Date: 20150324  
File: 560-02-58, 65, 66 and 68  
Citation: 2015 PSLREB 29  
Public Service Labour Relations and Employment Board Act and Canada Labour Code  
Before a panel of the Public Service Labour Relations and Employment Board  
BETWEEN  
ZABIA CHAMBERLAIN  
Complainant  
and  
TREASURY BOARD  
(Department of Human Resources and Skills Development)  
Respondent  
Indexed as  
Chamberlain v. Treasury Board (Department of Human Resources and Skills Development)  
In the matter of four complaints made under section 133 of the Canada Labour Code  
REASONS FOR DECISION  
Before:  
George Filliter, a panel of the Public Service Labour Relations and Employment Board  
For the ;Complainant:  
Herself  
For the Respondent:  
Caroline Engmann, counsel  
Heard at Ottawa, Ontario,  
June 27 to 30, July 25 to 29, September 8 and 9, and December 19 to 22, 2011;  
February 1 to 3, July 16 to 18, August 13 to 15, and September 10 to 12, 2012;  
January 14 to 16, February 4 to 6, April 29 and 30, May 1, June 10 to 12,  
July 25 and 30, August 1, September 16, 18 and 20, and December 2 and 3, 2013;  
and March 3, 4 and 6, and May 20 and 22, 2014.  
TABLE OF CONTENTS  
Paragraph  
Numbers  
Title  
Introduction and issues before the Board  
I
1 to 17  
II  
1.  
2.  
3.  
The hearing - Procedural rulings  
18 to 20  
21 to 23  
24 to 31  
Request of respondent to quash summons  
Request for introduction of affidavit evidence by the complainant  
Request by the complainant to bar named individuals from attending the  
32 to 35  
hearing  
4.  
Request by respondent that I rule on whether I had jurisdiction to hear  
36 to 38  
39 to 53  
54 to 60  
evidence with respect to matters occurring after December 10, 2009  
5.  
Request to record proceedings  
6.  
Request of complainant to enter opinion evidence in the form of expert  
testimony  
7.  
8.  
9.  
Additional summonses requested by the complainant  
61 to 84  
85 to 86  
87 to 88  
89 to 99  
100 to 101  
Exclusion of witnesses  
Further reports from Doctors Goldstein and Stewart  
10. Order for disclosure of further medical reports  
11. Ruling of Federal Court Trial Division  
12. Allegations concerning the integrity of the proceeding made by the  
complainant  
102 to 110  
111 to 112  
13. Confirmation allegations of acts of reprisals are not being made against  
counsel for the respondent  
14. Reports of Dr. Butter  
113 to 116  
117 to 119  
120 to 126  
127 to 146  
15. Recall of Eugina Rallis  
16. Attempt by the complainant to introduce evidence during her argument  
17. Adjournment to seek medical certificate  
18. Allegation of breach of Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and  
Canadian Human Rights Act  
147 to 149  
A. General  
150 to 162  
163 to 168  
B. Proposals by the Board for guidance to the complainant  
C. Allowing the complainant to pursue argument respecting Charter and Human  
Rights breaches is a denial of procedural fairness and an unwarranted delay  
169 to 175  
D. Code of conduct for adjudicators Treating parties with respect  
E. Length of hearing  
176 to 179  
180 to 187  
188 to 194  
195 to 198  
F. Socializing with one party  
G. Apprehension of bias directions during the hearing  
H. Entitlement to expeditious and fair hearing Necessity of considering the  
allegations and demands of the complainant set forth in her July 22, 2013 email  
199 to 202  
I. Acceptance of evidence  
203 to 212  
213 to 229  
230 to 243  
244 to 247  
248 to 254  
255 to 275  
J. Allegations of "unpleasant interactions" and unfair process  
K. Relief requested  
L. Recusal  
III  
IV  
V
A
B
Procedure  
Facts leading to the hearing of issues before the Board  
Reasons and analysis  
Issues  
276 to 277  
278 to 282  
283 to 292  
293 to 301  
Legislative authority  
C
Evidence of acts alleged to violate section 147 of the CLC  
List of acts of reprisals  
D
1.  
Act of reprisal was Mr. Johnson not calling other departments because he  
302 to 306  
307 to 321  
felt Zabia Chamberlain not able to return to work  
2.  
3.  
4.  
5.  
Act of reprisal was the draft reintegration plan  
Act of reprisal was the permanent saving of the voice mail by Mr. Johnson 322 to 323  
Act of reprisal not giving Zabia Chamberlain a female supervisor  
Act of reprisal was Mr. Johnson did not have the female employee  
324 to 326  
327  
mentioned in the voice mail contact Zabia Chamberlain  
6. Act of reprisal was not to transfer me to another department despite my  
request  
328 to 329  
7.  
Act of reprisal was having meetings with management to discuss my case 330 to 334  
8.  
Act of reprisal was Mr. Johnson not picking up the phone to call other  
335  
departments  
9.  
The letter of Mr. Johnson October 23, 2009 was an act of reprisal  
336 to 337  
338 to 341  
342  
10. Failure to appoint Zabia Chamberlain under employment equity policy  
11. Contravention of the employment equity policy is an act of reprisal  
12. Failure to appoint Zabia Chamberlain to another department  
13. Act of reprisal for Mr. Johnson to indicate there was no penalty imposed  
14. Act of reprisal for Mr. Johnson to question the letter of Dr. Goldstein  
343 to 344  
345 to 348  
349 to 356  
15. Act of reprisal for Mr. Johnson to request Zabia Chamberlain submit to an  
IME  
357 to 360  
361 to 364  
365 to 369  
370 to 372  
373 to 374  
16. Exhibit 41 Mr. Seguin says get more forceful is an act of reprisal  
17. Exhibit 39 briefing note where Mr. Seguin approaches a lawyer who had  
represented Zabia Chamberlain  
18. Holding over my head the status of my leave was an act of reprisal  
19. Act of reprisal for Mr. Johnson to suggest his suspicions it was a matter of  
summer holidays  
20. Act of reprisal for Mr. Trepanier to tell Mr. Johnson there is no need to  
respond to request of Zabia Chamberlain.  
375 to 378  
21. Act of reprisal for Mr. Johnson to indicate he is the delegated authority as 379 to 380  
this was more "bouncing around"  
22. Act of reprisal for Mr. Johnson to send letter November 19, 2009 (exhibit  
31)  
381 to 385  
23. Act of reprisal for Mr. Johnson to send letter dated December 9, 2009  
(exhibit 31)  
386 to 388  
389 to 391  
392 to 394  
24. Act of reprisal to initiate recovery of overpayments  
25. Act of reprisal for Mr. Johnson to ask Zabia Chamberlain to consider the  
reintegration plan and seek proper advice  
26. Act of reprisal for Ms. Powell to send Zabia Chamberlain a pay stub when  
no deposit was made (exhibit 31 January 19)  
395 to 396  
397 to 398  
399 to 401  
402 to 406  
27. Act of reprisal to unilaterally impose leave action on February 25, 2010  
(exhibit 63)  
28. Moving-transferring original assoc-DM responsible for workplace-Safety-  
Accommodation of me  
29. Department did NOT move me though department had authority + ability  
to move Her + any employee to another branch+building  
30. Mr. Fedyk was one of 3 executives who knew of the Safety-  
Accommodation matter that I had reported April-May 2008 before I left the  
building.  
Mr. Fedyk was active on discussing + meeting on my matters to Summer 2010 –  
up to his retirement  
407 to 411  
He took NO action under his Authority to correct Workplace Safety +  
Accommodation matters other than sit in Two-streams of meetings and approve  
Threatening letters.  
and Give direction-alongside ADM Rallis to new-group of 2009 Delegates  
31. Non-Response of ADM Louise Branch to Lawyer-email February 25, 2009 412 to 415  
32. ADM Branch had authority to resolve Safety, Harassment,  
Accommodation matters  
416  
33. Department had authority to relocate me + other Employees  
417  
34. No-Action of Employer in response to lawyer E-mail to use their Authority  
to transfer me to new position either EC-08 or with new EX-01 eligibility  
418 to 420  
35. No-Action of Employer to assist me in my own job-search efforts  
36. Significant threat, financial and Obstruction of Procedure-Policy  
421 to 424  
425 to 431  
37. Threat of non-approved leave, dated back to Oct 2008, still being held over  
my head  
432 to 435  
436 to 439  
440 to 449  
38. Leave-Actions always Retroactive by many many months which is a  
threat to me  
39. Blackberry-charges financial threat, discipline, Anguish, confusion,  
Health-loss  
40. Serge's retirement caused the loss of the only Executive that was left in  
Department I felt I could turn to - the only Executive that I felt comfortable with 450 to 452  
the following the accumulation of matters  
41. Announcement of New DG-delegate, and penalty to me of loss of Privacy  
+ Dignity  
453 to 455  
456 to 461  
462 to 479  
480 to 483  
42. Trauma, shame, fear, dizzying blacking-vision, Nightmares of filling out  
and sending this Safety-form that was sent to me  
43. No follow-up on Assault-Safety form though this form is much  
acknowledged  
44. Non-Lawfully-based threat Non-Procedurally-based threat Non-Policy-  
based threat  
45. Employer-Senior Executives not - acting to resolve upon receiving the  
complaint CLC s. 133(5) shows that they had Authority to Resolve, rather than 484 to 487  
allow matter to go for years of hearing-adjudication  
46. Significant Threat to Privacy, Dignity  
47. Delay in Accommodation  
488 to 501  
502 to 506  
507 to 509  
510 to 511  
48. Delay in leave-approval  
49. Threat of me of unknown pay status and of unknown pay actions  
50. Penalty to me of being bounced + moved from one Executive-Delegate to  
the Other Constantly over 2009  
512 to 514  
515 to 516  
51. Penalizing me of legislated-Requirements for Fairness, Dignity, Respect,  
Accommodation, Harassment, Safety  
52. Personal threat of Aggression by Departmental Executive-Delegate  
53. Refusal to Search for Accommodation  
517 to 523  
524 to 527  
528 to 530  
531  
54. Refusal to grant-offer-arrange a meeting with a female-DG  
55. Refusal to grant-allow phone-calls from Virginia J.  
56. Breach by P. Seguin in contacting Law Firm & Psychologist  
57. ADM Fedyk approving threatening Letter  
532 to 533  
534 to 536  
58. Employer-Senior Executives not-Acting to resolve upon receiving the  
Complaint  
537 to 551  
59. CLC s.133(5) shows that they had Authority to Resolve, rather than allow  
matter to go to years of hearing-adjudication  
552 to 556  
557 to 558  
559 to 563  
60. Breach of Values, Ethics, Professionalism  
61. Threatening letter many reprisals raised + noted in submission February  
5, 2013  
62. Financial Threat of being held at Excluded status  
564 to 571  
572 to 575  
63. Financial Penalty of Legal Fees and related legal-expenses  
64. CAPE wrote Nov/2008 to Spring 2010 affirming their good-faith position  
in declining representation  
576  
577  
65. Adjudicator verbally indicated there was nothing nefarious on the part of  
CAPE  
66. Penalty of Ms. Dingwall's role shifting penalty to health, anguish,  
privacy, dignity  
578 to 580  
581 to 583  
67. Significant Threat to Health, trauma  
68. Breach of CLC 125, 126, 129 Holding me directly attached to work of  
Aggressor  
584 to 585  
586 to 593  
69. Continuing to Injure me with Trauma, fear, Anguish, breaching Human  
Rights grounds of Health + Gender  
70. No Safety, Harassment, Accommodation follow-up arranged for me effect  
Summer 2009  
594 to 595  
596 to 599  
600 to 604  
605 to 606  
607 to 609  
71. No EX-salary  
72. HRSDC-labour writes that my CSST file is closed financial-threat +  
Obstruction  
73. No Means of Compensation  
74. Salary-stoppage by Johnson announced in Dec 2009 letter as Will now  
happen  
75. ADM Rallis NOT taking action on Safety, Accommodation, Salary,  
Harassment  
610 to 614  
76. Loss of Salary  
615 to 625  
626  
77. Financial Penalty  
78. Breach of CLC, breach of CHRA, breach of case law  
627  
79. Retroactive Salary-actions causing significant Trauma, confusion,  
Anguish  
628  
629  
630  
80. Unilateral pay-Actions imposed by Employer  
81. Pay-Section Officers dealing with me to implement the Retroactive  
Unilateral Pay Actions  
82. ROE unjust Constructive Dismissal  
631  
83. Unjust Constructive Dismissal onto non-Salary  
84. Employer's Forced + Unilateral pay-Action and Pay-stoppage  
85. Employer unjustly Dismissing me onto Disability  
86. Discriminating me on Grounds of Health  
632  
633  
634  
635  
87. Refusal to Search for Accommodation  
636 to 654  
655  
88. Refusal to follow requirements requested by Doctors in early 2010  
89. Refusal to Transfer and Reintegrate in new Position  
90. Refusal to exhaust Duty to search for Accommodation  
91. Discrimination of grounds of Health  
656  
657  
658  
92. Refusal to find + facilitate Transfer and Reintegration in new Position in  
another organization  
659  
93. No OHS follow-up on Assault-safety form 1070  
660 to 673  
674  
94. Significant breach of CLC 125 and 129, given no protocol steps on  
Assault-form  
95. Non-lawful Financial threat Non-lawful Financial-penalty  
675  
96. ADM Rallis is the Client ADM Rallis has taken No action to correct  
matters before her  
676  
97. Refusal and Denial of Procedural Help and Action from ADM Rallis  
677  
678  
98. Unjust Dismissal onto to Non-Salary with NO upholding of Duty to  
exhaust accommodation  
99. Unjust Constructive Dismissal and also Blocked non-lawfully from means  
of accessing injury-file  
679  
100. Forced to seek EI degrading, discriminating action of Dismissal  
101. ADM Rallis took NO action other than forward email to D. Trepanier  
102. Penalty of Respect, Dignity, and of Accommodation  
680  
681 to 689  
690 to 701  
103. Though the request was made for Female supervisor, no such  
Accommodation was offered or arranged  
702 to 703  
104. Penalty of Loss of Career  
704 to 713  
714 to 723  
724  
105. Penalty of Desperation to keep my employment and Career  
106. Penalty of desperation to continue working  
107. Penalty of Pleading and Desperation to keep my employment and Career 725  
108. Non-Action and Non-Response of Deputy Shuggart  
726 to 731  
109. CAPE attending as "Observer" not as RepresentativeThis penalty is  
Imposed by Employer  
732 to 737  
738 to 745  
746 to 748  
749 to 769  
110. Penalty of Health, trauma, fear, sorting and Reading privancy [sic]  
Documents  
111. Penalty of health, trauma, fear to have read 16 months after that the  
Blackberry accusation was in fact due to the original-aggressor  
112. Penalty in Fall 2010 of no Procedural Follow-up to Safety and Harassment  
Continuing Breach of live matter going back to 2007-2008  
113. Threat and Penalty of Employer NON-Action  
114. It was Nov 16 2010 that I Petrin finally received leave-Record  
115. Penalty to me of Employer Non-Action  
770  
771 to 786  
787  
116. I should not have to suffer Loss of Pay, Benefits, Accumulated Leave as a  
result of lengthy periods of Employer-Delegates NON Action  
788  
117. Dec 2010 confirms that the Matter I face relates directly to acts-of-  
aggression Reported to Jackson April 2008 While At Work  
789  
790  
791  
118. Penalty of inaccurate information on Aggression-findings  
119. Penalty of inaccurate information that suggest Pay-Section delays in  
coding  
120. Penalty of being held by Employer in non-approved unknown Leave-Pay  
status  
792  
121. Refusal of Respectful treatment by F. Vermaeten  
793 to 807  
808 to 821  
122. Loss of my career, Loss of my established EX-career path  
123. Affirmation in Testimony and Affidavit of Repeated-Distasteful  
Aggression Inflicted  
822 to 829  
124. Trauma-of learning Nov 2010 that a nearby Co-worker was "warned" as 830  
far back as Fall 2007 to not talk  
125. Severe fear, nightmares of whole Organization  
831  
126. Wrongful Constructive Dismissal Breach of all contractual Duties to Me 832 to 837  
127. Breach of Safety + Harassmnet [sic] Investigation procedures continued  
live issue from 2007-2008  
838  
128. Penalty and Threat of no Courage to Return to employer  
839  
840  
129. Penalty and Continued Threat and Continued Penalty of Living on  
Disability that is subject to conditions  
130. Penalty to Health and financially of continually seeking independent-  
Assessments to inform Physicians required Submissions to Disability 2 and 3  
times per year  
841  
842  
131. Penalty of Contact with Employer in Executive-Director for Litigation-  
Labour Relations  
132. Penalty of Delayed Time in studying the locations across the Ottawa-  
Gatineau region  
843 to 847  
848 to 850  
851  
133. Continuing loss of Health  
134. Continuing severe trauma severe agoraphobia and other bad health  
limitations  
135. Severe impact on Family, severe impact on my ability to function as  
Mother, wife and Daughter  
852 to 853  
136. Penalty of Odd-abnormal thing to Save a message continually for 3 years 854 to 858  
137. Breach of all contractual Duties to Me Breach of privacy  
859  
138. Severe Fear and Trauma of my Voice being videotaped in Executive  
House  
860  
139. Refusal-Denial to uphold CLC Safety policy and procedures of employer-  
Witness  
861  
862  
140. Continuing Breach of live Workplace Safety Matter reported while at  
work and while on Salary  
VI  
Analysis of submission on law by the complainant  
863 to 866  
867 to 870  
871 to 894  
895 to 913  
914 to 933  
934 to 940  
941 to 942  
943 to 954  
955 to 956  
957 to 959  
1. Federal workplace policies  
2. Duty to accommodate and human rights  
3. Procedural shams, camouflage, breach of procedural rights  
4. Canada Labour Code, Part II  
5. Post-grievance/complaints continuing, live and subsequent events  
6. Obstruction, threat, financial threat: third-party request  
7. Harassment, violence, constructive dismissal  
VII  
Analysis of submissions of the respondent  
1. Nature of the proceedings  
2. Did the respondent commit acts of reprisals against the complainant in 2009 by  
refusing to "accommodate her health needs", and if so, what is the appropriate  
960 to 970  
remedy?  
a. Who bears the burden of proof?  
b. Is the alleged violation a continuing one?  
3. Rebuttal of arguments of the complainant  
VIII Overall analysis  
971 to 972  
973 to 974  
975 to 1003  
1004 to 1022  
1023  
IX  
Order  
I. Introduction and issues before the Board  
1 The applicant, Zabia Chamberlain, is a long-serving member of the federal public service  
employed in the Department of Human Resources and Skills Development (HRSDC). In 2006,  
she was offered and accepted a temporary promotion to an acting assignment in an excluded EX-  
01 position. She claims that the workload in that position was excessive and that she was  
subjected to ongoing harassment by the supervisor to whom she reported in the acting  
assignment. Matters came to a head in April 2008, when the supervisor swore and shouted at Ms.  
Chamberlain.  
2 In April 2008, Ms. Chamberlain made a complaint to the assistant deputy minister (ADM) to  
whom her supervisor reported. Ms. Chamberlain fell ill shortly thereafter and has not worked  
since. The ADM investigated Ms. Chamberlain's complaint and concluded that Ms.  
Chamberlain's supervisor had violated the Treasury Board "Harassment Policy". Ms.  
Chamberlain, however, was not satisfied with the investigation report and has been engaged in a  
lengthy debate about it with HRSDC.  
3 Ms. Chamberlain's acting assignment in the EX-01 position ended as scheduled at the end of  
October 6, 2008, although she was absent due to illness at the time. HRSDC has offered to return  
Ms. Chamberlain to her substantive position of ES-07 in another branch of HRSDC, but Ms.  
Chamberlain claims that due to her medical condition, she cannot work in the locations that have  
been made available. She also argues that she ought to continue to be paid at the EX-01 level and  
alleges that she was effectively blocked from competing for promised vacancies at the EX-01  
level because her former supervisor, about whom she complained, ran the competitions for these  
positions.  
4 On December 3, 2008, Ms. Chamberlain filed a grievance in which she complained about  
several matters, including the treatment she had received from her supervisor, the investigation  
conducted by the ADM, the contents of the investigation report, her inability to compete for the  
posted EX-01 positions and loss of EX-01 salary, HRSDC's alleged disregard of its obligation to  
ensure her health and safety in accordance with Part II of the Canada Labour Code (R.S.C.,  
1985, c. L-2; "the Code"), the alleged failure of HRSDC to accommodate her, and the  
discrimination she claims to have faced as a woman, a member of a visible minority group and a  
person with a disability. Ms. Chamberlain referred her grievance to adjudication under the Public  
Service Labour Relations Act (S.C. 2003, c. 22, s. 2; "PSLRA"or "the Act"). Ms. Chamberlain  
also filed four complaints with the former Public Service Labour Relations Board ("PSLRB" or  
"the former Board"), alleging that the respondent violated its obligations to provide her with a  
safe work environment under the Code and engaged in reprisals, contrary to the Code.  
5 In a decision dated December 13, 2010, I dismissed Ms. Chamberlain's grievance on a  
preliminary basis, holding that it did not raise any adjudicable issue. In the same decision, I also  
ruled on the four Code-based complaints and held that only portions of them were adjudicable.  
6 That said, if ever there was a case involving a querulous litigant, this would be one. I have  
been seized of this matter for in excess of four years, and in this period of time, there were in  
excess of 60 days of evidence and submissions. Throughout, the complainant displayed much of  
the behaviour attributed to such litigants.  
7 For instance, she suggested the jurisdictional arguments raised by the respondent were acts of  
reprisal and threatening. She summonsed many senior government officials who she either knew  
or ought to have known had little if any knowledge of her case.  
8 She challenged some of my procedural decisions with words such as, "So, you're siding with  
the employer". And she maintained the retirement of a senior department employee with whom  
she had worked for many years was an act of reprisal against her by the respondent.  
9 The complainant filed four complaints under section 133 of the Canada Labour Code. The  
complaints were dated April 23, October 13, October 29 and December 10, 2009. In addition,  
she filed a grievance that was referred to me to adjudicate.  
10 After a week of hearings in the summer of 2010, I rendered the preliminary decision referred  
to in paragraph 5, dismissing the grievance for want of jurisdiction. Additionally, I concluded my  
jurisdiction to hear the complaints was limited (Chamberlain v. Treasury Board (Department of  
Human Resources and Skills Development), 2010 PSLRB 130). The relevant paragraphs of the  
decision state:  
114 In my view, I have very limited jurisdiction to hear the four complaints. I conclude that I can  
hear them, but only as they relate to allegations of reprisals to the grievor's exercise of her rights  
under the CLC that took place in the 90 days before the first complaint was filed. In other words,  
I have no jurisdiction to consider any complaint about any alleged reprisal that occurred before  
January 23, 2009, 90 days before April 23, 2009.  
115 To be clear, the grievor will be able to adduce evidence and make submissions about  
allegations of reprisals that occurred on or after January 23, 2009 under sections 133 and 147  
of the CLC. She will be entitled to present her case, but only as it relates to her allegations that  
the employer, as specified in subsection 133(1), "has taken action against" her "in contravention  
of section 147" on or after January 23, 2009.  
116 In conclusion, I wish to remind the parties that the Board has determined that a CLC  
complaint is not a vehicle to address all workplace issues (see Boivin). In reaching that  
conclusion, I have determined that my jurisdiction is quite restricted as specified in paragraph  
114 of this decision  
11 This decision was challenged by the complainant. The Federal Court - Trial Division remitted  
the decision respecting the grievances back to me in order to consider the application of the  
Canadian Human Rights Act (R.S.C., 1985, c. H-6; CHRA see Chamberlain v. The Attorney  
General of Canada, 2012 FC 1027). The complainant also challenged my decision respecting the  
limitations on my jurisdiction to the Federal Court of Appeal (Chamberlain v. Attorney General  
of Canada, 2012 FCA 44). The Court upheld my decision, and an application for leave to appeal  
to the Supreme Court of Canada was dismissed on August 9, 2012.  
12 As a result of the decision of the Federal Court - Trial Division, I determined that under the  
circumstances, there was no jurisdiction to hear the grievance (Chamberlain v. Treasury Board  
(Department of Human Resources and Skills Development), 2013 PSLRB 115). This decision  
has also been challenged by the complainant and was recently subject of a decision (2015 FC 50)  
which decision dismissed her application for judicial review.  
13 The issue before me is to consider whether or not, based upon a balance of probabilities, the  
complainant has established any impugned actions of the respondent after January 23, 2009  
amounted to acts of reprisal, in contravention of section 147 of the Code.  
