COURT FILE NO.: 98-CV-5929-000

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

(ON SC)

B E T W E E N:

GASTOPS LTD.

Plaintiff

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BRADLEY FORSYTH, DOUGLAS BROUSE, JEFFREY CASS, ROBERT VANDENBERG, and MxI TECHNOLOGIES LTD. a.k.a. 1197543 ONTARIO LIMITED

Defendants

A N D B E T W E E N:

BRADLEY FORSYTH, DOUGLAS BROUSE, JEFFREY CASS, ROBERT VANDENBERG, and MxI TECHNOLOGIES LTD. a.k.a. 1197543 ONTARIO LIMITED

Plaintiffs by Counterclaim

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BERNARD MacISAAC, DAVID MUIR, GARY CHIVERS and GASTOPS LTD.

Defendants by Counterclaim

)

)

)James Shields, Esq., John Yach, Esq. and

)Marion Jackson, for the plaintiff

)Stephen Appotive, Esq., Eric Appotive,

)Esq., Andrew Harrison, Esq., for the

)defendants

)Stephen Appotive, Esq., Eric Appotive,

)Esq., Andrew Harrison, Esq., for the

)plaintiff by counterclaim

)James Shields, Esq., John Yach, Esq. and

)Marion Jackson, for the defendants by

)counterclaim

)HEARD: See Appendix I: Dates of Trial and Submissions

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REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

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GRANGER J.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION

5

II. GASTOPS’ PRODUCTS AND PROJECTS

8

Development of GasTOPS’ Products and Projects, 1983-1996

11

III. INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS’ ROLES AT AND DUTIES OWING TO GASTOPS

63

The Law

63

Existence and Duration of a Fiduciary Duty

63

Obligation to Provide Reasonable Notice

69

Duty of Non-Competition and Duty to Disclose

71

Duty of Non-Solicitation

78

Duty to Not Misappropriate Trade Secrets or Confidential Business Information

80

Fiduciary Duty not to Usurp a Business Opportunity

89

Status for Bringing Action re: Misuse of Trade Secrets

94

The Defendants’ Roles at GasTOPS

94

Résumés and Performance Reviews

95

Forsyth

98

Brouse

100

Jeff Cass

105

Vandenberg

117

GasTOPS’ Recognition of Defendants’ Key Status: Stock Option Plan

119

Defendants’ Roles, 1991-1995

122

Oversight by MacIsaac and Muir

125

Responsibility for Contracts

126

Allocation of Workforce

127

Contributing to GasTOPS Business Plans

135

Recruitment

137

Recommendations

139

Confidential Business Information Available to the Defendants

140

Findings

143

Project-Specific Roles and Duties

145

CAF

145

U.S. Navy

155

Volvo

180

GE

192

Bombardier

214

Kuwaiti Air Force

219

DOT/RCMP

220

IV. THE RESIGNATIONS

225

Explanations

238

Alleged Reason for Resigning

238

“Starting and Running a Successful Software Company”

241

Cooperation Agreement

247

Direct Effects on GasTOPS

265

IP Rights Dispute with the CAF

265

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Competition for TIES Contract Renewal

270

Inability to Pursue Plans with the CAF

271

Inability to Pursue Plans with the U.S. Navy

276

V. THE DEFENDANTS’ CONDUCT AFTER THE RESIGNATIONS

277

Treatment of Evidence through the Litigation Process

292

Presentations to Prospective Customers

295

MxI’s Product Development and Products

298

The Experts

304

Dr. Alberto D. Mendelzon, Ph.D. 1979

304

Dr. David Lorge Parnas, Ph.D. 1965 and Dr. Martin von Mohrenschildt, Ph.D. 1994

319

Dr. Peter Chen, Ph.D. 1973

327

Advanced Diagnostic System (Also Known as Engine Diagnostic System)

336

Dr. Alberto O. Mendelzon, Ph.D. 1979 and ADS

369

Muir’s Comparison of GasTOPS’ and MxI’s Products

375

MxI’s Configuration Management Module for NALCOMIS

377

Springboarding

381

Trade Secrets and Confidential Business Information

387

Solicitation of GasTOPS’ Customers and Opportunities

390

CAF

393

U.S. Navy

434

Volvo

529

GE

560

Bombardier

602

Kuwaiti Air Force

620

DOT/RCMP

622

Summary

627

VI. REMEDIES

629

Injunctive Relief

629

Punitive Damages

665

Anonymous E-mails

665

Brouse’s Caricature

675

Titter MacFritters Contest

677

Findings

678

Counterclaims

679

VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS

681

Judgment

681

Addendum

682

APPENDIX I: DATES OF TRIAL AND SUBMISSIONS

685

APPENDIX II: ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

687

APPENDIX III: JURISPRUDENCE AND TEXTS CITED

690

APPENDIX IV: ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

693

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I. Introduction

[1]GasTOPS Ltd. (“GasTOPS”) has been involved in the maintenance of gas turbine engines in the marine and aviation fields since its incorporation in 1979. In addition to providing engineering consulting services for the maintenance of such engines, GasTOPS has developed computer software programs to assess their performance.

[2]The individual defendants were all employees of GasTOPS until they resigned in October 1996. On October 7, 1996, Bradley Forsyth (“Forsyth”) and Douglas Brouse (“Brouse”) resigned from GasTOPS effective October 18, 1996. They were told to leave the GasTOPS premises immediately. On October 10, 1996, Jeff Cass and Robert Vandenberg (“Vandenberg”) resigned from GasTOPS effective October 25, 1996, and October 23, 1996, respectively. On October 15, 1996, Forsyth and Brouse incorporated MxI Technologies Limited (“MxI”). On October 22, 1996, Jeff Cass and Vandenberg commenced employment with MxI.

[3]GasTOPS alleges that all of the personal defendants were subject to a fiduciary duty to GasTOPS as a result of their positions there and that Forsyth, Brouse, Jeff Cass and Vandenberg breached their contracts of employment with GasTOPS and, in particular, the implied term therein that required each of them to give reasonable notice of their intention to resign. As a result of their failure to give reasonable notice and actions following their resignations, GasTOPS claims it suffered damages.

[4]GasTOPS’ claims against the defendants can be summarized in general terms as follows:

Breach of Fiduciary Duty

-Misappropriation and unauthorized or unlawful use of confidential information

-Misappropriation and unauthorized or unlawful use of trade secrets

-Misappropriation of corporate opportunities with

oCanadian Armed Forces (“CAF”) o United States Navy (“U.S. Navy”)

o Volvo Aerospace Corporation (“Volvo”) o General Electric Corporation (“GE”)

o Bombardier

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oKuwait Air Force

oDepartment of Transport (“DOT”)/RCMP

Breach of contract

Breach of confidence

GasTOPS seeks:

Damages and injunctive relief arising from these allegations

Punitive Damages

[5]MxI’s claims against GasTOPS and the personal defendants by counter-claims are as follows:

Damages for breach of contract

General damages for failure to negotiate in good faith

Punitive damages

The sum of $18,133.97 as the balance due, inclusive of Goods and Services Tax, for professional services rendered to GasTOPS

Against the individual defendants by counter-claim, MacIsaac, Muir, Chivers and GasTOPS, jointly and severally, the following:

General damages

Special damages

Aggravated, exemplary and punitive damages

An interlocutory and permanent injunction restraining GasTOPS and the individual defendants by counter-claim from making any false statements to any person concerning the following:

o the circumstances of the departures from GasTOPS of the individual defendants or any other MxI personnel

o any alleged theft of intellectual property from GasTOPS

o the conduct of MxI principals or employees after their resignations from GasTOPS

o any other matter that would be damaging to the reputation of the defendants

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An interlocutory and permanent injunction restraining GasTOPS and the individual defendants by counter-claim from interfering with the economic relations between MxI and its clients and potential clients

Such further and other relief as this Court deems just

[6]MxI and the individual defendants deny that they were in competition with GasTOPS and/or that they misappropriated any technology and/or programs developed by GasTOPS. The defendants suggest that:

(1)GasTOPS has always been first and foremost an application engineering service company;

(2)GasTOPS’ focus has always been on condition-based maintenance;

(3)GasTOPS’ modus operandi in terms of technology development was to rely almost exclusively on customer funded research and development; and

(4)By October 1996, GasTOPS’ technology and related software were significantly different from each other and each customized for particular customers.

[7]It is important to keep in mind the following general principles:

(1)Bernard MacIsaac (“MacIsaac”), as GasTOPS’ majority shareholder, was entitled to conduct his business as he saw fit providing he treated his employees in a reasonable manner;

(2)GasTOPS’ employees were entitled to resign providing they gave reasonable notice of their intention to leave their employment; and

(3)GasTOPS’ former employees were entitled to form their own company and carry on business in any field subject to any fiduciary duty that they might owe GasTOPS resulting from their employment at GasTOPS.

[8]GasTOPS does not allege that Forsyth and Brouse and subsequently Jeff Cass and Vandenberg were not entitled to resign from GasTOPS and start MxI. Rather, it alleges that any future endeavours on their part must take into account the fiduciary duties they owed to GasTOPS. GasTOPS alleges that the four personal defendants breached the fiduciary duties they owed to GasTOPS as a result of their employment there by:

(1)Resigning from GasTOPS without giving reasonable notice;

(2)Offering employment to other employees of GasTOPS who they knew

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would give insufficient notice to GasTOPS;

(3)Misappropriating technology which they had helped develop at GasTOPS;

(4)Developing a software program to compete with the products that they had helped develop at GasTOPS;

(5)While they were employed with GasTOPS and working on such potential contracts, competing for and obtaining contracts for MxI with companies to whom GasTOPS was attempting to sell its products;

(6)Attempting to convince, in some cases successfully, GasTOPS’ customers to use MxI products instead of the GasTOPS’ products they had been instrumental in selling to the customer when employed at GasTOPS; and

(7)Providing MxI with confidential business information which it used to usurp business opportunities that GasTOPS was pursuing.

II.GasTOPS’ Products and Projects

[9]MacIsaac incorporated GasTOPS in 1979. At that time, MacIsaac was its only employee. Over the years, GasTOPS has been extremely successful and its number of employees has increased dramatically. MacIsaac has guided and continues to guide GasTOPS as its president. It was apparent from the evidence that MacIsaac is and has always been a very conservative businessman. Over the years, he has attempted to fund research and development at GasTOPS through customer contracts, whereby the customer would fund development of the product.

[10]GasTOPS, whose name is an acronym for “Gas Turbines and Other Propulsion Systems,” has been and continues to be engaged in the design, development and application of computer software products which assess machinery condition for operators of gas turbine engines (commonly referred to as “jet engines”). GasTOPS originally targeted military aviation markets but in the 1990s sought to enter the commercial aviation market. In addition, GasTOPS was working in the commercial industrial market, where turbine engines were used for industrial power plants, ships and pipelines. Over the years, GasTOPS developed software programs for detecting modes of damage to turbine engines based on information recorded during engine operations and/or maintenance. GasTOPS used this data to develop software based products to track the degradation of components of the engine and predict when maintenance was required; to fix or replace a damaged component before corrective maintenance was required; and to monitor component life usage and capture data related to engine condition. The purpose was to develop a complete “condition-based maintenance” system that incorporated prognostic

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(identifying damage to a component prior to failure), diagnostic (determining the nature of existing problems) and scheduled (routine inspection, adjustment, repair or overhaul) maintenance and to use collected data to feed back into the system.

[11]Before going into more detail, a summary of GasTOPS activities is as follows.

[12]In 1983, David Muir (“Muir”) was responsible for the “engine health monitoring group” within GasTOPS. It was focused on research and development relating to modeling and simulation techniques that could form the engineering basis for the design and development of health monitoring systems. GasTOPS had two major customers at that time, the Canadian Navy and the CAF. In 1986, Brouse was hired by GasTOPS to work with the CAF at National Defence Headquarters. In 1987, Forsyth was hired as a project engineer within this group.

[13]In the late 1980s, MacIsaac challenged GasTOPS’ three most senior group leaders (Robert Kind (“Kind”), Richard Dupuis and Muir) to examine their groups’ business and to look at various markets for the technology that GasTOPS was developing and how the technology might be provided to the market place in the form of products. Muir targeted GasTOPS products to the military aircraft, military marine, and general industrial (particularly prognostic capability for oil analysis) markets. Muir was looking to the U.S. Air Force, Army and Navy as possible opportunities for GasTOPS to pursue within North America and to Spain, Australia, Kuwait and Malaysia as possible opportunities to pursue with respect to the F-18 aircraft and via the U.S. Navy. While GasTOPS had little or no competition in Canada, a number of large American defence contractors, such as GE, provided competition in the U.S. market.

[14]Muir felt that GasTOPS could expand beyond the military market place by offering a suite of products for condition-based maintenance. But within the military sector, Muir felt that GasTOPS’ most marketable product was a Mobile Engine Data Interpretation Computer

(“MEDIC”). Also, in the area of oil analysis, he felt that GasTOPS had an opportunity to provide a prognostic product to military and commercial markets with a product called Configuration Management Information System (“CMIS”). The third product idea that the Maintenance Systems Division (“MSD”) had at this time was to provide a more comprehensive

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information management system similar to the one being developed for the CAF but specifically for the marine market place. This program eventually became known as MAINSTAY.

[15]In 1991, Forsyth, Brouse and Matthew Tobin (“Tobin”) became the senior members and managers of the MSD (formerly the engine health monitoring group), as Muir reformed the management team within his group to give them general management responsibilities for specific areas of the MSD. Forsyth was responsible for technology development, including for research and development work under contract with the CAF and Canadian Navy and for MAINSTAY; Brose for the CAF engineering service contract for development and support of the CF-18’s engine parts life tracking system (“EPLTS”); and Tobin for the development of our non-military product basis business (or, as Muir also called it, the “general industrial market”). Forsyth and Brose had a very close working relationship: Forsyth developed the methods and the software and Brose worked closely with the CAF to determine its requirements to introduce the developed products into its day-to-day operations.

[16]From 1985 to 1993, Gas TOPS developed its technology through contracts with the Department of National Defense (“DND”) and the CAF. From 1993 to 1995, Gas TOPS undertook a major design revision of its products to develop a system known as Engine Condition Monitoring System (“ECMS”) v.1, which the CAF used until 1998. During 1994, Gas TOPS commenced a project to incorporate all of the elements of Gas TOPS’ various databases into a single generic product for marine and industrial uses: MAINSTAY. In 1995, Gas TOPS undertook a major design revision of ECMS v.1. The redesigned system incorporated an improved database design and was developed for both aircraft and industrial application.

[17]During 1996, Gas TOPS was developing the next iteration of the ECMS. It was known as ECMS v.2 and incorporated an improved and re-engineered database design. ECMS v.2 integrated of ECMS v.1, Engine Maintenance Reporting System (“EMRS”), FLTS, Take Off Analyst Program, Take Off Trending Program, Engine Test Facility (“ETF”), Troubleshooting Program and Deployable Integrated Ground Station (“DIGS”).

[18]As of October 1996, GasTOPS was an industry leader in the area of engine condition-

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based maintenance, usage and life tracking of engine parts. None of the software programs developed by GasTOPS’ competitors were as sophisticated or covered such a wide spectrum of engine maintenance elements as GasTOPS product line: ECMS; Flight Line Troubleshooting Systems (“FLTS”); Lube Analysis (Oil Prognostic System); and MAINSTAY.

[19]At that time, GasTOPS was developing and pursuing a corporate opportunity for the sale of ECMS v.2 to the CAF, U.S. Navy, Volvo, Bombardier, GE, and DOT/RCMP. It anticipated delivering ECMS v.2 to the CAF in November 1996. GasTOPS had completed a MAINSTAY pilot project with Ontario Hydro and was pursuing the implementation of MAINSTAY at the Pickering Nuclear Station and similar opportunities for the Bruce and Darlington Nuclear Stations. In addition, it was continuing its work with Dofasco, Caidmark, Orenda Engines Ltd. and Nova. GasTOPS had also entered into the “due diligence” phase of its contract negotiations with GE to license its ECMS technology. In partnership with B.F.Goodrich, GasTOPS sought to secure a series of contracts with the U.S. Navy to license and service ECMS v.2 technology for use on the U.S. Navy fleet of F-18 fighter aircraft. GasTOPS was in contract negotiations with Volvo to license its ECMS v.2 technology for use in aircraft engines to be purchased by the Swedish Air Force. Also at that time, GasTOPS was negotiating with Bombardier to provide further enhancements to Bombardier’s software system used by the CAF for the entire aircraft, excluding the engine by incorporating ECMS technology into the Bombardier program.

Development of GasTOPS’ Products and Projects, 1983-1996

[20]GasTOPS developed its technology and software products through a series of contracts with various organizations. It obtained Canadian Research and Development (“CRAD”) contracts, which were funded by the DND, as well as Technical Investigation and Engineering Support (“TIES”) contracts, which were used by the DND to obtain engineering services in support of their operation and maintenance. Under the CRADs, GasTOPS did research and development of a product up to the prototype stage, which given to DND for in-service evaluation. Any further developmental work to finalize or implement the product was performed under a TIES contract.

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[21]By 1983, GasTOPS was researching both the prognostic and diagnostic aspects of maintenance and of damage to jet engines. This early research became an integral part of the design of ECMS v.2 in 1996. GasTOPS was awarded a CRAD to assess the feasibility of using flight recorded data from the CF-18 aircraft for the purpose of engine health monitoring. GasTOPS was also exploring how the information could be used for a parts life tracking system.

[22]In March 1984, GasTOPS delivered a requirements report prepared by Muir and MacIsaac on the use of flight recorded data to support CF-18 engine health monitoring to the DND under a CRAD. The report made recommendations on the feasibility of using flight recorded data and set out a project plan for continuing the development project. GasTOPS stated that the information from a flight data recorder could be used to support all aspects of the F-18 and its F404 engine maintenance. Following the delivery of its report in March 1984, GasTOPS was awarded a second CRAD for the development of three prototypes: steady state performance analysis, event data analysis and take-off (transient) performance data analysis. Also, subject to the confidentiality conditions, GasTOPS was allowed to make use of the results of the engineering work for other related projects.

[23]During the first CRAD, an EPLTS was being developed by Cognos for the CAF. It was delivered in 1985, but it did not work to the CAF’s satisfaction. The CAF contracted with GasTOPS to examine the problems the system and make it operational. GasTOPS provided a database expert to work with the DND for this purpose, to complete the documentation of the system, and to prepare training packages and courses for the CAF technicians. Brouse was hired specifically for this contract work and initially worked at DND Headquarters with Captain Schofield. He identified four problems with the system. GasTOPS was awarded further TIES contracts to examine these problems and to redesign the system to solve the deficiencies. Brouse

prepared a project plan under the TIES contract with Tobin’s assistance in March 1989. It contained a requirement for the correction of the identified deficiencies in the EPLTS system.

[24]Forsyth worked on the National Research Council (“NRCC”) contracts and the second CRAD. On the completion of the second CRAD, GasTOPS prepared a technical report summarizing its development work (Exhibit 13C). The report followed the completion of the two

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prototypes, one for diagnostics and the other for prognostics, using flight data recorded from the F-18. GasTOPS considered all of the development work under this CRAD to be unique in the market place.

[25]The three prototypes were completed in early 1989. The first dealt with a prognostic tool, in which GasTOPS developed parameters that became know as “condition indicators.” This software system processed the recordings, extracted the indicators, put these indicators in the database and produced a graphical display that became known as a “trending program.” The second prototype was an event recording taken at the time of an in-flight event and that information was used for troubleshooting the aircraft in support of corrective maintenance. The software was designed to process and then file the data. The program would then extract the relevant information and display, the time and history of the different engine parameters. The development included creation of a database to store information for subsequent display. The third prototype developed was a software program to be used for prognostics. It compared the dynamic performance of the engine as recorded during the take-off segment of each mission to its expected performance based on GasTOPS’ research. The difference between what was measured and what was expected became the basis for the prognostics. The CAF subsequently awarded GasTOPS another CRAD for the troubleshooting system (second prototype), and the development of the third prototype (take-off performance data analysis) was funded by further research contracts with the National Research Council.

[26]This research, which was conducted in 1989, dealt with the prognostic and diagnostic aspects, particularly as it related to the data from the flight data recorder of the aircraft. GasTOPS defined the research, the development program and the budget to show the CAF the next step in the development process and its cost. Forsyth was responsible for this contract and he dealt with the Captain of the engineering section for the fighter and trainer group and with a contact at the National Research Council. The work plans, budgets and business case were prepared by Forsyth on behalf of GasTOPS.

[27]Under this CRAD, Jeff Cass and Forsyth prepared a report entitled “First Line Engine Snag Handbook” (Exhibit 16C) in November 1990. GasTOPS had been contracted to put field

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research engineers at each of the main operating bases to collate the information coming from the evaluation of the prototypes and to develop a “knowledge base” or logic related to how the diagnostic tool would be used for maintenance support. This document provided instructions on how to use the event plots from the flight data recorder.

[28]In 1990, the MSD developed internally a troubleshooting prototype tool known as MEDIC, drawing on the FLTS prototype that had been developed under the CRAD. It was implemented on a notebook personal computer for demonstration to the U.S. Navy. Both the U.S. Navy and the CAF were looking for a deployable tool that could be used in the field. The U.S. Navy was the first customer interested in the MEDIC prototype. Forsyth was the lead project engineer on the U.S. Navy evaluation of MEDIC and he demonstrated the product to the U.S. Navy.

[29]In 1990, Brouse continued to be responsible for the work to be performed under the TIES contract to complete the improvements to the EPLTS.

[30]In 1991, the CAF awarded GasTOPS a CRAD to continue the development of the MEDIC product as a flight line troubleshooting tool. The CAF requested that the name be changed from MEDIC to FLTS. The development of the technology under this contract continued to be Forsyth’s responsibility. He and Jeff Cass, who had been doing the work on the personal computer version of Lube Analyst and MEDIC, supervised the conversion of FLTS to a personal computer.

[31]In 1992, Brouse authored a technical report which described the high level design for the FLTS software system. The report included the functions of the system and database design for FLTS. This report pre-dated the database design of the ECMS v.2 by approximately 18 months. In addition, Brouse was responsible for the work that was being done to effect the improvements on the EPLTS.

[32]With respect to the oil analysis product, GasTOPS was the successful bidder in a procurement competition from the CAF in 1991. It was contracted to develop an expert system

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(software system capable of interpreting data for the purpose of maintenance). This was a CRAD to develop a prototype system that combined oil analysis information with vibration analysis information into a single diagnostic system which became known as Prototype Integrated Diagnostics and Maintenance System (“PIDMS”).

[33]In 1992, GasTOPS continued to work on the EPLTS system and began the early work on the ECMS for the CAF, which had decided to replace the EPLTS system with ECMS. At that time work continued for the CAF on the PIDMS product which was known internally at GasTOPS as CMIS and which was eventually renamed Lube Analyst.

[34]On the non-military side, GasTOPS continued working with Dofasco on combining oil and vibration data for the purpose of predictive maintenance, as it had since the previous year, and it started to pursue a business opportunity with Ontario Hydro. In 1992, GasTOPS was contracted by Dofasco, through Digital Equipment Corporation (“DEC”), to develop a condition- based maintenance system that came known as the Condition-Based Maintenance - Data Analysis System (“CBM-DAS”). GasTOPS took the Lube Analyst and the data logger software and put all three of the elements, usage tracking, diagnostics and prognostics into demonstration software for Dofasco. As a result of the demonstration, Dofasco contracted GasTOPS to prepare a final specification for the CBM-DAS software system.

[35]At this point in time, the MSD was offering three products in the market place, MEDIC, Lube Analyst and MAINSTAY. The three products shared a common architecture, a software structure implemented using the OS/2 operating system. Underlying the products was a library of modules (“GGPPAS”) for components which performed general purpose functions that GasTOPS had been building since 1989.

[36]In 1992, two new significant business opportunities arose for GasTOPS: one with the U.S. Navy, which was an integrated diagnostics demonstration, and the second with the Canadian Coast Guard for a system referred to as the Performance Analyst Software System (“PASS”). GasTOPS delivered to the U.S. Navy a demonstration diagnostics system based on the Lube Analyst product of the MSD. With respect to the Canadian Coast Guard, GasTOPS

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won a competitive procurement and was contracted to define the requirements for the PASS product for the Coast Guard’s vessels. This was a GasTOPS research and development project for the transportation and development centre, the research and development division of the Canadian Coast Guard. Under the contract, GasTOPS developed an application of MAINSTAY for the Canadian Coast Guard vessels. This work was performed under Tobin’s management, while Forsyth and his group performed the technology development work.

[37]In 1993, the FLTS contract work was finished, the EPLTS system was still operating in the field and work continued with the CAF under the PIDMS project. GasTOPS continued working on the data logger project for the Canadian Navy, the PASS project for the Canadian Coast Guard and the integrated diagnostic demonstration for the U.S. Navy. In its Dofasco work, GasTOPS was to develop a project plan for the development of the CBM-DAS system that would meet the specifications previously produced by GasTOPS. In particular, it was to develop a new software module based on MAINSTAY’s existing design. This contract fell under the management responsibility of Tobin.

[38]In 1992, GasTOPS began the development of ECMS v.1 under a TIES contract. It was to be a re-hosting and re-development of the parts life tracking system EPLTS on a PC computer architecture. GasTOPS proposed to implement the database system on a PC. GasTOPS intended to add new functionality to the system, specifically the user interface using GasTOPS GGPPAS library to create a more intuitive interface for the technician. This work was being done by Brouse. At this time, ECMS v.1 was developed with only the parts life tracking usage monitoring and scheduled maintenance modules. The prognostic and diagnostic systems were being developed at the same time under other contracts. In July 1993, GasTOPS produced the requirement specifications for ECMS v.1. The requirements provided a general description of the new product, including its architecture, interfaces, functionality, performance requirements of the system, preliminary design and the general requirements. Under the CRAD, GasTOPS continued work on the diagnostic knowledge base and the prognostic system throughout 1993. At that time, the TIES contract was renewed for a further three-year period.

[39]In 1994, GasTOPS received a second CRAD to enhance the FLTS by adding the expert

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system underlying the Lube Analyst product to the flight line troubleshooting system. Under the first CRAD, GasTOPS had created a computer based software tool which was to be used with a paper document referred to as a troubleshooting manual, named the Snag Handbook. Using the handbook and the software tool, the technician could isolate specific problems in the aircraft, using the information received from the flight data recorder.

[40]In May 1994, GasTOPS entered into another CRAD for further development of the FLTS. GasTOPS incorporated the logic that was contained in the Snag Handbook, whereby the manual and its logic was put directly into the software system and incorporated into the expert system technology. Under the provisions of this contract, GasTOPS would own the background and foreground IP for the new version of FLTS.

[41]In June 1994, GasTOPS prepared a technical report entitled “FLTS v.3.1 Automated Snag Handbook System Specifications” (Exhibit 30C). The report was prepared by Dekum Cao and Chris Cass and reviewed by Forsyth. The report set out the functions of the software, the functional decomposition and the data model or database design of the system. The advancement in technology under this contract was the incorporation of the troubleshooting logic, which had been previously in a paper manual, into the software system using expert system technology. GasTOPS developed a pattern or feature recognition software that could automatically interpret some of the data traces that were being used for troubleshooting.

[42]GasTOPS continued working on the Dofasco project by implementing the Lube Analyst product into the Dofasco oil lab and beginning the implementation of the overall CBM-DAS system. The contract was supervised by Tobin, who was responsible for the delivery of the software to the client. Both the Lube Analyst and the CBM-DAS system were being developed by Forsyth and his group.

[43]Near the end of 1994, the EPLTS system was replaced by ECMS v.1. The ECMS database technical reference specifications were contained in a report prepared by Linh Nguyen (“Nguyen”) and Andrew Richardson for the DND in January 1995. During January 1995, GasTOPS produced a written user’s manual for ECMS v.1 and it was delivered to the DND

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under the TIES contract. It was a comprehensive overview of the ECMS system and its architecture with instructions to the user of the software. ECMS v.1 dealt with usage and configuration monitoring. The database contained usage and configuration data. The software system is part of the scheduled maintenance process. ECMS v.1 had two unique features. First, to the best of GasTOPS’ knowledge, this was the first time there had been the fielding of a database system of this size and complexity on a PC client server architecture using an Oracle relational database. Second, the use of the graphic user interface (“GUI”), allowing the user to access information through a graphic representation of the equipment, was also unique.

[44]In July 1995, GasTOPS entered into a license agreement with the Crown on behalf of the DND covering the ECMS v.1 software and the FLTS. Pursuant to the license agreement, the DND granted GasTOPS “a sole, non-exclusive license to use the licensed IP and to sell, sub- license or lease the licensed IP to others for use in Canada, the United States, Australia, Spain, Sweden and other such countries as have been previously approved in writing by the licensor…”

[45]GasTOPS continued to work on the PASS project with the Canadian Coast Guard. At the same time, GasTOPS had entered into a partnership with B.F.Goodrich to pursue a business opportunity with the U.S. Navy. In the industrial market place, there was a major opportunity developing with Ontario Hydro, which was interested in developing a condition-based maintenance program similar to the software system GasTOPS was developing for Dofasco. During 1995, GasTOPS was awarded another CRAD to develop a PC-based prognostic tool that would take data recorded from a CF-18 and use that data for the purpose of predictive maintenance. This was to develop a prognostic component for the CF-18 ECMS system. The PC-based prognostic tool was to be a component for the CF-18 ECMS system. The prognostic system was one of the three prototypes that had been developed earlier under the second major CRAD, the take-off data trending prototype. The prototype was to be developed as a PC based software tool with similar architecture to ECMS v.1 and FLTS. The technology development was carried out by Forsyth and his group. The primary person responsible for the development was Jeff Cass. Under this contract, there was to be the development of a common database for all applications for the ECMS v.2 database. In addition, GasTOPS was to own all intellectual

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property. In 1995, GasTOPS was working on the second CRAD whereby the troubleshooting procedures were being automated into FLTS.

[46]In May 1995, GasTOPS prepared a report for the DND entitled “F404 Diagnostic Procedure… Summary Report” (Exhibit 31C) which was authored by C.J. Cass, M.P. Egan and D.L. Kind. The report summarized the “knowledge-based” logic that was implemented in the new version of FLTS. In accordance with the contractual terms, the improvements to the logic which would be the foreground intellectual property, was to be owned by GasTOPS. The report was a summary of the development of the project to enhance the engine health monitoring technology in support of the CAF condition-based monitoring program from approximately October 1989 to December 1994 which concluded with the final version of the FLTS troubleshooting system. The report stated:

1.1Background

The First Line Troubleshooting System was developed by GasTOPS to support the on-condition maintenance approach utilized by the Canadian Air Force for the CF-18 fleet. The FLTS software makes use of the Aircraft Data Files (ADFs) that are recorded by the aircraft’s on-board Maintenance Signal Data Recording System (MSDRS). The MSDRS monitors a basic set of critical parameters and records this data at low frequency, every five seconds, on the Tape Transport Magazine (TTM) as mission data. If the system detects an exceedance of any of these parameters against predefined limits for safe operation, it records a Maintenance Monitoring Panel (MMP) code. Also, when an exceedance is detected, a much broader set of engine performance parameters is recorded as event data at high frequency, every tenth of a second, for 40 seconds (five seconds pre-event, and 35 seconds post-event) for the purpose of troubleshooting the detected engine anomaly. The MSDRS mission profile and engine limit exceedance event data are displayed graphically in FLTS and the embedded diagnostic expert system is used to identify the problem and its source.

Due to the potential danger associated with in-flight events, first time diagnosis is crucial to the prevention of a recurrence of the problem. In support of this goal, GasTOPS Ltd. has conducted evaluations of the consistency and accuracy of the automated

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diagnostic rule sets in the First Line Troubleshooting System.

[47]GasTOPS continued to provide in-service support for ECMS v.1. The Lube Analyst project for the CAF was being completed, and Lube Analyst was being marketed. The data logger and PASS projects were finished in 1995. The initial phase of the CBM-DAS project for Dofasco was completed by the end of 1995. In 1995, GasTOPS was pursuing a sale of the FLTS product to the Royal Australian Air Force (“RAAF”). Brouse had direct contact with the RAAF and did all of the work associated with the development of the contract. In addition, Brouse worked with the DND to complete the license agreement with the Government of Canada for this sale. It was a sub-license of the DND contract that permitted GasTOPS to sell the technology under a sub-license. The sale to the RAAF was an outright sale of the system for a specific amount, including a small amount for engineering services for preparation and delivery of the system. The software product in the contract was a commercial off-the-shelf product accompanied with a license agreement dealing with its use and restrictions. At the same time, GasTOPS obtained a second contract with Ontario Hydro to provide the MAINSTAY product as a pilot project as a condition-based maintenance system. This was a commercial sale with a license agreement between GasTOPS and Ontario Hydro. In addition, Ontario Hydro requested the technology be put in escrow and the parties entered into an escrow agreement.

[48]The FLTS system was unique, with nothing similar in the market place at the time GasTOPS introduced it for the F404 engine and for GE. ECMS v.1 was a parts life tracking system and it was distinct in the market place from other products by its GUI and the features that GasTOPS incorporated into that user interface to make it an intuitive or easy tool for technicians to use.

[49]When Lube Analyst was introduced into the market place, it was unique from other products as it was running on a PC with a GUI running on Oracle. It had an expert system that performed the inferencing on the data in the database. The MAINSTAY product, including the work performed for the Canadian Coast Guard and Dofasco, was also unique. The work that GasTOPS had been doing for the CAF was considerably more advanced than anything Dofasco had seen in the market place.

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[50]The MSD’s 1995/96 business plan, which was prepared and completed by Muir on November 30, 1995, with input from Forsyth and Brouse, described in its the objectives:

SUMMARY OF OBJECTIVES

TECHNOLOGY PLAN

1.The ECMS product will be completed thus providing a general purpose CBM product for military engines.

2.The MAINSTAY product will be converted to a WINDOWS 95 environment.

3.The MAINSTAY product will be further developed with the following specific functions added:

RCM module

Damage/Defect Reporting function

Configuration Management function

In addition, the Maintenance Scheduling function will be improved.

4.The LUBE ANALYST product will be improved in FY 95/96 with the following additional features:

Statistical Limits Report

Best Practices Guide

5.The ODM (oil debris monitor) electronics will be adapted to operate as a standalone monitor for airborne applications. At least one sensor adaptation will be completed in this fiscal year for helicopter gearbox applications.

[51]Muir summarized the MSD’s marketing plan for the financial year 1995-1996 as follows:

MARKETING PLAN

1.The MSD will meet an overall revenue target of $4.8M. This target is based on program revenue targets of:

1. Canadian Air Force

$2500K

2. FLTS & ECMS

$ 550K

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3. MAINSTAY - integrated Systems

$1050K

 

4. MAINSTAY - Lube Analyst

$ 250K

 

5. ODMJBF Goodrich

$ 450K

 

 

$4800K

2.

Prior to completion of the first quarter

of FY 95/96,

a market brief will be prepared for MAINSTAY.

 

3.GasTOPS will be positioned to win a major program with CP Rail in the coming year.

4.GasTOPS will be positioned to win a “partnership” contractual arrangement with Canadian Forces whereby the firm will be recognized as the technical development center for Condition Based Maintenance and Equipment Health Monitoring.

5.Marketing Support to BF Goodrich shall be directed to complete:

one sale of FLTS to USN

one sale of 0DM to McDonnell Douglas

one sale of Lube Analyst to US Department of Defense

[52]In preparing the business plan for MSD, Muir, as he had in the past, relied upon a technology plan that he had received from Forsyth on August 13, 1995, entitled “MSD 1995/96 Business Plan Technology Plan Contribution B. Forsyth August 13, 1995.” (Exhibit 7).

[53]In his report, Forsyth stated:

1.MAINSTAY

As presented in my Product Development Plan (GTL-8-35.6- WPA. 1), we are well on our way to having a complete Condition Based Maintenance System (CBMS). In fact, we have two of them: the CF-18 ECMS and the Dofasco CBM-DAS. Between these two systems, most of the desired functionality is provided. The challenge will be to effectively integrate the two.

There are two fundamental differences between the CF- 18 ECMS and the Dofasco CBM-DAS. The first obvious difference is the development environments used: the ECMS was developed in C++ for the OS/2 operating system, whereas the CBM-DAS was developed in Powerbuilder for the Microsoft Windows 3 .x

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operating system. The second difference, and equally as important, is that the ECMS has an equipment fleet focus, whereas the CBM- DAS has a stationary equipment or plant focus. The first results in technological differences and the second in functional differences.

Our technology plan should focus on the CBM-DAS version as I believe (and Doug agrees) that the Airforce will continue to fund development of the ECMS and will address the issue of development environment at the appropriate time.

The following are my suggestions for development efforts for the CBM-DAS based MAINSTAY.

1.1MAINSTAY Development Environment

The selection of the target MAINSTAY development environment is a critical (and ongoing) decision for the company. There are three fundamental components that must be selected and periodically reviewed: the operating system, the database and the development language.

Unfortunately the choice in operating system is not simply between the two we have already developed for. The problem is that both OS/2 and Windows 3.x have a very real likelihood of being obsolete within the next few years. The introduction of Windows ‘95 on August 24 threatens to become the new defacto industry standard.

The choice of databases seems to be safe with Oracle. We have used Oracle for both the ECMS and the CBM-DAS and are very familiar and comfortable with it. Thank goodness Oracle seems to be maintaining its market lead and there is no real pressure to select a different database (other than for the in-expensive, standalone applications such as Lube Analyst and perhaps the RCM tool).

The choice of development language is not as straightforward. The use of C++ provides the most flexibility; however, it requires substantially more effort than the new generation of information system development tools such as Powerbuilder. I don’t think it will be possible to compete with these new tools using conventional C++ programming. At first glance, Powerbuilder seems ideal as it provides insulation from the operating system and the promise of a Windows ‘95 version would hopefully make the conversion of CBM-DAS to Windows ‘95 simple. However;

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Powersoft, the Powerbuilder developer, was purchased by Sybase, an Oracle competitor. Now there are concerns that Oracle and Sybase may not play together and that the Powerbuilder tool may not efficiently interface with the Oracle database in the future.

There are no simple answers to these problems; however, there are two projects we could propose in the technology plan to help address them:

1.Development Tool Selection. We should conduct a thorough and formal reevaluation of the various application development tools available and select the most promising for future software development.

2.Windows 95 Conversion Project. This would be an R&D project to convert one of our applications to Windows ‘95 in order to familiarize ourselves with the product technologically. I propose that we would use the CBM-DAS as the test product.

….

3.ECMS

The ECMS functionality is becoming very extensive and by the time the SLPS (C-6-46) work is done in Mar/96, we should have a complete CBMS for the Airforce. There are a number of development projects we are going to pursue to increase the functionality further, these include:

Work Optimization - this comprises of improved planning and scheduling tools that would allow for optimizing shop visits beyond the current fixed ‘fall out’ window.

Fatigue Monitoring - this would include both crack growth tracking and fatigue lifing for airframe structural members.

Alternate Equipment Configuration - this involves enhancements to the current ECMS configuration management functions to handle alternate assemblies such as the attachment pylons for bombs or fuel tanks.

It is expected that each of these development projects will be funded directly by the Air Force.

4.Lube Analyst

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As you know, we are about to release a market ready version of Lube Analyst and will not want to undertake any software enhancements for at least the next six months. The only concern is that because Lube Analyst is an OS/2 application, our customers may start requesting a Windows 95 version. This would really be an exercise in re-doing functionality for the new operating system; obviously not a value added exercise but one that may be required to sell the product.

I believe our strategy should be to delay the development of the Windows 95 version as long as possible with the hope that we can leverage the Windows 95 version of MAINSTAY as the next major release of Lube Analyst. That is, we would add some of the lube analysis specific functionality to MAINSTAY while utilizing as much of the general purpose CBMS functionality as possible (e.g. limit evaluation, trending, expert system, etc.). We would then package a mini MAINSTAY that would serve as the Lube Analyst, while preserving all of the lab and instrument interface software.

Even if we adopt this strategy, we may want to have a discretionary R&D budget for Windows 95 conversion in our back pocket. If the sales potential proves to be very strong and the only impediment is the OS/2, we are not going to want to wait for the Windows 95 MAINSTAY development.

There are two development efforts we could undertake that are adjuncts to the application and that we will definitely want to undertake at some time, namely:

Statistical Limits Report - this would be a relatively inexpensive little project to use the Reportsmith database reporting software to generate a report of statistical operating limits for each component type in a given Lube Analyst database. This would be of great benefit to customers who do not have operating limits for their equipment (which appears to be most customers).

Operators Guide Development - this project would be a ‘best practices’ guide on how to set up and run an oil program using the Lube Analyst. This guide could really be useful as a marketing and training tool and would go a long way to creating ‘satisfied customers’.

[54] In his draft report, dated June 1995, which is included in his final report to Muir

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(Exhibit 7). Forsyth stated with regard to MAINSTAY product development plan:

1.INTRODUCTION

The Maintenance Systems Division (“MSD”) of GasTOPS Ltd. is evolving from a contracted research and engineering services based business to a product based business. The MSD grew out of the core business of GasTOPS Ltd., the research and development of equipment - primarily gas turbine equipment - ‘health monitoring’ methods based on a novel methodology of fault modelling and equipment computer simulation. The success in health monitoring methods development for the F404 gas turbine engines of the CF-18 fighter aircraft revealed a problem and an opportunity: the lack of an information system product that could adequately implement and support the methods developed. This realization and the experience in software development led to the focus on computerized information system product development as a means of exploiting the novel methods created and for developing and expanding business.

The shift in focus from contracted research to product development was very appealing because of the shrinking business opportunities afforded contracted research. The business difficulty with contracted research is twofold. Once a ‘problem’ has been solved, the customer becomes more knowledgeable in the area of concern and becomes less reliant on the contractor; not a good way to grow a business. Secondly, the customer base and funding source for contracted research is shrinking. The source of most research funding in Canada is the government, with the Department of National Defence by far the largest contributor in the area of equipment design, operation and maintenance research. Government funding of all kinds is expected to decrease, and research and development in particular is expected to suffer.

A product based business that incorporates and funds the methods development promises a more stable long-term business prospect. The technical advantage from the knowledge gained from the previous contracted research can be exploited in products that solve customer’s problems without diminishing, and actually increasing, the reliance on the supplier. Further, the market for an information system product that reduces equipment maintenance costs is large, growing and not limited to the government sector.

This document describes a planned approach to developing the

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MSD product development based business. The product market is identified. The MSD product development organizational structure and processes required to support the product based business are described. The product is defined. Finally, the planned product developed projects and schedules are presented.

2.MARKET IDENTIFICATION

The Maintenance Systems Division has selected Condition Based Maintenance (CBM) products and services as a primary business focus. The MSD objective is to provide customers with products and services that improve the productivity and effectiveness of their maintenance programs through the implementation of condition based maintenance practices.

Because CBM is still in its infancy, there are both opportunities and risks. The lack of maturity in the market will allow for a small, creative and unique company such as GasTOPS Ltd. to establish itself as a credible supplier. However, the education demands of the customers in order for them to understand the technology well enough to discriminate between product suppliers will put a substantial marketing burden on any company endeavouring to enter - or actually create - this market.

The following sections give a brief history of maintenance methods, describe the theory behind condition based maintenance, and discusses the MSD’s potential market CBM based products and services.

2.1History of Equipment Maintenance Methods

To better understand this emerging market, it is worthwhile to review the history of equipment maintenance. There are essentially three generations of maintenance [1]:

pre-1950’s: Fix it when it breaks’ or Corrective Maintenance predominates as the maintenance method;

1950’s to mid-1970’s: Scheduled Preventive Maintenance becomes commonplace; and

post-1970’s: On-Condition and Predictive Maintenance begins to emerge as an effective maintenance methodology.

….

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The limitations of scheduled preventive maintenance were first recognized by the commercial aviation industry as early as 1960

[2].Frustrated with the inability to increase reliability of civil aircraft by any feasible changes in either the content or frequency of scheduled overhauls, the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the civil airlines formed a task force to investigate the capabilities of preventive maintenance. This task force made two discoveries that at the time were very surprising, namely:

Scheduled overhaul has little effect on the overall reliability of a complex item unless the item has a dominant failure mode; and,

There are many items for which there is no effective form of scheduled maintenance.

This task force eventually led to the formation of a Maintenance Steering Committee (MSG), in 1965, that generated a document known as MSG-l describing a new methodology for defining maintenance called Reliability Centred Maintenance (RCM). The fundamental approach of RCM was to use on-condition maintenance where ever feasible to increase the reliability of equipment to levels that were not being achieved by scheduled restoration and overhaul. This approach to defining maintenance requirements includes a rigorous Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) to identify failure modes and a logic tree type analysis that defines what to do about each type of failure. The important aspect of the logic used in RCM analysis is that it emphasizes the use and selection of on-condition tasks first, and resorts to scheduled repair and overhaul, failure finding or equipment re-design and modification for those cases where on- condition tasks are not feasible.

The MSG-1 document expressly developed for the maintenance of the then new Boeing 747 aircraft and was unqualified success. For example, United Airlines used RCM to reduce the major structural inspections to 66,000 manhours compared to 4,000,000 called for in the pre-RCM developed maintenance program for the simpler DC-8 aircraft.

Refinement of the RCM procedures in the MSG-2 document were used to develop maintenance programs for the Lockheed LIO11 and the Douglas DC-10. This resulted in the reduction of scheduled overhauls to only 7 of the DC-10 aircraft components compared to the scheduled overhaul to 339 of the DC-S aircraft

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components. The maintenance savings were substantial as the elimination of scheduled overhaul of the engines alone resulted in a 50% reduction in engine spares inventory.

The RCM methodology has been subsequently refined and currently is used in three different but very similar formats. The civil aviation industry uses MSG-3 [3], the US Department of Defence uses a methodology developed by Knowlon and Heap [2], and John Moubray refined a methodology directed towards industrial applications entitled RCM II [1].

Again, it is worth emphasizing that RCM is only a method for defining maintenance; the real ‘benefit’ to practitioners is that it emphasizes the use of on-condition maintenance to prevent failures.

[55]The MSD’s 1995/96 business plan (Exhibit 6) showed a re-organization into a new management structure with program managers now becoming responsible for specific products. Brouse became the program manager for Aero Systems and Forsyth became a program manager for MAINSTAY. Each program manager would have responsibilities for specific matters. Tobin was given the responsibility for marketing and new business development focusing on the MAINSTAY product.

[56]In 1995, GasTOPS commenced the development of ECMS v.2 under two contracts, TIES and CRAD. Under the CRAD, GasTOPS was to develop the Second Line Prognostic System (“SLPS”) software product. At the completion of the development phase, it would be integrated into ECMS v.2. The integration of all component systems would take place under the TIES contract.

[57]By March 1995, GasTOPS had prepared the requirements report for Condition Based Maintenance System (“CBMS”), which was the name given to ECMS v.2. The report was entitled “CF-18 Condition Based Maintenance System (CBMS) Requirements Report” and was prepared for the DND. The report indicated that it was prepared by Tom Kubiseski (“Kubiseski”) and reviewed by Brouse. Its introduction (Exhibit 35) stated:

Several key elements in the creation of the CF-18 CBMS will be:

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ECMS/EMRS Integration. ECMS and EMRS are currently operating on two separate computer systems. EMRS will become a client/server application operating on the ECMS LAN to enable this integration. As part of this integration, context sensitive EMRS Forms will be callable from the ECMS Maintenance Manager’s iconic map.

ECMS/EHM Integration. The Takeoff Analysis, Takeoff Trending and the ETF Troubleshooting Programs currently reside on the VAX 11/785 computing facility at each CF-18 base. These VAX based programs were developed as proof-of-concept applications, and duplicate many of the functions and data storage features of the more fully developed ECMS and EMRS programs. To remove the redundant data requirements and the resulting additional manpower requirements the VAX based programs will be fully integrated into ECMS. This integration phase has been commonly referred to as SLPS (Second Line Prognostic System).

DIGS/FLTS Integration. The DIGS and FLTS programs will be integrated such that the DIGS will perform all processing required by the FLTS and populate the required database tables. The FLTS reporting software will be modified such that aircraft parameters as well as the current engine parameters may be reported and presented graphically.

ECMS Phase II. The ECMS Phase II requirements will be integrated as part of the CF-18 CBMS. This phase of ECMS will see enhancements such as an Equipment Configuration Setup Utility and a Usage Rollback Utility implemented at this time.

[58]As indicated in the introduction, the several systems (ECMS, EMRS, FLTS, Take-Off Analysis Program, Take-Off Trending Program, ETF Troubleshooting Program, EMR and DIGGS) were to be integrated to form a CF-18 CBMS and, upon completion, the program became known as ECMS v.2. Brouse had the primary responsibility for the contract development and Forsyth was responsible for finding the ideas and products to be included in ECMS v.2.

[59]In March 1995 GasTOPS made a presentation to the CAF, whereby a proposal was made to modify the ECMS v.2 development plan. The proposal was prepared by Brouse with assistance from Forsyth, Jeff Cass and Kubiseski. The main feature of the proposal was that GasTOPS now proposed a common database for ECMS v.2 which would be similar to the

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MAINSTAY database. GasTOPS was proposing to develop ECMS v.2 with a generic core design (general functionality within a basic database design, which would be a reusable design). The databases for ECMS, FLTS and CBM-DAS would be integrated into a new data model.

[60]The development work would be performed by GasTOPS’ product development staff and in particular, the defendant Jeff Cass’ product development team, which was developing the MAINSTAY product. The team approach being proposed by GasTOPS for the development work was:

[61]In March 1995 GasTOPS submitted to the DND a report entitled “CF-18 CBMS Functional Specifications Document (draft).” The document was prepared by W.M. Smith, L. Nguyen, A. Richardson and reviewed by D. Brouse. GasTOPS’ plan was to develop a new database for all of the applications to be integrated into ECMS v.2. The database would be similar to GasTOPS’ MAINSTAY. In addition, there were some MAINSTAY features and

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functions that had better design features than those currently being used in ECMS. GasTOPS intended to implement these features into ECMS v.2. There were also a number of ECMS v.2 components that were of a general purpose and could be integrated into MAINSTAY.

[62]The Design documents and design specifications were prepared by Jeff Cass to implement the proposed changes. He prepared a design specification for the prognostic expert system component of ECMS v.2 in order that the design would be reusable as a part of the MAINSTAY product. Similarly, a design document was prepared by Jeff Cass for the data collection component of ECMS v.2 (also referred to as “sample management” component). This component of ECMS v.2 software was integrated into the MAINSTAY product.

[63]By September 1995, GasTOPS had prepared for the DND a report entitled “CF-18 Condition Based Maintenance System – 404 Second Line Prognostic System Preliminary Design” (Exhibit 41c). The report was prepared by Kubiseski and reviewed by Brouse. This was the preliminary design of the SLPS component of ECMS v.2, also known as the prognostic component of ECMS v.2.

[64]In his August 13, 1995, MSD 1995/96 technology plan contribution (Exhibit 7), Forsyth defined MAINSTAY as:

MAINSTAY is the chosen name for maintenance information management systems product to be developed and marketed by the MSD. The MAINSTAY product is to contain the integrated functionality of a number of computer programs developed by the MSD for specific customer needs. By integrating these functions into a single system, it will be possible to develop a condition based maintenance product that meets the market needs identified in the previous section.

[65]When Forsyth prepared his technology plan, the computer programs that had been developed by the MSD consisted of the PASS, Lube Analyst product, and CBM-DAS. It was intended that MAINSTAY would contain the functionalities from FLTS, EMRS, ECMS, PASS, Lube Analyst and CBM-DAS.

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[66]The MSD’s 1996/97 business plan, prepared by Muir on August 30, 1996, contained the objectives for both the technology development and marketing plan. The MSD’s business plan focused on an opportunity with the U.S. Navy. GasTOPS hoped to upgrade ECMS and the FLTS product for use by the Navy. There was also to be a more substantial upgrade to ECMS: it would be converted in a new operating system, Windows NT/95 for the GE opportunity. As in the previous business plans, the technology portion of the plan was based on a separate report prepared by Forsyth. The MSD 1996/97 business plan (Exhibit 8) contains an excellent view of the past work of the MSD and its future objectives:

SUMMARY OF OBJECTIVES

TECHNOLOGY PLAN

1.The F/A-18 ECMS and FLTS products will be upgraded for U.S. Navy use.

2.The ECMS will be converted to the Windows NT/95 operating system, if selected by General Electric for their new Engine Services information services.

3.The Lube Analyst product will be adapted for use by the Joint Oil Analysis Program (JOAP).

4.An ODM system for the Sea King helicopter will be developed.

5.Production engineering and pre-flight qualification testing will be completed for the AH64 ODM system.

6.The CF-18 Solid State TTM development will be completed.

HUMAN RESOURCES PLAN

1.The Aero Program will establish a proper management team.

2.The Division will add 12 new technical staff to meet the level of effort requirements of the FY 96/97 Revenue Plan. This will include 4 field service representatives.

MARKETING PLAN

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1.The MSD will meet an overall revenue target of $6.5M based on the following breakdown of Program revenue targets:

Aero Program

$3500K

Industrial Program

2000K

ODM Program

1000K

 

$6500K

2.The Division will obtain a long term contract from the CAF to provide ECMS field operations support.

3.The Division will win a contract to produce solid state Tape Transport Magazines (TTMs) for the CF-18.

4.The Division will reach a “partnership” agreement with the CAF for “Integrated Health Monitoring (IHM)” support and will obtain a contract for oil analysis systems support.

5.The Division will win a major contract with the U.S. Navy for the F/A-18 ECMS/FLTS.

6.The Division will consolidate and formalize the CBM support services provided to Dofasco, at a level of approximately $500K/year.

7.The Division will continue the implementation of MAINSTAY at Ontario Hydro’s Pickering Nuclear Station in accordance with a Five Year Strategic Plan and will position itself for similar implementation programs at the Bruce and Darlington Nuclear Stations.

8.A single target market sector will be selected for near term MAINSTAY marketing efforts and the Division will position itself to achieve a MAINSTAY sale to a customer within this sector.

9.A “program” sale of Lube Analyst will be made to a U.S. JOAP member organization.

10.Twelve (12) copies of the RCM Analyst software will be

sold.

11.The Division will obtain a contract to develop an ODM system for the Sea King helicopter.

12.We will succeed in getting ODM into the procurement

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specifications for the CAF’s new SAR and Maritime helicopters.

2.REVIEW OF BUSINESS PROGRAMS

The MSD functions as an autonomous business unit within GasTOPS and shares the corporate mission of “improving the effectiveness of machinery through the application of computer technology”.

Specifically, the MSD focusses its business activities on the application of Condition Based Maintenance (CBM) technologies to aeronautical and industrial machinery and on the application of oil debris sensor technologies to aircraft propulsion systems.

2.1Aero Systems Program

The Aero Program was derived from the Division’s historical core business of providing engineering services to the Canadian Air Force (CAF). The general business development goals of the Program are twofold:

1.to continuously expand the level and scope of CBM system development and support services provided to the CAF.

2.to achieve additional business growth by exploiting the company’s CBM technology/ products within the following markets:

CAF

other military aircraft operators

commercial aircraft operators

aero-engine and aircraft OEMs

2.1.1Marketing Position

Total revenues for the Program in FY 95/96 were $2590K (estimated); 14% higher than the previous year sales of $2270K. The breakdown in these sales was as follows:

DFTEM

$1585K

CRAD

$ 220K

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DTHEM

$

360K

Repair and Overhaul

$

355K

Foreign Military Sales

$

55K

other

$

15K

 

$2590K

A significant fraction of Program revenues continue to come from a single CAF directorate, DFTEM. In FY 95/96 the Company significantly strengthened its position with this customer through a number of successful initiatives including:

renewal of company TIES contract

development and delivery of the ECMS version 2.0

provision of new CF-18 ground stations

development of a prototype solid state TTM for the CF-18

implementation of a Tutor/J85 ECMS

The company has also positioned itself to win three (3) new programs in FY 95/96:

contracting out of ECMS operations at CFB Bagotville and Cold Lake procurement of solid state TTMs

expansion of the ECMS non-engine CF-18 aircraft systems

The Chief of Research and Development (CRAD) continues to be an important source of technology development funding for the Program and the Company. In the previous year CRAD projects included:

completion of the take-off performance trending methods and software for the CF-18

completion of the Deployable Filter Debris Analyzer (DFDA) and Oil Screening Device (OSD) prototype developments

continuation of the Carleton University turbine blade damage studies

In FY 95/96 the company also positioned itself to obtain development funding for helicopter CBM, including a contract to development of an Oil Debris Monitoring (“ODM”) system for the

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Sea King.

In FY 95/96 the GasTOPS was successful in winning a contract from DTHEM to build and install a second F/A-18 engine exhaust augmentor tube at CFB Cold Lake. The general prospects for developing new business with this directorate, however, remain relatively poor.

….

It was an objective of the Program to achieve a follow-on sale of the CF-18 Flight Line Troubleshooting System (FLTS) to the Australian Air Force in FY 95/96; and this objective was not achieved. However, the company has made significant progress towards the sale of our F/A-18 FLTS and ECMS to the U.S. Navy. If achieved, this sale would position GasTOPS for significant future foreign military sales opportunities.

Significant progress was also made in FY 95/96 towards the sale of ECMS to General Electric for use at their major repair and overhaul sites.

2.1.2Technology Position

The Aero Program marketing plan (Section 5.1 of this Plan) focuses heavily on the exploitation of the company’s ECMS and FLTS products and their underlying technologies as a basis for new business development.

The significant short term opportunities for the ECMS include:

the potential sale to the U.S. Navy F/A-18 program

the potential sale to General Electric

the potential application of the ECMS to a CAF helicopter fleet

the potential application of the ECMS to the CAF Aircraft Structural Integrity Program (ASIP) data management requirement

In order to exploit these opportunities the following ECMS enhancements will be required:

conversion to Windows 95/NT (GE)

multiple equipment types/”blueprints” within a common database (GE)

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damage/defect tracking and reporting (GE, USN, CAF)

improved fleet management reporting (GE, USN)

intersystem interfaces for periodic test techniques (CAF)

The major short term opportunity for the FLTS is the potential sale to the USN and F/A-18 FMS customers. This will require the following features to be added to the FLTS:

diagnostic rules for the F402 engine

interface to the USN standard aircraft tape reading devices

automatic generation of work orders based on fault type

2.1.3Human Resource Position

The Aero Program presently includes 9 full-time technical staff members including the following management staff:

Doug Brouse

- Program Manager

Chris Cass

- Project Manager

Paul Bérubé

- Contract Manager (DFTEM TIES)

The Program is presently under-staffed and relies on resources from other programs to staff its contracts/projects. In particular, as a result of the recent resignation of Tom Kubiseski, the Program lacks an experienced Project Manager capable of handling large projects.

2.2Industrial Systems Program

The Industrial Program has grown out the Company’s efforts to commercialize the maintenance methodologies and systems technology originally developed for the Canadian Air Force. To- date, these efforts have resulted in the creation of three software products:

1.MAINSTAY - a Microsoft Windows 3.1 and Oracle based information system that provides plant-wide Condition Based Maintenance (CBM) functions for industrial applications.

2.Lube Analyst - an OS/2 and Watcom/Oracle information system for managing and interpreting used oil analysis test results.

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3.RCM Analyst - a Microsoft Windows 3.1 and Oracle based information system that supports the Reliability Centred Maintenance methodology for identifying and defining equipment maintenance tasks.

The general business goal of the Program is to establish specific markets for these products and their associated services which will result in continued business growth.

2.2.1Marketing Position

Total revenues of the Program in FY 95/96 were $1,630K (estimated); 14% higher than the previous year sales of $1,430K and 25% higher than the original FY 95/96 plan of $1,300K. The breakdown in these sales was as follows:

MAINSTAY

 

 

Dofasco

$

640K

Ontario Hydro

$

340K

Caidmark

$

410K

Orenda Engines Ltd.

$

81K

Nova

$

32K

 

$1503K

2.2.2Technology Position

2.2.2.1MAINSTAY

Significant progress was made in FY 95/96 towards the completion of a general purpose CBM software product for industrial plant application. In particular, for the Ontario Hydro and Caidmark projects the Dofasco “CBM-DAS” software was generalized and its functionality was broadened to include:

a “user defined calculation” module that allows users to define condition indicator calculations in the database

an Oracle based expert system for diagnosing/prognosing the cause of condition indicator exceedances and automatically generating maintenance work requests

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an interface to the Entek E-monitor Vibration Analysis (VA) database, including the synchronization of equipment and sample routes as well as the definition and extraction of condition indicators from the recorded FFT vibration spectrum

an interface to the GasTOPS’ Lube Analyst database

a Hand Held Data Logger (Telxon) user interface and MAINSTAY data transfer application that includes pen-based handwriting recognition that allows maintenance personnel to ‘write’ the measurement results directly into a local database that is then electronically (via an RS232 cable connection) uploaded to MAINSTAY

A number of short term contractual opportunities exist for further development/enhancement of the MAINSTAY product. These are described in the Technology Plan section of this plan.

2.2.2.2Lube Analyst

The Lube Analyst product has not achieved the sales targets anticipated, and it is felt that the OS/2 operating system requirement is a significant barrier to product sales. Conversion to Windows 95/NT will not be undertaken, however, unless a significant market (e.g. the JOAP) can be developed for the product.

2.2.2.3RCM Analyst

As previously noted, the development of a Reliability Centred Maintenance (RCM) software tool was accomplished in the past year. This product allows the user to perform equipment Failure Modes and Effects Criticality Analysis (FMECA), to select the ‘optimal’ maintenance task for each failure mode (re-design, on- condition, restoration, replacement or ‘let it fail’) based on the RCM methodology, and to define the maintenance plan in terms of resources, skills, frequency, etc.

2.2.3Human Resources Position

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The Industrial Program presently includes 17 full-time and 1 part- time technical staff members including the following management team:

Brad Forsyth

- Program Manager

Matt Tobin

- New Business Development

Jeff Cass

- Product Development

Dave Peloso

- Ontario Hydro

Rob Vandenberg

- Dofasco

Kevin Reynolds

- Lube Analyst/RCM Analyst

 

Product Support

2.3ODM Program

The goal of the ODM program is to develop new business opportunities based on the application of the company’s oil debris monitoring (ODM) technology to military and commercial aircraft.

In FY 94/95, GasTOPS entered into a formal partnership agreement with BFGoodrich Aerospace whereby BFGoodrich (BFG) will manufacture and market the ODM in return for a royalty on units sold. As such, the development of the ODM program is predicated largely on the development of GasTOPS’ partnership with BFGoodrich.

2.3.1Marketing Position

Revenues for the ODM program in FY 95/96 were $840K (estimated); an increase of $150K (or 22%) over the previous year sales of $690K. The breakdown in sales for FY 95/96 was as follows:

Pratt & Whitney F119 ODM Development

$315K

Pratt & Whitney F119 ODM Production

$ 35K

Hamilton Standard ODM License

$ 75K

BFGoodrich/AH64 ODM

$375K

BFGoodrich/Experimental Systems

$ 35K

BFGoodrich/Other

$ 10K

 

$845K

The ODM program has its origin in the company’s success in winning a major development contract with Pratt and Whitney (Florida) for the F119 engine. This development contract and an associated contract for the production of ODM sensors for the F119 flight qualification program will continue until the

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company’s FY 97/98 business year.

In FY 95/96, GasTOPS was successful in negotiating a license agreement with Hamilton Standard for use of GasTOPS’ F119 ODM signal processing design in F119 Comprehensive Engine Diagnostic Units (CEDUs) to be produced by Hamilton Standard. This agreement includes an upfront payment of U$100K (of which U$50K was received in FY 95/96) and a royalty of U$100 per sensor on each F119 ODM shipped to P&W for the Advanced Tactical Fighter (ATF) and Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) programs. The total anticipated production quantities for the Fl19 sensor are 3500 units over a 20 year period commencing in 1999.

In the past year, the Company was funded by BFGoodrich to develop an application-specific ODM sensor design for the AH64 helicopter engine nose and main gearboxes. Additionally, GasTOPS co-operated with BFG on the development of a general purpose ODM controller suitable for airborne applications of up to 8 sensors. The AH64 ODM system will be flight trialed in late 1996/early 1997 by McDonnell Douglas and the Israeli Air Force, with the expectation that, should the trial be successful, the IAF will procure 45 four-channel ODM systems over a 12 month period commencing in mid-1997.

Additional progress on the marketing of ODM for aircraft application in FY 95/96 included:

submission of an unsolicited proposal to the CAF for the development of a Sea King helicopter main gearbox ODM system (2 channel)

provision of an “experimental” ODM systems to Pratt and Whitney East Hartford for gearbox failure progression test programs at NASA Lewis and Miba Bearings

provision of an experimental ODM system to Allison Gas Turbines for T56 reduction gearbox failure progression testing

….

2.3.3Human Resource Position

At the present time, the ODM program has no dedicated staff

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Overall program management is provided by the Division V.P. (D. Muir). Development contracts are managed and executed by the Advanced Design and Development Division of the Company. System production in handled by the Company’s Production group.

3.TECHNOLOGY PLAN

The general strategy of the MSD with respect to technology or product development is to systematically obtain development contracts, both military and commercial, which will contribute to the overall development of its maintenance information management system and oil debris sensor products. Remaining elements of the technology plan are funded from internal resources or government grants, to the extent to which these funds are available.

The following describes the MSD technology development plans for FY 96/97.

3.1ECMS/FLTS

Further development of the ECMS and F/A-18 FLTS will occur under the following planned contracts.

a)DFTEM TIES

development of a ‘context-sensitive’ Engine Maintenance Reporting System that is integrated into the ECMS

modification of the ECMS to support the F/A-18 airframe including the support of alternate components, multiple blueprints, the management of airframe fatigue data, and the generation of airframe status reports

b)CRAD-Turbine Damage

improved characterization of the effects of turbine damage on F404 engine performance.

c)U.S. Navy

improved fleet management reporting

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NAVAIR-specific intersystem interfaces

F402 engine diagnostic rule set for FLTS

automatic generation of work orders based on FLTS fault types

d)CRAD-Other

implementation plan for application of CBM technologies to CAF helicopters (target application: Sea King)

intersystem interfaces for periodic oil and vibration analysis systems

Sea King pilot project

e)Other Contracts

It is anticipated that other potential contracts of the Aero Program will also contribute to the development of the ECMS product. This is particularly the case for the General Electric ECMS opportunity which will require conversion of the ECMS to the Windows NT/95 operating system. The estimated labour costs associated with this conversion are $280,000 and will not be undertaken without a prior commitment from GE to purchase the converted ECMS product.

3.2MAINSTAY

Further development of the MAINSTAY product will occur under the following expected contracts in FY 96/97.

a)Dofasco

development of a thermographic interface capability

development of a motor current analysis capability

development of a PI Oil Systems data historian interface

b)Ontario Hydro

development of motorized valve prognosis techniques and MOVATS interface

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development of generalized RCM analyses of heat exchangers, pumps, valves, etc., that can be packaged with MAINSTAY

c)Petrochemical opportunities

there are a number of potential contracts presently being pursued by Caidmark and Interplant which will require an interface between the InterPlant Process Data Historian database (this would provide a generic interface to all of the commercially available Distributed Control Systems) and MAINSTAY to be developed

the development of an interface to PSDI’s MAXIMO work order management system will be undertaken if GasTOPS is successful in winning the Petronas Gas Processing Plant project

Because of manpower constraints, no significant internally funded or discretionary MAINSTAY development is presently planned the next year.

3.3Lube Analyst

No further development of the Lube Analyst product will be undertaken in FY 96/97, other than that required to meet the DoD JOAP requirement. It is anticipated that minor enhancements to the product will be required for the JOAP, including improved data transfer and reporting capabilities and possibly certain USAF and/or NAVAIR specific intersystem interfaces. For the most part, these enhancements will not be undertaken without a contract from the DoD.

3.4RCM Analyst

The RCM Analyst product has and will be provided to a small number of organizations on a “try and buy” basis. It is anticipated that minor enhancements to the product will be made in order to secure these initial orders for the product.

Activities planned for FY 96/97 which may require internal funding include:

development of a tutorial database

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preparation of a Users Reference Guide

completion of conversion to Windows 95/NT

3.5ODM

A number of contracts in FY 96/97 will contribute to further development of the 0DM product. These include:

a)P&W ODM Development

IFR sensor qualification testing

design modification resultant from IFR EMI test results

Initial Service Release (TSR) qualification test procedures

b)Sea King ODM

development of a 2-channel ODM system for the Sea King Helicopter main gearbox

c)AH64 ODM

production engineering and pre-flight qualification testing of the AH64 ODM system for McDonnell Douglas

d)P&W ADP Sensor

development of a prototype, large bore (1¼ inch diameter) ODM sensor for P&W East Hartfordts Advanced Ducted Propulsor (ADP) engine development program.

e)Other Contracts

It is anticipated that BF Goodrich will contract GasTOPS to undertake specific ODM product development activities in response to specific business opportunities (e.g. the Allied Signal AS90 prospect).

No ODM development activities are planned for FY 96/97 which will require internal funding.

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4.HUMAN RESOURCES PLAN

4.1Management Plan

Figure 4.1 summarizes the present MSD management structure.

The Aero Program is in greatest need of additional management staff, and it is an objective of the Program Manager to establish at least one and possibly two additional Project Manager positions by the end of FY 96/97.

The Industrial Program may also require an additional Project Manager if the Company is successful in winning another major MAINSTAY implementation project.

5.MARKETING PLAN

5.1Aero Systems Program

5.1.1General Strategy

The general strategy of the Aero Program is as follows:

a)Continued marketing of maintenance program development and support services to the CAF, with an emphasis on funded technology and/or product development programs

b)Selective marketing of products developed for the CAF to

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other military and commercial aircraft operators and/or OEMs.

With regards to item b), current efforts are focussed primarily on the sale of the Engine Condition Monitoring System (ECMS) and F/A-18 Flight Line Troubleshooting (FLTS) products.

5.1.2CAF

The CAF represents the core business of the Program. In FY 95/96, sales to the CAF increased from $2300K to $2500K (9%), largely as a result of significantly increased revenues from the DFTEM TIES contract.

The objective for the upcoming year will be to increase revenues from the CAF to roughly $2700K (or by 8%) by pursuing the following general marketing plan:

a)DFTEM - Efforts with this customer will concentrate on bringing to contract a small number of new business opportunities already initiated at the time of writing this plan. These include:

A long term contract to provide CF-18 ECMS support services at Canadian Forces Bases Cold Lake and Bagotville (3 technical representatives at each base)

Expansion of the CF-18 ECMS to include non- engine aircraft systems; in particular, the structural components of the aircraft maintained under the CF-18 Aircraft Structural Integrity Program (ASIP)

Production of solid state Tape Transport Magazines (TTMs) for the CF-18

The second item above will most likely require some form of co-operation agreement with Bombardier Defense Systems Division (formerly Canadair).

b)CRAD - GasTOPS is currently positioned to win a series of small R&D contracts related to the application of CBM to helicopters from the Chief, Research and Development (CRAD) directorate. This effort presently lacks an overall implementation plan and cost justification. This plan will be prepared by the Company as early as possible in the next fiscal year.

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Additionally funding may also be sought from CRAD to complete the development of the Deployable Filter Debris Analyzer (DFDA) and/or the Oil Screening Device (OSD).

c)DTA - The Company is presently attempting to position itself to secure a contracting arrangement from the Directorate of Technical Airworthiness (DTA) for on-going support of the CAF periodic oil and vibration analysis programs. GasTOPS is already the sole Canadian sales/service agency for the Dynamic Instruments VBAS vibration analyzer and has recently proposed to provide R&O support for the Baird MOA oil analysis spectrometers and CAF oil laboratory software systems. These opportunities are part of a broader marketing initiative to establish a “partnership agreement” with the CAF for the provision of “Integrated Health Monitoring (IHM)” development and support services.

d)Other Directorates - GasTOPS’ efforts to sell the ECMS to the maintenance managers of non-fighter CAF aircraft fleets (i.e. transport and helicopter aircraft) have yet to bear fruit. In the next fiscal year marketing efforts will be focussed on the following opportunities:

CBM pilot project for the CH-124 Sea King helicopter

inclusion of GasTOPS’ ECMS and 0DM products in the procurement specifications for the new Maritime and Search and Rescue (SAR) helicopter acquisitions

5.1.3 F/A-18 ECMS and FLTS

At the time of writing of this plan, the Company is positioned to win a major contract (~$1.5M) from BFGoodrich Aerospace to demonstrate the F/A-18 ECMS/FLTS to the US Navy (NAVAIR). This demonstration contract could in turn lead to additional F/A-18 ECMS/FLTS sales of approximately $15M to NAVAIR and foreign F/A-18 operators over the next 3 to 5 years.

The objectives of the next fiscal year will be to win this major demonstration contract, to develop a marketing plan for “production” sales to NAVAIR and foreign F/A-18 operators, and to position ourselves to win these production sales.

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It is also noteworthy that GasTOPS has positioned itself to win the NAVAIR F/A-18 ECMS/FLTS opportunity by marketing the system as a replacement for the problematic NAVAIR - developed Maintenance Data Processing System (“MDPS”), a common ground support system for the several US Navy fleets. Hence, winning the F/A-18 program will position GasTOPS as a possible supplier to other NAVAIR programs including the V22, F-14, CH- 53 and AH-1W aircraft.

5.1.4Generic ECMS

The F/A-18 ECMS application is built on a generic core system which the Company, in partnership with BFGoodrich, has recently presented to General Electric. In 1997, GE plans to upgrade its “Engine Services” information management capabilities as part of

acorporate-wide program to implement state-of-the-art, enterprise- wide database systems for finance, manufacturing and customer support.

The GasTOPS’ ECMS product has received a favourable evaluation by the GE Information Systems (IS) group and is presently being evaluated at 4 GE “user” sites. A “make or buy” decision will be made by GE in September 1996.

If selected, GasTOPS will be required to undertake a major development effort to convert the ECMS application to the Windows 95/NT operating system over a period of approximately 6 months. Once converted, however, the ECMS will have broad applicability to the aero-engine and aircraft OEM markets.

5.2.4MAINSTAY

The MAINSTAY product grew out of the Dofasco CBM-DAS project. Two follow-on sales have been achieved: Ontario Hydro and ITM. At the time writing, only one serious prospect for MAINSTAY is being pursued (Petronas Gas Processing Plants 5&6).

The objective for MAINSTAY for the upcoming year will be to identify a market sector in which to concentrate MAINSTAY marketing efforts and to position ourselves to win a contract with a new customer in this sector.

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The following marketing plan will be used:

a MAINSTAY Marketing Brief will be prepared that includes an assessment of three candidate sector (metals, utilities, oil & gas) from which one will be selected

a portfolio of marketing materials will be prepared that are tailored to the selected sector

a direct marketing effort will be undertaken towards selected companies in the selected sector

GasTOPS will position itself to achieve a MAINSTAY sale to one of these companies

5.2.5Lube Analyst

Lube Analyst marketing efforts for the upcoming year will focus primarily on winning a contract with one of the U.S. Joint Oil Analysis Program (JOAP) member organizations. GasTOPS has teamed with BFGoodrich to pursue this opportunity and, at the time of writing of this plan, has made good progress towards a sale to either:

a)the U.S. Air National Guard;

b)the U.S. Air Force; or

c)NAVAIR.

The total current market for a JOAP lab software support system breaks down as follows:

U.S. Air Force

-

128 labs

U.S. Navy

-

47 labs

U.S. Army

-

28 labs

Other DOD

-

16 labs

Canada

-

12 labs

Other Countries

-

50 labs

 

 

281 labs

5.2.6RCM Analyst

The RCM Analyst product was launched in FY 95/96 with the

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following results achieved to-date:

248 inquiries have been received

a free trial copy was given to Penn State University

two companies have ordered the product on a trial basis (U$7500 if kept; U$500 restocking fee if returned)

The objective for the upcoming year is to achieve RCM Analyst revenues of $90K, including the sale of a client-server version to Ontario Hydro. The marketing plan for RCM Analyst is summarized as follows:

continue the promotion/advertising of the product in maintenance trade magazines; respond to resulting leads

continue promoting its sale to Ontario Hydro

monitor the trial use of the product by Johnson Controls, Eli Lilly and Penn State

contact RCM service providers as possible sales channels

survey existing contact list for reactions to product

develop assessment of product viability (mid-way through upcoming year)

5.3ODM Program

5.3.1General Strategy

The general strategy currently employed by GasTOPS and BFGoodrich (our US partner company) to market the ODM product involves:

a)missionary sales efforts aimed at raising the general level of market awareness of the technology and product

b)provision of the product to technical “gate keepers” or enthusiasts within key organizations

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c)targeted sales to specific military and commercial engine/aircraft programs.

The short term market opportunities presently targeted include:

a)military helicopter retrofits

b)commercial engines for ETOPS service

c)new military aircraft acquisitions

All planned marketing efforts are restricted currently to the U.S. and Canada.

….

5.3.4New Military Aircraft Acquisitions

The basic strategy in this market segment is to get ODM in the procurement spec for the acquisition program and to subsequently (or preferable at the same time) position ourselves to win the program.

Programs which are presently being pursued by GasTOPS/BFGoodrich include:

the CAF new SAR helicopter

the CAF new Maritime helicopter

the U.S. Navy V22

the U.S. Army AH-64 Longbow

It is noteworthy that GasTOPS has already won a position on the F119 engine program which is presently the only engine specified for the USAF F22 Advanced Tactical Fighter (ATF) and the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) programs. As previous noted, the expected production quantities for these programs are 3500 units over a 20 year period commencing in 1999.

BFGoodrich/GasTOPS are not pursuing the new European military aircraft programs such as the EJ2000, NH90, EH101 and JAS39.

5.3.5Other Opportunities

In addition to the above described planned activities, other applications of the ODM are presently pursued on an opportunistic basis. At the present time, these activities include an opportunity to

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incorporate the ODM into the design specification of Allied Signal’s new AS90 turbofan for regional and large business jets.

BFGoodrich has also approached GasTOPS recently for assistance in certifying their new helicopter Health and Usage Monitoring System (HUMS) product. This assistance will be provided in the form of engineering services for software verification testing.

5.3.6Revenue Plan

The total planned revenues for the MSD for FY 96/97 are summarized as follows along with results achieved for the previous fiscal year (estimated).

 

FY 95/96

FY 96/97

%

 

Achieved

Planned

Increase

Aero Program

$2590K

$3500K

35%

Industrial Program

$1630K

$2000K

23%

ODM Program

$ 840K

$1000K

19%

 

$5060K

$6500K

29%

[67]In August 1996, Forsyth forwarded his technology report for the forthcoming business year to Muir:

2.2MAINSTAY Program

The MAINSTAY program grew out of the efforts to commercialize the maintenance methodologies and systems technology originally developed for the Canadian Air Force (CAF). The business development of the program is based on three products that incorporate this technology:

1.MAINSTAY - a Microsoft Windows 3.1 and Oracle based information system that provides enterprise wide Condition Based Maintenance functions. This product was primarily developed from the Dofasco projects, with the commercial packaging of the product carried out under the Ontario Hydro project.

2.Lube Analyst - an OS/2 3.0 and Watcom/Oracle based information system for managing and interpreting used oil analysis

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test results. This product was primarily funded by GasTOPS and CRAD (through the PIDMS project).

3.RCM Analyst - a Microsoft Windows 3.1 and Oracle based information system that supports the Reliability Centred Maintenance methodology for identifying and defining equipment maintenance tasks. This product was developed under two projects, one with Dofasco and the other with Orenda.

The general business development objectives of the program are to expand the sales associated with these products and supporting services. More specifically, the objectives are:

1.to successfully implement complete CBM programs throughout Dofasco and Pickering and establish these as credible reference sites for the GasTOPS Condition Based Maintenance products and services;

2.to continue the development of a suite of general purpose RCM and CBM information system products that will significantly reduce the effort to implement RCM/CBM and form the basis of, and maximize, the program business growth; and,

3.to position Lube Analyst to become the Joint Oil Analysis Program (JOAP) approved product for the United States Air Force.

2.2.1Marketing Position

….

The lack of sales from our business alliance with the commercial labs forced us to re-evaluate our marketing efforts and we have since returned our focus to our original market, the operator owned labs. In particular, the marketing efforts has been focussed on our business alliance with BFGoodrich and the sale to the United States Joint Oil Analysis Program (JOAP) labs. Progress has been made in this area with the successful installation of Lube Analyst at the JOAP Technical Support Center (TSC) in Pensacola, Florida.

2.2.2Technology Position

There has been very good progress in the product development

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efforts for MAINSTAY for the past fiscal year. The primary technological focus was to migrate the Dofasco specific CBM- DAS software to a general purpose, professionally packaged/presented product with broader functionality providing the basis for the program business development. This was accomplished, along with significant functional enhancements, including:

a “user defined calculation” module that allows users to define condition indicator calculations in the database

an Oracle based expert system for diagnosing/ prognosing the cause of condition indicator exceedances and automatically generates maintenance work requests

an interface to the Entek E-monitor Vibration Analysis (VA) database, including the synchronization of equipment and sample routes as well as the definition and extraction of trending condition indicators from the recorded FFT vibration spectrum

an interface to the GasTOPS Lube Analyst database (analogous to the VA interface)

a Hand Held Data Logger (HHDL) user interface and MAINSTAY data transfer application that includes pen-based handwriting recognition that allows maintenance personnel to ‘write’ the measurement results directly into a local database that is then electronically (via an RS232 cable connection) uploaded to MAINSTAY

Many of these MAINSTAY enhancements have been incorporated at the database level in the ECMS version 2.0 development. The contractual requirement for a Second Line Prognostic System (SLPS) to be incorporated into ECMS provided an opportunity to consolidate the ECMS and MAINSTAY databases and database level functionality (i.e. the Oracle based programming language embodied in ‘packages’ and ‘triggers’ at the database level). The results of this effort are that the ECMS and MAINSTAY have identical database implementations for the condition indicator

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storage, user defined calculations, expert system and maintenance planning and scheduling. The only significant difference is that the ECMS 2.0 has a much more sophisticated equipment type and assembly representation to support comprehensive equipment configuration management; a current weakness in MAINSTAY that we have not had the contractual opportunity to develop.

Other MAINSTAY features that were pursued but not developed in FY96 include the development of a real-time process data interface and a thermography interface. It is expected that finding for both of these features will be obtained from either Dofasco or Ontario Hydro in FY97.

Another technology objective, the development of a Reliability Centred Maintenance (RCM) software tool, was accomplished in FY96. The RCM Analyst product was completed as a result of the Orenda Engines Ltd contract described above. This product allows the user to perform equipment Failure Modes and Effects Criticality Analysis (FMECA), to select the ‘optimal’ maintenance task for each failure (re-design, on-condition, restoration, replacement or ‘let it fail’) based on the RCM methodology, and to define the maintenance plan in terms of resources, skills, frequency, etc.

Additional technology accomplishments in FY96, include:

the evaluation and selection of a Windows 95/NT development tool - Powerbuilder 5.0 (This tool will allow us to use our existing Powerbuilder 4.0 MAINSTAY code base for Windows 95/NT development)

the evaluation, selection and implementation of an automated software testing tool - Segue QA Partner

the evaluation, selection and implementation of a software configuration management tool (to replace GasTOPS’ in-house tools that are expensive to maintain) - MKS Source Integrity

the development of a Software Trouble Report (STR) and “issues” tracking database

the development of enhanced maintenance scheduling in the ECMS version 2.0

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the prototype development of a Windows 95 equipment configuration management user interface

The Lube Analyst product also had a number of enhancements added over the last year, most of these were in support of the marketing effort to PMC customers and to the TSC. These enhancements included:

the integration of a customizable database reporting tool (Powersoft’s InfoMaker) and the development some standard reports, the most significant being a statistical condition indicator operating limits report

the incorporation of minor enhancements and ‘bug fixes’ identified through the PMC beta program at Sidbek Dosco and the TSC evaluation

the development of a BioRad Fourier Transform Infrared (FTIR) spectrometer interface

the development of a Spectroil M rotrode atomic emission spectrometer interface

the development of a Predict DR III ferrography particle quantifier interface

2.2.3Human Resource Position

The MAINSTAY Program management structure has been refined and formalized over the past fiscal year, the first year of the program. An organizational chart for the program is provided in Figure 2.x

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The program has been divided into five main areas of responsibility, with personnel assigned to each area. These responsibilities comprise:

1.Product Development - Jeff Cass is responsible for the design, implementation and testing of the maintenance information management products. This includes the selection and refinement of support tools, methodologies and procedures.

2.Ontario Hydro Account - Dave Peloso is responsible for the management of the Ontario Hydro account. This includes the development of new business, the management of existing Engineering support and development contracts, and the provision of feedback into product development requirements.

3.Dofasco Account - Rob Vandenberg is responsible for the management of the Dofasco account (with the same types of responsibilities as Dave Peloso).

4.Production and Support - Kevin Reynolds is responsible for the production and support of our general purpose products: Lube Analyst and RCM Analyst (to date Kevin has exclusively focussed on Lube Analyst). These responsibilities include preparation and QA of delivery media, development of installation procedures, field commissioning, user training and technical support.

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5.Methods Development - with the re-deployment of Chris Cass to the Aero Program following the departure of Andrew Richardson, Brad Forsyth has resumed responsibility of condition monitoring methods development (with Mike Egan being ‘groomed’ for this role). These responsibilities include the research and development of condition indicators, statistical analysis, trending techniques and diagnostic/prognostic methods.

[68]In 1996, GasTOPS was pursuing several opportunities in the market place, including the U.S. Navy. In its pursuit of these opportunities, GasTOPS was planning on upgrading its ECMS and FLTS products, converting the ECMS product to a Windows NT/95 new operating system for the GE opportunity and upgrading the Lube Analyst product for a program run by the U.S. Department of Defence.

[69]In June 1996, GasTOPS and the DND entered into a TIES contract for a period of three years at a value of $3 million. Under this contract, GasTOPS was to provide ongoing support and further development of the ECMS system and the transitioning from ECMS v.1 to ECMS v.2. In accordance with section 4.2 of the contract, GasTOPS was to own the foreground intellectual property that it developed during the course of the contract.

[70]The draft functional specifications of ECMS v.2 were prepared by Jeff Cass during September 1996 (Exhibit 44c). At the time Jeff Cass resigned from GasTOPS and commenced employment at MxI, the actual deliverable document had not been prepared. The only copy GasTOPS had was the in-house workbook draft prepared by Jeff Cass. The draft report outlines the integration of the software program. The data from all of the programs was combined into a single integrated database and software developed or redesigned to support each of the major maintenance processes: namely, scheduled maintenance, corrective maintenance and conditional maintenance. The final software system was to be a single integrated system operating under a single database for support of the F18 aircraft. After Jeff Cass resigned from GasTOPS and was employed at MxI, he provided GasTOPS with a document containing the database design of ECMS v.2 as of June 1996.

[71]With respect to MAINSTAY, GasTOPS’ goal was to create a general purpose product

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that could be used across a wide range of market segments for condition-based maintenance. In ECMS v.2, GasTOPS was attempting to integrate a number of software programs that would support maintenance in a single integrated system operating under a single database. The new software program would include SLPS as the prognostic tool, ECMS v.1 as the parts life tracking tool, FLTS as the diagnostic tool and the ground data station was being replaced with the PC- based system known as Portable CF-18 Ground Station (“PCGS”). In addition, GasTOPS was developing EMRS. All of these programs were being integrated into a common database that would enable the program to support all components of the aircraft.

[72]GasTOPS had obtained a CRAD to assess the feasibility of applying the ECMS software product to the Sea King helicopter. GasTOPS had also begun to develop an application of ECMS for the CF5 aircraft and in particular for the General Electric J85 engine in the CF5 aircraft under a TIES contract. With respect to MAINSTAY, GasTOPS was creating a new database to integrate the database for the ECMS system into the MAINSTAY database. The functionality being developed for the CAF would also be a part of the general purpose MAINSTAY product. The expert system component of the GasTOPS technology that had been developed for the oil analysis product was integrated into MAINSTAY and into the Dofasco system.

[73]In his contribution to the 1996/97 the MSD business plan, Forsyth wrote that the ECMS and MAINSTAY products had identical database implementation for most of the areas of maintenance support. However, the database in ECMS v.2 was more advanced than the MAINSTAY design for the configuration management part of the parts life tracking. He identified that a new development requirement would be to have MAINSTAY implemented in Windows 95/NT. GasTOPS was planning on using PowerBuilder 5.0, a software development tool, to implement the next version of MAINSTAY. Forsyth wrote that a new software configuration management tool had been selected, namely MKS, and that a software trouble report system would be developed to record specific problems that were identified in the development of a large complex software system. This was necessary because of the number of individuals who would be working on the same software system on different components or

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modules. A database was required to track these problems during the development process, in order that they could be collated and their resolutions recorded.

[74]In 1996, GasTOPS was pursuing an opportunity with the U.S. Navy; an opportunity with GE to provide the ECMS product for their maintenance repair and overhaul business for aircraft engines; opportunities in Kuwait, Malaysia; and the Volvo opportunity. In addition, there were two business opportunities GasTOPS was pursuing with Bombardier, one for the structural tracking requirement for the CF-18 aircraft and a proposal to replace a maintenance management module for the Data Management System (“DMS”) with ECMS. GasTOPS was also pursuing an opportunity with B.F.Goodrich to supply ECMS as part of the product B.F.Goodrich was developing for the helicopter health and life usage monitoring and the opportunity to supply the ground support computer software for their product. In addition, GasTOPS was pursuing opportunities with its MAINSTAY product and its RCM analyst product with Petro-Canada. There was an opportunity to provide a product similar to ECMS to the Ministry of Transport. GasTOPS made a proposal to the Ministry of Transport in September 1996 for a commercial aviation opportunity. GE was being pursued as it was looking for a parts life tracking tool for all its aircraft engine repair and overhaul sites for both military and commercial aircraft engines. In the summer of 1996, GasTOPS set up the ECMS v.2 demonstration for GE at four sites for evaluation purposes. As of October 1996, GasTOPS had completed the development of each of the major components of ECMS v.2. The common database that resided under each component was fully developed. The MSD was in the final stages of integrating the various components, being the process of correcting deficiencies (“bugs”) and getting the system ready for delivery to the CAF. As of October 1996, GasTOPS owned the intellectual property, confidential information and trade secrets that were contained in the background property that was brought to the various contracts, and in particular, the general purpose objects library, which was licensed to DND for use. GasTOPS had brought to the ECMS v.2 project as background IP, major design components of the GasTOPS’ MAINSTAY product, design features such as the graphic analysis to all, sample management features of the system, the expert system featured from MAINSTAY and Lube Analyst software products, the maintenance planning and scheduling features, which had been developed in the course of the Dofasco project. In addition, GasTOPS owned the

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foreground IP under the second flight line troubleshooting development contract, which provided that the software and design, including database design, was the property of GasTOPS. All of the work under the FLTS contract was the property of GasTOPS, which included all of the preliminary design work, and the database design of ECMS v.2. Under the terms and conditions of the 1996 TIES contract, all development work done on ECMS v.2 software system from June 1996 to October 1996 was the property of GasTOPS.

III. Individual Defendants’ Roles at and Duties Owing to GasTOPS

[75]The individual defendants’ roles at GasTOPS are important in considering the duties (fiduciary and otherwise) they owed GasTOPS, including the implied period of notice they were required to give to GasTOPS upon resignation.

The Law

[76]As I describe the individual Defendants’ roles at GasTOPS in this section, I will be making findings about the fiduciary and other duties they owed to GasTOPS. To ground those findings, I will first outline the relevant legal principles.

Existence and Duration of a Fiduciary Duty

[77]All employees owe their employer a general duty of good faith and fidelity, even if they are not fiduciaries (57134 Manitoba Ltd. v. Palmer (1989), 37 B.C.L.R. (2d) 50 (C.A.) at 5). It is an implied term of every contract of employment that an employee must, at all times during the employment relationship, protect the employer’s interest. In CRC-Evans Canada Ltd. v. Pettifer, [1997] A.J. No. 20, Sanderman J. described the common law duty of an employee to an employer at para. 45:

It has long been accepted that there is a fundamental term implied in every contract of employment. The employee is expected to serve his employer honestly and faithfully during the term of his employment. This duty of fidelity permeates the entire relationship between employer and employee. It is a flexible concept that is paramount to the basic relationship. There is an implied obligation placed upon the employee to act in the best interests of his

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employer at all times. The employee shall not follow a course of action that harms or places at risk the interests of the employer.

[78]A fiduciary duty elevates this common law duty, but it is grounded in the same policy. In Canadian Aero Service Ltd. v. O’Malley, [1974] S.C.R. 592 [CanAero], Justice Laskin in reviewing the policy behind the Court’s approach to fiduciary obligation in the corporate context stated:

What these decisions indicate is an updating of the equitable principle whose roots lie in the general standards that I have already mentioned, namely, loyalty, good faith and avoidance of a conflict of duty and self-interest. Strict application against directors and senior management officials is simply recognition of the degree of control which their positions give them in corporate operations, a control which rises above day-to-day accountability to owning shareholders and which comes under some scrutiny only at annual general or at special meetings.

[79]The Courts have provided some guidelines for determining whether a fiduciary relationship exists but stopped short of defining a strict test. Instead, the courts have stated that “the categories of fiduciary, like those of negligence, should not be considered closed” (Guerin v. The Queen, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335 at 384) and that the determination of a fiduciary duty must be based on the facts of each particular case.

[80]The seminal case on fiduciary duty is the Supreme Court of Canada decision of CanAero. There it was held that for a fiduciary obligation to attach to an employee, the employee must be in a position to exert or exercise some independent power or discretion over the employer’s business. As such, fiduciary duty demands the general responsibilities of loyalty, good faith, and avoidance of a conflict of duty and self-interest. In Frame v. Smith (1987), 42 D.L.R. (4th) 81, the Supreme Court provided three defining characteristics of a fiduciary employee:

1.the fiduciary has scope for the exercise of some discretion or power;

2.the fiduciary can unilaterally exercise that power or discretion so as to affect the beneficiary’s legal or practical interests;

3.the beneficiary is peculiarly vulnerable to or at the mercy of the fiduciary holding the discretion or power.

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And according to the Supreme Court in Hodgkinson v. Simms (1994), 117 D.L.R. (4th) 161, to find a fiduciary relationship requires finding “evidence of a mutual understanding that one party has relinquished its own self-interest and agreed to act solely on behalf of the other party” (176-77).

[81]In determining whether an individual is a fiduciary, the court must look at the nature of the relationship between the parties, the job function and the responsibilities being performed, as being more determinate of the issue, than the title held by the employee. The varying degrees of trust, confidence and reliance given to the employee and the corresponding vulnerability or dependency of the employer to competition when the person leaves, are the most pertinent factors in determining whether a fiduciary duty exists.

[82]Although in most cases fiduciary duties or obligations have been limited to senior officials or management of a company, on occasion, the Courts have extended fiduciary obligations to lower level employees, including those with technical rather than administrative duties, when an individual is found to be a key employee (Wilcox v. G.W.G. Ltd. (1984), 4 C.C.E.L. 125 (Alta. Q.B.)). A key employee is one whose position and responsibilities are essential to the employer’s business, making the employer particularly vulnerable to competition upon that employee’s departure.

[83]M.E.P. Environmental Products Ltd. v. Hi Performance Coatings Co., [2006] M.J. No. 211 (M.B.Q.B.), aff’d 2007 M.B.C.A. 71 [M.E.P. Environmental], enumerates more specific indicia that can be used to determine whether a former employee could be classified as “key”:

The indicia to be considered on the issue of whether a former employee was a “key employee”, such that he or she owed a fiduciary duty to their former employer and not to solicit former employer’s customers may be summarized as follows:

i.What were the employee’s job duties with the former employer?

ii.What was the extent or frequency of the contact between the employee and the former employer’s customers and/or suppliers?

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iii.Was the employee the primary contact with the customers and (or) suppliers?

iv.To what extent was the employee responsible for sales or revenue?

v.To what extent did the employee have access to and make use of, or otherwise have knowledge of, the former employer’s customers, their accounts, the former employer’s pricing practices, and the pricing of products and services?

vi.To what extent was the former employee’s information as regards customers, suppliers, pricing, etc., confidential?

[84]After identifying an employee as “key”, further determining whether that employee is a “fiduciary” is a difficult endeavour. According to James D’Andrea, “generally, a fiduciary is one who is empowered to act on behalf of and for the benefit of another with the ability to affect that other’s interest through the use of discretion” (Employment Obligations in Canada, looseleaf (Aurora Ont.; Canada Law Book 2006))

[85]The jurisprudence has imposed fiduciary obligations on employees in a number of different factual circumstances and in so doing have considered:

(a)whether the employee has scope for the exercise of some discretion or power, the employee can unilaterally exercise that power or discretion so as to effect the beneficiary is legal or practical interest and whether the beneficiary is vulnerable to or at the mercy of the fiduciary holding the discretion or power;

(b)knowledge of customer contact information, needs and preferences, and therefore, an ability to influence customers. An employee may be held to be a fiduciary if they are found to have “encyclopedic knowledge” of their employer’s customers, unrestricted access to all customer lists and information concerning customers, privy to policy issues and personal contact with, and responsibility for, a large portion of customers: see Smyth v. UndercoverWear Ltd., [1993] O.J. No. 2180 at para. 32 citing Hudson’s Bay Company v. McClocklin, [1986] 5 W.W.R. 29;

(c)knowledge of the business and market opportunity of the employer or playing a role in the employer’s strategic market development is a consideration in determining if the employees owed a fiduciary duty to the former employer. In Scantron Corp. v. Bruce, [1996] O.J. No. 2138, Eberhard J. stated at paras. 19 and 20:

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A fiduciary duty owed by senior employees may co- exist with a contractual duty. Wallace Welding Supplies Ltd. v. Wallace (1986) 8 CPC (2d) 157 (HCJ)

This issue calls into question the degree of trust and confidence placed by Scantron Canada in Bruce. A mere employee, absent contractual protections, can take with him the knowledge and skill attained during the employment and to use it to directly compete with the former employer. It is conceded that by joining Bruce in his new enterprise, Burrows becomes bound to the same duties. Alberts v. Mountjoy, (supra). It is also true that the freedom to compete refers to skill and knowledge, not confidential information. This information could include not only the special knowledge of the target customer but also knowledge of the employer's policies and procedures making it possible to undercut the former employer with a view to inducing the customer to change from its current supplier to the former employees.

(d)knowledge of and access to confidential information. It is not necessary for an employee to have access to corporate financial information to be found to be a fiduciary. It is the employee’s access to information of which disclosure would make the employer vulnerable. In a sales environment, customer information is critical or in a technological environment, product specifications are critical. In Scanton Corp., Eberhard J. stated at paras. 21 and 22:

I am persuaded on the evidence before me that Bruce did have sufficient seniority in the corporate organization to impose upon him the duty not to unfairly compete with his former employers. I base this not on his formal status as officer and director but as the senior employee in charge of the day to day operations of the Canadian subsidiary. He may not have had access to corporate financial information but he had everything he needed to know to direct sales in Canada. He had the information that made the employer vulnerable. He knew the customer information. For a sales operation, that is obviously critical information.

I am persuaded that he was under a duty not to exploit that information unfairly to his own advantage at the expense of his former employer.

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(e)direct and trusted relationships with existing and potential customers, particularly where there is a “unique relationship with the clients personnel contacts and [the defendants] had direct access to confidential information as to the clients’ needs, preferences and accepted rates”: see Quantum Management Services Ltd. v. Hann et al., [1996] O.J. No. 5382;

(f)whether or not the employee’s functions are essential to the employer’s business, therefore rendering the employer vulnerable to the employee’s departure: see J. Thorburn and K. Fairbairn, Law of Confidential Business Information, looseleaf, (Aurora, Ontario: Canada Law Book, 1998) at 4:5200 at 4-26.

Any one of these factors, or a combination of them, could result in a finding that an individual owes a fiduciary obligation to his employer.

[86]The content of the duty is threefold. As D’Andrea notes, whether one determines the existence of a fiduciary duty through ‘vulnerability’ or through ‘dependence of beneficiaries’, courts demand fiduciaries:

1.avoid all conflict of interest;

2.act only in the best interest of the trust of beneficiary; and

3.do not profit as a result of their position.

[87]CanAero addresses whether a fiduciary duty follows a fiduciary employee after the employment has terminated. Prior to CanAero, following English common law, without an explicit contractual restriction, departing employees were allowed to directly compete with their former employers. For the most part, if post-employment conduct was not unfair in its competition, it was permitted. CanAero stands for the proposition that if an employee is a fiduciary, that employee is further held to those responsibilities post-employment. At a minimum, beyond the duties of loyalty and good faith owed by all employees to their employers, fiduciary employees are limited in their ability to compete with their former employer and a departing fiduciary cannot take advantage of a corporate opportunity that ripened during the course of his or her fiduciary employment.

[88]Although CanAero did not provide for how long fiduciary obligations should last post- employment, there have been a number of decisions that have suggested it ought to last for a

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“reasonable” period of time (see Cline v. Don Watt & Associates Communications Inc. (1986), 15 C.C.E.L. 181 (Ont. Dist. Ct.) at 206; Genesta Manufacturing Ltd. v. Babey (1984), 6 C.C.E.L. 291 at 311; Wallace Welding Supplies Ltd. v. Wallace (1986), 11 C.C.E.L. 108 (Ont. H.C.J.)).

[89]In determining what would constitute a “reasonable” temporal extension of the fiduciary duty post-employment, some cases have extrapolated from would constitute reasonable notice. There are thus two ways to consider what would constitute reasonable notice to calculate the duration of the fiduciary duty post-employment. In MacDonald v. Klein, [1998] O.J. No. 4922 (Gen. Div.), the court found that the defendant’s fiduciary duties continued for the period equal to the amount of notice the defendant should have given his former employer (see also KJA Consultants, supra). In CRC-Evans Canada Ltd. v. Pettifer (1996) 26 C.C.E.L. (2d) 294 (Alta Q.B.), aff’d 216 A.R. 192 (C.A.), the court determined the appropriate duration of fiduciary duty post-employment by considering what would constitute reasonable notice if they were terminated by the employer without cause.

Obligation to Provide Reasonable Notice

[90]Failure of an employee to provide adequate notice will entitle the employer to an award of damages. Generally, reasonable notice is meant to give the employer time to hire and train a replacement (Physique Health Club Ltd. v. Carlsen (1996), 25 C.C.E.L. (2d) 231 (Alta. C.A.) at 239; Sure-Grip Fasteners Ltd. v. Allgrade Bolt and Chain Inc. (1993), 45 C.C.E.L. 276 at p. 282 (Gen. Div.)). In determining the time required to hire and train a new employee, one must look at the nature of the employee’s position and the area of work that the employer was competing in (Sure-Grip; Tree Savers International Ltd. et al. v. Savoy et al., [1992] A.J. No. 61 (Alta. C.A.)). How long would it take the MSD to recruit, train, and familiarize new employees to the GasTOPS products and their clients? How does the simultaneous departure of 75% of the MSD’s employees affect this timeframe? These factors will contribute to what constitutes “reasonable” notice.

[91]In Sanford Evans List Brokerage v. Trauzzi, [2000] O.J. No. 1394 [Trauzzi], the fact that the defendant was able to compete unfairly as a result of failing to give proper notice was

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considered when assessing the proper period of notice. Three employees resigned from their employment, one having been in a top management position for at least 7 years (vice-president when she resigned), and created a competing company with a fourth individual. The court held that the breached the fiduciary duty owed to her former employer and fixed the other two employees with fiduciary duty as well as a result of their leaving with the vice-president and joining her in the new company. In assessing damages for breach of fiduciary duty, the Court considered the appropriate period of reasonable notice, making particular note of the effect the early departure had on the plaintiff’s ability to compete. The court found that the vice-president should have provided the employer with a minimum of 6 months notice; the employer would have been entitled to any damages flowing from her failure to give sufficient notice but had mitigated its damaged to a certain extent.

[92]The defendants state that the reasonable notice required of a departing employee is not measured as the reciprocal of that required of the employer. According to the defendants, the reasonable notice that an employee is required to give upon resignation is generally less than the employer would be required to provide to the employee upon dismissal.

[93]The defendants suggest that the notice of resignation of two weeks they provided to GasTOPS was reasonable in all of the circumstances. The defendants suggest that two weeks’ notice, is in accordance with the notice period found to be reasonable in Engineered Sound Systems Ltd. v. Klampfer, [1994] O.J. No. 867, where it was held that two weeks’ notice of resignation was reasonable in the case of a skilled technician who was solely responsible for repairing particular types of intercom systems used by the employer’s major customers and assisted sales staff in supplying and discussing customer requirement. However, Klampfer was simply a technician repairing sound equipment, while the defendants in this case were highly trained and skilled individuals. In addition, these defendants were vital to the MSD team and its customers. The defendants, as evidenced by their résumés, were vital to GasTOPS; securing the business opportunities it was pursuing and maintaining its existing customers.

[94]Forsyth and Brouse submit that GasTOPS waived its entitlement to a longer notice period when it demanded they leave its premises immediately upon rendering their resignations, which

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included two weeks’ notice. However, the notice given to GasTOPS by all of the individual defendants was insufficient and was therefore a breach of the defendants’ obligations to give reasonable notice of termination of their employment. GasTOPS attempted to persuade the defendants to either withdraw their letters of resignation or in the alternative provide more reasonable notice. In my view, GasTOPS was entitled to accept as it did the breach of the employment contract by Forsyth and Brouse and ask them to immediately leave the premises. It appears that GasTOPS probably paid Forsyth and Brouse to the end of the notice period.

Duty of Non-Competition and Duty to Disclose

[95]It is implied in all employment contracts that employees will not compete with their employer while employed. Generally, merely planning to establish a competing business does not necessarily violate the duty to not compete. The general rule does not apply where it is clear the employee planned to abuse confidential information or trade secrets in the future business.

[96]As held in Westcan, in order for a breach to have occurred, there must have been active competition on the part of the employee. Fiduciary employees are held to a high standard with respect to the duty of non-competition. In Hydro Kleen Systems Inc. v. Park, [2003] A.J. No. 1199 (Q.B.), it was held that the defendants had breached their fiduciary duty to the plaintiff because they had left to start their own competing business.

[97]Note also that fiduciary obligations can attach to a non-fiduciary employee who departs with a fiduciary for the purpose of setting up a business in competition with their former employer. In DiFlorio v. Con Structural Steel Ltd., [2000] O.J. No. 340, J. Wilson J. stated at para. 117: “In any event, the case law is clear that fiduciary obligations attach to a non-fiduciary employee who departs with a fiduciary for the purpose of setting up a competing business. I conclude, therefore, that Bertolo and Grace both stood in a fiduciary relationship to Rocca; they both had common-law fiduciary obligations to the business” [citations removed].

[98]While there is thus a fundamental duty for fiduciary employees to not compete with one’s employer post-employment, an employee who desires to branch out on his or her own must disclose those intentions. As held in Cinema Internet Networks Inc. (c.o.b. Cinemaworks) v.

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Porter, [2006] B.C.J. No. 3200 (S.C.), a fiduciary employee is required to disclose to his or her employer that planning to compete has begun. Failure to disclose such intentions to compete constitutes a breach of fiduciary duty (Restauronics Services Ltd. v. Forster, [2004] 32 C.C.E.L. (3d) 50).

[99]In conjunction with these duties not to compete and to disclose intentions to compete, the employee has a duty to not take advantage of corporate opportunities encountered in the course of employment. Fiduciaries in particular are prohibited from obtaining for personal use any opportunity or business advantage belonging to their employer without the employer’s consent or approval (CanAero).

[100]In KJA Consultants Inc. v. Soberman, [2002] O.J. No. 489 (S.C.J.), the defendant was found to be a fiduciary employee. After leaving, he had contracted with a client of his former employer. It was found that he had no designs on working for the client in question when he resigned, but the court nonetheless found that he had breached his fiduciary duty by accepting the contract because he only knew about the opportunity through his prior employment.

[101]The defendants submit that a fiduciary employee is not in breach of his duties if he

attracts customers to his new business by reason of his own qualifications and abilities. In Berkey Photo (Canada) Ltd. v. Ohlig et al., [1983] 43 O.R. (2d) 518 (H.C.J.) White J. stated:

On the other hand, upon cessation of employment an employee, including one in a top management position, may immediately go into competition with his former employer and solicit the former employer's customers so long as there is no misuse of confidential information such as trade secrets or lists of customers: 309925 Ontario Ltd. v. Tyrrell et al. (1981), 127 D.L.R. (3d) 99 (Ont. H.C.J.); DCF Systems v. Gellman, supra; Alberts v. Mountjoy, supra. A former employee, including one in a top managerial position, may make use of his skills, general knowledge and any personal goodwill acquired during the course of his employment in competing with his former employer: 309925 Ontario Ltd. v. Tyrrell, supra; DCF Systems v. Gellman, supra; Alberts v. Mountjoy, supra. It is not a theft of a corporate opportunity if a party who had an ongoing business relationship with a former employer decides to deal in the future with a former employee;

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309925 Ontario Ltd. v. Tyrrell, supra; DCF Systems v. Gellman, supra.

The defendants submit that it is not a breach of loyalty for an employee, including a fiduciary employee, to accept business from a client who offers the employee its unsolicited business. In IT/Net Inc. v. Doucette, [2005] O.J. No. 1814 (S.C.J.), Kealey J. stated at para. 23:

In conclusion, I can find no element of unfairness in anything Carl Doucette did or did not do. He did not solicit, nor did he use confidential information to re-direct the maturing RFP business opportunity from IT/NET to his new employer DMR. Our law does not require that he reject an unsolicited offer for work in these circumstances. IT/NET was more likely the author of their own misfortune by their neglect in responding to Col. Bernier's SOW, or Col. Bernier's concern as to their corporate connection which had him reengage with Mr. Doucette.

The defendants submit that they did not solicit the plaintiff’s clients after their departure. Rather, in all cases, the defendants state that they were approached by the plaintiff’s former customers and/or potential customers.

[102]The defendants claim that they did not take any advantage of business opportunities belonging to the plaintiff, which CanAero prohibits, especially where the fiduciary “is a participant in the negotiations on behalf of the company.” In CanAero, Laskin J. stated that the fiduciary duty of directors and senior officers

disqualifies a director or senior officer from usurping for himself or diverting to another person or company with whom or with which he is associated a maturing business opportunity which his company is actively pursuing; he is also precluded from so acting even after his resignation where the resignation may fairly be said to have been prompted or influenced by a wish to acquire for himself the opportunity sought by the company, or where it was his position with the company rather than a fresh initiative that led him to the opportunity which he later acquired.

The defendants submit that the plaintiff had created the corporate opportunity in CanAero through considerable effort and development, while the opportunities here were not “maturing

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opportunities” that the plaintiff was “actively pursuing” prior to the defendants’ departure.

[103]In Berkey Photo, White J. stated:

For competition by a former employee to be a breach of fiduciary duty where there is not misuse of confidential information, there must be acts committed before the cessation of employment which formed at least a part of the wrongful conduct complained of. There must also be the acquisition of a business opportunity or advantage which was available to the employer and not readily available to the employer's competition…

The defendants submit that it is not a breach of fiduciary duty if the opportunity in question is “merely an idea” that was not developed by the plaintiff employer.

[104]The defendants rely extensively on the statement of Henry J. at para. 81 of Pizza Pizza Ltd. v. Gillespie, [1990] O.J. No. 2011, in addressing GasTOPS’ misappropriation of corporate opportunities allegations:

By "ripe" I understand the case law to mean that the opportunity available to the corporation is a prize ready for immediate grasping

--not a general course of future conduct which is merely being explored as Overs was doing. Moreover, all the evidence indicates that a substantial amount of initiative was taken by Gillespie in preparation and development of the chicken business…

Note that the paragraph immediately preceding that upon which the defendants rely reads:

In particular, it is open to a former employee, including a fiduciary, to take advantage of a business opportunity where that opportunity was not mature or specific to the corporation and where the employee did not resign to pursue that opportunity; moreover, the opportunity must be "ripe". See Tyrell, supra, and Dialadex Communications Inc. v. Crammond (1987), 57 O.R. (2d) 746, 14 C.P.R. (3d) 145, 34 D.L.R. (4th) 392 (H.C.J.).

In my view, this decision does not stand for the proposition that a plaintiff must prove that it would have secured the opportunity in question. Such an obligation would clearly be inconsistent

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with the decision of Laskin J. in CanAero, when he stated:

Liability of O'Malley and Zarzycki for breach of fiduciary duty does not depend upon proof by CanAero that, but for their intervention, it would have obtained the Guyana contract; nor is it a condition of recovery of damages that CanAero establish what its profit would have been or what it has lost by failing to realize the corporate opportunity in question. It is entitled to compel the faithless fiduciaries to answer for their default according to their gain. Whether the damages awarded here be viewed as an accounting of profits or, what amounts to the same thing, as based on unjust enrichment, I would not interfere with the quantum…

In Berkey Photo, White J. interpreted CanAero to mean that “it is not a precondition to relief on a claim for damages for breach of a fiduciary's duty that the corporate employer of the fiduciary would itself have obtained or maintained the business opportunity in question” (para. 51).

[105]The maturity of the business opportunity usurped by the defendant in the present case must be examined through the lens of the particular attributes of the industry in question. The factors Laskin J. relies upon in CanAero to determine whether former employees usurped a maturing business opportunity in breach of a fiduciary duty are:

1.the position or office held by the former employee;

2.the nature of the corporate opportunity;

3.the “ripeness” of the corporate opportunity;

4.the specificity of the corporate opportunity;

5.the former employee’s involvement in the pursuit of the corporate opportunity while employed by the plaintiff employer;

6.the amount of knowledge possessed by the former employee concerning the specifics of the corporate opportunity;

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7.the circumstances in which the corporate opportunity was obtained and whether it was “special” or possibly even “private”;

8.the factor of time and the continuation of fiduciary duty where the alleged breach occurs after the termination of the relationship with the company; and

9.the circumstances under which the former employee’s relationship with the plaintiff employer was terminated, that is whether by retirement, resignation or discharge.

[106]In CanAero, the issue was not whether the business opportunity was within CanAero’s grasp but whether the knowledge held by the defendants O’Malley and Zarzycki was that the opportunity was beyond CanAero’s grasp. Laskin J. stated:

The cardinal fact is that the one project, the same project which Zarzycki had pursued for CanAero, was the subject of his Terra proposal. It was that business opportunity, in line with its general pursuits, which CanAero sought through O'Malley and Zarzycki. There is no suggestion that there had been such a change of objective as to make the project for which proposals were invited from CanAero, Terra and others a different one from that which CanAero had been developing with a view to obtaining the contract for itself.

Again, whether or not Terra was incorporated for the purpose of intercepting the contract for the Guyana project is not central to the issue of breach of fiduciary duty. Honesty of purpose is no more a defence in that respect than it would be in respect of personal interception of the contract by O'Malley and Zarzycki. This is fundamental in the enforcement of fiduciary duty where the fiduciaries are acting against the interests of their principal. Then it is urged that CanAero could not in any event have obtained the contract, and that O'Malley and Zarzycki left CanAero as an ultimate response to their dissatisfaction with that company and with the restrictions that they were under in managing it…

In addition, the plaintiff need not enjoy any exclusivity with the potential client to succeed in a

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claim for misappropriation of corporate opportunities. In CanAero, the former employer was but one of five companies invited to bid on the project in question.

[107]The defendants claim that the opportunities MxI pursued were not the same corporate opportunities pursued by GasTOPS. In CanAero, the court rejected the defendant’s submission that no misappropriation of corporate opportunity occurred where the contract won by the defendants was not based on exactly the same corporate opportunity as sought by CanAero.

[108]In my view, employees who have participated in negotiations on behalf of their employer ought to be restricted in terms of their involvement with corporate opportunities belonging to their former employer. This restriction applies regardless of whether the employees in question are the exclusive contacts for the clients with whom they negotiated on behalf of their former employer. In CanAero, the defendants were only two employees “among others” to pursue the business opportunity in question on behalf of the plaintiff. Nevertheless, they were to account for obtaining the contract for themselves after the severance of their fiduciary employment relationship with CanAero.

[109]Of course, fiduciaries are not expected to be beholden to their former employer for an indefinite period of time, but it is expected that they will maintain their fiduciary duty post- employment for a “reasonable period”. Certainly during that “reasonable period”, a fiduciary is precluded from competing directly with the former employer and from exploiting corporate opportunities developed during that employment. Further, as a point of fact, if it was found that they had planned to compete whilst employed as fiduciary employees, they certainly owed this duty of disclosure of their intention to compete: Felker v. Cunningham (2000), 191 D.L.R. (4th) 734 (Ont. C.A.).

[110]Former employees cannot compete unfairly after leaving their employment. A situation of unfairness clearly arises where the defendants failed to give reasonable notice of the termination of their employment, thereby forcing existing customers and potential customers to look to MxI rather than GasTOPS for technical advice. I have absolutely no doubt that Forsyth and Brouse were aware prior to October 7, 1996, that if they left their employment at GasTOPS,

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the overwhelming majority of the employees within that division would seek employment with their new company as opposed to staying with GasTOPS. I am sure this became more apparent when Jeff Cass and Vandenberg resigned from MSD within three days of the resignations of Forsyth and Brouse, and others followed shortly thereafter.

[111]In my view, as a result of the defendants Brouse and Forsyth knowing the likely effects of their resignations, they were under an obligation to provide GasTOPS with at least ten months’ notice to allow GasTOPS to recover from the loss of key and other employees. As a result of their failure to provide reasonable notice, the defendants are responsible for the damages resulting from that failure.

Duty of Non-Solicitation

[112]In Edgar T. Alberts v. Mountjoy (1977), 79 D.L.R. (3d) 108 [Mountjoy], the court found that Mr. Mountjoy, as a general manager or chief executive, was a fiduciary employee of the plaintiff. After leaving the plaintiff’s employ, he had a fiduciary obligation not to solicit the plaintiff’s clients. Fiduciary employees are precluded from soliciting their employer’s customers

– either while employed (Schauenberg Industries Ltd. v. Borowski (1979), 25 O.R. (2d) 737 (H.C.J.)), or after leaving employment. Fiduciaries, post-employment, are also disallowed from soliciting other employees of the former employer.

[113]In W.J. Christie & Co. v. Greer (1981), 9 Man. R. (2d) 269 (C.A.) [Christie], it was made clear that fiduciary obligations continue after termination of the employment relationship. Combined with Mountjoy, this necessarily disallows fiduciary ex-employees from directly soliciting their former employer’s customers. As pointed out in Reservoir Group Partnership v. 1304613 Ontario Ltd., [2007] O.J. No. 202 (S.C.J.), the reason for the non-solicitation duty is to protect the employer: active solicitation of clients by former fiduciary employees would erode the goodwill and reputation of the employer in question. Christie also held that a fiduciary is actually entitled to accept business from the clients of a former employer, provided they did not directly entice them away from the former employer. If the customers approached the fiduciary, mere acceptance of an invitation is not equivalent to soliciting or recruiting customers.

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[114]Two further refinements to this exception to the fiduciary duty of non-solicitation should be noted. First, it has been held that a fiduciary has not breached the non-solicitation duty unless the client in question has finalized a business arrangement with the employee in question (Atlantic Business Interiors Ltd. v. Hipson, [2004] N.S.J. No. 90 (S.C.), aff’d 38 C.C.E.L. (3d) 1 (N.S.C.A.)). Second, general advertising does not constitute solicitation. In Trauzzi, it was held that solicitation is not problematic; rather, only unfair solicitation constitutes a breach. A former fiduciary employee may notify customers of the former employer of their services if such notification is part of a broader general advertising campaign.

[115]As held in Berkey Photo (Canada) Ltd. v. Ohlig (1983), 2 C.C.E.L. 113, former fiduciary employees also cannot solicit or lure active employees of the former employer to leave and start a new venture. In the very recent Supreme Court of Canada decision of RBC Dominion Securities Inc. v. Merrill Lynch Canada, 2008 S.C.C. 54 [RBC Dominion], the majority of the court found an RBC branch manager had breached his fiduciary duty to RBC in leaving without notice to join the branch of competitor Merrill Lynch. Moreover, it was found that in leaving he had persuaded employees of RBC to leave en masse and join him at Merrill Lynch. The majority held that he had violated his contractual duty of good faith to RBC. As a manager of RBC, one of his primary duties was to retain employees. Thus, persuading them to leave with him, after he himself had left without providing reasonable notice, necessarily breached his duties to RBC.

[116]As held with the duty of non-solicitation with respect to clients, solicitation means something more than passively receiving those employees into the former fiduciary’s employ (West Telemarketing Canada, ULC v. Titley (2005), 2005 BCSC 1585). However, as with clients, it seems to me that with respect to fiduciaries, such nuanced understandings of the post- employment duty of non-solicitation, overlooks the very point of a fiduciary duty. Again, it seems impossible to reconcile the fiduciary duty with hiring or luring active employees of the former employer, regardless of whether those employees were actively solicited or passively received. Further, it seems to me that this is the point in RBC Dominion: the breach of fiduciary duty is grounded in the terms of fiduciary employment and need not be retrospectively imposed

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to be found to have occurred.

Duty to Not Misappropriate Trade Secrets or Confidential Business Information

[117]Regardless of whether an employee is characterized as fiduciary or key, he or she is barred from misappropriating the former employer’s trade secrets and/or confidential information and from using such information to compete with the former employer. This is one of the only exceptions to the general principle of an employee’s right to competition listed in Geoffrey England’s Employment Law in Canada, 4th ed., looseleaf (Aurora: Canada Law Book). What constitutes a trade secret is difficult to determine or precisely identify, however it generally pertains to the nature of the business. The English decision of Faccenda Chicken Ltd. v. Fowler,

[1986] 1 All E.R. 617 (C.A.) suggests, it is possible to identify a trade secret by reference to:

1)whether employees know the material or information in question ought to remain confidential;

2)the nature of the material itself;

3)whether the employer has emphasized the confidential nature of the material;

4)whether the material can be separated from other, non-confidential material.

[118]Geoffrey England lists these factors as weighing in favour of finding a trade secret:

(a)if the material in question affords the employer a comparative advantage such that disclosure of that information would seriously harm the firm;

(b)if the employer can prove that it has made reasonable efforts to limit access to, and dissemination of, the material within the firm;

(c)if the custom and practice of the industry is generally to regard that particular kind of information as confidential;

(d)if the material in question is not accessible to the rest of the industry;

(e)if the material in question can be categorized as “pure and applied” research such as a novel invention, technical or design specifications, technical manufacturing or construction processes, chemical formulae, secret recipes or craft secrets.

[119]Conversely, “confidential information” tends towards the more administrative aspects of a business. As held in R. v. Stewart, 1983 O.R. (2d) 225, confidential information includes lists of suppliers; lists of customers and their needs; instructions as to manufacturing processes; lists of employees and relevant employment information; and computer programs cataloguing

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the firm’s business. For information to be protected as confidential information, it must carry the indicia of secrecy and satisfy the legal test for confidentiality (Khan v. RDMI Inc., [2001] O.J. No. 233). Of particular interest here are customer lists. Generally, courts protect employees who happen to remember those lists for their own purposes post-employment but will not protect those who are found to have memorized lists for the exclusive purpose of canvassing them for personal business post-employment.

[120]The purpose of the law of trade secrets is to provide protection for information-based assets that are not publicly known by prohibiting others from using, disclosing or otherwise misappropriating the information. The terms “confidential information” and “trade secrets” are recognized in the jurisprudence as being synonymous concepts. Numerous decisions have imposed a duty of confidence on former employees, whether or not they are fiduciaries. The main principle articulated in these decisions is that trade secrets or other information obtained in confidence while in the employ of an employer is not to be disclosed or used by former employees. Any disclosure or use of such information is a breach of the duty of confidence.

[121]In CPC International Inc. v. Seaforth Creamery Inc., [1996] O.J. No. 3393 (Gen.Div.), Cumming J. stated at para. 22:

To constitute a trade secret, the information must not be of a general nature, but must be specific. The specific information must not be generally known to the public but it [may] be acquired from materials available to the public with the expenditure of time and effort. The owner of that specific information must treat it as confidential and it must be clear that the owner regards the information as secret. The information should only be communicated to an employee on a need-to-know basis and within the constraint that the owner shows his/her intention to maintain the secrecy of the information. If there is disclosure to a third party beyond the employment relationship, the owner should require of that party that there cannot be disclosure or use in any way not authorized expressly by the owner.

[122]The confidential information need not be committed to a document that is physically removed from one’s former employer. Committing information to memory is tantamount to the

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physical taking of confidential information.

[123]In Matrox Electronic Systems Ltd. v. Gaudreau, [1993] Q.J. No. 1228 (S.C.J.), Guthrie J. discussed the “springboard” principle, which prohibits an individual from using information obtained in confidence as a springboard for activities detrimental to the person who made the confidential communication and requires such an individual to be careful to use only portions of the information that are in the public domain so as not to gain an advantage over the public. He stated at para. 83:

What is really being protected in situations of this nature is the original process of mind. The protection is enforced against persons who wish to use the confidential information without spending the time, trouble and expense of going through the same process. One can reconcile the springboard principle with the overriding principle denying confidence in information in the public domain, by describing the "springboard" as a measure of the scope and duration of the obligation enforcing good faith upon an ex-employee while the rest of the world catches up.

[124]Whether or not a particular subject matter is a trade secret is a question of fact. The onus is on the plaintiff to demonstrate that the information alleged to have been misappropriated was at all material times confidential. To determine whether information has the necessary “quality of confidence”, courts have considered:

(a)The extent to which the information is known outside the business;

(b)The extent to which it is known by employees and others involved in the business;

(c)Measures taken to guard the secrecy of the information;

(d)The value of the information to the holder of the secret and to its competitors,

(e)The effort or money expended in developing the information;

(f)The ease or difficulty with which the information can be properly acquired or duplicated by others; and

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(g)Whether the holder and taker of the secret treat the information as secret.

[125]In employment-related cases, the courts also consider whether:

(a)the employer possesses a trade secret;

(b)the employee knew it was secret;

(c)the employee acquired knowledge it during his/her employment;

(d)the employee has, after termination of his/her employment, used of this knowledge improperly.

[126]In my view, the defendants were well aware at all material times that the business opportunities GasTOPS was pursuing and its proposals to potential customers was confidential business information. I am also of the view that they were subject to a fiduciary duty not to use such information directly or through MxI to compete unfairly with the plaintiff. GasTOPS spent a great deal of time and money developing products and solutions for its customers, especially as its programs were “hard coded” (designed for a particular engine and/or aircraft). There can be no doubt that the confidential business information to which the defendants were privy at GasTOPS would be extremely valuable to GasTOPS competitors. It seems to me that confidential business information of which an employee learns during his/her employment over which a duty of confidentiality applies during the employment might also be subject to a duty of confidentiality after the employee leaves his/her employment, especially vis-à-vis customers or potential customers of the former employer. The defendants owed a higher degree of confidentiality with respect to such information in dealing with GasTOPS’ customers and potential customers than in dealing with those with whom GasTOPS had formed no business relationship during the defendants’ terms of employment there.

[127]In Delrina Corp. (c.o.b. Carolian Systems) v. Triolet Systems Inc., [1993] 47 C.P.R. (3d) 1 (Ont.Gen.Div.), the defendant was an experienced computer programmer employed by the plaintiff to re-write the source code for an application program. The defendant formed his own company and created a program to compete with the plaintiff’s program, and the plaintiff alleged misappropriation of trade secrets. O’Leary J. stated:

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In my view, the evidence before me does not enable me to conclude that what has gone into the development of this suite of programmes is of so confidential a character that respondent should be restrained... I emphasize that I am not here referring to the copying of the suite of programmes. That respondent plainly cannot do. It is common cause that much work, skill and time is needed to produce a suite of programmes of this kind. If respondent were permitted simply to copy it, he would be unfairly nullifying the advantage of the "long start" over anyone else to which applicants are entitled. To that limited extent, the suite of programmes is, in my opinion, a trade secret …

O’Leary J. found that if the defendant wanted to re-write the suite from scratch, he could do so, so long as he “wipe[d] clean from the slate of his memory (as if that were possible) any recollection he may have of the things which it seemed to him were appropriate for inclusion in such a suit of programmes, or of appropriate formulae, or the like.”

[128]In Software Solutions Associates Inc. v. Depow, [1989] N.B.J. No. 419 (N.B.Q.B.), Higgins J. discussed the criteria necessary to establish that information contained in computer software can be considered a trade secret, quoting an article that concluded:

[C]omputer software that is distributed pursuant to a licence agreement containing confidentiality provisions, and that is in all other respects treated as being confidential and proprietary property of the owner, would be a trade secret. Similarly, any information related to a unique hardware design will be a trade secret, provided of course that it is treated as such by the owner.

The information sought to be protected must be specific in nature.

[129]As with trade secrets, the facts of each particular case are crucial in determining whether a breach of confidence has occurred. The subject of an employee’s duties with respect to confidential information obtained in the course of employment was considered Chevron Standard Ltd. v. Home Oil Co., [1980] A.J. No. 656, aff’d [1982] A.J. No. 744 (C.A.), wherein Moore J. considered at para. 110 “the nature of the information, the employees' relation to it, the amount of knowledge possessed and the circumstances in which it was obtained and when it was obtained” as some of the factors to be considered. Moore J. also held that there is an onus on the

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plaintiff to establish that the information was confidential and that it was used to the plaintiff’s disadvantage.

[130]The facts in Clayburn Industries Ltd. v. Piper, [1998] B.C.J. No. 2831 (B.C.S.C.), are very similar to the facts of this case:

The information which was available to Messrs. Schoen and Piper was variously described. It included key contacts at various customers: who actually made the decision within an organization, who could agree by a "hand shake" and who had "constraints" on business decision making. It also included what products had previously been installed at a customer (how those products performed, what was and was not preferred by the customer), what workers from the union hall were good and what workers weren't (who should be "name-hired" and who had been found by which customers to be good or bad), the budget a client might have for repair or new construction in the upcoming year, the projects likely to require bids and those that would not be bid, what were the product costs of the plaintiffs, what were the standard markups of the plaintiffs for both product and labour costs, and technical information about the products of the plaintiff (productivity rates, installation practices and procedures, safety standards and practices).

After reviewing all of the evidence, I am satisfied that the plaintiffs have not shown that any lists were actually taken by Messrs. Schoen and Piper when they left the employ of the plaintiffs. As well, it is clear that some of the information that they took with them included information which would generally be available to anyone who made diligent inquiry.

However, I am satisfied that much of the information they knew as a result of their employment with the plaintiffs was of a confidential nature and that, in accordance with the decisions dealing with these matters, neither was in a position to use such confidential information. I find that Messrs. Schoen and Piper used the following confidential information improperly after they left the employ of the plaintiffs… (paras. 32-34)

[131]The defendants submit that in order to be capable of protection, the trade secret must be information that is defined with some degree of precision. In other words, it must be

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identified by the plaintiff with sufficient specificity.

[132]A breach of confidence will be established where: (1) the information has the necessary quality of confidence; (2) the information was communicated in circumstances giving rise to an obligation of confidence; and (3) there is an unauthorized use of the information to the detriment of the party communicating it. (See Lac Minerals Ltd. v. International Corona Resources Ltd., [1989] S.C.J. No. 83, at para. 129.)

[133]The courts have used a “reasonable person” test to determine whether information embodies the necessary quality of confidence. The courts examine whether a person, acting reasonably, should have expected the information to be confidential: if the person should have realized that the information was to be maintained in privacy, there will be an implied obligation to maintain it in confidence. In Coco v. A.N. Clark (Engineers) Ltd., [1969] R.P.C. 41, Megarry J. stated at 48:

It seems to me that if the circumstances are such that any reasonable man standing in the shoes of the recipient of the information would have realised that upon reasonable grounds the information was being given to him in confidence, then this should suffice to impose upon his the equitable obligation of confidence. In particular, where information of commercial or industrial value is given on a business-like basis and with some avowed common object in mind, such as a joint venture ... I would regard the recipient as carrying a heavy burden if he seeks to repel a contention that he was bound by an obligation of confidence.

The fact that an employer did not tell its employee that information was confidential is not determinative. The test is whether a reasonable person standing in the shoes of the recipient of the information would have realized that the information was being given in confidence.

[134]In Matrox Electronic Systems Ltd. v. Gaudreau, supra, the court acknowledged the difficulty of proving misuse of confidential business information through direct evidence in some cases. Guthrie J. stated at para. 94:

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In cases involving confidential business information, misuse can rarely be proved by convincing direct evidence. In most cases, employers must construct a web of perhaps ambiguous circumstantial evidence from which the Court may draw inferences which convinced it that it is more probable than not that what employers alleged happened did in fact take place. Against this often delicate construct of circumstantial evidence, there frequently must be balanced the testimony of the employees and their witnesses who directly deny everything.

[135]In Computer Workshops Ltd. v. Banner Capital Market Brokers Ltd., [1988] O.J. No. 223 (H.C.), the court recognized that computer software, including components, methodologies, designs, specifications, schematics and knowledge of the trial and error process employed creating it falls within the ambit of trade secrets and confidential information. The court held that a trade secret can exist in a product even where all the components thereof are in the public domain on the grounds that a trade secret can exist in the original combination or characteristics of components or in the unique design of the product as a whole.

[136]Customer information has also been held to be confidential information in need of protection by the court, as it is valuable and forms part of the good will of the employer and was developed over time at the employer’s expense. A former employee who had access to such information and used it after leaving the employer could seriously injure the employer’s business by springboarding to activities detrimental to the former employer.

[137]In Metaphore Corp. v. Protek Systems (London) Inc., [2000] O.J. No. 4975, I stated at

paras. 8-9:

Given that Metafore has designed unique systems for its clients and is aware of the needs of these clients, Protek, with former Metafore employees, is a threat to Metafore's business. A new company entering this specialized field would not pose such a threat. It is the confidential information that Metafore has about its clients that is so valuable.

Protek with former employees of Metafore can compete for the business of Metafore clients on the basis that a shift from Metafore to Protek will be seamless as the same employees will be servicing

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the client and making recommendations on improving their systems.

[138]Confidential business information may include customers’ names, contact persons for customers or potential customers, customers’ or potential customers’ needs and preferences, the rates the business (employer) proposes to charge the customer and the price that the customer is prepared to pay or is paying. A particular document containing the information need not have been removed from the employer to find that confidential information has been misappropriated. (See Trauzzi at paras. 62-63.)

[139]In addition to the special knowledge of the target and actual customers of the employer, the knowledge of the employer’s policies, procedures and selling strategies in relation to their customers can constitute confidential information, as it makes it possible to undercut the former employer and to promise a seamless transfer of business to induce the customer to move its business to a new supplier. In Scantron Corp., Eberhard J. stated at para. 20 that the freedom to compete refers to skill and knowledge rather than confidential information, because “This information could include not only the special knowledge of the target customer but also knowledge of the employer's policies and procedures making it possible to undercut the former employer with a view to inducing the customer to change from its current supplier to the former employees.”

[140]Former employees may be liable to their former employer for wrongful appropriation of corporate opportunities based on misuse of confidential information. In Omega Digital Data Inc. v. Airos Technology Inc., [1996] O.J. No. 5382, the individual defendants held senior positions at the plaintiff employer and were, together, intimately familiar with virtually all aspects of its business. While employed by the plaintiff, they were involved in negotiations with a potential distributor of the employer’s product that did not succeed; within days of leaving the employers, they were engaged in similar discussions on their own. Sharpe J. noted at para. 30 that the following factors would be relevant in considering whether or not the defendants wrongly appropriated the plaintiff’s corporate opportunity: “the pursuit by the defendants of precisely the same market niche [and] the evidence of approach to the same customers and of

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deals and arrangements with co-venturers actual or proposed of the plaintiff.”

Fiduciary Duty not to Usurp a Business Opportunity

[141]Following CanAero, Ewaschuk J. stated in Quantum Management at paras. 41-42:

Following the fusion of law and equity, the common law developed exceptions that favoured employers as opposed to employees. These exceptions are founded on the equitable concept of fairness and place fiduciary duties on departing employees not to compete with their former employers in prescribed circumstances. The first notable exception lies in the area of trade connections. The former employee may not solicit any customer whose name is contained on a list which the employee has taken from the employer: Canada Bonded Attorney and Legal Directory Ltd. v. Leonard-Parmiter Ltd. (1918), 42 O.L.R. 141 at p. 157, 42 D.L.R. 342 (C.A.).

The second notable exception lies in the area of "top management" or senior employees as opposed to mere employees. The law imposes a fiduciary duty on senior employees not to take advantage of economic [opportunities] that they become aware of by reason of their employment with their former employer: Canadian Aero Service Ltd. v. O'Malley (1973), 40 D.L.R. (3d) 371, 11 C.P.R. (2d) 206, [1974] S.C.R. 592.

[142]Accordingly, the fiduciary obligation not to usurp a corporate opportunity exists separate and distinct from the fiduciary obligation not to solicit. Ewaschuk J. found the defendants were senior employees and stated that they had “a duty not to solicit or deal with former customers of Quantum with whom they had had exclusive placement rights within a reasonable time before quitting Quantum's employ” (para. 48).

[143]In KJA Consultants Inc. v. Soberman, [2003] O.J. No. 3175, the employer brought an action against the defendant for breach of fiduciary duty. The defendant had resigned from his position as general manager with the employer. Immediately thereafter the defendant started his own business in competition with his former employer. Part of the defendant’s marketing campaign included sending letters about his new business to many of his former employer’s clients. He also, at the request of a particular client, took on the most significant contract that his

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former employer had at the time of his departure. Sachs J. in describing the issue before the court stated at para. 33:

This case raises the following issues:

(i)Did Mr. Soberman breach the fiduciary duties he owed to KJA when he took over the GWL/Commerce Court elevator modernization project?

(ii)Did Mr. Soberman breach the fiduciary duties he owed to KJA when he wrote to KJA's clients in the fall of 2001?

(iii)If the answer to either or both of the first two questions is "yes", what damages flowed from those breaches?

[144]While employed with the plaintiff, Soberman had worked on a large project for which he had prepared a Request for Proposal, submitted a proposal and, after the proposal was accepted, had been in charge of the work being done under the contract. At the time of Soberman’s departure, the plaintiff had built approximately 30% of the quoted contract price. After Soberman’s departure, the client contacted Soberman at his home and asked him if he would be interested in making a proposal to complete the contract. Soberman submitted a proposal for the exact amount left on the contract price quoted by the plaintiff, which the client accepted. In her judgment, Sachs J. held that the elevator project was not a “maturing business opportunity”. The contract had been finalized and was in the midst of being completed. There was no evidence that Soberman had resigned because of a desire to acquire the contract for himself. Furthermore, Soberman did not approach the client with a view to diverting the corporate opportunity from the plaintiff to himself.

[145]Sachs J. stated at paras. 40-42:

The question is whether it was Mr. Soberman's "position with the company or a fresh business initiative that led him to the opportunity which he later acquired." (Canadian Aero Space, supra, at 382). This question is complicated by the fact that KJA's business is a personal service business. As such, as with lawyers and accountants, personal relationships can figure largely in client decisions about who to retain for their business. In this case, the

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decision to switch the contract was a client decision based on Mr. Ramsay's knowledge of Mr. Soberman and, more particularly, according to Mr. Ramsay, on Mr. Soberman's familiarity with the contract in question.

It is precisely this aspect of Mr. Ramsay's decision that, in my view, made Mr. Soberman's acceptance of the contract a breach of his fiduciary duties. Mr. Soberman was only as familiar as he was with the terms of the contract, and the needs of the client, because of the work that he had done in negotiating, securing and performing the contract on behalf of KJA. Without that knowledge, knowledge that Mr. Soberman acquired because of his position with KJA, Mr. Ramsay would never have retained Mr. Soberman. That knowledge included not only pricing, but also complete details as to the services that KJA had promised to perform when it originally won the contract, and complete details as to the methods that KJA had and would continue to use in performing the contract.

Furthermore, Mr. Ramsay testified that if Mr. Soberman had not agreed to take over the contract, he would have stayed with KJA …

[146]Accordingly, there is a close link between misappropriation of a corporate opportunity and a breach of confidence claim. Where a fiduciary gains specific knowledge of the particulars of a corporate opportunity, regardless of whether it is ripening or fully ripe, he or she cannot use that knowledge to take the opportunity away from his/her former employer even if there is no active solicitation by the former employee.

[147]In Frame, where Wilson J., in determining whether a fiduciary relationship existed, stated at para. 60:

Relationships in which a fiduciary obligation have been imposed seem to possess three general characteristics:

(1)The fiduciary has scope for the exercise of some discretion or power.

(2)The fiduciary can unilaterally exercise that power or discretion so as to affect the beneficiary's legal or practical interests.

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(3)The beneficiary is peculiarly vulnerable to or at the mercy of the fiduciary holding the discretion or power.

[148]In the context of employment relationships, fiduciary duties are owed only by those employees who are empowered to unilaterally affect an employer’s legal and business interest. Holding this sort of responsibility gives the employee in “the kind of authority typically found in a relationship of dependency or vulnerability,” and it is this sort of relationship “in which equity will intervene to protect the dependant or vulnerable party by acting on the conscience of the fiduciary”: Anderson, Smyth and Kelly Customs Brokers Ltd. v. World Wide Customs Brokers Ltd., [1996] A.J. No. 475 (Alta. C.A.) at para. 20.

[149]Further, in order for liability to attach to a fiduciary, his power, be it legal or practical, must have been the actual cause of acquiring the benefit. In Scott v. Trophy Foods Inc., [1995] N.S.J. No. 145 (N.S. C.A.), Hallett J.A. stated at para. 60, speaking for the court:

After pointing out how difficult it is to find a definition of a fiduciary he states that the most he would venture as a description is as follows:

"A person will be a fiduciary in his relationship with another when and insofar as that other is entitled to expect that he will act in that other's or in their joint interest to the exclusion of his own several interests."

The concern that is met by imposing fiduciary obligations is that the fiduciary has a discretion or power that can affect the employer’s legal or practical interest. However, the one feature which is considered to be indispensable to the existence of the relationship is that of dependency or vulnerability.

[150]In general, courts have applied a restrictive approach to imposing fiduciary duties as such duties are recognized as onerous and exacting duties which the courts are reluctant to impose on employees other than those with extraordinary power and discretion to affect the affairs of the employer.

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[151]The defendants submit that the fact that the majority of the MSD employees resigned within a short period of time does not in itself imbue the employees with a fiduciary duty to their employer.

[152]The defendants submit that RBC Dominion Securities Inc. v. Merrill Lynch Canada Inc. stands for the proposition that the determination of whether a fiduciary duty exists requires an assessment of the employment relationship “during its currency” and not based upon the circumstances of the defendants’ departure. Holmes J. stated at para. 44:

to the extent that the finding of a fiduciary relationship rested on the circumstances of the defendant's departure, it appears to be inconsistent with authorities such as Barton, supra, which assess the character of the employment relationship during its currency.

[153]In my view, it is erroneous to say that the circumstances surrounding an employee’s departure are irrelevant to the determination of whether a fiduciary duty exists. I must consider whether the employer is particularly vulnerable to or at the mercy of the fiduciary. When an employee resigns without proper notice and immediately begins to work longstanding relationships that had been developed with customers through that employee’s previous employment, that conduct can be considered as evidence relating to a breach of a fiduciary duty.

