The primary issues to which they testified were  
O’Neil’s diagnosis, causation, progression and the personal and vocational effects of PTSD.  
The Plaintiff’s Witnesses  
a) Dr. Richard Ross Wheeler  
Dr. Wheeler was accepted as an expert qualified to give opinion evidence as a medical doctor. He is a general  
practitioner with some additional training in psychiatry and has held a full-time position with the mental health  
clinic at the Stanton General Hospital in Yellowknife since the early 1990s.  
Dr. Wheeler attended O’Neil for the first time on May 12, 1995. There were subsequent occasions when O’Neil  
was treated by Dr. Wheeler, including July 1995, when he was admitted for the second time as an inpatient at the  
hospital.  
Dr. Wheeler had personally witnessed the scene of the fatal blast. He was also aware that the deceased, Chris  
Neill, was a friend of O’Neil, and concluded that this increased the severity of witnessing the devastating  
aftermath. Dr. Wheeler also had information about O’Neil’s lengthy history with unions, including his receipt of  
death threats. When directed to his notes by counsel in cross-examination, Dr. Wheeler confirmed that O’Neil  
discussed his wife at significant length in the first consultation, and revealed that he cried frequently as a result of  
the marriage breakdown. Specifically, the symptoms reported by O’Neil included depression, difficulty sleeping,  
concentration impairment, low appetite, feeling that life had lost its luster, agitation and “non-focused” fear.  
After the first session, Dr. Wheeler diagnosed O’Neil’s condition as PTSD with delayed onset, in addition to  
significant depressive and anxiety features. The causes of O’Neil’s “injury” were identified by Dr. Wheeler as “the  
strike” and the “underground explosion with the murder of co-workers”. The qualification of delayed onset was  
due to the fact that O’Neil found himself incapable of working almost three years after the blast because he  
endured a shift in his life in terms of anxiety and panic causing a resurfacing of memories of the strike and the  
fatal blast. There was no mention in Dr. Wheeler’s reports, nor within his testimony that the Oklahoma City  
bombing was a trigger to O’Neil’s symptoms. Dr. Wheeler’s treatment included participation in weekly  
psychotherapy sessions, ceasing all work activities and taking the medications Zoloft and Desyrel.  
After O’Neil’s July admission to hospital, Dr. Wheeler opined that O’Neil’s condition had regressed and he had  
become increasingly unfocused. Therefore, Dr. Wheeler formulated a new plan involving a 10-week intensive  
outpatient treatment program for O’Neil at the Grey Nuns Hospital in Edmonton.  
b) Dr. William Alexander McCay  
Dr. McCay was qualified to give an expert opinion in the area of adult psychiatry. He met with O’Neil on two  
occasions at the request of Dr. Wheeler. The initial consultation was on May 16, 1995, for a one-hour interview,  
followed by a 20 to 30-minute session on June 20, 1995, while O’Neil was an inpatient at the hospital.  
O’Neil reported symptoms that included anxiety, insomnia, crying spells, depression, poor concentration,  
memory impairment, difficulty controlling thoughts and reduced appetite. In particular, O’Neil’s anxiety level  
was highest when on the subject of the mine site. Dr. McCay understood that the symptoms surfaced after he had  
viewed television coverage of the Oklahoma City bombing.  
Dr. McCay isolated the fatal blast to be the primary stress in O’Neil’s life. However, he testified that the surfacing  
of the symptoms was identified as having been influenced by the continuing conflict between workers who  
crossed the picket line and those who did not and the deterioration of his marriage. Dr. McCay was unable to  
state whether or not O’Neil had any ability to recall the blast scene specifically.  
Following the initial session, Dr. McCay diagnosed O’Neil as having PTSD with delayed onset. It was his opinion  
that the trigger for the onset of the symptoms was likely his exposure to the television coverage of the Oklahoma  
City bombing. The delayed onset qualification was based solely on O’Neil’s self-report of experiencing no  
symptoms until just before seeking medical help from Dr. Wheeler. Dr. McCay also noted that O’Neil’s depressive  
features were common among PTSD patients. Although he stated that individuals often meet the diagnostic  
criteria for both PTSD and depression, O’Neil did not meet the full criteria for depression. Dr. McCay conceded  
that a patient who had experienced a reactive depression to marital discord or one who had endured a barrage of  
death threats might present similarly to O’Neil.  
Dr. McCay recommended that O’Neil take about three months off work and attend regular therapy, and extended  
prescriptions for antidepressant and sleeping medication.  
When Dr. McCay met with O’Neil on the second occasion, it was his opinion that his condition had improved. By  
this time, Dr. Wheeler had altered O’Neil’s medication, which Dr. McCay deemed appropriate.  
c) Dr. Heike Juergens  
Dr. Juergens was accepted as a qualified expert to give opinion evidence as a chartered psychologist specializing  
in anxiety disorders and couples’ counseling. Between April 1996 and June 1997, Dr. Juergens met with O’Neil on  
an approximate bi-monthly basis. O’Neil also sought several sessions in October 1997 and February 1998.  
O’Neil provided Dr. Juergens with a detailed history of his experiences on his initial consultation. In cross-  
examination, when confronted with the suggestion that O’Neil had focused on issues other than the fatal blast, Dr.  
Juergens stated that she believed O’Neil was actually avoiding talking about the details of the blast, which in her  
view was a common reaction among trauma survivors. It was Dr. Juergens’ opinion that O’Neil’s symptoms were  
consistent with PTSD. Her basis for this diagnosis was O’Neil’s self-report, clinical presentation and her  
consultations with other treatment providers. A chronological outline of Dr. Juergens’ opinion with regard to  
O’Neil is provided below.  
On April 17, 1996, it was Dr. Juergens’ opinion that witnessing the blast scene represented a severely traumatic  
incident for O’Neil, as did months of cumulative trauma emanating from union discord and threats of violence  
from strikers, combined with the further subsequent losses in the break-up of his marriage and reduced contact  
with his daughter. During the two years following the blast, Dr. Juergens believed that O’Neil continued to live in  
fear, as indicated by the fortification of his home with electronic security and a guard dog. Dr. Juergens further  
opined that during this period O’Neil dissociated himself from his memories and feelings about the trauma. She  
advised that O’Neil immersed himself in his work and channelled his anger into fighting the union. Dr. Juergens  
testified that, when his wife left the marriage in May 1995, he experienced a significant escalation of PTSD  
symptoms. Furthermore, these were exacerbated by reliving the mine explosion following his exposure to media  
coverage of the Oklahoma City bombing. Ongoing counseling with a more structured intervention process, both  
in the counseling and in the vocational reintegration aspects, was suggested by her. The ultimate goal was to  
assist him into full-time employment or academic upgrading. Dr. Juergens perceived him to be cooperative in  
any programs or techniques suggested.  
As of October 7, 1996, Dr. Juergens found that O’Neil had experienced a gradual and sporadic improvement in  
tremors and level of energy. However, she advised that he required ongoing assistance to reduce anxious  
ruminations and avoidance behaviours, and to enable him to deal constructively and systematically with hyper-  
arousal, stress and change. At this time, he had expressed that he was experiencing severe financial problems and  
might need to declare bankruptcy.  
On January 8, 1997, it was Dr. Juergens’ opinion that O’Neil might be able to pursue paid, part-time employment  
at the end of January. However, she was unable to predict with any accuracy when O’Neil could return to full-  
time employment. Shortly thereafter, in her report dated March 20, 1997, Dr. Juergens noted that O’Neil had  
experienced a worsening of his symptoms in late January. Increased tremors, numbness, fatigue and recurrent  
nightmares of the Giant explosion were all reported by O’Neil. In Dr. Juergens’ opinion, there were several  
stressors impacting his symptoms, including the holiday season and viewing scenes of war in the film Evita. The  
most significant, however she deemed to be his former wife’s remarriage.  
By May 21, 1997, Dr. Juergens concluded that O’Neil’s PTSD symptoms had improved over the past year. She  
advised that vocational assistance should take over, and psychological therapy should be decreased. She further  
recommended that immediate counseling be provided when necessary. This was reiterated on September 16,  
1997, particularly emphasizing the importance of carefully structured progressions in job duties and hours of  
work. Dr. Juergens also advised that close onsite follow-up be provided to ensure O’Neil’s compliance with the  
“work hardening” plan. It was her recommendation that O’Neil’s counseling file be closed until such time as  
additional situational stressors undermined his psychological well-being.  
On November 12, 1997, following several sessions in October arising from O’Neil’s increased anxiety from an  
automobile accident, Dr. Juergens identified challenges involved in finding suitable job opportunities. The jobs  
identified as contraindicated included those with high stress levels, unions, potential interpersonal conflicts or  
environmental hazards. Dr. Juergens highlighted that interpersonal conflict was a stressor that could particularly  
trigger adverse reaction, and was significant to the Giant episode and O’Neil’s marital difficulties.  
In February 1998, Dr. Juergens met with O’Neil twice due to difficulties with his new job as a baggage handler  
with Air Canada. Coping with the shift work, combined with the fact that he had to join a union, were stressors  
reported by O’Neil.  
d) Dr. Richard Joseph Spelliscy  
Dr. Spelliscy was qualified as an expert to give opinion evidence as a chartered psychologist specializing in  
psychological assessment and consultation. Dr. Spelliscy was asked to conduct an assessment of O’Neil by Dr.  
Juergens with the approval of the WCB. He was informed that O’Neil was experiencing some difficulties with  
respect to his memory and cognitive functioning. He was also provided with an assessment that was conducted  
by the CPA, a prior treatment evaluation prepared by Dr. Juergens and reports of Drs. Wheeler, McGuire and  
McCay. He conducted the assessment on June 28 and July 12, 1996. This began with an interview of O’Neil prior  
to administering the psychological tests, so as obtain first-hand information on the presentation of O’Neil’s  
psychological status.  
Following the completion of all aspects of the evaluation, Dr. Spelliscy concluded that O’Neil’s self report of a  
number of cognitive, emotional and physical symptoms was consistent with someone who is experiencing some  
type of anxiety disorder. O’Neil’s cognitive results, which Dr. Spelliscy stated were likely a conservative estimate,  
were in the average range with some mild difficulties in attention concentration. However, Dr. Spelliscy believed  
O’Neil to have the potential for good memory, concluding that deficient memory could not explain his attention  
and concentration problems. Dr. Spelliscy also found O’Neil’s intellectual potential to be in the average range,  
and that his results were consistent with mild difficulties in attention and concentration. On cross-examination,  
Dr. Spelliscy conceded that these conclusions were based on the assumption that, in the absence of any emotional  
or psychological complications, O’Neil’s intellectual abilities would be at least average. Therefore, where O’Neil  
tested below average, it was assumed that there was something impacting the results. Dr. Spelliscy testified that  
O’Neil’s personality test results were consistent with the diagnosis of PTSD. In his opinion, Dr. Spelliscy believed  
O’Neil’s greatest threat to vocational rehabilitation or stability continued to be his PTSD rather than substantive  
cognitive deficits.  
Dr. Spelliscy recommended ongoing financial and emotional support to relieve O’Neil of some life stressors. He  
deemed psychotherapy to be essential for O’Neil’s reintegration into the workforce, combined with ongoing  
medication and medical intervention. In addition, he advised that academic upgrading would be helpful but must  
occur in a program which enabled O’Neil to work at his own pace in a social setting. He further suggested that  
O’Neil be re-examined in 12 to 18 months given that his presentation appeared to be fragile and that it was  
premature to obtain a clear prognosis on his workplace adjustment.  
e) Dr. Wanda Jean Crouse  
Dr. Crouse was qualified as an expert to give opinion evidence as a psychiatrist with experience in the assessment  
and treatment of anxiety disorders, including PTSD. At the relevant time, she was a part-time consultant with the  
Urgent Short-term Assessment and Treatment Unit (“USTAT”) in Victoria, British Columbia. USTAT’s function is  
to provide rapid access to psychiatric services but limit the duration of services to approximately 12 sessions.  
O’Neil arrived at USTAT on the advice of a British Columbia Workers’ Compensation Board psychologist for a  
specific form of treatment, eye movement desensitization and reprocessing . He received seven sessions,  
beginning on June 12, 2001, and continuing through July. Dr. Crouse conducted the initial assessment as well as  
his fifth session on July 11, 2001. All other sessions were conducted by Phil Enns, a clinician, and Ms. Nigro, a  
student doing a clinical practicum.  