14 Despite the fact the complainant applied for judicial review of my preliminary jurisdictional  
decision and additionally requested the decision be reviewed by the former Board pursuant to  
section 43 of the Act, she demanded these complaints be dealt with expeditiously. In fact, the  
complainant made this request before her judicial review application had been set down for  
hearing by the Federal Court.  
15 As the respondent did not object, and in order to attempt to satisfy the requests of the  
complainant, a pre-hearing conference was conducted on April 15, 2011, and a follow-up  
teleconference was conducted on April 17, 2011. During these pre-hearing conferences, the  
parties and the former Board agreed to scheduling nine days of hearing in June and July 2011.  
During these conferences, I suggested the complainant consider the ramifications of her request.  
16 Notwithstanding this, the complainant wanted to move ahead on her complaints, so the  
hearing of the merits commenced on June 6, 2011.  
17 On November 1, 2014, the Public Service Labour Relations and Employment Board Act (S.C.  
2013, c. 40, s. 365) was proclaimed into force (SI/2014-84), creating the Public Service Labour  
Relations and Employment Board ("the new Board") to replace the former Board as well as the  
former Public Service Staffing Tribunal. On the same day, the consequential and transitional  
amendments contained in sections 366 to 466 of the Economic Action Plan 2013 Act, No. 2 (S.C.  
2013, c. 40) also came into force (SI/2014-84). Pursuant to section 393 of the Economic Action  
Plan 2013 Act, No. 2, a proceeding commenced under the Public Service Labour Relations Act  
(S.C. 2003, c. 22, s. 2) before November 1, 2014, is to be taken up and continue under and in  
conformity with the Public Service Labour Relations Act as it is amended by sections 365 to 470  
of the Economic Action Plan 2013 Act, No. 2. Further, pursuant to section 395 of the Economic  
Action Plan 2013 Act, No. 2, a member of the former Board seized of this matter before  
November 1, 2014, exercises the same powers, and performs the same duties and functions, as a  
panel of the new Board.  
II. The hearing  
A. Procedural rulings  
18 On the first day of the hearing, the respondent raised an objection to the issuance of seven  
summonses, requesting I quash them.  
19 Additionally, the complainant raised two issues. The first one was for me to order certain  
named individuals barred from attending the hearing. The second one was for me to allow the  
admission of several affidavits and affirmed statements, which she had filed with the Federal  
Court in support of her judicial review application.  
20 This was the start of several procedural issues raised by the parties throughout the hearing. I  
will deal with the most important of these issues.  
1. Request of respondent to quash summons  
21 After considering the submissions of both parties with respect to the respondent's request to  
quash the summonses, I decided not to grant the request.  
22 In so doing, I accepted that a court, or in this case an administrative tribunal, will not allow a  
fishing expedition. In other words, the evidence must be relevant and significant (see Zündel  
(Re), 2004 FC 798, which refers to Jaballah (Re), 2001 FCT 1287, and to Merck & Co. v. Apotex  
Inc., [1998] F.C.J. No. 294 (T.D.)(QL))).  
23 However, in this case, I concluded if I were to err, I would rather do so on the side of  
ensuring the complainant received a fair hearing. When I rendered this ruling, I reminded the  
complainant although I was allowing her to call these witnesses, she should be aware their  
evidence must be relevant to the limited matters before me.  
2. Request for introduction of affidavit evidence by the complainant  
24 Insofar as the request of the complainant to have me accept as exhibits the affidavits filed  
with the Federal Court was concerned, I ruled that in order to ensure the respondent received a  
fair hearing, I would not admit them as exhibits. I did explain to the complainant if she wished to  
call the affiants or deponents so the respondent could cross-examine them on their evidence, she  
could do so, and the affidavits or affirmed statements would then be admissible, subject to their  
relevance.  
25 On this point, I note despite the explanation provided to the complainant, on the second day  
of the hearing, the complainant called one of the deponents, Mario Rondeau, as a witness. This  
witness had apparently taken the signature of two other deponents. When the complainant  
introduced the affidavit of Mr. Rondeau, she had attached the affidavits or affirmed statements of  
two other individuals. I ruled I would not accept this evidence and once again reminded her of  
the ruling I had made the day before.  
26 Despite this, during the examination of the same witness, the complainant offered as an  
exhibit an email that she had sent to him, and attached to this email were the very same two  
affidavits or affirmed statements she had attempted to offer earlier. Once again, I ruled against  
the acceptance of this document as an exhibit, but I did mark it for identification. In so doing, I  
once again explained to the complainant I would not accept any of the affidavits unless the  
person was called as a witness so the respondent would be allowed to cross-examine him or her.  
27 On the fourth day of the hearing, which was the last day of the first week, the respondent  
offered the affidavits could be introduced if the complainant consented to their cross-  
examination in the presence of a court reporter, in accordance with the Federal Court Rules  
(SOR/98-106). The complainant expressed a willingness to accede to this request, and I asked  
that the parties work together before this matter convened again on July 25, 2011.  
28 Unfortunately, the complainant eventually decided not to accede to this suggestion, and  
during the second week of the hearing, I heard from various of these affiants. As a result of their  
testimony, I received into evidence several of these affidavits, with the consent of the  
respondent, who reserved the right to argue their relevance.  
29 However, with respect to the affidavit of Renata Borysewicz, I initially received her affidavit  
into evidence, again with the conditional consent of the respondent, and adjourned the matter so  
as to review the contents thereof. I concluded as this affidavit was so clearly irrelevant to the  
matters before me, I returned the document and dismissed the witness without hearing any  
evidence from her.  
30 This decision was revisited on July 28, 2011 at the request of the complainant, who submitted  
the evidence of this witness was relevant to the issues before me. I asked the complainant to  
show the respondent the portions of the written documents she claimed were relevant. I decided  
this evidence was either irrelevant or would be more useful if it came from the evidence of the  
complainant herself.  
31 Despite these rulings, the complainant continued to pursue the right to call Ms. Borysewicz.  
She wrote to the staff of the Public Service Labour Relations Board, who in turn advised her she  
could call this person as a witness. Given this correspondence, and in order to ensure the  
complainant received a fair hearing, I recanted my original ruling and advised the complainant  
this witness could be called.  
3. Request by the complainant to bar named individuals from attending the hearing  
32 At the outset, the complainant requested I bar certain named individuals from attending,  
whether as witnesses or observers. I was advised by counsel for the respondent she might call  
two of these individuals, but she did not know the other three persons. Given this, I ruled I could  
not bar anyone, least of all potential witnesses, as to do so would impede the respondent from  
answering the case of the complainant. In so doing, I reminded the parties this was an open  
hearing.  
33 When the complainant indicated she did not wish to be in attendance during the possible  
testimony of these witnesses, I advised her she had the right to absent herself and should ensure  
she attended during their testimony, but ultimately, it was her decision.  
34 On July 28, 2011, the complainant again raised her concerns about being present when these  
witnesses testified. I reiterated the point I had made originally and suggested it would be wise if  
she did remain in the room during their testimony so she could hear what they testified.  
35 With respect to the other three persons, I did not make a ruling but indicated to the  
complainant as she was the only person who could identify them if they were ever in attendance,  
she should advise me, and we could deal with her request then. In saying this, I reminded her of  
the policy of the Board that hearings are open to the public and she would have to provide a very  
compelling argument for me to make an order that would bar anyone from these proceedings.  
She did not raise this issue again.  
4. Request by respondent that I rule on whether I had jurisdiction to hear evidence with  
respect to matters occurring after December 10, 2009  
36 The respondent raised an objection as to whether or not I had the jurisdiction to hear evidence  
of matters that occurred after December 10, 2009, being the date the last of the four complaints  
before me was filed. The complainant submitted I did, based upon her reading of LaBranche v.  
Treasury Board (Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade), 2010 PSLRB 65  
(specifically, paragraphs 162 to 171).  
37 Rather than ruling upon this at the outset, I allowed the complainant to adduce evidence of  
matters occurring after this date, and indicated I would rule on this jurisdictional issue in the  
body of the decision.  
38 In the second week of the hearing, the complainant submitted she considered that the  
respondent's objection was threatening in nature. Counsel for the respondent responded by  
denying this was the case. I reminded the complainant such objections were not to be taken  
personally and were quite commonplace in matters such as this one.  
5. Request to record proceedings  
39 At the commencement of the hearing in July 2011, the complainant asked if she would be  
allowed to record the proceedings. In support of her request, she submitted this would assist her  
in the presentation of her case.  
40 I ruled against this request and in so doing advised the complainant such a recording would  
be of little use to her and the only recording that might be accepted as impartial would be of a  
certified court reporter.  
41 Additionally, in order to accommodate her because she stated she found it hard to take notes,  
I allowed her to have someone sit beside her and with the use of a computer, take notes of the  
proceedings for her own use. This was not objected to by the respondent. In fact, for most days  
during these proceedings, the complainant took advantage of this opportunity.  
42 On July 9, 2012, prior to the resumption of the hearing, the complainant wrote to the former  
Board (exhibit 117). In this communication, she asked for the remainder of the proceedings to be  
recorded by a court reporter. In response to this, the respondent communicated with the former  
Board and outlined their opposition to this request.  
43 At the commencement of the hearing on July 16, 2012, I entertained arguments from both  
parties with respect to this issue.  
44 The complainant submitted this case was both lengthy and complex and therefore I should  
depart from the long-standing practice of the former Board. The complainant pointed to  
paragraph 22 of the Federal Court of Appeal decision (see Chamberlain,2012 FCA 44) in  
support of her contention this matter was complex.  
45 It is useful to quote exactly what the Court stated. The Court opined as follows: "I would only  
add that the reasons given by the Board indicate that, despite the voluminous and confusing  
nature of Ms Chamberlain's submissions, it dealt fully and fairly with her complaints and the  
issues that they raised".  
46 In my view, this statement does not confirm the matter is complex; rather, it confirms the  
complainant has not been willing or able to articulate her case in a cogent and understandable  
manner. It would be imprudent of me to draw a conclusion as to the complexity of a case based  
upon a self-represented individual's ability to present their case.  
47 In further support of her position, she referred to Singaravelu v. Deputy Head (Correctional  
Service of Canada), 2009 PSLRB 8, and Ayangma v. Treasury Board (Department of Health),  
2006 PSLRB 64.  
48 The respondent, on the other hand, argued this case had already taken several days and could  
conceivably take many more. In this regard, the respondent pointed out the complainant was still  
presenting her case. Furthermore, counsel for the respondent noted in her opinion, this was not a  
complex matter, and the order should not be granted.  
49 I asked the complainant if she were willing to pay the entire costs of the court reporting  
services if, and I emphasized this, I were to grant her request. In response to this request, she  
indicated she would be willing to pay for the cost of attendance of the reporter but not for the  
preparation of the transcripts for the respondent.  
50 In any event, after considering the request, I concluded any such order was discretionary, and  
I was unwilling to grant the request of the complainant, especially after having granted her the  
right to have notes taken by a third party. I noted at the hearing the reasons for this decision  
would be found in the final decision, but I did advise the parties I neither found this case to be  
complex in nature nor was I convinced this request would assist the parties or the process.  
51 Subsequent to this ruling, a decision was released supportive of my finding. In the case of  
Boshra v. Canadian Association of Professional Employees, 2012 PSLRB 78, the learned  
adjudicator adopted the rationale found at paragraph 29 in Singaravelu.  
52 The learned adjudicator also made reference to the Supreme Court of Canada, which  
recognized the absence of a recording of a transcript does not compromise the principles of  
natural justice or fairness (Canadian Union of Public Employees, Local 301 v. Montreal (City),  
[1997] 1 S.C.R. 793).  
53 My conclusion is reinforced by the ruling in Boshra.  
6. Request of complainant to enter opinion evidence in the form of expert testimony  
54 On the fourth day of the hearing, the complainant called Deborah Jelly as a witness. Ms. Jelly  
is a consultant who performs various types of administrative investigations for employers,  
including various federal government departments. I was advised the evidence of this witness  
was an opinion as to the nature of the investigation the respondent conducted in 2008. The  
respondent objected to this form of evidence, and I explained to the complainant the process of  
qualifying an expert.  
55 After considering the evidence of the witness, I had no hesitation in qualifying Ms. Jelly as an  
expert in the field of workplace harassment and harassment investigations. In coming to this  
conclusion, I was struck by two points. The first was Ms. Jelly was integral in the development  
of harassment policies that have been adopted by many government departments, including the  
respondent. Secondly, the respondent did not object to her being declared an expert.  
56 That said, I upheld the objection of the respondent that the evidence of Ms. Jelly should not  
be accepted. As stated by me at the hearing on June 30, 2011, the opinion evidence of this  
witness deals with an investigation, which occurred in 2008. My preliminary decision in this  
matter concluded my jurisdiction was with respect to determining if the respondent committed  
acts of reprisal against the complainant after January 23, 2009. So, as a consequence, the opinion  
of this witness was of no relevance to the matters before me.  
57 Furthermore, even if my jurisdiction included determining the validity of the 2008  
investigation, I would not have accepted her testimony for two reasons. First, and perhaps most  
importantly, it would have been of little help to hear her testimony, for as the trier of fact, it  
would be my determination that is most relevant. Furthermore, I am the gatekeeper of evidence,  
and in my view, despite the expertise of the witness, her evidence would have been of little  
assistance to me for the reasons outlined below.  
58 In coming to this conclusion, I considered the learned words of the judiciary in the following  
two cases: R. v. Abbey, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 24, and R. v. J.-L.J., 2000 SCC 51. In the second case,  
Justice Binnie reviewed the case law and confirmed the list of criteria the trier of fact should  
consider in exercising their role as "gatekeeper". This list includes considering the subject matter  
of the inquiry. In other words, is it such that ordinary people are unlikely to form a correct  
judgement about it? In my view, the opinion evidence of Ms. Jelly would not satisfy this  
threshold. Ms. Jelly's evidence was to be a critique of the manner in which the investigation into  
Ms. Chamberlain's complaint of harassment was performed. I am of the opinion that this issue is  
not one that necessitates expert evidence. The written policies and procedures on such  
investigations along with a careful review of the facts will be sufficient to permit an ordinary  
person to form a correct judgment about the manner in which the investigation was conducted.  
59 Secondly, according to Justice Binnie, I must consider if the evidence is about a novel  
scientific theory or technique. I again conclude the testimony of Ms. Jelly did not meet this  
threshold.  
60 Thirdly, I must consider how close the opinion approaches an opinion of the ultimate issue to  
be determined. The complainant submitted throughout the hearing the investigation conducted in  
2008 was unfair and was otherwise flawed. If I had concluded this issue was before me, then the  
evidence of Ms. Jelly would have been in fact addressing the ultimate issue the complainant  
wanted considered.  
7. Additional summonses requested by the complainant  
61 During the first week of the hearing, the complainant requested I issue further summonses.  
One was for Ian Shuggart, a deputy minister. Given the fact the complainant had already  
summonsed Helene Gosselin, another deputy minister, and it became clear the complainant had  
never met her, and furthermore, the witness provided no relevant testimony, I indicated to the  
complainant the issuance of a summons to Mr. Shuggart would be conditional.  
62 Furthermore, due to the time restraints of two witnesses, Gina Rallis and Frank Fedyk, the  
examination by the complainant had not concluded. Although I indicated to the complainant the  
evidence of these two witnesses was for the most part irrelevant to the matter before me, I  
allowed her to recall them, but I placed the same conditions on this request as I did with respect  
to request for the issuance of any summons to Mr. Shuggart.  
63 The conditions I imposed were to restrict the complainant to adducing evidence on relevant  
matters. I ordered the complainant to communicate with the former Board with a copy to the  
respondent and outline the specific questions she intended to ask and to further indicate the  
specific documents to which the complainant intended to refer the witness. Once in possession of  
this information, I would rule upon whether the summons to Mr. Shuggart would be issued or  
alternatively, if the complainant could recall either Mr. Fedyk or Ms. Rallis.  
64 As it turned out, the complainant did not pursue her request for the issuance of a summons to  
Mr. Shuggart.  
65 Upon the resumption of the hearing on July 25, 2011, I was advised by counsel for the  
respondent the complainant had contacted Mr. Fedyk, Ms. Rallis and Marilyn Dingwall to  
determine when they could appear to testify. Although the complainant had, at least to some  
extent, complied with my ruling insofar as Mr. Fedyk was concerned as she had supplied a list of  
areas she wished to cover with him, she had not obtained my permission to recall this witness.  
Furthermore, the complainant had never indicated a desire to recall Ms. Dingwall and had not  
provided a list of questions she wished to ask of Ms. Rallis.  
66 As Mr. Fedyk had agreed to attend, I allowed the complainant the right to recall him on July  
27, 2011, but I ensured she only question him with respect to the areas she had indicated in  
communication with the former Board and copied to the respondent.  
67 As for Ms. Rallis and Ms. Dingwall, the complainant finally provided the intended questions  
to be asked, and she made submissions on July 28, 2011. After hearing the submissions of the  
parties, I ruled the complainant could recall Ms. Rallis, but I identified the questions that could  
be asked of the witness.  
68 With respect to the request to recall Ms. Dingwall, I denied the request of the complainant as  
in my view, she had not established a "good cause" for me to order the recall. I also concluded  
the questions that the complainant wished to ask of Ms. Dingwall were not relevant to the issues  
before me.  
69 In rendering my decision on this matter, I reminded the complainant the ability to recall a  
witness is not a right and I was the person who had to determine whether or not such an order  
would be granted. I made reference to the prevailing case law in this regard and suggested it was  
she who had to convince me there was "good cause" to order the recall of the witnesses.  
70 Despite the initial decision of the complainant not to pursue the request for a summons to  
issue to Mr. Shuggart, during the fourth week, she changed her mind and asked that I issue  
summonses to Mr. Shuggart and Janice Charette. On December 19, 2011, I listened to arguments  
from the complainant and the respondent as to whether or not I should issue these summonses.  
71 The complainant admitted she had not spoken to either of these two individuals. Although she  
did email them, she had not received any responses. I reminded her again of the danger of calling  
witnesses for which she has no idea of what their evidence may be and with whom she has not  
spoken. Regardless, the complainant stated she still wanted to call these two witnesses.  
72 When asked specifically what evidence the complainant would be adducing, she did not  
address the question. Essentially, the complainant submitted as deputy heads, these individuals  
held the ultimate responsibility of dealing with the allegations. Also, she submitted the role of  
accommodation lies with the deputy head of the Department of Human Resources and Social  
Development.  
73 In response, the respondent submitted there were four criteria that I should consider before  
issuing the summonses requested. These criteria were as follows:  
1. The relevance and materiality of the evidence to be adduced.  
2. Would the granting of the summonses allow Zabia Chamberlain to engage in a "fishing  
expedition"?  
3. Is the granting of the summonses requested an abuse of process?  
4. Would the issuance of the summonses requested result in requiring the witnesses to  
breach their privilege? (Nelson v. Canada (Minister of Customs and Revenue), 2001 FCT  
843; R. v. Harris, 1994 2986; Zündel, Re; and Laboratoires Servier, Adir, Oril  
Industries, Servier Canada Inc. v. Apotex Inc., 2008 FC 825.)  
74 In this case, the respondent argued the complainant provided no basis for calling these  
witnesses. Counsel for the respondent also noted many of the witnesses called by the  
complainant were of little help to me in the determination of the issues before it. Counsel for the  
respondent reminded me the evidence would be better coming from the mouth of the  
complainant.  
75 After considering the submissions of both parties, I decided to take the request under  
advisement. In so doing, I indicated that I was inclined not to grant the request for the  
summonses, but in order to give the complainant the benefit of the doubt, I would hear the rest of  
her evidence-in-chief and then make my decision.  
76 After having concluded her examination-in-chief and her cross-examination, I advised the  
parties I was not going to issue the summonses as requested as there was no evidentiary or legal  
basis laid by the complainant proving these individuals had any relevant or material evidence  
that would assist me in my inquiry. I concluded, much like many of the other witnesses that the  
complainant had called, the issuance of these would result in a "fishing expedition". In coming to  
this conclusion, I was swayed by the fact the complainant had not so much as communicated  
with either Mr. Shuggart or Ms. Charette and could offer no explanation of the evidence she  
intended to adduce.  
77 On August 21, 2012, during a teleconference, the complainant again made a request for me to  
issue further summonses. Specifically, she requested summonses be issued to Ian Shuggart,  
Deputy Minister, Department of Human Resources and Social Development; Janice Charette,  
former Deputy Minister, Department of Human Resources and Social Development; Stephen  
Johnson, Director General at the Department of Human Resources and Social Development;  
Sandra Webber, Director General, Human Resources, Department of Human Resources and  
Social Development; Patricia Ellis, former Team Leader and Manager at the Department of  
Human Resources and Social Development; Renata Borysewicz, former Director at the  
Department of Human Resources and Social Development; and Dr. Maureen Stewart.  
78 The respondent objected to the issuance of summonses to Mr. Shuggart and Ms. Charette on  
the basis summonses had previously been rejected and the complainant failed to advance any  
new basis for her request.  
79 Upon questioning as to the purpose of calling Mr. Shuggart, the complainant acknowledged  
she had never met or spoken with this person. Furthermore, she was unable to provide me with  
an example of any testimony this person could provide that would otherwise not be better  
provided by other witnesses. Accordingly, I decided not to issue a summons to Mr. Shuggart.  
80 For exactly the same reasons, I decided not to issue a summons to Ms. Charette, with whom  
the complainant had likewise not spoken.  
81 Insofar as the request to summons Mr. Johnson was concerned, counsel for the respondent  
advised she would be calling this person as a witness, and given this undertaking, I determined  
not to issue a summons to him.  
82 The complainant decided to withdraw her request for a summons to Ms. Ellis.  
83 I granted the request for a summons to be issued to Ms. Borysewicz, but I cautioned the  
complainant the evidence of this individual was to be restricted to her personal knowledge of  
matters that occurred post-January 23, 2009.  
84 Finally, I noted the summons already issued to Dr. Stewart was, in my view, still in effect.  
8. Exclusion of witnesses  
85 At the commencement of the hearing, the respondent requested an order for the exclusion of  
witnesses. I explained to the complainant I had little or no discretion when asked to grant this  
order.  
86 I granted the order and asked all witnesses to leave the room. In so doing, I explained to the  
parties the purpose of such an order and reminded all witnesses during the hearing after their  
testimony, they were not to speak with any other witness or potential witness as to what they  
testified.  
9. Further reports from Doctors Goldstein and Stewart  
87 During the week of December 19 to 22, 2011, the complainant attempted to introduce two  
documents. These documents appeared to be, for the most part, yes and no answers provided by  
her treating physician, Dr. Stewart, and her treating therapist, Dr. Goldstein, to a series of  
questions drafted by the complainant. Counsel for the respondent objected to the introduction of  
these documents.  
88 In ruling not to accept them, I noted the complainant and the respondent had agreed to the  
introduction of several medical certificates. I also reminded the complainant the respondent had  
the right to cross-examine these witnesses with respect to their answers. Therefore, if the  
evidence in these documents was considered to be important to the case of the complainant, she  
should call them as witnesses in the normal course of the proceedings.  
10. Order for disclosure of further medical reports  
89 During testimony in February 2012, the complainant alluded to the fact she had seen four (4)  
doctors. The complainant advised me of the names of these doctors as until then there had only  
been reference to doctors Goldstein and Stewart.  
90 The complainant testified she had been referred by Dr. Stewart to Dr. Moncion and Dr.  
Butter. Counsel for the respondent asked for the production of any and all reports issued by these  
doctors. On occasion, the complainant was accompanied by a lawyer, and on this occasion, she  
was. After consulting with her legal counsel, the complainant agreed to provide these reports and  
supply them to counsel for the respondent by the end of May 2012.  
91 During the proceedings on July 17, 2012, the issue of whether the complainant had complied  
with her commitment was reviewed. The complainant testified she had not provided these reports  
to counsel for the respondent. I proposed an adjournment for the day so the complainant could  
obtain these reports from the doctor and provide them to the respondent. The complainant  
refused to supply these documents, despite her earlier commitment.  
92 Faced with this refusal, I adjourned the hearing and ordered the complainant contact the  
office of Dr. Stewart and obtain a copy of the reports of Dr. Moncion and Dr. Butter and provide  
them to counsel for the respondent.  
93 On July 18, 2012, at the commencement of the hearing, the complainant advised she had  
contacted the offices of Dr. Stewart and she would supply counsel for the respondent with copies  
by the end of the day.  