[154]In Alberts et al. v. Mountjoy et al., [1977] O.J. No. 2334 (H.C.J.) the court recognized that a corporation’s relationship with its clients was an asset which entitled an employer to protection from post-employment competition. Estey C.J.H.C. stated at para. 29:

Thus, the substantial business asset of the plaintiff, namely, its trade attachment with its clients, is a vulnerable asset exposed to the depredations of competition in all forms and particularly competition from ex-employees. Accordingly, it is not surprising to find a fiduciary duty arising in former employees for the protection of the undertaking of the former employer.

[155]The defendants suggest that fiduciary duties in an employment relationship will only be imposed in cases where the employer experiences “extraordinary vulnerability” at the hands of its employee. In my view, there is simply no concept at law of extraordinary vulnerability. In

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Frame v. Smith, supra, and other related decisions speak of the beneficiary being “peculiarly vulnerable” to or at the mercy of the fiduciary. The phrase “particularly vulnerable” suggests that the beneficiary is uniquely vulnerable to damages if the fiduciary was to breach the duties owed to the beneficiary.

[156]In this case Forsyth, Brouse, Jeff Cass and Vandenberg were “key employees” and as a result of their responsibilities and information that they had access to, owed a fiduciary duty to GasTOPS to provide reasonable notice of their intention to resign and not to misuse confidential information which was proprietary to GasTOPS. In my view, all of the personal defendants breached the fiduciary duties they owed to GasTOPS and as a result competed unfairly with GasTOPS. In addition the personal defendants allowed MxI to compete unfairly with GasTOPS by making GasTOPS’ trade secrets and confidential business information available to MxI.

Status for Bringing Action re: Misuse of Trade Secrets

[157]To succeed in an action for misuse of trade secrets, a plaintiff must establish on a balance of probabilities that it has the sole right to benefit from the use of the information, that the defendant wrongly appropriated the information (committed a breach of confidence) and that it suffered damages as a result of the breach. (See Thorburn and Fairbairn at §5:1000.)

[158]While Canadian jurisprudence has not been entirely consistent whether jurisdiction to protect confidential business information is based on property or on an equitable right, the most common basis for awarding a remedy for breach of confidential business information appears to be in equity. In R. v. Stewart, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 963, Lamer J. stated at para. 24:

It appears that the protection afforded to confidential information in most civil cases arises more from an obligation of good faith or a fiduciary relationship than from a proprietary interest. No Canadian court has so far conclusively decided that confidential information is property, with all the civil consequences that such a finding would entail …

The Defendants’ Roles at GasTOPS

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Résumés and Performance Reviews

[159]In addition to the viva voce evidence of the witnesses at trial, the defendants’ performance reviews from GasTOPS and the résumés they created after they resigned are most helpful in answering these questions. The defendants suggested that little, if any, weight should be attributed to these documents in determining their role while employed at GasTOPS as the résumés were created to market MxI to companies in November 1996. The “list of accomplishments” contained in the performance review were created by the defendants when employed at GasTOPS as part of the annual salary review process. Notwithstanding that these documents in some cases were signed by the defendants and, if not, were prepared by the defendants, the defendants take the position that it was reasonable for them in their résumés (prepared at MxI) and/or performance reviews to have “embellished” or to have “overstated” the roles that they fulfilled while employed at GasTOPS. In making such an argument, the defendants are admitting to outright fabrications or lies in their résumé regarding their previous employment at GasTOPS and in their performance reviews.

[160]For the purposes of salary increases and expertise, the defendants were asking others to rely upon the veracity of these statements whereas for the purposes of this trial, they are suggesting that I should not rely upon these statements. In general terms, as far as the named personal defendants are concerned, I prefer the facts contained in these documents which were prepared independently of this lawsuit as opposed to their viva voce evidence where it conflicts with the statements in their résumés and/or performance reviews. Throughout the trial and more particularly within the evidence of Forsyth and Brouse, there emerged a common theme that there was nothing improper in being untruthful in statements which were made to prospective clients. Brouse’s contradicted his own written reports or memos numerous times and in one case even suggested that he had lied to his business partners when he was employed at MxI.

[161]In my view, the defendants wanted MxI’s prospective customers to accept as truthful the statements made in their résumé and wanted me to accept that they lied in their résumés but were telling the truth at this trial. There can be no doubt that the defendants, even on their own evidence, wanted third party purchasers to accept the statements made in their résumés as

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truthful and accurate. I am sure the defendants would have confirmed the accuracy of their résumé to potential customers and, in fact, the evidence indicates that they did in proposals made to potential customers repeat in essence the statements made in their résumés. The résumés were prepared by the individual defendants and were not the product of some other party who might be blamed for the overstatements or inaccuracies. Muir and MacIsaac’s evidence, which I accept, corroborates the accuracy of the statements in the résumés of the personal defendants. I simply reject such an argument and the fact that the defendants would make such an argument while under oath at this trial reflects badly upon their credibility. I accept the written description of their job responsibilities as set out in their résumés as accurate and reject their attempts to distance themselves from such statements.

[162]Mr. Muir described the manner in which Forsyth and Brouse interacted with him in fulfilling their job responsibilities:

A.In the summer of 1995, and every summer was we did our business planning, we would deal with the issues associated with the management or planning of the business, one of which I mentioned was Human Resources and the organization of staff within the company and the divisions and the assignment of management responsibilities. So in the summer of 1995 we had discussions leading up to the formalization of the business plan about a change in the management structure, not just of my division, but of the company. And Forsyth, Brouse and Tobin were a part of the discussions leading up to the change in the management structure. So they were participants, in other words, in the development of a new management structure.

The structure itself is formalized at the time the business plan is formalized and at that point it's announced to the entire company and the president would do that in a meeting held in September shortly after the board of directors approves the new business plan for the year. So there is a formal announcement of the new management structure, as well, I met one-on-one with each of the individuals throughout the summer and as the new structure was formalized to formalize their new management duties.

Q.At that time was there any discussion or agreement as to how you would interact with the three program managers on an

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ongoing basis?

A.Yes. We had -- when I say “we" I'm talking about myself, Tobin, Brouse and Forsyth, -- we had been meeting regularly as a management team throughout that period, from 1991 to ‘95. Nominally we met once a month, although it was not uncommon for us to miss the odd month for scheduling reasons. The managers submitted to me, again regularly but not every month, monthly reports on the status of their management responsibilities. And we had a monthly reporting process in place.

In 1995, when we created the programs and moved the decentralized management concept down to the program management level, we instituted within my division a quarterly reporting process, in particular Brouse and Forsyth, who were business managers, reported quarterly to me throughout the 95-96 business year as to the progress of their business unit in terms its financial performance primarily, against the business plan -- the business plan that had been set out at the beginning of the year. So we had a formal quarterly reporting process set up whereby they would report to me their progress against the plan and objectives set out for the year.

At our monthly meetings that we held, almost every month, we would discuss all of the issues related to the management of the division, whether it be a market development issue, the acquisition of new customers, Human Resources issues such as employees that perhaps were having problems, perhaps employees that had done an outstanding job and we wanted to recognize them, product development was central to almost all of our meetings, we were attempting to share requirements from the marketplace and Forsyth was putting those together in the form of a product development plan and activity that we called “Mainstay".

So we held regular management meetings, had monthly reporting and in the final year, quarterly reporting against the business plan for the year.

[163]I have no doubt that Muir’s assessment of the positions occupied by Forsyth and Brouse is accurate and correct and that in 1995 there was, within the MSD, a decentralization of management down to the program management level and that Forsyth and Brouse were responsible for managing all aspects of business development within their units.

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Forsyth

[164]At the time of his resignation on October 6, 1996, Forsyth was a program manager within the MSD of GasTOPS. He had been promoted to positions of increased responsibility over the nine-year period since he was hired in June of 1987. At the time of his resignation, Forsyth headed up the industrial systems group within GasTOPS’ MSD.

[165]In the résumé Forsyth prepared during the fall of 1996, after he had resigned from GasTOPS and was the president and CEO of MxI Technologies Ltd., he stated that from June 1994 to October 1996, he was “Responsible for the establishment and management of the Industrial Program within the Maintenance Systems Division of GasTOPS”, which required him to manage the Program by conducting “business development including marketing and sales of engineering services and products; revenue, profit and labour forecasts; account and contract management; Oracle business alliance management; customer liaison and management; human resource management.” He also stated that as Manager of Product Development between June 1991 and October 1995, he “Managed all research and development work undertaken by the Maintenance Systems Division with responsibilities for overall technical, management, budgetary and administrative duties”; “Established product development methodologies, procedures and tools including: requirements definition, data modeling, Graphic User Interface (GUI) design, object oriented programming, software configuration control, automated software testing, delivery preparation and Software Trouble Report (STR) tracking procedures”; and “Managed the development of” FLTS, MAINSTAY, an Integrated Diagnostic and Maintenance System (“IDMS”), Lube Analyst, ECMS and RCM Analyst. Forsyth also detailed his roles at GasTOPS between 1987-1991 in this résumé

[166]On June 20, 1996, Muir asked Forsyth, Tobin and Brouse to summarize their accomplishments for the past year and their objectives for the next 6-12 months. In response to Muir’s request, Forsyth sent him a written summary of his accomplishments (Exhibit 298), and Muir and Forsyth subsequently met on June 27 and 28 to review Forsyth’s performance over the past year for the purpose of adjusting his salary. On July 2, 1996, Muir made notes of his conversation with Forsyth, who believed his was contributing significantly more than his peers.

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Muir’s note states:

Appears to be based on the notion that he is the “creator” of our CBM software product for which the company presently derives a large portion of its business. Moreover, Brad feels that he has been instrumental in “selling” our CBM software to key clients such as the Canadian Air Force, for which other people have received the credit (i.e. Doug B.).

[167]It is clear that Forsyth played a key role in managing and directing the business activities of the industrial program of GasTOPS’ MSD. Forsyth was primarily responsible for the business development activities within the industrial system business unit, including marketing and sales of engineering services and products. On the financial side, Forsyth was responsible for budgeting and contract management. Given that the industrial system business unit accounted for 23% of the annual revenues of GasTOPS, the manner in which Forsyth was able to fulfill his job responsibilities had a great impact on the company’s financial success. In a similar fashion, having managerial responsibilities for customer liaison, it is clear that Forsyth was primarily responsible for ensuring that GasTOPS’ customers’ needs and requirements were properly met. Forsyth, as shown in Exhibit 3, had managerial responsibilities over 14 employees at GasTOPS. He was directly involved in the annual business plan development process, as well as making key recommendations with respect to software development technologies, software requirements, and corporate opportunities. In August 1995, Forsyth presented to Muir his technology contribution to the MSD’s 1995/1996 business plan. In that plan, Forsyth identified how the product development effort should proceed and a strategy for the development of the MSD’s family of products. Many of these strategies were, in fact, followed by GasTOPS.

[168]In the summer of 1996 Forsyth submitted a technology plan to Muir (Exhibit 9) to assist Muir in preparing the MSD’s 1996/97 business plan. Muir adopted many of Forsyth’s suggestions.

[169]Accordingly, in my view, Forsyth was a key employee of GasTOPS who owed a fiduciary duty to GasTOPS while employed at GasTOPS and after he resigned from GasTOPS. Given Forsyth’s knowledge of GasTOPS’ products and their design and business opportunities,

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it would have been impossible to replace him in two weeks.

Brouse

[170]At the time Brouse resigned from GasTOPS, he was the program manager of the Aero Systems Group within the MSD, having been promoted to positions of increased responsibility over the 10-year period since he was hired at GasTOPS. In the résumé he prepared after resigning from GasTOPS, Brouse described his responsibilities at GasTOPS Ltd. (Exhibit 1959) from June 1991 to October 1996 as Program Manager of the Aerospace Business Unit as follows: “Responsible for the over-all business management of the Aerospace Program within GasTOPS; this business unit was the largest program within GasTOPS and generated 33% of the annual revenue for the company.” Brouse described his responsibilities as “business development including marketing and sales of engineering services and products; revenue and profit forecasts; account and contract management; subcontract management; VAR and channel liaison and management; customer liaison and management; human resource management (including recruiting) of a staff of 7 engineers and 2 technicians.” He also stated that he “Expanded the revenue of the business unit from $300K/year (1991) to $2500K/year (1995) (i.e. 53% annual growth) and developed, implemented and supported (under contract from the Crown)” ECMS, PCGS, FLTS and EMRS. Also included in this résumé are descriptions of Brouse’s various roles at GasTOPS between 1986 and 1991.

[171]At trial, Brouse sought to downplay his roles and responsibilities at GasTOPS by testifying that he had “stretched the truth” or “fudged” his résumé. Many times throughout his evidence Brouse said that he had “stretched the truth” or used a similar phrase in an attempt to distance himself or to take a position different from what he had written in documents, memos, or e-mails. I find that in all such cases, Brouse, was repudiating these written documents in order to better the position of MxI and/or himself in this action. In his evidence concerning his résumé, Brouse stated:

Q.If we go down on the first page on Exhibit 1959, under "GasTOPS limited, you be June of 1991 to October of 1996" but you say you're responsible for the overall business management of

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the aerospace program within GasTOPS; the activities include business development, including marketing and sales, of engineering service and its products. Do you see that, Mr. Brouse?

A.Yes.

Q.And again, you're making a point there to make a distinction between marketing and sales; correct? That's the net the effect of it; correct?

A.I'm identifying marketing and sales as two separate words,

yes.

Q.And when you speak of engineering services and products, the engineering products would obviously include the GasTOPS ECMS product, correct?

A.Yes.

Q.And so it is a fact, is it not, Mr. Brouse, that while employed at GasTOPS, you were responsible in part for the marketing and sales of ECMS product?

A.Well, as I said in-chief, what I was responsible for was supporting the sales effort and supporting marketing effort of the ECMS; for the most part I was doing two things: I was demonstrating the system and fielding technical questions on behalf GasTOPS and B. F. Goodrich, as well as helping prepare statements of work and definition of what we could do for the United States Navy.

Q.Mr. Brouse, your resume doesn't say support of marketing sales efforts, does it?

A.No, it does not.

Q.And as you indicated before, you wouldn't embellish a resume, would you?

A.Oh, I don't think I said that.

Q.I'm asking the question?

A.Would I embellish my resume? I would fudge a resume,

yes.

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Q.Just that we know we're somewhat developing a list of descriptors, Mr. Brouse. Is "fudge" the same as "stretching the truth"?

A.It is.

Q.Or is it making a misstatement?

A.I'd say it's stretching the truth.

[172]The key role Brouse played in business development and marketing, set out in his résumé, is confirmed through an analysis of the performance reviews he received while employed at GasTOPS dating back to the year 1995. Muir recognized the role played by Brouse in his performance review stating that GasTOPS’ relationship with the Director of Fighter Trainer Engineering and Maintenance (“DFTEM”) was at an “all time high and Doug continues to do an excellent job of maintaining and building this relationship”, that “Doug has assumed overall management and responsibility” for GasTOPS’ CAF Support work and also of supervision of another employee in relation to this work, and that “Doug’s responsiveness for CAF Marketing Initiatives has been, on the whole, very good… I see an extension of Doug’s present role directly working with Gary to develop specific opportunities” (Exhibit 298).

[173]In a subsequent review dated June 1995 (Exhibit 299), Muir assessed Brouse as follows: “Doug has excelled in the business development aspects of his responsibilities. He has established excellent relationships with both the customer (DFTEM) and DSS and has used these to good advantage. He is focused, aggressive and persistent in the pursuit of specific business opportunities.” Therein, Muir also stated that

In the past year Doug has completed most of his planned objectives including:

Successful implementation of the ECMS.

Planning, preparation, negotiation and acquisition of a series of TIES taskings in support of the ECMS and its related development activities.

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Acquisition of the DIGS contract and successful execution of phase I of this contract.

This review was written by Muir and reviewed by Brouse, who signed it.

[174]In 1996, Brouse prepared and submitted to Muir a summary of his accomplishments at GasTOPS (Exhibit 300), which confirms the key role he played in GasTOPS’ Aerospace business unit. Brouse wrote that he “continued the growth of the Aero programme such that it represents 35% of the revenue and 37% of the margin produced by the seven strategic business groups of the company. This has been achieved while maintaining a thin utilization of the overhead categories with respect to Proposals, Business Development and Marketing.” He further details his roles with respect to some of GasTOPS’ products, human resource management, and relationships with other divisions within GasTOPS.

[175]It is clear that Brouse was primarily responsible for the continued growth of the Aero Program, the number one revenue generator within GasTOPS. It is also clear that Brouse was involved in the marketing, negotiation and execution of contracts on behalf of GasTOPS. He played a key role in GasTOPS’ marketing effort to the United States Navy and in establishing a solid working relationship with GasTOPS partner, B.F.Goodrich. Muir confirmed that when Brouse became program manager, he assumed lead responsibility for business opportunities such as the United States Navy and Volvo. Muir testified as follows:

Q.And is this the same Lemoore meeting that you had given testimony on previously, again to the Navy opportunity?

A.Yes. This was the Navy -- the meeting, sorry, that Brouse attended on behalf of GasTops. At this point Brouse is the program manager for our Aero program of my division and he has taken over lead responsibility on business opportunities such as the Navy as well as Volvo, at this point, would have been his opportunity.

[176]Brouse’s job responsibilities were essential to GasTOPS’ business operation. In addition, the manner in which Brouse carried out his responsibilities had a substantial impact on GasTOPS’ profitability.

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[177]I have no doubt that Brouse was directly involved in GasTOPS’ technology and product development. Brouse was intimately involved in various corporate opportunities being pursued by GasTOPS, and as a result he was familiar with the evolving needs of the aviation maintenance software marketplace. For example, through his direct involvement in GasTOPS’ pursuit of the GE/Oracle opportunities, Brouse, with the assistance of Jeff Cass, was able to identify the “gaps” between the existing state of the MSD technologies and that being sought by the customer. GasTOPS relied heavily on Brouse’s judgment and loyalty to it to ensure the success of the Aero Program within the MSD.

[178]As a result of his business management role within the Aero Program, Brouse had virtually complete knowledge of the internal workings of the MSD, its design and the capabilities its products, its marketing strategies (both through his contribution to GasTOPS’ business plan and through discussions with Muir), and the needs of the its customers and prospective customers. Brouse was primarily responsible for developing and nurturing relationships associated with the sales and service contracts pursued by GasTOPS.

[179]Muir met with Brouse in July 1996 for the preparation of the MSD’s 1996/1997 business plan. Muir reviewed with him the detailed marketing penetration strategy diagram which depicted a proposed “road map” for future sales of the GasTOPS products. Muir would not have shared such sensitive and valuable information with a “mere” employee, but chose to share it with an individual he considered to be a key member of GasTOPS’ senior management team whom he expected would use this information to direct the future growth of the MSD.

[180]In 1993, Muir authorized Forsyth and Brouse to sign contracts on GasTOPS’ behalf. On December 19, 1994, Brouse signed a contract amendment from the Canadian Government on GasTOPS’ behalf. On September 30, 1994 Forsyth signed on GasTOPS’ behalf a proposal that was submitted to the Canadian Government.

[181]In my view, Brouse was a key employee of GasTOPS who owed a fiduciary duty to GasTOPS while employed by GasTOPS and after he resigned from GasTOPS. Due to his intimate knowledge of GasTOPS’ technologies, marketing strategies and business opportunities,

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it would have been almost impossible for GasTOPS to have replaced him in two weeks.

Jeff Cass

[182]As early as 1994, Jeff Cass was GasTOPS’ chief software developer and he was considered the key product development person from a technical standpoint.

[183]At the time of his resignation from GasTOPS in October 1996, Jeff Cass was a member of the GasTOPS’ development team, holding the position of MAINSTAY design group leader. Jeff Cass had been employed at GasTOPS in positions of increasing responsibility for 7 years prior to his resignation. Jeff Cass was primarily responsible for the underlying design of the GasTOPS’ ECMS and MAINSTAY group of products and was responsible for assessing the requirements for the extension of GasTOPS’ products into the commercial aviation market place. Jeff Cass assessed the technical gaps of the GasTOPS’ ECMS product in relation to the requirements of the DOT/RCMP and GE opportunities.

[184]On September 25, 1996, Jeff Cass completed a report entitled “DOT and RCMP Aircraft Fleet Management Systems Proposed Work Plans and Estimates, September 25, 1996” (Exhibit 48C). A review of this Exhibit makes it abundantly clear that Jeff Cass was intimately involved in GasTOPS’ pursuit of the DOT/RCMP business opportunity. In his report Jeff Cass stated:

This work plan summarizes an approach to add incremental functionality to the existing OS/2 based ECMS. Although this approach will provide a more attractive short-term work estimate for our customer, the code base for ECMS will continue to grow. There will be more code to convert to Windows later on and our development efforts on a per function basis will not be as efficient as they could be with Windows development tools. In other words, this is a deadend approach in terms of product development.

An obvious alternative approach would be to convert the current ECMS to Windows and then add the functionality to ECMS as required. As a product development plan, this makes a lot of sense. We could even begin to re-align MAINSTAY with the ECMS data model and use it as a setup tool for the system (remember, there is

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no front end on the ECMS configuration tables). This strategy would be far more costly than the DOT budget can provide. The basic ECMS conversion to windows stands at $500K and the re- alignment of MAINSTAY is probably in the order of $200K…

[185]In his résumé, which was prepared after he resigned from GasTOPS and was working at MxI, Jeff Cass described his responsibilities from October 1994 to October 1996 at GasTOPS as follows. As Products Manager, he was “Responsible for coordinating the synergetic development of four products: MAINSTAY, ECMS, RCM Analyst and Lube Analyst” with specific responsibilities including

Design of reusable, shared functional components for all four systems.

Design of single ‘enterprise’ data model that supports all four systems.

R&D tax claims associated with the development of these four systems.

Technical review of requests for proposals (RFP’s).

Preliminary job estimates and detailed project plans for proposals.

Software tool development review and selection.

Training and professional development of core product group.

Previously, from June 1992 to November 1994, Jeff Cass was a

Project Manager in the development of ECMS and of

MAINSTAY, for which his duties included (for ECMS)

the definition of requirements based on site visits and interviews at each of the Canadian Airforce’s bases.

the design and implementation of the system’s relational data model.

the documentation of the system’s functionality.

prime responsibility for the preliminary user interface design.

distributed application architecture (system operates as a set of LAN’s over a WAN)

project budgets, planning, scheduling and man power loading.

introduction of a maintenance life cycle business process for the ECMS product that included configuration control, release planning, and feature enhancement planning.

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(and for MAINSTAY)

conducting workshops and interviews for the purpose of establishing the new requirements.

the design of an integrated relational data model that encompassed purchasing, payroll, inventory control and maintenance.

the functional specification for MAINSTAY.

the design and documentation of standards and conventions.

assistance in the design of the ‘shop standards’ framework for Dofasco enterprise systems

Project budgeting, planning and scheduling responsibilities.

Also included in this résumé are details of Jeff Cass’s earlier employment history with GasTOPS.

[186]During cross-examination on his résumé, Jeff Cass stated:

Q.If I can draw you to -- your attention to page 3 of Exhibit 1764 in hard copy, there it says under subheading “GasTOPS Limited October 94 to October 96", it says you were promoted to products manager; correct?

A.That's correct, that's what it says.

Q.That’s an accurate statement?

A.The title I had at GasTOPS was senior design lead.

Q.Well, whatever title you thought you had at GasTOPS, for purposes of your resume, you're stating that you were products manager, correct?

A.On the resume, yes, that's the statement I'm making here.

Q.And in that regard you were responsible for co-ordinating the synergetic development of four products, being Mainstay, ECMS, RCM Analyst and Lube Analyst; correct?

A.That's correct.

Q.And there is a description there of those four products?

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A.Yes, there is.

Q.Under the sub-heading of “specific responsibilities”, first bullet was you designed a reusable shared functional components for all four systems; correct?

A.That's what it says, yes.

Q.And that’s an accurate statement?

A.Yes, this is referring to those Mainstay contribution design elements that we’ve been walking through.

Q.Next bullet says that you were responsible for the design of a single enterprise data model that supports all four of the systems; and that's a correct statement as well, is it not?

A.Yes, that statement is referring to the condition based maintenance area that is common to all four of those applications.

Q.Is there anything else on your resume, Mr. Cass, that you think is embellished?

A.Yes. The next bullet down as well, stating that I prepared the R&D tax claims associated with the four. I participated in the status reporting, that ultimately went to SR&ED claim, but I didn't prepare the tax claims.

Q.Anything else in your resume that’s embellished?

A.I haven't read through it all.

Q.I would like you to take a moment to scan through it, Mr. Cass, and let us know if there is anything else that you think is embellished?

A.On page 2, the area where it's describing VP Research and Development, there is an entry that says 1999 U.S. Navy Maintenix Implementation Plan. I participated in some of the activities, but I did not run the project as a whole.

Q.Who was responsible for that, Peloso?

A.Yes.

Q.All right. Anything else?

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A.On page 4, the descriptions of the systems are reasonable. The durations for the projects are my estimations, and I'm not sure if they're accurate or not in terms of the man-years of development.

Q.Well, they were -- let's take for example the 30 man-years associated with the development effort of ECMS. That's your best guesstimate, is it not?

A.That would be my guesstimate, yes.

Q.Similarly with Mainstay, it's a 12-year development effort?

A.Yes.

Q.All right. Anything else in the resume that's embellished?

A.Again, more with the project management side of things, with respect to the ECMS project on page 4, project budgets, planning scheduling and the manpower loading, I did that for ECMS-1; for ECMS-2, I assisted Tom Kubiseski in that capacity. And again, in the ECMS-2 area, the feature enhancement planning, that's something that I partook with, with respect to the software change control process that was run between Chris Cass and Warrant Officer Pare.

Q.Is that it for page 4?

A.Yes.

Q.So the statements then under ECMS project manager that you designed and implemented the systems relational data model; that's certainly accurate?

A.Yes, it is.

Q.And under the Mainstay project, the design of an integrated relational data model that encompassed purchasing payroll, inventory control and maintenance, that's accurate?

A.That is accurate as a stretch with respect to the overall CMMS project that was under the SHL umbrella. My first-hand activities as part of that were with respect to the CBM-DAS component of that CMMS system.

Q.Anything else on the resume, Mr. Cass, that was

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embellished?

A.No, I think that's it.

[187]On June 26, 1996, Jeff Cass’s supervisor, Forsyth, completed his performance review (Exhibit 292); it was signed by Forsyth, Jeff Cass, and Muir. In his performance review of Jeff Cass, Forsyth assigned responsibilities to Jeff Cass for the next reporting period of managing the MAINSTAY Design Group, including involvement in design, implementation and life cycle support of the MAINSTAY Product Line; support of the MAINSTAY Marketing effort; continuous involvement of the MSD’s software development methodology; selection and administration of MSD Research and Development projects; and recruitment, development and retention of personnel). The specific objectives assigned to him included managing successful delivery of reliable products, completing planned projects, preparing the R&D portion of the 1997 MAINSTAY Business Plan, and recruiting new graduates and Co-Op students.

[188]Forsyth also documented Jeff Cass’s successes in the preceding year. Forsyth found that Jeff Cass had successfully implemented ECMS v.2, designed and implemented the RCM Analyst product, managed the review and selection of the new Windows-based MAINSTAY development environment, and managed the selection and implementation of the QA Partner automated testing tool. He had also totally rewritten the ECMS design documentation and contributed to numerous proposals and marketing efforts including “the Caidmark ITM, Canadian Coastguard MIMS, Canadian Forces MASIS, Canadian Navy MAINSTAY, etc.” Forsyth defined Jeff Cass’s areas of strongest performance as getting the job done, his technical capabilities unrivalled at GasTOPS, problem solving and organization.

[189]Muir during his direct examination was asked about the performance review of Jeff Cass by Forsyth and stated:

Q.I'd like to focus your attention first of all on the summary

of objectives for the upcoming period and again, could you describe for the court in general terms what was identified by Mr. Cass and Mr. Forsyth there?

A.Yes. By this time Jeff Cass is -- has fully assumed the role

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of the lead designer for Mainstay, so his first objective relates to the management of his team and the individuals that are a part of his design team are identified.

The second objective relates to the overall design implementation and support of our complete line of Mainstay products, including the ECMS product for the Air Force, the Mainstay product that we had delivered to Ontario Hydro, RCM analyst and Lube Analyst.

So Cass now has responsibility for our complete Mainstay product line and all aspects of it from design through to support. He has an objective to support the marketing efforts, including definition of “requirements" and estimating cost estimates for projects involving our Mainstay products. Again, an objective to continuously improve the software development methodologies of the division, that's an ongoing objective and activity for the division and in this case for Mr. Cass. He has an objective, next objective, to bring forward to Mr. Forsyth specific recommendations for research projects, to select those projects and then to subsequently administer them. And to, as far as Human Resources goes, to participate in recruitment, development and the retention of people within his group.

Q.Mr. Muir, I'm now going to show to you page 2 of exhibit 292, and I have just highlighted there for you a couple of the results that Mr. Cass had achieved for the previous period. And can you describe for the court your understanding of those items?

A.You're referring specifically to the highlighted items?

Q.Yes.

A.Yes, okay. First highlighted item deals with the documentation, the design documentation for our ECMS product, and the result that was achieved was a total or a complete rewrite of the design documentation.

Q.Second item?

A.Second item under “areas of strong performance", this is Forsyth's assessment of Cass and he’s essentially saying that from a technical perspective his abilities are unrivalled, he’s never seen anyone like that at GasTops, Systemhouse, Dofasco et cetera. And that was certainly the cases for Jeff Cass, he is technically an extremely strong performer.

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And the final recommendation that's highlighted, again under his own professional development, Forsyth notes that he should endeavour to remain current in all of the technologies related to our Mainstay product and those are software technologies.

Q.Mr. Muir, I'm going to show you now page 3 of exhibit 292, can you first describe to the court based on this document the nature of your personal involvement in this particular review of Mr. Cass?

A.Yes. I reviewed this particular document and Forsyth's assessment and Mr. Cass and I signed the document, indicating that I agreed with his assessment.

Q.And there is a highlighted passage there with a red arrow. What was your understanding as to the meaning of that particular entry?

A.My understanding of that entry is that Cass has documented key components of our Mainstay product.

Q.Mr. Muir, based on this performance review and also based on your conversations directly with Mr. Forsyth and Mr. Cass, were you aware of anyone other than Mr. Cass at GasTops who had a better understanding of the technology associated with the Mainstay line of technologies?

A.No, there was certainly no one better than Jeff Cass.

[190]During cross-examination, Forsyth was also asked to review his June 26, 1996, performance review of Jeff Cass (Exhibit 292):

Q.Now, you've reviewed the document, does it accurately set

out his performance review?

A.Yes.

[191]Jeff Cass, during his own cross-examination, was referred to Forsyth’s June 26, 1996, performance review (Exhibit 292) and he stated:

Q.With respect to the employee objectives that you have for

the next period, so we're now speaking of the second half of 1996, your responsibility is to manage the Mainstay design group,

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consisting of Linh Nguyen, Darcy Chorneyko, which is spelled C- H-O-R-N-E-Y-K-O, Andrew Hircock and Kurt Strutt. And those duties include first bullet design implementation and life cycle support of the Mainstay product line, ECMS, Mainstay for Windows, RCM Analyst and Lube Analyst. Do you see that?

A.I see that, yes.

Q.So clearly you have the overall managerial responsibility for the Mainstay design group contrary to whatever your position may be described as in the upper right-hand corner; correct?

A.Yes. At the point in time here there are four separate systems. I am to become the person in charge of design and life cycle support of those four things.

Q.One of the responsibilities as well that you had was the selection and administration of the MSD research and development projects; do you see that?

A.Yes, I see that.

Q.Do I take that to mean it was your personal responsibility to choose those areas that would be subject to MSD research and development?

A.No. At this point the objectives for R&D had been laid out coming into the fiscal year and I was administering the reporting as well as the execution of work under those objectives. I did have latitude in terms of which objectives we pursued and which ones we didn't, but the objectives had been settled.

Q.Obviously the statement speaks for itself, but you're not just administering the projects, you're selecting them as well, that's what the statement says; correct?

A.Yes. I'm just clarifying the -- I'm selecting which ones have priority and which ones we're going to put effort in behind within a set of objectives that had been defined.

Q.Certainly as the manager of the Mainstay design group, if during the period of this time you identified other areas that were appropriate for research and development, surely you would have brought those to the attention of the company?

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A.At this time frame I would have given rise or communicated with Brad on the progress of activities that I was administering and executing. And if there were other activities I would have discussed those with Brad.

Q.And what I'm saying to you, Mr. Cass, I'm not asking you to tell me if you agree with this or not, if you identified other areas that you felt were appropriate for research and development it was your responsibility to bring those to the attention of Mr. Forsyth, correct?

A.That's correct. Within the scope of the work I already understood was the mandate of what I was to be doing research under.

Q.In fact, under the sub-heading of specific objectives, which is the third bullet from the bottom of the page, it says your objective is to prepare the R&D portion of the fiscal year 1997 Mainstay business plan, correct?

A.That's what it says, yes.

Q.Doesn't say review, it says prepare; you’re the person responsible for drafting it, correct?

A.Yes, at this point that is an objective Brad is handing to me,

yes.

Q.On the second page, again there is reference to the fact that your technical skills are still unrivalled at GasTOPS, SHL, Dofasco, at least that’s Mr. Forsyth's review of you; correct?

A.That's correct.

Q.And you're still being asked to further delegate responsibility in that regard; at paragraph 4, you're being asked to take an active role in recruiting personnel to support the growth of your own team, correct?

A.That's correct. And again, within the confines of the business that were sitting around, the projects that I worked on required people and if the projects required staff then I was to participate in the new additions it was recruiting them.

Q.If you identified a particular area that you wanted to

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exploit, like a new technology area you thought would have been beneficial to the product development, you would have raised that with Mr. Forsyth and perhaps recommend that you hire personnel to do that, correct?

A.No, that wasn't something I did at the time.

Q.Are you suggesting that your objectives don't include that?

A.Yes. At this point the objectives were both with research as well as hiring people that was in the context of a plan already put forward, at this point in June 26, ‘96, I certainly did not see it as my objective to come up with the marketing plan, the research plan and the staffing plan from the position I held.

Q.No, Mr. Cass, we have seen in your PRS that it was expected of you to remain fully current on what customers' needs were; why, because impacts directly on the design of the system, correct; you cannot design the system if you don't know what the customer needs?

A.Correct. When you're engaged in a project with a client, they do tell you pretty specifically what it is that they need.

Q.You're aware of what the customer requirements are?

A.From the specific customers, yes.

Q.I'm sorry?

A.From the specific customers, yes.

Q.You're charged with the overall responsibility of designing the products to meet those customer requirements, correct?

A.The requirements that I understood, yes.

Q.So the question to you is, if you became aware of new requirements of the customer, or new technologies, you would bring those forward and incorporate them into the design, would you not?

A.No. It would be quite the reverse. Well, there is actually two scenarios. One is if a customer and I'm working on a project is directly asking me for a requirement to be addressed, that is

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something I would deal with by bringing it back to project management, looking to see whether it's in scope or whether there is change control required to change the scope of the contract with that customer.

The second one being that if I was aware of a requirement that could go into any kind of a product, it wouldn't be R&D driving the development of those, it would be marketing forward saying this is what we want to build for the marketplace as a product. R&D wouldn't lead the identification and design of technology without marketing saying this is the customer base we're now going to try and build this for them, no.

Q.In your dealings with the customers, when you're ascertaining their requirements, Mr. Cass, if you became of the view there is another requirement that exists out there, maybe this customer does not need it but it's out there, could you not go under this general authority that you have to do R&D and say I think we should incorporate this new functionality in the product?

A.No, I didn't have authority to set the scope of R&D nor the budget nor the resources.

Q.It says right in your objectives you're to select and administer the R&D projects?

A.Select which ones that I work on in terms of ones that have already been defined, I think were 9 or 10 of them identified and we couldn’t do all of them at once. So I did have authority to say okay we're not going to do work on requirement no. 3, we’re going to work on requirement no. 4. But in terms of setting the overall list of requirements, no, I didn't do that.

Q.Do you not think, Mr. Cass, it would have been good business practice that if you learned through your contact with your customers of a new and exciting requirement that you would at least bring it forward to the company under the auspices of R&D, why wouldn’t you do that?

A.Definitely requirements would come back and be identified. As for setting in place the execution of the business to meet those, that's -- that is what the business is. That defines the business.

[192]It is clear to me that Jeff Cass was a key and essential employee within the MSD at

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GasTOPS. Due to his intimate knowledge of the GasTOPS’ ECMS and MAINSTAY technologies, GasTOPS was vulnerable to an abrupt resignation, as it would be difficult and time-consuming for GasTOPS to replace Jeff Cass. Certainly, GasTOPS could not have expected, nor could any company be expected, to replace an employee such as Jeff Cass in two weeks.

Vandenberg

[193]Vandenberg commenced work at GasTOPS after graduating from Carleton University. He was employed at GasTOPS at various positions until his resignation in October 1996. Subsequent to his resignation from GasTOPS, Vandenberg immediately commenced employment with MxI. At the time of his resignation, Vandenberg was a project manager, spending the majority of his time at Dofasco.

[194]In his résumé, which was prepared after he commenced employment at MxI, (Exhibit 1874), Vandenberg described his employment from November 1995 to October 1996 at GasTOPS as follows:

Project Manager within the Maintenance Systems Division of GasTOPS. Responsible for all engineering and software projects executed at Dofasco Inc. Specific job responsibilities included:

Consultant to Dofasco’s implementation and roll-out of their condition-based maintenance system and methodology.

Coordination of the engineering analysis performed on the turboblower system at Dofasco.

System Architect and Designer for enhancements to Dofasco’s Condition-Based Maintenance - Data Analysis System (CBM- DAS)

Management of the CBM-DAS software development team.

Conducted technical investigations and feasibility studies regarding the integration of additional predictive maintenance technology systems with the CBM-DAS.

He was also previously (November 1994 - November 1995)

Project Manager on the CBM-DAS implemented at Dofasco

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(November 1994 - November 1995) and a systems analyst (May 1991 - November 1994) for GasTOPS.

[195]In his performance review of Vandenberg, dated June 25, 1996, Forsyth stated:

Summary of Results for Appraisal Period

1. Results achieved for regular or planned objectives

ohas successfully completed the CBM-DAS development

projects as defined in the sub-contracts to SHL

ohas successfully implemented the Dofasco Utilities pilot CBM project

2. Results achieved for special or major unplanned tasks or

objectives

ohas developed a high level of respect from Dofasco personnel so that he has become indispensable; unfortunately, this has resulted in a brutal living arrangement with Rob travelling to Dofasco every week for the last two years…

[196]During his cross-examination, Vandenberg was questioned concerning this performance review (Exhibit 294). He stated:

Q.If I take you to Exhibit 294, which is your performance review dated June 25 of 1996, at page 3, we reviewed this earlier, at item 2:

"Has developed a high level of respect from Dofasco personnel such that he has become indispensable." Do you see that?

A.Yes.

Q.Do you agree that grow that [sic] was an accurate statement as to the relationship that you had with that particular GasTOPS client, being Dofasco?

A.I think from a technical sense it's true, in that from my experience on their project, I had a lot of background on that project. But that's, as I said, it is from a technical sense, I'd agree with that.

Q.At page 4 of the same exhibit, it says, on the right-hand side, on the top of the page, this is under the category of Job Knowledge and Technical Competence, it says: "Has the extremely

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rare skill of truly understanding the abstract data model required of Mainstay." Do you see that?

A.Yes.

Q.And this is assessment of you by Mr. Forsyth, correct?

A.Yes.

Q.Can you tell us, Mr. Vandenberg, what that particular statement means?

A.It's a measure of my data modelling skills. I had done a lot of data modelling work on the CBM-DAS and then subsequently Mainstay version 2.

Q.Will you agree with me, Mr. Vandenberg, this statement is in specific reference to the data model associated with Mainstay, the GasTOPS' product?

A.Yes. But the only data model I ever worked with was the CBM-DAS or Mainstay version 2.

[197]In my view, Vandenberg was a “key employee” at GasTOPS and certainly could not be replaced within two weeks. In addition, as a result of his position and access to confidential business information belonging to GasTOPS, he owed a fiduciary duty to GasTOPS.

GasTOPS’ Recognition of Defendants’ Key Status: Stock Option Plan

[198]In recognition of the key roles that certain employees such as Forsyth, Brouse and Jeff Cass held, GasTOPS created a stock option plan with the intent to divest some ownership in GasTOPS to the layer of management below the vice-presidents, when individual employees were identified as key to the growth of the company. Its purpose was to “develop the interest of key full-time and permanent employees of the Company in the growth and development of the Company by providing them with an opportunity through share options to acquire an increased proprietary interest in the Company” (Exhibit 283). Participation in the “Employee Stock Option Plan” was by invitation only.

[199]The defendants Brouse, Forsyth and Jeff Cass were identified as key employees of

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GasTOPS for the purposes of the Employee Stock Option Plan and were offered an opportunity to participate in the plan. In December 1995, letters and copies of the Employee Stock Option Plan were sent to these defendants. Muir stated in direct examination:

Q.How was it again determined that these managers would have the entitlement to purchase these shares?

A.The employees eligible for this particular plan were nominated by their vice president, so in my case I would nominate or recommend those key employees that I felt should participate in this plan, they were generally speaking the future key managers of the company. And each year a list of prospective employees, key employees, would be presented to the board of directors and approval for participation in this particular plan was reserved to the board of directors.

A.The purpose was to provide the employees with the ability to obtain a proprietary interest in the company on the argument that that was a good thing for the long-term growth and development of GasTops.

[200]The “key employee” stock option plan should be contrasted with the “GasTOPS’ Employee and Associates Share Purchase Plan,” the purpose of which was “to develop the interest of full-time and permanent employees and selected associates of the company in the growth and development of the company by providing them with an opportunity through share purchase to acquire an increased proprietary interest in the company.” Participation in the Employee and Associates Share Purchase Plan was available to any permanent full-time employee of GasTOPS.

[201]At the annual general meeting of GasTOPS on December 13, 1995 Forsyth, Brouse and Jeff Cass were approved for participation in the “Employee Stock Option Plan”. On December 22, 1995 an invitation to participate in the Employee Stock Option Plan was extended to Forsyth, Brouse and Jeff Cass along with others. Forsyth, Brouse and Jeff Cass accepted the offer to purchase shares pursuant to the Employee Stock Option Plan.

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[202]Chris Cass, the brother of Jeff Cass, was employed at GasTOPS and subsequently became an employee of MxI. During his cross-examination he stated:

Q.So in your mind, key people at GasTOPS are Forsyth, Brouse, Cass and Vandenberg, correct?

A.From a technical point of view, yes.

Q.Why do you say they’re key people from a technical point of view, Mr. Cass?

A.That’s simply my opinion of their positions.

Q.Why do you say that, Mr. Cass?

A.Because that was my understanding of their positions.

Q.Can you explain that, please, Mr. Cass?

A.My interactions with Brouse, Forsyth, Cass and Vandenberg led me to believe their capacities were of a technical nature.

Q.That wasn’t my question, Mr. Cass, my question is why did you say in your note that they were key people within the organization?

A.To indicate that in my opinion their technical capabilities were influential.

Q.Important?

A.Yes.

Q.And why do you say that?

A.Simply put, that was my understanding of their positions.

Q.Why do you say that, Mr. Cass? On what factual basis do you make that claim?

A.I’m not sure ---

Q.What technical roles were they assuming that led you to believe that they were key people within the organization? Was it

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their level of knowledge, was it their participation in contracts; what was it?

A. Their level of knowledge and their capabilities, as

I understood them, in designing software.

Q.Would you agree with me, Mr. Cass, that from a design perspective with respect to both ECMS and Mainstay that those four persons were effectively the designers of the system?

A.Yes, I would.

Q.And they were the persons who therefore had the key knowledge with respect to the design of those systems; correct?

A.They would be amongst the most important people, yes.

Defendants’ Roles, 1991-1995

[203]Between 1991 and 1995, Muir was responsible for market development, technology development, human resources and financial management for the MSD. During this time frame, the managers would assist him with these activities. Muir stated in direct examination:

Q.From 1991 to 1995, in your division, who would prepare contract proposals for customers?

A.The responsibility to prepare proposals, for the most part, was the managers: Forsyth, Brouse and Tobin. My role would be to help them do that as a manager. In some cases I may have actually written entire proposals if they we unavailable or not able to do it. But generally speaking, almost all of the proposal development was done by the three managers. My role was one of helping them do that and providing a review of those proposals before they were submitted to a client.

Q.Now, what role would your managers perform once they had -- the proposal has been submitted to the client?

A.Again, it depends somewhat on who the client is and the nature or complexity of the project and the contract. For much of what we did, the managers themselves would submit the proposal to the customer, be involved in any kind of fact finding or negotiation that took place following the proposal submission and,

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for example, deal with Public Works, who handled most of the contracting for DND at the time; they would deal with public works officer as well.

My role, again, was to help them do that. If there was a special need for me to get involved, I would get involved.

Q.If a contract was arrived at between GasTops and a client, who would sign that contract on behalf of GasTops as it relates to your division?

A.That varied, but again, generally speaking, certainly towards the 1993, ‘94, ‘95 time frame, the managers would sign the contracts. But there was many contracts that I signed on behalf of the division because of the nature of the contract, they were large significant contracts for which the customer expectation would have been someone senior at GasTops would sign the contract.

Q.And from ‘91 to ‘95 can you describe Mr. MacIsaac's role in the contract process in your division?

A.MacIsaac had little or no role at all in the contract process, except in the case where a contract might involve an investment by the company. I can't think of one, but the only time that MacIsaac would be involved, as I said, if there was an investment required by the company. If we were to take a contract where we knew up- front that the company was going to invest its own money to execute the contract as opposed to use customer money, he would be involved.

There was certain general business relationships being developed at the time, particularly B. F. Goodrich, where if we were to form something like a corporate teaming agreement, which is in effect a contract between two companies, certainly the president would be involved in that and likely sign a corporate teaming agreement. But for the most part, the work that the division was doing and the contacts being developed and executed by the divisions were done entirely within the division.

[204]According to Muir, during this time frame, managers such as Forsyth and Brouse would help to recruit new talent for GasTOPS. The managers would interview the candidates and make a recommendation to Muir. Upon approval by Muir, the managers would make an offer of

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employment to the candidate. Muir identified Forsyth in particular as making offers, subject to his review, beginning in the early 1990s (1992 or 1993).

[205]Between 1991 and 1995, the managers’ responsibilities included: identifying new work (particularly with existing customers); developing customer and champion liaison and developing work plans and cost estimates. Muir noted that everyone at GasTOPS, particularly managers, was always looking for new work and contributed by identifying opportunities. Tobin, for example, was in a new market and looking for new customers. The managers would work with the champions within organizations that were either already customers or considered very good prospects. With them, the managers would develop work plans, cost estimates, and justifications for the work so that the client or potential client organization could consider the contracts. Muir was responsible for the commercial side of negotiations, sometimes with the assistance of a manager (as occurred with Brouse regarding CAF contracts).

[206]Forsyth and Brouse stated that their customer and “champion” liaison contacts were of a technical nature and that more senior people from GasTOPS and B.F.Goodrich (Muir, MacIsaac, Chivers and Howe) were responsible for dealing with the customer decision makers. According to Muir, by 1994, the managers (Brouse, Tobin and Forsyth) organized the work within the area of their responsibility and their contracts. Muir stated that he had no role in assignment of work or manpower allocation within the particular areas.

[207]Muir testified that the managers below him were included in the discussions surrounding the change in corporate structure. Forsyth, Brouse and Tobin all testified that they were not consulted on this change, but rather the new structure was explained to them. The changes involved a new accounting system to keep better track of various projects, business development costs, and administrative and marketing costs and to make better business decisions. The different managers were assigned different roles according to their strengths; for example, Tobin was considered very good at customer interactions and business development and was assigned marketing and other business development roles.

[208]The change in the business structure at GasTOPS in the summer of 1995 increased

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the responsibilities of the managers, Brouse, Forsyth and Tobin, and also increased the responsibilities of Jeff Cass and Vandenberg. It may well be that there was not a great deal of consultation between MacIsaac, Muir and the managers concerning the change in management structure but the fact remains that the change increased the responsibilities of Brouse, Forsyth, Tobin, Jeff Cass and Vandenberg.

Oversight by MacIsaac and Muir

[209]The defendants submit that in addition to the new responsibilities which were given to the managers, Forsyth, Brouse and Tobin, there were new oversight controls which were put in place. One of these was the oversight by the vice-president of the division. Another control over the program managers was the program evaluation performed by quarterly “President’s Reports”. In 1995/96, MacIsaac created the procedure of having “President’s Reports” in order that program managers would report to him quarterly. This allowed him to stay apprised of their progress towards the business plan, the risks and the overall financial parameters they were achieving. In compiling these reports, the program managers worked with Kind, a vice-president, who advised them of the kinds of risks that should be included in their reports. MacIsaac stated that Brouse participated in the program evaluation for Aero Systems and Forsyth participated in the program evaluation for Industrial Systems/MAINSTAY, among others. Each program manager was expected to give a briefing to the president on their programs. Further, Kind, as the Advanced Development vice-presidence, would create reports for MacIsaac to serve a quality assurance function on complicated, technical projects. To create the reports, Kind would look at the program managers’ own reports and at the content of the individual projects within the program and he would discuss with the program managers the risks involved in their programs to determine which would be highlighted in the report for MacIsaac.

[210]Although MacIsaac wanted “President’s Reports” quarterly in 1996, there were no “President’s Reports” prior to Forsyth and Brouse resigning. Brouse and Forsyth did provide progress reports to Muir on a quarterly basis in the 1995/1996 business year.

[211]MacIsaac was a hands-on president and wanted to be aware of the finances of

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GasTOPS during each year. In order to maintain an oversight of finances, MacIsaac had the central accounting department report directly to him; direct responsibility for corporate infrastructure costs; at least five vice-president round table meetings per year; the purchase invoice files came across his desk for review; direct signing authority was limited to himself and the three vice-presidents; and program managers who were to provide quarterly briefings.

[212]In my view, these actions on the part of MacIsaac, did not detract in any way from the responsibilities given to the program managers. Any manager of any division in any corporation, has from time to time his/her actions and results reviewed by his/her superior.

[213]Muir also reviewed the actions of his three managers, Forsyth, Brouse and Tobin. They aimed to meet monthly between 1991 and 1995, the managers submitted regular reports (although not every month) on the stature of their management responsibilities, and they had a monthly reporting process in place.

Responsibility for Contracts

[214]Between 1991 and 1995, managers Forsyth and Brouse were, for the most part, responsible for preparing proposals for contracts. Muir would help them and review their proposals before they were submitted to a client. Often, the manager would also submit the proposal to the customer, be involved in any kind of fact-finding or negotiation following the proposal submission. The manager would also sometimes deal with Public Works or its officers, as it was responsible for most of the DND contracting at the time. Muir provided assistance and became involved as required. From 1993 onward, when contracts were arrived at with clients, managers would generally sign the contracts on behalf of GasTOPS; Muir would sign on behalf of the Division in cases of large, significant contracts for which the customer expected someone senior at GasTOPS to sign.

[215]Between 1991 and 1995, MacIsaac had little to no role in the contract process in the MSD. The exception would be in cases where the contract involved an initial investment by GasTOPS. Muir also noted in his testimony:

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There was certain general business relationships being developed at the time, particularly B. F. Goodrich, where if we were to form something like a corporate teaming agreement, which is in effect a contract between two companies, certainly the president would be involved in that and likely sign a corporate teaming agreement. But for the most part, the work that the division was doing and the contacts being developed and executed by the divisions were done entirely within the division.

[216]Forsyth and Brouse submit that their contacts were of a technical nature and that more senior people from GasTOPS and B.F.Goodrich (Muir, MacIsaac, Chivers and Howe) were responsible for dealing with the decision makers. I do not interpret the responsibilities that Muir had for his division and/or the role played by MacIsaac as detracting from the managers’ responsibilities.

Allocation of Workforce

[217]According to Muir, by 1994 the managers were responsible for the assignment of work and manpower allocation in their own particular area of responsibility and the contracts that they were responsible for.

[218]In contrast, Forsyth stated that the division was organized around projects and that employees would be moved from project to project depending on the need for manpower and although it was the responsibility of the managers to work out the allocation of manpower, Muir had the final say on the allocation of personnel. Forsyth stated that as a lead project engineer between June 1989 to September 1991, working under Muir, he was given a budget measured in terms of person hours to complete a job and a schedule of delivery dates. He stated that he was “given a fair bit of autonomy” on how he did it as long as the project came in on budget and on schedule. Muir would be involved on the customer side and would sometimes tell Forsyth what the project requirements and deliverables were, and Forsyth would report up to Muir (at that time through another management level).

[219]Forsyth also described the relationship he typically had with GasTOPS’ customers. He stated that the customer would have, on their end, the equivalent of a project manager or lead

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engineer – one of the “technical people” at the client – and it was with that person that he would have direct contact. Where GasTOPS’ deliverables were technical reports on, for example, the development of the condition indicator, he would provide the client with a report and would receive back from the client information about what changes they desired.

[220]When Forsyth was promoted to a management position, he “actually became responsible for a set of projects.” He stated that, once he was a manager, he might be the lead project engineer on some projects and have someone else working for him as lead project engineer on others, who Forsyth would supervise and help conduct the work. He was responsible for the budget, which turned into labour costs, called “cost of goods sold” by the company. He was responsible for adhering to the schedules for his projects. In his testimony, Forsyth stated that each group within GasTOPS had a set of engineering managers.

[221]Forsyth also testified that within the MSD, the managers often knew what work the others were doing. He reported that they “were really organized from a personnel standpoint” around projects, so that people could be reassigned to work on a different project if that would be a more efficient use of resources and more effectively generate revenue. He stated that the three MSD managers and their vice-president would hold administrative meetings to “sit down and juggle… who would work on what project going forward.” While the managers tried to work out the details amongst themselves, Forsyth claimed that Muir had the final say.

[222]MacIsaac stated that at the time he wrote the 1995/96 corporate business plan, the senior management of GasTOPS consisted of Chivers, Muir, Dupuis, Kind and himself. Following the reorganization and creation of program managers as detailed in the business plan, senior management also included Brouse, Forsyth, MacGillivray and Neilsen. The GasTOPS business plan 1995/96, authored by MacIsaac, detailed GasTOPS’ reorganization. He sought to support the development of management capability, fostering development of general managers and more specialized project managers, design managers, or production managers. He also sought to improve GasTOPS’ program/project evaluation system to allow management to quickly and conveniently appraise the performance of a particular program.

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[223]The business plan subsequently describes a shift to a “program team” concept with Program Business Managers responsible for business development strategy, customer requirements definition, customer liaison roles, sales, contract negotiation, and program quality assurance; Contract Managers responsible for project definition, estimates, personnel assignment, management and control, and reporting as well as program annual budgets; and Engineering Personnel. The plan stipulated that several teams were to report to a vice-president who would be responsible for all aspects of a given business unit. Finally, as president of GasTOPS’, MacIsaac retained control over final determinations regarding the initial or windup of specific programs.

[224]The business plan specified the organization for the 1995/1996 financial year, in which Forsyth and Brouse were program managers for the MAINSTAY and Aero system projects. Tobin, whose name does not appear on the organizational chart, was the third manager in the MSD, and was responsible for “business development in a marketing and sales sense for the whole division.” The organizational chart appeared in the business plan as follows:

[225] Muir stated that Forsyth, Brouse and Tobin were a part of the discussions –

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participants – in the development of the new management structure. He met with them one-on- one as the new structure was developed in order to formalize their new management duties. Then when the new structure was formalized in the business plan, it was announce to the entire company and then presented to the board of directors for approval.

[226]Once the new management concept was implemented, Muir instituted a quarterly reporting process, particularly for Brouse and Forsyth who were business managers. Each quarter, the managers would report their progress to Muir, compare it to the plan and objective set out for the year. Monthly meetings were used to discuss management issues within the MSD, such as market development issues, acquisition of new customers, human resources issues, and, especially, product development.

[227]Muir stated that Forsyth had the responsibility of determining who would assume second-level management positions among those working for him. He noted that he could not recall an occasion where he disagreed with Forsyth’s selections with respect to managers.

[228]Muir also discussed Jeff Cass’s responsibilities as a manager of development within Forsyth’s group in the MSD. The products Jeff Cass was responsible for were the MSD’s software products: MAINSTAY, Lube Analyst, RCM Analyst. He was further responsible for products under development for the CAF, such as the ECMS products. His roles included full responsibility for the design, implementation, testing and support of these products.

[229]Muir stated that Vandenberg was responsible for the management of GasTOPS’ project and work with Dofasco.

[230]The MSD 1995/96 business plan, which Muir authored, described its programs as:

1.Aero Systems

2.MAINSTAY

3.ODM/B.F.Goodrich.

[231]Brouse was the program manager for the Aero Systems, Forsyth the program manager for MAINSTAY and Muir was the program manager for ODM/B.F.Goodrich. Each

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team consisted of a program manager, contract/project manager and engineering personnel. Each program manager, reported to the vice-president of the MSD and was expected to undertake the following major tasks: business developments strategy; customer requirements definition; customer liaison; sales; contract negotiation; and program quality assurance. The project manager was responsible for the following tasks: project definition; project estimate; project personnel assignment; project management and control; project reporting; and project annual budget.

[232]Brouse’s overall view of the management structure changes is reflected in his evidence when he stated:

A.In the last year of the company I had been identified as the Aero Systems program manager for the -- for that little business unit call Aero Systems. And then I sort of discovered that one of my concerns was that I did not have as much authority over that program as I would have hoped. I discovered I had considerable responsibility but no real authority. But one of the things that happened in that program is that I had to take over the management of contracts other than the J85 and F404 TIES contract. And specifically, a number of hardware contracts that we had with regard to the oil screening device, the vibration analyser system, the aug tube. There is a number of these activities -- I should say augmented to.

What I discovered is on projects outside of the TIES area, the best that I could do, really, to manage the project is watch the time being billed by the engineers working on the project, but I had no real control and I found myself simply reporting to Mr. Muir at the end of the month what the status of the over budget would be on some of these projects.

I had attempted to work with the engineers in the other part of the company to try to get these projects under control. And I found that because they didn't report directly to me, in a supervisory position, that they were not responding to my request to get these projects on schedule. In fact, one of my difficulties was that one of these projects that I was in charge of was in fact run by another vice president at the company. So I had very little real control over these projects so I found that difficult to deal with.

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With regard to the project I was working on, with regard to the ones I did have control over, which is the Canadian Air Force TIES contract, I discovered that Mr. Muir would insist that at times I would be forced to, at his insistence, take resources off the project and put them on other projects which Mr. Muir had identified as being higher priority within the division, leaving me short staffed.

And at other times when there wasn't enough activity or work being conducted in these other projects, Mr. Muir would insist that I would take these people which were non-billable and place them on my projects and have them work. I found that difficult in that it was difficult to run projects when your Human Resources are being either added or pulled away.

So I found that aspect difficult. I also found it difficult that from time to time that what was referred to as an executive decision would be made by senior management or Mr. Muir, with regard to one of my programs and I would have to simply live with that decision. An example would be the promise to convert ECMS to Windows by Christmas or November of ‘96. I had no input into that, that decision was made without consultation with me, yet that would be something I would have to act on.

I also found that, you know, I wasn't contributing as much as certainly I would like to to [sic] business development plans. I wasn't participating in any of the significant meetings, such as the meeting that would occur once a month with B. F. Goodrich and GasTOPS. I was left out of that. Similarly to the meeting with Mr. Dinwoodie, I would have loved to attend at that, but that's the class of event that I was not invited to.

So those were certainly concerns. I was sort of recognizing that there was a very big distinction between myself and senior management and in that I wasn't really being asked to participate in senior management.

[233]It appears to me that Brouse was acknowledging that he had responsibility for the profitability of the program he was managing. His complaints, if valid, were directed more to the fact that he had to pursue profitability and efficiency in running his program. That he did not attend a limited number of specific meetings does nothing more than confirm that it was his expectation to attend at the said meetings. By way of singular example, Brouse claims that he

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would have liked to have attended at the meeting between MacIsaac and Dinwoodie in the context of the GE opportunity. In raising this issue, Brouse ignored that GasTOPS may have been seeking to add “weight” to the significance of the meeting by sending its president, a person who previously had little participation in the pursuit of the GE opportunity.

[234]Forsyth stated that when he became a project manager, he understood that he would get measured by how the program did, except that for the first year Muir still had authority over the accounting codes and charge codes. Accordingly, Forsyth felt that the restructuring did not change his responsibility. Forsyth stated:

A.I think that there was the intention down the road we would get measured as program managers, we would get measured by how the program did. But for the first year in particular he still had control and authority over the accounting and administrative charge codes or project codes. But there was this understanding that they wanted down the road, once the system was up and running, the accounting system, and once the system was running, that we would probably be measured on our overall performance on how well the program itself was going to be doing. So that I understand was the intention, but for all practical purposes it was the same responsibility we'd had previously.

Forsyth also stated that there was no difference in terms of his authority as compared to his years as an engineering manager. He said that the managers still had authority within the contexts of their projects to get the job done, and that how they did it was up to them. With respect to discretionary spending, there was no change in his role.

[235]Forsyth also stated that as a program manager his contact with senior management did not change. As before, he had no interaction with the board of directors. Similarly, the relationships he had with MacIsaac and Muir remained the same, subject to changes in the particular projects he was working on. He stated: “we were responsible for a series projects. We would have our bi-weekly meetings in which we would discuss resourcing and prospects coming in and what the effect that would have on the -- brought on the. But it was the same type of meetings and the same interaction that we had before, there was nothing changed.”

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[236]Although MacIsaac, Muir and Chivers retained oversight and control of the opportunities pursued by the MSD program managers, the program managers clearly exercised substantial management responsibilities, especially after the 1995 reorganization.

[237]According to Forsyth, Muir’s day-by-day role in the organization did not change except that he (Muir) took over work on the oil debris monitor (“ODM”) project. Forsyth acknowledged that he was responsible for three projects although the restructuring had shifted the programs that he was responsible for. Although Forsyth argued that in his capacity as a program manager his interaction with “senior management” did not change, the program management concept now envisaged President’s Reports being submitted to MacIsaac. The fact is that the defendants’ resignation occurred before the said reporting system could be implemented. The defendants argue that the program management concept resulted in only “superficial changes” and did not result in Forsyth and/or Brouse being imbued with trust, reliance or the authority of a fiduciary. In my view, the trial evidence verified the exact opposite. Forsyth and Brouse were given significant management responsibilities within GasTOPS.

[238]On January 13, 1997, Muir wrote to MacIsaac concerning his contribution to GasTOPS (Exhibit 693):

s.5 - “Organization Strength/Flexibility”

The events of the past three months indicate that the MSD organization was seriously flawed and that I failed to recognize these flaws and deal with them.

As a team, the MSD employees were extremely close-knit and worked well together. However, they were also very parochial in their interest (i.e. software) and extremely arrogant with regard to their perception of the value of their work relative to other groups within the company.

This situation suggests that a significant gap existed between the values held by the MSD staff and those held by senior management. As a member of senior management, it was my responsibility to communicate and explain the importance of these values and to deal with employees, particularly those in a

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management role, which would not accept the company’s value. In this particular case, I failed to recognize that the problem even existed, although in hindsight I can see numerous symptoms of the problem.

[239]It is clear from this extract, that Muir saw Forsyth, Brouse, Tobin and Cass to be in key management roles.

[240]When paragraph 5.4 of Exhibit 296 is read in its entirety, it is clear that MacIsaac perceived that the program managers were, in fact, fully responsible for their independent business units. According to MacIsaac, the vesting of the said responsibility in the program managers had created a competitive situation in the company that needed to be addressed. The “less than full understanding of the business responsibilities of the program managers” was referenced to the fact that the individual defendants, Forsyth and Brouse, needed to understand that loyalty and good faith towards the company, as a whole, was a mandated component of their role as business managers.

[241]The defendants submitted that their salaries were not indicative of the salaries paid to senior management. I fail to see how the salaries paid to Forsyth, Brouse, Jeff Cass and Vandenberg are relevant, to the issue of whether or not they owed a fiduciary duty to GasTOPS. In my view, in reviewing the organizational structure of GasTOPS, it is clear that within such structure, Forsyth, Brouse, Jeff Cass and Vandenberg were part of senior management notwithstanding they had reporting responsibilities to the president and vice-presidents.

Contributing to GasTOPS Business Plans

[242]In 1991, MacIsaac introduced the concept of preparing an annual business plan for GasTOPS to set out where the company had been and where the company was headed. MacIsaac wanted the company to grow in a fiscally responsible manner. The business plan was based on information provided to MacIsaac by the vice-presidents of each division, who had in turn gathered information from project managers within their divisions. MacIsaac attempted to project the number and types of contracts GasTOPS would secure in the forthcoming year. MacIsaac would go through the division “order books” to predict the anticipated revenues. In

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addition, he would review the projected costs to fulfill the contracts. In my view, the steps taken by MacIsaac in preparing the annual business report for GasTOPS was simply sound financial planning for a high tech company carrying on business in an extremely competitive field. The defendants, particularly Forsyth and Brouse, claim that they played no part in the preparation of the GasTOPS annual business plan. MacIsaac did not meet with Forsyth and Brouse in preparing the annual business plan for GasTOPS, but it is totally wrong to suggest, that Brouse and Forsyth and to a lesser extent Jeff Cass did not provide any input.

[243]In preparation for the annual business plan, each vice-president would prepare an annual business plan for his division. There can be no doubt that Forsyth and Brouse and to a lesser extent Jeff Cass and Vandenberg made submissions on the data, strategy and prospective customers to be pursued for inclusion in the MSD annual business plan. Forsyth and Brouse, were responsible for the management of their program and by making recommendations as to prospective customers, sales strategies, they were in fact dictating the MSD’s revenues and profitability targets. These were eventually incorporated into the annual business plan.

[244]Rarely did the individual defendants claim at trial that their information, decision, strategies and/or recommendations were not substantially agreed to and accepted by Mr. Muir and subsequently incorporated into the MSD plan. It was Muir’s responsibility as vice-president of the MSD to ensure that the divisional plan was completed on time for incorporation into GasTOPS’ business plan. Muir accomplished this through a direct and consultative process with the defendants Forsyth and Brouse as well as Matt Tobin. Muir stated he and his managers set out a plan as a management group and that it was understood that any members of the management team who became aware of anything that would significantly impact the plan were obliged to disclose such factors to Muir specifically.

[245]Forsyth was almost exclusively responsible for the development of the technology plan for the MSD. Muir did not “decide” on what technology development would be included in the business plan. Rather as he stated, those decisions were made in direct consultation with Forsyth.

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[246]In their submissions the defendants state:

More importantly, the defendants lacked the ability to dictate the development of technology at GasTOPS. Although Mr. Forsyth could make plans as to how the technology should be developed, it was Mr. Muir who decided what would be included in the business plan. Again, the defendants had the ability to recommend but not the ability to make the decision. Furthermore, the direction of the technology was ultimately dictated by the focus of the company which was condition-based maintenance as it related to gas turbine engines.

The ability for any of the defendants to control the development of the technologies under their programs was also constrained by the development philosophy of GasTOPS. The GasTOPS philosophy was that the primary source of research and development funding had to come from customers. Although this may have been a very smart plan financially it took control of the path of product development away from the company and put it in the hands of the customer.

The end result was that Mr. Forsyth (or defendant Cass although he was not a program manager) may have been able to make decisions about what platforms to develop in or what programming language to use (so long as these were not dictated by the customer), but they could not decide the overall direction of the software.

[247]It is clear that the defendants and the other employees of the MSD division, who left GasTOPS to work with MxI did not subscribe to MacIsaac’s business philosophy. Throughout the trial, the defendants and those who worked for MxI were critical of MacIsaac’s philosophy of increasing market share on a sound financial basis. In my view, the GasTOPS’ business approach did not in any way minimize the management role of the defendants or detract from their being key employees.

Recruitment

[248]From 1991 forward, Forsyth recruited new employees for the MSD. He would visit universities and recruit through co-op programs, including the industrial experience program at Carleton. Up to 1995, Muir would meet with the managers to determine how many people were

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needed for the upcoming year. Forsyth would interview the prospective employees and then bring his recommendations for hiring to Muir. Muir and Forsyth would then engage in a consultative process to decide whether GasTOPS needed the person, assess their suitability and to consider their qualifications to work within the group.

[249]Forsyth in his evidence indicated that he had responsibility for the recruitment and the hiring of students. He described how GasTOPS hired students from several universities, recruiting students from a number of those universities. Forsyth conducted interviews at Carleton University. He would go to the university knowing how many students were needed by the company as a whole, and he would return after the interviews with a short list of students to invite into the company for second interviews with the particular groups they would work with should they be hired. The ultimate decision regarding hiring for a particular student or group of students lay with whomever they would be working for, such that if Forsyth himself had authorization from Muir to hire a student it would be Forsyth himself would make the final selection. If a student proved to be a good addition to Forsyth’s group, he could seek authority from Muir to hire him or her full-time following graduation. Salaries for students and engineers were set by the company, and Forsyth stated that he had no input in setting them.

[250]Forsyth seemed to feel that his authority in hiring employees was in some manner curtailed as he did not have control over how many new employees would be hired in a given year or what the starting salaries would be. In my view, the fact that Forsyth did not control starting salaries or determine the number of employees that would be hired in no way detracted from his authority and management responsibilities.

[251]Forsyth and Brouse indicated that they had no managerial responsibilities concerning salaries and bonuses for employees who worked on their projects. The evidence is clear that Forsyth and Brouse made recommendations as to the appropriate salaries and bonuses of their employees. There was a consultative process between Muir, Brouse and Forsyth regarding the setting of salaries. Muir indicated that the setting of salaries would usually end up being a “compromise” between what was being recommended and what Muir felt, in his capacity as vice-president, was “reasonable”. Muir determined if he would make a recommendation to

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MacIsaac for a bonus to be awarded to Forsyth, Brouse and/or Jeff Cass. Forsyth recommend to Muir a bonus for Vandenberg. The process of determining and awarding bonuses was eventually the MacIsaac’s and the vice-presidents’ responsibility, ensuring that bonuses would be consistent throughout GasTOPS and reasonable given the profits generated by the division.

Recommendations

[252]The defendants Forsyth, Brouse and Cass were entrusted with primary responsibility for the identification of potential customers, the pursuit of prospective customers, the ascertaining of those customers’ unique requirements and the face-to-face meeting with the clients.

[253]The defendants in their submissions claimed that they were only responsible for making “recommendations” to more senior management on the key issues relating to the MSD. The defendants’ submission fails to account for the key role that their recommendations played in shaping the direction of GasTOPS. The MSD was entirely project driven. It was in the context of these projects that the defendants did, in fact, have ultimate management responsibility for ensuring the successful/profitability of their program. Further and of equal importance, the defendants were responsible for participating in the future direction of business development, playing key and vital roles in the marketing the GasTOPS technology to prospective third party customers. The DOT/RCMP opportunity and/or the GE opportunity are examples of how the success or failure GasTOPS’ marketing efforts rested almost entirely on the defendants’ ability to sell the ECMS product and to convince the customer that GasTOPS was able to meet its unique requirements. On all of these fronts, MacIsaac and Muir, played little, if any, role.

[254]Forsyth and Brouse held senior management positions at GasTOPS and had the ability to direct and unilaterally affect GasTOPS’ interests. The plaintiff entrusted Forsyth and Brouse with significant business development responsibilities based on a reasonable expectation that these defendants would conduct themselves with loyalty and commitment to GasTOPS. The defendants were fully aware of the control and influence they had in the management of their respective business units, and that the plaintiff would be particularly vulnerable to their post-

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employment if they entered into competition with GasTOPS. The defendants Forsyth, Brouse and Jeff Cass, were also entrusted with direct involvement in virtually all aspects of the business being carried out by the MSD at GasTOPS. These defendants were directly involved in:

i.the development of the MSD business plans;

ii.market identification;

iii.the development and implementation of market penetration strategies;

iv.technology and product development plans, particularly as they related to the needs of existing and prospective customers;

v.direct and trusted relationships with both existing and potential customers of GasTOPS;

vi.the actual pursuit of existing corporate opportunities;

vii.direct and trusted relationships with subordinate employees within the MSD and GasTOPS; and

viii.hiring, supervision and mentorship of subordinates at GasTOPS.

Confidential Business Information Available to the Defendants

[255]The individual defendants were entrusted with direct and virtually unfettered access to confidential business information that was proprietary to GasTOPS:

(1)The MSD’s business strategy, including its market penetration strategy and product development plan;

(2)The design of the ECMS and MAINSTAY family of products;

(3)The full particulars of all aspects of GasTOPS’ pursuit of ongoing and potential contracts with entities such as the U.S. Navy, Kuwaiti Air Force, GE Corporation, Oracle Corporation, Volvo, Bombardier, the DOT/RCMP and the CAF.

[256]This information was developed, created and/or assimilated at GasTOPS through the expenditure of considerable time, effort and money and had put GasTOPS in a leading competitive position in the computerized maintenance market place by the summer of 1996. The defendants knew, as any reasonable person would know that the foregoing information and documentation, was confidential and proprietary to GasTOPS and that they had been given access to this information for the sole purpose of fulfilling their job responsibilities at GasTOPS. The defendants, in their evidence, conceded that much of the information and documentation to

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which they had access or helped to develop was confidential business information.

[257]The defendants used the plaintiff’s confidential and proprietary information concerning the existence, status and particulars of various corporate opportunities to identify their market niche and target markets. In developing their marketing strategy, the defendants used the plaintiff’s confidential and proprietary information concerning the competition in “target markets” and the entities with whom they might partner to sell their competing product. In particular, the defendants used GasTOPS’ confidential information to:

a.Identify and then maintain communications with key client contact persons on existing and prospective contracts;

b.Know customers’ precise needs and requirements and the prices they were willing to pay;

c.Convince target customers that the defendants themselves had a complete and in-depth knowledge of those needs and requirements.

[258]Through their misappropriation and unauthorized use of GasTOPS’ trade secrets, confidential and proprietary information and intellectual property, the defendants convinced customers GasTOPS was pursuing that they could provide the same software solutions. They were, in fact, able to deliver the same software solutions in a shorter timeframe than would have been possible had the defendants developed their own software from scratch. The misappropriated information was used to design and develop the Maintenix/FlightWorks software system, through which MxI obtained and competed for corporate opportunities GasTOPS had been pursuing at the time of their resignations.

[259]In my view, the defendants used GasTOPS’ confidential and proprietary information as a springboard to gain an unfair business advantage in the market place by offering GasTOPS’ existing and prospective customers a virtually seamless transition to MxI and its products. The defendants actively portrayed themselves as a “spin off” of GasTOPS that possessed all of the experience and knowledge necessary to meet existing and potential customers’ needs. The defendants indicated that their product was the next iteration of the product they had developed at GasTOPS.

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[260]In addition to the reasonable inference that the defendants were privy to and used confidential business information of GasTOPS when pursuing the business opportunities after resigning from GasTOPS, there is direct evidence that the defendants had in their possession the 1997 GasTOPS’ business plan and the GasTOPS’ United States Navy ECMS implementation plan, described by Brouse as being a “sophisticated plan”, wherein he set out the strategy by which the ECMS product could be rolled out to the U.S. Navy.

[261]Subsequent to their resignations, the defendants pursued virtually every existing and potential MSD customer: the U.S. Navy, the Kuwaiti Air Force, GE/Oracle, Volvo, Bombardier, DOT/RCMP, and CAF. When dealing with these organizations while employed at GasTOPS, the defendants acquired confidential business information. It is for this reason that as key employees of GasTOPS, the defendants were subject to a fiduciary duty not to compete unfairly with the plaintiff corporation upon resignation.

[262]During its first three years of operation, over 80% of MxI’s total income was derived from U.S. Navy contracts. Even if the defendants’ program was a not fourth iteration of GasTOPS’, its purpose and function mirrored the purpose and function of GasTOPS’ product.

[263]In this case, the personal defendants were key employees and as such subject to a fiduciary duty not to compete unfairly with their former employer. After leaving GasTOPS, they had access to and improperly used and/or allowed MxI to improperly use GasTOPS’ marketing strategy, the needs and requirements of its customers and potential customers, the identities of its customers’ and potential customers’ decision-makers, the pricing proposals it made to potential customers, details of its intellectual property and programs and details of its future marketing and product development plans. Armed with the details of the plaintiff’s contracts with its customers or the details of contracts the plaintiff was proposing or about to propose to potential customers the personal defendants either directly or through MxI competed unfairly in breach of the fiduciary duty they owed to GasTOPS when they sought the very contracts GasTOPS was pursuing when they resigned.

[264]During the early stages of this trial, the parties consented to a confidentiality order

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clearly indicating that they understood that many of the documents that would be filed were confidential business documents and, as such, they could not to reveal their contents to others.

[265]It is clear from Forsyth and Brouse’s letters of resignation that they knew that they had access to confidential business information at GasTOPS, which they promised not to use.

[266]The plaintiff alleges that the defendants misappropriated the its data model designed and developed for the ECMS v.2 and MAINSTAY software systems, the GUI, the common functionalities and the trade secrets that were contained in the specifications, user manuals and design documents of ECMS v.1 and v.2, the FLTS and MAINSTAY. It alleges that the defendants used this confidential information to design and develop Maintenix/FlightWorks.

[267]In my view, the trade secrets that the defendants acquired while working for the plaintiff regarding existing customers and potential customers were so confidential that they cannot lawfully be used by former employees for their benefit without breaching their fiduciary duty. It is clear from the evidence that a great deal of time and money was expended by GasTOPS to determine the needs of its potential customers and develop proposals to satisfy those needs. It is a reasonable inference, based on the evidence of this case, that the confidential business information to which the defendants were privy could undoubtedly help the defendants pursue the very business opportunities they had worked on at GasTOPS. In my view, the defendants, having been privy to such confidential business information, were subject to a fiduciary duty not to pursue these business opportunities. It was, in my opinion, obvious to the defendants that such information was to be treated as confidential; their resignation letters and the parties’ request for a confidentiality order at the commencement of this trial demonstrate that they understood this.

Findings

[268]By reason of the foregoing, GasTOPS was vulnerable to the defendants’ direct competition in the area of aviation maintenance software.

[269]Although Jeff Cass and Vandenberg were less involved in the business aspects of the

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MSD, they possessed extremely valuable confidential information that was proprietary to GasTOPS, namely the design and development history of the ECMS/MAINSTAY family of products. In addition, Jeff Cass had been intimately involved in ascertaining the modifications that would be necessary to this technology to meet the ongoing and/or evolving needs of GasTOPS’ existing and prospective customers. Accordingly Jeff Cass was “poised and ready” to take the subject technology to the next development level. When all of the individual defendants resigned without proper notice, GasTOPS’ vulnerability was further increased, since the defendants as a group possessed confidential information, trade secrets and customer contacts necessary to immediately compete unfairly with GasTOPS.

[270]In my view, the personal defendants were key employees and, further, owed GasTOPS a fiduciary duty. This subjected MxI’s employees to the same fiduciary duties that the personal defendants owed to GasTOPS: see Metafore Corp.v. Protek Systems (London) Inc. [2000] O.J. No. 4975 at para. 15. Whether one follows the test of vulnerability or of dependence of beneficiaries, it is clear that the personal defendants firstly were key employees, and secondly owed the plaintiff a fiduciary duty. They were responsible for developing a significant commercial component of GasTOPS’ business, and achieved that through the use of sensitive technological information that they helped develop and which was at the very core of GasTOPS’ corporate identity. In addition, they were privy to or had determined the customers’ and potential customers’ requirements.

[271]The defendants were privy to GasTOPS’ sales strategies and to contractual relations between GasTOPS and its existing and potential customers, including contractual negotiations. In many, they instances were responsible for the negotiation of the contracts.

[272]The defendants carried out their responsibilities with little if any supervision. These defendants had a high degree of responsibility and were expected to be accountable.

[273]While the defendants claim to have been solely technical employees, the case law suggests that even highly skilled technical employees may be found to be fiduciary employees if they are crucial to the direction and guidance of the company.

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[274]In my opinion these defendants as a result of their responsibilities and expertise were “key employees” of the MSD of GasTOPS and owed a fiduciary duty to the plaintiff.

Project-Specific Roles and Duties

CAF

[275]Over a span of approximately 10 years, GasTOPS had developed its business relationship with the CAF and the DND with a view to developing and supplying software technology in the area of computerized aviation maintenance. Forsyth and Brouse were actively involved in the ongoing development of business opportunities with the CAF and other related opportunities for the marketing and sale of the ECMS software from the beginning of their employment with GasTOPS. They worked towards developing the technical requirements for GasTOPS’ software product for the CAF’s CF-18 aircraft engine maintenance program and on other military and non-military opportunities for the software system.

[276]By 1996, the MSD’s support of the CF-18 aircraft engine maintenance program for the CAF was valued at approximately $1.4 million per year (Exhibit 6). In the MSD’s 1995/96 business plan (Exhibit 6), which Muir with the Forsyth and Brouse’s assistance, GasTOPS’ business with the CAF was described as follows: “The prospects for continued business growth with the CAF appear to be very good. GasTOPS enjoys a leadership position in the area of condition based maintenance at a time when the CAF is attempting to rationalize and make more effective its aircraft maintenance programs.”

[277]The 1995/96 marketing plan, prepared by the MSD with Forsyth and Brouse’s input, projected the expansion of DFTEM support contracts. Forsyth and Brouse were actively involved in proposals to the CAF for the continued development of the ECMS system and the expansion of its application to other engines and aircraft.

[278]The MSD had a TIES contract for engineering support of the CF-18-F404 engine maintenance program, which Brouse administered on behalf of GasTOPS along with Warrant Officer Paré and Captain Scott Fitzgerald on behalf of the CAF. It also had a fixed-price contract

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to provide two technical representatives, one at CFB Bagotville and one at CFB Cold Lake, in support of the CF-18-F404 engine maintenance program and a fixed price contract to provide ground stations for the CF-18 aircraft. Expectations for the 1995/1996 fiscal year included new contracts, including a fixed-price contract to develop and implement an engine parts life tracking system for the GE J85 engine located on the Tutor trainer aircraft.

[279]The MSD continued to develop software technology requirements and business opportunities with the CAF into 1996. Its 1996/97 business plan (Exhibit 8) stated that in 1995/96, “the Company significantly strengthened its position with this customer through a number of successful initiatives including: renewal of company TIES contract; development and delivery of the ECMS version 2.0; provision of new CF-18 ground stations; development of a prototype solid state TTM for the CF-18; implementation of a Tutor/J85 ECMS.”

[280]With Forsyth responsible for the technical development of the software product and Brouse as head of Aero Systems, the MSD expected to develop new programs in the next fiscal year. Such programs included the rolling out of ECMS operations at CFB Bagotville and Cold Lake and expansion of the ECMS to include non-engine CF-18 aircraft systems. The MSD was technically positioned to expand the ECMS to include the structural components of the aircraft. It was also in a position to sell the ECMS to other CAF opportunities, including the Sea King helicopter and the new Maritime Search and Rescue helicopter (Exhibit 8).

[281]In June 1996, Brouse had completed negotiations for the renewal of the TIES contract for an additional three years. The renewal was referred to as the “1996 TIES contracts” and was signed by the Crown and GasTOPS (Exhibit 45C).

[282]By July 1996, the MSD’s ECMS v.1.7 was fully operational and in the field for the CAF. The MSD’s product development team, under Jeff Cass’s supervision, was in the final stages of completing the development of ECMS v.2.0 and preparing it for the necessary factory acceptance test that were anticipated to take place in the fall of 1996.

[283]During this period, ECMS and FLTS technology were being used by the CAF on

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their fleet of F18 A and B fighter aircraft for maintenance of the F404 engines.

[284]During 1996, Forsyth, Brouse and Jeff Cass were in the development phase of expanding the application of the ECMS software technology to the entire aircraft for GasTOPS. Negotiations were ongoing with Bombardier, CAE and the CAF to provide the ECMS software as an upgrade to the DMS system, which was being used by the CAF and provided by Bombardier. The Bombardier software system provided all maintenance support for the C-18 aircraft excluding the engine. Brouse was actively involved in pursuing the opportunity to provide ECMS technology to the CAF through Bombardier. Brouse was intimately familiar with the requirements and functionality of the upgrade. In addition, Forsyth and Jeff Cass were undertaking a further enhancement of the ECMS technology, including converting the system to run on Windows 95/NT, multiple equipment types blueprint within a common database.

[285]The MSD 1995/96 Business Plan had targeted the Sea King helicopter as a potential business opportunity for the sale of the ECMS. GasTOPS began to actively market the ECMS software to the Directorate responsible for Sea King helicopter maintenance. That marketing effort resulted in GasTOPS securing a 1996 contract through CRAD to assess the feasibility of applying the ECMS software to the Sea King helicopter. Brouse was aware of this contract, under which GasTOPS undertook a cost-benefit analysis in summer 1996 to determine the effect of implementing condition-based techniques on the Sea King helicopter. ECMS v.1 was used by GasTOPS as its primary tool for marketing and demonstrating the capability of the GasTOPS’ products. The software was demonstrated to the Sea King helicopter operators.

[286]Muir and Brouse prepared a document entitled “ECMS Marketing Hierarchy” dated July 21, 1996 (Exhibit 169). This exhibit presented the MSD’s marketing plan for the ECMS and FLTS components of GasTOPS’ business. Muir prepared the basic diagram and Brouse added the Sea King opportunity as a bubble on the top of the chart.

[287]Forsyth’s role with regard to the CAF, according to the defendants, had been to manage the various research and development CRADs. When he was made a program manager, he gave up these responsibilities to concentrate on the industrial side of the MSD.

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[288]According to the defendants Brouse who was the program manager of the Aero program at GasTOPS which included the CAF work, did not have exclusive contact with the Canadian Air Force. According to various witness, there was a set protocol that dictated that Brouse spoke with lower level members of the customer while Muir, Chivers and MacIsaac had contact with higher members of the CAF. In this regard, Muir stated:

Q.While we deal with the Canadian Air Force, am I right, Mr. Muir, that when you look at the relationship between the Canadian Air Force and an outside private contractor such as GasTops, that there was what I'll call a military protocol in place, in terms of what level of person within the company would normally speak to what level of person within the Air Force?

A.I suppose that's one way of viewing it. I think that generally speaking in business to business sales or business to in this case military organizational sales, there are a number of people involved in the process. And there is a chain of command on both sides and it's not uncommon at all in a large business transaction to have meetings right up the chain of command including the top ranking GasTops person meeting with the top ranking DND persons. That’s part of the business to business sale process.

Q.All right. So let's look at that sort of business to business chain of command. Let's start here: It's my understanding that Mr. Chivers was hired out of the Canadian Air Force, correct, or he had retired from the Canadian Air Force?

A.Yes, that's right.

Q.And if I am right, he came out of that particular directorate that you -- the company did a lot of business with, that is the fighters and trainers?

A.That’s right.

Q.Am I right that Mr. Chivers had occupied the rank of Colonel within the Canadian Air Force at the time of his retirement?

A.That's right.

Q.Am I right that when we talk about him being the vice president in the area of business development, one of the key areas for

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him was to continue the relationship between GasTops and the Canadian Air Force, correct, you've told us that?

A.Yes.

[289]Muir continued:

Q.What would have been the nature of other contact as between GasTops and CAF, apart from that that is being shown here with respect to Mr. Brouse?

A.Well, the air force is a large complicated organization and we had contact up the chain of command, right to the -- certainly the director level, perhaps the director general level within the

department that this customer is in. Throughout that period I maintained contact primarily with the major, who was responsible for this project. And my role was to go periodically to see the major, Major Marc Leblanc, and simply ask him how things were going and give him an opportunity to voice any concerns he had about the work that GasTops was doing.

So that was my role, was to simply give the customer an opportunity at that level to provide us with feedback, particularly if it was related to concerns they had with the work we were doing.

At the levels above the major, we had an individual at our company, Gary Chivers, who would maintain regular contact at the senior officer level, both the Lieutenant Colonel, the Colonel and infrequently but from time to time the Brigadier General, who is the director general of the group.

Q.Did Mr. Chivers, previous to his employment with GasTops, have any involvement with the CAF?

A.Yes. Mr. Chivers was the director of this particular directorate before coming to GasTops, he was the colonel and was the director of the fighter and trainer engineering and maintenance directorate.

[290]The defendants submit that during the period of time Brouse was employed at GasTOPS, he did not move up the rank within the GasTOPS protocol for dealing with the CAF to any great extent:

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(a)As a system analyst from 1988 to 1991, Brouse worked with the Warrant Officer level staff and sometimes Captain level staff at CAF. Brouse understood that the Warrant Officer reported to a Captain who reported to a Major who reported to a Lieutenant-Colonel who reported to a Brigadier- General.

(b)In October 1991, Brouse became a project manager. He gained more responsibility for budget and work allocation and reported to Muir. As a project manager, his contact was still primarily with the Warrant Officer level of the CAF. From time to time, he would deal with Captain level. On occasion, Brouse would attend a meeting with Muir where a Major would be present.

(c)In June 1993, Brouse was the EPLTS/ECMS project manager and was responsible for defining taskings under the TIES umbrella agreement. Brouse would do the taskings in conjunction with Mr. Warring (a civilian at NRC) and Warrant Officer Paré. In addition, Brouse also managed the execution of the project.

(d)In 1993, Chivers joined GasTOPS. Chivers was a former Colonel in the CAF. Chivers became vice-present of business development at GasTOPS. By the autumn of 1994, Brouse was supporting Chivers (and also Daryl Churchill and Larry Toms in their marketing work). In terms of the protocol for contact with the CAF, MacIsaac dealt with the Brigadier-General level, Chivers dealt with the Colonel level, Muir dealt with the Major level and Brouse would have contact with the Warrant Officer and Captain levels. Churchill would have contact with the Warrant Officer and non-commission officer levels.

(e)In 1993 through to June 1996, Brouse was still dealing with Warrant Officer Paré and Warring at the CAF. Once Warring left the CAF, Brouse worked with Captain Scott MacDonald. Brouse worked almost exclusively with the F404 personnel and DFTEM.

(f)In his performance review in June 1996, Brouse requested that he be allowed to have more contact with more senior members of the CAF. According to Brouse, this did not occur prior to his resignation.

[291]According to Brouse, he had responsibility for the projects under the TIES contract which included helping to define potential taskings with the CAF staff and making sure they were executed on time and on budget. Brouse stated that he had a role in the negotiations and discussions leading up to the signing of the 1996 TIES contract. According to Brouse, he wrote the GasTOPS’ proposal and response to an RFP from the government although he claimed that

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there were sections that he did not write. I gather from the evidence that he was responsible for the operation of the proposal. The defendants argue that the responsibility for negotiating the CAF contracts was shifted from MacIsaac to Muir within three or four years of Muir joining the company. At that point in time (mid-1980’s) MacIsaac saw it as a “repeat” customer and, whereas he kept control of other customers, he gave up control of the repeat customers early on. In addition, the defendants argue that Brouse was not in control of the overall strategy for gaining business within the CAF. This responsibility was shared between MacIsaac, Muir, Chivers and Brouse. Muir stated that by January 1996:

Q.Right. Am I right that it was your view that when it came to business strategy, in particular with the Canadian Air Force and other related Air Force customers, that it was the team of Mr. MacIsaac, Gary Chivers, Doug Brouse and yourself that were involved in that, correct?

A.Yes. In terms of the development of strategy. I'm primarily responsible, and I'm working together with Doug Chivers and MacIsaac.

[292]The defendants also submit that when GasTOPS sought to pursue further work with the Canadian Air Force by way of an unsolicited proposal to expand the ECMS program, none of the defendants authored the proposal which was forwarded by Chivers to Colonel Parch. Chivers stated:

Q.Let me take you to Exhibit 129. You identified for us

yesterday this covering letter of April 2, 96 from yourself addressed directly to Colonel Partch; correct?

A.Yes.

Q.We know from your evidence that Colonel Partch is now occupying the same position that you had occupied at the time you left the Canadian Air Force; correct?

A.Correct.

Q.Am I right, it was a conscious decision at GasTops to have you send the proposal directly to Colonel Partch in order that it have its maximum impact; correct?

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A.Correct.

[293]The defendants submit that they did not carry any influence or sway with the CAF and thus GasTOPS was not made vulnerable to unfair competition by their resignations. The defendants rely upon the statement of Muir as follows:

Q.Am I right that the practice was that if Mr. Brouse was

going to have contact about the level of captain, inevitably it would be either with yourself or perhaps Mr. Chivers simply because of that protocol we've been talking about, correct?

A.Usually Chivers. Again, Brouse especially as a program manager can make use of Chivers to execute the business development or the project related activities that he wants to do. If he wants to get into a certain office and present a certain proposal or issue, Gary was able to provide Mr. Brouse with entry to that office.

Q.That’s my point. He would use Mr. Chivers as his resource in order gain entrance in some fashion, correct?

A.That's right.

[294]The defendants submit that Chivers was the person in charge of GasTOPS’ government business. Chivers was hired by GasTOPS to bring in business and his title was vice- president of business development. Chivers stated:

Q.Now when you joined GasTops in 1993, what position did

you take?

A.I was hired as the vice president of business development.

Q.And can you give us a brief description of the scope of that position?

A.My primary responsibilities were associated with the development and maintenance of government business, GasTops and the Government of Canada.

Q.What would your duties responsibilities have been, firstly within GasTops, then, secondly, with respect to the government business?

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A.Well, probably best to answer the government business first is my responsibilities were to advance the business of GasTops within the Government of Canada, specifically the Canadian Armed Forces.

Q.Within GasTops?

A.Within GasTops I reported directly to the president, Bernie MacIsaac, and was responsible for developing GasTops' business within the Government of Canada.

[295]Based on this evidence, the defendants submit that Brouse’s role when employed at GasTOPS with the Canadian Air Force did not have the hallmarks of a fiduciary. In particular, the defendants argue that he did not have exclusive or high level contact with the customer, he was not the one with a relationship of trust or influence with the customer, nor was he the primary person planning the strategy for this customer.

[296]In my view, Brouse and Forsyth, were fiduciaries of GasTOPS and as such breached their fiduciary duties to GasTOPS vis-à-vis the CAF opportunity because:

(a)Positions held by the defendant employee”: Brouse, Forsyth and Jeff Cass held positions at GasTOPS which provided them with direct and unfettered access to all information relating to GasTOPS’ business dealings with the CAF. Forsyth was responsible for the technical development of the software product and Brouse, as head of “Aero system” negotiated the contracts with the CAF, including the renewal of the TIES contract, which resulted in the 1996 TIES contract.

(b)Nature of the corporate opportunity”: GasTOPS’ corporate opportunities with the CAF were unique and all contracts were sole source, providing for the research, development and provisions of computer software systems for the CAF to facilitate the process of aircraft maintenance.

(c)Ripeness of the corporate opportunity”: GasTOPS had spent years in meetings and negotiations with the CAF to design and develop the requirements and functionalities that were needed by the CAF. Brouse and Forsyth were intimately involved with the CAF in order to understand all of the requirements and functionality that had to be designed and developed.

(d)Specificness of the corporate opportunity”: The opportunity that GasTOPS had with the CAF and in particular, the roll-out of the 1996 TIES contract,

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was the exact opportunity that Brouse and Forsyth, were trying to take over in November and December 1996.

(e)Amount of knowledge possessed by the defendant employees concerning the specifics of the opportunity”: Brouse, Forsyth and Jeff Cass were in possession of all of GasTOPS’ knowledge of the requirements and functionality that was contained within the software products developed for the CAF, including all of the modules that comprised the ECMS v.2 software system.

(f)Circumstances surrounding the corporate opportunity, was it special or private?”: It was only through the direct communications with the CAF that GasTOPS, including Brouse, Forsyth and Jeff Cass came to have a complete understanding of the CAF requirements for their software systems.

(g)The time factor”: Brouse and Forsyth were in contact with the key customer contacts (Warrant Officer Paré and Captain Scott MacDonald) prior to their resignation, in order to advise them of their coming resignations from GasTOPS. Within a matter of days after resigning, Brouse and Forsyth were attempting to convince the CAF through Warrant Officer Paré and Captain Scott MacDonald that MxI in a position to compete the 1996 TIES contract. In his “summary log” for the month of October 1996 (Exhibit 1322 at page 8), Jeff Cass stated:

Captain Scott MacDonald dropped into MxI. He went to lunch with Brad and Doug. Scott is willing to push hard for the ECMS IP change to MxI. He said the TIES would be openly competed and the process will take at least four months. He said that Orenda would like the source code as well and they may be made prime in any arrangement. Orenda wanted [desperately] to hire ex-GasTOPS employees as they felt this was their chance to get back into the systems development arena.

[297]When I consider the above facts, I am convinced that Brouse, Forsyth and Jeff Cass all owed a fiduciary duty to GasTOPS and part of that fiduciary duty was not to misappropriate GasTOPS’ business opportunities with the CAF and/or interfere with GasTOPS’ contractual arrangements with the CAF.

[298]Prior to their resignations, Forsyth and Brouse arranged to meet with Warrant Officer Michel Paré (“Paré”), their primary contact on work related to the CAF. The defendants advised

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Warrant Officer Paré that they were about to resign from their positions at GasTOPS. The CAF was one of GasTOPS’ most valued customers. Warrant Officer Paré, after being advised that Brouse and Forsyth intended to resign from GasTOPS, arranged for them to meet with his superior officer, Captain Scott McDonald, who they also advised of their intentions to resign from GasTOPS. Having regard to the post-resignation conduct of Brouse and Forsyth, it is a reasonable inference that the purpose of their meeting with Warrant Officer Paré and Captain McDonald was to set the stage to pursue CAF business for MxI.

[299]During the trial it came to light that Forsyth, while employed at GasTOPS albeit a few days before his resignation, prepared a detailed diagram depicting the business process to be followed in his new company (Exhibit 2195). Exhibit 2195 was initially created on October 2, 1996 on a computer which bore the name “Forsyth”. This information appears from the “Properties” of the electronic file. The business process diagram as prepared by Forsyth, was similar to the business process diagram which was used by GasTOPS. The business process chart as prepared by Forsyth prior to resigning from GasTOPS appears in all of the MxI business plans from 1996 through to 1998. It is clear that Forsyth was preparing this business process plan for MxI while he was still employed at GasTOPS. This is a clear breach of his ongoing fiduciary obligation to GasTOPS while in its employ.

U.S. Navy

[300]One of Brouse’s primary responsibilities at GasTOPS was to pursue sales of GasTOPS’ ECMS product to both the U.S. Navy and GE. At trial, Brouse was asked to confirm that he was responsible, in part, for the marketing and sales of ECMS at GasTOPS. He stated:

Well, as I said in-chief, what I was responsible for was supporting the sales effort and supporting marketing effort of the ECMS; for the most part I was doing two things: I was demonstrating the system and fielding technical questions on behalf GasTOPS and B. F. Goodrich, as well as helping prepare statements of work and definition of what we could do for the United States Navy.

[301]As noted above, in my view, the written documents prepared by Brouse are far more accurate than his viva voce evidence. The role that Brouse played in the marketing of the ECMS

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product to the U.S. Navy is demonstrated in the list of “D. Brouse Accomplishments” authored by Brouse himself, in anticipation of his 1996 performance review (Exhibit 300). Under the sub- heading “USN”. Brouse described his own accomplishments: “Successfully caught the USN’s attention whereby we are presently well positioned to gain a large contract.”

[302]Further evidence of the role played by Brouse in the pursuit of the sale of ECMS licenses to the U.S. Navy is reflected in the draft sub-contract agreement between GasTOPS and MxI dated October 31, 1996. In the preamble to the agreement (Exhibit 367 at page 1) Brouse wrote:

WHEREAS GasTOPS has carried out marketing activities related to participating in the procurement of an Engine Condition Monitoring System (ECMS) to or on the behalf of the United States Navy (USN).

WHEREAS certain former employees of GasTOPS who are now employees of MxI were primarily responsible for such activities and would have been primarily responsible for carrying out the implementation of any contract relating to the ECMS for the USN.

It is clear from this document that Brouse and the other members of MxI considered themselves as the personnel at GasTOPS primarily responsible for the marketing efforts of ECMS products to the U.S. Navy and for the procurement of contracts with the U.S. Navy.

[303]I find it astounding that Brouse and Forsyth would suggest that they were not key employees at GasTOPS, and more particularly within the MSD, and that they were not responsible for the development and sale of ECMS products to the U.S. Navy. Mr. Howe of B.F.Goodrich, with whom GasTOPS was partnering in an attempt to secure the U.S. Navy opportunity, put it this way:

Q.Now, Mr. Howe, can you just describe us for us in general terms, say up until the end of August, 1996, the nature of your working relationship with Mr. Brouse in the pursuit of these opportunities?

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A.Basically Doug was introduced early -- I believe early in -- fairly early in the process as the person who would be the technical expert for our demonstrations and would help with all of the -- and provide all of the tech data for the proposals, and would also act as the Gas Tops marketing representative who would work directly with me in forming strategy for the pursuit of the U.S. Navy ECMS and FLTS opportunity, as well as the GE ECMS opportunity, to provide an enterprise-wide solution at GE.

Q.And can you describe the nature of the information flow as between the two of you?

A.Typically we would have frequent telephone strategy sessions. There were meetings many times, as often as every month, to talk about the strategy and to talk -- and we met obviously when we travelled together, which was frequent as you can see from the record, making these briefings. It was a pretty much hand-in-glove relationship where we had to be both knowledgeable of what was happening from the point of view of the pursuit plan.

Q.And as between yourself and Mr. Brouse, which of the two of you would have had more knowledge of the technical requirements of the United States Navy?

A.Clearly Mr. Brouse.

[304]Brouse sought to downplay the role he assumed in GasTOPS’ marketing efforts to the U.S. Navy. Brouse claimed that he was merely supporting the sales process through Brad Howe of B.F.Goodrich, but it is clear that Brouse had direct and influential contact with various representatives within the U.S. Navy, including Lieutenant Matt Herl, Terry Chandler, Ray Lebeau, as well as Robert White of McDonnell Douglas Aerospace (“MDA”). Through his marketing efforts, Brouse acquired an in-depth understanding of the U.S. Navy technical requirements, the details and limitations of existing legacy software systems, the details of possible alternative software solutions, as well as the full particulars of the technology the U.S. Navy sought.

[305]Brouse also learned while working at GasTOPS about the political hierarchy within the sections of the U.S. Navy, the key players in the U.S. Navy’s decision-making process and

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the U.S. Navy’s procurement process. As a result of Brouse’s direct interaction with Lieutenant Matt Herl, he was able to convince Herl that he (Brouse) had a complete understanding as to the U.S. Navy’s requirements and that he had access to the solution to the U.S. Navy’s requirements.

[306]Brouse’s logbooks for the period of September 1995 through October 1996 (Exhibits 58, 140 and 96) are replete with entries that evidenced the corporate intelligence that Brouse was gathering while in pursuit of the U.S. Navy opportunities on behalf of GasTOPS. The information, collected over a period of approximately 12 months, was gathered by Brouse at closed door U.S. Navy meetings, through direct and private telephone conversations with various U.S. Navy contacts, through interaction and communications with GasTOPS’ partner, B.F.Goodrich, through attendance at GasTOPS’ management meetings and through extensive face-to-face contact with key representatives of the U.S. Navy, including Lieutenant Herl who unfortunately died prior to the commencement of this trial. Brouse used this information to develop sophisticated marketing plans and strategies (Exhibits 93, 2136, 1890 and 1889), all of which were relied upon by GasTOPS and B.F.Goodrich to bring the U.S. Navy opportunity to near fruition. The confidential business information that Brouse gathered and was privy to while employed at GasTOPS can be seen in his daily logbooks, Exhibit 2135 (February 20, 1995 – September 18, 1995); Exhibit 58 (September 25, 1995 – April 15, 1996); Exhibit 140 (April 16, 1996 – August 21, 1996) and Exhibit 96 (August 25, 1996 – October 4, 1996).

[307]Brouse did not produce any of his logbooks after he resigned from GasTOPS; Forsyth did produce his. Brouse claims that at least one of his logbooks was lost after he left GasTOPS. When I review the details in Brouse’s logbooks while at GasTOPS, I believe that Brouse continued to maintain logbooks while at MxI and, based on his failure to disclose other relevant documents, deliberately “lost” or disposed of such logbooks in order to avoid having to disclose them. It is a reasonable inference that Brouse’s logbooks contained notations which would contradict his evidence.

[308]In his capacity as the GasTOPS’ representative primarily responsible for marketing the GasTOPS’ programs to the U.S. Navy, Brouse was required to assimilate all of the information he was gathering into detailed sales strategies for the ECMS and FLTS products.

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Brouse authored a document that explained the manner in which the ECMS product could be used for the F-18 program by PMA265 (Program Management Authority 265) in the context of the Automated Maintenance Environment (“AME”) development. The document was entitled “Proposed Role of the ECMS within the F/A-18 Program” (Exhibit 1890).

[309]Howe of B.F.Goodrich stated that Exhibit 1890 was delivered to the U.S. Navy in August of 1996 as part of the GasTOPS’ marketing effort. In the “introduction” section of Exhibit 1890 Brouse provided a succinct summary of his understanding as to the opportunity that was available to GasTOPS in the context of the U.S. Navy’s AME initiative. Brouse wrote:

The United States Navy (USN) presently operates a fleet of F/A- 18 aircraft as the backbone of their aircraft carrier fighter fleet. In order to maintain these aircraft more cost effectively, the USN has a requirement for a comprehensive information system to manage the F/A-18 maintenance data. Presently the maintenance data is managed using an assortment of software systems. These systems differ at each level of maintenance and are inconsistent in terms of hardware and software architectures, support required, and as a result are cumbersome to integrate. The Navy’s most serious problem is at the O-level whereby maintenance information support is provided by the Engine Configuration and Monitoring System (“ECAMS”) which is a 1970’s vintage computer system (i.e. the DEC PDP-11) that suffers from reliability problems and is difficult to maintain due to the unavailability of spare components.

To resolve this problem, the USN plans to develop and implement the Automated Maintenance Environment (AME) which will be designed to support F/A-18 C through F class aircraft and will provide an integrated approach to maintenance data collection, management and utilization. The USN has adopted an aggressive schedule for delivery of this system, whereby an interim, GUI- based system will be fielded at the O-level in 1997, and the comprehensive, complete system which includes all levels of maintenance will be implemented in 1999. It is noted that the AME will not be designed to support the aging F/A-18 A and B model which are planned to be phased-out of the Navy fleet in the near future.

The USN has identified that the commercially available Engine

Condition Monitoring System (ECMS) and the First Line

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Troubleshooting System (FLTS) could be used as a component of the AME. The ECMS and FLTS have been used by the Canadian Air Force (CAF) for over ten years to support their fleet of F/A-18 aircraft. It is a mature, robust system that can provide many of the functions required for the AME, including serialized configuration tracking, engine diagnostics, engine trending, technical directive tracking and maintenance scheduling.

[310]Under the sub-heading “Proposed Role of the ECMS within AME”, of Exhibit 1890, Brouse wrote:

As shown in Figure 1, it is proposed that the ECMS/FLTS be integrated as a client PC into this Local Area Network (LAN) architecture. The current functionality of the ECMS/FLTS meets and exceeds that of the current ECAMS system and would provide the following comprehensive maintenance information support for the F/A aircraft and engines:

aircraft reports regarding avionic, airframe (including airframe fatigue), and armament data

wide area network data transfer to other sites and computers (including ADF and airframe fatigue data) and replication (for data viewing purposes)

engine serialized engine configuration tracking

engine diagnostics

engine trending and maintenance prognostics

engine life tracking

engine maintenance scheduling including inspections, technical directives, scheduled removals, and periodics

engine status and logistic reports

The functionality described above is focussed primarily on the management of engine information. However, it is noted that with minor software modifications, the ECMS functions could be utilized to provide maintenance information support to the entire F/A aircraft. In that regard the system would:

manage the serialized tracking of all airframe, avionic and armament systems;

perform life tracking for the airframe in terms of the FLEI’s data;

schedule all aircraft and subcomponent inspections,

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technical directives, scheduled removals, periodics, and phase activities; and

provide aircraft status and logistics reports.

Utilizing the ECMS to support the entire aircraft offers several advantages to the USN. In addition to providing a single workstation with a common user interface to support both aircraft and engine, the system could be implemented quickly and with minimal risk.

[311]At page 5 of Exhibit 1890, under the sub-heading “Interim F/A-18 Support”:

As described above, the AME will be designed specifically for the F/A-18 C through E type aircraft only, and as a result, no support is planned for the A and B model types. In order to manage these aircraft, it is proposed that the ECMS/FLTS be fielded as a ‘stand- alone’ system for this fleet. Since the ECMS/FLTS is used specifically for A and B aircraft in this configuration in Canada, the system can be rapidly deployed and set-to-work. This early deployment would have the advantage of exposing a component of the AME to the users prior to complete AME implementation such that useful feedback to the AME developers could be provided.

Furthermore, if the USN determines that support is required for the C and D model types prior to the implementation of the AME, the ECMS/FLTS could be configured (with minor software modifications) to support these aircraft in a stand-alone configuration. Subsequently, as the AME initiative is implemented, the ECMS/FLTS systems would be ported to the Unix client-server configuration with no loss of investment to the USN. Figure 3 depicts the ‘stand-alone’ ECMS/FLTS system.

[312]Based on Exhibit 1890, one of the opportunities that GasTOPS was pursuing was for the ECMS to be a component part of the U.S. Navy’s AME initiative. It was being proposed that the ECMS/FLTS products be used on all of the United States Navy’s fleet of F/A-18 aircraft, models A through F, for both engine and airframe data. The primary functionality to be provided included serialized configuration tracking. The GasTOPS’ ECMS product would act as an ECAMS replacement.

[313]Brouse had known well in advance of his authorship of Exhibit 1890 that the U.S.

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Navy had identified the GasTOPS’ ECMS software as being a viable source of configuration management technology. As set out in Exhibit 80, Brouse’s Trip Report from the U.S. Navy visit, dated July 8, 1996, he knew that the ECMS data stripping and configuration management technologies were being considered as a component part of the AME initiative.

[314]Brouse also authored a document entitled “ECMS/FLTS Opportunity as MDPS Replacement” (Exhibit 1889). The document described the manner in which the ECMS product could be used as an MDPS replacement. At page 1 of Exhibit 1889, under the sub-heading “Background”, Brouse wrote:

The United States Navy is presently developing a generalized ground station called the Maintenance Data Processing System (MDPS) that is designed to support the data processing needs of their fleet of aircraft at both the 0, I and Depot levels of maintenance (i.e. First Line, Second Line and Depot). As best as we can determine, the MDPS is planned to support the F/A-18, the F-14, the V22 as well as several other aircraft that are classified in nature. As a first release of the system, the unit has been targetted specifically for the F/A-18 and the F-14 B and D class. In my opinion these weapon systems have been targetted because of their on-board data collection systems and their unique engine fatigue life requirements. The scope of this initial [sic] release involves 135 0-Level squadrons and 23 I-level sites.

It is noted that the GasTOPS FLTS and ECMS products, in their present form, can meet most of the MDPS requirement.

Also at page 1 of Exhibit 1889, under the sub-heading “Status of the MDPS”, Brouse wrote:

The MDPS system was originally to be delivered ~1991, but the delivery date has been moved several times and numerous revised delivery schedules have been missed. Most recently, the delivery schedule has been moved from August 1995 to August 1997. Total cost to date - $110 million.

Presently the MDPS is about to enter a technical evaluation phase (“TechEval”) at PAX River that has been targetted to last 6 months. Although this phase has not yet officially started, preliminary reports arising from the final stages of development/testing indicate that the system is performing poorly

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and over 200 software trouble reports (STR’s) have been raised. We have been told that the problems are significant in nature and include poor performance as well as logic processing errors. As a result, the MDPS Program Manager (Don Martin) has privately identified a requirement to fund a trial (“Demo”) of the GasTOPS system.

In addition, our lobbyist at Hill and Knowlton has determined that GasTOPS is well positioned to be contracted as a replacement to the MDPS. His intelligence has determined that, as a result of our successful presentation at PAX River, the Navy sees us as the number one contender if the MDPS fails. Apparently the Navy harbours little doubt (except for volume and deployability issues) that the ECMS could readily meet and exceed their needs.

Further at page 1 of Exhibit 1889, under the sub-heading “MDPS Functionality”, Brouse wrote:

The MDPS is to be the primary data collection source of aircraft data. It has been designed to interface to specialized hardware such as the Aircraft Data Interface Device (ADID) and the New Aircraft Data Interface Device (NADID), which are similar to the GasTOPS FDIU (i.e. devices used to interface to Aircraft Data Units such as the TTM’s and Digital Storage Units (DSU’s)). The data is then used by the MDPS to provide considerable functionality. This functionality is described in the ‘Prime Item Development Specification” for the MDPS and is summarized in the following table. Those requirements that are presently met by the FLTS/ECMS are identified.

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It is noted that the ECMS and FLTS provide considerably more functionality than described above.

The MDPS architecture is as follows:

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-486 PC

-Unix Operating System with Motif GUI

-Oracle

-TCP/IP Network

With the exception of the Unix operating system, this architecture is compatible with the ECMS/FLTS. It would be anticipated that the 0-level PC hardware could be used to host the ECMS and FLTS.

At pages 3 and 4 of Exhibit 1889, under the sub-heading “Scope of Our Offer”, Brouse wrote:

In order to meet the MDPS requirement, it is noted that GasTOPS need only offer a portion of the ECMS and FLTS functionality. The necessary function could be readily integrate together due to the modular structure of our systems. Features which are not part of the MDPS specification such as the diagnostic, predictive, fault defect reporting, and maintenance scheduling capabilities of our system could be offered as costed options.

It is noted that the original MDPS was to forward data to a PLTS II system that would provide fleet-wide tracking of engine configuration and life status. As part of our offer, we would replace this system with an ECMS unit. Furthermore, we would provide modification tracking for engine components.

Some non-recurring engineering will be required to meet the MDPS requirement. This involves software customization to meet the unique requirements of the Navy including interfaces to other information system and equipment, customized reports and maintenance input forms. Most notably an interface to the ADID/NADID device would be required. Furthermore, considerable effort will be required to set-up the system, populate it with data and train the users.

With regard to the F/A-18 and F-14 opportunity, our offer can be summarized as follows:

-deliver ~160 ECMS/FLTS units as MDPS replacements at 0, I and Depot level sites

-deliver an ECMS unit as a PLTS II replacement

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-provide engine component modification tracking (addition to MDPS requirements)

Non-recurring engineering would include:

-development of interfaces to ADID/NADID

-development of interfaces to other information systems

-development of customized reports and data entry screens

-system set-up and database population

-system installation

-user training

Costed Options Include:

-engine diagnostics

-predictive capability and trending

-fault/defect reporting

-maintenance scheduling

Finally, at the end of the proposal, Brouse wrote: “It is expected that the system would first be implemented for the F/A-18. Considering this aircraft represents a large portion of the Navy’s fleet, it is hoped that the system would then be used as a fleet-wide MDPS replacement.”

[315]Based on Exhibit 1889, GasTOPS was also pursuing an opportunity to provide configuration management and data stripping technology to the U.S. Navy if ECMS became a replacement for the failing MDPS system. It was anticipated, that the initial focus would be on PMA265s F/A-18 fleet of aircraft, with the hope and expectation that the ECMS would then be used across the entirety of the U.S. Navy’s fleet of aircraft.

[316]While employed at GasTOPS, Brouse authored a document entitled “U.S. Navy ECMS Implementation Plan” (Exhibits 93 and 2186). Exhibit 2186 (the U.S. Navy ECMS implementation plan) was found in MxI’s 1999 Lotus back-up in Forsyth’s file USNIMPL2. The

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ECMS Implementation Plan outlined the manner in which the GasTOPS’ ECMS product could be rolled out to the U.S. Navy’s fleet of F/A-18 aircraft. At trial, Brouse described the ECMS Implementation Plan (Exhibits 93 and 2186) as follows:

A.Brad Howe was asked to present at this meeting the B. F. Goodrich GasTOPS vision of how to provide an ECAMS replacement for the interim. And Mr. Howe and Mr. Muir had tasked me to come up with a plan as to how we could deliver the ECMS as a replacement for the ECAMS system.

Q.And did you in fact do that?

A.I did. I come came up with a pretty -- I thought a pretty sophisticated plan for how we could take the ECMS system and deliver it to the Navy in under a year time frame and deliver it to the Navy where it would have zero or at least minimal impact to their operations.

He came up with a pretty – I thought I pretty sophisticated plan and for how we could take the ECMS system and deliver it to the Navy in under a year time frame and deliver it to the Navy where it would have zero or at least minimal impact to their operations.

Later, in cross-examination, Brouse stated:

Q.Mr. Brouse, on day 162 of your evidence -- the search term, Your Honour, would be “sophisticated plan".

In describing this document, Mr. Brouse, you said “I came up with a pretty, I thought a pretty sophisticated plan for how we could take the ECMS system and deliver it to the Navy in under a year time frame, and deliver it to the Navy where it would have zero or at least minimal impact to their operations”?

A.Yes.

Q.And that was a true and accurate statement, Mr. Brouse; correct?

A.Yes.

Q.And that implementation plan, Mr. Brouse, would have represented the culmination of a fair amount of information

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gathering on the part of yourself, learning what the Navy's operational setup was and what their requirements were; correct?

A.I wouldn't say that. I mean, what you need to know, I think, for that implementation plan was what the ECAMS system did, which is provide a specification to us. As well as be aware of where these things were located, maybe a little bit about how they operated them. But that was really -- that is the key fodder for the information you would need to come up with that plan.

You probably would have to know about PLTS2 as well, a little bit.

Q.Mr. Brouse, clearly you knew by this date about optimized NALCOMIS; correct?

A.I had heard of it now, I think I'd heard of it once in the late August of ‘96.

Q.We've already seen your logbook two or three references to NALCOMIS; correct?

A.Right. But the reference to the optimized NALCOMIS, I think I had learned of it in late August.

Q.And you knew all about the AME initiative; correct?

A.I knew about the AME initiative.

Q.And as you've just indicated, you knew about the shortcomings of the ECAMS system; correct?

A.The ECAMS or the MDPS?

Q.The ECAMS system?

A.Yes, I did, yes.

Q.You also knew about the intended functionality of the MDPS and the status of its development; correct?

A.Yes. I did know that, yes.

Q.You had received information from various sources as to the various levels of maintenance within the United States Navy; correct?

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A.Yes.

Q.All of that information was taken into account by you in the preparation of this implementation plan; correct?

A.It was, yes.

Q.As I understand it from looking at the various productions, this document represents the, in your words, the most sophisticated implementation plan that had been developed to date; correct?

A.It was, in my opinion, a clever plan, not because of the technical nature of it -- I'm not a terribly technical person. It was clever in the concept of replacing these ECAMS units with ECMS is that whereby the other ECAMS units or the PLTS database upline wouldn't be able to identify that a replacement had occurred. It was a form fit functionality concept.

Q.Right. So you also knew about the PLTS system and its functionality and what was required to minimize the impact on that, correct, that is what you're saying?

A.I knew about the PLTS system. I didn't know much about PLTS, quite frankly. I thought -- I didn't know, I mean, I knew that the ECAMS sent up information. I knew that if we got the specifications for that, that we could mimic the same data going up.

So it was still important to, as part of this process, and I think we've seen in the logbook we had to gather much more information to be able to execute that plan.

Q.Given everything that you've just said about this plan, obviously the plan itself was commercially valuable to GasTOPS; correct?

A.I don't know what you mean, really.

Q.Pardon me?

A.I don't think I understand your question.

Q.Well, the implementation plan that you drafted, as sophisticated as it was, was commercially valuable to GASTOPS; GasTOPS would not want a competitor to get its hands on this

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plan, would it?

A.I doubt they would, no.

Q.It's a fact, they would not, Mr. Brouse. In your capacity as an employee at GasTOPS, you would not have handed this plan to somebody that's marketing the GOLD system?

A.Well, the reality is we did give the plan directly to the MDPS people at that very meeting. So it was a good plan. It was, I thought, a creative plan because of the approach. We didn't seal it up with confidentiality statements; and in fact we gave it directly to Jeff Kniola at that meeting in September.

Q.You gave it to the persons within the United States Navy that you have to give it to in order to further the opportunity from GasTOPS' perspective; correct?

A.Well, I guess Mr. Yach, if we were truly concerned about it, we could have easily gone to the Navy and to Lieutenant Herl and said we're giving this to you, but we don't want it shared with Bob Green from -- I forget the name of his organization -- or Jeff Kniola, and we didn't do that.

It was a creative plan, but I don't know how commercially sensitive it was. I wasn't terribly concerned about it. I mean fundamentally, to execute this plan, you know, you had to have a product like ECMS or MDP.

Q.Let me put it to you this way, Mr. Brouse, assume that there was some other third party corporation that operated out of the United States who was not involved with the United States Navy up to this point but who had a product that they could potentially sell to the United States Navy on this opportunity, all right. Can you assume that?

A.I can assume that.

Q.You would not want, Mr. Brouse, your ECMS implementation plan to be given to that corporation; is that fair?

A.I don't know if it really matters, Mr. Yach, quite frankly, if an implementation plan is not a design document, it's not a functional specification, it's a roll-out plan.

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Q.Mr. Brouse, you've just indicated in your evidence that you thought this was a clever plan because it would serve to minimize the impact on the U.S. Navy's operations and it would permit the implementation of ECMS within a specific time frame; you've already given that evidence, Mr. Brouse?

A.It's a clever plan, Mr. Yach. Quite frankly the concept is clever; the concept could be described to somebody in two sentences.

You're right, I think our druther would be that if there was this third party competitor with a product, our druther would be not to have it. But the reality is that we didn't try to protect it. The reality is we did give it to people that were competing with us.

Jeff Kniola, and it was quite clear in the meeting in September, when he was making his version of the MDPS, was very eager to compete with us and that plan was handed right to him, and nobody said he shouldn't get it. It was handed to Bob Green from Logicon as well.

[317]In my view, even though the document was shared with the U.S. Navy and more particularly Lieutenant Herl, it was a confidential business document that was the property of GasTOPS and should never have been in the care and control of Forsyth and/or Brouse after they resigned from GasTOPS. I have no doubt that Forsyth and/or Brouse made use of this confidential business document which belonged to GasTOPS on behalf of MxI.

[318]The analysis by Brouse of the status of the U.S. Navy opportunities, as articulated in Exhibits 1889 and 1890 was also reflected in a document entitled “NAVAIR ECMS/FLTS – Long-Term Tactical Action Plan” (Exhibit 92) authored by Howe and Brouse and dated September 22, 1996.

[319]Exhibit 92 identified that the failed or failing ECAMS and MDPS systems gave rise to the U.S. Navy’s need for configuration management and data stripping technology. Exhibit 92 also outlined that the MDPS was to be a component part of the AME initiative and that it was to be deployed on the F-18 E and F, as well as on the V-22 aircraft. Page 3 of Exhibit 92 under the sub-heading “Action Plan”, both “short-term” and “long-term” goals were identified. The “short-

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term” goal was described as being a replacement for ECAMS and PLTS for the F-18 A, B, C and D model aircraft whereby comprising the “MDPS core”. It was anticipated that if the short-term goal was obtained, the GasTOPS/B.F.Goodrich team might be allowed to continue to participate in the AME/Aviation Maintenance Integrated Diagnostics Demonstration (“AMIDD”) development process and ultimately become the MDPS replacement of the F-18 E and F, F14 and V-22 fleet of aircraft.

[320]The existence and particulars of the U.S. Navy opportunities, as articulated by Brouse in Exhibits 1889 and 1890 were confirmed at trial by witnesses from the U.S. Navy. They confirmed that GasTOPS’ ECMS was being seriously considered as the means by which the U.S. Navy might procure the configuration management/data stripping technology that it was seeking. Terry Chandler gave evidence concerning the functionality of the proposed MDPS, saying that it was intended to do data stripping, parts life tracking, and configuration management. It was “intended to be integrated with other suites or other applications, like interactive technical manuals and things like that,” but these three features were its guiding functions.

[321]Chandler then testified concerning the demonstrations of the GasTOPS’ ECMS product that were given in February of 1996 to various representatives within the U.S. Navy:

A.That particular demonstration, to put it quite frankly, blew everyone's socks off. They had never seen anything like this before. The majority of the configuration management, logistics management tools that the Navy was using at that particular time were very cumbersome, very difficult to operate and extremely labour intensive. The reliability of the data was always in question.

This system provided one-stop shopping for any manager that had an asset that they had to track. It also ensured that -- one of the things that we try to do in the Navy is capture realtime data, where does the best information occur? Right at the aircraft; right off the aircraft. We'd never been able be to truly do that before. This product offered that kind of functionality and was purported to provide that. From what we'd heard from the Canadian Air Force, it was doing that for them right then and there. A lot of people were very, very intrigued.

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My commanding officer, Commander Mark Stone was impressed. Many of the managers within the Naval Aviation Maintenance Office wanted more information. So it was a constant -- after that demonstration it was a constant parade through my office of people wanting more, wanting to hear more. I was presenting to people at all levels of leadership through NAVAIR and the Naval Aviation Maintenance Office. There was a lot of excitement.

[322]Further, and with respect to Lieutenant Herl and the development of the Super Hornet E and F aircraft, Chandler stated:

Q.All right. How did the GasTOPS ECMS product fit into Lieutenant Herl's mandate?

A.It provided a new realtime planning capability, configuration management, ownership rules, a lot -- and new ideas as well that he could embrace within that F-18 program. One point that I wanted to make is when you were -- I'm sorry. When you are in the middle of R and D cycle like the E/F was -- the Super Hornet was at that particular time. It's very well funded.

The problem with pushing a product through NAVAIR has always been finding funding. If you can get a sponsor like Lieutenant Herl, that had plenty of money to put on a system, to evolve it, make it a Navy working core [ph] system, then you've hit the jackpot. Lieutenant Herl was that kind of sponsor, he had the funding available.

So the ECMS approach took on a real tangible life. We had a sponsor; we had a potential customer that was interested, and that was lieutenant Herl.

[323]Accordingly, based on the evidence of Chandler, the U.S. Navy had identified GasTOPS’ ECMS as a potential source of configuration management and parts life tracking technology both in the context of the failing MDPS and for use on the new Super Hornet F-18 E and F aircraft and which were the subject matter of the AME development. Further, Chandler’s evidence provides clear insight into the value of GasTOPS’ relationship with Lieutenant Herl. Lieutenant Herl had the requirement, the money and had become a “champion” and advocate of the ECMS solution.

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[324]At trial, and with respect to the MDPS, Raymond Lebeau testified that MDPS was cancelled after objections were raised that the program would never be completed or would never do what it was supposed to do. When asked as to the impact of the cancellation of the MDPS program, on his own initiative, the AME, Lebeau stated:

A.That gave us a big problem because with that not there, there was no replacement system that would work into the year 2000, and we had to do OPEVAL in '99. So there was a great deal of concern what we were going to use in '99 and then what we were going to use in the next time period, because ECAMS was basically built and had a 2000 drop-dead point because of the way the system had been built.

Q.You made reference to an OPEVAL in 1999. Can you describe what that refers to?

A.Again I wasn't present at EVAL -- to the OPEVAL for the F-18 E and F, but basically it's where we check out the airplane, make sure it actually flies the way it is supposed to fly, and the all systems and support systems that work with the airplane are functional, and that's where the stuff like the IETM had to be functional, the other pieces of it had to be functional in terms of keeping track of all the maintenance data, et cetera.

The problem we were faced with at that point was we had to find a replacement system. We could run ECAMS in '99, but that would not give us a system that would let us deliver the aircraft in the year 2000, and we had to have both.

Q.Just so we're clear, the OPEVAL in 1999 is reference specifically to the E and F Super Hornet aircraft?

[325]In a similar vein, Chandler testified that the cancellation of the MDPS development gave rise to a need for a replacement, given the requirement for support for the E and F aircraft and the ECAMS’ Y2K problem. Chandler stated:

A.MDPS stands for the Maintenance Data Processing System.

I was the functional rep while on active duty for that system. It was a philosophy and envisioned system that was intended to become the ground station for multiple aviation platforms, the F14,

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V22, all series F-18s and anything else that required a ground station at that time.

When I arrived at the Naval Aviation Maintenance Office in 1993 it was still a -- it was a developmental effort within the Naval Aviation Maintenance Office, NAMO as we referred to it. Throughout my tenure at NAMO, it never really got beyond that development effort.

In late '95, the decision was made by the Navy leadership to no longer pursue the MDPS solution. As a result, that left a hole, because the ECAMS system was non-Y2K compliant, everyone knew that. There was also the requirement for supporting the F-18 E/F, everyone knew that. And they were hoping or counting on MDPS to provide that functionality.

When the decision was made to cancel that program and cease any further development on both the ground station and the upline repository, we were at a loss as to how to proceed.

[326]Bob White of MDA, the prime contractor to the U.S. Navy on the AME initiative also confirmed that the U.S. Navy was considering GasTOPS’ ECMS product as a replacement for the MDPS.

[327]There was extensive evidence adduced that established that Lieutenant Matt Herl was an important player in the United States Navy’s decision making process. (Note that Lieutenant Herl died before this trial commenced.)

(a)At trial, White of MDA (McDonnell Douglas Aerospace) stated:

A.Lieutenant Herl was my -- was the point of contact with the Navy. He attended most of the meetings and gave direction. He was in my view the representative from the Navy on that program.

(b)Chandler stated:

A.I was working closely with Lieutenant Herl at the time, and I was working as I said earlier as his contract technical support. And we were -- the Lieutenant and I both were learning as we went.

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And having been a fleet operator and understanding the environment, my approval was sought in a lot of the areas based on that experience and how complex certain things would be to support within the fleet or deployed or various other things.

But approval and input only mean that I liked it. I had no funding authority, lines of funding, or authorization for to allow them carry forth, that's basically the way it worked. Lieutenant Herl was the sole decision authority.

And later Chandler stated:

The problem with pushing a product through NAVAIR has always been finding funding. If you can get a sponsor like Lieutenant Herl, that had plenty of money to put on a system, to evolve it, make it a Navy working core [ph] system, then you've hit the jackpot. Lieutenant Herl was that kind of sponsor, he had the funding available.

So the ECMS approach took on a real tangible life. We had a sponsor; we had a potential customer that was interested, and that was lieutenant Herl.

And later Chandler stated:

A.Lieutenant Herl, as we've seen throughout some of these other documents, took to NAVMASSO a list of requirements: data stripping, DAS, lies usage indices calculations for the engines, and network functionality over the Navy wide area network. These were things he'd taken to NAVMASSO and directed them to develop those capabilities. They were having a hard time doing it; they were focussed in other areas. They were not necessarily at that time looking out for the F-18's best interests. The F-18 had a schedule, and they weren't staying on that schedule. That schedule was driven by the operational test and evaluation of the F-18 E/F and the Y2K issues relative to ECAMS, like I started earlier. He was becoming frustrated.

So as said earlier, he decided to pluck certain functionality out of NAVMASSO's development effort, that was DAS and LUI. And we approached China Lake, the government side at first, and they in turn contracted EER Systems at China Lake to develop those particular modules out there,

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independent of NAVMASSO. And it was kind of done is a

vacuum...

Q.We have heard evidence of ---

A....NAVMASSO wasn't pleased.

(c)Lebeau stated in regard to Lieutenant Herl:

Q.Let's speak just for a moment, Mr. Lebeau, about Lieutenant Matt Herl. At what time did he come into play with respect to the AMIDD/AME developments?

A.I would say it was somewhere in '96 he was -- Captain DYER brought him aboard out of naval graduate school.

Q.What was his title as of that date, do you know?

A.Lieutenant. He never had a title, but he was the one that was controlling AME within a year of his arrival.

Q.Now when you say he was controlling AME, what do you mean by that?

A.He was the one making the decisions.

[328]It is clear that Lieutenant Herl was an extremely valuable contact for GasTOPS as he was deeply involved in the decision making process of the U.S. Navy and had become an “advocate” and “champion” of the ECMS solution. The fact that Lieutenant Herl and the F-18 program office (PMA265) had become the “champion” of the GasTOPS’ ECMS product was noted in the NAVAIR ECMS/FLTS long-term tactical action plan (Exhibit 92) authored by Brouse and Howe on September 22, 1996:

The F-18 program office (PMA265) is now our sponsor. They understand the value, functionality and most of all, the maturity of our product. They have risked criticism and possible reprimand for being too supportive of our product when “competing” Navy developed products exist. They have even invited us to participate in the AME Program (described below) which seems to cause both McDonnell-Douglas and GE great consternation.

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At page 3 of Exhibit 92, it was stated:

While attending a meeting at Pax River on 8\27 & 8\28, our Navair PMA265 (F-18) program sponsors were summoned to Crystal City to brief Capt. Joe Dyer, the F- 18 Program Manager, on what they planned to do about an unsupportable ECMS/PLTS1 and an abandoned MDPS system. We were asked to help them develop their response in a late night session in our hotel room.

[329]The foregoing extracts from Exhibit 92 are clear evidence of GasTOPS’ understanding that PMA265 was in a position to dictate the possible outcome of the procurement process. The decision makers within PMA265 would not rely upon the opinions of PMA260, but rather the recommendation of their logistic support team including Lieutenant Herl.

[330]Howe of B.F.Goodrich stated that Lieutenant Herl had given a briefing at the CIP meeting in Toronto, Ontario on September 9 and 10, 1996 and as part of Herl’s briefing, the entirety of his (Herl’s) report entitled “Maintenance Data Brief and Recommendations” (Exhibit 96) was presented to those in attendance. On page 6 of Exhibit 91 the “ECAMS alternatives” were listed as being: MDPS, ECMS and Swiss/Finn Maintenance Data System.

[331]At page 8 of Exhibit 91, Herl noted that the MDPS will not pass TECHEVAL; that the system was not maintainable; and that the system will not support the F/A-18 deployment requirements. At page 12, of Herl’s report, it was specifically noted that the F/A-18 A/B/C aircraft would be outfitted with the ECAMS replacement commencing March 1991 until optimized NALCOMIS OMA was in the fleet in 2001. It was apparent from the report of Lieutenant Herl (Exhibit 91) that he and the PMA265 program office were considering and promoting the GasTOPS ECMS product as a possible source of the parts life tracking and configuration management technology that the F/A program office was seeking.

[332]In my view, Brouse played a key role in GasTOPS’ pursuit of the U.S. Navy opportunity and was a “key employee” who owed a fiduciary duty to GasTOPS. Some of the actions of Brouse which lead me to this finding are as follows:

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(1)Brouse had direct communication with key U.S. Navy contacts concerning matters of sales strategy and pricing. By way of example, Brouse corresponded directly with Joe Barrera of the V-22 office. His communications with the V-22 group office are consistent with GasTOPS viewing ECMS (Engine Condition Monitoring System) as an MDPS (Maintenance Data Processing System) replacement that could be ultimately applied across other fleets, including the V-22;

(2)Brouse was the “face of GasTOPS”, clearly being the GasTOPS’ representative at all of the key face-to-face meetings with the U.S. Navy. The defendants argue that Brouse’s role was a “demonstrator of the software” and was evidenced by Howe making a note for Brouse to get out his “pearl handled, duel roller ball, quick draw mouse”. I interpret this statement of Howe to be indicative, of the key role Brouse was playing in the pursuit of the U.S. Navy business opportunity. The U.S. Navy requirements were extremely technical and the success or failure of the marketing effort hinged on the GasTOPS/BFG team being able to convince the U.S. Navy that the ECMS (Engine Condition Monitoring System) product would meet their technical needs. Accordingly, Brouse, who understood the technical needs of the U.S. Navy and the ability of the GasTOPS’ product ECMS (Engine Condition Monitoring System) v.2 to fulfill those needs, was a critical person in the pursuit of the U.S. Navy business opportunity. On all of the evidence, only Brouse, at GasTOPS appeared to have the knowledge and ability to fulfill this role and as such he was a “key employee”;

(3)Brouse developed a trusted relationship with key U.S. Navy contacts, including Chandler and Lieutenant Herl;

(4)Brouse was the marketing representative from the GasTOPS/BFG team to whom the U.S. Navy looked for answers to their critical technical questions. The U.S. Navy was looking for a technical solution to a very technical problem and it was Brouse to whom the U.S. Navy personnel turned for answers to these questions. The precise procurement path by which the GasTOPS/BFG team might ultimately effect a sale was not as important as convincing the U.S. Navy that the ECMS (Engine Condition Monitoring System) v.2 product could fulfill the U.S. Navy’s requirements. This was the responsibility of Brouse. The role played by Brouse in pursuit of the U.S. Navy business opportunity when he was employed at GasTOPS, was a serious if not a fatal blow to GasTOPS’ ability to pursue this business opportunity when Brouse resigned giving two weeks’ notice of his resignation. The importance of Brouse in pursuing GasTOPS’ business opportunity with the U.S. Navy was apparent during the early part of November 1996 when Lieutenant Herl

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wanted Brouse to conduct the presentation on behalf of the GasTOPS/BFG team. In addition, it appears based on all of the evidence, that Brouse convinced Herl that MxI could meet the U.S. Navy’s requirements and at that point, Herl switched his allegiance and became the “champion” of MxI.

(5)Brouse was present at meetings, internal to GasTOPS at which time U.S. Navy marketing strategy was discussed. Brouse met with representatives of B.F.Goodrich on May 1, 1996 to “discuss the strategy for the NAVAIR (US Navy) F/A-18 opportunity”.

(6)Brouse had more frequent contact with the U.S. Navy than Howe and was frequently engaged with Chandler due to the paramountcy of the technical aspect of the sales process; and

(7)Brouse was directly involved with analyzing the U.S. Navy procurement process. Brouse was directly involved in a telephone conference call designed to ascertain how ECMS (Engine Condition Monitoring System) might be procured by the U.S. Navy without competition.

[333]The defendants argue that Brouse was “replaceable” and yet are critical of GasTOPS’ decision to proceed with its presentations to the U.S. Navy his absence. There can be no doubt that Brouse was fully aware of his influence and impact on the relationship between GasTOPS/B.F.Goodrich and the U.S. Navy through Herl.

[334]MxI argues, that “Mr. Brouse was not the primary individual marketing the GasTOPS’ product”. In my view, based on all of the evidence, Brouse was the primary individual at GasTOPS marketing the GasTOPS’ ECMS v.2 product to the U.S. Navy. Howe may have had the contractual obligation to be the primary marketer of GasTOPS’ product, but it was Brouse who was playing a more visible role in the marketing efforts: he made demonstrations and presentations, met with the U.S. Navy on short notice to prepare presentations to satisfy other inquiries that were being advanced by the U.S. Navy representatives, fielded inquiries from other platforms (including the V-22) and who Lieutenant Herl wanted to make the presentations.

Volvo

[335]As early as September 1989, GasTOPS targeted the Swedish Air Force as a potential

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customer through Volvo. The RM-12, a variant of the GE F404 engine, had been selected for the Grippen/JAS 39 aircraft of the Swedish Air Force and therefore presented an opportunity for GasTOPS. In 1994, GasTOPS again pursued this opportunity through the Canadian Embassy and was provided with the name of Stefan Hjort (“Hjort”) as a contact person at Volvo Aero Corporation. Shortly thereafter, Chivers, GasTOPS’ Vice-President, Business Development, wrote to Hjort (Exhibit 106) expressing GasTOPS’ interest in being represented by VOLVO Aero Corporation in Sweden in order to approach the Swedish government about providing ECMS for the F404 engine. In this letter, Chivers explicitly stated: “We are interested in supplying an ECMS for the F404/RM12 to meet an FMV requirement for aircraft maintenance information system. Unfortunately, we do not have any information on the precise requirements for this new system. Mr. Joakim Wallin of FMV is familiar with our ECMS and believes it could satisfy some of the requirements. Again, we require more information.” Finally, he noted that GasTOPS had also presented its product to representatives of the Finnish and Swiss Air Forces, who had expressed interest in it, as had the Spanish Air Force.

[336]On November 7, 1994, Chivers reported to the Canadian Embassy in Stockholm, Sweden (Exhibit 107) stating, “I think there is solid potential for sales of our system not only to Swedish Air Force but to Finnish and Swiss Air Forces for their F/A18 fighter fleet. If VOLVO Aero could act as our agent in Sweden, the possibility exists that they could act as our agent for all European sales. We would also be prepared to consider VOLVO as a follow-on life cycle support contractor for our ECMS” and, further, that “Possibilities aside, I think that a relationship with VOLVO is a natural, given they will be manufacturing and providing life cycle support for the engine that our ECMS supports.”

[337]On February 14, 1995, Chivers forwarded a fax to Volvo (Exhibit 108) stating, “I think our potential business arrangement is very important to GasTOPS and hopefully to VAC also. Therefore I would suggest that you and I continue our negotiation of the business agreement by fax. I believe we are close to agreement now; I see no VAC terms and conditions that GasTOPS could not agree to.” He continued:

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There is an F404 Component Improvement Program (CIP) meeting being held at GE in Lynn, Massachusetts during the week of 27 February. From our contacts in the Canadian Air Force, we have learned that the last CIP was attended by Mr. Magnus Bergstrom and Mr. Hans Berg from VAC/RM12 engineering and Mr. Somnel Tuve and Mr. Joachim Wallin from FMV. We have been asked by the Swiss Air Force to come to Lynn Massachusetts on 3 March to provide a detailed demonstration of our ECMS. We propose to expand our stay at Lynn to include a detailed demonstration to the VAC and FMV attendees at CIP. We also will be able to assign one of the system designers currently assigned to the ECMS improvement project to give the detailed demonstration. This engineer would not have been able to come to Tröllhatten. I think that the VAC and FMV engineers will receive a much more detailed demonstration of ECMS at Lynn than we could have provided in Tröllhatten.

[338]It appears from the exchange of correspondence and discussions that Volvo was seeking a more general business relationship with GasTOPS and wished to discuss opportunities for selling or re-selling GasTOPS’ products, with Volvo acting as a distributor for GasTOPS’ software products. In March 1995, GasTOPS and Volvo representatives met in Boston, at which time GasTOPS demonstrated its ECMS and FLTS. GasTOPS saw in Volvo an opportunity to sell ECMS and/or FLTS as part of a ground support data processing component because of the similarity between the functions of the Grippen flight recorder and that of the F18.

[339]On March 9, 1995, Chivers send a fax to Volvo entitled “F404 Engine Monitoring System” (Exhibit 109):

2.Our understanding of the JAS 39 requirement is as follows. FMV wants a new integrated information management system for the JAS 39. Our ECMS could be the engine module of the system. SAAB/VOLVO are co-developing an on board monitoring system that continuously records engine and aircraft parameters at 7.5 Hz, calculates and records engine LUI’s, status/error codes and “event monitoring”. FMV and VOLVO are working on a functional specification of the new system for the JAS 39. Procurement, by a competitive process, is planned by the end of 1995. We assume that the procurement of an existing system that requires little non-recurring

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engineering is preferred. Have we got it right?