Collateral information and copies of certain medical reports were provided by O’Neil’s acquaintance, Judy  
Benjamin (“Benjamin”). In one of several communications from Benjamin, she stated her belief that O’Neil’s  
claim should be re-opened and asked whether USTAT could support this by advising that O’Neil’s condition had  
deteriorated and that he needed treatment, vocational rehabilitation and pension for his loss of earnings. It is to  
be noted that O’Neil, one week before contact with USTAT, had voluntarily terminated his successful employment  
with the RV sales company. Furthermore, he had been removed from his WCB benefits and was only accessing EI  
medical benefits. The triage log for O’Neil, called in on May 24, 2001, to USTAT, indicated that he was  
unemployed (one week), suffered from PTSD, experienced flashbacks from the 1992 Yellowknife mine explosion,  
had “Acute Functional Impairment”, endured a marriage breakdown, was unable to work and could not afford  
treatment.  
Dr. Crouse confirmed a diagnosis of PTSD. She did not have the benefit of many of O’Neil’s previous medical  
reports, including those of Drs. Passey, McCay and Hartman, when she concluded her diagnosis. Some of these  
materials she received after the initial assessment. Strangely, she received the report of Dr. Hartman with parts  
that had been deliberately obliterated. These blatant deletions did not cause her to question her assessment. Her  
explanation leaves me uncomfortable, all the time knowing that O’Neil had had his WCB benefits cut. Her  
recommendations were that O’Neil receive short-term supportive and cognitive behavioural psychotherapy  
focusing on his symptoms of PTSD.  
Reviewing Dr. Crouse’s evidence in its entirety, I accept that, while Dr. Crouse’s evidence shows that she did not  
act in O’Neil’s interest to regain WCB benefits, she was well aware that she was being used as a conduit for this  
purpose. There is little question but that Benjamin and O’Neil were pressuring Dr. Crouse to aid O’Neil in that  
respect.  
Furthermore, I am puzzled as to how Dr. Crouse could be, as she testified “very confident” with her diagnosis in  
the face of her acknowledgment of her consideration of other troublesome events in O’Neil’s life other than the  
discovery of the deceased miners’ bodies. She spent little time with him, and was deprived of the full medical  
information available. In consideration of Dr. Crouse’s acknowledgment that compensation neurosis is a  
possibility, I am skeptical of O’Neil’s motives and his credibility.  
f) Dr. Donald Gregory Passey  
Dr. Passey was accepted as an expert qualified to give opinion evidence as a psychiatrist with expertise in trauma  
psychiatry, and specifically PTSD. Dr. Passey assessed O’Neil on July 30, 2001, on referral from a family  
physician. He saw O’Neil a second time in February 2003.  
In addition to conducting a formal interview with O’Neil on his first visit, he reviewed documentation from other  
medical practitioners that was provided to him by both O’Neil and Benjamin. Dr. Passey also received collateral  
information through direct communication with Benjamin. In the interview, Dr. Passey obtained a thorough  
history from O’Neil, which assisted him in forming an opinion and diagnosis. Stressors plaguing O’Neil at the  
time of this assessment were noted by Dr. Passey to be financial, primarily that his employment insurance was to  
expire in two weeks.  
Since the interview with O’Neil, Dr. Passey has recognized some discrepancies in the information that O’Neil  
provided to him. For example, O’Neil had incorrectly advised Dr. Passey that he had not flown an airplane since  
the fatal blast and neglected to highlight some of the relationships he had formed. He also did not alert Dr.  
Passey to the fact that he had videotaped the birth of a calf, even though O’Neil said that this sight triggered  
memories of the mine tragedy.  
Following his assessment, Dr. Passey determined that O’Neil had severe and chronic PTSD as well as depression.  
He stated that the PTSD was caused by the mine disaster and that the symptoms had waxed and waned over time  
but were prominent on the date of assessment. He also noted O’Neil’s obsessive compulsive tendencies before the  
blast and confirmed that these were even more prominent afterwards. He noted that O’Neil presented as rigid,  
inflexible and entirely task-focused. It was Dr. Passey’s opinion that this aspect of O’Neil’s presentation made his  
prognosis worse. He stated that such patients experience difficulty adapting to new situations and are  
workaholics to the exclusion of everything else; furthermore, these tendencies make treatment efforts more  
difficult.  
As for the role of the Oklahoma City bombing, Dr. Passey testified that this was a major trigger for O’Neil. As  
well, he believed that O’Neil’s means of immersing himself in tasks was semi-successful until the Oklahoma City  
bombing, which gravely exacerbated all of his PTSD symptoms. It was Dr. Passey’s opinion that this eventually  
resulted in the end of his marriage. Dr. Passey admitted that O’Neil had been exposed to other traumatic events  
such as his father’s death, the union activity, death threats and a fatal plane crash. However, it was his opinion  
that these events did not result in a level of dysfunction to enable a diagnosis. In essence, he opined that  
everything experienced by O’Neil related back to the sight of the explosion.  
Dr. Passey deemed the attempts to re-integrate O’Neil into the workforce as unsuccessful because of the lack of  
support to assist him with workplace triggers. Consequently, Dr. Passey believed that O’Neil’s natural reaction  
was to flee the workplace on the appearance of a trigger. Specifically, Dr. Passey stated that the presence of any  
conflict was a trigger for O’Neil, which activated the anxiety, fear and induced emotions.  
Dr. Passey was of the opinion that O’Neil was unable to work. In his evidence, he stated that one-third of PTSD  
patients, despite the best of treatment, still have symptoms 10 years later, leading to the conclusion that a  
significant number of these are not going to be employable or will be episodically employable. He highlighted  
that an individual’s ability to work relates to his or her ability to contain the symptoms. When presented with  
reports from other experts who stated that they believed O’Neil had been ready to return to work, Dr. Passey  
could not disagree with their findings without having met with O’Neil on the dates they had; rather, he stated  
that, because of the disorder’s tendency to “wax and wane”, an individual will present differently at different times  
depending on what triggers are present. Dr. Passey recommended the continued use of medications and therapy  
with a clinician experienced in PTSD.  
O’Neil saw Dr. Passey again on February 11, 2003. Dr. Passey was aware that O’Neil had not had any clinical  
treatment since the initial assessment. O’Neil reported a decrease in some symptoms, although memory  
problems, startle reflex sensations, anxiety and irritability continued. Specifically, O’Neil’s irritability was evoked  
during times he spent with his daughter. Dr. Passey noted that O’Neil continued to have dreams about the mine  
but not the blast scene specifically. It was Dr. Passey’s opinion after this visit that O’Neil still met the criteria for  
PTSD, but it was no longer deemed to be severe, while his symptoms of depression remained.  
Dr. Passey recommended that O’Neil receive 6 to 12 months of optimal therapy, a combination of medication and  
counseling. He concluded, however, that due to the limited treatment resources available to O’Neil on Vancouver  
Island, such treatment would not be received. Consequently, he opined that his symptoms were likely to persist  
for the rest of his life and interfere with employability.  
In Dr. Passey’s opinion, O’Neil will never be a commercial pilot, but perhaps might be able to regain his private  
pilot’s licence. Furthermore, he stated that O’Neil would not be a miner again, particularly in Yellowknife. In  
terms of suitable types of employment, Dr. Passey indicated that O’Neil must work alone. Even if his symptoms  
were to subside, Dr. Passey stated that there would be occasions where the disorder would “flare up” rendering  
O’Neil unemployable for periods of time.  
g) Dr. Christopher James  
Dr. James was called by O’Neil and was qualified as an expert to give opinion evidence as a medical doctor. His  
first meeting with O’Neil was on September 17, 2001, when O’Neil appeared on a walk-in basis. He had  
previously been a patient of one of Dr. James’ associates, but continued to see Dr. James on occasion between  
September 2001 and April 2002.  
On his first visit, Dr. James altered O’Neil’s medication and then provided an unsolicited opinion to the WCB  
advising it that O’Neil had a significant disability and was unsuitable for employment. He further advised that  
O’Neil required extensive medical and psychological management of his PTSD.  
On December 14, 2001, Dr. James provided another opinion to the WCB. His diagnosis was PTSD and he  
recommended counseling and return to work planning. However, he stipulated that O’Neil was not capable of  
working full duties due to severe PTSD. Furthermore, Dr. James indicated that O’Neil might be permanently  
unable to work as indicated in the report of Dr. Passey. This was reiterated on February 4, 2002. Dr. James  
noted that O’Neil showed a slight improvement in anxiety and that the changes in medication had been effective,  
although he was still unable to work. He advised the WCB that O’Neil had a permanent disability and referred it  
to Dr. Passey’s report.  
The Defendants’ Witness  
Dr. Carl Arthur Blashko  
Dr. Blashko is a psychiatrist who was qualified as an expert to give opinion evidence relating to the assessment  
and treatment of mental disorders and specifically relating to his independent medical assessment of O’Neil. Dr.  
Blashko has extremely impressive qualifications and a deep insight into PTSD. He was asked to provide a  
diagnostic opinion as to the cause of O’Neil’s employment and interpersonal difficulties since 1992; more  
specifically, he was asked to opine on whether O’Neil had PTSD, the extent of it, whether it had resolved and  
O’Neil’s prognosis.  
Prior to conducting the interview, Dr. Blashko had been furnished with nearly all of O’Neil’s previous medical  
reports, data, records, personal memos and voluminous information since the date of the blast. This gave him the  
advantage of some important material that other experts who testified did not have.  
Dr. Blashko conducted his assessment of O’Neil on January 17, 2003. During the interview, O’Neil reported that  
“he suffered a psychological disorder due to observing the aftermath of a mine blast which caused nine deaths  
including his closest friend”. He informed Dr. Blashko that he had suffered PTSD and was unable to function  
adequately, particularly with regard to employment.  
Dr. Blashko ascertained O’Neil was cooperative and involved, without evidence of antagonism, oppositional  
behaviour, hostility, negativism or other attitudes or behaviours that would interfere with the interview process.  
Furthermore, there was no evidence of under-estimating, over-estimating or distorting information. Dr. Blashko  
noted that O’Neil’s sole concern throughout the interview was his “unwavering belief that he was unable to  
function in a work role”. Dr. Blashko noted that O’Neil was unable to present symptoms to support this  
contention. This perception, which became obsessive to O’Neil, is an issue of major significance in this claim, in  
my view.  
Dr. Blashko determined, and I accept, that O’Neil seemed self-programmed to cling to the mine incident as the  
sole cause of his PTSD, ignoring other severe and prolonged stressors that contributed to his psychological state  
in May 1995. O’Neil was anxious to detail the experience of observing the dismembered bodies of his fellow  
miners. He was relaxed, not unduly distraught, and spoke in a clear and controlled manner, absent emotionality.  
He espoused the indicia of developed, significant symptoms of anxiety, panic, hyper-vigilance, insomnia,  
depressive feelings, low stress tolerance and an inability to function in a work role beginning in mid-May 1995.  
Dr. Blashko grouped segments of the interview around specific time periods. When directed to focus on the last  
two to three years, O’Neil reported that some of his symptoms had reduced significantly, including hyper-  
vigilance, anxiety, episodic panic, insomnia and recurrent dreams and nightmares. However, he also reported  
that some symptoms continued with certain trigger events, albeit far fewer. Interestingly, he told Dr. Blashko that  
he had not had any responses recently, but believed his medication was partly to explain. When he does  
experience a trigger event, he advised Dr. Blashko that this causes an increase of symptoms, provoking a need to  
escape and avoid activities. A current example provided by O’Neil was receiving phone calls that were  
contentious or conflictive. Also persistent was O’Neil’s chronic fatigue that has resulted in having to push himself  
to exercise more often.  
Additionally, at several junctures in the interview O’Neil maintained that there was no improvement in his  
inability to work, and this continued to be his main issue. He was unable to explain the factors impairing this  
ability, but he tended to think about the bombing. Consequently, a great deal of interview time was spent  
assessing connections between qualities of mental state and inability to function. Dr. Blashko was unable to elicit  
significant mental status changes that could reasonably be understood to cause impairment of functioning. He  
highlighted that O’Neil had undertaken a lifestyle of wellness, including a balanced diet, abstinence from alcohol  
and drugs and appropriate rest. Furthermore, although O’Neil complained of difficulties with concentration and  
short-term memory which impaired his ability to cope with work settings, this was not evident to Dr. Blashko.  