94 At the end of the proceedings on July 18, 2012, the complainant advised she was concerned  
with the dissemination of these reports. Having heard submissions on this point, I ordered that  
the dissemination of the information contained in these reports would be limited to the disclosure  
that was necessary for the purposes of this hearing. I further ordered that in any portion of this  
hearing wherein these documents were being considered, I would consider a motion by either  
party to proceed in the absence of the public.  
95 I am concerned that the medical reports contain highly sensitive personal information, which  
relates to mental health issues involving the complainant, and their dissemination could have a  
negative impact upon her health and future security. While neither party applied for a sealing  
order specifically, the complainant did make her concerns regarding the dissemination of the  
reports clear to me, and I acknowledged her concerns. In attempting to address these concerns in  
my decision, I have come to the conclusion that a sealing order is required in order to give effect  
to my ruling during the hearing.  
96 The default position in a hearing before the PSLREB is the open court principle, meaning that  
all the information before the PSLREB should be available to any member of the public,  
including the media. The Board has published its "Policy on Openness and Privacy" on its  
website and has stated:  
The open court principle is significant in our legal system. In accordance with that principle, the  
Board conducts its oral hearings in public, save for exceptional circumstances. Because of its  
mandate and the nature of its proceedings, the Board maintains an open justice policy to foster  
transparency in its processes, accountability and fairness in its proceedings.  
… Parties and their witnesses are subject to public scrutiny when giving evidence before the  
Board, and they are more likely to be truthful if their identities are known. Board decisions  
identify parties and their witnesses by name and may set out information about them that is  
relevant and necessary to the determination of the dispute.  
At the same time, the Board acknowledges that in some instances mentioning an individual's  
personal information during a hearing or in a written decision may affect that person's life.  
Privacy concerns arise most frequently when some identifying aspects of a person's life become  
public. These include information about an individual's home address, personal email address,  
personal phone number, date of birth, financial details, SIN, driver's licence number, or credit  
card or passport details. The Board endeavours to include such information only to the extent  
that is relevant and necessary for the determination of the dispute.  
97 The Dagenais/Mentuck test is the applicable test to consider in sealing information or  
exhibits: Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835, and R. v.  
Mentuck, 2001 SCC 76. The elements of this test are:  
(a) Is the order necessary in order to prevent a serious risk to an important interest, including a  
commercial interest, in the context of litigation because reasonably alternative measures will not  
prevent the risk?  
and:  
(b) Do the salutary effects of the order, including the effects on the right of civil litigants to a fair  
trial, outweigh its deleterious effects, including the effects on the right to free expression, which  
in this context includes the public interest in open and accessible court proceedings?  
98 The Supreme Court of Canada has clarified that the party seeking a sealing order bears the  
onus of justifying its issuance based on sufficient evidence a general assertion of potential  
harm is insufficient. In addition to considering the evidence adduced by the parties, the decision  
maker is legally bound to consider the constitutional protection that has been extended to the  
right of the public to access evidence, even if no party argues for that right.  
99 In applying the Dagenais/Mentuck test, I am concerned that the publication of the mental  
health particulars of the complainant might impact her rehabilitation or raise security concerns if  
the information becomes public. The publication of the information contained in the exhibits is  
not essential to a transparent understanding of this decision. I order that the medical reports  
entered as exhibits be sealed.  
11. Ruling of Federal Court - Trial Division  
100 On August 31, 2012, the Federal Court - Trial Division rendered a decision  
(Chamberlain,2012 FC 1027). In this decision, the learned trial judge upheld my ruling with  
respect to the dismissal of the grievance, however:  
… remitted [the matter] back to Mr. Filliter (if he is available, or to another adjudicator if he is  
not) for the consideration of whether a PSLRB adjudicator possesses jurisdiction to adjudicate  
upon Ms. Chamberlain's human rights claims, and if so, to hear and decide those claims on their  
merits.  
101 At the resumption of the hearing on September 10, 2012, I discussed the significance of the  
aforementioned decision insofar as the issues before me concerning the complaints under the  
Canada Labour Code were concerned. Both parties were in agreement the ruling of the learned  
trial judge had no impact upon this process and agreed to proceed in continuing to call evidence  
and submitting arguments on the complaints, subject to the limitations on my jurisdiction.  
12. Allegations concerning the integrity of the proceeding made by the complainant  
102 On many occasions during these proceedings, the complainant exhibited fits of anger  
towards witnesses, counsel for the respondent and me. It was during these frequent outbursts the  
complainant often made serious allegations against the truthfulness of her own witnesses, the  
professional approach of counsel for the respondent and the impartiality of me.  
103 To the credit of the witnesses who had received summonses by the complainant and who  
were then challenged with respect to their honesty, not one of them became defensive, and all  
allowed the fit of anger to pass.  
104 In the same vein, counsel for the respondent, for the most part, at least until the latter part of  
the evidentiary portion of the hearing, did not react.  
105 Finally, I also did not hold the complainant accountable for most of the unsubstantiated  
allegations she made during these emotional outbursts. However, I did often remind her that such  
outbursts were not helpful to the conduct of the hearing.  
106 That is, until January 15, 2013. On this day, the complainant, just before the noon-hour  
break, had another outburst, during which she accused me of discriminating against her on the  
basis of "the colour of her skin". To this first comment I did not react, but towards the end of the  
day, the complainant repeated the allegation, but this time not in a fit of rage but while a witness  
was on the stand.  
107 I asked the witness to leave the room, at which time I advised the complainant I took her  
allegation very seriously as it called into question the integrity of the proceedings, the  
impartiality of me and, indirectly, the actions of counsel for the respondent. I indicated if this  
was her true belief, she should move to have me remove myself. In stating this, I told the  
complainant if such a motion were not made, I expected her to withdraw the allegation for the  
record.  
108 After consulting with her supporters present, including a person Ms. Chamberlain identified  
as a legal assistant who sat with her throughout a large part of the hearing, the complainant stated  
for the record this allegation was withdrawn. I accepted her withdrawal and adjourned until the  
next day. Before leaving, I urged the complainant, as I had in the past, to stop making these types  
of allegations unless she intended to deal with them.  
109 The next day, despite my admonishment, and following a ruling I made on the admissibility  
of a document, the complainant, in a fit of anger, alleged I was "again siding with the employer".  
This was not the first time she had suggested this, and I reminded her of her previous similar  
allegations. I asked if she intended to move I recuse myself from this matter, and she stated she  
did not. I then asked she withdraw this and her previous similar allegations for the record.  
110 Again, after consultation with her supporters, the complainant withdrew this and her  
previous similar allegations.  
13. Confirmation allegations of acts of reprisals are not being made against counsel for the  
respondent  
111 On February 6, 2013, counsel for the respondent once again voiced her concerns the  
complainant was making allegations that counsel for the respondent had personally acted in a  
manner that might be considered an act of reprisal.  
112 After consideration, the complainant stated for the record she clearly and unequivocally was  
not making any allegation counsel for the respondent acted in any manner that would be  
considered, either directly or indirectly, an act of reprisal against the complainant.  
14. Reports of Dr. Butter  
113 At the end of the evidentiary portion of the case for the complainant, she mentioned she was  
seeing a new doctor, Dr. Butter, and asked permission to submit as evidence the reports he issued  
to her family physician. Counsel for the respondent objected, asking for the opportunity to cross-  
examine Dr. Butter. The complainant advised she would not be calling Dr. Butter as a witness  
and did not pursue her request to enter the report into evidence.  
114 However, during rebuttal evidence, the complainant once again asked to admit into evidence  
the most recent report of Dr. Butter. Counsel for the respondent revisited her objections.  
115 I explained to the complainant I had to consider many issues before determining if I could  
accept the letter. First of all, before the close of the case for the complainant, I had asked whether  
she was going to call Dr. Butter, and was advised "no". Secondly, I had been consistent in my  
rulings of not allowing evidence to be submitted without the opportunity of it being challenged  
in cross-examination. Thirdly, there appeared to be certain portions of the letter deleted, and this  
caused the respondent concern. Fourthly, if I were to consider the request to admit the document,  
the respondent might ask her to agree to or alternatively that I order the complainant to submit to  
an independent medical examination. Finally, the respondent might ask for an adjournment in  
order to present its own expert opinion to counter the opinion of Dr. Butter.  
116 After consideration, the complainant withdrew the document, thus negating the need for me  
to make a ruling on its admissibility.  
15. Recall of Eugina Rallis  
117 Ms. Rallis testified on June 28, 2010, and at the completion of her direct examination,  
counsel for the respondent declined the opportunity to cross-examine her. On July 27, 2010, the  
complainant moved to recall her as a witness. After considering the request and given the fact  
Ms. Rallis had been pushed to complete her testimony on the first day as she was scheduled to  
fly overseas, I granted the complainant the opportunity of recalling her, but in order to avoid  
undue duplication of testimony and to ensure the complainant ask only relevant questions, I  
reviewed the lengthy list of questions she wished to ask and made rulings on the appropriateness  
of the questions.  
118 Some questions were not allowed as they called for opinion evidence, and I explained to the  
complainant the answers to these questions would not in any way assist her case. Other questions  
were reworded once I understood what the intent of the inquiry was. Still others were disallowed  
as the questions were identical to those that had been asked the first time Ms. Rallis was called or  
were irrelevant to the matter before me.  
119 On April 30, 2013, during submissions, the complainant, for the first time, raised this issue  
in the context of her not being provided a fair hearing. I allowed the lists of questions with  
notations from both sides to be introduced as evidence (exhibits 163 and 164). After a review of  
the questions, the complainant indicated she was not pursuing the issue of fairness on this aspect.  
16. Attempt by the complainant to introduce evidence during her argument  
120 On June 11, 2013, the complainant, during her argument, made reference to two documents,  
which had not been introduced as exhibits during the proceedings. Counsel for the respondent  
argued the complainant should not be allowed to introduce these documents at this stage of the  
proceeding as to do so would prejudice their position as they would not be allowed to address the  
contents thereof.  
121 The complainant, on the other hand, asked that I mark these documents as exhibits.  
122 After considering the positions of both parties, I concluded I was not prepared to introduce  
the documents (referred to as PRD # 1735 and 2991) as exhibits. I indicated I was of the view to  
do so would be inappropriate, a breach of the rules of natural justice and an error in law. Thus,  
any reference made to these documents by the complainant would be deleted from the record,  
and the complainant was ordered not to make any further reference to them.  
123 In coming to my conclusion, I noted the complainant had ample opportunity to put both of  
these documents to four of her witnesses (Ms. Rallis, Mr. Fedyk, Mr. Trepanier or Ms. Dingwall)  
or, alternatively, during her extensive cross-examination of the witness for the respondent (Mr.  
Johnson).  
124 The complainant argued she was not allowed to ask questions of Ms. Rallis regarding these  
documents. I reminded the complainant the limitation of her questioning of Ms. Rallis was only  
with respect to the recalling of her. There was no limitation placed on the complainant when she  
first called this witness.  
125 For all of these reasons, I concluded I would not accept the documents as exhibits.  
126 Despite my ruling and the explanation of my rationale, the complainant continued to argue  
for 25 more minutes on the ruling. During this time, I reminded her on several occasions I had  
made my ruling and urged her to move on with her argument on the merits. When she did not, I  
adjourned the matter for a short period of time so as to allow the complainant to compose herself  
and address the merits of the matter before me.  
17. Adjournment to seek medical certificate  
127 At around 3:30 p.m. on June 11, 2013, the complainant broke down in tears. Although she  
had emotional breakdowns at various times during the course of the proceeding, this was the first  
time she stated, "I am wondering if I have the health to continue". Counsel for the respondent  
noted her concerns, as did I. As a result, I adjourned the matter until 11:00 a.m. June 12, 2013 in  
order to allow the complainant to determine if she could see her treating physician or therapist.  
128 On June 12, 2013, I convened the hearing, and the complainant indicated she was unable to  
contact either her physician or therapist.  
129 After considering the position of the complainant and listening to the position of the  
respondent, I adjourned the matter to the next scheduled hearing date (July 25, 2013) and advised  
the complainant I needed her to supply a medical certificate, either from her physician (Dr.  
Stewart) or her therapist (Dr. Goldstein), which addressed the following three questions:  
1. Is Zabia Chamberlain healthy enough to continue to participate in these proceedings and  
to fully engage in the conduct of her case and to facilitate the case management of her  
case?  
2. If so, are there any restrictions or limitations on the ability of Ms. Zabia Chamberlain to  
continue participating in these proceedings?  
3. If so, what if any accommodation measures should the Board consider providing Ms.  
Zabia Chamberlain in order to allow her to complete the presentation of this case?  
130 The former Board sent the complainant correspondence enclosing a letter she was requested  
to provide to her doctors, which articulated the questions noted above, and on July 16, 2013, the  
complainant provided the response of Dr. Stewart.  
131 The correspondence from Dr. Stewart failed to address the first question I posed and went  
into great detail on other matters.  
132 Notwithstanding this, the doctor then listed seven accommodations, which she stated were  
"required". As a general comment, this letter confirmed my previously held belief, formed as a  
result of her testimony, that Dr. Stewart had transcended from the role of objective medical  
advisor to that of an advocate. As such, I was faced with deciding how much reliance I could  
place on the opinion of Dr. Stewart.  
133 In support of this conclusion, I was particularly struck by the reference by her to considering  
"recent information from various observers, written to her doctors, describing some incidents and  
pressures Mrs. Chamberlain has faced in these hearings". The identities of the observers were not  
revealed, and the incidents were not described. I am left with the question as to how this could in  
any way be related to providing an objective medical opinion as to the ability of a patient of a  
doctor to continue to represent herself.  
134 It is helpful to summarize the position articulated by Dr. Stewart as in my view, in its  
totality it represents an attempt to advocate on behalf of her patient for things, some of which had  
already been dealt with earlier in the hearing.  
1. The provision of "proper court reporting and transcript of all remaining PSLRB days".  
2. The provision of a second adjudicator, preferably a full-time female, to be present for the  
remainder of the hearing.  
3. That "Mrs. Chamberlain not be blamed for discussion of repeated physical and emotional  
aggressive abuses she suffered in the workplace. These abuses were proven in the  
Employer's own investigation and have been confirmed by witness testimony to this  
hearing".  
4. The presentation of the rest of the evidence and to "read all her case presentations with a  
minimal or no interruption".  
5. "It is required that there be no more than three (3) hearing days each week, spaced every  
second day, with a day of rest and recovery between hearing days". That said, the doctor  
also indicated that the complainant was able to participate in the back-to-back days  
scheduled for July 25 and 26, 2013.  
6. The doors and window blinds in the room were to be closed so as to reduce exposure to  
loud noises and bright lights, which trigger or worsen stress/migraine headaches.  
7. "It is essential that the PSLRB allow the Adjudicator(s) adequate time, prior to the  
hearing days, to read all the documents and submissions received throughout the past four  
years".  
135 When I reviewed the letter in its entirety, the first thing I noted was the issue of the court  
reporter had been dealt with earlier in the proceedings. I repeat my findings and conclusions in  
paragraphs 39 to 53. In my view, the doctor provided no medical justification to explain why a  
court reporter was required for the duration of the hearing or how the provision of this service  
would have been any better than the accommodation I had provided to the complainant.  
136 In a similar vein, the complainant had previously requested a second adjudicator, and this  
was refused as to do so would be a breach of natural justice.  
137 With respect to points 3, 4 and 7, I had on many occasions explained the realities of an  
adversarial system to the complainant. I had also explained on several occasions when I  
interrupted, it was to ensure I understood the submissions of the complainant or to alternatively  
provide some direction and assistance to her. It is to be noted I also was perplexed by the  
statements of the doctor in point 3 and how these might in any way be related to a medical  
opinion.  
138 Finally, I concluded the accommodation measures noted in points 5 and 6 were well  
founded.  
139 On July 19, 2013, the former Board wrote the complainant as follows:  
Board Member Filliter has reviewed Dr. Stewart's July 15, 2013, report and has directed me to  
advise the parties as follows:  
After a review of Dr. Stewart's report in its totality, it is clear that the report fails to directly  
answer Question 1 of Board Member Filliter's June 13, 2013, letter addressed to Ms.  
Chamberlain's treating physician or treating therapist.  
Question 1 reads as follows: "Is Ms. Zabia Chamberlain healthy enough to continue to  
participate in these proceedings and to fully engage in the conduct of the her case and to  
facilitate the case management of her case?" Question 1 is a threshold question which was to be  
answered by either Dr. Stewart or Dr. Goldstein.  
In order to proceed with the next hearing dates scheduled to start July 25, 2013, Ms.  
Chamberlain is required to obtain in writing a clear a specific answer to Question 1 from her  
treating physician or treating therapist.  
Nonetheless, Board Member Filliter has reviewed the itemized accommodation requirements  
detailed in Dr. Stewart's report and has interpreted them to provide a full answer to Questions 2  
and 3 in the June 13, 2013, letter. His ruling concerning said requirements is as follows:  
Requirement 1 Ms. Chamberlain raised the issue of a court reporter in the course of the  
proceedings and Board Member Filliter rejected the request. However, Ms. Chamberlain was  
permitted to have a person of her choice present for the purposes of taking notes for her use. She  
has had persons with her throughout the process for this purpose and this seems to have  
"minimize confusion about verbal statements said in the hearing, and to minimize the need for  
her to have to repeat information she has already provided." In the view of Board Member  
Filliter nothing has changed since his earlier ruling and he is not prepared to grant the request  
at this juncture, especially since all the evidence has been adduced. In coming to this conclusion  
Board Member Filliter notes there is no medical reason provided to suggest a court reporter is  
needed rather than the process already provided to Ms. Chamberlain.  
It should be noted that Board Member Filliter has always permitted others attending the hearing  
to take notes on Ms. Chamberlain's behalf for her use and purposes, thus minimizing her own  
need to do so. The practice of allowing Ms. Chamberlain to attend the hearing with persons of  
her choosing tasked with taking notes on her behalf and for her purposes will continue.  
Requirement 2 The issue of having a 'second adjudicator' present has been addressed  
previously. As determined before, no such person will be present. The Chairperson of the PSLRB  
appointed Board Member Filliter as a single-member panel of the Board with respect to these  
matters as is permitted pursuant to the Public Service Labour Relations Act.  
It is noted that there does not appear to have been a medical basis provided for this requirement.  
Furthermore, it would be a fundamental denial of procedural fairness and a breach of natural  
justice to introduce a second decision maker that has not been seized and present throughout this  
process. Finally, it is not within the powers of the Board member seized with this matter to  
assign another Board member to join the proceedings at this very late stage and to do so would  
be in breach of the Public Service Labour Relations Act. Accordingly, this accommodation  
requirement is not granted.  
Requirement 3 This does not appear to be a description of an accommodation requirement.  
Rather, it appears to be a commentary on the conduct of the hearing, of which the writer of the  
report was not in attendance. As the "requirement" does not establish an accommodation  
measure, there is no ruling to be made on this requirement.  
The parties are reminded that they are engaged in an adversarial process, and that the  
principles of natural justice and procedural fairness require that both parties be afforded the  
opportunity to challenge the positions taken and evidence presented by their respective  
adversaries. The parties are also reminded the Board Member Filliter is the master of his own  
proceedings, and as such, he may interrupt a party in order to seek clarification or confirm  
understanding, make determinations and rulings, issue orders, and exercise all the powers  
pursuant to the Public Service Labour Relations Act.  
Requirement 4 Regarding the requirement to avoid interrupting Ms. Chamberlain while she  
presents evidence and 'case presentations', the parties are reminded again that the principles of  
natural justice and procedural fairness require that parties be afforded the opportunity to  
challenge the positions of their respective adversaries. This principle extends to raising  
objections. The parties are also reminded the Board Member Filliter is the master of his own  
proceedings, and as such, he may interrupt a party in order to seek clarification or confirm  
understanding, make determinations and rulings, issue orders, and exercise all the powers  
pursuant to the Public Service Labour Relations Act. Accordingly, this accommodation  
requirement will not be granted.  
Requirement 5 The requirement to schedule no more than 3 non-consecutive hearing days in a  
week, spaced every second day, is granted.  
Any further hearing days in the present matter will be scheduled in this way. It is noted that Dr.  
Stewart has indicated that Ms. Chamberlain is capable of proceeding for the consecutive hearing  
days scheduled for July 25 and 26, 2013. Therefore, these days will proceed without a "day of  
rest" between the hearing days. However, Board Member Filliter will be sensitive to the needs of  
Ms. Chamberlain and will review with the parties at the commencement of […] matter on July  
25, 2013 whether the matter […] go a full day on July 26, 2013.  
Regarding the hearing days scheduled for July 30 to August 1 and September 16 to 20, 2013,  
Board Member Filliter will canvass the parties on July 25 or 26, 2013, as to how to proceed with  
the specific scheduling of hearing days and days of rest in these blocks.  
Requirement 6 As indicated above, Board Member Filliter has never had any issue with Ms.  
Chamberlain being accompanied by others for support during the hearing. In fact, the hearing is  
a public hearing and Ms. Chamberlain has always had supporters accompanying  
her.Accordingly, this accommodation requirement will be granted, with the sole caveat that such  
supporters will have to adhere to the decorum expected in a public hearing room. It is noted that  
adherence to such decorum by Ms. Chamberlain has not been a problem in the past.  
Regarding keeping doors and window blinds partially closed, this will be granted. Board  
Member Filliter notes this is the very first time this request has been made.  
Requirement 7 This also does not appear to be a description of an accommodation  
requirement. Rather, it appears to be a commentary on the conduct of the hearing, of which the  
writer of the report was not in attendance. As the "requirement" does not establish an  
accommodation measure, there is no ruling to be made on this requirement.  
Furthermore, the parties are again reminded that Board Member Filliter is the master of his own  
proceedings pursuant to the Public Service Labour Relations Act.  
It is again noted that Question 1 of Board Member Filliter's letter was not answered.  
Accordingly, and in light of the above ruling, Ms. Chamberlain is directed to seek and provide in  
writing, by no later than July 22, 2013, an answer from a treating physician or therapist to the  
following question: "Is Ms. Zabia Chamberlain healthy enough to continue to participate in  
these proceedings and to fully engage in the conduct of her case and to facilitate the case  
management of her case."  
Finally, please note that until further notice, all future correspondence should be directed to the  
undersigned as the Officer of the Board's Registry responsible for these files in place of Lisa  
Woodstock.  
[Sic throughout]  
140 Dr. Goldstein, the therapist for the complainant, signed a letter dated July 22, 2013. She  
responded to the first question posed by me by stating "Yes. Mrs. Chamberlain is healthy enough  
to proceed with and to manage the conclusion of her matters raised to the PSLRB".  
141 However, the therapist went further and stated she agreed with the requirements of Dr.  
Stewart. In stating this, Dr. Goldstein said: "The doctors also gave serious consideration to  
Affidavits and recent reports of observers to the PSLRB that described incidents and pressures  
that Mrs. Chamberlain faces in these hearings".  
142 For the very same reason I articulated respecting Dr. Stewart, I am of the view the opinion  
of Dr. Goldstein shows she also transcended from that of an objective medical professional to  
one of advocate. As such, I was faced with determining if I could rely at all on her opinion.  
143 In this letter, Dr. Goldstein does review some of recommendations proposed by Dr. Stewart  
and adds her own. It is useful to summarize her conclusions and address them.  
1. Requirement 1 - With respect to having a court reporter, Dr. Goldstein referred to an  
incident when the persons who usually attended to take notes were not available.  
2. Requirement 2 - Although this "requirement" revolved around the use of a second  
adjudicator, Dr. Goldstein made reference to the fact that the registry officer now  
assigned to the case had changed, which was unrelated to the "requirement".  
3. Requirement 3 - The wording of this was particularly disturbing as it established without  
doubt the advocacy role of Dr. Goldstein.  
4. Requirement 5 - This "requirement" was that I not schedule hearing dates consecutively,  
yet Dr. Goldstein recommended considering scheduling the hearing during the weekends.  
5. Requirement 7 - Dr. Goldstein suggested the complainant not be questioned as to the  
location of documents to support her submissions.  
144 On July 22, 2013, the complainant emailed the acting Chair of the former Board and  
requested his intervention by claiming her rights under the CHRA and the Canadian Charter of  
Rights and Freedoms ("the Charter") were being infringed. The complainant had in the past  
included the Chair in a plethora of emails and had been advised clearly such allegations were to  
be brought before me, being the decision maker assigned to the case. Accordingly, this email was  
forwarded to me.  