3.I also hope that we were able to demonstrate that GasTOPS is more than a software development house. Our company was started in 1979 by our current president as a one man company doing gas turbine performance research and development. Although we are now 85 people (55 engineers), and we have expanded into condition based maintenance systems and propulsion system dynamic analysis for aircraft, naval ships and heavy industry (steel mills, pipelines, nuclear reactors, etc) we still base our expertise on [vigorous] engineering analysis and methods development.

[340]On November 1, 1995, Chivers sent a further fax to Volvo (Exhibit 110) regarding the “General Electric F404 CIP meeting at NAS Lemoore, 13-16 November, 1995,” which stated: “At the General Electric F404 CIP meeting being held at NAS Lemoore 13-16 November, 1995, the Canadian Forces will be providing a detailed and comprehensive briefing on the F404 Engine Condition Monitoring System that was developed under contract with GasTOPS Ltd.” Brouse attended the meeting at the Naval Air Station Lemoore, California, and met with representatives from Volvo. At this time, Brouse was GasTOPS’ Aero Program’s manager and took the lead on business opportunities with the U.S. Navy, Volvo and others. Muir stated that at this meeting with Volvo, Brouse presented further information about GasTOPS’ product to Volvo, including information about its pricing and “its justification for a potential procurement.”

[341]In the MSD’s 1995/96 business plan (Exhibit 6), Muir described the Volvo opportunity: “The MSD will also continue to pursue an opportunity to provide the ECMS to the Swedish AF for their JAS39 Grippen program. The JAS39 is powered by a derivative of the GE F404 engine (RM-12) which is manufactured under license by Volvo. GasTOPS is close to signing a formal cooperation agreement with Volvo for the JAS39 program.”

[342]In February 1996, arrangements were made for representatives from Volvo to attend at GasTOPS for a demonstration of the ECMS. On February 29, 1996, GasTOPS received a fax from Volvo (Exhibit 111) setting out the items that Volvo wished to discuss during the meeting:

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During the proposed meeting with you we feel that the following items should be included.

1.Presentation and demonstration of the GasTOPS EGMS concept.

2.Presentation of current JAS39 RM12 Condition Monitoring System.

3.Discussion of similarities and differences regarding data registration, handling and evaluation.

Questions: We intend to forward to you questions that arise during our review of the available documentation.

4.Possibilities to customize and implement the GasTOPS ECMS in the JAS39 system or include selected modules of the ECMS.

5.Evaluation of possible continued technical co-operation.

[343]The meeting at GasTOPS’ offices in Ottawa was held on February 29 and March 1, 1996. Brouse demonstrated GasTOPS’ products and recorded details of the meeting in his logbook (Exhibit 58 at pages 151-157). As far as GasTOPS was concerned, the meeting was successful, and on May 24, 1996, Volvo suggesting it work with GasTOPS and the Swedish Air Force to valuate “manpower, time schedule and costs to modify the FLTS-system so it can be used by the Swedish Air Force for JAS 39/RM12… The SAF and AMD people will now [consider] if they should continue with the GasTOPS FLTS. Our impression is that they will look upon the possibilities to buy knowledge and parts of software from you. They are also interested in your Oil Debris Monitoring and Deployable Filter Debris Analyzer” (Exhibit 113).

[344]Muir testified that Brouse was responsible for pursuing the Volvo opportunity for GasTOPS as of February 29, 1996. Muir would provide technical assistance as needed, and Chivers would also help Brouse, with the possibility of continuing on as a liaison if Volvo was comfortable dealing with Chivers. Brouse, however, would be the one to make any decisions about Chivers’ role. According to Chivers, and I accept his evidence, when he was “speaking to” Volvo he relied upon Brouse for all of the technical information pertinent to the Volvo

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opportunity.

[345]On August 12, 1996, Volvo’s Roger Persson (“Persson”) wrote to GasTOPS (Exhibit 114) stating that he wanted to make a demonstration of the ECMS to the Swedish Air Force in March 1997. He stated that he wanted GasTOPS’ system to apply to the RM12 engine and sought information on “How do I do it [his demonstration]? What will the cost be? How much work have to be done?” GasTOPS responded by fax on August 12, 1996 (Exhibit 115), expressing continued interesting in working with the Swedish Air Force, describing the ECMS’s support modules, and seeking clarification of the details of this request in preparation for a March 1997 demonstration. Prior to Volvo’s August 12, 1996, request, Volvo’s interest had been limited to the FLTS, which is only one component of the ECMS. This request was for a complete condition-based maintenance system. Volvo indicated that it wanted GasTOPS to give a demonstration of the ECMS and suggested that a meeting be held in Ottawa in September 1996.

[346]On September 12, 1996, representatives of Volvo met with Brouse and Forsyth. Brouse recorded details of this corporate opportunity in his logbook (Exhibit 96, pages 51 to 56), including the commercial terms, customer requirements and the functionality that the potential customer requires. He also send a follow-up fax to Volvo on September 18, 1996 (Exhibit 117), confirming GasTOPS’ willingness to assist Volvo in setting up a demonstration of the ECMS and FLTS for evaluation by the Swedish Air Force and clarifying the steps that each party would have to take to go forward in preparation for a March 1997 presentation date.

[347]During the latter part of November 1996, Volvo and GasTOPS discussed the possibility of GasTOPS demonstrating the ECMS and FLTS to Volvo in Sweden. On November 25, 1996, GasTOPS received an RFP from Volvo for the demonstration of ECMS and FLTS during March 1997 in Sweden (Exhibit 431). By December 18, 1996, GasTOPS had submitted a proposal with a fixed price of $58,000 USD (Exhibits 433 and 434).

[348]The defendants suggest that Brouse played a minor role in the Volvo corporate opportunity at GasTOPS and as such did not owe it fiduciary duty. They submit that Chivers was the lead person at GasTOPS for the Volvo opportunity. In my view, as I have stated previously,

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Brouse owed a fiduciary duty to GasTOPS which included a fiduciary duty vis-à-vis the Volvo opportunity. Although Chivers may have been the contact person between GasTOPS and Volvo, Brouse was responsible for the Volvo opportunity when he became a program manager and was certainly the lead in the technical requirements of this opportunity. Brouse had full knowledge of the Volvo requirements as set out in his logbook (Exhibit 58, pages 151-157). Chivers indicated in his evidence that he remained the lead on the Volvo project until mid-September 1996 and remained involved in the Volvo project after the resignations.

[349]It is clear that Brouse, as program manager, was responsible for the Volvo opportunity within GasTOPS’ corporate structure. He had full knowledge of Volvo’s requirements, notwithstanding that Chivers was the person speaking to Volvo on behalf of GasTOPS until Brouse became directly involved with Volvo as a result of a meeting held on September 12 and 13, 1996. Chivers described that meeting as a “hand off” to Brouse.

[350]On October 25, 1996, Volvo replied to Brouse’s October 3, 1996, fax, wherein he outlined a work plan for a demonstration to be given by GasTOPS to Volvo (Exhibit 359). It is apparent that Volvo was aware that Brouse was the lead on GasTOPS’ end.

[351]Even if I accepted that Brouse’s involvement in the Volvo opportunity while employed at GasTOPS was limited to a technical role, I would still find that he owed a fiduciary duty to GasTOPS, as he was intimately involved in Volvo’s technical requirements and how GasTOPS intended to address those requirements.

[352]In my view, Muir, correctly set out the roles played by himself, Chivers and Brouse in the Volvo opportunity. He said that “At this particular stage [Brouse] would be presenting to Volvo further information about our product, its pricing, its justification for a potential procurement.” Chivers acted as a liaison at this point and handed off responsibility to Brouse when two engineers were coming to GasTOPS from Sweden to discuss the ECMS: GasTOPS would present the ECMS product, the visiting engineers would described the system being developed for the Grippen and RM12, and they would discuss similarities between the two and possibilities for customizing or modifying GasTOPS product as a specific module of the Grippen

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development, as well as any other possible avenues of technical cooperation. Muir testified that he would himself assist Brouse at the meeting because he had quite a bit of technical knowledge about flight data recording generally, but Brouse would be the one to make the presentation and conduct the ECMS demonstration on behalf of GasTOPS.

[353]Muir also testified about the notes he took from the meetings when they took place, including detailed notes about the portion of the meeting dealing with Volvo’s development for the Grippen. He felt that the meeting had been generally positive. GasTOPS had software tools already developed that met much of what Volvo perceived as its futures requirements; GasTOPS viewed the meeting as having identified an opportunity to provide existing software tools to Volvo. At the same time, Brouse was recording specific information from the Volvo representatives regarding technical work that was underway and business-related commercial information.

[354]GasTOPS claims the defendants misappropriated its confidential business information in the design and delivery of the ADS system to Volvo. The defendants argued that in law these claims are not supportable. The defendants submit:

1)There is no generic cause of action known as “misappropriation of intellectual property”;

2)Intellectual property is a convenient label with which to encapsulate a number of specific types of rights recognized and protected under the law. These specific rights consist of the following: patents; trade-marks; copyrights; industrial designs; plant breeders’ rights; integrated circuit typographies and trade secrets;

3)All of the aforementioned intellectual property rights except trade secrets are governed by Federal Statutes. None of the Federal Statutory intellectual property rights have been asserted in this case. As a result, we are left with trade secrets;

4)Trade secrets are governed by the common law;

5)Trade secrets deal with private, confidential information

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that give the owner a business advantage over its competitors. As a result, trade secrets are information that: is the result of the expenditure of human effort, skill or money; is not known to others; and has been kept confidential;

6)Factors to be considered when deciding on whether property is a trade secret include: (1) the extent to which the information is known outside the owner's business;

(2)the extent to which it is known by employees and others involved in the owner's business; (3) the extent of measures taken by him to guard the secrecy of the information;

(4)the value of the information to him and his competitors;

(5)the amount of money or effort expended by him in developing the information; (6) the ease or difficulty with which the information could be properly acquired or [independently] duplicated by others; and (7) whether the holder of the secret and the taker treat the information as secret.

7)While trade secret protection can apply to computer technology and software it does not apply to information that is in the public domain or otherwise available to customers or competitors;

8)Trade secrets do not encompass an employee’s general skill and knowledge. Employees are free to use their general skills and knowledge anywhere following termination of employment;

9)In order to have status to bring an action for misuse of trade secrets the party must have an exclusive right in the subject matter of the trade secrets. This exclusive right belongs to the owner of the trade secret.

[355]The defendants argue that GasTOPS did not have an exclusive right in the trade secrets it claims were misappropriated by MxI. They submit that the Government of Canada owned the intellectual property on which FLTS was based and the Government of Canada allowed GasTOPS to market FLTS under a license signed in July 1995 and a letter of agreement dated April 1997. The defendants argue that GasTOPS did not have the status to bring an action or an alleged misuse of the trade secrets by the defendants.

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[356]The defendants argue that GasTOPS had the onus to prove that the information in question was actually a trade secret and was treated as such. The defendants submit that GasTOPS failed to show that the data model or other FLTS documentation were, in fact, kept secret or confidential by GasTOPS. For example, the defendants submit that the FLTS data model and documentation was also possessed by the CAF and no member of the CAF was called as a witness by the plaintiff to establish that the CAF treated the FLTS data model and documentation as secret or confidential. This is the same argument that the defendants put forward with respect to the ECMS software system, and in particular that GasTOPS had no exclusive right to the trade secret because the Government of Canada owned the IP and that GasTOPS failed to prove that the ECMS documentation was a trade secret and/or kept secret or confidential.

[357]In my view GasTOPS derived its rights in the trade secrets from the design work it performed for itself and on behalf of its clients. These trade secrets developed by GasTOPS were protected through both its contracts and license agreements with its clients. The trade secrets are contained in the various technical reports prepared for each of the products. In addition, the roles of each of the defendants, was described in detail in the development of these trade secrets.

[358]Muir described in detail the development of GasTOPS’ trade secrets and the contracts entered into with the Canadian Government. He identified two types of contracts that GasTOPS had with the Government of Canada, the CRAD and TIES contracts. The first series of contracts referred to as CRADs, contained specific terms and conditions setting out the ownership and confidentiality of trade secrets.

[359]In July 1995, GasTOPS entered into a license agreement with the Government of Canada for the ECMS software, whereby GasTOPS received a license to market the ECMS software as described in the Appendix “A”, namely FLTS v.3 and ECMS v.1. Section 8 of the license gave GasTOPS the following rights:

a)The licensee and the licensor shall promptly inform each other of all improvements, enhancements, derivatives or updates made from time to time to the Licensed IP during

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the life of this agreement, and provide each other with information documents and other matters necessary to put the improvements, enhancements, derivatives and updates into practice.

b)Improvements, enhancements, derivatives and updates made by the Licensor shall be included under the Licensed IP without alteration of the terms and conditions therein.

c)The Licensee agrees that it shall grant to the Licensor, for such period as this license remains in effect, a non- exclusive unconditional, irrevocable, royalty free, right and license to use sub-license or lease for such improvements and enhancements, derivatives and updates, proprietary to the licensee and existing at the date of this license or made during the life of this license.

[360]I am satisfied that GasTOPS has status to bring this action for misuse of its trade secrets. It must also be remembered that the plaintiff in this action has confined its claims to business opportunities it was pursuing at the time of the resignations and, as such, the trade secrets encompass the confidential business information that GasTOPS had developed for these specific business opportunities. I find it difficult to accept as a matter of fair business practice that employees who owe a fiduciary duty to an employer can work on a business opportunity for their employer and then leave the employer and use that information to pursue the same business opportunity for another employer.

[361]The defendants suggest that the FLTS IP was not confidential and that there was an onus on the plaintiff to adduce evidence to “show whether the Canadian Air Force kept the software and its related documentation a secret, or even considered it to be secret.” This argument is based on the fact that GasTOPS had contractual obligations preventing it from keeping the trade secrets confidential. Accordingly, the defendants argue that GasTOPS lost all confidentiality concerning their trade secrets because the design documents were delivered to customers as contract deliverables.

[362]In my view, this argument fails to take into account Muir’s evidence as to how diligently GasTOPS treated its trade secrets, such as by securing access to its facilities with

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different levels of safe keeping for classified and unclassified information and conducting security clearance to the NATO secret level on its employees, or how the trade secrets were referenced in its contracts with its customers. These required the customers to protect the confidentiality of such trade secrets. In addition, GasTOPS marked documents as “confidential” in circumstances where there was not a contractual obligation between the parties to keep the trade secrets confidential.

[363]Muir’s testimony regarding the procedures and protocols put in place at GasTOPS to protect its confidential information is confirmed by the contracts entered into between GasTOPS and the DND/Government of Canada. There was an abundance of evidence contained in the contracts between the Government of Canada and GasTOPS of the contractual customer’s obligation to protect confidential information GasTOPS supplied to it.

[364]The defendants argue that the FLTS software was based on an open database model and as such could not be a trade secret. There was no evidence adduced at trial that any other party aside from MxI had gained access to any of GasTOPS’ trade secrets. In fact, the only product that was competing with GasTOPS after the defendants’ departure from GasTOPS in October 1996 was the software products manufactured by MxI. Many of MxI’s employees, including the personal defendants, had access to all of GasTOPS’ trade secrets and confidential information concerning the business opportunities that are the subject matter of this lawsuit while employed there.

[365]The defendants suggest that “GasTOPS voluntarily disclosed the data model and/or database to others.” All of the contracts entered into between GasTOPS and its customers required that both parties keep the information confidential. There is no evidence that GasTOPS disclosed the design of the data model and/or database to any person or corporation that was not bound by a confidentiality agreement.

[366]The only witnesses who gave evidence on the development of the MMP codes were MacIsaac and Muir. Contrary to the defendants’ submissions, Muir did not say that the troubleshooting capability based on MMP codes already existed, but that GasTOPS thought that

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it could be automated by using a computer. A careful reading of the testimony indicates that he said that GasTOPS was undertaking research to develop a software system that resulted in the FLTS. The defendants are mistaken when they submit that GasTOPS “automated the troubleshooting manuals and the rules within them.” Muir testified that GasTOPS used completely different data to improve the troubleshooting logic and automated the entire process.

[367]According to Muir, and I accept his evidence, GasTOPS’ contribution to the development of the expert system was unique in that it used an entirely different set of data (event recording which GE had not been using prior to that time). It was not the extension of the knowledge base found in the FLTS paper manuals that GasTOPS extended, as alleged by the defendants. GasTOPS had developed an entirely different set of data and logic. It was GasTOPS’ logic that MxI provided to Volvo when they forwarded their proposal to them. Volvo was correct when it stated it wanted MxI to provide the requirements for an FLTS.

[368]The defendants argue that the basic idea behind troubleshooting (that a failure in a machine has a cause and that you can hopefully discover what actually broke by checking for symptoms and fix it) is not knowledge owned by GasTOPS, GE or any other person or corporation. It is a basic application of deductive reasoning and cannot be a trade secret.

[369]I find this argument misses the heart of the issue in this case, as the “basic idea behind troubleshooting” has nothing to do with database design. As the evidence showed in this case, the design decisions made by the designers in the troubleshooting domain of ADS and ECMS v.2 are identical. If the defendants’ proposition is correct, there should only be one way to design a database that would support the troubleshooting process. The defendants did not ask their experts to express an opinion on this. Dr. Mendelzon was of the opinion that “one can think of many different ways of slicing that pie,” with “many degrees of freedom there and a lot of room to be creative.”

GE

[370]As of July 1996, the MSD was poised to market its ECMS and FLTS technology in the aviation maintenance market place. As of July 1996, the MSD had rolled out ECMS v.1.7 to

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the CAF for use on its CF-18 fighter aircraft. The ECMS v.1.7 was fully operational in the field and the CAF served as a “reference site” to assist GasTOPS in its efforts to market the ECMS product to other target customers. The MSD product development team, headed by Jeff Cass, was in the process of finalizing the next release of ECMS v.2.0.

[371]At this time, the MSD was engaged in an intensive marketing campaign in selling ECMS licenses to large entities such as the U.S. Navy and GE. The defendants Forsyth, Brouse and Jeff Cass were directly involved in the pursuit of such opportunities. Brouse focussed on direct marketing activities, while Forsyth and Jeff Cass managed the direction of the product design to address the emerging needs of new prospective customers.

[372]The U.S. Navy and GE were significant players in the aviation market place and the fact that they were interested in the software technology of GasTOPS is direct evidence of the uniqueness and state of the art of GasTOPS’ ECMS and FLTS technologies as of July 1996. In fact, During July 1996, GasTOPS felt that the competition in the niche market place it was pursuing was minimal. In the case of the U.S. Navy, the only competition that GasTOPS was aware of was the ongoing in-house development of a system known as MDPS, a program that was eventually cancelled. In the case of GE, the only competition which GasTOPS was aware of was the Sabre system, and by October 1996, GasTOPS understood that the Sabre system was no longer being actively considered by GE.

[373]Muir and Brouse met in July 1996 for the purpose of preparing the MSD business plan. At that time, Muir reviewed with Brouse a detailed market penetration strategy diagram that depicted a proposed “roadmap” for future sales of the ECMS and FLTS technologies. The strategy diagram was entitled ECMS/FLTS Targets and dated July 21, 1996 (Exhibit 169). The diagram identified target customers for these technologies and also identified the linkages and pathways by which GasTOPS could penetrate various sub-segments of the aviation market place. The market penetration strategy represented a single business opportunity, being the opportunity to exploit the GasTOPS’ ECMS and FLTS technology throughout the entirety of the aviation market place. Muir explained the diagram as all beginning with the CAF reference site, which GasTOPS used to position itself with major contacts with the U.S. Navy, Navy/Air Force

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(“NAVAIR”) and GE. According to Muir, GasTOPS viewed the GE opportunity as key to its marketing strategy:

It’s like a domino effect to the entire aviation industry, both military and commercial. And you can see the linkages with the different engines, specific engines, and how the GE opportunity, together with the Navy, can be used to -- as a pathway or a means to penetrate a huge potential market. So, for example, if you look at the General Electric bubble and the arrow going from GE to the F18 E/F, that’s the Super Hornet, you see the 414 engine; and there we can use the General Electric opportunity as a stepping stone to the Navy Super Hornet. Likewise if you go back to bubble no. 3, the U.S. Navy opportunity, the U.S. Navy opportunity, as we understood at that time, was a multi-faceted opportunity. Not only were we poised to win the NAVAIR F18 program, but there was related foreign military programs shown as item no. 5, the F18 FMS opportunities. As I described earlier, the Navy opportunity, which was to replace this MDPS system, also opened the door to the V22, and that's shown as item 26, that's the V22 Osprey aircraft. Those are all military programs.

Now, if you go back to bubble no. 2, General Electric is also a primary supplier to the United States Air Force, in particular of the F110 engine. That's an engine that's used in both the F16 and the F15 fighter aircraft. So the General Electric opportunity also opened the door to opportunities with the United States Air Force and I noted there, in addition to the General Electric opportunities with the air force, there is several other major fleets such as C130 Hercules, the F22 advanced tactical fighter, the B2 bombers, these are all major fleets of the United States Air Force with a requirement for parts tracking.

General Electric, going back to bubble no. 2, also manufactured at their Lynn facility the T700 engine and that's the predominant engine used by the United States Army for their Apache helicopters, which is their primary fleet. So you can see bubble no. 9, General Electric also opened the door to the United States Army and the Apache opportunity with the United States Army.

General Electric also, as we've described or as I've described earlier, was primarily a commercial aviation engine opportunity. Most of the engines of interest to General Electric in the demonstration we conducted were engines for commercial airlines,

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and I've noted three engines there, two which I talked about earlier: the CF6 and the CFM56 on an arrow going from GE to the airlines. GE had a third engine under development at that time, just being introduced to the marketplace, which was the GE90. And that’s one of their primary engines today for the commercial aviation section.

GE, being one of three major commercial aircraft engine suppliers (and the one with the largest market share), was the opportunity GasTOPS saw to get to the rest of the commercial aviation market. GE had a connection with Oracle, and Muir expected Oracle to have connections to the other two major suppliers as well.

[374]Muir’s evidence can be summarized as follows:

(1)The CAF would be used as a “reference customer” to assist GasTOPS in the pursuit of other target customers. As of July of 1996, the CAF was using the ECMS and FLTS technology on their fleet of F18 A and B fighter aircrafts.

(2)The CAF had been used successfully, as a “reference site” to position GasTOPS to potentially sell licenses for the ECMS and/or FLTS technologies to the F18 program office of the U.S. Navy for use on the U.S. Navy’s fleet of F18 E through D aircrafts.

(3)GasTOPS considered the U.S. Navy opportunity to be a “multi-faceted opportunity”. GasTOPS knew that the successful licensing of its ECMS product to the F/A-18 program office within the United States Navy would likely lead to additional sales of ECMS licenses to foreign military operators of the same aircraft, such as the Kuwaiti Air Force. Similarly, given that the sale of ECMS licenses to the F/A-18 program office might constitute a replacement for the common ground station system known as MDPS, the ECMS might become the technology of choice for other intended users of the MDPS system, including the U.S. Navy’s fleet of F18 Osprey aircrafts.

(4)Further, as a “multi-faceted opportunity” the sale of ECMS licenses to the F/A- 18 program office might lead to sales of the ECMS licenses for use on the F/A- 18 E and F aircrafts, known as the Super Hornet, an aircraft that was then under development.

(5)The GE opportunity was considered by GasTOPS to be the “door” to the entire aviation industry, both military and commercial. The General Electric opportunity was linked directly to the NAVAIR F/A-18 A through D opportunity as GE was the manufacturer of the F404 engine used on the F/A-

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18 A through D aircraft.

(6)The GE opportunity was also linked directly to the possible sale of ECMS licenses for use on the U.S. Navy’s fleet of F/A-18 E and F aircraft (Super Hornet). GE was the manufacturer of the F-414 engine, utilized on the Super Hornet aircraft.

(7)The GE opportunity potentially could lead to sales of ECMS licenses to the U.S. Air Force given that GE was the manufacturer of the F-110 engine used by the U.S. Air Force on their fleet of F-15 and F-16 aircraft.

(8)The GE opportunity could possibly lead to sales of ECMS licenses to the U.S. Army, given that GE manufactured the T-700 engine utilized by the U.S. Army’s fleet of Apache helicopters.

(9)The GE opportunity potentially could lead to an association between Oracle and GasTOPS, which in turn might lead to further opportunities with other major engine suppliers in the commercial aviation market place, including Pratt and Whitney, Allison/Rolls Royce. In the case of Pratt and Whitney, it was known by GasTOPS to be the manufacturer of the F-119 engine, utilized by the U.S. Air Force as well as the JT8-D, JT9-D and PW400 engines. The latter three engines were used in the commercial aviation market place. Allison/Rolls Royce was the manufacturer of the T-56, GMA-2100 and RB- 211 aircraft engines, also utilized by the United States Air Force, the T-406 engine used on the V-22 aircraft and the RB-211 trend engine used by commercial airlines. GasTOPS considered the GE opportunity to be primarily a “commercial aviation engine opportunity”. Both of the demonstrations of the ECMS technology to GE were conducted on GE engines used by commercial airlines, including the CF-6 and CFM-56. Accordingly, the GE opportunity opened the door to the commercial airline market for GasTOPS.

[375]The market penetration strategy, as set out in Exhibit 169, was commercially valuable and confidential to GasTOPS. It showed how the successful pursuit of one market opportunity could lead to others and the linkages or pathways that could be relied upon to penetrate the market place. The information contained in Exhibit 169 had been gathered by Muir, Brouse, and to some extent Forsyth in the pursuit of various opportunities over a number of years.

[376]All of the personal defendants were aware of GasTOPS’ market penetration plans and the business opportunities available to GasTOPS immediately prior to their resignations. GasTOPS’ future plans to pursue the business opportunities available in September 1996 and the

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enhancement to its products was clearly confidential business information, which GasTOPS would not have shared with its competitors. I have no doubt that the personal defendants were aware of the confidentiality aspect of this information and realized that all times that this information which was vital to the ongoing success of GasTOPS was not to be shared with GasTOPS’ competitors.

[377]In fact, Forsyth, Brouse and Jeff Cass were directly involved in GasTOPS’ pursuit of the sale of ECMS licenses to GE. Forsyth was involved in supporting the marketing effort from a “technical standpoint,” in terms of the technology underlying ECMS. Jeff Cass was directly involved in the more technical aspects of the marketing effort, particularly with respect to the possible conversion of ECMS to a Windows operating system, although he testified that he had a “fairly light role.” Similar to the role he played in pursuing U.S. Navy opportunities, Brouse was directly involved in virtually all aspects of the GasTOPS/B.F.Goodrich marketing effort to both GE and Oracle:

(1)Brouse met and corresponded with key representatives of GE to fully identify the GE opportunity and to ascertain the GE requirements;

(2)Brouse met and corresponded with a representative of Oracle regarding the possibility of GasTOPS teaming with Oracle to satisfy both the GE requirements and for the ECMS product to possibly become a component part of the enterprise-wide solution that Oracle was considering;

(3)Brouse interacted with the technical personnel from both GE and GasTOPS (including Forsyth and Jeff Cass) to ascertain the enhancements/modifications that would be necessary for ECMS to meet GE’s requirements; and

(4)Brouse became the GasTOPS representative most knowledgeable of the overall GE requirements, the ability of GasTOPS’ ECMS product to meet them, and perhaps most importantly, the size and importance of the GE opportunity as a gateway to the entire aviation marketplace.

In his role as the GasTOPS representative primarily responsible for the pursuit of the GE opportunity, Brouse compiled extensive information regarding all aspects of the GE opportunity. This information constituted confidential business information and was GasTOPS’ property

[378]There are several specific examples of Brouse’s involvement in the GE and Oracle

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opportunities and the confidential business information he was gathering at GasTOPS:

(1)Exhibit 154 is a memorandum from Brouse to Muir dated May 28, 1996, and copied to Forsyth with a subject line “G.E.C.M.S.” Brouse identified this document as his report from a trip he had taken with Brad Howe of B.F.Goodrich to Lynn, Massachusetts. The purpose of the meeting was to determine the GE requirements and to demonstrate the ECMS. In his report, Brouse noted:

(a)that he and Howe had met with Lou Bernazzani of GE, who was the head of a tech support team;

(b)that GE was looking for a software system to help with the management of engine data, including for both military and commercial clients;

(c)that GE wanted to track the usage, modification and configuration data against the engines;

(d)that GE would not accept an OS/2-based system – accordingly, the GasTOPS/ BFG team had stated to GE that the tentative product plan was to convert the ECMS system to Windows ‘95 by the summer of 1997;

(e)that according to Brad Howe, GE had shortened the list of potential purchases to GasTOPS’ ECMS and the Sabre system used by American Airlines; and

(f)that a decision was expected to be made shortly, possibly within a few weeks.

(2)Exhibit 156 was Brouse’s Trip Report from a trip to GE aircraft engines in Cincinnati, Ohio. The report was dated June 14, 1996. Again, Brouse was accompanied by B.F.Goodrich’s Howe. In his report, Brouse specifically identified some of the key players from both GE and Oracle who were in attendance at the meeting:

(a)Mark Tulino – GE – Manager, Fleet Management Systems;

(b)Jorge Ortiz (“Ortiz”) – Oracle – Principal Analysis;

(c)Ted Whaley (“Whaley”) – GE – Manager, Data Support.

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[379]In the introductory paragraph to his Trip Report to GE Aircraft Engines in Cincinnati (Exhibit 156) Brouse wrote:

Brad Howe and I visited GE Aircraft Engines in Cincinnati to discuss the possibility of providing the ECMS to GE to track engine data. From this trip we have discovered that:

1)GE is serious about the possibility of purchasing our system, and

2)Oracle Corp may be interested in using our system as a means to supply an R&O solution to airlines, OEMs and the military for both engines and airframe.

This makes clear to me that Brouse understood ECMS was being considered by GE and Oracle as a possible component of a larger R&O application. In his Trip Report, Brouse explained:

Oracle is taking a keen interest in our product and depending on the outcome of GE’s decision, may invite us to become a CIAP partner, whereby Oracle would promote and sell our system as a component of a larger R&O application targeted to airlines, engine and aircraft OEM’s and the military.

Oracle, I believe, has succeeded in dominating the RDMS market (somewhat like Microsoft has done in the operating system market). Like Microsoft, Oracle’s next step is to get into (and dominate) the RDBMS application market. Oracle is attempting to identify vertical market segments, capture them, and then move horizontally across the market area. As part of this process, Oracle is locating third party companies that have developed applications that can be integrated together to meet the vertical market requirement. These companies would be invited to participate in the Cooperative Integrated Applications Partnership (CIAP) programme whereby the mighty Oracle marketing and sales staff (which is legendary in the RDBMS business and is credited for capturing the RDBMS market) would promote and sell the integrated package (the third party company would still be allowed to sell their product independently of Oracle). Oracle presently publishes a catalogue of all Oracle applications; however, it is their plan to develop these integrated solutions of third party systems and publish the products in a separate catalogue (a product can only be listed in one of the catalogues). As a result, Oracle would

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be competing against many of their clients!

According to Joe Dugan, Regional Vice President, Oracle wants to get into the “Repair and Overhaul” application area and sees GE as the entry mechanism. I strongly believe Oracle has done a market analysis and knows the scope of the market. I also believe that Oracle is presently working on the technical scope of the service. I also believe that Oracle will recommend the ECMS to GE. In that regard, Jorge Ortiz, an Oracle consultant, wants to visit GasTOPS separately from the GE tour to examine our database design and to further discuss the functionality of the system. Most notably, Jorge wants to discuss some of our Mainstay features such as route management.

[380]At trial, Howe described the relationship between GE and Oracle:

Q.Mr. Howe, what's your independent recollection, if any, with respect to the significance of Oracle's involvement in these meetings?

A.Well, it could be both a good thing and a bad thing. The good thing was that Oracle, if we were able to integrate our ECMS into their larger system, it opened up even a more major piece of the market to us, beyond GE.

Any negative aspects, though, would be -- would centre around Oracle deciding that they could somehow do the same thing that we could do, you know. There was no indication that they thought that, but we knew it was important to protect our proprietary position.

[381]Based on the description of the relationship between GasTOPS and Oracle, it is understandable that GasTOPS identified Oracle as a target for ECMS sales. In his Trip Report (Exhibit 156), with respect to the GE opportunity itself, Brouse again noted that GE was considering two options, including GasTOPS’ ECMS. In his report, Brouse noted: “GE is sold on the functionality of the ECMS and sees it as the solution to their parts life tracking requirement.” As he did in his earlier Trip Report (Exhibit 154), Brouse noted that ECMS must be in Windows ’95 and that GE had been told GasTOPS’ planned to migrate its product into Windows ’95 during summer 1997. Brouse noted: “GE has not balked at our price (i.e. —200K for the R&O site). Nor have they balked at our customization per diem rate of —$800/day (we

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have described to GE that customization will be required). I believe GE is ready to throw a lot of money at this requirement. My guess is GE already has about 6 to 10 Oracle guys working on this project.” Clearly, Brouse had been privy to pricing discussions between GasTOPS and GE.

[382]At trial, Howe described his understanding of the GE requirements as of June 1996 as

follows:

A.They were looking for what they would term "an enterprise-wide solution" where they would actually install -- this Oracle-based enterprise-wide solution would do a number of different things. But the part they were interested in with us was our ECMS application, to be able to go and deal with engine configurations, parts life tracking, the same kind of things that the U.S. Navy was interested in, except for GE it was at their various maintenance bases; they had approximately 29 light and heavy combined -- some were light, some were heavy maintenance bases. And they had what you would have to call the equivalent of four depot sites: they in one in Strouther, Kansas, one in Ontario, California; there are, of course, majors sites at Lynn and Evendale.

I mean you could make that rough comparison to the Navy's, you know, depots; and then the varies other sites would be more like intermediate and operational organizational sites.

Q.Do you have an understanding as of this date as to the type of aircraft that were being serviced at these stations?

A.These would have been large commercial aircraft, large commercial transports.

[383]On June 20, 1996, Brouse and Howe of B.F.Goodrich received a fax from Bernazzani of GE (Exhibit 157), in which Bernazzani identified the GE environment and the specific requirements involved within the GE Aircraft Engines. Bernazzani advised that

(a)GE Aircraft Engines had manufacturing facilities in Evendale, Ohio and Lynn, Massachusetts as well as service facilities in Strother, Kansas and Ontario, California.

(b)The Evendale plant manufactured large engines for both military and commercial applications and the Lynn plant manufactured small engines, also for both military and commercial applications;

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(c)GE had entered into an agreement with Oracle to install its enterprise software at all GE facilities. Oracle, however, did not have a module to support parts life tracking, technical bulletin tracking and event tracking.

(d)The task was to identify one system that could satisfy the requirements of all four facilities to become a part of the Oracle enterprise solution; and

(e)His goal was to have a central repository of data consisting of multiple databases related to one another and encompassing military and commercial applications, from which GE facilities could process and retrieve data.

[384]The fax Bernazzani sent to Brouse and Howe was directed to them personally as members of the GasTOPS/B.F.Goodrich team as opposed to an industry-wide release. Accordingly, the fax corroborates that Brouse and Howe were “key employees” for GasTOPS and B.F.Goodrich in this business opportunity and were privy to GE’s most confidential needs.

[385]On July 3, 1996, Brouse authored a report (Exhibit 161) after GE’s Mark Tulino visited GasTOPS. According to Brouse, Tulino wished to discuss the possibility of GasTOPS providing GE with a “trial copy” of ECMS. GE was, according to Tulino and reported by Brouse, seeking trial copies of the ECMS software for use at all four of the major General Electric sites (Lynn, Massachusetts; Cincinnati, Ohio; Strother, Kansas and Ontario, California). GE sought GasTOPS’ assistance in the demonstration of the ECMS system. Brouse stated in Exhibit 161:

GE is somewhat sceptical about our ability to deliver a Windows version by Nov. 96 and will not pay “up front” for a system.

GE has identified that we are on a short list of one (i.e. the users have dismissed the STD solution), and that if we are not chosen they will develop the technology in conjunction with Oracle.

Mark stated that the November time frame is soft and that GE doesn’t have any ‘real’ deadlines. He mentioned March 97 as a more probable time frame for system delivery.

[386]At this point, Brouse understood that GE was narrowing its options down to the ECMS product. Further, he understood that the deadline for delivery was “soft” and that GE

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would likely wait until the following year for delivery of a Windows based system.

[387]On July 12, 1996, Brouse sent a fax to Howe at B.F.Goodrich (Exhibit 164). He outlined GasTOPS’ willingness to provide four copies of the ECMS program to be evaluated by the GE user communities. Brouse specifically stated that “Due to the highly sensitive nature of the ECMS database design, it is imperative that a non-disclosure agreement be signed by G.E. prior to delivery.” This statement by Brouse indicates his belief that the ECMS database was proprietary to GasTOPS and that it required protection by way of a non-disclosure agreement.

[388]With respect to the GE demonstrations, Brouse stated:

A.I was very involved technically with this project. I worked personally with Mr. Bernazzani and Mr. Whaley determining their requirements and getting their information about how these engines configured and about the engine data. And I was liaising back with Mr. Bernazzani and Mr. Whaley about how far along we were in setting up the evaluation, providing them information regarding how we configured the engines, was it satisfactory.

During this process GE was insisting that we do more engines and do considerably more engines than we had agreed to at the front of this project, to establish the data and load the data for many more engines, and I forget how many we proposed, but it was supposed to be just a handful; in the end it was I think in the order of dozens.

Accordingly, it is clear that Brouse was directly involved in ascertaining the GE requirements and obtaining detailed information on how their commercial airline engines were configured. This information constituted confidential business information proprietary to GasTOPS.

[389]On July 18, 1996, Brouse authored a memorandum entitled “Cost Estimate for Windows Conversion of the ECMS for G.E.” (Exhibit 167). In the introductory paragraph, Brouse stated that discussions with GE personnel suggested that only 55% of the system needed to be converted to Windows to meet their requirements and that the “actual” deadline for delivery was March 1997. In the cost estimate section of his report (Exhibit 167), Brouse concluded that the Windows conversion could be completed within six months at a cost of $496,000.00.

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[390]In early October 1996, Brouse was asked to prepare a GE briefing (Exhibit 178) note for MacIsaac, who was visiting GE in Cincinnati, Ohio. In it, he described the status of the opportunity and some of the people and issues involved:

GE Briefing Note

1.Opportunity

GE is presently implementing, in conjunction with Oracle, an enterprise wide information system to manage all of their corporate data (e.g. human resources, finances, etc.). To be included in this project is the implementation of an ‘R&O’ capability to manage their engine maintenance data. Their time-line is short, and GE had originally intended to have a portion of the over-all information system (including the R&O function) completed for Sept - Dec of 96.

To meet the R&O requirement, GE and Oracle are exploring the possibility of purchasing third party software; however, if nothing can be found then GE/Oracle intends to develop the functionality themselves.

To GasTOPS, the GE opportunity represents a large license fee and an appreciable-amount of labour services and associated revenue. More importantly, GE could provide us the opportunity to have a presence in the commercial aviation sector and could allow us to offer our product as an integrated subcomponent to the Oracle Enterprise system.

2.Status

2.1Our Understanding of their Procurement Process

To the best of our knowledge, the GE decision process for procurement of the R&O function was as follows:

1.Review the market for possible third party software products and generate a short list of possible candidates;

2.Obtain the software for the potential

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solutions and technically trial and evaluate the software with GE end users; and

3. If a suitable candidate passes the evaluation, purchase the software and integrate it into the GE enterprise system.

2.2The Contenders

To the best of our knowledge, GE is considering 3 potential options for the R&O solution:

1)the STD system from STD of the Sabre Group; and

2)the ECMS;

3)in-house development.

Our understanding is that the STD solution did not meet the expectations of the GE users and may have been eliminated as an option.

We do not know if GE/Oracle are still considering in-house development of the R&O capability, but one would have to assume so.

2.3Work Completed By BFG/GasTOPS to Date

In pursuit of this opportunity, we have done the following:

May 1 - provided a presentation of the system to representatives of GE Lynn

June 12 - provided a similar presentation to GE Cincinnati with Oracle in attendance

~June - based on concerns about the system architecture, BFG/GTL stated that a Windows-based ECMS can be ready by Nov. if a commitment is made by

GE

June 25 - as part of the evaluation, GE visited Orenda to view the ECMS in operation and to discuss the system with the users.

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July 3 - Mark Tulino made a surprise visit to GTL and asked us to provide a limited scope, free demo of the system for evaluation purposes at their 4 major North American User sites (Evendale, Lynn, Ontario (CA) and Struthers (Kansas)).

Aug 28- BFG/GTL provided 4 demonstration copies of the ECMS that contained substantially more data than agreed to in the SOW (i.e. ~2500 engine compared to

10)and provided a 1 day training session in Cincinnati (it is noted that delivery date was pushed back due to delays in obtaining data from GE).

Sept 18 - subsequent to the two week evaluation, GE had a number of questions regarding the manner in which the engine data was stored and a one day database design seminar was provided to GE in Cincinnati. It was agreed by all parties that this was the end point of the evaluation.

As a result of the evaluation, BFG/GTL have provided considerable information to GE regarding the manner in which one would structure (from a user perspective) such an engine information system. We have educated them in this area.

Although not officially stated, it is our understanding that the ECMS has successfully passed the technical evaluation. However, it is recognized by both GE and BFG/GTL that the ECMS is not designed to meet all of their specific requirements as a commercial engine OEM.

What is still unknown for both GE and BFG/GTL is what specific modifications will be necessary to the ECMS to meet their requirement. It was therefore agreed that the next step would be a “gap analysis” whereby BFG/GTL would be funded to analyze the GE maintenance operations, their data collection mechanisms, their utilization of the data and their Oracle enterprise system. This is to be a paid effort whereby BFG/GTL would get to ‘go to school’ on the operations and problems of an engine OEM. The end product of the gap analysis would be a functional definition of the modifications necessary to the ECMS, and a preliminary budget and schedule.

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BFG/GTL do not know if GE’s senior management has been briefed on the events described above.

2.4Pricing Provided

BFG has provided the standard US Navy pricing to GE (i.e. 215K per Depot and $860 per diem services). It is noted that GE has four major depots.

3.Players

The key technical players from GE are: Lou Bernazzani - Mgr Data Support in Lynn Ted Whaley - Mgr Data Support in Cincinnati The project manager from GE is:

Mark Tulino - Mgr, Fleet Mgt Systems, Cincinnati

Mark works for Ling Ling Juang who I believe manages their IS department.

Ling Ling works for Jay Dinwoodie, who you will be meeting. Dinwoodie is the decision maker.

Our one key contacts in Oracle is Jorge Ortiz who is a promoter of our system. He works for Joe Dugan, an Oracle VP. BFG has made overtures to Dugan with regards to working together, but Dugan has not responded.

4.Questions to be Answered

1.Is GE senior management aware of the possible purchase and integration of a third party R&O product and do they support this strategy?

2.Is GE still considering any other third party systems other than the ECMS (e.g. is STD really dead)?

3.Is GE/Oracle still considering development in-

house?

4.What is GE’s procurement plan? What steps will be followed prior to a purchase by GE? Would the purchase be

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handled through Oracle? What is the budget?

5. What is GE’s schedule for their new information system?

5.Delivery Schedule

It is estimated that to convert the ECMS components required for the GE requirement, a group of 9 skilled employees (including project managers, programmers and database specialists) will be required, full-time, for 6 months. Special enhancements to the ECMS to meet new GE requirements would be extra.

This briefing note demonstrates that Brouse fully appreciated and understood the significance of the GE opportunity to GasTOPS. He understood that the GE opportunity might open the door to the entirety of the commercial aviation market place and that it could lead to ECMS becoming a component part of the Oracle enterprise system. In my view, the briefing note also demonstrates that Brouse had an intimate understanding of all aspects of the GE and Oracle business opportunities.

[391]Clearly, the information that Brouse included was confidential and proprietary to GasTOPS, as it was the culmination of extensive marketing efforts directed at GE and Oracle.

[392]On October 3, 1996, MacIsaac attended at the GE facility in Cincinnati, Ohio. MacIsaac met with Mark Tulino and Jay Dinwoodie, the latter being the GE person that Brouse had described as “the decision maker.” MacIsaac described his understanding of Dinwoodie’s role in the decision making process. He said that Dinwoodie “had been brought in to run the Information Technology Services Group in an attempt to unify that service across some or all of the corporation.” MacIsaac asked Dinwoodie directly if he would be the person to make the final decision in these negotiations; Dinwoodie replied that he was.

[393]In his October 3, 1996, Trip Report on his visit to GE in Cincinnati, Ohio, MacIsaac

stated:

Background

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GasTOPS Ltd. has demonstrated the PLTS System to GE and had been asked to provide the kind of consulting services to GE that were judged to be unnecessary to complete an evaluation. The purpose of this meeting was to “smoke out” the real reason for this situation and to withdraw totally if it was judged to be a corporate espionage exercise.

General Observations

Dinwoodie spent considerable time filling in the background to the project. He has been 19 months in the position and in his mind, he was sent in to clean up a bad scene.

It was an “out of control” organization which had been allowed to pretty well do whatever it wanted. They were losing money and fooling with various software packages with no apparent purpose. He stated that he had been required to write off $100 million in purchased packages that could never be commissioned to any useful purpose.

At the same time, GE has decided that customer service is where its at and one of the key elements of this initiative was to clean up ITS and make it responsive not just to GE Aircraft Engines but to all other GE divisions as well.

To achieve this grand plan, they set out to buy as much of the solution as possible in a multi-tier fashion. This is roughly as follows:

a)Establish a common Base System (This has turned out to be Oracle)

b)Establish specific Division Systems (For Example - Engine Services)

c)Establish specialized application (GasTOPS PLTS)

He repeatedly stated that so long as he was in charge GE would stop developing their own s/w for anything that can be purchased.

In evaluating the PLTS systems we were pitted against SABRE

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and another company that neither Dinwoodie nor Tulino could (or wanted) to remember. SABRE was brought to the table by Oracle and is their system of choice at the moment. They have lost the competition to GasTOPS in GE’s mind and GE will only return to them if GasTOPS Ltd. fails in the “due diligence” segment of their evaluation.

Due Diligence is apparently a Dinwoodie initiative. He stated repeatedly that the “old” GE method of buying Software by “feel” is gone. They now only make final decisions after they have obtained satisfactory answers to questions which, in their mind, relate either to functionality or to the ability to obtain a clean interface.

Mark Tulino stated that their concerns with BFG/GasTOPS were:

a)OS/2 conversion

b)Software Stress resistance

c)API (I think means application procedures Interface)

He estimated that our timely conversion to Windows was mandatory. A brief discussion on the level of maturity of Windows 95 lead only to the fallback position of WINDOWS NT.

At the end of their due diligence period, they “plan on buying our software”! Dinwoodie admitted that they were asking for things that may make us uncomfortable and apologized for not telling us that for all but due diligence we had won the competition.

He suggested the following course of action simultaneously:

1)Get started on the larger purchase agreement.

2)Issue P0 for due diligence services.

Final Conclusions

1.This project is going to go.

2.It’s ours to lose.

3.We are running out of time.

4.We should be able to work the commercial deal through at the same pace as the due diligence. Dinwoodie was quite sensitive to our concerns and seems to be willing to have a

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contract ready to sign on the same day as the due diligence issues are settled.

5.Neither I nor Bob Mason feel that there is another agenda nor is there an in house effort. GE Cincinnati have gone from 20,000 employees in 1989 to 8,000 in 1996. They only do things themselves now if it is either cheaper or they can’t find an outside supplier. Dinwoodie would like to see an arrangement with Oracle emerge because he will obtain the benefit of our outside experience when he tackles other application areas. (Locomotives??)

[394]At trial, MacIsaac stated that his “take away” from the GE meeting was as follows: “My intention was that we work both the due diligence purchase order and the larger procurement contract together, and one move of my tests of General Electric was their willingness to work those together. It was my belief that the time frame we were talking about was of the order of six to eight months, but we had better be able to demonstrate something by Christmas.”

[395]On October 4, 1996, the day following his meeting with GE, MacIsaac met with Muir and Brouse at the GasTOPS offices in Ottawa, where he provided an account of his GE meeting and how GasTOPS would proceed. He recalled that he “specifically asked” Muir and Brouse to develop a plan for completing the conversions required by GE, to demonstrate that GasTOPS was capable of supplying the system to them. MacIsaac said that he planned to assemble the money needed to complete the project, which would require extra funding because it was not in GasTOPS’ business plan. To do so, MacIsaac would first find out “whether our banker would extend us that amount of credit” and, if necessary contact venture capitalist funds around Ottawa to acquire credit.

[396]Throughout his evidence, Brouse attempted to downplay the significance of documents and statements which indicated the maturity of the business opportunity between GasTOPS/B.F.Goodrich and GE. I am not prepared to accept the gloss that Brouse put on most of his evidence. When asked to confirm that the outcome of MacIsaac’s meeting with GE was positive for GasTOPS, Brouse attempted to downplay its significance:

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Q.In fact, Mr. MacIsaac told you at that particular meeting that he was prepared to go out to his bankers and to get the funds necessary to do this work with General Electric; you knew that?

A.I don't remember. It might be in my notes, but I don't remember that specifically.

Q.Well, Mr. Brouse, does it not make sense, that if you're having a meeting with the president of the company, and you -- according to your evidence, you rarely had such meetings?

A.That's correct.

Q.You’ve come to meet with Mr. MacIsaac; you're clearly receiving what is good news for GasTOPS; correct?

A.It would be appear to be good news to GasTOPS, yes.

Q. How could it not be good news, Mr. Brouse, if Mr. MacIsaac is telling you that GE says they're going to go with GasTOPS, they're going to buy the software?

A.Well, quite frankly, I was a bit confused coming out of that meeting. Some things that were said in that meeting that seemed to me completely inconsistent with what I knew about the opportunity, specifically these 1100 stations, as opposed to the four stations, the four depots which we had been quoted at $250,000 apiece.

Furthermore, the other thing that confused me, was this statement that, as I took it in the meeting, had this been a half billion dollar exercise, they would have moved forward; had it been $100,000 they would have moved forward with it. But somehow, being a multi-million dollar exercise, it’s all swept up in this time, that to me I saw as a bit of a specious argument.

I also – it was inconsistent with my understanding of Tulino being the pusher. It's my recollection that Tulino was, in fact, the most generous on potential deadlines for the timing of the Windows conversion.

So a lot of this information that Mr. MacIsaac got was inconsistent with my understanding of the GE potential opportunity.

Q. Whatever the information was, Mr. Brouse, that Mr.

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MacIsaac received, he received it from the most senior person within GE that GasTOPS had dealt with up to this particular point; correct?

A.That's correct.

Q.If nothing else, Mr. Brouse, you'll agree with me that GasTOPS saw the outcome of the meeting with General Electric as being positive?

A.Certainly Mr. MacIsaac did, yes. And, to be fair, despite the inconsistencies in the information that Mr. MacIsaac was providing to me, I would say it's positive too, because it did appear they wanted to move forward with GasTOPS limited.

[397]At the conclusion of his meeting with MacIsaac and Muir, it must have been apparent to Brouse that GasTOPS was on the verge of concluding an enormous contract with GE. In my view, by the following Monday, both Brouse and Forsyth were aware that GasTOPS/B.F.Goodrich were on the verge of contracting with GE for the delivery of approximately 1000 licenses for ECMS. Brouse and Forsyth were also aware that in order to bring this business opportunity to fruition, it would be necessary to convert the ECMS program to operate in Windows and to make other modifications to ECMS. I am sure that Brouse and Forsyth were aware that it would be necessary for the MSD to remain intact over the next 12 months for GasTOPS to achieve these goals.

[398]It is a reasonable inference that MacIsaac’s decision on October 4, 1996, to raise the necessary capital to convert GasTOPS’ products Windows and the pending contract with GE played a large part in Brouse and Forsyth’s decision to resign. It may well be that they had been considering resignation for some period of time prior to October 4, 1996, but the information delivered to Brouse by MacIsaac on that date was the imminent cause of their resignations. It is also a reasonable inference, notwithstanding the protestations of Forsyth and Brouse, that they resigned from GasTOPS at that time as they intended to form their own corporation and develop a computerized maintenance management system in a Windows environment and to compete with GasTOPS in the aviation marketplace, including the military marketplace.

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Bombardier

[399]In the MSD’s 1996/1997 business plan, which was prepared before the resignations, Muir forecasted the expansion of the ECMS software system to include the structural components of the aircraft. Muir saw this as a new business opportunity. He anticipated that GasTOPS would be required to enter into a cooperation agreement with Bombardier’s Defense System Division (formerly Canadair) as Bombardier was the “system engineering support contractor” for the CF-18 fighter aircraft. Bombardier provided all of the maintenance support for the aircraft with the exception of the engines.

[400]On March 4, 1996, Chivers became aware of an upgrade being planned to the DMS, a maintenance database system developed and maintained by Bombardier and used on the CF-18 aircraft to record primarily maintenance and technical information related to the aircraft, with the exception of the engine. Chivers understood that the projected upgrade would take 24 months to complete with a software development component valued at 4 million dollars. At that time, the officer responsible at DND for the DMS was Major Comtois.

[401]In March 1996, Brouse received a copy of Chivers’ memorandum outlining the software development component having a value of 4 million dollars (Exhibit 128). Shortly thereafter Brouse attended a meeting with Chivers and Muir, wherein they decided to prepare a proposal to the CAF on the basis that the application of the ECMS system could be extended from the engine to the entire air frame. Muir saw this as a significant opportunity for GasTOPS and felt that GasTOPS could meet this requirement with a modified version of the ECMS.

[402]As a result, Brouse prepared an unsolicited proposal for the CAF with Forsyth and Jeff Cass’s assistance. In the proposal, he described how the ECMS could effectively perform the functions of the DMS. In his proposal, Brouse maintained that the functionality contemplated by DND for the CF-18 as an upgrade of the DMS already existed in the ECMS. According to Brouse, ECMS v.2 had been designed so that it could deal with all components of the aircraft. Brouse described the manual system that the CAF was using to record maintenance information in logbooks on the entire aircraft, except the engine. The information in the logbook was then

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given to a data entry clerk who entered the information into the DMS software system. Brouse commented on the inefficiencies of this process and proposed that the ECMS be used to meet the CAF’s requirements as it could (Exhibit 130 at page 5):

1.Perform serialized parts tracking on all maintenance significant components of the aircraft;

2.Track the usage utilization on all lifed aircraft components;

3.Track all maintenance transactions against the aircraft;

4.Identify and schedule all routine and non-routine aircraft maintenance activities including modifications, special inspections, conditional inspections, periodic inspections, etc.;

5.Provide an electronic log set;

6.Provide logistic planning capabilities including stock levels, sparring requirements, fleet status life/inspection/modification status reports, workload planning and best build component matching.

[403]Brouse stated in the unsolicited proposal (Exhibit 130) that the ECMS database would simply be configured to support CF-18 aircraft maintenance to set the proposed system to work. A series of PC computers, networked together and placed at locations where aircraft maintenance would be performance, would host the system. This would allow maintenance information to be entered directly into the system while the work was being executed and allow data to be forwarded to other locations for further support.

[404]On April 2, 1996, GasTOPS forwarded its unsolicited proposal to DND. On April 12, 1996, Brouse and Chivers met with the CAF to review the unsolicited proposal. At the end of the meeting, Brouse believed that the CAF would not be moving forward with either the GasTOPS or Bombardier proposals.

[405]On July 11, 1996, Brouse spoke with Bombardier’s Serge Leguellec (“Leguellec”) regarding the possibility of GasTOPS teaming with Bombardier so Bombardier would provide the technical/domain knowledge and GasTOPS would provide the software for the upgrading of the DMS. Leguellec, formerly an officer with DND, was and had been employed in

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Bombardier’s marketing group since March 1996. Brouse forwarded the details of their conversation to Muir in an e-mail entitled “hop on board the S. Leguellec team” (Exhibit 131). Brouse opined that Leguellec was very interested in working with GasTOPS to develop a type of condition-based maintenance system for specific aircraft structural components. Brouse was advised by Leguellec of who to contact at the CAF. Brouse wrote in his e-mail to Muir:

1)He has informed his superiors that the Canadair/CAE relationship wrt to DMS is not working and is a “piece of crap”. He was summoned to the V.P. of Marketing (Jane ?) to explain himself (after he had announced this at an internal meeting) and has described the situation to Marc Bourret, the Director of the F-18 program.

2)He has discussed the situation with his old team at DTA. Most notably, Serge feels that the key guy now is Major Normand Landry who is now in charge of IFOS and F-I 8 ASIP. BJ has been placed in a senior consult/policy role (I don’t know what that means over at DND, but that is the death knell at GTL). Apparently the Ozzies and the Canucks have identified that they require a Fault/Defect database to support this project and are considering joint funding of a system.

3)Apparently Normand has agreed to a two step plan whereby an SOR is developed by a contractor under RISO and then the production is contracted. With regard to the SOR, Normand is considering having Lansdowne, Celeris or one other company generate the document. Serge feels that Steve H is the most likely candidate. Serge claims that the company that generates the SOR cannot bid or be used on the actual production contract.

[406]When Leguellec was a captain in the CAF working for Major Miller, he championed GasTOPS and its products. Brouse had known Leguellec since April 4, 1995, and had worked with him on an aircraft component life management (“ACLM”) project/concept, which was an attempt to bring condition-based maintenance methodologies and technologies to specific components on the air frame of the aircraft. At that time, the parties considered a teaming arrangement to meet the future information technology needs on the CF-18s.

[407]In pursuing an arrangement with Bombardier, Muir led the development and

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negotiation of any agreement and Brouse was responsible for specific opportunities, namely on- line maintenance and structural tracking.

[408]As suggested in Brouse’s e-mail (Exhibit 131), Muir instructed Chivers to contact Major Marc Bourret who had left the CAF and was working at Bombardier. By memorandum dated July 12, 1996 Chivers reported that the information received from Leguellec was correct and that Bombardier was considering GasTOPS as a potential partner for the on-line maintenance tracking and structural tracking project as well as a third project known as MASIS.

[409]Bombardier arranged to make a presentation to GasTOPS on July 31, 1996, entitled “The Winning ASMIS/ACLM Information System Concept, a Bombardier Inc. and GasTOPS Ltd. Strategic Alliance, Synergy of Air Frame and IT Know-How” (Exhibit 133). Bombardier reviewed the CAF’s requirements for a software information system that would obtain all maintenance information on the air frame. Leguellec proposed that GasTOPS’ generic information system be used to provide the required functionality. Leguellec was suggesting that GasTOPS develop a generic information system from the ECMS concept which was particularly well-suited to ACLM. According to Muir, Leguellec was referring to the fact that the ECMS was based on a generic condition-based maintenance design (MAINSTAY) and that this design concept was well-suited for the ACLM requirement. Bombardier was suggesting a partnership arrangement with GasTOPS for this opportunity and for future opportunities.

[410]Upon returning from the Bombardier presentation, Chivers reported to Muir by handwritten note dated August 1, 1996 (Exhibit 134), and provided Brouse with a copy of the presentation. After reviewing the PowerPoint presentation, Brouse understood that Leguellec wanted Bombardier and GasTOPS to work in a partnership to develop an ACLM system.

[411]According to Chivers’ memorandum, Leguellec would obtain approval from Bombardier to go ahead with the partnership agreement with GasTOPS. Bombardier expected the CAF to issue a RFP for the ACLM in October 1996 and that Bombardier and GasTOPS would prepare a statement of work or work plan for the project by early 1997.

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[412]In September 1996, Brouse noted in his logbook that Bombardier was interested in having GasTOPS work with Bombardier “to solve the DMS” and Major Jim Henry of the CAF was in favour of such an arrangement. Leguellec described to Brouse how the requirements were being made and where DND was going on the project (Exhibit 96, pages 34 to 36).

[413]On September 13, 1996, Brouse spoke with Leguellec about recent developments at Bombardier and CAF about this business opportunity. Apparently, there were agreements between Bombardier and Canadian Aviation Electronics (“CAE”) that had to be considered before Bombardier could enter into an agreement with GasTOPS. Leguellec suggested that Bombardier’s preferred solution would be for CAE to work with GasTOPS (Exhibit 96 at pages 56 to 63).

[414]On September 24, 1996, Muir received a memorandum from Leguellec scheduling a meeting for September 27, 1996, at GasTOPS and requesting the presence of Muir, Brouse and Chivers. Leguellec invited two representatives from CAE. The meeting was called because of a consortium agreement between Bombardier and CAE whereby Bombardier was obliged to work with CAE on the DMS. Bombardier sought to arrive at an agreement between GasTOPS, CAE and Bombardier to discuss how the DMS would be upgraded and the role that GasTOPS and its ECMS system would have in the upgrade. Leguellec provided an agenda for the meeting setting out the topics to be discussed (Exhibit 135).

[415]The meeting was held on September 27, 1996 at which time the CAE representative did a PowerPoint presentation entitled “CF-18 DMS”. The slides described the DMS, its users, specifications and DND’s requirements. According to Muir, during the presentation, CAE proposed to use ECMS to meet certain requirements for the upgrades of the DMS, namely the on-line maintenance tracking and the electronic log set for the aircraft. (Exhibit 136) Bombardier and GasTOPS also made presentations. Warrant Officer Paré attended the meeting, as he had been advised of it by Brouse. The meeting covered the potential working relationships between GasTOPS and Bombardier in a software development project, whereby ECMS and DMS would be merged to support the CF-18 air frame and the engines. Brouse recalled discussions around the possibility that the GUI being the front end of ECMS would be applied to the DMS

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(Exhibit 96 at pages 79 to 84).

[416]After the meeting, Muir anticipated receiving a non-disclosure agreement from Bombardier and that continued discussions would take place with CAE and Bombardier.

Kuwaiti Air Force

[417]During the time he was employed at GasTOPS, Brouse knew that the Kuwaitis were awaiting an MDPS replacement and that they would likely procure the same system as the U.S. Navy. As a result, Brouse was directly involved in GasTOPS’ marketing efforts to sell the ECMS technology to the Kuwaiti Air Force.

[418]On August 22, 1996, Howe of B.F.Goodrich sent a faxed transmission to Brouse and Muir (Exhibit 84) which included a cover page that stated:

Lt. Matt Herl called this morning in a tizzy for two reasons

(1)Brian Burns is in today pitching their alternative to Todd Mellon/Capt Dyer for sale to Kuwait.

(2)Matt has his own meeting with Todd and Capt. Dyer to show procurement options (which avoid competition) for ECMS.

The attached (13) pages are my response and they include your white paper. I pulled out the stops and sent it directly to them as decision time for Kuwait is imminent.

[419]At page 2 of Exhibit 84, Howe provided Brouse with a copy of correspondence he had forwarded to Lieutenant Herl dated August 22, 1996. In his correspondence under the sub- heading “Option” “B”, Howe stated that one of the circumstances that would permit other than full and open competition for the U.S. Navy to acquire ECMS licenses was through the “procurement of ECMS/FLTS through international agreement” (FMS sale to Kuwait)”. In his correspondence, Howe wrote, “This does not directly help the Navy procure ECMS/FLTS for Navy F18 use but offers the benefit of establishing the software as COTS. The sale to Kuwait could be permitted without full & open competition using the PAR 6.302-4 International Agreement Clause.”

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[420]Accordingly, Brouse was fully aware that an opportunity existed for GasTOPS to provide its ECMS technology to the Kuwaiti Air Force as a foreign military sale (“FMS”) as a direct result of GasTOPS’ pursuit of the U.S. Navy opportunity. The NAVAIR/ECMS/ FLTS long-term tactical action plan authored by Brouse and Howe specifically confirms that the GasTOPS/B.F.Goodrich team had “pitched” the ECMS/FLTS to the Kuwaitis at the CIP meeting in Toronto (Exhibit 92 at page 4).

[421]In describing this Kuwaiti opportunity, Muir stated that in summer 1996 Lieutenant Herl told Howe and Brouse that Kuwait was interested in an MDPS replacement as that program became further and further delayed. Brouse later attended a meeting with representatives from the Kuwaiti Air Force to show them GasTOPS’ product and discuss “the potential of the Kuwaiti procurement of ECMS.” On September 18, 1996, Brouse followed up with Ken Johnston, F/A- 18 project office, Kuwaiti Air Force, providing him with literature on the ECMS and FLTS.

[422]When asked about the Kuwaiti Air Force opportunity as of the end of September 1996, Muir testified that he understood Kuwait’s plan to be to purchase the same MDPS replacement as the U.S. Navy.

[423]When questioned concerning the Kuwaiti Air Force business opportunity while employed at GasTOPS, Brouse confirmed that he knew through his employment at GasTOPS, and from conversations with Terry Chandler and with representatives from the Kuwaiti Air Force itself, that whichever company sold its system to the U.S. Navy would have an advantage in selling to other forces, such as the Kuwaitis.

[424]On October 7, 1997, Muir prepared a “ROM Estimate for Kuwaiti AF ECMS” (Exhibit 499) to demonstrate to a possible partner who indicated that he might be able to assist in the sale of ECMS to Kuwait. Pursuant to the Rough Order of Magnitude (“ROM”), Muir estimated that the proposed sale to the Kuwaiti Air Force of ECMS would generate revenues to GasTOPS of $1,270,000.

DOT/RCMP

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[425]In the summer of 1996, GasTOPS was pursuing an opportunity to modify its ECMS products for use on a fleet of commercial/passenger aircraft, similar to those used in the computer airline market place. In the summer of 1996, Darrel Churchill (“Churchill”) of GasTOPS identified an Advanced Contract Award Notice (“ACAN”) of the government’s intention to purchase, on a sole source basis, a parts life tracking system for the RCMP. The ACAN identified the need for an inventory management software system to track parts both on and off the aircraft and keep maintenance records. The ACAN identified the opportunity as one that would not be competed. The government had already chosen its vendor, Time Air Inc., but was required by policy to publicly state its intention to purchase a product from a specific vendor. Any potential vendor was allowed to challenge the ACAN by indicating it had a product that may meet the requirements. According to Brouse, he did not consider the ECMS as a “good fit” for the opportunity as it appeared to him that the RCMP was looking for a CMMS. Churchill did not agree with Brouse and contacted Public Works and Government Services Canada (“PWGSC”).

[426]On August 2, 1996, Churchill spoke to the procurement arm of the Canadian Government, PWGSC, suggesting that GasTOPS’ ECMS software product could meet the RCMP requirements (Exhibit 138). By letter of response dated August 2, 1996 (Exhibit 139), PWGSC provided GasTOPS with a system requirements document that listed the functionality being sought by the RCMP which stated:

COMPUTERIZED AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE CONTROL

SYSTEM

Air Services Branch has since August 96 been reviewing several software packages designed for inventory and maintenance control. The projects initial purpose was to determine what products were on the market and that would fulfil Air Services requirements which would consist of the following.

-The program has to have good reliability reporting capabilities to allow Air services to monitor hard time components.

-Be able to track parts to an exact location at all

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times without any breaks in the process.

-Error checking capabilities for times, part no.’s, serial no.’s etc.

-An audit section for Quality Assurance reports.

-A proven program acceptable to Transport Canada.

-Because the AME’s at the Air Sections would be required to do their own planning and data entry, the degree of security of any given program would be an important determining factor.

-The ability to handle assemblies and subassemblies.

-The ability to handle inspection and installation kits.

-Be able to deal with Airworthiness Directives and Service Bulletins, both mandatory and non mandatory.

-The ability to be wide area networked across Canada to a minimum of twenty two Air Sections.

-The ability to track all of the journey log entries and report on them.

-It must error check serial numbers so that a serial number can not be attached to more than one of the same part number.

-Have a good financial section capable of budget forecasting and cost analysis, and the ability to export data to the RCMP financial programs.

-Be able to track the technical libraries in Ottawa and all the Air Sections.

[427]In its covering letter dated August 2, 1996, PWGSC advised GasTOPS that its ECMS marketing information had been provided to both the RCMP and the DOT. In subsequent correspondence dated August 8, 1996 (Exhibit 141), PWGSC advised GasTOPS that DOT was interested in acquiring a similar system to that being sought by the RCMP and accordingly GasTOPS was pursuing business opportunities with both the DOT and RCMP.

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[428]At trial, Brouse testified that he was actively involved in GasTOPS’ pursuit of the opportunity with the DOT and the RCMP. On August 9, 1996, Brouse met with Mr. Zorn from the RCMP, and Brouse gathered further information about the required functionality and the various other software systems that the RCMP and DOT had considered. On September 4, 1996, Churchill, Brouse, Forsyth and Jeff Cass met with personnel from DOT and the RCMP, and GasTOPS learned that DOT was installing an Oracle enterprise software system and Oracle Financials for management of their finances and that it sought to integrate this system with the maintenance management system. They further learned that the requirement was for E/D aircraft including helicopters and fixed wings aircrafts such as Cessnas and Beavers. The system would have to maintain compliance with ATA codes and the CARS and FARS programs. This was a concern as GasTOPS was only able to manage engines and specifically only one engine type at a time. The minimum requirements of a system for DOT/RCMP included tracking parts and labour costs, tracking authority level of individuals, entering transactions, journey logs, recording technical publications and training installation support. At this point, Brouse was of the opinion that ECMS was not capable of meeting the DOT/RCMP requirements and would require significant functionality changes.

[429]After this meeting, Brouse, Forsyth and Jeff Cass remained actively involved in pursuing the DOT/RCMP opportunity on behalf of GasTOPS. These defendants attended a further meeting to define more accurately the required functionality of a software system similar to users of commuter aircraft and they learned more about the business process of both the RCMP and DOT. They worked collaboratively with one another to develop a scope of work that identified the enhancements/modifications that would have to be made to the ECMS to meet the requirements of the commuter aircraft market place as well as the pricing for the job.

[430]On September 18, 1996, Brouse sent a copy of Jeff Cass’ DOT/RCMP Aircraft Fleet Management System Requirement Report (Exhibit 146) to DOT/RCMP to confirm their requirements. Brouse claimed it was a summary of the notes he took at the meeting on September 4 setting out the requirements as understood by GasTOPS. Jeff Cass authored the summary and noted on the first page in section 1.1 that “the Department of Transport and RCMP

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requires functionality that is above and beyond the existing capabilities of ECMS v.2.”

[431]On September 24, 1996, Mr. Grace, sent a fax to Churchill and Brouse requesting an estimate for ECMS v.2 without any additional functionality. Upon receipt, Brouse stated that he believed that they were no longer interested in using ECMS for their overall solution but were interested in some of its capabilities. Brouse contacted Grace to specifically ask about their thoughts on the ECMS product. Brouse made notes on the face of the fax indicating that the government was worried about GasTOPS’ lack of exposure to the commercial sector and GasTOPS’ lack of understanding of the commercial requirements.

[432]Muir felt that PWGSC was looking for a quote before the opportunity went any further. Later on September 24, 1996, Brouse sent a fax to Grace indicating GasTOPS could provide ECMS v.2 for a discounted price of $4,500 per unit (quoted under the other systems that PWGSC considered). Customization of ECMS would be provided at a reasonable rate.

[433]On September 25, 1996, Jeff Cass authored an internal document entitled “DOT and RCMP Aircraft Fleet Management System Proposed Work Plan and Estimate.” On September 26, 1996, Brouse sent a fax to Grace outlining that the cost of customization in addition to the license fee would be in the range of $280,000 to $410,000. Prior to their resignation, Forsyth, Brouse and Jeff Cass had no further interaction with Grace concerning the DOT/RCMP business opportunity.

[434]Days before Brouse resigned from GasTOPS, he advised GasTOPS that it should not pursue the DOT/RCMP opportunity: “I provided to Mr. Churchill my opinion that this is not something that we should really purse, that it's very different than what we've pursued in the past and what they're requesting goes far beyond the capability of the ECMS product.”

[435]During the summer of 1996, Brouse was intimately involved in ascertaining the requirements on the DOT/RCMP opportunity, which could have provided a separate and distinct pathway for GasTOPS to enter into the commercial aviation marketplace. Brouse made the decision that GasTOPS should not pursue this opportunity. It is a reasonable inference that at the

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time Brouse made his recommendation that GasTOPS should not pursue the DOT/RCMP opportunity, he knew that he would be resigning from GasTOPS and would become part of a new company that would compete with GasTOPS. It is also a reasonable inference that when Brouse recommended that GasTOPS not pursue the DOT/RCMP opportunity he intended that his new company would pursue.

IV. The Resignations

[436]On October 7, 1996, Forsyth and Brouse submitted separate letters of resignation from GasTOPS. The letters of resignation were identical and stated:

I regret to inform you that I have decided to resign from GasTOPS Ltd. on Friday, October 18, 1996. While my future plans are somewhat uncertain, rest assured that I will NOT:

1.solicit business from any existing GasTOPS Ltd. clients or potential clients that GasTOPS Ltd. has been pursuing and counting on;

2.utilized or take with me any confidential company information or property; nor,

3.solicit any employees or GasTOPS Ltd.

I hope that my departure will not be too disruptive to GasTOPS Ltd. and that the company will find a suitable replacement. However, if GasTOPS Ltd. should need my services to assist in the transition, I will be available on a sub-contract basis.

In their letters of resignation, Forsyth and Brouse provided GasTOPS with 2-weeks notice of the effective date of their resignation, being October 18, 1996.

[437]On any interpretation of the letters of resignation of Brouse and Forsyth it is clear that they understood that they owed a fiduciary duty to GasTOPS. Both Forsyth and Brouse assured GasTOPS that they would not solicit business from any existing GasTOPS clients or potential clients that GasTOPS had been pursuing and counting on and would not utilize or take with them any confidential company information or property. In addition they stated that they would not

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solicit any employees of GasTOPS.

[438]In my view, Forsyth and Brouse’s letters of resignation set out the duty that they owed to GasTOPS as a result of their employment and that each of them was aware of their duty. If they had abided by the contents of their letters of resignation, this lawsuit would never have proceeded. Unfortunately, Forsyth and Brouse did not follow through on the assurances that they gave to GasTOPS. A review of the evidence leads me to believe that they never intended to abide by such assurances.

[439]During his cross-examination, Forsyth conceded that he and Brouse had given short notice to ensure that they could start their own business, as they would not be able to start a business while employed by GasTOPS. Forsyth stated:

We thought that -- we talked about how much notice we would give and what we would do. We decided that we couldn't start a business while we were working for GasTOPS directly, but we could do, if we were working in a subcontract arrangement, because then we're not employees anymore."

Later, during cross-examination Forsyth confirmed that the primary purpose of working in a subcontract arrangement for GasTOPS would be to fund the development of MxI’s own product and provide revenues, saying “It was to provide income to live off of and to support what we were doing.”

[440]In my view, Forsyth and Brouse gave insufficient notice of their resignation in order to establish their own company, which would compete directly with GasTOPS, as soon as possible. If they had given ten months’ notice, which would have been reasonable, the defendants would have continued to owe to GasTOPS a duty of loyalty and good faith which would have prevented them from establishing their own company and competing with GasTOPS in the area of aviation maintenance software. I have no doubt that the defendants Brouse and Forsyth resigned when they did in order to have an opportunity to compete for the GE and the U.S. Navy opportunities that were almost at the point of fruition for GasTOPS.

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[441]On October 10, 1996 Jeff Cass resigned from GasTOPS effective October 25, 1996. On October 10, 1996 Vandenberg submitted his letter of resignation from GasTOPS effective October 23, 1996.

[442]Muir was shocked when his two senior managers resigned at the same time with virtually no notice. Muir asked Brouse and Forsyth to reconsider their letters of resignation but both indicated their resignations were non-negotiable. Once Muir determined that neither Forsyth nor Brouse would reconsider their resignation, he discussed the matter with MacIsaac. Muir considered it “highly suspicious” for the two senior managers to arrive at the same time and submit identical letters of resignation which gave virtually no notice and to do so almost immediately after MacIsaac had announced that he was prepared to obtain the necessary financing to convert ECMS to Windows in order to close the GE deal.

[443]Muir and MacIsaac then asked Forsyth and Brouse to immediately leave the GasTOPS premises. Muir indicated that, given the lack of proper notice, he and MacIsaac were concerned about GasTOPS’ best interests and Brouse and Forsyth’s effect on other employees:

We felt that the potential was there for them to affect our employees and that we look might lose further employees. So for those reasons it was decided that Forsyth and Brouse should leave immediately, and I went down to speak to the two of them.

[444]When Forsyth and Brouse failed to give reasonable notice of their intention to resign, they breached their implied contractual obligation to provide reasonable notice and as such GasTOPS was justified in asking the defendants to leave the GasTOPS’ premises.

[445]During the conversation Muir had with Forsyth regarding his resignation, Forsyth advised that Vandenberg and Jeff Cass would also be resigning. I have no doubt that when Forsyth and Brouse resigned they understood others would be resigning from GasTOPS to join their planned new company.

[446]During his direct examination and cross-examination, Forsyth suggested that when he resigned he and Brouse had no plans regarding the type of business they would engage in. After

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Forsyth completed his evidence, certain backup tapes were produced by the defendants, which established that Forsyth and Brouse intended to establish a company which would compete with GasTOPS in the aviation maintenance software field.

[447]In the backup tape produced by the defendants (during Brouse’s cross examination of Brouse and pursuant to my order) was an electronic document from Forsyth’s directory entitled business process.vsd and dated October 2, 1996 (Exhibit 2195). It was an elaborate diagram depicting the numerous, interrelated divisions of the company he planned to incorporate.

[448]As a result of the late disclosure by both sides I allowed both sides to have witnesses recalled in order that they could cross-examine such witnesses on documents that had been disclosed after the witness left the witness box and which should have been disclosed prior to the commencement of the trial.

[449]When Forsyth was re-called for continued cross-examination on November 25, 2005, he was presented with the document’s “Properties.” It suggested that he had created this diagram on October 2, 1996, in anticipation of MxI’s business plan, which Forsyth confirmed:

Q.Again, just to confirm, this, sir, is your original work done in anticipation of preparing your business plan at MxI; correct?

A.Correct.

[450]I have no doubt, that given the nature of the work that the employees of MSD were doing, they became members of a team and there was a strong relationship between the employees and their managers (Forsyth, Brouse and Tobin). There was also, I am sure, a strong relationship between Jeff Cass and the employees who worked for him. Between the discontent within MSD and the abrupt resignations of Forsyth, Brouse, Jeff Cass and Vandenberg, as well as other program managers such as Peloso, I am sure the remaining MSD employees seriously considered joining MxI. MSD was looked on as a “team” of employees and it is therefore not surprising that the initial abrupt resignations of the defendants would result in a further “exodus” of MSD employees from GasTOPS.

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[451]The following employees resigned from the MSD on the dates indicated:

Employee

Date of Resignation

 

 

Brad Forsyth

October 7, 1996

(Exhibit 315)

Doug Brouse

October 7, 1996

(Exhibit

316)

Rob Vandenberg

October 10, 1996

(Exhibit

318 & 335)

Jeff Cass

October 10, 1996

(Exhibit 317 & 334)

Dave Peloso

October 10, 1996

(verbal)

 

 

October 15, 1996

(Exhibit 328)

Chris Cass

October 15, 1996

(Exhibit 330)

Bill Smith

October 15, 1996

(Exhibit 331)

Kevin Reynolds

October 15, 1996

(Exhibit 332)

Mark Lennox

October 15, 1996

(Exhibit 329)

Linh Nguyen

October 16, 1996

(Exhibit 333)

Mike Egan

October 16, 1996

(verbal)

 

 

October 18, 1996

(Exhibit 343)

Laura Cline

October 16, 1996

(verbal)

 

 

October 18, 1996

(Exhibit 342)

Andrew Hircock

October 18, 1996

(Exhibit 344)

Matt Tobin

October 21, 1996

(Exhibit 346)

Dave Isaacs

October 22, 1996

(Exhibit

350)

Sikander Adam

October 25, 1996

(Exhibit

358)

Darcy Chorneyko

October 25, 1996

(Exhibit

428)

Donna Kind

November 18, 1996

(Exhibit 407)

Dekun Cao

January 31, 1997

(Exhibit 429)

*Matt Tobin, Dave Isaacs, Darcy Chorneyko, Donna Kind and Dekun Cao did not immediately join MxI upon resigning from GasTOPS.

[452]On October 7, 1996, the day that Forsyth and Brouse resigned from GasTOPS, there was an informal gathering of MSD employees at the Beacon Arms. These employees were upset by Forsyth and Brouse’s resignations. Many of them felt that if their team leaders resigned they wanted to continue to be members of the team or teams headed by Brouse and Forsyth. There were a number of meetings involving employees of MSD and Brouse and Forsyth. Within 18 days of the resignation of Forsyth and Brouse, 12 further MSD employees had resigned and gone on to work for MxI.

[453]After the impromptu gathering at the Beacon Arms, there was a further gathering at Jeff Cass’s home. As the evening progressed, those who were at Jeff Cass’s home met with

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Forsyth and Brouse at Brouse’s home. Peloso described the meeting at Brouse’s home as follows:

Q.Who else was there, sir, other than the three of you [Forsyth, Brouse and Peloso]?

A.I can't be definitive. Marc Lennox, Bill Smith, I believe D’Arcy Chorneyko. I believe Jeff Cass.

Q.Chris Cass?

A.It's possible. Again ---

Q.I take it, sir, at that particular meeting you also said you were there pretty much every night that week; correct?

A.Correct.

Q.I take it during the course of those meetings, Mr. Brouse and/or Forsyth would have advised you fully of what they were planning to do in their new business venture; correct?

A.Advised me fully is maybe a bit strong, but there was discussed about what they thought they were going to do, yes.

Q.I would like to know, sir, the entirety of your recollection of those discussions?

A.That they wanted to form a software company. They wanted to produce a software product. There was debate that one of the product ideas was an Internet based backup system. Another idea was software maybe for someone with their -- has their own private aircraft or something like that.

Q.So, sir, if I understand your evidence correctly, starting as early as the Monday after they've resigned there is discussions about possibility of doing some type of an aviation maintenance software; correct?

A.Again, it was on the Monday, the Tuesday or the Wednesday. I'm there every day that week, that topic does arise, yes. I really don't recall which specific date, but it does arise, yes.

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Q.Sir, what were the discussions surrounding that potential product?

A.That it would have absolutely nothing to do with condition based maintenance. That it would be a small product in the sense that it would likely deal with someone who, you know, who had an airplane or two or something like that, small aircraft, and just trying to follow the owner's manual, if you like. The owners makings manual.

Q. … What convinced you to go and join them?

A.They would allow me to join them. As I explained to Mr. Muir, I really didn't care what they were doing, it was more important to me as to which team I’m going to be on and I’m joining those guys. I really didn't care what they were doing.

[454]Within hours of their resignation from GasTOPS, Forsyth, Brouse and Cass were meeting with MSD employees and describing to them their plans to start up their own business focused on aviation maintenance software.

[455]On October 8, 1996, Muir met with MSD’s remaining managers. In attendance were Jeff Cass, Peloso, Reynolds and Chris Cass. At the meeting Jeff Cass confirmed to Muir that he intended to resign. Reynolds also confirmed his intention to resign while Peloso seemed, according to Muir, to be leaning towards resignation. At the same time Muir believed that Chris Cass might not resign. On October 9, 1996, Muir met with the entire MSD staff and confirmed that the company was seeking to restructure itself following the Forsyth and Brouse’s abrupt resignations. Muir did not advise the remaining MSD staff that other managers of GasTOPS had expressed an intention to him to resign. On October 10, 1996, Jeff Cass submitted his letter of resignation to Muir (Exhibit 317), writing: “My last day at GasTOPS will be Friday, October 25, 1996 which should allow me to complete the deliverable MAINSTAY system for ITM and to see ECMSv.2.01 through its Acceptance Test Plan.”

[456]With respect to the period of notice given by those who resigned, Muir stated:

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Q.Mr. Muir, was there any discussions between yourself and Mr. Vandenberg with respect to his continued employment at GasTops past October 23, 1996?

A.Yes. In the case of all of these resignations, including Forsyth and Brouse, I felt that these individuals had a professional responsibility to remain at GasTops until such time as we could, as a company, arrange for a suitable replacement for them, and I made that point to them all. I said that 'the notice you're giving me is not adequate to find a replacement.' I impressed upon them all my desire to have them stay until such time as we could find a suitable replacement or effect a change in the team at GasTops that would allow us to continue to do our work.

Q.Did Mr. Vandenberg express any interest in working past that day of October 23?

A.No.

[457]Although the MSD employees wanted of their own accord to be part of the MxI team and were to some extent disenchanted with their working conditions at GasTOPS, they also had assurances that they could work for MxI before they tendered their resignations at GasTOPS. It may well be that after the departures of Forsyth, Brouse, Vandenberg, Jess Cass and Peloso, the remaining employees would have eventually left GasTOPS, but under other circumstances their departures would have been delayed as they searched for further or different employment.

[458]In my view, Forsyth and Brouse knew that if they resigned from GasTOPS and started their own software company, the majority of the MSD “team” would want to join their company to continue its software development work. In addition, Forsyth and Brouse knew that if most of the members of the MSD left GasTOPS for MxI, GasTOPS would be unable to fulfill its contracts and continue to pursue the new business opportunities it had been pursuing at the time of the resignations. I have no doubt that Brouse and Forsyth knew the devastating effect that their resignations and the resignations of the other MSD employees would have on GasTOPS. Also, the resignations of Forsyth, Brouse, Jeff Cass, Vandenberg, Peloso and the other members of the MSD without reasonable notice and their subsequent employment at MxI, would in all likelihood result in the MSD’s customers and potential customers wishing to stay

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with the MSD “team” now employed at MxI.

[459]Again, any employee of MSD was entitled to resign with reasonable notice, taking into account the technical nature of the work being carried out by the employees and the time it would take to find, hire and familiarize new employees to their positions. In addition, the new employees would have to be introduced to GasTOPS’ customers and potential customers so that the customers would have confidence in the new employees’ abilities to understand and satisfy their needs. The MSD’s customers prior to October 1996 had great confidence, built up over a number of years, in Forsyth, Brouse, Jeff Cass, Vandenberg and Peloso and those who worked for them. Finding, training and introducing new employees to the GasTOPS’ customers would take far longer than two weeks. Accordingly, the notice given by Forsyth, Brouse, Vandenberg, Jeff Cass and Peloso was totally inadequate, and each of these individuals knew their notice was inadequate In my view, these defendants intended to destroy GasTOPS’ MSD.

[460]In my view, there is a lack of evidence that Brouse and/or Forsyth directly lured the MSD employees away from GasTOPS to join MxI. On the other hand, I find that Forsyth and/or Brouse, having resigned from GasTOPS in order to establish a new company, owed a duty to GasTOPS to ensure that any MSD employee who approached them about future employment with MxI had resigned from the MSD with reasonable notice before they discussed any future employment possibilities at MxI. In addition, there was an obligation in my view on Forsyth and/or Brouse to ensure that any new MxI employee who had been employed by GasTOPS was aware of his/her fiduciary obligations to GasTOPS.

[461]In this case the personal defendants, who were fiduciaries of GasTOPS and who did not provide their employer with reasonable notice, should not have encouraged employees of GasTOPS to leave to leave GasTOPS by offering them employment with MxI. The encouragement in this case arose when employees of GasTOPS approached them and asked if they could work for MxI. These people were still employed at GasTOPS when they made such a request and did not resign from GasTOPS until after securing employment at MxI. In my view, this amounts to solicitation and is a breach of the duty of non-solicitation of employees. The defendants knew or ought to have known that the employees of MSD to whom they offered

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employment would not give GasTOPS reasonable notice and would thereby render GasTOPS incapable of fulfilling its contractual obligations or continuing to pursue the opportunities it was pursuing prior to the defendants resigning.

[462]It is clear that Forsyth and Brouse gave insufficient notice in order to afford themselves an opportunity to establish their own company, which would compete directly with GasTOPS. If they had given proper notice, GasTOPS would have converted ECMS to a Windows environment and closed the pending opportunity with General Electric. If Forsyth and Brouse had given proper notice of their intention to resign, they would have remained employees of GasTOPS and during such period of notice they would have continued to owe to GasTOPS a duty of loyalty and good faith which would have prevented them from establishing their own company to compete with GasTOPS in the area of aviation maintenance software.

[463]In his letter of resignation dated October 7, 1996 Forsyth stated: “I hope that my departure will not be too disruptive to GasTOPS Ltd. and that the company will find a suitable replacement. However, if GasTOPS Ltd. should need my services to assist in the transition, I will be available on a sub-contract basis.” In his letter of resignation dated October 7, 1996 Brouse stated: “It is my sincerest hope that my departure will not be too disruptive to GasTOPS (this is certainly not my intent) and that the company successfully find a suitable candidate to fill my role. However, if GasTOPS should need my services to assist in the transition, they can be made available under contract.”

[464]The offer by both Forsyth and Brouse to assist in the transition on a sub-contract basis is indicative of Forsyth and Brouse’s realizing that GasTOPS would need assistance in the transition period given the fact that they were leaving on two weeks’ notice.

[465]The contractual negotiation between GasTOPS and Forsyth and Brouse during October and November 1996 were indicative of the true objectives of MxI. GasTOPS was seeking assistance from MxI while it re-established MSD (Maintenance System Division) whereas the true intent of MxI was to appropriate the software developed by GasTOPS for its own and to own any software developed by MxI under sub-contracts with GasTOPS.

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[466]On October 7, 1996 Brouse and Forsyth delivered their letters of resignation to Muir and were not prepared to discuss providing GasTOPS with a more reasonable period for the effective date of their resignation. On October 8, 1996 Jeff Cass verbally advised Muir that he was resigning and his formal letter of resignation was delivered on October 10, 1996 with the effective date of resignation being October 25, 1996. On October 10, 1996 Vandenberg delivered his letter of resignation.

[467]The combined effect of the failure of Forsyth, Brouse, Jeff Cass and Vandenberg to provide reasonable notice of their intention to resign from GasTOPS, offering employment to the other members of the MSD (Maintenance System Division) team resulted in GasTOPS suffering irreparable damage which included:

(a)It caused the remaining employees of the MSD (Maintenance System Division)/GasTOPS to seriously question their willingness to remain employed at GasTOPS particularly given that the defendants were offering the said employees the opportunity to remain with the “MSD (Maintenance System Division) team” by joining the new, start-up company, known as MxI;

(b)It caused existing GasTOPS customers such as Dofasco and the Canadian Air Force, to re-evaluate their existing business relationship with GasTOPS. In the case of the CAF (Canadian Air Force), it caused the CAF (Canadian Air Force) to seek to claw back certain intellectual property rights that had accrued to GasTOPS under previous contractual arrangements;

(c)It caused prospective customers, such as the United Stated Navy and General Electric, to re-evaluate their willingness to contract with GasTOPS for the sale of ECMS (Engine Condition Monitoring System) licenses;

(d)It enabled the defendants to immediately establish a competing business to GasTOPS, thereby offering to the existing and prospective customers of GasTOPS an alternative source for configuration management software technology and services;

(e)It ensured that GasTOPS’ business, in terms of both software sales and development was paralyzed for a prolonged period of time thereafter, enabling the defendants to compete unfairly with

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GasTOPS in the market place;

(f)It enabled the defendants and corporate defendant MxI to continue to pursue GasTOPS’ prospective customers in a virtually seamless manner. More particularly, it enabled individuals such as Brouse and Jeff Cass to continue interacting with GasTOPS’ prospective customers in an effort to close the pending deals that GasTOPS had been pursuing; and

(g)Once the defendant MxI was successful in procuring the United States Navy opportunity that GasTOPS had been pursuing, it used the profits from the said contract to fund a development and marketing of its Maintenix product to other market segments.

[468]Immediately upon the breach by the defendants of their implied contractual obligation to provide reasonable notice, GasTOPS sought to mitigate its potential losses arising from such conduct.

[469]Muir asked both Brouse and Forsyth to reconsider their letters of resignation and both of them advised him that their resignations were non-negotiable and that neither intended to discuss further continued employment with GasTOPS.

[470]Given the breach of the implied term of their employment contract to given reasonable notice, GasTOPS was entitled, on such a breach, to ask Forsyth and Brouse to immediately leave the premises and the GasTOPS’ action was in no way an acceptance by GasTOPS of the two weeks’ notice of resignation given by these employees.

[471]When Muir met MacIsaac and went to advise Forsyth to leave the premises forthwith, he was advised by Forsyth that he (Forsyth) knew that there were other employee resignations forthcoming. Muir testified:

I was pretty sure in the case of Forsyth I could at least get some information from him as to why they were leaving. So I asked him, I said 'Brad, why are you guys doing this?' And at that point he told me it was the list of concerns. He said 'You never did anything about the list of concerns.'

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And I said to him something to the effect that we were to work on that together, and that in my mind we simply hadn't gotten to it yet. But in his mind he didn't want to discuss it any further. He simply said 'It's the list concerns and that's why I'm leaving.' And then he offered to me the fact that there would be other resignations; he said 'We're not the only ones that are leaving.' I then asked him 'Who else is leaving?' And he said to me Vandenberg, Cass and others. I probed him on the "the others", and he wouldn't volunteer who "the others", and he simply said to me "just others".

So I said to him again that I felt he should leave immediately. I suggested to both he and Brouse that they leave and come back after hours and pick up their personal effects, and I believe both of them did that.

[472]Accordingly, the moment Forsyth resigned, he knew that others were about to resign and I have no doubt, that he knew that as soon as it became known that he and Brouse intended to establish a software company developing computerized maintenance software for the aviation industry, many of the employees of the MSD (Maintenance System Division) would want to join the fledging company.

[473]On October 15, 1996, Muir received letters of resignation from Peloso, Reynolds and Chris Cass, each of whom gave two weeks’ notice. Muir requested that each of these individuals extend their period of notice in order to assist GasTOPS in the transition period following their resignation but they all refused. On the same day Muir also received letters of resignation from Tobin, Smith, Lennox and Linh Nguyen. Lennox, Smith and Nguyen went to work for MxI. Nguyen conceded at trial that he spoke with Forsyth and Brouse after Forsyth and Brouse resigned and met with Forsyth before resigning from GasTOPS.

[474]Earlier, on October 8, 1996, Muir had met with Reynolds, who advised that he intended to resign, and it had nothing to do with Forsyth and Brouse’s departures from GasTOPS. Reynolds said that he had just returned from his honeymoon and that he and his wife had talked about leaving Ottawa. When Reynolds delivered his letter of resignation to Muir, Reynolds cited only personal reasons for his refusal to extend his period of notice, which Muir did not find to be a rational explanation. The MxI-Maintenance by Information Ltd. business

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plan which was created on October 11, 1996 (Exhibit 2116) indicates quite clearly that, at the time Reynolds delivered his notice of resignation to Muir, he had already committed himself to MxI and that for this reason he could not and did not wish to extend his period of notice to GasTOPS.

[475]In summary, the failure of Forsyth, Brouse, Jeff Cass and Vandenberg to give reasonable notice of their intention to resign caused GasTOPS irreparable damage, including:

1.The remaining employees of the MSD questioned their willingness to remain at GasTOPS, particularly when the defendants were offering them an opportunity to remain with the “MSD team” at MxI;

2.Existing GasTOPS customers, such as the Dofasco and the CAF, re- evaluated their relationships with GasTOPS. It caused the CAF to seek a claw back of certain intellectual property rights that had accrued to GasTOPS under previous contract arrangements;

3.Prospective customers, such as the US Navy and GE re-evaluated their willingness to contract with GasTOPS for the sale of ECMS licenses;

4.The defendants were able to immediately establish a competing business, offering GasTOPS’ existing and prospective customers an alternative source for configuration management software technology and services;

5.GasTOPS’ business, in terms of both software sales and development, was paralyzed for a prolonged period of time thereafter, enabling the defendants to compete unfairly with GasTOPS and the market place;

6.The individual and corporate defendants continued to pursue GasTOPS’ prospective customers in a virtually seamless manner. More particularly, it enabled Brouse and Jeff Cass to continue to attempt to close pending deals that GasTOPS had been pursuing and relying on; and

7.Once MxI successfully misappropriated the GasTOPS’ United States Navy opportunity, it used those lucrative profits to fund the development and marketing of its maintenance products to other market segments.

Explanations

Alleged Reason for Resigning

[476] In January 1996, individual MSD employee concerns were brought to Muir’s

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attention. At the end of January or early February 1996, Pierre Dorion, who had worked for Forsyth on the Dofasco project, and was “a key player in the RCM analyst project” resigned. His resignation was a shock to those who worked with him. Dorion advised his fellow employees that he had secured a position at Télévitesse, which he felt was more in line with his educational background and training as an electrical engineer. On the last day of Dorion’s employment at GasTOPS, many of the MSD employees gathered in the conference room for a farewell party. At the gathering Dorion spoke frankly about what he saw as lacking in his position at GasTOPS, including his opinion that the management/focus of the company was unclear. This observation started a chain reaction wherein other MSD employees voiced their concerns on employment issues and job satisfaction. Forsyth invited everyone to the boardroom to discuss the emerging issues, ranging from product development to growth potential to company focus to older issues such as the lack of computers, e-mail and a secretarial pool. This was an informal meeting convened as a result of the apparent employee discontent. Forsyth effectively took charge of the gathering and gave the employees a forum to speak about their concerns, and he, Brouse and Tobin attempted to explain the company’s philosophy and responded to certain misconceptions. According to Reynolds, Forsyth was defensive of GasTOPS which in his (Reynolds’) mind was not the way to encourage the employees to have an open discussion. Reynolds stated:

Just people were – like I said, people started throwing out complaints and Brad would sort of counter each one, well, the company isn't that bad, it’s not – I don't remember individual instances, I just remember Brad sort of countering all these things. I was thinking in my own mind well, that’s not a good way to encourage people to come and talk to you. I think he must have recognized that, because it evolved – like I say, I can't remember if it was in one meeting or over maybe two, but into okay if people aren’t happy with things, we should start to look at that and understand what people aren't happy with.

But don't just complain like we should start to look at how we can deal with some of these issues as well.

[477]Tobin stated in reference to Muir’s knowledge of the “employee concerns” that the question of employee concerns had come up at one of the managers’ meetings (including Forsyth and Brouse). The notion was raised that the managers might convene meetings to solicit

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concerns from the group’s members, and Muir did not dissuade or discourage the managers from doing so. I have no doubt that Muir had an indication of employee discontent around this time.

[478]The second meeting concerning the employee concerns was held during the second week of March 1996. The entire MSD was invited to the meeting and all employees were encouraged to voice their concerns and to recommend a solution to the issues that they raised. Forsyth, Brouse and Tobin facilitated the meeting and clarified the issues and solutions identified by the employees. As facilitators, Forsyth, Brouse and Tobin did not contribute or voice any issues or concerns about GasTOPS and/or MSD. At the conclusion of the meeting Forsyth agreed to transcribe the notes and distribute the organized list to the employees of MSD.

[479]In a memorandum dated April 30, 1996, Forsyth asked each employee of MSD to review and rank the concerns, which were broken down into 12 sections:

1.Communication;

2.Management leadership / business focus;

3.Treated with respect (e.g. upper colony);

4.Advanced opportunities (company growth);

5.Professional challenge;

6.Benefits (dental, pension);

7.Salary (market value);

8.Company equity;

9.Technical screen role and advancement;

10.Training and professional development;

11.Resistance to office automation and computer tech;

12.GasTOPS’ image.

[480]All of the employees, with the exception of Forsyth, Tobin and Brouse, ranked their concerns, and by mid-June 1996, Forsyth had collated the results of this survey. Forsyth then

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submitted the results to Muir, who was annoyed that Forsyth had undertaken this process. Muir was concerned that Forsyth had opened a “Pandora’s Box” and that Forsyth would have trouble keeping the lid on this process. Muir instructed Forsyth to meet with the employees and emphasize the non-monetary benefits that they enjoyed while working at GasTOPS.

[481]According to Muir, on receipt of the employee concerns which was provided to him by Forsyth, he provided a copy of the document to MacIsaac, whereas MacIsaac said that he first received the document from Forsyth.

[482]The plaintiff submits that Forsyth, Brouse and Tobin were attempting to instill employee discontent during the spring and summer of 1996 by suggesting the employees air their concerns and suggest a solution. The plaintiff suggests they did this to be able to more easily recruit the MSD members to MxI once they resigned from GasTOPS.

[483]Although there was discontent at MSD, the evidence, fails to establish, that Forsyth, Brouse and Tobin, individually or collectively, were promoting discontentment within the division in an attempt to have the employees of MSD follow them to the business they intended to establish.

“Starting and Running a Successful Software Company”

[484]In May 1996, Brouse and Jeff Cass attended a two-day seminar entitled “Starting and Running a Successful Software Company”. They subsequently shared the seminar handout material (Exhibit 555) with Forsyth who made his own notes on the material (Exhibit 1518).

[485]Muir had no knowledge that Brouse and/or Jeff Cass had attended the seminar nor was he advised by any of the personal defendants that they had attended the seminar. Jeff Cass’s time sheet showed that he booked vacation time from GasTOPS to attend the seminar. Brouse’s time sheet show that he did not disclose his attendance at the seminar by booking time off for either professional development or vacation/sick leave time. Brouse attended the seminar on May 24, 1996 and his time sheet summary indicated that he had worked a total of seven hours at GasTOPS on two different projects on that date. During his cross-examination, Brouse could not

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recall how he made up for the time he spent at the conference on that date. He claimed that he might have docketed the time on the wrong date as a result of being rushed to complete his time sheets.

[486]It is clear that Brouse and Jeff Cass did not want GasTOPS to know that they had attended this seminar. Brouse’s dockets for Friday, May 24, 1996, when he was in attendance at the seminar indicate that Brouse billed his time improperly to a customer.

[487]Nancy Lawless, controller at GasTOPS indicated, that none of the defendants had submitted a request for reimbursement of any expense associated with their attendance at the seminar.

[488]In fairness to Jeff Cass, he stated in evidence, that he attended the seminar because he was considering starting his own company:

A.Yes. The seminar was entitled “starting and running your own software business", something to that effect. And I came to learn of the seminar and I had thought about the possibility of starting my own company. I had, from time to time, thought about working for myself and the subject matter of the seminar interested me and I went to it.

[489]Jeff Cass indicated that he had paid for the cost of the seminar and had not charged the expense back to GasTOPS and that he was the sole registrant from GasTOPS at the course. He admitted that he had never advised Muir that he had attended the seminar. Jeff Cass did inform Forsyth that he would be attending the seminar and after attending part of the seminar he suggested to Brouse that he might be interested in attending part of the seminar.

[490]The evidence of Jeff Cass regarding the circumstances under which he attended the software seminar directly conflicts with Forsyth and Brouse’s evidence. They maintained that Brouse and Jeff Cass had attended the seminar on behalf of GasTOPS, with Muir’s knowledge, consent and encouragement. Forsyth stated that he had approached Jeff Cass and had requested that Jeff Cass attend certain parts of the seminar, which Brouse could not attend.

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[491]Forsyth claimed that Brouse intended to enroll in the seminar as part of his professional development activity at GasTOPS but was unable to attend the whole course. Forsyth believed this was because he was working on a proposal or some other task at the time. When Forsyth was also unable to attend, he asked Jeff Cass if he wanted to go, particularly to learn about some of the more technical aspects of the seminar. Forsyth testified that Brouse and Jeff Cass went on alternating days or to whatever topics they could each attend.

[492]Brouse attempted to support Forsyth’s version of events in his testimony. He recalled the seminar being advertised as useful both to entrepreneurs and to anyone running an individual profit and loss centre within an organization. He claimed it was discussed at one of the MSD’s managers’ meetings with Muir, who thought Brouse and Forsyth might find it useful but noted that company policy dictated that professional development be done on their own time. As a result, Brouse claimed, Muir paid for the course while the managers would have to make up their missed time. Brouse said that in the end he and Jeff Cass attended, splitting one slot by each attending different components of the course that were of interest to them.

[493]During cross-examination, Brouse retreated from his statement on how he came to attend the seminar and, in fact, conceded that his recollection may have related to an entirely different professional development course. Brouse stated:

Q.And you also gave evidence that it was suggested that you might find this course to be useful. Was that discussed at the meeting?

A.What was discussed at the meeting, to the best of my recollection, and it's a bit vague, but that the course would be useful for somebody to take at the company, yes.

Q.Mr. Brouse, when you say “your best recollection”, we've been over this before. As I understand the evidence you’ve given previously, when you say your best recollection, you're not specifically recalling the event having taken place, correct?

A.Well, I recall having discussions about this course, I have very specific recollections of post-discussions of the course and I -- I have a recollection of discussing the possibility of going to this

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course at one of these management meetings, at least I think it was this course, I presume so.

Q.It might not have been this course the discussions you're recalling?

A.I can't be absolutely certain, but I do recall very specifically discussing this course after I had attended.

….

Q.Do you have a specific recollection, Mr. Brouse, of these facts that you alleged to have given in your in-chief evidence?

A.I recall sitting in Mr. Muir's office discussing, I believe, to be this course.

Q.But it might not have been this course?

A.There's a possibility it wasn’t this course, but I think it was.

[494]I simply do not accept the evidence of Brouse on the circumstances surrounding his attendance at this seminar. Brouse had been asked repeatedly to participate in professional activities outside GasTOPS. On June 23, 1995, Muir in his written performance review of Brouse under the sub-heading “Recommendations for Training/Development,” wrote: “For the last time, I would recommend that Doug participate in some form of professional activity outside of GasTOPS – for his benefit and for the benefit of the company.” One year later, on June 20, 1996, in anticipation of the 1996 GasTOPS performance reviews, Muir requested from the three program managers, including Brouse, a list of accomplishments for the past year. Muir specifically asked Brouse to summarize his accomplishments for the past year, including “personal development or other aspects of GasTOPS development”.

[495]At trial Brouse admitted that he received the memo on or after June 20, 1996. Brouse responded to Muir’s memo but made no mention whatsoever about the fact that he had attended the software seminar. Muir confirmed that Brouse made no mention of his attendance at the software seminar during his 1996 performance review. Throughout the course of the trial, Brouse claimed he embellished and/or stretched the truth regarding his own accomplishments,

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and it is impossible to believe that Brouse would not have listed as an accomplishment his attendance at the seminar had he in fact been there on GasTOPS’ behalf and with Muir’s knowledge and encouragement. The only rational explanation for Brouse not having listed his attendance at the seminar as a personal development accomplishment is that he was purposely trying to hide his attendance. Forsyth made his own notes on the material which were handed out at the seminar, as did Brouse and Jeff Cass. Upon a review of the notations and Forsyth’s notes, it is evident that Forsyth and Brouse intended to start their own company and develop a software product to compete with GasTOPS in the area of aviation maintenance management.

[496]The reference material distributed at the seminar included materials on the concept of a “technology adoption lifestyle”. The author categorized the buyers of software as follows:

Innovators: the technology enthusiasts (perhaps 2%)

Early adopters: the visionaries (perhaps 8%)

Early majority: the pragmatist (perhaps 40%)

Late majority: the conservatives (perhaps 40%)

Lagers: the skeptics (perhaps 10%).

[497]The author of the conference material suggested that it is difficult to move sales from one group to another and described the space between the groups as the “gaps”. The author suggested that the biggest “gap” exists between the “early adopters” and the “early majority”, that gap being described as a “chasm”. The author suggested a strategy, to assist companies in “crossing the chasm”. He recommended that software companies “choose a very small niche market”. He then suggested that companies should dominate the niche market and then move on to related niches.

[498]Brouse made handwritten notations wherein he linked the technology adoption lifestyle directly to the ECMS technology that had been developed by GasTOPS. Brouse noted

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that the “technology enthusiasts” were the users of the F404 engine. Brouse described the “early adopters” as being users of the F404 and J85 engines and he questioned whether the “early majority” might also include users of the J85 engine. The F404 and J85 engines were the engines being used by the CAF on their F/A-18 fighter aircraft as of May 1996 and their maintenance management needs were, at that time, being met by the GasTOPS ECMS product. Brouse clearly saw certain GasTOPS ECMS customers as being the “innovators” and “early adopters” of the software technology that he and Forsyth intended to develop. More specifically, Brouse saw the users of the F404 and J85 aircraft engines as being the early customers of the technology adoption life cycle. The goal for Brouse and Forsyth would be to “cross the chasm” and to penetrate the remaining bulk of the aviation market place.

[499]Brouse’s analysis of the technology adoption life cycle was subsequently clearly adopted and relied upon by the defendants at MxI. The fact that Brouse had identified military users of aviation maintenance software as being “innovators” and “early adopters” of MxI’s technology is articulated in the various corporate government documents that were generated by MxI during its first several years of operation. In the January 1997 marketing plan Brouse authored for MxI, he identified the military as being one of MxI’s target markets and made specific reference to “technology enthusiasts and visionaries – technology adoptions cycle”.

[500]In the MxI 1998/1999 business plan, which Forsyth wrote, under the sub-heading “Market Readiness”, he noted that the U.S. Navy had contracted MxI to implement its maintenance technology to manage their entire fleet of aircraft and the CAF had purchased Maintenix, on a trial basis, to be utilized on their CF-18 fighter aircraft (using F404 engines) located at Cold Lake. Forsyth then noted in the business plan:

The military because of their necessity to be technically advanced and their large financial resources is a classic “early adopter” (i.e. they embrace technology prior to other market segments). Therefore, if the military implements a technology as a key component to their business process, it is likely the civilian market will follow (particularly when that market has a need and the product is priced appropriately).

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[501]This is identical to Brouse’s identification on the seminar material of the F404 engine users as technology enthusiasts and early adopters. Brouse’s identification makes it obvious why the defendants, within one week of incorporating MxI, identified their “military aviation target market” as being “3,300 GE F404 F/A-18 engines delivered worldwide in the past 15 years (approximately 1,500 aircraft)”. Brouse simply incorporated his experience selling GasTOPS’ ECMS into his analysis of the “technology adoption life cycle” relating to MxI’s own product.

Cooperation Agreement

[502]Subsequent to the resignations of Forsyth and Brouse, negotiations took place between GasTOPS and MxI concerning work which GasTOPS was prepared to subcontract to MxI under certain conditions. Eventually the negotiations failed and in reply to a letter forwarded to Forsyth by Messrs. Shields and Hunt, solicitors for GasTOPS, Mr. Forsyth wrote:

As stated in the termination letters of Mr. Forsyth and Mr. Brouse, MxI Technologies will not solicit business from any GasTOPS customer that GasTOPS had been pursuing prior to our departure. As a result, MxI will not interfere with GasTOPS economic relations with its customers or potential customers (I.e. items a. through c. of your fax). Furthermore, Mssrs. Brouse, Forsyth, J. Cass or Vandenberg will not breach their fiduciary duties as former employees of GasTOPS.

However, MxI does not agree with your advice of item d. of your fax (I.e. MxI cannot enter into contractual relations with GasTOPS’ customers). Provided that we, Mssrs. Brouse, Forsyth, J. Cass or Vandenberg, are complying with the statements of our termination letters, to which we have adhered, MxI is free to contact with any party we choose. In that regard, please advise GasTOPS to refrain from their current practice of slandering MxI and/or their employees to GasTOPS’ existing or potential customer base.

[503]Accordingly, it is clear that Brouse, Forsyth, Jeff Cass and Vandenberg appreciated, that they owed a fiduciary duty to GasTOPS. Such duties would include a duty of loyalty, good faith and avoidance of conflict of interest after resigning from GasTOPS.

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[504]However, the defendants deny that they were fiduciaries of GasTOPS. The defendants take the position in this trial that their résumés were created to market MxI to customers in November 1996 at a time when it was apparent that there would not be a commercial relationship between GasTOPS and MxI. The defendants submit that the letter Forsyth wrote to Messrs. Shields and Hunt on November 26, 1996 in which he stated that “Messrs. Brouse, Forsyth, J. Cass or Vandenberg will not breach their fiduciary duties as former employees of GasTOPS” is not an admission that the defendants owed a fiduciary duty to GasTOPS.

[505]The determination of the issue of a fiduciary duty depends upon all of the facts. Certainly, the letter written by Forsyth on MxI stationery is an important factor in determining if the defendants were in a fiduciary relationship with GasTOPS and if they realized that there was such a relationship.

[506]On October 10, 1996, after Forsyth and Brouse had resigned from GasTOPS, Muir approached Jeff Cass and suggested that he should consider joining Forsyth and Brouse in doing sub-contracting work for GasTOPS and advised that Vandenberg had also resigned. Muir encouraged Jeff Cass to speak to Vandenberg regarding sub-contracting for GasTOPS. Jeff Cass stated that Muir indicated GasTOPS would look to Forsyth and Brouse to perform software development work, as GasTOPS was getting out of the software development field. Muir denies having indicated to Cass that GasTOPS was getting out of the software development business and, given the negotiations between GasTOPS and Brouse and Forsyth, I am satisfied that GasTOPS had no intention of abandoning software development work at any time. However, during the negotiations of October and November 1996, GasTOPS did in fact indicate that it wanted Forsyth and Brouse to do their software development work on a contract basis. Eventually, negotiations for a cooperation agreement between GasTOPS and MxI failed, as it appeared MxI wanted to own any software it developed for GasTOPS.

[507]After Jeff Cass and Vandenberg’s resignations, Muir met with MacIsaac and expressed his view that GasTOPS could not continue without significant damage to its business if it did not attempt to retain the services of Forsyth, Brouse, Jeff Cass and Vandenberg on a sub-

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contract basis. Muir felt that GasTOPS should attempt to retain their services to minimize the disruption to its business that was caused by their failure to give proper notice. MacIsaac agreed with Muir’s assessment and Muir telephoned Forsyth on the evening of October 10, 1996, to advise him of the nature of the services GasTOPS sought. Muir testified that during that telephone conversation, he indicated that he was seeking Forsyth’s services in continuing the work he had been doing prior to his resignation and to assist in the transition to a new team.

[508]After speaking with Forsyth, Muir arranged to meet with Forsyth and Brouse later on the evening of October 10, 1996. Muir asked Forsyth and Brouse whether they would be interested in providing their services to GasTOPS, initially as independent contractors. Forsyth and Brouse expressed a willingness to provide services and also advised that they were thinking of starting their own company, possibly to provide computer back-up services over the Internet. Muir and the defendants then discussed the possibility that Vandenberg and Jeff Cass also be retained under new company to be formed. Forsyth and Brouse claimed that they were unsure of Jeff Cass and Vandenberg’s plans, but they agreed to consider approaching them and would submit to Muir a proposal for the services discussed, hopefully by the upcoming weekend. Of course, I simply do not accept that Forsyth and Brouse were unaware of their future business plans when they resigned. Not only did they know when they resigned what their company would be doing in the future, they had known for some time prior to resigning what they would be doing.

[509]After meeting with Muir, Forsyth and Brouse went to Jeff Cass’ home. Jeff Cass expressed that he would not engage in a sub-contracting arrangement, which he believed would drive the MSD team apart. They discussed product areas the team could pursue, and Forsyth and Brouse confessed that they were rethinking their business plans and that they were very surprised to learn that Muir had said GasTOPS would stop working in the software development area.

[510]This surprise indicates that Forsyth and Brouse were hearing this information for the first time from Jeff Cass. In their evidence at trial, which preceded the evidence of Jeff Cass, Forsyth and Brouse indicated that they had received this information from Muir prior to meeting with Jeff Cass. Although I do not accept that Muir ever indicated that GasTOPS was getting out

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of the software development business, it is conceivable that Jeff Cass understood that GasTOPS intended to sub-contract their software development business. If GasTOPS had intended to get out of the software development business there would be no reason for GasTOPS to enter into any sub-contract arrangement regarding software development. In addition, even if I were to accept the evidence that Muir indicated on October 10, 1996, that GasTOPS was abandoning software development, it was crystal clear by the end of the failed November 1996 negotiations between GasTOPS and MxI that GasTOPS was not abandoning the software development field.

[511]The defendants suggest that the negotiations which took place between GasTOPS and Brouse and Forsyth between October 10 and November 15, 1996, wherein there were discussions concerning MxI doing contract work for GasTOPS somehow affected the fiduciary duties which the four defendants owed to GasTOPS. In my view, the negotiations did not alter in any way the fiduciary duties owed by the defendants to GasTOPS and in fact alerted the defendants of their fiduciary duties.

[512]On November 18, 1996, James Shields of Shields & Hunt wrote to MxI Technologies Ltd. (Exhibit 382) stating:

We act as counsel on behalf of GasTOPS Inc. As you are aware, GasTOPS has engaged in commercial negotiations with MxI in an attempt to minimize the disruption to its operations following the abrupt departures of former employees Forsyth, Brouse, Cass and Vandenberg. These negotiations have failed to result in an equitable commercial relationship between GasTOPS and MxI.

You are hereby advised that GasTOPS will not engage in any further negotiations with MxI or with Mssrs. Forsyth, Brouse, J. Cass or Vandenberg. More importantly, you are hereby advised that under no circumstances should any of the afore-mentioned persons or entities:

(a)interfere with GasTOPS economic relations with its customers, or potential customers;

(b)induce any of GasTOPS customers to breach their contracts with GasTOPS;

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(c)communicate with GasTOPS customers or potential customers in an attempt to disrupt in any way GasTOPS business and operations or to entice any customers or potential customers to discontinue dealing with GasTOPS;

(d)enter into contractual relations with GasTOPS customers; or

(e)do any act which breaches the fiduciary duties of Mssrs. Brouse, Forsyth, J. Cass or Vandenberg as former employees of GasTOPS.

In addition to the foregoing, you are hereby advised that the afore- mentioned persons and entities are required to return to GasTOPS any and all confidential information, including but not necessarily limited to all software design information and source codes, which they may have removed from the premises of GasTOPS.

[513]On November 26, 1996 Forsyth replied to Mr. Shields (Exhibit 383), acknowledging receipt of the letter and reasserting the claims from his and Brouse’s resignation letters that they would not solicit business from any GasTOPS customer or potential customer being pursued prior to their departures. He noted that MxI possessed none of GasTOPS’ confidential material, aside from some particular materials that would be returned to GasTOPS shortly. Forsyth claimed “MxI will not interfere with GasTOPS economic relations with its customers or potential customers” and that he, Brouse, Jeff Cass, and Vandenberg would not breach the fiduciary duties they had as former GasTOPS employees. In his letter, Forsyth wrote that MxI did not agree with the assertion (which it believed to be slander) that it “cannot enter into contractual relations with GasTOPS’ customers” and believed instead that it could contract with whomever it chose provided Forsyth, Brouse, Jeff Cass and Vandenberg adhered to the statements in their resignation letters, which they had done.

[514]In their letters of resignation, Forsyth and Brouse provided two weeks’ notice of the effective date of their resignation, being October 18, 1996. In their letters of resignation they stated: “If GasTOPS should need my services to assist in the transition, they can be made available under contract.” It is clear from the evidence of Forsyth, that a consideration in the two weeks’ notice that they provided to GasTOPS was that Forsyth and Brouse understood, that as

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long as they remained employees of GasTOPS they could not start their own business which would be in competition with GasTOPS. On the other hand, for Brouse and Forsyth to successfully pursue the start-up of a new company for the development of a Windows-based computerized maintenance software program for the aviation field, they had to immediately resign from GasTOPS if they were going to be able to compete for the contracts that GasTOPS was pursuing.

[515]It should be remembered, that no later than October 2, 1996 while Forsyth was employed at GasTOPS, he had already created an elaborate diagram that depicted the inter- relationship between numerous divisions of the company he and Brouse planned to incorporate: see Exhibit 2195 which was the business process diagram dated October 2, 1996 retrieved from the 1999 back-up CD from Forsyth’s directory which was produced, during the summer of 2004. Exhibit 2195 appears in the MxI-Maintenance by Information Ltd. business plan dated October 1996 and which was extracted from the MxI server back-up CD during the summer of 2004 and marked as exhibit 2116.

[516]Exhibit 7 is Forsyth’s contribution to the 1995/1996 business plan of MSD and is dated October 13, 1995. At page 12 of the document prepared by Forsyth, is figure 3.1 MSD product development business model which is similar, to Exhibit 2195 which Forsyth was developing on October 2, 1996 and which eventually was incorporated in the MxI-Maintenance by Information Ltd. business plan (Exhibit 2116) which was created on October 11, 1996 by Forsyth.

[517]It is, in my view, clear from these documents that prior to their resignation on October 7, 1996, Forsyth and Brouse were planning on resigning from GasTOPS and establishing their own software development company and had done a great deal of planning which included others employed at MSD coming to work for the new company.

[518]As previously stated, the first MxI business plan which has a creation date of October 11, 1996 states: “MxI Technologies Ltd. was created by ex-management staff of the Maintenance System Division of GasTOPS Ltd. The two senior program managers of the

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division, Doug Brouse and Brad Forsyth, and the five project managers, Dave Peloso, Kevin Reynolds (“Reynolds”), Jeff Cass, Rob Vandenberg, and Chris Cass, had resigned from GasTOPS Ltd. out of a desire to create a product-based company that is focused on information technology.”

[519]This statement is revealing as it indicates, that Brouse, Forsyth, Peloso, Reynolds, Jeff Cass, Vandenberg and Chris Cass had resigned from GasTOPS Ltd. out of a desire to create a product-based company that was focused on information technology. I did not gather from the evidence of any of these individuals that they resigned from GasTOPS for the purpose of establishing a software development company but rather that they had resigned from GasTOPS because their concerns as documented in the “employees concerns” were not being met.

[520]On October 14, 1996, Forsyth faxed a proposal to GasTOPS outlining a future relationship between MxI and GasTOPS. Upon receipt of the MxI business proposal, Muir contacted Forsyth and asked him amongst other things what the name “MxI” stood for. Forsyth told Muir that MxI stood for “Management by Information.” (Brad Howe of B.F. Goodrich also said that Brouse told him on October 18 that MxI stood for “Management by Information.”) Forsyth’s statement was false, as on October 15, 1996, MxI-Maintenance by Information Technologies Ltd. was incorporated. On October 17, 1996, the name was changed to MxI Technologies Ltd. GasTOPS submits, and I accept, that Forsyth was attempting to withhold his and Brouse’s intentions to develop aviation maintenance software by misinforming Muir of the name of their company and by changing its name.

[521]Forsyth’s MxI-GasTOPS business relationship proposal (Exhibit 327) stated:

1. Business Opportunity

GasTOPS Ltd. has approached MxI to discuss a potential business relationship. Specifically, it was proposed by GasTOPS that:

MxI employ Jeff Cass and Rob Vandenberg and provide their services part-time to GasTOPS Ltd. as on-site managers

MxI would provide software support for ECMS and MAINSTAY

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MxI would provide software development services to GasTOPS

MxI would provide marketing support for the ECMS sale to the US Navy

GasTOPS stated that a condition for awarding the above work would be that MxI must demonstrate a commitment to these services.

MxI is only interested in pursuing a long term business relationship with GasTOPS, as a short-term arrangement would be a major distraction from the product development aspirations of MxI.

In this regard, MxI would like to propose the following business relationship

2. Proposed Business Relationship

MxI proposes to offer a portion of MxI ownership in exchange for a long term business association with GasTOPS Ltd.

MxI would offer to GasTOPS the following:

10% equity ownership in MxI

support and development services for the GasTOPS MSD software products

engineering management services for an interim period while GasTOPS restructure and rebuild their engineering services capabilities

marketing support services

an agreement that MxI would not pursue business with the following GasTOPS clients, other than as sub-contractors to GasTOPS and provided that GasTOPS acts as a channel to these clients in good faith:

Canadian Airforce

Ontario Hydro

BFGoodrich (including US Navy and GE)

In exchange GasTOPS would provide to MxI the following:

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the right to promote the MxI association with GasTOPS Ltd. and to benefit from the good name established by GasTOPS

a non-competition agreement that GasTOPS will not undertake development work in the area of equipment maintenance software

an exclusive agreement that MxI is the sole software development and support agency for the ECMS and MAINSTAY products as specified in an agreed upon product development plan

the right of first refusal for software development and support services

a percentage of the fees from the sales of GasTOPS owned or licensed products that are supported and maintained by MxI

an understanding that MxI will freely employ any GasTOPS software developers who apply and are accepted for employment

3. Benefits to Partners

The advantages to MxI are as follows:

it portrays MxI as a GasTOPS Ltd. ‘spin-off’ company (providing credibility to MxI)

MxI would immediately be provided long-term software development and support work

The advantages to GasTOPS are as follows:

it portrays MxI as a GasTOPS Ltd. ‘spin-off’ company (maintaining an image of stability and growth to GasTOPS clients)

GasTOPS would be provided a long-term software development and support agency

GasTOPS would have the opportunity to resell MxI created products to their client base

GasTOPS would enjoy monetarily from the success of MxI

with the support provided by MxI, GasTOPS will be able to aggressively pursue new business opportunities

[522]I am satisfied that during the meeting between Muir, Forsyth and Brouse on October

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10, 1996, Muir indicated that GasTOPS was seeking the services of Forsyth, Brouse and possibly Vandenberg and Jeff Cass on a short-term contractual basis to assist GasTOPS in its “recovery plan.” Forsyth’s proposal clearly does not reflect such a short-term relationship.

[523]Instead, MxI proposed that GasTOPS would receive a 10% equity stake in MxI and in return GasTOPS could not undertake development work in the area of equipment maintenance software, and would be required to outsource the said work exclusively to MxI. The proposal did not prevent MxI from competing directly with GasTOPS by selling their own product to other third parties. In addition, the proposal did not prevent MxI from selling their own competing product to any of the listed potential or existing customers of GasTOPS, as long as they could demonstrate that they had not “pursued” the business. Pursuant to this wording, MxI could claim that it was not prevented from contracting with GasTOPS’ existing or prospective customers such as the U.S. Navy if the U.S. Navy was to approach MxI on its own initiative. Forsyth admitted in his testimony that the MxI business proposal would not prevent MxI from competing with GasTOPS in the aviation maintenance market place.

[524]Forsyth and Brouse suggest that when they submitted their draft cooperation agreement on October 14, 1996, MxI-GasTOPS business relationship proposal (Exhibit 327), the plaintiff was aware that the defendants were seeking a long-term arrangement with GasTOPS as opposed to a short-term (3-6 month) subcontract agreement. There is no doubt, on reading the MxI-GasTOPS business relationship proposal (Exhibit 327) which was submitted on October 14, 1996, that MxI wanted to take over software development work taking place at GasTOPS at the time.

[525]Vandenberg, in his letter of resignation, indicates that on October 10, 1996, Muir proposed that he and Jeff Cass join Forsyth and Brouse for the purpose of assisting GasTOPS in completing some of its contractual obligations. Accordingly, on October 10, 1996, GasTOPS was attempting to negotiate a cooperation agreement on a short-term basis for the purposes of completing some of their contractual obligations.

[526]Forsyth stated that on October 14, 1996, after he had faxed the proposed MxI-

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GasTOPS proposal to Muir, he received a telephone call from Muir who indicated that, based on MxI’s proposal, they were “quite far apart” and that GasTOPS was not interested in a long-term relationship. Forsyth claimed that the “short-term support” request from GasTOPS was contrary to what he had understood Muir sought from an MxI-GasTOPS relationship. It may well have been MxI’s desire to enter into a long-term permanent relationship with GasTOPS when it submitted the business relationship proposal, but this was not GasTOPS’ desire, as Muir stated:

Well, we had approached two individuals, Forsyth and Brouse, with the idea that we would retain their professional services to assist GasTops in a transition to a new management structure within the company and in particular within my division. And Forsyth and Brouse come back with a proposal from a new company called MXI, where essentially they're proposing that we turn over our business to them, in particular the maintenance information system business to them, in return for 10 percent equity in their company. And that was so completely different from what I had asked Forsyth and Brouse to propose to me on Thursday night, that we -- “we” being I was meeting at this point with MacIsaac, Kind and Dupuis, we reviewed this proposal and decided very quickly that we should contact Forsyth and simply tell him thank you for your proposal but it's not really what we had in mind. Which is what I did. Shortly following our review of this document I called Forsyth and said, thank you for your proposal but what we were looking for was your support to help us with the transition, we were looking for professional services, not the kind of business proposition that he had put in that particular document.

[527]By the time Forsyth submitted the business proposal to Muir, the defendants had already created a written business plan detailing their intention to develop an aviation maintenance software system. The MxI business plan presentation (Exhibit 2194), which was created in an electronic format that was last modified on October 21, 1996, notes that the defendants intended to incorporate MxI in October 1996. Since MxI was initially incorporated on October 15, 1996 (Exhibit 373), it follows that this business plan presentation must have been created prior that date. At pages 7 and 8 of the presentation document, the defendants describe their intention to develop an aviation maintenance software system. More importantly, at page 9, the defendants specifically target all users of the GE F404 F/A-18 engines (including the United

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States Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, Canada, Australia, Spain, Kuwait, Finland, Switzerland and Malaysia) as their target market by way of “direct sales” notwithstanding their assertions during the trial that they did not intend to target military customers in direct competition with GasTOPS. This document is clear and convincing evidence of their intention to target the military and is also clear evidence of the attempt of Brouse and Forsyth to mislead this Court, particularly as the defendants only produced when I ordered that both parties produce electronic copies of their back-up tapes. Exhibit 2194 was found by the plaintiff in Forsyth’s back-up home directory. Exhibit 2194 was first introduced as an Exhibit in this trial on day 200 - November 17, 2004 during the cross-examination of Brouse.

[528]On October 15, 1996, MacIsaac convened a company-wide meeting, at which time he told the GasTOPS employees that the negotiations with MxI had fallen through and GasTOPS would not be subcontracting any work to MxI.

[529]According to the defendants, a number of GasTOPS employees decided to resign as a result of MacIsaac’s attitude during this meeting and many of them, including Egan, contacted Forsyth and/or Brouse to enquire if they could join their company. According to Forsyth, when he met with Egan on the night of October 15, 1996, he explained that he and Brouse had not yet decided on what direction their company would take. I simply do not accept Forsyth’s evidence, as they had already incorporated their new company named MxI-Maintenance by Information Technologies Ltd.

[530]In my view, Brouse and Forsyth were always aware that GasTOPS wanted a short- tem cooperation agreement but that, given the numerous resignations from the MSD, Forsyth, Brouse, Jeff Cass and Vandenberg sought to take advantage of GasTOPS’ difficult situation.

[531]On October 16, 1996, Muir approached MacIsaac and advised him that he did not believe the MSD could continue as a functioning business as a result of receiving all of the letters of resignation. Muir and MacIsaac arranged to meet with Forsyth and Brouse. Muir indicated that their first topic of conversation was MxI’s business intentions and that GasTOPS was prepared to contract its software development entirely and exclusively to MxI if GasTOPS

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could be satisfied that MxI would not compete with GasTOPS. According to Muir, and I accept his evidence, he asked Forsyth directly what his business intentions were Forsyth responded by repeating the idea of backing computers up over the Internet and adding and that MxI was considering “a new business idea” he could not discuss further because they were in discussion with venture capitalist. MacIsaac asked Forsyth directly whether the proposed new business in any way competed with GasTOPS, and Forsyth assured both MacIsaac and Muir that it did not.

[532]After this meeting, MacIsaac drafted an agreement (Exhibit 336), which the parties signed on October 17, 1996 (MacIsaac for GasTOPS; Forsyth for MxI), outlining their understanding of what the GasTOPS and MxI representatives had agreed upon. Based on this agreement, which is clear and unequivocal, GasTOPS would retain ownership of its software and software that GasTOPS hired MxI to develop, and GasTOPS and MxI were not to compete against each other’s products. They all agreed that the document would not constitute a legal document and that they would have counsel review it and revise it to create what would become a legally binding document. This document stated:

Co-operation Agreement

MxI

Development & support of ECMS, MAINSTAY, RCM Analyst and Lube Analyst products.

Applications Engineering services as required for a period of 6 months.

Marketing support for product applications as required.

Referral of applications business opportunities to GasTOPS Ltd.

% of fees for sales of GasTOPS Ltd. owned or licensed s/w on a case by case basis.

Non-competition in the application of GasTOPS’ products.

Right of 1st refusal on future development of Maintenance

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Information software.

GasTOPS Ltd.

Non-competition in development of Maintenance Information software.

Ownership rights to GasTOPS’ software products. Limitations of Agreement

Non-performance by either party.

[533]On October 20, 1996, Forsyth and Muir met to discuss projects needing support and who at MxI would work on each project. On October 22, 1996, Muir wrote to Forsyth (Exhibit 348):

Further to our discussions on Sunday, this letter is to confirm our intention to place one or more contracts with MxI for the provision of professional services on an as required or call up basis.

These services will include engineering, systems analysis, programming and database support services for the following GasTOPS’ projects:

1.The Dofasco RAD project

2.The Caidmark ITM project

3.The JOAP/TSC Lube Analyst project

4.The F404 ECMS rollout project

5.The J85 ECMS rollout project

6.The US Navy and Foreign Military F/A-I 8 ECMS prospects

7.The General Electric ECMS prospect

as well as certain other miscellaneous project/prospect requirements.

In order to complete this purchase order we will require labour rates for each of the individuals employed by MxI who may participate on these projects.

As discussed, we also intend to conduct the work in accordance with a Subcontract Management Plan which will outline the

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procedures used to invoke and administer each callup. This plan will be provided to MxI shortly.

Also on October 22, 1996, Forsyth sent MxI’s labour rates to Muir, as Muir had previously requested.

[534]On October 22, 1996, Muir downloaded the MxI web page (Exhibit 352), which promoted MxI as a fast growing high tech company specializing in PC-based information systems. It noted that the MxI team:

Aviation maintenance – design, development and implementation of aircraft serialized component, life, service bulletin and reliability tracking systems;

Industrial maintenance – design, development and implementation of Computerized Maintenance Management Systems (CMMS) for industrial plant-wide maintenance management.

The home page did not indicate the product line that the MxI team planned on developing, but it indicated that there would be an announcement regarding its new product line in December 1996. I am sure that GasTOPS felt that its products and customers were protected by the agreement dated October 17, 1996, and that MxI would not be developing a product which would compete with the GasTOPS products.

[535]On October 25, 1996, Muir delivered the formal cooperation agreement (Exhibit 356), which he believed reflected the October 17 agreement, to MxI. Forsyth and Brouse found the cooperation agreement unacceptable as it contained a non-compete clause that they thought would not only have restricted MxI from competing directly with GasTOPS but would have also prevented it from forming business relationships with any other company who may have had or been seen to have products or application services that competed with GasTOPS.

[536]Both parties alleged that the other entered into the negotiations for a cooperation agreement in bad faith. GasTOPS alleged that the defendants and MxI were attempting to secure ownership of GasTOPS’ products and of any software developed by the defendants under

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contract with GasTOPS. The defendants alleged that the plaintiff, after advising the defendants that it was “getting out of the software business,” was really attempting to prevent the defendants from developing a computerized maintenance software program. Even if the defendants interpreted statements made by Muir shortly after the resignation of Forsyth and Brouse as indicating that GasTOPS intended to abandon the software development, any such interpretation should have been seen as incorrect once GasTOPS rejected Forsyth’s first proposal on October 14, 1996. GasTOPS’ position during the negotiations, as stated by MacIsaac and Muir, made it absolutely clear that GasTOPS was only prepared to subcontract the development of software if GasTOPS remained the owner of the intellectual property developed in the process and the developer did not use the software to compete with GasTOPS.

[537]On October 29, 1996, Muir forwarded a draft sub-contract agreement relating to GasTOPS’ work with the CAF to MxI (Exhibit 365). In the draft agreement, it was specifically noted that GasTOPS was to be the primary contact for the DND and would direct and coordinate

all activity relating to the sub-contract or GasTOPS’ prime contract with the client. The agreement also provided that, as per the original cooperation agreement, all IP rights would vest in GasTOPS. On October 31, 1996, Brouse forwarded some proposed changes to the draft subcontract agreement to Muir (Exhibit 366) respecting the ownership of intellectual property. Brouse proposed that if GasTOPS owned the intellectual property under the TIES contract, MxI be granted co-ownership of the intellectual property. GasTOPS rejected this proposal.

[538]On November 7, 1996, Brouse forwarded to Muir a draft cooperation agreement (Exhibit 372), which stated at paragraph 2 that MxI reserved the right to develop software applications with the same or similar functionality to GasTOPS’ products and to market or sell them, forming business alliances or partnerships with any organization or person. Paragraph 2 was contrary to the provisions of the original cooperation agreement, whereby MxI agreed not to compete in the application of GasTOPS’ products. Obviously, if a product had similar functionality, it could be applied in similar markets. MxI also insisted that all proprietary rights relating to the products and documentation developed by MxI pursuant to the United States Navy agreement would be jointly owned by GasTOPS and MxI.

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[539]When Muir received this document, he met with MacIsaac. They discussed its contents, and determined that unless MxI reconsidered its position, particularly with respect to the U.S. Navy, there was no possibility that they would reach any negotiated cooperation agreement. Muir testified that “At this point we are, as I said, 180 degrees apart on a number of key issues related to what I would refer to as an “exclusive supplier" arrangement with a company such as MXI.”

[540]GasTOPS decided to meet with B.F. Goodrich, its business partners in its U.S. Navy and GE opportunities, to apprise them of the status of the negotiations with MxI and to develop a plan of action with them. At the meeting, GasTOPS provided B.F. Goodrich with some of the particulars of MxI’s proposal (e.g., license fees, billable hours, ownership of intellectual property, software development). Muir testified that B.F. Goodrich agreed with GasTOPS that MxI’s proposals “represented what amounted to ransom, and that they were not prepared to accept those conditions anymore than GasTOPS was prepared to accept them.” They further agreed that GasTOPS would stop further work with MxI under the purchase order that had been developed in parallel to the failed negotiations. They would “ask MXI to stop work on behalf of - - in particular we discussed the United States Navy and General Electric opportunities, which were of primary interest to B. F. Goodrich” and discussed how to attempt to go forward with those opportunities without MxI’s assistance.

[541]Muir, on the day after meeting with B.F. Goodrich, spoke with Brouse and “instructed him to stop work on all activities associated with the purchase order that had been raised” and told him that no broader cooperation agreement could be reached unless MxI reconsidered its position on the U.S. Navy proposal. Muir stated that

I specifically asked Brouse to return some materials to GasTops that he was using for the marking efforts, in particular a notebook computer and I told him that someone from GasTops would be coming over to MXI later that morning to pick up the computer because I was going to use it to conduct the meetings that were scheduled later that week with Mr. Milan and Captain Derrick of PMA260.

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[542]While GasTOPS and MxI attempted to negotiate terms of the cooperation agreement, GasTOPS was issuing purchase orders to MxI for specific services it wished MxI to perform, mostly continuing the work the MxI employees had been doing while at GasTOPS.

[543]By November 11, 1996, it must have been apparent to Brouse that GasTOPS was ending all negotiations on a cooperation agreement. On that date, he received a telephone call from Muir advising MxI to cease working on all purchase orders that had issued to MxI. Brouse claimed he was surprised to receive this call, as he was scheduled to leave the following day for a meeting with U.S. Navy personnel in Washington on behalf of GasTOPS.

[544]On November 12, 1996 Brouse received a telephone call from the U.S. Navy advising him that his security clearance was ready for the meeting. Brouse contacted Muir to find out what was happening as it appeared that the U.S. Navy was still expecting him to attend the meeting. Muir advised Brouse to cease working on all projects under the purchase order and instructed Brouse to return the laptop computer of GasTOPS as he (Muir) was going to take over the presentation to Milan and Captain Derrick of MPA 260 (U.S. Navy).

[545]On November 8, 1996, Jeff Cass saw an advertisement in the Globe & Mail indicating GasTOPS was looking for software engineers. The defendants suggest that the hiring of software personnel was inconsistent with the October 17, 1996 agreement, but I see nothing in that agreement to indicate that GasTOPS was obliged to subcontract all future software development to MxI. The agreement MacIsaac prepared on October 17, 1996, makes it abundantly clear that GasTOPS was not agreeing to subcontract all future software development to MxI. Further, if GasTOPS had failed to take any such steps to replace the MSD employees who had resigned, I am sure that MxI would argue that GasTOPS failed to mitigate any damages it may have incurred.

[546]As of November 26, 1996, Brouse, Forsyth, Jeff Cass and Vandenberg, along with the other former MSD employees who were now working for MxI, owed a fiduciary duty to GasTOPS arising out of their former employment. It was also clear at this time from the letters exchanged following the failed negotiations that GasTOPS intended to continue to develop and

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market computerized maintenance software in the aviation market, regardless of what some employees had understood Muir to have said earlier.

Direct Effects on GasTOPS

IP Rights Dispute with the CAF

[547]GasTOPS suffered serious consequences arising from the resignations. Without time to hire qualified replacement technical employees for the MSD, PWGSC, DND and the CAF felt GasTOPS no longer had the necessary qualified technical personnel to complete its contractual obligations. Consequently, the PWGSC suspended all work under the 1996 TIES contract and requested a clawback of the intellectual property rights that had been granted to GasTOPS under the various contracts.

[548]On October 25, 1996, GasTOPS met with the CAF and PWGSC to request a six month recovery period to account for the resignations. It sought time to find, hire and train replacement employees, which could not be done within the two-week notice periods. Replacement employees also had to form trusting relationships with customers and potential customers in this very technical field. At this meeting, the DND notified GasTOPS that it sought the return of all IP rights acquired by GasTOPS under its various contracts with the Crown (Exhibit 409).

[549]GasTOPS’ business relationship with PWGSC, DND and the CAF became strained in the months that followed. On November 6, 1996, Noella MacIntyre (“MacIntyre”) wrote to GasTOPS on behalf of PWGSC demanding it surrender its foreground IP rights in the ECMS technology by November 13, 1996 (Exhibit 410). These IP rights had been granted to GasTOPS in previous contracts with the Crown. In addition, MacIntyre’s letter required GasTOPS to amend the 1996 TIES contract by replacing the clause granting foreground IP to contractor) to one granting foreground IP to Crown despite the fact that the original clause awarding IP rights to GasTOPS had been included in the contract signed in July 1996.

[550]On November 7, 1996 MacIntyre wrote a further letter to GasTOPS (Exhibit 411)

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stating:

It is understood that the progress of the work at GasTOPS is being impacted due to the lack of qualified personnel. In addition, as GasTOPS is aware, future DND operational software support requirements are on hold until agreement can be reached, and approval provided to GasTOPS, on [its] Get Well Plan. Therefore, GasTOPS is to provide to PWGSC [its] Plan in an expeditious manner. A response from GasTOPS is requested no later than 12 November 1996. Should GasTOPS wish to discuss this matter, do not hesitate to contact the undersigned.

[551]Warrant Officer Paré was the life cycle material manager responsible for the ECMS suite and the technical authority for the CRADs with GasTOPS. In 1996, he took over the role of technical authority for the TIES contracts. According to Warrant Officer Paré, he always dealt with Brouse at GasTOPS and described Brouse as GasTOPS’ “Air Force Manager.” Warrant Officer Paré worked closely with Brouse and Forsyth to develop proposals by GasTOPS to the CAF, which led to contracts between GasTOPS and the CAF.

[552]Warrant Officer Paré testified that he was invited to have lunch with Brouse and Forsyth in September 1996. During the luncheon, Forsyth and Brouse announced that they were resigning from GasTOPS. Warrant Officer Paré recommended to Forsyth and Brouse that they speak with Captain MacDonald, his superior. When questioned at trial about the effect of such an announcement by Forsyth and Brouse, Warrant Officer Paré said that he had no concerns about GasTOPS being able to complete its obligations under the TIES contract and complete the roll- out of ECMS v.2. After being shown his answers on his examination for discovery, Warrant Officer Paré conceded that these resignations would have had an affect on GasTOPS’ ability to roll-out ECMS v.2 to the CAF. It was for this reason that Warrant Officer Paré told Forsyth and Brouse to meet with Captain MacDonald.