Throughout the four-hour interview with O’Neil, there was no evidence of dismissal, lack of interest, distress or  
problems of concentration; rather, there was an emphasis throughout on his perceived inability to resume a work  
role. Similarly, although he complained of a degree of hyper-vigilance and related triggers therefor, Dr. Blashko  
was bereft of evidence of any impairment, but for O’Neil stating he tired more easily.  
An interesting observation of Dr. Blashko arose when O’Neil was asked the question whether he could work when  
this litigation was complete and ceased to interfere with his lifestyle. He replied that he would continue to be  
unable to work. When asked why this was the case, O’Neil had no explanation, which led Dr. Blashko to conclude  
that his psychological symptoms would continue to impair his function. This supports a conclusion that O’Neil’s  
inability to work is not rooted in trauma associated with the mine blast incident. This was precisely my  
impression immediately following O’Neil’s testimony and before Dr. Blashko testified.  
At the time of the interview, O’Neil opined that he was experiencing certain financial difficulties following the  
discontinuance of WCB support in February 2000. However, the WCB support had been re-instated in April  
2002. I note with interest at this juncture that his income at the date of the interview with Dr. Blashko was  
$2,300 per month in WCB benefits (tax free) and $895 CPP income. That $3,195 monthly income could not be  
bettered with his educational and work experience, leading me to conclude that little desire existed for him to  
seek employment.  
O’Neil was living a beloved lifestyle on Vancouver Island enjoying his freedom and time spent with family, friends  
and his dog.  
Another time period on which Dr. Blashko focused O’Neil’s attention in the interview was from May 1992 to May  
1995. Dr. Blashko acknowledged that Stanton General Hospital records (along with Dr. McCay’s consultation)  
suggested that O’Neil was “very unwell” psychologically beginning in the middle of May 1995, and that he had  
been under great pressure since May 1992. He understood from O’Neil that, when he began at Giant in 1983, he  
enjoyed a sense of pride in union work, its movement and accomplishments, but was rebuffed by CASAW Local 4  
when he attempted to participate. O’Neil’s philosophy did not complement CASAW National’s and CASAW Local  
4's anti-American, pro-Communist sentiment. Dr. Blashko noted that at no time did O’Neil ever become aligned  
with CASAW National or CASAW Local 4, but rather the relationship worsened when he attempted to introduce  
merger discussions with CAW National. He learned that O’Neil was also derided each time he complained about  
antics carried out by certain co-workers intending to cause or encourage deliberate harm to Royal Oak.  
Dr. Blashko also took notice that, once the strike began, O’Neil became more discouraged at the lack of  
organization. His popularity, already low, fell further with the anger of his striking brothers when they learned of  
his dalliances with Royal Oak management. That was followed by his press interview, which he hoped would  
bring about new negotiations, but instead provoked death threats, forcing him to leave town for a period of time.  
It was clear to Dr. Blashko, and I find, that O’Neil was distraught, distressed, agitated and discouraged with his  
working environment prior to September 1992.  
After the fatal blast, when O’Neil was convinced that the deaths could be laid at the feet of a well-known radical  
sub-group within CASAW Local 4, Dr. Blashko highlighted that O’Neil’s next obsession was to form the GMEA.  
That, too, resulted in disaster and took its toll on both his marriage and health. Not only did O’Neil then have  
CASAW Local 4 railing against him, but CAW National as well, fracturing his relationship with his namesake  
uncle who was an executive member of CAW National. His attempt to interest Canadian Steelworkers Union also  
failed. Royal Oak warned him that, if he persisted with similar attempts, he would be fired. Clearly, O’Neil was  
met with antagonism and animosity from all sides. Finally in January 1995, his wife informed him she and their  
daughter were leaving. They did so in May, thereby stripping away his pride as a family man.  
There was no question these just recited events brought him stress, most of which were his own doing.  
It was Dr. Blashko’s conclusion that, although O’Neil was agitated, angry and distraught, he did not manifest any  
psychiatric disorder, and I accept his opinion. He outlined the factors that must be assessed in order to establish  
a diagnosis of PTSD as follows:  
1) The existence of a traumatic event;  
2) There must be the development of characteristic symptoms following exposure to an extreme traumatic  
stressor(s); and  
3) The disturbance causes clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other important  
areas of functioning.  
Dr. Blashko identified issues which, in his view, defeat a diagnosis of PTSD. Firstly, during the interview O’Neil  
complained that he had symptoms of PTSD and was experiencing an inability to function in many areas of his life,  
including employment. However, examining the period from September 2000 to the date of the interview, Dr.  
Blashko found no evidence of this.  
Secondly, it is characteristic of a person with PTSD to re-experience the traumatic event. Consequently,  
avoidance becomes a common behavioural pattern according to Dr. Blashko. This was not apparent in O’Neil’s  
case. Dr. Blashko found O’Neil made no effort to avoid thinking or talking about witnessing the blast scene.  
Furthermore, his memory of the experience was excellent; where PTSD exists, memory is usually adversely  
affected.  
Thirdly, PTSD generally causes a diminished interest or participation in significant activities. However, O’Neil  
exhibited excitement, enthusiasm and idealism towards relationships with friends and family, his physical health  
and well-being, as well as social and entertainment-related activities. It was Dr. Blashko’s opinion that “these  
positive psychological experiences are incompatible with the diagnosis of PTSD”. Furthermore, O’Neil held a  
strong sense of his future, which included writing and journaling. There was no indication of significant stress or  
impairment of functioning in intimate relationships, family relationships, socialization or work, yet O’Neil  
continued and continues to assert that he is unable to work because of PTSD.  
It was Dr. Blashko’s opinion that finding the destruction of life and property after the blast on September 18,  
1992, was not the traumatic stress that caused O’Neil to have significant anxiety and depression beginning in May  
1995. Instead, the traumatic stresses leading to his significant psychological disorder were identified as his anti-  
CASAW attitude which for many years led to negative relationships with union executive and workers, his anti-  
union work in the immediate strike period causing threats against him and his family which eventually caused  
him to leave town and, most significantly, his leadership in respect of GMEA, an association he founded,  
organized and maintained with the goal of decertifying CASAW. Dr. Blashko further supported his conclusion by  
noting that it is well-established that the duration of the traumatic stressors has a direct relationship to the  
psychological impact on an individual. In O’Neil’s case, observing the aftermath of the blast was certainly  
traumatic but very short-lived, unlike the traumatic stress experienced with his anti-union work. The latter had a  
far greater impact on psychological status. This conclusion I accept.  
Other stressors for O’Neil included the financial burden relative to GMEA. Bill collectors were demanding  
payment from the insolvent GMEA, which caused O’Neil concern and personal hardship. Finally, losing his  
family appears to have been the ‘last straw’ and the development of anxiety and depression ensued; following this  
he did not return to work. Dr. Blashko disagreed with O’Neil’s suggestion that the Oklahoma City bombing was a  
trigger of the fatal blast, for the reasons previously discussed.  
Dr. Blashko did an in-depth analysis of the care, assessment and treatment by medical and occupational persons  
since May 15, 1995. A summary of his observations is set out below:  
· Dr. McCay - May 16, 1995  
Dr. McCay agreed that there were stressors, other than the blast, which O’Neil attributed to his PTSD. However,  
Dr. McCay did not assess the effects of O’Neil’s intense efforts against CASAW in the pre and post bombing  
period.  
· Gibson Medical Clinic - May 15, 1995 - December 31, 1995  
He was prescribed Rivotril for an unexplained reason because of being harassed by Royal Oak over a two-three  
week period respecting return to work or his anti-union stance.  
· Paulette Plouffe, Primary Therapist, Psychiatric Outpatient Program, Grey Nuns Hospital - August 24, 1995  
He was expelled from this group therapy as he, contrary to one suffering from PTSD, talked uncontrollably about  
the mine disaster. The stressors were identified as the “death of a friend, stressful work condition, believing he is  
in an unsafe neighbourhood, exposure to hostility”.  
· Dr. McKenna - August 31, 1995  
He was prescribed Paxil, Desyrel 50 mg., and Clonazepam 5 mg.  
· Dr. McKenna - September 12, 1995  
Dr. McKenna described O’Neil as “pretty normal”. Although Dr. Blashko noted that Dr. McKenna did not have all  
of the material that was available, Dr. Blashko acknowledged that O’Neil exhibited PTSD symptoms from May 15,  
1995, through August 1995.  
· Dr. McGuire - October 16, 1995  
Dr. McGuire made no comment about the significant family stressors impacting O’Neil for the months before and  
after the blast. Dr. Blashko signaled that there was no record that this doctor obtained information on O’Neil’s  
anti-union activities. Dr. McGuire did note O’Neil was enjoying selling “animation art”. This enjoyment aspect is  
contrary to PTSD sufferers according to Dr. Blashko, who highlighted that Dr. McGuire felt O’Neil should be  
involved in work activity. Dr. Blashko conceded that O’Neil could not return to the mine at this time because of  
hostility that awaited him there.  
· Dr. Wheeler - November 22, 1995  
This doctor attributed O’Neil’s PTSD to the strike, and the deaths that ensued. Dr. Blashko believed Dr. Wheeler  
was mistaken in failing to recognize pre and post blast anti-union activities.  
· Kim McIssac, Vocational Evaluation Specialist - December 17, 1995  
Dr. Blashko questioned McIssac’s findings that O’Neil had an above average mental and academic ability after a  
review of his previous work experience. There was no description provided of the information or data utilized by  
McIssac, and this conclusion flies in the face of O’Neil’s poor academic background and his low functioning cage  
operator’s work. In the result, it was Dr. Blashko’s opinion that, as of 1995, O’Neil’s PTSD was at best in the mild  
to moderate range and certainly not severe.  
· Dr. Denson - January 22-23, 1996  
He reported that O’Neil could benefit from some form of re-training. Furthermore, Dr. Denson shared the view of  
Dr. McKenna that he had patients with more severe problems of PTSD than O’Neil but who returned to work. Dr.  
Denson had received a communication from Dr. McGuire that she believed O’Neil should return to some form of  
work and that not to do so would be detrimental to his mental health. Dr. McKenna concurred in this opinion.  
· Clancy White, Counselor - February 6, 1996  
He reported O’Neil having personal safety paranoia respecting his previous anti-union activities. Dr. Blashko  
believed it was significant that O’Neil was now focusing on the fallout from his anti-union activities instead of the  
blast solely.  
· Dr. Juergens - February 13, 1996  
She questioned whether O’Neil’s “superficial presentation of reasonable intelligence is quite different from his  
actual abilities”, suggesting his intelligence is limited. She also noted his commentary of anger against or from his  
uncle, respecting unions. Dr. Juergens did therapy only, no assessment.  
· Dr. Juergens - April 1, 1996  
Dr. Blashko noted the absence in Dr. Juergens’ report of O’Neil’s GMEA work and its effect on him. Dr. Blashko’s  
comments were as follows:  
He was totally obsessed with his employee association and there was a disregard for his daughter and wife. His  
family lived under a siege mentality. This also has implications in terms of therapy. Jim requires insight into the  
fact that his obsession with his employee association had severe negative consequences. Unless Jim begins  
recognizing that decisions by him have significant consequences, there will be a tendency for him to get into  
difficulties on a consistent basis in interpersonal relationships and work settings.  
· Dr. Juergens - April 17, 1996  
It was Dr. Juergens’ opinion that O’Neil’s symptoms of anxiety, recurrent nightmares, memory and concentration  
deficits were caused by several stressors. These were identified as the mine blast experience, months of  
cumulative trauma from union discord and threats of violence from strikers, the break-up of his marriage and  
reduced contact with his daughter. She noted that for the two-year period following the blast he “continued to  
live under a shadow of fear, fortifying his home with electronic security and a guard dog, but he largely  
dissociated himself from his memories and feelings about the trauma. He immersed himself in work and  
channeled his anger into fighting the union by forming his own employee association.” Dr. Blashko generally  
agreed with this assessment.  
However, Dr. Blashko did not agree that the blast scene was a significant traumatic event, and that O’Neil’s anti-  
union activity was an attempt to deny and dissociate himself from the blast experience. Dr. Blashko pointed to  
the fact that O’Neil’s attempts to decertify CASAW Local 4 caused severe stress, including his receipt of death  
threats for his actions. Dr. Blashko noted that it was not the fatal blast that caused striking workers to retaliate  
against him, nor did the fatal blast cause O’Neil to fear for his life. Instead, his actions as against strikers and the  
executive of CASAW Local 4 caused severe hostility directed to him, which continued for a long period of time.  