145 At the commencement of the proceedings on July 25, 2013, I read this prepared statement:  
This matter was set down to continue today with hearing the rest of the argument on the merits of  
the matters before me. However, much has happened since we were here on June 12, 2013. I  
also want to say the letter from Zabia Chamberlain to the Chair has been forwarded to me to  
address.  
You all will recall we adjourned on June 12, 2013 so as to allow the complainant the opportunity  
to obtain a letter from either her doctor or her therapist. The letter being requested by myself  
was to address the following three questions I posed:  
1) Is Zabia Chamberlain healthy enough to continue to participate in these proceedings  
and to fully engage in the conduct of her case and to facilitate the case management of her case?  
2) If so, are there any restrictions or limitations on the ability of Ms. Zabia Chamberlain  
to continue participating in these proceedings?  
3) If so, what if any accommodation measures should the Board consider providing Ms.  
Zabia Chamberlain in order to allow her to complete the presentation of this case?  
On July 15, 2013 Dr. Stewart signed a letter in which she did not answer the first question  
posed, offered a lot of medical information which was neither requested or helpful and rather  
than making suggestions for accommodation measures offered the following requirements which  
I summarize as follows:  
1) Provision of "proper court reporting and transcript of all remaining PSLRB days."  
2) Provision of a second adjudicator, preferably a full time female to be present for the remainder  
of the hearing.  
3) That "Mrs. Chamberlain not be blamed for discussion of repeated physical and emotional  
aggressive abuses she suffered in the workplace. These abuses were proven in the Employer's  
own investigation and have been confirmed by witness testimony to this hearing."  
4) Presentation of the rest of the evidence and to "read all her case presentations with a minimal  
or no interruption."  
5) "It is required that there be no more than three (3) hearing days each week, spaced every  
second day, with a day of rest and recovery between hearing days.' That said the doctor also  
indicated that the complainant was able to participate in the back to back days scheduled for July  
25 and 26, 2013.  
6) The doors and window blinds in the room are to be closed so as to reduce exposure to loud  
noises and bright lights which trigger or worsen stress/migraine headaches.  
7) "It is essential that the PSLRB allow the Adjudicator(s) adequate time, prior to the hearing  
days, to read all the documents and submissions received throughout the past four years.  
Because of my concern respecting the health of the complainant I directed the Board to send a  
follow up letter which was done on July 19, 2013. This letter is self-explanatory and resulted in a  
letter dated July 22, 2013 being signed by Dr. Goldstein which was received by the Board  
shortly thereafter. This letter made the following points which I comment on:  
Requirement 1 - With respect to having a court reporter Dr. Goldstein refers to an incident  
when the persons who usually attended to take notes were not available. This was during the  
presentation of the argument of the complainant and I do recall this incident. On this occasion  
and on the few other times it occurred I asked the complainant if she wanted to continue and she  
agreed to do so despite not having a note taker with her. During those instances I was careful to  
ensure the complainant was able to take full notes of the proceedings. Dr. Goldstein also makes  
reference to a recommendation of a Dr. Moncion supporting this request. Dr. Moncion did not  
testify and I have reviewed his letters which were offered into evidence (exhibits 150, 151 and  
155) and see no such recommendation. But, regardless, I am willing to further accommodate the  
complainant by deciding if the person normally attending with the complainant for the purposes  
of note taking is unavailable we will not proceed. But, I do ask the complainant, out of courtesy,  
to advise the Board offices as soon as she is aware of the unavailability of these persons so as not  
to waste valuable hearing time.  
Requirement 2 - Dr. Goldstein makes reference to the fact the case is now being overseen by  
Nick Miller rather than Lisa Woodstock. This is an internal management decision of the Board  
and has no bearing on the proceedings itself which are being conducted by me. It is noted Dr.  
Goldstein makes reference to a recent letter form Dr. Moncion, a partner of Dr. Goldstein and  
this letter is not in evidence before me.  
Requirement 3 - The wording of this is particularly disturbing as it establishes the advocacy role  
of Dr. Goldstein insofar as this issue is concerned. This is what she said "Affidavits and reports  
from observers show that Mrs. Chamberlain has felt blamed at the hearings. Sensitivity is  
important, particularly for workplace abuses already confirmed in Employer documents and  
witness court declarations." I am not sure what is being referred to in this sentence which  
purports to be part of a medical opinion. Additionally, it does not make any recommendation in  
any event.  
Requirement 5 Dr. Goldstein recommends considering scheduling the hearing during the  
weekends. This seems to fly in the face of the proposed 3 day limitations on hearings proposed  
by Dr. Stewart.  
Requirement 7 Dr. Goldstein makes reference to the complainant being questioned as to the  
location of documents to support her submissions. The complainant has been advised on several  
occasions of the difference between evidence and exhibits which are to be considered by the  
decision maker and correspondence with the Board which does not form part of the record. It is  
important as the hearer of this matter to ensure the complainant is referring to evidence and  
exhibits in her argument rather than documents that are not to be reviewed by myself and do not  
form part of the record.  
I think it only fair the parties be advised of my conclusion respecting the nature of the reports of  
both Dr. Stewart and Dr. Goldstein. In my view I must be careful to put much reliance on these  
letters. Upon review of the letters I have concluded that with respect to finite issue of the three  
questions posed to these doctors they have transcended from the role of being an objective  
medical advisor the opinions of which I can put the utmost reliance on to that of an advocate for  
the complainant. Once a professional medical advisor leaves his or her role as an objective  
medical professional the courts have consistently determined their opinions must be scrutinized  
if they are to be considered at all.  
That said, as these doctors have provided letters over the duration and there has been no  
evidence their opinions have been harmful to the complainant I am prepared to partially  
accommodate the complainant. Other than offering to not sit if she does not have a note taker the  
letter of the Board dated July 19, 2013 stands. In this regard I am drawing the conclusion Zabia  
Chamberlain is capable to continue with these proceedings and in so doing I rely upon the  
opinion of Dr. Goldstein. If this level of accommodation does not suit the complainant she is  
asked to advise me today.  
However, this is not the end of the matter. On July 22, 2013 the complainant wrote to the acting  
Chair of the Board alleging amongst other things the position of the Board as set forth in the  
letter of July 19, 2013 breached her rights under the Canadian Human Rights Act and the  
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The basis of these allegations are not obvious on  
their face and perhaps involve complex legal principles.  
That said Zabia Chamberlain has been advised before and I am reminding her again that to send  
such a letter to anyone but the officer in charge of the file is inappropriate. All correspondence is  
reviewed by the officer and if appropriate will be forwarded to me by Mr. Miller as I am the  
Board member assigned to this case. In summary I am once again advising the complainant to  
cease and desist in sending such communication to persons other than the officer in charge of  
the case.  
I consider this letter an challenge to the integrity of the proceedings. I thank the complainant for  
raising her concerns, and as master of the proceedings I am not prepared to proceed until I have  
had time to fully consider the position now being adopted by the complainant after many days of  
hearings.  
Ms. Chamberlain, I am going to ask you a question that demands a yes or no answer only.  
However, before requiring an answer I am suggesting that you consider this question very  
seriously and consult with whomever you feel is appropriate. The question is "are you prepared  
today to articulate your argument with respect to the allegation your Charter rights and  
human rights are being violated?"  
If you say yes then we will proceed on that issue alone. If you say no we are scheduled to return  
next Tuesday at which time I will allow you that day to present your argument on this single  
issue. We would then break for a day as per the accommodation I am prepared to grant you and  
allow counsel for the employer to present her response on Thursday.  
[Sic throughout]  
146 After considering the question for in excess of an hour, the complainant advised she would  
rather present her argument on the issues she raised in her emails of July 22 and 23, 2013 on July  
30, 2013.  
18. Allegation of breach of Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and Canadian Human  
Rights Act  
147 On July 30, 2013, the complainant arrived late and was not willing to commence on time.  
On this occasion, she commenced at 09:46.  
148 I reminded the complainant at the commencement of the proceedings she was to address the  
allegations set forth in her email of July 22, 2013, in which she raised issues to the effect the  
former Board was acting in a manner that breached her rights as set forth in the CHRA and the  
Charter. Both parties then presented their arguments to me on this issue alone.  
149 On August 22, 2013, the following email was sent to the parties:  
1)  
In the circumstances of the case, Board Member Filliter has concluded that the Canadian  
Human Rights Act (CHRA) does not apply to these quasi-judicial proceedings. In the  
alternative, Board Member Filliter is of the view that the complainant has not made out a case of  
a violation of the CHRA.  
2)  
In the circumstances of the case, Board Member Filliter has concluded that sections 7 and  
15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Charter) do not apply as argued by the  
complainant to these quasi-judicial proceedings. Additionally, Board Member Filliter is of the  
view that the complainant has failed to make out a case that there has been any violation of the  
Charter.  
3)  
The proceedings have been and continue to be conducted in accordance with the rules of  
natural justice, procedural fairness and the Code of Conduct and Guidelines for Members of the  
Public Service Labour Relations Board (Code of Conduct), and has been and continues to be  
conducted in as expeditious a fashion as the complainant allows.  
4)  
There is no foundation to grant any of the relief requested. Additionally, many of the  
requested items of relief would violate the rules of natural justice, procedural fairness and the  
Code of Conduct as they apply to the employer.  
5)  
As part of these proceedings, the complainant provided what she termed to be a  
"conditional acceptance" of Board Member Filliter's impartiality. As the complainant  
maintained the position that Board Member Filliter engaged in "conditional impartiality", Board  
Member Filliter considered her motion as one for his recusal. Based on the applicable legal test  
and in light of the evidentiary burden on the applicant in such motions, which evidentiary burden  
was not met by the complainant, there is no basis for Board Member Filliter recusing himself.  
6)  
The complainant will continue her argument on the merits of the above-noted matters  
commencing on September 16, 2013, and continuing again on September 18 and 20, 2013 as  
indicated in the Notice of Hearing dated August 7, 2013.  
As indicated at the close of arguments, full and final reasons for the above will be set out in the  
final decision in these matters.  
A. General  
150 As counsel for the respondent noted, the question to be asked is whether sections 7 and 15  
of the Charter apply to this situation.  
151 In my view the answer to this question is "no".  
152 Section 7 of the Charter talks about principles of fundamental justice and is not applicable  
in this instance. There was no evidence the fundamental rights of the complainant, those being  
life, liberty and security, were violated. The case of Blencoe v. British Columbia (Human Rights  
Commission), 2000 SCC 44, defines the parameters of the applicability of section 7, and these  
were not met in the case before me. In my view, there is no evidence the "state" has caused any  
delay in the processing of this matter, so I conclude there is no causal connection.  
153 Section 15 of the Charter speaks of equality rights and is likewise not applicable in this  
case. As counsel for the respondent noted, the complainant has been afforded a level of  
procedural fairness, which allowed her to call as many witnesses as she wished and offer  
evidence she wished, and the respondent limited their objections.  
154 The test to engage section 15 of the Charter is articulated in R v. Kapp, 2008 SCC 41. I  
agree with counsel for the respondent there was no evidence of a violation of section 15 of the  
Charter. When one fully analyzes the argument of the complainant, she alleges there was what  
she categorized as an unpleasant tone of communications during the hearing, and this is the basis  
of her argument of unequal treatment. This allegation, even if founded in fact, which I quickly  
add I do not think to be the case, is not founded in law.  
155 Counsel for the respondent also properly pointed out that for sections 1, 2, 3, 7 and 14 of the  
CHRA to apply, one must conclude this Board is providing a service. For this and for reasons to  
follow, I reject the allegations of the complainant.  
156 The complainant read from a prepared statement. She made very lengthy introductory  
remarks referring to the correspondence from the former Board to the complainant (exhibits 165  
and 167), the prepared statement delivered by me on July 25, 2013 and the list of  
accommodation measures I had granted the complainant as a result of communications from her  
doctor and therapist.  
157 The complainant made reference to a speech made in April 2013 by a representative of the  
Canadian Human Rights Commission. It was not introduced as evidence, but in any event, the  
complainant simply submitted the representative confirmed the CHRA covers the discriminatory  
actions of all in the public service and requires, in some instances, accommodation to the point of  
undue hardship.  
158 As general statements, I cannot disagree, but I do take issue with any suggestion the  
Commission oversees the acts of this Board. The Commission has no authority to oversee the  
acts of a decision maker because of the principle of judicial independence (see Cartier v. Nairn,  
2009 HRTO 2208; Gonzales v. Ministry of Attorney General, 2009 BCSC 639).  
159 Do the oversight powers of the Commission extend to the Board? In my view, the answer is  
"no", for the same reasons they do not extend to a judge.  
160 I am of the view the general principle of judicial independence extends to quasi-judicial  
boards, such as this one. In support of this conclusion, the Federal Court adopted the words of  
the Ontario Divisional Court, which saw "[t]he mischief of penetrating the decision process of a  
tribunal is exactly the same as penetrating the decision process of a judge". (Agnew v. Ontario  
Association of Architects (1988), 64 O.R. (2d) 8, and Canada (Privacy Commissioner) v. Canada  
(Labour Relations Board),[1996] 3 FCR 609.)  
161 Therefore, if the complainant was suggesting the Commission has oversight powers with  
respect to the proceedings before, me I disagree. It is the courts that have the power to oversee  
the actions of the Board. Further, the legislation explicitly gives the Board oversight in some  
instances with respect to provisions of the CHRA.  
162 For these reasons, I conclude the complainant has no right pursuant to the provisions of the  
CHRA for accommodation to the point of undue hardship as she alleges. All of that said, even if I  
am wrong, I addressed the issue of the accommodation requested by the complainant in the  
context and granted her accommodation commensurate with the medical advice she provided.  
B. Proposals by the Board for guidance to the complainant  
163 The complainant submitted since February 2013, she had asked to be allowed to get through  
her arguments without interruption or interference. She alleged that by suggesting certain  
approaches to her in order to assist her in the presentation of her submissions in an organized  
fashion, I impacted her right to a fair hearing under the Charter and under the CHRA.  
164 On two occasions, I attempted to focus the complainant in her argument by posing certain  
questions.  
165 The first question I posed was, "What direct evidence ties the actions of the employer into  
allegations of reprisal in contravention of section 147 (a) to (c) of the Code?" This did result in  
the complainant speaking to about 46 allegations, albeit, as will be seen later in these reasons, in  
a rather convoluted and unorganized fashion.  
166 The second approach I proposed was for the complainant to compile a list of allegations she  
alleged amounted to acts of reprisal. The complainant provided two documents, and they did  
provide some direction to the argument of the complainant.  
167 Both approaches were ways of asking her to address the issue before me. And when she  
followed the suggestions, her arguments had more structure.  
168 The complainant also alleged I had unduly interrupted her and interfered with her argument  
when I asked her to show direct evidence of acts of reprisals. This is not reflective of my  
recollection. I do acknowledge on occasion asking her for clarifications or explanations, and my  
intention was always to assist her as her argument otherwise was extremely confusing and  
unfocused and, thereby, ensured that I, as decision maker, understood her case.  
C. Allowing the complainant to pursue argument respecting Charter and Human  
Rights breaches is a denial of procedural fairness and an unwarranted delay  
169 The complainant argued my statement of July 25 requiring the complainant to argue on the  
single issue of the allegations of her rights under the Charter and CHRA was a risk to her right to  
a fair and expeditious hearing and affected her health.  
170 According to the complainant, both of her doctors' overriding requirements were to allow  
her to finish her argument with minimal interruption. The complainant argued this portion of the  
overall process was unnecessary and did not provide her with her rights set forth in sections 7  
and 15 of the Charter as there was an inequity in not being allowed to continue to argue the  
merits uninterrupted.  
171 The complainant also submitted both of her doctors provided opinions of her health needs.  
The complainant categorized this portion of the hearing as a misuse of hearing time and again  
submitted the interlocutory matter was unnecessary. The complainant raised concerns her  
fundamental rights of natural justice and procedural fairness for a hearing were not being  
complied with, and she submitted the Act requires an expeditious hearing.  
172 I reiterate the comments I made in paragraphs 127 to 146 about the medical opinions of her  
doctors. In my view, one does not need to review very much of the letters to note the role both  
doctors took. For instance, neither doctor proffered a medical opinion as to why a court reporter  
was required, yet they both had an opinion, without any medical basis, that it was now a  
requirement. At the very least, one would have expected one of the doctors to have explained  
why the accommodation granted to the complainant early in the proceeding was lacking but such  
was not addressed.  
173 Furthermore, both doctors took some time and effort to indicate they had read affidavits or  
spoken to persons in attendance at the hearing, yet they did not indicate who these persons were  
or what was being said. And they both indicated they relied upon this information in coming to  
their conclusions. This evidence was never placed before me.  
174 Dr. Stewart is responsible for the complainant's whole health. In the view of the  
complainant, the doctor wrote about the health limitations from both physical- and mental-health  
standpoints. That may be the view of the complainant, but it is not a view I share for the reasons  
enunciated above.  
175 As a result, I am not prepared to accept without question the medical opinions of either  
doctor, for as I stated in the prepared statement, both have transcended from the role of objective  
medical advisor to that of advocate on behalf of the complainant, even though I agreed to  
accommodate the complainant based on the recommendations of her medical consultants.  
D. Code of conduct for adjudicators Treating parties with respect  
176 The complainant also argued the overriding requirement was she be allowed to finish her  
submissions with minimal interruption. As such, the complainant again submitted this  
interlocutory motion was unnecessary. In making this submission, the complainant argued that I,  
as decision maker, should know of my obligations under the Act and the Code of Conduct  
published on the former Board's website. This has been addressed by the Board both in its  
correspondence of July 19, 2013 (exhibit 167) and the statement read by me on July 25, 2013.  
177 The complainant then spent significant time reading portions of the Code of Conduct. She  
addressed the section of the Code of Conduct dealing with the apprehension of bias and no  
appearance of favouritism. Without any evidence, the complainant alleged over the 4 years of  
hearing, she and purported witnesses (which have apparently attested in writing) have never  
heard me raise my voice to counsel for the respondent or otherwise spoken in a belligerent or  
unpleasant manner to them. In the same vein, the complainant submitted these same witnesses  
have "testified" to having heard unpleasant verbal interaction with the complainant.  
178 This allegation is most difficult to address given I was not provided with any of the alleged  
statements, so I cannot make findings of fact. That said, her recollection of my behaviour  
towards her is not compatible with mine. I have at all times treated the complainant with respect  
and dignity, showing sensitivity to her needs, culture, gender and human rights. I will admit at  
times I have had to speak in a direct fashion to the complainant but only when she has  
interrupted, failed to follow my directions or orders, or acted in an unruly and accusatorial  
fashion towards me or counsel for the respondent.  
179 Despite the allegations of the complainant, I have listened carefully to her views and showed  
respect to her. I certainly tried to demonstrate a high degree of sensitivity to her culture, gender  
and human rights.  
E. Length of hearing  
180 The complainant attempted to suggest I was responsible for the length of the proceedings,  
and as a result, she has not been a provided an expeditious hearing.  
181 I would certainly agree this matter has taken an inordinate amount of time. In my view, this  
case should have taken no longer than 5 to 7 days.  
182 I will also acknowledge at various times, I would interrupt the complainant in an attempt to  
give her some guidance on process and to further protect her interests. That said, she seldom if  
ever followed my guidance or suggestions.  
183 As of the date of making this argument, being July 30, 2013, we had sat for 41 days. During  
this time, the complainant had called 24 witnesses, and if you take into account the 1 day counsel  
for the respondent directed her one and only witness and the maximum of 3 days she used to  
cross-examine witnesses, it is clear the complainant utilized 37 of the 41 days.  
184 Furthermore, the complainant never started at the appointed time. On average, she was 20 to  
30 minutes late commencing in the morning and 15 to 20 minutes late starting after the lunch  
break. This does not take into account the time she was late after breaks in the mornings and  
afternoons or the unduly lengthy breaks she took before posing questions. I allowed her this time  
in order to accommodate her as she did not wish to proceed without her support team, who were  
often the persons who arrived late and with whom she wished to consult. It was also not unusual  
for her to consult with her supporters for upwards of 30 minutes before posing questions.  
185 This extensive period of time is directly attributable to the complainant.  
186 Finally, as I have alluded to in this decision, the complainant spent an inordinate amount of  
time calling evidence and arguing with respect to circumstances not within my jurisdiction. I am  
speaking of circumstances that predate January 23, 2009, a date upheld by the Federal Court of  
Appeal. Indeed, even in her argument, she again attempted to suggest I consider matters  
occurring in the pre-January 23, 2009 period.  
187 In a word, I find this allegation to be frivolous and unfounded.  
F. Socializing with one party  
188 The complainant then referred to the portion of the Code of Conduct that admonishes  
decision makers from having meals or socializing with one party. I am glad I asked the  
complainant if she was alleging I had socialized with the respondent as she acknowledged I had  
not. However, I was utterly surprised when the complainant alleged I had spoken to Mr. Johnson  
during the time he was a witness. When I asked for a clearer understanding of this allegation, she  
indicated I was in the hallway looking at my smart phone while Mr. Johnson spoke in sentences  
to me. She did not suggest she had seen me respond, and she did not hear what was allegedly  
being said by Mr. Johnson.  
189 Additionally, the complainant submitted while on the witness stand Mr. Johnson rolled his  
chair up to the desk where I sat. I pause here to note that as Mr. Johnson's testimony took place  
over several days, it was heard in two distinct rooms. One had a table where I sat, and the other  
had a desk. The complainant specifically referred to the desk, and it should be noted it would  
have been impossible for Mr. Johnson or any witness to "roll his chair" up to the desk without  
coming from behind the witness stand, which was stationary and similar to a cubicle.  
190 Even if this did occur, which it did not, one wonders how this could be considered social  
interaction.  
191 These allegations were made without the benefit of evidence I could consider, but  
nonetheless, they need to be addressed.  
192 First and foremost, I am struck by the undisputed fact the complainant did not raise a  
concern at the time these alleged incidents occurred. This would have allowed the witness to  
testify as to what occurred and for counsel for the respondent to address the concerns  
accordingly. I draw an adverse inference from this fact.  
193 Furthermore, the complainant admitted at one point in time I had raised the fact to both  
parties I had inadvertently met up with Mr. Johnson in the foyer of the building while getting  
coffee. This admission confirms my practice as an arbitrator/adjudicator for some 10 years.  
194 I have no recollection of what is being alleged ever occurring. But, had I spoken with Mr.  
Johnson as the complainant alleged, I would have raised this with both parties at the resumption  
of the hearing as I had done when I unexpectedly met him in the foyer.  
G. Apprehension of bias directions during the hearing  
195 The complainant also submitted the orders and directions given to her far outweigh those  
given to the respondent. In her view, this is evidence of an apprehension of bias. I take issue with  
this allegation. What the complainant considers orders and directions were provided to her to  
assist her in presenting her case within the boundaries that a hearing imposes.  
196 In general terms, counsel for the respondent referred me to the case of Wagg v. Canada  
(Attorney General), 2003 FCA 303, where in paragraphs 31 to 33, the Court agreed that a judge  
could intervene for the purposes of focusing a self-represented litigant. This is what I did  
consistently throughout the hearing.  
197 One of the directions the complainant raised was what she referred to as "disallowing"  
certain questions of Ms. Rallis. In this regard, reference was made to exhibits 163 and 164. I  
repeat my findings and conclusions in paragraphs 117 to 119 and note when this witness was  
recalled, I did make an order limiting the questions to be asked or, alternatively, reformulated  
these questions. The questions were argumentative, already asked or poorly worded. Counsel for  
the respondent categorized my involvement as "entirely appropriate to direct and guide" a self-  
represented person.  
198 In making reference to this incident, the complainant submitted I had subjected her to cross-  
examination during her argument. I was taken aback by this unsubstantiated allegation. I did ask  
questions of the complainant during her submissions for clarification and assisted her when she  
did not appear to understand, but I did not cross-examine her, as alleged.  
H. Entitlement to expeditious and fair hearing Necessity of considering the  
allegations and demands of the complainant set forth in her July 22, 2013 email  
199 The complainant argued she has a right to conclude the presentation of her case in an  
expeditious fashion. She specifically raised sections 7 and 15 of the Charter,which she alleges  
deal with her legal rights.  
200 I agree with the complainant. She is entitled to a fair and expeditious hearing, but again, the  
facts cannot be forgotten. It was she who decided to call 24 witnesses (many of whom provided  
irrelevant evidence); it was she who had argued for a full seven (7) days; and it was she who  
raised the issues of the Charter and CHRA in an email of July 22, 2013 (exhibit 169). These are  
the reasons for this portion of the hearing.  