[553]GasTOPS alleges that after being advised of Forsyth and Brouse’s intentions to resign, Warrant Officer Paré acted on the IP issue by sending documents to MacIntyre, including the GasTOPS’ ECMS license, in order to regain the IP rights GasTOPS had obtained in earlier contracts. At trial, Warrant Officer Paré did not remember what prompted him to send these

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documents to MacIntyre on September 24, 1996.

[554]On October 1 and 2, 1996, Warrant Officer Paré spoke with MacIntyre and, according to MacIntyre’s notes of these meetings, one of the topics discussed was whether the provisions of the 1996 TIES contract relating to ownership of the IP could be revised. From October 2 to October 9, Warrant Officer Paré continued to press for a change in the IP rights under the 1996 TIES contract. A memo from MacIntyre’s legal advisor stated that “DND is now advising that this was a mistake.” Warrant Officer Paré confirmed that it was he who made the mistake.

[555]By October 28, 1996, Warrant Officer Paré had taken the position that he would not authorize any further work under the 1996 TIES contract until GasTOPS agreed to the requested changes in the IP ownership rights. Captain MacDonald agreed with this position. Warrant Officer Paré reviewed and instructed Ms. MacIntyre to send two letters to GasTOPS, dated November 6 and 7, 1996 (Exhibits 410 and 411). Warrant Officer Paré maintained that he did not speak to anyone at GasTOPS about the IP issue because it was not his job to do so. Rather, it was MacIntyre’s responsibility to deal with the IP issue. The evidence however casts a different light on the credibility of Warrant Officer Paré:

(a)At first, Warrant Officer Paré maintained that he did not speak to anyone at MxI between October 1996 and January 1997 with relation to the CAF including the IP dispute. Later in his evidence, he stated that he never told MxI about his dispute with GasTOPS over the ownership of the IP, nor about GasTOPS’ performance in the roll-out of ECMS, but he did admit that he talked to MxI about applying for a license.

(b)According to Brouse and Forsyth, Warrant Officer Paré kept them abreast of GasTOPS’ efforts to recover from the mass resignations, the roll-out of ECMS v.2 and PWGSC request that GasTOPS give up its IP rights in ECMS v.2.

(c)In his logbook for November 1996 (Exhibit 958) at page 7, Forsyth wrote that he had a telephone conversation on November 5, 1996 with Warrant Officer Paré and noted:

-Michel is threatening to close the contract, based on non- compliance

-Noella MacIntyre will explain

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-Apply for license if we ask

(d)According to Forsyth’s evidence, he understood that Warrant Officer Paré intended to cancel the 1996 TIES contract because GasTOPS did not have the required qualified technical employees as such employees were now working at MxI. Further, Forsyth said that Warrant Officer Paré was “suggesting that… or asking” if MxI would provide support to the ECMS software system and that MxI should apply for a license through MacIntyre (Exhibit 953 at page 7).

Warrant Officer Paré gave this information to Forsyth two or three days prior to GasTOPS receiving MacIntyre’s November 7 and November 8, 1996, letters, which had been approved by Warrant Officer Paré.

[556]This evidence leads me to the conclusion that at the time Forsyth and Brouse announced their intention to resign from GasTOPS to Warrant Officer Paré, there was an ongoing dialogue between Warrant Officer Paré and Forsyth and Brouse concerning MxI’s involvement with the CAF. At best, Warrant Officer Paré was attempting to secure ongoing access to the ECMS technology and support for such technology from MxI as he was concerned that GasTOPS could no longer fulfill its obligations under the TIES contract and service contracts to support ECMS. At worst, Brouse and Forsyth were actively pursuing the work that GasTOPS was doing for the CAF with the encouragement of Warrant Officer Paré.

[557]During his cross-examination, Forsyth was asked about a visit he received from Captain MacDonald at MxI on November 8, 1996, during which they discussed GasTOPS’ performance under the 1996 TIES contract. Forsyth stated that he did not discuss either of the IP issues between DND and GasTOPS, the granting of a license to MxI for the said IP, or the fact that DND was threatening to close the 1996 TIES contract with GasTOPS.

[558]Forsyth was then shown a summary report of events (Exhibit 1322 at page 8) prepared by Jeff Cass who wrote the following with respect to Captain MacDonald’s visit: “Captain Scott MacDonald dropped into MxI. He went to lunch with Brad and Doug. Scott is willing to push hard for the ECMS IP change to MxI. He said the TIES would be openly competed and the process will take at least four month…” When faced with this summary,

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Forsyth admitted that the facts as stated in the summary were true. He confirmed that Jeff Cass was not present at any meeting with Captain MacDonald and that the information had come from either himself or Brouse. In regard to Exhibit 1322, Forsyth stated that if MxI were to acquire an ECMS license, it could compete directly with GasTOPS for other military contracts.

[559]Captain MacDonald’s desire to have the ECMS IP changed from GasTOPS to MxI corroborates Warrant Officer Paré’s true motive in demanding that GasTOPS relinquish its IP rights in the ECMS system before the CAF would authorize any work under the 1996 TIES contract. In my view, it is reasonable to assume that Brouse and Forsyth indicated to Warrant Officer Paré and/or Captain MacDonald that if the DND placed GasTOPS in default under the 1996 TIES contract, MxI was in a position to take over such work. On November 19, 1996, in his “MxI Profile Presentation to Canadair”, Brouse stated that MxI had an immediate opportunity with the CAF pending the result of an IP dispute, at which point the “Crown may compete ECMS support.”

[560]On November 13, 1996, Warrant Officer Paré requested by letter that GasTOPS forward to him a copy of the ECMS v.2 software, its source codes and its specifications. Warrant Officer Paré stated that he wrote this letter “in case something went wrong” since he knew that “everyone else at GasTOPS had left.”

[561]GasTOPS was also under the threat of being placed in default of its 1996 TIES contract. It was attempting to satisfy PWGSC and DND on their request for a “recovery plan” and the return of GasTOPS’ IP rights to ECMS. On November 27, 1996, MacIntyre wrote to GasTOPS (Exhibit 414) stating that she required GasTOPS’ Get Well Plan no later than December 4, 1996; if she did not receive it by that date, the Crown would have to consider placing GasTOPS in default of the contract due to non-performance.

[562]If MxI’s founders had provided GasTOPS with reasonable notice based on their positions, expertise and the time required to find replacements and train such employees, GasTOPS would have been able to replace its technical staff in an orderly manner and not lose the CAF’s confidence. Also, it would not have found itself in the position of having the CAF

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threatening to “close out” the 1996 TIES contract due to a lack of qualified technical staff. In addition, the CAF would not have been in a position to force GasTOPS to relinquish its IP rights in ECMS in exchange for a six-month recovery period.

[563]On December 9, 1996, MacIntyre had a conversation with Gary Chivers at GasTOPS concerning the IP rights to ECMS. Chivers noted (Exhibit 415 at page 45) that MacIntyre told him that if GasTOPS did not agree to the new IP clauses, it would receive no more business under the existing TIES contract. Chivers testified that he told this to Muir and MacIsaac upon receiving the information from MacIntyre. Accordingly, unless GasTOPS was prepared to relinquish its IP rights to ECMS it would lose the 1996 TIES contract for the roll-out of ECMS v.2 and another contractor would be hired to complete the contract.

[564]On December 20, 1996, Brouse and Forsyth met with Captain MacDonald and Major Lewis of the CAF (see Exhibit 1405 at page 20).

[565]By letter dated December 23, 1996 (Exhibit 416), GasTOPS received written notice from PWGSC/DND that the DND would not accept GasTOPS’ Get Well Plan until the IP dispute was settled. Ms. MacIntyre stated that “GasTOPS’ concurrence [to DND’s position] is requested no later than January 6,” 1997. On January 6, 1997, GasTOPS met with PWGSC and DND to resolve the issue surrounding the IP rights and the Get Well Plan. In order to obtain approval for its Plan, GasTOPS agreed to give up the IP rights they had obtained to the ECMS.

Competition for TIES Contract Renewal

[566]On September 24, 1998, GasTOPS received notice from DND through Captain Fitzgerald that the CAF intended to compete the upcoming renewal of the TIES contract. GasTOPS had held the TIES contract with the CAF since 1985. It had been extended every three years on a “sole source” basis to GasTOPS. Captain Fitzgerald provided GasTOPS with two documents that formed the basis of the CAF decision to compete the TIES contract. The CAF confirmed that the TIES contract had been sole sourced to GasTOPS because there were no Canadian competitors at the time. It was the CAF’s position that MxI “has emerged as a competitor for the support of the PC based aircraft maintenance system.” The CAF also felt that

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“MxI had demonstrated an ability to provide software support of ECMS/FLTS/TCGS.” As a result, it was recommended that the TIES contract be competed and that Warrant Officer Paré prepare the documentation in support of this competition. (See also Exhibit 514, the minutes of the September 22, 1998, TIES review meeting.)

[567]Muir stated that the effect of this decision on GasTOPS was “that our present TIES contract would come to an end on the 31 of March, 1999. The engineering component of that contract would be renewed for a three-year period, but the software development and support component of the contract would be competed.”

Inability to Pursue Plans with the CAF

[568]GasTOPS 1996/97 business plan (Exhibit 296 at pages 17 and 18) states:

Technology

A number of the objectives set forth in the 1995/96 technology plan have been met. Others have been deferred, while still others have been modified to address new and emerging customer requirements.

Objectives fully met include:

a)DM for airborne applications.

b)MetalSCAN product fully developed with interface to DCS.

c)Voice activated maintenance records evaluated.

d)ECMS development (Version 2).

Objectives either modified or only partially met include:

a)MAINSTAY conversion to WINDOWS.

b)MAINSTAY features.

c)LUBE Analyst features.

The MagNET product development was substantially delayed due to longer than expected development efforts on both ODM and MetalSCAN as well as higher than expected demand for MetalSCAN product.

A more detailed discussion of the technology issues facing

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GasTOPS Ltd. will be presented in Chapter 3 of this plan.

Human Resources

All of the major objectives of the human resources plan for 1995/96 have been addressed and all have been met to the extent feasible at this time.

The administrative system has been made operational and is completely satisfactory.

PRO-ENGINEER has been adopted as the standard for mechanical design at GasTOPS Ltd.

The costs of manufacturing of MetalSCAN have been reduced by approximately 25% and further effort is underway; however the objective of 50% is now known to be unrealistic using the current design.

The organizational change to programs has been instituted with a very high degree of success. There are still some human resource issues related to roles and responsibilities that require attention; however, the adoption of this structure has produced many positive results and was long overdue.

Overall, there have been no major staff changes in 1995/96. Several project engineers have left the company and several new engineers have joined. Overall staff level has changed from 81 ½ persons to

78persons.

[569]As a result of the resignations without reasonable notice, GasTOPS was unable to pursue the business opportunities outlined in its 1996/97 business plan and to fulfill its contractual obligations. The planned ECMS enhancements would have resulted in a program just as attractive as Maintenix. As a result of the resignations without reasonable notice, GasTOPS was unable to carry out the enhancements to ECMS as projected for the financial year 1996/97.

[570]Jeff Cass was the lead designer of ECMS. He was the person all of the employees in the MSD relied upon for design support when making any changes. His importance to the ECMS project can be seen from the objectives Forsyth set out for Jeff Cass from January to June of

1996 (Exhibit 292 at page 1):

o To manage the MAINSTAY Design Group, currently

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consisting of Linh Nguyen, Darcy Chorneyko, Andrew Hircock and Kirk Strutt. These duties include:

-Design, implementation and life cycle support of the MAINSTAY Product Line: ECMS, MAINSTAY for Windows, RCM Analyst and Lube Analyst.

oSpecific objectives include:

-To manage the successful delivery of reliable and ‘solid’ products for ECMS Version 2.0, Ontario Hydro MAINSTAY and Caidmark ITM projects

-To complete the planned FY96 R&D projects

-To implement a defect recording and tracking system that will assist in the support of MAINSTAY and will allow us to develop performance metrics upon which the continuous improvement process can be focussed…

[571]Jeff Cass’s importance to GasTOPS can be seen in his résumé prepared by him while employed at MxI (Exhibit 1764). Jeff Cass stated that as Products Manager responsible for MAINSTAY, ECMS, RCM Analyst and Lube Analyst, his responsibilities included:

Design of reusable, shared functional components for all four systems.

Design of single ‘enterprise’ data model that supports all four systems.

R&D tax claims associated with the development of these four systems.

Technical review of requests for proposals (RFP’s).

Preliminary job estimates and detailed project plans for proposals.

Software tool development review and selection.

Training and professional development of core product group.

[572]Forsyth was aware of the effect the resignations of the members of the MSD had on GasTOPS. Forsyth in a memorandum of his meeting with Kevin Goddard, a GasTOPS employee, on October 12, 1996 (Exhibit 1615) stated in part:

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Kevin then suggested that the fair thing to do would be for some of these people to stick around until the division could at least get back on its feet. I asked him if he had any idea of how long that would take. He thought it would take maybe six months. I explained to him that there were so many key technical people leaving that they would have to hire off the street and that it would take years to re-establish the capabilities. I then pointed out that even if it was only six months, why in the world would people stick around and miss out on opportunities that will not be there in six months. Can GasTOPS guarantee there will be something waiting for them at the end of the transition? No. He responded that GasTOPS had done a lot for these people; I responded very strongly that these people had done a lot if not more for GasTOPS already and that the slate was clean - we don’t owe GasTOPS shit! He conceded.

[573]The statement Forsyth made approximately six days after his resignation, that it would take GasTOPS years to replace those who resigned and went to work for MxI and to re- establish the capabilities of the MSD confirms GasTOPS’ argument that Forsyth and Brouse resigned knowing they were not giving GasTOPS reasonable notice and knowing that their actions would cause harm to GasTOPS. Notwithstanding this knowledge they deliberately proceeded as they did because they knew GasTOPS was very close to consummating an agreement with GE and that MacIsaac had decided to move forward with the conversion of ECMS and make other enhancements to the program.

[574]GasTOPS’ John Turner described the state of ECMS’ documentation in October 1996 as “incomplete.” He stated that he would have expected to find

… everything from detailed requirement specification, requirements management records showing the evolution of the requirements from the high level ones that we saw in one of the previous exhibits, then those being allocated to the functional specification. The functional specification that we looked at was incomplete.

The next thing we would expect is a detailed design which would be for each component an allocation of the requirements and

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functions identified in the requirements specification and the functional specification to the individual classes of that make up a component. And those design documents would typically include a class hierarchy diagram showing the relationships between the classes, parent/child relationships. In addition, there were a number of libraries that had been set up to support ECMS and other products, so we would expect to see references to those libraries, the interactions between the components, specific classes and the library classes.

Then we would expect to see each of the classes decomposed into the various attributes or variables and functions that support that class, and description of the functions, the logic implemented by the functions, and, in addition, we would expect some reference back to the requirements for those.

In addition, we would expect to find detailed acceptance test plans and procedures. We did find that for the PEGS/FLTS components but we did not find it for ECMS. In both cases -- I guess in the case of PEGS/FLTS it was out of date. In the case of ECMS it did not exist.

We would expect to find up-to-date user's manuals and -- or at least, in the interim version, we would expect to find details of the test process, the intermediate records of the results of testing.

We would expect to find detailed description of each of the packages within the database, again the logic behind those, similarly the triggers.

[575]In my view, the difficulties that arose from the transition of knowledge from those employees leaving the MSD to those employees remaining resulted from the abrupt resignations. There was simply not enough time for the orderly transition of information, which contributed to GasTOPS’ inability to fulfill contractual obligations with the CAF and to pursue its other business opportunities. The defendants argue that if GasTOPS was unable to locate certain documents it was as a result of the plaintiff’s failure to adopt proper systems for filing and saving documents and electronic files. The evidence does not disclose that there was any difficulty in locating documents prior to the resignations. It seems to me that one employee obligations is to ensure that his/her work product is properly and completely documented and made available to those replacing them upon their resignation. In this case, there did not appear to be any organized

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transfer of work product. This may have been the GasTOPS’ fault, but I am inclined to the view that it was the fault of \departing employees. Again, if there had been reasonable notice given by these employees, there would have been a smooth transition of all of the electronic files and hard copy documents in order that the remaining MSD employees could demonstrate the product and make changes to the product when they had the capability of so doing.

[576]The defendants alleged that the cause of the problem with testing and rolling-out the ECMS v.2 software to the CAF was a result of GasTOPS failing to organize an adequate transfer of knowledge during the time the notice periods and cooperation agreement were in effect. Again, this argument fails to take into account the fact that the resignations were occurring without reasonable notice over a short period of time and the MSD was in crisis October through December 1996.

[577]MxI’s allegation that there was “little by way of organized knowledge transfer” by the resigning employees to those who were remaining ignores the fact that notwithstanding Muir’s request that the employees stay so that such a transfer could take place, they all refused and left GasTOPS with no ability to train employees to be available to receive the transfer of knowledge. GasTOPS was forced to negotiate a cooperation agreement with MxI but ended the negotiations when Forsyth and Brouse requested ownership in GasTOPS’ technology. Only when the negotiations for the cooperation agreement came to an end was Turner was faced with having to recruit employees to take over the tasks of the resigned employees in order to meet the contractual obligations of GasTOPS.

Inability to Pursue Plans with the U.S. Navy

[578]GasTOPS alleged that the individual defendants conspired to resign together in order to usurp corporate opportunities including the U.S. Navy opportunity. MxI responded that the resignations were directly related to the failure of GasTOPS’ senior management to take action regarding the MSD employees’ concerns.

[579]GasTOPS alleged that the individual defendants each gave only two weeks’ notice to cause maximum disruption to the MSD’s operations. MxI responded that both Forsyth and

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Brouse were willing to work for GasTOPS as independent contractors to work on existing contracts or to continue to pursue potential contracts, including with the U.S. Navy and that Muir had encouraged Jeff Cass and Vandenberg to join Forsyth and Brouse for GasTOPS’ best interests. MxI notes the October 17, 1996, cooperation agreement, that Brouse worked to pursue the U.S. Navy opportunity on GasTOPS’ behalf when the agreement was in effect, and that GasTOPS chose to revoke that agreement unilaterally in November 1996.

[580]GasTOPS alleged that it was poised to win the U.S. Navy opportunity at the time of the resignations. MxI responded that a number of obstacles still stood in the way of that result, including the existence of competing technologies (MDPS being internally developed) and customer requirements that it would own ECMS v.2 and that ECMS v.2 be in a Windows environment. MxI argues that GasTOPS/B.F.Goodrich created a new obstacle to their success in winning the U.S. Navy opportunity by revoking GasTOPS’ cooperation agreement with MxI, and that the U.S. Navy opportunity would not have been realized in any event as of December 1996 because the customers’ immediate need was “satisfied with the porting of the ECAMS software to a personal computer architecture” and because of a U.S. Navy policy decision to favour internal development of maintenance information systems.

V. The Defendants’ Conduct after the Resignations

[581]On October 15, 1996, eight days after Forsyth and Brouse resigned from GasTOPS, they incorporated MxI, a high-tech startup software product company. When incorporated, MxI was without office space, infrastructure, capital, banking facilities or work in progress. The only asset that MxI had was its employees, a small group of young entrepreneurs at a stage of life where they could take risks of incurring fairly significant debt while also pouring substantial “sweat-equity” into a startup software company. These entrepreneurs all previously worked for GasTOPS.

[582]The founders of MxI felt that GasTOPS’ business approach of having the customer fund the research and development did not allow for the focused and orderly research and development of software products that could be sold off-the-shelf to a variety of customers

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across a number of market sectors. They felt that:

(a)GasTOPS’ business model resulted in the development of highly customized technology and software;

(b)technology and related software developed by GasTOPS was non-generic as it was designed to meet a particular customer’s requirement;

(c)the technology underlining software had little adaptability or transfer ability; and

(d)GasTOPS’ customers, in many cases, ended up owning the technology and software, in whole or in part, because it had been developed at its expense.

[583]MxI’s founders wanted to produce an off-the-shelf generic maintenance management software product which was developed by internal research.

[584]The original entrepreneurs behind MxI were Forsyth, Brouse, Jeff Cass and Vandenberg. In October 1996, they were joined by Dave Peloso (“Peloso”), Kevin Reynolds (“Reynolds”) and Chris Cass. By November 1996, the group at MxI also included Mike Egan (“Egan”), Laura Kline, Bill Smith (“Smith”), Andrew Hircock (“Hircock”), Mark Lennox (“Lennox”) and Linh Nguyen (“Nguyen”), all of whom had been employed in GasTOPS’ Maintenance Systems Division (“MSD”) when Forsyth and Brouse resigned. These people, after securing employment at MxI, gave GasTOPS two weeks’ notice and immediately commenced to work for MxI.

[585]During his direct examination, Forsyth identified Exhibit 1383 as the first MxI business plan which he wrote in October 1996. Forsyth stated that he completed the first business plan for MxI at the end of October. The corporation profile report for MxI Technologies Ltd. which was filed as Exhibit 373 indicates that the corporation was incorporated on October 15, 1996 and the name of the corporation had been changed to MxI Technologies Ltd. on October 17, 1996. The previous name of the corporation was MxI-Maintenance by Information Technologies Ltd.

[586]Pursuant to my order during the trial, both the plaintiff corporation and the defendant corporation were obliged to make available the backup tapes which existed on the corporate servers. I also allowed either party to the litigation to recall any witness for the purpose of cross-

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examination on any of the electronic files and/or documents which were produced during the trial and which should have been produced prior to the commencement of the trial. As a result of my order, Exhibit 2195 which is described as a business process VSD diagram dated October 2, 1996 was retrieved by the plaintiff from the 1999 backup CD from Forsyth’s directories of MxI. The properties of the electronic file containing the diagram indicate that it was first created on October 2, 1996 and was modified on the same date. The properties information on the file indicates that it was created on a computer named B. Forsyth. As a result of my order, GasTOPS requested that Forsyth be recalled. During his cross-examination he was shown (Exhibit 2116) a document entitled MxI-Maintenance by Information Ltd. business plan which had been extracted from the MxI server backup CD. As the plaintiff was provided with an electronic copy of this file, it was able to access the “Properties” of the file and it appears that the document was created on October 11, 1996 on a computer named “Mark Dupuis”. It also indicated that on October 11, 1996 the document was 13 pages in length. Forsyth admitted that he was the author of such document and it was an earlier draft of Exhibit 1383 which was entitled MxI Technologies Ltd. Business Plan and was prepared by Forsyth by the end of October 1996. Although admitting he was the author of Exhibit 2116, MxI-Maintenance by Information Ltd. Business Plan, Forsyth claimed that the dates shown in the “Properties” of the electronic file, indicating it was created on October 11, 1996 are incorrect but he did not offer any plausible explanation for such dates. It is important to remember, that according to the “Properties” Exhibit 2116 was created and amended at 12:39 p.m. on October 11, 1996. Accordingly, all of the information contained in the document was known to Forsyth or prepared by Forsyth as of that date. It is clear, that Exhibit 2116 was created prior to October 17, 1996, as that was the date that the name of the corporation was changed to MxI. I find it difficult to understand how Exhibit 2116 could be created by Forsyth on a computer named “Mark Dupuis” on October 11, 1996 at a time when Forsyth was apparently not in possession of a GasTOPS computer. In any event, Forsyth agreed that he was the author of Exhibit 2116 which included a copy of Exhibit 2195 entitled business process VSD which was created by Forsyth on October 2, 1996.

[587]This Business Plan further described the market opportunity as follows:

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The aviation regulatory agencies require that all aircraft operators record a “log set” of flying hours (usage), defects found, maintenance actions and configuration changes. These records are currently maintained manually by a majority of operators. Experience with the CF-18 demonstrates that these records can be managed much more efficiently and accurately with a computerized information management system.

Accordingly, it is apparent, that as early as October 11, 1996, MxI considered developing a computerized information management system which would functionally compete with GasTOPS’ products.

[588]Initially, the Business Plan of MxI-Maintenance by Information Ltd. indicated that the new company was targeting the commercial aviation market place as opposed to the military market. However, within weeks, MxI was targeting military clients.

[589]When I consider the details in the business plan prepared by Forsyth on October 11, 1996 or shortly thereafter; the resignations of the MSD personnel and the inadequate notice given by those resigning from MSD I am driven to the conclusion, that prior to October 7, 1996 there had been discussions between Forsyth, Brouse and others employed at MSD about the formation of a new company that would develop and market an “electronic log set” based on the Oracle Relational Data Management System (“RDBMS”) and designed for Microsoft Windows ’95 and Windows NT. On a high level, the difference between the proposed product to be developed and marketed by MxI and GasTOPS’ ECMS was that it was to be a Windows-based program which the market place was demanding. The proposed MxI program, as later described by the defendants, was a fourth iteration of the GasTOPS product.

[590]It is a reasonable inference that the announcement by MacIsaac on October 4, 1996 that as president of GasTOPS he would secure the necessary financing in order to convert ECMS version to a Windows-based program and that he felt that GasTOPS would secure the General Electric business opportunities caused Forsyth and Brouse to decide to immediately resign from GasTOPS in order to launch their company and develop their proposed program in Windows and compete for the business opportunities that GasTOPS was pursuing prior to their resignation.

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[591]The MSD employees were members of a software development team that felt constrained by MacIsaac and Muir’s business philosophy of having customers pay for research and development. The employees who eventually left MSD and moved to MxI did not wish any constraints on their creativity, and I have no doubt that they saw MxI as a wonderful opportunity to be involved in research and development of the fourth iteration of the system they developed at GasTOPS.

[592]Throughout the trial, the defendants attempted to establish that MxI had not targeted military customers and that its focus was on the commercial airline industry. It claimed GasTOPS had not pursued the commercial airline market in any meaningful way prior to their resignations from GasTOPS in the fall of 1996.

[593]During the trial, Forsyth was emphatic that MxI’s focus from the outset was to target the commuter airlines in commercial airlines markets. Forsyth stated that the commuter airlines had been selected by MxI “for initial market penetration.” Forsyth stated:

And we thought with the company of our size and getting started that the commuter airlines would be a likely target because there is quite a few of them. They’re smaller, we thought they might be a candidate target. So that’s the one that we were at this time focussing on.

Forsyth explained that there was also a temporal reason for selecting this market, as a number of commuter airlines in North America had had problems with maintenance issues at the time.

[594]Forsyth also testified that “The target always was the commercial airlines. We were definitely moving more towards the larger tier 1 airlines; the regionals were not our target market. Because of our market assessment, we realized that to win the market place we have to win the tier 1 airlines…”.

[595]Brouse was shown Exhibit 169 and asked whether MxI had adopted the same strategy GasTOPS had identified, namely to access the commercial aviation market place through military operators such as the CAF and NAVAIR. Brouse answered that MxI had a different

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strategy initially, namely to penetrate the commuter airline market followed by large commercial airlines. But, “By the time we got to our third business year, we decided maybe there is a way through this thing, through the military.” Brouse said that MxI sought to do so through very specific named accounts rather than through a generalized approach to the military.

[596]Part way through the trial, during Brouse’s cross-examination, electronic documents found on MxI’s back up tapes were disclosed that cast serious doubt on the evidence of Forsyth and Brouse. They documented in detail the market strategy employed by MxI in the months immediately following its incorporation. These documents demonstrate that the defendants were actively targeting the military marketplace from the outset, more particularly targeting that part of the military aviation industry that utilized the GE 404 engine. It is hard for me to accept that Forsyth and Brouse were unaware of the existence of these documents on their back up server, and I refuse to accept any suggestion that Forsyth and Brouse had forgotten the contents of the electronic documents, which I had ordered be produced. I am driven to the conclusion that Brouse and Forsyth, prior to the disclosure of these documents, were attempting to mislead this court when they stated they were not targeting the military market place.

[597]It is also clear that the defendants were actively targeting and pursuing GasTOPS’ existing and prospective customers, including the CAF the U.S. Navy and GE. It is also that the defendants, from the inception of MxI, pursued a market penetration strategy identical to the market penetration strategy developed by GasTOPS during July 1996. These electronic documents were drafted by the founders, senior managers and primary shareholders of MxI and reflect the true intentions of the individual defendants and the corporate defendant.

[598]Exhibit 2194, entitled MxI Technologies Ltd. Business Plan, was located in the MxI 1999 Lotus Notes back up CD from Forsyth’s home directory. The “Properties” of the electronic file indicate that Forsyth was the author and created the document on or before October 21, 1996. I suspect that the document was first created prior to that date, as the document indicates that MxI “will be” a privately-held corporation and MxI was incorporated on October 15, 1996. Under “market”, the document states:

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Market

(Military Aviation)

oTarget Market Identification

-3,330 GE F404 F/A-18 engines delivered worldwide in the past 15 years (Approximately 1,500Aircraft)

-Operators: U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corp, Canada, Australia, Spain, Kuwait, Finland, Switzerland, Malaysia

oCompetition

-NAVAIR Developed MDPS (Failed Tech Eval)

oMarketing Strategies

-Pricing: Premium

-Advertising and Promotions: U.S. Foreign Military Sales

-Distribution: Direct Sales

It is clear that MxI, by at least October 21, 1996, had defined its target market as the military aviation market place, more specifically users of GE’s 404 engines. MxI was targeting two of GasTOPS’ most valuable existing-prospective customers, namely the CAF and the U.S. Navy.

[599]It is also clear, that MxI was intending to employ a direct sales approach and as such would be directly soliciting business from existing customers or potential customers of GasTOPS at the time they resigned from GasTOPS. In addition, other MxI target customers as shown in Exhibit 2194 included the U.S. Marine Corp, Australia, Spain, Kuwait, Finland, Switzerland and Malaysia. Consistent with the GasTOPS’ marketing penetration strategy, as depicted in Exhibit 169, MxI was adopting a strategy of targeting foreign military users of the GE 404 engine.

[600]Forsyth identified the failed NAVAIR MDPS system as being MxI’s only competition for the said market. In identifying the MDPS as MxI’s competition with respect to possible sales to F404 engine users, Forsyth must have been relying on confidential information that had been made available to both himself and Brouse while they were at GasTOPS. While Forsyth and Brouse were employed at GasTOPS, they had an ongoing and regular dialogue with the United States Navy and only through that process would they be able to ascertain the state of the competition in this market place.

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[601]Another indication of the true intentions of MxI came to light in a presentation prepared by Brouse as vice-president of marketing of MxI for Canadair (Bombardier). The presentation contained in Exhibit 1990 was found in the back up CD produced during the evidence of Brouse. The electronic file of the presentation indicates that it was created on November 19, 1996. In the presentation which he prepared, Brouse set forth the “immediate opportunities” on page 8 in a manner consistent with Forsyth’s MxI business plan presentation dated October 21, 1996 (Exhibit 2194):

ECMS Situation

GasTOPS is currently the ECMS support (contract to March 99)

GasTOPS has requested 4 to 6 month recover from 25% staff loss

Crown will likely compete ECMS support if

GasTOPS cannot regroup and pending Intellectual

Property resolution

Immediate Opportunities

Canadian Air Force CF-18

-DMS having installation difficulties

-loss of ECMS support

»ECMS contractor has lost 25% of staff

»ECMS hosted on unsupportable OS/2

»ECMS Intellectual Property (IP) dispute

-Pending result of IP dispute, Crown may compete ECMS support

United States Navy

-no ground station support for F / A-18

-losing interest in OS / 2 solution

-will likely compete for new system

[602]On page 12 of the presentation, Brouse stated:

USN Situation

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GasTOPS and partner BFG were VERY close to the sale of the ECMS

USN has lost interest

-GasTOPS loss of staff

-OS/2 supportability

USN will likely compete a for a Windows system

USN has expressed a serious interest in MxI (however MxI will require a partner).

[603]On November 22, 1996, Brouse forwarded correspondence to Rodney Kyle (“Kyle”), Directorate of Intellectual Property for the Canadian Government, (Exhibit 421) wherein he stated:

As we discussed yesterday on the phone, MxI is interested in obtaining the license to market and sell the Engine Condition Monitoring System (ECMS) to potential clients who are presently seeking a product with this type of functionality.

[604]Exhibit 421 is direct evidence of MxI’s true marketing intent, that being to obtain a license for ECMS in order to sell licences, on their own initiative to prospective customers such as the CAF and USN. As pointed out by the plaintiff, the defendants never disclosed the existence of or produced this document. GasTOPS learned of the existence of MxI’s license request through an Access to Information Request.

[605]The specific software technology, to which Brouse sought licenses on behalf of MxI, is identical to the listing of specific software that MxI acknowledged GasTOPS was poised to deliver to the U.S. Navy (see Exhibit 367). On October 31, 1996, Brouse delivered to GasTOPS a draft agreement relating to the U.S. Navy work that MxI was to perform on behalf of GasTOPS pursuant to the initial cooperation agreement.

[606]On November 22, 1996, when Brouse wrote to Kyle (Exhibit 421), he stated that MxI was interested in acquiring a licence to ECMS product in order that it could sell the product to prospective customers. When questioned on June 10, 2004 concerning the reason for writing the

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letter Brouse stated:

Q.Can you tell the court what it is that led to a conversation with Rodney Kyle?

A.Yes. A couple of days earlier than this I received a phone call from Michel Pare. And from that phone call I came to the understanding that Bombardier was seeking to get the ECMS license from the Crown, and was offering to convert the ECMS to Windows for free if the Crown would grant them that license.

So I saw this as very disturbing news. I felt if Bombardier was successful in achieving this –- and Bombardier is a pretty connected company with regard to the Crown; that if they were successful in achieving this, that would put GasTOPS in a very bad position with regard to the Navy, and put MXI in a bad position, that the whole opportunity would be lost.

[607]Rodney Kyle was called as a witness by the plaintiff and identified Exhibit 421, being Brouse’s request for the ECMS license to sell to prospective clients. Warrant Officer Paré was called as a witness by the plaintiff on day 102 and during his cross-examination, the defence did not ask him about the alleged conversation that Brouse suggests took place. There was during the trial no evidence adduced apart from this alleged conversation between Brouse and Warrant Officer Paré to establish that Bombardier had any interest in acquiring an ECMS license. Counsel for the defendants acknowledged, that the evidence of Brouse on this alleged statement between himself and Warrant Officer Paré was not being introduced for the truth of the contents of such statement but rather as proof that Brouse had heard Paré make such a statement. I simply do not believe Brouse’s suggestion that he wrote to Rodney Kyle to protect GasTOPS. This suggestion by Brouse is nothing more than an attempt on his part to mislead this Court.

[608]The contents of the letter written by Brouse are clear and leave no doubt that Brouse was writing to Kyle in an attempt to secure a license to sell the ECMS products to potential customers that MxI was targeting. I have no doubt that Brouse wrote to Kyle in an attempt to obtain a license on behalf of MxI to the ECMS products, based on information which he obtained when he worked for GasTOPS that GasTOPS did not have an exclusive license to sell these products.

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[609]Brouse’s explanation for his letter to Kyle on November 22, 1996 was:

A. Well, if in fact another company could secure this license, then Bombardier could secure this license, and then they would be in a position to take that TIES work and the Navy work, and that would snooker GasTOPS Limited as well as MXI; we wouldn't be working under a subcontract under TIES, nor would we be assisting GasTOPS in delivering ECMS for the Navy. So I was quite concerned by this.

So I attempted to determine if that was possible by, in fact, applying for the license myself.

[610]In my view, this statement by Brouse is simply untrue. On November 18, 1996, GasTOPS had given MxI formal written notice that it was terminating all negotiations or discussions aimed at concluding a cooperation agreement between the parties (see Exhibit 382). I do not believe that on November 22, 1996, Brouse was applying for the ECMS license to somehow benefit GasTOPS.

[611]Forsyth stated that the early development of MxI’s corporate objectives was a “collaborative effort” involving all employees. Forsyth agreed that he had ongoing contact with Brouse concerning both target markets and target customers. In cross-examination, Forsyth agreed that, given the development of MxI’s corporate objectives was a “collaborative effort”, it was likely that other managers, such as Kevin Reynolds, would have had ongoing contact with Brouse particularly with respect to target markets and target customers.

[612]In an e-mail dated December 5, 1996 (Exhibit 2085), Kevin Reynolds, in his capacity as manager of quality at MxI, advised that he would be “volunteering for the first of the bi- weekly information sessions from the managers to the company”. Reynolds said that he was convening a company-wide meeting for the following day, at which time he would provide an overview of quality systems. Reynolds attached to his e-mail three different documents that were meant to provide all MxI employees with “background for the information session”. One of the attachment to his e-mail was entitled “MxI Technologies Business Metrics”. Under the sub- heading “Mission (what we should be doing now)”, the corporate objectives of MxI were

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described as follows: “To develop maintenance tracking software products and support services for North American commercial and military aircraft operators…”.

[613]Under the sub-heading “Situation Analysis”, Reynolds identified MxI’s “potential customers” as including entities from both the commercial and military market places. With respect to the military market place, Reynolds identified the specific potential customers as including the CAF, the U.S. Navy, the U.S. Air Force, the U.S. Marine, the U.S. Air National Guard and foreign militaries. Under the sub-heading “Competitors”, Reynolds noted as follows: “All competitors identified to date are small, and their products are based on obsolete technology and/or internal development. In addition, the competitive products do not provide integrated solutions and have various customer created add-ons in working systems.”

[614]With respect to the military aviation market place, Reynolds specifically noted that the only competitor was the U.S. Navy’s internally-developed system known as the MDPS. Reynolds admitted that under the sub-heading “Situation Analysis”, he was identifying the “target markets” for MxI as well as MxI’s competitors in both the commercial and military market segments. Further, he admitted that he would have relied upon the MxI business plan that had already been developed by MxI before he put together his “Situation Analysis”.

[615]In his cross-examination Reynolds, conceded that the purpose of the meeting on December 6, 1996 was “to give people an idea of the things I (he) had been researching...” Reynolds maintained that his analysis was “preliminary” but agreed that it was based on the best information that was available to him as to what MxI was planning to do and where MxI was going. Under the sub-heading “Situation Analysis”, Reynolds stated: “There is some interest from larger organizations, but to date they don’t have products. There may be an opportunity for a teaming arrangement with one of these organizations.” He noted that Bombardier and GE “have expressed an interest”.

[616]The content of Reynolds’ “Business Metrics” document is entirely consistent with MxI’s October 21, 1996, business plan presentation (Exhibit 2194). More particularly, both corporate documents clearly identify the military aviation market as being a target market.

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Further, both documents specifically identify the operators of the GE F404 F/A-18 engines as being the target customers. The customers included the CAF, U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine and certain other foreign militaries, including Kuwait. In addition, both documents specifically identify NAVAIR-developed MDPS as being the only competition in the marketplace.

[617]The Reynolds’ “Business Metrics” document identified the possibility of a “teaming arrangement” between MxI and certain larger organizations. More particularly, Reynolds stated that Bombardier, GE and Oracle had all “expressed an interest”. This information is consistent with the presentation MxI prepared for Bombardier, dated November 19, 1996 (Exhibit 1990). In it, Brouse advised that MxI planned to develop a maintenance management system for commercial aviation. The presentation then described “immediate opportunities” as including the CAF and the U.S. Navy. With respect to the U.S. Navy, the presentation specifically noted that it had expressed a serious interest in MxI but required MxI to join with a partner to compete for its opportunity. When Reynolds’ “Business Metrics” document is compared to Muir’s ECMS market penetration strategy (Exhibit 169), it is clear that MxI was using the ECMS market penetration strategy, GasTOPS’ confidential business document, for its own benefit.

[618]In his “Business Metrics” document, Reynolds identified virtually all of the ECMS target customers as being either target customers of MxI or entities with whom MxI could “team” to develop and sell their own product. When Forsyth was recalled for a resumption of his cross-examination, he agreed that he would have known that Reynolds was about to give the company-wide presentation on quality assurance. Despite this admission, Forsyth claimed he had no recollection of speaking with Reynolds about sales targets for the MxI product. Forsyth, when asked whether it was a true statement that, as of December 5, 1996, the mission of MxI was “to develop maintenance tracking software products and support service for North American commercial and military aircraft operators” stated: “I don't know the exact time frame of the discussion of some of this military aircraft stuff, that came in and out of our discussions.”

[619]By February 11, 1997, David Peloso, the Manager of Operations at MxI had completed drafting a “Pre-Screening Application Form” for submission to Technology Partnership Canada for the development of FlightWorks (Exhibit 1964). According to Peloso, he

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would have sought information from Brouse regarding MxI’s “target market” because Brouse was primarily responsible for the development of MxI’s marketing strategy during its first three or four years.

[620]At page 10 of Exhibit 1964, Peloso wrote: “The marketing plan for FlightWorks, as summarized in Chapter B3c and outlined in detail in Reference 1, is to initially target the regional airline industry as well as the Canadian Air Force CF-18 and the United States Navy F/A-18 communities.” At page 23, Peloso further explained the MxI marketing strategy:

As an initial point of market penetration, MxI plans to target the North American aviation industry. More specifically, MxI will target the regional airline industry, the Canadian Air Force CF-18, and the United States Navy F/A-18 communities because of the following attractive properties of these target market sub- segments:

The capability to buy. (See Reference 1)

Manageable market size.

(This sub-segment consists of approximately 250 buyers).

The market lacks any sizeable competitors.

The unique maintenance problems associated with these aircraft are readily solvable with MxI’s novel technology.

MxI’s very relevant experience with the Canadian Air Force provides unique insight into this market.

In addition, MxI’s marketing efforts to-date provide significant encouragement that the above market sub-segment would adopt FlightWorks. This fact, and the detailed marketing plan for FlightWorks (defined in Reference 1) can be expanded upon should further information be necessary.

[621]In cross-examination, Peloso stated that the target markets for MxI had been identified in a draft marketing plan authored by Brouse (Exhibit 2084). Peloso’s Pre-Screening Application for Development of FlightWorks, which was prepared for Technology Partnerships Canada (Exhibit 1964), made specific reference to Brouse’s fourth revision of the marketing plan

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from January 23, 1997 (Exhibit 2084).

[622]In Exhibit 2084, both the commercial and military market segments are identified as being “potential markets for MxI.” Brouse had broken the military market down into sub- segments, including the CAF, U.S. Navy, U.S. Air Force and U.S. Marine. Brouse specifically stated that there would be “military pricing”.

[623]The Pre-Screening Application was considered by MxI to contain “confidential information proprietary to MxI.” During cross-examination, when asked what information in the material was considered by him to constitute “confidential information”, Peloso included “future business plans of MxI and those intentions” because he wouldn’t want MxI’s competitors to acquire that information. This statement by Peloso in my opinion confirms that the defendants knew that the MSD’s market penetration strategy, as reflected in the 1996/1997 MSD Business Plan (Exhibit 8) and the 1996/1997 GasTOPS Business Plan (Exhibit 296), were confidential and proprietary to GasTOPS. In my view, any reasonable employee, particularly those employed in senior management positions such as the personal defendants, would understand that they received such information in confidence and that they were not allowed to use such information for their own personal benefit and/or to the detriment of GasTOPS.

[624]Based on all of the evidence, it is clear that Forsyth and Brouse, from the date of the incorporation of MxI, and Jeff Cass and Vandenberg, from the date they decided to join Forsyth and Brouse, intended through MxI to compete with GasTOPS, in the military and commercial market with a product that would replace the GasTOPS product already in the market place or be a substitute product for potential customers of GasTOPS.

[625]MxI intended and did in fact use confidential business information, which the personal defendants obtained while employed at GasTOPS, to form a marketing strategy. I am convinced beyond any doubt that the personal defendants intended to use confidential business information concerning existing customers or potential customers of GasTOPS which they had access to while employed at GasTOPS for MxI’s benefit and GasTOPS’ detriment.

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[626]I find it extremely distressing that Forsyth and Brouse whom I consider to be the main founding principals of MxI attempted for months on end in this trial to deny that MxI was targeting the military market place or improperly using the business and marketing strategy developed by Muir while they were employed by GasTOPS. Again, as I stated earlier, I am driven to the conclusion, that Forsyth and Brouse, deliberately attempted to mislead this Court in their viva voce evidence and by failing to produce documents which they had in their possession which contradicted their viva voce evidence.

Treatment of Evidence through the Litigation Process

[627]This cause of action arose early in October 1996, and GasTOPS issued and served its statement of claim on November 27, 1996. The defendants were aware of the claims being made against them by GasTOPS as of that date. A further statement of claim was issued on May 12, 1998. At the time the original statement of claim, the defendants were represented by counsel, and I have absolutely no doubt that counsel advised the defendants that they had to maintain and eventually disclose to GasTOPS all documents pertaining to the claim. As MxI intended to develop and market a conditioned based maintenance software program for the aviation market place, it was important that the defendants maintain a record of the development of their software program and their endeavours to market the proposed software program in the aviation market place.

[628]As I have stated elsewhere in my reasons, I am confident that defence counsel advised the defendants of their obligation to maintain all documents and to make full and complete disclosure as required by the Rules of Civil Procedure.

[629]Almost six years elapsed between the issuance of the statement of claim and the commencement of the trial. Documents that were key to GasTOPS’ claim and were in the defendants’ possession were not produced by the defendants until the trial was well underway. In an action of this magnitude, it is not surprising that disclosure of a few documents might be overlooked. Unfortunately, I have come to the conclusion that the defendants deliberately destroyed, deleted, allegedly lost or failed to disclose key documents, which I can only presume

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would have assisted GasTOPS. It was the number of documents that were not produced, and/or deleted, destroyed, or lost that is disturbing.

[630]Only after I made sweeping disclosure orders requiring both sides to deliver their back-up tapes containing electronic documents were many documents disclosed that should have been made available by the defendants from the outset. In numerous cases, the documents found on MxI’s back up contradicted the evidence of Forsyth, Brouse, Jeff Cass and others who were employed at MxI. I imagine that if Brouse realized these back up tapes existed he would have deleted harmful parts of them too. The fact that Brouse may not have known that these back up tapes existed does not in any way excuse the non-disclosure, as there must have been personnel at MxI who knew of them.

[631]Some of the relevant documents that MxI failed to produce prior to trial and were only found after I ordered electronic disclosure, or were found by other means, were:

I.MxI business plan presentation (Exhibit 2194);

II.Letters re: MxI’s ECMS license request (Exhibits 421, 421A, 422, 423 and 423A);

III.MxI presentation to Bombardier (Exhibits 1990 and 1895);

IV. E-mail from Kevin Reynolds, MxI founder to company re: company metrics (Exhibit 2085);

V.1996/1997 marketing plan authored by Brouse (Exhibit 2084);

VI. TPC (Technology Partnership Canada) pre-screening application form (Exhibit 1964);

VII. MxI – Maintenance by Information Ltd. business plan dated October 1996 (Exhibit 2116);

VIII. Forsyth’s business process diagram re: MxI corporate structure dated October 3, 1996 (Exhibit 2195); and

IX. Brouse’s e-mail to Lieutenant Herl dated December 20, 1996 re: “Christmas present” (Exhibit 2061).

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All of these documents disclose MxI’s business activities during the critical period of time between MxI’s founding until early 1997. More importantly, all of these documents had a negative or adverse effect on the defendants’ defence.

[632]At trial, Brouse claimed he had lost his logbooks for the period commencing on the date of his resignation and continuing to early January 1997 and stated that he then decided to maintain his notes electronically. Brouse admitted that the said logbook would have contained notes of key meetings that he was having with GasTOPS’ existing and prospective customers, including the CAF.

[633]Brouse said that the MxI documents he was preparing on his home computer immediately following the incorporation of MxI were also lost or destroyed. Brouse further stated that he had never backed up this information. At trial, Brouse stated that the Toshiba laptop that he had used exclusively during the course of his early marketing activities at MxI was stolen from the MxI premises and that the laptop had also not been backed up.

[634]Brouse testified that “… as I understood this whole process, the discovery process, is that the files that everybody was interested in were those that got posted into notes.” I am satisfied that the scope of disclosure was explained to Brouse and that he simply decided not to look for or deliberately failed to produce documents he knew would be inconsistent with the defence that he and MxI intended to put forward at trial.

[635]Brouse admitted that he had destroyed copies of his files relating to MxI’s request for an ECMS license. Jeff Cass admitted that he had purposely not disclosed certain documents that he felt were of an embarrassing nature, that no one ever specifically asked him for all documents he had and that he had lost his logbooks from his initial months of employment at MxI and that some of those he did produce were not comprehensive. By contrast, Forsyth agreed that he specifically asked Jeff Cass if he kept logbooks and that Jeff Cass replied that he had not done so until April 16, 1997. In my opinion, Forsyth was attempting minimize the fact that Cass had also been unable to produce his logbook entries for the key period of time following the resignations.

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[636]In my view, the defendants deliberately failed to disclose documents, logbooks, and computers because they contained information that would be inconsistent with their defence of this action. If I had not ordered production of the back up tapes in an electronic format and other electronic documents, the defendants’ intentions and activities might never have surfaced.

[637]Again, I wish to make it abundantly clear that I do not believe defense counsel was in any way involved in this attempted deception. I am sure that as soon as documents in the possession of the defendants came to the attention of counsel for the defendants, they insisted that disclosure be made of such documents.

Presentations to Prospective Customers

[638]In virtually every presentation made by MxI to prospective customers during its first 2-3 years of operation, it emphasized the fact that the “MxI team” had designed and developed the ECMS which was in successful use by the CAF. Examples of this can be found in:

(a)Exhibit 1990 - MxI profile presentation to Canadair dated November 19, 1996;

(b)Exhibit 1369 – MxI presentation to MDA;

(c)Exhibit 1895 – MxI presentation to Bombardier dated December 4, 1996;

(d)Exhibit 1277 – MxI presentation to NAVMASSO (Navy Management System Support Office) dated January 31, 1997;

(e)Exhibit 1965 – MxI presentation to SHL (System House);

(f)Exhibit 2082 – MxI profile presentation by Brouse, last modified May 22, 1997;

(g)Exhibit 1991 – MxI profile presentation to First Air;

(h)Exhibit 2102 – MxI PowerPoint presentation to Volvo dated June 14, 1997;

(i)Exhibit 2121 – MxI presentation to MANTECH dated February 18, 1997.

In each and every one of the above presentations, MxI described the product functionality of its proposed product as being virtually identical to the product functionality of the ECMS.

[639]All of these file presentations convey the following:

1.MxI is a “spin off” company of MSD of GasTOPS;

2.MxI staff includes all MSD program managers and project managers and

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most of the software technical team from GasTOPS;

3.MxI employees while employed at GasTOPS developed ECMS… to any engine like tracking on the CF-18;

4.CMS as developed by the MxI personnel while at GasTOPS formed the following:

(a)serialized tracking (30,000 rotables);

(b)technical directive bulletin tracking;

(c)fault defect tracking;

(d)maintenance requirements identification;

(e)digital log sets;

(f)condition indicators/trending;

(g)logistic planning.

5.MxI planned to develop a maintenance management system for commercial aviation based on experience and knowledge gained from ECMS development.

[640]The MxI product was to include:

(a)serialized rotable tracking;

(b)consumable tracking;

(c)airworthiness directive/service bulletin tracking (i.e. TD’s) life tracking;

(d)faults/defect tracking and trending;

(e)digital log sets;

(f)cost tracking;

(g)maintenance planning and scheduling;

(h)logistic support.

[641]As seen in the above presentations, the functionality of the proposed MxI product was virtually identical to the functionality of the ECMS system which MxI said its personnel developed while employed as GasTOPS.

[642]The profile presentation by MxI indicated that MxI intended to use GasTOPS’ prior success in selling the ECMS product to the “innovators” and “technology enthusiasts” as a springboard to the remainder of the aviation maintenance market place with their own competing product. Brouse’s handwritten notes on the seminar material indicated he intended to usurp GasTOPS’ existing and potential customers who were interested in the ECMS technology.

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[643]The seminar materials suggested that one avenue for product distribution was through original equipment manufacturers. Under this particular sub-heading Brouse wrote “G.E.” During MxI’s first two months of operation, the defendants specifically identified GE as an entity with whom MxI might partner to sell its products.

[644]On Friday, October 4, 1996, Brouse attended a meeting with MacIsaac and Muir, at which time MacIsaac announced that GE would likely contract with GasTOPS for the sale of its ECMS product and that MacIsaac was prepared to fund the conversion of the ECMS product to a Windows platform in order to effect the sale. Forsyth and Brouse promptly departed from the GasTOPS premises on October 4, 1996, and did not return to work until the following Monday, at which time they tendered their resignations.

[645]I have no doubt that prior to October 4, 1996, both Brouse and Forsyth had contemplated leaving GasTOPS and establishing their own company intending to develop a product similar to ECMS to compete with GasTOPS in the aviation industry and that they saw GE as a potential sales channel for their product. GasTOPS’ imminent sale of the ECMS to GE would be an exceedingly large contract for GasTOPS and would preclude the defendants’ prospective company from using GE as a sales channel.

[646]Notwithstanding the statements of Forsyth and Brouse that they did not intend to target the military aviation market for the sale of their new product and did not intend to pursue GasTOPS’ existing or potential customers, the MxI 1997 business plan presentation (Exhibit

2194) stated in part:

Market

(Military Aviation)

oTarget Market Identification

-3,300 GE F404 F/A-18 engines delivered worldwide in the past 15 years (Approximately 1,500 Aircraft)

-Operators: U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corp, Canada, Australia, Spain, Kuwait, Finland, Switzerland,

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Malaysia

oCompetition

-AVAIR Developed MDPS (Failed Tech Eval)

oMarketing Strategies

-Pricing: Premium

-Advertising and Promotion: U.S. Foreign Military Sales

-Distribution: Direct Sales

Note that this document, last modified on October 21, 1996, (according to its “Properties”) was produced from a backup tape of Forsyth’s home directory only after Forsyth had testified.

[647]I simply do not accept Brouse’s and Forsyth’s statements that when they resigned from GasTOPS they had no idea of the nature of the business they intended to start.

[648]Forsyth conceded at trial, that both he and Brouse spent the afternoon of Friday, October 4, 1996, discussing the start up of their own business. Forsyth stated:

Q.Now, Mr. Forsyth, we know that you left GasTOPS half- way through the day on October 4, to go with Mr. Brouse to discuss starting your own business, correct?

A.Incorrect. We went for lunch at Houston's, at their restaurant for a normal lunch, and at that lunch we started to discuss this issue. And we ended up staying for most of the afternoon discussing the issue.

Q.You never came back to GasTOPS, did you?

A.That day, no.

Q.In fact, that very afternoon you made another call to your lawyer to arrange to meet with her on the following Monday; correct?

A.Yes, I believe so.

MxI’s Product Development and Products

[649]In the development of a software program, the designers and developers proceed as follows in general terms:

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1.determine requirements of the software program by collecting information on the customer’s problem and preparing a requirements definition, including a risk assessment, and develop a project plan;

2.conceptual design of the intended software product, including the conceptual data model (conceptual design of the database) and a preliminary functional analysis, including conceptual GUI screen lay-outs;

3.implement the physical data model, including database design performance testing;

4.design and implement software source code, including GUI development;

5.test the system to ensure it meets the requirements;

6.deploy the system, including customer acceptance testing.

[650]GasTOPS followed these steps in developing software products. The first step in the process was to investigate the problem and then make an assessment of how the problem could be solved by learning as much as possible about the customer, its requirements and the market in which it operated. Background IP is used at this stage of the development process. In the second phase, the designer creates specifications for the end-product. In creating the conceptual design of the database, the designer must identify entities (major information components or logical group of data), attributes (major functions of the components and the major data items within it) and relationships (how the different components interact) and incorporate them into the preliminary design to meet the customer’s functional (intended role) and non-functional (cost and other parameters) requirements. The conceptual data model for each domain must be complete and accurate; data must be put into a table format for it to be entered into the database.

[651]The third phase of the database development is the creation of a physical data model. This includes compilation, where the conceptual model is translated into language that allows the computer to execute it, and run time, at which point the database becomes operational and one starts inserting data.

[652]At the physical data model stage, the designer identifies the items that were set out in the conceptual phase and entities are given an entity name that is recognizable by the computer;

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attributes become the columns of the tables and data type is identified; and relationships are implemented through keys which tell the computer the direction of the relationship. At this stage there is data model performance testing where real data is placed into the system to test that all of the data relates to each other and is accessible as defined by the requirements. Also at this stage, the GUI development is initiated, which involves “putting up” the application user interfaces to map requirements/functions to each screen. This process must be documented in the functional specifications. It is at this time that the source code is developed, where the programmer writes commands to the computer allowing it to manipulate and present the data in the database to the end user. There are several design choices available, but the source code is heavily influenced by the structure of the data model as it manipulates the database.

[653]The final phase is testing and development, wherein a test plan is developed and each function is tested and defects or bug reports are logged. Acceptance testing is the last stage: a formal demonstration is made to the client to ensure the application meets its requirements.

[654]At GasTOPS, the documentation produced during their development process was:

(a)First, the project plan was prepared describing generally the work to be performed and including an estimate of the time and effort required for each development stage. An overall schedule for the project was created, allowing the customer to inspect GasTOPS’ progress at key points.

(b)Second, the requirements report would contain all of the information that GasTOPS had related to the proposed development project, details received from the customer describing the customer’s business process, the customer’s requirements and what the customer needed in terms of the software project. GasTOPS would include a very preliminary assessment of the software including what functionality had to be developed, the database and what kind of information would be required and how it should be stored. The report would also include comments on the architecture, performance and interface requirements.

(c)Third, design documents were prepared. The functionality that was defined at a general level within the requirements document is expanded into a detailed specification of the specific functions that the software system is to perform and documented in the “functional specification”. The database design would be in a defined detailed database design and recorded in a

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database design document. The different functions of the software are organized into software modules, and each module would be specified and defined in terms of output from the data. Each software module was designed and documented in a software design document.

(d)Fourth, system test plans were created, defining procedures for verifying that the software system meets the functions detailed in the requirements document. Both individual modules and the overall system must be tested, and the tests are documented in a software or system test plan.

(e)Fifth, source code documentation is prepared, and the specifications for individual software modules are implemented by conversion into source codes. Source codes and listings for them are created for the software.

(f)Sixth, the user’s manual and release documents were completed. At the delivery stage, a release document was prepared, listing the customer and

all deliverables under the contract, including software deliverables. If source code was a deliverable, it was delivered in paper or electronically.

[655]Brouse described MxI’s software development process in a fax (Exhibit 1592) to Lieutenant Matt Herl on July 7, 1997. He listed the key steps in the development of any software project: requirements definition (determining what needs to be done, both generally and in a detailed analysis); risk assessment (examining everything that could possibly interfere with the development and implementation of the project and identifying contingencies); project plan (detailing each task involved in the software development process); functional analysis (breaking down each of the requirements into a number of smaller functions describing how the requirements will be met and changing these as needed during the first two-thirds of a project); data model development (developing a conceptual model identifying all the entities, their attributes and all of the relationships between them); data model performance testing (ensuring the data model can do what is required of it); technical proof of concept (developing a mock-up of a new portion of the system to ensure the technology will meet the functions required of it); GUI development (putting up all of the application user interfaces); code development (developing and testing all of the difficult, logical code of an application, updating the functional specification as necessary, and in-process testing of the code modules); testing; factory acceptance testing.

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[656]The software development process as described by Brouse in his fax to Lieutenant Matt Herl (Exhibit 1592) was effectively the same as the development process set out by Forsyth in the MSD’s 1995/96 business plan and described above. It stated that product development projects shall proceed according to the following steps: a Project Plan shall be prepared; a Systems Requirements Report will document the general requirements of the system; a System Functional Specification will define and document the detailed system functions; a Data Model will define and document the context of the problem and the data required to support the system functions; the database design will be validated; a knowledge base will be developed similarly to the database development, if necessary; a Design Specification and working prototype will be designed and documented, including detailing the user interface; a System Test Plan to define tests to be conducted to validate that the system provides the functions set out in the System Functional Specifications; the system software will be developed and tested, both in parts and as a whole system (according to the System Test Plan); on-line help features and User’s Manuals will be written; the software can be released for beta testing.

[657]Jeff Cass stated that the software development process followed by MxI was not the development process described by Brouse in his fax to Lieutenant Herl (Exhibit 1592). He stated that the testing process as described in steps 11 and 12 of Brouse’s fax were different. As for items 1 through 10, Jeff Cass stated that for the MxI product there was not a formal phase for risk assessment. He said there was a project plan developed for the entire project development activity and then a project plan for steps 4 through 10.

[658]According to Jeff Cass, the documentation MxI produced while developing its FlightWorks and Maintenance products from October 1996 until July 1997 is contained in Exhibit 1593. In reality, this is just a calendar listing dates when certain tasks were carried out.

[659]According to an affidavit Jeff Cass swore on July 20, 1998, the FlightWorks prototype data model was completed in December 1996. It was his opinion that “the data model is crucial for any information system,” and he stated that MxI had developed a conceptual data model using “a lot of data modeling on paper” and then Powersoft Data Architect v.5.0. He stated: “data model for the Maintenix product is too large for any single person to manage.”

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[660]In describing the design and development of the FlightWorks software system, Jeff Cass stated that he had assembled a team for the data modeling. He identified the team as being Vandenberg, Chris Cass, Mike Egan, Laura Klein and Mark Lennox. During cross-examination, he conceded that the only members of his team with any data modeling experience were himself and Vandenberg; the others had very little, if any, such experience. The defendants during the course of the trial were unable to produce any of the paper designs on the data modeling efforts through the entire period of data development other than those documents identified by Jeff Cass in Exhibit 1593. He assembled all the design documents that comprised the FlightWorks software system prototype “design and implementation.” Jeff Cass identified the documents that comprised the data model sketches for the FlightWorks software system prototype as being items (a), (f), (g), (h), (i), (j), (o) within Tab 730 of Exhibit 1593. He indicated that he designed the “base” data model and would receive design documents on the modules from other members of his team. He was to integrate these designs into the data model, but he was unable to produce any documentation for the design of the base database. He said, “the base database that was sketched out in FlightWorks is broad. It contains many years’ worth of development work”.

[661]If FlightWorks and Maintenix were developed using the procedure outlined by Brouse in his fax to Lieutenant Herl July 7, 1997 (Exhibit 1592), I am astounded that there are not more documents to evidence the development work Jeff Cass was supervising in November 1996 through June 1997 at MxI. The defendants were aware in November 1996 that GasTOPS had instituted proceedings against them and had retained counsel to advise them in this matter, and it was incumbent upon them to retain all documents that would be relevant to the proceedings. I am driven to the conclusion that MxI, in developing FlightWorks and Maintenix between October 1996 to July 1997, relied upon GasTOPS’ development work during their employment there and that this is the reason for the absence of design documents. I can only conclude that, if MxI destroyed design documents, it was done to conceal the basis upon which they developed their products.

[662]Vandenberg described his design and development contributions to the data model for the FlightWorks prototype as being “very little” in November 1996 and a “little more” work in

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December 1996 and “further work” in January 1997. Vandenberg said that he did not do any “detailed” work on the data model for FlightWorks, but rather worked with “higher level” concepts. According to Vandenberg, there was very little work done on the FlightWorks prototype until January 1997, at which time work was commenced on the source code. Vandenberg confirmed that there was one version of the data model for FlightWorks by the end of December 1996 and another version of the same data model in March 1997.

The Experts

[663]During this trial, I heard from four eminently qualified experts: Alberto O. Mendelzon, David Parnas, Martin von Mohrenschildt and Peter P. Chen. All of these experts are Professors of Computer Science at universities in Ontario and the United States. I was impressed by the expertise of each of these experts. Mendelzon was engaged by the plaintiff and was called to give evidence at trial. Parnas, von Mohrenschildt and Chen were engaged by the defendants and were called as witnesses in the defense.

[664]All of the experts in varying degrees were involved in comparing the GasTOPS products and the MxI products. On a very high level, the experts, compared the software products by comparing the software code of each product, and the method employed by the plaintiff corporation and the defendant corporation, to design and develop the products. In addition, Mendelzon compared the functionality of the GasTOPS products and the MxI products.

Dr. Alberto D. Mendelzon, Ph.D. 1979

[665]In his report (Exhibit 1067-C) dated December 7, 1999, and revised on June 5, 2003, Mendelzon reviewed the functionality of all of GasTOPS MxI’s software products:

1.2SYSTEM FUNCTIONALITY

All the systems considered are designed to support the maintenance function for complex pieces of equipment such as aircraft or manufacturing machinery. They provide, to various degrees, the following functionality:

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Distributed storage of configuration and maintenance information

Graphical interface for manipulation of configuration and maintenance data

Tracking of part life and part usage

Tracking of part acquisition and storage

Support for diagnosis and troubleshooting of part malfunctions

Tracking of scheduled maintenance.

[666]According to Mendelzon, both GasTOPS’ and MxI’s software products are computer- based tools to support the concept of condition-based maintenance using operational measurements and share several related areas of functionality, including configuration tracking, usage monitoring, maintenance management and troubleshooting.

[667]Mendelzon found that the software systems of GasTOPS and MxI shared the following functionality with respect to distributed storage of configuration and maintenance information (where information is stored where it is needed rather than in a central database), their GUIs and hierarchical structure (storing information in both parent and ancestor fields, allowing access to all components under the top assembly). Mendelzon found that the software systems of GasTOPS and MxI shared the following functionality:

(a)distributed storage of configuration and maintenance information – information is stored where it is needed, rather than in a central database, and then synchronized at regular intervals;

(b)graphical user interface; and

(c)hierarchical structure – stores parts in both the next higher field or immediate parent and ultimate ancestor in the hierarchy creating an index at the top level allowing immediate access to all the components directly and indirectly under the top assembly.

[668]Mendelzon stated that both data models address the required functionality of a customer to identify components that are compatible. Whether one chooses to represent parts that are incompatible, or those that are compatible, would depend on how many parts one expects to

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be incompatible. However represented, it cannot be determined by the data model, instead the interpretation of the relationship is determined by the software.

[669]In Mendelzon’s opinion, ECMS v.2 and Maintenix’s functionality were strikingly similar. ECMS v.2 had functions that Maintenix did not, which does not detract from his finding that the functionality of Maintenix is similar to ECMS v.2 with two exceptions: first, Maintenix was written in Windows NT and, second, Maintenix allowed for multiple aircraft configuration within the software program. If a purchaser required a “multiple aircraft configuration” of the ECMS v.2 software product, such configuration would have to be carried out by GasTOPS, while the customer could customize Maintenix for multiple aircraft configuration.

[670]In comparing ECMS v.2 and Maintenix, it is important in my view that two factors be considered. First, the purchaser or prospective purchaser is only interested in the product’s functionalities. Second, the main thrust of GasTOPS’ claim is that the defendants’ program, Maintenix, was being offered to customers as the next iteration of ECMS.

[671]Dr. Mendelzon described his instructions from the plaintiff, as follows:

A.My instructions were to compare the data models used in two families of systems that had to do with the condition based maintenance, one from the GasTops and one from MxI. In particular, the GasTops' systems were ECMS version 2 and Mainstay and RCM Analyst; and the MxI systems were NALCOMIS, Maintenix and ADS. So my first question that was asked of me is: How similar are the data models of these two companies; and the second question was: How likely -- whatever degree of similarity that I find -- how likely is it that two independent groups starting from scratch would have arrived at this degree similarity.

[672]Dr. Mendelzon described the relationship between the data model and the source code

as follows:

There is a database that will store information. And there is a collection of programs that are written by programmers to execute various activities that modify the database, retrieve information

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from the database, display the database on the screen, et cetera. All these programs are expressed in so-called programming languages, and the text of these programs written in that programming language is called source code.

[673]In describing the relationship between the functionality and the database design of the software system, Dr. Mendelzon stated:

Q.Now, is there a relationship between the system functionality and the database design?

A.Yes. There is a fairly direct relationship in that the system functionality determines what kind of information the system needs to maintain. So, in that sense it determines the requirements for the database design, sort of starting point for the database design.

Q.And can you explain to us the linkage, if any, between the application and the database?

A."Application" is a term that refers to a set of computer programs. So to build an application, what you do is you write a program or a set of interrelated programs. All of these programs -- almost all these programs, have to interact with the database in some way. For example, if you think about the trouble-shooting component, that needs to access the database to retrieve information about how a particular part has performed, and what is known about its usage, and what is known in -- and recorded in the database about any conditions that were detected for that part, and this information will be retrieved from the database. And then the application program will use this information to perform some computations that will help it decide what the diagnosis is for that condition, or will display some graphs on the screen so that an engineer can try to determine what was the cause.

[674]From his investigation, Dr. Mendelzon concluded in this instance that both ECMS and Maintenix both “have a generic database design that could be customized for specific applications, without any change or almost without any to the structure of the database. It could be customized simply by entering the baseline data into the respective tables.”

[675]In analyzing and comparing the baseline equipment subject area of both EMCS and

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Maintenix, Dr. Mendelzon concluded:

A.There were several very striking similarities here. Other than the overall structure that is essentially the same entities connected by relationships in essentially the same way, that would be the first and most obvious similarity. But there are two or three actually design features that struck me as somewhat unusual, and those were also important in comparing these two.

I've already mentioned, I think, all of them. The first one is the use of not just a next higher field to store what is the immediate parent of a component in a hierarchy, but also the top level higher field. That is an usual thing to do. It's a clever thing to do because it allows by then generating an index on that top level, top parent field, it allows immediate access, as I said, to all the components that are directly or indirectly under a given top level assembly. And if you didn't have that, then the software would have to navigate through the data connecting each entity with the next entity with the next entity and so on, and this would be a much slower and more expensive process.

The second one is the way that the positions are encoded. This idea, which is also a clever idea, of just having the number of positions stored, the number of possible positions that a part can appear in stored in the hierarchy table, and then have in a separate table the listing of those positions. And what that does is, it allows a part that may appear in multiple different positions to be described only once instead of having to repeat the description as many times as positions.

On the other hand, there is a price that is paid in flexibility by doing that which is that then the part that appears in multiple positions must have the same structure in all the positions in which it appears, because that structure is only described in one place.

The third thing that was striking is the use of the compatibility information matrix, which is represented by NIP PART cross [X] NH part in GasTops and equipment part compat DEF in the MxI design. I would have thought that simply listing the blueprint hierarchy, which is which is embedded in NIP WUC cross [X] WUC, would be sufficient to determine the part compatibility or incompatibility, and I was surprised that it would have to be brought out and made explicit in this way.

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So in all those three cases in some sense there is some redundancy that has been introduced into the design in order to make it more efficiently, in order to make the system work better at run time. Always when redundancy is added, there is often a price to be paid in terms of, on the one hand, possible inconsistency, because if you're storing the same information more than once, then whenever you change the information, you have to make sure you change it in all the places where there is redundancy. Also, in terms of flexibility in the case of the position information where the information is compressed.

Dr. Mendelzon, noted that a software engineer must make a very large number of design options at the conceptual level, including selecting which entities would be captured, what relationships between them would be captured. There would also be many options in determining the way positions are represented in mapping these entities and relationships and may options in representing hierarchies.

[676] In analyzing and comparing the actual equipment area of each program, Dr. Mendelzon stated that the description of the Maintenix’s baseline equipment was exactly the same as in GasTOPS’ design. In examining the actual equipment area and considering the design choices or options available to a software designer, Dr. Mendelzon stated that in some areas of design there were some differences between the products (the way the hierarchy is represented and the redundancy in storing the link). He stated that these were the areas for which a designer would have fewer options from which to choice because they are determined mostly when designing baseline equipment earlier in the process.

[677]In general terms, Dr. Mendelzon found that while Maintenix delineates an explicit distinction between the baseline and actual equipment in the naming conventions used, the two database models were designed essentially the same. In addition to the overall structure being essentially the same, Dr. Mendelzon found that there were several very striking similarities. One was the decision to represent both the baseline and actual equipment as a set of rational tables instead of building a design that is specific to one particular kind of equipment, which enables easy customization of the system. There are various ways to represent hierarchies and data models; the main challenge in relational data modeling is to achieve adequate performance at the

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physical data level model. The method of just storing a part and its parent can result in slow response time while performing the joining operation. This unique design feature GasTOPS employed to address this issue was a redundancy which allowed for quicker searches by creating an index at the top level, and is exactly the same in the MxI design of the actual equipment (although the MxI baseline design does not deal with the highest component).

[678]In Dr. Mendelzon’s opinion, the GasTOPS design allows for parts to appear in more than one position within a component. The design and codes allows for a part that appears in multiple positions to be described only once but requires the structure of the part to be the same in all positions. Dr. Mendelzon found that this was a unique design feature which was also present in the MxI design in the same manner.

[679]Dr. Mendelzon stated that the GasTOPS baseline design contains a compatibility information matrix that allows some parts to be sub-parts of other parts. While one model represents parts that are incompatible and the other those that are compatible, from a data model perspective, there is no way to tell which of the two is intended. As such, Dr. Mendelzon concluded that this design feature is the same in the MxI design. This was a redundancy and Dr. Mendelzon thought that it would have been sufficient to determine part compatibility/incompatibility through the blueprint hierarchy.

[680]Dr. Mendelzon referred to what he found as “common limitations” because there were certain design choices that had been made in the same way in both data model designs. Dr. Mendelzon stated that a program designer normally attempts to design a system that is as flexible as possible, which sometimes proves to be too ambitious and leads to a decision to limit flexibility in favour of performance. In his analysis, Dr. Mendelzon found that GasTOPS and MxI made such trade-offs in exactly the same manner, namely:

(a)although a part can appear in one position, there is only entry for the part and a separate table describes it. This may not be problematic if one expects that the component occurring in multiple positions will be metric because the structure must be the same no matter the position;

(b)a parent hierarchy implies that there is a unique parent and that a

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component is only a subcomponent of one other higher level component. The singular reference to a parent does not permit representation of the fact that a subcomponent may appear under two different components. One would have the choice of replacing the strict tree structure with a more general structure where a component may have multiple parents.

(c)ultimate ancestor is an introduction of a redundancy, thus there are two costs: space and possible inconsistency.

[681]In his examination and analysis of the databases in actual equipment, Dr. Mendelzon concluded that the common limitations that he found appear exactly the same way in each database. He noted usage baseline and usage tracking in particular.

[682]In his analysis of the baseline usage for both data models, Dr. Mendelzon stated:

A.Again, the first observation is the overall similarity in the diagrams and the fact that there is such direct correspondences between entities and relationships in one of the diagrams and entities and relationships in the other one. But more striking to me is the overall approach, what I explained earlier in the decision to have this baseline for samples and condition indicators, that is to architect the data model in such a way that just by plugging in a new set of baseline data the system could be immediately reconfigured to work for a different kind of aircraft or a different piece of machinery or a fleet of something else, and that is done exactly the same way in both systems.

[683]Dr. Mendelzon compared GasTOPS and MxI’s database designs, finding that the overall organization of the two was the same. He compared their domains, finding “Clearly, they’re very similar” in spite of being organized a little bit differently. He compared their models with respect to the diagrams and direct correspondence of entities and relationships, and found similarities there as well.

[684]According to Dr. Mendelzon, the software engineer would have had a number of design choices but it appears that the designers of both systems made the same choices. For example the notion of condition indicators is not obvious, but was an invention in the original GasTOPS’ data model; the concept of grouping sample types is not obvious, as there would be designs in which this is not done; and the concept of connecting samples back to the baseline

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hierarchy is not determined in some sense by the nature of the problem. Similarly, the actual usage tracking domain was designed in much the same way, as once the baseline was defined, then it is more or less predictable what entities will be in the actual design. The MxI and GasTOPS designs of the actual usage tracking domains were similar but not to extent of the previous domains where the only changes were in the names, which is very insignificant because the computer does not care about the names. In this area, the relationships are organized a bit differently in the two designs.

[685]In all, Dr. Mendelzon found the following similarities between the GasTOPS and MxI

design:

(a)concept of maintenance plan in the GasTOPS design corresponds with baseline task plan in the MxI design;

(b)the maintenance schedule domain in GasTOPS’ design corresponds to the baseline and actual maintenance tasks in the MxI design;

(c)preventive underscore ACTV table corresponds loosely with the task underscore task table;

(d)actual maintenance information (HIS underscore preventive underscore ACTV) is decomposed in the MxI design creating several tables including task maintenance plan, task plan set up and task schedule rule;

(e)the decision of how to model maintenance activities and how to model the sequence of scheduling maintenance activities.

[686]According to Dr. Mendelzon the similarities were highlighted by the decision to separate baseline from actual. In other words, one has a set of entities describing the activities to be tracked by the system and where in the equipment hierarchy these activities are applied, what steps are to be taken and how often they must be performed. As such, one can customize the data model for a completely different organization, by changing data in part of the design.

[687]Dr. Mendelzon concluded after performing his analysis and comparisons:

(a)Major Domains

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A.The conclusion is that they're organized into essentially the same major domains.

In the Maintenix system the distinctions between the domains are made more explicit. For example, you see that in the ECMS column, both actual equipment and baseline equipment are called resource. But, in fact, when you look at the actual entities, there is a clear distinction in the ECMS model between actual and baseline, and that is the distinction that has been made explicit in the Maintenix documents.

(b)Baseline Equipment Domain

A.My conclusion is that they are extremely similar; in fact, this was one of the most interesting domains because some of the unique decisions that were made in both the GasTops and the MxI design, unique but common to both designs.

Q.I'll just take you back to page 6, paragraph 3.1.1. In the first paragraph, can you elaborate for us there your conclusion that there were unique design decisions that were common to both MxI and GasTops in the data model?

A.Yes. I'm referring here to the way of representing both the baseline and the actual equipment as a set of relational tables, in particular the introduction of redundancy in the form of a link to a top level assembly, in addition to the link in the next higher assembly. The redundancy in the number of positions that a component can appear in and the somewhat peculiar way of separating out the position information from the part information. And to begin with, even before getting to that point, the way that the system is split into baseline and actual is, in fact, a very major area of coincidence between them; instead of building a design that is specific for one particular kind of equipment, we have this baseline versus actual separation so that you can easily customize the system to represent different kinds of equipment.

(c)Actual Equipment Domain

A.Again here we find a very high degree of similarity,

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which is not surprising. Because, given that the baseline designs are so similar, since the actual designs will naturally mirror the baseline designs, then you would expect to have this high degree of similarity between them.

(d)Common Limitations

A. In the three cases that are listed here, that is the way that components that can appear in multiple positions are handled, that is the first one. The second one is the use of a next higher field so that a baseline component can have only a single parent not multiple parents. And the third one, the use of the highest field so that each subcomponent points to the top level assembly that it's a part of.

So these are three different design features in which the two designs agree. And in all cases they seem to be trade-offs of flexibility or express a power if you like versus performance, when we're -- in all three cases the designs have apparently favoured performance over flexibility.

Q.What conclusion do you draw from that?

A.That this reinforces my impression of the similarity between the two models

(e)Baseline Usage

A.My conclusion here is that there are very strong similarities at the conceptual level. The choice of abstractions to represent a particular kind of measurement, or sort set of measurements, and call it condition indicator to indicate some potential problem: the idea of organizing samples into sets of measurements taken at the same time on the same piece of equipment, the connection between the sample types, or the samples or the condition indicators and the equipment hierarchy. So these are all non-obvious ways of doing things that -- for which the two systems followed exactly the same path.

(f)Usage Trackage

A.Again, the conclusion is that there is a very high

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degree of similarity, which again, because we're on the actual side of a baseline/pair means that the actual part of the design is consistent with the baseline part. So if the baseline level is similar, then it follows that the actual level will also be expected to be similar and, in fact, it is.

(g)Maintenance Tasks

A.Again, my conclusion is that there is a high degree of similarity in between them, in particular the way of slicing up the world, if you like, deciding to characterize to -- again to do the split between baseline and actual, and to decide how to model maintenance activities and how to model the sequence and the scheduling of maintenance activities.

Here the physical model shows more differences between them than in previous instances. It would look like some of the concepts from the GasTops' model have been evolved into some more refined concepts in the MxI model.

[688]In a report dated December 7, 1999, and revised June 5, 2003, Dr. Mendelzon stated:

The detailed discussion above, in my opinion, makes it obvious that the similarities between the GasTOPS family of data models on one hand and the MxI family of data models on the other are very pronounced. The models agree in their overall philosophy, their large scale structuring into major domains, the overall organization of each of these domains, and a multitude of details within each domain.

I also find that this level of similarity is far beyond what could have been expected from two independent groups that started from the same set of requirements. The discussion above documents several instances in which particular, sometimes quirky, design decisions of the GasTOPS models are repeated in almost identical form in the MxI models.

[689]Dr. Mendelzon examined the documentation received from the defendants to ascertain if in his opinion a formal development process had been used in the design and development of the databases and commented:

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Developing a data model of this magnitude and complexity is a substantial task. Existing relational modeling tools and techniques target mostly conventional business-oriented data processing applications and can be difficult to apply to engineering projects such as the ones tackled by the GasTOPS and MxI systems. A typical development process, of which developing the data models would be a crucial part, would be structured in several phases. At least, oversimplifying somewhat, it would take a requirements gathering phase to ascertain application requirements, a system design phase, a coding phase, a testing phase, and deployment. Data model requirements would come out of the requirements gathering phase and data model design would be accomplished as part of the system design phase.

[690]Dr. Mendelzon stated that when a software designer designs a domain, the following choices/steps are relevant:

(a)conceptual/logical data model – at this stage there are a few rules and the key is to understand the domain, application and client, in order to understand what has to be captured within the database and within what form. This usually takes the form of an object-oriented diagram showing entity relationships.

(b)physical data technique – this is linked to the selection of a database management system which determines the sort of physical data model one is going to use.

(c)physical data model (design) – organizing that part of the real world that one is trying to model inside the system. This involves:

1.breaking the system into domains; and

2.deciding which entities one chooses to represent in each domain, which should be merged and which relationships can be left implicit or can be derived from other relationships, etc.

3.this is usually a long process with a few wrong turns along the way that require correcting.

(d)Once the physical database (design) is complete, the database is created using a system such as Oracle or SQL.

[691]Dr. Mendelzon stated that the designer may not follow a particular development

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process religiously but that it is relatively rare to find a physical data model without a logical/conceptual data model behind it in a database as complex as Maintenix/FlightWorks. Dr. Mendelzon examined the documentation provided by the defendants and concluded:

So I was looking for some evidence that there had been a conceptual level, logical level design for the NALCOMIS system instead of going directly to the tables that is physical data model. And I didn't find any in the documents that I looked at; in fact, there is a statement in one of the documents, it's document M-28, that I quoted here, that says:

"due to scheduling constraints, this preliminary model is going to have to be primarily based on the CM development team's -- (CM means computer management there) -- on the CM development team's data modeling experience and knowledge of fleet maintenance information systems."

So I interpreted that as saying we're skipping the conceptual logical data model phase, and we're going directly to the data model because we already know how to do it.

[692]In his report (Exhibit 1067C), Dr. Mendelzon noted that while some of MxI’s documents outline careful data model design processes, these were not provided for in the NALCOMIS system design. He stated, “The data model diagrams and listings of tables are the output of running standard reverse engineering tools on the database after it already had been designed and created, not before.” He also found evidence in the NALCOMIS Configuration Management Subsystem Software Development Project Plan that MxI bypassed a formal development process and that, having found no evidence of conceptual database design, he concluded it had not been done. There was little, if any, evidence that MxI’s products were developed from scratch. Further, he stated that some structures in the GasTOPS’ model appeared to have been refined or improved n the MxI model and that the notation in the tools used to describe the MxI model are more modern than those used in the GasTOPS model, from which he concluded that the GasTOPS model had been developed first.

[693]Dr. Mendelzon said it seemed clear MxI had reverse engineered their product from

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GasTOPS’.

[694]The conclusion reached by Dr. Mendelzon that the MxI databases were not developed from scratch is confirmed to some extent by the Maintenix White Paper authored by Brouse (Exhibit 10). Dr. Mendelzon was referred to the Maintenix White Paper in re-examination, and he stated:

Q.Dr. Mendelzon, first of all, can you tell us what the phrase "fourth design iteration" would mean in this context?

A.It means, in general, taking a solution to a problem, which is a design, and then refining it, iterating it, meaning producing a new version of the design that solves essentially the same problem.

[695]It would seem to me that the numerous statements made by MxI in their presentations that Maintenix was the fourth iteration of the maintenance information system confirms Maintenix was simply a new version of GasTOPS’ products. This is important, as MxI and the personal defendants refined the maintenance information systems which they designed at GasTOPS and then marketed a refined systems to GasTOPS’ customers or potential customers. Accordingly, I am not surprised in the least that Dr. Mendelzon found similarities between GasTOPS’ and MxI’s products and no evidence MxI’s products were developed from scratch.

[696]The defendants retained Drs. Parnas, Mohrenschildt and Chen as experts to compare and offer an opinion on the similarities between the GasTOPS’ ECMS software products and the MxI-Maintenix products.

[697]In considering the opinions of all of the experts in this matter, it is important to keep in mind, that there are two fundamental differences between ECMS and the MxI products. The MxI product is the fourth iteration of a computerized maintenance system, and, as such, one would expect differences in the products arising from the refinements and improvements. The defendants, as they stated numerous times in their literature, were responsible for the design and development of the first three iterations. The fourth iteration incorporated the features that were important in the market place and which GasTOPS was planning to incorporate before the

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resignations. Accordingly, it was difficult for the experts to compare these products, as they were being asked to compare the third iteration to the fourth iteration.

[698]In my view, the evidence is clear that Maintenix is the fourth iteration of the computerized maintenance systems developed by the defendants when they were employed at GasTOPS. The defendants, while working for GasTOPS, were aware of the potential users of computerized maintenance systems; the requirements of the market place, and more particularly the requirement of GasTOPS’ customers and potential customers; the underlined structure of the first three iterations of the computerized maintenance systems developed by themselves at GasTOPS; the future requirements of the market place in a computerized maintenance system (i.e., Windows operating system and generic program to accommodate numerous engine and aircraft configurations).

Dr. David Lorge Parnas, Ph.D. 1965 and Dr. Martin von Mohrenschildt, Ph.D. 1994

[699]The defendants retained Dr. Parnas in June 1998 to prepare a report. On June 15,

1998 Forsyth forwarded an e-mail to Dr. Parnas in which he stated:

The software products that the two software systems are based upon are as follows:

1.0The Canadian Air Force ECMS

1.1Oracle Relational Database System

1.2Borland C++ Programming Language

1.3OS/2 version 2.0 Operating System

2.0The Mxi Maintenix Product

2.1Oracle Relational Database System

2.2PowerSoft PowerBuilder 5.0 Development Tool (Basic-like Programming Language)

2.3Microsoft Windows NT version 4.0 Operating System

I think that relational database design experience will be the most relevant for the analysis, e.g. the ability to read an Entity- Relationship diagram, Normalizaation theory, etc.. The ability to read C++ and PowerBuilder (the Basic-like PowerScript programming language) syntax would be required to compare the

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implementations of the two systems. However, knowledge of the operating systems involved is probably not necessary.

[700]Dr. Parnas, on receipt and review of Forsyth’s e-mail on June 15, 1998, concluded: “When I look at the list systems, they were at the edge of my expertise”. Dr. Parnas conceded, that his area of expertise did not include database design, entity relationships or normalization theories. He also conceded that his ability to read C++ and Power Builders syntax was also on the “edge of my area of expertise”. As a result, Dr. Parnas contacted Dr. Mohrenschildt to work on the report with him. Dr. Parnas came to the conclusion that in order to do a comparison of the software systems referred to in Forsyth’s e-mail, the source code would be a better way to do it.

Dr. Parnas advised Forsyth, that if he wanted to have a database comparison done, he (Dr. Parnas) was not the right person to do a database comparison.

[701]On July 7, 1998, Dr. Parnas wrote to Dr. Mohrenschildt stating in part seven items that he was going to compare in the source code for the software systems. Dr. Parnas stated:

My plan is to:

(1)compare the functions performed by both programs

(2)compare the data structures used in both programs

(3)compare the module structure of the programs

(4)compare the “uses” structure of the programs

(5)compare the process structure of the programs

(6)search for similarities in algorithms used by both programs

(7)search for similarities in variable names, etc.

We will then determine if any similarities discovered follow unavoidably from the task, or are “natural” for the task or if they seem to reflect “copying” of ideas from the older program to the newer one. MxI expects a summary statement and a report that details our findings. There may also be a requirement for interim reports depending on the schedule of the court proceedings. Since you are more familiar with the programming languages involved than I am, I expect that you will perform most of the detailed analysis. I will draft the reports for discussion with you and produce the final versions when we have agreed on their content.

[702]On July 9, 1998, Dr. Parnas wrote to Forsyth outlining his methodology which would

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be a comparison of the “architecture”. It was Dr. Parnas’ opinion, “if one program uses intellectual property from the other project, this will be evidenced by similarity in the architectures”. After setting out his plan to compare eight items, he stated:

We will then determine whether any similarities that we have discovered follow unavoidably from the task, i.e. are natural for the task, or if they seem to reflect application of ideas from the older program to the newer one.

[703]Between July 10, 1998, and July 12, 1998, Dr. Mohrenschildt sent his preliminary analysis to Dr. Parnas, who forwarded his comments back to Dr. Mohrenschildt on July 12, 1998 (Exhibit 2326). Dr. Parnas explained that he agreed that there had been no literal copying of code from one file to another, but that he had not himself seen the evidence of this:

Q.But you haven’t even seen anything yet?

A.I had seen -- you're right, I hadn't seen ---

Q.You hadn't seen a thing?

A.No, I had seen the demo.

Q.But that’s the demo that you didn't even look at?

A.Yes. But this is a trivial point. You’re right, so I agree

based entirely on what Martin has said and some things that I already saw in the demo in that there were changeable things in the demo that couldn’t have been in that. But for the most part I’m relying on Martin, that there’s no literal copying.

[704]In his e-mail to Dr. Mohrenschildt on July 12, 1998, Dr. Parnas added that the functionality of the system could be judged based on its initial functionality, which is dictated by the market, and on its adaptability to changes and procedures, which he notes is “a major contribution of MxI.”

[705]In his evidence, Dr. Parnas explained this paragraph as follows:

Q.How did you come to the conclusion where you say we needed to point out that the first is dictated by the market, the

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second is a major contribution of MxI. You haven't examined the code, you haven't even looked at the documentation?

A.Because ---

Q.Is it something you were told?

A.No, it was something we saw in the demo.

Q.But this is the demo you just told us you had no interest in.

A.No, I didn't say no interest, I said I didn't look at the details. The demo showed that they could make changes to things that we could not see any way to make changes in the ECMS code. And then we -- that was based mostly on the demo, it was consistent with what they had told us.

Q.You're telling us today that it was from your observations of the demo that you know all about this run time and being able to fix in run time, because that is what you’re saying here, sir?

A.No, let's make it clear. I knew that this was a claim and I knew this was in their demo. What I didn't know, and that he determined by looking at the code, was that it was done consistently throughout. Anybody can show you one place where they can do a thing like that, and we had seen that in the demo. Martin was telling me that.

What I later confirmed for myself was that it was as a result of very deliberate design decisions and ---

A.I'm just suggesting to you, Doctor, that you were told that during your visit to MxI?

A.We were told that.

Q.When you say on the data structures I think we should find a few examples of similarities and differences, we can use those examples to explain where the similarities are natural approaches to the problem while the differences show new programming ideas from MxI. Now that's quite a conclusion without even seeing the code or the documentation?

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A.That's true, I hadn't seen it at that point.

[706]I am surprised that Dr. Parnas would form an opinion that similarities in the data structure are natural approaches to the problem while the differences show new programming ideas from MxI. I am driven to the conclusion that Dr. Parnas started his comparison of two products on the premise that they were completely different and simply looked for evidence to confirm that premise. It appears that Dr. Parnas who was to write the report had been retained to demonstrate that the programs were dissimilar as opposed to being retained to compare the programs and come to an independent conclusion.

[707]On July 21, 1998 Dr. Parnas sent an e-mail to Brouse (Exhibit 2331) indicating that he had written his report without the source code he was to receive from GasTOPS:

The report has just one section missing and Martin has just sent me what I need to write that. Then, he and I need to polish the draft. I hope it will be ready soon.

I think you will like it. I made a list of things that we needed to compare, but I think it was overkill. I could have [stopped] after the data structures.

There is one thing. I told Brad that we had not received the code that [GasTOPS] had promised to send. [There] was some problem with their CD burner when I was there and it was to be sent. I mentioned this to Brad and he said it was about to come by courier and I still have not received it.

Eric [Appotive] just called to ask if there is anything we need. Perhaps you could save us a phone call and tell him that the version 1.7 code did not arrive.

However, I can’t say we need it. I would just like to say that we should have it. My guess is that what we are saying applies to both, but it would be good to confirm that.

On July 22, 1998 Dr. Parnas confirmed that he had now received the GasTOPS CD.

[708]Dr. Parnas also did not look at or analyse or compare MAINSTAY (the program on which ECMS was based) notwithstanding that he had documentation for it. He stated that he did

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not look at MAINSTAY as he was instructed to compare ECMS with Maintenix:

Q.Now, what investigation did you do with respect to Mainstay?

A.I think we were told that it wasn’t relevant to what we were doing here, I didn't pay much attention to it.

Q.So based on what they told you, you didn't bother looking at what ECMS was based on?

A.We looked at the organizational structure of ECMS, which is what we said we would do.

Q.It says here you are the expert who's to do this evaluation, that the ECMS system is based on Mainstay; correct?

A.That's what they say.

Q.Did you appreciate that you had Mainstay documentation...

A.Yes.

Q. ...from GasTOPS?

A.Yes.

Q.And you decided not to look at it based on what MxI told

you?

A.We had been asked to compare ECMS with Maintenix, and that's what we did.

Q.As an expert, why would you exclude it?

A.Because I didn't need it. The list of documents ---

Q.As I understand it, the reason you didn't need it is you were told not to look at it?

A.Nobody ever told me not to look at it, they gave it to me and said you have all this available to you if you want it and they gave me the freedom. When I looked at the code I didn't find a

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need to look at it.

Q.That's not what you just told us, not more than 60 seconds ago you said you didn't look at Mainstay because you were told not to?

A.Was told to look at ECMS and Maintenix, nobody told me to look at Mainstay.

[709]Dr. Mohrenschildt understood the engagement with MxI to be a comparison of ECMS to Maintenix to determine “if ECMS intellectual property is used within Maintenix”. Dr. Mohrenschildt took this to be an investigation as to whether or not there had been a copying of the architectural elements in the source code. Dr. Mohrenschildt stated that he was to do the detail analysis of the source code and that he prepared draft reports, which he e-mailed to Dr. Parnas. Dr. Mohrenschildt was not made aware of the how the ECMS software system had been developed and relied solely on the documentation and source code that he had been given.

[710]Dr. Mohrenschildt sent his first draft report to Dr. Parnas on July 11, 1998. In this draft, he commented that he had reviewed certain documentation and CDs. Dr. Mohrenschildt did not keep a record or notes of the basis for the conclusions he stated in his draft report. He was unaware he had even received the source code for ECMS v.2 from GasTOPS:

Q.So, is it possible that you would have been looking at the

source code that was received from GasTOPS?

A.If we received -- I didn't say definitely we received, but if we received some, it could be.

Q.So you don't recall what it is you're looking at? You don't recall what version of ECMS you're looking at, and you don't recall which disk you were looking at on the morning of July 11; correct?

A.I was looking at ECMS, it was either -- It was 2 point something and 1.7 something. So if it was 2.01, 2.02 or any of these versions I don't recall.

Q.On this morning you recall looking at 1.7 source code?...

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A.I think so, yeah.

Q....And 2.0?...

A.Something, source code...

Q....Source code?

A.I think that's what I had.

Dr. Mohrenschildt’s failure to document the programs he was analysing and the steps he took to arrive at his conclusion detracts from the weight of his input into Dr. Parnas’ report.

[711]In his first draft report, Dr. Mohrenschildt stated: “It was simple for me this morning

to match parts and data structures”. When asked what it was he had compared, Dr. Mohrenschildt stated:

A.As I recall, the first thing I was looking at were what's called is assemblies or things like this.

Q.Uh'hmm. So what you were you matching?

A.Can't recall very specifically each and every detail I would be matching there.

Q.And you have no notes of what you were doing?

A.No handwritten -- No, no, I don't have any notes.

[712]With respect to the examples he was relying on in his report, Dr. Mohrenschildt stated that he had an electronic record of what he found, in which he included his comments. However, at the time of the trial, he no longer had a record of those examples. I find it hard to accept that Dr. Mohrenschildt would not have kept detailed notes of the examples he used in his comparison.

[713]In doing his analysis, Dr. Mohrenschildt did not employ any system of checks or verification of the procedures he was following. He described his work as follows:

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A.I explained it. I used -- I looked at the -- I mean there were no tools which measure this. What I do is I navigate through the source code and I look up particular portions of the source code.

Q.That's all you did?

A.That's what I did, yeah.

Q.You had no structured procedure to verify your results and you had no record of how you traced what you were doing, correct?

A.Doing this time I remember I recorded all the things I did, but I don't have this file anymore.

[714]Dr. Mohrenschildt could not recall which version of the ECMS source code he was using when he started his analysis on July 11, 1998. On cross-examination he agreed that the examples in support of his analysis that he had testified on and entered as Exhibits, were not taken from ECMS v.2.01 source code, but rather from v.2.0 of the ECMS source code. He conceded that the examples referred to in his direct examination were not the original examples that were used in his report; rather, he reconstructed them three weeks prior to this trial from memory.

Dr. Peter Chen, Ph.D. 1973

[715]The third expert retained by the defendants was Dr. Peter Chen, who prepared several reports after examining GasTOPS’ data models for ECMS, MAINSTAY and RCM analyst with the MxI’s data models for Maintenix, NALCOMIS, Configuration Management and ADS.

[716]In his first report dated November 22, 2001, Dr. Chen stated:

In the following I will try to answer two important questions as follows:

Are the data models of these two families exactly the same? The answer is: NO. The data model of the Product Y family of MxI is not an exact copy of the data model of Product X family of the GasTOPS.

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Are the data models of these two families very similar? The answer is: NO.

According to Dr. Chen, the answer to his first question did not need any explanation, and he did not provide any analysis in his report as to how he came to this conclusion. In order to answer the second question, he did an analysis of the data models for the software systems described above by taking the major categories found by Dr. Mendelzon and applying a mathematical scoring scheme to each.

[717]Dr. Chen in his report described the scoring scheme as follows:

In order to evaluate the similarity of these two models, I use a simple scoring scheme. I treat each major category the same weight, and there are four major categories as specified by Dr. Mendelzon [MEND99]. I assign a similarity score of 0.25 (i.e., ¼) for each major category and 0.125 for each subcategory if both data models are “very similar” in that category. In they are not very similar, we assign a score of “0.” Using this scoring method, if all the categories are very similar, the total score would be 1.00 (in other words, these two date models would have been 100% “very similar”). If all the categories were not very similar, the total score would be “0.” For category 3.4, I assign the score of “0” because the troubleshooting date model was not applicable to Maintenix and NALCOMIS. Based on this score scheme, the total similarity score for all categories is only 0.375. In other words, it is less than 50%. Even if we put some scores into category 3.4, the results won’t improve too much. Let us give Category 3.4 the score of 0.081 (=0.25 x 1/3) because only one data model of the three systems (NALCOMIS, MAINTENIX, and ADS) matches with the GasTOPS data model in this category. With this additional score of 0.081, the total score for all categories would have been 0.456, and it is still less than 0.5 (50%).

Please note that we are using the results of Dr. Mendelzon’s analysis [MEND99] as the input for our analysis. Even if his results are completely correct, we can still say that these two data models are NOT very similar.

[718]On June 7, 2002, Dr. Chen submitted a further report dated May 30, 2002. Throughout the month of July 2002, Dr. Chen forwarded various draft reports to the defendants’

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law firm, and on July 21, 2002, he submitted further detailed comparisons of the ECMS v.2.0, Maintenix and ADS data models. In his earlier reports (dated November 22, 2001, and May 30, 2002), Dr. Chen had been unable to locate an Architecture Domain, which Mendelzon referred to, in the MxI documentation. In his report dated May 30, 2002, Dr. Chen explained:

Q.But somehow between May 30th and your final report you found the architecture abstract?

A.Yes, that's correct.

Q.Now, Having read this, does it help you tell us the source that led you ---

A.No.

Q.Not being able to find this domain from, I guess, according to you, from September 2001 right through to the end of May 2002, but then within a very short period of time you suddenly find it?

A.If you look at the time sheet, you can see I spend a lot of time between end of May to July 22nd, so I spend a lot of time in reading the document again and again, and I discover the architecture domain.

Q.Tell me something, Dr. Chen, your paragraph 2 in Exhibit 2879 in May of 2002, how accurate are you in that paragraph?

A.The paragraph was accurate when I wrote it, but later on I discover I made errors and I discover where the architecture domain is in the document. So I change the table 1.

Q.So when you did your November 2001 report you couldn't find the architecture domain?

A.That's correct.

Q.Didn’t know about it?

A.Yes.

Q.You did know that Dr. Mendelzon had found it; you still

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repeat on May 30th that you haven't been able to find it?

A.Yes, that's correct.

Q.So you’re in error?

A.Yes. I made error some of the time.

Q.We see one error -- one rather drastic error...

A.I disag—

Q. ...because we don't even know by the end of May 2002, the number of domains?

A.Whether it's drastic or not, I think it's judgment. But I did make that errors, that's correct.

Q.And that error is then reflected in table 1 of Exhibit 2857 and table 1 of Exhibit 2079 [sic]?

A.Yes.

[719]Again, in comparing the reports of May 30 and July 21, 2002, regarding the change in the number of domains, Dr. Chen stated:

Q. ... the sentence reads “However it seems ECMS 2.0 does not have the views corresponding to the two additional domains of Maintenix baseline task plan and organization.”

In your final report you say “Does not have the views exactly corresponding to the last two domains of Maintenix abstract -- architecture abstracts and organizations.” I'm asking you why the change?

A.The change is, because later on I find out it is -- there is some correspondence between those two domains, so I classify them as similar, yes.

Q.So then in the first paragraph of Exhibit 2879, you were

wrong?

A.There are certain thing is based on judgment. So at that time, when I wrote first report, report on Exhibit 2879, based on my knowledge and my judgment was, the last -- the domain

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baseline task plan doesn't have equivalent domain in ECMS-2.0. And later on I find out there are some thing in the ECMS system can be treated as the detail domain.

Q.So the answer to my question was: “Yes, I was wrong in Exhibit 2879 with respect to that part of the paragraph.”?

A.Yes.

[720]Although understandable, Dr. Chen did not have a correct understanding of the various domains of ECMS. In his report dated May 30, 2002, Dr. Chen described the two additional domains that he found in Maintenix as being “baseline task plan and organization.” In his July 20, 2002, report, he described the two additional domains as baseline task plan and organization in his written text and refers to them in his table as architecture abstracts and organization. On comparing Table 1 in Dr. Chen’s report dated May 30, 2002 (Exhibit 2879), with Table 1 in his report dated July 21, 2002 (Exhibit 2857), he reports that “baseline task plans” is now within the maintenance plan domain of ECMS. In Table 1 of his July 20, 2002 report, it appears that Dr. Chen cannot find architecture abstracts and organization in ECMS:

Q.And those are the two domains -- are those the two

domains that you referred to in the sentence above, where you say, "The first seven of what we found are the same as Mendelzon's so we count down seven. We come down to the baseline task plans and maintenance plan. However I also found two additional domains: baseline task plans and organization, and these two domains are listed near the end of table 1."

So what are you saying there?

A.I think this was taken probably from the previous version of the report. When I changed the table, I did not change this particular -- added this to the other architecture abstracts and organizational domains.

So the number is it still correct, just the name of domain were not correct, was taken from previous version.

Q.So even though you found two additional domains, one of them being baseline task plans you found in the GasTOPS' product?

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A.No. What I'm saying, the two new domain. This paragraph should have read the two new domain I found, is architecture abstract and organization.

Q.So then we have – then that sentence is wrong, if there is a mistake in that sentence?

A.That's correct.

Q.But this is the final report, I take it?

A.Yes, I assume it is.

[721]During his cross-examination Dr. Chen was shown the definition given to “organization” in the Maintenix design specification. Dr. Chen took that definition and, for a similar domain in the ECMS documentation, was unable to find a domain in the ECMS documentation with the name “organization.” Dr. Chen in cross-examination was shown screen shots from ECMS v.2.0 as he had never seen the software system demonstrated and in particular was shown a screen shot entitled “ECMS Maintenance Manager”:

Q.So from this screen shot, keeping in mind the definition we

just read from the MXI Exhibit 1094, pages 113 and 114, you have organizations that fly aircraft; you have organizations that administer maintenance, being the repair; you have a repair shop engine test facility; you have inventory; correct?

A.Correct.

Q.Now, assuming this slide is true and accurate, would you agree with me that the ECMS database would include data on organizations or aircraft parts are being flown repaired, stored and shipped?

A.Yes.

Q.And you did not find any of that in the source document that you looked at; correct?

A.I didn’t find a domain with the name "organization".

After being taken through the ECMS v.2 database design documents and shown the code tables, Dr. Chen agreed to revise Table 1 comparison of the domains by adding the word “resource” to

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the table with respect to “organization” in ECMS v.2.

[722]Dr. Chen’s failure to completely understand or appreciate the organization of the databases of ECMS v.2 and Maintenix results from the limited time that he had to understand these complex database designs. This failure casts great doubt upon the validity of his conclusions. Dr. Chen did not dispute Dr. Mendelzon’s qualitative findings; he simply reconstructed Dr. Mendelzon’s Table 2.1 by adding two domains in Maintenix which he could not find in ECMS and then did a mathematical calculation to arrive at a similarity factor of 7/9, which would read 8/9 with this correction.

[723]On reading Dr. Chen’s reports (May 30, 2002, and July 20, 2002) it appears that he simply followed Dr. Mendelzon’s report, followed by a reconstruction of the Entity Relationship (“ER”) diagrams. This methodology was more of a critique of Dr. Mendelzon’s analysis and was not an independent analysis of the two data models. It appears to me that Dr. Chen was attempting to find ways in which to mathematically decrease the degree of similarity rather than to carry out a qualitative analysis. Dr. Chen’s second method of analysis was an examination of the similarities and differences between the entity relationship diagrams of the data model in the major domain. Dr. Chen used the diagrams found in Dr. Mendelzon’s report as a starting point and then prepared a “more complete” entity relationship diagram for each domain. Dr. Chen’s analysis would have been more persuasive had he carried out an independent analysis.

[724]After Dr. Chen prepared his expanded entity relationship diagrams, he then applied a “similarity formula,” which he explained to be extremely difficult to apply the formula and prone to error. As Dr. Chen stated in his July 20, 2002, report, he allowed a 50% variance for the difference of opinion between experts. In my view, the fact that Dr. Chen had to allow a 50% variance for “differences of opinion between experts” demonstrates that his approach to comparing the databases was based on a subjective interpretation, which in many cases was shown to be wrong and as such lacks any semblance of veracity. It is evident that the formula and results thereof can be manipulated by the subjective interpretation of the data used in the calculations.

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[725]I am also concerned that the formula methodology employed by Dr. Chen was not a generally accepted technique for a quantative estimation of similarity in data models:

THE COURT: Dr. Chen, I just have a couple of questions so I can understand better the evidence.

You referred us, I think for the first time on day 288, which would have been last week, to what I call a formula, when you were comparing. Now is that formula that you devised? I take it that you're the author of that formula?

A.No.

THE COURT: Oh, is someone else?

A.It's a formula used, I would say, one of the formula being used by -- in the academic world, okay. It’s not developed [ph] by

me… Put it this way, this kind of formula is usually initially used in precedent [ph] in the mind, okay, in the mind, and you don't do expressive calculation. You just look at that and see, you know, whether they're similar or not and do some mental counting quickly, okay. Then —

THE COURT: So you would have done those mental calculations?

A.Well, the simple ones. Like, Meldelzon’s diagram very similar. So very quickly you can do some – you don’t get exact number, but mentally you can see the percentage how much similar, just a [rough] idea.

But when you get to a complicated diagram, like the one I did, too many entities mentally cannot do that kind of work.

[MR. SHIELDS:] Dr. Chen, His Honour asked you a question about the formula -- sorry, formula. And did I understand your answer that that formula is some sort of generally accepted technique to do a similarity test of data models?

A.It is one of the general accepted —

Q.If so, can you tell me where I would find it?

A.You can -- you may not find exactly same one. I haven't

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done the search. But there have been several comparison of data models.

Q.My question simply was: if that formula is some sort of standard to compare the similarity of data models, where do I find standard set out? Because to date I haven't been able to find it.

A.First, this is a formula used -- one of the acceptable formula to compare whether two things are similar or not, okay. It's not just limited data model.

Q.When you bring it to data models, if you could just tell me the reference where I can find it?

A.The data model, I know there are several comparisons, I don't know if it’s anyone using the specific one or not.

Q.You agree with me that this formula is not usually used to compare data models?

A.I disagree.

Q.Can you just tell me the text where I would find it as being one of the acceptable measurements, that's all I need?

A.Okay. Right now I don't have that with me, okay, but that's -- First, they are not -- let me explain to the court in answer to your question too.

There are very few formally stated comparison of data models, okay. And I myself was actually involved in one formal study of comparison besides this one.

But to answer your question, there are very few published result of comparison of data model. So to answer your question, it is not but -- may not have published evidence about this formula being used. However it is commonly used in the environment of comparing two things whether they're similar or not.

[726]As a result of these various issues, I place very little weight on Dr. Chen’s conclusion that these data models were dissimilar.

[727]In the end I find the analysis and opinion of Dr. Mendelzon to be much more reliable than the methods employed and analysis of the other experts in this case. Accordingly I accept

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the opinion of Dr. Mendelzon as set out in the Executive Summary of his report:

I have compared the data models of GasTOPS systems ECMS V2.0, Mainstay, and RCM Analyst with those of MxI systems NALCOMIS, Maintenix and ADS. In both cases, each company’s models are variations of each other; for the purposes of this report I ‘will largely ignore the differences within each company’s family of models and concentrate on comparing one family to the other.

My first conclusion is that the GasTOPS and MxI families exhibit very strong similarity. This is apparent in the basic philosophy of the data models, in their large scale structure, and in many specific details of the relational data structures used to implement them.

My second conclusion is that these similarities go far beyond what could be expected from two independent designs that address the same domain.

[728]As a result of accepting the opinion of Dr. Mendelzon I find as a fact that the defendants misused the confidential business information/trade secret i.e. the ECMS v.2 design information which was the property of GasTOPS which they had access to while employed at GasTOPS to design and develop Maintenix.

Advanced Diagnostic System (Also Known as Engine Diagnostic System)

[729]Further, the troubleshooting functionality in GasTOPS’ products, which consisted of the fault tracking and diagnostic system, was not part of the Maintenix NALCOMIS systems. The troubleshooting functionality was incorporated in the ADS designed and developed by MxI for Volvo. Brouse, when employed at GasTOPS, had access to GasTOPS’ trade secrets/confidential business information with respect to the Volvo opportunity. Chris Cass and Egan also had access and knowledge of the FLTS software system. Egan developed the rules and knowledge-base used in FLTS and co-authored, with Chris Cass, the GasTOPS’ confidential document entitled “SLPS Knowledge-base Validation” (exhibit 2375C). Brouse, Forsyth, Egan and Chris Cass all contributed to the authorship of the July, September and October 1997 proposals by MxI to Volvo Aero Corporation for the “development of an engine diagnostic system” (“EDS”). The July 1997 proposal from MxI to Volvo was entitled “Proposal for the

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Development of an Engine Diagnostic System (EDS)”. (Note that the second page of MxI’s proposal stated: “All information contained within this document is submitted in confidentiality to Volvo Aerospace Corporation”. Clearly, the defendants considered it to be confidential business information.)

[730]MxI’s corporate qualifications were set out in the proposal to Volvo (Exhibit 1507):

6. Corporate Qualifications

MxI has considerable experience in the development of maintenance information systems. Furthermore, MxI has mechanical engineering expertise in the domain of gas turbine diagnostics and prognostics. The following sections list a few representative projects.

6.1 U.S. Navy

MxI is currently under contract with the US Navy to design and develop an equipment maintenance management module for the US Navy’s Naval Aviation Logistics Command Management Information System (NALCOMIS). NALCOMIS presently manages the maintenance scheduling, life tracking and maintenance tracking for all of the aircraft utilized by the Navy and is currently being upgraded to a modern database and Windows architecture. MxI was selected to design and develop the core functionality of the maintenance information system including the serialized configuration tracking, life monitoring, Technical Directive tracking and maintenance scheduling. Furthermore, MxI shall design and develop the data replication capability of the system to provide fleet data to the Integrated Weapon Systems Database to enable ‘total asset visibility’ and shall provide logistic support tools to facilitate the analysis of the data.

6.2 Canadian Air Force

The staff at MxI have worked extensively with the Canadian Air Force (CAF) for over ten years. In that time period, many successful software development activities were performed.

6.2.1 First Line Troubleshooting System (FLTS)

In 1990, the CAF commissioned the development of the First Line

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Troubleshooting System (FLTS) to enable their squadron-based field technicians to more rapidly troubleshoot engine faults. The project involved the design and development of an intuitive system that presents and analyzes in-flight engine data such that engine fault modes can be readily diagnosed. The system is hosted on a notebook PC and uses a GUI interface and expert system inference engine designed to lead the technician through a series of yes/no questions while simultaneously presenting x-y plots of relevant engine data.

6.2.2 Engine Condition Monitoring System (ECMS)

In 1992 the personnel of MxI undertook the development of the Engine Condition Monitoring System (ECMS) on behalf of the CF- 18 engine maintenance manager. The project involved the development of a sophisticated serialized component tracking system to manage the configuration and low cycle fatigue damage accumulation on 300 CF-18 engines (comprising 30,000 removable items located at four geographically remote locations) and that could be easily operated by maintenance technicians located in the field.

6.2.3 Portable CF-18 Ground Station

In 1994 the CAF elected to extend the functionality of the FLTS system to act as the CF-18 Portable Ground Station and to replace their aging inventory of VAX-based computer systems. The staff of MxI were tasked to modify the FLTS system to download all CF-18 in-flight data, plot, analyze and report on all in-flight data, and integrate the new system seamlessly into the ECMS system.

6.3 Dofasco Steel

MxI is presently under contract with Dofasco, Canada’s largest integrated steel mill and North America’s most profitable steel maker to support their Computerized Maintenance Management System (CMMS).

6.3.1Condition-Based Maintenance & Data Analysis System (CBM-DAS)

In the fall of 1993, as sub-contractors to SHL, the personnel of MxI developed a comprehensive subsystem for a client/server based maintenance management system. This subsystem included the definition of assets targeted for maintenance, the definition of

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tasks required to maintain the assets, the justification of maintenance tasks based on Reliability-Centred Maintenance analysis and the identification of characteristics or fault patterns that indicate deteriorated or failed equipment. In addition, the CBM-DAS provided extensive functionality for entering and analyzing characteristic equipment data for the purpose of proactively scheduling corrective maintenance tasks before the occurrence of actual equipment failures (this is the foundation for Condition-Based Maintenance).

In 1995, again as sub-contractors to SHL, the personnel of MxI fully integrated the CBM-DAS into Dofasco’s enterprise-wide Computerized Maintenance Management System. The CMMS at Dofasco, migrated as a legacy system from a mainframe to client/server by SHL, is the World’s largest single Oracle instance that simultaneously serves up to 3,000 Dofasco maintenance employees. The CMMS provides extensive corporate functionality for maintenance planning and scheduling, payroll, inventory control and purchasing.

6.4 Rolls Royce

In the spring of 1997, under subcontract to MDS Aero Support Corp., MxI was contracted to design a sensor suite management system for Rolls Royce engine test facilities to assist in the maintenance life cycle of these complex aero-engine components.

6.5 Mechanical Engineering Experience

The staff of MxI Technologies has considerable experience in the field of computer-based modeling of gas turbine performance. The staff of MxI has designed and developed T56, J85, RB211 and F404 models for customers such as the Canadian Air Force (CAF), NOVA Gas Transmission Ltd. and the National Research Council of Canada (NRC). In particular, the F404 model was a high- precision dynamic model capable of simulating faulted engine performance for diagnostics and performance trending research. This model was used extensively in the knowledge base development for both the FLTS and the prognostic module of the ECMS.

Furthermore, MxI Technologies has experience in the integration of machinery models with diagnostic software systems. MxI has developed steam turbine and compressor models for Dofasco and

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Eastman Chemical and integrated them with a condition based maintenance software program (CBM-DAS). The models are used for on-line equipment performance assessment and fault diagnostics.

[731]Comparing the GasTOPS documents: “First Line Engine Snag Handbook” prepared by Jeff Cass and Forsyth; “F404 Diagnostic Procedure CDRL.4 Automatic Event Interpretation Summary Report” prepared by Chris Cass, Mike Egan and D.L. King and reviewed by Forsyth; “Advanced 404 Health Monitoring: Synopsis of F404 EHN II Developments” prepared by D.L. Kind and Chris Cass and reviewed by Forsyth; and “First Line Troubleshooting System User’s Manual Version 5.0” prepared for B.F.Goodrich/NAS (Naval Air Station) Lemoore Trial during August 1996. Compare them with MxI’s proposals to Volvo: “Proposal for the Development of an Engine Diagnostic System (EDS)” (Exhibit 1507); Volvo EDS Requirements October 16, 1997 (Exhibit 2390); and the MxI proposal to Volvo for an ADS. From this comparison, I am driven to the conclusion that the similarities between the software programs is far more than coincidental and that the MxI proposal for the ADS is based on the GasTOPS’ software program, which was confidential business information/trade secret belonging to GasTOPS which Egan, Chris Cass, Brouse and Forsyth had access while employed at GasTOPS.

[732]In his examination in-chief, Forsyth was shown the MxI proposal sent to Volvo in July 1997, section 3 entitled “Diagnostic Methodology” (Exhibit 1507). Forsyth said that he discussed the Failure Mode Effects and Critical Analysis (“FMECA”) and MSGS methodology with Egan and gave the following explanation:

I had discussions with Mike Egan, who was primarily responsible for the technical approach portion of the proposal. And we had decided that the methodology we were going to use to store these trouble shooting steps or trouble shooting rules was going to be based on a standard engineering methodology called reliability centred maintenance, or MSG3. In particular, we were going to use a technique called failure modes and criticality analysis or FMECA as the methodology of storing the faults, failures and symptoms that would be displayed to the technicians. So this would be the storage mechanism for storing the Volvo- developed trouble shooting steps or rules.

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The maintenance steering group in the third version of that had developed this methodology called RCM. So it was -- MSG3 in particular was an aviation-derived version of reliability centred maintenance. It had been expanded out into industry, other than aviation, and was called RCM. But the term is almost interchangeable, there's slight differences but RCM and MSG3; one's the group that created it, the other one is the methodology.

The FMECA is a part of that, which is really the input side. What RCM does is define what maintenance you should do. But part of the analysis is to do the failure modes and effects criticality analysis, so it's the input side to the RCM process. As I said, it's a standard engineering methodology.

This is the same diagnostic methodology that was applied by GasTOPS’ technical staff in the design and development of its software systems. In a GasTOPS report prepared by Tobin, there is an explanation that the FMECA methodology comes from a US military standard, MIL-STD- 1629A, which defines this methodology. Egan was aware that this methodology had been used at GasTOPS, but he had very little if any knowledge of the FMECA methodology. Egan stated in cross-examination:

Q.Do you know -- and I mean this with the greatest of respect -- do you actually know what a FMECA analysis is and how it's done?

A.I’ve never done a full one, I'll admit that, yes. I have done a portion of or at least an off sheet of the FMECA in order to assist the troubleshooting.

Q.You'll agree with me that you have never done a pure FMECA analysis?

A.Typically pure FMECA analysis are used by the manufacturers and engineers of the equipment. I've never worked as an engineer.

Q.But you say that you've done something, either a derivative of or similar to or flowing from or using some of the concepts from

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FMECA; is that correct?

A.Yes.

Q.And when did you do that?

A.Certainly ---

Q.By July 23, ‘97?

A.We had -- at GasTOPS we had used some of the elements of this in developing troubleshooting rules. And this type of information typically is listed in, again, these GE manuals, any kind of OEM, this is output is used by a lot of the vendors -- or sorry, the owners of the engines.

Q.Mr. Egan, my question was personal to you?

A.I had used the output from GE of FMECA analysis to help with troubleshooting, yes.

Q.That's that manual you referred to?

A.That’s one source, yes, probably the main source.

Q.I take it then that you hadn't done any at MxI by this time?

A.No, I had not.

Q.And when you were using this concept from FMECA at GasTOPS, what work were you doing and which area?

A.I was using some of the outputs of this class of analysis to help develop troubleshooting rules for the F404 engine.

Q.So you were using the GE work?

A.In many cases, yes.

Q.So that wouldn't be using FMECA methodology, you were using the results that someone else had done FMECA analysis; correct?

A.That's fair, yes.

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Q.So if you were to talk pure methodology theory and concepts you wouldn’t know the relationship between FMECA and RCM at that level?

A.At that specific level, no, I wouldn't.

Q.Now, did you ever talk to Jeff Cass or Chris Cass about FMECA, around this time frame, which we saw was July 23?

A.I don't think I would have. Potentially Chris, since I know he had some experience previously, but I don't remember doing it, no.

Q.I would like to show you Exhibit 1761 at page 31, this has been identified previously as the RCM analyst marketing plan, and it's dated February 1996. I'm going to take you to page 31.

This is facts sheet on RCM Analyst and I already have your testimony on RCM Analyst, you can read the whole page but I'd like to ask you questions with respect to what’s under the paragraph on the right-hand side at the top, “additional features”. Just the first bullet, so let me know when you're ready?

A.Okay.

Q.Now my question to you relates to what we see as the standard, which is identified as MIL-standard STD-1629A. My question to you quite simply is: have you ever read that standard?

A.Not to my knowledge.

Q.Have you ever seen it?

A.Not that I recall.

[733]As the designer of the ADS system, Egan should have begun his work by reviewing the background issue such as MSG-3 and FMECA methodology. It appears from Egan’s evidence that he did not. He never read the documents relating to such methodology and looked at the MSG-3 and FMECA methodologies only to “come up with a terminology for the software”. According to Egan, he did not review specific information concerning the RM12 engine, such as the measurements or symptoms available, the design of the machine itself or any typical cause and effect relationships that were known about the engine, its maintenance and/or

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reliability history. Egan stated that he received no information from Volvo on the maintenance or reliability history of the RM12 engine. On February 17, 1998, Egan sent an e-mail to Volvo requesting failure modes and defects data. He did not receive the information from Volvo until after his design development and data modelling was completed.

[734]During the cross-examination of Mr. Egan, counsel reviewed with him his knowledge and experience in data modelling, software design and RCM analysis methodology in the context of his performance reviews for 1994-1995, and, in response to these questions, Egan stated:

A.There would have been no software development work there, with the exception of maybe some of the F404 dynamic model.

BY MR. SHIELDS:

Q.Certainly no data modeling?

A.No.

Q.And the software systems and/or products of GasTOPS that you would have been working on here were the same ones you had described previously; correct?

A.That's correct.

Q.And anything new?

A.I don't know what the progress of the SLPS system would have been at that point, but I was building the rules to go underneath that as well.

Q.Paragraph 1, we see the summary of the results that you achieved for that year. And again, it's the same SLPS and FLTS software product in the EHR reports et cetera?

A.And some other engineering supports, yes.

Q.None of which would include data modeling or software development; correct?

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A.That's correct.

Q.Can you just tell us though, in paragraph 2, what the first bullet refers to, prepare draft SLPS CBA?

A.That refers to a cost benefit analysis for the prognostic system.

Q.What was entailed in -- if you can recall -- in that work?

A.I don't really recall much of doing that, actually.

Q.If we look at paragraph 3, the second bullet, good technical expertise, I think that must be “with” F404 engineering applications?

A.With respect to, yes.

Q.What’s being reported there?

A.Technical expertise again refers, I believe, to the knowledge base and the rules development for those tools.

Q.All right. If we go to number 4, the areas of performance which would be improved, the first bullet says “develop better understanding F404 engineering application system design (data model, et cetera); do you see where I'm reading?

A.I do.

Q.And did you do that in the subsequent time frame?

A.Certainly there was no data modeling. At some point during all this I did need to insert some of the rules into the system, so that’s maybe what it’s referring to.

[735]In the continuation of his cross-examination, Egan addressed his role in starting to design the system for Volvo in the spring of 1997:

Q.Now, what design process did you follow?

A.I wouldn't put a name to it.

Q.Well, as the designer, did you review the background to the

problem that you were trying to solve?

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A.Well, certainly during the formal development, which happened after ?? contract, we did have a more formal process we stepped through in terms of developing the system; is that what you're referring to?

Q.Let me take you specifically to February of ‘98, then?

A.Okay.

Q.You've been awarded the contract?

A.Okay.

Q.Can you tell us then what design procedure or process you used to do your development work for this Volvo contract?

A.I'm not sure I completely follow the question. We certainly followed a process to nail down the requirements, get agreement on what was going to be developed to look at a functional specification to develop a software conceptual design as well as a data model conceptual design. The actual name for the process, I don't know that we had one.

Q.I wasn’t asking you for the name, I want to know what you

did?

A.That is what we did.

Q.All right. I take it then that you reviewed the background to the problem that you were trying to solve, as a designer?

A.The design was mainly done by me and the background was fairly well-known by that point because I had been working with it for, well, for many years in that area but then certainly with Volvo over the last few months.

So I guess yes, if I would have refreshed myself on it and begin to think about it.

Q.Did you, for example, review and look into the MSG3 and FMECA methodologies?

A.Then? Potentially.

Q.Pardon?

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A.Potentially we would have.

Q.I'm talking about you, as the designer?

A.I do remember, for example, looking at it to come up with terminology for the software.

Q.Looking at what, sir?

A.FMECA, MSG3, different processes to look at different terminologies.

Q.How did you look at the FMECA process?

A.I don't recall whether it was -- I think it was industry literature, but I don't recall exactly.

Q.You haven't produced any documentation relating to this industry process, either you or MxI?

A.You can look it up on the Internet very easily.

Q.Pardon?

A.You can look it up on the Internet very easily.

Q.I showed you a standard yesterday, did you look at that standard, which is the FMECA standard?

A.Not that I recall.

Q.What documentation did you look at with respect to MSG3?

A.Again, I don't recall specifically. I believe we did have the document in-house, so we may have referred to it.

Q.All right. Could you produce that document, because up to this time it hasn't been produced?

A.I can look to see, yes.

Q.If you could advise your counsel of your results, if you find it, if you could produce it?

A.Okay.

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Q.Now, can you tell us what specific information you reviewed about the RM12 engine, which I took is the subject of your development process?

A.Well actually, no, it wasn't. The development process was based on any type of gas turbine, so there wasn’t a certain gas turbine in mind when doing it.

Q.So you didn’t have regard to the peculiarities of an RM12

model?

A.We may have for interest sake, but it wouldn’t reflect in the software, no.

Q.Mr. Egan, I want personally you, what you're doing, because you’re the designer. So I take it no is the answer, you didn't?

A.Well, I'm pretty sure I did look at specifications for the RM12, however it would not have impacted the software design, no.

Q.Did you get or receive from Volvo the measurements or symptoms which were available on that engine as of February ‘98?

A.I don't believe we got a set until much later on, actually.

Q.Did you get the design of the RM12?

A.I can’t recall what we received in terms of the RM12, no.

Q.You haven't produced any documents showing that you received the design of the RM12, so I’m assuming that you didn’t?

A.Well, we certainly would have had some information on the RM12, because there was some work we were doing on the maintenance management side sometime thereafter, I'm not sure the exact date of that.

Q.I’m talking about February of ‘98, before you started your design work?

A.I don't recall what we had and I wouldn't have required it anyways.

Q.All right. But you do know that, I’m assuming that you

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know that to do a -- to use the FMECA methodology they based on the functional design of the machine in question, that’s correct, right?

A.Yes, and I'm expecting that Volvo knew that and were providing the rules based on that. It had nothing to do with what we were doing in terms of the software.

Q.So that was of no concern to you?

A.We had to reflect the rules so they could be populated in the database, but no, the rules themselves were not of concern to me.

Q.Would you obtain the maintenance or reliability history of the RM12 prior to starting your design work?

A.If we did, it wasn't in support of design work, no.

Q.So the answer to my question, between you and I is no, you didn't need that to do your work?

A.That's correct.

Q.So can you tell us of a particular modeling method that you recall reviewing?

A.No, I can't.

Q.The second one, what does that refer to, RMV?

A.That is RM8 and RM12 designs.

Q.What’s that?

A.Those are the two engine types that Volvo manufacturers. I’m sure I would have done some research before going over so I could sound intelligent about them.

Q.What did you review?

A.At this point I would have looked up on the Internet to get some specifications for what it is.

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Q.You called up on the Internet the specifications for both of those engines?

A.Again, I can't recall doing it, but that is something I would likely do, yes.

Q.But you’re not sure whether you did or not?

A.No.

Q.Because your log notes from here on don't indicate any review of the RM8 or RM12 designs?

A.At this point all I would have been looking for is what aircraft they fit on, what derivatives they are of, some high level stuff so I would at least know what they’re talking about when we’re in discussions.

Q.But you didn't make any not of it in your logbook from there to your visit?

A.Okay.

Q.And then you're going to review the RCM and FMECA; and what is that?

A.That?

Q.Considering what you told me yesterday?

A.That again is working through my knowledge, making sure it's current in my knowledge so that I can go over and speak to them on some of these topics.

Q.What did you review with respect to RCM?

A.Not necessarily anything on paper, I could have just went through and remembered what I knew about them.

Q.So this would be whatever is in your head, so to speak, as opposed to looking at a document?

A.Or, again, looking up on the Internet, I don't remember what detail I would have went into at that time.

Q.The next one is the prelim Volvo proposal, and that, I take

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it, is the document you showed us?

A.At this point that was probably the previous one that was sent, yes.

Q.Further on in your notes, and the date that you had said in- chief this would be around September 30, in-chief you said that here you were refreshing your memory on FMECA?

A.That looks like what I'm doing, yes.

Q.How does that relate to FMECA?

A.It relates to a small portion of FMECA, the part that’s used in diagnosing something.

Q.You've told us what experience you have had in doing the FMECA analysis up to this date; correct?

A.Yes, that I only use a portion of the analysis results as part of the troubleshooting exercise.

Q.And that's all this PD document you had access to at GasTOPS?

A.Well that is one document used for the F404, yes.

Q.All right. Can you tell us what is the source that you got this information from on this page?

A.This looks to me to be, again from my memory, just writing it out so it's clear for myself.

Q.This again is from your mind?

A.I do a lot of notations like this in my books, yes.

Q.If I can take you to page 120, you have a list, again, of things to do for Volvo?

A.I do.

Q.And the date is still September 29, ‘97, so there has been no new dates in your logbook up to this date?

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A.That's true, okay.

Q.Now, as of this date, we had heard testimony from other witnesses that the data model -- data models were developed using a tool called an S Designer?

A.Correct.

Q.Up to this date, had you had any experience using the S Designer?

A.Not really, no.

Q.And up to this date, which is September of ‘97, did MxI have a group of individuals who were doing the data modeling using S Designer?

A.Well, keeping in mind data modeling can be done on paper as well, S Designer ---

Q.I’m only talking about S Designer usage there?

A.There were people who were creating the actual physical data models in S Designer, yes.

Q.Who were they?

A. At that point it would have been Jeff Cass, Rob Vandenberg, Bill Smith. There may have been a few other people who knew how to use it, I never really did.

Q.This is your things to do in the future list. Paragraph 2, you say “review engine modeling techniques”; do you see where I'm reading?

A.I do.

Q.What is that that you're going to review, is that the same topic we saw previously?

A.I believe it is.

Q.You haven't quite done it yet?

A.Apparently now, or I want to do it again, yes.

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Q.And I take it it's the same -- rather than ask you the question -- it’s the same description you gave on the previous pages?

A.Yes, up to this point I’ve taken lots of notes about that kind of stuff, so it’s going back and reviewing the notes.

Q.No. 3 is you're now going to review the F404/RM12 theory?

A.Correct.

Q.What are you referring to there?

A.I'm going to attempt to look at the details around theory and control strategy for the RM12, in particular, so that I can speak intelligently when I go over to meet with Volvo.

Q.Did you do that?

A.I'm sure I tried.

Q.How would you do it?

A.I know that I didn't have any documentation on either of those engines, so I would have had to do it by looking for some, likely on the Internet at that point.

Q.Okay. No. 4 is review “blue book"?

A.Correct.

Q.What’s that?

A.I believe what that is a large soft covered textbook I had from school that goes through all the gas turbine theory and modeling and a number of different papers.

...

Q.You didn't make any note in your logbook between this period of time and your visit to Volvo of doing that; is it possible you didn't do it?

A.It's likely I would have read through it, I don't know if I would have necessarily taken notes.

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Q.The next one, 5, is “review Volvo material”. What’s that in reference to?

A.This is reviewing anything we've received from Volvo to that point, or prepared for Volvo up to that point.

Q.I understand the only thing you reviewed from Volvo is that one page spec by this time?

A.There is also notes made by Brad and Doug for meetings, so there was a few minor things.

Q.That's all that you’re reviewing, proposal must refer to the draft documents we've seen?

A.Well, at this point we would have already sent a proposal as well to them, so likely it refers to that.

Q.All right. Now, when did you do these reviews?

A.I could have done some of them that day, I could have done some of them on the plane over, I can't recall exactly.

Q.Did you make any notes of these reviews?

A.I don't recall. Some of these I wouldn't have needed to take notes, it was really just to read through something. Other ones I may have.

Q.I'll take you over to pages 129, from 129 to 137 are your notes on the Swedish, your trip to Sweden. We see here it starts on October 7, ‘97?

A.Correct.

Q.Now, are these the only records that you kept of information you received when you were in Sweden?

A.These are the only records I know of, yes.

Q.And I take it you got no further documentation?

A.Not that I've seen.

Q.Now if I can just take you to Exhibits 2394 and 2395. And Your Honour I think here we have to go to hard copies, although

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I will check my exhibit list. This hasn’t been entered into Summation yet. 2394 is an e-mail from Mr. Egan to Volvo in February of ‘98; and 2395 is an e-mail to Volvo, February 18, 1998, with the attachment?

Q.Do you have those?

A.I do, yes.

Q.You have yours in a book?

A.I do, yes.

Q.In the second one, Mr. Egan, on the attachment 2395, you're requesting failure modes and effect data from Volvo?

A.No, actually this is them requesting of me what data they need to start collecting and if there is any formats for it and I'm responding to that.

Q.You're sending them a spreadsheet for Volvo to fill out?

A.I’ve created a simple spreadsheet that they can fill out themselves, yes.

Q.Did you get the data back?

A.I seem to recall us getting some data back much later on,

yes.

Q.Do you have any record of it?

A.I can look for it.

Q.But it hasn't been produced to date; correct?

A.Not that I know of, no.

Q.Do you have any idea of the approximate date that you would have received it? We are in February of ‘98?

A.I don't.

Q.We are talking March, April, May June?

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A.I remember seeing it when they were using it to fill the data into the system, which would have been 6 or 8 months later, I guess. I can’t recall if they sent it to us or not. I can check for you.

Q.So I take it that if you had received it, it would have been long after your data modeling and development exercise; correct?

A.Certainly, yes.

Q.If I can take you to Exhibit 2392, and this would be your logbook for February 4, ‘98 to April 10, ‘98. Firstly, I'll take you to page 55. You'll see at the top of the page this is February 24, ‘98?

A.Yes.

Q.This is your meeting with Volvo?

A.Correct.

Q.I take it, it was in Ottawa?

A.I can't recall for sure. There certainly were meetings in Ottawa.

Q.This is February 24. Now, at this meeting did you receive any additional information to be used in your design work?

A.Maybe I could see some notes around this? I can't recall the specific reason for the meeting.

Q.That’s the next page, which would be 56?

A.Okay, is there any more after that?

Q.57?

A.That's a different topic, maybe back a couple of pages for me if you would?

Q.That’s the meeting?

A.Is there any notes before it to say what the meeting is for?

Q.Not that I could understand?

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A.Yes, you’re right.

This would have been early on in the development.

Q.February 24, ‘98, I was just asking you if you've got any additional information from Volvo to use in your design?

A.I can't recall. We would have discussed the design, I can't recall if there was any information provided.

Q.Let's go down to paragraph 3, numbered 3 -- item no. 3 at the bottom of the page. What’s that in reference to? What’s the kick-off meeting milestone no.1 has been achieved, signed by Jan- Ove?

A.There was a series of milestones as part of the contract. And this is referring to the number 1 milestone having been achieved at that point.

Q.What was that?

A.I don't recall what the milestones were, they would be in the contract.

Q.We know there was certainly no software development or database development; correct?

A.The contract itself does list the milestones and explains what they are, I don't recall what they were.

Q.So, put it to you another way. As of this date there hadn’t been any data modeling work done or software development work done; correct?

A.The final reports hadn't been delivered, that's certainly true. I don't know what progress we would have made in the month leading up or the two months leading up to this.

Q.I understood your evidence to be that you designed the system?

A.Uh'hmm.

Q.By February 24 had you designed the system?

A.I can't recall off the top of my head. I would have to go

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through my note books and see where we were at that point.

As you now, there was lots the design notes all the way through this book. I don't know at what stage I was right here.

Q.Well, as of February 24, ‘98 had you done any data modeling design work?

A.There has been some diagrams produced by this point of data models, yes.

Q.You had done data modeling for this project by February 24?

A.I think the first data model was drawn on a page around the meeting in Sweden.

Q.That's your data modeling work?

A.Well, that was one example of it.

Q.Because there is nothing else after that diagram, up to this

date?

A.That may be the extent of it. I know what I also was doing around this period, was looking at the Maintenix data model to see which portions of it could be used for pieces of this solution as well.

Q.Do I understand your evidence correctly, in-chief, that you were not knowledgeable of the conceptual data modeling side, but on the physical data modeling side; is that fair?

A.That's fair, that I really don't know what conceptual data models are, yes.

Q.The reason I draw your attention to point no. 3, kick-off meeting, I usually understood that to be the start, kick-off, the beginning?

A.I think this is the start of the formal project, yes.

Q.I take it from your review of these two pages of your notes of this meeting that you didn't receive any additional information from Volvo at this stage?

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A.Again, I can't recall what I would have received from them at this point.

Q.If you did, I can tell you it hasn't been produced, so it doesn't exist?

A.Certainly we would have discussed the project, so maybe there was some verbal stuff provided. Again, I don’t recall.

Q.If I can take you over to page 86, March 8, ‘98. Again, it's under “things to do”, which I'm assuming are things in the future?

A.Yes.

Q.And if we look under Wednesday, this was something you were going to do and that was to talk to Rob re: data model?

A.Correct.

Q.And firstly, why would you talk to Rob, who I'm assuming is Rob Vandenberg?

A.It is, yes.

Q.Why would you talk to him?

A.He was the overseer of the Maintenix data model, which I was going to make use of some of it.

Q.And then there is a line saying “installed data modeling software and trialed”?

A.Correct.

Q.What is referred to there?

A.That's a reference to installing, I'm assuming what I’m referring to is this S Designer and trying it out.

Q.But you don’t know, right? Is that what you’re telling me, that you're assuming?

A.Well, I believe that's the only software we were using for data modeling at the time.

Q.It must be S Designer that they now put on your computer,

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if I read that correctly, or what was done?

A.That's what I’m saying as a “to-do”, I don't believe we did do that. Certainly I never became proficient in using it. The decision was made that Rob would maintain the physical data model control and I would design on paper and provide him the input to do that.

Q.Okay, let me understand this: You're not going to do a conceptual data model for this project, you're going to do hand sketches of a physical data model that you then hand to Mr. Vandenberg, who inputs it through S Designer; is that right?

A.I will do hand sketches of, or draw on pieces of the Maintenix data model, of probably something in between the conceptual and the physical. I certainly had no formal training in data modeling.

Q.Well, it says “sit with ?? and do some data modeling”. Did you actually do that?

A.I believe that's in reference to trialing the S Designer to see if I should start using it. I believe I did, but the decision was not for me to start using it.

Q.You failed the test?

A.I failed the test.

Q.So up to this date you had never done data modeling before on S Designer and you don’t do it; correct?

A.In S Designer, that's correct.

Q.If I understand your evidence, you were going to do what I'll refer to as hand sketches?

A.Yes.

Q.Or hand diagrams?

A.Yes, or write up in some form these things, yes.

Q.You would then hand them to Rob Vandenberg, who would interpret your work and he would then put your work into the Maintenix data model?

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A.That's correct, keeping in mind that most of the data model is simply a slight variation on what was already in Maintenix. And then there is a few areas that were expanded to reflect the troubleshooting and other plot characteristics.

Q.So when you say you were the designer of this system, that's what you meant, what we just described?

A.Which makes up the system, yes.

Q.As long as I know the process.

If I can take you now over to page 105, at the top we see it's March 16. And under paragraph 3, correct me if I’m wrong, it will help all of us more senior people here ---

MR. STEPHEN APPOTIVE: I was able to read it.

MR. SHIELDS: I was just trying to be helpful.

Q.It says data model with an arrow to conceptual -- arrow, as in bow and arrow, “talk to Rob re: best way to do this”. Then underneath you have a line for physical and a line for data model design DOC. Do you see where I've attempted to read?

A.I do, yes.

Q.Now what are you talking about here with Rob Vandenberg? Or first of all, did you do it, because it's something in the future?

A.I certainly had a number of meetings with Rob to discuss the data model.

Q.I'm just wondering with respect to this on March 16, if you in the future did do this?

A.I can't recall this exact discussion.

Q.And what was it -- what was your intention then when you wrote this note to do?

A.This is in reference to one of the milestones which is coming up, which is the data model design document.

And at this point, again this is poor recollection, but we had to

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decide what to show in data model design document, whether it’s conceptual or physical. I believe in the end it was just a physical data model, if I have my definitions correct, that was put in the document.

Q.So that's what you're talking about, that you're not certain whether or not you actually had this meeting with Rob to see the best way to do this?

A.I'm not certain.

Q.If I take you over to page 114, this is now March 18, ‘98. And we see under the no. 4 is now discuss data model and implementation approach with Rob; do you see where I'm reading?

A.I do.

Q.Now what are you discussing?

A.Again, this is another one of our meetings where we are discussing the data model and how it's going to be physically created for use.

Q.Now, the basic -- would the data model be finished by this

date?

A.I can’t recall the exact date that the data model report went

out.

Q.But you would agree with me that from the way we’ve read up to this date, the design of it would certainly be finished by now?

A.There would be -- yes, or portions of it, at least, yes.

Q.Now, from pages, for example, 55 through to 114 in this book, I didn't see any sketches that you did that you would have given to Rob Vandenberg?

A.Uh'hmm.

Q.Where would those sketches be?

A.My recollection is actually using printed out Maintenix data models and then writing on those to show differences or changes or additions to it.

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Q.Do you have those?