The effect was that he had to hide from others; he was unable to walk freely in the community. Meetings with  
others involved in GMEA were held in secret. Dr. Blashko opined that this “lifestyle was a traumatic experience  
for Jim and his wife and was the factor that caused his wife to separate from him”.  
Dr. Blashko was in agreement with Dr. Juergens’ assessment that O’Neil required counseling, including  
desensitization to traumatic images and losses he experienced. However, Dr. Blashko was of the view that  
therapy should also be directed towards assisting O’Neil to recognize “how his personal philosophies and beliefs  
about union activities drove his singular approach to decertify CASAW”. Dr. Blashko believed that O’Neil will  
continue his behaviour which caused retaliatory actions from others unless he accepts his own role in  
perpetuating his own difficulties. Dr. Blashko stated that O’Neil “developed a self-justified approach to the union  
and tried to fight it almost single handedly. The individuals who did support him, did so in secrecy. Jim’s  
supporters did not want to be identified in the community.” Dr. Blashko pointed to notes regarding the Canada  
Labour Relations Board hearing from March 1993, where no one attended in support of O’Neil for fear of  
retaliation from striking CASAW Local 4 members. Dr. Juergens identified that this precipitated a sense of  
betrayal and subsequent vigilance and distrust in interpersonal relationships. She also reported that counseling  
should be directed to successfully confronting and challenging his fears and suspicions regarding perceived  
interpersonal threats and difficulties. Dr. Blashko plainly stated that O’Neil believed that very real threats existed  
against his life. These were not misperceptions. He had to leave Yellowknife for his own safety.  
· Dr. Spelliscy, Ph.D. Consulting Psychologist - August 8, 1996  
It must be appreciated that Dr. Spelliscy assessed O’Neil for his intelligence and his cognitive functioning in  
reference to future vocational rehabilitation. It was noted that Dr. Spelliscy focused only on O’Neil’s jeopardy  
arising from the blast, which Dr. Blashko believed was a minor issue compared with his anti-union work. As a  
result of this narrow view, Dr. Blashko opined that Dr. Spelliscy’s conclusion that O’Neil’s fear of others is due to  
the blast was not well-founded. Instead, Dr. Blashko signaled that the fear is based on O’Neil’s self-directed and  
self-imposed anti-union work in both the pre and post-blast period.  
Dr. Blashko took no issue with the conclusion that Dr. Spelliscy’s assessment supported the diagnosis of PTSD.  
However his apprehension was as follows:  
The only concern that I have about Dr. Spelliscy’s report is that the results are viewed as a conservative estimate  
of his true abilities. Jim failed grade six. He may or may not have completed grade ten. All his work in the mine  
was as a labourer. Jim’s educational background and work experience highly correlate with the test findings. It is  
my opinion that the test results accurately reflect Jim’s innate abilities.  
· Dr. Juergens - November 15, 1996  
At this time there were discussions between O’Neil and Dr. Juergens regarding a number of losses in O’Neil’s life,  
including the death and illness of some family members and friends, as well as the finalization of his divorce on  
October 1996. O’Neil was expressing distrust and betrayal towards his wife as well as the caretakers in his  
building.  
However, Dr. Blashko found that O’Neil’s activities at this time indicate a high level of functioning and limited  
symptoms. These activities included his creative writing course, driving his father-in-law home to Yellowknife  
following surgery, visiting his mother-in law one hour daily in an Edmonton hospital, writing children’s books,  
exercising, tanning and doing homework.  
· Dr. McKenna - November 29, 1996  
Dr. McKenna reported that O’Neil exercised more this summer. His mood is good and optimistic. He had initial  
insomnia and some degree of tremor when tired.  
· Dr. Juergens - March 20, 1997  
She noted a marked improvement in PTSD symptoms over the past year, and that Dr. McKenna concurred with  
this opinion.  
· Dr. Juergens - May 21, 1997  
Dr. Juergens reported that there will be a reduction in the frequency of psychological counseling and the focus  
will be shifted to vocational rehabilitation. Clearly, this suggested that the psychological status has improved to  
such a degree that vocational rehabilitation should be the primary focus. Dr. Blashko interpreted Dr. Juergens’  
report at this time to say that O’Neil on this visit was symptom-free.  
· Kim McIssac, Vocational Evaluation Specialist - May 29, 1997  
As a result of a meeting among all vocational support persons involved in assisting O’Neil, and a consideration of  
Dr. Juergens’ recommendation for vocational counseling, Dr. Blashko agreed that the identification of a realistic  
and attainable vocational goal was the appropriate focus.  
· Dr. Juergens - September 16, 1997  
Dr. Juergens’ suggestion that O’Neil’s counseling file be closed, as he was utilizing psychological skills actively and  
appropriately, indicated to Dr. Blashko that PTSD psychological symptoms were minimal and not requiring  
further counseling intervention.  
Dr. Blashko took interest in Dr. Juergens’ notes regarding their discussions about finances. It was noted that  
O’Neil desired the same level of income that he had at the mine. However, Dr. Blashko recognized that neither  
O’Neil’s education nor training would place him in a position with such earnings. Instead, he estimated that  
O’Neil’s earning capacity was likely $30,000 to $35,000 per year, compared with his WCB pension, which was  
about $31,000 tax free. Dr. Blashko identified that O’Neil accepting a position with a lower income than what he  
was receiving from the WCB was a potential problem.  
I am satisfied that this is the main reason why O’Neil did not want to return to the workforce.  
· Dr. Juergens - October 14, 1997  
Dr. Juergens noted that O’Neil was engaged in a relationship with a girlfriend. Dr. Blashko indicated that this is  
contrary behaviour to someone with PTSD.  
· Dr. Juergens - November 27, 1997  
Dr. Juergens determined that O’Neil no longer exhibited depression; his anxiety was minimal and he was rarely  
dreaming. Furthermore, she advised that O’Neil was having “enjoyment”, which Dr. Blashko stated is not an  
experience that those with PTSD can have.  
· Dr. Juergens - November 12, 1997  
She assessed O’Neil to be psychologically well.  
· Dr. Juergens - November 13, 1997  
Dr. Juergens suggested triangulation as O’Neil may tend to denigrate the importance of certain therapists.  
· Dr. Juergens - February 18, 1998  
It was noted that O’Neil’s inability to remember airport codes might be due to his having failed grade 6 and  
ultimately only attaining grade 10.  
· Dr. Gervais - June 6, 1998  
Dr. Blashko accepted Dr. Gervais’ opinion that some PTSD signs and symptoms remained but that O’Neil should  
return to the workforce, and that the union problem had been a contributing factor. However, he disagreed with  
Dr. Gervais that exposure to the blast was the major factor for reasons already provided.  
Dr. Blashko found that Dr. Gervais contradicted himself in finding that cognitive functioning was impaired from a  
psychological disorder. Dr. Blashko advised for that to be true, the psychological disorder had to be of at least a  
moderate to severe degree. In O’Neil’s case, Dr. Gervais found it to be minimal. Dr. Blashko noted that Dr.  
Gervais’ findings on cognition and intelligence correlate highly with those of Dr. Spelliscy.  
· Dr. Copus - June 25, 1998  
Dr. Copus’ independent medical opinion was agreed with, and mirrored Dr. Blashko’s.  
· Dr. McKenna - September 1, 1998  
It was Dr. McKenna’s view that by this time O’Neil was only minimally symptomatic and functioning quite well.  
· Dr. McKenna - October 6, 1998  
O’Neil was sleeping well, socializing and his mood was good at this time.  
· Barbara Barnet - October 29, 1998  
It was her view that O’Neil should return to work.  
· Barbara Barnet - December 3, 1998  
Barnet told Roper to use team conferences with vocational support personnel as O’Neil was “playing one against  
the other”.  
· Dr. Gervais - January 18, 1999  
Dr. Gervais noted good yearly improvement in O’Neil. Roper believed O’Neil was the cause of his own stress. Dr.  
Blashko noted that Roper appreciated that O’Neil did not have the ability to earn a salary comparable to his  
previous employment and this created fear and anxiety. Also, earnings from a job for which he was qualified were  
not comparable to his non-taxable WCB pension. The fact that nothing offered or suggested to O’Neil was  
acceptable to him suggested to Blashko that non-psychological factors may be preventing him from cooperating  
and gaining from vocational rehabilitation.  
I endorse that conclusion as it corresponds with my finding from O’Neil’s testimony.  
· Dr. Gervais - June 14, 1999  
It was Dr. Gervais’ opinion that O’Neil’s PTSD symptoms had largely resolved, and were not currently  
problematic.  
· Dr. Hartman - August 25, 1999  
Dr. Hartman reported that the most salient symptom O’Neil presented to him was stress and getting back to work  
and reintegrating into the world and society. Dr. Hartman also found O’Neil’s attempts to decertify CASAW Local  
4 to be a significant stressor. Further, he found O’Neil’s voluntary termination of jobs not to be related to  
depression or PTSD but “rather a combination of iatrogenic factors (being away from a work environment for  
several years; having little to do but become overly focused on hypochondriacal minutiae) and factors related to a  
secondary gain (a preference for maintaining a relevant lifestyle on total disability.)” It was Dr. Hartman’s  
opinion at this time that O’Neil did not have PTSD.  
Dr. Hartman’s results were comparable to those of Drs. Gervais and Spelliscy.  
· Shawn Roper, Vocational Rehabilitation Consultant - August 26, 1999  
He found O’Neil to be lacking motivation and not ready to enter the work force. Therefore, he closed his file.  
· Barbara Barnet - October 19, 1999  
O’Neil was advised by the WCB to keep his goals for a job realistic, attainable and available.  
· Brian Hawrelak - January 28, 2000  
Hawrelak concurred with Roper about O’Neil. He advised that O’Neil was discontinuing with vocational support  
as he had decided to relocate to Ontario.  
· Dr. Crouse - May 24, 2001  
She provided an assessment consistent with that of Dr. Blashko in that she recognized various contributing  
factors to PTSD other than the bombing incident.  
· Dr. Passey - July 30, 2001  
Dr. Passey identified the stress factors as the bombing scene, union work and marital difficulty.  
Dr. Passey indicated a number of symptoms experienced by O’Neil, including difficulty with noisy or confined  
places, increased startle reflex, having his back against the wall in a public place and avoiding shows about  
violence, explosion or murder. Dr. Blashko had two concerns with this. Firstly, he considered the reporting of  
such symptoms to be fairly significant, such that O’Neil would not have been able to work in RV sales for an eight-  
month period. Also, this degree of symptomatology was not contained in previous reports. Secondly, Dr. Blashko  
disagreed with the implied suggestion that the fatal blast was the cause of these symptoms. As has been  
previously stated, Dr. Blashko believed that the threats to O’Neil and his family over a three-year period because  
of his pre-blast and post-blast union work, were the main contributors or traumatic stressors leading to these  
symptoms.  
Dr. Passey highlighted that O’Neil seemed to have a limited interest in his life, such as not playing golf or  
returning to flying. However, Dr. Blashko disagreed with this conclusion because O’Neil’s poor financial state  
from September 2000 to May 2002 prevented these activities. Furthermore, Dr. Blashko stated that O’Neil  
advised him in January 2003 that he was looking forward to golf as his financial state had improved. As well, Dr.  
Blashko made reference to the time period when O’Neil was selling RVs. He was very social and developed  
excellent relationships with his customers, a deep and committed relationship with his daughter, and strong  
intimate relationships with women. Also, O’Neil had keen interests in cooking, walking his dog and caring for his  
personal needs such as being presentable at work, maintaining a balanced diet and exercising. To this extent, Dr.  
Blashko did not accept as valid Dr. Passey’s opinion that O’Neil had a diminished interest in life, was hard to  
motivate and had difficulty caring for himself.  
Dr. Passey had received collateral information from O’Neil’s friend, Benjamin. However, Dr. Blashko indicated  
that Benjamin appeared to be “over-involved” in O’Neil’s life. In fact, at the time of the assessment, he was trying  
to place strong boundaries on Benjamin and the relationship deteriorated quite significantly. Dr. Blashko was  
doubtful that she could be considered a reliable and candid observer. There was other documentation reviewed  
by Dr. Passey; however Dr. Blashko indicated that the information and documents used by Dr. Passey to reach his  
conclusions were not noted. This omission was highly problematic in Dr. Blashko’s view.  