201 As noted by counsel for the respondent, exhibits 169 and 170 confirmed the complainant  
requested action from the acting Chair of the former Board. Therefore, the so-called  
interlocutory hearing was necessitated by the complainant herself and was further confirmed by  
the allegations of the complainant throughout her argument where, as counsel for the respondent  
put it, she "disclosed the issues which were troubling her".  
202 As the complainant called it, the "diverting" of a number of hearing days to address the  
issues raised by her in her July 22, 2013 email was in my view necessary. I alluded to this in my  
prepared statement. These allegations challenged the integrity of the proceeding and had to be  
dealt with as did the demands of the complainant.  
I. Acceptance of evidence  
203 The complainant argued that the Board has the statutorily conferred power and authority to  
accept any evidence, whether admissible or not in court. However, section 226 is not applicable  
in this case as it sets out the powers of adjudicators as opposed to those given to panels of the  
Board.  
204 The complainant again referred me to her request to recall Ms. Rallis as evidence of me not  
accepting evidence in accordance with this power. First and foremost, the so-called power is  
discretionary, and I must always be aware of the rules of natural justice and procedural fairness.  
Secondly, with respect to the recall of Ms. Rallis it is true, as noted above, I did limit questions  
to be asked of her as the complainant had called her earlier when there were no such restrictions.  
205 As explained, I was not allowing the complainant to go on a fishing expedition and further  
noted the evidence of Ms. Rallis when she testified the first time for the most part was not  
relevant. I explain this in more detail above. It is also to be noted that some questions I did not  
allow the complainant to ask while for others, I reworded them. I repeat my findings and  
conclusions in paragraphs 117 to 119 and 197.  
206 The complainant suggested she was not allowed to ask questions on what the parties  
referred to as "the 3rd party form". This is not true, but I did limit her from asking questions that  
called for the opinion of the witness. In so doing, I explained to the complainant the reason and  
that she would be able to argue about this form and the opinion evidence would not be of much  
assistance. The same can be said of the allegations of the complainant concerning what the  
parties referred to as "the assault form".  
207 In her argument, the complainant suggested I should have allowed her to enter two  
documents as exhibits during her closing submissions. I analyzed this more fully earlier in this  
decision. These documents were not in evidence, and the complainant could have examined  
several of her witnesses with respect to them but chose not to do so. To allow her to enter the  
documents as exhibits during this point of the proceeding would have put the respondent in an  
unfair position. As such, although I can allow evidence that would otherwise not be accepted in a  
court of law, I erred on the side of ensuring a fair hearing. In my view, this decision did not  
affect the health of the complainant as alleged, and there was no evidence adduced to support  
this allegation. I repeat my findings and conclusions in paragraphs 120 to 126.  
208 The complainant argued that during the discussion concerning these documents, I in effect  
cross-examined her. It is to be noted this exchange took place on April 30 and May 1, 2013 when  
the complainant was not giving testimony but rather was making legal arguments. While I did  
want to get to the root of the issue concerning the two documents in question, I would not  
categorize this as a cross-examination.  
209 In conclusion, I exercised my discretionary power and did not allow the complainant to  
enter two documents as evidence during her closing arguments. The complainant submitted this  
decision was discriminatory to her based on health limitations. As noted by counsel for the  
respondent, this was not the time to revisit evidentiary rulings made by me during the course of  
the hearing.  
210 The complainant continued to make reference to comments she attributed to counsel for the  
respondent before the Federal Court. Allegedly, counsel for the respondent said words to the  
effect the issues of the complainant are "matters which are live and continuing". Therefore, the  
complainant argued I should have continued to accept evidence of her apparent ongoing issues  
with disability coverage.  
211 The complainant also argued she was "retroactively unjustly, constructively dismissed". I  
address this issue later in the decision. She argued the power of the Board is to accept evidence,  
and there should not have been any limitations on her introducing this.  
212 I am not convinced the position of the complainant has any foundation at all.  
J. Allegations of "unpleasant interactions" and unfair process  
213 The complainant alluded to a comment I was alleged to have made when she agreed to  
disclose the reports of her doctors to counsel for the respondent. She alleges I said words to the  
effect of: "You wouldn't want to know what I could do to you if you didn't disclose doctors  
notes", and she categorized this as shameful and putting at risk her rights under the Charter.  
214 My notes indicate I did tell her I was pleased she, after much reluctance, had agreed to  
disclose the doctors notes to the respondent as an order of production would likely have been  
made, but I did not make any threat as alleged by the complainant.  
215 The complainant argued that at times my behaviour was abusive. She did not indicate  
specific incidents; nor did she provide evidence to support this allegation. I was left with the  
impression that what she was really saying was anytime I made a procedural ruling against her, I  
was being abusive. In fact, in some communication with the former Board, she would use the  
word "chastise" to describe my attempt to explain process and assist her in the presentation of  
her case.  
216 The complainant again raised the issue of a court reporter as an example. She suggested  
there were some instances when a tribunal might allow such to occur and disagreed with  
comments made by counsel for the respondent that to allow her this would "over-formalize" the  
process. She submitted my ruling was unfair. I have already spoken to this issue.  
217 The complainant also made reference to her filing of a Code complaint on February 15,  
2011 and the letter from the former Board on March 4, 2011, which informed her of the decision  
to hold the complaint in abeyance until the final decision on the matters before me. She  
submitted the former Board as a whole gave the appearance of delaying the decision in the  
disposition of her matters, contrary to the Charter.  
218 She alleged that by not upholding principles of accepting evidence, this caused her concerns  
at the risk of losing her Charter and CHRA rights. The complainant again referred to sections 7  
and 15 of the Charter and to the CHRA. She also referred me to Suresh v. Canada (Minister of  
Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 SCC 1, where at paragraph 113, the Court refers to Baker v.  
Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817, and common law rules  
of procedural fairness. She alleged this is the tie into section 7 of the Charter and there is a  
requirement of procedural fairness. I cannot disagree with this. It should be noted that the other  
party, which has the same rights to a fair hearing before me, is the respondent, and to accede to  
the suggestions of the complainant would cause unfairness to the respondent. I constantly  
balanced these often competing interests in my decisions and took the time to explain the  
rationale of my decisions.  
219 She then again referred to the alleged interaction between me and Mr. Johnson. She noted  
Suresh is referenced in McColl-Frontenac Inc. v. Alberta (Minister of Environment), 2003  
ABQB 303, at paragraphs 41 to 43 and 45. Specifically, she referred me to paragraph 42. In her  
view, the alleged interaction did not meet the requirement of procedural fairness. I have already  
ruled on this issue earlier in this decision.  
220 The complainant stated she submitted an application in June 2011 to rescind and amend the  
original decision (Chamberlain, 2010 PSLRB 130) pursuant to section 43 of the Act. A decision  
was rendered in December 2012, dismissing her application. She argued that despite  
correspondence from the former Board, she and the respondent were not given the chance to  
make submissions. She alleges this "draws a concern of risk" to her Charter rights. It should be  
noted this review was done by another Board member who reviewed the entire file, including the  
documents and arguments submitted by Ms. Chamberlain, according to the decision itself.  
221 The complainant submitted, without evidence, the former Board continued to copy Jeff  
Laviollette on the emails in December 2012 even though the same individual was no longer  
associated with Treasury Board after March 2012. She alleged this was a violation of her Charter  
and human rights as she only learned of this in December 2012 when she determined his email  
address was invalid.  
222 She also alleged the former Board sent a letter of the results of the section 43 review, which  
was not addressed to counsel for the respondent but rather to Brenda Marcoux, whom she  
described as a department executive. She alleged this was not transparent and not fair and did  
little for her health. According to the complainant, this was a risk to her Charter and human  
rights and was inconsistent with other tribunal correspondence to that date.  
223 I find that neither of the above two actions on the part of Registry staff or the former Board  
constitute, in any respect, a violation of Charter or human rights and was provided with no legal  
precedent on the part of the complainant to support this allegation.  
224 In the summer of 2010, the complainant was asked to provide a list of potential witnesses by  
me, and this request was followed up on August 2, 2010 by a letter from the former Board. She  
was told by me to assume I decided I had jurisdiction and the hearings would not start until  
January 2011. The complainant submitted this was a violation of her Charter and human rights.  
And on one occasion, she alleged I had made a jurisdictional decision without listening to these  
witnesses, but in fairness, she withdrew this allegation.  
225 She argued that I should have heard the evidence on the merits before determining the  
jurisdictional issue. She submitted this was the normal process, according to the former Board's  
website. While the practice is to often hear the matter on its merits and deal with the  
jurisdictional matter within the final decision, it was obvious to me the parties would benefit  
from a ruling on the jurisdictional challenge, and I exercised my discretion in the interests of  
fairness and economy.  
226 The complainant then argued that I have considerable discretion in determining when the  
90-day limits under the Code can start. At this stage, I advised the complainant I would allow her  
to make this argument, but I reminded her that my decision was made; it was upheld by the  
Federal Court of Appeal and by a review by another member of the former Board under section  
43 of the Act.  
227 The complainant argued there was little burden placed on the respondent in this case and  
they were subject to very few orders, directions or demands. The complainant argued her  
position is the respondent continues to violate their obligations to her. She submitted counsel for  
the respondent did very little cross-examination of most her witnesses. All of this points to a  
conclusion in the eyes of the complainant that she was not an equal party in this proceeding, and  
thus, her rights under sections 7 and 15 of the Charter were being violated.  
228 At the outset, the burden of the complainant was to provide evidence on acts she claimed  
were acts of reprisal by the respondent post-January 23, 2009. Unfortunately, despite many  
reminders, she continued to try and prove matters that occurred prior to this date. In fact, even  
during her submission, she continued to suggest I should consider evidence of incidents that  
occurred prior to the date and in so doing submitted I have the authority to amend my earlier  
decision.  
229 This intransigence on the part of the complainant was the major reason why this matter took  
so long both from a point of view of presenting evidence and from the point of view of the  
argument. She obviously does not like my jurisdictional ruling, but it has been upheld, and I  
cannot and will not vary it.  
K. Relief requested  
230 In conclusion, the complainant argued section 24 of the Charter allowed her relief. When I  
asked her what relief she was looking for, she was not prepared to answer. After a discussion of  
this with her, I agreed she could email the former Board with her requests for relief by 10:00  
a.m. on July 31, 2013.  
231 Her email was received at noon rather than at 10:00 a.m. as ordered, with no explanation for  
the delay. It is useful to reproduce verbatim the contents of the email.  
1. as requested & committed-to at hearing-day July 30th yesterday early-afternoon, I am now  
providing both PSLRB & respondent-Counsel with the relief I seek under section 24 of the  
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.  
2. I maintain & refer PSLRB to my verbal submissions of July 30 2013, which was requested of  
me by PLSBR Thursday July 25 2013 for this interlocutory Motion matter  
a requested-Motoin which stem from me raising-to & asking PSLRB to not put at-risk my  
Charter Rights & Human Rights see pasted below July 22 & 23 emails from me.  
3. The relief is based on the issues I raised yesterday, including references I made to court-  
Case-rulings (on ss. 7 & 15 of the Charter and on decision-maker authority & undue  
intervention), existing-Statutes-published (PSLR Act, CHR Act, the Charter) and existing  
public-published policy, mandates & Guidelines (PSLRB Code of Conduct, PSLRB guidelines  
Grievances & Complaints, and CHRC-mandate in public speech 2013).  
4. The relief is also based on the overriding accommodaton-measure requested by my two-main  
Doctors July 15 & 22 2013 which their letters demonstrate is based on their assessment &  
treatment of mental & physical health-limitations ("restrictions").  
5. The relief is also based on the mandate, purpose, code-of-Conduct & norms-of-practice,  
power, breadth-of-authority of PSLRB all of which require inherent-adherence to Charter  
principles, and some explicity-stating consideration-accommodation of human rights (i.e. health,  
gender, culture).  
and all of which are not-excluded from the provisions of Charter & Human Rights.  
6. In some of below, requested-relief involves respondent-Employer, whom I have submitted  
many times is breaching all their legal-duties to me for the much-acknowledged-much-proven  
(by Employer & witnesses) mumerous-incidences & forms of aggression and for the exercise of  
my rights under the CLC (and other policy & laws governing public-servants).  
7. I respectfully apologize for the hour½ -delay, and I committed to summarize my requested-  
relief in ⅔ of a page – which is as follows:  
a. full & fair adherence to PSLRB published Code of Conduct (which I presented yesterday July  
30th) for all future hearings & proceedings-days on my matters particularly 1. adherence to  
PSLRB conduct-Code's requirements on averting verbal-undue-intervention & averting  
unpleasant-verbal-tone, 2. equitable-treatment of me as party equal to verbal-treatment of  
respondent-Party, 3. consideration-accommodation of my health-limitations (and other Human  
Rights such as gender), 4. fairness & equity of demands & burden on me relative-to burden &  
demands on respondent, 5. transparency & consistency in verbal-demands, in written-  
correspondence and in parties-addressed in PSLRB-correspondence  
(e.g. in attached correspondence of late-2012 on application-section-43)  
b. adherence-to & full-exercise of breath of powers & authority afforded in PSLR Act ss.40 &  
226 in 1. accepting & considering all documentary-evidence adduced by me and 2. in accepting  
& considering all documentary-evidence & submissions by me related to the live & continuing  
nature of the penalties & reprisals being-suffered & directly-related to other documents-already  
on-record  
(e.g. conditions of health, financial-expenses, financial-losses & penalties, disability-file all of  
which relate directly to the current-matters & to the existing-record)  
c. acceptance on-record of these current-matters and consideration-of the attached March-4  
2011 PSLRB-letter & attached complaint-75, which PSLRB wrote 2½ years-ago indicating my  
matters as a whole is fully-open to being disposed of in the current-matters  
this includes Parties' reading the record of the current-matters for clarity they may need.  
d. with adherence-to PSLRB code-of-Conduct to averting undue-intervention-undue-interruption  
and with adherence-to overrideing accommodation-measure-requested by Doctors, I request that  
any necessary-verbal-question to-me or necessary-demand or necessary-intervention be written-  
out on paper & handed to-me so I can have a fairer-chance to understand it.  
e. PSLRB adhere to the PSLR Act breadth-of powers & authority 1. to rescind & amend prior-  
decisions, with consideration-of 2. of my health as is known by PSLRB-Respondent in 2012  
order-of-disclosure and of my much-stated/written position from early-2011 to early-2013 that I  
should not have to go to federal Courts, my matters should never have had to be raised to courts,  
and 3. to conclude impartial, fair, just, transparent & lawful resolution of my matters  
expeditiously without additional-unnecessary delays and in a manner that averts risking Charter  
& Human rights.  
[Sic throughout]  
[Emphasis in the original]  
232 This email was typical of the confusing nature of the presentation of the case by the  
complainant. The request for relief was five-fold and was set forth in her paragraph 7.  
233 In paragraph 7(a), the complainant, although in a very confusing manner, made a broad-  
based demand for what will be referred to as "fair and equal treatment". I concluded she had  
been treated fairly and equitably throughout the process. I reviewed the allegations of the  
complainant and concluded there was no breach of what she refers to as her Charter and human  
rights. Therefore, I am not prepared to grant an order for relief the foundation of which had not  
been established and which in my view had already been provided in any event.  
234 I accept the position of counsel for the respondent who noted as master of my own  
proceedings, I have the right to ask questions for clarification, as required.  
235 In paragraph 7(b), the complainant attempted to do two things. First of all, she attempted to  
have me accept all evidence she tried to introduce during the proceedings. She interpreted my  
power in this regard in a very liberal fashion and ignored the rules of natural justice and  
procedural fairness, which apply.  
236 I am not prepared to grant this order as to do so would create an unfair situation for the  
respondent.  
237 The second aspect of this request for relief went to the so-called "live and continuing" nature  
of the matters. This was a veiled attempt for the complainant to have me extend the jurisdiction  
to the pre-January 23, 2009 period. I am not prepared to do this as my decision of December  
2010 was considered by the Federal Court of Appeal and even the Supreme Court of Canada and  
upheld.  
238 When I first read paragraph 7(c), it appeared to me the complainant asked me to assume  
jurisdiction over her fifth complaint pursuant to the Code, one that is not before me. However,  
the complainant clarified her request verbally to mean she wanted the record of this complaint to  
be introduced as evidence. For obvious reasons, I was not able to consider this request at this  
point in time if I was to ensure a fair hearing for both parties.  
239 In paragraph 7(d), the complainant referred to "undue" intervention and interruption and  
requested that all questions and interventions be provided to her in writing. As I have already  
found, there was no foundation to the categorization that such questions or interventions were  
indeed "undue". Furthermore, I stated the complainant had established no foundation for granting  
relief. That said, if I considered this as a request for accommodation, I would first of all be faced  
with the fact there was no medical evidence supporting this request, and furthermore, as the  
complainant was given the opportunity to have a note-taker present, I see no justifiable reason to  
further delay the proceedings in order for counsel for the respondent or me to put our questions  
or in the case of the respondent her objections in writing.  
240 Finally, in paragraph 7(e), the complainant requested I grant the relief of amending my  
jurisdiction to consider the pre-January 23, 2009 matters. I am of the view the complainant made  
no case for relief to be granted in the first instance. Aside from the fact she apparently is blaming  
counsel for the respondent, the former Board, me and the courts for having to go to the courts,  
the complainant ignored the reality of the situation.  
241 I made a jurisdictional decision in December 2010 in which I defined the extent of my  
jurisdiction. The complainant, as was her right, reviewed this decision at the Federal Court of  
Appeal. This court upheld my decision insofar as the Code complaints were concerned. She  
sought leave to appeal this decision to the Supreme Court of Canada, and this application was  
dismissed. In addition, the complainant asked the former Board, pursuant to section 43 of the  
Act, to review my decision, and this resulted in the reviewing Board member upholding my  
decision.  
242 If I were to consider the requests for relief as stated by the complainant, I would be faced  
with an obvious violation of the rules of natural justice and procedural fairness, which apply  
equally to the complainant and the respondent.  
243 For all of the reasons noted above, I rejected the allegations of the complainant and denied  
her requests for relief submitted on July 31, 2013.  
L. Recusal  
244 I viewed the submissions of the complainant as a motion for recusal even though she did not  
specifically ask for this relief. When asked if she was satisfied that I would act in an impartial  
and objective manner in rendering my decision on the merits of the matters before me, she  
somewhat cagily answered she would, "if you granted the relief she asked for" in this motion.  
245 Counsel for the respondent raised this issue in her submissions and asked me to address this.  
Obviously, I am prepared to do so, and I indicated to the parties I would treat the motion of the  
complainant as one for recusal if I were not willing to grant the relief requested.  
246 Having reviewed the allegations of the complainant in their entirety, I am not convinced I  
should grant the motion for my recusal. Decision makers have in the past faced such allegations  
and have adopted the test of the "reasonable person" (see Singaravelu, and Veillette v.  
Chouinard, St-Amand and Canada Revenue Agency, 2013 PSLRB 61).  
247 In my view, when considered in context, the interventions and interactions of me would not  
be viewed as being biased, unfair, unpleasant or indeed inappropriate. The matter has certainly  
taken a very long time, but despite the suggestion of the complainant, this was not caused by  
anything members of the Board, I or counsel for the respondent have done. The complainant  
must take responsibility for the number of days it has taken for her to present her case.  
III. Procedure  
248 It is useful to review the procedure followed in this case.  
249 The complainant started with her opening statement. Early on, counsel for the respondent  
objected, submitting the complainant was in reality giving evidence. I explained to the  
complainant the difference between an opening statement and giving evidence. Once I was  
satisfied she understood the difference, I offered her the opportunity to be either sworn in or  
affirmed and give her statement as evidence. The complainant declined to do this and continued  
with her opening statement.  
250 Unfortunately, the conduct of the complainant during the opening statement was a precursor  
to her conduct during the questioning of witnesses and during her various submissions. During  
the "opening statement" and during the questioning of witnesses, she constantly attempted to  
provide evidence in her preambles. Counsel for the respondent was very patient with the  
complainant, but on occasion, she objected to the conduct of the complainant, and often, I  
reminded the complainant not to give evidence.  
251 She consistently exaggerated and often misquoted documents and cases. As a result of the  
respondent's objections and on my own initiative, I admonished the complainant on many  
occasions. For instance, at one point, the complainant was asking a question to a witness and  
stated a certain investigation conducted by the respondent established she had been "distastefully  
and aggressively" dealt with. When asked by me to show me where in the report the word  
"distastefully" appeared, she could not.  
252 Despite my instructions and guidance to the complainant, either willfully or perhaps without  
thought, she continued this conduct.  
253 I agree with the complainant's view that this hearing took much longer than it should have.  
Although the complainant acknowledged it was not in her best interests to delay these  
proceedings, the reason this hearing took as long as it did was almost entirely as a result of her  
conduct. She summonsed 24 witnesses, many of whom she had never met before the hearing,  
most of whom she never even spoke to before calling them to the stand and many of whom were  
able to offer little relevant evidence. And when she did call witnesses, she was clearly  
unprepared and often took several minutes between questions while she consulted with her  
support team.  
254 I explained to the complainant when she "took the stand", I would allow her to testify from  
her counsel desk and her support people could surround her. However, I explained she would not  
be able to speak with anyone concerning the case or her evidence for as long as she was on the  
stand. In suggesting this to her, I reminded her of the need for me to assess the reliability of her  
evidence untainted by any suggestion she was influenced by the intervention of other persons.  
IV. Facts leading to the hearing of issues before the Board  
255 As a way of background, the complainant is a long-time employee. Her substantive position  
was in the Strategic Policy and Research (SPR) branch of the respondent. She was classified ES-  
07. She was under the supervision of Serge Bertrand.  
256 In 2006, the complainant was placed in an acting EX-01 position in the Skills and  
Employment Branch (SEB) under the supervision of another individual, whom I will refer to as  
"JA". EX-01 is a higher classification than an ES-07 position. Thus, while acting in the position,  
the complainant received a higher level of pay.  
257 Between June 2007 and April 2008, the complainant was subjected to the management style  
of her supervisor at the SEB. The complainant described it as aggressive. She testified as a result  
of this activity, she incurred "injured health, harassment and human rights risks".  
258 The complainant drafted a lengthy email on April 22, 2008 to Karen Jackson, Senior  
Assistant Deputy Minister. As I found in my preliminary decision, both parties agree this email  
was important from a contextual point of view. However, it is important to note each party had  
its own interpretation of its significance and meaning (exhibit 5, tab 1).  
259 In any event, Ms. Jackson responded the same day and suggested a meeting would be the  
preferred way to discuss the contents of the email (exhibit 5, tab 1).  
260 The complainant responded to Ms. Jackson's email on April 30, 2008. She thanked Ms.  
Jackson for the willingness to meet but suggested she was not comfortable attending a meeting.  
She then made several requests, including dealing with her supervisor's management style,  
requesting 20 days of either compensatory or other special circumstances leave and requesting  
10 days of French language training and permanent appointment to an EX-01 position (exhibit 5,  
tab 2).  
261 After the complainant and Ms. Jackson exchanged a number of emails, the complainant  
emailed Ms. Jackson again on May 25, 2008. She referred to her email of April 22, 2008, and, in  
fact, restated a portion of it. The restated portion reads as follows (exhibit 7, tab 4):  
I request immediate action from SEB and SPR for my safe and risk-free placement apart from the  
AEM directorate and from "JA" in a way that inflicts on me no further pain, suffering or loss,  
and in a way that does not deprive me of the opportunity to continue to serve this department in  
the capable, productive and respectful way that I have been serving.  
262 Ms. Jackson responded to the complainant's May 25, 2008 email by a letter dated May 28,  
2008. Ms. Jackson alluded to the fact the complainant had not agreed to mediation and indicated  
she would conduct an investigation into the complainant's allegations during the three weeks of  
sick leave that the complainant's physician had certified (exhibit 7, tab 5).  
263 On May 30, 2008, the complainant again emailed Ms. Jackson. The complainant indicated  
she appreciated the offer of a one-week management leave followed by a two-week French  
training leave, but she had been advised by her physician to go on sick leave. Furthermore, the  
complainant confirmed the proposed mediation was not an option as her physician had advised  
against it. The complainant indicated after the sick leave, she would return to her home branch,  
the SPR (exhibit 7, tab 7).  
264 In response to Ms. Jackson's decision to conduct an investigation, the complainant sent an  
email dated June 5, 2008. The complainant outlined in point form a number of allegations  
describing the behaviour of her supervisor at the SEB she felt should be investigated (exhibit 7,  
tab 8).  