A.I've not seen any of those, no.

Q.When did you become aware of the lawsuit, MxI was first

sued?

A.First time?

Q.Yes?

A.Very early on.

Q.That would have been in November of ‘96?

A.Correct.

Q.Were you asked from November of ‘96 through to today to produce all of your documents?

A.At certain intervals we've certainly been asked to produce all documents, yes.

Q.And did you?

A.Everything that I could find, yes.

Q.So other than the diagram that was taken out of your logbook, we haven't seen any other of your hand drawings; correct?

A.I thought there was a few more examples in the book, I'm not positive. But no, I mean those scrap pieces of paper I don't have access to anymore.

Q.I would like to show you Exhibit 1593 to these proceedings, and under tab 730 evidence has been given by Messrs. Cass and Vandenberg that these are all your documents and design work for the flight works prototype. And I would direct your attention specifically -- you can read through the whole list, but rather than do that the only place I see your name is at H, I and T?

A.Okay.

Q.And can you tell us what that is?

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A.H is a data model sketch for the flight recording, which I think has been identified as me and it's not.

Q.So that's not you?

A.I don't believe, no.

MR. SHIELDS: Here, I'll show you what it is.

Your Honour, in these proceedings that document has been identified as Exhibit 1680, it will just take me a second to bring it up.

Q.Sorry, I can't do that because I have the wrong exhibit number. I'll go back to my -- in any event, it's not -- you're saying it's not yours?

A.I believe it's not mine, yes.

Q.All right. Hold on a second.

I’m just taking you back to Exhibit 1593, moving on to I, which is entitled “undated equipment blueprint data model sketches, Mike Egan”. Do you know what that is?

A.It's not showing up on my screen, actually.

Q.Well, here. There we go, sorry about that?

A.That's fine.

I do know what that is, yes, that's the equipment blueprint model that I had worked on.

Q.The description is in the plural. Are you aware of anything other than that one sketch?

A.I believe that there was -- I believe that there was another data model attached to it that was not associated with that, if I remember correctly.

Q.Well, this is listed under Flight Works prototype design and implementation, is that where it should be listed?

A.Well, actually I don't know for sure what the second page of that would be. The blueprint was on one page, mainly.

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Q.And that you've put in as Exhibit 2379, correct? I'll show it to you. You would have it in your hard copy because it's not in Summation yet?

A.Okay. 2379?

Q.Yes?

A.Thank you. Yes, so this is the one page data model summary of that, yes.

Q.It says it's undated there. You have no recollection though of what the date is that that was done, do you?

A.Not exactly, no.

MR. SHIELDS: Do you have it, Your Honour?

THE COURT: Not yet. Why don’t we just move on, Mr. Shields?

MR. SHIELDS: You can borrow mine, Your Honour.

THE COURT: No, I remember that.

MR. SHIELDS: Is that what we are talking about?

Q.So you say there should have been an attachment to this?

A.No, there should not be. The one page is the ---

Q.Where does this document come from?

A.This was on some scrap paper that was collected and submitted.

Q.Did you have any other scraps of paper with the work on it, similar to this?

A.I guess not, showing design work, no.

Q.Now I’d like to show you what has also been introduced as an exhibit in these proceedings as Exhibit 1088-C. And here it's entitled “handwritten log notes asset manager BOM, undated”. You’ll agree with me it's the same document; correct?

A.Correct.

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Q.Now, at this stage it wasn't attributed to you?

A.Was it not? Okay.

Q.It doesn't get attributed to you until we see Exhibit 1593. But I'm assuming from what you're telling us that this is your handwriting?

A.That's correct.

Q.Now what process procedure did you follow in keeping your documents after you were aware of the lawsuit?

A.I certainly kept notes in my logbook, for the most part. And whenever we were asked to produce things, and certainly there was priority put on producing things that were asked for, otherwise I kept track of my notes and my work at Volvo.

Q.Can I take it then, Mr. Egan, all of your design work is either this exhibit or what we see in your logbook?

A.Well, there may have been other work done on, as I say, some of the other scrap pieces of paper, but they didn’t ---

Q.What happened to them?

A.I assume they went in the garbage, like a lot of other scrap paper around the place.

[736]It would seem to me that as the designer of the ADS system, Egan, would begin his task by reviewing and becoming familiar with the MSG-3 and FMECA methodology. It appears that Egan did not review these and looked at them only to become familiar with the terminology for the software. According to Egan, he did not review specific information concerning the RM12 engine, such as the measurement or symptoms available, the design of the engine or any typical cause and effects relationships that were known about the engine, its maintenance and/or reliability history. Egan confirmed that he received no information from Volvo on the maintenance or reliability history of the RM12 engine. On February 17, 1998, Egan sent an e- mail to Volvo requesting failure modes and effects data. According to Egan, he did not receive the information from Volvo until after his design development and data modelling was complete.

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[737]In my view, in order to design the ADS system without reference to GasTOPS’ programs, Egan would have had to review specific information concerning the engine that was the target of the design, as the RCM and FMECA methods are based on the functional design of the engine, typical cause and effects relationships that are known about it based on its maintenance and reliability history. Not only did Egan lack data model experience using the S Designer software program, he also had no knowledge as to what a conceptual data model was although he had done some physical data modelling.

[738]On March 8, 1998, Egan noted in his logbook under the heading “things to do”, “Wed”, “talk to Rob re: data model – install data modeling software and trialed”, “sit with Rob to do some data modeling.” Egan’s explanation of this entry was that he was going to speak with Vandenberg because he was the “overseer of the Maintenix data model, which I was going to make use of some of it.” The reference to the data model software referred to the installation of S Designer on Egan’s computer and the fact that he would try out the S Designer software. Egan explained:

Q.It must be S Designer that they now put on your computer, if I read that correctly, or what was done?

A.That's what I’m saying as a “to-do”, I don't believe we did do that. Certainly I never became proficient in using it. The decision was made that Rob would maintain the physical data model control and I would design on paper and provide him the input to do that.

Q.Okay, let me understand this: You're not going to do a conceptual data model for this project, you're going to do hand sketches of a physical data model that you then hand to Mr. Vandenberg, who inputs it through S Designer; is that right?

A.I will do hand sketches of, or draw on pieces of the Maintenix data model, of probably something in between the conceptual and the physical. I certainly had no formal training in data modeling.

Q.Well, it says “sit with ?? and do some data modeling”. Did you actually do that?

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A.I believe that's in reference to trialing the S Designer to see if I should start using it. I believe I did, but the decision was not for me to start using it.

Q.You failed the test?

A.I failed the test.

[739]On March 20, 1998, Egan met with Vandenberg and noted in his logbook “review diagram… fill in tables/columns… come up with conventions with Rob.” According to Egan, at this meeting the data modeling was effectively completed. It would appear that the data model had been completed during March 8 and March 20, 1998, during the same period Egan apparently learned how to do data modeling. Egan stated that he arrived at the attributes that he decided to put into the database and how he organized the data as follows:

Q.Well you must have wanted data within your database. In

other words, how did you decide on the entities, attributes, their relationships within the database; how did you keep control of it, if you did or if someone else did you can tell me who it was?

A.Certainly -- well, the initial design was based on some of our -- my rough sketches and designs, so pulling out the attributes and the entities that we knew were required. As I said, other parts of it were leveraged from Maintenix at the time. And the actual change control of those, however, was really only started to be maintained after the first release of the data model. Up until that point it was a big change that was going on.

[740]It is clear Egan had very little data modeling experience. He was unable to use S Designer software program for physical data modeling. He did not know what a conceptual data model was. As a result he had to follow a process whereby the defendant Vandenberg would maintain the physical data model control while Egan would make his designs of the data model on paper, which he would give to Vandenberg to interpret for the physical data model.

[741]Egan was unable to produce any of his hand sketches of his design work other than those found in his logbook. According to Egan, he simply made notes on the “print-out of the maintenance data model.” Apparently, he wrote directly on these print-outs to show changes or additions to the data model. Egan was unable or unwilling to produce any of these design

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documents nor could he find any copies of these documents in the defendants’ productions.

[742]Again, I find it astounding that MxI and all of its employees including the personal defendants did not retain all documents, e-mails, design documents and program designs from the moment they were sued by the plaintiff in November 1996 to the date of trial. Egan’s failure to produce his design documents apart from what was in his logbook leads me to the conclusion that there never were any such design documents and that Egan did not design the data model for the ADS MxI supplied to Volvo. He may have made certain modifications to the maintenance data model through Vandenberg so that they were able to provide to Volvo a data model based on GasTOPS’ FLTS.

Dr. Alberto O. Mendelzon, Ph.D. 1979 and ADS

[743]In carrying out his comparison of the data models, Dr. Mendelzon compared the data models in ECMS and ADS and stated in his report:

A fourth major area is fault tracking and diagnosis, embodied in ECMS in the form of an expert system for troubleshooting. This is not mentioned above because the troubleshooting functionality is not part of Maintenix or NALCOMIS; however, it is part of the ADS system designed by MxI for VOLVO, and we will compare it to the ECMS troubleshooting data model in section 3.4 (see Exhibit 1067).

Dr. Mendelzon described his findings on comparing the software programs as follows:

Q.Now, Dr. Mendelzon, can you explain to us your figure on page 8, 3.1.2 and the tables that we see on pages 2 and 3 of Exhibit 1100-S?

A.Yes. This is, as I said, the description of the baseline equipment part of the GasTops design.

Maybe the place to start is the entity on the left in the middle of the three entities along the left edge of the figure: NIP WUC times [X] WUC. WUC stands for work unit code, that's a term that I think is used by the U.S. military, to refer to something that could be roughly characterized as a type of part or a type of component.

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And what is stored in this table is essentially the blueprint of all the equipment that is managed by the system.

So, remember that each of these rectangles corresponds to a table in the database; a table consists of columns and rows. In the NIP WUC cross [X] WUC table, each row describes a component, so it will include some information to identify that particular component, and it will also have two references, and this is how the tree structure, or the hierarchical structure, is encoded. For each component there will be a reference to the next higher component, that is the parent of this component in the component tree. So, for example, if a rotor assembly is part of a fan assembly, then the entry for the rotor assembly will have a reference to the entry for the fan assembly.

The second kind of reference that each part contains is a reference to the highest level part, that is not the direct parent but the great great great grandparent, the ultimate ancestor of this part, what is the highest level of component that this part is a component of. So, for a fan assembly, that might be an engine, say, an engine is a top level assembly that we don't want to describe as being a component anything else; if that is the case, then the entries for each one of the subparts of an engine, all the way down to the most detailed ones, they would all contain a direct reference to the ultimate ancestor, that is the engine.

Now, one interesting -- so that's one interesting feature of this design is this reference to the ultimate ancestor or ultimate parent. And it's interesting because it's redundant. In fact, you don't need to store with each part who is its ultimate parent because you can reconstruct that information by tracing to the next higher parent, and then the next higher and then the next higher. So, for example, if you store -- if you know who is the father of a person and you know who is the father of the father, then you know who is the parental grandfather, you don't need to store that information separately. The same thing is happening here. There is a redundancy. That redundancy happens, I believe, although this is never said explicitly, it happens in order to speed up a certain operation that is very important in this kind of system, and that's the operation of -- given an assembly, given a top level component, find all its parts and subparts, all the way down to the finest level of detail.

If we didn't have this link, this reference from each part to its top

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level assembly, then we would have to trace through the immediate parent links laboriously until we reach the ultimate parent of each part.

The other striking feature of this NIP WUC cross [X] WUC table is the use of a number of positions. There is a field called something like number of positions. This is intended for parts that can appear in more than one position within their higher level component; for example, an engine can appear either as a right or left engine. When that situation occurs, then the number of positions field for that part will store how many different positions are there for this part, so if it's right and left it would be two. And for parts that have more than one possible position where they can occur, the actual positions will be listed in the table immediately below this one in the diagram. That is the table NIP WUC cross [X] position.

So that table will say, for example, for an engine, if the two possible positions are left and right, there will be an entry for left position and an entry for right position.

The table NIP PART, which we can see immediately to the right of assembly, along the top row of the diagram, that one stores the information about types of parts, independently of the hierarchy. And the connection between NIP WUC cross [X] WUC, that is the hierarchy table, and NIP PART, that is the part type table, is through the NIP WUC cross [X] part table. So whenever -- this is a common pattern. Whenever we have a rectangle that has two arrows going out into two other rectangles, for example, NIP WUC cross [X] part has an arrow going into NIP PART and an arrow going into NIP WUC cross [X] WUC, usually that means that this entity actually represent a relationship, a many to many relationship between the two entities that the arrows go into. In this case, that relationship is what part types can possibly appear at a given place in the hierarchy. So we're connecting slots in the hierarchy in some sense with part types that can be used to fill those slots, and that is the function of the NIP WUC cross [X] part table.

Q.Finally we have in the top right the NIP PART cross [X] NH part -- (NIP, WUC, PART)

MR. STEPHEN APPOTIVE: Sorry, Dr. Mendelzon, I missed -- which box are you now talking of, I missed that?

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A.NIP cross [X] NH, top right corner. So there we can see there that there are actually two arrows going from this box to NIP PART, and that means that each entry in this table, each entry in the NIP PART cross [X] NH part table connects to entities of NIP PART. So it's showing us some relationship between pairs of part types. And the relationship that it is showing between pairs of part types is a compatibility relation. Some parts are allowed to be subparts of other parts, and some parts are not allowed to be subparts, and that is what is represented by this table.

[744]Dr. Mendelzon examined the documentation and software that he received from MxI to ascertain if he could find any evidence of a formal development process having been used in the design and development of the database with regard to ADS. He stated in his report:

For the MxI Maintenix and ADS systems, the situation is somewhat different. The data model design documents [M29, M31] use object-oriented terminology and English-language narrative to describe the entities and relationships. However, it seems clear that these descriptions are reverse-engineered from the existing design as opposed to being specifications for it. This follows from the fact that in many cases, documented above, the “classes” in the class diagrams, instead of corresponding to real- world objects the way they are supposed to in object-oriented methodologies, are in one-to-one correspondence with physical tables, which themselves are in one-to-one correspondence with tables in the earlier GasTOPS physical models.

[745]In regard to this finding, Dr. Mendelzon stated:

Q.Back to the bottom. Now can you tell us what you mean by your conclusion that for the Maintenix and ADS systems the situation is somewhat different?

A.It's different in that there are documents, M-29 and M-31, respectively, that at first glance look like conceptual data model design documents, and they look like that way because they are written a tool that is meant for a conceptual database design and using terminology that comes from conceptual database design. But, in fact, on closer examination I didn't find real logical or conceptual model in either one of these documents.

The idea -- they are using some called object-oriented technology,

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which I think we reviewed yesterday. Object-oriented technology is an extension of some sense of entity relationship modeling. And the idea is that you start by defining classes of objects, and this corresponds to what is called entities in the entity relationship world; and then you define behaviours for these objects, and the behaviours correspond to properties of the objects which in the entity relationship world are modeled either by attributes or by relationships.

And then you take those objects and from them you derive what are the tables that are going to be in the physical data model. But in the case of these documents, M-29 and M-31, most of the classes of objects in fact look exactly like physical tables in the physical data model, which in turn look exactly like physical tables in the GasTops data model.

So, in fact, instead of being true conceptual design documents, these are physical data model descriptions for the most part that are couched in a conceptual design language.

Q.What conclusion do you draw from that?

A.Again, having not found any evidence, including these two documents, of a conceptual database design having been done, I conclude that it was not done.

Q.Now, I'd like to show you Exhibit 1114-C a Power Point presentation entitled -- I'm sorry, S, not C -- Power Point presentation entitled "Development Process", and ask you to identify and explain this slide?

A.These are three bullets that summarizes the discussion that we have just had. The first one talks about the main conclusion, which is that I found very little evidence of a formal data model process having been followed.

And then the next two bullets distinguish between the case of NALCOMIS and the case of Maintenix and ADS. In the case of NALCOMIS there is no evidence of a conceptual data model having been developed. So when I say formal data model development process here, I'm not looking for anything too formal or too extensive, just a complete logical conceptual data model, and that is what I couldn't find evidence of for NALCOMIS.

And for Maintenix and ADS, the situation is that there is

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something looks like a conceptual model at first sight, but my impression is that it was actually reconstructed from the physical model, that is that either the physical model was designed directly without passing through a conceptual model, and this is what is shown in these documents, or the conceptual document described here was extracted from a preexisting physical model.

[746]My interpretation of Egan’s evidence is consistent with Dr. Mendelzon’s findings.

[747]In my view, it is the high degree of similarity between these two databases, which is important and leads to the conclusion, that ECMS was the foundation database upon which the ADS system delivered by MxI to Volvo was designed. In my view this is consistent, with the defendants’ position that their software products were the fourth iteration. Dr. Mendelzon, after examining the data models of the ADS and GasTOPS’ software systems which dealt with troubleshooting concluded that the databases were similar. Dr. Mendelzon came to the conclusion and I accept his evidence, that the designers of the ADS program would not have designed the program with the high degree of similarity with the GasTOPS troubleshooting programs if they had not relied upon the GasTOPS design. According to Dr. Mendelzon, there were many different ways in which to develop the system and the fact that they were developed in the same way leads to the conclusion that ADS was based upon the GasTOPS’ products. Dr. Mendelzon was unable to locate conceptual design documents for the development of the ADS system. He found only physical data model descriptions. While he did find something which appeared to be a conceptual model, he ultimately concluded that it was actually reconstructed from the physical model.

[748]Taking into account the evidence of Egan and the conclusions of Dr. Mendelzon, I am convinced, that the ADS system was based on the ECMS data model. It is inconceivable to me that if there was a conceptual data model that MxI and the personal defendants would not have retained all of the design documents or electronic files upon which the conceptual model was based as they knew that they were facing a lawsuit instituted against them by GasTOPS in November 1996.

[749]Dr. Chen did not do a detailed analysis of any ER diagrams found in the

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troubleshooting domain. Therefore, any findings or conclusions he made with respect to the comparison of the troubleshooting domains are based only on his belief. Accordingly, Dr. Mendelzon’s findings with respect to a comparison between the troubleshooting domains found in the ADS data model and the ECMS data model stands unchallenged by the defendants’ expert.

[750]I am driven to the conclusion that Egan did not possess the necessary expertise to design a troubleshooting program from scratch. Accordingly, I find that Egan as the MxI designer of the ADS program based the ADS program on the GasTOPS troubleshooting program and thereby used confidential business information which was the property of GasTOPS. As a result, MxI and its employers breached the fiduciary duty they owed to GasTOPS when they used GasTOPS’ confidential business information to design ADS.

Muir’s Comparison of GasTOPS’ and MxI’s Products

[751]In addition to the experts’ and defendants’ documentation and testimony, Muir testified about his comparison between GasTOPS’ and MxI’s documentation and products.

[752]Brouse described in a 1999 document entitled “Maintenix White Paper” (Exhibit 10) “how Maintenix applies modern relational database, internet and windows technology to resolve the most difficult aircraft maintenance management problems, quickly and easily.” In his White Paper Brouse sets out in detail Maintenix’s functionality and how it addresses the aircraft maintenance management problems. Muir compared the functionality found in Maintenix, as described in the White Paper, with the functionality found in ECMS/MAINSTAY:

Under paragraph or section 2, and in general terms, ECMS included parts tracking, 2.1 capabilities; maintenance planning capabilities and functionality, 2.2; maintenance tracking capabilities, section 2.3; flight line maintenance capabilities, section 2.4; maintenance program management and control capabilities, section 2.5; fleet management capabilities, section 2.6; and ECMS partially met, but not entirely, the requirements of the FAR regulations. So ECMS contained all of those capabilities with the exception of meeting the FAR regulation.

[753]Muir also found the following based on his comparison of Maintenix (based on the

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White Paper and MxI’s web page) and ECMS’ functionalities:

a)With respect to parts tracking described on page 5 of the White Paper, the design features and capabilities are identical to the design capabilities of ECMS as seen in Exhibit 22A.

b)The White Paper states: “Furthermore, part/serial number, part description and ATA code are presented for rapid component identification. The ATA codes were the same codes as described in paragraph 3.1.1 of Exhibit 47C

– DOT and RCMP aircraft fleet management systems requirements report dated September 26, 1996 and prepared by Jeff Cass.

c)The White Paper states that Maintenix tracked serialized components, parts, consumables and systems. ECMS tracked serialized components but not consumables. This was an enhancement required for ECMS for the DOT/RCMP opportunity as noted in Exhibit 47-C, at paragraph 3.1.2.

d)The White Paper illustrates the configuration tracking capabilities of Maintenix. Muir stated that this was the same design concept of the configuration tracking features of ECMS as illustrated in Exhibit 22A.

e)The White Paper refers to “total asset visibility”. This is the same requirement described by Lieutenant Herl in Exhibit 376 at page 3 in Muir’s presentation to the U.S. Navy in November 1996. The White Paper describes Maintenix’s data replication features. According to Muir, these were the same as the functional specifications for ECMS v.2 prepared by Jeff Cass on September 17, 1996.

f)In his White Paper, at page 8 of Exhibit 10, Brouse inserted an “enterprise- wide network architecture” diagram which is almost identical to the network architecture for ECMS as described in the ECAMS/ MDPS replacement – presentation by Lieutenant Herl to Captain J. Derrick on December 14, 1996. (Exhibit 376 at page 8)

g)In his White Paper, Brouse at page 9 inserted a diagram entitled “inventory” which has the identical design concept as described in the ECMS maintenance manager screen in the ECAMS/MDPS replacement – presentation by Lieutenant Herl to Captain J. Derrick on December 14, 1996.

h)In his White Paper, Brouse refers to a “search utility” which is similar to the search utility in ECMS as described in the ECMS functional specifications, dated September 17, 1996 (Exhibit 44C at page 54, section 7.2.3.1).

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i)In his White Paper, Brouse describes the “drag and drop” feature of Maintenix. ECMS v.2 had a similar “drag and drop” functionality.

j)At page 10 of his White Paper, Brouse refers to “multiple aircraft configuration”. The ECMS software could not support multiple aircraft assemblies, but the database design could. (Exhibit 44C at page 16, paragraph 3.1.1.2)

k)In his White Paper, Brouse refers to “part compatibility”. The same part compatibility feature is in the ECMS functional specifications. (Exhibit 44C at page 20, paragraph 3.1.3.4 and page 43, paragraph 7.1.3.2)

l)In his White Paper, Brouse describes the maintenance planner for the Maintenix software system. The same maintenance manager is also included in ECMS (Exhibit 22A).

m)In his White Paper on Maintenix, Brouse states: “the symbols are ‘boiled up’ through the assembly tree”. This is the same descriptor used in the ECMS system and its symbols used to identify maintenance requirements and their urgency. GasTOPS had used this phrase to describe the same design feature in ECMS (Exhibit 576 at pages 88 to 89).

n)In his White Paper, Brouse describes the feature in Maintenix which allows the user to forecast upcoming maintenance requirements using different parameters. ECMS had the same capabilities (Exhibit 576 at page 130, paragraph 4.2.1).

o)Brouse stated in his White Paper that Maintenix operates on an Oracle relational database management system and operates on both client server architecture and wide area network architecture. ECMS also operated on an Oracle relational database management system product and on a client server architecture and wide area network architecture.

MxI’s Configuration Management Module for NALCOMIS

[754]The defendants also designed and developed the configuration management module for NALCOMIS. The specifications for the design of NALCOMIS provided that the defendants were to develop “the core configuration management module of NALCOMIS” which is referred to as the EQ-3M which was to be provided by MxI via NAVMASSO. The specifications for EQ-3M are found in Exhibit 572, Systems Specifications for Optimized Naval Aviation (NALCOMIS) prepared for naval air services command headquarters dated April 9, 1997.

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[755]In reviewing page 10 of (Exhibit 572), Muir stated:

A.My understanding of that line is that the core configuration management module of NALCOMIS, referred to in this document as the EQ-3M, is the responsibility of MxI, the development of it, and that the work is being done by via NAVMASSO, the U.S. Navy department responsible for NALCOMIS.

Q.And what in the GasTops' proposal with the U.S. Navy, what was GasTops going to provide, as compared to what paragraph number -- item no. 14 refers to?

A.Generally speaking, GasTops proposed to provide a replacement for the ECAMS ground station of the United States Navy, the system used to strip information off the Navy tapes and provide that information to other processing systems.

GasTops also proposed to replace the MDPS system for the United States Navy. The MDPS system included a parts life tracking and configuration management capability, and that particular capability is similar to that described in this document for the EQ-3M.

Q.Now, I'll take you to page 35 of the same document, and refer you to paragraph 3.2.8.12, which is near the bottom. Firstly, can you explain to us the first sentence that says:

"This section is subject to change based on the analysis occurring at NAVMASSO by MxI team, scheduled to end mid-April, 1997."

From GasTops' experience, what analysis would have had to have been undertaken by anyone developing this software?

A.The first step in the software development process, as I've given evidence earlier in these proceedings, is the requirements definition stage. The analysis -- My understanding of the analysis referred to in this paragraph would be the initial definition of requirements for the EQ-3M system, and that would be based on an assessment of the U.S. Navy's specific requirements, as well as the general requirements for configuration and parts life tracking for military aircraft.

Q.Now, in the next sentence that we see, there is a reference to the EQ-3M subsystem. When you read that sentence, how does it compare to what the ECMS does?

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A.The sentence describes the EQ-3M as a general purpose life usage and serialized configuration tracking system. The maintenance management and life usage management modules of our ECMS were a general purpose life usage and serialized configuration tracking system for military aircraft.

So, in general terms, the EQ-3M is identical, at this level of description, to the ECMS, in particular the configuration and parts life tracking aspects of our product.

[756]The NALCOMIS specifications for the core configuration management module to be designed and developed by MxI stated:

The SA shall [CN-SSS-xxx] have capability to

1.Identify maintenance organizations qualified to maintain assets tracked in the system

2.Identify the ‘cognizance hierarchy’ of the system”

3.Define the types and configuration hierarchy of the maintenance significant components for each supported aircraft

4.Establish an aircraft tree hierarchy of the components that identifies the physical relationship of the components

5.Establish validation rules

6.Identify usage parameters, including life data to be accumulated and limits, to be tracked against specific component types

7.Identify each of the known TDs that must be applied to specific components and related data such as the usage parameter that schedules the directive, or if any other TD is required after the directive is embodied

8.Identify, on a maintenance task-by-task basis, the ‘business rules’ associated with scheduling the maintenance activity

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9.Identify various validation rules with respect to equipment hierarchy configuration, TD execution, and usage parameters

[757]In comparing the NALCOMIS specifications document with ECMS, Muir stated that ECMS had the capacity to provide all of the items listed as numbers 1 through 9, which are also found at page 9 of the ECMS/MDPS replacement presentation made by Lieutenant Herl to Captain Derrick on November 14, 1996 (Exhibit 376), to find a replacement for ECAMS. In the presentation, Lieutenant Herl compared MDPS and ECMS:

USN Life Cycle Supportable

!ECMS allows continuous modification by the USN to the weapon system maintenance plan (without s/w modification or contract support)

!Flexibility is built-in to ECMS such that the following parameters can be changed ‘on-the-fly’:

-organization type

-component type and assembly hierarchy

-usage parameter and condition indicators

-usage and condition indicator limits

-inspection type

-inspection interval

-Technical Directive type

-validation rules

(b)The systems specifications for the optimized NALCOMIS (Navy aviation logistics command management information system) OMA (Exhibit 572 at page 37, paragraph 3.2.8.12.1) states in part:

The ‘drag-and-drop’ windowing feature shall [CN-SSS-xxx] be employed such that components and assemblies can be moved between organizations…

This feature is a part of the ECMS (Engine Condition Monitoring System) v.2 as shown in Exhibit 22-F.

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(c)In the systems specifications for the Navy aviation logistics command management information system (“NALCOMIS”) (Exhibit 572 at page 37, paragraph 3.2.8.12.1) there is a requirement for the information related to usage and maintenance to be presented in a graphical hierarchal break-down of the equipment. This is identical, to the ECMS (Engine Condition Monitoring System) feature shown in Exhibit 22-A.

(d)In the NALCOMIS specifications, at page 37, paragraph 3.2.8.12.2 there is a requirement to track components with respect to their location within a hierarchy of components. A similar feature is shown in ECMS (Engine Condition Monitoring System) in Exhibit 22-A.

(e)In the NALCOMIS specifications, paragraph 3.2.8.12.3 at page 37, there is a requirement to collect and process usage data. This feature is shown in ECMS (Engine Condition Monitoring System) in Exhibits 22-C and 22-D.

(f)In the NALCOMIS specifications at page 38, there is a requirement to track aircraft usage data. This feature is found in ECMS (Engine Condition Monitoring System) at page 67 of the user manual for ECMS (Engine Condition Monitoring System) v.2. (Exhibit 576, paragraph 2.8.2)

(g)The NALCOMIS specifications required “drag and drop” capability which is found in ECMS (Engine Condition Monitoring System) (Exhibit 22-F).

(h)The NALCOMIS specifications required “total asset visibility” and the same feature is described at page 8 of the ECAMS (Engine Configuration and Monitoring System)/ MDPS (Maintenance Data Processing System) presentation.

(j)The NALCOMIS specifications (Exhibit 572 at page 41, paragraph 3.2.8.12.8) there is a requirement for a logistics support utility. A similar feature can be found in ECMS (Engine Condition Monitoring System) v.2 at page 129 of the ECMS (Engine Condition Monitoring System) user manual. (Exhibit 576)

Springboarding

[758]In my view, the defendants’ actions bring into play the concept of springboarding given the fiduciary duty the personal defendants had to GasTOPS. It seems to me that even if

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the defendants can demonstrate that Maintenix is different from GasTOPS’ products, they used confidential business information regarding the CAF, U.S. Navy, and other potential customers and belonging to GasTOPS to develop and market their fourth iteration of the computerized maintenance program. In this manner, the springboarding theory applies. What is really being protected in this type of situations is the original process. The protection is enforced against persons who wish to use the confidential information to avoid spending the time, trouble and expense to go through proper development processes. GasTOPS’ claim is directed towards the use of confidential business information including the springboard theory, and it seeks damages arising from the defendants’ having used such information to obtain contracts with GasTOPS’ existing or potential customers.

[759]In my view, the defendants simply took GasTOPS’ confidential business information and re-wrote its programs in Windows NT with soft coding with the knowledge that GasTOPS planned to do both of those things too; this constitutes a breach of the defendants’ fiduciary duty to GasTOPS. The defendants’ clear intent was to springboard ahead of GasTOPS and usurp its business opportunities.

[760]The defendants misappropriated the plaintiff’s trade secrets/confidential proprietary information in intellectual property and used it in developing its Maintenix/FlightWorks software systems. This misappropriation was in addition to the misappropriation of the proprietary knowledge of the customer requirements that GasTOPS had developed, which the defendants used to design and develop its software systems. GasTOPS submits, and I agree, that the defendants misappropriated the data model that was designed and developed for the ECMS v.2 and MAINSTAY software systems, the GUI, the common functionalities and trade secrets that were contained in the specifications, user manuals and design documents in ECMS v.1 and v.2, the FLTS and MAINSTAY. In their statement of defence, the defendants take the position that “MxI set out to design a brand new product from the ground up in terms of concept, design and implementation” and that Maintenix neither uses nor is derived from the ECMS design specifications or source code.

[761]By 1992, Jeff Cass was involved in many of the MSD software development projects.

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Forsyth commented in his performance review of Jeff Cass, dated June 30, 1992: “Jeff was instrumental in all of our software developments last year. Without him there is no doubt in my mind that we would not have developed systems in the same timeframes achieved.” By 1993, Jeff Cass was the technical lead at GasTOPS. According to his performance review by Forsyth, he was the only knowledgeable individual in high level design and detailed implementation with respect to any of his software development projects. So, Forsyth directed Jeff Cass to take an active role in establishing software development procedures and policies and to keep current with object-oriented analysis and design methods (Exhibit 1749).

[762]During 1993, Jeff Cass had responsibility over all aspects of the Dofasco project. In his performance review, Forsyth directed Jeff Cass to keep abreast of any technological developments to ensure that GasTOPS was keeping in tune with the latest technologies (Exhibits 1750 and 1751).

[763]In 1994, Jeff Cass took on more responsibility for the MAINSTAY design as its lead designer for GasTOPS’ attempt to develop a generic version based on the CAF, Dofasco and Canadian Coast Guard’s. He had full responsibility for the Dofasco version, CBM-DAS.

[764]In early 1995, Jeff Cass was assigned by Forsyth to achieve similar results with the CF-18/CMMS design by making aspects of MAINSTAY/CBM more generic, enabling them to be put into ECMS v.2. This involved the creation of further generic condition-based maintenance solutions for ECMS. Forsyth noted in his January 1, 1995, performance review (Exhibit 1753) that Jeff Cass had “developed a good foundation for MAINSTAY system data model. This is the most critical aspect of the system design.”

[765]Jeff Cass described that the following had been accomplished by February 1995: Dofasco’s CBM-DAS included condition-based maintenance; the CBM area that was to be leveraged in ECMS v.2 had been extracted; and some very preliminary work had been done on incorporating that CBM area to ECMS v.2. These three tasks constituted Jeff Cass’s contribution to the development of the generic MAINSTAY product at that time. His performance review for that period acknowledges his contribution in these areas, noting that he “combined the F404

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ECMS and CMB-DAS data models into a single MAINSTAY data model” and that he took “responsibility for the MAINSTAY components of the CF-18 CBMS” (which does not refer to the generic version of MAINSTAY, as the pieces coming out of the CMB-DAS were not yet generic enough for that purpose).

[766]In the latter half of 1995, Jeff Cass took on the role of the lead design engineer for MAINSTAY, in which he was to complete the ECMS v.2 design and manage the development of the MAINSTAY components being extracted from the Dofasco CMB-DAS and made more generic before being used to meet the ECMS v.2 requirements. By June 1996, Jeff Cass had overall managerial responsibilities for the MAINSTAY design group, whose duties included design implementation and life cycle support of the MAINSTAY product line, ECMS, MAINSTAY for Windows, RCM Analyst and Lube Analyst. He was aware of the customer requirements and was responsible for designing the projects to meet those needs.

[767]According to Jeff Cass, in 1995, as ECMS v.2 was being designed, the functional specifications were being authored with the intention of developing a database and source code. By 1996, the MAINSTAY maintenance planning and scheduling, usage tacking, graphical analysis tool, prognostic expert system and sample management specifications had been embodied in the ECMS v.2 software and database.

[768]Jeff Cass prepared a summary of his achievements (June 1995-1996) for his June 1996 performance review (Exhibit 1755). In it, he lists many responsibilities under several headings: project administration, design, prime project estimation (software systems), project estimation review, technical review of RFPs, technical software, technical documentation and supervisory. In my view this document accurately reflects the scope of Jeff Cass’ work at GasTOPS during the stated period, particularly as he prepared it himself. Forsyth prepared a Summary of Objectives (Exhibit 292) for Jeff Cass following this performance review. In it, Forsyth assigned him responsibilities including managing the MAINSTAY Design Group, managing the successful delivery of reliable products for ECMS v.2, recruiting a new full-time employee and selecting and hiring university Co-Op students.

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[769]These documents make clear that Jeff Cass was familiar with the design of GasTOPS’ products and with the RFPs GasTOPS was dealing with at the time and was very involved in designing the ECMS v.2 data model. I have found that he was a key employee of GasTOPS and as such owed it a fiduciary duty.

[770]When MxI commenced business, it represented to the market place that its software system, Maintenix, was the fourth designed iteration in 10 years of maintenance information systems and its staff had designed the first three iterations while employed at GasTOPS. In the White Paper that Brouse authored on behalf of MxI as early as 1997, he stated under the subheading “Problem – Vendor Reliability”:

The MxI team has considerable experience in the design, development and set-to-work of maintenance information systems and Maintenix represents the fourth design iteration in ten years of such a system. Most notably, the team:

1)designed and implemented an Equipment Condition Monitoring System for the Canadian Air Force (CAF) to track, plan and schedule maintenance for 30,000 engine and airframe components on the CAF fleet of F/A-18 fighter aircraft distributed throughout Canada, and

2)designed and implemented a plant-wide Condition-Based Maintenance and Data Analysis System (CBM-DAS) for Dofasco Steel used to track, plan and schedule maintenance for 85,000 components which is utilized by 2000 users.

More significantly, the United States Navy (USN) has selected and is licensing Maintenix as the core module to provide serialized configuration tracking, maintenance tracking and planning for their entire fleet of USN aircraft (6000 aircraft, 130 aircraft types distributed over 400 locations). The USN is the second largest fleet of aircraft in the world.

[771]In a proposal Brouse made to Bombardier on behalf of MxI, he stated:

Maintenix has several advantages over our competitors. These are:

Fourth Generation Design – Maintenix represents the culmination of over 11 elapsed years of experience in the design and

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implementation of maintenance information systems. Since the mid-1980s the staff of MxI have successfully developed, supported and/or implemented [EPLTS for the CAF, PC-based ECMS for the CAF, and Windows-based CMB-DAS for Dofasco]… The experience and knowledge gained in the successful development and set-to-work of these large scale enterprise-wide maintenance information systems have provided MxI with the know-how and ability to develop Maintenix - the fourth iteration of this technology.

Modern Architecture – … Because PC’s and Windows as the standard computer platform of choice, supportability is not a concern.

Built for the End User – … Based on our experience with the United States Navy and the Canadian Air Force, MxI has developed a user interface that utilizes a highly intuitive ‘iconic drag and drop’ data entry and reporting approach…

[772]The MxI team referred to in the White Paper and in the Bombardier proposal consisted of those who had been GasTOPS’ experienced technical staff. They are the ones who had ten years of experience in the design of maintenance information systems. This, according to Brouse, provided MxI with the know-how and ability to develop Maintenix, and one of the issues in this case is whether or not the “know-how” referred to by Brouse arose from the defendants’ skill and/or knowledge or from GasTOPS’ trade secrets, confidential information and intellectual property.

[773]The defendants argue that the “know-how” and ability to develop Maintenix arose from the skill and knowledge which they learned while employed at GasTOPS and which they were entitled to take with them and use when they resigned from GasTOPS. In my view, even if the ability to develop Maintenix arose from their skills and abilities, I must determine whether they were entitled to use these skill and abilities in developing Maintenix and pursuing the very business opportunities GasTOPS was pursuing.

[774]The defendants learned from their interaction with GasTOPS’ prospective customers that the marketplace sought a Windows-based iteration of ECMS v.2. There were also marketplace demands for a more generic product that the user could configure for more than one

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aircraft. Knowing this confidential business information, the defendants rewrote ECMS in Windows and made it more generic, despite knowing GasTOPS intended to do so itself. MxI then represented to potential customers that its Maintenix system was the fourth iteration of the maintenance information systems with functionality not available with GasTOPS’ product.

[775]GasTOPS takes the position, and I agree, that the development of Maintenix was the fourth iteration of the maintenance information systems developed by GasTOPS. As a result, MxI not only misappropriated GasTOPS’ trade secrets/confidential proprietary information and intellectual property to design and develop the FlightWorks maintenance software systems but made it known to GasTOPS’ customers and potential customers, that its products were the fourth iteration of the programs developed by GasTOPS, developed by the same team that had developed previous GasTOPS’ iterations. It is a reasonable assumption that MxI’s prospective purchasers would believe they were purchasing the newest ECMS/MAINSTAY version.

Trade Secrets and Confidential Business Information

[776]While trade secret protection can apply to computer software, the information sought to be protected must not be of a general nature but rather must be specific. The trade secret information contained in the technology that GasTOPS had developed and is seeking to protect was extremely specific. In this case, although MxI’s program Maintenix was written in a Windows NT format and was “soft coded,” which allowed its purchasers to customize it for different aircraft in their fleets the program was based on the specific technology which was confidential business information belonging to GasTOPS and which the personal defendants were privy to while employed at GasTOPS. The defendants’ wrote in their promotional literature and résumés that Maintenix was the fourth iteration of a computerized maintenance software program they had developed while employed at GasTOPS. In my view these statements are evidence that the defendants misused GasTOPS trade secrets or confidential business information in developing Maintenix. The defendants misused such confidential business information or trade secrets belonging to GasTOPS in order that they (the personal defendants and MxI) would not have to spend the time and money in developing their product and to also have the ability to bring their product to the market place within months of incorporating MxI. If

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the defendants had been obliged to spend years as GasTOPS did in developing their product they would not have been able to compete for the contracts that GasTOPS had been pursuing.

[777]GasTOPS claims that each of the defendants had key roles in the organization and was entrusted with sensitive information that belonged to GasTOPS and that was necessarily confidential. The defendants conversely argue that either the information was not confidential or the information constituted a professional skill they had acquired and as such follow the employee. They further suggest that computer programs are not necessarily trade secrets and or that because they could be reverse engineered the public has access to them.

[778]The defendants had access to commercial contracts; technology developed by GasTOPS; business opportunities GasTOPS was pursuing or intended to; and customer and potential customer requirements. In my view, the defendants knew this information was confidential, and they breached their fiduciary duty by using such information or by making such confidential business information available to MxI and allowing MxI to use such information in competing for the very contracts they worked on at GasTOPS. While the defendants raise interesting defences, they are not immediately relevant. The issue in my opinion is not the practical or business aims of the information (and ultimate product) but, rather, how that information was communicated during their employment and how it was used during that employment.

[779]The defendants cite the test for confidence laid out in LAC Minerals Ltd. v. International Corona Resources Ltd., [1989] 2 S.C.R. 574, to argue that GasTOPS has not established that the information in question was confidential. In my view the very nature of that test confirms that the material in question was a trade secret belonging to GasTOPS. And, with respect to whether or not the defendants misappropriated that information as trade secret, there can be no doubt that they did.

[780]What remains consistent in the reported decisions and articles is that in identifying whether certain information constitutes a trade secret is whether its disclosure would harm the employer. The purpose of GasTOPS was to sell its programs to customers and the very raison

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d’être of the defendants’ employment at GasTOPS was to develop and refine programs for the purposes of selling them to clients. Logically, it must follow then, that the material in question – the programs the defendants would go on to refine for their own post-employment purposes – constitutes a trade secret. Appropriating the core of the GasTOPS program, even if their aim was to revise it, necessarily constitutes misappropriation of a trade secret.

[781]Further, the misappropriation of the trade secrets here is conflated with the misappropriation of confidential information. As GasTOPS argues, the defendants used confidential and proprietary information concerning the existence, status, and particulars of its corporate opportunities to acquire those opportunities and refine the product and sell it on their own.

[782]The plaintiff also urges a finding that the defendants actively solicited existing or potential clients of GasTOPS. While such a finding may be made, it is also distinguishable from the fiduciary breach of misappropriation of confidential information and trade secrets. That is, it is not necessary to find that the defendants solicited various GasTOPS clients to find them in breach of the duty not to misappropriate trade secrets and confidential information. This latter breach necessarily inheres in their aim to develop a fourth iteration of the program, as such development would have been guided by the trade secrets foundational to their employment and the confidential information cultivated through client consultation at GasTOPS.

[783]The various defences advanced by the defendants on this particular matter thus strike me as practically irrelevant. As pointed out by D’Andrea in his reading of Cherry Lane Fashion Group (North America) Ltd. v. Stranahan, [1999] B.C.J. No. 1802 (S.C.), even if one can ascertain whether or not the information deployed by the former employee was confidential, there are varying degrees of employee responsibility. With this in mind, the test ought to be not whether the information was necessarily confidential, but rather whether the information deployed was done so against the former employer. This test strikes me as more in tune with the essence of a fiduciary duty.

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Solicitation of GasTOPS’ Customers and Opportunities

[784]In summary, MxI directly solicited GasTOPS’ customers and opportunities as

follows.

[785]CAF

a)In September 1996, Brouse and Forsyth met with Warrant Officer Paré and Capt. Scott MacDonald to inform them that they were contemplating resigning from GasTOPS;

b)In October 1996, Brouse and Forsyth directly solicited the CAF for the ECMS v.2 roll-out through Warrant Officer Paré and Capt. MacDonald;

c)In November 1996, Forsyth and Brouse solicited the CAF through Capt. MacDonald to obtain the rights to ECMS and compete GasTOPS’ TIES contract with the CAF;

d)In November 1996, Brouse actively solicited Warrant Officer Paré, Miss McIntyre of Public Works and Government Services Canada and the Directorate of Intellectual Property for a license to the ECMS technology;

e)During December 1996, Forsyth and Brouse met with Bombardier to solicit the DMS to work with the CAF;

f)In December 1996, Forsyth and Brouse solicited Lockeye and Martin for work on the CAF’s Material Acquisition and Support Information System (“MASIS”);

g)In January 1997, Brouse and Forsyth solicited Major Comtois and Capt. Dhaliwal for the DMS to work with the CAF;

h)In January 1997, Brouse solicited Major Comtois in an attempt to secure the 411 Squadron work with the CAF;

i)In March 1997, Forsyth solicited Major Comtois and Rufiange for the MASIS work at the CAF;

j)In June 1997, Forsyth directly solicited the MASIS work by meeting with SHL Systemhouse;

k)In June 1997, Brouse directly solicited CAF work from Majors Lewis, Allen and Miller;

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l)In July 1997, Forsyth actively solicited for sales of the Maintenix product to the CAF T-Birds through Major Wendlandt;

m)In August 1997, Brouse and Forsyth actively solicited the CAF for the Sea King helicopter opportunity through Warrant Officer Paré;

n)In September 1997, the defendants Forsyth and Brouse solicited sales of the Maintenix product to the CAF through Major Lavoie for the T-Birds;

o)Throughout 1997, Brouse and other employees of MxI actively solicited the CAF through Warrant Officer Paré to obtain commercial intelligence concerning GasTOPS’ corporate opportunities with the CAF in an attempt to usurp these opportunities;

p)In 1998, Brouse and Forsyth solicited the CAF for an evaluation between their Maintenix product and GasTOPS’ ECMS products through Warrant Officer Paré;

q)In 1999, Brouse directly solicited the CAF for the renewal of the 1996 TIES contract.

[786]GasTOPS alleges that these direct solicitations by Brouse and Forsyth brought MxI significant revenues from the CAF. GasTOPS alleges the defendants relied heavily on trade secrets and confidential proprietary information acquired during the course of their employment at GasTOPS to obtain these revenues.

[787]U.S. Navy

B.Within days of the GasTOPS’ work order being issued by GasTOPS to MxI, on November 11, 1996, Brouse actively solicited the Canadian Government for a license to sell the ECMS products developed by GasTOPS to the U.S. Navy;

C.In November 1996, Brouse directly solicited a partnership with Bombardier to pursue the U.S. Navy opportunities;

D.In November 1996, Brouse directly solicited work from the U.S. Navy through Lieutenant Matt Herl by actively marketing the Maintenix product;

E.In November 1996, Brouse initiated contact with Terry Chandler to involve MxI in the U.S. Navy opportunity being pursued by GasTOPS;

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F.In November 1996, Brouse assisted Lieutenant Herl in finding replacement parts for the PDP-11 computer. It is a reasonable inference that the gratuitous assistance Brouse gave to Lieutenant Herl was a direct solicitation of work MxI was seeking from the U.S. Navy;

G.In December 1996, Brouse contacted MDA in further pursuit of the U.S. Navy opportunities;

H.In late December 1996 and early January 1997, Brouse actively solicited, through Lieutenant Herl, a relationship with the Navy Management System Support Office (“NAVMASSO”), through which MxI could provide the U.S. Navy the core technology it sought and which was part of the business opportunity GasTOPS was pursuing with the U.S. Navy;

I.In February 1997, Forsyth and Brouse actively solicited a relationship between MxI and MANTECH to provide core technology sought by the U.S. Navy, which was part of the business opportunity GasTOPS was pursuing with the U.S. Navy when Forsyth and Brouse resigned;

J.In July 1997, Brouse actively pursued the sale of Maintenix licenses to the U.S. Navy through Lieutenant Herl and Ray Lebeau.

The defendants generated significant revenues through Brouse’s efforts, from optimized Navy Aviation Logistics Command Management Information System (“NALCOMIS”) contracts and especially through the sale of maintenance licenses to the U.S. Navy.

[788]Volvo

[789]A. In January 1997, Brouse and Forsyth solicited contact with Volvo through a meeting with Capt. MacDonald and Warrant Officer Paré.

[790]GE

A.In late November and early December 1996, MxI called Lou Bernazzani at GE Aircraft Engines several times. Bernazzani was one of GasTOPS' key contacts through whom GasTOPS was pursuing the GE/Oracle opportunity. Brouse conceded that he had contacted Bernazzani after resigning from GasTOPS but claimed that his contact was for information concerning the NAVAIR initiative;

B.In December 1996, Brouse forwarded e-mails to key representatives of both GE and Oracle inviting ongoing contact between them and MxI;

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C.After MxI finished developing its own product, Brouse continued in his direct solicitation efforts, meeting with Oracle’s Ortiz and subsequently corresponding with him to establish a partnership between MxI and Oracle to develop the Maintenance and Repair Overall (“MRO”) solution.

Brouse also continued his efforts to secure the GE opportunity by soliciting a partnership with RTS, a company that had recently hired Ortiz.

[791]Bombardier

a)Shortly after his resignation in October 1996 from GasTOPS, Brouse contacted Bombardier’s Leguellec;

b)In November 1996, Forsyth and Brouse directly solicited a partnership with Bombardier in order to pursue the CAF opportunity, and

c)In December 1996, Forsyth and Brouse directly solicited Bombardier to pursue the roll-out of GasTOPS’ ECMS v.2 software product

CAF

[792]In GasTOPS’ 1996/97 Business Plan (Exhibit 296), the technology position stated: “The Aero Program marketing plan (see later section) focuses heavily on the exploitation of the company’s ECMS and FLTS products and their underlying technologies as a basis for new business development.” It listed the ECMS’ short-term opportunities to include the potential sale to the U.S. Navy F/A-18 program, the potential sale to GE; the potential application of the ECMS to a CAF helicopter fleet; and the potential application of the ECMS to the CAF Aircraft Structural Integrity Program (“ASIP”) data management requirement. It also outlined the enhancements that would have to be applied to ECMS in order to exploit these opportunities, including conversion to Windows 95/NT, enabling multiple equipment types/“blueprints” within a common database, creating damage/defect tracking and reporting, improved fleet management reporting and allowing intersystem interfaces for periodic test techniques. In the same section of the same document, the major short-term opportunity listed for the FLTS is the potential sale to the U.S. Navy and F/A-18 FMS customers, which would require added features in the way of diagnostic rules for the F402 engine, interface to the USN standard aircraft tape reading devices and automatic generation of work orders based on fault type.

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[793]In a document entitled “MxI Software Development and Support Services” Exhibit 2097), found amongst MxI’s backup tapes and shown to have been modified December 19, 1996, Brouse described the development of ECMS from v.1 to v.2 and the state of the software technology. For Version 2,

The development team was tasked to design and develop a generalized system that:

1.could be applied to any engine or aircraft type operated by the CAF,

2.could be customized by CAF personnel by altering information in the database,

3.provided complete maintenance scheduling for all aircraft components,

4.provided trending of condition indicator data, and

5.included an expert system inference engine to assess condition data and recommend maintenance actions.

This 18 month, $1.5 Million project was undertaken by the MxI personnel and was successfully completed on-time and on-budget. The final system includes 200,000 lines of code and over 100 database entities.

[794]In October 1996, at the time of Forsyth, Brouse, Jeff Cass, Vandenberg and the majority of the MSD staff’s resignations, GasTOPS was in the process of completing the de- bugging of the ECMS v.2 software for the CAF.

[795]During the same period of time, unbeknownst to MacIsaac and/or Muir, MxI was engaged in a campaign targeting PWGSC in an attempt to interfere with GasTOPS’ 10-year business relationship with the CAF. The MxI initial business plan presentation (Exhibit 2194) clearly identifies the GE F404 F/A-18 engines being used by the Canadian military as a targeted market. Exhibit 2194’s “Properties” indicate that the document was created on October 21, 1996, by Forsyth and that it was modified on October 21, 1996, and printed October 20, 1996. It is a reasonable inference that this document was created prior to October 21, 1996, and is a clear

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indication that, immediately after resigning from GasTOPS, Forsyth, Brouse and MxI’s other founding members targeted the military market for the sale of a computerized maintenance system and specifically the CAF, which they knew was a client of GasTOPS, and other business opportunities GasTOPS was pursuing prior to their resignations.

[796]In my view, the marketing strategy employed by Forsyth and Brouse on behalf of MxI almost from the day they resigned from GasTOPS (and in the case of the CAF from the day they announced their intentions to Warrant Officer Paré and Captain MacDonald) was to convince prospective customers, such as the CAF, Bombardier, and the U.S. Navy, that the employees of MxI had developed ECMS v.2 and that MxI was a “spin-off” of the MSD of GasTOPS with 70% of the MSD employees. As a result, the roll-out of ECMS v.2 would be seamless and immediate if it was done by MxI, as MxI would not require any time to become familiar with ECMS v.2 and/or the technology upon which ECMS v.2 was based.

[797]I am sure that Forsyth, Brouse and MxI’s other founders wanted GasTOPS’ prospective customers and the CAF, with whom GasTOPS had contracts, to feel that the only difference between dealing with GasTOPS and MxI would be the company’s name and in all other respects the customers would feel they were dealing with MSD.

[798]In her summary notes of her conversation with Warrant Officer Paré on November 13, 1996 (Exhibit 420), MacIntyre noted that Warrant Officer Paré told her that DND was considering terminating the 1996 TIES contract and going to an open bid. This same information had been given by Warrant Officer Paré to Forsyth some eight days previously and was confirmed by Captain MacDonald on his visit to MxI on November 8, 1996.

[799]In order to be able to compete for the 1996 TIES contract and be in a position of take over all of GasTOPS’ CAF work, Forsyth and Brouse on behalf of MxI approached Bombardier to form a partnership. On November 13, 1996, someone from MxI telephoned Bombardier. During the same period of time Brouse and Forsyth, contacted Orenda and the U.S. Navy concerning business opportunities using the ECMS technology. In addition, MxI also applied for a license from the Crown for the ECMS technology which would be required for all non-CAF

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marketing opportunities.

[800]On November 19, 1996, Muir met with Warrant Officer Paré to inform him that GasTOPS had been unable to reach an agreement with MxI on the roll-out of ECMS v.2. Warrant Officer Paré had on November 18, 1996, been informed of this fact by MxI.

[801]Then, on November 21, 1996, Brouse telephoned the Directorate of Intellectual Property for the Government of Canada and spoke with Rodney Kyle (“Kyle”). Their discussion was outlined in a letter Brouse sent to Kyle dated November 22, 1996 (Exhibit 421). Brouse was seeking a license “to market and sell … ECMS to potential clients,” the same reason given by MacIntyre in November 13, 1996, notes (Exhibit 420).

[802]As of November 21, 1996, MxI was targeting the CAF for the 1996 TIES contract to roll-out ECMS v.2, Bombardier for the upgrade to the DMS software for the CAF and the U.S. Navy. If MxI obtained a license for the sale of ECMS software, it would be in a position to usurp GasTOPS’ corporate opportunities with Bombardier and the U.S. Navy.

[803]As the “Air Force Manager” for GasTOPS, Brouse had unfettered access to trade secrets/confidential and proprietary information belonging to GasTOPS regarding the requirements and functionality of GasTOPS’ software systems its customers and potential customers’ requirements. Specifically, Brouse was privy to what Bombardier and the U.S. Navy sought from the ECMS and, as such, knew exactly what technology to request in his license application for ECMS, as shown in the attachment to his application (Exhibit 421).

[804]Warrant Officer Paré acknowledged that during November 1996 he spoke with Brouse and that Brouse may have talked to him about ECMS and applying for a license for ECMS. MacIntyre stated that she received telephone calls from Brouse indicating MxI hoped to obtain a license from the Crown for the ECMS software. MacIntyre described Brouse’s telephone calls:

A.Sometimes the questions are asked in a yes or no fashion. And I must admit that this is the first time I've been through this

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type of process. I'm trying to be accurate when things are vague. But -- and so I hesitate sometimes to elaborate.

I respect the fact that there are questions being asked with an intent for an answer, and I'm trying to answer the questions that are being asked as opposed to detailed elaboration. But I can tell you something further, and yes, I have memories and some of it is vague.

The reason I'm adamant about discussions because I had to shut Doug Brouse down in a conversation I was having with him. At some point, and I said 'I can't have these conversations with you.' I don't know if that was over of a license agreement or over a contract, or something, but I said 'I'm working with you on the security but I cannot have discussions with you any further.' And he was trying to have other discussions with me. And that's why I'm hesitating.

Q.All right?

A.But I had very uncomfortable discussions where I had to say to him, 'Don't call me about these matters, they're not my matters. I can say that it was about, certainly, Article No. 2, that they were looking for opportunities with respect to the software. And I was under a contractual arrangement with GasTops.

So I'm sorry if I, you know -- I don't want to change my testimony,

I'm just trying to provide further clarification to it.

THE COURT: Ms. MacIntrye, when you say "they", who do you mean? In the last answer -- series of answers, you say they wanted to discuss things. Who did you mean by "they"?

A.MxI.

[805]In cross-examination, Brouse claimed that he had applied for a license for the ECMS because of a telephone conversation he had with Warrant Officer Paré prior to November 21, 1996, in which he learned that Bombardier was itself applying for the same license. This was his evidence despite the contents of Exhibit 1990, which indicates that MxI sought the license to market and sell ECMS to its potential clients. When questioned on his purpose for applying for a license for ECMS, Brouse stated that MxI did so to confirm whether or not the Canadian government was willing to provide an ECMS license to anybody other than GasTOPS because it

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had heard Bombardier was seeking the same thing.

[806]In my view, given the unreliability of Brouse’s evidence throughout this trial and his attempts on numerous occasions to give evidence different from documents which he authored, I have no hesitation in finding that, when Brouse wrote to Kyle seeking a license to sell ECMS, he was attempting to enable MxI to pursue the very business opportunities that GasTOPS had been pursuing based on its ECMS technology. In his letter to Kyle, Brouse said he wanted the licence to market and sell ECMS software.

[807]MacIntyre was alert to the potential danger in discussing matters concerning the Crown, the CAF and GasTOPS with Brouse, who was calling on behalf of MxI. I find myself somewhat surprised that Warrant Officer Paré and to a lesser extent Captain MacDonald would have discussed or advised Brouse of confidential business issues between the CAF and GasTOPS knowing that MxI was pursuing GasTOPS’ work with the CAF.

[808]Given the statement in Brouse’s letter of resignation, it would seem to me that if he had truly meant what he said in his letter of resignation regarding non-competition, he would have told Warrant Officer Paré and Captain MacDonald that he did not wish to discuss any issue regarding GasTOPS and its business relationships with the Crown or CAF. The fact that such discussions were ongoing in the fall of 1996 indicates clearly to me that Forsyth and Brouse fully intended to pursue CAF work arising out of ECMS v.2 technology and its roll-out even before they resigned from GasTOPS.

[809]At no time did MxI and/or Brouse produce any of the application documents sent to the Directorate of Intellectual Property or replies received from the Directorate. GasTOPS only learned of the application for a license to sell ECMS by MxI and/or Brouse through its own application for Access to Information directed to the Government of Canada. In my view, Brouse and MxI did not wish to disclose this application in this trial and, except for the government’s response to the plaintiff’s Access for Information application, MxI and/or Brouse would never had revealed that they made such an application.

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[810]On November 25, 1996, Kyle replied to Brouse’s request on behalf of the Director of Intellectual Property by letter. He denied MxI’s request on the grounds that “DND is not at liberty to grant you the commercial license you requested.” In response to Kyle’s refusal, Brouse pursued his request for a license by fax to Kyle (Exhibit 423) in which he sought an explanation for the DND’s inability to grant the license given MxI’s understanding that ECMS was Crown- owned property and that GasTOPS’ license was non-exclusive. Brouse could only have known about the latter term by virtue of his position as “Air Force manager” at GasTOPS.

[811]Through a contact at DND, Forsyth learned of the resolution of the IP issues between GasTOPS and DND on January 9, 1997. Forsyth noted in his logbook “John was talking to the Air Force. They are happy that they now have all the IP for the ECMS in exchange for a GTL grace period” (see Exhibit 1452 at page 6). On January 23, 1997, Brouse wrote a letter (Exhibit 1993) withdrawing his request for a license to sell and market the ECMS software. On the same day, Brouse withdrew his request for a copy of the license agreement that GasTOPS had for the sale of ECMS (see Exhibit 1532).

[812]In what can only be described as an astounding admission at trial, Brouse was obliged to concede during cross-examination that he had destroyed all of the documentation relating to the request for a license and the request for a copy of GasTOPS’ license after being served with the original statement of claim in this matter. Brouse’s actions typify his lack of respect for the judicial process and indicate why I found his evidence to be evasive at best and untruthful in many instances. In destroying these documents, Brouse was attempting to mislead the court. Again, I wish to be abundantly clear that I do not in any way feel that counsel for the defendants were involved in the destruction of these documents. I feel sure that if counsel for the defendants had known of Brouse’s intention, they would have taken steps to stop him and would have immediately brought his actions to the attention of the court.

[813]When it became apparent that the 1996 TIES contract would not be competed and that GasTOPS had been given a period of time to recover, the defendants turned their attention to actively pursuing other CAF opportunities that GasTOPS had been pursuing either on its own or in partnership with Bombardier. During 1997 and 1998, the defendants were planning to

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compete with GasTOPS for the 1999 renewal of the 1996 TIES contract.

[814]On December 4, 1996, Forsyth and Brouse met with Bombardier at which time they proposed a partnership arrangement. The proposal was for MxI to provide to Bombardier a software system to support the maintenance management of the entire aircraft. This was the opportunity that GasTOPS had been pursuing with Bombardier and CAE.

[815]In my view, the evidence demonstrates that Forsyth and Brouse actively interfered in GasTOPS’ business relationship with the CAF by positioning MxI to take over the 1996 TIES contract. Further, they attempted to compete with GasTOPS by obtaining a license for the ECMS technology to sell the ECMS software outside the CAF. To accomplish these corporate goals, the defendants relied on their knowledge of confidential and proprietary information belonging to GasTOPS, including the requirements of the CAF, the technology behind the ECMS software and its license for the ECMS technology.

[816]On November 13, 1996, Warrant Officer Paré had a discussion with MacIntyre, who noted in her summary (Exhibit 420) that: “MxI wants to apply for the license to the ECMS software, and have the same opportunities as GasTOPS to sell it. But can this happen if we do not have all of the rights.” Warrant Officer Paré’s evidence regarding this is different:

During this conversation we have talked of many, many things, okay. We were trying to look at everybody doing analysis looking at different avenues. So we were going into trouble time and we wanted to know how we can release the software version 2 in the field right now.

So the step we took is we called back the version 2 software entirely, so we could be in a position now to go out and subcontract whoever we wanted to support us, somebody that had the capabilities to do it.

[817]It is a reasonable inference that Warrant Officer Paré wanted to repossess the IP rights that GasTOPS had obtained under contract in order for the Crown to grant a license to MxI. MxI would then “have the same opportunities as GasTOPS to sell it.” I am satisfied that Warrant Officer Paré and Captain MacDonald, having realized that the Crown could not grant a license to

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MxI to sell ECMS v.2 (as GasTOPS owned its IP rights), encouraged the Crown to claw back the IP rights to ECMS v.2 for the purpose of allowing MxI to obtain a license to sell ECMS v.2 and to support the roll-out of ECMS v.2 to the CAF.

[818]After pursuing GasTOPS’ corporate opportunity with Bombardier, Forsyth and Brouse continued to pursue another GasTOPS’ corporate opportunity with the CAF, referred to as MASIS. On December 17, 1996, Forsyth noted in his logbook (Exhibit 1405 at page 17) that he met with Jeff Cass to reconstruct what they knew of the MASIS and Maintenance Information Management System (“MIMS”) projects from their work at GasTOPS.

[819]When GasTOPS was discussing its partnership arrangement with Bombardier, one of the projects identified was the MASIS project. It was intended to be a third cooperative project between GasTOPS and Bombardier. The discussions between GasTOPS and Bombardier ended after MxI started to pursue Bombardier in November 1996. GasTOPS continued to pursue the MASIS project and in July 1997 entered into a teaming agreement with IBM (Exhibit 480) to pursue it. IBM was to be the prime contractor and GasTOPS a sub-contractor for the provision of its expertise in the area of condition-based maintenance for CAF aircraft. As of 1997, the Canadian government opted not to proceed with the MASIS project. In September 1998, an RFP was issued and IBM was the successful bidder on the MASIS project.

[820]On December 18, 1996, Forsyth and Brouse met with Lockheed Martin in pursuit of a corporate opportunity with the CAF for the MASIS and MIMS. In relation to these projects, Forsyth noted that he and Jeff Cass tried to recall some of the context of these systems, which one or both of them had come across while working at GasTOPS.

[821]As noted in his logbook, Forsyth spoke with Major Comtois on January 27, 1997. Major Comtois was responsible for the DMS along with Captain Dhaliwal. The DMS was the same software system that Brouse and Forsyth had discussed with Bombardier in November and December 1996. According to Forsyth, they were pursuing a business opportunity to interface the MxI product with the DMS. Forsyth agreed that while he was at GasTOPS he was aware of the business opportunity that GasTOPS was pursuing to interface DMS with ECMS.

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[822]On January 30, 1997, Brouse and Forsyth attended a meeting with Major Comtois and Captain Dhaliwal which is noted in Forsyth’s logbook (Exhibit 1452 at page 20) as the “DMS meeting”. In January 31, 1997, Information of Interest (“IOI”) report (Exhibit 1533) under the subject CAF, Forsyth refers to the summary of the meeting (Exhibit 1534) prepared by Brouse. Brouse opined that there were two opportunities for MxI to obtain CAF business, the first being a sub-contracting opportunity with Canadair (Bombardier) to the GUI on the DMS and develop an electronic log set and the second being for the Crown to purchase MxI’s product. Brouse concluded that the sub-contract with Canadair (Bombardier) was the quickest route.

[823]On January 31, 1997, Brouse and Forsyth met with Captain MacDonald and Warrant Officer Paré. Neither Forsyth nor Brouse was able to recall any of the details of this meeting.

[824]On February 5, 1997, Forsyth, Brouse and Jeff Cass met to evaluate the demonstration given to Major Comtois and Captain Dhaliwal on January 30, 1997. In his DMS memorandum dated January 31, 1997 (Exhibit 1534), Brouse stated that Major Comtois seemed interested in MxI’s FlightWorks but that getting a contract would be difficult because the CAF had decided to buy a software application under the MASIS project to meet all of its maintenance information needs. This meant that no department could develop its own software and that it was difficult for departments to buy software off-the-shelf; “As a result, the only mechanism any department has to get anything done is through existing contracts (generally R&O contracts because they are sooo huge) and on the pretence that the work is simply support or minor enhancement efforts.” Canadair (Bombardier) had two such projects at the time, as Brouse had noted in his summary of the meeting (Exhibit 1534). Brouse also wrote in his memorandum that Major Comtois still believed that he could possibly buy a commercial off-the- shelf product and even pay to have it customized, and for that purpose he sought a copy of MxI’s product for evaluation by the DND. Brouse concluded that the most expedient way to be paid by Major Comtois was through the Canadair sub-contract:

The only way I see us getting any money [from] Comtois is as follows:

1) via the Canadair contract whereby we would be subcontracted,

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or

2)whereby the Crown purchases our system and then pays for customizations.

Due to the lengthy process of software purchase, I believe the most expedient way is to subcontract through Canadair.

I believe we should proceed as follows:

1)attempt to get an alpha version of the software available for end of March that has some basic functionality in it (TBD) and request to get it installed on their server

2)continue to fire up the gang at DND, get them hooked and convince them to fund us through their OMS vehicle

3)wait for a call from Canadair.

Change plan as necessary

[825]In pursuing this corporate strategy, Brouse contacted Major Comtois on February 24, 1997. Although Brouse had no note of this conversation with Major Comtois or any recollection of the details, Forsyth wrote in his logbook (Exhibit 1454 at page 9): “Doug talked to Richard Comtois about FlightWorks demos.” Apparently, Brouse had convinced Major Comtois to have a demonstration of the FlightWorks software in the field on March 10, 1997.

[826]In his IOI report for the period ending February 28, 1997 (Exhibit 1535 at page 4), Forsyth stated: “Major Comtois has asked for an Alpha version of FlightWorks to take on tour to the CF Bases. Doug is to meet with him on Thursday, March 6, to train the Major on its use and to discuss the demo.”

[827]MxI appears to have been successful. On March 14, 1997 in his IOI report for the period ending March 14, 1997 (Exhibit 1536 at page 2), Forsyth stated: “Major Comtois’ visit to Cold Lake was apparently well received. He also revealed that 441 Squadron want to purchase a service log application and will now issue us a letter RFP.” And in his IOI report for the period ending March 21, 1997 (Exhibit 1536 at page 3), Forsyth stated: “We have received an RFP from

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441 Squadron. We are considering proposing a beta site license to the squadron for FlightWorks. This would essentially be a $1 license and a $5,000 installation and support fee. Other squadrons would be required to pay a substantially higher license fee (i.e ~$15k).”

[828]On March 26, 1997, Major Comtois telephoned Forsyth concerning his Bagotville visit and MASIS. Forsyth’s note on this conversation (Exhibit 1537) stated that Major Comtois had the demo running smoothly and was comfortable with it. Some technicians attending the briefing were familiar with ECMS and reacted positively to MxI’s product. There were a few concerns: some of the technicians had trouble with the idea of abandoning paper forms, for example, but Forsyth and Major Comtois agreed that familiarity with DMS would lead the way to a more comprehensive commercial project. Forsyth further wrote that threw would soon be an RFP for a MASIS software integration project and that there was a big gap to be filled by the primary application and additional major functions required. Finally, Forsyth noted that Major Comtois wanted to “host a presentation of FlightWorks to DTA and others at Building 155.”

[829]Forsyth then had a telephone conversation with Major Rufiange. Forsyth’s note concerning this telephone conversation (Exhibit 1538) reflects that he called Major Rufiange to thank him for the MDS reference and that FlightWorks was available for demonstration. They arranged a “critical meeting” to hold the demonstration after Forsyth represented that the system could integrate date with supply, and Forsyth gathered from the conversation that Majors Comtois and Rufiange were both involved in the MASIS project, potentially both as “key guys in making certain decisions.”

[830]During April 1997, the defendants actively pursued the CAF by offering a software system with similar functionality to GasTOPS’ ECMS and to meet the same requirements:

(a)Brouse and Comtois discussed MxI briefing the CAF on FlightWorks. Forsyth’s IOI for the period ending April 4, 1997 (Exhibit 1540 at page 1) states: “Major Comtois wants us to brief the CAF (Canadian Air Force) on FlightWorks. Doug will post a note in the sales initiative database.” (Significantly, during the trial, the “sales initiative” database was reviewed and no such note existed.)

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(b)On April 11, 1997, Major Rufiange attended at MxI and was shown a demo of FlightWorks. The prototype of FlightWorks which was shown to Major Rufiange was never produced by the defendants at this trial. In his IOI for the period ending April 12, 1997 (Exhibit 1540 at page 2), Forsyth stated: “Major Rufiange visited us on Friday and was very impressed with FlightWorks. He wants to bring over some logistic people to see the software and to discuss the requirements. One thing he brought up was that the system should apply to all of DND, not just the AF, therefore we should come up with a more generic product name.”

(c)In his IOI for the period ending April 25, 1997 (Exhibit 1540 at page 4), Forsyth stated: “Received official word from Cold Lake that we were selected for the 441 Squadron service desk software. Squadron personnel are to visit MxI in May to review the FlightWorks Alpha version user interface.”

(d)On April 18, 1997, Major Lewis was given a demonstration of FlightWorks at MxI;

(e)On April 23, 1997, Major Rufiange called Forsyth to advise that he did not get the last page of the fax from Doug Brouse. According to Forsyth, Brouse was faxing the MxI White Paper to Rufiange. This White Paper was not produced during this trial by the defendants.

[831]During May 1997, Forsyth and Brouse pursued the opportunity with the CAF 441 Squadron and continued their efforts at gathering intelligence about GasTOPS:

(a)During the week of May 6, 1997, Forsyth made arrangements for representatives from 441 Squadron to visit MxI on May 20-23, 1997 to see a demonstration of the dummy prototype of FlightWorks and to discuss 441 Squadron’s requirements (see Exhibit 1544 at page 1);

(b)In his logbook (Exhibit 1543 at page 5), Forsyth noted: “Doug spoke to Scott MacDonald. Apparently, they are going to start the ECMS 2.0 roll-out at the end of June.”

[832]In June 1997, Forsyth and Brouse continued to pursue opportunities with the CAF’s

441 Squadron, MASIS and gather intelligence on GasTOPS’ efforts to roll-out ECMS v.2:

(a)Forsyth and Brouse met with Major Yashamita from 441 Squadron to discuss the MxI software system.

(b)On June 10, 1997, Forsyth met with SHL to discuss, amongst other things, the MASIS project. According to Forsyth, MxI would be supplying its software

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system as the module to provide the work order management.

(c)In his IOI for the period ending June 13, 1997 (Exhibit 1545 at page 2), Forsyth stated:

CAF - Michel Pare says that GTL has been tasked $290k for the ECMS rollout. This is nearly double the quote given prior to our departure and GTL still has not passed the ATP for ECMS 2.0. We also heard that the only stable version of ECMS is the executable version delivered to LeMoore for the USN trial - they don’t have the source code for this version?!?!. GTL are now claiming that we somehow sabotaged the software before we left - this is a complete and total lie as you all know. What a joke. Now you know where your tax dollars go!!!

[833]During the summer of 1997, Brouse prepared a mail-out of the Maintenix brochure to key officers – “a very targeted group of people” – within the CAF. The mail-out was sent to Majors Comtois, Lewis, Allen, Miller and Rufiange. These are the Majors within the CAF who Brouse had used as “champions” to solicit CAF business for the MxI’s system. Brouse stated that even though MxI didn’t actually have a product at that point, he was soliciting interest, and particularly for potential beta customers, in the product MxI was building.

[834]In order to keep up-to-date on GasTOPS’ recovery, the roll-out of ECMS v.2 under the 1996 TIES contract and any corporate opportunities GasTOPS was pursuing within the CAF, Brouse continued to rely on the relationship he had developed with Warrant Officer Paré when he was at GasTOPS. Almost from the moment he left GasTOPS, Brouse solicited confidential information from Paré on GasTOPS’ business relationship with the CAF. As a result, Brouse was aware of the corporate opportunities GasTOPS was seeking with the CAF and enabled MxI to compete with GasTOPS for them. If MxI had not intended to compete with GasTOPS for corporate opportunities GasTOPS was pursuing with the CAF, Brouse would have had no reason to pursue such information or to record and distribute such information amongst MxI’s employees. The anonymous e-mails (which I will deal with later) makes it absolutely clear that

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MxI’s employees were aware that MxI was competing with GasTOPS for the business opportunities GasTOPS had been pursuing prior to October 1996.

[835]On July 2, 1997, Brouse had a telephone conversation with Warrant Officer Paré and prepared a memorandum for distribution to MxI’s employees (Exhibit 1339). Brouse stated that during the conversation he would ask questions and Warrant Officer Paré would give him the answers. He described this conversation as part of his intelligence gathering on where GasTOPS’ business opportunity stood with the CAF. The memorandum prepared by Brouse (Exhibit 1339) states:

TIES T56 500K Amendment

The GasTOPS TIES contract will be amended to include an extra 500K for the T56 rollout starting in April 1998. So there is still time.

FLTS Installation

The FLTS V did not install and Pare was both quite quiet and defensive about this. Pare claims that the problem was a memory leak in the original code. Apparently the system will yack-out if you have too many ADF’s in the list box. Apparently this can be configured by the user such that a work-around is available; however, Michel now uses a much higher standard than he used to with us (he was too heavily influenced by Doug’s marketing skills?!) and will no longer let something be released to the field unless it is perfect.

The bug in the FLTS was a known error that Pare remembers seeing when we used to work at the company. Furthermore, some ‘twit’ at GasTOPS had recently repeated this error but neglected to fill out an STR form. This individual was part of the million man march to Bagotville and announced this fact (I guess he really is a twit - or a hell of a company man).

Pare claims that GTL will not get paid for a bad installation (I don’t believe this - see below). Furthermore, GTL fixed the problem within 3 days of returning back to Ottawa (yeah right) but the next installation attempt will occur concurrent to the ECMS roll-out, timing still undefined.

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GasTOPS Recovery Plan

Pare claims that GTL is “right on track” with the recovery plan. His rationalization is that GTL made an attempt to install FLTS in June but it was his high standards that caused the installation abort (no fault of GTL). As I recall, the GTL recovery plan called for renewed capability by March 1st, and installation of FLTS and ECMS in June. I guess the only thing that was “on track” was the CAF funding, but details, details...

GasTOPS Loot

I managed to obtain from Pare that one of the recent bills from GTL was 120K. This was discovered after Pare was complaining about the new DSS agent (Jean Charlebois). Apparently Jean is giving DND grief about buying supplies under TIES etc. Most notably, GTL screwed up a bill with GST (for $3.50) and returned a bill of 120K! I got this info from Pare after he told me that GTL was not receiving funding.

Orenda Java/HTML

Apparently, Orenda has received money to develop a Java- based/HTML-based user interface to the ECMS and potentially to the DMS. It looks good, and Pare is convinced that this is the technology of the future. He refers to this system as his back- pocket backup plan. Apparently, Albert Schmid has been flogging this thing and has caught the attention of Benoit Arcand [from] Bombardier (or at least got an audience with him). One thing is for sure, the CAF is enamored with this technology.

GasTOPS Sale

Pare claims that GTL has made a sale of something to someone. No other details. My guess is that GTL (after their tax-payer paid marketing junket) feels that they have made sales of FLTS to Volvo. We know better - we just received an RFP by e-mail.

DMS/ECMS Integration

DMS and ECMS are being integrated. No other details. This could be A Schmid’s Java toy.

[836] Warrant Officer Paré, when questioned at trial concerning Exhibit 1339 and his

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conversation with Brouse, initially denied giving such information to Brouse. When pressed he admitted to giving some of the information to Brouse. I formed the impression that Warrant Officer Paré was extremely evasive in his answers concerning Exhibit 1339 as he realized he should never have revealed such information to Brouse. It was clear to me that Warrant Officer Paré was acting as a “champion” for MxI in its pursuit of the CAF business.

[837]In his IOI for the period ending August 8, 1997 (Exhibit 1552 at page 2), Forsyth wrote: “W.O. Pare is hosting Terry Chandler on Monday afternoon to present the CAF ‘EPLTS Concept of Operation’. This should be interesting!!!” The following week, Forsyth wrote (Exhibit 1552 at page 3): “Jeff learned some interesting things from W.O. Pare while hosting Terry Chandler. It looks like the CAF have plans to role out ECMS to other aircraft fleets.”

[838]Jeff Cass made notes of Warrant Officer Paré and Terry Chandler’s meeting (Exhibit 1340) on August 14, 1997. According to his notes, Jeff Cass was able to obtain an up- to-date commercial intelligence report on GasTOPS’ progress on the roll-out of ECMS v.2 and the status of other opportunities GasTOPS was pursuing with the CAF. In addition to ECMS information, Warrant Officer Paré discussed the integration of DMS and ECMS and GasTOPS’ pursuit of the Sea King project.

[839]Forsyth was aware that GasTOPS was making an effort to sell the ECMS system for the Sea King helicopters. He anticipated that MxI would work on the Sea King opportunity during the period of the cooperation agreement.

[840]In September 1996, Laura Kline worked on the cost-benefit analysis for the Sea King helicopter business opportunity. She examined cost savings that could be realized by using the ECMS. In October 1996, when Forsyth and Brouse resigned from GasTOPS, Laura Kline was still working on that project, but she resigned and moved to MxI before completing it.

[841]On August 15, 1997, the day after Jeff Cass obtained from Warrant Officer Paré the confidential commercial information on GasTOPS’ corporate opportunity with the CAF for the Sea King helicopters, GasTOPS met with representatives of DND, including Warrant Officer

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Paré. At the meeting, GasTOPS’ cost-benefit analysis and proposal were reviewed. Warrant Officer Paré noted that “it was considered an excellent proposal,” and GasTOPS was asked to prepare a feasibility study and submit it to Warrant Officer Paré for his review and approval.

[842]In September 1997, Forsyth and Brouse continued to pursue the CAF corporate opportunity with 441 Squadron and began to actively pursue a corporate opportunity with the CAF T-Birds through Major Lavoie. Forsyth noted in his logbook that he had arranged several meetings including one with Orenda. MxI arranged for Major Lavoie to receive a demonstration of the MxI product.

[843]On September 26, 1997, Forsyth continued to pursue the MASIS opportunity with the CAF by having lunch with Major Lewis. Forsyth noted in his logbook (Exhibit 1508 at page 21) the importance of these meetings with Major Lewis:

… he’s handed out the Maintenix brochure

he has info on MASIS

prime PFP to hit streets

[844]On September 30, 1997, Forsyth and Brouse gave a presentation of the Maintenix system to a group of select individuals at the CAF T-Birds, namely Majors Lavoie and Lewis and Captains Cecil and Daly. In his IOI for the period ending October 4, 1997 (Exhibit 1583 at page 1), Forsyth wrote: The presentation went very well and re-inforced their interest in Maintenix. [They] want Doug to work with Capt Cecil in setting up a Beta Program. I received a call from Major Ed Wendlandt, the T-Bird Squadron Aircraft Maintenance Engineering Officer (SAMEO) who requested to be the Beta site. Needless to say things look very good.”

[845]This demonstration was followed by a similar demonstration to the CAF Challenger AEO, Major Chris Schofield. Forsyth noted this enabled MxI to obtain further information on the Bombardier opportunity.

[846]On October 2, 1997, Chris Cass, brother of Jeff Cass, engaged in another telephone conversation with Warrant Officer Paré. Chris Cass made notes of his telephone conversation (Exhibit 1341), in which he wrote that there was a review of GasTOPS’ progress in rolling-out

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ECMS v.2 under the 1996 TIES contract and of the ECMS’ overall performance. There was also discussion as to why the Maritime helicopter fleet was now looking at Maintenix instead of the ECMS for the Sea King helicopter corporate opportunity with the CAF. Paré agreed that Chris Cass’s memorandum accurately set out their conversation and testified that GasTOPS had not given him permission to discuss their dealings and ECMS with MxI, adding “It's my contract. The contractor. We tell them what to do. This is what they're paid to do.”

[847]According to Warrant Officer Paré, the Maritime command for the Sea King helicopter, was considering Maintenix by October 2, 1997. Accordingly, I find that Forsyth and Brouse acted on the information they received from Warrant Officer Paré on August 14, 1997, about the GasTOPS’ proposal and opted to compete with GasTOPS for this business opportunity.

[848]In my view, there was much more to the relationship between Warrant Officer Paré, Brouse, Jeff Cass and Chris Cass than was revealed at trial. Paré appeared very uncomfortable when questioned on the disclosure of information concerning the relationship between GasTOPS and the CAF to members of MxI. On the other hand, Brouse, Jeff Cass, Chris Cass and Forsyth did not seem the least bit reluctant to disclose that they had sought and received GasTOPS’ confidential business information concerning the CAF and used what they discovered.

[849]The IOI bulletins, prepared and distributed by Forsyth, are extremely enlightening as to the steps that were taken by MxI in pursuit of the CAF opportunity.

[850]For the period ending October 4, 1997 (Exhibit 1583 at page 1), Forsyth wrote:

CAF F-18 - ECMS gossip → (linked file)

CAF T-Birds - We gave a full Maintenix demo to the T-Bird AEO office, Major Martin Lavoie, Capt Chris Cecil and Capt Jeff Daly, on Tuesday. Major Lewis also came over. The presentation went very well and re-inforced their interest in Maintenix. [They] want Doug to work with Capt Cecil in setting up a Beta Program. I received a call from Major Ed Wendlandt, the T-Bird Squadron Aircraft Maintenance Engineering Officer (SAMEO) who requested to be the Beta site. Needless to say things look very good.

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CAF Challengers - We gave a Maintenix demo to the Challenger AEO, Major Chris Schofield, on Thursday. The demo went well but Major Schofield is also looking at CAMP. The appeal of CAMP is two-fold: there are a lot of Challengers already in the CAMP database and Schofield thinks he can benefit from the data; and, Schofield thinks that a modem connection to a central database at CSI could be a lot simpler to support and manage compared to a LAN/WAN configuration required be Maintenix. The good news is that it appears that Schofield will follow whatever the T-Birds do because they are both in the same squadron.

Bombardier - One of the important things that came out of the meeting with Schofield was the fact that Bombardier has an RFP out for a maintenance management system. Schofield gave us the name of Jerry Cote at Bombardier who Doug called and forwarded information to.

[851]For the period ending October 10, 1997 (Exhibit 1583 at page 2), Forsyth wrote:

CAF UTTH - We have now made contact with the Utility Transport and Tactical Helicopter (UTTH), or Twin-Huey, office. I called the Deputy Project Manager (DPM) Major Bernie Boland and they are looking for configuration management software. See telecon →(linked file).

Bombardier - We received the RFP from Bombardier for a Computerized Maintenance Management System (CMMS). We have until November 3 to deliver a proposal and a 30-day trial version of the software. The initial review of the requirements indicate that Maintenix is very well suited to their requirements. I think the biggest impediment will be the size and age of our company.

[852]For the period ending October 17, 1997 (Exhibit 1583 at page 4), Forsyth wrote: “CAF - Interest in Maintenix keeps building. Major Best is now interested. See telecon → (linked file).”

[853]For the period ending October 24, 1997 (Exhibit 1583 at page 5), Forsyth wrote: “CAF - Doug, Rob and Dave hosted a whole contingent of CAF personnel on Friday (Where’s the meeting minutes, boys?). Attendees included Lt. Col. Jim Henry, Major Reg Best, Major

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Ludi Hollic, Capt Arnie Vanderhoven, et al. The presentation of Maintenix went well and the interest keeps building.”

[854]For the period ending October 31, 1997 (Exhibit 1583 at page 6), Forsyth wrote: “CAF - I attended a DND - Industry Integrated Health Monitoring (IHM) Collaboration meeting (see → linked file). I haven’t decided if this is serious or not, but I will stay on top of it. A so- called Statement of Work (SOW) is due in early Dec.”

[855]In addition to his IOI reports as set out above, Forsyth called Major Boland on October 10, 1997, in pursuit of the Utility Transport Tactical Helicopter (“UTTH”) opportunity with the CAF. On October 15, 1997, Brouse had a telephone conversation with Major Best, who had received a copy of the Maintenix brochure from Major Lewis. On October 24, 1997, in pursuit of the CAF T-Bird opportunity, MxI’s Egan met with Captain Cecil to review the project plans for the T-Bird trial.

[856]As noted in his logbook (Exhibit 1582 at pages 12-13), Forsyth called Major Lavoie for an update on MxI’s progress in securing opportunities with the CAF. He also attended a meeting at which he received an update on the MASIS project.

[857]As evidenced by the IOI for November (Exhibit 1584) and Forsyth’s logbook for November 1997 (Exhibit 1510), on November 5, 1997, Forsyth followed up his October telephone conversation with Boland on the UTTH opportunity by calling him again. On the same day, Forsyth learned that his contact, Major Lewis, had been able to establish that the “Hercules boys [C130 transport aircraft] are ready to buy)” Maintenix.

[858]On November 10, 1997, Forsyth learned that GasTOPS had “teamed with IBM” for the MASIS project. In pursuit of this opportunity Forsyth and Brouse started to look for a partner. According to Forsyth’s IOI for November 1997, he learned that the project was delayed until 1998. Brouse was then tasked with finding out who was biding on it in order for MxI to pursue the “Prime System Integrators” to sell them on the Maintenix software system.

[859]In his IOI for the period ending December 19, 1997 (Exhibit 1586 at page 3), Forsyth

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reported on the implementation of the “Way Ahead” corporate strategy to obtain corporate opportunities and contracts with the CAF, stating in part:

CAF – We had a busy week with DND. Our customer party at the Corel Centre went very well. We had fourteen (14) guests at a corporate box and were able to establish good relationships with a number of Majors, including two in the MASIS office. We then went to the “sticky floor” on Friday and by the end of the day had at least 30 people wearing our USN – MxI – Maintenix hats. I think most of Building 155 know who the hell MxI are now.

[860]In January 1998, MxI continued to pursue the CAF corporate opportunity with the T- Birds. In his IOI for the period ending January 31, 1998 (Exhibit 1588) Forsyth wrote in part: “CAF - We are on schedule for our beta program with the T-Birds. The product looks fantastic and Mike has done an excellent job of collecting all the necessary setup data and getting the system configured. As you all know, this beta is critical to our success. Everyone has done a great job of ensuring the software is ready to go.”

[861]On January 13, 1998, in pursuit of the MASIS opportunity in competition with GasTOPS, Brouse prepared a paper (Exhibits 2108, 2109 and 2110) that he sent to Major Lavoie of the CAF, in which he described MxI’s plan to compete with GasTOPS: “MxI is aggressively pursuing the MASIS contract. Our plan is to team with one or more of the large enterprise system vendors and offer Maintenix as the aviation maintenance management component of the MASIS system. In that regard, we are currently discussing partnership relationships with Oracle, SHL and Nincom and have meetings planned with IBM, Arthur Anderson and Omnilogic” (Exhibit 2108 at page 2). In his paper, Brouse presented to the CAF that Maintenix was “superior” to GasTOPS’ ECMS software system because it had “Superior functionality – the functionality of Maintenix has been defined by extensive market research and through the analysis of competitor products. As a result the system contains a most comprehensive functionality of any aviation maintenance management system and is the only system designed to fully support two-way data replication.” Brouse then set out five functions in Maintenix which he claimed were not found within the ECMS. The “five functions” which Brouse claimed were in Maintenix and not in GasTOPS’ ECMS were functions that GasTOPS was intending to add to

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ECMS at the time Brouse and Forsyth resigned from GasTOPS in October 1996.

[862]On January 6, 1998, Brouse continued pursuing the CAF opportunity, giving a presentation to the Search and Rescue helicopter project management office. This was the former EH101 helicopter opportunity now known as the Cormorant. In his IOI for the period ending February 13, 1998 (Exhibit 1590 at page 1), Forsyth stated in part:

IBM - Doug and I met with Mike Gannon of IBM to discuss the MASIS opportunity. We know that IBM is already teamed with GasTOPS for the bid. Mike confirmed this but pointed out that [there] was nothing in their agreement to prevent IBM from using Maintenix as a solution for MASIS. Mike admitted that they would use what ever solution the client wanted.

CAF Cormorant - Doug and Dave gave a Maintenix presentation to the search and rescue helicopter Project Management Office (PMO). The CAF have just announced the selection of the Cormorant [formerly known as the EH1OI] as the new helicopter to be purchased. They are very interested in using our software to support maintenance of the new aircraft.

CAF T-Birds - Doug, Mike and Siku had a very good trip out to Greenwood to install the Maintenix beta. The squadron seems really excited about using the software. What was extremely impressive was the fact that they had a technician trained up on the use of the system within four (4) hours. Now that is something the CAF likes to hear!

[863]On February 12, 1998, Forsyth and Brouse met with IBM, with the full knowledge that IBM had partnered with GasTOPS on the MASIS project.

[864]In his IOI for the period ending February 20, 1998 (Exhibit 1590), Forsyth wrote: “CAF T-Birds - The field beta in Greenwood seems to be going very well. MCpl Hutchison, the technician they selected to run the software is very computer literate and seems excited about the whole program. Apparently he has given a half-dozen demos of the software already.” MxI described this contract on its web page (Exhibit 478 at page 3) as follows:

The Canadian Air Force has elected to act as a Beta site for the

Maintenix system and is presently configuring the software to

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manage select squadrons of Challenger CT-33 T-Bird and F/A-18 Hornet aircraft.

MxI is presently working closely with the CAF to assist in the installation of the system in Greenwood, Nova Scotia and Cold Lake, Alberta.

[865]When Muir saw MxI’s web page, he became concerned that “MxI had insinuated themselves upon the Canadian Air Force and would represent a competitive threat to GasTOPS with respect to the work we were doing for the Canadian Air Force, particularly our F18 contract. We saw this particular development as the first step towards MxI competing against GasTOPS for its core F18 business.”

[866]GasTOPS attempted the roll-out of the ECMS v.2 software on February 2, 1998, but it was rejected by Warrant Officer Paré. In April, GasTOPS was advised by Warrant Officer Paré that Maintenix was to be evaluated by Orenda for potential application to the F18 program. There was to be a technical evaluation of the Maintenix product and its ability to meet F18 and F404 engine tracking requirements that were being satisfied by GasTOPS’ ECMS at that time. Muir stated that “Corporately we were very disturbed to hear that Warrant Officer Paré and the customer we were working with was planning a trial of what amounted to a replacement product for ECMS. Our position that we took corporately was to meet immediately upon finding out about this planned evaluation. We met with the director responsible for the fighter and trainer group.”

[867]Warrant Officer Paré stated that he chose to have an independent evaluation of the ECMS v.2 and Maintenix due to the February 2, 1998, failure of the roll-out of ECMS v.2:

A.Like I said, when, sometime in '98, I believe; why, because I was fed up with the way GasTOPS always postpone delivery, that everything that we were trying do always fail. I mean, it was evident now in my find, in our department's mind, that GasTOPS were totally incompetent, unavailable to perform, always repeating mistakes after mistakes after mistake, always using the wrong baseline software, the wrong configuration to the network. So if you could ask fro something to go, but there were accident added.

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So we were at that point right now, we said, and I proposed to my boss 'Let's go out and do a fair independent evaluation of the actual version 2 of ECMS and what Maintenix has to offer', so to be able after that to evaluate the possibilities of our staying with GasTOPS or we moving to a new application. It was question for us to judge or to analyse if we were to pour more hundreds of thousands of dollars into a product that was not coming about. Or if we were able to give somebody else a price for package that could do the job.

So we had to get some data to do a fair analysis, are we going with

GasTOPS, are we changing contractor and go with somebody else.

[868]On April 9, 1998 Forsyth recorded in his logbook (Exhibit 1342 at page 6) that he had received a telephone call from Warrant Officer Paré. The note made by Forsyth concerning this telephone conversation stated:

-The CF-18 office would like to evaluate Maintenix as a possible ECMS replacement.

-Michel says the ECMS 2.0 ATP at Orenda was “pathetic” and major functionality does not work.

-Orenda will be tasked for a 3 to 4 week period to evaluate Maintenix.

-Michel would like to convert ECMS version 1.7 baseline into Maintenix.

Warrant Officer Paré did not seek approval from his superiors to conduct this comparative evaluation until April 24, 1998.

[869]On May 6, 1998, GasTOPS was advised that Warrant Officer Paré was anticipating receiving the formal tasking for the evaluation of Maintenix and ECMSv.2 by Orenda. Warrant Officer Paré confirmed the evaluation would be of ECMS v.2 and not v.1.7.

[870]On May 22, 1998 Warrant Officer Paré sent an e-mail to the attention of Chris Cass and Brouse advising of the evaluation and requesting the software and documentation be sent to Orenda.

[871]GasTOPS was concerned that Warrant Officer Paré and the CAF were about to do an evaluation of what amounted to a replacement product for the ECMS. As a result of such

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concern, GasTOPS arranged a meeting with the director responsible for the fighter and trainer group, Colonel Lucas. After the meeting, Colonel Lucas instructed his staff not to proceed with the evaluation. Subseqent to the cancelled evaluation, MxI continued to pursue business opportunities with the CAF.

[872]On October 21, 1998, Brouse prepared an unsolicited proposal to the CAF (Exhibit 1498). In his proposal, Brouse suggested that the MxI software could “readily replace” ECMS and proposed that the CAF use Maintenix as the interim solution for the MASIS project. After sending a number of letters promoting the use of Maintenix in the MASIS project, MxI received a letter from Colonel Ryan on February 10, 1999, advising that the CAF could not accept the unsolicited proposal for the MASIS project.

[873]In his IOI for the period ending February 19, 1999 (Exhibit 1612 at page 6), Forsyth stated in part: “There was an Advanced Contract Award Announcement (ACAN) for a sole- source extension six (6) month extension to the ECMS support contract to GasTOPS. This announcement is posted on the internet to determine if anyone can compete for the work. We have contested the announcement because we can provide CF-18 maintenance information management using MxI that is much better than the ECMS.” By letter dated February 9, 1999 (Exhibit 1944), Brouse wrote to PWGCS, setting out MxI’s objection to the contract extension:

As stated in the notice, the Government is proposing to extend the Technical Investigation and Engineering Services (TIES) contract for the Engine Condition Monitoring System (ECMS) that manages the maintenance and low cycle fatigue data for the F/A-18 engines. MxI would like to take this opportunity to make the Government aware of our commercially available aviation maintenance management software system known as Maintenix that:

1)Meets and exceeds the capabilities required by the Air Force to support the F/A-18 engines,

2)Has been proven both within the United States Navy F/A-18 program and within Canada at Canadian Forces Base Greenwood,

3)Can be rapidly installed,

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4)Is supportable, and

5)Can be acquired, maintained and operated at less cost than is presently being incurred by the Air Force to meet their requirement.

It is MxI’s understanding that the ECMS version 2 system has been ready for installation for two years (i.e. the system was conditionally accepted by the Government in October, 1996 and had been field proven within the United States Navy at VFA-125 squadron in the fall of 1996) but that the system has yet to be installed for the Canadian Air Force. As a result, the Government requires a contract extension of 6 months to allow for its implementation. MxI would like to highlight the immediacy by which we can install our Maintenix product (i.e. full installation and training within one month of contract award).

Maintenix is one of several products available that can meet the Air Force requirements. By way of example, Sun Country Airlines recently solicited and received bids from 11 vendors to provide a system similar to that required by the Air Force. In light of the fact that these commercial alternatives are available to the Government, MxI believes that the requirement for the provision of an F/A-18 engine data management system should be competed to ensure that the Government obtains the best service/product for the lowest cost.

[874]On March 11, 1999, Forsyth wrote a letter to the Assistant Deputy Minister for DND, making him aware of MxI’s objection to the renewal and advising that MxI had filed an Advance Contract Award Notice (“ACAN”) challenge (Exhibit 1613). By letter dated March 16, 1999, PWGSC advised MxI that their objection had been denied (Exhibit 1947) and that the TIES contract would be extended for a period of six months but no longer. Forsyth reported in his IOI for the week ending March 26, 1999 (Exhibit 1612 at page 9) that “we have now moved into the next level, a challenge to the Canadian International Trade Tribunal (CITT).”

[875]The Canadian International Trade Tribunal (“CITT”) complaint filed by MxI was settled on the basis that the government agreed not to sole source the renewal of the 1996 TIES contract, which would allow MxI to compete for such contract. Accordingly, on December 11, 1999, PWGSC issued a Letter of Intent (“LOI”) to prospective competitors for the renewal of the

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1996 TIES contract asking for comments from the industry on the draft RFP for a CBMS for the F18 engine (see Exhibits 538 and 539).

[876]On December 24, 1999, Brouse wrote a letter (Exhibit 1952) setting out MxI’s comments as requested in Exhibit 538. In his letter, Brouse objected to the two options that had been offered on the grounds that: “In MxI’s view, the RFP, in its present form, strongly favours option 1 (support for the existing ECMS) and in particular, favours existing Canadian Forces contractors … [GasTOPS].” In addition, Brouse objected to the provisions requiring the successful bidder to enter into a non-competition clause with GasTOPS, the cost evaluation and personnel requirements on the grounds that these provisions favoured GasTOPS. Brouse proposed:

MxI respectfully requests that the Air Force consider the following changes to the RFP that will, in MxI’s opinion, facilitate a competition that will yield the best product at the best value to the Crown

1)Remove the requirement for the support of the FLTS and PCGS from this RFP and treat this requirement under a separate contract. This will relieve vendors from agreeing to the penalizing and risky non-compete clauses with GasTOPS,

2)Identify the support tasks that are to be conducted under the technical investigations section of the SOW and ask vendors to quote this work as firm fixed price,

3)Expand the requirement for qualified vendor personnel to include related experience in other aerospace sectors and/or F/A-18 programs.

[877]It appears from Brouse’s letter (Exhibit 1952), that he was using trade/secret confidential proprietary information that he had access to while employed at GasTOPS, namely his knowledge of the software systems that comprised the ECMS.

[878]On May 17, 2000, PWGSC issued the RFP, which now provided that the bidders have the choice of either upgrading or replacing specific components of GasTOPS’ ECMS,

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namely the system manager, life usage manager, engine maintenance reporting system and EMRS components of the system. The upgrade was essentially converting the existing systems from OS/2 operating systems to a Windows operating system and adding additional specified functionality.

[879]By letter dated September 15, 2000 (Exhibit 568), PWGSC advised GasTOPS that MxI had been the successful bidder under the RFP and that the contract was awarded to MxI on the grounds that it had obtained the lowest dollar per point ratio. At the debriefing meeting with PWGSC, GasTOPS was advised that there were only two compliant bidders, MxI and GasTOPS. MxI scored 92.5 points and the value of their bid was $764,000. GasTOPS had scored 85.6 points with a dollar value of $908,000, and as a result MxI was awarded the contract.

[880]The defendants, in their very detailed and excellent submission, state:

(a)the resignations of the defendants did not cause any damage to the plaintiff in relation to the CAF TIES contract;

(b)the defendants’ resignations, or actions before hand, were not the cause of a dispute between the plaintiff and the CAF over ownership of intellectual property rights for ECMS nor did their actions give the Crown an advantage over the plaintiff in this regard;

(c)none of the defendants owed fiduciary duties to GasTOPS on account of their work for the CAF; and

(d)if the defendants or any of them did owe any fiduciary duties to GasTOPS, they did not breach same or there was no damage as a result of any breach.

[881]In their submissions at paragraph 12, the defendants state:

2.On October 7, 1996, the plaintiff chose to terminate Messrs. Forsyth and Brouse immediately upon receiving their letters of resignation. The defendants were not given the opportunity to work through their notice period and update anyone on the status of their projects. Further, GasTOPS rejected the offers of Mr. Forsyth and Mr. Brouse to work under a subcontracting agreement so that a

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proper transition of the work could have taken place. It is submitted that if Messrs. Forsyth and Brouse were needed to fulfill the plaintiff’s obligations to the CAF they would not have acted in this way.

3.Several days later, Messrs. Jeff Cass and Vandenberg expressed their intention to resign to the plaintiff. It was only then that the plaintiff agreed to discuss the possibility of an agreement with Messrs. Forsyth and Brouse. The plaintiff asked Messrs. Cass and Vandenberg to join the other two defendants in supporting GasTOPS under subcontract.

4.The plaintiff and defendants began to negotiate a subcontract agreement but GasTOPS rejected the offer put forward by the defendants. On October 15, 1996, Mr. MacIsaac announced to the company that the negotiations had failed. It is submitted that had the plaintiff needed the defendants to successfully move forward with their opportunities (including the CAF TIES contract) then they would not have closed down negotiations so quickly.

[882]I do not accept the defendants’ argument as set out above. First, the four personal defendants failed to provide GasTOPS with reasonable notice of their resignations. Their argument seems to assume that two weeks’ notice was a reasonable period of notice. When the defendants made it known that they were breaching their fiduciary duty to provide reasonable notice to their employer, GasTOPS did nothing more than act on this breach and ask the defendants Forsyth and Brouse to leave immediately.

[883]Second, Forsyth, Brouse, Jeff Cass and Vandenberg had agreed to a sub-contracting agreement whereby GasTOPS would have merely sole-sourced the work that MSD was doing prior to the resignations for a fee. I have no doubt that this lawsuit would never have materialized had the defendants agreed to perform work for the plaintiff on a fee for service basis. Unfortunately, the defendants wanted far more than a fee for service sub-contract with GasTOPS. The defendants made it clear in their negotiations that they wanted an ownership interest in the IP developed under the terms of the sub-contract agreement.

[884]On all of the evidence surrounding the negotiations concerning the cooperation agreement, it is evident to me that Forsyth and Brouse, who as a result of their resignations

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without reasonable notice and the hiring of others at MxI without reasonable notice to the MSD, placed GasTOPS’ MSD in the position that it was unable to fulfill its contractual obligations and to pursue the business opportunities that it had been pursing. Forsyth and Brouse attempted to take advantage of the situation in which they had put GasTOPS by their breach of their fiduciary duties.

[885]If all of the employees of GasTOPS’ MSD had provided reasonable notice:

a.GasTOPS would have recruited, hired and trained new personnel and then introduced them to its customers and prospective customers, making a seamless transition between old and new employees;

b.GasTOPS would have been able to fulfill its contractual obligations during the period of notice and thereafter without difficulty;

c.GasTOPS would have continued to improve and develop ECMS to meet the changing needs of the business opportunities it was pursuing and the needs of its contractual customers;

d.GasTOPS during the period of notice would have converted ECMS to a Windows NT platform and designed a more generic product.

Accordingly during the period of reasonable notice, the next iteration of ECMS would have been developed by the employees of GasTOPS’ who resigned and went to work for MxI where they developed the fourth iteration of ECMS which they called Maintenix.

[886]If MxI’s founders had provided GasTOPS with reasonable notice of their resignations and had insisted that the employees of GasTOPS to whom they made offers of employment provide GasTOPS with reasonable notice before joining MxI, GasTOPS would have had at least until July 1997 to pursue its business opportunities and to develop a further iteration of ECMS.

[887]The defendants argue that the resignations of the four named defendants did not cause GasTOPS any extraordinary concerns, as it would not have affected the contracts and opportunities that GasTOPS were pursuing or already working under. In terms of the CAF, the defendants argue that the resignations would not cause the testing and roll-out of ECMS v.2 to the Canadian Air Force to be disrupted, as the software had finished the development cycle and

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was in a stable state when these defendants resigned. The task of rolling-out the software to the field and testing was not a task with which any of the defendants were actively involved. MxI argues that the people involved in the roll-out of ECMS v.2 at GasTOPS would have been Chris Cass, Bill Smith, Shawn Spryszak, Mark Lennox and Kirk Strutt.

[888]The defendants argue that it was not the resignation of the named defendants that caused the CAF to stop funding the 1996 TIES contract until a recovery plan had been established; rather, they argue that the request for the recovery plan only came later in October 1996 when most of the other MSD members had resigned.

[889]In my view, this argument fails to appreciate that it was the resignations of MxI’s founders, including the four named defendants, without proper notice and the establishment of MxI that was the root cause of the government requiring a “recovery plan” from GasTOPS. The government was concerned that GasTOPS could no longer fulfill its contractual obligations under the 1996 TIES contract as a result of the loss of its personnel.

[890]On October 19, 1996, Muir prepared a memo entitled “MSD Recovery” (Exhibit 345). In explaining the circumstances under which he had prepared the memo, Muir stated that GasTOPS priorities were to retain as many of its customers as possible, to “stabilize” MxI, to maintain marketing momentum and the momentum on opportunities GasTOPS was pursuing to effect sales, and to rebuilt its engineering or technology capability.

[891]With respect to the CAF, as of October 19, 1996, Muir stated:

Q.What about the Aero program contracts?

A.The Aero program was Brouse's program, and the projects,

particularly those with respect to the Canadian Air Force, were quite dramatically affected by the events; the most significant one of which was the ECMS roll out project where the entire project team, with the exception of a student, Spryszak, had resigned. So clearly, in the case of that project, we needed both the engineering and software resources of MXI.

Q.Looking at page 7 of exhibit 345?

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A.We had a second related ECMS project on another aircraft, the tutor aircraft and the J85 engine. We had a contract, but had not yet started work. Again, the entire project team for that project had resigned. So we were in a position where we would need to retain the services of MXI, both engineering services on an interim basis and software support for the ECMS product.

Q.Looking at item C, being the Sea King CBA?

A.Yes. CBA is a cost benefit analysis. And the Sea King is a helicopter, a maritime helicopter which is operated by the Canadian Air Force and we had a contract in progress with the Canadian Air Force to examine the benefits of implementing condition based maintenance on the helicopter. Laura Klein was the engineer working on the project. And she was leaving before the project was completed. So there was a need to find someone to replace Laura Klein and complete the project.

Q.Turning now to page 8 of 345?

A.The CRAD, that's the research directorate of the Canadian - - the Department of National Defence. We had an ongoing research project that was a collaborative project with Carleton University. They were doing experimental work on the effects of turbine damage. We were doing analytical work, mathematical modelling at GasTops to apply the research to the diagnostics systems, prognostics systems that we were developing. The lead engineer on that was Chris Cass, he resigned; Mike Egan was working on the project and he resigned. We had a subcontractor, Barbara Muir, who’s my wife, and she was going to remain with the project. We needed to, obviously, replace Cass and Egan.

[892]In Muir’s opinion, and I think correctly, GasTOPS was at serious risk of loosing its entire business, including its key customer, the CAF. As Warrant Officer Paré stated, he considered Brouse to be “GasTOPS’ Aero Manager”. Brouse was the lead person responsible for the CAF customer and marketing ECMS to the CAF and other Aero customers.

[893]As previously indicated the defendants’ argument fails to address the fact that in the short-term GasTOPS was unable to fulfill its contractual obligations and in the long-term unable to further enhance ECMS, all as a result of the resignation of the named defendants and the other founders of MxI. In addition, MxI’s conduct in offering employment to other MSD members

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who had not resigned from GasTOPS and whom MxI knew would not provide GasTOPS with reasonable notice, compounded the short-term difficulties of GasTOPS and the long-term effects of such resignations.

[894]The defendants argue that neither Brouse nor Forsyth were fiduciaries of GasTOPS with regard to their work at the CAF. According to the defendants neither Brouse nor Forsyth had exclusive contact with members of the CAF.

[895]The defendants’ argument on the CAF business opportunity and breach of a fiduciary duty by Forsyth, Brouse and Jeff Cass is founded on the theory that, as they were not given complete control over every facet of GasTOPS’ business dealings with the CAF, they could not owe a fiduciary duty to GasTOPS. In my view, Forsyth, Brouse and Jeff Cass were key employees notwithstanding they reported to superiors within GasTOPS and owed a fiduciary duty to GasTOPS.

[896]In their submissions, the defendants submit that Brouse’s “Way Ahead” as set out in his January 30, 1997, memo was limited solely to the Bombardier opportunity. The IOIs issued by Forsyth in 1997 and 1998 indicate in clear terms that Brouse’s “Way Ahead” was the corporate strategy adopted by MxI in all of its dealings with the CAF and was not limited to the Bombardier business opportunity.

[897]In the defendants’ submissions regarding the CAF they state:

The plaintiff often takes issue with the defendants issuing their work experience at GasTOPS in presentations. It is submitted that there is nothing wrong about using past experience to advertise for work even if it means listing the functions of the software created at the old company. This functionality was not confidential. It was listed by the plaintiff in various brochures and was obviously known by members of the CAF as they owned and used the ECMS software that had this functionality. In fact, members of the CAF would themselves give demonstrations of the software at CIP meetings.

[898]The information contained in presentations made by the defendants to GasTOPS’ customers or potential customers went much further than simply listing the defendants’ past

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experiences. The purpose of the presentations was to show that the members of MxI had developed the ECMS and FLTS technology and the vast majority (70%) of the MSD employees had moved to MxI. In my view, the purpose of including such information in the presentations by MxI was to convince customers of GasTOPS and potential customers of GasTOPS that if they wanted to consider using a product similar to ECMS and/or FLTS they should contract with MxI because it had the expertise and experience in developing and customizing such products, where as GasTOPS no longer did. The purpose of including information on MxI’s employee’s experience was to convince potential customers that MxI was a spin-off from the MSD. It is also evident that the information contained in the presentations was designed to show that the MxI product was the next iteration of GasTOPS’ product.

[899]It is important to keep in mind the circumstances surrounding these presentations. MxI was only able to make the claim that it had the experience and ability to support, while GasTOPS no longer did, as a result of the failure of the founding members of MxI to give proper notice. In addition, these presentations were being made to the customers and/or potential customers of GasTOPS all of whom were considering acquiring ECMS v.2 and/or FLTS technology from GasTOPS. It would be a different situation if the presentations made by MxI containing past history, expertise and past product development had been made to the commercial airline market and more particularly, customers within that market place that GasTOPS had not been pursuing. The presentations made by MxI and entered into evidence at this trial were made to customers or potential customers of GasTOPS by former employees of GasTOPS who as a result of their failure to provide GasTOPS with reasonable notice were attempting to take advantage of the breach of their fiduciary duty.

[900]MxI submits, based on a detailed review of the evidence, that “it was the Crown that sought to have MxI do the work and not MxI that initially solicited the Crown.” As stated earlier, it was clear to me that MxI was pursuing Crown work as early as mid-October 1996. Even if I assume that it was the Crown pursuing MxI in November and December 1996 and in 1997, the fact that the Crown and/or the CAF was pursuing MxI arose directly from the defendants’ failure to provide GasTOPS with reasonable notice.

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[901]The defendants cannot argue, in my view, that notwithstanding the breach of their fiduciary duty to provide GasTOPS with reasonable notice (which destroyed the MSD) that they are entitled to take advantage of their tortious conduct and accept work from the Crown and/or the CAF. It may well be that the CAF had to pursue MxI as it needed ECMS or a similar product to be rolled-out. The fact that the Crown and/or the CAF required the MxI product and/or support was a direct result of the tortious conduct of the defendants.

[902]Almost from the moment Brouse and Forsyth resigned from GasTOPS, they, along with others at MxI, maintained a business relationship with Warrant Officer Paré. The evidence leads to the conclusion that MxI was attempting to obtain commercial intelligence concerning GasTOPS from Warrant Officer Paré. I am sure that the information which MxI received from Warrant Officer Paré concerning GasTOPS’ relationship with the CAF and its recovery from the mass resignations was useful to MxI in its pursuit of the CAF business opportunity.

[903]The fact that there were such conversations between Warrant Officer Paré and members of MxI is an indication of MxI’s determination to usurp GasTOPS’ business opportunity with the CAF and interfere with its contractual relationship with the CAF. If MxI had not been attempting to usurp such business opportunities, there would be no reason for MxI to be seeking corporate intelligence from Warrant Officer Paré. In addition, if Forsyth and Brouse really meant what they said in their letters of resignation, they would have told Warrant Officer Paré that they were not interested in information concerning GasTOPS and that he should not convey such information to them.

[904]On January 30, 1997, Forsyth and Brouse met with Major Comtois and discussed business opportunities for MxI. While Forsyth and Brouse were employed at GasTOPS, neither of them had worked closely with Major Comtois. Muir did not suggest that GasTOPS had been working with Major Comtois in pursuit of CAF work. There was evidence that Chivers had spoken to Major Comtois.

[905]In early March 1997, MxI hosted Major Comtois at its facility and trained him to give demonstrations of their software prototype named FlightWorks. Major Comtois left with a

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version of FlightWorks on a laptop in order to give demonstrations of the software to the CAF squadrons he visited. According to Forsyth, one of the reasons for MxI giving Major Comtois a copy of FlightWorks for demonstration was to determine if the military market would be open to using aviation maintenance software designed for commercial operators. Again I find this rationale for giving a copy of FlightWorks to Major Comtois strange, as Forsyth maintained that MxI was not targeting the military market place.

[906]According to MxI, Major Comtois demonstrated FlightWorks at Squadron 441 and MxI received an RFP from that Squadron dated March 12, 1997, as a result. The RFP dealt with a “servicing desk” application to support line maintenance at various locations. Forsyth said that he understood that Squadron 441 was using a paper-based system to record servicing data and wanted to switch to an electronic application.

[907]On March 27, 1997 MxI submitted a proposal to Squadron 441 in response to the RFP. The proposal sought to have Squadron 441 accept the opportunity to become a beta site for FlightWorks, which would also fulfill the needs from the RFP. The proposal would allow Squadron 441 to use the software for a nominal license fee ($1.00), but Squadron 441 would have to pay for travel expenses and some labour cost. The proposal was accepted by Squadron 441 by letter dated April 17, 1997 (Exhibit 1988). Work began on planning the project by MxI but the project was terminated in the spring of 1998. MxI submits that the business opportunity with Squadron 441 was a “service desk” opportunity and GasTOPS was not aware of such an opportunity prior to October 1996 and never pursued such an opportunity.

[908]In my view, the importance of MxI’s business relationship with Squadron 441 was that Brouse and Forsyth were pursuing the CAF with a software product that was based on the design specifications and functionality of ECMS v.2. This was an attempt by Forsyth and Brouse to have the military test FlightWorks. It was important for MxI to have the military test FlightWorks, as MxI and more particularly Forsyth and Brouse intended to target the military market place and more particularly the CAF and thereby usurp GasTOPS’ business opportunity with the CAF.

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[909]MxI submits that the business opportunity it developed with Squadron 434 (Greenwood T-Birds and Challengers) was not one that GasTOPS had ever pursued before or after the resignations of the defendants. The opportunity which arose in September 1997 was, according to MxI, for Squadron 434 to be a beta site for FlightWorks. The opportunity arose when Brouse spoke with Major Lavoie, who was in charge of the T-Bird aircraft. Major Wendlandt, who worked with the T-Birds based in Comox, British Columbia, was Captain MacDonald’s predecessor and was responsible for the ECMS project. Accordingly, I am satisfied that the defendants Forsyth and Brouse knew Major Wendlandt on a professional basis while they were employed at GasTOPS. There was no evidence introduced at trial that GasTOPS had ever pursued the T-Bird fleet of aircraft being operated by the CAF prior to the resignations. The relationship between MxI and Squadron 434 included several phases:

(a)Phase 1: MxI software was to be installed at the aircraft maintenance control and records office;

(b)Phase 2: The software would be set up on PC’s throughout the base so others could utilize the information; and

(c)Phase 3: There was to be replication of data forwarded to National Defence Headquarters. Eventually, Phase 3 was modified and instead of replication, the scope of the project at Squadron 434 was extended. The data testing included seven Challenger aircraft and 21 T-Birds.

The only revenues received from this project came at the end of the project when Greenwood (Squadron 434) provided $24,936.35 to support the wrap up.

[910]Although I am satisfied that MxI was soliciting the Sea King business opportunity, eventually GasTOPS was awarded the contract to provide ECMS v.2 to the Sea King. As a result, no damages arise from the Sea King business opportunity.

[911]According to the defendants, the MASIS project was to create a centralized information system to track all materials for the whole of the Canadian Armed Forces (Army, Navy and Air Force). The defendants suggest that Chivers spoke with Bourret at Canadair (Bombardier) in July 1996 and discussed various issues including MASIS as a project that

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GasTOPS and Canadair could work on together. In their submissions, the defendants state:

Mr. Muir testified that Mr. Brouse was “following MASIS” and had met once with “MASIS people”. He also testified that Mr. Chivers would have been maintaining contact with MASIS people. Mr. Brouse testified that his only activity was attending a meeting in June 1996 with a Canadian Army Captain who gave a description of MASIS and how a system named Delta may fit within it. Mr. Forsyth thought some people at GasTOPS may have been looking at providing condition based maintenance functionality for MASIS. There is no documentary evidence of any significant work being undertaken by GasTOPS in pursuit of the MASIS opportunity prior to the resignations nor is it listed in the business plans.

GasTOPS only opened a business opportunity file for MASIS in 1997. GasTOPS’ customer was IBM who was acting as the head contractor for a team of different companies. MASIS only issued a request for proposals in 1998.

In his evidence, Mr. Muir considered MASIS to be a new opportunity as of June 1997:

Q.Now, Mr. Muir, we had talked of the recovery period up to June of 1997. Can you tell us between June of 1997 to the end of December 1997, did GasTops obtain any new opportunities?

A.Yes. We pursued a small number of new opportunities. We were successful in coming to a teaming agreement with IBM for the project known as MASIS, M-A-S-I-S, which was a Canadian Air Force project to implement -- sorry, was a Department of National Defence project to implement a -- what they called a “material acquisition system".

MxI also sought to pursue the MASIS opportunity. They spoke with companies they thought would be prime contractors such as Lockheed Martin and SHL. Neither of these were GasTOPS’ customers. On March 26, 1997 there were phone conversations between Mr. Forsyth and Majors Comtois and Rufiange. After these conversations Mr. Forsyth made the note that “it’s becoming clearer that Comtois and Rufiange are both involved with MASIS

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project and may be key guys in making certain decisions”. It is obvious from this note that the defendants did not have a good grasp as to how MASIS was proceeding as they are only then finding out who may be key players in the process.

[912]These submissions suggest that MASIS was only a business opportunity for GasTOPS commencing in 1997. This suggestion ignores Forsyth and Brouse’s evidence that GasTOPS was pursuing the MASIS opportunity in early 1996. Forsyth, in his logbook entry for Tuesday, December 17, 1996, stated: “met with Jeff to discuss what we could recall of MASIS and MIMS.”

[913]The business opportunity that GasTOPS was pursuing in a teaming relationship with IBM was the MASIS project. The business opportunity was not with IBM but rather was the MASSIS project. Eventually IBA supported by GasTOPS was the successful bidder on the project.

[914]MxI suggests that it did not solicit a customer of GasTOPS when seeking to bid on the MASIS project. The customer was not the F404 cell of the CAF with whom GasTOPS had its primary dealings, nor was it even the CAF as its scope also included the Navy and Army.

[915]In my view, although IBM was the successful bidder on the MASIS project and GasTOPS was teaming with IBM on this project, the importance of the evidence surrounding the MASIS project as it relates to this lawsuit is that it establishes, that MxI was attempting to usurp the business opportunity that GasTOPS was pursuing through a teaming arrangement with IBM. Forsyth was aware that GasTOPS had been pursuing the MASIS project when he was employed at GasTOPS. It must always be remembered in a case such as this, which involves sophisticated technology, the time between the start of the pursuit of a business opportunity and the signing of a contract to provide such technology can take years.

[916]On July 20, 1998, Brouse wrote to Colonel Ryan of Director Aerospace Equipment Business Management in the CAF to solicit interest in their purchasing Maintenix to act as an interim system while DND developed MASIS. Brouse had never met Colonel Ryan and received no reply to his letter or telephone inquiries.

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[917]On October 21, 1998, after IBM, working with GasTOPS, had been selected to implement MASIS, Brouse again wrote to Colonel Ryan attaching an unsolicited proposal soliciting the CAF to use Maintenix for its various aircraft while MASIS was being developed. Brouse represented to the CAF that Maintenix can “readily replace ECMS II”. In early November 1998, Brouse met with Lieutenant-Colonel Mitchell to discuss the unsolicited proposal. Brouse wrote a follow-up letter after the meeting (Exhibit 1943) inviting Lieutenant- Colonel Mitchell to visit MxI’s facility. In February 1999 Brouse received a letter from Colonel Ryan informing Brouse that he was not interested in pursuing the unsolicited proposal.

[918]Although MxI was not successful in its solicitation of work through Colonel Ryan, it is apparent from Brouse’s actions that MxI was competing with GasTOPS for business opportunities which GasTOPS had been pursuing prior to the resignations.

[919]MxI submits that by 1998 any fiduciary duties the defendants may have owed to GasTOPS would have been long extinguished. I do not accept this argument, as the business opportunities which were being pursued by GasTOPS prior to the resignation of Forsyth and Brouse were opportunities that take years to come to fruition. GasTOPS began to pursue the MASIS opportunity in the summer of 1996; the contract was awarded in 1998.

[920]As previously indicated, the 1996 TIES contract which had been extended was competed by PWGSC as the 1999 TIES competition. On September 15, 2000, PWGSC advised GasTOPS that the contract had been awarded to MxI.

[921]Brouse had started his “Way Ahead” corporate strategy shortly after leaving GasTOPS. By using all the contacts he had made while at GasTOPS and by developing the next iteration of ECMS v.2 technology, he put MxI in a position to compete for the 1999 TIES contract. MxI suggests that there was no “way ahead plan” and that “nor was there evidence that could link the success MxI had with the Greenwood Beta to the 1999 TIES competition”.

[922]On March 18, 1999, Brouse in a letter (Exhibit 1947) directed to Helen Williams, Assistant Deputy Minister, PWGSC, complaining of DND’s intention to sole source a contract

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extension to GasTOPS stated in part: “Maintenix was fully and rigorously tested via an MxI financed trial at Canadian Forces Base (CFB Greenwood) for a period of one year…”.

[923]In para. 201 of its submissions, MxI suggests that it won the 1999 TIES competition by being able to develop a software system with the same functionality that the CAF sought. This statement confirms Dr. Mendelzon’s opinion that Maintenix and ECMS had the same functionality and Maintenix was the fourth iteration of the same functionality.

[924]If the personal defendants had provided GasTOPS with reasonable notice, GasTOPS would have been able to carry out its plan to develop and market the fourth iteration of ECMS which would have resulted in ECMS being the leading computerized aviation maintenance program. If this had occurred GasTOPS would have dominated the aviation marketplace in the field of computerized maintenance.

[925]In my view the defendants are liable to the plaintiff for any losses it suffered vis-à- vis the CAF contracts and/or business opportunities as a result of:

(1)Failing to give reasonable notice of their intention to resign;

(2)Offering employment to employees of MSD of GasTOPS knowing such employees would not give reasonable notice of their intention to resign;

(3)Soliciting customers or potential customers of GasTOPS;

(4)Using confidential business information that was the property of GasTOPS;

(5)Using its knowledge of ECMS to create Maintenix and thereby avoiding the time and effort to develop Maintenix without relying on the IP upon which ECMS was based; and

(6)Interfering with GasTOPS’ business relationship with the CAF.

U.S. Navy

[926]During the early part of November 1996, the GasTOPS/B.F.Goodrich team attended several meetings with the U.S. Navy to further promote the ECMS product. On November 4,

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1996, Brouse, together with the assistance of a representative from B.F.Goodrich, presented a demonstration of the ECMS product to Captain Joe Dyer, PMA265, the entity responsible for the F/A-18 fighter aircraft. Brouse stated that, at the meeting, Lieutenant Herl made a PowerPoint presentation to Captain Dyer similar to, if not the same as, Exhibit 376, which later given by Lieutenant Herl to Captain Derrick. In the presentation given by Lieutenant Herl, the GasTOPS’ ECMS product was promoted as a potential ECAMS replacement. In his presentation, Herl promoted ECMS over the competing MDP system indicating that ECMS was more compliant to the U.S. Navy’s requirements than was the MDP system. At pages 9 and 10 of his presentation, Herl reiterated the functionality and flexibility of the ECMS product, as well as the life cycle cost savings that had been experienced by the CAF through their use of ECMS.

[927]In his Trip Report on his briefing to Captain Joe Dyer dated November 4, 1996 (Exhibit 370), Brouse noted:

Marie Greening identified that although PMA265 has set aside $3M for installation and roll-out, it is the position of PMA265 that PMA260. should pay for the license fee. Apparently, PMA260 has the money required to outfit the fleet, but it is presently car-marked for further MDP development. Lt. Herl has confirmed that the cost of the ECMS outfitted for the fleet is equivalent to the MDP budget. As a result, it appears that Capt. Derrick is still very much a player in this contact.

The present thinking in PMA265 is that if we insta1l soon, then PMA260 will be boxed in and that they can make a very compelling case to Derrick to cough up the money for licenses. In that regard, I have promised Lt. Herl that we can have the ECMS customized as an ECAMS replacement within 4 months. This promise has been relayed to Capt. Dyer and his team.

[928]On November 13 and 14, 1996, GasTOPS/B.F.Goodrich made further demonstrations of the GasTOPS’ ECMS product to senior representatives within the U.S. Navy. On November 13, 1996, Muir and Howe made a demonstration of the GasTOPS’ ECMS product to Buzz Milan the deputy commander of the logistics section of NAVAIR. Prior to the software demonstration, Lieutenant Herl made a PowerPoint presentation (Exhibit 375) which, according to Muir was identical, except for the title page, to the presentation given by Herl to Captain Derrick

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(Exhibit 376) on the following day. As the presentations were similar, Muir only retained the title page of Exhibit 375. Based on the presentations made by Herl on November 13 and 14 to Milan and Captain Derrick, Herl remained an advocate of ECMS and promoted it as the preferred software solution.

[929]Muir provided a demonstration of GasTOPS’ ECMS software to Milan and at the conclusion of the demonstration, Milan thanked Muir and Lieutenant Herl for their presentations and complimented Muir on the GasTOPS’ software product. Milan stated that he felt the GasTOPS’ ECMS product was the kind of product that the U.S. Navy needed and he further told Muir that their need went beyond just the F-18, as they needed an information tool such as ECMS for all aspects of their equipment maintenance including surface ships and other weapons systems that they operated.

[930]Howe, who was also in attendance at the presentation to Milan, stated that although Lieutenant Herl had expressed some initial regrets about the manner in which the ECMS demonstration had proceeded, the presentation had gone extremely well and that there was possibly an opportunity to apply the ECMS technology to turbine driven ships.

[931]On the following day, November 14, 1996 the GasTOPS/BFG team met with Captain Derrick of PMA260. According to Muir, Lieutenant Herl gave the same presentation that had been given to Milan on the day before to Captain Derrick. Subsequent to Lieutenant Herl’s presentation, Muir provided a further demonstration of the ECMS software. At the conclusion of his demonstration, Muir was asked by Captain Derrick to leave the meeting room. After an in- camera meeting, Captain Derrick emerged and thanked Muir for his presentation and complimented him on the ECMS product. Lieutenant Herl then announced that both GasTOPS and the MDP group, being the PMA260 group would be further funded to develop their systems to a common specification and that the said activity would take place over the next three or four months resulting in the customization of the two products. Muir understood that the comparison would be funded by the U.S. Navy and would be completed in April 1997.

[932]On November 21, 1996, GasTOPS received an e-mail from Lieutenant Herl along

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with an attachment (Exhibit 391). The attachment was a Memorandum of Agreement dated November 19, 1996 between PMA265 and PMA260. The memorandum was as follows:

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[933]Accordingly, there was to be a final draft of the MDPS replacement system specifications by mid-December 1996. Both systems, the ECMS and MDP, were to be equally funded to modify/configure the two software systems to meet the specifications. With respect to scheduling, the Memorandum of Agreement provided that the software systems needed to be fully functional to support the F/A-18 A, B, C and D aircraft at all levels of maintenance without further development and with an integrated AME and F/A-18 E and F solution to be delivered in mid-1998. The final selection was to be made by April 30, 1997.

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[934]GasTOPS subsequently received the EMDPS from Lieutenant Herl, which was the specification document referred in the Memorandum of Agreement. Lieutenant Herl asked GasTOPS to provide its comments on the specifications as he wished to incorporate functionalities and features of the ECMS product into the specifications so that the specifications would more accurately reflect ECMS’ capabilities.

[935]On November 27, 1996, GasTOPS responded to Lieutenant Herl’s request for comments on the EMDPS. Muir stated in regard to Exhibit 392:

A.Yes. This is a fax sent by Mr. Bérubé of GasTops to Lieutenant Herl on the 27 of November, 1996.

In this document, Mr. Bérubé is providing Lieutenant Herl with our comments and feedback on a specification that we had been provided, referred to as the “EMDP spec". The EMDP or enhanced MDP spec, my understanding of the document that was provided to us by Lieutenant Herl for review was that this was the document or the spec which was referred to in the memorandum of agreement, the specification which was to be used by both GasTops and the MDP group as a definition of the requirements that we were to meet in the next phase of the program.

[936]Prior to and during November 1996, Lieutenant Herl was promoting the GasTOPS’ ECMS product as the preferred software solution for the U.S. Navy’s configuration management, parts life tracking and data stripping needs. Lieutenant Herl’s confidence and support was a key development in the procurement process, given the obvious influence he had in the U.S. Navy’s decision making process. The defendants suggest that decisions regarding procurement were made at levels above Lieutenant Herl. Regardless of whether the said decisions were actually made at higher levels, it is clear from the evidence that Lieutenant Herl was the person responsible for making the key recommendations and that those recommendations were acted on.

[937]On December 11, 1996, the GasTOPS/B.F.Goodrich team forwarded to Captain Dyer its proposal for the implementation of the ECMS product to the fleet of F/A-18 aircraft. The GasTOPS/BFG proposal was attached to the cover letter and described as: “Engine Condition Monitoring System for the U.S. Navy F/A-18 A-D” (Exhibit 396). The proposal contained

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GasTOPS’ understanding as to the nature of the U.S. Navy’s requirements as well as the proposed means by which GasTOPS/B.F.Goodrich would meet those requirements. The proposal also contained pricing and roll-out strategies. The proposal noted that the document was “Proprietary-Competition sensitive”. On each of the actual proposal pages, there was a disclaimer that read, “This document contains material which is the proprietary property of B.F.Goodrich Aerospace and should be treated as a confidential disclosure in accordance with the statement on the title page.”

[938]The GasTOPS/B.F.Goodrich team considered the information in the proposal to be confidential business information. Brouse was familiar with the information contained in the proposal, which was largely based on his marketing efforts at GasTOPS.

[939]At page of 3 of the U.S. Navy proposal (Exhibit 396), under the sub-heading “Executive Summary”, the GasTOPS/B.F.Goodrich team described the U.S. Navy problem:

With the recent cancellation of the Maintenance Data Processing System (MDPS) program, the Navy is faced with the following problems:

!An F/A-18 Enhanced Comprehensive Asset Management System (ECAMS) which is virtually unsupportable

!Short term Foreign Military Sales (FMS) commitments which need to be met

!A disruption and potential delay to the F/A-18 Automated Maintenance Environment (AME) development

Further, the United States Navy proposal provided:

A phased acquisition plan is proposed whereby, under Phase I, BFGoodrich will tailor and install an interim fleetwide MDPS replacement. This will occur within a period ii months in response to the Navy’s short term needs for an F/A-18 ECAMS replacement and an MDPS replacement for EMS customers. Under Phase II, BFGoodrich will work closely with the Navy to field a permanent MDPS replacement system, fully compliant with the F/A-18 AME technical requirements and implementation schedule of mid-1998.

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[940]The proposal described ECMS in an overview as follows:

The ECMS is a general purpose database system designed to track the location, configuration, life usage status, condition and maintenance history of serialized aircraft components.

[941]It is clear that GasTOPS/B.F.Goodrich was proposing to provide to the U.S. Navy the serialized configuration tracking technology it was seeking. Further, although the immediate focus of phase 1 of the implementation plan was to outfit the A through D fighter aircraft, as an ECAMS replacement, the long-term proposal was to have the ECMS form a component part of the AME initiative for use on the E and F Super Hornet aircraft. GasTOPS submits that the defendants purposely resigned without proper notice in order to establish a competing company that had identified from its inception the U.S. Navy as one of its primary target markets. The plaintiff submits that the fact that MxI was targeting the U.S. Navy it is evident from page 9 of the MxI business plan presentation dated October 21, 1996 (Exhibit 1322). Notwithstanding that GasTOPS had issued a stop work order to the defendants Brouse was actively pursuing the U.S. Navy opportunity through direct contact with Lieutenant Herl, Terry Chandler and possible partner Bombardier.

[942]In addition, in November 1996 Brouse actively sought an ECMS license on behalf of MxI to sell ECMS licenses directly to the United States Navy for the financial benefit of MxI.

[943]GasTOPS/B.F.Goodrich knew through their interaction with the U.S. Navy, as well as through direct contact with the Kuwaiti Air Force, that sales of ECMS licenses to the U.S. Navy might result in sales to foreign military customers once the ECMS product became the replacement for the failed MDPS. It was also understood that if the GasTOPS’ product became an MDPS replacement, that ECMS could be applied across various other fleets, including the F- 414 and V-22 aircraft.

[944]On November 10, 1996, Forsyth, Brouse, Jeff Cass, Peloso Reynolds and Chris Cass being six of the seven founders of MxI met “to discuss BFG and GTL” (Exhibit 958, page 13). At the meeting and as reflected in the logbook entries of Forsyth (Exhibit 958, page 13),

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“We agree to wait for our discussions with B.F.Goodrich before we act.” On November 11, 1996, GasTOPS issued a verbal stop work order to MxI. The defendants understood that a stop work order had been issued. In his logbook, Vandenberg (Exhibit 1788, page 5) wrote: “Today we were “flicked” by GTL. A full stop work order given.”

[945]By early November 1996, the defendants were already seeking to insinuate themselves into the U.S. Navy opportunity by seeking a private audience with GasTOPS’ partner, B.F.Goodrich. On November 11, 1996, Forsyth wrote in his logbook (Exhibit 958): “Doug received a call from Brad Howe. He (sic) won’t be at GasTOPS until the afternoon and are going to dinner with Bernie. They may visit us tomorrow.”

[946]Muir stated that prior to B.F.Goodrich’s trip to Ottawa on November 11, 1996, Brad Howe told him he had received a telephone call from Brouse. According to Howe, Brouse told him that although his lawyers had advised him not to speak to Howe, Brouse had something he wanted to show Howe at the MxI premises. On November 13, 1996, Muir made a note to his file that Brouse had invited Howe to visit MxI. In my opinion it is clear that Brouse was actively soliciting a meeting with B.F.Goodrich, GasTOPS’ business partner on the U.S. Navy opportunity. It is a reasonable inference that Brouse had been advised that his conduct in soliciting a meeting with B.F.Goodrich was inappropriate and constituted a breach of his post- employment obligations to GasTOPS.

[947]Within days of failing to arrange a meeting with B.F.Goodrich, MxI turned its attention to Bombardier. On November 15, 1996, Forsyth met with Serge Leguellec of the Defense Systems Division of Bombardier. Brouse prepared a presentation dated November 19, 1996 (Exhibit 1990) for presentation to Bombardier. In the Bombardier presentation, MxI emphasized that it consisted of virtually the entire former MSD. The Bombardier presentation also claimed that while employed at GasTOPS, the “MxI team” had developed the ECMS. The description of the functionality of the MxI product that was then provided was almost identical to the described functionality of the ECMS product, and the “product flexibility” was identical to the product flexibility of GasTOPS’ ECMS product (except that ECMS could not be configured by the user in 1996).

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[948]In March 1996, and while employed at GasTOPS, Brouse had prepared an unsolicited proposal to the CAF (Exhibit 130) that envisioned GasTOPS and Bombardier working together to expand the application of the ECMS product to the entirety of the aircraft. At pages 5 and 9 of Exhibit 130, Brouse described the ECMS database as being configurable to support CF-18 aircraft maintenance, including “information regarding the various maintenance organizations, aircraft component hierarchy, inspection cycles, life limits, etc.” In my view, the Bombardier presentation (Exhibit 1990) was an attempt to convey to Bombardier that MxI was in fact the successor of the MSD and that the MxI product would be virtually identical in its functionality and flexibility to the ECMS product.

[949]The Bombardier presentation (Exhibit 1990) is extremely revealing as to the intentions of MxI and its targeted customers. Page 8 of Exhibit 1990 states:

Immediate Opportunities

Canadian Air Force CF-18

-DMS having installation difficulties

-loss of ECMS support

-ECMS contractor has lost 25% of staff

-ECMS hosted on unsupportable OS/2

-ECMS Intellectual Property (IP) dispute

-Pending result of IP dispute, Crown may compete ECMS support

United States Navy

-no ground station support for F/A-18

-losing interest in OS/2 solution

-will likely compete for new system.

[950]This presentation as a whole is a clear indication to me that the MxI product was functionally the same product as GasTOPS’ ECMS and was being promoted as an alternative to the ECMS product. It is also obvious from this presentation that MxI was competing for the U.S. Navy opportunity and the CAF contracts. In addition the Bombardier presentation contains confidential business information concerning the GasTOPS/B.F.Goodrich relationship with the U.S. Navy on the sale of ECMS product.

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[951]The Bombardier presentation indicates that there had been contact between MxI and the U.S. Navy as of November 19, 1996, and, according to MxI, the U.S. Navy had expressed a serious interest in MxI. The only inference which can be drawn from this information is that MxI had been soliciting the U.S. Navy business opportunity and the U.S. Navy was interested, in the MxI product.

[952]It is astounding to me that by November 19, 1996, the U.S. Navy, was aware of the product that MxI would be marketing when it had taken GasTOPS six years (according to MxI) to develop ECMS. I can only assume that the product being proposed by MxI was a copy of the ECMS program to be written in Windows, which was what MacIsaac had stated GasTOPS would be doing on October 4, 1996.

[953]The timing of the Bombardier presentation, dated November 19, 1996, is consistent with the timing of Brouse’s request to the Canadian government for a license to sell the ECMS product. Brouse attached to his letter a listing of the software systems that MxI was interested in licensing. The list was identical to the listing of software that the defendants had previously identified as being the subject matter of the potential sale of ECMS licenses by GasTOPS to the U.S. Navy.

[954]At page 2 of Exhibit 421A (letter to Rodney Kyle), Brouse in his license request to Kyle, described the “Requested Software Systems for Licensing” as being:

a.Engine Condition Monitoring System (v.2.0)

b.Engine Maintenance Reporting System (all versions)

c.First Line Troubleshooting System (v.5), and

d.Portable CF-18 Ground Station (all versions)

Accordingly, the defendants were seeking to license from the Canadian government the exact same technology that was the subject matter of GasTOPS’ potential sale of ECMS licenses to the U.S. Navy. Not only was Brouse attempting to secure the U.S. Navy opportunity for MxI, but he was also attempting to prevent his former employer from pursuing such business opportunity.

[955] The defendants claim that the Bombardier presentation dated November 19, 1996

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(Exhibit 1990) was never presented to senior management at Bombardier. It is true that the defendants continued to modify Exhibit 1990 up to December 3, 1996, and as such it became a separate PowerPoint presentation to Bombardier (Exhibit 2170). The “properties” pages associated with Exhibit 2170, introduced at trial as Exhibit 2171, confirmed that Exhibit 2170 was last modified on December 3, 1996, at 12:41 p.m. In my view, Exhibit 2170 is not appreciably different from Exhibit 1990 and continues to attempt to convey the impression, that the MSD has moved to MxI, and it was the employees of MxI who had developed ECMS while at GasTOPS. In addition, the PowerPoint presentation attempts to convey to those who view it, that MxI, is developing a version of ECMS on a Windows platform. On pages 13 and 14 of Exhibit 2170, MxI again reiterated the fact that GasTOPS had been very close to the sale of the ECMS product to the U.S. Navy and that the U.S. Navy was losing interest in GasTOPS’ solution. The PowerPoint presentation also reiterated that the U.S. Navy had expressed a serious interest in MxI but that MxI would require a partner. At page 15 of Exhibit 2170, the defendants identified the benefits of a partnership between MxI and the defence services division of Bombardier as including, inter alia:

MxI technical support advantage was to win CF ELMS support contract (if competed).

MxI technical support advantageous to win U.S. Navy F/A-18

Ground Station (if competed).

[956]As of December 3, 1996, MxI was actively promoting a partnership between MxI and Bombardier in order to pursue the U.S. Navy opportunity, which the personal defendants had pursued while employed at GasTOPS, namely to provide configuration management/parts life tracking to the U.S. Navy due to there being “no ground support for F/A-18” (Exhibit 2170, page 13). The fact that MxI intended, if possible, to partner with Bombardier to usurp the U.S. Navy opportunity from GasTOPS is evidenced in a subsequent e-mail from Brouse to Chris Cass of MxI dated May 30, 1997 (Exhibit 2104):

Serge and I are meeting on Monday (finally). I broke the news to him about our involvement with the USN. He got really excited and claimed this is just the kind of ammunition he needs to go back

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to his management. Serge admitted that Canadair has been avoiding us because of the lawsuit. I told him that decision cost them the opportunity with the USN. Serge claims that he wants to work with us on the commercial side - but he said that would lead to other market segments???