Dr. Blashko expressed great concern over Dr. Passey’s diagnosis of “chronic post traumatic stress disorder  
(severe) and depression”. In particular, he found the use of the term “severe” to be inappropriate when O’Neil  
manifested so many positive features during the summer of 2001.  
Dr. Blashko strongly disagreed with Dr. Passey’s opinion that there was an obvious diagnosis since the time of the  
mine explosion, which was reactivated by the Oklahoma City bombing. It was Dr. Blashko’s view that O’Neil’s  
anti-union activities before and after the bombing incident were the major traumatic stressors. The blast incident  
was, in his opinion, but one incident or factor though a minor one that played into the PTSD, and that occurred  
along the way of events that resulted in the PTSD. Dr. Blashko said this and I endorse this opinion: “It is my  
opinion that Jim’s observations and involvements relevant to the immediate aftermath of the blast of September  
18, 1992, was a minor stressor as compared to the anti-union activities that he undertook.” Further, Dr. Blashko  
believed that the trauma extended not only to him but to his family. It was evident to Dr. Blashko that O’Neil’s  
wife was very supportive for a number of years but it seemed as though she could no longer accept the lifestyle  
that O’Neil imposed on the family because of his anti-union work. Dr. Blashko stated that O’Neil prided himself  
on his role as a father and husband, therefore was devastated when his wife and child left in May 1995. After this,  
O’Neil could no longer return to work. Dr. Blashko could not agree that simply watching the Oklahoma City  
bombing could reactivate his symptoms. Instead, there were so many other significant factors operative from  
May 1992 to May 1995.  
Dr. Blashko found Dr. Passey’s discussion about triggers at the work site to be flawed. Dr. Passey gave as an  
example that the red placenta on the farm reminded O’Neil of bodies at the explosion site. Dr. Blashko found that  
this was at variance with what O’Neil had described to him. He understood that O’Neil enjoyed his time working  
at the farm, continues to visit the farm and has maintained a relationship with the farm family. He was involved  
in many aspects of the farm and on one occasion he took a video of a calving to share with his daughter. Dr.  
Blashko opines that this in no way suggests that O’Neil considers the farm experience nor the specific feature of  
birthing or placenta as a trigger. Further, he saw no evidence of avoidance of the farm setting; instead, O’Neil has  
positive feelings about this experience.  
Dr. Blashko did not agree with Dr. Passey’s statement that O’Neil was “dysfunctional and unemployable due to a  
work related medical disorder”. He did not believe that O’Neil was dysfunctional at the time of the assessment or  
that he had a totally work-related disorder. Again Dr. Blashko asserted that O’Neil’s anti-union work in the pre-  
bombing and post-bombing periods were of his own motivation. He recognized that working against the union in  
the pre-bombing period and developing GMEA in the post-bombing period was causing a great deal of anger and  
hostility in the CASAW Local 4 membership. According to Dr. Blashko, O’Neil’s life was frequently under threat,  
not because of his work role, but because of his self-chosen and self-directed anti-union work.  
Based on my direct assessment of O’Neil when he testified, combined with the evidence provided by Barnet of the  
WCB, Dr. Blashko’s analysis herein simply validated the inference drawn by me. O’Neil was required to establish  
on a balance of probabilities that the Court could draw the appropriate inference of negligence against the  
Defendants from the circumstances recited herein. On weighing the circumstantial evidence with the direct  
evidence, I am satisfied on a balance of probabilities that a prima facie case of negligence against the Defendants,  
as circumscribed herein, is made out. I further find that the Defendants did not in law totally negate the evidence  
of O’Neil. See Fontaine, supra. Thus, O’Neil succeeds to the extent indicated later herein.  
CONCLUSION  
The fact that O’Neil was on the mine rescue team leaves me with some skepticism about the extent to which the  
blast impacted on his mental and physical health. That being said, I accept that the blast had some influence  
based on the medical evidence advanced. Dr. Wheeler noted that the blast scene “was a profound effect for him”.  
Dr. Hartman, for example, acknowledged the incident of September 18, 1992, was a disturbing traumatic event,  
but in the summer of 1999 he could return to the work force and at that time he did not have PTSD.  
In succession, the treatment providers on whom O’Neil attended believed, almost without question, that he had  
PTSD. There was a commonality in that for the most part; the symptoms were subjectively O’Neil’s, and, once he  
ran the treatment provider gamut to January 2000, he began to feign the said symptoms. However, there were  
many other and more significant factors involved, in particular, those stresses brought on by himself. I accept Dr.  
Blashko’s opinion in that respect as expressed and illuminated herein; in particular while counsel for O’Neil  
would have the Court conclude that Dr. Blashko was improperly out of sync with all of O’Neil’s treatment  
providers, that is a conclusion with which I strongly disagree, and I cite an example of a statement of Dr. Blashko  
as follows:  
Dr. Copus concludes that history confirms the conclusions of others that he has suffered from a posttraumatic  
stress disorder as a result of his traumatic experiences in Yellowknife commencing in September 1992. The  
traumatic stress included the experience relative to the explosion and deaths of co-workers as well as chronic  
tension that he felt his life might be at risk because of union politics surrounding the event. Dr. Copus reported  
that the social situation in Yellowknife after the explosion was a very tense and adversarial one and this was an  
important additional factor in the development and perpetuation of his P.T.S.D. Dr. Copus concluded that the  
appropriate treatment seems to have been able to resolve his P.T.S.D.  
Dr. Blashko agreed with the above conclusion of Dr. Copus that at some point O’Neil did contract PTSD, but not  
as O’Neil maintains, that is strictly from the blast on September 18, 1992. I am satisfied, however, that O’Neil has  
established a causal connection disablement to the September 18, 1992, blast scene to the extent illustrated by Dr.  
Blashko.  
O’Neil became too comfortable with his gentlemanly, relaxed lifestyle and had little interest in re-entering the  
work force. With his education and work experience he could not foresee earnings higher than the WCB benefits  
on which he preferred to be supported for the balance of his life. In addition, I find he has compensation  
neurosis. That was clear to me from Dr. Crouse, as well when he was interviewed by Dr. Blashko, and that  
impaired his desire to return to work from January 2000 up to the date of the trial. To sustain his preferred  
condition, O’Neil feigned the subject symptoms in order to maintain the WCB pension.  
I find no manifestation of significant symptoms of any psychiatric disorder including PTSD as of September  
2000. I further find that the evidence is compelling that he was symptom-free and ready for the workforce when  
in the hands of Roper, Zimmerman and Hawrelak in early 2000. His refusal to accept assistance caused these  
vocational and rehabilitation consultants to surrender. This was the basis for termination of the WCB benefits,  
effective February 2000.  
I am satisfied that O’Neil forfeited any entitlement to damages and loss of income beyond January 31, 2000, as  
his physical and mental health could not on the evidence warrant supporting the same. Thus his self-  
programmed diegesis as to his suitability for resumption of employment, regurgitated to all who would listen,  
expired.  
The findings of negligence and the law espoused in the Fullowka action, including that relating to directors’ and  
officers’ liability apply mutatis mutandis, here. The conduct of the Defendants towards the deceased miners in  
Fullowka and the assurances of safety given them were delivered to O’Neil, particularly those by Byberg. Those  
very assurances were so robust that, as the strike progressed, they overcame O’Neil’s deeply-held perception that  
he feared the union wanted someone to die so anti-replacement worker legislation could be given birth.  
Hargrove, as indicated earlier herein, is a Defendant in this action only. I have, in the Fullowka action, discussed  
Hargrove’s participation and need not repeat it here. Suffice it to say that Hargrove’s conduct and acts were in the  
Fullowka action held to be those of CAW National, and accordingly identified with CAW National and he incurs  
no personal liability in this action. The same applies to Gould.  
THE LAW  
All of the Defendants raised s. 2(1)(d) of the Limitation of Actions Act:  
(1) The following actions must be commenced within and not after the following times:...  
. . .  
(d) actions for trespass to the person, assault, battery, wounding or other injury to the person, whether arising  
from an unlawful act or from negligence, or for false imprisonment or malicious prosecution, within two years  
after the cause of action arose;  
To recapitulate, O’Neil immediately resumed work at the mine following the blast on September 18, 1992.  
On October 21, 1993, on hearing that Warren had been charged with murder in the deaths of the nine miners,  
O’Neil took a stress management session with Kerr, a nurse at Giant.  
On April 19, 1995, the Oklahoma City bombing occurred, which O’Neil testified triggered memories of the blast on  
September 18, 1992. However, he continued to work until May 12, 1995, when he attended on Dr. Wheeler at  
Stanton General Hospital, Yellowknife, as a result of his experiencing flashbacks, his tendency to constantly  
search for bombs at work and his inability to sleep. From that point onwards his medical voyage began.  
On April 28, 1997, he commenced this action. Prima facie, O’Neil’s action has been commenced out of time.  
The onus of disproving knowledge rests on the plaintiff when the defendant raises a limitation period. See Luscar  
Ltd. v. Pembina Resources Ltd. (1994), 1994 ABCA 356 (), 162 A.R. 35 (C.A.)., leave to appeal refused  
[1995] 3 S.C.R. vii.  
O’Neil, to survive this defence, must do so on the strength of the principle of discoverability. Henry J. of the  
Ontario Supreme Court, in Viscount Machine & Tool Ltd. v. Clarke (1981), 1981 1843 (ON SC), 34 O.R.  
(2d) 752, developed this at 759, where he said:  
The long established rule of law is that in negligence cases the cause of action arises not when the negligent act is  
done but when damage is suffered. Until damages occur the plaintiff cannot sue. Until then he has no cause of  
action. See Salmond on Torts, 17th ed. (1977), p. 597, and Darley Main Colliery Co. v. Mitchell (1886), 11 App.  
Cas. 127 (H.L.), Long et al. v. Western Propeller Co. Ltd. Et al (1968), 1968 589 (MB CA), 67 D.L.R. (2d)  
345, 63 W.W.R. 146 (Man. C.A.).  
Where, as here, damage occurs but is continuous and progressive, the cause of action does not begin to run until  
the damage manifests itself. For example, in George A. Demeyere Tobacco Farms Ltd. v. Continental Insurance  
Co. (1984), 1984 1823 (ON SC), 46 O.R. (2d) 423 at 435 (H.C.J), aff’d 1986 2634 (ON CA), 1986,  
53 O.R. (2d) 800 (C.A.), Griffiths J. quoted with approval from an earlier decision, a passage which included the  
following:  
The loss or damage in this case did not occur all at one time as in a fire or theft. It was continuous and  
progressive. Surely in a fact situation where the damage is continuous, progressive but undiscovered the  
limitation period would not start to run until the damage manifests itself.  
Griffiths J. continued at 435:  
In my view, the damage to the tobacco crop by disease would “manifest itself” when the extent of the deterioration  
of the crop by disease could reasonably be ascertained.  
O’Neil did not have a cause of action until the damage on which his claim is based occurred. His claim is based on  
his having been disabled from work by reason of the onset of PTSD, which occurred in early May 1995. On May  
12, 1995, O’Neil sought medical advice as to the existence and nature of a medical problem. Part of the diagnosis  
of PTSD is that it must interfere with the ability of the person to function. O’Neil was able to continue working  
full-time until May 12, 1995. Until he developed serious symptoms of PTSD which became sufficient to interfere  
with his ability to work on May 12, 1995, the cause of action advanced in this case had not arisen.  
The principle of discoverability was articulated by the Supreme Court of Canada in Kamloops, supra. It was  
reiterated and confirmed in Central Trust Co. v. Rafuse, 1986 29 (SCC), [1986] 2 S.C.R. 147. The majority  
of the Court, per Wilson J., held in Kamloops that the limitation respecting the negligence of the municipality did  
not begin to run until the plaintiff had knowledge or the means of knowledge of the facts giving rise to the cause of  
action. The majority of the Court had the same concern that the Manitoba Court of Appeal expressed in Long v.  
Western Propeller Co. (1968), 67 D.L.R. (2d) 345. In Kamloops; Wilson J. pointed out the Court’s concern this  
way at 40:  
But perhaps the most serious concern is the injustice of a law which statute-bars a claim before the plaintiff is  
even aware of its existence.  