265 After conducting the investigation, Ms. Jackson released her findings in writing to the  
complainant on July 4, 2008. Without going into detail, it was clear Ms. Jackson's findings  
concluded the complainant's supervisor at the SEB had not conducted himself properly. In fact,  
Ms. Jackson concluded she would take corrective action with the supervisor (exhibit 5, tabs 18  
and 19).  
266 As was evidenced by a series of emails, it was obvious Ms. Jackson's report was not well  
received by the complainant. The complainant, in three lengthy emails, requested clarification or  
action. On August 1, 2008, the complainant sent Ms. Jackson an eight-page email. On August 6,  
2008, she sent another two-page email and a further three-page email. On August 12, 2008, the  
complainant sent yet another three-page email. Each email either took issue with Ms. Jackson's  
conclusions or raised other concerns (exhibit 5, tabs 22 to 24).  
267 Those emails resulted in yet another email exchange between Ms. Jackson and the  
complainant in mid-August 2008. On August 13, 2008, Ms. Jackson responded to the concerns  
raised by the complainant on August 6 and 12, 2008. The complainant sent an email in which she  
accepted a correction to her medical leave commencing June 2, 2008, requested French language  
training from September 22 to October 3 and requested a new work location (exhibit 7, tab 9).  
268 Ms. Jackson responded on September 4, 2008, by email, and confirmed the complainant's  
acting assignment as an EX-01 in the SEB would end on October 6, 2008. Additionally, she  
authorized leave from June 6 to October 6, 2008 as other paid leave. The complainant then sent a  
four-page email to Ms. Jackson on September 8, 2008 in which she revisited many of the issues  
raised in her previous emails. However, the complainant also raised some issues with respect to  
new office arrangements on the fourth floor of her office building, as proposed by Ms. Jackson  
(exhibit 7, tab 11).  
269 After the email exchange between Ms. Jackson and the complainant in September 2008, the  
complainant emailed her supervisor in the SPR (Mr. Bertrand), explaining in general terms the  
circumstances of her return to work. Mr. Bertrand responded and indicated her office was going  
to be on the third floor and not on the fourth (exhibit 6, tab 1). The complainant did not accept  
the placement of her office on the third floor, and on September 22, 2008, she proposed she be  
placed on the second floor (exhibit 6, tab 2).  
270 Ms. Jackson and the complainant exchanged emails again in late September 2008. It was  
clear the complainant was no longer working in the SEB and she was to be reintegrated into the  
SPR (exhibit 7, tabs 12 and 14). The complainant took issue with Ms. Jackson's response on  
September 29, 2008. In a three-page reply email, the complainant claimed her complaints had  
not been handled properly and further asked for a more formal process to be put in place to  
resolve her concerns (exhibit 7, tab 16).  
271 In early October 2008, Ms. Jackson and the complainant began yet another exchange of  
emails. The exchange was initiated by another invitation from Ms. Jackson for a face-to-face  
meeting. The complainant responded by suggesting an "… external 3rd party mediation process  
through the PSLRB". That email contained an allegation by the complainant that the posting of  
the job in which she had been acting for almost two years was "… a hostile wilful act of malice  
or a wholly disregardful [sic] act of public disrespect for me" (exhibit 7, tab 17).  
272 The complainant's acting assignment concluded on October 6, 2008. After her leave, she  
was to return to her substantive position in the SPR. Between October 2 and 10, 2008, the  
complainant exchanged more emails with her substantive supervisor, Mr. Bertrand, about the  
location of her office. The complainant expressed concerns about some of the proposals. Mr.  
Bertrand responded by suggesting a "… gradual re-integration [sic] into the workplace".  
Additionally, Mr. Bertrand indicated he would "… continue the search for a suitable workstation  
in line with your needs" (exhibit 6, tabs 3 and 4).  
273 On October 9, 2008, the complainant requested that her other leave (special circumstances)  
be extended until December 12, 2008 (exhibit 6, tab 6). The complainant's doctor explained her  
absence in a number of notes. In each note, the doctor stated the complainant would likely be  
able to return to work, initially on November 3, 2008, and then on January 5, 2009 (exhibit 4,  
tabs 3 and 4).  
274 All of the complaints filed are pursuant to section 133 of the former PSLRA, thus invoking  
certain provisions of the Code. They were filed in 2009, at a point in time when the complainant  
was not at work.  
275 The complainant never returned to work following the expiration of her leave and is  
presently in receipt of disability payments.  
V. Reasons and analysis  
A. Issues  
276 Has the complainant established that she was the subject of acts or reprisals by the  
respondent?  
277 If the answer to this question is in the affirmative, are these acts as a result of the  
complainant exercising her rights under the Code?  
B. Legislative authority  
278 My jurisdiction to hear complaints under the Code is provided in section 240 of the Act,  
which states as follows:  
240. Part II of the Canada Labour Code applies to and in respect of the public service and  
persons employed in it as if the public service were a federal work, undertaking or business  
referred to in that Part except that, for the purpose of that application,  
(a) any reference in that Part to  
(i) "arbitration" is to be read as a reference to adjudication under Part 2,  
(ii) the "Board" is to be read as a reference to the Public Service Labour Relations and  
Employment Board,  
(iii) a "collective agreement" is to be read as a reference to a collective agreement within the  
meaning of subsection 2(1),  
(iv) "employee" is to be read as a reference to a person employed in the public service, and  
(v) a "trade union" is to be read as a reference to an employee organization within the meaning  
of subsection 2(1);  
(b) section 156 of that Act does not apply in respect of the Public Service Labour Relations and  
Employment Board; and  
(c) the provisions of this Act apply, with any necessary modifications, in respect of matters  
brought before the Public Service Labour Relations and Employment Board.  
279 Section 133 of the Code states the following:  
Complaint to Board  
133.(1) An employee, or a person designated by the employee for the purpose, who alleges that  
an employer has taken action against the employee in contravention of section 147 may, subject  
to subsection (3), make a complaint in writing to the Board of the alleged contravention.  
280 Section 147 prohibits an employer from taking reprisal actions against an employee:  
General prohibition re employer  
147. No employer shall dismiss, suspend, lay off or demote an employee, impose a financial or  
other penalty on an employee, or refuse to pay an employee remuneration in respect of any  
period that the employee would, but for the exercise of the employee's rights under this Part,  
have worked, or take any disciplinary action against or threaten to take any such action against  
an employee because the employee  
(a) has testified or is about to testify in a proceeding taken or an inquiry held under this Part;  
(b) has provided information to a person engaged in the performance of duties under this Part  
regarding the conditions of work affecting the health or safety of the employee or of any other  
employee of the employer; or  
(c) has acted in accordance with this Part or has sought the enforcement of any of the provisions  
of this Part.  
281 Jurisprudence from the former and its predecessor Board clarifies what it considers reprisal  
actions.  
282 Failing to pay overtime for time spent outside work hours cooperating with a safety officer  
does not constitute a breach of paragraph 147(a) of the Code (see O'Neil et al. v. Treasury Board  
(Solicitor General Canada - Correctional Service), PSSRB File Nos. 160-02-55 to 60  
(19980714)). Maintaining a complainant's isolation from his co-workers constituted a penalty  
and created a high level of stress, resulting in the complainant using sick leave and annual leave  
credits (see Pruyn v. Canada Customs and Revenue Agency, 2002 PSSRB 17). A refusal to pay  
travel expenses incurred by an employee to attend a health and safety committee meeting is not  
considered a penalty or reprisal (see Tanguay v. Statistical Survey Operations, 2005 PSLRB 43).  
Finally, an employer's action need not be financial to be a reprisal (see Chaves v. Treasury Board  
(Correctional Service Canada), 2005 PSLRB 45).  
C. Evidence of acts alleged to violate section 147 of the CLC  
283 In an attempt to assist the complainant, I suggested she organize her thoughts by drafting a  
list of all of the actions of the respondent she felt constituted acts of reprisal. I indicated she  
could then focus her submissions and my attention on the matters she was complaining about and  
for which I have jurisdiction.  
284 At the commencement of the argument of the complainant, she provided a document that  
was not at all similar to a list of reprisals, and she started arguing in a very convoluted and  
unhelpful manner. After the lunch break, I reminded her of the legal burden she had to meet. I  
furthermore suggested it was not fair to her case if she left me confused and without knowing the  
actual allegations of reprisal she was making.  
285 After a discussion with her supporters, she started then to outline the acts she submitted  
were acts of reprisal. In all, she alleged there were in excess of 140 acts that constituted acts of  
reprisal. Later in this decision, I will deal with each of these allegations in the order she  
presented them to me. Many of these were closely related and repetitive, and although she was  
aware of the necessity to tie each allegation into section 147 of the Code, she often did not.  
286 On April 30, 2013, again to assist her to focus her thoughts, I asked the complainant to  
indicate to me what direct evidence tied the actions of the respondent into allegations of reprisal,  
in contravention of paragraphs 147(a) to (c) of the Code. The complainant spent in excess of a  
day attempting to answer this question. Her response was confusing and non-responsive and she  
rambled, and although she was reminded by me of this on various occasions during her  
argument, her confusing approach and the non-responsive nature of her submissions continued.  
287 The following outlines the response the complainant provided to my question, followed by  
my commentary. It cannot be forgotten the response to this question took up about a day-and-a-  
half of argument and ultimately added very little if anything to my assessment of the  
complainant's case.  
a.  
The complainant referred me to the Treasury Board "Manager's Handbook Canada Labour  
Code" (exhibit 11). Specifically, she referred to page 129, which refers to section 133 of the  
Code. The complainant referred to the bottom of the page, where the Handbook indicated there is  
considerable discretion when a complaint relates to a threat. Having listened carefully to the  
complainant, I am at a loss to understand how this was evidence. In my view, this response did  
not address the question I posed and was of little or no assistance to me in my deliberations. At  
best, it might be considered to be legal argument, but then again, she made no reference to what  
she was alleging to be the threat.  
b.  
The complainant continued throughout the hearing to take the position the 2008 incidents  
were relevant to my consideration, and this despite continual reminders by me and interventions  
by counsel for the respondent. My preliminary decision, which was upheld by the Federal Court  
of Appeal (Chamberlain - FCA), was clear. I reminded the complainant of her obligation to  
present evidence and arguments with respect to acts of reprisal that occurred after January 23,  
2009.  
c.  
The complainant submitted in December 2012 she offered 2 affidavit transcripts, which  
were objected to by the respondent. She confirmed I did not enter them as exhibits. Having  
considered these comments, I am left with no other conclusion than they were entirely non-  
responsive to my question. Furthermore, how could affidavits, which were not marked as  
exhibits, be considered evidence?  
d.  
The complainant submitted in April and May 2008 she reported in person and in writing to  
the respondent an allegation of harassment (exhibit 3, tab D-1, 14th page). The complainant  
argued she complied with paragraph 147(b) of the Code. This was a non-responsive answer. My  
jurisdiction was with respect to alleged acts of reprisal post-January 23, 2009. Also, her  
submission she complied with the Code in providing her allegation of harassment flies in the  
face of my preliminary decision (Chamberlain PSLRB), which was upheld by the Federal  
Court of Appeal (Chamberlain FCA), as this allegation predates January 2009.  
e.  
The complainant referred me to the "Assault Related Incident Questionnaire" form  
(exhibit 107), which she completed in 2009. The complainant submitted she was still on salary  
and undefined leave at this juncture. She argued this form provided information "… to a person  
engaged in the performance of duties …" under the Code, as contemplated by paragraph 147(b).  
I was not convinced it did what was submitted by the complainant as it was a form provided to  
the Workers Compensation Commission. But, if the complainant was correct in her assertion, I  
do not comprehend how this answered the clear question I had posed. How was this direct  
evidence of acts of the respondent tying it to paragraph 147(b) of the Code? At best, it might  
establish the complainant had provided a complaint, but as decided in the preliminary decision, I  
determined the first complaint was filed on April 23, 2009.  
f.  
In a similar vein, the complainant referred me to an email exchange in April 2009  
concerning the LAB 1079 form (exhibit 99). The LAB 1079 form referred to is found in exhibit  
107. The complainant submitted by providing this form to safety officers, she was providing  
information "… to a person engaged in the performance of duties …" under the Code, as  
contemplated by paragraph 147(b). I make the same observations as I did in the immediately  
preceding bullet.  
g.  
The complainant referred me to a letter from Karen Jackson dated May 28, 2008 (exhibit  
7, tab 5). The complainant submitted she received this correspondence, which outlined the  
process for investigation which would be conducted by Ms. Jackson. First of all, this letter  
predated my jurisdiction and was of no assistance in my deliberations. Second, it was entirely  
non-responsive to the question I posed.  
h.  
The complainant submitted her verbal evidence, in conjunction with emails between Z.  
Chamberlain, D. Brousseau and K. Jackson between May 14 and June 4, 2008 (exhibit 20), a  
May 23, 2008 confirmation of a meeting with Mr. Fedyk (exhibit 55), and an email exchange  
between her and Mr. Fedyk on May 27 and 29, 2008 (exhibit 56) requesting mediation with the  
original aggressor, were acts of reprisal. The allegations of the complainant suggested these  
actions were acts of reprisal that are outside the time frame of the complaints before me as  
articulated in my preliminary decision. This answer was non-responsive to the question I posed.  
i.  
The complainant referred me to correspondence from Ms. Jackson to her in August 2008,  
which she suggested confirmed the nature of the investigation (exhibit 16). The complainant  
submitted there was no prior mention of the policy on harassment to her. Even if this were true, it  
was irrelevant to the matters before me as it predated January 23, 2009 and was non-responsive  
to my question.  
j.  
The complainant referred to correspondence from Ms. Jackson dated May 28, 2008  
(exhibit 7, tab 5), which she categorized as committing "direct non procedurally [sic], non  
transparently [sic] conducted investigation", which tied the action to section 147 of the Code.  
Again, even if this were true, it was irrelevant to the matters before me as it predated January 23,  
2009 and was non-responsive to my question.  
k.  
The complainant again referred me to correspondence from Ms. Jackson to her in August  
2008, which she suggested confirmed the nature of the investigation (exhibit 16) and further  
suggested there was no response to her accommodation request made in April 2008. As stated  
above, even if this were true, it was irrelevant as it predated January 23, 2009 and was non-  
responsive to my question.  
l.  
At this point, I reminded the complainant my jurisdiction was to consider allegations of  
reprisal post-January 23, 2009, and this date was upheld by the Federal Court of Appeal. I  
advised her I could not rule on allegations that predated this. Despite this admonishment, the  
complainant continued.  
m.  
The complainant referred me to the evidence of Debbi Bryson, Carolle Corneau and  
Marlene Chaussé, being three witnesses who in 2008 apparently sat close to her office and  
testified as to their observations of the behaviour of JA (exhibits 58, 59 and 61). The complainant  
submitted the evidence established these persons were never interviewed during the investigation  
of Ms. Jackson. The complainant submitted she showed each of them the exchange of  
communication between her and Ms. Jackson in 2008 (exhibit 5, tab 22). The complainant  
submitted the failure of Ms. Jackson to interview these persons showed "tampering of my rights"  
under the Code. The complainant did not expand upon this allegation, but suffice to say even if  
there was substance to this, it predated January 23, 2009 and was not a matter before me.  
n.  
The complainant referred me to correspondence from Marilyn Dingwall in October 2008  
(exhibit 17). She made no submission as to the purpose of this reference, but regardless, even if  
there was substance to whatever position the complainant was making, it was irrelevant as it  
predated January 23, 2009 and was non-responsive to my question.  
o.  
The complainant submitted the evidence of Maureen Grant and Sandra Webber, two senior  
management personnel, confirmed such investigations would normally take 4-6 months. The  
complainant pointed out Ms. Jackson completed her investigation in less than two months. The  
complainant did not expand upon this observation. Notwithstanding this, even if I were to  
conclude the investigation of Ms. Jackson was not full and wholesome, which I do not as this  
issue was not before me, it was irrelevant to the matters before me as the investigation was  
concluded prior to January 23, 2009.  
p.  
The complainant referred me to the "Policy on Prevention and Resolution of Harassment  
in the Workplace" (exhibit 32), specifically to page 2, which defines "delegated manager". She  
argued the evidence of the three directors who gave evidence (Ms. Dingwall, Ms. Grant and Ms.  
Webber) confirmed there was no investigation conducted pursuant to sections 125 and 126 of the  
Code, despite her reporting the issues. Again, this allegation referred to the 2008 period, which  
predated my jurisdiction.  
q.  
The complainant submitted the response to her grievance signed by Louise Branch on  
February 20, 2009 acknowledged harassment had occurred (exhibit 3, tab A). This allegation  
appeared to be a true reflection of the facts, but the complainant made no submission as to how  
this was direct evidence that tied the actions of the respondent into acts of reprisal, in  
contravention of paragraphs 147(a) to (c) of the Code.  
r.  
The complainant referred me to an email from her then lawyer dated February 25, 2009  
(exhibit 3, tab A) in which he appealed to senior executives for appropriate corrective action.  
The complainant noted the evidence confirmed there was no response to this email. In fact, the  
complainant noted in March 2009 there was an email confirming Louise Branch, the director  
responsible for the file, was relocating to another region (exhibit 106). Additionally, the  
complainant noted the receipt of an email dated February 2, 2009 confirming the appointment of  
Frank Vermaeten and the promotion of Ms. Jackson (exhibit 82). The complainant argued these  
actions were acts of reprisal. The complainant was unable to provide me with any case law to  
support her contention the transfer of a manager (Ms. Branch) from one location to another, the  
appointment of another person (Mr. Vermaeten) and the promotion of a third person (Ms.  
Jackson) could be conceived as acts of reprisal. I find her contention in this regard entirely  
unfounded in fact or in law. That said, I was more concerned the respondent did not respond to  
the letter from her lawyer. More will be said of this later in the decision.  
s.  
The complainant submitted it was in the fall of 2010 she learned direct witnesses to the  
acts of harassment in 2008 were not interviewed by Ms. Jackson in 2008 (exhibits 58, 59 and  
61). As noted above, accepting this statement on its face did little to assist the complainant in her  
complaint. The investigation, whether it was good, bad or indifferent, was completed in 2008 and  
was not a matter before me and was therefore irrelevant. Further, the initial complaint submitted  
by the complainant only spoke of one incident of harassment, which incident was not witnessed  
by those Ms. Chamberlain now claims ought to have been interviewed. Even if the complainant  
submits that she only learned in 2010 that these individuals had not been interviewed, this was  
information that she could easily have obtained during the time period in question, and her  
attempt to complain about this now is another attempt on her part to enlarge the temporal  
limitations of my jurisdiction.  
t.  
The complainant submitted she received for the first time the "Hazardous Occurrence  
Investigation Report" form signed by Ms. Jackson on May 12, 2009 (exhibit 47) in July 2010.  
This form was completed to support the application for Commission de la santé et de la sécurité  
du travail of Quebec (CSST) benefits filed by the complainant. The complainant noted Ms.  
Jackson indicated there were no witnesses, and this was incorrect and thus an act of reprisal.  
Upon closer review of the form, Ms. Jackson identified the date of the incident as January 10,  
2008, which coincided with the date in the original complaint filed by the complainant. Despite  
the submission of the complainant, the form was inaccurate, and three witnesses testified to  
observing the behaviour of whom the complainant described as the aggressor; upon a review of  
my notes, it was clear none of these witnesses testified about this date in particular. As noted,  
January 10, 2008 was the date the complainant referred to as the "Date and time of accident"  
when she first filed her Assault Related Incident Questionnaire (exhibit 107). I conclude,  
despite assertions to the contrary by the complainant, Ms. Jackson was not untruthful when she  
completed this form.  
u.  
The complainant started by referring me to the Treasury Board "Manager's Handbook  
Canada Labour Code" (exhibit 11). She argued the respondent had a duty for procedural follow  
up, which she contended was not done in this case. Her position was the occupational health and  
safety procedures required under section 129 of the Code were tampered with and the respondent  
withheld information. In making this contention, the complainant submitted the various pieces of  
communication (exhibits 12, 14, 115, 99 and 47) established a follow-up was to be done by local  
officers, yet the form was sent to Ms. Jackson to complete. Furthermore, the complainant alleged  
Ms. Jackson lied when she completed the form (exhibit 47) by saying there were no witnesses. In  
her view, this was withholding of her procedural rights under the Canada Labour Code. In my  
view, as noted above, the complainant failed to provide proof Ms. Jackson lied when she  
completed the form (exhibit 47). Furthermore, all of this must be read in the context of the  
complainant's original form (exhibit 107), which specified the date of the accident as January 10,  
2008. Although the attached documents go farther than this date, this was the identified date by  
the complainant.  
v.  
The complainant argued the appointments of various directors over the years were acts of  
reprisal. She referred to those actions as "shifting responsibilities". There is no question this file  
was overseen by many members of management; however, I fail to see how this could be an act  
of reprisal. In this regard, I noted the complainant did not provide me with any jurisprudence to  
support her contention. In making her submission, the complainant referred me to exhibits 49  
(PRD # 689), 89, 90 and 123. I accepted the complainant was most likely impacted emotionally,  
physically and psychologically due to her frail condition, but I cannot accept these decisions of  
the respondent could be considered acts of reprisal. Insofar as this is concerned, I noted the  
complainant submitted Ms. Dingwall was not telling the truth when she emailed Mr. Johnson on  
September 10, 2009 (exhibit 123) and stated she had not been nor would be involved in this file.  
This is an odd position for the complainant to take. Ms. Dingwall was called as her witness, and  
as such, if the complainant took the position, she was not honest and it was incumbent on her to  
allow Ms. Dingwall to explain herself. This was not done, in clear violation of the rules of  
evidence, most specifically that in the case of Browne v. Dunn, (1893) 6 R. 67. Furthermore, on  
many occasions I reminded the complainant she should be careful calling witnesses unless she  
was aware of the nature of their testimony. As I stated to the complainant throughout the  
proceeding, the evidence of her witnesses, in this case Ms. Dingwall, would be considered the  
evidence of the complainant.  
w.  
The complainant made an application for the disclosure of documents pursuant to the  
Access to Information Act (R.S.C. 1985, c. A-1, ATIA). As a result of this application, she  
received a number of documents she had not seen before, which she alleges relate to her  
complaints. She submitted these documents establish her rights under the Code were violated  
going back to 2007. I have been clear I cannot consider allegations of acts of reprisal that  
predated January 23, 2009 and that this portion of the issues before me has been settled and will  
not be revisited. Furthermore, the complainant's main stated concern was with respect to the fact  
Ms. Jackson did not interview certain witnesses in her 2008 investigation, of which I have  
spoken earlier.  
x.  
The complainant referred to a number of emails confirming she actively sought alternative  
work (exhibit 102). These emails were sent from her work email, and she testified throughout the  
process she continued to get work-related emails throughout 2008 and more sporadically in  
2009. The complainant argued as a result she was not separated from JA. She submitted Ms.  
Dingwall testified it would have been appropriate to separate her from JA; however, Ms.  
Dingwall was not advised of the extent of the contact the complainant had with the aggressor.  
Ms. Borysewicz testified in September 2012 and was shown exhibit 102. She testified between  
2008 and 2009 the workload for the position in which the complainant was acting was reduced.  
She was asked and could only speculate why people were not informed the complainant was no  
longer there. In the view of the complainant this was, in her words "non procedural [sic] non  
transparent [sic]". Mr. Johnson testified he offered to cancel her email account so as to avoid the  
apparent distress or to adjust her out-of-office message and have her not open her emails, neither  
of which the complainant was prepared to do (exhibit 10, tab 31). While I do accept the  
complainant's concern the respondent was unable to offer another solution with respect to  
receiving what she referred to as "work related emails", the evidence was she did not do any  
work on them and simply ignored them. Furthermore, in none of the emails was she specifically  
asked to perform a task; rather, she was one of a number of employees copied with these emails.  
The complainant was not able to provide me with any jurisprudence to suggest this could be  
considered an act of reprisal, and I am not inclined to accept the unfounded assertion of the  
complainant.  
y.  
Ms. Borysewicz was shown an email dated October 29, 2009 from Bob Thomas, the  
person who replaced the complainant (exhibit 109). In this email, Mr. Thomas referred to the  
improved behaviour of JA, and the witness confirmed this to be true. She further testified JA had  
received a few acting assignments as assistant deputy minister. In the view of the complainant,  
these acts of the respondent were "non procedural [sic], non transparent [sic]". She considered  
these to be acts of reprisal. I do not see how the independent acts of the employer with respect to  
another employee can be seen as an act of reprisal toward the harassed employee.  
z.  