[957]With respect to the substantive content of Exhibit 1990 (Bombardier presentation dated November 19, 1996), Brouse suggested that “after discussing it with Forsyth, we decided that in fact it was inappropriate to provide that to Bombardier…”. In cross-examination, Brouse stated:

Q.Did you feel, Mr. Brouse, that it was inappropriate to provide that information to Bombardier?

A.We’re discussing specifically where GasTOPS was with the United States Navy, that’s not really public knowledge -- At any rate, I had come to the conclusion -- or I thought it was but Mr. Forsyth thought it wasn't. At any rate, so we’re are discussing that, yeah, that topic.

Q.You discussed the fact that the status of GasTOPS' pursuit of the U.S. Navy opportunity was in essence confidential business information; correct?

A.Yes, we shouldn't be discussing it was our conclusion, yes.

Q.Because it was confidential business information?

A.Or people might consider it to be confidential, yes.

[958]The above evidence of Brouse demonstrates that Brouse knew that the existence, status and particulars of GasTOPS’ marketing efforts to the United States Navy were confidential business information and proprietary to GasTOPS, not only with respect to a competitor such as Bombardier but also with respect to a potential competitor such as MxI. Notwithstanding this knowledge, Forsyth and Brouse used this confidential business information as an impetuous to incorporate their own competing business (see Exhibit 2194, MxI 1997 Business Plan Presentation (last modification date October 21/96) from MxI 1999 Lotus Notes back up CDs from Forsyth’s home directory).

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[959]In addition, confidential business information which Brouse knew to be confidential was used in the presentation made to Bombardier on December 3, 1996 (Exhibit 2170). In addition to Exhibit 2170 containing confidential business information, it also demonstrates the depth of MxI’s involvement with the United States Navy in November and December 1996.

[960]The actions of MxI, and more particularly Forsyth and Brouse, leave no doubt in my mind, that as early as October 21, 1996, the personal defendants had identified the United States Navy, in its capacity as an operator of the GE 404 F/A-18 engines, as being a vital part of MxI’s “target market.” In this regard, the actions of Forsyth, Brouse and MxI are consistent with this objective.

[961]When Kyle of the Directorate of Intellectual Property responded to MxI’s “ECMS U.S. and Canada IP License Request” by denying the request (Exhibit 422) Brouse refused to accept Kyle’s position and subsequently corresponded further with Kyle on November 27, 1996 requesting further reasons for the denial of the license request.

[962]At trial, pursuant to my order during the presentation of the defence that electronic copies of back up tapes be produced, two key documents were discovered that were directly related to GasTOPS’ pursuit of the U.S. Navy opportunity and which were confidential business information GasTOPS. The first document, was Exhibit 2186, entitled “U.S. Navy ECMS Implementation Plan”. Exhibit 2186 was an electronic copy of Exhibit 93 which was introduced at trial by GasTOPS. The second document found on the home directories was entitled “Cost of Implementation” (Exhibit 2188) and contained the estimated man days associated with the U.S. Navy ECMS implementation plan.

[963]Brouse conceded that he had prepared Exhibit 2186 while he was employed by GasTOPS. The U.S. Navy ECMS Implementation Plan was a commercially sensitive and confidential document which was proprietary to GasTOPS. Despite the demand contained in the Shields and Hunt letter dated November 18, 1996 (Exhibit 382) and Forsyth’s assurance that MxI would return all confidential information to GasTOPS, including any such information that they had used in the course of the cooperation agreement phase between the companies (Exhibit

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383), the defendants kept copies of this most valuable and confidential document. Further, the defendants failed to disclose the fact that they possessed the said document during the documentation disclosure process in this trial.

[964]Brouse when asked if he had any explanation as to how the United States Navy ECMS implementation plan (Exhibit 2186) was found on the MxI server stated:

A.Yes. We were in possession of the document; it was on -- certainly in our notebooks. I may have kept a copy because we are transferring the notebooks back and forth to GasTOPS all the time, kept a copy on my PC, my desk-top PC that I brought in from home, eventually it found its way to our server. I neglected to delete it when GasTOPS asked us to return all the properties, I clearly neglected to delete this one, or -- at any rate.

I simply do not believe Brouse when he said: “I neglected to delete it when GasTOPS asked us to return all the properties, I clearly neglected to delete this one, or -- at any rate.” Brouse and Forsyth knew the importance of not misappropriating and relying upon confidential business information of GasTOPS and despite the assurance by Forsyth that all documents would be returned, the defendants retained the U.S. Navy’s ECMS implementation plan.

[965]I have no doubt that if MxI had secured a license for ECMS, it would have relied on the U.S. Navy ECMS Implementation Plan and cost of implementation plan, which Brouse described as “sophisticated”, to roll out the ECMS product to the U.S. Navy.

[966]Brouse forwarded his ECMS license request to the Directorate of Intellectual Property on November 22, 1996, four days after the defendants received the letter from Shields and Hunt dated November 18, 1996 advising the defendants not to breach their fiduciary duties owed to GasTOPS and demanding a return of all confidential and proprietary information.

[967]It must also be noted, that the defendants failed to disclose the existence of Exhibit 421A when making their ECMS license request to Kyle to the plaintiff. The existence of this request was discovered when the plaintiff made an “Access to Information” request to the Canadian government and received a copy of the said letter.

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[968]By November 25, 1996, Brouse had been told by the Directorate of Intellectual Property that MxI would not be granted a license to sell the ECMS. Within two days of receiving this information, Brouse circulated an e-mail to the entirety of the MxI staff advising them of the contents of a conversation he had with Lieutenant Matt Herl of the U.S. Navy:

As most people in the company are aware, Lt Herl has called me on a number of occasions to discuss the status of our negotiations with BFG/GasTOPS - during those conversations, the good Lt asked me about our new company focus, which I described as a Windows-based package to manage the maintenance on commercial aircraft which would offer many features and functions similar to the ECMS but would be a new product that would offer many more functions. Lt. Herl has taken quite an interest in this potential product.

Over the last two weeks I have come to the following two conclusions:

1the Navy no longer has an immediate need for a new F/A-18 ground station as they have developed a technique for converting the ECAMS PDP-11 code to the Everex computer; and

2the Navy has lost interest in an OS/2 solution due to supportability problems of the system architecture and the supplier.

As a result, it is my intuition that the USN is now in the market for a Windows-based system and will probably wait a year or so for its delivery. They will also want this to be an off-the-shelf product and will want to buy from an established, trusted and large supplier like GE or MDA. I believe that our new product could fit that bill.

[969]As soon as the defendants learned that they would not be able to secure their own license to sell the ECMS product to the U.S. Navy, they developed an alternative plan. The alternative plan, as reflected in Exhibit 2078, was to sell an MxI-developed product to the U.S. Navy. In his e-mail, Brouse emphasized that the MxI product would have “many features and functions similar to the ECMS”. MxI was faced with the problem that as of November 27, 1996, it did not have a fully functioning, Windows-based system that it could provide to the U.S. Navy.

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MxI, which was being assisted by Lieutenant Herl, needed to find some alternative mechanism by which it could provide the serialized configuration management/parts life tracking technology that the U.S. Navy required. Lieutenant Herl attempted to partner MxI with a large corporate entity that could provide a legitimate means by which the necessary technology could be obtained by the United States Navy.

[970]The content of Brouse’s e-mail to the employees of MxI (Exhibit 2078) is evidence of direct solicitation by MxI of the U.S. Navy. Brouse was actively promoting the Maintenix product to Lieutenant Herl as being a replacement to the GasTOPS ECMS solution. Brouse described the MxI product as “a Windows-based package to manage the maintenance on commercial aircraft which would offer many features and functions similar to the ECMS but would be a new product that would offer many more functions”. According to Brouse, Lieutenant Herl took “quite an interest in this potential product”. Brouse stated in his e-mail that the discussions concerning the MxI product were initiated by Lieutenant Herl who called to discuss the status of negotiations with GasTOPS/B.F.Goodrich. Even if Lieutenant Herl called Brouse, and I doubt that he did, it seems to me that Lieutenant Herl would have called GasTOPS to ascertain if it would be able to continue to pursue the potential business opportunity with the U.S. Navy. The fact that Herl may have been the one to call MxI is irrelevant, as the content of Brouse’s e-mail to MxI employees demonstrates that Brouse was soliciting the U.S. Navy opportunity for MxI. This was a clear breach of the fiduciary duties that Brouse and the other employees of MxI owed to GasTOPS.

[971]The plaintiff called Robert White of MDA as a witness. White was the person at MDA primarily responsible for MDA’s work with the United States Navy on the AME initiative. White stated that MDA was not involved in the development of parts life tracking or configuration management – serialized tracking. When asked if he (White) had a recollection of MDA ever being offered the parts life tracking/serialized tracking type of work, White stated: “Lieutenant Herl wanted us to solve the problem. We basically went back -- and we were never funded to do this -- and said we're not the people who own the environment, we don't have the expertise to do this, and basically discouraged him from putting us on contract.”

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[972]MDA did not approach MxI with “a new corporate opportunity.” Rather, MxI relied upon the influence and conduct of Lieutenant Herl to try and force a partnership between MxI and MDA. The attempted partnership between MxI and MDA is consistent with Brouse’s e-mail dated November 27, 1996 (Exhibit 2078), wherein he noted that the United States Navy would want to buy MxI’s product “from an established, trusted and large supplier like GE or MDA.”

[973]In his e-mail to MDA’s White, dated December 9, 1996 (Exhibit 1279), Brouse sought to impress upon MDA his understanding of the requirements of the U.S. Navy. It is a fair inference that the information conveyed by Brouse was obtained by him through the course of his employment at GasTOPS. In his e-mail, Brouse confirmed that he knew

I.MDA was developing the AME system for the F/A E and F aircraft;

II.one such component of the AME system was to be the MDPS system, which was to provide the data stripping and maintenance analysis functions for the AME;

III.the MDPS system had not passed the technical evaluation phase of its development cycle and that the project had been terminated;

IV.

the Navy had been searching for an alternative this system;

V.the functionality that was being sought including parts life tracking, serialized tracking, full tracking of the serialized configuration of all maintenance, significant components of the aircraft, their location and service ability status (technical direct tracking, reliability tracking, maintenance scheduling, and data replication); and

VI.

the U.S. Navy was looking for a system that had the same flexibility as the

 

ECMS system, including the ability to define parameters such as

 

organization

types, component type

and assembly hierarchy, usage

 

parameters,

usage limits, maintenance

tasks, maintenance intervals and

rules and TD types.

[974]I am satisfied that MxI was actively pursuing the exact same opportunity that GasTOPS was pursuing, namely to provide parts life and serialized tracking/configuration management technology to the U.S. Navy. MxI was proposing that the technology it could supply would become an MDPS replacement and an integral part of the AME initiative, which is

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exactly the role GasTOPS had envisaged for its product ECMS.

[975]At trial Brouse admitted he was pursuing work with MDA on behalf of MxI:

Q.Mr. Brouse, you were the one that was actively pursuing work with the United States Navy; correct?

A.Well, at this point in time I was pursuing work with McDonnell Douglas.

[976]MxI’s marketing efforts to the U.S. Navy through MDA was consistent with MxI’s corporate objectives of selling configuration management technology to the U.S. Navy as reflected in the MxI business plan presentation (Exhibit 2194, page 9).

[977]During January 1997, Brouse prepared a PowerPoint presentation to MDA (Exhibit 1369). At page 7 of his presentation, Brouse described the product functionality of MxI’s proposed product:

Product Flexibility

Product will be configurable by the user to define:

-organization types

-component type and assembly hierarchy

-usage parameters

-usage limits

-maintenance tasks (e.g., inspections, periodics, conditionals)

-maintenance intervals and rules

-Airworthiness Directive/Service Bulletin types (i.e. TD’s)

-validation rules

What We Accomplished

While employed at GasTOPS the team developed:

-the maintenance information system used to manage the engine life tracking on the CF-18 (Equipment Condition Monitoring System – ECMS)

!serialized tracking (30,000 rotables)

!technical directive bulletin tracking

!fault defect tracking

!maintenance requirement identification

!digital log sets

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!condition indicator/trending

!logistic planning

Other CF developed applications

-First Line Troubleshooting System

!notebook PC based engine diagnostic system

!expert system inference engine

-Portable CF18 Ground Station

!notebook PC based aircraft ground station

!download aircraft (including SAFE), engine, avionic, armament data

!provide graphical reports on data

!provide textual reports on data

Non-aviation applications

Dofasco

-North America’s largest steel mill

-developed CMB-DAS as a submodule to the Computerized Configuration Maintenance Management System (CMMS)

!schedules maintenance on 85,000 components using CBM techniques

!supports 2000 users

!integrates 3rd party Lube, Vibration, and Hand Held Data Logger systems

-presently under contract with Dofasco to support CMMS

Product Plans

Plan to develop a maintenance management system for commercial aviation

Product will be based on experience and knowledge gained from ECMS development

Product will be hosted on industry leader Windows95/WindowsNT

Plan to introduce a Beta version 3rd quarter of 97

Product Functionality

System functionality still being defined but will include:

-serialized rotable tracking

-consumable tracking

-Airworthiness Directive/Service Bulletin tracking (i.e. TD’s)

-life tracking

-maintenance scheduling

-fault/defect tracking and trending

-cost tracking

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Product Flexibility

Product will be configurable by the user to define:

-organization types

-component type and assembly hierarchy

-usage parameters

-usage limits

-maintenance tasks (e.g. inspections, periodics, conditionals)

-maintenance intervals and rules

-Airworthiness Directive/Service Bulletin types (i.e. TD’s)

-validation rules

MxI and MDA

MxI has the skills and experience to assist MDA with their AME development

MxI personnel have repeatedly and successfully developed large scale applications (Canadian Air Force, Dofasco)

MxI is presently developing a product with a core functionality which is very similar to MDA’s needs

MxI can provide the required functionality (similar to ECAMS/MPD/ECMS plus) within 12 months of AOC

[978]After reviewing the PowerPoint presentation (Exhibit 1369) prepared by Brouse for a presentation to MDA, there can be little doubt that MxI was pursuing the same opportunity that GasTOPS had pursued while the defendants were employed at GasTOPS. In addition, Exhibit 1369 leads to the conclusion that MxI’s product was functionally similar to GasTOPS’ ECMS, although written in a Windows environment.

[979]The defendants did not contract with MDA to provide configuration management/serialized parts life technology to the U.S. Navy. Instead, through the efforts of Lieutenant Herl, MxI partnered with MANTECH to provide the technology through NAVMASSO as part of optimized NALCOMIS.

[980]I am satisfied, that Brouse, in his capacity as vice-president of MxI, was actively soliciting the GasTOPS’ U.S. Navy opportunity through MDA. Brouse was put in contact with MDA by Lieutenant Herl and not as a result of any new initiative on the part of MDA. Further, the configuration management/parts life technology that Brouse was offering was identical to the

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functionality that GasTOPS had previously offered by way of license sales to the U.S. Navy through Lieutenant Herl. In soliciting the U.S. Navy opportunity through MDA, Brouse relied on confidential business information that he had misappropriated from GasTOPS concerning the U.S. Navy requirement and the status of the opportunity.

[981]Another example of MxI’s involvement in the U.S. Navy opportunity during December 1996 and early January 1997, as well as MxI and Brouse’s failure to disclose these attempts, can be found in relation to Exhibit 1449 which was a document entitled “Systems Classifications for the ECAMS Replacement” prepared for Naval Air Systems Command Headquarters by Intermetrics Inc. of Pennsylvania dated December 13, 1996.

[982]Brouse was asked in-chief:

Q.Did you see this document at the time, Mr. Brouse, Christmas 1996?

A.I did.

Q.Did you get a chance to review it at that time?

A.I did.

Q.Can you give the court what your understanding was of the document as result of the review?

A.I didn't understand why this document had been written; I did not really understand why it had been provided to MXI. After looking through the document, I felt it was an attempt to position the MDP/MDS system as a system for use by the Navy either as the MDPS replacement or even in a broader fashion, but I saw this as a document promoting the use of the MDP/MDS system.

Q.Why was that?

A.In certain sections of this document it references the fact that proposed system should utilize a DEC Alpha computer; this is the hardware system that the MDP/MDS was hosted on. And that's an unusual piece of hardware. So I saw this as an attempt by that organization to promote their system.

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[983]Shortly thereafter, Brouse was asked if he did anything to “follow up with anybody about it.” In response Brouse stated, “It was my best recollection that I spoke to Lieutenant Herl and described to him that I thought it was an attempt to promote the MDP/MDS system.” Brouse’s answer was clearly an attempt to distance MxI from any involvement in the U.S. Navy opportunity in December 1996 and January 1997.

[984]Exhibit 1282 was entered into evidence as being all the e-mails that the defendants produced in response to an undertaking to provide all of the e-mails exchanged by Brouse and Lieutenant Herl through January 1997. Brouse confirmed at trial that he was the person responsible for reviewing his e-mails to comply with the said undertaking. In cross-examination Brouse was asked to review his e-mail dated December 3, 1996:

Q.Subject was “test of cyberspace”?

A.Yes.

Q.You had sent to Lieutenant Herl three separate items?

A.Yes.

Q.To ensure that you could use e-mail usefully; that was your

word; right?

A.Yes.

[985]Brouse was then shown Exhibit 2057, the same e-mail dated December 3, 1996, that was found in his back up disk that was produced as a result of my order. Brouse stated:

Q.All right. So there is no doubt, Mr. Brouse, that as early as

December 3 of 1996, you are preparing yourself for the ability to send to Lieutenant Herl all of the types of attachments that you would want to use in pursuing U.S. Navy work; correct?

A.Yes. I don't think that's a fair characterization. Essentially we just got our e-mail system set up within MxI and e-mail was actually relatively new for businesses, certainly business to business communication. And we were looking for somebody to test, and Herl certainly wanted to do this, to confirm that you could send a Word document, Power Point presentations, that kind of

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thing.

Q.You're suggesting to the court it was just pure coincidence that the person to whom you are testing this e-mail is the same person involved with the United States Navy through which you eventually landed all of these lucrative contracts; is that what you're saying?

A.It's coincidental. I can't recall if we had a conversation with Lieutenant Herl or he had suggested to us that he would like to get this facility going because he did want to exchange documents, I really can't remember. But I do remember quite clearly that we were eager to see if we could send business correspondence via e- mail. We had just set the system up not more than a day or two earlier, as I recall.

[986]At this point, Brouse was shown Exhibit 2058 an e-mail he sent to Lieutenant Herl December 19, 1996, and which was not produced by the defendant Brouse as part of Exhibit 1282. The e-mail is entitled “simple message for attachment purposes” and was sent to Lieutenant Herl by MxI employee Chris Cass from Brouse’s e-mail account. Cass wrote: “G’day Lt. Herl: This is a message from Doug Brouse’s e-mail account, you should be able to simply reply to it with any attachments.” Later that same day, Chris Cass sent another e-mail to Lieutenant Herl (Exhibit 2059), which was also not included in Exhibit 1282: “This is a second attempt to give you a simple message from Doug’s e-mail account so that you can reply to it. I was not sure if the last one went out because it did not register through WEBCON (our internet provider here in Ottawa).”

[987]On December 20, 1996, at 9:02 a.m. Brouse sent a further e-mail to Lieutenant Herl entitled “test” (Exhibit 2060). This e-mail was not included in Exhibit 1282. In his e-mail, Brouse wrote: “Please reply to this test. Cheers.” In cross-examination, Brouse stated:

Q.You're sending an e-mail on Friday morning, December 20,

to Lieutenant Herl, again looking for a reply to your test; correct?

A.That's correct.

Q.And for what purpose were you sending this e-mail to Lieutenant Herl?

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A.I don't remember.

Q.Do you have any possible explanation as to why you're sending it to Lieutenant Herl?

A. Again, we may be simply just testing the connection. I mean, actually when I look at this series of e-mails, this was -- might be the first time we're actually connecting to e-mail at NAVAIR. And it could then very well be that he had identified to us that he wanted to send us a document. I really don't remember.

[988]Twenty-three minutes after sending Exhibit 2060, Brouse sent a further e-mail to Lieutenant Herl entitled “Christmas present” (Exhibit 2060), which was not contained in Exhibit 1282. The body of the e-mail stated: “Fire away. Please send me my Christmas present.” In cross-examination, Brouse stated:

Q.By two mails, being Exhibits 2058 and 2059, where Chris Cass is trying to get Lieutenant Herl to send an attachment as a test; correct?

A.Yes -- sorry, Chris Cass is, I don't think, sending an attachment.

Q.No. Chris Cass is sending to two different e-mails?

A.Yes.

Q.Being Exhibits 2058 and 2059?

A.Yes.

Q.Inviting Lieutenant Herl to reply with an attachment; correct?

A.Yes. With any attachments, yes.

Q.That's right. So that's the lead-in to Exhibit 2061, where you send an e-mail to Lieutenant Herl where you say “Fire away. Please send me my Christmas present"?

A.Yes.

Q.So you're looking for an attachment, right?

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A.I'm not sure. Possibly, yes.

Q.Well, what Christmas present were you hoping that Lieutenant Herl was going to give to you?

A.I don't remember.

Q.Red pyjamas?

A.No, I wasn't hoping to get pyjamas. I really don't remember. It could very well be that he was sending this Rossi document, I don't recall.

Q.What Rossi document, Mr. Brouse?

A.The Infomatics ECAMS system specification, replacement document.

Q.You're saying to Lieutenant Herl on December 20 of 1996, approximately 10 days earlier, “fire away, please send me my Christmas present". And the only explanation you can offer to this court is that that is the ECAMS replacement specification, which is Exhibit 2054; correct?

A.That's a possible explanation, yes.

Q.Okay. Why would that document, Mr. Brouse, be a Christmas present to you?

A.Well, I don't even know it’s that document, but Lieutenant Herl -- at any rate, I'm speculating here, but he seemed to want to send this document to us, so okay.

Q.Okay. Why is it a Christmas present to you, Mr. Brouse? Why is it something you wanted to receive?

A.I don't even know if this is the document I’m seeking.

Q.What other document could it be, Mr. Brouse?

A.It could be another bitmap, Mr. Yach, I don't know, I don't know remember.

Q.The only plausible explanation, based on the disclosure we

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have, is that it was the ECAMS replacement spec, Exhibit 2054; right?

A.I think that's very possible, but I don't know.

Q.Okay. That's entirely consistent with the evidence, Mr. Brouse, that Mr. Forsyth gave, which was you received the ECMS replacement spec, Exhibit 2054, on Christmas Eve. And in his logbook entries, Exhibit 1405, which is the Forsyth logbook for December of 1996, page 21, Forsyth says on December 24; “received spec from Herl, sent a copy to Doug via e-mail” and on Friday, December 27 “read ECAMS replacement system specification.” That's this document right here, 2054; correct?

A.Yes.

Q.So let's go back, Mr. Brouse, to Exhibit 2061?

A.Yes.

Q.Your e-mail, December 20 of 1996, “fire away, please send me my Christmas present." The best possible explanation that we have, based on disclosure and all the evidence we have heard so far, is that that was Exhibit 2054, which is the ECAMS replacement specification?

A.Yes, that's a possible explanation, yes.

Q.It's the only explanation that we have so far?

A.It's not the only explanation, but it's possible.

Q.Give me another one?

A.It could be another bitmap, I don't really know, but it's very possible.

Q.What bitmap would Lieutenant Herl be sending to you at Christmas time that you would be so interested in?

A.Yeah, I sent him a bitmap December 3; I don't know if he's responding. I really can't remember.

Q.You're inviting him to respond to you, Mr. Brouse?

A.Yes.

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Q.He's not just sending one of these funny e-mails that people share amongst each other -- if I can finish up. You and Mr. Cass are going to great efforts to set up a system where he can reply to you with an attachment. He’s not just doing this on his own initiative?

A. Other than he's asking us to get this set up, but right. I mean, obviously we are working with this guy to be able to get e- mails going back and forth, including attachments, that’s pretty clear to me.

Q.What other e-mail did you get with an attachment, other than the ECAMS replacement specification?

A.None that I can recall. I don't even think I got that one directly.

Q.But you got it?

A.I did get it, yes.

Q.You got it before Christmas Eve?

A.Yes. That's correct.

Q.Just in time for Christmas you got your present; correct?

A.Okay.

[989]Brouse was then shown Exhibit 2053, an e-mail from Brouse to MxI employees Marc Lennox and Chris Cass dated January 1, 1997. The two attachments to his e-mail were Exhibit 2054 (the ECAMS replacement specification) and Exhibit 2056 (a draft document entitled MTMPSP2.dot). In the body of Exhibit 2053, Brouse wrote to Marc Lennox and Chris Cass: “[Here] you go.” In cross-examination, Brouse was then shown a comparison between the contents of these emails, which made it clear that Exhibit 2056 was a work in progress wherein someone was relying upon Exhibit 2054 to create a refined requirement specification for an ECAMS replacement.

[990]In my view, the defendants were actively involved in the drafting and refinement of the ECAMS replacement specifications. Accordingly, there is no doubt that the defendants were

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actively involved in the pursuit of work with the U.S. Navy that was identical to some of the work being pursued by GasTOPS: to provide the ECMS technology as an ECAMS replacement.

[991]Brouse refused to acknowledge the defendants’ involvement in the U.S. Navy opportunity. During cross-examination, Brouse stated:

Q.Let me put a proposition to you, Mr. Brouse, and tell you exactly what happened in December of 1996. You knew well in advance of December 20, 1996, that Lieutenant Herl was going to send to you Exhibit 2054, which is the ECAMS replacement specification, and he told you that you were going to rewrite the core requirement section of parts life tracking, configuration management, data stripping, and you're going to send it back to me and that is going to become the so-called new EM3 requirement.

And just to finish this scenario for you, Mr. Brouse, you received it on Christmas Eve; you and Mr. Forsyth poured over it. You, sir, drafted Exhibit 2056. You didn't finish it as of January 1, 1997; you and Mr. Forsyth had drafted the key complicated parts of it, this core technology that we've talked about, and then by way of Exhibit 2053, on January 1 of 1997, you send to Lennox and Cass the original ECAMS replacement document, what you had done to date and said “Here you go boys, finish it off.” That, Mr. Brouse, is what happened, correct?

A.No.

Q.That is an entirely plausible explanation as to what happened, and it would explain, with extreme consistency, all these e-mails that we've seen to date; correct?

A.I mean it's -- sure, what you're saying is possible. But what happened was Lieutenant Herl sent us this system spec document, the Bob Rossi one, in all likelihood, and sent his pre-draft of his EM3 document.

Q.Mr. Brouse, you've already given evidence about how you and MxI had this key knowledge and how to develop a system such as this. We are going to get into this in more detail, there is all kinds of evidence from the United States Navy confirming they were relying entirely on you for this technology, how to set it up, you said that yourself. I can’t remember who the person was from the United States Navy, I'll find it over lunch. You said that I think

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it was Bob White did not even have as good an understanding of what the U.S. Navy needed as you did.

Where would Lieutenant Herl possibly come up with this knowledge, information and experience to draft Exhibit 2056. Why would he have gotten this information from Mr. Brouse?

A.Lieutenant Herl worked inside of PMA265, so he understood the requirement quite well. Lieutenant Herl was responsible for trying to find this ECAMS replacement. Lieutenant Herl worked closely with GasTOPS Limited. He understood the ECMS. Lieutenant Herl also worked quite closely with the people at MDPS, as well as the people with MDP/MDS. He was quite knowledgeable in all of these various systems and the requirement of PMA265.

Q.So is your evidence now, Mr. Brouse, that Lieutenant Herl sent this document to you?

A.That's entirely possible, yes.

[992]Nowhere in the documentary disclosure by MxI was there any evidence that Exhibit 2056 had been prepared by Lieutenant Herl and sent to the defendants at MxI. It is clear that that Brouse considered the ECAMS replacement specification (Exhibit 2054) to be his “Christmas present” and that he forwarded a copy of that document, together with the draft amendments thereto, to Lennox and Chris Cass for their review and further work.

[993]Brouse was cross-examined as to why this e-mail had not been produced by him in answer to a specific undertaking to produce all e-mails sent and received during the relevant time. Brouse was shown Exhibit 1889, his back up disk that was saved as of September 2000 and produced during the course of the trial:

Q.Mr. Brouse, if I try and locate Exhibit 2061 in here, I would

go to December 20. You see I've clicked on to that particular e- mail, being Exhibit 2061; do you see that?

A.I do.

Q.If I click on it again, there is Exhibit 2061; correct?

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A.Yes.

Q.If I go back in your sent items listing to December 10 of 1996, you'll see there I've clicked on to an e-mail message that was sent on December 10, 1996, and it's entitled “in the dark"?

A.Yes.

Q.Do you see that?

A.Yes.

Q.If I click on that, we get an e-mail that says “subject in the dark"; do you see that?

A.Yes.

Q.It's speaking about a call from Bob White et cetera?

A.Yes.

Q.I take you back to Exhibit 1282, which is the e-mails that you had produced in response to an undertaking to provide all the e-mails as between yourself and Lieutenant Herl through to and including January of 1997, and in particular page 13. We see there that you did in fact produce that in the dark e-mail that we just looked at, dated December 10, 1996; correct?

A.That's correct.

Q.If I go back to the screen image that was your sent items folder, and go to January 6 of 1997, you see there is another sent e- mail there that is described as “once more with feeling"; do you see that?

A.Yes.

Q.Again, if I click on that, we see the subject is “once more with feeling", and it's an e-mail dated January 6 of 1997; correct?

A.Yes.

Q.Going back, Mr. Brouse, to Exhibit 1282, and in particular at page 5, you'll agree with me that again, you did produce that January 6, 1997 e-mail regarding “once more with feeling", correct?

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A.Yes.

Q.Now, Mr. Brouse, you were the person who was responsible for reviewing your e-mails to comply with the undertaking to produce all of the e-mails exchanged between yourself and Lieutenant Herl in the November/December of 1996 and January of 1997 time frame; correct?

A.Yes.

Q.And I've shown you, Mr. Brouse, that on your sent items box the two e-mails that straddle Exhibit 2061, on a chronological basis, were in fact produced and yet Exhibit 2061 was not produced; can you explain that?

A.No, I can't. Sorry. Mr. Yach, could you go back to my e-

mail?

Q.Which e-mail?

A.Sorry, the e-mail structure, the file folder. Organized by the -- if you could hit the “to” button, so it organizes everything by person. Scroll down to, I guess, Matt Herl or ---

Q.That doesn't help you much, does it, Mr. Brouse. If you had done it that way, you would have pulled up the “once more with feeling" e-mail that is highlighted there on the screen, then 12 e-mails up there is your Christmas present e-mail; right?

A.Yes, I know. I'm just trying to figure out what I might have done wrong. At any rate, I don't know how I missed it. It seems to me I also missed one in January when you were cross-examining me a couple of weeks back, it looked like you missed another one as well.

If you want me to try to explain that, if you could take me to the exhibit that actually has all of the productions. It is up to you. I might be able to explain.

Q.If you think there is a way that you can explain it not being produced, show me the direction and I'll take you there?

A.Let’s go to my productions, if you don’t mind.

Q.It seems Ms. Shields has absconded with the CD, Your

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-

Honour.

 

A.

It would be in Blaze, I

think, Mr. Yach, the ones

I produced.

 

Q.You said you wanted to look at the e-mails that were exchanged between yourself and Lieutenant Herl?

A.Yes, the ones I produced were all -- did not produce this

one.

THE COURT: I think it's the affidavit of documents Mr. Brouse is referring to, I could be wrong.

BY MR. YACH:

Q.Mr. Brouse, that's Exhibit 1282, which is a series of 19 pages?

A.Yes.

Q.That were described as the e-mails exchanged with Lieutenant Herl?

A.Yes. If you could just flip through those there. Okay. That's fine. Next. Okay that is fine. Okay. Okay, that's fine. That's fine. That's fine, okay. Okay. Next. All right.

Q.In fact, Mr. Brouse, you see there that page 14 is those series of e-mails that were sent by Chris Cass testing for attachment purposes; right?

A.Right. My only -- at any rate, it's speculation on my part, but Lieutenant Herl seems to have multiple e-mail addresses. This one comes from an IBM address. So I might have missed it, not recognizing that I just missed one of these three or four e-mails addresses that he has. That's the only thing I can think of.

[994]In my opinion, Brouse deliberately failed to disclose Exhibit 2061. Brouse disclosed the e-mails sent immediately before Exhibit 2061 and immediately after Exhibit 2061. The deliberate non-disclosure by Brouse of this e-mail was to support his contention, which I do not accept, that MxI was not pursuing the U.S. Navy opportunity. I am driven to the conclusion that Brouse purposely failed to disclose Exhibits 2061 and 2053 (which was also late-produced

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during trial and retrieved from Exhibit 1989) because such e-mails demonstrated that the defendants were actively involved in providing an ECAMS replacement specification to the U.S. Navy, and particularly Lieutenant Herl, shortly after resigning from GasTOPS and establishing MxI.

[995]The Christmas present that Brouse received from Lieutenant Herl, namely the ECAMS replacement specification was a document that would enable MxI to achieve an understanding of the requirements of an ECAMS or MDPS replacement. Brouse’s evidence, wherein he professed to have no knowledge as to why Lieutenant Herl would have sent the document to MxI or why he sent the document to Chris Cass and Marc Lennox together with a work-in-progress draft requirement specification (Exhibit 2056), was a deliberate falsehood.

[996]Brouse and MxI were involved with Lieutenant Herl in drafting an ECAMS replacement specification that would be tailored by MxI to be as consistent as possible with the technology that MxI was expecting to provide to the U.S. Navy. Lieutenant Herl’s providing this document to MxI was consistent with his earlier actions when he provided GasTOPS with an EMPD replacement specification and asked GasTOPS to review and amend the specifications to tailor it to GasTOPS’ ECMS.

[997]MDA discouraged Lieutenant Herl from putting it under contract to do configuration management/parts life tracking/data stripping work. In Exhibit 1292, the memorandum of a telephone conversation between Brouse and Lieutenant Herl dated July 7, 1997, Brouse noted: “My good friend Bob White, who initially rejected the opportunity to take on the CM and Data Stripping work is apparently a bit hungry for some taskings. This could be another avenue, but we will wait a bit on this one.”

[998]Lieutenant Herl then took the ECAMS/MDPS replacement requirements to NAVMASSO to be incorporated into optimized NALCOMIS. He prepared a presentation entitled “NALCOMIS AME F/A-18 Executive Decision” (Exhibit 1310). Chandler was shown this document:

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Q.Mr. Chandler, you'll note, the only date we've been able to find on this document that comes out of VSE productions is this one on this page, 8, that says at the bottom September 30, 1997; do you see that?

A.Let me scroll here. Okay. That's probably correct.

Q.That's the last page of the presentation.

A.Okay.

Q.Mr. Chandler, my question to you is this, first of all, are you able to identify this document for us? I'll take you back to page 1.

A.I recognize it. This was a presentation by Lieutenant Herl… It was a presentation for authorization to move forward with the AME fleet wide, or in a development phase anyway.

Q.This was around the time frame of September 1997?

A.It appears so, yes, sir.

Q.If I can draw your attention to page 6 of the presentation, you'll see in the highlighted passage that MDPS/ECAMS capability was added September of '96; do you see that?

A.Yes, sir.

Q.Is that consistent with your personal understanding of the timing of the addition?

A.Yes, sir, that's consistent.

Q.And the note goes on to say that NALCOMIS was given the most difficult tasks, which includes PLT/CM (ECAMS and MDPS requirement); do you see that?

A.Yes, sir.

Q.Again, are those the same requirements that we referred to earlier as being having been met by the Maintenix product together with the DAS?

[999]Chandler was then shown Exhibit 1317, described as “A Proposed Approach to

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Bringing OMA In-Line with NALCOMIS CM/OMA Data Model”. Exhibit 1317 was dated June 10, 1997. Chandler stated:

Q.Could you in a very general sense advise us as to the significance of the document?

A.It -- optimized NALCOMIS, prior to Lieutenant Herl engaging with NAVMASSO, was more of a vision than it was actually something that was under way. The original intent was not even to begin development until 05, but because of the needs of the F18 in that they had been tasked with going -- 'take all of NAVAIR with you', he addressed the NALCOMIS issues and felt that he could provide a generalized approach for all of NAVAIR by applying F18 resources.

NALCOMIS, optimized NALCOMIS, NALCOMIS OMA, regardless of how you refer to it, is all the same system, had no clear vision on their functionality. They were still stuck in their Legacy approach things.

This document here is an explanation of how optimized NALCOMIS can be used across the various classes of maintenance throughout the Navy and all the different logistics elements throughout the Navy, and address all platforms needs as well as the F18.

Now it focussed in some cases on the F18 because they're the ones that paid for this effort. But for the most part this document explains how the database architecture, the system functionality is going to occur on a very low level basis.

[1000] On January 31, 1997, MxI delivered a presentation to NAVMASSO (Exhibit 1277). Brouse noted that the U.S. Navy was “presently developing AME to support F/A-18 E and F and V-22. On the same page, Brouse noted that Lieutenant Herl was considering adding new requirements to the AME initiative and that Herl wanted to embody the said requirements in an additional “plug and play” module to NALCOMIS. Brouse identified the proposed module name as the Equipment Maintenance Management Module (“EM3”). At page 10 of Exhibit 1277, Brouse described the EM3 requirements as including serialized configuration tracking, TD tracking, life tracking, lifed component removal and TD scheduling, and incremental data

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transfer to cognizant sites (total asset visibility). Brouse also described the EM3 features: user configurable (maintenance organization identification; asset identification; multiple usage parameter identification; TD identification; life component removal and TD scheduling and business rule setup; validation rule identification), Windows explorer asset and organizational view (“drag and drop” configuration change; report identification from icon) and site to site data transfer.

[1001] The requirements and functionality as proposed by Brouse to NAVMASSO were identical to the requirements and functionality that Brouse had suggested take place through a partnership between MxI and MDA. It is clear, that having been turned down by MDA, Lieutenant Herl was now taking his requirements to a different entity with whom MxI could partner, namely NAVMASSO. Brouse confirmed at trial that Herl was bringing the F18 program office’s requirements to NAVMASSO for incorporation into NALCOMIS.

[1002] As of January 1, 1996, Michael Abrahms was employed by the U.S. government at a U.S. Navy command called Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command Systems (“SPAWARS”). Abrahms was the director of development of aviation system software for the U.S. Navy. He had held that post since 1985 and described himself as “the father of NALCOMIS”. Abrahams described NALCOMIS: “The NALCOMIS system still does, as a matter of fact, it's still active in the fleet -- provides aviation maintenance software that keeps track of all the scheduled maintenances, unscheduled maintenance, orders parts, provides all the information needed to keep the planes flying, and save it.”

[1003] Abrahams described the circumstances under which NAVMASSO came to work with MxI. After being shown certain optimized NALCOMIS project documents including Exhibits 1281 and 1331, Abrahams stated:

A.Well, let me pause here a minute. This is what the government has to write in order to get somebody to come to work for them. This is not why I was told MXI was coming. I don't know whether you want to get into that now or not. And you notice I said I was told MXI was coming, I didn't ask for MXI

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Q.All right. Well, let's get to that issue then, I guess now. Can you explain what you mean by that?

A.What I mean by that is, we were the keepers of NALCOMIS. We had plans to optimize NALCOMIS which we've already discussed. We had scheme and methods to come up with configuration management control. The FA18 folks came to us and said, and I believe it was PMA-- I forget the number. Their commander and Lieutenant Matt Herl came to me, and I was called to the Washington office of my functional manager up in SPAWARS, and I was told 'Either you take MXI, because they've already done this for the Canadian Air Force, or you're not getting the money to update NALCOMIS." I'm really cutting to the chase here, but that's what that meeting was about.

I said 'Well, we have all the knowledge in NALCOMIS. We can do this. They can't do this in NALCOMIS without us. I would really like to be given the opportunity to develop this. We were told by the FA18 folks, 'We're going to use this thing that they're already using in the Canadian Air Force.'

So my choice was either to go back and find a way to pick up MXI or not get funded that year. And would have been terrible because NALCOMIS is a really helpful thing for the Navy, and getting it in point and click, you know, Bill Gates for these kids was wonderful, the training costs went way down. So that's how MXI was presented to me. These documents are -- this is how you work inside the U.S. Navy -- I won't say the government, but inside the Navy. And you have to have all the stuff and you have to acquire what we called "CD-erabls", contract deliverables, and that's what these are, these are setting up what you have to deliver.

I hope I didn't get us too far off track.

Q.No. But by the end of the day, the goal was to use the MXI experience and/or technology to do the module?

A.They were to bring software, which they did bring; it didn't work, but they brought it. When I say it didn't work, it did not fit into the United States Navy's scheme of doing things.

When asked to elaborate on his reference to the CAF system, Abrahms stated:

Q. When you say "they did it" for the Canadian Air Force,

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who are you referring to?

A.MXI.

[1004] Abrahms was specifically asked whether there was any justification or rationale given for the use of MxI on the NALCOMIS project, and he stated:

A.They had done it before. They already a system working, configuration management that we needed.

Q.At that point were any other third party vendors or civilians spoken of who might also be able to provide that technology?

A.No.

[1005] It appears from Abrahms’ evidence that it was Lieutenant Herl and PMA265 who had the requirements and the funding for the development of the configuration management technology that the U.S. Navy was seeking. In addition, it establishes that it was Lieutenant Herl who was dictating MxI be used as the source for the technology. In that regard, it is noteworthy that the U.S. Navy wanted the CAF system which indicates that GasTOPS’ marketing efforts while Brouse and Forsyth were employed by GasTOPS had brought the U.S. Navy opportunity to fruition.

[1006] When queried on the specific wording of a letter written to WestJet July 21, 1997, (Exhibit 2119), and more particularly the passage “because of the CAF success, the United States Navy (USN) had decided to adopt this technology…”, Brouse stated:

A.Well, it probably should say "adopt our technology".

Q.That's not what it says, Mr. Brouse. It says, "this technology"?

A.That's not what it says, but that's what it should say.

[1007] Throughout the trial, when confronted with documents he had authored which conflicted with his verbal testimony Brouse almost invariably took the position that his verbal testimony which helped the defendants’ case was correct and his written document was in error. In my view, the documents authored or written by Brouse are much more in keeping with the

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truth than his verbal testimony which I found unreliable and quite frankly astounding at times. I came to the conclusion that Brouse would say anything which he thought would enhance the position of the defendants.

[1008] The confusion on the part of Abrahms, as to who was actually responsible for the development of the CAF system was understandable given that Brouse on behalf of MxI deliberately mislead NAVMASSO into believing that MxI, was responsible for the development of the ECMS software. In his presentation, to NAVMASSO in January 1997 (Exhibit 1277), Brouse falsely claimed at page 5 under the sub-heading “What We Accomplished”:

What We Accomplished

The MxI team has developed:

the maintenance information system used to manage the engine life tracking on the CF-18 (Equipment Condition Monitoring System - ECMS)

>>serialized tracking (30,000 rotables)

>>technical directive bulletin tracking

>>fault defect tracking

>>maintenance scheduling

>>digital log sets

>>condition indicator/trending

>>logistic planning

[1009] The evidence of Abrahms and Captain Ezzard who was assigned to SPAWARS from June 1995 until June 1996 was that the U.S. Navy was primarily seeking configuration management technology. Captain Ezzard was involved in the development of the NALCOMIS software system, a system that had been developed to be common across the entire naval aviation community such that all aircraft squadrons would use the same system.

[1010] When asked specifically about the “functional footprint” of optimized NALCOMIS and more particularly asked to explain the term “configuration management” in the context of an information system, Captain Ezzard stated:

A.It does to me. To me, it was a challenged area for naval aviation at that time because every airplane has lots of different components, and you have to have all the components put together

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properly for that airplane to work. So those components were part of a configuration of that airplane.

And the challenges at the time, especially with the F18, were that you could put two different components together in an airplane that people thought should go together and work, and they might not work. And so how do we -- part of our challenge was, how do we gain better understanding of the attributes of those components so that could figure out which ones should be matched and used in a particular airplane. And that was about configuration management of the airplane and the components down to essentially a serial number basis of keeping traffic of those parts.

Q.And the NALCOMIS OMA, did it have any role or responsibility in that regard in the context of configuration management for the fleet?

A.No. At that point in time OMA didn't really do

configuration management; in fact, nothing in naval aviation, I believe, really did configuration management for Navy -- for the U.S. Navy. The Navy was figuring out it needed to probably do something to create a method of doing better configuration management.

[1011] Accordingly, the fundamental requirement of the U.S. Navy had always been configuration management, particularly serialized parts tracking.

[1012] Raymond Lebeau, in January 1996, was working for AIR 36. At that time he was running a test system called AMIDD, at the El Toro naval air station. When he appeared at trial on October 1, 2003, he was the IPT lead for technology and assessment for the AME program at the F18 office, known as PMA265. Lebeau described the AME program as follows:

A.It's the automated maintenance environment. This is the outgrowth of AMIDD where we've tried to put together all the pieces in a slightly different form. And the purpose of this program when it was originally developed was to be prepared to operate the OPEVAL system that was necessary for the F18 E and F introduction to the fleet. It was put in place to operate that way.

We have two different systems operating that way currently. We have the SAME program, which is either Super Hornet or similar AME depending on which time frame we're talking about. Then

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we have the FAME program, which is about to go into operation next August, which is the E/F version of the program, and is built around optimized NALCOMIS. The FAME program is built around the MxI tool Maintenix.

[1013] When asked about configuration management, Lebeau identified configuration management/serialized parts tracking technology as being a fundamental requirement for the U.S. Navy fleet of F/A-18 fighter aircraft. Lebeau attended at the offices of MxI in Ottawa in January 1997 and discussed with MxI’s its proposed solution to the U.S. Navy’s configuration management problem. He said:

I'm not sure I saw the product that we finally ended up with at that time. We discussed configuration management, the circular charts in showing how one component can be part of this one and then it can be part of another thing. They had a bunch of circular charts that we'd use in different presentations. I don't know how else to describe it if you don't know what I'm talking about, so it's a little difficult. But I know we went through things like that.

Q.Mr. Lebeau, what was your understanding, if any, as to the role MxI might play in the development of this particular concept?

A.As Matt introduced it to me, they were principal contractor that he was dealing with at some point in time. It sounded like it occurred somewhere after I went up there in January, and when I came back, he hardened that position. But that's a tentative memory. I don't want to overstress it too much, because that's the time frame that I went up there. I know I went up there in the middle of a snowstorm, I saw some stuff, I came back. We talked. And the next thing I know he was moving ahead.

Q.When you say he was moving ahead, you're speaking of Lieutenant Herl?

A.Lieutenant Herl.

Q.He was moving ahead with what?

A.With getting something done to follow up with MxI in terms of a product that he could use.

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[1014] It appears that the purpose of Lebeau attending the MxI office in January 1997 was to assure himself that MxI had the configuration management technology that was being sought by the U.S. Navy and more particularly by Lieutenant Herl’s group known as PMA265. It appears that Lebeau was convinced that MxI had the technology. The fact that the U.S. Navy was seeking MxI’s configuration management technology is supported by MxI’s own documents. On February 18, 1997, MxI delivered a presentation to MANTECH entitled “MxI Profile” (Exhibit 2121). Brouse wrote:

Who We Are

oMxI “Maintenance by Information”

o‘Spin-off’ company of the Maintenance Systems Division (MSD) of GasTOPS Ltd

oStaff includes

-all MSD Program Managers and Project Managers

-most of the software technical team (~7O%)

o Software company specializing in maintenance management information systems

-software development expertise

-maintenance engineering expertise

-developing an aviation maintenance management product

What We Accomplished

oWhile employed at GasTOPS the team developed:

-the maintenance information system used to manage the engine life tracking on the CF-18 (Equipment Condition Monitoring System ECMS)

>>serialized tracking (30,000 rotables)

>>technical directive bulletin tracking

>>fault defect tracking

>>maintenance requirement

identification

>>digital log sets

>>condition indicator/trending

>>logistic planning

oOther CF developed applications

-First Line Troubleshooting System

>>notebook PC based engine diagnostic system

>>expert system inference engine

-Portable CF18 Ground Station

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>>notebook PC based aircraft ground station

>>download aircraft (including SAFE), engine, avionics, armament data

>>provide textual and graphical reports on data

oSupport and daily management of CF systems performed by Orenda Aerospace

oNon-aviation applications o Dofasco

-North America’s largest steel mill

-developed CBM-DAS as a submodule to the Computerized Configuration Maintenance Management System (CMMS)

>>schedules maintenance on 85,000 components using CBM techniques

>>supports 2000 users

>>integrates 3rd party Lube, Vibration, and Hand Held Data Logger systems

-presently under contract with Dofasco to support CMMS while transition to their IS department takes place

[1015] At page 9 of the MANTECH presentation, Brouse wrote that MxI’s product plans were to develop a maintenance management system for commercial aviation based on experience and knowledge gained from ECMS development. He wrote that the product would be hosted on industry leaderWindows 95/NT platform and that MxI planned to introduce a Beta version during the third quarter of 1997. It is evident from its “product plans” that MxI was designing or basing its product on experience and knowledge it gained from the development of ECMS. In my view, this constitutes an admission on the part of MxI that its product is based on ECMS and that in developing it, MxI was relying upon GasTOPS’ confidential business information.

[1016] In May 1997, MxI made a presentation to SHL (Exhibit 1965), which stated under the heading “Product’s Status” that MxI had completed its first phase of market research and that Maintenix development had been initiated. In particular, MxI stated that its database design was completed and that the product had been selected by the U.S. Navy “to manage serialized usage tracking and maintenance scheduling for USN fleet of aircraft.”

[1017] In an MxI presentation dated June 16, 1997 (Exhibit 2081), the U.S. Navy project was described as having a 14-month delivery schedule based on the Maintenix software. MxI stated

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that it would provide serialized tracking, maintenance planning and scheduling for 6000 aircraft of 130 different types on 40 sites for 2000-5000 users.

[1018] In a PowerPoint presentation entitled “MxI Profile” dated August 17, 1997 (Exhibit 2080), Brouse stated that the U.S. Navy had “contracted MxI to use Maintenix core technology to manage scheduling for USN fleet of aircraft”, citing similar numbers as above (in Exhibit 2081). He also wrote that the U.S. Navy would save $60 million annually with Maintenix.

[1019] On September 15, 1997, Brouse prepared a Market Analysis for the MxI business plan (Exhibit 1420) which stated that “The United States Navy has contracted MxI to implement the Maintenix technology to manage their entire fleet of aircraft (4000 vehicles).”

[1020] In a 1997 document entitled Maintenix White Paper (Exhibit 1421), Brouse similarly wrote: “More significantly, the United States Navy (USN) has selected and is licensing Maintenix as the core module to provide serialized configuration tracking, maintenance tracking and planning for their entire fleet of USN aircraft (6000 aircraft, 130 aircraft types distributed over 400 locations).”

[1021] On December 1, 1997, Brouse issued a press release on behalf of MxI (Exhibit 2075), stating: “Apparently, MxI’s customers and strategic partners agree. The company was only 6 months old when the United States Navy (USN) opted to purchase MxI’s technology to manage the Navy’s entire fleet of aircraft — the second largest in the world comprising 4300 aircraft operating at 400 sites.”

[1022] And on MxI’s website, on January 5, 1998, it was reported that “Maintenix has been selected by the United States Navy as the technology to plan, schedule and track the maintenance on the entire fleet of aircraft – the second largest fleet in the world.”

[1023] The MxI market plan authored by Brouse in January 1998 (Exhibit 2090) similarly stated: “the United States Navy has contracted MxI to implement the maintenance technology to manage their entire fleet of aircraft (4000 vehicles).”

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[1024] In an April 13, 1998, MxI press release (Exhibit 2072), Brouse stated that the U.S. Navy was convinced that MxI’s technology could save it tens of millions of dollars it had been losing due to lost maintenance data. He noted that the U.S. Navy selected MxI’s Maintenix technology and hired its staff to implement and integrate the system into the Navy’s overall information management system when MxI was only six months old.

[1025] These documents confirm that the U.S. Navy contracted MxI for serialized configuration tracking technology soon after Forsyth and Brouse resigned from GasTOPS. Given the time it would take to develop a product and for the U.S. Navy to assess it, I believe negotiations between MxI and the U.S. Navy began almost immediately upon the resignations.

[1026] Forsyth conceded that he had been interviewed for an article that appeared in The Ottawa Citizen on March 4, 1998 (Exhibit 1567), which stated in part:

Within a few months, the company was invited to meet U.S. navy officers in St. Louis. The navy was just in the midst of a major redesign and rebuilding of its maintenance information system. It was perfect timing.

“When they heard what we were doing, they decided to come up here and visit us,” said Mr. Forsyth. “We knew they were serious when they decided to come up in January.”

The navy signed them up based on their first prototype. But as far as having the final product, the team at MxI was just getting started.

[1027] At trial, Abrahms stated that MxI had been contracted through MANTECH to bring configuration management software into NALCOMIS OMA development. Abrahms stated that as of July 1997, MxI provided the configuration management serial number tracking part of its software:

They brought, as I said before, they brought software and we loaded it on our machine. We had to adjust the databases to make different data models. But then making that software work into the rest of the Navy's business model took a lot of work.

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I don't think -- if you hadn't been part of developing NALCOMIS, I don't think you could have done it. And the reason I say that is we had -- NALCOMIS was a system that's been around for a while, and we did it in light of everybody telling us 'You can't do that. A government route group cannot develop that.' So groups like TRW, Raytheon, and several other large companies would set up appointments in my office to come in and review NALCOMIS so that they could help us, and they would [set up] like two-week meetings to review this stuff. Usually it would take three days, sometimes as long as four days. And they would come in and debrief and say, 'Thank you very much. You're doing a good job. We don't think we can help you.' And then they would leave.

It was a very complex system -- still is a very complex system. As I said, when you read the requirements, they're one thing. When you actually get it to work, it's quite different.

[1028] Later in his evidence, Abrahms stated:

Q.The software that you say that MXI brought to the table, what specifically did that software do, or what was the functionality of it?

A.It was the configuration management serial number tracking part.

[1029] It appears that Lieutenant Herl arranged for MxI to be sub-contracted to MANTECH on the optimized NALCOMIS development project. The best evidence of this can be found in Exhibit 1966, entitled “Project History and Need for Sprint to 31-March-1998 Delivery.” It was authored by Peloso, one of MxI’s founders, who said that the document was a synopsis of MxI’s work on the configuration management component of optimized NALCOMIS. Peloso identified the Super Hornet E and F development and the failing ECAMS unit as being the two problems for which the U.S. Navy required resolution. At page 2, Peloso noted that one possible solution to the said problem had been the MDPS, which had been “scrapped.” He wrote that Lieutenant Herl saw Maintenix as a solution to this problem.

[1030] Under the sub-heading “MxI Working Within the U.S. Navy” Peloso then wrote:

• A big problem was the fact that the F/A-18 Program Office

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could not in a timely manner procure Maintenix or MxI’s services directly. This is because Maintenix did not solve the whole problem for the USN and, as a government agency, the F/A-18 Program Office can’t just go out and buy something - the proper government procurement procedures must be followed, there must be lengthy competitive bids, etc.

A further difficulty was that the USN has its own “Information Systems department” in the form of the SPAWAR Systems Center (formerly called NAVMASSO). This agency writes software for USN maintenance management - primarily a system called NALCOMIS.

The F/A-18 Program Office had little confidence that SPAWAR Systems Center (SSC) could neither deliver what they required nor meet their schedule. This was because SSC had a poor track record for designing and deploying information systems. [SSC takes exception to this and believes themselves to be a professional software house.]

Lt. Herl’s solution was to form a “shotgun wedding” of sorts by convincing SSC to work with MxI, subcontracted through SSC’s preferred contractor - ManTech. [SSC contracts a large number of people from ManTech to work directly with them on a daily basis.]

MxI wanted this work, as it would add a great deal of credibility to our company and product to be able to list the USN a reference site for our work and product.

[1031] Accordingly, Lieutenant Herl was seeking the MxI Maintenix product, and his method of securing it was to force a working relationship between MANTECH and MxI. As a result of Lieutenant Herl and MxI’s actions, the U.S. Navy sought to obtain from MxI the identical technology and functionality that it had been seeking from GasTOPS in the form of GasTOPS’ ECMS product. Further evidence of this fact can be found in the NAVMASSO Trip Report dated February 24, 1997 (Exhibit 1283). In it, Brouse made specific reference to a PMA265’s “unique requirements” and then stated: “If MxI/Mantech/NAVMASSO don’t cut the mustard then they will go to either Hughes or BFG (by the way, the Hughes threat is very real!)”

[1032] Brouse’s Trip Report indicates the GasTOPS/B.F.Goodrich ECMS solution was still

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very much in play at the U.S. Navy in February 1997, and his reference to the B.F.Goodrich solution as an alternative to MxI’s demonstrates that the opportunity MxI was pursuing was identical to the one GasTOPS had been pursuing in October 1996. The contracts that MxI entered into with MANTECH, through which MxI provided configuration management technology to the U.S. Navy (Exhibits 1301, 1134, 1335 and 1457) through to NAVMASSO resulted in MxI providing their Maintenix product to the U.S. Navy to replace the ECAMS, thereby usurping the opportunity that GasTOPS had pursued.

[1033] On March 12, 1998, Peloso authored and forwarded an e-mail to Lieutenant Herl (Exhibit 1321), with an attachment entitled “the U.S. Navy’s Replacement for an ECAMS (Engine Configuration and Monitoring System) – A Synopsis”. It was drafted while MxI was still under sub-contract to MANTECH to provide the configuration management technology to NAVMASSO. Under the sub-heading “Introduction”, Peloso stated that the U.S. Navy was replacing the existing ECAMS with an entirely new information management infrastructure on a PC and Windows platform along with two software systems:

US Navy’s ECAMS Replacement:

1.The Data Stripping System:

Software designed and developed under contract to the US Navy

This software extracts maintenance-relevant usage data from onboard flight recorders and makes it available to the Configuration Management system.

2.The Configuration Management System:

The Configuration Management system is based on a commercially available aviation maintenance management software system called Maintenix. That is, the US Navy recognized the capabilities of Maintenix and opted to engage the manufacturer, MxI Technologies Ltd., in the migration of Maintenix from its as-delivered Oracle relational database platform to the US Navy’s Sybase platform.

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The adoption of a Maintenix-based solution to its configuration management, usage tracking, and maintenance scheduling problems represents a large step in the Navy’s goal of an Automated Maintenance Environment. This advancement is described in Chapter 2.

[1034] Chandler confirmed that he had a copy of this document in his possession at VSE Corporation. When questioned about the document, he stated that he believed it had been produced in March 1998 and confirmed that MxI had written it. Peloso stated that he wrote the document on behalf of Lieutenant Herl, and he was asked to confirm the accuracy of the information contained in it:

Q.Correct me if I’m wrong, but in the document the ECAMS replacement is described first of all as being the data stripping system; correct?

A.Yes.

Q.And that, of course, is the work that MxI did with the EER system; correct?

A.Correct.

Q.Then the configuration management system which is based on the commercially available system called Maintenix; correct?

A.Yes, that's the description of the porting, if you like, of Maintenix software to make this core CM module, which again would, as part of optimized OMA comprise an ECAMS replacement.

Accordingly, by providing the configuration management technology on the NAVMASSO development, as well as the data stripping technology through the EER systems, MxI was providing an ECAMS replacement, which was precisely the opportunity GasTOPS was pursuing prior to Forsyth and Brouse’s resignations.

[1035] MxI suggested that NAVAIR decided against both the ECMS and MDP products in late 1996 because a different short-term solution was arrived at to address NAVAIR’s immediate need: PC ECAMS.

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[1036] Bruce William O’Donnell reviewed the role that PC ECAMS played, as it related to the U.S. Navy’s need for a replacement for the ECAMS system. In his direct examination, O’Donnell stated that the first time he recalled hearing that the U.S. Navy was considering a PC version of ECMS in late 1996 or early 1997. He said Lieutenant Herl, who had found a company “who had ported ECAMS to a PC,” had brought this information to his attention. O’Donnell stated that “PC ECAMS was never intended as a replacement for ECAMS, it was just hardware -

-we were dealing with hardware obsolescence issues, and that was how we dealt with them” and that “The plan had always been to replace ECAMS as a system in its entirety. At that point, the F18 program office had started to pursue a different solution.” O’Donnell testified that PC ECMAS was in use until 1999, when it was replaced by Similar to Automated Maintenance Environment (“SAME”) due to Y2K issues; SAME replaced the ECAMS functionality for the F404 community of F18 A through D and was the AME for the F18 E and F, including automated debrief and reporting.

[1037] According to O’Donnell, the MxI Maintenix product was a fundamental part of SAME, which provided parts life tracking and configuration management as both an ECAMS replacement and as the AME solution for the Super Hornet E and F aircraft. PMA265 was adopting a “risk mitigation plan” to buy Maintenix licenses from MxI due to the apparent inability of NAVMASSO to deliver optimized NALCOMIS. O’Donnell testified that Maintenix was a module of SAME and provided parts life tracking and configuration management. He testified that the Maintenix product was still providing that functionality at the time of his testimony, as it had done since 1998 in the case of E and F planes and early 1999 for the A through D planes.

[1038] According to O’Donnell, the plan of PMA265 had always been to replace ECAMS in its entirety. PMA265 entered into an agreement with PMA260, whereby PMA265 agreed to bring the development of an ECAMS replacement in-house, and at that point the MDP development effort was terminated.

[1039] PMA265, which was represented by Lieutenant Herl, had the ability to direct contracts and to decide on procurement process to obtain the configuration management/parts

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life tracking/data stripping technology it was seeking.

[1040] O’Donnell’s evidence confirms that it was the MxI Maintenix product, in combination with the data stripping technology that MxI provided through EER systems, that became the ECAMS replacement on the A through D aircraft, focusing on the engines as well as the AME solution on the Super Hornet E and F aircraft. Again, this was the same business opportunity that GasTOPS had been pursuing with the U.S. Navy prior to Forsyth and Brouse’s resignations.

[1041] As early as May 1996, while Brouse was still employed at GasTOPS, he knew that it was an option for the U.S. Navy to re-port ECAMS to “buy time.” At page 39 of Exhibit 140, Brouse made the logbook entries noting “Developers are still confident”, “ECMS”, “Salvage MDPS”, and “Report ECAMS to buy time.”

[1042] Lieutenant Herl directed the data stripping work to MxI through EER systems. The work product of the data stripping project was described as “AME F/A-18” Data Stripping Subsystem (Exhibit 1291). Again, MxI usurped an opportunity, this time to provide data stripping technology for F/A-18 aircraft, with the U.S. Navy that had been pursued by GasTOPS prior to the resignations.

[1043] During the time that MxI was working with NAVMASSO through MANTECH, it was developing its own maintenance product, which it eventually hoped to license to the U.S. Navy. In his note dated July 3, 1997 (Exhibit 1287), Brouse noted:

Ray figures we will know after this meeting if NAVMASSO is still the way to go. If they decide against NAVMASSO, I’m not sure where this puts us. PMA-265 may de-obligate the money and we may get shut down, although I think this is unlikely without a backup plan.

In that regard, I informed Ray that we have been developing Maintenix with a larger team than at NAVMASSO, that is well managed and authorized to do overtime. As a result, Maintenix would meet the Navy’s needs (with some customization) and would meet the Navy’s schedule. Ray told me to hold onto that

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card; however, the problem the F18 office has is that if they do go for a stovepipe, who will install it? NAVMASSO would give them considerable grief here. (But if NAVMASSO doesn’t play ball, the F18 office has no choice but to stovepipe - no matter what.)

[1044] Brouse in the context of Exhibit 1287 stated:

A.Well, I'm concerned that if the F18 office pulls out of NAVMASSO, that MXI is out of work here on this front. And I'm suggesting to him that if they do that, they're going to need some go forward plan. And I mentioned to him that we had been developing this Maintenix product; that it's coming along very well. And if that were to be the situation that PMA265 found themselves in, that maybe they could use our product to meet the requirement.

[1045] Based on the contents of Exhibit 1287 and the evidence of Forsyth and Brouse, it appears MxI was actively soliciting sales of its Maintenix product to the U.S. Navy. It would have been advantageous for MxI to license its Maintenix product directly to the U.S. Navy rather than have the Navy choose optimized NALCOMIS for its configuration management needs.

[1046] On July 8, 1997, Brouse wrote to Raymond Lebeau and Lieutenant Herl (Exhibit 1288) enclosing a copy of the MxI Maintenix brochure. In the body of his letter, Brouse wrote that the first Maintenix release would occur in November 1997. Shortly after Brouse forwarded the Maintenix brochures to Lieutenant Herl, he made notes of a telephone call with Lieutenant Herl on July 7, 1997 (Exhibit 1292):

2)Herl has 10M on the side in case he has to buy a CM package - but needs a contractual vehicle

4)MacAir is hungry and could be an alternative contractual vehicle

10M on the Side

Matt has 10M on the side for next year. He wants to do what the

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MDPS boys did, whereby the MDPS abortion project was ongoing at the same time that Logicon and a small group at NAWC Indy produced the highly successful MDP. Herl figures he can buy Maintenix, but he will need a contractual vehicle to do so. Herl still supports the SBIR concept. I figure we may need a channel. EER and MDA are candidates.

MacAir

My good friend Bob White, who initially rejected the opportunity to take on the CM and Data Stripping work is apparently a bit hungry for some taskings. This could be another avenue, but we will wait a bit on this one…

[1047] Brouse confirmed that MxI’s Maintenix was being considered by Lieutenant Herl as part of an integrated set of commercial tools NALCOMIS was not otherwise capable of providing a comprehensive maintenance management system to the U.S. Navy.

[1048] On November 6, 1997, Peloso, responded to Lieutenant Herl’s request for a briefing on Forsyth’s meeting at MANTECH (Exhibit 1984):

LtH said that he has a plan for the elimination of NALCOMIS.

Will have more on this later.

He was concerned that we ensure that he can “replace” ECAMS and MDPS by next summer. He asked that we ensure that Replication is operational.

I responded that our next step is to lay out a detailed project plan based on where we are. We will have to make use of ManTech resources for things like Replication and Reporting. LtH asked that we monitor them and have backup plans if they can’t keep up. I told him that, in general, we will keep informed of their progress but timing and resourcing and the late start may mean that some functionality will arrive late.

In general I replied to his “wish” list by saying that our first task under the “new’ contract will be to lay out in detail the tasks we can get done (and the tasks slated for ManTech). We can only get done what the 6 people can get done in the remaining time-frame.

He was okay with this and looked forward to a summary of the new plan.

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[1049] Again, this evidence corroborates that MxI was actively soliciting the U.S. Navy. As set out in Peloso’s notes, the plan was to ensure that Maintenix could replace both ECAMS and MDPS, exactly what GasTOPS had been pursuing for its ECMS product in 1996.

[1050] Abrahms was adamant that MxI was working directly for Lieutenant Herl and not with NAVMASSO.

[1051] In February 1998, the defendants adopted a strategy aimed at securing sales of its Maintenix product as an ECAMS replacement. On February 23, 1998, Peloso created a document entitled “CM Follow – On Strategy Position Discussion” (Exhibit 1967) and posted it internally in MxI’s Lotus Notes database system:

Goals

1.End up with an ECAMS replacement

2.Minimize on-site time at SSC / leverage a position that minimizes requirements for interaction with SSC

3.Get NAVFLIR and MAF in place (in addition to ECAMS replacement)

4.Establish a position that makes possible a migration to GAME/Mx as a CM replacement

Strategy

Discredit Tom Klooster and SSC in eyes of Cdr Chase

Thereby get Chase’s attention that our recommendations have merit

Present our recommendations to Chase once TK is writhing on the floor

Low-ball OMA-CM integration effort → thus address Goal #2

Premise: The integration effort is not that bad - little need for MxI

Perception: SSC will not expect this. Will be expecting us to sandbag for more work

OMA-CM Integration

Suggest that SSC adopt the originally recommended plan of use of APIs

MxI spends 1 month on site helping them devise an

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OMA-CM integration design

This design comprises the spec of APIs - which MxI writes in Ottawa

Peloso claimed that the “strategy position discussion” was nothing more than his personal “thinking on paper” about a U.S. Navy sales strategy. In my view, the “strategy position” paper, which was authored by Peloso in his capacity as program manager for all U.S. Navy business, reflected the MxI’s corporate strategy vis-à-vis the U.S. Navy opportunity.

[1052] When questioned about the MxI strategy (to withdraw all MxI support on the optimized NALCOMIS development effort in order to position MxI to sell licenses to its products) Brouse stated:

Q.And you know that by this date MxI's positioning itself to be an active participant in the GAME initiative, which was allegedly a separate initiative putting together a commercial off the shelf product and it included Maintenix as one of its core components; correct?

A.Yes, that's correct.

Q.So just so that we understand in the context of MxI's goals here, you're about to deliver the CM module on this NAVMASSO service project. But what you're intending to do is to minimize any further involvement with NAVMASSO, attempt to secure Maintenix as opposed to optimized NALCOMIS as an ECAMS replacement; and even further than that, have Maintenix itself replace CM; correct?

A.Not entirely. When it says “minimize”, it says not to minimize onsite time at SSC. I remember issue really being as their demand that we work down in Chesapeake. It's my recollection that about this time of February/March of 1998 that we ourselves at MxI were coming to the opinion that this NALCOMIS OMA would not be delivering on time and as a result we could position ourselves as the system for the PC ECMS replacement. So I think that's a fair statement.

And I am not sure what item 4 is really getting at.

Q.Isn't it clear, Mr. Brouse, what item 4 is referring to is the

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fact that even though you have just delivered or are about to just deliver this CM module produced on NALCOMIS, your goal really at this point is to license Maintenix; you don't want optimized NALCOMIS to succeed, correct?

A.Yeah, I don't know. I mean, it says as a CM replacement and CM is a component of NALCOMIS OMA. So I'm not sure if Mr. Peloso is suggesting that Maintenix we would license our product into this NALCOMIS OMA, I'm not sure.

Q.Let's just forget for a moment what this document says, Mr. Brouse?

A.Right.

Q.You'll agree with me it was MxI's strategy in February of 1998 to license its Maintenix technology to the United States Navy, rather than them succeed with their optimized NALCOMIS development?

A.Yes. It was our position that NALCOMIS OMA was unlikely to succeed. And as a result it would be a good opportunity for us to provide our product.

Q.It's helpful, Mr. Brouse, is it not to ensure they don't succeed for MxI to minimize its involvement at SSC; you're the specialists with respect to this type of software?

A.Right.

Q.The project is much less likely to succeed if you're not there to help out, correct?

A.Yes that is a fair statement. But I was unaware that we were sort of putting the sticks in the spokes to have the NALCOMIS OMA fail. I recall we were working very hard to make it succeed, but we felt it was pushing a rope here.

[1053] On May 4, 1998, Peloso wrote to MANTECH (Exhibit 1968): “MxI currently finds itself in a position whereby it can no longer source resources to ManTech for work at SSC. I understand that this news may be a source of frustration for you and SSC.” Within a few days of MxI advising in this letter that it would no longer source resources to NAVMASSO, Lieutenant Herl advised that the F/A-18 Program Office (PMA265) had adopted its own “risk

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mitigation strategy” that was based on the purchase of MxI Maintenix licenses. On May 15, 1998, a risk mitigation plan meeting was held (Exhibit 1299) at which time Herl announced that PMA265 had decided to proceed with the acquisition of Maintenix licenses.

[1054] Chandler stated that the SAME initiative became the ECAMS replacement. (See Exhibit 1308, which was a production received from VSE Corporation entitled “Statement of Work, Naval Air Systems Command, F/A-18 Program Office, PMA265, SAME, OEM, In Service Engineering Support.”) In regard to Exhibit 1308, Chandler stated:

A.… This is the statement of work for the stand-alone iteration of the F18 AME system that's in place today.

Q.If I can draw your attention down, Mr. Chandler, to the third paragraph, it's highlighted, it's the second paragraph with a blue arrow beside it. It says, "In pursuit of its goal, the F18 Program Office has adopted the commercial off-the-shelf computerised maintenance management software, Maintenix, as a component of SAME; do you see that?

A.Yes, sir.

Q.It goes on at the next paragraph to say, "The FA18 Program Office has also developed the data stripping software as a module of SAME, using MxI Technologies as the key development resource"; do you see that?

A.Yes, sir.

Q.Now, first of all, with respect to the Maintenix product, can you describe for the Court the general functionality that's being provided by that system through this SAME initiative?

A.Maintenix provides at the ground station level localized squadron configuration management, status accounting, status itself, whether the asset is operational or not, serial *** tracking, task flow management, and just local logistics support.

At the database level, it provides the global view of all assets world-wide, based on ownership, and it provides a portal for engineers, logisticians [ph] and asset managers to view the performance logistics and state of their various assets as they

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pertain to the F18s, specifically in the engine realm today, and to some degree the structural.

Q.When you made you a reference to serialized parts -- I'm not sure if you used the word "tracking", but is that a reference to the parts life tracking capabilities of Maintenix?

A.Yes, sir. The serial number is the fingerprint or thumb print like I referred to earlier of the component, that's how you distinguish an individual component from the millions of other ones just like it that exist in the Navy, Marine Corps inventory.

Q.Coming back then to the reference to the FA18 Program Office having developed the data stripping software, can you tell us more about that: What is that specifically in reference to?

A.DAS, or Data Acquisition System, is, one, it's a set drivers that are necessary to initiate the operation of the hardware devices, which we spoke of earlier its DSU RSs, Data Storage Unit Rack SCSI, and PANIC, or PCMCIA cards. I have no idea what PCMCIA stands for, I just know how to say the acronym. But they are portable cards that come in out of the aircraft as memory units. DAS removes the data off the memory unit, does what we call flight separation. It distinguishes between one flight to the next to the next; it determines whether or not it was actually a flight, or, you know, where the aircraft went, wheels in the well and was out flying around; or if it was a ground turn, which they do a lot of in the F18 community. It slices and dices all these different events, puts them in files and makes those files available to not only Maintenix but also to the other applications that are reliant on that data.

Now those data files have -- they're packed full of information. The F18 is a smart aircraft. It provides not only the engine life usage data, which we call Deltas, or LUIs, Life Usage Indices, but it also has in that file the bit data built-in test. This is the aircraft's ability to go in and look at its own onboard systems continuously, monitor their state, and then record that state down onto that memory unit. So all of this is put down into a file. My mind just went blank. But we have a specific name for the file.

But, anyway, this file is then compiled by flight, by bureau number, or the name, the identifying name of the aircraft, and then it's passed on to the other applications that use this whole pot of

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information to perform their functions, Maintenix being one of them.

Q.Now, Mr. Chandler ---

A.Now DAS --

Q.Mr. Chandler, I had ---

A.Go ahead, I'm sorry.

Q.I had shown you previously this document I believe which was made Exhibit 1306, this was the statement of work with respect to MxI. And I drew your attention to passage that says "The AME is critical for the FA18 in that the AME has been designated as the ECAMS and MDPS replacement"; do you recall that?

A.Yes, sir. I do you recall that.

Q.Is the functionality that's being provided by the combination of the Maintenix product and the DAS that we just referred to, meeting the requirements of an ECAMS and MDPS replacement?

A.Considering that MDPS was never deployed and was a development effort, I can't speak to that. But it meeting the requirements of ECAMS over all, yes, sir, and exceeding those.

Q.All right. You had said earlier in your evidence that you were familiar with the anticipated functionality of the MDPS, which was to include configuration management and parts life tracking, correct?

A.Yes, sir. For that context, Maintenix DAS is meeting that requirement, yes, sir.

[1055] Once MxI obtained its goal of providing the ECAMS replacement and having provided the functionality vision of the MDPS system, MxI actively solicited for sales of its Maintenix licenses to other fleets, including the Navy’s fleet of V-22 aircraft. GasTOPS had also targeted the V-22 aircraft as a possible user of the MDPS replacement, as part of the AME initiative. As set out in Exhibits 395 and 396, GasTOPS had proposed to initially replace the ECAMS units and then become the MDPS replacement on the AME initiative.

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[1056] In his GasTOPS logbook (Exhibit 140), Brouse noted on July 12, 1996, “We have the V-22 in our pocket”.

[1057] On or about May 25, 1999, Peloso forwarded to V-22 a document entitled “General Document Info Tip to VSS dated May 25, 1999” (Exhibit 1980). The cover page of such document described the subject matter as being “Info Kit to VSS re. V-22’s Use of Maintenix”. Under the sub-heading “SAME Overview,” the document states that “SAME is a platform- independent maintenance management information system assembled initially for the F/A-18” and that its goals are to “Meet the asset configuration management and usage tracking needs of advanced aircraft” and “Address broader Navy goal of Total Asset Visibility and Business Process Improvement.” Under the sub-heading “SAME Components,” the defendants wrote that SAME was comprised of Maintenix, F/A-18 data stripping and capability to interface to IETMs, Pilot Debrief and Diagnostics. And, under the sub-heading “Introduction”, the defendants wrote: “SAME (Similar to Automated Maintenance Environment) is a maintenance information system for the F/A-18. This document is focused on SAME Phase I (ECAMS Replacement). SAME Phase I performs the same functions as ECAMS but consists of two software applications: Data Stripping and Maintenix. Tracker.”

[1058] Maintenix, together with the data stripper that MxI had developed through its association with EER Systems, constituted the ECAMS replacement. Maintenix’s roll-out as an ECAMS replacement for use on the F/A-18 A through D aircraft was identical to the opportunity identified by GasTOPS as Phase I of its proposal to the U.S. Navy in December 1996 (Exhibits 395 and 396). The second phase of the GasTOPS’ proposal was to have the ECAMS product rolled-out as “the permanent MDPS replacement system”. GasTOPS proposed that ECMS could be targeted to other fleets, including the V-22.

[1059] MxI used the revenues generated through its work with the U.S. Navy as a springboard for its entire business operation. As set out in Exhibit 1565S, which is a summary of the Exhibits regarding MxI’s U.S. Navy income from 1996 to and including 2003 (Exhibits 1223, 1224, 1225, 1226, 1447, 1274C), MxI generated a total of $26,307,537.00 in revenue through the U.S. Navy work. Forsyth confirmed the accuracy of this Exhibit. It demonstrated that

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the U.S. Navy income represented 70%, 80% and 92% of MxI’s total income in the years 1996/97, 1997/98 and 1998/99, respectively. For the first three years of MxI’s operation from 1996 to 1999, the U.S. Navy income represented fully 83.6% of its total income.

[1060] After reviewing Exhibits 1565S and 1561S, Forsyth was asked whether MxI was financially dependent on the U.S. Navy work. Forsyth stated that MxI made a conscious decision to use the U.S. Navy as its revenue source during those first three years and that it had in fact scaled back its work on other projects (such as SHL) to pursue the U.S. Navy work. Forsyth stated that, between this income and the fact that no one took a salary for the first six months, MxI was able to take its entire staff to Barbados in January 1998.

[1061] In relation to Exhibit 1562 being a presentation entitled “MxI Barbados Retreat,” Forsyth confirmed that one of the retreat’s purposes was to bring the employees together to evaluate MxI’s position. This presentation, which Forsyth wrote, noted that MxI was a start-up company and was financially dependent on the U.S. Navy contracts.

[1062] Further evidence of the financial dependency of MxI on the U.S. Navy avenues is evidenced in Exhibit 2780, was a document prepared by Peloso and titled “Peloso’s IOI for May 1999.” Peloso stated:

A.… this was an item of information document I author to be distributed internally at MxI.

Q.Under the subheading of Lieutenant Herl's status, confidential, you note there that there is action underway to process orders for Herl to take a new billet at EI CENTRO; correct?

A.Yes, it’s a actually L central.

Q.Sorry, L central. That was a cause for concern for you at MxI, was it not, sir?

A.Not particularly, no.

Q.You weren't concerned that your number 1 champion that had been pushing for all this work to be done by MxI from

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December through until this date, the fact that you're going to loose him is not significant to the company?

A.Again, he is a representative of PMA265, I assume he's going to have a replacement to fill that role.

Q.Just read into the record, sir ---

A.The requirements of PMA265 don't change because Matt Herl leaves.

Q.Do you understand what the term champion means in a context of a sale cycle, sir?

A.Yes, I do.

Q.What’s your understanding of it?

A.An advocate.

Q.Would you agree with me that Lieutenant Herl was a very aggressive and active advocate for MxI?

A.I agree he was an advocate, yes, he saw results delivered by

MxI.

Q.Did you know whether or not Lieutenant Herl’s replacement was going to be an equally aggressive advocate?

A.No, I didn't know.

Q.So the fact that you're losing this aggressive advocate might be a cause for concern to MxI; correct?

A.I don't know why at this point, we’re under contact to deliver the ECAMS replacement, that’s work almost underway. Contracts are in place, the requirement is clear, OPEVAL is about to begin, the software is ready to go. Again, the requirement of PMA265 hasn't changed, OPEVAL is literally any day now and the ECMS replacement site activation must embark any day now.

Q.Can you read into the record, sir, the first paragraph of your

note?

A.“The general premise, in case this is lost on anyone, is that a business reliant on the Navy as a core source of working capital

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is at high risk, my application to the Ottawa Citizen for the biggest paper route on record is being processed”.

Q.Why do you say that, sir?

A.I’m flippantly relaying the fact that MxI's future should not be based solely on business with the United States Navy.

Q.Up to that date effectively it had been, correct, as far as source of working capital is concerned?

A.There were contracts with other organizations. It's a significant player, sure.

[1063] Peloso’s IOI demonstrates in the clearest of terms the importance of the U.S. Navy business to MxI and the importance of Lieutenant Herl, who was a “champion” of MxI just as he had been a “champion” of GasTOPS when Forsyth, Brouse, Jeff Cass and Peloso were there and GasTOPS pursued the ECAMS replacement opportunity.

[1064] Forsyth admitted that one of the “great advantages” of securing the U.S. Navy work was that MxI was able to announce on its website that it had been selected by the U.S. Navy to provide the technology to plan, schedule and track maintenance of the its entire fleet of aircraft, the second largest in the world. The defendants were able to use the U.S. Navy contracts as their primary source of revenue during MxI’s initial years and to market its products to other corporate entities and third parties.

[1065] In a well thought out and well presented submission, MxI denies that it misappropriated the GasTOPS/B.F.Goodrich opportunity respecting the U.S. Navy. It summarized GasTOPS’ allegations and its responses to each allegation. I will recount these summaries in the paragraphs that follow.

[1066] GasTOPS alleged that the individual defendants had unrestricted and sometimes almost exclusive contact with GasTOPS’ customers and potential customers and that Brouse led the team pursuing the U.S. Navy opportunity with B.F. Goodrich.

[1067] MxI responded that senior management at GasTOPS always had top-level contact

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with business partners, including in the context of the U.S. Navy opportunity. In that case, it was MacIsaac and Muir who met with B.F. Goodrich’s senior management work out a cooperation agreement between the two companies. MxI also stated that Howe was the person to establish marketing and sales strategies, including arranging meetings with U.S. Navy representatives and that Brouse, who attended these meetings with Howe, took the “supporting role” of demonstrating the ECMS technology and answering technical questions.

[1068] GasTOPS alleged that GasTOPS/B.F.Goodrich were pursuing an “unlimited opportunity” with the U.S. Navy by October 1996.

[1069] MxI responds that they were “exploring a well-defined opportunity i.e. the sale of ECMS to a particular customer (NAVAIR’s PMA265 and 260) who served as a replacement for a particular legacy software (ECAMS) which was then being used to collect data for particular engines (GE F404 which were the engines on F/A-18 A, B, C, and D).”

[1070] GasTOPS alleged that MxI usurped the very opportunity it had been pursuing with the U.S. Navy in 1997.

[1071] MxI responded that the work it did under sub-contract to MANTECH for NAVMASSO (beginning March 1997) was a different opportunity because:

I.Current customers, i.e. MANTECH (a private contractor) as opposed to PMA265/260 (may be program offices);

II.Different chains of command (MANTECH/ NAVMASSO (Navy Management System Support Office) under SPAWARS (Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command) as opposed to PMA265/260 under NAVAIR);

III.Different customer requirements (optimization of NALCOMIS OMA as opposed to replacement of the legacy ECAMS);

IV. Different functionality (fleet-wide as opposed to platform specific);

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V.Different revenue streams (fee for service labour work as opposed to sale of sub-license); and

VI. Different operational timeframes (open-ended basis thereafter as opposed to three years (1996-1999)).

[1072] MxI also noted that its second opportunity with the U.S. Navy arose in November 1997, a full year after the resignations, after NAVMASSO/MANTECH decided not to develop data stripping functionality. This was also a different opportunity:

I.Different customers (EER, a private contractor as opposed to PMA265/260 Navy program offices);

II.Different revenue streams (fee for service labour work as opposed to sale of sub-licenses);

III.Different integration (a 1-off application as opposed to functionality embedded within ECSM v.2.

MxI claimed that its customer was a private contractor with no previous dealings with GasTOPS and that the MxI contract revenue was based on fee for service labour rather than license fees. The software developed for the customer was a one-off application whose data stripping functionality was never incorporated into MxI’s commercial products. It also claimed that it was spring 1998, after it became clear that NAVMASSO/MANTECH would miss the delivery deadline for optimized NALCOMIS OMA for the Super Hornet Operational Evaluation, that MxI received its third opportunity to sell Maintenix as part of a risk mitigation plan. MxI stated that this opportunity differed from GasTOPS’ 1996 opportunity because:

I.Different customer requirements (OPEVAL (Operational Evaluation) of the Super Hornet as opposed to replacement of the legacy ECAMS on the F18-18 A, B, C, and D);

II.Different functionality (CMMS for the whole aircraft as opposed to CBM for the engine only);

III.Different operational timeframes (pending delivery of the optimized NALCOMIS OMA to the fleet including the F/A-18 Super Hornet as opposed to

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the defined period to and including 1999).

Finally, MxI claimed that it was only late 1999, nearly three years after the resignations, that MxI received a fourth opportunity that was effectively the same opportunity GasTOPS had been pursuing in 1996.

[1073] The defendants’ arguments boil down to a single defense: that the U.S. Navy contracts secured by MxI were not identical to the opportunity GasTOPS pursued before Forsyth and Brouse’s resignations.

[1074] In CanAero, the Supreme Court of Canada rejected the notion that no misappropriation of a corporate opportunity ought to be found where the contract awarded to the defendants was not based on exactly the same corporate opportunity as that being pursued by the plaintiff. In my view, the defendants were in fact pursuing an opportunity with the U.S. Navy that was identical to that pursued by GasTOPS/B.F.Goodrich prior to the resignations. The U.S. Navy, and more particularly the group responsible for the fleet of F/A-18 fighter aircraft, was seeking the parts life tracking/configuration management technology that was already in use by the CAF. Although the contractual vehicles through which the technology was obtained might initially have been different, the U.S. Navy had not changed its objectives. The contracts provided the U.S. Navy with technology serving the same purpose as the technology GasTOPS was attempting to sell. The PMA265’s requirements never changed and always drove the U.S. Navy opportunity. Lieutenant Herl was apparently primarily responsible for selecting the parts life tracking/configuration management technology as an MDPS/ECAMS replacement and for use in the development of the Super Hornet E and F aircraft.

[1075] Captain Ezzard stated that Lieutenant Herl was in no position to dictate the functionality to be included in NALCOMIS OMA, as authority flows down from the chain of command and not upwards. According to Ezzard, his NALCOMIS OMA and Intermediate Maintenance Activity maintenance information systems were specifically developed to match the maintenance policies dictated by Naval Operations, as reflected in the Navy Aviation Maintenance Policy (“NAMP”). Captain Ezzard stated that NALCOMIS OMA and IMA were

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“specifically developed to match the maintenance policies that are in the Navy.” The NAMP was a guidance document around which software was built to serve the business processes outlined therein. Captain Ezzard testified that the Chief of Naval Operations was responsible for policy and for funding all naval aviation activities. According to Captain Ezzard, although there was consultation between PMA265 and Naval Tactical Command and Support System, it was Naval Operations and NAVAIR that stated policies.

[1076] Captain Ezzard is correct in stating that final “operational requirements documentation” were the responsibility of Naval Operations and not Lieutenant Herl, but there is no doubt in my mind that Brouse saw Lieutenant Herl as a decision-maker when he was working for GasTOPS and later when he was working for MxI. Lieutenant Herl presented a gateway to securing the U.S. Navy opportunity for GasTOPS, and later for MxI. He was a “champion” in the true sense of the word, championing ECMS as a replacement for ECAMS prior to Forsyth and Brouse’s resignations, thereafter becoming the “champion” for Maintenix. Lieutenant Herl wanted the parts life tracking/configuration management program being used by the CAF, first trying to get it through MDA and later through NALCOMIS.

[1077] According to Captain Ezzard, NAVAIR and SPAWARS were distinct organizations funded through Naval Operations. They were basically equals in terms of product acquisition. According to Captain Ezzard, the organizations did not report to each other, but rather cross- communicated where necessary to facilitate the development and acquisition of products. Each organization reported separately and upwards, ultimately to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy. Captain Ezzard described the role and responsibility of different organizations that fell under the NAVAIR chain of command.

NAVAIR 3.0

This organization had responsibility for defining naval aviation logistics, concepts and policies for NAVAIR and ultimately for OPNAV in the sense of helping OPNAV to define policy for the carrying out of naval aviation maintenance. During the mid-1990’s Buzz Milan was the Deputy of NAVAIR 3.0;

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PMA265

This program office had responsibility for the development and acquisition of the F/A-18 aircraft and its systems. During the mid- 1990’s Captain Dwyer was the Program Manager;

PMA260

This program office had responsibility for the development and acquisition of standard support equipment (including maintenance information systems) that was required and common across NAVAIR’s fleet of aircraft. Captain Derrick was the Program Manager during the mid-1990’s;

PMA151

This program office had responsibility for the development, testing and certification of the NALCOMIS maintenance information systems (i.e. NALCOMIS IMA for intermediate maintenance activity and NALCOMIS OMA for organizational maintenance activity) for fielding and use by the Navy user community. The program manager of PMA151 reported upwards to a Rear Admiral who was a part of NAVAIR 1.0 who in turn reported upwards to an organization under the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research Development and Acquisition, who provided oversight for programs doing information technology work.

SPAWARS (Space and Naval Warfare Systems command)

Captain Ezzard defined the role and responsibility of different organizations that fell under the SPAWARS chain of command.

NTCSS (Naval Tactical Command and Support System Program)

In June of 1995 PMA151 was merged with this program office and assumed responsibility for NALCOMIS IMA (Intermediate Maintenance Activity) and NALCOMIS OMA (Organizational Maintenance Activity) as well as other maintenance information systems.

NAVMASSO (later called SSC Chesapeake)

The NALCOMIS program office (NTCSSP) used this organization to develop, build and sell the NALCOMIS products.

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[1078] Howe was the lead marketing and sales executive on the GasTOPS/B.F.Goodrich team that was trying to promote ECMS v.2 as a possible replacement of the legacy ECAMS information system. According to Howe, he learned of Lieutenant Herl during a telephone call with Chandler on May 8, 1996. He understood Lieutenant Herl to be a key operational person in the search for the solution to fill the set of requirements needed by PMA265 for the ECAMS replacement on the F/A-18 AB and CD engines. According to Howe, while Herl was of great assistance to the GasTOPS/B.F.Goodrich team in promoting ECMS v.2, he was not a decision- maker.

[1079] Howe’s sales path document entitled “US Navy ECMS/FLTS Critical Path” which he authored on June 14, 1996 (Exhibit 850C) is illustrative of the complexity of the U.S. Navy organizational structure in terms of trying to market and eventually sell a maintenance information system to any particular organization within the U.S. Navy. Howe explained that to succeed they would have to convince a substantial number of people of the value of their product and to promote it. He named Andy Hess, George Bolln, Captain Dyer, Captain Derrick Colonel Levitt, Admiral Tinston, Buzz Milan and Chuck Silva as individuals who needed to be convinced, many of them by 1997, in order to move the program forward.

[1080] At page 3 of Exhibit 850c, Howe wanted to capture an added complexity (achieving a very high level of executive contact between B.F.Goodrich and GE) in order to promote the sale of ECMS v.2 to GE and then leveraging that with a sale to the U.S. Navy. At page 5 of Exhibit 850c, Howe attempted to depict his understanding of the PMA265 in a chart that showed Lieutenant Herl on the lowest rung. Howe stated that he met Lieutenant Herl in the early summer of 1996 and, through him, arranged for the GasTOPS/B.F.Goodrich team to attend a number of meetings from July to November 1996.

[1081] MxI argues first that Brouse was never at a meeting between the U.S. Navy and GasTOPS/B.F.Goodrich by himself. In the sixth meeting on November 4, 1996, B.F.Goodrich ensured that Kinson attended in Howe’s absence. Second, Herl was an attendee and/or presenter at each meeting but never a decision maker. Third, the attendees disclosed the wide variety of organizations from within the U.S. Navy bureaucracy that had an interest in attending. Fourth,

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the attendee list confirms that large well-known private sector companies with deep connections within the U.S. Navy bureaucracy were present, including MDA and GE.

[1082] MxI argues that Lieutenant Herl may have been GasTOPS’ “champion” but that he was not a decision maker. According to MxI, the office of the Chief of Naval Operations, not Lieutenant Herl, had responsibility for defining policy in the carrying out of maintenance for the Navy’s air fleet and, accordingly, had responsibility for defining requirements that the program office within NAVAIR were to meet. In addition, the office of the Chief of Naval Operations, not Lieutenant Herl, was the funding the optimization of NALCOMIS OMA. It was the office of the Chief of Naval Operations and not Lieutenant Herl that PMA151 (the NALCOMIS program office) looked to for policy direction requirements and funding. It was Captain Dyer, Marie Greening and Todd Mellon, not Lieutenant Herl, who Brad Howe thought to be the senior contact persons within PMA265.

[1083] MxI submits that it is absurd to think that the U.S. Navy was prepared to wait for a product from MxI and to wait for MxI to secure a partner. In addition, MxI argues that to accept GasTOPS’ proposition that the U.S. Navy was prepared to wait for MxI to produce Maintenix requires one to accept that Lieutenant Herl (a recent graduate of the Naval School) was able to convince Naval Operations to delay its decision on replacing ECAMS. MxI argues that Lieutenant Herl did not have the ability/authority to take his PMA265 requirements to NAVMASSO for incorporation into the development of optimized NALCOMIS OMA.

[1084] Captain Ezzard’s evidence regarding U.S. Navy decision-making processes was of a general nature only. At no time did the defendants put to Captain Ezzard (or to anyone else) the specific question as to whether PMA265 had in fact dictated that their requirements be realized through optimized NALCOMIS. Captain Ezzard was not involved in the Optimized OMA program from the summer of 1996 to the summer of 1998 and as a result had no first-hand knowledge of any decisions that might or might not have been made in December 1996.

[1085] The irrefutable fact is that PMA265, as represented by Lieutenant Herl, wanted the parts life tracking/configuration management technology used by the CAF and needed a means

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by which to obtain it. Whether the technology was obtained through MDA (as was attempted by Lieutenant Herl/Brouse in early December 1996) or through the optimized NALCOMIS development effort is entirely irrelevant to the issues in this litigation.

[1086] MxI argues that the hierarchical nature of the U.S. Navy’s bureaucratic structure is relevant to this litigation. More particularly, the defendants alleged that decisions as to both the U.S. Navy’s requirements and the means by which those requirements would be met must have been made at a level higher than Lieutenant Herl. Lieutenant Herl had the responsibility of making the key recommendations to his superior officers, both of which recommendations were acted upon. The issue of whether some other person or entity other than Lieutenant Herl of PMA265 made the ultimate decision to use MxI technology is irrelevant. The pertinent fact is that the personal defendants breached the fiduciary duty they owed to GasTOPS by usurping for themselves the very same U.S. Navy opportunity that GasTOPS had pursued. In addition the personal defendants allowed MxI to use confidential business information belonging to GasTOPS to pursue and obtain the business opportunity that GasTOPS had been pursuing.

[1087] MxI argues that GasTOPS’ suggestion that the U.S. Navy was prepared to wait for MxI’s product lacks any reality, but it appears from MxI’s November 19, 1996, presentation to Bombardier that it was targeting the U.S. Navy opportunity and believed it was well positioned to secure the work notwithstanding that it did not have a marketable program in 1996 and that the U.S. Navy would have had to wait a considerable time for a product to be delivered by MxI.

[1088] MxI argues that there were numerous computerized maintenance information systems being used by different organizations in different chains of command within the U.S. Navy. MxI argues that the opportunities pursued by GasTOPS and MxI were not identical. GasTOPS, through its partnership with B.F.Goodrich, sought to sell configuration management and parts life tracking technology to the U.S. Navy for use on its fleet of F/A-18 aircraft, including the Super Hornet E and F aircraft. In addition, it was PMA265, represented primarily by Lieutenant Herl, that had the driving requirements creating the opportunity in question. Those requirements included the Operational Evaluation for the E and F aircraft and the aging ECAMS unit.

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[1089] The issue before me is whether MxI pursued the same business opportunity that GasTOPS was pursuing prior to the Forsyth and Brouse’s resignations. In my opinion, MxI did so. The issue of whether the PMA265 requirements were realized through the involvement, assistance or participation of other U.S. Navy entities is not relevant to the issue before me.

[1090] MxI suggests that GasTOPS’ position fails to take into account Captain Ezzard’s evidence, whose office was charged with the responsibility for optimization of NALCOMIS OMA. Captain Ezzard’s program office (PMA151 and later NTCSS) was responsible for the development, testing and certification of NALCOMIS IMA and OMA. These two maintenance information software systems were, according to Captain Ezzard, common across the entire naval aviation community and any aircraft squadron would use the same system regardless of the type of aircraft it was operating.

[1091] NALCOMIS IMA was the system used for intermediate maintenance activity. Captain Ezzard said that NALCOMIS IMA was meant to meet certain requirements. These were to provide a computer automated system to be used to document and keep track of all maintenance work in that activity. It automated into a software system what was previously managed on paper, dealing with the nature of a malfunction, what was done to fix it, how many hours the repair took, and who worked on it.

[1092] Captain Ezzard stated that NALCOMIS OMA was the information system used in respect to organizational maintenance activity, and it was authorized for fielding in December 1994. According to Captain Ezzard, NALCOMIS OMA was an effort to create an information system to be used in every aircraft squadron to eliminate paper documentation. It created “a computer simulation or commuter instance of the business of doing aircraft maintenance at a squadron level,” capturing all information associated with aircraft discrepancies, how they were fixed, the parts that were replaced (with individual parts tracked by unique serial number), who worked on the airplanes, what consumable materials (oil, grease, gaskets, paint, etc.) were used in maintaining a plane, etc. It tracked flight hours and the air crew people during those hours.

[1093] According to Captain Ezzard, the migration from NALCOMIS OMA to optimized

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OMA involved a requirement that there be a new architecture for the software, including a new operating system (Windows NT) a fourth generation programming language (Powerbuilder) and the use of a new relational database (Sybase). The anticipated timeframe for the optimization was 1996-2000, based on a development cycle that included a requirements phase, a development plan authorized by the Milestone Development Authority, the actual development, prototype fielding, testing and deployment. Captain Ezzard stated that by the fall of 1996, a draft operational requirements document and a functional economic analysis had been completed and were under review. Once the requirements phase was completed, approval would be sought from Milestone Authority; it was hoped that approval could be scheduled for the third quarter of 1996, which was before Forsyth and Brouse resigned from GasTOPS.

[1094] The defendants suggest that Captain Ezzard’s evidence concerning the functional footprint of NALCOMIS OMA as of June 1996 makes it clear that it was a military version of a Computerized Maintenance Management System (“CMMS”). MxI submits Captain Ezzard’s evidence is in marked contrast to the GasTOPS’ argument that Lieutenant Herl’s requirements document (EM3) was the definitive requirements document for the OMA optimization project. Lieutenant Herl may have thought that his requirements document was the definitive document but NTCCS/NAVMASSO/MANTECH were not in agreement.

[1095] MxI argues that GasTOPS’ argument focuses on the PMA265/260 requirements for configuration management and life tracking for the engine component on the F/A-18 AB and CD fleet of aircraft and then follows this requirement from PMA265/260 to NAVMASSO through Lieutenant Herl. GasTOPS, according to MxI, theorizes that the PMA265/260 and NTCSS/NAVMASSO/MANTECH requirements were identical and therefore the business opportunity that presented themselves to GasTOPS/B.F.Goodrich and MxI were similar. MxI argues that Captain Ezzard’s evidence refutes this argument as he makes it clear that one of the basic concepts underlying the AME philosophy was the idea of plug and play modules where some modules would be platform specific and others would have fleet-wide applicability. Captain Ezzard stated that one of the requirements dictated by Naval Operations for the OMA optimization was the development of a configuration management module that would have fleet-

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wide application. According to Captain Ezzard, while platform specific modules might be internally developed or purchased depending on the choice made by that user community, the common modules were to be developed internally by NAVMASSO or Naval Tactical Command Support System.

[1096] Captain Ezzard stated it was a policy decision to move away from independent software systems (stovepipe solutions) that each provide functional capabilities to particular platform (each of which was associated with a particular Program Office) and toward an optimized OMA that would encapsulate all functional capabilities. Captain Ezzard stated that one such independent software system was ECAMS and that he authorized the publication of a diagram depicting how the optimized NALCOMIS OMA was being developed in an AME with plug and play modules some of which were platform specific and some of which were platform independent (Exhibit 2851).

[1097] According to Captain Ezzard, PMA265 had to work with a number of other higher ranking organizations in order to determine how their platform specific modules would fit within the optimized NALCOMIS OMA. NAVAIR had several people involved in putting together the pieces of the AME, and NAVAIR had to try to manage these various areas to keep them as similar as possible. Otherwise, it would have had to create unique interfaces for all of them just because they wanted to be different, when the goals were to increase commonalities and reduce costs.

[1098] Captain Ezzard had responsibility for putting together a cost-benefit analysis for the OMA optimizations, anticipating the total cost to be $23.53 million. As part of the cost-benefit analysis, he considered the value in moving away from these various software systems, including that for the F/A-18 Super Hornet. Captain Ezzard stated that the programs “estimated the value of that benefit if they didn't have to go do those independent systems at about 23.31 million.”

[1099] In their submissions, the defendants state the Captain Ezzard’s first-hand knowledge highlights the fact that PMA265/260 and NTCSS/NAVMASS/MANTECH were very different organizations with very different requirements. PMA265/260 sought platform-specific goals, in

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particular to replace ECAMS, while NTCSS/NAVMASS/MANTECH sought platform- independent goals, including internal development of a configuration management module with fleet-wide applicability.

[1100] In my view, the evidence of Captain Ezzard must be viewed with extreme caution as he was not involved in the optimized NALCOMIS efforts between the summer of 1996 and the summer of 1998. He conceded that the decision to incorporate configuration management into optimized NALCOMIS was made in his absence. Accordingly, Captain Ezzard had no direct knowledge of the development that occurred on the optimized OMA project during his absence and had to rely upon documentary information (such as Exhibit 2853) to bring himself up to speed on the status of the project when he returned to it in the summer of 1998.

[1101] In cross-examination, Captain Ezzard confirmed that the said funding had been provided by a NAVAIR sponsor but did not have any understanding as to what EM3 stood for when referred to Exhibit 2852, which specifically noted that NALCOMIS OMA received $2.65 million for EM3 on April 15, 1997. He noted that he never acquired an understanding of what EM3 stood for.

[1102] In my view, it is clear that Captain Ezzard had no first hand knowledge of the OMA optimization or decisions relating thereto during the key period in question (November 1996 to the summer of 1997). Again, I am satisfied that Lieutenant Herl brought the configuration management/parts life tracking technology requirements to the optimized NALCOMIS development effort. In his presentation entitled “NALCOMIS AME F/A-18 Executive Decision” (Exhibit 1310), Lieutenant Herl specifically noted that it was the “F/A-18 decision” to deploy AME across the entire fleet using NALCOMIS as the infrastructure and that MDPS /ECAMS capability was added in December 1996. He also noted that NALCOMIS had been given the most difficult task, including “PLT/CM (ECAMS and MDPS requirements)”.

[1103] MxI submits that there were platform specific requirements in 1996 confronting both PMA265 (F/A-18 user group) and PMA260 (common ground maintenance support group), and the short-term requirement was to develop or purchase a maintenance information system to

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replace ECAMS on the then operational F/A-18 AB and CD fleet of aircraft. The long-term requirement was also platform specific, focusing on an engine maintenance information system for the F/A-18 E, F Super Hornet, which was then under development. This platform specific module’s architecture had to be consistent with the AME philosophy so that it could be plugged into the optimized NALCOMIS OMA system of record.

[1104] MxI argues that these short- and long-term requirements were separate and distinct but acknowledged that they were relevant to one another because of the of the plug and play feature that contemplates a sharing or exchange of some data as between the F/A-18 platform specific module and the platform independent modules of optimized NALCOMIS OMA. MxI argues that because the requirements were separate and distinct, the witnesses intimately involved with the SPAWARS fleet-wide requirements (Captain Ezzard and Mike Abrahms) and those intimately involved with the AMIDD/AME initiative (Raymond Lebeau and Robert Wayne White) were only vaguely aware of ECMS v.2 and the promotion of that platform specific engine maintenance system to PMA265/260. These witnesses testified to, at most, a passing knowledge of ECMS v.2 without knowledge of what this system was or involvement in the ECAMS/MDPS replacement selection process.

[1105] MxI submits that O’Donnell and Chandler worked most closely with PMA265 and PMA260 at the time in question. O’Donnell understood that ECAMS was developed by an outside contractor in the mid-1980’s, when PMA265 was taking initial delivery of its fleet of F/A-18 aircraft. O’Donnell became familiar with it starting in 1993 as a result of his role in test evaluation of MDPS. According to O’Donnell, in the early 1990’s, a move was started to replace ECAMS (Engine Configuration and Monitoring System), and only MDPS (developed by PMA260) was being considered as an alternative. According to O’Donnell by 1996 there was no critical need to replace ECAMS, and although there was an issue about getting a replacement part for the hardware upon which ECAMS ran, there were no squadrons in the fleet that could not operate for lack of hardware.

[1106] With respect to the MDPS, O’Donnell stated that it was an engine only system like ECAMS and provided the same functionality for the F404 engine but was in addition to support

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the T-406 engine, the V-22 and the F-110 engine in the F-14. He said MDPS was to run on a PC. According to O’Donnell, it was sometime in 1996 that his group concluded that MDPS was not a suitable ECAMS replacement because MDPS and PLTS database “could not talk to each other” and data replicated from MDPS to PLTS would become corrupted. Once the 1996 decision was made in respect to MDPS, O’Donnell knew that PMA260 was looking to MDPS, although he had heard rumours of other systems being looked at by PMA265.

[1107] The evidence of O’Donnell can be summarized as follows:

ECAMS was engine specific (i.e. GE F404);

ECAMS’ functionality included configuration management and parts life tracking for some of the components on the GE F404 engine;

ECAMS was initially under the auspices of PMA265, later under PMA260;

By 1990-1991, a requirement surfaced to replace ECAMS;

The replacement for ECAMS was to be the PMA260 developed MDPS;

MDPS was also an engine only information system. It differed from ECAMS in that it serviced not only the GE 404 engine but also V-22 and F14 engines;

MDPS had the same functionality as ECAMS;

Like ECAMS, MDPS would replicate data to the PLTS database;

Sometime in 1996, with termination of MDPS, PMA265/260 had to look at alternatives.

[1108] According to MxI, O’Donnell’s evidence corroborates the defence theory that the requirements being addressed by PMA265/260 in 1996 were separate and distinct from the requirements associated with the optimization of NALCOMIS OMA. O’Donnell said that he became involved in the test evaluation of MDPS because ECAMS and MDPS were “peculiar maintenance information systems” as opposed to “common maintenance information systems”. MxI suggests that NALCOMIS OMA and NALCOMIS IMA are “common maintenance information systems” as opposed to “peculiar maintenance information systems”.

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[1109] With regard to the U.S. Navy business opportunity, MxI attempts to restrict the GasTOPS’ U.S. Navy opportunity to being an ECAMS replacement for use on the engines of F/A-18 A through D aircraft. In my view, GasTOPS was being considered as an ECMS replacement and, if selected, as an MDPS replacement. GasTOPS’ ECMS v.2 would replace the aging ECAMS system and provide data stripping and maintenance analysis for the AME.

[1110] In December 1996, Brouse, was already having discussions with MDA and in MxI’s presentation to MDA (Exhibit 1369) proposed that MxI partner together with MDA because “MxI has the skill and experience to assist MDA with their AME development”; “MxI personnel have repeatedly and successfully developed large scale applications” for CAF and Dofasco; “MxI is presently developing a product with a core functionality which is very similar to MDA’s needs”; and “MxI can provide the required functionality (similar to ECAMS/MDP/ECMS plus) within 12 months of AOC.”

[1111] In his e-mail to White, dated December 9, 1996 (Exhibit 1279), Brouse noted the MDPS system has not passed the technical evaluation phase of its development cycle and that the project had been terminated: “As a result, the Navy has been searching for an alternative to this system, however, if none is found, it is my understanding that the Navy may extend the scope of work (and the budget) of the AME initiative to develop the necessary functionality.” In his e-mail, Brouse listed the functionality that would be included as part of the proposed joint venture effort as between MxI and MDA as including parts life tracking, serialized tracking, TD tracking, reliability tracking, maintenance scheduling and data replication.

[1112] These two documents provide conclusive evidence that MxI pursued the exact same opportunity that GasTOPS had been pursuing prior to Forsyth and Brouse’s resignations. MxI envisaged that its technology would become the MDPS replacement and an integral part of the AME initiative, exactly what GasTOPS had envisaged for its ECMS v.2 product. In Brouse’s Trip Report on his visit to Crystal City at the request of Lieutenant Herl to provide a briefing on the ECMS on July 8, 1996 (Exhibit 80), Brouse stated:

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The conclusion of our contractor meeting was that BFG/GasTOPS should contribute to the AME and could/would provide the following capability:

DSU stripping Configuration management Diagnostic capacity

(The prognostic capability was lost on these guys and I didn’t push the issue).

I wasn’t privy to the conclusions of the government meeting, but I will work my sources to determine what happened. My “spidey senses” tell me that the US Navy guys want to proceed as follows:

1.Conduct the Lemoore demo.

2.If successful, implement the ECMS for the F/A AB and CD aircraft.

3.Use the ECMS as a building block for the AME (and as a result, bring BFG/GasTOPS to the trough!!).

[1113] In summary, MxI argues that Naval Operations had two separate groups reporting to it, NAVAIR and SPAWARS. PMA260, PMA265 and PMA151 reported to NAVAIR until June 1995 and their key information systems were ECAMS and MDPS. The key requirement of the groups reporting to NAVAIR was to find a replacement for ECAMS on the F/A-18 AB’s and CD’s aircraft. Another key requirement of this group was the delivery of MDPS for Operational Evaluation for F/A-18 EF’s. The focus of these groups was the F/A-18 engine.

[1114] SPAWARS consisted of PMA151 (after June 1995), NTCSS and NAVMASSO. The key information systems used by this group were NALCOMIS OMA and IMA. The key requirements of this group were the optimization of NALCOMIS OMA and IMA.

[1115] MxI argues the NTCSS/NAVMASSO/MANTECH organizations sought to conduct internal development for fleet-wide common functions and for all aircraft (platforms) and to develop plug and play functionality for aircraft specific systems. It argues that NTCSS/NAVMASSO/MANTECH would not develop aircraft specific functionality. MxI further

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argues that PMA265/260 organizations sought to manage aircraft (platform) specific systems, including ECAMS and MDPS. MxI argues, that the evidence of Captain Ezzard, Abrahms, Lebeau and O’Donnell support the above arguments and is contrary to the GasTOPS’ arguments that Lieutenant Herl’s EM3 document was the definitive requirements document for the OOMA project; and that the PMA265/260 requirements for parts life tracking were identical to the NTCSS/NAVMASSO/MANTECH requirements and was thus the same opportunity pursued by GasTOPS in 1996.

[1116] MxI argues that the focus of GasTOPS’ opportunity with the U.S. Navy was the promotion of ECMS to PMA265/260 as a replacement for ECAMS and that at no time did GasTOPS/BFG target or court NTCSS/NAVMASSO/MANTECH for possible involvement in the optimized NALCOMIS OMA project.

[1117] MxI argues that on April 30, 1996, Muir faxed B.F.Goodrich’s Hayden a draft agreement between GasTOPS and B.F.Goodrich in pursuit of the “NAVAIR (US Navy) opportunity” (Exhibit 69). The draft agreement forwarded by Muir referred to the “NAVAIR (US Navy) requirements” and did not refer to SPAWARS, which was the chain of command that included NTCSS/NAVMASSO/MANTECH. According to MxI, the short-term and long-term business opportunities identified by Muir in his draft agreement (Exhibit 69) dealt with MDPS, the engine maintenance information system being developed under the PMA260’s auspices.

[1118] In his evidence, Muir identified the short-term business opportunity for the GasTOPS/B.F.Goodrich team to be provision of diagnostic functionality (FLTS) to compliment MDPS. Muir defined the longer term possible opportunity as the actual replacement of Maintenance Data Stripping should it not be available as the ECAMS replacement.

[1119] In the spring of 1996, Brouse authored the “ECMS/FLTS Opportunity as MDPS Replacement Report” (Exhibit 1889). He understood “that for the most part MDPS had the same functionality as ECAMS” and explained that the document was meant to determine whether the combination of FLTS and ECMS could serve as a replacement for MDPS. According to Brouse, at the time he authored his document, MDPS was still the system of choice to replace ECAMS

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on the F/A-18 AB’s and CD’s. Brouse stated that GasTOPS could have tried to “cast the net a little broader” but that he was under very strict instructions from his senior management to do it “one slice of the salami at a time.” The target, according to Brouse, was to remain the F/A-18 AB’s and CD’s and the promotion of ECMS v.2 as an ECAMS replacement to resolve PMA issue on the F404 engine.

[1120] Brouse explained that a couple of months later the very same message was again delivered by Muir. In the context of a discussion about the AMIDD project and the initiative concerning an AME, Muir cautioned Brouse that GasTOPS should not get involved in a “grander, larger development effort” that could turn into “white elephants.” As a result, according to Brouse, the focus remained on the potential sale of ECMS v.2 as an ECAMS replacement.

[1121] On June 14, 1996, Howe created his “ECMS/FLTS Sales Path” document (Exhibit 850C), wherein he identified PMA265 and PMA260 as being on the “critical path” for the sale of ECMS.

[1122] On August 30, 1996, Muir signed off on his 1996/97 MSD business plan (Exhibit 8), in which he indicated that “the significant short-term opportunity for the ECMS includes the potential sale to the U.S. Navy F/A-18 program.” Muir saw GasTOPS as poised to win a major contract from B.F.Goodrich to demonstrate ECMS on the F/A-18 AB’s and CD’s and, in the long-term (3-5 years), saw the opportunity as a sale of ECMS to NAVAIR.

[1123] MxI’s position throughout its submissions on the U.S. Navy business opportunity was that GasTOPS’ U.S. Navy opportunity was confined to being “an ECAMS replacement.” In my view, this argument is flawed and is not supported by the totality of the evidence. That the MSD’s pursuit of the U.S. Navy was limited to ECMS as an ECAMS replacement reflects only part of the 1996/97 business plan, which further stated that:

GasTOPS has positioned itself to win the NAVAIR/F/A-18 ECMS/FLTS opportunity by marketing the system as a replacement for the problematic NAVAIR-developed Maintenance

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Data Processing System (MDPS) a common ground station support system for the several US Navy fleets. Hence, winning the F/A-18 program will position GasTOPS as a supplier to other NAVAIR programs, including the V22, F-44, CH-53 and AH-1W aircraft (p 27-28).

[1124] GasTOPS’ opportunity was to provide configuration management/serialized parts life tracking/data stripping, but its initial focus on selling the ECMS technology to NAVAIR was by no means an indication that it saw its U.S. Navy business opportunity as limited to this narrow role. In my view, it was always GasTOPS’ intention to pursue the sale of its ECMS, configuration management/serialized parts life tracking/data stripping technology to the U.S. Navy for use by its entire fleet of aircraft. It must always be kept in mind that GasTOPS’ ability to expand the focus of its potential business opportunity with the U.S. Navy was limited by the personal defendants’ resignations without reasonable notice and subsequent hiring of other MSD members at MxI. In effect, the personal defendants destroyed the MSD and its ability to pursue other business opportunities with the U.S. Navy that would have been available to it had the personal defendants afforded GasTOPS a reasonable period of time to re-establish the MSD.

[1125] During cross-examination, Brouse stated:

We were out to replace that failing MDPS, and we would be obligated to work on this NALCOMIS hardware infrastructure as the minimum. We would be obligated to share data with NALCOMIS and we would become part of the automated maintenance environment concept. But strictly, what we were seeking, strictly for the F404 engines of the F18. That was my primary focus.

There were some discussions about potentially moving beyond that, but the very strict focus that I had, very strict focus that I was asked to have, was to be the MDPS replacement for the F404 engine.

[1126] It is clear to me that Brouse understood that a replacement of ECAMS with ECMS was simply the first step in selling the GasTOPS’ technology to the U.S. Navy for configuration management/serialized parts life tracking/data stripping for its entire fleet of aircraft. MxI argued that GasTOPS pursued a limited business opportunity with the U.S. Navy, the replacement of

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ECAMS with ECMS, but this is unsupported by the documentary and Brouse’s own evidence.

[1127] In Exhibit 1889, a document he wrote at GasTOPS entitled “ECMS/FLTS Opportunity as MDPS Replacement”, Brouse stated that “It is expected that the system would first be implemented for the F/A-18. Considering this aircraft represents a large portion of the Navy’s fleet, it is hoped that the system would then be used as a fleet-wide MDPS replacement.” Also, in his Trip Report dated July 8, 1996 (Exhibit 80), following a U.S. Navy visit, Brouse wrote that as a result of GasTOPS’ contribution to the AME, “ECMS would act as the MDPS replacement.”

[1128] The “NAVAIR ECMS/FLTS – Long-Term Tactical Action Plan” authored by Howe and Brouse on September 22, 1996 (Exhibit 92) indicates that the short-term goal of GasTOPS/BFG as “becoming the replacement for ECAMS and PLTS for the F/A-18 A, B, C and D models” does not reflect the entirety of such long-term tactical action plan which stated:

Action Plan: There are a number of serial milestone that must be achieved in order for us to attain the short term goal of becoming the replacement for ECAMS and PLTS for the F-18 A, B, C and D models (MDPS core). It is imperative for us to attain this short term goal (become a funded contractor) on the F-18 program, if we expect to be allowed to continue to participate in the AME/AMID development process and ultimately become the MDPS replacement for F-18 E & F, F-14 and V-22…

[1129] In my view, GasTOPS/BFG saw ECMS v.2 as the first stepping stone to a much larger business opportunity with the U.S. Navy and Brouse clearly understood this.

[1130] The U.S. Navy ECMS Implementation Plan (Exhibit 93) was attachment “C” to Exhibit 92 NAVAIR/ECMS/FLTS - Long-Term Tactical Action Plan authored by Howe and Brouse and dated September 22, 2996. In the introductory paragraph to Exhibit 93, Brouse specifically acknowledged that the AME was to operate on the new optimized O-Level NALCOMIS hardware/software infrastructure. Further and of equal importance, Brouse specifically noted that the U.S. Navy planned to integrate the ECAMS replacement unit with both the AME and NALCOMIS initiatives. The introductory paragraph of Exhibit 93 states:

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1. Introduction

The United States Navy (USN) presently utilizes the Enhanced Configuration Asset Management System (ECAMS) as the ground station for their fleet of F/A-18 aircraft. This system is responsible for downloading aircraft and engine data, tracking the life usage on specific serialized engine components and forwarding airframe and updated engine usage data to a central database repository. The system operates on an unsupportable 1970’s vintage DEC PDP-11 computer and utilizes software which is difficult and costly to maintain. As a result, the USN plans to replace the units with a modern data information system and presently is evaluating the BFGoodrich Engine Condition Monitoring System (ECMS) and the Maintenance Data Processing (MDP) system as potential replacement units. Furthermore, the USN is developing an Automated Maintenance Environment (AME) which will operate on the new Optimized O-level NALCOMIS hardware/software infrastructure and will provide comprehensive and integrated maintenance support for the new F/A-18 E and F model aircraft. The USN plans to integrate the ECAMS replacement unit with the AME and NALCOMIS initiative. In the event that the ECMS is chosen as the ECAMS replacement, the following describes a proposed implementation plan.

[1131] Accordingly, the parts life tracking/configuration management technology which was embodied in ECMS was anticipated by Brouse and GasTOPS to be integrated with both the AME and optimized NALCOMIS initiatives. Whether that technology was integrated by ECMS being a “stand-alone unit” or by integration of the technology into the optimized NALCOMIS software itself is not relevant to the issues in this litigation.

[1132] PMA265 had the parts life tracking/configuration management requirements that GasTOPS/B.F.Goodrich sought to provide and that MxI eventually provided. In early December 1996, Howe sent a letter to Captain Dyer (Exhibit 395) and enclosed a proposal entitled “Engine Condition Monitoring System for the U.S. Navy F/A-18 A-D (Exhibit 396). MxI argues that these two documents GasTOPS/B.F.Goodrich’s perceived opportunity with the U.S. Navy in December 1996. According to MxI, the relevant facts to be drawn from the documents are that:

The proposal is sent specifically to Captain Dyer of PMA265;

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The proposal is addressed to PMA265, recognizing it to be a part of the “Naval Air System Command”;

The proposal is specifically entitled “Engine Condition Monitoring System for the U.S. Navy F/A-18 A-D’s”;

The proposal sets out GasTOPS/B.F.Goodrich’s understanding of the PMA265 requirement, i.e. the need for an ECAMS replacement and for a maintenance information system that will allow PMA265 to move forward with its Operational Evaluation of the Super Hornet in an AME. Both requirements are platform specific to PMA265;

The proposal recommends a two-phase implementation i.e. delivery of ECMS v.2 in an OS/2 environment to serve as an ECAMS replacement and then delivery of the same ECMS v.2, but in Windows 95/NT. Importantly, both phases are still platform specific where the customer is PMA265; and

The proposal contemplates two sources of revenue for GasTOPS/B.F.Goodrich: sub-license fees and application engineering revenue (i.e. support of the system in the field).

[1133] MxI argues that GasTOPS’ written proposal (Exhibit 396) was limited to ECAMS replacement, but the “executive summary” proposed a phased acquisition whereby B.F.Goodrich would tailor and install an interim fleetwise MDPS replacement under Phase I and would work closely with the U.S. Navy on a permanent MDPS replacement system that met all of the AME requirements under Phase II, to be completed mid-1998.

[1134] In my view, this document clearly shows that GasTOPS/B.F.Goodrich was pursuing a much wider business opportunity with the U.S. Navy than a replacement of ECAMS with ECMS as alleged by MxI.

[1135] The IP ownership issue that MxI suggest was an obstacle to GasTOPS securing the U.S. Navy business opportunity ultimately proved to be no issue given that MxI successfully sold millions of dollars of Maintenix licenses to the U.S. Navy.

[1136] PMA265, and more particularly Lieutenant Herl, never considered any other competitive option to meet the U.S. Navy needs, except the technology being offered by MxI. As

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stated by Abrahms, the U.S. Navy as represented by Lieutenant Herl wanted the “Canadian system” and they obtained that technology from the defendants.

[1137] MxI argues that PMA265’s requirement for parts life tracking/configuration management was met by PC ECAMS and, as a result, PMA265 no longer required the technology offered by GasTOPS/B.F.Goodrich. However, O’Donnell, the U.S. Navy witness most familiar with PC ECAMS, stated that it was never intended as an ECAMS replacement but rather was a “band-aid” measure used to solve some hardware problems. It is important to remember that the existence of PC ECAMS apparently had no effect on MxI’s ability to sell Maintenix licenses to the U.S. Navy.

[1138] In my view, GasTOPS/B.F.Goodrich did not acknowledge that the NAVMASSO development represented a separate and distinct opportunity by opting not to pursue work with NAVMASSO. Rather, it was an acknowledgement that MxI had usurped the U.S. Navy business opportunity. In addition, after the MSD employees’ resignations, GasTOPS/B.F.Goodrich was not in a position to compete for this business opportunity.

[1139] On May 1, 1996, Brouse noted in his logbook (Exhibit 140, page 17):

NAVAIR MDPS Opportunity – presented to Brad H.

1)Software O-Level – ECMS

FLTS I-Level – ECMS D/C Level – ECMS

1)

NRE – Fixed

 

 

NAPID I/F

$35K

 

ECAMS/MDPS

25K

 

F402 Rules

35K

 

ECMS Tailoring

170K

This logbook entry confirms that Brouse presented to Howe his view of how the GasTOPS’ software technology could be used at the various levels of maintenance within the U.S. Navy. During cross-examination, Brouse suggested that his “presentation” to Howe was limited to

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providing pricing for the ECMS product, but in my view it is convincing evidence that GasTOPS/B.F.Goodrich’s business opportunity with the U.S. Navy included MDPS and was never limited to the replacement of ECAMS.

[1140] Chandler, the U.S. Navy employee who had been specifically tasked to find a replacement for MDPS, stated that he was looking at the GasTOPS’ ECMS system as an MDPS replacement as of early 1996. He also testified that, at the same time, MDPS was planned to be a common ground station for multiple aviation platforms, including the F14, V-22, all series F18’s (including the Super Hornet E and F) and anything else that required a ground station.

[1141] In his evidence in-chief, Chandler testified as to the broader role played by Lieutenant Herl, stating that “Lieutenant Herl's job was to find a ground station that could be integrated -- when I say a ground station, that included a software suite that would provide configuration management and the ability to integrate all these other software tools to provide a total support package for the aircraft, the Super Hornet,” not just an engine application to replaced ECAMS. GasTOPS’ ECMS provided much of what Lieutenant Herl was tasked to find as well as new ideas to bring into the F18 program. Lieutenant Herl also brought funding to the project, which was otherwise difficult to obtain, so “So the ECMS approach took on a real tangible life. We had a sponsor; we had a potential customer that was interested, and that was lieutenant Herl.”

[1142] After the resignations and shift of technical expertise to MxI, Lieutenant Herl and the U.S. Navy knew that GasTOPS would be unable to pursue this opportunity. Through Brouse, Lieutenant Herl learned that MxI could and would provide the configuration management/serialized parts life tracking/data stripping that the U.S. Navy required. Brouse had convinced Lieutenant Herl and others that GasTOPS’ product ECMS v.2 could meet all of the U.S. Navy’s requirements, and he was subsequently able to convince them that MxI could fulfill the U.S. Navy’s requirements and could provide the U.S. Navy with the “Canadian solution.”

[1143] MxI argues that the work it did with NAVMASSO through MANTECH was a new and separate/distinct opportunity from that which was being pursued by GasTOPS. In my view, the evidence establishes that Lieutenant Herl’s PMA265’s requirements, which were identical to

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the requirements GasTOPS sought to fulfill by selling ECMS licenses to the U.S. Navy, drove the relationship between MxI and NAVAIR/MANTECH. The evidence for this conclusion is that Lieutenant Herl invited Brouse to a January 9, 1997, AME meeting “to discuss the technical coordination required to bring in additional ‘Plug-n-Play’ modules into the existing AMID project” (Exhibit 1282); that Brouse subsequently told NAVMASSO that the U.S. Navy was developing AME to support F/A-18 E and F and V22 in such a way that AME would be a plug and play module for NALCOMIS under a proposed name of EM3 and that Lieutenant Herl was considering adding new requirements to the AME initiative (Exhibit 1277); and that Brouse wrote (also in Exhibit 1277) that the EM3 required functions would be serialized configuration tracking, TD tracking, life tracking, lifed component removal and TD scheduling and incremental data transfer to cognizant sites (total asset visibility). The proposed functionality of Lieutenant Herl’s EM3 requirements was identical to the requirements that GasTOPS was seeking to meet by selling ECMS licenses to the U.S. Navy.

[1144] During late December 1996 and early January 1997, an informal document was prepared at MxI entitled “EM3 Project Draft Plan” (Exhibit 1287), which confirms that MxI was seeking to meet Lieutenant Herl’s EM3 requirements. When questioned as to the author of Exhibit 1287, Jeff Cass stated that he made no “real big effort” to look for its author and that he couldn’t recall if it had even been him. After making such statement in his testimony, Jeff Cass was shown Exhibit 1756, a supplementary affidavit of documents wherein Exhibit 1278 was described as “EM3 project draft plan – Dave Peloso”. Jeff Cass then stated that he had had a role in designating Peloso the author of this document, a decision he based on the type of document and the fact that it is a plan outlining a number of project phases but that he never confirmed with Peloso that he was correct; Jeff Cass stated that he could not say for a fact that he had not authored it himself. He testified that he recognized Exhibit 1278 as a “a combination of items to be put forward in a project for EM3 as well as, in dark italics, items that were already either in the plan or in development for the Flight Works prototype, or at least where there is capability within the Flight Works prototype to provide capability within the EM3 (cubed) set of project items here.”

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[1145] This portion of Jeff Cass’s evidence was given a day prior to the date on which the defendants were forced to produce certain electronic documents. Exhibit 2198 is an electronic copy of Exhibit 1278 and its “Properties” confirm that it was last modified on January 7, 1997, and that it was authored by Jeff Cass. In his earlier evidence, Jeff Cass admitted that he had reviewed the properties pages of Exhibit 1278 to ascertain the last modification date of January 7, 1997. In so doing, Jeff Cass would also have seen that he was the author of the said document.

[1146] Brouse was cross-examined on the significance of Exhibits 1278 and 2198:

Q.Mr. Brouse, you were the one that was actively pursuing work with the United States Navy; correct?

A.Well, at this point in time I was pursuing work with McDonnell Douglas.

Q.Well, the contents of Exhibit 2198 relates to how a party could go about developing this EM3 technology for Lieutenant Herl, is it not?

A.Yeah, I don't know. It would appear to me -- but I don't know. It would appear to me that -- well. It would appear to me that this would be a project plan that would take Flight Works and modify it based on the EM cubed requirements to meet McDonnell Douglas' requirement, is the way I would read this.

Q.Well the legend says “U.S. Navy EM3" at the top of the page; right?

A.It does.

Q.So EM3 is for the U.S. Navy; right?

A.That's what it ends up being for, but I noticed that line item 3 it says MDA software methodology, so.

Q.The end result, Mr. Brouse, is to provide this EM3 technology to the United States Navy, correct, and we saw that in the presentation that MxI gave to NAVMASSO, that Power Point presentation where you talked about Lieutenant Herl's EM3 requirements; correct?

A.Well yes, that was at the end of January after I learned

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about NAVMASSO and their plans with optimized OMA.

Q.Are you suggesting, Mr. Brouse, that the EM3 requirement that you were speaking to NAVMASSO about in late January 1997 was somehow different than the EM3 requirement that is being referenced in this document dated early January of 1997?

A.No, I'm not suggesting that.

Q.All right. It's the same thing, right?

A.The EM cubed requirement?

Q.Yes?

A.I would assume so.

Q.You know that, Mr. Brouse?

A.I've only seen one EM cubed requirement, yes.

Q.If we can look, Mr. Brouse, at line item 122?

A.Yes.

Q.It talks about EM3 data model enhancements; do you see

that?

A.Yes.

Q.Item 23 says “design core logical data model”; do you see

that?

A.Yes.

Q.And then line item 24 says, “migrate physical data model from Oracle to Sybase”; do you see that?

A.I do.

Q.And that's consistent with the evidence that you've just given, which is the plan here was to take MxI's existing Flight Works data model, make enhancements to it to deal with the EM3 requirements and then to migrate that physical data model from Oracle over to Sybase; fair?

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A.I'd like you to repeat that, if you could.

COURT REPORTER: That’s consistent with the evidence you’ve just given, which is the plan here was to take MxI’s existing data model, make enhancements to it to deal with the EM3 requirements and then to migrate that physical data model from Oracle over to Sybase; fair?

A.I don’t know if that’s what’s being contemplated here.

Q.Mr. Brouse, you're directly involved in the pursuit of this work with the United States Navy; you're going down to St. Louis January 7 or 8 of 1997. Is it not correct, sir, that you were fully aware of the proposal from MxI as of this date as to how to meet Lieutenant Herl's EM3 requirement?

A.No, I don't think I was. I don't think I knew what Jeff was thinking when he put this document together. I don't recall taking this document down with me to McDonnell Douglas. Quite frankly, I don’t think I could speak to it. It's pretty technical. It appears to me that Jeff is just doing some thinking that -- about how he could meet that requirement if that -- you know, utilizing our technology. I don't know.

Q.So if Mr. Cass or Mr. Peloso presents this as being the U.S. Navy plan as at January 7 of 1997, your evidence is you probably weren't aware of it, is what you're saying; right?

A.I don't recall being aware of it; and if I was aware of it, I certainly -- I don't think I could speak to it as to what the steps were and what they were thinking at a technical level.

Q.Mr. Brouse, I thought you said when you were pursuing the U.S. Navy opportunity on behalf of GasTOPS that all you were doing was technical support, you're a specialist in that aren't you?

A.Well, I think that's not a fair characterization. I'm not a big project plan expert. I'm not a big development expert. I certainly knew the ECMS. I knew its capabilities, I knew how to implement that for a customer. I wasn’t, certainly by the time 1996 came along, the big design guy. I haven't designed a logical data model in my life, I don't think.

Q.So all the evidence you gave in-chief about your knowledge of EPLTS and the development of the data model,

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you're just guessing at that I take it?

A.No, I was involved in that. Let me just answer your question. The design methodologies and design approaches changed from the late 1980s to the late 1990s.

Certainly the way you approach -- certainly the way I watched these guys approach a data model design was different than what I had done, specifically when you get into software development, these guys are all using Power Builder, object oriented approach, which I was familiar with and knew of, but I never developed in that environment.

Q.Let me ask the question to you in this way, Mr. Brouse, try to simplify it. You're about to leave to go down to St. Louis to meet with the United States Navy, and you had a choice: either you could meet with your development team to find out how they would propose to meet the U.S. Navy’s requirement or not meet with them and simply go down to the meeting blind; which one would you choose?

A.I would probably choose meeting with the design team. That being said, the design team would frequently give me details that I couldn't speak to because it's beyond my capability. And I'm not going to make a fool of myself in front of a customer, trying to speak to issues that I can't speak to.

So that's where I would leave it. And this plan is -- at any rate, it doesn't look complete to me at all, it’s got basic steps, but ---

Q.I thought you said you don’t know anything about this, Mr. Brouse, how can you say that now?

A.Well, ---

Q.You say you’re not an expert in it, you don’t know anything about it?

A.I've seen other plans.

Q.All right?

A.And I've seen plans, not that I could do it myself, but I've seen other plans that have more detail than this, typically.

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Q.So you have other plans of this nature; you understand them. But you didn't look at this one and you didn't understand this one at the time?

A.I don't understand it today. I don't understand the difference between the bold and non-bold. No, this is -- there is no definition of durations. This looks like this is a beginning of a plan, quite frankly.

Q.Did you have a lot of discord at MxI as between the sales and the product development team in the sense that one has no idea what the other one is doing?

A.Yes.

[1147] In re-cross-examination, Brouse was shown Exhibit 2199, a document entitled “EM3 Requirements – January 26, 1997”. It is an electronic copy of Exhibit 1729, which was introduced during Jeff Cass’s evidence in-chief as a document containing notes he wrote to himself in advance of a January 28 meeting. Accordingly, the requirements of Lieutenant Herl’s EM3 were discussed and addressed by the defendants prior to their attendance at the meeting in St. Louis in late January 1997.

[1148] In cross-examination, Jeff Cass confirmed that Lieutenant Herl’s EM3 requirements were subsequently incorporated into MxI’s optimized NALCOMIS development effort. Further evidence that MxI had been retained to incorporate Lieutenant Herl’s EM3 requirements into optimized NALCOMIS can be found in Exhibit 1758, which is a memorandum prepared by MxI employee Laura Kline following a meeting conducted in April 1997. Laura Kline testified that the meeting’s purpose was to engage in project planning for the U.S. Navy work, the requirements for which related to four core functions: Configuration Sub-System, including Baseline and Tracking; Usage Sub-System, including Baseline, Tracking and Interface; Maintenance Sub-System, including Baseline and Tracking; and Total Asset Visibility Sub- System, including Item Transfer and Data Replication.

[1149] Jeff Cass confirmed that Lieutenant Herl’s EM3 requirements were being considered by MxI. In relation to Exhibit 1758, Jeff Cass confirmed that, in addition to the four core

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functions, some functions including data stripping were among those described as being “outside of the core” of NALCOMIS. Jeff Cass was then referred to page 2 of Exhibit 1758, wherein Laura Kline had specifically noted:

Next two weeks should concentrate on:

AME requirements definition document

detail Configuration Management requirements

Project plan times 3: stripping/integration/core.

Jeff Cass stated in cross-examination that he did not recall to what “AME requirements definition document” referred.

[1150] The contents of Exhibit 1758 establish that the MxI development team had met to develop a plan to meet Lieutenant Herl’s EM3 requirements. Part of that process involved a review of AME requirements, work that was not directly related to the “fee for service” work that MxI was allegedly doing for NAVMASSO on optimized NALCOMIS.

[1151] GasTOPS submits that differences in the business opportunity with the U.S. Navy relied on by the defendants are not born out by the evidence. In a very persuasive chart, which I accept as accurate, the plaintiff states:

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Defendants’ Conclusions

(i)Different Chains of Command

(ii)Different Organization

(iii)Different Personnel

(iv)Internal Development v. Outside Procurement

Evidence Established at Trial

Same end-use customer – PMA265, as represented by Lieutenant Herl

Same end-use customer – PMA265, as represented by Lieutenant Herl

Same end-use customer – PMA265, as represented by Lieutenant Herl

Exact same technology being sought – parts life tracking/configuration management technology, the “Canadian system”

- 528 -

(v) Different Customer Requirements

Identical customer requirements –

 

 

PMA265’s AME Super Hornet

 

 

development and ECAMS/MDPS

 

 

replacement

(vi)

Different Streams of Revenue

Identical streams of revenue – funding

 

 

starts from PMA265, is provided to

 

 

NAVMASSO, then to MANTECH,

 

 

then to MxI

(vii)

Different Timeframes

Identical timeframes - the defendants

 

 

seamlessly integrated themselves into

 

 

the GasTOPS U.S. Navy opportunity

 

 

and immediately began the process of

 

 

marketing the parts life

 

 

tracking/configuration management

technology as early as November of 1996.

[1152] After reviewing the defence submissions on the U.S. Navy business opportunity, it seems to me that MxI’s defence to this issue is that the contracts it obtained constituted different opportunities than the business opportunity pursued by GasTOPS. In my view, any so-called “differences” between the opportunities pursued with the U.S. Navy by MxI and those pursued by GasTOPS reflected only different avenues through which the configuration management/parts life tracking/data stripping technology was acquired by the U.S. Navy from MxI. In my view, GasTOPS was pursuing a business opportunity for configuration management/parts life tracking/data stripping technology for the whole U.S. Navy fleet of aircraft. MxI usurped this business opportunity for itself by selling its technology which was the fourth iteration of the GasTOPS technology to the U.S. Navy. The personal defendants succeeded in usurping this business opportunity by breaching the fiduciary they owed to GasTOPS by resigning without reasonable notice, by offering employment to other GasTOPS employees who would also fail to provide reasonable notice, by developing the fourth iteration of ECMS that GasTOPS was planning to develop and release and by using GasTOPS’ confidential business information or allowing MxI to use GasTOPS confidential business information to target its customers and potential customers including the U.S. Navy.

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[1153] The conduct of the personal defendants as set out above amounts to a gross breach of the fiduciary duty they owed to GasTOPS and as a result the personal defendants are liable to compensate GasTOPS for any loss it incurred as a result of this breach. Further, by using confidential business information which it knew belonged to GasTOPS to develop Maintenix and to usurp the business opportunities GasTOPS was pursuing when the personal defendants resigned, MxI is liable to compensate GasTOPS for any losses it suffered as a result of MxI using such confidential business information.

Volvo

[1154] On January 12, 1997, GasTOPS prepared a project plan for internal purposes only. The plan contained reservations held by GasTOPS concerning its engineering capabilities as a result of the resignations from the MSD that had occurred in the intervening time:

Due to the recent events at GasTOPS, the primary risk associated with this project is the timing of it. More explicitly, the risk is whether we fully understand the requirements of the project and are able [to] meet them at this time. This covers all aspects of the project from engineering analysis, to application development, database population, system installation, and set-to-work. Although significant progress has been made towards re- establishing an understanding for and capability to support these activities, this will be the first project actually undertaken in its entirety by the new ECMS/SDT team.

Specific risk areas and concerns include the following:

1)whether the SDT will have the ECMS v2.0l application sufficiently complete to support the planned trial and demonstration to the Swedish Air Force;

2)whether the SDT and ECMS team members will have sufficiently come to grips with the ECMS/FLTS data model to populate it for the demonstration both in terms of data requirements and where to put it;

3)the definition and subsequent integration of the

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RUF data file processing utility into the

ECMS/FLTS; and,

4)language, specifically the ability to communicate with Volvo representatives and comprehend Volvo design documentation written in Swedish.

The only other foreseeable risk area is associated with schedule. GasTOPS has delayed the initiation of this project by over 1 month without adjusting the planned demonstration date.

[1155] On January 16, 1997, GasTOPS received a purchase order from Volvo for its planned demonstration (Exhibit 436) and conducted the demonstration at the end of April 1997.

[1156] On June 13, 1997, Muir met with representatives from Volvo who expressed interest in developing the diagnostic system for the RM-12 engine used on the Grippen aircraft. It appeared that Volvo was mainly interested in GasTOPS’ diagnostic technology. Specifically, Volvo was attracted to the FLTS component of the ECMS. Unbeknownst to GasTOPS, Volvo was meeting with MxI on June 14, 1997.

[1157] On June 26, 1997, Volvo faxed GasTOPS its requirements for an “engine diagnostic system”. On July 2, 1997, Muir forwarded a fax to Volvo (Exhibit 457), seeking clarification as to whether GasTOPS would be in a “competitive bidding situation” for the work with Volvo and noting that “we do not want to submit a detailed proposal to you at this time” if that was the case. Prior to receiving Volvo’s requirements, GasTOPS was unaware of any other company with a software program similar to its FLTS and was not aware that Volvo intended to conduct a competition to meet its requirements on an engine diagnostic system.

[1158] Muir felt it was not appropriate to provide Volvo with a draft proposal at this stage due to the possibility that confidential technical information might be revealed to other competitors in the process. For similar reasons, GasTOPS did not want to propose a price to Volvo in advance of a formal competition.