In Rafuse, supra, the Supreme Court of Canada, per LeDain J., confirmed the following general rule governing  
limitation periods at 224:  
[A] cause of action arises for purposes of a limitation period when the material facts on which it is based have  
been discovered or ought to have been discovered by the plaintiff by the exercise of reasonable diligence...  
See also Peixeiro v. Haberman, 1997 325 (SCC), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 549.  
In applying the principle of discoverability to the law of limitations, Moore C.J. held in Smith v. Deloitte & Touche  
(1999), 253 A.R. 382, at para. 30, 1999 ABQB 991, as follows:  
The law is clear that for discoverability purposes, it is not necessary that a party be aware or appreciate that the  
facts give rise to a cause of action. Rather, all that is required in order for the limitation period to commence is  
that the party be aware of those facts: see, for example, Luscar Ltd. v. Pembina Resources Ltd., [1995] 2 W.W.R.  
153; 162 A.R. 35; 83 W.A.C. 35 (C.A.). In Luscar, the Court of Appeal rejected the trial judge’s suggestion that a  
party must not only have discovered the facts that establish the cause of action, but also must have recognized the  
significance.  
As stated by Vertes J. in Fullowka v Slezak, [2002] N.W.T.J. No. 21, at para 23, 2002 NWTSC 23 “[A] limitation  
period begins to run from when the plaintiff discovers the damage, or ought reasonably to have done so, and has  
determined, or could reasonably have determined, the identity of the tortfeasor.” It was not until Dr. Wheeler  
diagnosed O’Neil with PTSD and that it was primarily caused by his exposure to the blast site that it could be  
determined there was a cause of action, who the tortfeasor or tortfeasors might have been, and what acts or  
omissions might give rise to liability.  
Applying the discoverability principle, I am satisfied that the limitation period here began to run when O’Neil  
attended on Dr. Wheeler on May 12, 1995, and accordingly the Limitation of Actions Act does not bar this claim.  
My findings respecting the defence of novus actus interveniens as applied in the Fullowka action apply, mutatis  
mutandis, in this action. That is also the case with respect to my findings as to unions as separate entities,  
liability of directors, Hargrove, Gould’s liability and adverse inferences.  
Having been satisfied that there was a casually connected period of disability, and in view of my finding that by  
January 31, 2000, O’Neil had fully recovered, I note that this effective date was the same date on which the WCB  
terminated O’Neil’s benefits, and Hawrelak, his vocational counsellor at that time, was released by both O’Neil  
and the WCB.  
Notwithstanding full recovery, I find that O’Neil cannot return to the workplace as a miner or as a commercial  
pilot. The reason therefor is compelling, the sole basis being his attitude towards unions and his inability to  
function in a union environment, which cannot be attributed to his underground experience on September 18,  
1992. I reiterate that which I carefully delineated as to what brought on the PTSD, what was present prior to  
September 18, 1992, and what carried on thereafter.  
I take judicial notice that work as a miner and as a commercial pilot carries with it union membership, in which  
environment O’Neil cannot function due to his fixation about unions that he created himself. He cannot lay that  
at the feet of the Defendants.  
DAMAGES  
I accept Brown’s calculation of total loss (inclusive of pre-judgment interest) at January 31, 2000, to be $343.075.  
Brown’s assessment is preferred to Taunton’s. She had the benefit of O’Neil’s tax returns. Her adjustments of  
earnings and contingencies best fit O’Neil’s situation, particularly as she also had the benefit of Giant payroll  
records from a payroll audit done by the WCB for all miners. O’Neil’s earnings were consistent with the figures  
from the audit, so that their transposition delivers the aura of accuracy to Brown’s calculations.  
I adopt her calculation of annual potential loss of income for May 1995 through January 2000 as follows:  
1995 $43,220  
1996 $72,719  
1997 $78,272  
1998 $79,272  
1999 $64,031  
2000 $5,561 (for January only)  
Taunton’s methodology was not founded on facts that were proven but on statistics.  
Respecting expenses claimed, I adopt what is said in Cooper-Stephenson, supra at 166: “[T]he ultimate test of any  
expense claimable under special damages is its reasonableness”. As such, the WCB can only recover the  
reasonable payments it made to O’Neil or on his behalf and the reasonable expenses he incurred directly.  
Special damages of $2,945.58 have been agreed to by all counsel.  
The WCB has paid out the sum of $297,625.01 on O’Neil’s behalf for past cost of care. The sum of $195,715.89  
only is properly claimable here, since $101,909.12 has been deducted representing amounts paid by the WCB as  
compensation. This was properly delineated by O’Neil’s counsel as follows:  
Under the collateral benefits principle, a Plaintiff who has received compensation under a state or public scheme  
would be required to deduct the amount of these collateral benefits from his claim for lost income. Where the  
agency making the benefit payments (here the WCB) is subrogated to the rights of the Plaintiff and has a right of  
recoupment, if the Plaintiff is awarded the full amount of the estimated lost income, the agency will recoup the  
amount of the benefits paid out from the amount recovered, and therefore that amount should not be included in  
the amount awarded to the agency for the amounts disbursed by it.  
Management Fee - Tax Gross-up  
In view of the time fuse on O’Neil’s claim, and for reasons delineated in the Fullowka action for much of the same  
relief sought, my reasons therein applying, mutatis mutandis, no management fee or tax gross-up is recoverable.  
General Damages  
This claim can be classified as one in the nervous shock category as defined in Rhodes v. Canadian National  
Railway (1990), 1990 5401 (BC CA), 75 D.L.R. (4th) 248 (B.C.C.A.), leave to appeal refused [1991] 1 S.C.R.  
xiii, as the impact on a claimant’s mind caused by “fright, terror or horror”, as Southin J.A. or as Taylor J.A. said  
at 298:  
For exposure to the “aftermath” of an accident to be the basis of recovery for psychological injury there must, in  
my view, be proof that the injury was caused by some experience of an alarming, startling or frightening nature,  
and that it was foreseeable that such injury might ensue.  
I have found in the Fullowka action, the companion proceeding, that foreseeability was established, as it has been  
here in this nervous shock claim. O’Neil seeks $100,000 adjusted to current values, even though $50,000 is  
sought in his Statement of Claim.  
Counsel for O’Neil urged the following authorities on the Court. In Lee v. Too (30 November 1993), Vancouver  
B910099 (B.C.S.C.), the plaintiff was found to have suffered PTSD as a result of witnessing a car accident  
involving her son and then searching for him after he had been thrown from the vehicle. The son was  
unconscious when the plaintiff found him, and she initially thought he was dead. Subsequently, he recovered from  
his physical injuries but the plaintiff was diagnosed with PTSD. The onset of the PTSD was delayed for some six  
months. Drossos J. said at 6:  
On the issue of causation, the factors of foreseeability and causation proximity, including relational, locational  
and temporal proximity, referred to in Rhodes Estate v. CNR ¼ have been made out in this case. There is no  
doubt that the plaintiff actually observing the accident in which she initially thought her son dead and then  
learned of his serious injuries, was a horrific and shocking event to her. Although the upset and full manifestation  
of the Plaintiff’s post-traumatic stress disorder did not reach the point until approximately six months after the  
accident for the plaintiff to seek medical treatment, I am satisfied on considering the testimony of Dr. Jiwa, that  
there can be a delayed reaction. Further, there is evidence of symptomology consistent with the disorder relating  
to the accident, in particular, flash-backs and nightmares as well as others, to support and establish that the  
plaintiff’s traumatic stress disorder was caused by the accident.  
The non-pecuniary damages awarded were $20,000, a sum Pinkerton’s argued is in order for O’Neil.  
The facts in Swain v. Moore Estate, [2000] O.J. No. 1628, (S.C.J.), were that the plaintiff, Mrs. Swain, was a  
passenger in a truck driven by her husband. A vehicle operated by Moore went through a stop sign and struck the  
Swain truck. Mrs. Swain was injured in the accident and was rescued from the cab of the truck by her husband.  
She was placed on the grass beside the truck. Then she saw Moore hanging from the seat belt in his car which had  
slid forward around his neck. This caused Mrs. Swain great anguish. After returning home from hospital, she  
began to have problems sleeping and had in her mind an image of Moore hanging from his seat belt. She was  
diagnosed as having PTSD, anxiety and depression, and eventually was also diagnosed as having fibromyalgia.  
She was unable to continue to work in the family business; she suffered panic attacks, and “even events that  
would not be considered stressful were stressful for her”. Non-pecuniary damages of $100,000 were awarded. It  
is this sum, O’Neil argued, that is appropriate here. In awarding the non-pecuniary damages of $100,000 in  
Swain, Patterson J. said at paras. 10-14:  
She no longer enjoys or is able to continue her love of shopping and buying special gifts for friends. Essentially  
her shopping now is just very practical and in fact in almost all cases her husband goes grocery shopping with her  
just to assist in making decisions and making sure that matters are looked after. She is unable to make decisions  
and to make meals except at the most basic level. There is no question that she is using coping skills such as  
pacing herself in order that she is able to do some housework and prepare some meals and other activities that are  
attempting to bring some normalcy to her life.  
There is no question that Joyce Swain's life has been altered permanently and that she is a highly credible witness  
who will continue to suffer from chronic pain, post-traumatic stress syndrome, fibromyalgia as well as inter-  
related and unrelated anxiety and depression caused by the auto accident.  
Various tests since the accident have tried to determine Joyce's capability of going back to work part-time. It is my  
view that this is completely unrealistic. She had employment with her husband but she was making mathematical  
errors, was indecisive, and was unable to handle stress of even the most minor nature. The accident effectively  
precludes her from being gainfully employed in the open market. There has been some suggestion that she could  
do minor and passive duties, but from my observation of her as a witness I believe that is highly unlikely and in  
my view Joyce is not capable of even part-time work for the foreseeable future. She is still trying to cope with the  
fact that she is not the same person and never will be, but I must [compliment] her on her striving to use coping  
skills that she's learned to maximize the quality of her life.  
I have been provided with a series of cases from the plaintiff from British Columbia and from Manitoba whereas  
the defendant's lawyer has provided me with cases which are essentially from the Province of Ontario both at the  
trial and at the Court of Appeal level. The range in value for very serious injuries of the type suffered by Joyce out  
of the Province of Ontario tend to be in the $100,000 to $150,000 range. Within the Province of Ontario it  
appears that the range of awards in similar cases range from $40,000 to $90,000. The high end case also  
involved very serious physical injuries and surgery related thereto.  
It is my belief that the injuries suffered by Joyce are catastrophic in that she in my view is totally disabled. The  
ability to work within her own business with her husband is over. The dreams that they had for the business and  
for their retirement years are forever altered. The combination of problems and injuries suffered which include  
post-traumatic stress syndrome, fibromyalgia, anxiety, depression and chronic pain tend to work against each  
other in Joyce's case. It is my opinion this combination is equivalent to an extremely serious physical injury. As I  
have indicated, she is going to have to cope with the fact that she will never be the same and that she is  
unemployable. At a personal level many of the happinesses of her life have been taken away, - her love of  
painting, her hiking at the family cottage, her looking after the home as well as the shop from a leadership and  
physically active point of view. I therefore am of the opinion that the value of the damages particular to Joyce  
Swain is $100,000.00.  
O’Neil also cited Silva v. Valmana, 2003 21884 (ON SC), [2003] O.J. No. 2571 (S.C.J.), where the plaintiff  
suffered from PTSD, panic disorder and generalized anxiety disorder along with major depression. The medical  
evidence was that PTSD could be a life-long disorder, and that the symptoms of mood swings and depression  
would not likely improve significantly in the future. The incident in issue happened in October 1999, and, by  
January 2000, the plaintiff had returned to his old job on a half time basis and by early 2001 had returned on a  
full-time basis. The Plaintiff was awarded general damages of $100,000.  
Both Swain, supra, and Silva, supra, are distinguishable. Swain suffered severe physical and psychiatric injuries.  
Silva was assaulted, shot and confined by the defendant. His psychiatric injuries were major depression,  
dysthymia, panic disorder and generalized anxiety disorder, all of which would remain injuries. In both Swain  
and Silva the injuries and their lasting effects were much more extensive than those of O’Neil.  