The complainant argues she was subject to new aggression by Mr. Seguin, who allegedly  
pounded his hand on the table during a meeting, which occurred in September 2009. The  
complainant alleged she was subjected to this and it was discrimination on the basis of gender  
and skin colour. I have no doubt Mr. Seguin did attempt to emphasize his position at this meeting  
by knocking on the table. Even if I were to accept the categorization of the complainant and her  
brother Dean he pounded his hand, how was this an act of reprisal under the Code?  
aa. The complainant referred to the "Election Form Form LAB 1081" (exhibit 51) as an act  
of reprisal. The complainant continually referred to this form as the "3rd party" form and claimed  
the CSST was the respondent and it was illegal to require her to complete the form and identify  
either JA or indeed any fellow employee as a third party. As a result, she submitted the denial of  
her compensation was a financial penalty and this was a violation of section 147 of the Code by  
the respondent. I do not accept this argument. The 3rd party form was more accurately called an  
election to claim under the Act (Form LAB 1081). It is in reality a form that subrogated any right  
the employee had to sue for damages should he/she elect to claim benefits. In other words, an  
employee had the option of applying for compensation benefits and subrogating their rights or  
alternatively suing the responsible party themselves. I cannot understand why the complainant  
would not have read the following passages on the first page:  
In the event the injury was caused by a party outside the federal government or its  
agencies, you must decide to either claim against the responsible party, or claim  
compensation under the Government Employee's [sic] Compensation Act… .  
Should you decide to claim compensation, section 9(3) states that all your rights  
to sue for damages related to personal injuries are automatically subrogated to  
Her Majesty, who then may or may not exercise those rights against the  
responsible third party. Subrogation means the transfer of rights from one person  
to the other… .  
In my view, the refusal of the complainant to name a third party was reckless at best. Although  
she did not provide me the legal opinion, which she stated she had relied upon in forming this  
opinion, she testified her lawyer advised against signing this document. Frankly, this was not  
credible. The form was typical of the manner in which such claims are dealt with, and if the  
complainant wished to maintain her objection, she could have completed the form and signed it  
"under protest". If there was any financial penalty, which was not proven, I would attach it to the  
intransigence of the complainant and not to the respondent.  
bb. The complainant submitted in May 2009 she raised her concern about signing the third-  
party form with the respondent in an email exchange with Mr. Johnson (exhibit 10, tab 16). In  
the email from Mr. Johnson dated May 1, 2009, he suggested to the complainant she complete  
the form as requested if she wished to pursue the compensation claim. In my view, this can in no  
way be considered an act of reprisal; rather, it was an act of an employer who was concerned for  
the well-being of its employee. My comments with respect to the respondent's signing of the  
form are noted above.  
cc. The complainant argued on May 13, 2009 Mr. Johnson was not prepared to extend special  
leave beyond May 2009 and asked for updated medical information (exhibit 10, tab 31). I cannot  
agree this was an act of reprisal. Frankly, in my view it was indeed reasonable under the  
circumstance for the respondent to require an update to the medical records of the complainant.  
Further in this email, Mr. Johnson asked the complainant if she was requesting the involvement  
of a local officer or committee pursuant to section 128 of the Code. I am of the view, especially  
having listened to his testimony, this was a request for clarification. Unlike the complainant, I  
was not concerned with the testimony of Mr. Johnson indicating as a new manager he was most  
interested in accommodation and not as concerned with what happened in the past. I do not  
accept the assertions of the complainant these actions amount to a contravention of sections 122,  
124, 125, 127, 128 and 129 of the Code. The complainant was not at the workplace at this time,  
and the evidence of Mr. Johnson was in summary he wanted to do something to return the  
complainant, whom he and the respondent considered to be a valuable worker, to the workplace.  
In my view, there was no way this could be considered an act of reprisal.  
dd. The complainant put a lot of weight on the testimony of Mr. Johnson, who stated, "he was  
not willing to invest the time to call around to other departments". She argued this was an act of  
reprisal resulting in a financial penalty. This statement cannot be taken out of context. Mr.  
Johnson explained this by saying two things. First of all, he and other representatives valued the  
employment of the complainant and did not wish to lose her services. More importantly, he  
testified he was not willing to make these calls without knowledge of the medical restrictions of  
the complainant. This was not in my view an act of reprisal.  
ee. The complainant also took issue with the testimony of Mr. Johnson, who acknowledged  
over the years a number of meetings occurred to discuss her case. I fail to see how this can be  
viewed as an act of reprisal, and the complainant was unable to articulate how this responded to  
the question posed by me. In my view, it would have been odd for management not to meet to  
discuss this matter, and even if I were wrong, there was no allegation these meetings caused any  
financial loss to the complainant or were disciplinary in nature or threatened discipline.  
ff.  
The complainant submitted she was being discriminated against and treated unequally  
because of the meetings of management concerning her case. She alleged her privacy rights must  
have been violated. First of all, if there was any foundation in law to these allegations, which I  
do not believe there to be, the complainant failed to provide any evidence of unequal treatment  
or a breach of privacy rights. And furthermore, if there had been an evidentiary and legal basis  
for this allegation, how does this constitute an act of reprisal pursuant to section 147 of the  
Code? In my view it was not, as there was no disciplinary action or threat thereof proven by the  
complainant.  
gg. The complainant submitted the fact Mr. Johnson played a key role on the Occupational  
Health and Safety Committee and yet was more concerned about accommodation was an act of  
reprisal. I have written about this allegation above, but suffice to say I do not agree with the  
complainant's submission in this regard, and if I am wrong, there was no evidence of disciplinary  
action or threat thereof as a result of this approach.  
hh. The complainant alleged the respondent discriminated against her on the basis of health,  
colour and gender. At the outset, I heard no evidence to support this allegation. That  
notwithstanding, while Mr. Johnson was frustrated by this case, I do not accept the complainant's  
categorization of his response as annoyance with the reports he was receiving from the  
complainant authored by her therapist (Dr. Goldstein). This may be understandable given his  
main goal was accommodation. I do not accept the position of the complainant that Mr. Johnson  
was annoyed with her request to deal with a female supervisor. That said, I do have concerns the  
respondent did not accede to this request, which was proposed by the complainant's therapist and  
doctor.  
ii.  
The complainant referred to the testimony of Mr. Johnson, who for a number of years had  
saved three voice-mail messages of the complainant in September 2009 before creating an  
audio/video of them, which was introduced in evidence (exhibit 161). The complainant argued  
this was a breach of her privacy rights, but when asked to explain how, she was unable to  
articulate a reason. She acknowledged it was her voice on these messages and they were not  
delivered under duress. The messages were quite lengthy, but in at least one of them, she states  
she would be willing to return to work at the Sparks Street office. The evidence shows shortly  
thereafter, she was offered this office and refused this accommodation. Regardless, I do not  
understand how the complainant claims this to be a violation of her privacy rights. However, if I  
am wrong in this conclusion, I conclude the complainant called no evidence and made no  
convincing argument to link this allegation to section 147 of the Code.  
jj.  
The complainant referred me to the briefing note dated July 15, 2009 addressed to Ms.  
Rallis (exhibit 39), which was provided to her as a result of her application pursuant to the ATIA.  
The complainant expressed her displeasure regarding what was said in this document especially  
on the first page, where she is described as becoming "demanding and eventually relied upon  
formal recourse through a grievance and a complaint under the Canada Labour Code". She  
additionally took issue with the report establishing Mr. Seguin had approached her lawyer  
without her authority. The complainant submitted this was direct evidence of the respondent's  
reprisal as it was a retaliatory position towards her. Despite the allegation of the complainant, I  
am not convinced the contact of Mr. Seguin with her lawyer was an act of reprisal contrary to  
section 147 of the Code. Indeed, once an employee is represented by counsel, the employer  
should be contacting them, and no special authorization on the part of the employee is required. I  
can understand the complainant being upset at the categorization of her, but I do not accept this  
was an act of retaliation. Although the author was not identified or called as a witness, there was  
no evidence to conclude anything other than this internal document is an honest opinion of the  
status of her case as of July 15, 2009. There was no evidence offered by the complainant to tie  
this into a violation of section 147 of the Code. Once again, this allegation was non-responsive to  
the question posed and unhelpful to my inquiry.  
kk. The complainant referred me to an email from Mr. Seguin dated July 24, 2009 (exhibit 10,  
tab 42, page 2 of 7), wherein he stated:  
You have every "right" to file complaints and/or grievances but you are legally bound by the  
principle of "work now, grieve later". In other words, your legal obligations to your Employer to  
report to work or be on approved leave are not superseded by your rights to legal processes.  
The complainant argued this was a "chastising" letter to her. While I do not share her views as to  
the categorization of this email, if I am wrong, I am still at a loss how this was an act of reprisal.  
The complainant has not established this email resulted in discipline or the threat of discipline  
covered by section 147. In my view, this allegation was not responsive to my question.  
ll.  
The complainant referred me to an email from Mr. Seguin dated August 7, 2009 (exhibit  
10, tab 43) to her. The complainant took issue with the last portion of paragraph 1, which asks  
her to deal with him and Mr. Johnson; paragraph 2, which asks the complainant to meet so as to  
avoid the formal process; and paragraphs 3 and 4, which ask for a meeting with the complainant.  
The complainant argued the failure of the respondent to offer her the opportunity to deal with a  
female executive was an act of reprisal. As noted above, while I do have a concern with the  
respondent not attempting to offer the complainant this accommodation, I do not see it as an act  
of reprisal that violates section 147 of the Code. While the email does refer to the more formal  
process at the Public Service Labour Relations Board, I do not find it to be harsh. In fact, I  
interpret this letter as confirming the respondent's willingness to attempt to resolve the issues as  
expeditiously and informally as possible.  
mm. The complainant referred me to an email from Mr. Seguin dated August 12, 2009 in which  
he states the department has no "existing obligation with respect to what you refer to as CLC 128  
to provide unilateral 'accommodation'" (exhibit 10, tab 47). She argued this approach perpetuated  
the discriminatory approach towards her on the grounds of gender and withheld her Canada  
Labour Code procedural rights. It is important to reproduce the pertinent portions of section 128,  
which state:  
Refusal to work if danger  
128. (1) Subject to this section, an employee may refuse to use or operate a machine or thing, to  
work in a place or to perform an activity, if the employee while at work has reasonable cause to  
believe that  
(a) the use or operation of the machine or thing constitutes a danger to the employee or to  
another employee;  
(b) a condition exists in the place that constitutes a danger to the employee; or  
(c) the performance of the activity constitutes a danger to the employee or to another employee.  
Although I asked the complainant for a further explanation, she was unable to articulate how the  
email could be considered an act of reprisal, contrary to section 147 of the Code. She continued  
to allege this to be a discriminatory action of the employer towards her but failed to tie it into the  
Code as asked. The answer was non-responsive and unhelpful.  
nn. The complainant referred me to an email chain between her and Karen Ladouceur of the  
Labour Program at the Department of Human Resources and Social Development (exhibit 115).  
These emails were sent between April 2009 and August 2009 and related to the various forms  
including what the complainant referred to as the 3rd party form. She specifically referred me to  
the bottom of page 2 as an act of reprisal as it showed the respondent was aware of the fact she  
was involved in a Code complaint. In my view, this argument made little or no sense, and even if  
I am wrong, in my view, this was a clear explanation to the complainant of the need to complete  
the form and nothing else. This was what was said in the impugned email:  
Our office has determined the possibility of a third party because your claim (harassment) could  
be considered to be out of the course of employment for any employer's agent. As soon as our  
office determines a third party, we are obligated by law to ask that the claimant completes [sic]  
the election form in order to inform us of their choice of claim. If you do not complete the form  
or if you choose to claim against the third party, we cannot authorize the claim with CSST.  
It is my conclusion the complainant stubbornly and without reason refused to fill out the form,  
and it was for this reason she lost any opportunity to receive benefits. Additionally, the  
respondent argued and I accept that the Labour Program of the Department of Human Resources  
and Social Development was not the section to whom the complainant reported. I also refer to  
my comments about the 3rd party form noted in a preceding bullet. Despite the allegation of the  
complainant this act was a "withholding of information and a transparent unlawful procedure", I  
disagree. Again, in my view, the complainant was non-responsive and unhelpful in answering the  
question I posed this way.  
oo. The complainant referred me to an internal email to Ms. Rallis dated August 4, 2009,  
which she received as a result of her application under the ATIA (exhibit 40). The email is an  
update of the status of ongoing relations between the respondent and the complainant. She was  
most upset with these sentences: "Peter Seguin is trying to contact the employee to see if she will  
reconsider and come back to the table. If mediation is indeed cancelled, we will be giving her a  
final offer (i.e. no more leave and come back to work)". The complainant argued this was a  
threat of disciplinary action and therefore an act of reprisal in violation of section 147 of the  
Code. While I do understand this allegation of the complainant, for the following reasons I do  
not agree. First, this is an internal document and as such I fail to see how she could have felt  
threatened before she received it. Even then, although it might have been troublesome to the  
complainant, how can it be considered a threat? Read in context this email can, in my view, only  
be seen for what it was, an update on the status of the ongoing relations with the complainant  
addressed to a relatively new senior management official. Although it may be somewhat curtly  
worded, it cannot be interpreted as being more than outlining the proposed direction of the  
author. I do not accept the submission of the complainant this established the intention of the  
respondent to, in her words, "dismiss me onto non-salary".  
pp. During the response of the complainant, she made reference to a document titled "PRD  
001735", which had not been entered as an exhibit during these proceedings. As noted above, I  
made a ruling with respect to this document, and as it was not before me, I will say no more.  
qq. The complainant alleged the email from Mr. Fedyk dated October 22, 2009 to Mr.  
Johnson and others was an act of reprisal (exhibit 77). In this email, Mr. Fedyk writes "excellent  
letter message is clear". The evidence was he referenced a letter sent to the complainant on the  
next day (exhibit 13, tabs 22 and 24, as well as exhibit 116). First of all, the email from Mr.  
Fedyk was received by the complainant as a result of her application pursuant to the ATIA. The  
letter itself was received by her in October 2009. I do not accept the complainant could have felt  
the email of Mr. Fedyk was threatening. She might have been disturbed by the words but not  
threatened. As for the email, I note the original draft sent to Mr. Fedyk (exhibit 13, tab 22) was  
amended before it was sent to the complainant (exhibit 13, tab 24). I do not agree with the  
complainant's categorization of this letter as the implementation of the plan to, in her words,  
"dismiss me onto non-salary". The letter must be read in context. It was sent in response to the  
voice-mail messages the complainant left with Mr. Johnson (exhibit 161) and addresses some of  
the apparent concerns she raised. Mr. Johnson emphasized the purpose of the letter was first and  
foremost to reinforce the reintegration plan provided to the complainant on September 30, 2009,  
which was "based on the recommendations made by your medical advisors up to that time". The  
author addressed some of the issues raised by the complainant with respect to the reintegration  
plan as follows:  
1. Appointment at the EX-01 level retroactively. Mr. Johnson categorized this as an  
unreasonable accommodation. I agree with his assessment, and the complainant has  
provided no evidence or jurisprudence on this issue that would convince me otherwise.  
2. Permanent transfer to a new organization or department, or an assignment to UNESCO  
mission (or other missions in France) followed by a return to a position in Service  
Canada or PRI located on Elgin St, Savanne or Sparks St. Mr. Johnson responded by  
stating he had no authority to transfer the complainant to other organizations and further  
reminded the complainant the reintegration plan placed her at the Sparks Street office and  
her assignment was outside the part of the department that was considered problematic to  
the complainant.  
3. Retraction of all risk of salary, vacation and sick leave losses and repayment and  
coverage of all financial penalties. Mr. Johnson identified receipt of a new letter from the  
complainant's therapist (Dr. Goldstein), which he interpreted as raising questions about  
the complainant's limitations, which contradicted earlier information. He requested the  
complainant consent to an independent medical assessment.  
I disagree with the complainant's assessment of this letter as disciplinary in nature and therefore  
an act of reprisal. The evidence of Mr. Johnson confirms my assessment of the letter. Although  
the complainant might have disapproved, the letter in my view was an attempt by the respondent  
to continue in its efforts to accommodate her. There was nothing hidden and no agenda; the letter  
was a direct and responsive communication to her asking for her assistance in the development  
of a plan of accommodation or reintegration plan. Unfortunately, the evidence confirms the  
complainant was not willing to actively assist in the development of this plan. I do not consider  
this letter to be an act of reprisal as suggested by the complainant.  
rr.  
The complainant submitted the "Record of Employment" (exhibit 48) established the  
respondent had always intended to fire her, and they accomplished this goal. I reject the  
argument of the complainant first of all as the Record of Employment does not state she was  
terminated; rather, it confirmed she was laid off, and the reason was identified as "Illness or  
injury". In confirmation of the employment status of the complainant, the Record of Employment  
indicated she might return, but the date was unknown. The evidence confirmed this was issued  
on March 1, 2010 so as to allow the complainant to claim disability benefits.  
ss. The complainant finally referred me to the complaint she filed under the Code on October  
29, 2009 (exhibit 3, tab D-1). She submitted this document outlined three "overarching  
contraventions":  
1. The first one was found at the bottom of page 2 and was summarized by the complainant  
as the "withholding of procedural rights". There were 14 paragraphs in this portion of the  
complaint. It was evident to me upon a review of these points the complainant referred  
back to what occurred in 2008 and attempted to meet the timeline by making such  
statements as, "I re-read for the first time in many months…" and then made reference to  
communication dated in 2008. Given my preliminary decision (Chamberlain PSLRB,  
supra), I find this non-responsive to my question and entirely unhelpful.  
2. The second was found at page 7 and was described by the complainant as the  
"withholding of Occupational Health and Safety procedures" and includes "allegations  
respecting the third party form". I have already addressed the election form in at least two  
bullets above. Furthermore, the complainant alleged the respondent was responsible for  
sending these forms to her, which, as noted above, was a position with which I do not  
agree. Furthermore, I do not accept her allegations this was a disciplinary action or  
resulted in a financial penalty or any other violation of the Code for the same reasons I  
outlined in the bullets above.  
3. Her third point made reference to the October 23, 2009 letter (exhibit 13, tab 24), which I  
addressed in a more wholesome fashion above (paragraph 287(qq)). Despite the  
arguments of the complainant, I was unable to conclude this letter could be construed as  
disciplinary in nature; nor did it impose a financial penalty on the complainant. I reiterate  
my interpretation of this letter.  
288 Having considered these allegations, I am of the view none of them constitutes an act of  
reprisal on the part of the respondent. Simply put, they do not violate section 147 of the Code.  
289 During some general statements made by the complainant on June 10, 2013, she submitted  
counsel for the respondent had suggested the issues of accommodation were "live matters", so  
therefore I should expand my inquiry to include what occurred in 2008. For the very same  
reasons I articulated in my preliminary decision (Chamberlain PSLRB), which were in turn  
accepted by the Federal Court of Appeal (Chamberlain FCA), I rejected this invitation.  
290 On June 10, 2013, the complainant again raised some general points about being limited in  
her examination of certain witnesses. Specifically, she submitted she was not allowed to ask  
certain questions of Ms. Rallis and pointed to documents marked as exhibits (exhibits 163 and  
164). These documents were the questions the complainant wanted to ask of the witness with  
notes taken by both counsel for the respondent and her. The documents outline those questions  
that I did determine were either irrelevant or otherwise unnecessary. I repeat my findings and  
conclusions in paragraphs 117 to 119, 197 and 203 to 205.  
291 It must be remembered Ms. Rallis was a witness for the complainant, who testified for the  
first time on June 29, 2011. The complainant completed her questions on that day, and the  
respondent had no cross-examination. The complainant asked for the opportunity to recall Ms.  
Rallis. I granted her the right to do so, after reminding her this was unusual and on the condition  
she provide me with a list of questions that would be vetted by me so as to avoid duplication and  
irrelevant questions. Many of the questions the complainant wished to pose when Ms. Rallis was  
recalled on July 29, 2011 and found on these documents (exhibits 163 and 164) were either  
irrelevant or had already been asked.  
292 The complainant submitted there were times when I upheld objections of counsel for the  
respondent and thus interfered in her ability to present the case. Although the complainant did  
not identify these instances, as a general comment, throughout the proceeding, counsel for the  
respondent on occasion objected to certain questions. I erred on the side of the complainant in  
these instances and for the most part allowed questions to be asked by her on the understanding I  
would attach the appropriate weight to this evidence. This general rule of thumb adopted by me  
even extended to allowing the complainant to pose questions of witnesses concerning incidents  
that happened in 2008. I therefore reject the complainant's allegation and can state with  
confidence that if anything, I erred on the side of the complainant rather than against her.  
D. List of acts of reprisals  
293 After the first day of the complainant's argument, it was clear she was still struggling in  
organizing her thoughts. In an attempt to be of assistance, I proposed she provide me with a list  
of all of the actions of the respondent she alleged to be acts of reprisal and in contravention of  
section 147 of the Code. Over the next few days, the complainant first provided one list and  
subsequently provided me with what she considered an expanded list. Neither of the documents  
would be what I considered a list. It became clear to me the second of the documents alleged  
over 140 separate acts of reprisal.  
294 Although she had to be reminded to follow the list, during the next few days of her  
argument, she focused on articulating her arguments on a point-by-point basis. This approach  
was helpful for the complainant in presenting her arguments in an organized and somewhat  
understandable fashion.  
295 However, on June 10, 2013, the complainant submitted I should not have asked her to  
identify which acts or documents were acts or reprisals. In making this statement, the  
complainant submitted that "every act of the employer was an act of reprisal, including  
defending the judicial review I commenced in the Federal Court". I asked the complainant at this  
juncture if this was an emotional response or a considered response. She confirmed she wanted  
to state this for the record after considering her position since the last day of sitting, which was  
May 1, 2013.  
296 The complainant submitted paragraph 4 of my preliminary decision, where I referenced the  
decision of the former Board to combine the Code complaints with her grievance, was important.  
297 The complainant argued her complaints were not only about her being permanently placed  
in a position at the EX-01 level. In support of this, she referred me to the email of her then  
lawyer (exhibit 3, tab A-1), specifically point 14, where he wrote on her behalf and asked for  
accommodation and reintegration at either her acting level (EX-01) or her substantive level (ES-  
07).  
298 The complainant argued the 25 allegations in her complaint (exhibit 3, tab C-1) formed the  
basis of my jurisdiction.  
299 The complainant also argued in interpreting section 147 of the Code, I should not forget the  
words "or other penalty".  
300 At this juncture, it is useful to set out the 140 acts of reprisal raised by the complainant. The  
first 27 allegations of acts of reprisal noted below were raised by the complainant without  
reference to the list. From number 28 on is found on the complainant's expanded list provided  
during the second day of hearing. A quick review confirmed there was significant overlap and  
repetition.  
301 I have purposely quoted each and every one of these allegations. Under each one, I have  
summarized the argument of the complainant and analyzed it.  
1. Act of reprisal was Mr. Johnson not calling other departments because he felt Zabia  
Chamberlain not able to return to work  
302 The complainant argued the notes from her doctors (exhibits 144, 110 and 145) requested  
reintegration. She submitted the failure of Mr. Johnson to call other departments was an act of  
reprisal as it did not allow her to return to work.  
303 On a stand-alone basis, the complainant and her doctors were requesting an assignment to  
another department or branch, but I cannot overlook the testimony of Mr. Johnson in this matter.  
He testified and I accept his view at this point in time, he was not certain the complainant was  
able to return to work at all. Therefore, he was not prepared to expend the time or energy of  
contacting others.  
304 In my view, given what occurred, especially from August to October 2009, this was a  
reasoned and reasonable approach. Despite a voice-mail message from the complainant  
indicating she was prepared to work at the Sparks Street office (exhibit 161) and an assignment  
to another position with no involvement with JA, the complainant was not willing to accept this  
accommodation or even provide an alternative plan. This resulted in Mr. Johnson writing a letter  
on October 23, 2009 (exhibit 13, tab 24) wherein, amongst other things, he asked the  
complainant to agree to an independent medical examination.  
305 Under the circumstances, I cannot and do not agree with the submission of the complainant  
this was an act of reprisal.  
306 I repeat my findings and conclusions in paragraph 287(dd).  
2. Act of reprisal was the draft reintegration plan  
307 The complainant argued the reintegration plan provided by the respondent was, in her  
words, "a plan of discipline and demotion and a plan of isolation".  
308 For the following reasons, I reject this position. First of all, Mr. Johnson sent a draft plan to  
the complainant on September 30, 2009 (exhibit 13, tab 14).  