[1159] On August 5, 1997, Jeffrey Neilson (“Neilson”) of GasTOPS contacted Persson concerning the proposed competition, who said the only competitive bid Volvo was interested in

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was Intelligent Electronics Limited’s test product. Neilson made a note of his conversation with Persson (Exhibit 458). There is no mention in the memo that Volvo was in discussions with MxI. On August 19, 1997, Volvo confirmed by fax (Exhibit 460) that it would be conducting a competition.

[1160] On October 28, 1997, MacIsaac received a telephone call from Volvo’s Lars Banling concerning the nature of the ongoing litigation between GasTOPS and MxI.

[1161] Muir discussed the similarity between Volvo’s requirements for an EDS system (Exhibit 464) and GasTOPS’ FLTS, which was developed by the defendants while employed GasTOPS. Using the FLTS User’s Manual (Exhibit 758). Muir testified that the FLTS’ graphical analysis capabilities regarding flight recorded data for the purposes of diagnostics and fault isolation were “similar if not identical to the data analysis or graphical analysis capabilities included in Volvo’s procurement specifications.” He also testified that FLTS’ ability to lead the user through the use of the graphical tool, through yes/no questions, to a diagnosis was “again very similar, or virtually identical, to the requirements specified by Volvo in their procurement specification.” Generally, he noted, “The requirements that are called up in this section of the Volvo procurement spec, with one or two exceptions, can all be found within the user's manual” of GasTOPS’ FLTS.

[1162] According to Muir, prior to receiving Volvo’s request for a quotation, GasTOPS had only discussed licensing with Volvo. Volvo’s request for a quotation signaled that it wanted to own the intellectual property. Throughout the month of November 1997, GasTOPS sought to renegotiate with Volvo to enter into a licensing arrangement with Volvo. GasTOPS hoped to offer a customized version of FLTS, and it was not prepared to proceed any further with Volvo until there was an agreement that Volvo would not have unrestricted rights to the deliverable. The licensing/ownership issue was settled between GasTOPS and Volvo and, as a result, GasTOPS submitted a quotation and technical proposal on December 3, 1997 (Exhibits 471 and 765).

[1163] On December 16, 1997, Volvo advised GasTOPS that its quoted price was higher

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than other vendors’ and requested that GasTOPS reconsider its price. On December 17, 1997, GasTOPS submitted a second quotation, to which Volvo responded that the price was still higher. GasTOPS submitted a final price on December 18, 1997. (See Exhibits 474, 475 and 476).

[1164] On December 23, 1997 Volvo and MxI entered into a Letter of Intent whereby MxI would provide an advanced engine diagnostic system (“EDS”) for a fixed price sum of $372,800 USD pursuant to MxI’s November 24, 1997 proposal (amended by fax dated December 16, 1997) (Exhibits 1909 and 1511). On December 30, 1997 Volvo advised GasTOPS that it had awarded the contract to another vendor without disclosing the name of the successful vendor (Exhibit 477).

[1165] In February 1998, Muir downloaded a portion of the MxI website which stated at page 3 that Volvo had contracted with MxI to “adapt the core technology of Maintenix to develop an advanced engine and diagnostic system… Volvo plans to offer this product as a support tool for users of their RM-12 engine” (Exhibit 478).

[1166] The defendants’ Statement of Defence states:

In or about January, 1997, BAC took an initiative and approached MxI for a demonstration of its Maintenix product. MxI heard nothing further until in or about late June 1997, when DAC sent MxI a preliminary request for a proposal. At about that same time, BAC advised MxI that BAC was no longer interested in the ECMS product being marketed by GasTOPS. The defendants state that any allegation by GasTOPS that MxI had any role whatsoever to play with BAC’s decision to pursue different products is totally and completely without foundation.

[1167] GasTOPS’ corporate opportunity with Volvo had been established prior to the defendants’ resignations in October 1996. Brouse was heavily involved in GasTOPS’ business opportunity with Volvo, and contrary to what is pleaded in the Statement of Defence, the defendants competed directly with GasTOPS for this corporate opportunity and delivered a software system to Volvo which is almost identical to the GasTOPS’ FLTS software system. The

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evidence at trial, as introduced by the defendants, indicated that Maintenix did not contain the database or functionality that was in the software system the defendants delivered to Volvo.

[1168] Notwithstanding the defendants’ statement that their first meeting with Volvo was totally unexpected, it appears Volvo learned of MxI through Captain MacDonald. Subsequently, on January 31, 1997, Brouse and Forsyth had lunch with Captain MacDonald and Warrant Officer Paré (see Exhibit 1452 at page 21) as evidenced in Forsyth’s logbook for January 31, 1997.

[1169] During the week of February 7, 1997, Persson and Hjort of Volvo visited MxI and were given a demonstration of the FlightWorks prototype.

[1170] I find it strange that the defendants could not or would not produce a copy of the prototype used in their February 1997 demonstration to Volvo, despite being asked to do so on numerous occasions. It is likely that the prototype was a copy of the GasTOPS’ FLTS or was obviously based on it.

[1171] In his IOI for the period ending February 7, 1997 (Exhibit 1535), Forsyth wrote: “We [received] a surprise visit from Volvo on Tuesday. Roger Persson and Stefan Hjort were in town for a CASI meeting and to meet with GasTOPS. They came by to find out what we were up to. We had a good visit but I don’t know where it will go from here.” In his testimony, Forsyth said that he believed Brouse had met Persson while he was employed at GasTOPS but that he did not think Brouse had ever met Stefan Hjort (“Hjort”) before; he testified that he himself had never met them before. Forsyth believed the Volvo representatives learned of MxI’s location from someone at the CAF, he did not know who, based on something Persson had said.

[1172] Forsyth was aware that GasTOPS had been pursuing a business opportunity with Volvo, and in fact, during the brief time that MxI was doing contract work for GasTOPS, Chris Cass had pursued the Volvo business opportunity for GasTOPS.

[1173] According to Brouse, Persson and Hjort unexpectedly visited the MxI premises in Ottawa during the week of February 7, 1997. He testified that he asked Persson how they learned

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of MxI’s location and that Persson would not answer. Brouse and Forsyth gave their visitors a tour of their facilities and showed them a “demonstrable” version of the FlightWorks prototype to show them what the system would be able to do when it was completed. Brouse testified that they showed this primarily to Hjort, who was the more senior of the two and who did not show much interest in the product because the Swedish Air Force planned to implement Intentia’s Movex system to perform the same functions as Maintenix would perform. In his testimony, Brouse left the impression that MxI had no further dealings with Volvo until June 1997, when Persson wanted to “drop by” MxI again.

[1174] In describing his meeting with Persson during June 1997, Brouse testified that Persson did in fact come to the MxI office. He said that Persson described to him Volvo’s long- term plans, including that they wanted to improve after-market support for the engines it created and repaired so that they would not have to be provided to Volvo’s customers by its competitors. Persson noted that the Swedish Air Force would be the trial customer for this arrangement: using the Movex system for maintenance management on aircraft and engines, it wanted to take data and link it into their corporate information system so that they could more effectively predict when parts would be required, when maintenance overhauls would be required, etc. Brouse testified that he thought this was a good and novel idea but that Volvo should consider using a system other than Movex for other customers because it was large and “not a very capable system”; he believed Maintenix could be used instead and testified that he thought he had told Persson so.

[1175] It must be remembered that, while employed at GasTOPS, Brouse was extensively involved in GasTOPS’ pursuit of the Volvo opportunity. Also, during the brief period of cooperation between GasTOPS and MxI in the fall of 1996, MxI was retained by GasTOPS to assist GasTOPS in pursuing the Volvo business opportunity. MxI was aware that Persson and Hjort had previously been at GasTOPS’ premises when they came unexpectedly to MxI in February 1997. Accordingly, there can be no doubt that during the week of February 7, 1997, MxI and more particularly Forsyth and Brouse were aware that GasTOPS was still pursuing a business opportunity with Volvo.

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[1176] Despite the impressions left by Brouse in his examination-in-chief, it became apparent in the documentary evidence and in his cross-examination that he actively pursued a business opportunity with Volvo between February 1997 and June 14, 1997. On April 4, 1997, Brouse sent an e-mail to Roger Persson (Exhibit 2099) which stated: “Just a simple to note to say hi. I have tried to call you on the phone on several occasions but it is impossible to reach you, and with your phone system in Volvo, I can’t leave a message. I was just kind of curious about the state of things with Volvo and the Swedish Air Force (SAF). Give me a call when you can.” In addition, the Bell Canada records for MxI (Exhibits 2100 and 2101) indicate that calls were placed from MxI to Volvo during April and May 1997. In cross-examination, Brouse testified that the “state of things” about which he was inquiring was the Grippen development and the Movex implementation.

[1177] Brouse’s evidence confirms he knew of Vovlo’s requirements, as related by Persson during 1996 when he was employed by GasTOPS.

[1178] During his cross-examination, Brouse stated:

Q.So to set up this meeting of June 14, now that you've seen Exhibit 2104, was the contact made while he was in Canada, as you've stated, or not?

A. Well, again, I didn't say he contacted me in Canada.

I stated that I was contacted by Mr. Roger Persson for this meeting.

It appears by that e-mail that that contact might have occurred in

May.

Q.Mr. Brouse, you said on day 173, "I understand from him that he is in Ottawa..."?

A.Yes.

Q."...He's in Canada and wants to drop by."?

A.Yes. It appears that I spoke to him in May. And clearly in June he contacted us and dropped by. And it's pretty clear, now with the benefit of that e-mail, that we may have organized this thing in May. Again, it's the same thing: That he's in Ottawa and he's going to drop by.

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At any rate, if you take this is a contradiction, I'm sorry, but that was my best recollection. Apparently it was in May that we organized a visit.

Q.Also in May you found out about the status of the GasTOPS' demonstration in Sweden; correct?

A.Apparently, yes.

Q.Well these are your words, sir. Is there any doubt in your mind that you're not recording correctly what your understanding was?

A.I'm recording, likely correctly, what my understanding is,

yes.

Q.So, you at least would have had from May 30, '97 till June 14 to make the presentation that we saw as Exhibit 2102; correct?

A.Yes.

[1179] Brouse attempted to describe another unexpected visit by Persson to MxI. He testified that there was no stated purpose for the meeting. If one accepts this, Persson was simply gathering information at the meeting and MxI was not attempting to pursue a business opportunity with Volvo. However, in his IOI for the period ending June 20, 1997 (Exhibit 1545), Forsyth wrote: “Roger Persson came in to MxI on Saturday, June 14, to see us and to discuss their needs. Roger says he may be interested in MxI developing a squadron troubleshooting system. We also spoke of Volvo’s need for maintenance support software to assist them in their aspirations to become the European support agency for the F404/RMI2.”

[1180] Between Persson’s February 1997 and June 14, 1997, visits to MxI, GasTOPS was demonstrating its ECMS and FLTS to Volvo, a fact of which Brouse was aware. Brouse suggested that he did not have any interest in GasTOPS’ demonstrations. I would assume that he tried to convey this impression in order to bolster the claim of MxI that it was not pursuing a business opportunity with Volvo prior to June 14, 1997.

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[1181] On May 30, 1997, Brouse forwarded an e-mail to Chris Cass (Exhibit 2104) stating: “Volvo is meeting with us on June 14th. [Apparently] GTL did manage to install the ECMS version 2 demo in Sweden including interfacing to their test cell and the aircraft. Regardless, they still want to speak to us…”

[1182] A PowerPoint presentation entitled “MxI Presentation to Volvo June 14, 1997” was found on the MxI backup tape, containing information gleaned from the defendants’ experience at GasTOPS. The document’s Properties indicated it was printed on June 14, 1997. Brouse could not recall giving the presentation but agreed it was possible that it had been given. I am satisfied that Brouse either made the PowerPoint presentation to Persson or provided Persson with a hard copy of the PowerPoint presentation on that date.

[1183] On June 17, 1997, Brouse created a meeting note on his meeting with Persson on June 14, 1997 (Exhibit 1505). He wrote: “Presently, Volvo is searching for technology to assist their customers in the maintenance of the engines and that will also assist Volvo in providing superior product support. Although Volvo is not quite ready yet for our Maintenix technology, they are interested in potentially asking us to develop a generalized diagnostic tool for engine troubleshooting.” According to Brouse, Persson stated that Volvo required a diagnostic system and Brouse advised that MxI was interested in building it for Volvo. During the meeting, Persson confirmed that Volvo had been dealing with GasTOPS with respect to its FLTS and ECMS. According to Brouse, Persson advised that Volvo was no longer interested in GasTOPS’ ECMS and that Volvo was looking at GasTOPS’ FLTS and might ask MxI to bid on a diagnostic system in competition with GasTOPS’ FLTS.

[1184] As demonstrated in the PowerPoint presentation dated June 14, 1997 (Exhibit 2102), Brouse advised Persson that the GasTOPS employees who had designed and developed the FLTS now worked at MxI. As he had on numerous other occasions, Brouse was suggesting that MxI now had the expertise to develop ECMS and/or FLTS software and that GasTOPS no longer had such expertise. The purpose of such a statement was to persuade Volvo and other potential customers to deal with MxI as opposed to GasTOPS.

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[1185] On June 26, 1997 GasTOPS received a requirement document from Volvo (Exhibit 456). GasTOPS’ Jeff Neilson (“Neilson”) stated that Volvo had visited GasTOPS in early June, requesting information on some hardware products, its MetalScan software and vibration analyzer. GasTOPS later received the requirement document, and Neilson stated that the request built upon the FLTS segment of the demonstration system but applied to the RM* engine in addition to the RM12 upon which GasTOPS had built its demonstration. He further testified: “They also, in the requirement section, talk about some of the enhancements or upgrades they were looking for, an interface to what's called an electronic handbook. They also identify that they would like some capability to modify the trouble shooting rules. For the demonstration we had essentially manually populated those trouble shooting rules and they wanted a little utility.” Although this was just a preliminary set of requirements, Neilson identified that it was GasTOPS’ FLTS that would cover these requirements.

[1186] Neilson was unaware that MxI was drafting and preparing the requirement specifications for the October 26, 1997 RFP, which outlined Volvo’s requirement for an ADS, another request that could be satisfied by GasTOPS’ FLTS.

[1187] In my view, Volvo’s RFP (Exhibit 464) was written by Brouse and Egan based on the confidential information taken from GasTOPS’ FLTS software system.

[1188] On June 27, 1997 Brouse received an e-mail from Persson (Exhibit 1506) which stated: “I [wonder] if you could give me a suggestion and your thoughts on an Engine Diagnostic system. I attached a short description of my main requirement of such a system.” Brouse instructed Mike Egan to prepare and forward a proposal to Volvo the following month. MxI forwarded a proposal to Volvo on July 25, 1997 (Exhibit 1507).

[1189] At Brouse and Forsyth’s June 1997 meeting with Persson, they discussed MxI’s progress on Maintenix as well as the engine troubleshooting software that Volvo was seeking. Forsyth stated that he understood that Volvo was seeking a new system as FLTS did not have the functionality that Volvo required as FLTS was a twin engine application. FLTS’ diagnostic was done by comparing the performance of one engine on the CF-18 to the performance of the

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second engine. Volvo on the other hand required a product for a single engine aircraft. Based on information gained at this meeting, Forsyth did not believe that they were in competition with GasTOPS. According to Brouse, Persson asked if MxI would be willing to develop a system that would diagnose engine faults under contract. At the conclusion of the meeting Persson advised MxI (and Brouse noted in the meeting minutes) that he might ask them to bid on a diagnostic system in competition with FLTS. Egan was tasked to come up with ideas for a diagnostic system that “would be a good diagnostic system to propose to Volvo (if they were interested).” Egan proceeded to run through different options that he believed might work for Volvo.

[1190] While employed at GasTOPS, Egan developed the rules and knowledge-base used in the FLTS: the engine health indicators, fault signatures and fault library for the 404 engine. Egan’s knowledge of the FLTS, RCM Analyst methodology and FMECA were detailed in his performance reviews (Exhibits 211, 212 and 213).

[1191] According to Egan, no other company had developed engine health indicators, fault signatures or fault library for the 404 engine. Furthermore Egan was not aware of any software development like the FLTS or SLPS in relation to the 404 engine being written any company other than GasTOPS. As an employee of GasTOPS, Egan was fully aware of the discussions taking place between Volvo and GasTOPS with respect to the development of a diagnostic system for the RM12 engine based on take-off and in-flight recordings. While employed at MxI, Egan was not aware of Volvo’s requirements until after the June 14, 1997, meeting between Volvo and MxI. As indicated in his logbook (Exhibit 2386 at page 72), Egan made notes concerning the engine measurements. He was certain that this information did not come from Volvo and admitted that the evidence was provided to him by either Forsyth or Brouse. Further in his cross-examination, Egan suggested that the information contained in his logbook with respect to engine measurements came from either his work at GasTOPS or his academic studies.

[1192] On June 27, 1997 Brouse received an e-mail from Volvo with an attached draft RFP containing Volvo’s requirements (see Exhibit 1506: e-mail to MxI (D. Brouse) from Volvo “Roger”). Egan reviewed the document and understood that Volvo was interested in procuring a diagnostic system with the following functionality and requirements:

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(a)The program should be able to read the engine run time history from Oracle database. This data would come from an external database not provided by vendor.

(b)There shall be a described methodology to develop rules for engine diagnostics. Thus the user needed a screen in which to enter the diagnostic rules.

(c)The rules will not be in the source code but in the database to be imputed by Volvo. It must allow the end user to configure the system.

(d)There had to be a report generation tool. This should not be in the executable code but as data.

(e)Must be able to connect maintenance action to an electronic hand box.

(f)The diagnostic system had to be able to set up for different configuration engines and different types of engines. Must support different types of assets and potentially different customers. Must be defined in software so it can be set up and changed.

(g)Volvo would own all source code.

[1193] In describing its development of the ADS for Volvo, MxI and Forsyth, Brouse and Egan relied on the contents of conversations with Persson. During the trial the defendants refused to undertake to call Persson as a witness, and the evidence of statements made by Persson or documents received from Persson were admitted as statements heard or documents received by the defendants (not for the proof of the information contained in such documents or statements). Notwithstanding the basis upon which such evidence was admitted, in their submissions, the defendants attempted to use Persson’s statements, those of others at Volvo and documents authored by Volvo employees who were not called as witnesses as proof of their contents.

[1194] Brouse described the e-mail received from Volvo on June 27, 1997 (Exhibit 1506), as an RFP, but there was no evidence from Volvo that this was in fact an RFP. Brouse, as he had in the past, used an unsolicited proposal approach to Volvo to obtain a contract with Volvo. Volvo was quite precise when it stated in the e-mail “this document is a first definition of VAC main Requirements on an Engine Diagnostic System. This requirement will be more precisely before a

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Request For Proposal will be sent to different vendors.”

[1195] Regarding the creation of the ADS proposal (Exhibit 1507), Egan stated that it was a collaborative effort. He was the central person writing it but “Doug had to review it before it went out, absolutely.” There were a number of pages he had not seen, and Egan testified that his collaborators wrote those. When counsel during cross-examination put the proposition to Egan that the reason he did not prepare the chapter on the work plan was because he did not design the ADS software, Egan categorically denied the suggestion.

[1196] The documents submitted by MxI to Volvo Aero Corporation entitled “Proposal for the development of an engine diagnostic system (EDS)” (Exhibit 1507) stated: “All information contained within this document is submitted in confidentiality to Volvo Aerospace Corporation”. Then the introduction stated: “MxI Technologies is pleased to respond to Volvo’s request for a proposal regarding the development of an EDS. Attached is an approach and implementation strategy that could be readily executed by MxI to meet the Volvo requirements. MxI’s proposal provides several significant advantages to Volvo…”

[1197] It is clear that MxI was purporting to respond to a Volvo RFP, which was inappropriate as Volvo made it clear that an RFP would be forthcoming in the future and would be provided to other vendors. This was an attempt by MxI to secure a business opportunity it knew GasTOPS had been pursuing. It is also significant that MxI took the position that the information contained in the proposal was confidential information belonging to Volvo and yet argues that when GasTOPS somehow waived any confidentiality when it gave its customers or potential customers with the same disclaimer. In my view, such disclaimer would warn any employee of GasTOPS that this was confidential information belonging to GasTOPS and could not be used in the future if he/she went to work for another employer who was competing for the same business opportunity.

[1198] When asked about his source of knowledge regarding engine diagnostics, Egan stated that he studied engine performance and design in university and gained experience in the troubleshooting area while at GasTOPS working projects for the CAF. Another source of Egan’s

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knowledge was the GE troubleshooting manual, which he said defined a series of operational failures that led the user of the engine into the troubleshooting process.

[1199] It appears from Egan’s evidence that the GE troubleshooting manual and process, which the defendants did not produce, was a document that was in GasTOPS’ possession and supplied to GasTOPS by the CAF. All documentation supplied by the CAF to GasTOPS, including third party documentation was to be kept confidential by GasTOPS. Accordingly, Egan was using confidential information that belonged to the CAF and/or GasTOPS, as a source of his drafting the proposal for Volvo.

[1200] Egan in describing his knowledge and/or understanding of the FMECA model in cross-examination stated that he had “done a portion of or at least an off sheet of the FMECA in order to assist the troubleshooting” but that he had never done a pure FMECA analysis. What he had done was something derivative of, similar to, flowing from or using some of its concepts. He did this while at GasTOPS, helping to develop troubleshooting rules for the F404 engine, including for the GE work. He acknowledged that he was using “results that someone else had done FMECA analysis” rather than using FMECA methodology himself.

[1201] The defendants claim that Egan spent approximately 38 hours in preparing the MxI proposal for the development of an EDS for Volvo. In contrast, GasTOPS said that it had taken six to seven years of research and design efforts to develop the FLTS software system to the point it was at in October 1996. The fact that Egan states that he was able to put together this proposal in 38 hours notwithstanding he had little experience in the area of diagnostics leads me to the conclusion that the only way in which Egan could have prepared this proposal was to base it on GasTOPS’ FLTS software. I have no doubt that this proposal was a collaboration of information provided by Brouse and Chris Cass to Egan and that this collaborative information was copied almost entirely from the GasTOPS’ FLTS software which was confidential business information belonging to GasTOPS. Egan, Chris Cass and Brouse were well aware that it was confidential business information.

[1202] Egan stated that he designed the ADS data model and categorically denied all

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propositions to the contrary. He claimed that the development of the ADS data model was done by extending Maintenix’s data model, previously designed at MxI. The extended portion of the data model represented the troubleshooting specific tables and relationships needed to meet Volvo’s requirements. Egan stated that he was helped by Jeff Cass and Vandenberg.

[1203] According to Egan, the process used to build the physical data model was one where Egan would sketch on print-outs of the Maintenix data model by hand to show what tables would be brought into the ADS as well as sketching the new tables not already in the Maintenix data model. Egan would then have Vandenberg create the physical data model as per his sketches.

[1204] None of the sketches were produced in this litigation. Egan conceded that many of the sketches were thrown away once the information had been put into the computer. The defendants suggest that “once the sketches were imputed into the computer there would not have been a reason to keep them.”

[1205] I find this suggestion astounding given the fact that the plaintiff had commenced an action against the defendants by late November 1996. Not only should such sketches have been retained, but it would have been advantageous to the defendants to have sketches showing that they had designed the ADS software system without using any part of the GasTOPS’ FLTS. Given the fact that these alleged sketches were destroyed, I am driven to the conclusion that either the defendants purposely destroyed them so they would not have to produce them or these documents never existed.

[1206] In describing the data model he developed for the ADS software (exhibit 1096C) Egan stated that the document was meant to go through all of the database design details underlying the software. It contained two main sections, one providing an overview of some major design decisions and one regarding the Machinery Information Management Open System Alliance (“MIMOSA”) standard. The third section deals with the “detailed design around the data model itself.”

[1207] With respect to the flexibility of the ADS software given the design decisions made in

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its creation, Egan stated that allowing Volvo to input its own data into the software’s baseline tables would allow it to configure “any number of engine types in the system” and to collect different sorts of data, perhaps varying by engine; “It allows them to set up all their own trouble shooting rules in the system.”

[1208] In describing the section of the ADS design specifications dealing with baseline equipment (exhibit 1096C), Egan stated:

A.Just below that there is the EQP Assemble BOM table, which allows them to further divide that engine type into individual components that they want to model failures for, so it's not the full structural breakdown that we were talking about as part of Maintenix, however it does allow them to go down to the level of a component for defining that failure mode that we'll see in a further part of the data model.

But this is what provides the flexibility to add any number of engine types, and then all of the follow-on data model -- or the data in the follow-on areas can change depending on which engine type you're talking about.

Q.If I can ask you a couple of questions follow up on that. If the end user, in this case Volvo, changes the data, what's the repercussion of that?

A.That would change how the system works in many ways, that it would -- every time someone runs the actual trouble shooting system in this case, it will look to the rules that are defined in the baseline tables and modify its characteristics based on what's in the tables.

Q.Can you tell us if the user changes the data, what if any significance is there to the source code underlying the GUI or that middle business rule, business logic layer that you talked about?

A.There's no impact on it. Certainly the source code is designed such that it looks into these tables. So what it means is they change table contents, data, and not need to change the source code in order to change the characteristics of the software.

[1209] Egan’s evidence regarding the design and development of the ADS data model and

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its flexibility is not supported by other testimony. The defendants did not ask any of their experts (Dr. Parnas, Dr. Mohrenschildt or Dr. Chen) to express an opinion on the extension of the Maintenix database into ADS, the use of MIMOSA in the ADS data model or the “flexibility” of the ADS data model. The third expert, Dr. Chen, admitted in cross-examination that he did not do a detailed analysis of the ADS data model.

[1210] Both Dr. Mendelzon and Jeff Cass stated that the design of the FLTS database was generic and was suitable for any kind of equipment representation and not specific to the F404 engine. The ADS software provided to Volvo allowed the purchaser to configure the software, as opposed to the FLTS which required the source code to be altered for different engine types.

[1211] The defendants concede in their submissions that Egan did not do any work in the development of FLTS (Flight Line Troubleshooting System); that he had little data modeling experience; and that his lack of knowledge of what a conceptual data model was didn’t really matter because he “had little need” for it because he was not “an academic attempting to create a conceptualized model.” GasTOPS accepts these submissions as they corroborate GasTOPS’ submission that MxI skipped the entire design and development process in designing and developing the ADS software system.

[1212] MxI admits to designing the physical data model of the ADS. This is exactly what Dr. Mendelzon concluded when he did his examination of the MxI development process: that the conceptual design documents were created from the physical design after it was implemented.

[1213] For reasons I do not understand, the defendants did not have their experts compare the ADS data model with the FLTS data model. Dr. Mendelzon did a comparative analysis of the two physical data models and constructed “a conceptual data model for ECMS v.2 and ADS.” Dr. Mendelzon’s evidence with respect to his comparison of the ADS data model and the ECMS data model stands uncontradicted. The defendants suggest that there were similarities between the ADS data model and the ECMS v.2 data model because they were both based on “a similar troubleshooting methodology,” but this assertion is without foundation. Rather, as Dr. Mendelzon found, the similarity arose out of the fact that the ADS data model was derived

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from a portion of the ECMS data model.

[1214] The defendants attempted to explain the “conceptual sources” that Egan claimed he used to design and develop the ADS data model. The defendants suggest that Egan had “knowledge of industry standards such as RCM, MSG-3 and FMECA.” Apart from Egan’s statements, there was no evidence to establish that there were any such industry standards.

[1215] According to the defendants, Egan spent a lot of time and effort studying the relationship between certain causes of engine failure and the symptoms that they would produce while working at GasTOPS. This allowed GasTOPS to add to the existing set of known troubleshooting rules for the GE F404 engine. Egan testified that he analyzed hundreds of engines in an effort to troubleshoot the causes of their problems. Egan, despite having no role in the FLTS’ development, did use an early version of FLTS as a user to view the characteristics of engines and occasionally developed the rules that underline it and put them into the system.

[1216] Egan testified that, through his work experience doing troubleshooting at GasTOPS, he was exposed to the GE troubleshooting manual, which defined a series of operational failures that led the user of the engine through the troubleshooting process. The defendants submit that, through actively troubleshooting hundreds of engines, Egan had an excellent grasp of the fundamental concepts related to this task. According to the defendants, this is general knowledge of how one goes about the troubleshooting process and as such is knowledge that an employee should be able to take with them when they resign from a company.

[1217] In my opinion, the knowledge that Egan claims he learned at GasTOPS concerning the relationship between causes of engine failure and the symptoms such failures would produce was not general knowledge within the industry or in the public domain. It was knowledge of research done by the Egan while an employee at GasTOPS and the results of his work were confidential trade secrets of GasTOPS.

[1218] All of the information contained in Egan’s logbook was contained in a report Egan prepared while employed at GasTOPS entitled “Advanced F404 Health Monitoring, F404

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Dynamic Engine Model Report” (Exhibit 2373). Egan conceded this was a confidential document belonging to GasTOPS. According to Egan, the only requirement specification he had seen from Volvo was contained in the e-mail sent from Volvo to Brouse dated June 27, 1997, until he received the final RFP in November 1997 for the ADS system from Volvo in which the RFP contained the requirements that Egan had sent as a first draft to Volvo.

[1219] On July 28, 1997, Egan made further notes in his logbook (Exhibit 2386 at page 131) stating: “Another important test would be K (compressor?) stall … ‘fairly easy to identify’ … ‘search for T1 spike and P3 drop’.” Egan stated that Volvo did not provide this information to him and suggested that his notes were based on information within his general knowledge of how gas turbines operate. In a document entitled “F404 Diagnostic Procedures” authored by Egan and others (a confidential GasTOPS report) (Exhibit 31C), information identical to that which was contained in his logbook can be found at pages 9 and 10. At page 136 of his logbook (Exhibit 2386), Egan drew a sketch. Although he had no explanation as to why he drew the sketch in that particular way, an identical figure can be found at page 100 of the FLTS user’s manual prepared by GasTOPS for B.F.Goodrich/NAS Lemoore Trial (Exhibit 578 at page 100).

[1220] Egan made a detailed comparison in his logbook of what Volvo could expect to get from GasTOPS or MxI’s proposals. The left hand column contained Egan’s analysis of the FLTS. He claimed not to have seen the GasTOPS proposal. Rather, he stated that his knowledge of the FLTS was based on documents he obtained and work he engaged in while employed at GasTOPS. The right hand column contained the manner in which MxI would provide a counter- proposal. He admitted he prepared the comparison because “We’re trying to win the business by this point.” Egan was not aware of any other company competing for this business.

[1221] After reviewing page 141 of Exhibit 2386 (Egan’s logbook), he remembered that the phrase “troubleshooting QA” was the process of questions and answers within the troubleshooting process and illustrated by the sketch Egan had drawn in his logbook at page 131 of Exhibit 2386 and similar to the diagram on page 100 of Exhibit 578 of the GasTOPS’ FLTS user’s manual.

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[1222] When shown the diagram in his logbook (Exhibit 2386 at page 145) entitled “VEN”, which represents the variable exhaust nozzle and a fault associated with it, Egan could not explain why he drew this particular diagram at this particular point in his notes. He stated that he would have learned this example from his experience at GasTOPS. Coincidentally, the same description of the fault in question and a graphic similar to Egan’s diagram is contained in the FLTS handbook prepared by GasTOPS for DND (Exhibit 16C at pages 37 and 38). Below the VEN diagram, Egan described three faults. During his cross-examination, Egan confirmed that the information noted in his logbook had come from his experience at GasTOPS. A confidential report prepared by GasTOPS for DND (Exhibit 32C at page 11) contained identical information.

[1223] Egan noted at page 151 of his logbook (Exhibit 2386) that he had discussed the Volvo proposal with Forsyth, Brouse and Chris Cass on July 21, 1997. According to Egan he could not recall any of them participating extensively in drafting the proposal. Brouse, on the other hand, stated in his examination-in-chief that he had personally drafted chapters 1 through 5 of the proposal between July 16 and 25, 1997.

[1224] Not surprisingly, Egan stated that he had prepared the proposal (Exhibit 1507) on a computer. I would have been astounded if he had not prepared the proposal on a computer. Notwithstanding that the proposal was prepared on a computer, no drafts or copies of it were found in any of the electronic backups from any of the MxI servers. Egan was positive that he had stored the proposal on an MxI server.

[1225] This is another example MxI’s failure to retain electronic copies of documents being prepared during the litigation. MxI and its employees were aware in July 1997 that GasTOPS had been pursuing a business opportunity with Volvo and that MxI was competing for the same business opportunity with Volvo. In addition, the people preparing the proposal to Volvo on behalf of MxI had worked on the GasTOPS proposal to Volvo prior to their resignations. These same people were aware that GasTOPS was suing MxI. Accordingly, it would seem to me that any reasonable person at MxI would realize that all drafts and modifications to any proposal should be kept in an electronic format in order to counter a claim that confidential information which was the property of GasTOPS had been included in the proposal. As electronic copies of

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the proposal were not produced and could not be found, I am driven to the conclusion that MxI and some of its employees did not want copies of the draft proposal to be disclosed. The only reason could be that an examination of the electronic file would indicate the source of the information contained in the proposal was GasTOPS confidential business information.

[1226] During Egan’s cross-examination, it became apparent based on e-mails from Brouse and Chris Cass that they had written much of the proposal. After being shown an e-mail from Brouse to Egan dated July 23, 1997 (Exhibit 2411), Egan conceded that Brouse had written the introduction to the proposal contained in Exhibit 1507. E-mails from Chris Cass dated July 21, 1997 and July 22, 1997 (Exhibits 2413 and 2414), indicate that Chris Cass authored chapter 6 of the proposal and made substantial contributions to chapters 4 and 5.

[1227] Exhibits 2411, 2413 and 2414, e-mails from Brouse and Chris Cass to Egan concerning the proposal to Volvo, all contained attachments. The e-mails were produced from Egan’s Lotus e-mail folder on an MxI server and produced during the course of the trial. But none of the attachments to Exhibits 2411, 2413 and 2414 could be opened and, as a result, there was no disclosure of these attachments which formed an important part of Exhibit 1507.

[1228] At para. 3.2.1 of MxI’s proposal to Volvo, Egan set out the setup utility: “The setup utility will allow the definition of all the relationships which are necessary to diagnose engine fault modes based on fault symptoms. The specific knowledge base areas which will be configurable are listed below.” The list set out at paragraph 3.2.1 is similar to information contained in the confidential GasTOPS report authored by Egan and others and entitled “F404 Diagnostic Procedures” (Exhibit 31C at pages 17, 18, 19 and 23).

[1229] Paragraph 3.2.2 of MxI’s proposal, under the heading “Engine Diagnostic Core”, sets out the functionality of the system. Volvo had made no mention of the functionality in the document it had forwarded to MxI in June 1997. Egan stated that the functionality he listed in the proposal was “functionality that I would have used to diagnose problems in the past.” The very same functions are listed in the FLTS user manual (Exhibit 578). When questioned on this Egan stated that he was aware of this functionality from the FLTS. He also testified that this

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functionality was not among the requirements set out by Volvo.

[1230] On July 2, 1997 Brouse spoke with Warrant Officer Paré and noted (Exhibit 1339):

Discussion

TIES T56 500K Amendment

The GasTOPS TIES contract will be amended to include an extra 500K for the T56 rollout starting in April 1998. So there is still time.

FLTS Installation

The FLTS V did not install and Pare was both quite quiet and defensive about this. Pare claims that the problem was a memory leak in the original code. Apparently the system will yack-out if you have too many ADF’s in the list box. Apparently this can be configured by the user such that a work-around is available; however, Michel now uses a much higher standard than he used to with us (he was too heavily influenced by Doug’s marketing skills?!) and will no longer let something be released to the field unless it is perfect.

The bug in the FLTS was a known error that Pare remembers seeing when we used to work at the company. Furthermore, some ‘twit’ at GasTOPS had recently repeated this error but neglected to fill out an STR form. This individual was part of the million man march to Bagotville and announced this fact (I guess he really is a twit - or a hell of a company man).

Pare claims that GTL will not get paid for a bad installation (I don’t believe this - see below). Furthermore, GTL fixed the problem within 3 days of returning back to Ottawa (yeah right) but the next installation attempt will occur concurrent to the ECMS roll-out, timing still undefined.

GasTOPS Recovery Plan

Pare claims that GTL is “right on track” with the recovery plan. His rationalization is that GTL made an attempt to install FLTS in June but it was his high standards that caused the installation abort (no fault of GTL). As I recall, the GTL recovery plan called for renewed capability by March 1st, and installation of FLTS and

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ECMS in June. I guess the only thing that was “on track” was the

CAF funding, but details, details...

GasTOPS Loot

I managed to obtain from Pare that one of the recent bills from GTL was 120K. This was discovered after Pare was complaining about the new DSS agent (Jean Charlebois). Apparently Jean is giving DND grief about buying supplies under TIES etc. Most notably, GTL screwed up a bill with GST (for $3.50) and returned a bill of 120K! I got this info from Pare after he told me that GTL was not receiving funding.

Orenda Java/HTML

Apparently, Orenda has received money to develop a Java- based/HTML-based user interface to the ECMS and potentially to the DMS. It looks good, and Pare is convinced that this is the technology of the future. He refers to this system as his back- pocket backup plan. Apparently, Albert Schmid has been flogging this thing and has caught the attention of Benoit Arcand [from] Bombardier (or at least got an audience with him). One thing is for sure, the CAF is enamored with this technology.

GasTOPS Sale

Pare claims that GTL has made a sale of something to someone. No other details. My guess is that GTL (after their tax-payer paid marketing junket) feels that they have made sales of FLTS to Volvo. We know better - we just received an RFP by e-mail.

DMS/ECMS Integration

DMS and ECMS are being integrated. No other details. This could be A Schmid’s Java toy.

This note is another example of Brouse’s corporate intelligence gathering concerning GasTOPS. In my view, Brouse was gathering this information because MxI was competing for business opportunities GasTOPS was pursuing when Forsyth and Brouse were employed there.

[1231] MxI knew in June and July 1997 that it was competing with GasTOPS for the Volvo business opportunity. Brouse had Egan make a comparison between what MxI was going to offer

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and what he knew GasTOPS would be offering in their FLTS software program. Egan stated, in explaining his notes of his logbook at page 141 (Exhibit 2386) on July 16, 1997, that the comparison was made to win the work from Volvo for which GasTOPS was also competing, that he knew of no other companies competing for it and that GasTOPS’ was, in any event, the only product with which he had intimate knowledge. Regarding the information about GasTOPS’ product contained in the table, he stated:

A.Well, this is comparing what our offer would be, in this case, to what I assume their offer would be.

Q.How could you assume what GasTOPS' offer was?

A.Well, when you’re putting a proposal in you always try to think what the other party is going to be doing.

Q.You know FLTS?

A.I know the product somewhat, yes.

Q.I take it you haven't seen the GasTOPS' proposal?

A.Absolutely not.

[1232] Accordingly, between February 7, 1997 and June 14, 1997, MxI was pursuing a business opportunity with Volvo and was (subsequent to June 14, 1997) in direct competition with GasTOPS for the business opportunity GasTOPS was pursuing prior to the resignations.

[1233] On August 25, 1997, Brouse prepared a memo to file (Exhibit 1555) summarizing his telephone conversation on that date with Persson. He wrote that Persson liked the MxI proposal and that it was on the short list, that GasTOPS’ FLTS was no longer being considered, that a decision would be made mid-October, and that Persson may be able to provide MxI with further business opportunities as a result of a reorganization at Volvo that Brouse thought put Persson in a “more key position.”

[1234] On August 28, 1997, Brouse had a further telephone conversation with Persson, during which Persson advised him that MxI was in a favourable position with respect to the EDS

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contract and that the Swedish Air Force would be moving ahead with the engine diagnostic system. In his IOI for the period ending August 29, 1997 (Exhibit 1552 at page 5), Forsyth wrote: “Doug spoke with Roger Persson of Volvo about the MDS-MxI proposal for the test cell. MDS were under the impression that Volvo wanted engine configuration tracking included in the test cell proposal. Doug clarified that what Roger was interested in was test cell equipment configuration tracking. See → (linked file)”

[1235] While Brouse was employed at GasTOPS, he was involved in pursuing the Volvo opportunity and was intimately familiar with the customer requirements for this opportunity, the functionality that had to be developed for the software and GasTOPS’ software system that had the functionality to meet Volvo’s requirements, namely FLTS.

[1236] In his IOI for the period ending September 26, 1997 (Exhibit 1580 at page 6) Forsyth wrote: “We have been asked by Jan Ove, the project manager for the Engine Diagnostic System, to visit Sweden the week of October 6 to discuss the project. Mike and Doug will go.” According to Brouse the purpose of the October 6, 1997, visit was to meet with Volvo senior management because of MxI’s size and newness and to discuss the proposal. In his evidence in-chief, Brouse explained that it was only when he was in Sweden that he became aware that GasTOPS’ FLTS was still being considered. According to Brouse, he met Volvo representatives and made a presentation of MxI’s product. He discussed with Volvo how Maintenix could be used as the “product support tool” and the requirements for the EDS project.

[1237] Forsyth maintained that it was his belief that as of October 10, 1997, GasTOPS was no longer being considered by Volvo. This continued to be Forsyth’s evidence despite the fact that he had spoken with Brouse on October 9, 1997, and, according to Brouse, had been informed that GasTOPS was still competing for this corporate opportunity.

[1238] In his examination in-chief, Brouse made no mention of the fact that MxI had prepared the requirements for the EDS system that would be incorporated in the RFP subsequently forwarded by Volvo. In his IOI for the period ending October 10, 1997 (Exhibit 1583 at page 2) Forsyth wrote:

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Doug and Mike’s visit to Volvo went very well. The requirements for the diagnostic system were developed to Volvo’s satisfaction (According to Doug, Mike really impressed them). Doug’s presentation of Maintenix went over well (once Bill and Marc saved the day by recovering the Oracle DB). Volvo expressed real interest in becoming the European channel for Maintenix. I want to stress to everyone that we must keep this opportunity totally secret; no-one should know that Doug and Mike even went to Sweden. We don’t want our competitors to get an advantage by knowing anything about our visit.

[1239] When shown Exhibit 1583, Brouse stated during cross-examination that Forsyth’s IOI represented what he had reported for the most part, but that MxI did not develop Volvo’s requirements as the document suggests. He did not believe the IOI was incorrect, but instead that it was mostly correct aside from what this one portion may lead one to believe.

[1240] Brouse was then shown Exhibit 1582, Forsyth’s logbook for October 1997, and more particularly the entry for October 3, 1997, at page 2. In regard to the entry on that date, Brouse stated that he did not know what was being referred to by the entry that read, “Received Mike’s Volvo spec.” Forsyth, on the other hand acknowledged that he did recall reviewing the specifications prepared by Egan with Brouse.

[1241] As indicated earlier, Brouse stated he visited Sweden to discuss the EDS and to alleviate any fears held by Volvo who were “quite concerned” about MxI’s newness.

[1242] An e-mail dated September 22, 1997 from Jan-Ove Ostensen, Volvo project manager, Military Engine Division (Exhibit 2111) which was located on a disk containing materials found on the backup tape at MxI and which was disclosed in October 2004 during the cross- examination of Brouse, stated:

I’m contacting you because we want help from an expert to write more detailed requirements for a FLTS-system. We are hoping to start this work on the 6:th of October here at Volvo Aero Corp. in Trollhättan, After the requirements are written we will send a request for proposal to at least three different vendors.

Do you think it would be possible for anyone at MxI to help us to

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do this work here at Volvo for one week? If it is possible what’s the price for it? When the requirements are sent to [different vendors] it would [of course] be an advantage for MxI, because you had help us to write the requirements.

[1243] Notwithstanding Brouse’s refusal to admit that MxI wrote the requirements for Volvo’s EDS project, it is clear that Egan’s purpose in going to Sweden was to write the requirements for a FLTS software system. I am satisfied that Forsyth and Brouse were aware that, for the Volvo corporate opportunity, they had to write the requirements for a FLTS software system. In order to do so, they used the requirements that had been developed for GasTOPS’ FLTS.

[1244] MxI’s proposal to Volvo (Exhibit 1507) was a collaborative effort with Forsyth, Brouse and Chris Cass supplying Egan with critical information on the proposed diagnostic system. All of these individuals, including Egan, had access to GasTOPS’ confidential and proprietary information while employed at GasTOPS and had intimate knowledge of the FLTS. I have no doubt that the information contained in MxI’s proposal to Volvo originated from GasTOPS’ confidential information.

[1245] Egan and others claimed they prepared the proposal to Volvo based on their general experience and knowledge acquired while employed at GasTOPS. In my view none of these individuals, being Forsyth, Brouse, Chris Cass or Egan was entitled to use knowledge they acquired while at GasTOPS to draft a proposal, to Volvo which they knew was a competing proposal to an opportunity that GasTOPS had been pursuing and they had worked on while employed at GasTOPS. I am satisfied that the information contained in the MxI proposal to Volvo came from GasTOPS’ confidential business documents and, as such, these individuals and MxI misappropriated confidential business information.

[1246] Brouse and Egan assisted Volvo in drafting the requirements document in June 1997 and the RFP dated October 26, 1997 and used GasTOPS’ confidential information in doing so.

[1247] The defendants submit that the GasTOPS’ proposal was not successful because Volvo was insisting upon unrestricted rights and unlimited use of all deliverables; GasTOPS’ proposal

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was priced higher than MxI’s; and Volvo was insistent that the system run on a Windows operating system.

[1248] In my view, the conduct of Forsyth, Brouse and other members of MxI in using GasTOPS’ trade secrets to bid on this opportunity allowed MxI to submit a much lower priced bid. As far as the requirement for a Windows-based product, GasTOPS intended to convert its products to a Windows-based opportunity, and it was the failure of Forsyth, Brouse and others to give proper notice of their resignations that delayed the conversion.

[1249] On June 14, 1997, Persson met with Brouse and Forsyth and according to Brouse advised them that Volvo was looking to improve its after-market support capability. Volvo wanted to collect data from their customers to more easily predict when they were going to require parts and overhaul. Brouse claimed that he understood from Persson that GasTOPS’ ECMS product would not be chosen by Volvo because the Swedish Air Force (a major client of Volvo) was developing a large information system with the software company Movex (which had ECMS capability); Volvo was using SAP for parts life tracking; and the CAF was not going to choose ECMS for the SAP MASIS project and therefore ECMS would not be SAP- integratable.

[1250] This evidence was not supported by testimony from Persson or any other Volvo representative, so all of this evidence was admitted on the basis that Brouse heard these statements but not for the truth of such evidence.

[1251] Forsyth claimed that, as a result of meeting with Persson, he did not believe that the GasTOPS’ FLTS software had the functionality that Volvo required, as the FLTS software was a twin engine application and its diagnostic function was done by comparing the performance of one engine on the CF-18 to the performance of the second engine. Volvo on the other hand required a product for a single engine aircraft. Based on this information Forsyth did not believe that MxI would be in competition with GasTOPS.

[1252] On June 27, 1997 Brouse received an e-mail from Persson asking for MxI’s thoughts

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on an EDS. MxI took this to be an RFP. The e-mail included a short list of requirements that Volvo was looking for in its diagnostic system. The preliminary requirements sent to GasTOPS on June 26, 1997, are identical to the document attached to the June 27, 1997 e-mail to MxI.

[1253] Brouse understood Persson would be away for the month of July 1997, and Brouse intended to have the response to the RFP on Persson’s desk by the time he returned from holidays. Egan was then tasked with responding to the RFP. Egan spent the remainder of June and July planning a troubleshooting proposal for Volvo. Chris Cass, Brouse and Forsyth provided input into the final proposal, which was submitted by e-mail on July 25, 1997.

[1254] On September 22, 1997, Brouse received an e-mail from Jan-Ove Ostensen, project manager, Volvo Aero Corporation (Exhibit 2111) seeking MxI’s assistance in drafting the requirements for an FLTS system. On October 7, 1997 Egan and Brouse traveled to Sweden to meet with Volvo. According to Egan, the meeting was a brainstorming session where everyone participated and contributed to the list of software requirements needed by the Swedish Air Force. According to Brouse, it was not until this trip to Sweden that MxI became aware that GasTOPS was still in competition for the opportunity. On October 9, 1997 Brouse called Forsyth from Sweden and advised him that the meeting with Volvo went well and that Volvo appeared to be interested in being the European channel for Maintenix.

[1255] Brouse said he received a telephone call from Volvo’s Lars Bandling on December 15, 1997. Brouse stated that the purpose of the call was to express some “serious concerns” Volvo had about working with MxI because MacIsaac had informed him that MxI’s IP was all stolen and that the company was financially unstable. Brouse testified that he “was obviously very upset. This isn't exactly the first time I've heard these kind of accusations. Here we have an opportunity to Volvo and I told Mr. Bandling quite emphatically that neither of these statements were the least bit true and to follow that up we provided to Mr. Bandling a copy of our financial statements.” It must be kept in mind that these alleged statements to MxI were only admitted as proof that Brouse heard such statements and not as to the truth of such statements. This is important, as the defendants attempted to use these statements to prove the contents of such statements in their submissions.

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[1256] On December 23, 1997, MxI received an LOI from Volvo to purchase MxI’s ADS system in accordance with MxI’s proposal.

[1257] The defendants submit that GasTOPS elected not to call Mr. Bandling or any other Volvo representative to testify as to when and why Volvo competed the opportunity and awarded the contract to MxI. In my view, given the fact that Forsyth and Brouse had worked on the Volvo opportunity at GasTOPS and that Egan and Chris Cass had worked on the FLTS program at GasTOPS, the plaintiff was not obliged to establish why Volvo competed the opportunity and/or awarded the contract to MxI but rather was only obliged to demonstrate that MxI competed unfairly for the opportunity.

[1258] Regarding the misappropriation of corporate opportunities and breaches of fiduciary duties, the evidence establishes:

(a)“Position held by the defendant employee”. Brouse and Forsyth held positions at GasTOPS that provided them with direct and unfettered access to all information relating to GasTOPS’ pursuit of the Volvo opportunity. More particularly, Brouse was involved in marketing the GasTOPS’ ECMS product to Volvo.

(b)“Nature of the corporate opportunity”. The opportunity with Volvo was unique; namely, the provision of computer software systems to upgrade an existing system for the Swedish Air Force.

(c)“Ripeness of the corporate opportunity”. GasTOPS spent considerable time and effort in pursuing and meeting with Volvo in order to gain an understanding of the requirements and functionality that would be required. Brouse attended meetings with Volvo while employed at GasTOPS in order to understand all of the requirements of the Volvo opportunity.

(d)“Specificness of the corporate opportunity”. The opportunity pursued by GasTOPS and MxI were identical.

(e)“Amount of knowledge possessed by the defendant employee concerning the specifics of the opportunity”. Brouse possessed all of GasTOPS’ knowledge of the requirements and functionality of the FLTS software system that Volvo required.

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(f)“Circumstances surrounding the corporate opportunity; was it special or private?” It is clear that it was only through direct communications of the meetings with Volvo that GasTOPS (including Brouse) came to have a complete understanding of the Volvo requirements.

(g)“The time factor”. It was less than three months following the stop work order issued by GasTOPS that Brouse and Forsyth were in contact with Volvo. Brouse and Forsyth made it clear to Volvo that GasTOPS no longer had the ability to do the required work and that they could provide the requirements and functionality that Volvo needed.

[1259] In my opinion, the defendants’ claim that Egan was able to design and develop the ADS data model on the basis of his past experience at GasTOPS fails to satisfy me that Egan and/or Brouse and Chris Cass had the necessary expertise or ability to develop the ADS program within the timeframe suggested by Egan and others without using confidential business information belonging to GasTOPS. The evidence of Egan, Brouse and Chris Cass in the development of the ADS data model for Volvo fails to take into account the following:

(a)The use of event recording for troubleshooting was the focus of the research effort undertaken by GasTOPS under contract with the CAF. The reason for the CRADs with the CAF was because GE did not use this information in its troubleshooting process. The CAF entered into a contract with GasTOPS to develop this capability because it was not obtainable from GE or generally available from anyone else.

(b)On June 14, 1997, when Persson met with MxI, he advised MxI that Volvo had been dealing with GasTOPS for the FLTS and ECMS systems. Volvo requested MxI to develop a diagnostic system in competition with the FLTS system.

(c)Egan had analyzed “hundreds of engines,” as had Jeff Cass and Forsyth, all of which was done as part of a unique research effort funded by the CAF and performed when they were employees of GasTOPS.

(d)There was a lack of evidence at trial to prove that the FMECA/RCM/MSG-3 methodologies had anything to do with the development of the ADS software system, and, in fact, there was a lack of evidence to establish that FMECA/RCM/MSG-3 were industry standards.

[1260] I have found that MxI was asked by Volvo to write the requirements for the ADS system, which should be, as Volvo stated, “a reproduction of FLTS.” If this information was

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common knowledge, as suggested by the defendants, why would Volvo approach GasTOPS’ competitor to write the specifications for such a software system? As the designer and builder of engines, Volvo had all of the knowledge and ability to write the specifications, especially if it was common knowledge. I am sure that Forsyth and Brouse either directly or indirectly indicated to Volvo that it did not have to deal with GasTOPS because they were in possession of proprietary information on the FLTS. I am sure that Volvo saw an opportunity to benefit from GasTOPS’ 10 years of research by contracting with MxI at a much cheaper cost.

[1261] In summary, insofar as the Volvo opportunity is concerned, I find the following:

(a)Forsyth, Brouse, Jeff Cass and Vandenberg owed a fiduciary duty to GasTOPS not to use the confidential information contained in the FLTS software system and not to interfere with GasTOPS’ pursuit of the Volvo business opportunity;

(b)That in designing the data model and software program for the ADS (EDS) program for Volvo, MxI used confidential business information which was the property of GasTOPS; and

(c)That MxI and its employees knew that GasTOPS was pursuing its business opportunity with Volvo prior to resigning from GasTOPS and up to the end of 1997 when MxI successfully usurped GasTOPS’ business opportunity with Volvo by securing the Volvo contract.

[1262] Accordingly, the personal defendants as a result of their breach of the fiduciary duty they owed to GasTOPS are responsible for any loses suffered by GasTOPS. In addition MxI as a result of using confidential business information which belonged to GasTOPS is also responsible for any lose suffered by GasTOPS.

GE

[1263] After resigning from GasTOPS, Brouse initiated and maintained contact with the key representatives of GE and Oracle he had interacted with during his employment at GasTOPS. Once MxI developed its own product, the defendants actively pursued the same opportunities with both GE and Oracle that they had been involved in pursing at GasTOPS.

[1264] Although MxI did not contract with GE or Oracle for the sale of any significant

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number of licenses of its product, the defendant’ actions in attempting to usurp the maturing business opportunities that GasTOPS was pursing with GE and the Oracle, caused damage to GasTOPS.

[1265] It seems to me that Forsyth and Brouse, as key employees of GasTOPS knowing the circumstances surrounding the GE opportunity and the importance of the MSD division continuing intact to support the GE business opportunity, owed a fiduciary duty, to GasTOPS to provide GasTOPS with 10-12 months’ notice of their intent to leave GasTOPS’ employment and to ensure, that they did not encourage other members of the MSD to resign without giving reasonable notice. In almost every case, employees who left the MSD failed to provide GasTOPS with reasonable notice of their intention to resign and they did not submit their resignation from GasTOPS until they had secured employment with MxI. It was the breach of this duty by the personal defendants that prevented the MSD from going forward and contracting with GE.

[1266] On October 8, 1996, Brad Howe of B.F.Goodrich spoke to Tulino (Exhibit 337) stating, that the estimated cost to GE of the “due diligent phase” would be $44,949 US and an overall cost for the licenses of $5,681,800 US.

[1267] After Forsyth and Brouse’s resignations, GasTOPS/B.F.Goodrich continued to pursue the GE sales opportunity. By letter dated October 16, 1996 (Exhibit 894C), Howe forwarded to Tulino a copy of a memorandum dated October 16, 1996, in which Muir stated in part that the migration of the ECMS sub-systems to the Windows architecture would begin in November of 1997 and it was expected that a beta version would be completed by February 1997.

[1268] It appears that after the resignations of Brouse and Forsyth, and later of Jeff Cass and Vandenberg, GasTOPS hoped to pursue and complete the GE opportunity by entering into a cooperation agreement with MxI. In my view, GasTOPS simply intended to contract out to MxI the work that its former employees would have done at GasTOPS. At some point during the negotiations in October 1996 and November 1996, Brouse and Forsyth came to the conclusion that if GasTOPS merely contracted out work in pursuit of its ongoing business opportunities,

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MxI would not be in a position to compete independently for the business opportunities that GasTOPS was pursuing.

[1269] By November 11, 1996, Howe realized that GasTOPS had been unable to negotiate a cooperation agreement with MxI. Howe noted that the GasTOPS/B.F.Goodrich team should seek a 3-6 month delay to enable them to complete the project. Howe stated that following the events of November 1996, “the trail went cold in December of 1996 for Goodrich and GasTOPS” and the contract with the due diligence was never negotiated.

[1270] On March 9, 2004, during this trial, an article appeared in The Ottawa Citizen newspaper. Brouse during his evidence stated that he was interviewed by a reporter for The Ottawa Citizen and did not deny the accuracy of the article when confronted with it during cross- examination. The article stated in part:

Co-founders Doug Brouse and Brad Forsyth, company president, saw an opportunity in 1995 to move into the aviation niche with a software product. Mr. Brouse was in conversation with Oracle, which was spreading its wings into verticals ranging from manufacturing to pharmaceuticals.

“I remember very specifically talking with Oracle. We thought we’re going to do this and we’re going to beat them at it. And we did,” says Mr. Brouse, MXI’s executive vice president. “If you are a niche player and you are focused, you can beat them.”

Since developing the software in 1996, MXI has rebuilt the architecture a handful of times. “The amount of money we pour into R&D is huge. We have a large development staff and we are constantly re-architecting the system.”

[1271] It is reasonable to assume that Brouse’s discussions with Oracle were those very discussions he had with Ortiz of Oracle in June 1996 while employed at GasTOPS. In his Trip Report to GE Cincinnati dated June 14, 1996 (Exhibit 156), Brouse wrote: “Oracle is taking a keen interest in our product and depending on the outcome of GE’s decision, may invite us to become a CIAP partner, whereby Oracle would promote and sell our system as a component of a larger R&O application targeted to airlines, engine and aircraft OEM’s and the military.”

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[1272] During his cross-examination on The Ottawa Citizen article, Brouse stated:

Q.There's a description here of MXI. And going onto the second page of the exhibit -- I've highlighted for you, it says, "Co- founders Doug Brouse and Brad Forsyth, company president, saw an opportunity in 1995 to move into the aviation niche with a software product. Mr. Brouse was in conversation with Oracle, which was spreading its wings into verticals ranging from manufacturing to pharmaceuticals. 'I remember very specifically talking with Oracle. We thought we're going to do this and we're going to beat them at it. And we did,' says Mr. Brouse, MxI's executive vice president." Do you deny having made that quote, Mr. Brouse?

A.I don't know if I made it exactly as it's written there. But I do remember telling the woman from the Ottawa Citizen that in part that she asked how we sorted of spotted this opportunity. And in part I had seen this opportunity because Oracle was going after it. I do remember thinking when we were starting up MXI that we would be going into competition with Oracle.

I don't know if I actually thought this at the time, but I thought this would make for good press at this point because we were competing with Oracle for the Qantas account.

Q.You already said, Mr. Brouse, in your evidence in-chief that you had identified this particular opportunity in the summer of 1996?

A.Yes, I did. I saw this as an opportunity in '96, the commercial airline space.

Q.That's right.

A.Yes.

Q.Through the course of your employment with GasTOPS, and only as a result of you gaining an audience with General Electric and Oracle to discuss their respective needs. That's the only reason you learned about it?

A.Well, no, that's not exactly true.

Q.What's not true about that, Mr. Brouse?

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A.There's other sources of information that came to me other than through all my activities through GasTOPS Limited. I mean I'm reading the press as well about the problems with WestJet and other areas.

But certainly, yes, when I met with Oracle and they told me they're getting into this market space, which I'm sure was probably also out in the public domain. But certainly in that conversation with them, I thought, yeah, you know, I always kind of suspected or I had been suspicious that the large commercial airline space or the commercial airline space would need this product, because I saw the difficulties in the military. And here goes Oracle looking to meet the need. So that was verifying to me that there's a need there.

[1273] Further, during his cross-examination, Brouse conceded that it was as a direct result of his marketing efforts on behalf of GasTOPS that he learned of the general market opportunity that was subsequently pursued by MxI. Brouse stated:

Q.If we go back to, Mr. Brouse, then to Exhibit 1626, which is that Ottawa Citizen paper article, dated March 9 of 2004; again, I've highlighted for you in yellow the relevant passage. It states that the co-founders, Doug Brouse and Brad Forsyth, the company president, saw an opportunity in 1995 to move into the aviation niche with a software product. Mr. Brouse was in conversation with Oracle, which was spreading its wings into verticals ranging from manufacturing to pharmaceuticals." That's almost verbatim a reference to this trip report, the discussions you had with Mr. Ortiz from Oracle; correct?

A. Well, again the date 1995 is incorrect, obviously. And I can't recall in the conversations I had with Jorge Ortiz whether or not I learned that some of these verticals are manufacturing pharmaceuticals. I think I received that information just from the general public.

But, yeah, I had become aware in 1996, I think outside the conversation with Jorge Ortiz, that Oracle was getting what they referred as the "applications business", and manufacturing was certainly a big area, pharmaceuticals as well.

Q.What do you mean, Mr. Brouse, when you said you learned of that "outside of" -- I'm not sure what you said.

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A.Outside of conversations I had with Jorge Ortiz.

Q.Mr. Brouse, you learned of this -- The newspaper article that attributes a quote to you, it says that you remember very specifically talking with Oracle. Now I take it your conversations with Oracle were as a direct result of GasTOPS' pursuit of the General Electric and Oracle opportunities; correct?

A.Well, no. It was in direct pursuit of the General Electric opportunity. GasTOPS, as I recall, was not pursuing Oracle; in fact, as I recall, when Bernie spoke with GE, he was adamant they would work directly with GE and not Oracle. But you are correct, this conversation that I had with Oracle was as a result of GasTOPS pursuing GE.

Q.Right. And consistent with the evidence that you gave in your examination in-chief, you decided in the summer of 1996 that you might develop your own product to go after this particular market; correct?

A.No. No. In the summer of 1996 I began to realize this requirement for the market. It wasn't really until October of 1996 that I thought we could build a product to meet it -- to meet the requirements. So coming into the fall of 1996 is when -- if we were going to get into this area, we would be in direct competition with Oracle.

[1274] The article in The Ottawa Citizen and Brouse’s cross-examination as set out above is further and compelling evidence that Brouse and Forsyth abruptly resigned from GasTOPS in a deliberate effort to usurp the very opportunities that GasTOPS had been pursuing with both GE and Oracle and, in so doing, relied upon confidential information they had gathered while employed at GasTOPS.

[1275] Given the intention of Forsyth and Brouse to usurp the GE and Oracle business opportunities for themselves and MxI, it is not surprising that another co-founder of MxI, Kevin Reynolds, had specifically identified both GE and Oracle as being corporate entities with whom MxI could partner in the development and sale of their Maintenix product. Reynolds first made this statement in early December 1996, in “MxI Technology Business Matrix.” The document prepared by Reynolds is evidence that the personal defendants and MxI were relying

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upon confidential business information that the personal defendants had gathered through the course of their employment at GasTOPS and provided to MxI to ascertain the competitive situation for their new product, including the fact that both GE and Oracle had “expressed an interest” in the type of functionality that the defendants intended to develop. Accordingly, it is not surprising that within days of GasTOPS advising MxI that it would no longer negotiate a cooperation agreement, MxI placed telephone calls to “key” contacts at GE.

[1276] At trial, Brouse suggested, that his initiation of contact with GE Aircraft Engines, and more particularly Lou Bernazzani, was a result of information he had obtained from Lieutenant Herl that Buzz Milan might place on the market a RFP for a large maintenance management information system. I simply do not believe Brouse when he stated that the reason for contacting GE was to enquire about a “broad agency announcement” to be made by Buzz Milan. When cross-examined on his contact with General Electric, Brouse stated:

Q.Did you ever have any discussions of any kind whatsoever, Mr. Brouse, with Bob White about this so-called NAVAIR-wide initiative or Buzz Milan?

A.I don't think so.

Q.What's your understanding, Mr. Brouse, as to why, in the end result, McDonnell Douglas did not choose to contract with MxI to do this work?

A.It's my understanding now that what had transpired is that Buzz Milan did not go to market looking for an enterprise maintenance information system.

Q.In fact, Mr. Brouse, there never was any such opportunity reduced to paper or published; correct?

A.No -- well, it was my understanding there would be. It's my speculation now, now that we’re involved in this court case, that it would be Bob Rossi’s document that might have been what they were planning to use for that system, but I don't know, it's speculation on my part.

Q.Mr. Brouse, I'll ask the question again: You're not aware of any documentation wherein this so-called NAVAIR-wide initiative

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was reduced to writing as a proposal, as an opportunity, as a general tender, any of those descriptors?

A.No. No. I'm not, no. It's my understanding it never got

there.

Q.I understood your evidence in-chief, Mr. Brouse, it was this so-called NAVAIR-wide initiative that prompted you to contact Lou Bernazzani of General Electric; correct?

A.That's correct.

Q.Can you describe for us, please, the nature of your discussions with Mr. Bernazzani?

A.They were very long ago, but my best recollection is that he -- I was under the understanding that something called a broad agency announcement would be released and that GE would know about it. So I called Lou, and it’s my best recollection that Lou then gave me other numbers of people within GE that would know of such a thing if it were happening; Lou wouldn't be one of those people.

So then it's my best recollection that he gave me other numbers and then I followed up.

Q.Who did you contact?

A.I can't remember.

Q.I take it, Mr. Brouse, during your discussion with Mr. Bernazzani you would have told him about your new company focus and the fact that you were building a commercial aviation product; correct?

A.I don't know.

Q.Why wouldn't you, Mr. Brouse?

A.Because I was focussed in on this broad agency announcement.

Q.If I take you back, Mr. Brouse, to Exhibit 1891, you'll recall this is a letter dated April 16, 1996 from yourself to Mr. Lou Bernazzani of GE during your employment with GasTOPS, where

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at paragraph 2 you state “I believe from our phone conversation that the ECMS meets and exceeds your requirements of a multi- engine enterprise-wide life and configuration management system."?

A.Yes.

Q.You go on to elaborate on that?

A.Yes.

Q.And certainly right up to the very last morning of your employment with GasTOPS, which was the point at which you learned about the serious interest of General Electric procuring the ECMS product, you knew full well that Lou Bernazzani was a key player in the piece; correct?

A.Yes. It was my understanding that Lou Bernazzani was one of the technical evaluation people, so he was important in that regard.

Q.So here you are within a couple of weeks of a stop work

order being issued by GasTOPS and you're contacting Mr. Bernazzani about this so-called NAVAIR-wide initiative; correct?

A.That's correct.

Q.You’re initiating the call; correct?

A.Yes, I am.

Q.Are you telling ---

A.I believe so, at any rate.

Q.Are you telling this court, Mr. Brouse, that you did not at that time mention to Mr. Bernazzani the fact that MxI was developing this commercial aviation product called Maintenix or Flight Works?

A.I really don't remember. I don't recall the conversation turning that way.

[1277] Throughout the trial it seemed to me that Brouse’s memory can be described as

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“selective.” If there were conversations years before that Brouse felt could help the position of MxI or if he had to explained notations in his logbook, Brouse was able to remember statements made in his presence in great detail; where he must have believed his answers would be detrimental the defendants’ position, he was conveniently unable to remember the conversation. In addition, Brouse’s memory was excellent during his direct examination and it seemed to fail him continuously during his cross-examination. As I have stated on many occasions in my reasons, I do not believe Brouse’s evidence in this action is trustworthy.

[1278] I have no doubt that the purpose of Brouse contacting Bernazzani at GE was to advise him of the fact that MxI was developing its own maintenance information product that could be used by GE as opposed to the GasTOPS’ ECMS product.

[1279] On December 17, 1996, Brouse telephoned Ted Whaley of GE Aircraft Engines. Whaley was Bernazzani’s counterpart at the data support centre in Cincinnati, Ohio. Brouse claimed that he had no recollection of contacting Whaley in December of 1996. As a possible explanation for contacting Whaley, Brouse said that there might have been “loose ends” left over from the cooperation agreement phase between GasTOPS and MxI which required him to contact Whaley, such as a document that was returned. I find this statement unbelievable. When cross-examined on his contact with Whaley, Brouse stated:

Q.Mr. Brouse, it's a fact that you contacted Mr. Ted Whaley in December of 1996, after you commenced operations at MXI; correct?

A.I don't know if I actually contacted him. I think I sent him an e-mail. I don't think we actually ever spoke or responded.

Q.I'll show you the phone records later, Mr. Brouse, and we'll compare the telephone numbers that you recorded in your logbook for Mr. Ted Whaley, and you'll find somebody at MXI made a phone call to Ted Whaley in early December 1997 [sic]? Do you have any recollection of doing that, Mr. Brouse.

A.Actually no, I don't.

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Q.Given the status of MXI's operations in December of 1996, is there anyone else from MXI who could possibly be contacting Ted Whaley from General Electric?

A.I don't know. I mean, we did have that subcontract work with GasTOPS Limited. Maybe there's some ---

Q.You're speaking now of December 1996, after the termination of the coop agreement?

A.Understood. There might have been loose end that needed to be tied up. I don't know.

Q.What type of loose ends could there be after GasTOPS issued a stop work order to you in unequivocal terms?

A.I could speculate, if you want me to speculate?

Q.I'd like to know what lose ends you think there might be?

A.What I think, by way of example, Ted may have called in to one of our technical people, and somebody had us return the call and say we can't do this. There have been a document that might have been returned. I don't know. It's pure speculation.

[1280] On the same day that a telephone call was placed from MxI to Whaley, Brouse forwarded an e-mail to Whaley (Exhibit 2087) which stated: “Just thought I would drop you a personal note to wish you a Merry Christmas. By the way, if you ever want to reach me, you can get me at 613-747-4698.”

[1281] On December 17, 1996, Brouse sent an e-mail to Jorge Ortiz at Oracle Corporation (Exhibit 2088) which stated: “Brad Forsyth, Jeff Cass and I just thought we would drop you a line and wish you a Merry Christmas. I hope that everything is going well for you and your family. If you ever need any Cuban cigars, you know who to contact. Merry Christmas and a Happy New Year”

[1282] When cross-examined on Exhibits 2087 and 2088, Brouse stated:

Q.So, Mr. Brouse, on December 1, 1996, well after your last discussions with GE about doing any work on this so-called "Buzz

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Milan initiative", you're sending what I'll call a general e-mail to Mr. Whaley, where you say "Hey, Ted, just thought I would drop you a personal note to wish you a Merry Christmas. By the way if you ever want to reach me you can get me at 613-747-4698."?

A.Yes.

Q.And that is an MXI phone number; correct?

A.That is.

Q.Clearly, Mr. Brouse, I suggest to you that you're inviting Mr. Whaley to contact you at some future date in the hopes of selling to General Electric your product; correct?

A.Well, we won't have our product for another year. But certainly when we do have a product I would be willing to sell it to General Electric sure.

Q.That's the purpose for which you sent the e-mail to Mr. Whaley. You don't know Mr. Whaley in any personal capacity; correct?

A.I've met Mr. Whaley a number of times, and I like the gentleman. So I wouldn't say that I don't have a personal relationship with Mr. Whaley.

Q.[Another] is an e-mail that you sent to Mr. Jorge Ortiz?

A.Right.

Q.Who works at Oracle?

A.Yes.

Q.Who was, in addition to Mr. Whaley, one of the other key players in General Electric opportunity that GasTOPS had been pursuing before you resigned -- and we'll get into that. That's correct is it not Mr. Brouse?

A.Yes.

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Q.Obviously, Mr. Brouse, the document speaks for itself, but this is a virtually identical e-mail to that which you sent to Mr. Ted Whaley; correct?

A.Yes.

Q. And did you have a personal relationship with

Mr. Jorge Ortiz?

A.Yes.

Q.Is it your evidence, Mr. Brouse, that that is why you were sending him this e-mail December 17 of 1996?

A.Yes. I liked the gentleman and wanted to sort of keep in

touch.

Q.Is that why you sent him the e-mail Mr. Brouse simply as a personal salutation?

A.Oracle is an important company out there. I'm not going to say that keeping contact with somebody in Oracle is not going to be good for my business system some day in the future, that could very well have been in the back of my mind or on the day I did this as well.

[1283] It is apparent to me that Brouse sent these e-mails to maintain relationships he had developed while employed at GasTOPS. He did this in order that MxI could continue to pursue business opportunities at GE and Oracle through the same key contacts. In my opinion, these e- mails amounted to a solicitation by MxI of business opportunities with GE and Oracle.

[1284] Eventually, MxI, did engage in extensive discussions with both GE and Oracle for the sale of Maintenix licenses. As soon as MxI had developed its program to the point of being able to market its product, Brouse corresponded with Ortiz of Oracle seeking to have Oracle use the Maintenix program as a component part of the MRO solution for GE.

[1285] Exhibit 2124 was a note from Brouse to Jorge Ortiz which was created on April 14, 1998 by Brouse. The value of obtaining an electronic copy of a note is shown in this exhibit which, when delivered to the plaintiffs in an electronic format, allowed the plaintiffs to ascertain

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the date that the document was created and by whom it was created notwithstanding that the note itself did not indicate in its body, the date of creation and/or the author. The note stated:

It was pleasure to meet you again in Fort Lauderdale two weeks ago, and I appreciate you providing us with an opportunity to speak with Stefan. I think Stefan will agree that our two products are quite complimentary and that Maintenix can provide to your customer, GE, a mechanism to track Line and Shop level engine reliability, maintenance status and configuration while the engine is in operation by a GE end customer (e.g. KLM, US Airways, United States Navy etc.). This capability will allow GE and the Oracle MSO software to have a priori knowledge of the maintenance requirements of an engine prior to receipt at a GE R&O facility as well as providing the end customer with a sophisticated tool for managing the difficult task of in-field maintenance.

It is noted that BAAN has decided to extend their MRO capability to include functionality similar to that of Maintenix. To this end, BAAN purchased a Dutch company called InfoControl that has this capability and is integrating their technology into their core BAAN product. BAAN plans to release the software in the 4th quarter of this year using KLM as their launch customer.

To date, BAAN has only announced plans of their software release, and is presently unable to demonstrate the system in any form. This is in stark contrast to Maintenix, which is available now and in operation in Beta form by the Canadian Air Force, and purchased by the United States Navy for implementation on their entire fleet of 4300 aircraft — the second largest fleet of aircraft in the world. As a result, a window of opportunity exists for Oracle to integrate their MSO system with Maintenix and be first to market with an end to end maintenance management system for the aviation maintenance industry.

I have included some Maintenix marketing material as well as a copy of the BAAN brochure for their planned software release.

MxI would welcome the opportunity to work with Oracle and GE in the development and implementation of a superior total MRO system.

[1286] The cross-examination of Brouse on this note is extremely revealing. Brouse stated:

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Q.Mr. Brouse, you know for a fact, sitting here today, that you made overtures to Oracle through Jorge Ortiz to have the Maintenix product incorporated into an Oracle MSO system; correct?

A.Yes. What had transpired is, there is a trade show in Fort Lauderdale, an MRO trade show, to which I attended. We actually bumped into Jorge Ortiz there and discovered Oracle had a booth and was launching their MSO capability. It was also at this trade show that we learned what Baan, which at the time was a huge competitor to Oracle, them and SAP, and what their plans were to do themselves to get into this full end-to-end maintenance management solution.

We had bumped into all these people at the trade show, and subsequently, I believe at the trade show, I made these overtures.

Q.You knew, Mr. Brouse, back in June or July of 1996, through the course of your employment with GasTOPS, that Oracle was interested in this type of an MSO application; correct?

A.At the time they were referring to it as MRO. But, yes, in June 1996 I learned that they were heading in this direction.

Q.It's the same thing?

A.They would argue it's a little different. But effectively it's the same thing, yes. So I learned that in June. And then it wasn't until the April show in 1998 that we actually saw these guys launch it.

Q.Which, of course, was contemporaneous with MXI having its product available now for market?

A.Our product was available then, yes.

Q.You couldn't have approach, really, Jorge Ortiz before that date with your product because you didn't have a product; correct?

A.No. In fact, I probably should have approached them earlier. The reality is that our product was under development; that wouldn't have been a problem for the Oracle because they'd want to integrate it. Our product was up in beta form and in operation in beta form months earlier.

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The reality is, is that Oracle, by the time we spoke to them in March or April '98 had our already sort of committed to their design solutions for their MSO offering.

[1287] It is clear that the defendants actively solicited the sale of their Maintenix product to Oracle for use by GE as soon as it was fully developed. In so doing, the defendants were actively pursuing the identical opportunity that GasTOPS had been pursuing through GE in the summer and early fall of 1996. In pursuing this business opportunity, the defendants were relying on confidential business information that Brouse had gathered during the summer of 1996 when he was working for GasTOPS and pursuing these same opportunities.

[1288] By August 1999, Ortiz had left the employment of Oracle and was working with a company called RTS. According to Brouse, RTS was pursuing work with GE and Ortiz was suggesting that MxI join forces or partner with RTS in pursuit of the GE opportunity. In early August 1999, Brouse obtained information from Ortiz, that Oracle wished to develop internally the same type of functionality that was being sought by GE. Accordingly, MxI was seeking to gain access to GE through RTS as opposed to going through Oracle. During the time that Brouse was employed at GasTOPS, he was aware that either GE or Oracle might attempt to develop in- house the functionality that GasTOPS was attempting to market to GE and Oracle.

[1289] In his handwritten notes dated August 3, 1999, entitled “RTS”, Brouse noted a possible presentation to representatives of GE Aircraft Engines, including Gary Wendt and David Gregory. The purpose of the meeting with RTS was to discuss the possibility of MxI working with RTS to provide its maintenance product to GE. In a memorandum to file dated August 18, 1999, Brouse noted that Jorge Ortiz had informed David Gregory of GE Aircraft Engines that RTS may not wish to prime the total solution that GE is looking for. Brouse stated in cross-examination:

Q.Well you'll agree with me, Mr. Brouse, that at the meeting two weeks previous you were in discussions with RTS regarding working with them to provide something to General Electric; do you agree with that?

A.Yeah, I think that's one of the topics of discussion.

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Q.David Gregory was one of the persons seen as having some requirements that could be met; correct?

A.That's correct.

Q.As I understand it, MXI was looking to provide Maintenix to General Electric through that vehicle or avenue; correct?

A.Yes, that we would team together and provide a total solution, yes.

Q.So this particular note says “RTS may not wish to prime a total solution that Gregory is looking for. And as a result, Gregory has agreed to meet with us directly on August 31 in Ontario, California”, which is of course one of those big four GE sites we described earlier, where you'll be given an opportunity to view the plant?

A.Yes.

Q.That’s what the note says; correct?

A.That's what it says, yes.

Q.So it certainly appears, Mr. Brouse, assuming that you subsequently met with General Electric, that this is the means by which you gain a direct audiences with General Electric; correct?

A.Well, one of the means. We had three separate initiatives with GE: there was this engine overhaul opportunity, David Gregory; there’s an opportunity for Garret; there was this opportunity where we looking at just recently with that RFQ December 3 for the maintenance record management opportunity. There might have been a fourth but I’m not sure.

This is isn’t the sole means by any stretch of the imagination.

Q.Mr. Brouse, you're now agreeing with me, are you, that one of the opportunities that MXI was pursuing at this time was to provide Maintenix to the repair and overhaul sites through Gregory; correct?

A.Yeah, we had seriously looked at that, yes.

[1290] Brouse and Ortiz were subsequently able to secure a direct audience with

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David Gregory to market the Maintenix product for use at the repair and overhaul sites of GE. Subsequently, other initiatives within GE Aircraft began to be discussed with MxI, although the possibility of applying Maintenix to the repair and overhaul sites was the initial and primary opportunity that MxI was pursuing.

[1291] On September 1, 1999, Ortiz wrote to Gregory of GE Engine Services (Exhibit 2131) noting in part:

As scheduled MxI and I met with IB Hansen and other Ontario operational users. (see list of attendees below). MxI provided a presentation and the general reaction was that the MxI product functionality addresses the Ontario operational requirements.

It was also clear that the following current systems used today could be replaced by MXI.

1.Engine Records System

2.Engine Data System

3.Parts Tracking System

4.Router Generation System

5.OSB Work-Scope System

6.ACCUM System

7.Labor Tracking or Vouchering System

Within these there might be some peculiar data elements that are not carried by MXI but I am certain that these represent minor changes. The Router Generation changes I discussed above.

More important however, is that MXI would like to have a follow up meeting with you to discuss their conclusions and recommendations, and to get your input on how [to] proceed, when and who in the management chain needs to be addressed to move this forward. Include in this discussion is also what role Oracle plays in this scenario. Doug Brouse indicated that he would be willing to come out to Strother’s next week and have a short face to face meeting with you before [your] next management report with T. Torbeck and Vareski or J. Dinwoodie.

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[1292] Brouse was in attendance at the GE facility in Ontario, California. He confirmed that that facility was interested in replacing their engine records system, engine data system and parts tracking system with the Maintenix product:

Q.The note then goes on to say at the third last full paragraph, Doug Brouse wants to discuss these value added functions that expands your service to your customer to support your operations and increase revenue; correct?

A.Yes.

Q.Clearly, Mr. Brouse, you're still directly involved in play in the pursuit of this work with General Electric?

A.Well, I'm in play. I don't know if I'd say still in play. We're just beginning to pursue this.

Q.Your note then goes on -- or the note, rather, Mr. Brouse, then goes on to say that MxI would like to have a follow-up meeting with you, being David Gregory, to discuss their conclusions and recommendations and to get your input on how to proceed?

A.Yes.

Q.When and who in the management chain needs to be addressed to move this forward?

A.Yes.

Q.So you're at Ontario, California, you're in the shop, you're giving a demo of the Maintenix there and you want to move the matter further. And you're trying to gain an audience directly with either Gregory or someone else; correct?

A.That's correct.

Q.And in fact, the note then says “Doug Brouse indicated that he would be willing to come out to Strouther next week, and that is Strouther, Kansas, which is the other major service facility; correct?

A.Strouther, Kansas, as I understand it, is a major facility,

yes.

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Q.To have a short face-to-face meeting with you before your

next management report with T. Torbeck and Vareski or J. Dinwoodie; right?

A.Yes.

The other day, Mr. Yach, you just reminded me of it now to look at this note, you had asked me if I knew of any other large facilities, large overhaul facilities that GE operated outside of North America. It occurs to me now that GE has a large facility in Wales.

Q.So we have the reference, Mr. Brouse, in the last exhibit there to you trying to meet with Gregory before the next reports to, amongst others, J. Dinwoodie. I’ll take you back to your logbook entry from the morning of the day you resigned from GasTOPS, which is page 91 of Exhibit 96.

You'll recall on the morning of October 4, Mr. MacIsaac had told you about the results of his meeting he had with J. Dinwoodie; correct?

A.Yes.

Q.The fact that Dinwoodie wants us to team with Oracle, that we were selected some time ago, and Dinwoodie having said they are going to “buy our software"?

A.Yes.

Q.Correct?

A.Yes.

Q.So coming back to Exhibit 2131, in MxI's pursuit of work with General Electric, you haven't quite reached the J. Dinwoodie level, but you’re hopeful he’s going to receive some information about MxI through David Gregory; correct?

A.I wouldn't characterize it that way. I think what Jorge is saying here is that he understands that David Gregory works in the IT department of GE. He's a mid-level manager and he has to report up through all these various people.

Q.Sure, Mr. Brouse. And the plan, from Ortiz's perspective, is to link you up directly with Gregory and to hope that Gregory will

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then report up the management chain to Dinwoodie about what's happening with MxI; correct?

A.Sure.

Q.Now, as of this date, being September 1, 1999, when this is being authored by Ortiz, is Ortiz still with RTS or is he now working independently?

A.I can't remember.

Q.Well, there is no mention in the letter at all to Gregory of RTS being involved; correct?

A.No, there is not, but he does get into this whole contract management area. But, my suspicion is at this point he's left, but I can't be sure.

Q.Right. So we have this meeting that takes place August 3, 1999, where Ortiz is trying to link you up with GE through RTS, that doesn't seem to go anywhere. And he's now put you -- he's now left RTS; he's putting you directly in touch with General Electric; correct?

A.As I recall, we received word from the correspondence I've seen here today that RTS didn't want to prime this but Gregory was willing to meet us directly. So this has been organized.

Q.Ortiz jumps off the RTS ship and now is trying to assist MxI directly, correct? In fact, the note -- Ortiz's note says at the last highlighted paragraph, middle of the paragraph, “included in this discussion is also what role Oracle plays in this scenario”?

A.Yes.

Q.So it was perceived as possible that MxI might end up working together with Oracle; correct?

A.Well, again, Oracle is the system that GE has spent millions and millions of dollars as their Enterprise resource planning backbone, anybody who is going to be selling software to GE is going to be interfacing to Oracle.

Q.Sure. And the issue is, what role is Oracle going to play in this scenario?

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A.Yes.

Q.Are they simply going to interface and is it going to become a component part of Oracle; there is different possibilities, right Mr. Brouse?

A.Yes, I think what is being contemplated here is what interfaces would be, what functions Oracle would play.

Q.You would have no problem at all, Mr. Brouse, from a business perspective, if it turned out that you did get partnered up with Oracle, right, because you had been pursuing that already?

A.Yes, that would be potentially good if we struck the right deal, absolutely.

[1293] On behalf of MxI, Brouse was actively pursuing an identical opportunity to the one that GasTOPS had been pursuing. Brouse was proposing that Maintenix be used as a replacement for the engine records system, engine data system and parts tracking system. In addition, it was being contemplated that Maintenix might become a component part of the Oracle enterprise-wide system.

[1294] Exhibit 1573 contains a number of documents reflecting MxI’s continued pursuit of work with GE. At page 16 of Exhibit 1573, there is a Trip Report concerning MxI’s attendance at a meeting with GE data services in Evendale, Ohio, dated September 7, 1999. Brouse admitted that MxI was pursuing the same opportunity with GE that GasTOPS had pursued earlier. When cross-examined on Exhibit 1573 Brouse stated:

Q.And under the subheading of Needs, it says the first one is improving the current system of capturing and collecting information about the global fleet of GE engines being military and commercial?

A.Yes.

Q.And that's an identical need or is the identical need to what GasTOPS was pursuing back in October of 1996; correct?

A.It could be.

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[1295] Initially, the defendants had pursued the GE MRO opportunity through Oracle and then later through RTS. Once it had been determined that those avenues were no longer viable, Brouse contacted Jorge Ortiz to gain a direct audience with GE Aircraft Engines to propose Maintenix as a configuration management solution to be applied to the data centres and repair and overhaul facilities. After Brouse contacted GE, various other departments within GE, in addition to the data centre and service facilities where GasTOPS was pursuing opportunities, also became interested in the Maintenix product.

[1296] Forsyth was asked to compare the GE requirements as set out at pages 3-7 of Exhibit 1572 with the GE requirements as set out in Exhibit 157, being the GE requirements document that GasTOPS had received from Lou Bernazzani in June of 1996. Forsyth’s response was:

You'll agree with me, Mr. Forsyth, that the opportunity that's being described in Exhibit 157 is identical to that being described in Exhibit 1572?

A.The requirements are identical. This was not the opportunity that we were doing, but the requirements described here are identical.

Q.The requirements are identical. The facilities to use it are identical?

A.Yes.

Q.The customer that is to use it is identical?

A.Yes.

[1297] When asked if MxI was pursuing the same opportunity as GasTOPS had been pursing prior to his resignation, Arnold Vandenhoeven, an MxI employee, stated during his cross- examination:

Q.Looking at page 4 of the exhibit, sir. Have you seen this particular document before; there is number of documents?

A.Yes, I've seen this document before.

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Q.And this is described as requirements for fleet training module, it's dated October 6, ‘99. Do you see that?

A.I'd believe that that would probably say “Fleets Tracking Module”.

Q.And if you turn to page 3, you see there in handwritten notation, “draft from Lou and Gary W.”; do you see that?

A.Yes I do.

Q.Is that your handwriting?

A.I believe it is, yes.

Q.That's a reference to you having received this draft from Lou Bernazzani and Wendt; correct?

A.That's correct.

Q.And this document, sir, does embody some of the requirements GE had at the time; correct?

A.At the time I was looking at gathering requirements, as

I stated, and I asked for any documents that would help us, and I was given this draft document I believe by Mr. Wendt as a starting point for the requirements.

Later on though, it was replaced by the grid that Mr. Peters provided that we actually responded to.

It appears that upon receiving the “Fleet Tracking Module” requirements document, MxI understood that it was to address requirements identical to those GasTOPS responded to in 1996.

[1298] In his cross-examination, in the context of the “Fleet Tracking Module” requirements document, Brouse also conceded that the opportunity described in Exhibit 1572 was identical to the opportunity being pursued by GasTOPS as described in Exhibit 197.

[1299] On October 26, 1999, Vandenhoeven of MxI wrote to David Gregory, GE Aircraft Engines, Cincinnati, Ohio (Exhibit 1573) stating: “We are very pleased to be participating in your GEAE initiative to bring enterprise wide information solutions to the many groups within

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GE Aircraft Engines. As we had discussed on the phone, we prepared a short white paper to discuss the concepts of Engine OEM Product Support and we forwarded it to the people that were carrying out the analysis within GE…” When cross-examined on the letter he had written (Exhibit 1573) Vandenhoeven acknowledged that, of a number of groups at GE to which MxI sought to sell its products, one of the groups was the data centres and repair and overhaul shops.

[1300] Accordingly, contrary to the sworn evidence of Forsyth, the defendants were actively pursuing an opportunity to sell their Maintenix product to be used at the GE Aircraft Engines data centres and repair and overhaul facilities. This is the same opportunity that GasTOPS had been pursing in the summer and early fall of 1996.

[1301] Approximately two or three weeks after receiving the requirements document for the “Fleet Tracking Module”, MxI received a “Request For Quote From General Electric” (Exhibit 1442). In the body of the Request For Quote, MxI was asked to quote on a “multi- phased program,” entitled “Maintenance Records Management Software Program”. The Request For Quote anticipated there being two “phases” to the program, with the first being a six-month pilot project during which GE Aircraft Engines would evaluate the MxI software and the second phase of the program being the “roll-out” of the program, to a number of GE Aircraft Engines sites, as well as customer sites throughout the United States and internationally.

[1302] On December 10, 1999, Brouse responded to the Request For Quote on behalf of MxI in a letter (Exhibit 1443), saying, “Pricing model I is a license structure for internal use by GE. Pricing model II is a license structure for use of the system by external GE customers.”

[1303] Brouse described models I and II as follows:

Model I - GE Internal Use

In order to allow GE to economically realize the benefits of the Maintenix system, MxI proposes that the license fee for Maintenix be provided to GE at a cost of $6,000 (US) per seat. Maintenance and upgrade support would be provided annually at $3,000 (US) per seat. As requested in the RFQ, MxI would waive the license fees and maintenance fees for Phase I of the proposed project.

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Under these licensing terms, GE would be licensed to operate the system at GE owned and operated locations for their own internal business purposes. GE would be authorized to load data obtained from customers, however, GE would not be authorized to provide any third party direct access to the information contained in the Maintenix database.

Model II - External Use

MxI proposes to offer the Maintenix license to GE’s external users employing an annual recurring fee based on the number of engines tracked in the system on behalf of GE customers. The proposed annual license fee of $2,500 (US) per engine grants use of the system to an unlimited number of users at an unlimited number of sites and includes support (software patches, telephone support) and upgrades to the software. It is noted that external users include GE representatives (e.g. FSR’s) located at customer sites or any non-GE employee with direct access to the Maintenix database or system.

[1304] MxI was anticipating generating license fees from GE through the internal use by GE of its Maintenix product. This opportunity was identical to the opportunity being pursued by GasTOPS, whereby it was being proposed that the ECMS product be used at upwards of 29 sites within GE Aircraft Engines, including the data centres and repair overhaul facilities. The “external users” of the program selected by GE was a natural progression of the application of the configuration management and parts life tracking technology program to be selected by GE Aircraft Engines.

[1305] According to Brouse, MxI had worked on phase I of the GE Aircraft Engines project, and he began to support GE Aircraft Engines in finding external customers. These efforts were unsuccessful; about a year later, GE Aircraft Engines terminated its relationship with MxI.

[1306] On January 15, 2000, Brouse prepared a document entitled “Bottom Line Pricing for G.E.” (Exhibit 1575). When questioned concerning this document, Forsyth stated that the target market suggested by Brouse (at least 10,000 aircraft) would be a “very good thing.” Later, Forsyth stated:

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Q.First of all, it's clear that it's MxI's understanding as of this particular date that the opportunity that is has with General Electric is going to perhaps give them the opportunity to break the Maintenix system into the commercial aircraft market; correct?

A.The idea here is that they could be one of the channels into this market. They are trying to start this new service where they offer a hosted software package to particularly smaller airlines where they would run all their software and services, and the airline would pay a fee to have the aircraft managed. And so that's an expansion of what GE is trying to do as a business opportunity.

[1307] In regard to the significance of the GE opportunity to MxI, Brouse confirmed that the GE opportunity was a “tremendous” one for MxI. MxI viewed the opportunity as “a very significant way to get into the commercial market place, yes.”

[1308] Forsyth stated that MxI performed work for GE from March 2000 to March 2001, when it was terminated by GE. Forsyth understood that GE opted to terminate the contract because GE entered into another relationship that would have encompassed the project MxI was working on. Forsyth stated that the GE Aircraft Engines opportunity had generated total revenues to MxI, from October 1999 through September 2001 of $518,968.36.

[1309] The personal defendants deny that they conspired to sabotage the GE opportunity in the fall of 1996 by the timing of their resignations. The defendants also deny that they had a plan prior to their resignations to usurp the GE opportunity. They suggest that the GasTOPS/B.F.Goodrich opportunity with GE was not “ripe” or “mature” in the fall of 1996.

[1310] The defendants argue that the evidence demonstrates that MxI obtained its business opportunity with GE as a result of its own initiative, networking and know-how three years after the defendants resigned from GasTOPS. The defendants argue that GasTOPS is asking me to speculate as to what GE’s motives were in 1996 without the benefit of direct evidence from GE on this issue. The defendants argue that perhaps GE simply lost interest; decided it had more important priorities; didn’t trust GasTOPS and/or B.F.Goodrich; or decided the cost of the modifications was prohibitive or too uncertain or were not impressed with ECMS. In the end, the defendants submit that the evidence raises an inference that the business opportunity that

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GasTOPS was pursuing along with B.F.Goodrich with GE appears to have died a natural death. MxI suggests that when it pursued the opportunity with GE in 1999, it learned of GE’s requirements through its independent work effort. The defendants state they did not have any requirement documents in their possession relating to the 1996 opportunity, and, in addition, GE’s 1999 requirements were far broader than the 1996 requirements.

[1311]

MxI

suggests

that

there

were

numerous

obstacles

confronting

GasTOPS/B.F.Goodrich in the pursuit of the GE opportunity in 1996:

(a)competing software products;

(b)results of the preliminary evaluation of ECMS v.2 on the OS/2 platform;

(c)the requirement to convert ECMS v.2 to Windows ‘95;

(d)the commitment to convert ECMS v.2 to Windows by November 1996;

(e)

GasTOPS’ requirement to raise at least $500,000.00 to fund

 

the conversion of ECMS v.2;

(f)arranging for GE to sign a contract for the due diligence phase (whereby the gap and functionality and cost of modification would be formally assessed);

(g)attempting to persuade GE to proceed in tandem with both the due diligence contract and the much larger contract to procure ECMS v.2. GasTOPS’ fundamental strategy required getting GE under contract for the procurement of ECMS v.2 before GasTOPS borrowed the $500,000.00 to convert its program to Windows ‘95;

(h)GE refused to proceed with the due diligence contract in tandem with the contract to procure ECMS v.2. As a result GasTOPS would be obliged to borrow $500,000.00 for the conversion of ECMS v.2 to Windows ‘95 without a contractual commitment from GE;

(i)the ownership of the intellectual property to be supplied to GE had not yet been resolved;

(j)GasTOPS/B.F.Goodrich had to maintain a robust business relationship in order to exploit the opportunity. B.F.Goodrich was, by agreement with GasTOPS, the contractual sales and marketing arm to GE.

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[1312] The defendants argue that in 1999, Vandenhoeven was independently contacted by GE and he pursued a single opportunity which was the engine leasing program within the engine records service in Cincinnati. This opportunity was under the auspices of the Aviation Information Services (“AIS”) Group and was a distinct opportunity that ripened three years after the personal defendants resigned from GasTOPS. A second business opportunity with GE was pursued by Brouse within the MROs at Ontario and Struther. The MROs contained records centres as opposed to data centres. This opportunity did not come to fruition.

[1313] The defendants submit that the plaintiff has the onus of proving, on a balance of probabilities, that the opportunities were the same. In my view, the plaintiff has more than satisfied the onus of proving the opportunity with GE was identical to the 1996 opportunity.

[1314] The defendants argue that it is significant that the GE opportunity MxI pursued unfolded in 1999, approximately three years after they had left GasTOPS. The defendants argue that even in the circumstances of a fiduciary, the law of fiduciary does not seek to confer privilege on one party by insulating it indefinitely against competition from another party: see Anderson, Smyth and Kelly Customs Brokers at para. 35. The defendants argue that an employee’s capacity to adversely affect the interest of the former employer substantially diminishes over time and, as the employer’s vulnerability diminishes, the fiduciary duty is exhausted.

[1315] In my view, the foregoing analysis of the law is incorrect. The issue of “ripeness” is just one of the many factors that a court can consider when determining whether there has been a misappropriation of a corporate opportunity in breach of a fiduciary duty. Further, a plaintiff is not required to demonstrate that it would have secured the corporate opportunities that were subsequently pursued by the defendants or, for that matter, that it would have continued its pursuit of the said opportunities itself. To place such an onus on a plaintiff would be manifestly unfair given that the plaintiff’s ability to continue its pursuit of the various corporate opportunities is affected adversely by the defendants’ tortious conduct. Finally, a plaintiff is not required to show that the corporate opportunities it was pursuing are the same as the opportunities pursued by the fiduciary in all respect. In fact, substantial similarities are not

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always required.

[1316] The issue of “ripeness” of the General Electric opportunity is not determinative of the issue of an equitable duty. In determining whether the personal defendants breached their fiduciary duty to GasTOPS by using confidential business information and/or making such information available to MxI which belonged to GasTOPS, the following factors are of importance:

(a)position of office held by the defendant employees – each of the defendants Forsyth, Brouse and Jeff Cass held positions at GasTOPS that provided them with direct and unfettered access to all information relating to GasTOPS’ pursuit of the GE/Oracle opportunities. More particularly, Brouse was intimately involved in the marketing of the GasTOPS’ ECMS program to GE, while Forsyth and Jeff Cass became intimately familiar with the modifications/enhancements that would have to be made to the GasTOPS’ existing technology to meet the GE requirements. In addition, Jeff Cass engaged in an extensive “gap analysis” wherein he enumerated the enhancements that would be required to meet the GE requirements and indirectly, the requirements associated with operators of commercial aircrafts;

(b)the nature of the corporate opportunity – the potential opportunities with GE and Oracle were unique – namely the provision of computer software design to track information relating to aircraft parts to facilitate the process of aircraft maintenance. In 1996, there were very few if any real competitors to the GasTOPS’ ECMS;

(c)“ripeness” of the corporate opportunity – the issue of “ripeness” is just one of the many factors to be considered. The evidence indicates that GasTOPS’ opportunity to sell ECMS licenses to General Electric was very near fruition. This fact was known to Forsyth and Brouse. Forsyth and Brouse resigned immediately following the announcement made by MacIsaac that GasTOPS had won the General Electric contract. MacIsaac also announced that he intended to obtain the necessary financing to effect the modifications necessary to the ECMS program to meet GE’s requirements. In my opinion, the business opportunity that GasTOPS was pursuing along with B.F.Goodrich with GE and Oracle was “ripe” under any definition of a mature business opportunity;

(d)specificness of the corporate opportunity – the opportunities pursued by GasTOPS and MxI were identical – namely the use of computer software

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to track information relating to aircraft parts to facilitate aircraft maintenance;

(e)MxI employees’ involvement in pursuit of the corporate opportunity – while employed by GasTOPS, Brouse, Forsyth and Jeff Cass played key roles in GasTOPS’ pursuit of the opportunities with both GE and Oracle. Brouse, provided MacIsaac with the “G.E. briefing notes” prior to MacIsaac meeting with GE in early October 1996. Brouse provided MacIsaac with a detailed briefing on the status of the GE opportunity which included:

-technical background to the GE requirements;

-Brouse’s understanding of the GE procurement process;

-Brouse’s understanding of the competitive situation;

-a chronological history of the work competed by GasTOPS/B.F.Goodrich to date in its pursuit of the said opportunity.

-information regarding pricing;

-information regarding the key customer contacts at GE; and

-the anticipated delivery schedule.

(f)amount of knowledge possessed by Forsyth, Brouse and Jeff Cass concerning the specifics of the G.E. and Oracle corporate opportunities – Forsyth, Brouse and Jeff Cass collectively possessed all of GasTOPS’ knowledge regarding the specifics of the GE/Oracle business opportunity;

(g)circumstances in which the corporate opportunity was obtained by GasTOPS and whether it was “special” or “private” – GasTOPS had created the GE opportunity through the direct demonstrations of its FLTS and ECMS products to GE. The pursuit of the sale of ECMS licenses by GasTOPS to the U.S. Navy also impacted on GE’s level of interest in the GasTOPS’ products. GE was not involved in a “public tender” situation. There was no evidence that any of the information regarding the GE requirements could have been obtained through public sources.

(h)the factor of time and the continuation of the fiduciary duty where the alleged breach occurs after the termination of the employment relationship with the plaintiff company – within two months of the defendants resigning from GasTOPS, Brouse began to solicit the key players at GE.

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As soon as the MxI product was in a saleable form, the defendants began to solicit the sale of their product to GE. The fact that revenues were not generated by the defendants until some three years – post-resignation from GasTOPS is irrelevant. In this case, the defendants specifically targeted GE as being an entity with whom they could partner for sale of their product. In addition, Brouse actively solicited the GE work through Oracle and, more particularly, through GasTOPS’ key Oracle contact Jorge Ortiz;

(i)the circumstances under which the defendants’ relationship with GasTOPS was terminated – Forsyth and Brouse departed from GasTOPS’ premises halfway through the work day immediately following the meeting that was attended by Brouse at which MacIsaac announced that GE had selected GasTOPS. Forsyth and Brouse resigned without giving proper notice and in so doing, breached their fiduciary duty to provide their employer with reasonable notice.

[1317] In this case, it was the actions of the personal defendants in failing to provide reasonable notice when they resigned that prevented GasTOPS from pursuing this business opportunity. In my view, it would have been impossible for GasTOPS to replace them in two weeks and be in a position to pursue the GE/Oracle business opportunity. The fact that Forsyth, Brouse and Jeff Cass, along with Vandenberg failed to give GasTOPS reasonable notice and then established MxI for the purpose of competing with GasTOPS in the military and commercial aviation marketplace made it impossible for GasTOPS to continue pursuing the GE/Oracle business opportunity. Also, when the personal defendants, through MxI, offered employment to almost all of the other members of the MSD, knowing such employees would not provide GasTOPS with reasonable notice, they breached their fiduciary duty to GasTOPS.

[1318] It is important to remember that GasTOPS and the newly established MxI were “high tech” software corporations competing in the computerized maintenance of aircraft field. There is no doubt in my mind that the personal defendants knew that their actions had decimated the MSD, and they along with MxI intended to take advantage of the situation they created to compete unfairly with GasTOPS in the military and commercial aviation markets.

[1319] The defendants state that when they pursued the business opportunity of GE in 1999:

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-they learned of GE’s requirement through its “independent work effort”;

-the requirements in 1999 gathered by Egan and Vandenhoeven came directly from GE They were analyzed and assessed and then responded to by Egan.

-they did not have any requirements documents coming out of the 1996 opportunity, nor did they require same in order to pursue the 1999 opportunity.

-the requirements in 1999 were not confidential or proprietary to GasTOPS. The requirements in 1999 covered a much broader footprint than the requirements in 1996.

[1320] In my view, this argument fails to address the fundamental issue that it was only through the defendants’ pursuit of the GE/Oracle opportunities in the context of their former employment with GasTOPS that the defendants became aware of the state of the market place for the type of computer software that is the subject matter of this litigation. It was precisely through their extensive work in gathering the GE requirements that Forsyth, Brouse and Jeff Cass learned of the unique requirements within this sector. It was based on that information, together with the defendants’ understanding of the requirements of other entities such as the U.S. Navy and the DOT/RCMP, that they created a new start up company to develop a competing software package to satisfy those very requirements.

[1321] The evidence demonstrates that the information regarding the requirements of GE was gathered through direct meetings and communication with prospective customers, all of which was initiated and pursued at GasTOPS’ own effort and expense.

[1322] The defendants argue that the “theory” of GasTOPS’ case assumes that GE would have been willing to wait three years to contract with MxI. Considering this argument in isolation, it seems attractive as it is difficult to perceive that any prospective purchaser would wait three years before purchasing the software system, but this is exactly what GE did. The U.S. Navy appears to have waited a similar period of time before purchasing a new software system.

[1323] In my view, the period of time that GE waited before purchasing a software system is indicative of the time it takes to develop and test a software system. Accordingly, it does not

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appear that the waiting period of three years in this industry is a long period of time.

[1324] In addition, the time that GE waited to make a decision regarding a new software program is indicative of the time that a fiduciary duty continues when an employee in the computer software area resigns. The fact that large sophisticated entities such as the U.S. Navy and GE would wait three years for the production of the MxI product is in itself clear evidence of the unique nature of the product and the lack of any viable competition.

[1325] The fact that it took MxI three years to bring their program to a deliverable state does not in any way indicate that GasTOPS had a three year lead in pursuing these opportunities. Forsyth, Brouse, Jeff Cass and Vandenberg’s actions in resigning from GasTOPS without giving GasTOPS reasonable notice and hiring the vast majority of the employees of the MSD decimated the MSD and, in fact, probably put GasTOPS behind MxI in the development and marketing of a computerized maintenance program.

[1326] The defendants argue that in the summer of 1996, Howe and Brouse understood that GasTOPS’ opportunity with GE was potentially for 29 on-wing sites and the four General Electric facilities. The defendants argue that MacIsaac, following his October 3, 1996, meeting in Cincinnati with Dinwoodie and Tulino, confirmed that the opportunity was the four GE facilities and 29 on-wing sites. According to the defendants, the additional 1100 sites referred to by MacIsaac are not referred to in his Trip Report or in his viva voce evidence at trial. Howe admitted in cross-examination that the B.F.Goodrich short and long-term sales and marketing plans did not include these 1100 other General Electric sites. At trial, Tulino stated that the 29 on-wing sites did not exist in October 1996. According to Tulino, as of November 2003 only six on wing sites had been built world-wide and there was a lack of evidence at trial as to how many of the on-wing sites existed in 1996.

[1327] According to the defendants, when MacIsaac told Muir and Brouse of the additional 1100 sites, he was advising them of the information he had received at his meeting with Dinwoodie. In his logbook entry for October 4, 1996 (Exhibit 96, page 23), Brouse specifically noted MacIsaac’s comment that they “could be talking about 1100 G.E. stations”.

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[1328] I am satisfied on a balance of probabilities that the business opportunity being pursued by GasTOPS/B.F.Goodrich with GE/Oracle was similar if not identical, to the business opportunity pursued by MxI in 1999 with GE and Oracle.

[1329] It is not the scope of the GE opportunity that is important but rather the nature of the opportunity. In the context of the scope of the opportunity, the defendants argue that GasTOPS had been incorrect in suggesting that there might be something in the order of 29 repair sites, which was confirmed by Tulino’s evidence at trial.

[1330] The defendants argue that the competition GasTOPS faced in its pursuit of the GE opportunity is a relevant issue. In my view there is no onus on the plaintiff to prove it would have succeeded in obtaining the GE contract. Rather, the issue is whether the defendants came to learn of this ripening corporate opportunity through the course of their employment at GasTOPS and whether they breached their fiduciary duty by failing to give GasTOPS reasonable notice of their resignation and by pursuing through MxI the same or a similar opportunity that GasTOPS had been pursuing post-resignation from GasTOPS.

[1331] The evidence indicates that the competition faced by GasTOPS, if any, was minimal. According to Tulino, he was only aware of two other options available to GE, the Sabre option and a possible in-house development. The clearest evidence of a lack of competition in the aviation market place in context of the GE opportunity lies in the fact that even three years after the defendants resigned from GasTOPS, GE had not replaced its legacy system.

[1332] The defendants concede that GasTOPS and GE were at the “gap analysis” stage as of October 22, 1996, and the effort required to modify/extend the functionality of the ECMS program was sizeable. They argue that this fact is relevant and submit that GasTOPS was being asked to commit to a Windows conversion deadline that it could not have met.

[1333] In the G.E. Gap Analysis (Exhibit 355), Jeff Cass confirmed in writing that “there are no insane requirements: everything they ask for can be achieved.” When this admission is considered together with MacIsaac’s statement that he was prepared to obtain the necessary

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financing to affect the required modifications/enhancements to ECMS, it is clear that Forsyth and Brouse understood GasTOPS was prepared to undertake the modifications/enhancements necessary to close the deal with GE. The defendants allege that GasTOPS did not have the resources or manpower to effect the conversion of ECMS to Windows by a November 1996 deadline. GasTOPS submits there was no such deadline. Prior to MacIsaac meeting with General Electric on October 3, 1996, Brouse provided MacIsaac with an update on the General Electric opportunity in his “GE Briefing Note” (Exhibit 178). Nowhere in Brouse’s briefing note did he indicate that GasTOPS was committed to a November 1996 date for the conversion to Windows.

[1334] Brouse in his GE briefing note described the process of the “gap analysis”, a process which did in fact subsequently unfold. Under the sub-heading “Delivery Schedule”, Brouse wrote: “It is estimated that to convert the ECMS components required for the GE requirement, a group of 9 skilled employees (including project managers, programmers and database specialists) will be required, full-time, for 6 months. Special enhancements to the ECMS to meet new GE requirements would be extra.” Nowhere in his briefing note does Brouse suggest that GasTOPS could not effect the said conversion. If Brouse was of the view that the conversion was not possible, he would have said so. Even at trial, none of the defendants said that the Windows conversion could not have been effected.

[1335] In his Trip Report dated October 3, 1996, MacIsaac made no mention whatsoever of a November 1996 deadline. Instead, MacIsaac noted that the “timely conversion to Windows was mandatory” and that as of October 3, 1996, General Electric planned on “buying the GasTOPS’ software.” Accordingly, as of October 4, 1996, MacIsaac, Muir and, more importantly, Brouse were of the belief that the timing of the Windows conversion was not an immediate “show stopper” and that there was certainly no deadline of November 1996.

[1336] In Brouse’s logbook entry for October 4, 1996 (Exhibit 96, page 91), he noted that “Dinwoodie wants us to team with Oracle.” This entry clearly indicates that he comprehended the possibility that GasTOPS would work with Oracle on the GE opportunity. This statement must have indicated to Brouse that there was an increased probability that GasTOPS would be able to have their product incorporated in the Oracle MRO application.

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[1337] The defendants argue that GasTOPS had not made a formal commitment to obtain outside financing to proceed with its expressed intention to convert ECMS to Windows.

[1338] The defendants argue that there is no evidence to indicate that MacIsaac actually took any meaningful and timely steps to obtain financing to fund the conversion to Windows. In my view, this argument fails to address the fact that on October 7, 1996, one business day after the meeting of October 4, 1996, Forsyth and Brouse resigned from GasTOPS. These resignations were followed shortly by the resignations of Jeff Cass, Vandenberg, Peloso and others. Given these resignations within a short period of time without reasonable notice, it is not surprising that GasTOPS was unable to continue to pursue the business opportunity it was pursuing before the resignations of almost all of the key employees of the MSD. GasTOPS submits that it was in “survival” mode after the resignations of these individuals, and I am not the least bit surprised that MacIsaac did not pursue obtaining the necessary financing to convert ECMS in the months that followed. It was the actions of the defendants that made it impossible for GasTOPS to pursue the business opportunity with GE or borrow the necessary funds to convert ECMS. MacIsaac was a very conservative businessman who would only have borrowed the necessary funding for the conversion ($500,000) if he was convinced that there was an imminent business opportunity available to GasTOPS, allowing GasTOPS to recoup such a capital investment. I have no hesitation in accepting MacIsaac’s evidence that upon his return from meeting with General Electric on October 3, 1996, he fully intended to arrange for GasTOPS to borrow $500,000 to convert the ECMS products to a Windows platform.

[1339] Throughout their submissions, the defendants have suggested that it was unlikely GasTOPS could have reached a final agreement with GE on the sale of ECMS licenses. The defendants have put forward a number of reasons why an agreement between GasTOPS and GE could not have been concluded, such as whether its relationship with B.F.Goodrich would have succeeded. In my view, the issue for this Court is whether the conduct of the personal defendants amounted to a breach of their fiduciary duty which prevented or interfered with GasTOPS’ ability to pursue its business opportunity with GE.

[1340] The defendants also suggest that there is no evidence that they interfered in

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GasTOPS’ GE opportunity. In my view, the failure of the defendants to provide GasTOPS with reasonable notice and then to offer employment to other members of the MSD, whom they knew were still employed at GasTOPS and did not intend to provide GasTOPS with reasonable notice, amounted to a breach of their fiduciary duty to their employer and as such was a blatant interference with GasTOPS’ ability to pursue the GE opportunity.

[1341] In addition, on November 27, 1996 at 9:59 a.m., a telephone call was placed from MxI to the office of Lou Bernazzani at GE (see Exhibit 1304 – MxI Bell Canada account summary dated December 10, 1996 and Exhibit 157 confirming Mr. Bernazzani’s telephone number as being 617-594-4724). Less than two hours later, Bernazzani had downloaded from the MxI website the newspaper article from The Ottawa Business Journal (Exhibit 1351) that outlined the extent of loss of technical capability at GasTOPS. According to Tulino, he was provided with a copy of the article by Bernazzani.

[1342] Given the timing of the MxI telephone call to the office of Bernazzani at GE, being less than two hours before the downloading of the The Ottawa Business Journal article, I am satisfied that someone from MxI and most likely Brouse telephoned Bernazzani, whom he knew to be a key person at GE to alert GE of the mass exodus of personnel from the MSD to MxI. In my view, the purpose of this telephone call was two-fold: firstly, to indicate to GE that GasTOPS, and more particularly its MSD, no longer had the ability to fulfill GE’s requirements and secondly, to advise GE that MxI, although a newly founded corporation was essentially the MSD and had the expertise to provide GE with a program that would fulfill its requirements.

[1343] Although Brouse denies that he was attempting to solicit work from GE in November and December 1996, the Business Metrics document (Exhibit 2085) prepared by Kevin Reynolds identified GE as a potential partner with MxI in the development and/or marketing of the MxI product. There is no doubt that in late 1996, approximately two months after it was incorporated, MxI disseminated a document to all its employees identifying GE as a potential partner with MxI in the development and/or marketing of the MxI product.

[1344] As previously indicated, I did not find Brouse a credible witness and the document

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prepared by Kevin Reynolds, who was a co-founder and senior manager, confirms my belief that MxI, and more particularly Brouse, always intended to target GE as a potential customer and to achieve the relationship with GE that GasTOPS had been pursuing.

[1345] On August 3, 1999, the day that Vanderhoeven received his first call from Gary Wendt, Brouse was meeting with RTS and they developed a plan to make a presentation to Wendt of GE in order to attempt to sell GE the Maintenix product. When cross-examined on the notes he made of his meeting with RTS on August 3, 1999 (Exhibit 2129), Brouse stated:

Q.Now, who was it from RTS that you were meeting with, Mr. Brouse; do you recall?

A.It was Jorge, as well as he had introduced me to some of the principals of RTS, but I can't remember the names.

Q.Your notes says at the blue highlighted passage, that Oracle wants to do this themselves in engine shops; do you see that?

A.Yes.

Q.What's that a reference to, Mr. Brouse?

A.I don't know. They -- I don't know.

Q.I take it, Mr. Brouse, that the purpose of the meeting with RTS was to discuss the possibility of MXI working with RTS to provide its Maintenix product to General Electric; correct?

A.I think that was one of the opportunities, yes. Is this the only page?

Q.You can correct me if I’m wrong, Mr. Brouse, but as I understand it, the note, and particularly if you come onto the second page of the note, there is a plan or a discussion regarding making a presentation to a Gary Went and a David Gregory of General Electric; correct?

A.That's correct.

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Q.I’ve highlighted in blue at the bottom of page 2, it says “Gregory wants...” -- I'm not sure what that word is, Mr. Brouse, can you help me out?

A.Something at Dallas and Houston.

Q.“And David Gregory is working with Boeing in the overhaul area in sharing business.” Do you see that?

A.That's correct, I see that.

Q.Again, this is information that is being discussed at this meeting you're having with Ortiz and others at RTS; correct?

A.I think so.

Q.And David Gregory of General Electric is being identified as a key player, I'll put it, at General Electric; correct?

A.That's correct, yes.

Q.In fact, at page 3 -- although it's difficult to read some of the page -- there is in fairly dark printing the fact that David Gregory of General Electric is the manager of Acquisition and Integration; correct?

A.That's what it says, yes.

Q.He works for a David Jividen, J-I-V-I-D-E-N?

A.Or Dave Jividen works for -- work for, yes, you’re right, works for David Jividen.

Q.And he, I guess, is a client service manager; correct?

A.That's what the note says.

Q.Gary Went is also described as a player in the piece; correct?

A.Yes.

[1346] It was Brouse, through his meeting with RTS who arranged to contact Wendt at GE in an attempt to make a presentation to him, which he ultimately did. Accordingly, MxI’s contact with GE arose from Brouse’s approach to Wendt, not from Vandenhoeven’s marketing efforts.

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[1347] In an attempt to establish MxI’s relationship with GE which commenced in the spring of 1999 and continued through 2000, the defendants relied on the evidence of Vandenhoeven. Vandenhoeven, in refreshing his recollection of events, relied upon certain documents including e-mails.

[1348] In cross-examination, it was determined that the defendants had failed to produce Vandenhoeven’s logbook for the period in question. Vandenhoeven’s logbooks for all periods other than the key period of time upon which he gave evidence were produced. Vandenhoeven during his cross-examination claimed to not remember if he had a logbook for the period in question. I find this unbelievable. It must be remembered, that all of the employees of MxI were aware that MxI was being sued by GasTOPS and it was imperative that MxI keep detailed notes of all of its actions including contacts with potential customers. The failure to produce a logbook for Vandenhoeven for this period of time leads me to the conclusion that his logbook was deliberately not produced for this trial as it contained notes that would not support the position being put forward by the defendants.

[1349] This is but one instance of the failure to produce important documents by the defendants. The missing logbooks, laptop computers, and more importantly the missing design sheets and computer software data showing the development of the software products all lead me to the conclusion that there was a deliberate effort on the part of MxI to withhold documents in this trial. If it had not been for an order requiring the back up tapes to be produced in an electronic format many of the documents, which establish the true intent of Forsyth, Brouse and others after leaving GasTOPS would never have been discovered by the plaintiff. In my view, the failure to make complete disclosure is the result of the actions of Forsyth and Brouse. Throughout the entire trial, I came to the conclusion that counsel for the defendants, namely Stephen Appotive, Eric Appotive and Andrew Harrison, acted in the highest traditions of the legal profession and cannot be criticized in any way for their clients’ failure to make full and complete disclosure. I have no doubt, that if defence counsel had known of the existence of these documents they would have insisted that all such documents be retained and produced for discovery in a timely manner.

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[1350] In my view, the GE opportunities being pursued by Vandenhoeven and Brouse were the same opportunity and not a “separate opportunity” as alleged by the defendants.

[1351] On November 9, 1999 Vandenhoeven forwarded an e-mail (Exhibit 2748) to David Peters of GE wherein he advised in part:

I am also beginning to put together a statement of work that we would base our ROM estimates of doing a GE Pilot. At this stage, we will give you some pricing structure (per seat basis more than likely) but it may be difficult to try and estimate the final shape and size (and hence costs) of a GE Maintenix solution. Using this information GE should be able to gain some confidence in the overall cost structure. We feel that we may be best served to also put an offer to you for an extensive pilot project that would give you a good feel for how the system works and at the same time addresses the complexity of the data center and overhaul shop integration that will be required. This pilot would cover a six month period where we would set up the engine leading (or another business unit of your choice) and begin operations as soon as practical, letting it run for the subsequent months to get a good feel for the steady state conditions that Maintenix may run under. At the same time, we would do the detailed analysis and integration studies with the legacy systems currently used at GE and chart the course for the fully integrated solution. By the end of six months or sooner, GE will have the plan to develop and implement the complete solution, we feel that this two step approach offers you the best flexibility and allows you to make the most informed decisions along the way. We have also had good successes in working closely with our clients internal development teams to get the best overall solution in place.

[1352] In my view, the proposed engine leasing rollout was simply a pilot project intended to give GE an idea of the manner in which the Maintenix product could be used. Neither GE nor MxI had any particular preference as to the location of the pilot project as shown by MxI’s suggestion that GE could “use another business unit of (their) choice”.

[1353] The requirements document from the GE AIS Group is entitled “Requirements Document for Fleet Tracking Module dated October 6, 1999” Exhibit 1572, page 3. The document entitled “Fleet Tracking/Maintenance Planning Software Evaluation User’s Ranking”

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(Exhibit 1573) is a user’s ranking document that was created after the release of the requirements document and is not the requirements document suggested by the defendants. The requirements found in the “Requirements Document for Fleet Tracking Module dated October 6, 1999” are identical to those GasTOPS sought to meet in the fall of 1996 before the defendants resigned from GasTOPS. Accordingly, the opportunity being pursued by the defendants at GE, commencing as early as 1998, were identical to those they had pursued while employed and on behalf of GasTOPS. The fact that the Engine Leasing Group was selected as the “pilot project” is irrelevant to the overall nature of the opportunity. Further the fact that the chosen technology might be applied to outward-facing customers is also irrelevant. Any such proposal is obviously an extension of getting the technology in play at the data centre and repair and overhaul sites.

[1354] In my view, the defendants, Forsyth, Brouse and Jeff Cass, were key employees of GasTOPS vis-à-vis the GE/Oracle business opportunity and they breached their fiduciary duty to GasTOPS, vis-à-vis the business opportunity with GE in four ways:

(a)by failing to provide GasTOPS with reasonable notice, resulting in GasTOPS being unable to pursue the GE business opportunity;

(b)by offering or having MxI offer employment to employees of the MSD, knowing they would not provide GasTOPS with reasonable notice and knowing that the offering of such employment would result in the MSD being unable to fulfill contracts and pursue business opportunities;

(c)by pursuing a similar business opportunity with GE on behalf MxI; and

(d)by using or making available to MxI for its use confidential business information belonging to GasTOPS including but not limited to the design of GasTOPS’ technology i.e. ECMS and FLTS.

Bombardier

[1355] On October 19, 1996, after Forsyth and Brouse’s resignations, Muir drafted an MSD recovery plan (Exhibit 345). Muir was required to take over Brouse’s role to follow-up on new business initiatives, including the two opportunities with Bombardier for the air frame components in damage defect tracking and the on-line log sets for the entire aircraft. In his recovery plan, Muir noted: “Bombardier is pushing us hard on the CF-18 ECMS opportunities –

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we will need MxI’s support to respond to them in the near term.” It appears that Muir intended on behalf of GasTOPS to pursue the Bombardier opportunity by employing MxI under the terms of the proposed cooperation agreement.

[1356] After the cooperation agreement between GasTOPS and MxI failed, Muir continued to pursue business opportunities with Bombardier for the providing of an on-line maintenance tracking capability as part of Bombardier’s DMS for the CAF. There was also a continuing opportunity to provide Bombardier with the structural component tracking capacity for the entire aircraft for the CAF. Muir intended to use the ECMS to meet the requirements of both projects.

[1357] As a result of the mass resignations without reasonable notice, Muir was obliged to advise Bombardier that GasTOPS would require a recovery period of approximately six months. In January or February 1997, Muir was informed by Leguellec that the CAF was now looking at commercial off-the-shelf products with respect to the on-line maintenance tracking upgrades to the DMS.

[1358] On January 21, 1997, Muir noticed a report in the AEO weekly summary prepared by DND. It stated that with respect to the on-line maintenance tracking requirement there was a pilot project and related prototype testing at 425 Squadron and 441 Squadron at Cold Lake, Alberta. The report stated that the prototype would be ready in May 1997 (Exhibit 443).

[1359] Muir was unaware of the provider of the product for this demonstration and spoke with Leguellec on February 20, 1997, noting, “He says that FT (Maj. Comtois) is now considering an “off-the-shelf product from Transport Canada for their electronic log set requirement (i.e. ECMS is no longer their preferred option)” (Exhibit 444).

[1360] As a result of his conversation with Leguellec, Muir asked Chivers, Churchill and King of GasTOPS to gather further information. Chivers contacted Major Comtois, who said he was considering four options. Of the four options, the third was the proposal that GasTOPS had been pursuing with Bombardier for the integration of the ECMS system with DMS and the fourth was the commercial off-the-shelf product for Transport Canada (Exhibit 445). Muir did

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not know at this time that Brouse and Forsyth had gone directly to Major Comtois and obtained a contract to provide the CAF with FlightWorks the MxI “off-the-shelf” product for the electronic log set. After the conversation between Chivers and Major Comtois, the GasTOPS opportunity with Bombardier appeared to be an end.

[1361] While Brouse and Forsyth were employed at GasTOPS, they were privy to information relating to the Bombardier and/or CAE business opportunity, which included the DMS and ECMS. Forsyth was aware of discussions taking place between GasTOPS, Bombardier and/or CAE concerning the interfacing of the DMS and ECMS. Brouse knew as early as 1988 that Bombardier was responsible for the repair and overhaul of the CF-18, and he knew that Bombardier had supplied the DMS used to support the CF-18 air frame. In the unsolicited proposal which GasTOPS made to the CAF for the upgrade to the DMS software system, Brouse set out the requirements and functionality that would be required. He set out how the ECMS software could be modified to provide the required functionality to track the maintenance requirements of the air frame, precisely the functionality Bombardier was looking for to meet the CAF requirements for the upgrade of the DMS.

[1362] Accordingly, Brouse had detailed knowledge of the DND’s requirements, the needed functionality of the software system to meet those requirements and GasTOPS’ business plan to partnership with Bombardier to use the ECMS software to meet those requirements.

[1363] Shortly after his resignation, Brouse spoke with Leguellec although he had no recollection of what was discussed during that telephone conversation. Brouse’s next recollection of meeting with Leguellec was when Leguellec attended at the MxI offices.

[1364] Forsyth made an entry in his November 1996 logbook that he had met with Leguellec at Canadair on Friday, November 15, 1996. According to Forsyth, Leguellec had called and asked if he could visit MxI, and although Forsyth could not remember when this telephone call was made, Leguellec apparently visited MxI’s offices before this meeting. Forsyth had no recollection as to when it took place or what was discussed during this visit. In his logbook for November 1996 (Exhibit 958 at page 28), Forsyth noted: “Apparently, Bombardier has

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approached the CF and have offered to give the CF a Windows version of ECMS and DMS in exchange for the ECMS source code.”

[1365] According to Forsyth, he obtained this information from Brouse. Again at page 32 of his logbook in a note dated November 25, 1996, Forsyth stated that Brouse had received a telephone call from Leguellec requesting that MxI visit Canadair on December 4, 1996, and that Leguellec would visit MxI on November 27, 1996 to “go over our presentation.” According to Forsyth, Brouse had been working on a presentation to Canadair. At page 33 of his November 1996 logbook (Exhibit 958) Forsyth noted that “I recommend that we sell it on the merits of a new general purpose Windows based maintenance tracking system” and that “The CAF are going to have to replace the obsolete OS/2 based ECMS.”

[1366] According to Forsyth, it was MxI’s plan to assist Bombardier in the further development of Bombardier’s DMS and to take the product to the stage where it would be a Windows-based maintenance tracking system and would replace what Forsyth referred to as an obsolete OS/2 ECMS system.

[1367] The “maintenance tracking system” noted by Forsyth in his logbook was one of the upgrades in relation which GasTOPS sought to implement on the DMS using ECMS. The details of the requirements and functionality had been described by Brouse in his unsolicited proposal to the CAF in April 1996 at a time when Brouse was employed by GasTOPS.

[1368] Forsyth’s logbook for November 1996 (Exhibit 958) indicates that he and Brouse met with Leguellec at the MxI offices on November 27, 1996, at which time a slide presentation that he and Brouse had prepared was reviewed. Forsyth’s note indicates that Brouse was to make a further presentation to Bombardier’s vice-president of marketing, Defense Systems Division. According to Forsyth, on November 15, 1996, Leguellec visited the MxI offices and indicated that he wanted MxI to meet with Bombardier at Mirabel.

[1369] Forsyth and Brouse stated that they wanted to meet with Bombardier because Bombardier manufactured commercial aircraft, a market MxI sought to enter. If they obtained

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such work from Bombardier, it could result in Bombardier agreeing to sell the MxI product in the market place. In his cross-examination, Forsyth agreed that that he and Brouse were targeting the CAF as a potential user of a Windows-based version of ECMS. Forsyth also stated, although Brouse did not, that once the cooperation agreement between GasTOPS and MxI was terminated, the defendants were seeking fee-for-service work.

[1370] Forsyth’s logbook notes (Exhibit 958 at page 33) corroborate his evidence. The evidence that MxI was targeting the military marketplace is further evidence that MxI was initially targeting the same opportunity GasTOPS had been pursuing with Bombardier before the resignations. The presentation prepared by Brouse for the Bombardier meeting makes it clear that MxI was attempting to gain an entry into the military aviation marketplace through Bombardier by having Bombardier use Maintenix in place of ECMS as an upgrade to the DMS.

[1371] Forsyth said that “Bombardier was interested in MxI’s product ideas for commuter airlines,” but this statement was never proven, as the defendants did not call a representative from Bombardier to prove its intention when meeting MxI. In my view, it is unlikely that a representative of the military support group at Bombardier such as Leguellec would discuss the use of Maintenix for Bombardier’s commercial jet systems.

[1372] During his evidence on February 5, 2004, Forsyth undertook to find the presentation he and Brouse had prepared for Bombardier, but he was unsuccessful.

[1373] During Brouse’s examination-in-chief, after Forsyth had completed his evidence, a hard copy of a document describing the presentation given by MxI to Bombardier on December 4, 1996, was produced by MxI’s counsel. They indicated at that time that this was the same presentation that Forsyth had referred to in his testimony and that a hard copy of the presentation was found either on May 6, or May 8, 2004 (Exhibit 1895). On June 10, 2004, after Brouse had completed his direct examination with respect to Exhibit 1895, I asked him:

THE COURT: Well, if it's a Power Point demonstration, is there an electronic copy of this some place?

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A.No, Your Honour, we searched for that. At the time, you know, it was early December, we didn’t have a computer infrastructure. At any rate, I don't know what computer this was created on, but there was no electronic copy, we've searched for that, Your Honour.

THE COURT: When you went to the meeting, would you have had any notes for your oral presentation?

A.Well, I had this presentation, Your Honour. I didn't make up any notes to speak around it other than this presentation. At any rate I may have made notes of the meeting but those have been lost at this point.

[1374] On the evening of September 29, 2004, in the middle of Brouse’s cross-examination, a CD was produced by counsel for MxI entitled “Back up Brouse, September 21, 2004”. According to Brouse, this CD contained everything that was on the server as of August 30, 2000. The CD was entered into the record as Exhibit 1989. After having reviewed the CD, Brouse stated that he was able to identify a presentation prepared by him and Forsyth labelled “MxI Profile, Presentation to Canadair dated November 19, 1996.” The electronic presentation was entered into the record as Exhibit 1990.

[1375] When questioned about Exhibit 1990 in cross-examination, Brouse stated that Leguellec expressed to him an interest in ECMS and the potential sale by GasTOPS to the USN so he (Brouse) had initially included information about that in his presentation. He testified that he and Forsyth decided it would be inappropriate to provide that information to Bombardier and therefore removed it from the presentation on November 27, 1996. He stated that Leguellec never saw this initial version of the presentation, nor did anyone but he and Forsyth. He suggested that he and Forsyth created a modified presentation.

[1376] During his cross-examination Brouse could not explain the drafting history of Exhibit 1990, nor was he able to identify which presentation he and Forsyth had reviewed on November 26, 1996. Brouse conceded that he drafted Exhibit 1990, which according to the “properties” data attached to the electronic file of the presentation indicated that it was created on November 19, 1996. Brouse stated that he created the document on November 19, 1996

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because he received a telephone call from Leguellec on that date. When shown Forsyth’s logbook entry for November 20, 1996 Brouse conceded that he did not receive a telephone call from Leguellec on November 19, 1996.

[1377] In the end, Brouse was unable to identify which presentation was examined by himself and Forsyth on November 26, 1996. Brouse stated that he thought Exhibit 1990 entitled “MxI Profile Presentation to Canadair, November 19, 1996” was reviewed by himself and Forsyth on November 27th which resulted in the production of Exhibit 1895 for the meeting with Leguellec.

[1378] Brouse in his cross-examination conceded that Exhibit 1990 contained “inappropriate information” concerning GasTOPS and more particularly ECMS.

ECMS Situation

-GasTOPS is currently the ECMS support contractor (contract to March 99)

-GasTOPS has requested 4 to 6 month grace period to recover from 25% staff loss

-Crown will likely compete ECMS support if GasTOPS cannot regroup and pending Intellectual Property resolution

ECMS Software

-ECMS consists of 250,000 lines (developed over 6 years) of OS/2 specific code

-Code cannot be easily ported to Windows

-GasTOPS claims ownership of a portion of the code

-- GasTOPS sold the Crown the GGPPAS (user interface and database layer)

-Crown is contesting this ownership

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ECMS License

-GasTOPS has the license to market the ECMS

[1379] According to Brouse, Exhibit 1895 was created for the meeting with Bombardier on December 4, 1996. Brouse then said that it was Exhibit 1895 that was reviewed with Leguellec on November 27, 1996. Brouse also suggested that Forsyth was the author of Exhibit 1895.

[1380] On day 186 of the trial, Brouse was shown an e-mail that had been found in Exhibit 1989. The e-mail was sent by Brouse to Forsyth on November 27, 1996 at 12:37 p.m. In his e- mail Brouse stated that “this is the proposed presentation that I thought we would provide to Mr. Leguellec” (Exhibit 1994). The attachment to the e-mail was entitled “MxI profile presentation to Canadair November 19, 1996” and its Properties confirmed that the presentation was modified at 1:36 p.m. on November 27, 1996, approximately one hour after Brouse’s e-mail to Forsyth (Exhibit 1994).

[1381] The defendants later produced another CD labeled “copy of MxI back up tape of server October 1997,” which was entered as Exhibit 2007. The following day, Brouse was shown a file contained within Exhibit 2007 named “TV made for Canadair” (Exhibit 2035), which Brouse identified as an electronic copy of Exhibit 1895. The evidence disclosed that the only presentation that had been revised on the afternoon of November 27, 1996, was Exhibit 1990, which resulted in Exhibit 1995. Further, the Properties of the “TV made for Canadair” presentation were entered into the record as Exhibit 2036, and Brouse confirmed that they showed he made revisions to this presentation on December 3, 1996, the day before the presentation to Bombardier. Brouse had no explanation as to why Exhibit 2035 “TV made for Canadair” was not found within the CD labeled “copy of MxI back up tape of server October 1997.”

[1382] After further production, Brouse was shown a document found on Forsyth’s folder in the MxI 1999 Lotus mail back up disk under “For Marketing.” The file contained a PowerPoint presentation entitled “MxI – Bombardier DSD Business Opportunities Presentation to

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Bombardier DSD December 4, 1996” (Exhibit 2170). Brouse identified this as the presentation he had begun to prepare and e-mailed to Forsyth on November 27, 1996. Its Properties (Exhibits 2171 and 2172) showed that Brouse had created the document on November 20, 1996, and had modified it on December 3, 1996. Exhibit 2170 appears to be a revision of Exhibit 1990 which was subsequently revised as Exhibit 1995. In cross-examination, Brouse volunteered: “…I do recall that Mr. Forsyth and I had a discussion where we decided this presentation, either 1990 or even 2172, wouldn't be appropriate for Bombardier. I can say with absolute certainty that we gave -- that when we gave the presentation on December 4, that we didn't give either the presentation of 2172, Exhibit 2172 nor 1990.”

[1383] It is clear that Brouse wanted to make this statement, as he had already told the court, that on November 27, 1996, he and Forsyth considered that some statements in Exhibit 1990 (revised to Exhibit 2170) to be “inappropriate” and created Exhibit 1895 (revised to Exhibit 2035).

[1384] Exhibits 1990/1995 and 2170 disclosed a complete description of GasTOPS’ situation at that time with the CAF as well as the sales status of the U.S. Navy. Exhibit 2170 is a further revised version of Exhibits 1990/1995, with additional details added regarding the U.S. Navy and the relationship MxI foresaw it would have with Bombardier.

[1385] I am satisfied that Exhibit 1895 was not a revision of Exhibit 1990 and was in fact shown to Leguellec on November 27, 1996. I am also satisfied that Exhibit 1990 was revised before MxI’s meeting with Leguellec and that such revisions resulted in the creation of Exhibit 1995. The presentation was further revised the day before the meeting with Bombardier on December 4, 1996, which ultimately resulted in the creation of Exhibit 2170.

[1386] There was no rational explanation put forward by Brouse to explain why he prepared two PowerPoint presentations, one revised on December 3, 1996, and labeled “TV made for Canadair” (Exhibit 2035) and another also revised on December 3, 1996 and labeled “MxI – Bombardier DSD business opportunities” (Exhibit 2170). In my view, Brouse and Forsyth, created the presentation (Exhibit 2170) to convey to Bombardier the information following that

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MxI was targeting the military marketplace, that GasTOPS had requested a grace period of up to six months to recover from the resignations, that MxI was composed of MSD members from GasTOPS, and that MxI’s employees had been the ones to develop the ECMS at GasTOPS.

[1387] I have no doubt that Brouse and Forsyth, wished to convey to Bombardier, that they understood the requirements and functionality for the proposed DMS upgrade and Bombardier’s business relationship with the CAF. This knowledge was obtained by Forsyth and Brouse at GasTOPS and was confidential business information, which Forsyth and Brouse knew.

[1388] For many months at this trial, Forsyth and Brouse attempted to convince me that MxI was targeting the regional jet airline market and was not targeting the military market, but these presentations and other evidence clearly show that that Forsyth and Brouse were attempting to mislead this Court in relation to Bombardier as MxI was targeting the military market through Bombardier.

[1389] According to Forsyth, he and Brouse met with Bombardier at the Bombardier offices in Mirabel, Quebec, on December 4, 1996. Forsyth’s logbook (Exhibit 1405 at page 4) refers to notes prepared by Brouse; Brouse’s notes were never produced as they were apparently lost.

[1390] Brouse stated that in giving the presentation to Bombardier on December 4, 1996, he wanted to inform Bombardier that MxI was developing an aviation maintenance management system and that he was seeking “any sort of service work” from Bombardier. Brouse stated on page 7 of Exhibit 1895 that he was attempting to explain the difference between the functionality of the MxI product and that of the ECMS product. He wanted to inform Bombardier that the MxI product would track all parts of the air frame and the engine.

[1391] I gathered from Brouse’s evidence that he was demonstrating the difference between the functionality of MxI’s proposed product and the ECMS. His description of the MxI product was to show that only it could track all parts on the air frame and engine. Yet, in the proposal Brouse authored on behalf of GasTOPS and sent as an unsolicited proposal to the CAF (Exhibit 130), he said that ECMS could do all of the functionality that he later suggested

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(December 1996) only MxI could accomplish.

[1392] In his evidence, Brouse agreed MxI’s purpose in meeting with Leguellec was correctly stated by Forsyth in his logbook entry for November 26, 1996 (Exhibit 958 at page 33), which stated “I recommend that we sell it on the merits of a new general purpose Windows- based maintenance tracking system”; “The CAF are going to have to replace the obsolete OS/2 ECMS”; and “The USN wants a Windows-based product.” Exhibit 2170 indicates that Brouse was providing Bombardier GasTOPS’ confidential business information on the topics noted by Forsyth in this logbook entry.

[1393] On page 10 of Exhibit 1895 and page 15 of Exhibit 2170, Brouse proposed a partnership with Bombardier, whereby MxI would provide a software program to support maintenance management of the entire system, being the engine and air frame as well as “integrated logistics management.” This is the same proposal he made on behalf of GasTOPS to the CAF in an unsolicited proposal and subsequently to Bombardier (Exhibit 130). The software development was the same as the software upgrade that GasTOPS was proposing to provide Bombardier with in their partnership arrangement for the DMS which Brouse was well aware of, as a result of his attendance as a GasTOPS employee at the meeting with Bombardier on September 27, 1996.

[1394] A close examination of MxI’s presentation to Bombardier (Exhibit 1895) shows the defendants’ strategy was to use corporate intelligence gathered at GasTOPS to promote their product and proposed partnership with Bombardier. Brouse described the GasTOPS’ ECMS system that MxI personnel had developed and set out the functionality of ECMS and MAINSTAY. Brouse indicated to Bombardier that the MxI product would be based on “experience and knowledge” gained by the employees while at GasTOPS and listed the proposed functionality of the MxI product which coincides with the functionality he described in his unsolicited proposal to the CAF, later proposed to Bombardier on behalf of GasTOPS.

[1395] Brouse was aware that GasTOPS was pursuing a partnership with Bombardier to develop the ECMS to extend to the complete airframe and not simply the engine. Brouse

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attended all of the meetings and knew the required functionality and the modifications which had to be made to the ECMS software system to meet the requirements.

[1396] According to Brouse, he had no further contact with Bombardier for six or seven months after the December 4, 1996 meeting. Not having heard from Bombardier on the DMS enhancement, Brouse went directly to the CAF to provide the upgrade to the DMS that GasTOPS had been negotiating with Bombardier and CAE to supply to the CAF.

[1397] While an employee of GasTOPS, Brouse had gathered all of the corporate intelligence on this opportunity which had been incorporated in his unsolicited proposal to the CAF. Not only was MxI, and more particularly Brouse, attempting to usurp GasTOPS’ business opportunity with Bombardier; it was also attempting to usurp GasTOPS’ business opportunity for the upgrade of the DMS with the CAF. Forsyth and Brouse took the steps following to usurp GasTOPS’ potential business opportunity with the CAF:

(1)On January 30, 1997, Forsyth and Brouse met with Major Comtois, who was responsible for the DMS provided to the CAF by Bombardier. During this meeting they demonstrated MxI’s FlightWorks program and discussed potential work with the CAF. In particular, they discussed enhancements to the DMS that the CAF was looking for through Bombardier, namely adding a GUI on DMS and developing an electronic log set.