In Bechard v. Haliburton Estate (1991), 1991 7362 (ON CA), 5 O.R. (3d) 512 (C.A.), liability for nervous  
shock was found where the plaintiff was travelling in her husband’s vehicle; Haliburton went through a stop sign  
and collided with the vehicle, and then, while Haliburton (who was injured in the collision) lay in the middle of  
the travelled portion of the county road, a vehicle approaching ignored the warnings of bystanders and ran over  
Haliburton and killed him. Griffiths J.A., for the Court, upheld the trial Judge’s finding that the offending driver  
was liable for the plaintiff’s nervous shock, or “post traumatic stress reaction or post traumatic neurosis”, even  
though the person who was run over was a stranger to the plaintiff. The non-pecuniary award at $50,000 was  
also upheld.  
Swain, supra, Silva, supra, and Bechard, supra, are distinguishable in that the plaintiffs were at the material times  
in personal danger or were primary victims within the foreseeable range of physical injury.  
Pinkerton’s opened its submissions on non-pecuniary damages by noting that O’Neil was psychologically healthy  
when he was interviewed by Dr. Blashko on January 17, 2003, and that he had been psychologically healthy since  
at least September 2000. I have found that O’Neil had made a complete recovery by January 31, 2000, and must  
view damages recoverable with that in mind.  
Pinkerton’s noted that only Lee, supra, involved a claim for purely psychological injury, but that case involved a  
close proximity relationship absent in O’Neil’s claim. There, the mother directly observed the vehicle, in which  
her 13-year old son was a passenger, cartwheel in the air and disappear over the edge of the highway. He was  
thrown from the vehicle, appeared dead, and nearly lost his arm. The mother accompanied him through the long  
flight to the hospital and through his prolonged recovery. She received $20,000 for PTSD.  
Pinkerton’s then cited the following eight authorities:  
(a) In Sant v. Jack Andrews Kirkfield Pharmacy Ltd. [2002] 3 W.W.W. 543, 2001 MBQB 294, Jewers J. awarded  
the plaintiff $40,000 in general damages for her PTSD symptoms that had persisted for over eight years.  
(b) In Anderson-Redick v. Graham, (2000) 258 A.R. 42, 2000 ABQB 36, Paperny J., as she then was, awarded the  
plaintiff $18,000 in general damages for PTSD symptoms that had persisted for thirteen to seventeen months.  
(c) In Cox v. Fleming (1995), 1995 3127 (BC CA), 15 B.C.L.R. (3d) 201, (C.A), varying on other grounds  
(1993), 13 C.C.L.T. (2d) 305 (B.C.S.C.) the British Columbia Court of Appeal, per Finch J.A., upheld the trial  
Judge’s award of $20,000 for nervous shock. This award was based on the “emotional scar” the plaintiff  
sustained as a result of viewing the severe injuries that were inflicted on his son in a fatal motor vehicle accident.  
(d) In Brouwer v. Grewal (1995), 1995 9093 (AB QB), 168 A.R. 342 (Q.B.), Marshall J. awarded the  
plaintiff $25,000 for her emotional injuries. The plaintiff had suffered through a major depression for nearly two  
years and PTSD which had not responded to treatment by the time the judgment was rendered over three years  
after the accident.  
(e) In Nespolon v. Alford, [1995] O.J. No. 1616 (Gen. Div.), rev’d (1998), 1998 7127 (ON CA), 40 O.R. (3d)  
355 (C.A.), leave to appeal refused [1999] 1 S.C.R. xi, Daudlin J. held that the plaintiff was entitled to recover  
$39,000 in general damages for PTSD symptoms that had persisted for over seven years by the time the case was  
decided and would require treatment for a further five years. On appeal, the defendants successfully argued that  
they were not liable for the plaintiff’s nervous shock.  
(f) In Lee, supra, Drossos J. awarded the plaintiff $20,000 in general damages for her mild to moderate PTSD  
that had largely resolved by the time the judgment was rendered over three years after the accident.  
(g) In Ashley Estate v. Goodman, [1994] O.J. No. 1672 (Gen. Div.), McKay J. awarded the four plaintiffs $8,000,  
$5,000, $3,000 and $500 in general damages for the nervous shock they suffered.  
(h) In Sutton v. Pelley, [1993] O.J. No. 2429 (Gen. Div.), Crane J. awarded the plaintiff $5,000 in general  
damages for his nervous shock.  
Pinkerton’s submitted that the above cases support a general damages award in the range of $20,000 for the  
Plaintiff’s PTSD.  
Witte and Sheridan submitted that the most relevant cases are those regarding purely psychological injury. In  
McDaniel v. Jim Pattison Industries Inc. (c.o.b. Save-On-Foods), [1990] B.C.J. No. 2949 (S.C.), the parking lot on  
the roof of a crowded store collapsed. Many patrons and an employee claimed for purely psychological injury,  
mainly PTSD. The range of general damages for the PTSD injuries ranged from a low of $3,000 to a maximum of  
$30,000, the latter for the employee-plaintiff who also received $20,000 for loss of past and future income.  
Witte and Sheridan also cited Cox, supra, where the plaintiff observed his teenaged son’s two-day struggle to live  
from an accident so serious his son’s face was not recognizable. The plaintiff was unable to work, developed  
symptoms including nightmares, and lost interest in everything, for which he attended counseling and took anti-  
depressants. His claim for nervous shock failed as on the evidence it was found that he did not suffer from PTSD  
as he would have developed similar symptoms whether or not he saw his son’s body. Ryan J. did find that the  
horror of the accident’s aftermath had caused a permanent “emotional scar” on the plaintiff’s mind and awarded  
$20,000 general damages. There was no award for loss of income because his psychological injury was not  
factually connected to his inability to work. The Court of Appeal affirmed the damages awarded for nervous  
shock, indicating that a larger award would be unjustified.  
Witte and Sheriden also said that Raivich v. Gero, [1996] B.C.J. No. 2002 (S.C.), was a case where the Plaintiff  
suffered physical and psychological injuries and is in some ways analogous to O’Neil’s case. Raivich involved a  
female plaintiff in her 30’s who had some pre-accident psychological problems. Wilson J. was not convinced the  
plaintiff’s psychological state was brought on by PTSD or that her emotional disorder would be permanently  
disabling. She received $30,000 in general damages, $13,440 for past income, and $16,000 for future income.  
In the result, and as I have found that O’Neil had recovered from PTSD as of January 31, 2000, and that the blast  
scene, while traumatic, played a minor role compared to other factors of self-induced trauma as illuminated  
herein, a fair and reasonable award for non-pecuniary damages is $45,000.  
Claims for aggravated, punitive and exemplary damages sought in the Statements of Claim in both actions were,  
despite inquiry by the Court of all counsel for the Plaintiffs, not pursued; thus, they are not addressed herein.  
Relief Granted  
James O’Neil, Action No. CV 07028  
O’Neil is entitled to judgment as follows:  
(a) General pecuniary damages for past loss of earnings, earning capacity, and employer-sponsored benefits in the  
amount of $343,075;  
(b) Reasonable expenses incurred in the amount of $195,715.89  
(c) Special, out-of-pocket expenses and other losses and expenses agreed to in the amount of $2,945.58;  
(d) General non-pecuniary damages for nervous shock, pain, suffering and loss of the enjoyment of the amenities  
of life in the amount of $45,000;  
(e) Interest pursuant to the Judicature Act, where applicable.  
(f) Goods and Services Tax, where applicable; and  
(g) Costs to be spoken to.  
ALLOCATION OF FAULT Action CV05408 (Fullowka) and CV07028 (O’Neil)  
In Heller v. Martens (2002), 303 A.R. 84, 2002 ABCA 122, the Alberta Court of Appeal suggested that five factors  
should be considered, weighed and compared relatively one to the other, in order to fix degrees of fault.  
The first factor deals with the nature of the duty owed by the tortfeasor to the injured person. Where a party  
exercised substantial control over an activity which is inherently dangerous, the highest duty of care will be  
expected of that party in ensuring that a known risk does not materialize. Where the risk does materialize, the  
party will have to show that it took every commercially practicable step to prevent the risk from materializing in  
order to avoid liability. If it does not, the degree of blameworthiness under this factor is high.  
The second and third factors respectively are the number of acts constituting fault and the timing of the conduct.  
These two factors referred to by the Alberta Court of Appeal in Heller, supra, can be combined as they really  
address the same issue, that is, the opportunity of the parties to reflect and consider the consequences of their  
actions or inaction, as the case may be. In other words, was there an opportunity to rectify a problematic  
situation?  
The fourth factor is the nature of the conduct held to amount to fault. Here, the Court considers the degree of risk  
created by each of the parties and the effect or potential effect of occurrences within the risk and any increment in  
the risk brought about by their conduct after the initial risk was created. According to Fleming, supra, in  
situations where even slight negligence is fraught with exceptional peril to others, the main blame must fall on the  
person who created the risk or worsened it.  
Fifth is the extent to which the conduct breaches statutory requirements. On this point, the Alberta Court of  
Appeal in Heller, supra, offered little precise guidance except to emphasize that evidence of breach of statute  
would be a strong indicator to be taken into account in the blameworthiness process.  
Additionally, consideration might well be given to the nature of the statute reached. For example, is it penal in  
nature? The breach of a penal statute carries with it a much greater degree of blame as compared to the breach of  
a non-penal statute. The nature of the statute in terms of its object also may warrant consideration. Is it health  
and safety legislation that exists to provide guidance in terms of safety in the workplace? A breach of that kind of  
statute might well have more weight than a breach of a licensing statute. Even within the same statute, the  
breach of a provision in relation to hours of work, and there was clear evidence of that in this case, might well  
carry less significance than a breach of a provision directly or more directly relating to worker safety.  
The Alberta Court of Appeal in Heller, supra, was careful to say that the list is not exhaustive and that there may  
well be other factors in a particular case the Court considers important to weigh, measure and compare.  
Under the rubric of degrees of fault, consideration must also be given to the Contributory Negligence Act, which  
provided:  
2.(1) . . . [W]here by the fault of two or more persons damage or loss is caused to one or more of them, the liability  
to make good the damage or loss is in proportion to the degree in which each person was at fault.  
This provision is almost identical to the provisions in other jurisdictions where “fault” has been interpreted to  
mean “blameworthiness”, and is determined by the extent by which each causative negligent action fell short of  
the standard of care that was required in all of the circumstances.  
Pursuant to factual findings and the authorities cited herein, I find the allocation of fault for both actions as  
follows:  
Party  
Degree (Percentage)  
Royal Oak  
23  
Pinkerton’s  
15  
CAW National  
22  
Warren  
26  
Bettger  
1
Shearing  
2
Seeton  
2
GNWT  
9
Arthur M. Lutz  
J.S.C.  
Dated this day of December, 2004.  
Counsel for the Plaintiffs:  
Sheila Fullowka, Doreen Shauna  
Hourie, Tracey Neill, Judit Pandev,  
Ella May Carol Riggs, Doreen  
Vodnoski, Carlene Dawn Rowsell,  
Karen Russell and Bonnie Lou  
Sawler J. Philip Warner, Q.C., Jeffrey B. Champion, W. Benjamin Russell and Lillian H. Riczu  
Counsel for the Plaintiff:  
James A. O’Neil James E. Redmond, Q.C.  
Counsel for the Defendants:  
Royal Oak Ventures Inc., Margaret  
K. Witte and William J.V. Sheridan Robert G. McBean, James T. Neilson and David P. Wedge  
Counsel for the Defendant/Third Party:  
Pinkerton’s of Canada Limited John M. Hope, Q.C., Norma J. Mitchell  
and Jennifer S. Jones  
Counsel for the Defendants:  
Government of the Northwest Territories,  
Anthony W. J. Whitford, David Turner  
and Lloyd Gould Peter Gibson, Christine Pratt and  
Randal Carlson  
Counsel for the Defendants:  
Canadian Autoworkers National and  
and Basil E. Hargrove Lyle S.R. Kanee and Patrick Nugent  
Counsel for the Defendant:  
Timothy Alexander Bettger S. Leonard Polsky and Heather Sanderson  
Counsel for the Defendant:  
Harry Seeton Austin F. Marshall and James Mahon  
Counsel for the Defendant:  
Roger Wallace Warren: James D. Brydon and Betty Lou McIlmoyle  
Allan Raymond Shearing: Unrepresented  
Counsel for the Third Parties:  
Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada  
and certain Federal Ministers James N. Shaw and Tracy King  
Appendix A - Glossary of Mining Terms  
* Indicates the definition is from A Dictionary of Mining, Mineral and Related Terms, compiled by Paul W.  
