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[129]
Since Maskine, the Board has (as was done in Colborne) defined its task in an
appeal such as the present one as being solely that of determining whether or not the
approval, or refusal to approve, by a council is one which can be seen as reasonably
consistent with the intent of the M.P.S., or not. How council got to that decision – e.g.,
whether by an allegedly bad procedure or a good one, or by an allegedly bad thought
process, or a good one – is a matter which the Board (applying its interpretation of Maskine)
has repeatedly stated to be irrelevant. The Board has regarded such alleged errors, and the
granting of a remedy, if any, to be a matter solely within the jurisdiction of the Nova Scotia
Supreme Court, and lying outside the jurisdiction of the Board.
[130]
Mr. Epstein urges the Board to abandon this approach. He asserts that Maskine has
been "over read," and that the Court of Appeal's decision should be read in the context of the
Board's decision in the same case, which he characterized as having focused at great length
upon the process followed by Council, while giving short shrift to procedural issues which Mr.
Epstein argues relate to the issue of reasonable consistency.
[131]
While Mr. Epstein acknowledged that the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to deal with
alleged errors in Council's decision making process, he maintained that the Board has an
equal and parallel jurisdiction, meaning that a person alleging procedural or other such
defects in a council's process may choose to go either to the Supreme Court by way of
judicial review, or to the Board, by way of appeal, and get exactly the same remedy, if
successful, i.e., an order remitting a matter to a council for reconsideration.
[132]
In the view of the Board, one can, as Mr. Epstein argues, perceive in the
development of the case law in recent years (some of which was cited by Mr. Epstein in
argument) some signs which may indicate a tendency on the part of the Courts to attribute
greater powers to certain statutory tribunals, such as the Board: see, for example, Nova
Scotia (Workers' Compensation Board) v. Martin; Nova Scotia (Workers' Compensation
Board) v. Laseur, [2003] S.C.C. 54, in which the Supreme Court of Canada reversed a
finding by the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal that the Workers' Compensation Appeal Tribunal
lacked power to find that provisions of a statute were contrary to the Charter.
[133] While the Board has carefully reviewed Mr. Epstein's arguments, the Board does not
agree that it has the jurisdiction he asserts. The Board's reasoning in relation to this point
includes the words of the Act itself, as well as the case law.
[134]
Applying the purposive approach to the Act (as directed by the Court of Appeal in
such decisions as Heritage Trust of Nova Scotia et al. v. Nova Scotia Utility and Review
Board et al. (1994), 128 N.S.R. (2d) 5 (C.A.), the Board concludes that, while the legislation
intends to provide for an appeal to the Board, it also intends to restrict the scope of such
appeals. In the Board's view, this is clearly demonstrated by the language of both s.
251(1)(b), and s. 251(2). Section 251(1)(b) says that a person "may only appeal . . . on the
grounds that the decision of the council does not reasonably carry out the intent" of the
M.P.S. [emphasis added]. Section 251(2) reinforces this by saying that the Board, in dealing
with such an appeal, "shall not allow" the appeal "unless" it decides that council's decision
failed to "reasonably carry out the intent of the M.P.S." [emphasis added]
[135]
Acceptance of Mr. Epstein's position would mean that the Board could allow an
appeal without making a finding on whether Council's decision reasonably carried out the
intent of the M.P.S. – a position that the Board sees as inconsistent with the language of ss.
251(1)(b) and 251(2), which it has just quoted.
Document: 134716