(2)According to Brouse’s summary of the meeting (Exhibit 1534), MxI saw two opportunities to obtain business from the CAF. The first opportunity existed through the Canadair contract, whereby MxI would be a subcontractor to provide the GUI on the DMS. The second opportunity existed by developing an electronic log set or having the Crown purchase FlightWorks with MxI customizing it for the DMS. Brouse felt that the quickest way to secure work would be through a subcontract with Canadair/Bombardier. Brouse proposed that the marketing strategy would be an action plan whereby MxI would provide an Alpha version of its software by the end of March 1997 and request Major Comtois to install it on the CAF server in order to “continue to fire up the gang at DND”. Get them hooked and convince them to fund us through their DMS vehicle”.

(3)Brouse stated that he met with Major Comtois during February 1997. According to Brouse he recalled that Major Comtois wanted MxI to give a presentation to National Defence Headquarters:

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Essentially Major Comtois had asked for this prototype that we had to demonstrate to the field. Major Comtois wanted to put some pressure on DMS, which is the product that he was or the system that he was responsible for that had been provided by Bombardier. And as I understood it from Major Comtois, he was dissatisfied with what they were providing.

So he wanted to show to the field and get back to Bombardier that he had other options available to him if he needed to be. And in return for us providing him this demonstration, he was going to set up a presentation at NDHQ for us.

[1398] In an e-mail dated May 30, 1997 (Exhibit 2104), Brouse told Chris Cass that he had finally heard from Bombardier and a meeting was scheduled to take place. Brouse and Forsyth met with Bombardier on June 11, 1997, and Forsyth stated in his IOI for the period ending June 13, 1997 (Exhibit 1545 at page 2):

Canadair - Doug and I met with Serge Leguellec and Benoit Arcand from Canadair. The meeting was established to discuss the potential of utilizing Maintenix as a product/tool for Canadair to support their commercial systems. The meeting went extremely well and it appears that Canadair will seriously consider utilizing Maintenix as the key software system to provide total maintenance service to their clients. They are proposing we try a beta on their unmanned reconnaissance vehicle (the flying peanut).

CAF - Michel Pare says that GTL has been tasked $290k for the ECMS rollout. This is nearly double the quote given prior to our departure and GTL still has not passed the ATP for ECMS 2.0. We also heard that the only stable version of ECMS is the executable version delivered to LeMoore for the USN trial - they don’t have the source code for this version?!?!. GTL are now claiming that we somehow sabotaged the software before we left - this is a complete and total lie as you all know. What a joke. Now you know where your tax dollars go!!!

[1399] On June 23 and 24, 1997, Forsyth reviewed the proposal prepared by Brouse for Bombardier. Brouse then forwarded the proposal to Leguellec, following which Bombardier

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would become a beta site for the Maintenix product. The proposal suggested that MxI’s product had a competitive advantage because it was the fourth iteration of a maintenance information systems technology, the other three having been developed by MxI’s employees at GasTOPS.

[1400] As I have stated before, the fourth iteration of the maintenance information system technology referred to, was the next version of ECMS, which GasTOPS was planning to develop and market at the time of the resignations of Forsyth and Brouse.

[1401] As of the end of June 1997, Forsyth considered Bombardier to be a business opportunity that would result in the sale of licenses of Maintenix. The defendants continued to pursue the corporate opportunity with Bombardier. As part of MxI’s negotiations with Bombardier, Brouse and Forsyth prepared a price proposal to Bombardier on August 26, 1997, for an opportunity that was made available by Benoit Arcand of Bombardier. On September 17, 1997 Brouse and Forsyth met with Bombardier and made another presentation (Exhibit 2040), in which Brouse relied substantially on the projects they had worked on while employed at GasTOPS and in which he referred to MxI as “spin-off company from the MSD group of GasTOPS.”

[1402] He also stated with respect to MxI’s litigation with GasTOPS that “Ontario court system enacted new rules to unilaterally dismiss stagnating nuisance cases. GasTOPS’ claim against MxI was thrown out of court. No lawsuits are pending against GasTOPS or its principals. MxI has outstanding lawsuit against GasTOPS” (Exhibit 2040 at page 17). These claims were clearly false and indicate of the lack of veracity in Brouse’s statements in the workplace. Brouse concluded his false statements regarding the litigation with GasTOPS by including a picture of MacIsaac being hit in the face with the notation “crazy” over his head.

[1403] Brouse described the relationship between Bombardier and MxI in the MxI marketing analysis prepared in September of 1997 (Exhibit 1420) as follows: “MxI has good access to this company (both geographically and personally) and plans to aggressively exploit their contacts within this organization.”

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[1404] In MxI’s 1998/99 business plan (Exhibit 1429), Forsyth lists a business opportunity for MxI with Bombardier regarding the NATO Flight Training in Canada (“NFTC”) and a potential sales opportunity with a revenue value of $300,000 per year for product and another $150,000 for service. After this contract, MxI obtained a contract with Bombardier to supply Maintenix for Bombardier’s business jets. MxI coded this contract under CMMS.

[1405] In MxI’s 1999/2000 business plan (Exhibit 1432), Forsyth forecasted revenue sales from Bombardier at $1,250,000. The following year (Exhibit 1435), Forsyth lists Bombardier and the NFTC as base customers and includes the Computerized Integrated Maintenance Management System (“CIMMS”) contract with Bombardier for their business jets in the company revenues. In MxI’s 2002/03 business plan (Exhibit 1438), Forsyth notes as an accomplishment that MxI “established an impressive customer base,” including Bombardier. Forsyth explained that MxI had two contracts with Bombardier, one to supply Maintenix in support of Bombardier’s business jets and the other to support “Bombardier on their operations in Moose Jaw and Cold Lake for their NATO Flight Training in Canada.”

[1406] MxI takes the position that the GasTOPS’ business opportunity with Bombardier involved potentially teaming with Bombardier and CAE to upgrade the DMS used in the CAF F18 team fleet of aircraft.

[1407] According to MxI, after meeting with Bombardier and CAE in September 1996, GasTOPS did not actively pursue this opportunity. GasTOPS did not enter into a contract with Bombardier and/or CAE. According to MxI, after the resignations GasTOPS did not contract with MxI to assist it in the pursuit of this business opportunity despite being referred to in the MSD recovery plan. In February 1997, GasTOPS was informed that the CAF had changed its mandate and its product was no longer preferred. At that point the business opportunity ended.

[1408] MxI submits that it won two contracts with Bombardier. The first contract was in respect of Bombardier’s business jets. MxI responded to an RFP for the replacement of Bombardier’s CIMMS in November 1997. MxI ultimately won this contract in January 2000. According to MxI, this opportunity was distinct from GasTOPS’ opportunity in that MxI would

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be dealing with Bombardier’s commercial aircraft in respect of the replacement of their CIMMS, while GasTOPS’ potential business opportunity was to upgrade the DMS in conjunction with CAE for the F18’s. The second contract MxI secured was in respect to the NFTC project. MxI contracted to manage the airworthiness log set for the flight school’s aircraft. GasTOPS did not pursue this opportunity, and MxI submits that it is completely distinct from the GasTOPS’ potential opportunity with CAE for the DMS for the F18’s in 1996.

[1409] The defendants submitted that none of the personal defendants were fiduciaries of GasTOPS vis-à-vis the Bombardier opportunity and that even Brouse, who had the most contact with Bombardier, was limited to several discussions with Serge Leguellec. The defendants suggest Chivers had contact with both more senior Bombardier staff and senior CAF personnel. They suggested that they did not solicit GasTOPS’ customers by speaking with Bombardier personnel, because GasTOPS never entered into any contracts with Bombardier. The defendants also submitted that they did not usurp a ripe and specific opportunity that GasTOPS had been pursuing with Bombardier, because GasTOPS’ opportunity ended in February 1997 and because they never did work on the projects GasTOPS had been pursuing; furthermore, these opportunities were alleged by the defendants to be neither ripe nor specific. They argue that ECMS’ functionality was not a secret and that they did not breach any duties to GasTOPS by explaining the work MxI’s employees had done on ECMS while still at GasTOPS. The defendants’ also submitted that the opportunities they did eventually win were not those GasTOPS had been seeking out prior to or after the resignations (in fact the defendants’ state GasTOPS did not know about these opportunities), nor were the contacts at Bombardier the same, and that any fiduciary duties would have dissipated by the time they won contracts with Bombardier in 1997 and 1998 and began accruing revenue years later.

[1410] In my view, the Bombardier corporate opportunities that GasTOPS was pursuing through a proposed partnership with Bombardier was to use an enhanced ECMS to integrate with the Bombardier DMS to cover all parts of the aircraft, engine and structural parts. MxI, starting in November 1996, interfered with GasTOPS’ opportunity by attempting to convince Bombardier to partner with it rather than with GasTOPS.

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[1411] In my view the evidence concerning the Bombardier corporate opportunity establishes the following:

(a)“Positions held by the defendant employees”. Brouse and Forsyth held positions at GasTOPS that provided them with the direct and unfettered access to all information relating to GasTOPS’ pursuit of the Bombardier opportunity. More particularly, Brouse was involved in marketing the GasTOPS’ ECMS product to Bombardier. Brouse authored the document setting out the required functionality that would have to be added to ECMS v.2 software system to upgrade the DMS for the CAF.

(b)“Nature of the corporate opportunity”. The opportunity with Bombardier was unique, namely the provision of computer software systems to upgrade an existing system for the CAF to facilitate the process of aircraft maintenance.

(c)“Ripeness of the corporate opportunity”. GasTOPS spent considerable time and effort in meeting with the CAF, CAE Bombardier to gain a better understanding of the requirements and functionality that would be needed to upgrade the DMS. Brouse attended meetings with Bombardier in order to understand all of the requirements necessary.

(d)“Specificness of the corporate opportunity”. The opportunity pursued by GasTOPS and by Forsyth and Brouse after they resigned from GasTOPS were identical as admitted by the defendants at trial.

(e)“Amount of knowledge possessed by the defendant employee concerning the specifics of the opportunity”. Brouse possessed all of GasTOPS’ knowledge of the requirements and functionality that was needed to upgrade the DMS.

(f)“Circumstances surrounding the corporate opportunity, was it special or private?” From the evidence it was clear that it was only through the direct communication of the meetings with the respective customers, particularly the CAF, Bombardier and CAE that GasTOPS including Brouse came to have a complete understanding of Bombardier’s requirements.

(g)“The time factor”. It was a matter of days following the stop work order issued by GasTOPS as a result of the collapse of the cooperation agreement that Brouse and Forsyth were in contact with their key customer contact (Leguellec) at Bombardier inquiring about the customer’s requirements. Within days, Brouse and Forsyth made it abundantly clear to Bombardier that GasTOPS no longer had the ability to do the required work and they could provide the requirements and

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functionality needed to upgrade the DMS for the CAF.

(h)After making their presentation to Bombardier on December 4, 1996 and not hearing from Bombardier, MxI pursued the CAF directly hoping to obtain a contract to do the enhancements to the DMS that the CAF had been looking for (Exhibit 1534).

[1412] In my view, GasTOPS established that the defendants, by using confidential business information that belonged to GasTOPS, interfered with its business opportunity with Bombardier and wrongfully attempted to misappropriate the Bombardier opportunity to upgrade the DMS.

[1413] Throughout the evidence dealing with the Bombardier opportunity, references were made to “electronic log set” (simply another way of describing configuration management and parts life tracking software). Brouse set out in detail in his unsolicited proposal to the CAF in the upgrade of the DMS that the ECMS software could do the complete “electronic log set, for the aircraft including the engine”.

[1414] In describing the NFTC program business opportunity with Bombardier, the defendants stated that the opportunity was “managing the airworthiness log set for the NFTC flying school aircraft”. It is clear that after attempting to usurp the GasTOPS’ business opportunity with Bombardier and the CAF to upgrade the DMS, Forsyth and Brouse continued to pursue the military support group (via Leguellec and Arcand) in order to be positioned to obtain the NATO flight training opportunity to provide an “electronic log set”.

[1415] In conclusion, given the fiduciary duty Forsyth and Brouse owed to GasTOPS vis-à- vis the Bombardier business opportunity, Brouse and Forsyth breached their fiduciary duty by providing confidential business information belonging to GasTOPS to MxI in order that it could attempt to usurp GasTOPS’ business opportunity to provide configuration management and parts life trucking for the complete aircraft. In my view, the fiduciary duty Forsyth and Brouse owed to GasTOPS continued until 2006, as did the prohibition against using GasTOPS confidential business information. The wrongful actions of the defendants brought to an end the business opportunities GasTOPS was pursuing with Bombardier and as a result the defendants are responsible for any loses suffered by GasTOPS as a result of these wrongful actions.

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Kuwaiti Air Force

[1416] In early 1998, Muir was informed by Howe of B.F.Goodrich that the MxI had won the Kuwaiti opportunity and would provide the Kuwaitis with a product to meet their requirement for an MDPS replacement.

[1417] On September 2, 1998, Lieutenant Herl forwarded to MxI’s Peloso an e-mail with a letter attached from PMA265 to the Chief of the Kuwaiti Air Force program regarding the “Kuwait F/A-18 program; AME, ROM” (Exhibit 1981). At paragraph 2 on page 3 of the correspondence, the author stated:

2.The United States Navy (USN) is employing four (4) modules of AME to replace Enhanced Comprehensive Asset Maintenance Systems (ECAMS) prior to the year 2000. They are: The Data Stripper, Structural Analysis Fatigue Transfer File, Life Usage Indices (LUI) Calculator, and the Data Base (DB) which is a Commercial Off the Shelf (COTS) product called Maintenix. The cost for this system is $10,000 per aircraft and provides the user yearly updates, full unlimited usage, on call contractor technical support, supports aircraft avionics software upgrades such as Operational Flight Programs, and entrée to future planned AME modules.

2.The AME provides the benefits of an advanced automated diagnostics system that allows for an efficient and cost effective maintenance capability to be achieved at the squadron level, while using the advantages of Configuration Management, Fatigue Life Expenditure, Parts Life Tracking and Trend Analysis. Future enhancements will include Interactive Electronic Technical Manuals (IETM), Pilot Debrief, Digital Training Records and Aircraft Data Statistical Analysis. The technical goal of AME is to implement methodologies, specifications, tools and equipment to deploy to the US Navy fleet a computer-aided maintenance system with expert system diagnostics. The direct benefits of AME are;

Increased weapons system operational availability by eliminating downtime currently devoted to unnecessary inspection, servicing and replacement.

Reduce maintenance man-hours.

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Reduced monetary expenditure by eliminating needless parts replacement.

Provide an integrated automated maintenance data collection capability that will allow more accurate and efficient asset reporting and management.

AME provides a database of locally owned aircraft, engines and tracked components. The serial number and configuration of these items are tracked as well as any life usage information. The database is updated automatically during normal aircraft data download. Under normal circumstances distribution of updated data is handled automatically and is transparent to the user. AME is the replacement for the ECAMS and the Parts Life Tracking System I.

Further in the correspondence, the author advised the Kuwaiti Air Force that the first year cost to the Kuwaiti Air Force was expected to be approximately $400,000.

[1418] PMA265 was recommending to the Kuwaiti Air Force that it use the Maintenix product as an ECAMS replacement.

[1419] When questioned concerning the Kuwaiti opportunity, Peloso stated that MxI did end up providing Maintenix to the Kuwaiti Air Force. He said that he worked with Lieutenant Herl and members of the FMS office of PMA265 and that he also understood that the Kuwaiti Air Force expected to use the same ECAMS or MDPS replacement chosen by the U.S. Navy, which is in fact what happened.

[1420] On September 17, 1999, Raytheon Systems Company on behalf of the Kuwaiti Air Force forwarded a purchase order to MxI for the purchase of 22 Maintenix licenses at $8,000 per license, for a total of $176,000 (Exhibit 1489). In addition, MxI received revenues from the sale of Maintenix to the Kuwaiti Air Force as follows:

October 1999 to September 2000 — $237,160.00 (Exhibit 1226)

October 2000 to September 2001 — $269,280.00 (Exhibit 1447)

October 2001 to September 2002 — $305,634.00 (Exhibit 1274C)

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October 2002 to September 2003 — $130,367.00 (Exhibit 1569).

[1421] In 2004, MxI transferred the licensing agreement with the Kuwaiti Air Force from an annual agreement to a perpetual license agreement. The perpetual license was sold to the Kuwaiti Air Force for $960,000 USD.

[1422] As I have found that the defendants misappropriated the U.S. Navy business opportunity that GasTOPS was pursuing, it follows that the defendants misappropriated the Kuwaiti business opportunity that GasTOPS was pursuing prior to October 1996. The misappropriation of the Kuwaiti business opportunity was accomplished by the personal defendants using confidential business information belonging to GasTOPS or advising and allowing MxI to use such confidential business information to secure the Kuwaiti opportunity.

DOT/RCMP

[1423] Within a month after the incorporation of MxI, the defendants were using the corporate intelligence that they had gathered and assimilated in their pursuit of the DOT/RCMP opportunity while employed at GasTOPS. The information acquired by Brouse while employed at GasTOPS on the DOT/RCMP opportunity was extensive, as shown in Exhibits 47C, 48C, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147 and 148.

[1424] In the MxI business plan dated October 21, 1996 (Exhibit 2194), Forsyth defined the MxI business opportunity as follows: “The aviation regulatory agencies require that all aircraft operators record a ‘log set’ of flying hours (usage), maintenance actions and configuration changes. These records are currently maintained manually by a majority of operators. These records can be managed much more efficiently and accurately with a computerized information management system.” Further at page 8 of Exhibit 2194 under the heading “Products”, Forsyth wrote: “MxI Plans to Develop an ‘Electronic Log Set’ based on the Oracle Relational Database Management System (RDBMS) and Designed for Microsoft Windows 95 and Windows NT. An Inexpensive and Simplified Version of the Product will be Developed for Regional Airlines and Small Commercial Operators. A Comprehensive Wide Area Network Version will be Developed for the ‘Major’ Airlines.” The development of an “electronic log set” to replace the paper-based

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journey logs for use by users of computer aircraft was the very crux of the DOT/RCMP opportunity.

[1425] In my view, it is a reasonable inference that the fundamental components of the MxI business plan, being the identification of its competition in the commuter airline market place, was derived directly from the information the defendants had gathered at GasTOPS, while performing their job responsibilities in pursuing the DOT/RCMP opportunity.

[1426] On November 18, 1996, Vandenberg called Larry Yarush of DOT as a result of a lead given to him by his parents. While working at GasTOPS, Vandenberg worked exclusively at Dofasco and had no business or social dealings with Brouse. Further, Vandenberg had no involvement with the development of GasTOPS’ aviation management products or their marketing. He was unaware that GasTOPS had pursued an opportunity with the DOT. During his conversation with Yarush, Vandenberg was advised that DOT was unhappy with its present inventory system. Vandenberg requested a meeting, and Yarush referred him to David Howard. Vandenberg advised him that MxI’s product was in the prototype phase. At the conclusion of the conversation, Vandenberg understood the RCMP was also looking for a similar system and that it had evaluated a number of systems but found them to be weak in either inventory or maintenance. Vandenberg noted that Doug Brouse, Jeff Cass or Laura Cline should follow up on this information. Apparently, Brouse had met Yarush and Howard on one occasion during the September 4, 1996 meeting. There is no evidence that there was any follow up to Vandenberg’s conversation with Yarush.

[1427] On November 12, 1997, Vandenberg and Peloso met with members of DOT to introduce them to MxI and its Maintenix product. Vandenberg understood that DOT was looking for a system to provide parts life tracking and inventory management. He also understood that DOT would be sending out an RFP for a maintenance management system in the near future.

[1428] On November 14, 1997, Vandenberg, Peloso and Jeff Cass visited the DOT hangar at the Ottawa Airport to gather further information about Transport Canada’s current systems and requirements. MxI learned that Transport Canada was using different systems for different

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purposes and that Transport Canada was looking for a “turn key solution.”

[1429] On December 3, 1997, Vandenberg spoke to Stephen Borovoy of DOT and confirmed that there would be 14-15 attendees at a scheduled December 11 meeting including Howard, who was the team leader for the “new” initiative. There was a lack of evidence on what the “new” initiative was and, as a result, I had difficulty ascertaining whether there was any similarity between GasTOPS’ 1996 business opportunity with DOT/RCMP MxI’s 1997 opportunity.

[1430] On July 23, 1998, Kevin Reynolds noted the receipt of the DOT RFP (Exhibit 1859) which was posted on the MERC system. The RFP set out in significant detail the requirements of the DOT. The RFP indicated that the requirement was for an “off the shelf” software package that must provide a means for the Aircraft Service Directorate’s Aircraft Maintenance and Dispatch System (“AMDS”) of Transport Canada to control multiple inventories, aircraft and component maintenance, work orders, production planning and shop control, flight operations and financial cost allocation. On September 4, 1998, MxI responded to the RFP (Exhibit 1861). MxI was ultimately unsuccessful in its bid. There was no evidence that GasTOPS responded to this DOT RFP, despite the fact it was published on the MERC system.

[1431] The defendants submit that they did not solicit this opportunity. Vandenberg conceded that he made a “cold call” to Yarnish in November 1996 based on a family connection in order to gather information, but there was no further contact between DOT and MxI until November 1997. In September 1998, MxI responded to a public notification of an RFP for an opportunity with DOT, while GasTOPS chose not to respond. The defendants suggest that GasTOPS accepted and supported Brouse’s assessment that ECMS did not meet the requirements of the business opportunity and significant customization would be required at great expense to win the business opportunity. They submit that GasTOPS cannot now claim that they usurped the opportunity, when in fact GasTOPS never submitted a proposal or intended to compete.

[1432] In my view, Forsyth, Brouse and Jeff Cass were intimately involved in GasTOPS’ pursuit of the DOT/RCMP opportunity and it was through that involvement that they learned the

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unique requirements of the RCMP/DOT, which were similar to those of commuter airlines. In addition, while employed at GasTOPS, they gathered information concerning competition in that market place and the abilities/limitations of the products of those competitors. I have no doubt, that the defendants incorporated this information in the pursuit of the DOT/RCMP business opportunity, all of which was confidential business information.

[1433] The defendants submit that their product was a CMMS and therefore fundamentally different from GasTOPS’ products. It must be remembered that while employed at GasTOPS Jeff Cass outlined in detail the enhancements/modifications that could be made to the ECMS products to meet the DOT/RCMP requirements (and, accordingly the requirements of the commuter aviation market place). I am satisfied that it was through the pursuit of the DOT/RCMP business opportunity at GasTOPS that the defendants became aware of the requirements of the commuter airline market place.

[1434] The legal issue is whether or not the defendants breached a fiduciary duty when they used such information (or allowed MxI to use it) to develop a product to meet those requirements. The thrust of the defendants’ argument was that it was not a “ripe” corporate opportunity and that there was no evidence that DOT/RCMP had any interest in GasTOPS’ proposal.

[1435] However, Forsyth, Brouse and Jeff Cass held positions at GasTOPS that provided direct and unfettered access relating to GasTOPS’ pursuit of the DOT/RCMP opportunity. Brouse was involved in the marketing of GasTOPS’ ECMS product to DOT/RCMP, while Jeff Cass became familiar with the modifications/enhancements that would be required to make GasTOPS’ existing technology meet the requirements of DOT/RCMP. One only has to view Exhibits 146 and 48C, which were authored by Jeff Cass, to realize the detail and knowledge of the “incremental functionality” that would have to be added to ECMS v.2 to meet these requirements. The business opportunity with the DOT/RCMP was a unique business opportunity which involved the delivery of a computer software program to track information related to aircraft parts to facilitate the process of aircraft maintenance. I believe that the defendants, prior to their resignations, intended to develop a software product designed in part to meet the needs of

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the commuter aviation market place.

[1436] The defendants noted that they did not pursue the RCMP/DOT business opportunity until November 1997. However, the evidence still indicates that when the defendants did approach DOT/RCMP, it was to pursue the same business opportunity GasTOPS had pursued in August and September 1996. As I understood the evidence, MxI initially approached DOT/RCMP outside of the context of the RFP and that only subsequently did they respond (unsuccessfully) to the RFP.

[1437] When GasTOPS first became involved in the DOT/RCMP business opportunity, GasTOPS was responding to an ACAN. There was no evidence that the DOT/RCMP requirements were “public.” To the contrary, only through subsequent direct communications and meetings with the prospective customer did GasTOPS (and its employees Forsyth, Brouse and Jeff Cass) acquire a complete understanding of the customer’s requirements and those of the computer aviation market place.

[1438] GasTOPS suggests that it was only days after the negotiations with MxI were terminated that MxI contacted DOT. I accept Vandenberg’s evidence that he telephoned Yarush because of his family connection and that there was no follow up by MxI until December 1997.

[1439] The defendants suggest that the RCMP/DOT opportunity was a search for a commercial aviation “CMMS product.” In his examination in-chief, Jeff Cass stated:

All the same major areas of procurement, materials management, asset management and maintenance management can be used to organize those requirements. This is a full-blown CMMS that was being looked for. And we knew there was a gap between what they were looking for and what we had in the ECMS-2.0. I recall there being three options to try to go with what Doug and I described, or at least that I can recall, and one was to try to just sell them ECMS-2.0 and propose that as is, where clearly it would fall far short of what they were looking for in terms of some of the functions we’ve described that they were looking for.

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[1440] It is clear to me from reading Exhibits 146 and 48C that Jeff Cass believed incremental functionality could be added to ECMS v.2 to meet the DOT/RCMP requirements. At no time did Jeff Cass opine that the DOT/RCMP requirements called for an entirely different product known as a CMMS.

[1441] In my view the general requirements of the operators of commuter aircraft is general knowledge and as such is not confidential business information and as such the defendants were not in breach of the fiduciary duty they owed to GasTOPS. On the other hand the specific requirements of the DOT/RCMP as determined by GasTOPS was confidential business information and as such the personal defendants were not entitled to use such information to the detriment of GasTOPS.

[1442] Although neither GasTOPS nor MxI secured a contract with DOT/RCMP, the defendants’ actions illustrate that they did not hesitate to use confidential business information of which they learned at GasTOPS and which they knew was proprietary of GasTOPS.

Summary

[1443] In the circumstances of this case I am of the view that the defendants actively solicited GasTOPS’ existing and prospective customers. The defendants solicited these customers in their presentations by indicating that MxI was made up of former employees of MSD, suggesting that MxI was simply a spin-off of the MSD, and asserting that MxI had the expertise that was formerly held by GasTOPS. In my view, this statement was an active solicitation of customers by former employees who owed a fiduciary duty to their former employee. Even if I accepted that the actions of the personal defendants amounted to no more than passive acceptance of business offered to them by GasTOPS’ former clients, I would find that the personal defendants’ past employment with GasTOPS would prevent them from accepting such work without breaching their fiduciary duty. A fiduciary simply cannot work with clients of the former employer for the duration of the fiduciary duty, including time post- employment.

[1444] A fiduciary may not solicit the customers or prospective customers of his former

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employer. In this case, all of the personal defendants owed a fiduciary duty to GasTOPS and were not entitled to directly solicit customers or potential customers of GasTOPS because of the advantage they had gained relating to those clients (such as names of contacts), learning the needs of the clients, and developing personal relationships they while working with them on behalf of GasTOPS. Brouse, Forsyth, Jeff Cass and, to a lesser extent, Vandenberg had formed relationships with contact persons at GE, the U.S. Navy and other customers and potential customers of GasTOPS. Brouse had initially been hired by GasTOPS as its contact person for the CAF. I have no doubt that in the field computerized maintenance software, the relationship between individual GasTOPS employees and the customer or potential customer’s contact person was extremely important. GasTOPS personnel would gain invaluable information concerning the needs of the customer or potential customer in meetings with them.

[1445] In Atlas Janitorial Services Co. v. Germanis, [1994] O.J. No. 316 (Ont. Gen.Div.) Dilks J. stated at para. 43 that an employee owes implied duties during his or her term of employment to serve the employer faithfully; not to compete with the employer; not to reveal confidential information; not to conceal facts from the employer which ought to be revealed; and to provide full-time service to the employer. Dilks J. continued at para. 70:

There is nothing intrinsically difficult in defining soliciting. It simply means to ask for or invite business. Although it was argued, I was not referred to any authority for the proposition that it is not soliciting to submit a tender or to quote on a contract so long as one is doing it at the invitation of the customer. There is no obligation to respond to an invitation to tender or quote. Although the first generates the second, the second does not follow inevitably. That said, it is not every solicitation that will run afoul of the injunction or contractual obligation, for only solicitations of customers will be caught; there is no prohibition against soliciting former customers.

[1446] In their capacity as fiduciaries of GasTOPS, the personal defendants owed a duty to GasTOPS not to solicit its existing or prospective customers for a reasonable period of time after their resignation. This duty not to solicit was exceedingly important in this case, where the defendants had personal relationships with people instrumental in purchasing the MSD’s

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products. In addition, the defendants had intimate knowledge of the MSD’s existing and potential customers’ needs and requirements and of the MSD’s marketing strategy, including that which it intended to employ to sell products to identified prospective customers.

[1447] The personal defendants’ failure to provide GasTOPS with reasonable notice of their intention to resign positioned the defendants as an alternative to GasTOPS’ existing and prospective customers’ software needs. It is important to keep in mind the extremely vulnerable position of the plaintiff as a result of the failure of the defendants to provide GasTOPS with reasonable notice. If the defendants had provided GasTOPS with 10-12 months notice, it could have, and in my view in all probability would have, made arrangements to replace these defendants and to have fulfilled its goal of converting its products to a Windows environment. If GasTOPS had been able to do so and hired new personnel in a timely manner to replace the defendants, the new personnel could have been introduced to its existing customers and potential customers and become familiar with its products. In such circumstances, the effect of the defendants’ breach of their fiduciary duty to GasTOPS would have been lessened greatly.

[1448] The actions of the defendants were, in my view, a clear invitation to GasTOPS’ existing and prospective customers to shift their contracts to MxI or to enter into contracts with MxI for the contracts that GasTOPS was pursuing when the defendants resigned.

[1449] In addition to the defendants failing to give reasonable notice and using confidential business information belonging to GasTOPS to pursue GasTOPS’ customers or potential customers I have found that MxI’s product Maintenix was a fourth iteration of GasTOPS’ products. Maintenix was the fourth iteration of ECMS and was developed from GasTOPS’ confidential business information. Accordingly when the defendants pursued GasTOPS’ customers or potential customers, they did so with a product that was developed using GasTOPS’ confidential business information.

VI. Remedies

Injunctive Relief

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[1450] In cases such as this which involve a breach of confidence, the courts have considerable flexibility to fashion a remedy to suit the particular circumstances of the case. Injunctions to prevent the continued use of confidential information can be granted. Injunctive relief may be sought in addition to a claim for other reliefs such as damages or an accounting of profits and may be granted before or after trial. (See: Thorburn and Fairbairn at 7.2100 and Lac Minerals Ltd. at paras. 74, 81 and 186)

[1451] The primary consideration for the courts in determining whether to grant an injunction is whether damages or the repayment of profits alone would provide an adequate remedy. In most cases involving the misappropriation of confidential information, damages are not, on their own, an adequate remedy because of the difficulty in quantifying the harm suffered and the risk of future injury.

[1452] Where confidential information is obtained from an employer and subsequently used as a springboard in a competing enterprise, the court may grant an injunction to deprive the offending party of any advantage obtained by wrongfully using the confidential information. The “springboard principle” was described in Terrapin Ltd. v. Builders’ Supply Co. (Hayes) Ltd.,

[1960] 5 R.P.C. 128 (C.A.) at 130 as follows:

a person who has obtained information in confidence is not allowed to use it as a springboard for activities detrimental to the person who made the confidential communication, and springboard it remains even when all the features have been published or can be obtained by actual inspection by any member of the public.

[1453] In “springboard principle” cases an injunction will normally be granted for such time as it would otherwise have taken the offending party to obtain the confidential information by lawful means. (See: Thorburn and Fairbairn at 7:2320 citing Saltman Engineering Co. v. Campbell Engineering Co. [1963] 3 All E.R. 413 (C.A.)). In “springboard” cases”, injunctions will be granted because there has been a breach of confidence and the innocent party should be placed in the same position he or she would have been in had the offending party not appropriated the confidential information. Where the offending party is not prevented from competing with the innocent party, he or she will nevertheless be prevented from taking

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advantage of the innocent party’s confidential information. However, where the offending party owed a fiduciary duty to the innocent party, he or she may be prevented entirely from competing with the innocent party: see Schauenburg Industries Ltd. v. Borowski (1970), 101 D.L.R. (3d) 701, 25 0.R. (2d) 737 (H.C.J.).

[1454] The “springboard” doctrine applies not only to confidential information, but also to information which is partly public and partly confidential or to information which, having been disclosed in confidence to certain recipients, then falls into the public domain. In Seager v. Copydex Ltd., [1967] 1 W.L.R. 923 (C.A.) at 931 Lord Denning stated:

When the information is mixed, being partly public and partly private then the recipient must take special care to use only the material which is in the public domain. He should go to the public source and get it: or, at any rate, not be in a better position than if he had gone to the public source.

[1455] Terrapin Ltd. v. Builders’ Supply Co. (Hayes) Ltd. is a case in which Roxburgh J.

granted an interlocutory injunction restraining the defendants from manufacturing certain buildings using confidential information belonging to the plaintiffs. It had been argued that the information concerned could no longer be confidential, since it had been published by the plaintiffs when they placed on the market their own building embodying it and published descriptions of those buildings. That argument was rejected by Roxburgh J., as being inconsistent with the decision in Saltsman Engineereing. After referring to that case, Roxburgh J., added:

as I understand it, the essence of this branch of the law, whatever the origin of it may be, is that a person who has obtained information in confidence is not allowed to use it as a springboard for activities detrimental to the person who made the confidential communication, and a springboard it remains even when all the features have been published or can be ascertained by actual inspection by members of the public… the possessor of the confidential information still has a long start over any member of the public… it is, in my view, inherent in the principle upon which the Saltsman case rests that the possessor of such information must

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be placed under a special disability in the field of competition to ensure that he does not get an unfair start.

[1456] A similar approach was adopted by the Manitoba Court of Appeal in Apotex Fermentation Inc. v. Novopharm Ltd., (1988), 162 D.L.R. (4th) 111 (Man. C.A.) at para. 176 where the court held:

there is strong American authority to support the proposition that such a submission is simply irrelevant when, as here, the defendant did not in fact utilize the outside sources. See Elcor Chemical Corporation v. Agri-Sul Inc., 494 S.W.2d 201 (1973, Court of Civil Appeals of Texas) and the authorities referred to therein. The issue is not whether the defendant could have utilized different sources to make the same progress, but rather the reality of the situation which is the knowledge that the defendant gained by way of the misuse of a confidential relationship.

[1457] In Cadbury Schweppes Inc. v. FBI Foods Ltd., [1999] S.C.J. No. 6 at para. 85 the court stated:

The law would lose its deterrent effect if defendants could misappropriate confidential information and retain profits thereby generated subject only to the payment of compensation if, as and when they are caught and successfully sued.

[1458] When a court is asked to order an injunction in a trade secret proceeding, the lack of good faith and forthrightness on the part of the defendants is a relevant factor to be considered. The remarks of Judge Elfvin of the United States District Court in Monovis Inc. v. Aquino , 905 F. Supp. 1205 (W.D. N.Y. 1994) are particularly apt, given the facts of the present case:

“An injunction against use and disclosure alone would be insufficient to achieve the requisite equity in this case. Instead, the defendants must be enjoined from competing in the single-screw compressor marketplace. The reasons for such conclusion are several. First, even assuming the best of good faith, it is doubtful whether Aquino could completely divorce his knowledge of the trade secrets from any single-screw compressor work in which he might engage.... Second, there is much to cause this Court to

question whether the defendants would in good faith act to avoid using and disclosing information belonging to others; the record in

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this case suggests the opposite. The defendants have repeatedly chosen to interpret Aquino's obligations in a begrudgingly narrow sense, violating both their letter and spirit ....”

“Furthermore, the defendants' approach to this litigation does little to inspire confidence that they can be relied upon not to use and/or disclose the plaintiffs' trade secrets....”

This statement was cited with approval in Apotex Fermentation Inc. v. Novopharm Ltd. (1998), 162 D.L.R. (4th) 111 (Man. C.A.) at paragraph 174

[1459] In my view, given the length of time which has expired since the resignations of Forsyth and Brouse in early October 1996 and the end of the evidentiary phase of the trial in March 2006, I do not believe that this is an appropriate case to grant the plaintiff injunctive relief. In my view, an accounting of profits earned by MxI and damages to be paid by the personal defendants can adequately redress the plaintiff’s loss.

[1460] The remedy of an accounting of profits is an equitable remedy. Its object is not to punish the infringer but to prevent his or her unjust enrichment by compelling him or her to surrender those profits that were improperly made as a result of the infringement: see Reading & Bates Construction Co. v. Baker Energy Resources Corp., [1994] F.C.J. No. 1514 (F.C.A.) at para. 12.

[1461] An accounting of profits is often available in breach of confidence cases. Usually, an accounting is not a restitutionary measure of damages. Thus, while it is measured according to the defendants’ gain, it is not measured by the defendants’ gain at the plaintiff’s expense: see Lac Minerals at para. 186.

[1462] In an accounting of profits approach, the damage suffered by the plaintiff is immaterial, the object of the accounting is to give the plaintiff the actual profits which the defendants have made and of which equity strips them, as soon as it is established that the profits were improperly made: see Teledyne Industries, Inc. v. Lido Industrial Products Ltd. (1982), 68 C.P.R. (2d) 204 at 208 (F.C.T.D.)

[1463] The remedy of an accounting of profits is not dependent upon proof that the plaintiff

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would have obtained business opportunities or contracts but for the defendant’s wrongful conduct. In Industrial Development Consultants Ltd. v. Cooley, [1972] 2 All E.R.162 the defendant was the managing director of the plaintiffs who, on the plaintiffs’ behalf, entered into negotiations with a third party to manage a large building project. The third party made it clear that it would not award the contract to the plaintiffs. Subsequently, the third party approached the defendant and told him that, if he were independent of the plaintiffs, he would be chosen to do the work. The defendant procured a release from his employment on false grounds of illness and eventually became the project manager for the third party. The plaintiffs sued him and elected to pursue an accounting of profits. The court recognized that:

if the plaintiffs succeeded they will get a profit which they probably would not have got for themselves had the defendant fulfilled his duty. If the defendant is allowed to keep that profit he will have got something which he was able to get solely by reason of his breach of fiduciary duty to the plaintiffs.

The court nevertheless ordered the accounting on the basis that it was the defendant who had acted wrongly. (See: Thorburn and Fairbairn at 7:2800, citing Industrial Development Consultants Ltd. v. Cooley, [1972] 2 All E.R. 162 at 175)

[1464] In my view, having found that the personal defendants breached their fiduciary duty to GasTOPS by using GasTOPS’ confidential business information/trade secrets and providing such confidential business information/trade secrets to MxI in order that they could jointly use such information to the detriment of GasTOPS the appropriate remedy would be to order MxI to account to GasTOPS for the profits it improperly made and to order the personal defendants to be responsible for the damages suffered by GasTOPS as a result of their breach of the fiduciary duties they owed to GasTOPS. In addition, the personal defendants will be responsible for any damages suffered by GasTOPS as a result of their failure to provide GasTOPS with reasonable notice or their resignations.

[1465] Upon an employee using confidential business information/trade secrets belonging to his/her former employer directly or through his/her new employer, the former employer has a choice between choosing an accounting for profits (impressed with a resulting trust) (Canadian

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Aero Service Ltd. v. O’Malley (1973), 40 D.L.R. (3d) 371 (S.C.C.); White Oaks Welding

Supplies v. Tapp (1983), 42 O.R. (2d) 445 (H.C.J.)), or to be indemnified for damages due to

losses suffered (Sure-Grip Fasteners v. Allgrade Bolt & Chain Inc. (1993), 45 C.C.E.L. 27 (Ont. Gen. Div.); Canadian Industrial Distributors Inc. v. Dargue (1994), 7 C.C.E.L. (2d) 60 at p. 70 (Ont. Gen. Div.); Anderson, Smyth & Kelly v. World Wide Customs Brokers (1996), 20 C.C.E.L.

(2d) 1 (Alta. C.A.), at p. 15; CRC-Evans Canada Ltd. v. Pettifer (1997), 26 C.C.E.L. (2d) 294, aff’d 216 A.R. 192 (C.A.); KJA Consultants Inc. v. Soberman (2003), 29 C.C.E.L. (3d) 47 (S.C.J.), aff’d 39 C.C.E.L. (3d) 13 (C.A.)).

[1466] Further, there is authority that an employer does not have to elect a single remedy, and may lead evidence on both its own loss and the fiduciary’s profit, including their accomplices profit (Moore International (Canada) Ltd. v. Carter (1984), B.C.L.R. 207 (C.A.)

[Moore]; see also Clifford & Associates Consulting Ltd. v. Cliff (1996) 72 C.P.R. (3d) 53

(B.C.C.A.) for misuse of physical assets in addition to information). In Moore at p. 214, the B.C. Court of Appeal tried to clarify when each approach to damages calculations should be used:

The fiduciary or accomplice should not be permitted to gain from the breach of the fiduciary’s obligation of trust and good faith. So, if their profit is greater than the loss by the former employer, an accounting is a better standard of compensation than damages. But, conversely, the employer should not be penalized for any business ineptitude of the fiduciary or his accomplice. So, if the loss by the employer is greater than the profit of the fiduciary, damages would be the better standard of compensation. It follows that, where the evidence will support a sound assessment based on the accounting profits and also a sound assessment based on a calculation of loss and where, in the particular circumstances, both remedies are available and both are supported by the pleadings and the evidence, the compensation awarded should be the higher of the two. [Emphasis added]

The Court of Appeal further stated that where both damages and an accounting are claimed, the plaintiff is not required to elect one remedy over the other. The trial judge may award compensation that is both best supported by the evidence and the higher award.

[1467] If damages are awarded to compensate the plaintiff for the loss suffered it is

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important to recognize that such damages are subject to contingencies based on the circumstances. As such, in making a calculation of damages for breach of a fiduciary duty, including the misuse of confidential business information/trade secrets, the court must be alert to “the vagaries and risks of commerce [that] must be taken into account” (Mountjoy at p. 120).

[1468] Historically, the principle for recovering the loss incurred as a result of a breach of a fiduciary duty has been to require the breaching employee to account for any profits earned (Phipps v. Boardman, [1965] 1 All E.R. 849). This was re-iterated in Canaero, wherein Laskin J. stated at p. 392:

Liability of O’Malley and Zarzycki for breach of fiduciary duty does not depend upon proof by Canaero that, but for their intervention, it would have obtained the Guyana contract; nor is it a condition of recovery of damages that Canaero establish what its profit would have been or what it has lost by failing to realize the corporate opportunity in question. It is entitled to compel the faithless fiduciaries to answer for their default according to their gain. Whether the damages awarded here are viewed as an accounting of profits or, what amounts to the same thing, as based on unjust enrichment, I would not interfere with the quantum.

[1469] It should be noted that because the court will not permit a fiduciary (nor his or her accomplice) to gain from the breach, the profit made by the faithless fiduciary may not be the most appropriate measure. If the faithless fiduciary made very little profit, to hold him or her to merely an accounting for profit, would reward the faithless fiduciary’s inefficiency. In this case there is no suggestion that MxI was an ineffective company. It was a profitable enterprise.

[1470] These two forms of damages are interrelated and need not be considered as distinct.

As stated by Finlayson J.A. in McCormick Delisle & Thompson Inc. v. Ballantyne (2001), 12

B.L.R. (3d) 257 (Ont. C.A.) [McCormick], at para. 26:

The case law indicates that there are two potential ways to calculate damages for breach of fiduciary duty in an employment context. One is an accounting of profits made by the party who breached the duty, while the other method focuses on the loss suffered by the party which was owed the duty… Perhaps

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unwisely, the appellant chose the second method, but also relied on the profits improperly obtained by the respondents as a measure of the reasonableness of the figure claimed as damages. [Emphasis added]

[1471] Moreover, as further noted by Sachs J. in KJA Consultants Inc. v. Soberman (2003),

29C.C.E.L. (3d) 47 (Ont. S.C.J.) [KJA Consultants], at paras. 51-52, both forms may lead to similar results:

51Compensation for breach of fiduciary duty has a restitutionary objective. In a case such as this there are two different approaches to compensation:

(i)Disgorging the benefits wrongfully acquired by the defendant or

(ii)Restoring the Plaintiff to the position it would have been in if the breach had not occurred.

52The first approach focuses on the defendant’s gain; the second on the plaintiff’s loss. The plaintiff may elect which approach to compensation they are seeking. In this case KJA has

elected to have their damages measured by the gain to Mr. Soberman. However they also submitted that both approaches would produce very similar results. I agree.

[1472] Firstly, in calculating damages based on the disgorging profits, such damages must be rooted in the defendant’s breach of a fiduciary duty or misuse of confidential business information/trade secrets. As such, the temporal limits as to which profits are to be disgorged can be set by noting the duration of the employee’s post-employment fiduciary obligation. Secondly, expenses ought to be considered and deducted from a calculation of the profits to be disgorged. However, quantifying the precise amount of expenses to be deducted requires considering how much it would have cost the wronged employer to pursue the accounts and income lost (and not what it cost the breaching employee to procure that income).

[1473] As noted by Sachs J. in KJA Consultants – who calculated damages through disgorging profits accruing to the defendant’s breach – at para. 53, the expenses to be deducted must be estimated by the plaintiff and must relate to the projects or accounts in question:

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Mr. Soberman’s gain is measured by the income he made as a result of his breach of fiduciary duty. In calculating this income I find that the expenses incurred to earn this income were the expenses that were directly attributable to the projects concerned, I accept [the plaintiff] Mr. Jenkins testimony that these expenses would not exceed 5% of the amount charged on any specific project. Mr. Soberman did produce a statement setting out his overhead expenses. However, I find that, given the nature of these expenses, they would

(a)have been incurred whether Mr. Soberman took on KJA client business or not eg. Automobile, promotion, accounting, legal fees, telephone.

(b)were discretionary expenditures eg. Meals and entertainment; or

(c)were expenditures that would be included in the 5% project allowance provided for eg. postage, printing, courier, office supplies, travel.

[1474] The other approach to compensating the former employer for the loss suffered for the breach of fiduciary duty and/or misuse of confidential business information/trade secrets is to estimate the loss suffered by the employer which would include lost opportunities not acquired by the defendants but lost by the former employer.

[1475] In Mountjoy, the court assessed damages based on what the plaintiff had lost. As such, the potential profit was adjusted against the overhead, expenses, and business insurance that would have been spent by the plaintiff, to achieve a net profit figure of what was lost due to the defendant’s breach of fiduciary duty. Further, the court reasoned that many of the clients who were lost by the defendant would have been lost anyway, and total damages were reduced.

The Mountjoy approach has been followed in Hawboldt Industries v. Chester Basin Hydraulics

&Machine Ltd. (1983), 57 N.S.R. (2d) 413 (S.C.).

[1476] As such, generally, when a plaintiff elects to have damages assessed on the loss of profits, calculations may proceed as follows:

1.Calculate the loss of gross income or revenue;

2.Deduct the expenses the plaintiff would have incurred to earn the income;

3.Adjust the above total by an amount representing attrition due to client

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mobility (Sure-Grip Fasteners at p. 292).

[1477] Specifically, with respect to deducting the plaintiff’s ostensible expenses, as noted by Estey C.J.H.C. in Mountjoy at pp.120-21, failure to take into account expenses which would be required to earn the lost income may put the plaintiff in a better position than if the plaintiff had earned the lost revenue. If no evidence is led on this issue, the court will estimate the appropriate level of expenses which would have been made to earn the income. To calculate such an amount requires:

1.a deduction for the for a proportionate share of the annual overhead expenses (Mountjoy; W.J. Christie & Co. v. Greer (1981), 121 D.L.R. (3d) 472 at 479);

2.a consideration that some customers might have followed the breaching employee, even if he or she had not competed unfairly (309925 Ontario Ltd. v. Tyrrell (1981), 127 D.L.R. (3d) 99 (H.C.J.) at 107). Such considerations may further be developed by the court by:

a.taking into account the type of business the former employer is engaged in, and the likelihood of loss of business due to presumably weak client loyalty (White Oaks at 165; Mountjoy at 358; Sure-Grip at 295).

b.taking into account whether the former employee could have advertised and taken the proper approach, and the employer might have still lost the income in question (Mountjoy at 120). In E.M. Plastic & Electric Product Ltd. v. Hobza (1993), 52 C.P.R. (3d) 166 (Ont. C.A.), a 30 % reduction for damages concerning loss of profit was made by the Court of Appeal to recognize contingencies such as the fact that the employee was entitled to fairly compete in the market, and clients may move even where there is fair competition.

[1478] Canaero stands for the proposition that since the former employer can compel the faithless fiduciary to answer for his or her default according to that individual’s gain, the former employer does not have to establish precisely what its profit would have been or what it has lost by failing to realize the corporate opportunity in question. Thus, the court may assess the likelihood that an employer did indeed lose a particular business opportunity because of the

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defendant’s breach, even if the defendant did not acquire that opportunity.

[1479] A precise calculation, therefore, is not required. Rather an estimate of what may have been lost by the plaintiff due to the defendant’s breach, subject to a reduction for contingencies, is the proper approach in considering such lost opportunities.

[1480] An award of damages is intended to compensate the plaintiff for loss and to attempt to place the plaintiff in the position it would have been in had the breach not occurred. Where an action is based on a breach of confidence or good faith, the plaintiff may be awarded damages in an amount to compensate it for its loss. The formula for the measure of damages in an action for breach of confidence is well recognized. The following words of Lord Wilberforce in General

Tire & Rubber Co., v. Firestone Tyre & Rubber Co., [1975] 2 All E.R. 173 were adopted by

Sopinka J. in Lac Minerals at para. 85 where he stated:

As in the case of any other tort (leaving aside cases where exemplary damages can be given) the object of damages is to compensate for loss or injury. The general rule at any rate in relation to 'economic' torts is that the measure of damages is to be, so far as possible, that sum of money which will put the injured party in the same position as he would have been in if he had not sustained the wrong (Livingstone v. Rawyards Coal Co [(1880) 5 App. Cas. 25 at 39] per Lord Blackburn).

[1481] The difficulty or uncertainty in the proof of damages will not excuse a wrongdoer or preclude recovery by an injured party. The plaintiff should be afforded every opportunity to prove damages once the misappropriation is shown. See: Apotex Fermentation Inc.

Damages

[1482] The plaintiff adduced evidence of the losses it suffered as a result of the defendants’ usurping their corporate opportunities and misappropriation of trade secrets/confidential information relating to its intellectual property through Muir and Bruce Brooks, a chartered accountant. The defendants adduced expert evidence on the alleged business loss suffered by GasTOPS through Gary Timm. For reasons which I will discuss later I prefer the evidence of

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Brooks.

[1483] Both experts addressed in their reports the damages which they assessed GasTOPS suffered as a result of the actions of the defendants.

[1484] In preparing his report, Brooks relied upon five assumptions in making his calculations. Relying upon those assumptions, Brooks examined the corporate and business background of GasTOPS by examining the documentation set out in Appendix B of his report (Exhibit 1129, Report of BDO Dunwoody dated April 5, 2002).

[1485] Brooks stated that the purpose for obtaining this background information was as follows:

A.The purpose of the background is to get a general idea of what makes up the company, where it's come from and where it's going. It's to give a general understanding of the company and the environment in which it operates.

To get an idea of the management structure of the business, the product lines and how the company is structured and the services it provides, and how the company has evolved over the years, the principal customers that it's been dealing with, the nature of the contracts and especially the recurring nature of the contracts, and the types of R&D that is going into building up the products that the company is developing and evolving into.

[1486] Brooks in preparing his report maintained the divisional structure that had been in existence at GasTOPS at the time of the resignations of Forsyth and Brouse. At that time, the MSD consisted of several business areas, namely ECMS, MAINSTAY, other air and oil debris monitoring (ODM). Brooks maintained this division in order to trace revenues, expenses and net profits to the MSD. He then was able to make a loss calculation by looking at what the actual revenues were within those units of the MSD, versus what had happened after the resignations of Forsyth and Brouse.

[1487] Having adopted this methodology Brooks then prepared schedules 3 and 4 of Exhibit 1129 in order to determine the revenues, cost of goods sold and expenses for ECMS,

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MAINSTAY, other AERO and ODM.

[1488] In addition, Brooks examined the business operations of MSD as of October 1996 and found the following initiatives had been projected in the business plan:

(a)CF-18 ECMS Fields Operations

(b)CF-18 ECMS/DMS integration

(c)CF-18 ECMS/ASIP integration

(d)Sea Kings ECMS

(e)Utility Technical Helicopter (UTTH) ECMS

(f)CC-130 Hercules ECMS

(g)Solid State Tape Transport Mechanism (SSTTM)

[1489] According to Brooks, in examining the business records of GasTOPS, he did not find any revenues from the above initiatives listed in items (a) through (g) except for item (f) where he found revenues in the amount of $73,000.

[1490] In his examination of the GasTOPS’ financial statements, including the balance sheet and profit and loss statements Brooks made the following observations with respect to the financial performance of GasTOPS for the 1997 fiscal year:

(a)1997 sales dropped by $892,866 from the prior fiscal year and potential sales opportunities did not develop;

(b)1997 total expenses increased by $345,277;

(c)1997 income from operations decreased from 1996 by $1,238,143;

(d)Corporate liquidity decreased in 1997 (working capital ratio - schedule 5-C);

(e)Financial stability was negatively impacted in 1997 and later by increase in debt (schedule 5-A); and

(f)Expenses for certain corporate activities increased as a direct result of measures taken to save the company. These included:

i.Loan interest – new debt;

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ii.Professional fees – litigation against MxI and the former employees (1997-2002); and

iii.Recruiting – new staff requirements.

[1491] In order to determine a growth rate and revenues that would have been expected in the first year following the resignations of Brouse and Forsyth, Brooks summarized his findings from the business plan as follows:

(a)Forecasted MSD revenue was budgeted at $6,500,000. This included $680,000 (subsequently revised to $900,000 for the ODM systems);

(b)Signed contracts for $1,510,000 existed at August 14, 1996 or 23% of the annual budget;

(c)Forecasted MSD cost of goods sold was budgeted at $2,990,000 or 46% having a projected gross margin of 54%;

(d)US Navy sales of ECMS were budgeted for $800,000;

(e)Budgeted capital expenditures were $189,000 including IMCS project ($70,000), telephone ($50,000), work cells ($50,000) and other additions ($19,000); and

(f)Profit before tax was budgeted at $926,000 or 10.1% of revenues.

[1492] Brooks determined from his review of the GasTOPS’ business plans and financial statements, several “principal indicators of future success” which he described as follows:

(a)Decentralized organizational structure with strong program managers;

(b)Increasing annual revenues for the company and the MSD division;

(c)Company profitability was improving and MSD was profitable;

(d)Increasing customer leads (US Navy, GE, Kuwait, Volvo, etc.);

(e)Success with US Navy would bring entry into other

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markets including the commercial airlines;

(f)Strong financial base (excess working capital and significant shareholder equity investment) and years in business provided GasTOPS with credibility to the prospective new customers;

(g)ECMS was viewed as a leading edge software by CAF, U.S. Navy, General Electric and other prospective customers;

(h)ECMS conversion to Windows was planned to be in place by 1998 at a cost of $1,250,000.00 and would be recovered in contract work;

(i)Experienced MSD workforce with low historical turnover. MSD workforce budgeted to increase from 30 to 42 in 1997;

(j)Reputation for quality of work and expertise;

(k)No Canadian competition and limited global competition;

(l)Sole source position for continued ECMS development funding from DND;

(m)Significant past investments in R&D which created a deterrent for others to enter the industry and catch up; and

(n)Strong management team with many years of experience at GasTOPS.

[1493] In order to calculate the loss of profits or the loss of income suffered by GasTOPS, Brooks’ methodology consisted of examining what the net profits of the company would have been had the resignations of the majority of the MSD employees not occurred. Brooks compared the projected net profits with the actual results during the loss period. In order to accomplish this, Brooks developed an understanding of the business and its organizational structure, as well as past and expected future operating results which he found in financial statements and past budgets prepared by GasTOPS.

[1494] Brooks estimated the damages suffered by GasTOPS as:

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The sum of money that will put the party (GasTOPS) that has been injured or who has suffered, in the same position as it would have been in if it had not sustained the wrong for which it is now getting compensation or reparation.

[1495] The second phase of the methodology employed by Brooks was to calculate what the profit or loss should have been for MSD had the resignations not taken place. In calculating the future revenues for the MSD, Brooks forecasted a 25% growth rate, which was based on the historical growth rate of the MSD.

[1496] After reviewing the historical records of the budgeted revenues versus actual revenues, Brooks chose the 1997 budgeted figure as representative of what the revenues should have been. After analyzing all of the applicable items Brooks estimated that the total lost revenues (excluding ODM) for 1997 to 2002 inclusive as follows:

(a)1997 - $5,600,000 (as per budget)

(b)1998 - $7,000,000 (25% increase thereafter)

(c)1999 - $8,750,000

(d)2000 - $10,938,000

(e)2001 - $13,672,000

(f)2002 - $17,009,000

Estimated total lost revenues - $63,050,000

[1497] In my view, given the history of GasTOPS, its management team and expertise within the MSD, the forecasted lost revenues between 1997 and 2002 of $63,050,000 was reasonable. If the defendants and the other members of the MSD had given reasonable notice and allowed the MSD to recover from the loss of these employees, and if MxI had not pursued the business opportunities being pursued by GasTOPS at the time of the resignations and had not used confidential business information belonging to GasTOPS, it is a reasonable inference that

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GasTOPS would have achieved these revenues.

[1498] After calculating the future revenues, Brooks determined the gross margin percentage to be applied against the MSD forecasted revenues at 50%. He arrived at this figure based on historical data of GasTOPS and MxI’s gross margin for the years 1997 to 2001 which averaged 71.8%. He calculated the gross margin for MSD at $31,525,000 for the period 1997 to 2002.

[1499] Brooks then subtracted the actual gross margin, $14,524,000 realized by GasTOPS’ MSD (excluding ODM) from the forecasted gross margin for the period 1997 to 2002. The difference, or $17,001,000, was the estimated loss of gross margin suffered by GasTOPS from October 1996 to September 30, 2002 as a result of the defendants’ conduct.

[1500] The fourth step in determining the loss of profits suffered by GasTOPS was to determine if fixed expenses had been saved or foregone in the period after October 1996 resulting in a savings to GasTOPS. This amount, if any, would be subtracted from the forecasted loss of gross margin.

[1501] Brooks calculated fixed expenses (excluding ODM) at 40% of forecasted revenues. In the year ending September 30, 1996, MSD’s fixed expenses were 38.6% of MSD revenues. Apparently management at GasTOPS attempted to achieve a 10% net profit before tax, along with a budgeted 50% gross margin forecast, to calculate a 40% fixed expense rate. The fixed expenses calculated by Brooks were estimated at the difference between the forecasted fixed expenses less the actual fixed expenses, after subtracting the out-of-pocket expenses included in the actual fixed expenses.

[1502] Brooks then determined the extent of lost R&D tax credit as a result of the forecasted loss of business. R&D tax credits are generated from both internal R&D projects and external customer contracts that have R&D aspects. In order to estimate the foregone tax credits, Brooks reviewed all R&D claims from 1997 to 2001 to determine the portion allocated to MSD (excluding ODM) each year.

[1503] Mr. Brooks stated that his summary of all the elements of the loss calculation

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included the estimated annual gross margins that should have been achieved which were in the amount of $31,525,000. This figure is subtracted from the actual gross margins that had been calculated, which was in the amount of $13,000,697 which leaves the amount of $17,828,000 being the forecasted gross margins not achieved by GasTOPS over the 1997 to 2002 time frame. From this amount, Mr. Brooks subtracted the fixed expenses that were saved, which he calculated at approximately $10,922,000. Therefore, it was Mr. Brooks’ calculation that the total loss would be $8,290,000, which included the addition of the investment tax credits that were not achieved to September 30, 2002.

[1504] Using this approach the loss suffered by GasTOPS was approximately $1,200,000 per fiscal year. Extrapolating GasTOPS loss to September 30, 2006 on Brooks estimated loss GasTOPS loss to the end of September 2006 would be approximately $13,100,000.

[1505] Although I do not feel this was the appropriate approach to determining the monetary liability of the defendants it provides me with comfort for the manner in which I have calculated the monies to be paid by the defendants to the plaintiff.

[1506] Mr. Brooks testified that he used a verification process by comparing the actual GasTOPS revenues, plus the MSD actual revenues, and comparing that total with his forecasted revenues. He did a similar comparison of gross margins. It was his opinion that this verification process supported his analysis and conclusions.

[1507] The defendants’ expert, on damages, Gary Timm, in calculating the business loss suffered by GasTOPS used the same general approach as Brooks but differed in the period of loss, revenue, fixed expenses and R&D tax credit methodologies. Timm arrived at a high and low calculation of the total estimated loss of profits to GasTOPS between $306,180 and $660,240. (see: Exhibit 2784 at page 7)

[1508] Timm in direct examination explained his mandate as follows:

A.In terms of our mandate at page 4, it was two-fold, one was to provide an opinion as to business loss suffered, if any, by

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GasTOPS, due to the departure of certain employees from

GasTOPS in or about October of 1996.

Secondly, we are were asked to review and comment on the report of BDO Dunwoody April 5, 2002.

[1509] In cross-examination, Timm stated that he had been retained to do a critique of the Brooks report. As a result, he read the Brooks report first, before doing his own analysis. Timm stated that the background information on GasTOPS included in paragraph 1.3 of his report, was actually taken from the Brooks report. Timm included this factual background description in his report without verification.

[1510] When he was referred to the sentence in his report “it’s our understanding that GasTOPS’ MSD was focusing their efforts on Canadian Government military contracts” and advised that this statement did not appear in the Brooks report, Timm admitted that the source of that information would have been from either the defendant Forsyth or documents he had reviewed. Timm was then shown the GasTOPS’ documents that he had apparently reviewed and again the statement was not in any of those documents.

[1511] Timm was then shown Exhibit 2786 which contained a list of documents which he said that he relied upon in preparing his report. In cross-examination Timm stated:

Q.You never reviewed my any these contracts, did you?

A.No, we did not.

Q.Why not?

A.These particular contracts were not -- they weren't relevant to the quantification of loss, if you will.

Q.Why is that?

A.Because in the approach of quantification we had looked at the contracts or customers that MxI had obtained which might have otherwise been obtained by GasTOPS.

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Q.So that's why you didn't examine any of the contracts, you're not an expert on contracts?

A.In terms of the technical aspects of it, that's correct.

Q.What about the terms, the start, the finish; do you need to be an expert to understand that?

A.No, you do not.

Q.But that was of no interest to you?

A.It’s -- it was not, in terms of our analysis, necessary.

[1512] In cross-examination Timm confirmed that the source of the information relating to MxI background was from either the MxI documents or Forsyth. According to Timm, as reflected in his report, MxI’s “targeted” market was major commercial airlines. After being shown the MxI marketing plans, which stated that MxI’s focus was on military targets, he stated:

Q.My question to you is -- specifically is: Did you talk to your client about the fact that their business plans state that MxI will focus on military targets? Did you?

A.I don't recall that we did.

Q.I’m suggesting that if you did, you would have put it [into] your report, wouldn't you?

The reason I ask you that, sir, if you make a point in the paragraph above with respect to GasTOPS where you say it's our understanding that GasTOPS MSD division was focusing their efforts on the Canadian government military contracts, we went all through that song and dance. But you don't say the same thing about MxI, that military targets were their focus, yet you knew; right?

A.Yes, I should have known.

[1513] In preparing his report, Timm attempted to estimate the additional MSD profit before tax had the resignations of Forsyth, Brouse and others not occurred. Timm looked at two time periods for the period of loss; namely, two years and a calculation until the year 2002. Timm estimated the revenue based on specific contracts, whereas Brooks used the budgeted 1997

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revenue for MSD. Timm based his evaluation on loss of profit on the cost of sales and gross margins and the historical results of GasTOPS which was similar to the methodology used by Brooks. For fixed expenses, Timm used the historical results of MSD without ODM and allocated identified fixed expenses to those revenues. For R&D tax credits, Timm used the historical rate of tax credits that GasTOPS had achieved, whereas Brooks had used the same figure plus a 5% growth factor per year.

[1514] At his meeting on June 20, 2002 with Messrs. Appotive and Forsyth, Timm posed the question “whether GasTOPS would have obtained the MxI revenues”. Timm wanted to look at the revenues that MxI earned and determine if GasTOPS could have earned these revenues. Apparently Forsyth objected to this process. Timm stated:

Q.So at this stage, if I read this page, what you were going to do was simply take all the MxI revenue, take the GasTOPS' cost structure, Mr. Forsyth had two problems with that: One was MxI had a different cost structure; and secondly, there was an issue as to whether GasTOPS would attained MxI revenues; correct?

A.Those would be the two items on here; that's correct.

Q.You resolved the problem by simply having Mr. Forsyth identify what MxI revenues GasTOPS would have attained, correct, you've told us that three or four times yesterday?

A.In terms of how it ended up was we had to make that assumption, that’s correct.

[1515] On July 18, 2002 Timm met with Forsyth and made notes on the information Forsyth gave to him with respect to contracts GasTOPS would have achieved that MxI did in fact achieve and how the calculations should be determined. (see: Exhibit 2814 at pages 2 to 5)

[1516] Timm stated that the objective in preparing his report was to determine what revenue, if any, that was earned by MxI, could have been earned by GasTOPS. He stated: “In order to assess that, we have relied on the identification of those revenues from Mr. Brad Forsyth.”

[1517] In cross-examination Timm was shown the GasTOPS’ business plans and customers

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or potential customers such as U.S. Navy, Kuwait, Bombardier, CAF (Canadian Air Force), Air Canada and Volvo. Timm’s explanation for not including the revenues that MxI had received from those contracts in his report was as follows:

Q.So are you saying to me today, sir, that to make that determination you simply asked Mr. Forsyth to tell you?

A.Right. In our report, in terms of our approach, the revenue that is identified, that the customer has identified, as our report indicates, it's -- we've assumed certain revenues based on that representation, that's correct.

[1518] Timm in explaining why he had not included in the GasTOPS’ loss the U.S. Navy revenues received by MxI stated:

Q.I will be quite blunt with you, right on the screen here we have U.S. Navy, $3,240,000. The reason the U.S. Navy isn't in there is because Mr. Forsyth told you it shouldn't be; right or wrong?

A.As I indicated, we assumed only those that would not be.

Q.No, you were told which ones would not be; correct?

A.We were told which ones would have been or would not have been, that's correct.

Q.You were told not to use the U.S. Navy, Kuwait; correct?

A.That is correct.

[1519] Timm conceded that “the revenues themselves are the driver to get to the bottom line profit” and for those revenues, he relied upon the representations from Forsyth in his identifying the contracts.

[1520] Timm indicated that the estimated lost revenues identified in Table 2 of Exhibit 2788- S were those revenues that Forsyth had identified and were not revenues that he had arrived at through an independent analysis or investigation. Timm stated:

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Q.Mr. Timm, I want to make sure I’m understanding you. You’re telling me it’s your approach on that line, it’s Mr. Forsyth approach, not yours as an independent evaluator?

A.If I can just step back one. The approach was to identify the revenues that MxI had generated which GasTOPS could have otherwise generated. Based on our work we couldn't identify those and we've made an assumption based on what Mr. Forsyth told us.

So those are the revenues that are there right now.

Q.Mr. Forsyth's revenues?

A.The ones Mr. Forsyth identified, that's correct.

[1521] Timm established the period of loss at two years after the date of the resignations of Forsyth and Brouse and others based on the following factors:

(a)By 1998 GasTOPS revenues had increased to the GasTOPS’ historical revenue trend which was based on the actual results prior to the departure of certain employees;

(b)By 1998 GasTOPS’ MSD division revenues, and their ECMS product revenues, had both recovered to a level higher than in 1996;

(c)The fluctuations in GasTOPS’ Canadian Government’s contracts do not appear to be related to the departure of certain employees, but rather on the existence and duration of contracts;

(d)By 1999 GasTOPS’ non-government Canadian revenue had recovered to its 1996 level; and

(e)After the departure of certain employees in 1996 the non- Canadian contracts continued to increase.

[1522] In preparing his analysis of the period of loss, Timm did not take into account the 1997 business plans of GasTOPS and the budgets that were indicated therein, nor did he take into account the effect of the departure of the 20 technical staff of the MSD, nor the contract opportunities that GasTOPS had at the time of these resignations. He had no knowledge of the contracts that made up the revenues received by GasTOPS in 1997/98. He looked solely at the

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revenue figures. He did not look at any lost opportunities of GasTOPS, or at the lead time required to convert an opportunity into a contract. For example, in the preparation of Table 4 on page 15 (Exhibit 2788-S) Timm simply recorded revenues received and did not take into account the length of time it takes to progress from opportunity to contracts to payments.

[1523] In preparing Table 5 on page 16 of his report (Exhibit 2784) Timm did not review the Canadian Government contracts but simply used the revenue figures he found. After preparing Table 5, Timm stated in his report:

Based our review of the yearly Canadian Government contracts, and derived revenues, we made the following observations:

(a)A number of GasTOPS’ Canadian Government contracts appear to be non-recurring, one time only contracts;

(b)Most Canadian Government contracts appear to be in place for a limited number of years, and some have stopped prior to the departure of certain employees from GasTOPS; and

(c)MxI did not generate any significant revenue from Canadian Government contracts until 2001, approximately 5 years after the departure of certain employees from GasTOPS.

[1524] Regarding his observations on page 16 of Exhibit 2784 (Kroll Lyndquest Avery Report) Timm stated:

Q.“Most Canadian government contracts appear to be in place for a limited number of years and some have stopped prior to the departure of certain employees from GasTOPS”; that's not correct, is it? What it should say, I'm suggesting, is that you should have said from my review of the revenue figures, it appears that revenues stopped on some of these contracts prior to the departure of certain employees; correct?

A.That would -- yes, that would be fair.

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Q.Then you say “MxI did not generate any significant revenue from Canadian government contracts until 2001.” Tell me something, how can you make that observation? What’s the basis for that observation?

A.It would again be based on the revenue that was generated by MxI.

Q.So you looked at MxI's revenue figures to get that?

A.What is recorded, yes.

[1525] In cross-examination with respect to the Kroll Lyndquest Avery estimated lost revenues shown in Table 8 of Exhibit 2784, Timm stated:

Q.What loss of revenues are you referring to?

A.That will be the revenues that we assumed, the revenues that were -- we've assumed would have been earned by MxI that GasTOPS could have earned and those are the revenues that were identified by Mr. Forsyth.

Q.So these are the revenues that Mr. Forsyth told you and GasTOPS would have earned; correct?

A.That is correct.

Q.My question to you, Mr. Timm, was very direct. You used the word in your report the “KLA estimation”, I'm saying you to, sir, you made no estimation; you were told what the revenues were, correct?

A.We have used those revenues that I’ve indicated, that's correct.

Q.So should we take that sentence out and amend it to read the loss of revenues that Mr. Forsyth told us are as follows; correct?

A.Those are the revenues that were identified by Mr. Forsyth.

Q.We then go to table 8, we again on the right-hand side, I'll just scroll down so it's on the screen, on the right-hand side you

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have in brackets, square brackets or block, “KLA report” and underneath it “KLA estimated lost revenues”. Those again are Mr. Forsyth's?

A.They are his and they are assumed in the calculation.

Q.Again, KLA didn't make any estimation, right?

A.We've assumed those revenues.

Q.So should this one read KLA assumed lost revenues as opposed to estimated?

A.Yes, I would put “assumed" in there.

In paragraph 6.0 of Exhibit 2784 being the Report of Kroll Lyndquest Avery, Timm outlined his estimation of the lost research and development tax credits. In preparing his estimate, Timm conceded that he relied upon Forsyth and MxI management for the determination as to which contracts GasTOPS would have performed without incurring R&D expenditures.

[1526] In estimating the fixed expenses, Timm was aware of the different types of revenue being received, either through manufacturing or licensing revenues. He stated that depending upon the type, the cost of goods sold and fixed expenses percentage would change, because licenses would not attract as much of the cost of the sales percentage.

[1527] Timm prepared trial balance sheets for MxI from September 30, 1997 through to September 30, 2001. For the year 2000 relating to product sales, service sales and recoverable expenses; namely, items 4000 and 4001 (Exhibit 2785, page 6) with respect to line item 4000, being product sales, Timm found no labour cost attributed to it. In terms of his report and these trial balances, he stated:

Q.Did you see any labour attributed to those product sales?

A.I do not, no.

Q.What does that tell you?

A.There is just no labour attributed to it.

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Q.How would you attribute, calculate, evaluate, assume or understand the cost of goods sold -- cost for this product sales?

A.For this particular product sales it would not appear there is any particular cost -- expense costs of labour associated with it.

Q.Did you make any adjustments in your calculation for cost of goods sold with respect to this $2,700,000?

A.In terms of my?

Q.Your work?

A.In my work? No, we've looked at the historical rates and no we have not. In terms of our work, no, we did not.

[1528] Timm indicated that the phrase “product sales” at line 4000 of the trial balance had the following meaning:

Q.Mr. Timm, over the lunch hour, were you able to find out for us what the expression “product sales” on page 6 and 9 of Exhibit 2785 meant?

A.It would represent license fees.

[1529] In preparing his report, on the cost of goods sold, Timm used 15% of revenues, which he testified was based on the historical cost of sales for the MSD. He explained the revenue figure with respect to the contracts as follows:

Q.Just so the record is clear on this paragraph, when you used the phrase in the third line “revenue contracts identified in section 5.4” those are the three contracts that Mr. Forsyth determined that you would use, correct?

A.These were those three contracts, that’s correct.

[1530] In comparing his GasTOPS and MxI comparative income statements, Timm did not deal specifically with licensing fees:

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Q.What if the contracts were to change and it was found that there was a contract in there that had a huge license fee?

A.Then yes, the cost of goods sold would have to change to definitely deal with what the cost of goods sold on that license would be.

[1531] In para. 5.1.4 of his report (Exhibit 2784 at page 30), Timm set out his methodology for determining the revenue potentially lost by GasTOPS. Timm said he used the following criteria:

(a)The MxI contract relates to a customer or past customer of GasTOPS;

(b)The contract has to be related to a customer MxI actually generated revenues from; and

(c)The type of maintenance monitoring system, or related services, to be provided under the contract falls under the type of revenue that was generated by GasTOPS.

[1532] According to Timm, this criteria was established in the following manner:

Q.How did you establish this criteria, what is the foundation?

A.Again, it was on the general premise and again it was assuming that revenue, it was on the premise of which revenues did MxI generate that could have been otherwise generated by GasTOPS.

Q.Mr. Timm, what it was is what revenues did Mr. Forsyth think GasTOPS would have gotten from those contracts and which contracts; correct?

A.In terms of those ones that were there, that would be correct.

Q.Correct, right. 5.4.2 is all from Mr. Forsyth?

A.That is correct.

2009 * 66153 (ON SC)

- 658 -

Q.If you go over to page 31, second bullet, scheduled and preventive maintenance, this entire paragraph is from Mr. Forsyth; correct?

A.That would be correct, yes.

[1533] Again in what can only be described as a total lack of independence on the part of an expert, Timm related that he did not include the U.S. Navy opportunity because Forsyth told him it was a “different opportunity”. He also related that with respect to what is written in paragraphs

5.4.1and 5.4.2 of his report (Exhibit 2784) he took everything that Forsyth told him at “face value”.

[1534] In paragraph 5.4.3 of his report (Exhibit 2784 at page 30) Timm identified the revenues that were potentially lost by GasTOPS. In cross-examination, he explained that the actual identification of these contracts was done by MxI management or Forsyth. He prepared in Table 13 at page 32 of Exhibit 2794 a summary of the revenues potentially lost by GasTOPS. Timm stated that he prepared this summary on the following basis:

Q.Thank you. Now very simplistically, as I understand what you have done, you've accepted the revenue figures that were given to you, first of all you accepted the contracts, you took the revenue figures and added them up; correct?

A.That would be correct.

Q.You then took those figures and took out the cost of goods sold and fixed expenses; correct?

A.That is correct.

[1535] Timm stated that with respect to Table 2 (update) (Exhibit 2788-S), estimated loss of profits by GasTOPS Ltd. in the event there were contracts that had license fees, he would have made the following adjustments:

Q.Now if table 2 was to have included contracts that had license fees, from what I understood you to say earlier there would be an adjustment to the percentage on the cost of goods sold; correct?

2009 * 66153 (ON SC)

- 659 -

A.That would be correct.

Q.How would you make that adjustments in terms of licenses?

A.In terms of licenses there would be two components I would have looked at. One in terms of the cost of goods sold. In terms of cost of goods sold my understanding would be next to no costs, if any, to it. It would be minimal. I understand in terms of licenses typically there is some type of software keys that go with things, so there may be a minimal cost.

However, also you have to look at fixed expenses together with it, because you would have to look at specific expenses with regard to R&D and marketing and so on for those licenses.

[1536] During cross-examination, Timm was shown Exhibit 2819-S which showed MxI’s revenues not included in Table 2 (Exhibit 2788-S), estimated loss of profits by GasTOPS. Exhibit 2819-S included all of the contracts that MxI obtained between 1997 and 2005, including the U.S. Navy and other military aircraft and commercial aircraft accounts. Timm explained that from the figures in Exhibit 2819-S the cost of goods sold would have to be deducted at 50%. Timm stated:

Q.So from this Exhibit, 2819-S, by way of example for the U.S. Navy we would put in the top line $33,913,000?

A.From this exhibit we are looking at now?

Q.Yes?

A.Assuming those items are U.S. Navy, there is a total of $33,913,000 here.

Q.We would then take from that figure the cost of goods sold which you said was 50 percent?

A.Again, now this is where -- you asked me about licenses, we would have to adjust the cost of goods sold appropriately between licenses and normal revenue, in other words the cost of goods sold for licenses would be much lower if anything. We would have to do that adjustment, yes.

2009 * 66153 (ON SC)

- 660 -

[1537] With respect to the fixed expenses, Timm explained:

Q.Okay. Then from that figure you would then take the fixed expenses which are -- you have your gross margin then take fixes expenses at 12 percent?

A.As I explained though, that was on a differential cost method, so continuing with that this is the part that I don’t -- you would have to look at other expenses, again if you’re dealing with licenses we have to deal with R&D, we have to deal with any other marketing cost with this level of revenue. Okay, so in other words it's not -- we cannot just take 12 percent on this level of revenue, the 12 percent that I have in there was based on those contracts and it varied -- cost would vary directly so there may be other costs to be taken out of here, that’s all I'm saying.

Q.So what you're telling me is that the 58 percent figure might be -- would be less on certain revenue but that certain revenue might catch a higher fixed cost percentage; correct?

A.That is correct.

[1538] Timm explained that Research and Development tax credits would be added in which would provide the total loss. MxI’s actual percentage of cost of goods sold and Research and Development cost are set out in Exhibit 2809S which is Appendix B7 to Exhibit 2784 (Report of Kroll Lyndquest Avery).

[1539] According to Timm’s methodology the loss suffered by GasTOPS could be calculated on the basis of 38% of the total lost revenues, which assumes the 50% cost of sales plus 12% for fixed expenses. An adjustment would have to be made for research tax credits which would increase the total amount of the loss. A further adjustment would have to be made if there are license fees included in the total lost revenue as Mr. Timm stated license fees carry minimum or no cost of goods sold. By way of example taking only the U.S. Navy revenue which totaled $34 million and without making the adjustment for the research tax credit or license fee, the loss would be 38% of $34 million or $12.9 million.

[1540] In my view the report from Timm, although adopting a methodology extremely close to the methodology adopted by Brooks, is not an independent report as he relied upon

2009 * 66153 (ON SC)

- 661 -

information supplied to him by Forsyth as opposed to verifying such information.

[1541] I am also concerned that the opinion of Timm did not take into account the following:

(a)The years of Research and Development by GasTOPS in developing ECMS (Engine Condition Monitoring System) and FLTS (First Line Troubleshooting System) and the other related products; and

(b)The length of time it takes to develop a program through a business opportunity, negotiate a contract and implement a software program; and

(c)That the MSD (Maintenance System Division) prior to the resignations of Forsyth and Brouse had developed a state of the art program for condition based maintenance and were on the verge of selling the program to General Electric and the United States Navy and upgrading the programs that they had supplied to the Canadian Air Force; and

(d)GasTOPS was pursuing other business opportunities with Volvo, Bombardier, Department of Transport/RCMP, Kuwaiti Air Force, Lockheed Martin; and the “springboard” effect of selling their product to a military purchaser; and

(e)That in its 1996/97 business plan, GasTOPS intended to upgrade its programs to a Windows NT platform and make its programs more generic.

[1542] The difficulty faced by both damage or loss experts in this case was that they did not know prior to preparing their reports and giving their evidence the basis upon which I would compensate the plaintiff in the event I found the defendants, or some of them, liable. In addition, if I found a breach of a fiduciary duty and/or misuse of confidential business information/trade secrets, the damage experts did not know at the time of preparing their reports how long such duty or prohibition against using such business information/trade secrets would last.

[1543] The plaintiff in its submissions suggests that I direct a reference to determine the loss it has suffered and for the profits that MxI should account for after I determine the temporal period, if any, against the use of its confidential business information/trade secrets. Although there is merit in the plaintiff’s suggestion of a reference I am of the view that if possible this action should be brought to an end at this time as it has been outstanding since 1996.

2009 * 66153 (ON SC)

- 662 -

[1544] Taking into account that the MSD of GasTOPS was a highly technical based division; the state to which it had developed its software programs ECMS and its other suite of programs as of October 1996; and the time it took a software company to develop a program, develop potential customers, customize products or potential products; test products and then roll out the product, I am satisfied, that the fiduciary duty owed to GasTOPS by Forsyth, Brouse, Jeff Cass, Vandenberg and the prohibition against all defendants in using confidential business information/trade secrets belonging to GasTOPS vis-à-vis the existing customers of GasTOPS and potential business opportunities that GasTOPS was pursuing in October 1996 should last for a period of 10 years.

[1545] It is also important to keep in mind, that after an organization such as the United States Navy or General Electric purchases and installs a software program such as ECMS, v.2 or Maintenix, it would be reluctant for many years to change the core products it was using. In this case there was no such reluctance as the MxI product was simply the next iteration of the GasTOPS’ product ECMS.

[1546] In my view given the conduct of Forsyth, Brouse, Jeff Cass and Vandenberg who were the directing minds of MxI and the fact that MxI held itself out as a “spin-off” company of GasTOPS that had developed the earlier versions of Maintenix and now had the majority of the MSD employees working for it, the appropriate remedy is to have MxI account to GasTOPS for the actual profits from its dealings with the U.S. Navy, Other Military Aircraft Operators, Bombardier and General Electric between October 30, 1996 and November 1, 2006. Unfortunately I only have financial information of the revenues received by MxI (for the years

1997 to 2005 inclusive): see Exhibit 28195. I have calculated these revenues to be as follows:

U.S. Navy

$33,913,883

Other Military

$11,304,697

Bombardier

$ 2,771,388

General Electric

$ 518,969

 

$48,508,937

2009 * 66153 (ON SC)

- 663 -

In addition I have added the gross revenues from Volvo and Canadian Air Force as set out in Exhibit 27995 for the years 1997 – 2002 inclusive in the amount of $1,498,000.

[1547] Accordingly the total gross revenues for the calculation of the monies to be paid by MxI to GasTOPS is $50,006,937. I have deducted from the total gross revenue of $50,006,937 the cost of goods sold and fixed expenses at 62%, leaving an operating income of $19,002,617.

[1548] Based on the evidence of Brooks I would deduct from MxI’s operating profit of $19,002,617, 40% which Brooks estimated to be the fixed expenses of GasTOPS. Accordingly the amount to be accounted for by MxI to GasTOPS is $11,401,571 for the period from October 31, 1996 to November 1, 2005.

[1549] As there was a lack of evidence concerning the monies received by the personal defendants the appropriate remedy sought by the plaintiff is damages to put GasTOPS where it would have been if not for the actions of the defendants. The actions of the personal defendants which caused the losses suffered by the plaintiff were:

(a)Failing to give reasonable notice; and

(b)Misusing confidential business information/trade secrets belonging to GasTOPS.

[1550] In my view the best assessment of the damages suffered by GasTOPS as a result of the actions of the personal defendants are the profits I have ordered MxI to account for. The profits to be accounted for are substantial and reflect damages for failure to give reasonable notice and for misuse by the personal defendants of GasTOPS’ confidential business information/trade secrets. In determining the profits to be accounted for, I have deliberately not included any tax credit recaptured by MxI for R&D as GasTOPS in the past has attempted to have its customers fund R&D. In addition, by not including the tax credit I have taken into account a negative contingency.

[1551] In my view the personal defendants and MxI acted jointly and should be jointly responsible for the sum of $11,401,571 owing to GasTOPS.

2009 * 66153 (ON SC)

- 664 -

[1552] This calculation does not take into account that a portion of the revenues may be attributed to license fees and if such, the cost of goods sold may be less than $62%. In addition, I do not have before me, the revenues received by MxI in the year 2006. During the course of the trial, some evidence was placed before me, that MxI, had begun to sell perpetual licenses to the above-mentioned customers. If the plaintiff wishes to pursue this claim for accounting of profits for the year 2006, it shall advise the defendants of its desire to pursue an accounting of profits for 2006 and MxI shall make appropriate disclosure. I can be spoken to in order to arrange a time for such evidence to be received by this Court.

Out of Pocket Expenses

[1553] After the resignations of Forsyth, Brouse, Jeff Cass, Vandenberg and others, GasTOPS incurred financing recruitment, and training costs which it alleges were directly incurred as a result of the defendants’ actions.

[1554] Muir testified that GasTOPS had to recruit and replace several managers and numerous qualified technical staff in order to meet the contractual obligations that GasTOPS had with its clients.

[1555] In addition to the recruitment efforts, Muir stated that it was necessary for GasTOPS to undertake a process of educating or training the new hires on the engineering work that GasTOPS was performing. In order to recruit new employees GasTOPS ran several newspaper advertisements in local and national newspapers. Muir indicated that the total cost incurred for these advertisements was $33,506.11. In addition, Muir testified that it was necessary to retain professional recruiting companies in order to recruit the required qualified technical staff. The plaintiff received invoices from these recruiting companies for services rendered in the total amount of $109,954.10.

[1556] Muir stated that as a result of the resignations in October 1996, it was necessary for GasTOPS to increase its line of credit and take out a special term loan. MacIsaac stated that it was necessary for him to make arrangements with the bank to obtain an increase in GasTOPS’

2009 * 66153 (ON SC)

- 665 -

line of credit and obtained a term loan which was secured on the remaining assets of GasTOPS.

[1557] According to Muir, a summary of the cost incurred for the increase in the line of credit and term loan, included interest payments and transaction fees charged by the bank which Muir stated cost $70,517.03. (See Exhibit 620)

[1558] In his expert report, Brooks reviewed the out-of-pocket expenses relating to financing cost, recruitment and training cost and concluded that the total amount of expenses incurred with respect to the financing cost was $47,591 and the professional service fees and recruitment cost totaled $134,067 for a total of out-of-pocket expense of $181,658. (See: Exhibit 1129 at page 27 to 28 and Exhibit 1130 at page 11 in the Report and Revised Report of BDO)

[1559] In my view, the plaintiff has failed to establish that these special damages for out-of- pocket expenses can be related solely to the actions of the defendants in the months of October, November and December 1996. I must keep in mind, that Forsyth, Brouse, Jeff Cass, Vandenberg and all of the other MSD employees who resigned from GasTOPS and took up employment with MxI were entitled to resign from GasTOPS upon reasonable notice to GasTOPS. In my view, GasTOPS would have incurred these out-of-pocket expenses, albeit over a longer period of time, if the employees had given reasonable notice as GasTOPS had to replace these employees.

[1560] Accordingly, the claim for out-of-pocket expenses is rejected.

Punitive Damages

[1561] GasTOPS claims punitive damages from the defendants arising from several incidents that took place following the resignations. These include a series of anonymous e-mails received by GasTOPS, an offensive caricature Brouse drew, and MxI’s “Titter MacFritters Contest.”

Anonymous E-mails

[1562] Commencing in February 1997, individuals employed at GasTOPS began receiving a series of demeaning anonymous e-mails. These e-mails were all sent through a re-mailer, which

2009 * 66153 (ON SC)

- 666 -

hid the sender’s identity. The following chart summarizes the dates on which the e-mails were sent and to whom, their contents and other details.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

SC)

Exhibit

 

Date

 

Recipient

 

Contents

 

Other Details

(ON

No.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

438

February 25,

Muir

“Hey Dave, has your company

During cross-examination,

66153

 

1997

 

blown-up yet? I’ll bet you’re not

Forsyth had no knowledge of

 

 

 

 

 

 

sleeping too well these days... Your

this anonymous e-mail, but

*

 

 

 

friend, Jack.”

identified the author as Marc

 

 

 

 

Lennox, a former employee of

 

 

 

 

GasTOPS who was employed at

2009

 

 

 

 

MxI.

439

March 3,

John Turner

“Why don’t you losers try updating

Again, Forsyth denied any

 

 

1997

(responsible

your web page at some point! Or

knowledge of this anonymous e-

 

 

 

for software

do you know how?”

mail being sent but identified the

 

 

 

development

 

author as Lennox. When

 

 

 

activities at

 

questioned concerning this e-

 

 

 

GasTOPS

 

mail, Brouse understood the e-

 

 

 

after the

 

mail to reference the dated look

 

 

 

resignations)

 

of and technology used for

 

 

 

 

 

GasTOPS’ web page, which he

 

 

 

 

 

agreed had been a matter of

 

 

 

 

 

general discussion around MxI.

 

440

March 8,

MacIsaac

“I understand that your company

This e-mail was sent as

 

 

1997

 

may be hiring people to help cart

GasTOPS ran ads for employees

 

 

 

 

boxes and equipment when your

to replace those who had

 

 

 

 

company goes ‘tits up’. How

resigned.

 

 

 

 

would I go about applying for such

Again, in cross-examination,

 

 

 

 

a position? Thanks for your

 

 

 

 

attention.”

Forsyth denied any knowledge

 

 

 

 

 

of the e-mail being sent to

 

 

 

 

 

MacIsaac but identified the

 

 

 

 

 

author as Lennox. Brouse when

 

 

 

 

 

questioned concerning Exhibit

 

 

 

 

 

440 stated that Lennox was

 

 

 

 

 

referring to the “Titter

 

 

 

 

 

MacFritters Contest at MXI,”

 

 

 

 

 

and that Brouse, Lennox, Chris

 

 

 

 

 

Cass and others at MxI had

 

 

 

 

 

discussed GasTOPS’ potential

 

 

 

 

 

bankruptcy.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

441

April 17,

GasTOPS’

Is this some kind of joke? That first

This e-mail was sent while

 

 

1997

general e-

line kills me... Ha! Ha!

GasTOPS was still running ads

 

 

 

mail address

[Quoting from the advertisement:]

for software developers.

 

 

 

 

 

 

- 667 -

Exhibit

Date

Recipient

Contents

Other Details

No.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

SENIOR SOFTWARE

Forsyth could not recall what

 

 

 

 

DEVELOPER AND ASSIT.

would give rise to the sending of

SC)

 

 

 

MANAGER

this e-mail, but again identified

 

 

 

(ON

 

 

 

 

the sender as Lennox. Brouse

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

If you would like working for a

testified that he believed Lennox

66153

 

 

 

company who cares about its

sent the e-mail because he

 

 

 

 

449

July 28,

Alex

people, when take heart…

thought the ad was an inaccurate

*

This last paragraph kills me…

This e-mail was sent after an

 

 

 

 

depiction of GasTOPS’ culture.

 

 

1997

Soubliere (a

Really funny.

article about GasTOPS appeared

2009

 

 

GasTOPS

[Quoting from the article:] …In a

in the Ottawa Business Journal.

 

 

employee)

 

 

 

 

 

covering letter, GasTOPS officials

Again, Forsyth did not know the

 

 

 

 

said the firm –which has previously

circumstances giving rise to this

 

 

 

 

shunned media inquiries—plans to

anonymous e-mail but identified

 

 

 

 

change its habits “as we now realize

it as being sent by Lennox.

 

 

 

 

the importance of (media)

Brouse believed the e-mail

 

 

 

 

relationships.”

referred to GasTOPS’ attempts

 

 

 

 

 

to gain more media coverage and

 

 

 

 

 

himself recalled reading an

 

 

 

 

 

article about how GasTOPS’ was

 

 

 

 

 

“coming out of the shadows or

 

 

 

 

 

something like that”; he believed

 

 

 

 

 

the e-mail referenced that.

 

486

August 7,

GasTOPS’

Is it true that BFG has dropped you

This e-mail followed GasTOPS’

 

 

1997

general e-

as a partner? Jack

negotiating with B.F. Goodrich

 

 

 

mail address

 

concerning a business

 

 

 

 

 

opportunity with the Malaysian

 

 

 

 

 

Air Force in July 1997.

 

 

 

 

 

Again, Forsyth identified the

 

 

 

 

 

sender as Lennox but denied any

 

 

 

 

 

knowledge of the facts giving

 

 

 

 

 

rise to this e-mail. Brouse

 

 

 

 

 

explained that they had learned

 

 

 

 

 

the relationship between

 

 

 

 

 

GasTOPS and B.F.Goodrich was

 

 

 

 

 

strained and that B.F.Goodrich

 

 

 

 

 

had dropped or was seriously

 

 

 

 

 

considering dropping GasTOPS

 

 

 

 

 

as a partner. Brouse testified that

 

 

 

 

 

he had learned this in September.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

489

August 28,

GasTOPS’

WARNING!!!!!!

According to Forsyth, this e-mail

 

 

1998

general e-

 

was sent by Lennox.

 

 

 

mail address

If your business receives an e-mail

 

 

- 668 -

Exhibit

Date

Recipient

Contents

Other Details

No.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

titled “JOIN THE CREW” DO

 

 

 

 

NOT open it! It will cause whole

 

 

 

 

divisions of the company to

 

 

 

 

suddenly and unexpectedly quit

 

 

 

 

(and erase all your hard drives too).

 

 

 

 

Send this letter out to as many small

 

 

 

 

companies as you can ……. this is

 

 

 

 

a new virus and not many people

 

 

 

 

know about it!

 

 

 

 

If anyone receives mail entitled;

 

 

 

 

PENPAL GREETINGS! please

 

 

 

 

delete it WITHOUT reading it!!

 

 

 

 

This is a warning for all small

 

 

 

 

businesses - there is a dangerous

 

 

 

 

virus propagating across the

 

 

 

 

Internet through an e-mail message

 

 

 

 

entitled “PENPAL GREETINGS!”.

 

 

 

 

DO NOT DOWNLOAD ANY

 

 

 

 

MESSAGE ENTITLED “PENPAL

 

 

 

 

GREETINGS”!!

 

 

 

 

This message appears to be a

 

 

 

 

friendly letter asking your business

 

 

 

 

if they are interested in a penpal,

 

 

 

 

but by the time you read this letter,

 

 

 

 

it is too late. The trojan horse virus

 

 

 

 

will have already infected the boot

 

 

 

 

sector of everyone’s brains in the

 

 

 

 

company, destroying all useful

 

 

 

 

information (if there was any to

 

 

 

 

begin with). It is a self -replicating

 

 

 

 

virus, and once the message is read,

 

 

 

 

it will AUTOMATICALLY

 

 

 

 

forward itself to anyone standing in

 

 

 

 

a 50-foot radius.

 

 

 

 

This virus will DESTROY your

 

 

 

 

company, and holds the potential to

 

 

 

 

DESTROY the companies of any of

 

 

 

 

your friends. If this virus keeps

 

 

 

 

getting passed, it has the potential

 

 

 

 

to do a great deal of DAMAGE to

 

 

 

 

businesses with incompetent leaders

 

 

 

 

around the world! 1 1!

 

2009 * 66153 (ON SC)

- 669 -

Exhibit

Date

Recipient

Contents

Other Details

No.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Please, delete the message entitled

 

SC)

 

 

 

“PENPAL GREETINGS!” as soon

 

 

 

 

 

(ON

 

 

 

as you see it! And pass this message

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

along to all of your friends,

 

66153

 

 

 

relatives and the other readers of

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

the newsgroups and mailing lists

 

*

 

 

 

not hurt by this dangerous virus!!!!

 

 

 

 

which you are on so that they are

 

 

467

November

GasTOPS’

In every contest, there must be a

This e-mail was sent after MxI

2009

 

20, 2007

corporate e- loser... That would be you. Jack.

won a contract with Volvo in

 

 

mail address

 

November 2007 that GasTOPS

 

 

 

 

 

had also pursued.

 

 

 

 

 

Again, Forsyth identified

 

 

 

 

 

Lennox as the sender.

 

451

November

Jeff Nielson

You on the CF like a dirty shirt?

Forsyth identified the sender of

 

 

24, 1997

(a GasTOPS

 

the e-mail to be Chris Cass.

 

 

 

employee

 

Brouse was cross-examined on

 

 

 

attempting

 

this e-mail stated that he did not

 

 

 

to roll out

 

know all the topics being

 

 

 

ECMS v.2 to

 

covered in the anonymous e-

 

 

 

to the CAF)

 

mails but did know this one:

 

 

 

 

 

“Mr. Neilson had met, I believe,

 

 

 

 

 

Mr. Andrew Richardson in an

 

 

 

 

 

airport and had told Mr. Neilson

 

 

 

 

 

that MxI were on the U.S. Navy

 

 

 

 

 

like a dirty shirt.”

 

918

November

MacIsaac

Is “This is where we part company”

MacIsaac said that he had shown

 

 

24, 1997

 

analogous to “It’s my way or the

Jeff Cass a movie representative

 

 

 

 

highway”? What happened?

of GasTOPS’ leadership issues

 

 

 

 

 

when he interviewed him and

 

 

 

 

 

that the first line of the e-mail

 

 

 

 

 

was directly quoted from that

 

 

 

 

 

movie. Forsyth claimed that he

 

 

 

 

 

was unaware of the

 

 

 

 

 

circumstances giving rise to this

 

 

 

 

 

anonymous e-mail but attributed

 

 

 

 

 

the authorship to Chris Cass.

 

 

 

 

 

Jeff Cass confirmed that he had

 

 

 

 

 

in fact met with MacIsaac and

 

 

 

 

 

had discussed the movie “12

 

 

 

 

 

O’Clock High”; He recalled that

 

 

 

 

 

he had told people of MacIsaac’s

 

 

 

 

 

suggestion with respect to the

 

 

 

 

 

movie but could not recall whom

 

- 670 -

Exhibit

Date

Recipient

Contents

Other Details

No.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

he told.

SC)

452

December

On Robin

Did you get one share or two?

Forsyth was not aware of the

 

12, 1997

Tarbet (a

 

circumstances giving rise to

 

 

(ON

 

 

senior

 

the content of the e-mail but

 

 

software

 

said it had been authored by

66153

 

 

developer

 

Chris Cass. Brouse explained

 

 

at

 

that they may have heard at

*

 

 

GasTOPS)

 

that time that GasTOPS was

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

giving a small number of

2009

 

 

 

 

shares to everyone at the

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

company.

 

472

December

Muir

[Subject: loser]

Forsyth claimed that he did

 

 

12, 1997

 

You make me sick, you spineless

not have knowledge of the

 

 

 

 

contents of the e-mail or the

 

 

 

 

jellyfish! Jack.

circumstances surrounding its

 

 

 

 

 

sending, but he did identify

 

 

 

 

 

Lennox as its author. Brouse

 

 

 

 

 

stated that he used the

 

 

 

 

 

expression “spineless

 

 

 

 

 

jellyfish” to refer to Muir and

 

 

 

 

 

to GasTOPS in a summer

 

 

 

 

 

1997 analysis of all of MxI’s

 

 

 

 

 

competitors.

 

473

December

Neilson

Been bombarded with e-mail?

According to Forsyth, this e-

 

 

12, 1997

 

 

mail was authored by Chris

 

 

 

 

 

Cass. At the time the e-mail

 

 

 

 

 

was received by Neilson, he

 

 

 

 

 

and Muir were GasTOPS’

 

 

 

 

 

representatives for the Volvo

 

 

 

 

 

opportunity.

 

453

December

Neilson

Subject: “SYCOPHANT n. One

Forsyth identified Lennox as

 

 

15, 1997

 

who approaches Greatness (or

the author of this e-mail.

 

 

 

 

Bernie as the case may be) on

 

 

 

 

 

his belly so that he may not be

 

 

 

 

 

commanded to turn and be

 

 

 

 

 

kicked. He is sometimes an

 

 

 

 

 

editor (or a GasTOPS V.P.).”

 

 

495

December

Muir

Now that’s a Press Release!

This e-mail was sent after an

 

 

16, 1997

 

 

MxI press release was

 

 

 

 

 

published in The Ottawa

 

 

 

 

 

Citizen about its securing a

 

 

 

 

 

contract with the U.S. Navy.

 

- 671 -

Exhibit

Date

Recipient

Contents

Other Details

No.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The headline was, “Deal

SC)

 

 

 

 

sends employees packing to

 

 

 

 

Barbados”

 

 

 

 

(ON

454

December

MacIsaac

Are the rumours true that there is

Forsyth attributed authorship

 

29, 1997

 

an “unauthorized” effort to

to Jeff Cass, and Brouse

66153

 

 

 

develop ECMS in Windows

related its contents to having

 

 

 

within your company? You

heard that GasTOPS was

*

 

 

 

might need to check in on the

developing ECMS in

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

R&D taskings costs.

Windows at that time.

2009

497

January 17,

Muir

I understand you’re willing to pay

This e-mail was sent after Muir

 

 

1998

 

big dollars for information. Well, I

had a telephone conversation

 

 

 

 

wish you luck. It’s too bad that

with Nguyen, who had been a

 

 

 

 

there is no information to be had

senior programmer at GasTOPS

 

 

 

 

you FUCKING slime bag!!!!

and worked briefly for MxI

 

 

 

 

You’re an embarrassment to

before moving to SHL

 

 

 

 

society. P.S. I hope your children

Systemhouse.

 

 

 

 

don’t know about your great code

Forsyth identified the author of

 

 

 

 

of ethics... Jack.

 

 

 

 

 

this e-mail as Lennox.

 

479

February 5,

Muir

The fox is in the henhouse!

This e-mail followed MxI’s

 

 

1998

 

 

February 3, 1998, press release

 

 

 

 

 

that it had won the Volvo

 

 

 

 

 

contract.

 

535

September

Muir

[Subject: Paul? From: Evil

Earlier on the day this e-mail

 

 

2, 1999

 

Plumber]

was sent, Chivers and Charles

 

 

 

 

 

King (on GasTOPS’ behalf)

 

 

 

 

You stupid sloppy fuck! Did you

attended a meeting with the

 

 

 

 

think I would forget so easily. Now

DND (including all officers in

 

 

 

 

it is my turn. FUCK YOU!

the chain of command between

 

 

 

 

 

Colonel Lucas and Warrant

 

 

 

 

 

Officer Paré) to settle the

 

 

 

 

 

intellectual property dispute and

 

 

 

 

 

competitive procurement of the

 

 

 

 

 

TIES contract. The DND argued

 

 

 

 

 

it owned all of the intellectual

 

 

 

 

 

property associated with ECMS

 

 

 

 

 

v.2 and that they would proceed

 

 

 

 

 

with the competition for the

 

 

 

 

 

TIES contract. When Chivers

 

 

 

 

 

and King returned to GasTOPS’

 

 

 

 

 

offices, Chivers reported to Muir

 

 

 

 

 

and MacIsaac. The e-mail was

 

 

 

 

 

sent later in the evening.

 

 

 

 

 

Jeff Cass and Brouse denied

 

- 672 -

Exhibit

Date

Recipient

Contents

Other Details

No.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

writing or sending Exhibit 535,

 

 

 

 

and, according to Forsyth, all of

 

 

 

 

the anonymous e-mails could be

 

 

 

 

identified as having been sent

 

 

 

 

either by Lennox or Chris Cass

 

 

 

 

with the exception of Exhibits

 

 

 

 

479, 495 and 535. Forsyth

 

 

 

 

indicated that Lennox had

 

 

 

 

authored the e-mails signed

 

 

 

 

“Jack”.

[1563] Nguyen became aware of the January 17, 1998, anonymous e-mail (Exhibit 497). On February 14, 1998, he sent an e-mail to Muir, Forsyth, Brouse, and Jeff Cass (Exhibit 498):

An envelope with no sender address came in my mailbox last week. In it was a hard copy of an anonymous e-mail sent to Mr. Dave Muir, GasTOPS Ltd. The e-mail tries to insult Mr. Muir using old-time sailor/trucker language (I believe modern sailors and truckers have more civilized manner today). There are no return address on both mail items, so I can’t reply individually.

[Mr. Dave Muir] As I explained in our earlier conversation, I have no direct or indirect interest whatsoever in the legal dispute between GasTOPS and MxI, and I will not change my mind in this lifetime. If you think I’m involved in any way in this dirty assault to you, you’re 100% wrong.

[Mr. Jeff Cass] I told you about Mr. Muir’s phone call to me because I didn’t want you, as a friend, to misunderstand that I’m associated with GasTOPS for any reason. Pre-empty strike, I guess, in case the news came to you from other side... Too bad, I never thought that it would become trash material.

[Mr. Brad Forsyth, Mr. Doug Brouse] Only Mr. Forsyth has kids, but I trust that neither of you would ever authorize your children to play this kind of prank to anybody. So at work, you should apply the same policy to your employees.

I never regret leaving GasTOPS and MxI, but now I’m glad I did.

[1564] Forsyth testified that he first became aware of these anonymous e-mails through Nguyen’s e-mail, which he said included an e-mail attachment that was dated January 17, 1998.

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(It became evident in cross-examination that the January 17 e-mail had not been attached to Nguyen’s e-mail; Forsyth could not recall how he had in fact received a copy of the January 17 e-mail.) He said that before he could do anything about the e-mail, Lennox approached him, admitted to having written the e-mail attachment, and apologized. Forsyth said he told Lennox to “definitely make sure it didn't happen again and make sure that no one else in the company would do anything like this.” Forsyth then became aware of the other e-mails through the litigation discovery process (although none was included in the defendants’ affidavit of documents Forsyth swore prior to the start of the trial), at which point he investigated who at MxI had written them, concluding that the authors were Lennox and Chris Cass. Forsyth telephoned Nguyen and apologized, but he never apologized to Muir.

[1565] Brouse stated that he received the e-mail from Nguyen on February 14, 1998 (Exhibit 498). After an electronic copy of Brouse’s e-mail account had been produced, it was determined that the e-mail was not in Brouse’s “in-box”.

[1566] Jeff Cass denied sending any anonymous e-mails and said that he became aware of them through the e-mail he received from Nguyen (Exhibit 498). Jeff Cass conceded that when he was preparing the affidavit of documents, he did not include his copy of the e-mail received from Nguyen “more than likely out of embarrassment” and because “it was a personal document.” He said he probably deleted it from the system, leaving no record of it. Jeff Cass took the position that he did not become aware of the remaining anonymous e-mails until the discovery process in 2000.

[1567] Jeff Cass agreed in cross-examination that he had spoken to his brother Chris Cass about the anonymous e-mails. He agreed that this conversation took place prior to him giving evidence and at a time when he knew that his brother was going to be called as a witness. Jeff Cass told Chris two to three weeks before he testified at trial that he knew Chris had written some of the e-mails; he did not identify any of the e-mails in particular, but just said so generally. Chris acknowledged that he had sent some and said he regretted having sent them. Jeff Cass was cross-examined regarding the timing of this conversation:

2009 * 66153 (ON SC)

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Q.Mr. Cass, you're aware as an executive of MxI and the named Defendant that there is an order of this court that you're not to be discussing the evidence of this trial with other witnesses, including your own evidence?

A.Yes, I'm aware of that.

Q.Yet you still went ahead and spoke with your brother?

A.I did mention this to him, yes.

Q.He hasn't been prepared yet for his evidence?

A.No.

[1568] Brouse stated that he learned how the technology of sending anonymous e-mails worked from Chris Cass or Lennox in 1997 or 1998. He said that he was shown how to do it but didn’t know how to do it. After the defendants produced further electronic documents during trial, an e-mail was found, dated March 5, 1997, from Brouse to [email protected] with the subject “anonymous mail” (Exhibit 2001). Brouse testified that this e-mail was created when Chris Cass or Lennox came to his office and showed him how to send an anonymous e-mail.

[1569] However, on March 3 and 7, 1997, Brouse and Lennox exchanged test anonymous e- mails. On March 3, 1997, Lennox sent an anonymous e-mail to John Turner of GasTOPS (Exhibit 439), and on March 7, 1997, Lennox sent one to MacIsaac (Exhibit 440).

[1570] The defendants, Forsyth, Brouse and Jeff Cass, denied any knowledge of these anonymous e-mails until February 1998, when they received Nguyen’s e-mail (Exhibit 498). Following further electronic production from the defendants, an e-mail was located dated October 1, 1996, from Chris Cass to Forsyth, Vandenberg, Jeff Cass and Doug Brouse with the subject “disrespectful message.” The content of the e-mail was “do you cats agree that an anonymous re-mail version of this with, ‘how do I get ECMS v.2.0 to work?’ would be fun?” with a captioned picture. When confronted with this e-mail Brouse stated that, while he knew “anonymous e-mails were flowing around within the company between people,” he was unaware any were being sent to GasTOPS. Brouse testified that Chris Cass had not been asking permission to send an e-mail to GasTOPS but that he was “simply putting a joke on the table.”

2009 * 66153 (ON SC)

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Brouse was also asked why Chris Cass would use a remailer if he planned to send this e-mail within MxI and what he thought Chris Cass planned to do. Brouse replied: “I think he's done what he's going to do. I think he's sent this to us. I don't understand it completely. He's got initial against people I don't understand. I think he's done what he's going to do, you know, a bit of joke maybe I could send this anonymous e-mail to GasTOPS Limited. I think he's done what he's going to do.” Finally, Brouse said he deleted this e-mail and therefore had no copy of it.

[1571] I have no doubt that Brouse was fully aware that anonymous e-mails were being sent to GasTOPS, notwithstanding his protestations to the contrary.

[1572] These e-mails provided me with insight into Forsyth, Brouse, Jeff Cass, Chris Cass and Lennox’s characters. Throughout the trial, I waited for someone from MxI to offer an apology to MacIsaac, Muir, Turner, Neilson and any other recipient of such anonymous e-mails and yet no apology was forthcoming. I concluded that Brouse, Chris Cass, Lennox and Jeff Cass saw nothing wrong with sending these e-mails but that they did not want to be publicly identified as the authors of the e-mails or complicit in sending such e-mails.

[1573] These anonymous e-mails indicate that the senders fully understood MxI to be in direct competition with GasTOPS and that the senders revelled in the fact that MxI had usurped GasTOPS’ business opportunities. It may well be that Forsyth was not aware that such anonymous e-mails had been sent prior to February 14, 1998, but in my view Brouse did know. As a senior executive of MxI, he implicitly approved of the demeaning e-mails, which indicates the breach of the fiduciary duty MxI and Brouse owed to GasTOPS.

[1574] The failure to make proper disclosure of the “anonymous e-mails” indicates the defendants’ failure throughout the trial to make full and complete disclosure and the lengths to which they went to destroy evidence they felt was embarrassing or detrimental to their defence.

Brouse’s Caricature

[1575] On March 4, 1997, Brouse drew a despicable cartoon titled “Bernie Mac-I-Own- Everything Hosts a Company Meeting” (Exhibit 2000). He depicted MacIsaac as a Nazi, Muir as

2009 * 66153 (ON SC)

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a snake and the employees as mindless. The drawing speaks volumes about Brouse’s character as a businessman. When shown the caricature in cross-examination, Brouse claimed that he had not circulated the drawing but that people had seen it drawn on a piece of paper, although he did acknowledge having put it on his “local component of the server” in electronic format because he wanted to use it as the wallpaper on his computer.

[1576] Brouse then testified that on April 14, 1997, he sent a fax to Major Jim Miller, a friend and supporter of MxI at the CAF. In the body of an e-mail to Major Miller at the same time, Brouse stated: “a picture is worth 1000 words, so I’ve decided to fax you a copy of the caricature that was anonymously forwarded to me.” When asked if this caricature was the caricature in Exhibit 2000 Brouse stated that he was certain that it was not; he sent Major Miller only the MacIsaac character depicted as a Nazi (drawn separately a second time). Brouse did not have a copy of the attachment and acknowledged that he had “possibly” destroyed it.

[1577] Brouse was asked if he did anything else with respect to the caricature and he claimed that he did not. Further productions made by the defendants disclosed an e-mail sent by Peloso to the MxI employees on March 4, 1997, entitled “at Doug’s request.” Attached to the e-mail was the caricature, and there was no request that the employees keep the e-mail within MxI only. Brouse could not recall Peloso sending the caricature out and said that “It seems to me what he e- mailed out was a picture of a cheque that we got.” After being given time to verify the attachment to the e-mail that Peloso sent on March 4, 1997 (Exhibit 2152), was Exhibit 2000, Brouse stated that he had simply been confused and that Peloso had sent out another e-mail attaching an image of a cheque.

[1578] Bill Smith, an employee of MxI and who had previously been employed by GasTOPS, acknowledged that he had received the e-mail (Exhibit 2152) and had seen the caricature attached thereto. He thought that it was “some dark humour” that was “maybe a little bit over the top” because it was “a pretty extreme comparison” of some personal problems that some people have to, in MacIsaac’s case, a Nazi. Smith was asked how he would feel if a depiction of him as a Nazi was sent to one of his clients. He responded “I don't think I would be very happy about that.”

2009 * 66153 (ON SC)

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[1579] Chris Cass also acknowledged that he had received the e-mail from Peloso (Exhibit 2152) with the attachment of the caricature. Chris Cass stated that “At the time I found aspects [of it] funny,” in particular a depiction of (presumably) “Darryl Churchill acting as a two-faced person,” but agreed that the diagram overall was “very disgusting.” Chris Cass also testified that deleted his copy of the e-mail and that Brouse had sometimes drawn similar depictions on the bulletin board in his office.

[1580] I find it difficult to accept that, apart from Laura Kline, no one at MxI denounced Brouse’s caricature prior to being cross-examined at this trial.

Titter MacFritters Contest

[1581] After the resignations and MxI’s establishment, the defendants took an unusual interest GasTOPS’ solvency. The defendants and MxI’s employees organized a contest which they entitled “Titter MacFritters”, during which individuals speculated on how long GasTOPS would survive. This did not come to the attention of GasTOPS until after the production of the back-up CD of the MxI server during trial.

[1582] On January 17, 1997, Brouse sent an e-mail to Wayne Yuke, a student at Carleton University. In the text of the e-mail (Exhibit 2009) Brouse wrote: “P.S. Have you heard to the Titter MacFritters contest? Big bucks that you could win.” In his testimony, although, Brouse said that no money was ever put down.

[1583] Brouse stated that the contest was initiated by Chris Cass. He could not recall when he first found out about the contest but did admit that he certainly knew of it by January 17, 1997, because he referred it in his e-mail to Mr. Yuke.

[1584] On April 21, 1997, Brouse sent an e-mail to Jeff Cass, Peloso and Chris Cass. After referring to a sale by GasTOPS, Brouse stated: “Looks like there will be no ‘Titter MacFritters.’” There was then an exchange of e-mails between Peloso and Brouse, in which Peloso stated in Exhibit 2014: “… it may yet fritter – just keep shoving sticks in the spokes!!” Brouse claimed that he did not know what Peloso was referring to, but I believe he and others at MxI knew

2009 * 66153 (ON SC)

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exactly what Peloso was saying, as all of MxI’s employees knew MxI was competing for the CAF business that GasTOPS had at the time of the resignations. It is also obvious that that these employees knew that GasTOPS was suffering as a result of their resignations on two weeks’ notice and that they were hoping to take advantage of GasTOPS’ difficulties in servicing its contracts and to pursue those business opportunities it was pursuing prior to October 1996.

Findings

[1585] The plaintiff is seeking an award of punitive damages based on the anonymous e- mails, the Titter MacFritters Contest and the caricature drawn by Brouse. In my view, the only conduct that could support an award for punitive damages is the caricature. The drawing is a scurrilous and despicable caricature, and it offends this Court’s sense of decency and should have offended the sense of decency of anyone who saw the caricature. In Hill v. Church of Scientology, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1130, Cory J. defined, in general terms, circumstances in which punitive damages may be awarded at para. 196:

Punitive damages may be awarded in situations where the defendant's misconduct is so malicious, oppressive and high- handed that it offends the court's sense of decency. Punitive damages bear no relation to what the plaintiff should receive by way of compensation. Their aim is not to compensate the plaintiff, but rather to punish the defendant. It is the means by which the jury or judge expresses its outrage at the egregious conduct of the defendant. They are in the nature of a fine which is meant to act as a deterrent to the defendant and to others from acting in this manner. It is important to emphasize that punitive damages should only be awarded in those circumstances where the combined award of general and aggravated damages would be insufficient to achieve the goal of punishment and deterrence.

[1586] In Whiten v. Pilot Insurance Co., [2002] S.C.J. No. 19, Binnie J. stated at paras. 67-68:

First, the attempt to limit punitive damages by "categories" does not work and was rightly rejected in Canada in Vorvis, supra, at

pp.1104-6. The control mechanism lies not in restricting the category of case but in rationally determining circumstances that

2009 * 66153 (ON SC)

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warrant the addition of punishment to compensation in a civil action. It is in the nature of the remedy that punitive damages will largely be restricted to intentional torts, as in Hill, supra, or breach of fiduciary duty as in M. (K.) v. M. (H.), [1992] 3 S.C.R. 6, but Vorvis itself affirmed the availability of punitive damages in the exceptional case in contract. In Denison v. Fawcett, [1958] O.R. 312, the Ontario Court of Appeal asserted in obiter that on proper facts punitive damages would be available in negligence and nuisance as well. In Robitaille v. Vancouver Hockey Club Ltd. (1981), 124 D.L.R. (3d) 228, the British Columbia Court of Appeal awarded punitive damages in a negligence case on the principle that they ought to be available whenever "the conduct of the defendant [was] such as to merit condemnation by the [c]ourt" (p. 250). This broader approach seems to be in line with most common law jurisdictions apart from England.

Second, there is a substantial consensus that coincides with Lord Pratt C.J.'s view in 1763 that the general objectives of punitive damages are punishment (in the sense of retribution), deterrence of the wrongdoer and others, and denunciation (or, as Cory J. put it in Hill, supra, at para. 196, they are "the means by which the jury or judge expresses its outrage at the egregious conduct").

[1587] If the award of general damages had been modest in this case, it would not have been sufficient to achieve the goal of punishment and deterrence for the drawing and distribution of the caricature. Had that been the case, I would have made an award for punitive damages against Brouse personally in the amount of $50,000. However, all of the defendants, whether personally or as a shareholder of MxI are being punished for their conduct by having to account for the profits they earned in breach of the fiduciary duty they owed to GasTOPS and for the unauthorized use of GasTOPS confidential business information. In my view, general damages amounting to approximately $11 million is a sufficient denunciation of the defendants’ objectionable conduct.

Counterclaims

[1588] The defendants by way of counterclaim, in their pleading claimed $8,168,133.97 in damages, plus injunctive relief, interest and costs against GasTOPS, MacIsaac, Muir and Chivers. The plaintiffs by counterclaim, MxI claimed over $5.5 million in damages against

2009 * 66153 (ON SC)

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GasTOPS, raising allegations of breach of a contract, unlawful interference with economic relations and conduct warranting an award of punitive damages. The personal plaintiffs by counterclaim, Forsyth, Brouse, Jeff Cass and Vandenberg claimed $2.6 million from GasTOPS and the personal defendants by counterclaim, MacIsaac, Muir and Chivers. The pleadings alleged that MacIsaac, Muir and Chivers and GasTOPS, had committed a number of acts that the plaintiffs by counterclaim plead supported claims for defamation, deliberate interference with economic relations and aggravated, exemplary and punitive damages.

[1589] In their written submissions, the plaintiffs by counterclaim appear to have abandoned all of the claims referred to above and reduced their claim to $18,133.97. This claim is advanced by MxI against GasTOPS for an alleged unpaid invoice.

[1590] After the resignations, negotiations took place between GasTOPS and MxI whereby GasTOPS proposed to subcontract work to MxI. On October 29, 1996, a GasTOPS purchase order was issued to MxI in accordance with their cooperation agreement and the agreed upon labour rates. On October 31, 1996, an invoice was sent from by Forsyth to Muir for work performed under the purchase order. The invoice was for $10,667.09 and included work done up to and including October 31, 1996. On November 12, 1996, GasTOPS issued a stop-work order to MxI. On November 18, 1996, GasTOPS terminated any agreement between the two companies. On November 19, 1996 MxI forwarded a further invoice to GasTOPS for work done under the purchase order prior to the stop-work order. This invoice was for $7,466.07 (Exhibit 631). GasTOPS paid neither of these invoices. There was no dispute that these monies are outstanding and owing to MxI. Accordingly, I am satisfied, that GasTOPS is indebted to MxI in the amount of $18,133.16.

[1591] GasTOPS claims to be entitled to an equitable set-off of this sum from the monies owing to it by MxI pursuant to the accounting for profits which I have ordered.

[1592] The distinction between a set-off at law and a set-off in equity was discussed by the British Columbia Court of Appeal in Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Tucker Industries Inc. (1983), 149 D.L.R. (3d) 172. A set-off at law is based in statute and requires that both

2009 * 66153 (ON SC)

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obligations be debts and that both debts be mutual cross-obligations. The source of a set-off at law in Ontario is found in s. 111 of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43. In Place Concorde East Limited Partnership v. Shelter Corp. of Canada Ltd., [2003] O.J. No. 5437 (S.C.J.), Pepall J. explained the development of equitable set-off at para. 246: “Equitable set-off developed as a result of the strict operation of statutes of set-off which did not extend to encompass unliquidated or non-mutual claims. Common law courts provided no relief in cases involving assignments or unliquidated damages. Accordingly, equitable set-off evolved so as to respond to the deficiencies in the common law.” Equitable set-off applies where cross- obligations are not debts and is available when there is a monetary whether liquidated or unliquidated claim. An equitable set-off can also apply where a mutuality is lost or never existed. See Holt v. Telford (1987), 41 D.L.R. (4th) 385 (S.C.C.); P.I.A. Investments Inc. v. Deerhurst Ltd. Partnership (2000), 20 C.B.R. (4th) 116 (Ont.C.A.) at paras. 31-32; Algoma Steel v. Union Gas Ltd., [2003] O.J. No. 71 (C.A.) at paras. 26-29.

[1593] There is a close connection between the claims in both actions. The parties to the claims are the same. The claim based on the invoice for $18,133.16 arose out of the same circumstances, namely the resignations. This was followed with the parties attempting to enter into a cooperation agreement, and GasTOPS issued a purchase order to MxI in an attempt to limit the detrimental impact of the resignations; MxI alleges that it performed work on behalf of GasTOPS under this purchase order resulting in outstanding invoices totaling $18,133.16. In my view, it would be unjust to deny a set-off, as the amount owing pursuant to the invoice arose as a result of Forsyth and Brouse resigning from GasTOPS without providing reasonable notice. The damages claimed by GasTOPS are also based in these same events. Accordingly, the monies claimed by MxI from GasTOPS shall be set-off against those owed by MxI to GasTOPS.

VII. Concluding Remarks

Judgment

[1594] Subject to the plaintiff seeking to adduce further evidence concerning revenues received by MxI during 2006, judgment shall issue as follows:

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(a)GasTOPS shall have judgment against Bradley Forsyth, Douglas Brouse Jeff Cass, Robert Vandenberg and MxI in the amount of $11,401,571;

(b)MxI shall have judgment against GasTOPS on the counterclaim in the amount of $18,133.16; and

(c)GasTOPS shall be entitled to a set-off of the judgment of MxI against it in the amount of $18,133.16 from the sum owing by Forsyth, Brouse, Jeff Cass and Robert Vandenberg and MxI.

[1595] Counsel may make arrangement to appear before me in Ottawa to deal with further evidence concerning the revenues received by MxI in 2006 if the plaintiff so desires and to make submissions concerning pre-judgment interest and costs.

Addendum

[1596] After living with this trial since early September, 2002 there are a number of matters I feel are important enough to be included in my reasons, notwithstanding that they may not directly affect the issues between the plaintiff and the defendants.

1.Reasons for Judgment

The trial commenced on October 1, 2002, and lasted 295 days. The last day of the evidentiary phase of the trial was March 23, 2006. During the course of the trial I admitted into evidence 2893 exhibits totalling approximately 70,000 pages. During the later part of 2006 and 2007, counsel made submissions in this matter. The last submissions made by the plaintiff, by way of rebuttal, was on November 6, 2007. The submissions totalled more than 3,000 pages. After receiving the submissions, I read and summarized them prior to drafting my Reasons for Judgment. I have followed the plaintiff’s submissions in many instances as I found them most compelling. The fact that I followed the plaintiff’s submission does not indicate in any way that I did not consider the defendant submissions. All parties and counsel should understand that I reviewed all of the evidence, and all of their submissions before writing any part of my judgment.

2.Counsel

I would be remiss if I did not complement all counsel on their presentations of their clients’ cases. Although the trial lasted 295 days, counsel did not unduly lengthen the trial. It would be difficult for me to imagine better prepared counsel than appeared before me in this case. Counsel had complete understanding of the evidence and the issues in this trial. Neither the plaintiff nor the defendants could have asked more of their counsel. Both sides were brilliantly represented in this case.

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All counsel acted in the highest traditions of the legal profession and at all times conducted themselves in a civil manner in addressing each other, the court and witnesses. Throughout the trial, as I came to know counsel better, I realized that I could rely on any statements they made in the courtroom. In addition, I came to realize that counsel understood their obligation to make disclosure and insisted that their clients make disclosure as soon as documents were brought to their attention. The preparation and conduct of counsel throughout the trial made it a pleasure for me to preside at this trial.

2009 * 66153 (ON SC)

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The manner in which counsel conducted themselves and the trial should be a model for all barristers in Ontario.

___________________________

Mr. Justice B.T.Granger

Released: September 25, 2009

2009 * 66153 (ON SC)

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Appendix I: Dates of Trial and Submissions

Heard at: Ottawa, Ontario

Trial:

October 1, 22, 23, 24, 28, 29, 30, and 31, 2002

November 4, 5, 6, 12, 14, 15, 18, 19, 21, 25, 26, 27, and 28, 2002 December 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 11, 12, 16, 17, and 18, 2002

January 27, 28, 29, and 30, 2003

February 3, 4, 5, 6, 10, 11, 12, 17, 18, 19, 20, 24, 25, 26, and 27, 2003 March 3, 5, 6, 10, 11, 17, 18, 24, 25, 26, 27, and 31, 2003

April 1, 2, 3, 7, 8, 29, and 30, 2003

May 1, 5, 7, 8, 12, 13, 15, 20, 21, 22, 26, and 27, 2003 June 9, 10, 11, 12, 17, 18, 19, 23, 24, and 25, 2003 October 1, 3, 7, 8, 9, 15, 16, 20, and 21, 2003 November 3, 4, 12, 14, 24, 25, 26, and 27, 2003 December 2, 3, 8, 9, and 10, 2003

February 2, 3, 4, 5, 9, 10, 11, 12, 16, 17, 18, 23, 24, and 25, 2004 March 8, 9, 10, 11, 15, 16, 17, 18, 22, 23, 24, and 25, 2004 April 5, 6, 7, 8, 13, 14, 15, 19, 20, 21, 22, 26, 27, and 28, 2004 May 17, 18, 19, 20, 25, 26, 27, and 31, 2004

June 1, 2, 8, 9, 10, 15, 17, 18, 21, 22, and 23, 2004 September 13, 14, 15, 21, 22, 23, 27, 28, 29, and 30, 2004 October 6, 7, 12, 13, 14, and 25, 2004

November 1, 2, 3, 8, 9, 10, 16, 17, 18, 22, 23, 24, and 25, 2004 December 7, 8, 9, 13, 14, 15, 16, and 17, 2004

February 28, 2005

March 1, 2, 3, 7, 8, 9, 10, 14, 15, 16, 17, 21, 22, 30, and 31, 2005 April 1, 4, 5, 19, and 21, 2005

May 9, 10, 11, 12, 26, 30, and 31, 2005

June 1, 7, 8, 9, 14, 15, 16, 20, 21, 22, and 23, 2005 September 27, 28, 29, and 30, 2005

October 7, 11, 12, 14, 18, 19, 20, 25, 26, and 27, 2005

November 1, 2, 3, 8, 9, 10, 22, 23, 24, and 30, 2005 December, 1, 2, 5, 8, 9, 13, 14, 15, and 16, 2005 March 23, 2006

September 5, 2007

Submissions:

November 14, 2006 (Plaintiff’s Submissions)

February 28, 2007 (Defendants’ Submissions)

September 28, 2007 (Plaintiff’s Reply)

October 9, 2007 (Defendants’ Rebuttal)

November 6, 2007 (Plaintiff’s Reply to Rebuttal)

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Appendix II: Acronyms and Abbreviations

 

 

Acronym/Abbreviation

Full Term

ACAN

Advanced Contract Award Notice

ACLM

aircraft component life management

ADAPS

Automatic Data Acquisition Processing System

ADS

Advanced Engine Diagnostic System

AIS

Aviation Information Services

AMDS

Aircraft Maintenance and Dispatch System

AME

Automated Maintenance Environment

AMIDD

Aviation Maintenance Integrated Diagnostics Demonstration

ASIP

Aircraft Structural Integrity Program

Brouse

Douglas Brouse

CAE

Canadian Aviation Electronics

CAF

Canadian Air Force

CBM-DAS

Condition-Based Maintenance - Data Analysis System

CBMS

Condition Based Maintenance System

Churchill

Darrel Churchill

CIMMS

Computerized Integrated Maintenance Management System

CITT

Canadian International Trade Tribunal

CMIS

Configuration Management Information System

CMMS

Computerized Maintenance Management System

CRAD

Canadian Research and Development

DEC

Digital Equipment Corporation

DFTEM

Director of Fighter Trainer Engineering and Maintenance

DIGS

Deployable Integrated Ground Station

DMS

Data Management System

DND

Department of National Defence

DOT

Department of Transport

ECAMS

Engine Configuration and Monitoring System

ECMS

Engine Condition Monitoring System

EDS

Engine Diagnostic System

Egan

Mike Egan

EM3

Equipment Maintenance Management Module

EMRS

Engine Maintenance Reporting System

EPLTS

Engine Parts Life Tracking System

ER

Entity Relationship

ETF

Engine Test Facility

FLTS

Flight Line Troubleshooting Systems

FMECA

Failure Mode Effects and Critical Analysis

FMS

foreign military sale

Forsyth

Bradley Forsyth

GasTOPS

GasTOPS Ltd.

GE

General Electric

GGPPAS

General Purpose Performance Analysis Software

GUI

graphic user interface

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Acronym/Abbreviation

Full Term

 

 

Hircock

Andrew Hircock

 

 

Hjort

Stefan Hjort

 

SC)

IDMS

Integrated Diagnostic and Maintenance System

 

 

 

Kind

Robert Kind

 

(ON

Kubiseski

Tom Kubiseski

 

Kyle

Rodney Kyle

66153

 

 

Leguellec

Serge Leguellec

 

 

Lennox

Mark Lennox

 

*

LOI

Letter of Intent

 

 

 

MacIntyre

Noella MacIntyre

2009

MacIsaac

Bernard MacIsaac

 

 

MASIS

Material Acquisition and Support Information System

 

 

MDA

McDonnell Douglas Aerospace

 

 

MDPS

Maintenance Data Processing System

 

 

MEDIC

Mobile Engine Data Interpretation Computer

 

 

MIMOSA

Machinery Information Management Open System Alliance

 

 

MIMS

Maintenance Information Management System

 

 

MRO

Maintenance Repair and Overhaul

 

 

MSD

Maintenance Systems Division

 

 

Muir

David Muir

 

 

MxI

MxI Technologies Limited

 

 

NALCOMIS

Navy Aviation Logistics Command Management Information System

 

 

NAMP

Navy Aviation Maintenance Policy

 

 

NAVAIR

Navy/Air Force

 

 

NAVMASSO

Navy Management System Support Office

 

 

Neilson

Jeff Neilson

 

 

NFTC

NATO Flight Training in Canada

 

 

Nguyen

Linh Nguyen

 

 

NRCC

National Research Council Canada

 

 

ODM

oil debris monitor

 

 

OMA

Organizational Maintenance Activity

 

 

Ortiz

Jorge Ortiz

 

 

Paré

Warrant Officer Michel Paré

 

 

PASS

Performance Analyst Software System

 

 

PCGS

Portable CF-18 Ground Station

 

 

Peloso

Dave Peloso

 

 

Persson

Roger Persson

 

 

PIDMS

Prototype Integrated Diagnostics and Maintenance System

 

 

PMA

Program Management Authority

 

 

PWGSC

Public Works and Government Services Canada

 

 

RAAF

Royal Australian Air Force

 

 

RDBMS

Relational Data Management System

 

 

Reynolds

Kevin Reynolds

 

 

ROM

Rough Order of Magnitude

 

 

SAME

Similar to Automated Maintenance Environment

 

 

 

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Acronym/Abbreviation

Full Term

 

 

SLPS

Second Line Prognostic System

 

 

Smith

Bill Smith

 

SC)

SPAWARS

Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command Systems

 

 

 

Thoms

Larry Thoms

 

(ON

TIES

Technical Investigation and Engineering Support

 

UTTH

Utility Transport Tactical Helicopter

66153

 

 

Vandenberg

Robert Vandenberg

 

 

Whaley

Ted Whaley

 

2009 *

 

 

 

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Appendix III: Jurisprudence and Texts Cited

Jurisprudence

309925 Ontario Ltd. v. Tyrrell (1981), 127 D.L.R. (3d) 99 (H.C.J.)

57134 Manitoba Ltd. v. Palmer (1989), 37 B.C.L.R. (2d) 50 (C.A.) Alberts et al. v. Mountjoy et al., [1977] O.J. No. 2334 (H.C.J.) Algoma Steel v. Union Gas Ltd., [2003] O.J. No. 71 (C.A.)

Anderson, Smyth and Kelly Customs Brokers Ltd. v. World Wide Customs Brokers Ltd., [1996] A.J. No. 475 (Alta. C.A.)

Apotex Fermentation Inc. v. Novopharm Ltd., (1988), 162 D.L.R. (4th) 111 (Man. C.A.) Atlas Janitorial Services Co. v. Germanis, [1994] O.J. No. 316 (Ont. Gen.Div.) Berkey Photo (Canada) Ltd. v. Ohlig et al., [1983] 43 O.R. (2d) 518 (H.C.J.)

Cadbury Schweppes Inc. v. FBI Foods Ltd., [1999] S.C.J. No. 6 Canadian Aero Service Ltd. v. O’Malley, [1974] S.C.R. 592

Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Tucker Industries Inc. (1983), 149 D.L.R. (3d) 172 Canadian Industrial Distributors Inc. v. Dargue (1994), 7 C.C.E.L. (2d) 60 at p. 70 (Ont. Gen.

Div.);

Cinema Internet Networks Inc. (c.o.b. Cinemaworks) v. Porter, [2006] B.C.J. No. 3200 (S.C.) Clifford & Associates Consulting Ltd. v. Cliff (1996) 72 C.P.R. (3d) 53 (B.C.C.A.)

Cline v. Don Watt & Associates Communications Inc. (1986), 15 C.C.E.L. 181 (Ont. Dist. Ct.) Computer Workshops Ltd. v. Banner Capital Market Brokers Ltd., [1988] O.J. No. 223 (H.C.) CRC-Evans Canada Ltd. v. Pettifer (1996) 26 C.C.E.L. (2d) 294 (Alta Q.B.), aff’d 216 A.R. 192

(C.A.)

CRC-Evans Canada Ltd. v. Pettifer, [1997] A.J. No. 20 DiFlorio v. Con Structural Steel Ltd., [2000] O.J. No. 340 Engineered Sound Systems Ltd. v. Klampfer, [1994] O.J. No. 867 Felker v. Cunningham (2000), 191 D.L.R. (4th) 734 (Ont. C.A.) Frame v. Smith (1987), 42 D.L.R. (4th) 81

General Tire & Rubber Co., v. Firestone Tyre & Rubber Co., [1975] 2 All E.R. 173 Genesta Manufacturing Ltd. v. Babey (1984), 6 C.C.E.L. 291

Guerin v. The Queen, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335 at 384

Hawboldt Industries v. Chester Basin Hydraulics & Machine Ltd. (1983), 57 N.S.R. (2d) 413 (S.C.)

Hill v. Church of Scientology, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1130

Hodgkinson v. Simms (1994), 117 D.L.R. (4th) 161

Holt v. Telford (1987), 41 D.L.R. (4th) 385 (S.C.C.)

Hudson’s Bay Company v. McClocklin, [1986] 5 W.W.R. 29 Hydro Kleen Systems Inc. v. Park, [2003] A.J. No. 1199 (Q.B.) Industrial Development Consultants Ltd. v. Cooley, [1972] 2 All E.R. 162 IT/Net Inc. v. Doucette, [2005] O.J. No. 1814 (S.C.J.)

KJA Consultants Inc. v. Soberman, [2002] O.J. No. 489 (S.C.J.) KJA Consultants Inc. v. Soberman, [2003] O.J. No. 3175

LAC Minerals Ltd. v. International Corona Resources Ltd., [1989] 2 S.C.R. 574

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M.E.P. Environmental Products Ltd. v. Hi Performance Coatings Co., [2006] M. J. No. 211 (M.B.Q.B.), aff’d 2007 M.B.C.A. 71

MacDonald v. Klein, [1998] O.J. No. 4922 (Gen. Div.)

McCormick Delisle & Thompson Inc. v. Ballantyne (2001), 12 B.L.R. (3d) 257 (Ont. C.A.) Metafore Corp.v. Protek Systems (London) Inc. [200] O.J. No. 4975

Metaphore Corp. v. Protek Systems (London) Inc., [2000] O.J. No. 4975 Monovis Inc. v. Aquino , 905 F. Supp. 1205 (W.D. N.Y. 1994)

Moore International (Canada) Ltd. v. Carter (1984), B.C.L.R. 207 (C.A.) Mountjoy; W.J. Christie & Co. v. Greer (1981), 121 D.L.R. (3d) 472 at 479 Omega Digital Data Inc. v. Airos Technology Inc., [1996] O.J. No. 5382

P.I.A. Investments Inc. v. Deerhurst Ltd. Partnership (2000), 20 C.B.R. (4th) 116 (Ont.C.A.) Phipps v. Boardman, [1965] 1 All E.R. 849

Physique Health Club Ltd. v. Carlsen (1996), 25 C.C.E.L. (2d) 231 (Alta. C.A.) Pizza Pizza Ltd. v. Gillespie, [1990] O.J. No. 2011

Place Concorde East Limited Partnership v. Shelter Corp. of Canada Ltd., [2003] O.J. No. 5437 Quantum Management Services Ltd. v. Hann et al., [1996] O.J. No. 5382

R. v. Stewart, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 963

Reading & Bates Construction Co. v. Baker Energy Resources Corp., [1994] F.C.J. No. 1514 (F.C.A.)

RBC Dominion Securities Inc. v. Merrill Lynch Canada, 2008 S.C.C. 54 Restauronics Services Ltd. v. Forster, [2004] 32 C.C.E.L. (3d) 50

Saltman Engineering Co. v. Campbell Engineering Co. [1963] 3 All E.R. 413 (C.A.) Sanford Evans List Brokerage v. Trauzzi, [2000] O.J. No. 1394

Scantron Corp. v. Bruce, [1996] O.J. No. 2138

Schauenburg Industries Ltd. v. Borowski (1970), 101 D.L.R. (3d) 701, 25 0.R. (2d) 737 (H.C.J.) Scott v. Trophy Foods Inc., [1995] N.S.J. No. 145 (N.S. C.A.)

Seager v. Copydex Ltd., [1967] 1 W.L.R. 923 (C.A.) Smyth v. UndercoverWear Ltd., [1993] O.J. No. 2180

Sure-Grip Fasteners Ltd. v. Allgrade Bolt and Chain Inc. (1993), 45 C.C.E.L. 276 at p. 282 (Gen. Div.)

Teledyne Industries, Inc. v. Lido Industrial Products Ltd. (1982), 68 C.P.R. (2d) 204 at 208 (F.C.T.D.)

Terrapin Ltd. v. Builders’ Supply Co. (Hayes) Ltd., [1960] 5 R.P.C. 128 (C.A.) Tree Savers International Ltd. et al. v. Savoy et al., [1992] A.J. No. 61 (Alta. C.A.) Wallace Welding Supplies Ltd. v. Wallace (1986), 11 C.C.E.L. 108 (Ont. H.C.J.) West Telemarketing Canada, ULC v. Titley (2005), 2005 BCSC 1585

White Oaks Welding Supplies v. Tapp (1983), 42 O.R. (2d) 445 (H.C.J.) Whiten v. Pilot Insurance Co., [2002] S.C.J. No. 19

Wilcox v. G.W.G. Ltd. (1984), 4 C.C.E.L. 125 (Alta. Q.B.)

Texts

J. D’Andrea, Employment Obligations in Canada, looseleaf (Aurora Ont.; Canada Law Book 2006).

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J. Thorburn and K. Fairbairn, Law of Confidential Business Information, looseleaf, (Aurora, Ontario: Canada Law Book, 1998).

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Appendix IV: Acknowledgements

I would also be remiss if I did not recognize the contribution of the court staff and judicial support personnel who assisted me in the courtroom and in preparing of my Reasons for Judgment.

Court Reporters

David Nash was the assigned court reporter in this case and provided myself and counsel with real time reporting. Mr. Nash’s dedication and assistance throughout the trial was invaluable.

During the trial, we had a digital audio system recording the evidence as a pilot project. The court reporters who operated the digital audio recording system were Brenda Gagnier, Denise Grant, Pam Thompson and Lynn Del’Orme, all of whom ably assisted the court during the trial and demonstrated the value of digital audio recording.

Court Service Officer

Kevin Lundy was the CSO throughout the trial, and he managed the courtroom with great efficiency and was of great help to me throughout the trial.

Clerk

Tina Ayoub acted as the clerk of the court throughout the trial and was of great assistance to counsel and myself.

Judicial Assistants

I am greatly indebted to Sylvie Ménard and Debbie O’Neil in Ottawa and Evelyn Steedman and Janice Kosnik in London for transcribing my Reasons for Judgment.

Technology

During the trial, Cheryl Curren of Platinium Legal and later of Commonwealth Legal, gave freely of her time in assisting myself and counsel in conducting an electronic trial.

The Court reporters, court service officer, court clerk, technology assistant, judicial assistants and legal clerks were always helpful and unfailingly polite. The dedication of these people went far beyond the terms of their employment.

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