Thrush, Department of the Interior, 1968  
+ Indicates the definition is from Dictionary of Mining, A. Nelson, George Newness Limited, 1964  
C AKAITCHO SHAFT - The shaft located in the most northern part of Giant Mine. Also referred to as  
“Supercrest”.  
C AMEX - an explosive composed of ammonium nitrate and fuel oil in granular form that is stored in plastic  
packaging.  
C A” SHAFT - The shaft located in the most southern part of Giant Mine.  
C B1-38 PORTAL - A portal at the B1-38 Pit.  
C B-LINE - A type of high explosive used to detonate other explosives.  
C B RAMP - The ramp system at Giant Mine that exits at the UBC portal.  
C “B” SHAFT - The shaft located in the central part of Giant Mine.  
C B VENT SHAFT - A ventilation shaft located at the B Shaft at the Giant Mine.  
C BREAKTHROUGH - Passage cut through the pillar to allow the ventilating current to pass from one room to  
another¼An opening made, either accidentally or deliberately, between two underground workings.*  
C CAGE - Mining term for elevator. The structure used in a mine shaft for conveyance of men and materials.  
Cages are usually designed to take one or two cars per deck and may be single or multi decked.*  
C CAP - A devise for detonating an explosive charge. See “electric caps” and “non-electric caps”.  
C CAP MAG - An underground storage facility used to stockpile and supply detonating caps.  
C CAGE TENDER - In mining one who directs station operations and movement of a cage used to raise and lower  
men, mine cars, and supplies between various levels and surface, working at top of shaft or at an intermediate  
level inside a mine.*  
C C-DRY - A building on the Giant Mine site used for changing into mining gear, showering, storage of some  
mining equipment, and certain other mine operations.  
C C” SHAFT - The shaft located next to the C-Dry of Giant Mine and the main means of conveyance to the  
underground other than by means of a ramp system.  
C CHARGING STATION - An underground location with facilities to charge the batteries of Lokis.  
C CHUTE - A channel or shaft underground, or an incline trough above ground, through which ore falls or is shot  
by gravity from a higher to a lower level. A body of ore, usually of elongated form, extending downward within a  
vein.*  
C COOKER - The location at Giant Mine where a chemical/thermal process is used to extract the gold from ore.  
C CROSSCUT or CROSS-CUT - A tunnel driven at an angle to the dip of the strata, to connect different seams or  
workings. ¼ An underground passage directed across an ore body to test its width and value or from a shaft to  
reach the ore body.  
C CROSS SHIFT - Where more than one shift of employees is utilized, the shift that is before or after the current  
shift.  
C CRUSHER - The facility at Giant Mine used to crush muck for milling.  
C DRIEGER’S BAG - A bag used by a miner to carry tools and safety instruments.  
C DRIFT - A horizontal passage underground. A drift follows the vein, as distinguished from a crosscut, which  
intersects it.*  
C ELECTRIC CAPS - A small copper or aluminum tube, sealed at one end, containing a flashing mixture¼ The  
heating effect of an electric current flowing through a bridge-wire ignites the flash composition and fires the  
detonator which in turn sets off the explosive charge in the shot hole.+  
C FILL - Any sediment deposited by any agent to fill or to fill partly a valley, a sink or other depression.*  
C HANG - Portions of rock left hanging overhead after an underground explosion.  
C HEADFRAME - The steel or timber frame at the top of a shaft, which carries the sheave or pulley for the  
hoisting rope, and serves various other purposes. Also called gallows frame; hoist frame; head stocks.*  
C HEADING - A roadway driven in a coal seam, unless it is a hard heading which is driven in stone ¼In long  
wall stall mining, the stalls are turned off the heading.+  
C HIGH BALLERS - Miners’ slang for high production, bonus-generating underground miners.  
C HOIST - A winding engine installed at the top of the shaft of a metal mine and used for raising mineral,  
lowering supplies and the transport of workmen. A small haulage engine, which may be portable, for various  
duties underground.+  
C JACK LEG - A type of drill used for underground gold mining that is supported by a vertical metal leg and is  
hand operated by the miner.  
C JUMBOTRON - A large underground drill that forms part of a vehicle driven by a miner.  
C LIFT - The vertical height traveled by a cage in a shaft. The distance between the first level and the surface or  
between any two levels.*  
C LOKI - A type of underground electric locomotive used on tracts to haul or push a mancar or an ore car.  
C LOOSE - Portions of rock leftover after an underground explosion.  
C MAGNAFRAC - A high explosive in powder-filled tubular form.  
C MANCAR - A car for transporting miners.  
C MANCHA - An electric locomotive used on tracts to haul or push a mancar or single flatcar for supplies, smaller  
and less powerful than a Titan motor.  
C MANWAY - A passageway for the use of miners only; an airshaft; a chute.*  
C MILL - An above-ground facility at the Giant Mine where the crushed muck was further processed to separate  
the gold.  
C MUCK - Stone; dirt; debris ¼Rock or ore broken in the process of mining¼*  
C NON-ELECTRIC CAPS - the explosive loaded into a bore hole for blasting; also, any unit of an explosive, as a  
charge of nitroglycerin or a charge of detonating composition in the blasting cap.*  
C ORE - A solid, naturally occurring mineral aggregate of economic importance, from which one or more valuable  
constituents may be recovered by treatment.+  
C ORECAR - A mine car for carrying ore or waste rock.*  
C OVERHANG - Projecting parts of a face or bank. Unsupported areas between the punch and die. The  
overhanging edge of an undermined cliff.*  
C PIT or OPEN PIT - Any mine, quarry or excavation area worked by the open cut method to obtain material of  
value.*  
C PORTAL - A tunnel-like opening to the underground of a mine used for egress and ingress.  
C POWDER - A miner’s term for any explosive used for shot firing in ¼mines.*  
C POWDER MAG - An underground storage facility used to stockpile and supply explosives.  
C RAISE - A vertical or inclined opening driven upward from a level to connect with the level above, or to explore  
the ground for a limited distance above one level*  
C RAMP SYSTEM - A series of inclines/declines in to and out of a mine used to transport workers, equipment and  
other materials using motorized vehicles.  
C REFUGE STATION - An underground location that is supplied with emergency equipment such as oxygen,  
water and communications.  
C SCOOP - See “scooptram”.  
C SCOOP SHOP - An underground garage where scooptrams are stored and serviced by mechanics.  
C SCOOPTRAM - An underground front-end loader vehicle with a large scoop shovel, used for clearing and  
hauling muck and rock.  
C SLASH - An open or cutover tract.*  
C STENCH GAS - A substance with a distinctive, disagreeable odor put in the air current to warn underground  
workers of fire or other emergency.*  
C STICK POWDER - A type of explosive in stick or tubular form, e.g. dynamite.  
C STOPE - An excavation from which ore has been excavated in a series of steps.  
C SHAFT - An excavation of limited area compared with its depth, made for finding or mining ore or coal, raising  
water, ore, rock or coal, hoisting and lowering men and material, or ventilating underground workings.*  
C TAILINGS - The parts, or a part, of any incoherent or fluid material separated as refuse, or separately treated as  
inferior in quality or value; leavings; remainders; drags.*  
C TAPE FUSE - A type of fuse used to detonate explosives that is ignited by lighting with a flame.  
C TITAN - A type of underground locomotive used on tracks to pull or push a mancar or a string (train) of ore  
cars, larger than a Mancha.  
C UBC PORTAL - A portal near the B-2 Pit.  
CV 05408  
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE  
NORTHWEST TERRITORIES  
BETWEEN:  
SHEILA FULLOWKA, DOREEN SHAUNA HOURIE, TRACEY NEILL, JUDIT PANDEV, ELLA MAY CAROL  
RIGGS, DOREEN VODNOSKI, CARLENE DAWN ROWSELL, KAREN RUSSELL and BONNIE LOU SAWLER  
Plaintiffs  
- and -  
ROYAL OAK VENTURES INC., (formerly Royal Oak Mines Inc.), MARGARET K. WITTE, also known as PEGGY  
WITTE, PROCON MINERS INC., PINKERTON’S OF CANADA LIMITED, WILLIAM J.V. SHERIDAN,  
ANTHONY W.J. WHITFORD, DAVE TURNER, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE NORTHWEST TERRITORIES AS  
REPRESENTED BY THE COMMISSIONER OF THE NORTHWEST TERRITORIES, NATIONAL AUTOMOBILE  
AEROSPACE, TRANSPORTATION AND GENERAL WORKERS UNION OF CANADA, Successor by  
Amalgamation to CANADIAN ASSOCIATION OF SMELTER AND ALLIED WORKERS, and the Said CANADIAN  
ASSOCIATION OF SMELTER AND ALLIED WORKERS, HARRY SEETON, ALLAN RAYMOND SHEARING,  
TIMOTHY ALEXANDER BETTGER, TERRY LEGGE, JOHN DOE NUMBER THREE, ROGER WALLACE  
WARREN, DALE JOHNSTON, ROBERT KOSTA, HAROLD DAVID, J. MARC DANIS, BLAINE ROGER  
LISOWAY, WILLIAM (BILL) SCHRAM, JAMES MAGER, CONRAD LISOWAY, WAYNE CAMPBELL, SYLVAIN  
AMYOTTE, and RICHARD ROE NUMBER THREE  
Defendants  
- and -  
ROYAL OAK VENTURES INC., (formerly Royal Oak Mines Inc.) HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT OF  
CANADA, THE MINISTER OF INDIAN AFFAIRS AND NORTHERN DEVELOPMENT, CANADA, AND THE  
MINISTER OF LABOUR, CANADA and THE ROYAL CANADIAN MOUNTED POLICE AS REPRESENTED BY  
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA and THE COMMISSIONER OF THE ROYAL CANADIAN MOUNTED  
POLICE  
Third Parties  
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT OF  
THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE A. LUTZ  
CV 07028  
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE  
NORTHWEST TERRITORIES  
BETWEEN:  
JAMES A. O’NEIL  
Plaintiff  
- and –  
MARGARET K. WITTE, also known as PEGGY WITTE, PROCON MINERS INC., ROGER WALLACE WARREN,  
PINKERTON’S OF CANADA LIMITED, WILLIAM J.V. SHERIDAN, ANTHONY W.J. WHITFORD, DAVID  
TURNER, LLOYD GOULD, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE NORTHWEST TERRITORIES AS REPRESENTED BY  
THE COMMISSIONER OF THE NORTHWEST TERRITORIES, CANADIAN ASSOCIATION OF SMELTER AND  
ALLIED WORKERS LOCAL 4, HARRY SEETON, CANADIAN ASSOCIATION OF SMELTER AND ALLIED  
WORKERS, ROSS SLEZAK, THE NATIONAL AUTOMOBILE, AEROSPACE, TRANSPORTATION AND  
GENERAL WORKERS UNION OF CANADA, BASIL E. HARGROVE, THE NATIONAL AUTOMOBILE,  
AEROSPACE, TRANSPORTATION AND GENERAL WORKERS OF CANADA LOCAL 2304, LISA EVOY as  
Administrator of the Estate of the late James Milton Evoy, deceased, DALE JOHNSTON, ROBERT KOSTA,  
HAROLD DAVID, BLAINE ROGER LISOWAY, WILLIAM (BILL) SCHRAM, JAMES MAGER, WAYNE  
CAMPBELL, SYLVAIN AMYOTTE, GORDON ALBERT KENDALL, EDMUND SAVAGE, JOE RANGER, ALLAN  
RAYMOND SHEARING, TIMOTHY ALEXANDER BETTGER AND TERRY LEGGE  
Defendants  
- and –  
ROYAL OAK MINES INC., HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN THE RIGHT OF CANADA, THE MINISTER OF  
INDIAN AFFAIRS AND NORTHERN DEVELOPMENT CANADA, AND THE MINISTER OF LABOUR CANADA,  
THE ROYAL CANADIAN MOUNTED POLICE AS REPRESENTED BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA  
and THE COMMISSIONER OF THE ROYAL CANADIAN MOUNTED POLICE, PINKERTON’S OF CANADA  
LIMITED  
Third Parties  
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT OF  
THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE A. LUTZ  


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