309 In so doing, Mr. Johnson requested the complainant review it with her therapist, Dr.  
Goldstein, in advance of a proposed meeting, which would include Dr. Goldstein. On October 5,  
2009, as there was no response from the complainant, he sent a follow-up email to her (exhibit  
13, tab 15). Despite the contention of the complainant this communication was aggressive and  
therefore an act of reprisal, I conclude just the opposite. Both the tone of the emails and the  
testimony of Mr. Johnson confirm he was acting in what can only be described as a conciliatory  
fashion.  
310 Unfortunately, the complainant only responded to this draft on October 9, 2009 (exhibit 13,  
tab 17) and did so without meeting with the respondent. In this response, she asked to be sent on  
"an overseas assignment with lost EX salary coverage, special leave and financial expenses".  
Additionally, she provided a further note from her doctor.  
311 Despite this, Mr. Johnson was obviously not put off and on October 13, 2009 (exhibit 13,  
tab 18) proposed a meeting with the complainant to attend the facilities at Sparks Street as  
proposed and to address questions to the doctor. This request was met by the complainant with  
yet another refusal and a reiteration of her demands for accommodation (exhibit 13, tab 19).  
312 Subsequent to this, the complainant, on October 14, 2009, provided Ms. Rallis and Ms.  
Dingwall, but not Mr. Johnson, with a new letter from Dr. Goldstein (exhibit 13, tab 20).  
Unfortunately, the complainant did not call Dr. Goldstein as a witness as it would have been  
helpful for her to explain this and other letters over her signature. Regardless, this letter was  
three pages long, and in the first two pages, she outlined her discussions with the complainant.  
She formulated the following conclusion at the end of her letter:  
For her health, she needs an immediate change in supervisor and a direct female supervisor for  
her reintegration (consistent with my letter of June 3rd, 2009). I do not approve her meeting with  
officials who have treated her insensitively in recent months, and I ask that she not be put in a  
situation where she has to meet with the employer without the presence of both a neutral party  
and her own representative. I am aware of and have offered to provide emotional support to her  
in any way I can for the upcoming meetings. So as not to breach practitioner-patient  
confidentiality, please send your written health questions via Mrs. Chamberlain. I will work with  
her physician to assess and approve her reintegration and accommodation.  
313 It is understandable why Mr. Johnson was not satisfied with this letter. It in no way  
addressed the real question, that being the proposed reintegration plan. As a result, the next  
communication was that of Mr. Johnson to the complainant dated October 23, 2009 (exhibit 13,  
tab 24) in which he addressed some of the demands of the complainant in her email (exhibit 13,  
tab 19) and asked her to agree to submit to an independent medical exam.  
314 I do not accept the argument of the complainant this was an act of reprisal. I am of the view  
Mr. Johnson was, as he stated, trying to reach a plan of accommodation and the complainant was  
not in any way assisting in the process.  
315 The actions of the complainant and her doctors at this juncture did not meet the obligations  
she had to assist in an attempt to reach a point of accommodation.  
316 In coming to this conclusion, I also considered the voice-mail message the complainant left  
on the phone of Mr. Johnson (exhibit 161), wherein she was clear. She stated an accommodation  
could be reached if there was an office located in the Sparks Street office.  
317 Only a few weeks later, the respondent located an office on Sparks Street; yet, despite her  
earlier undertaking and without any explanation, the complainant pronounced it inappropriate.  
The words in her email of October 9, 2009 (exhibit 13, tab 17) were telling. In her first point, she  
stated in reference to Sparks Street, "… where it's proposed that I work solely and remotely… ."  
This was an accommodation she asked for in the first place, yet when the respondent offered  
what she wished, she rejected it.  
318 The complainant cannot attempt to transfer the entire duty of accommodation to the  
respondent. In a case decided some years ago, I articulated the joint responsibility of the  
employer and the employee in such cases (Gibson v. Treasury Board (Department of Health),  
2008 PSLRB 68):  
35 The Supreme Court of Canada indicated that the "… search for accommodation is a multi-  
party inquiry… ." In writing that, the Court concluded that there is a duty on the "…  
complainant to assist in securing an appropriate accommodation…": Central Okanagan School  
District No. 23 v. Renaud, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 970, para 43 and 44. Although the Court is quick to  
point out that the employer is in the best position "… to determine how the complainant can be  
accommodated without undue interference in the operation of the employer's business…" it is  
clear from that case that the complainant must do his or her part.  
36 It is my view that it would be an unreasonable responsibility to place the onus on the  
employer to unilaterally determine the nature of the disability of the employee and similarly  
unilaterally determine the nature of the accommodation without some input from the employee:  
Price v. Fredericton (City), [2004] N.B.H.R.B.I.D. No. 1 (QL); upheld by Price v. Fredericton  
(City), 2004 NBQB 319, and New Brunswick (Human Rights Commission) v. Fredericton (City),  
2005 NBCA 45. In this case, the grievor testified, and her representative also submitted, the  
untenable position that once the employer was advised of the existence of a possible disability,  
the onus fell entirely upon the employer to accommodate the needs of the grievor. I simply  
cannot accept this rationale, and the grievor's representative was unable to provide any case law  
to suggest that this was the status of the law.  
319 It is my conclusion the complainant did not do "her part". Every time the respondent offered  
a plan of accommodation, the complainant put up another road block. Due to the intransigence of  
the complainant, this was not a "multi-party inquiry" but rather a process, which was frustrated  
by the actions of the complainant.  
320 Despite the allegations of the complainant, I do not accept the actions of the respondent to  
attempt to determine her needs and accommodate them was an act of reprisal. Rather, the  
approach of Mr. Johnson in this regard was appropriate, fair, even-handed, transparent and  
without malice.  
321 I repeat my findings and conclusions in paragraph 287(rr).  
3. Act of reprisal was the permanent saving of the voice mail by Mr. Johnson  
322 The evidence of Mr. Johnson was in September 2009 the complainant left three voice-mail  
messages at his office. His evidence was he continued to save these messages and eventually  
recorded them at his home on a DVD, which was introduced by consent as exhibit 161. The  
complainant argued this was a violation of her privacy rights as well as a retaliatory act of  
reprisal.  
323 For the reasons addressed above, I reject the submission of the complainant. Furthermore, I  
repeat my findings and conclusions in paragraphs 287(ii) and (rr) and 317.  
4. Act of reprisal not giving Zabia Chamberlain a female supervisor  
324 According to the complainant, the evidence confirmed she asked Mr. Johnson for the  
opportunity to deal with a female supervisor. Mr. Johnson allegedly declined to provide her with  
this opportunity and expressed frustration at being asked. The evidence of Mr. Johnson did not  
disclose any level of frustration. Rather, in September 2009, he relied on the voice-mail  
messages of the complainant, located an office space in Sparks Street as requested and provided  
a draft reintegration plan. In so doing, he offered to meet with the complainant and her  
psychologist to discuss any potential issues that might be raised. This, in my view, is not  
evidence of frustration.  
325 Regardless, even if Mr. Johnson expressed frustration, was this an act of reprisal? I do  
acknowledge, as I have said earlier in this decision, I have a concern the respondent did not  
accede to this request of the complainant. However, I do not accept this act can be an act of  
reprisal. There was no evidence to suggest this amounted to a penalty to the complainant of the  
type described in section 147, and as a result, I see no violation of section 147 of the Code.  
326 I repeat my findings and conclusions in paragraph 287(hh).  
5. Act of reprisal was Mr. Johnson did not have the female employee mentioned in the voice  
mail contact Zabia Chamberlain  
327 I repeat my findings and conclusions in paragraphs 324 to 326.  
6. Act of reprisal was not to transfer me to another department despite my request  
328 The complainant asserted the respondent should have called other departments and arranged  
for her to be transferred. I accept the evidence of Mr. Johnson, who confirmed he was not willing  
to call other departments as he did not have a medical report indicating the complainant was able  
to return to work. His testimony was until such time as he was aware of any and all limitations of  
the complainant, he was unwilling to investigate other opportunities.  
329 In rejecting this allegation on the part of the complainant, I repeat my findings and  
conclusions in paragraphs 287(dd) and 302 to 306.  
7. Act of reprisal was having meetings with management to discuss my case  
330 The evidence of Mr. Johnson confirmed members of the management team met and  
discussed the situation as it applied to the complainant. The complainant submitted the meetings  
took place for over a year.  
331 She submitted these meetings were an act of reprisal. When asked for an explanation, she  
simply stated management should have been speaking with her and not about her.  
332 The only evidence before me concerning these meetings was that of Mr. Johnson. Based  
upon his testimony, I am unable to conclude there was anything nefarious about them. He  
described them as briefing or information sessions and nothing more.  
333 As a consequence, I reject the submission of the complainant these meetings were acts of  
reprisal. They were not.  
334 I repeat my findings and conclusions in paragraphs 287(ee) and (ff).  
8. Act of reprisal was Mr. Johnson not picking up the phone to call other departments  
335 In rejecting this, I repeat my findings and conclusions in paragraphs 302 to 306 and 328 to  
329.  
9. The letter of Mr. Johnson October 23, 2009 was an act of reprisal  
336 On October 23, 2009, Mr. Johnson wrote to the complainant and offered a draft  
reintegration plan (exhibit 31). The complainant characterized this letter as disciplinary in nature  
and therefore an act of reprisal.  
337 In rejecting this, I repeat my findings and conclusions in paragraph 287(rr).  
10. Failure to appoint Zabia Chamberlain under employment equity policy  
338 The complainant referred me to exhibits 135 to 137 and submitted the respondent had  
breached section 147 of the Code by not appointing her to a position under the employment  
equity program. In making this assertion, the only evidence before me consisted of a list of some  
female employees who had been appointed to various positions within the public service,  
apparently without competition.  
339 There was no evidence offered to suggest the complainant would have been under  
consideration, whether she met the necessary qualification, how her circumstances compared to  
those who were appointed or that she had been rejected. The complainant asserted because she  
was on a qualified list for the classification level in which she was acting, she should have been  
automatically appointed, without a competition.  
340 Based on the evidence before me, I am of the view that for me to find in favour of the  
position of the complainant would require a quantum leap in logic, and one which I am not  
prepared to make. During the operative period of time, the complainant was off work, based  
upon medical documents. Even if the complainant had some entitlement to this program, and this  
is not a conclusion I reach as there was no evidentiary basis to do so, it would be expected an  
employee appointed thereunder would be able to attend at work. But, according to  
correspondence from her own physician and therapist, this was not so.  
341 Accordingly, I cannot conclude this was an act of reprisal.  
11. Contravention of the employment equity policy is an act of reprisal  
342 I repeat my findings and conclusions in paragraphs 338 to 341.  
12. Failure to appoint Zabia Chamberlain to another department  
343 This allegation is interrelated with allegations enumerated as 10 and 11. As such, I repeat  
my findings and conclusions in paragraphs 338 to 341.  
344 I therefore conclude the allegation of the complainant in this regard is unfounded as this  
cannot be considered an act of reprisal under section 147 of the Code.  
13. Act of reprisal for Mr. Johnson to indicate there was no penalty imposed  
345 The complainant asserted it was an act of reprisal for Mr. Johnson to testify there was no  
penalty imposed on her. If I were to accept this assertion, it would be tantamount to finding the  
respondent was not entitled to take a position that differed from the one taken by the  
complainant.  
346 Such an assertion defies logic and must be rejected.  
347 Unfortunately, the complainant in this matter constantly claimed the positions of the  
respondent, when they did not agree with her position, were acts of reprisals. In her closing  
argument, the complainant again reiterated a statement she had withdrawn earlier in the  
proceedings. During the proceedings, the complainant argued the response to all of her  
complaints were acts of reprisal, but she withdrew this statement as she recognized this  
implicated counsel for the respondent (paragraphs 111 to 112); however, she once again raised  
this position in her closing argument.  
348 I find no foundation for finding the statements of Mr. Johnson could in any way be  
considered acts of reprisal. They in no way breach section 147 of the Code.  
14. Act of reprisal for Mr. Johnson to question the letter of Dr. Goldstein  
349 Mr. Johnson testified he was frustrated by the doctors of the complainant. He described  
them as not being helpful to the process. Specifically, he was referring to Dr. Goldstein.  
350 His evidence was centred on the draft reintegration plan he provided to the complainant on  
September 30, 2009 (exhibit 4, tab A-9). In his covering email, he suggested "good news"  
concerning the location, and to a large part this was based upon what he considered were  
recommendations of the doctor. It was also based upon the voice-mail message left by the  
complainant in which she agreed the work location of Sparks Street would be acceptable. It  
should be noted Mr. Johnson proposed a meeting with the complainant and Dr. Goldstein to  
discuss the draft.  
351 Such a meeting did not occur, as Dr. Goldstein wrote a letter dated October 7, 2009 (exhibit  
4, tab A-10). This letter was signed without the doctor ever meeting or speaking to Mr. Johnson  
to discuss the draft reintegration plan. In this letter, Dr. Goldstein asks that the complainant "be  
accommodated as soon as possible with a respectful transfer elsewhere in the public service  
safely unconnected and away from HRSDC and Place du Portage".  
352 It was this statement Mr. Johnson found unhelpful. I tend to agree with his categorization;  
this letter was not at all helpful to the obligation of the respondent to accommodate the needs of  
the complainant to the point of undue hardship. It was not only unhelpful to the respondent but  
also to the complainant, given my findings in paragraphs 127 to 146.  
353 A complete review of the notes and letters signed by Dr. Stewart and Dr. Goldstein provides  
a sense of a lack of cooperation. I also had the advantage of listening to the evidence of Dr.  
Stewart and read letters from both addressed to the former Board.  
354 During the evidence of Dr. Stewart, she volunteered that during a recent appointment, a  
friend of the complainant's attended and wondered aloud if JA had been masturbating behind  
Zabia Chamberlain's chair. When asked what she thought of this allegation, the doctor stated she  
had felt this had occurred from the beginning. I find this astounding. When one reads the original  
allegations of Zabia Chamberlain and compares them to what was now being alleged, one is left  
with the inevitable conclusion the incident or incidents have evolved into a much more serious  
allegation. The testimony of the doctor in my view put her in the position of being an advocate.  
355 In my view, Dr. Stewart transcended from the role of impartial, neutral and objective  
medical practitioner to the role of advocate for the complainant.  
356 As such, I have great difficulty in accepting the medical opinions of either as being  
objective. Although Mr. Johnson did not have the advantage of the evidence I heard, in my view  
he was correct in concluding the opinions of the complainant's doctors were unhelpful. On the  
face, they were inconsistent at best and often contradictory. I repeat my findings and conclusions  
in paragraph 287(cc).  
15. Act of reprisal for Mr. Johnson to request Zabia Chamberlain submit to an IME  
357 On October 23, 2009, Mr. Johnson corresponded with the complainant (exhibit 13, tab 24).  
In this letter, Mr. Johnson requested the complainant undergo an independent medical  
examination, and to this end, he enclosed an appropriate consent form. I repeat my findings and  
conclusions in paragraphs 287(rr) and 311 to 315.  
358 The complainant argued this was an act of reprisal.  
359 Mr. Johnson testified at some length about his concerns surrounding the medical advice the  
complainant was receiving. These concerns were as a result of the rejection of the draft  
reintegration plan he had drafted. It must not be forgotten Mr. Johnson prepared this plan as a  
draft and extended an invitation to the complainant and Dr. Goldstein to meet with him to  
discuss it (exhibit 4, tab A-9). Dr. Goldstein rejected the plan on behalf of the complainant on  
October 7, 2009 without the benefit of a meeting (exhibit 4, tab A-10). He therefore concluded  
that perhaps an Independent Medical Examination (IME) would be of assistance to both parties  
in arriving at a reasonable accommodation.  
360 I fail to see how this opinion of Mr. Johnson, which in my view was justified under the  
circumstances, could be considered an act of reprisal as alleged by the complainant. It does not  
amount to a suspension, termination, or financial or other penalty as described therein and  
therefore does not fall within section 147 of the Code.  
16. Exhibit 41 Mr. Seguin says get more forceful is an act of reprisal  
361 Exhibit 41 was an email from Mr. Seguin, who was identified by some of the witnesses as  
being the person overseeing the accommodation of the complainant. The email was sent to Ms.  
Rallis, Mr. Fedyk, Mr. Gosselin, Mr. Pickering and Mr. Trepanier on August 5, 2009.  
362 The complainant argued the words, "We agreed last Thursday that I would make one more  
conciliatory effort to arrange a meeting with Mrs. Chamberlain, and that we may then have to be  
more 'forceful' in our approach, if she continues to refuse to meet", amount to an act of reprisal  
(exhibit 41). I do not accept this allegation as these words do not amount to a suspension,  
termination, or financial or other penalty and therefore do not fall within section 147 of the Code.  
363 This letter is clearly an internal memorandum, which the complainant was unaware of until  
she received it as a result of her request for documents. It certainly does show the respondent felt  
it needed to be forceful, but at best it is a road map for future moves by the respondent. The word  
"forceful" is not defined in the document itself, and despite evidence from the complainant and  
her witnesses, this word remains undefined.  
364 I repeat my findings and conclusions in paragraphs 287(mm) and (rr), 311 to 315, and 336  
to 337.  
17. Exhibit 39 briefing note where Mr. Seguin approaches a lawyer who had represented  
Zabia Chamberlain  
365 Exhibit 39 was described as a briefing to the Assistant Deputy Minister dated July 15, 2009,  
which outlined the status of the situation as it related to the complainant. In the concluding  
paragraphs, it is stated Mr. Seguin made contact with counsel for the complainant, who was  
unavailable until mid-August.  
366 The complainant argued the contact initiated by Mr. Seguin with a lawyer who no longer  
represented her was an act of reprisal and resulted in a financial penalty of having to pay her  
lawyer.  
367 The complainant did not adduce any evidence which established she had to pay her lawyer  
for this call from Mr. Seguin and only raised this aspect of the issue in argument. Furthermore,  
the complainant acknowledged she did not tell the respondent she had terminated the services of  
this lawyer, so without such knowledge, I do not accept that it was inappropriate for the  
respondent to contact her last known solicitor. Indeed, if the respondent had tried to contact the  
complainant directly while she was represented by counsel, this would probably have resulted in  
a complaint from her.  
368 Additionally, I note that this attempted contact did not result in a suspension, termination, or  
financial or other penalty and therefore did not violate section 147 of the Code.  
369 I repeat my findings and conclusions in paragraph 287(kk).  
18. Holding over my head the status of my leave was an act of reprisal  
370 This allegation stems from the position of the complainant that while she was on paid leave  
(2008 and 2009 specifically), the respondent did not always immediately determine the basis for  
this leave. The complainant could not point to any time she was cut off pay.  
371 To some extent, I addressed this issue in paragraph 287(cc).  
372 I am perplexed how the complainant would suggest these actions can in any way be  
considered an act of reprisal, as contemplated by section 147 of the Code. She failed to provide  
me with any evidence that would support an allegation of improper employer intention and  
further failed to provide any evidence at all that the respondent's alleged failure to immediately  
determine a basis for her leave resulted in her being dismissed, suspended, laid off, unpaid, or the  
victim of a financial or other penalty.  
19. Act of reprisal for Mr. Johnson to suggest his suspicions it was a matter of summer  
holidays  
373 This allegation was not understandable to me despite attempting to ascertain the basis of it.  
The complainant provided no evidence in support of this allegation or any jurisprudence.  
374 Suffice to say I was not convinced the actions of the respondent could in any way be  
considered acts of reprisal, as contemplated by section 147 of the Code.  
20. Act of reprisal for Mr. Trepanier to tell Mr. Johnson there is no need to respond to  
request of Zabia Chamberlain  
375 The complainant referred me to exhibit 76. This is an internal email chain on July 13, 2009  
respecting the reintegration of the complainant and her request for special leave. It starts with an  
email from Mr. Johnson indicating, amongst other things, he had received a request for special  
leave from the complainant, which he was not prepared to respond to until he had more  
information.  
376 Mr. Trepanier responded the same day and stated, "At this point it is status quo, therefore  
you do not need to respond to her request. We will provide you with info if there are  
developments".  
377 This document was not seen by the complainant until she received it as a result of her  
request pursuant to access to information. The complainant alleged this was an act of reprisal.  
378 I do not agree with the complainant. This internal memorandum was not an act of reprisal,  
as contemplated by section 147 of the Code as it is nothing more than routine correspondence on  
the part of management that discloses no intention that would be in contravention of the Code.  
Furthermore, there was no evidence of a financial or other penalty or an act of discipline  
(suspension or termination) as described in section 147.  
21. Act of reprisal for Mr. Johnson to indicate he is the delegated authority as this was  
more "bouncing around"  
379 The complainant argued the evidence established there were many persons who oversaw or  
were involved in her file from time to time. These included Mr. Bertrand, Mr. Johnson, Mr.  
Trepanier, Mr. Fedyk, Mr. Lachapelle, Mr. Pickering, Mr. Seguin and Ms. Rallis. I agree with  
the submission of the complainant in this regard.  
380 However, I am not inclined to accept the assertion of the complainant this was an act of  
reprisal. It may have been confusing and unpleasant for the complainant, but there was no  
evidence to support her contention the number of individuals involved amounted to an act of  
reprisal, as contemplated by section 147 of the Code. I do not accept this amounted to a financial  
or other penalty or a suspension or termination; nor do I find that it stemmed from an improper  
purpose. The evidence disclosed nothing more than the fact that this file was processed in what I  
would describe as a typical manner.  
22. Act of reprisal for Mr. Johnson to send letter November 19, 2009 (exhibit 31)  
381 Exhibit 31 is a bundle of documents entered as evidence by the complainant. Within the  
bundle was a copy of a letter from Mr. Johnson to the complainant dated November 19, 2009.  
This letter made reference to the refusal of the complainant to allow an independent medical  
examination, the "evolving accommodation needs", her readiness for work and the fact her sick  
leave bank was exhausted on October 21, 2009.  
382 At the end of the first page, Mr. Johnson states, "You have the choice to use your vacation  
leave (leave balance is 60 days plus 5 days of one-time vacation leave) or to use leave without  
pay". The complainant argued this was an act of reprisal resulting in a financial loss or penalty.  
383 I do not agree with the complainant. This was an administrative letter, which I would have  
expected to be sent under the circumstances. Indeed, had it not been sent, I would have had real  
concerns about the transparency of the respondent.  
384 In any event, the letter provided the complainant with a choice. It also indicated the  
respondent was still attempting to develop a reintegration plan.  
385 In conclusion, I am of the view this was not an act of reprisal, as contemplated by section  
147 of the Code.  
23. Act of reprisal for Mr. Johnson to send letter dated December 9, 2009 (exhibit 31)  
386 The complainant referred to exhibit 31 again, where there is a copy of a letter from Mr.  
Johnson to the complainant dated December 9, 2009. The complainant submitted this was an act  
of reprisal.  
387 At the outset, I am not of the view this letter constituted an act of reprisal, as contemplated  
by section 147 of the Code. It reviewed the various pieces of correspondence, which were sent to  
the complainant on October 23, 2009 and November 9, 2009, in which she was given choices  
respecting her status. For some unexplained reason, the complainant did not respond to these  
letters, and in the letter dated December 9, 2009, Mr. Johnson stated he was changing her status  
to leave without pay.  
388 This was an administrative act prompted by the refusal of the complainant to communicate  
with the respondent. In my view, it was not an act of reprisal, as contemplated by section 147 of  
the Code.  
24. Act of reprisal to initiate recovery of overpayments  
389 The complainant argued the letter of December 9, 2009, which stated "and ask them to  
initiate the necessary recoveries back to October 19, 2009", amounted to an act of reprisal.  
390 Nothing could be farther from the truth in my view. This was an administrative action  
dictated by the requirements of the Financial Administration Act (R.S.C., 1985, c. F-11, FAA).  
Mr. Johnson, as the manager responsible, had the responsibility to ensure the recovery of  
overpayments. It is telling to me that the complainant did not take issue with the amounts to be  
recovered. Clearly, she recognized she had received monies for leave, which could not be  
accounted for in the normal leaves available. Yet she took issue with the letter advising her of the  
action that the respondent was required to take.  
391 I do not accept the argument of the complainant that this was an act of reprisal, as  
contemplated by section 147 of the Code.  
25. Act of reprisal for Mr. Johnson to ask Zabia Chamberlain to consider the reintegration  
plan and seek proper advice  
392 In the same letter of December 9, 2009, Mr. Johnson stated:  
I encourage you to review the reintegration plan provided on September 30, 2009 and seek  
proper advice on your current situation. The department remains open to discuss resolution  
options with the assistance of a third party, namely the Public Service Labour Relations Board  
Mediation Services.  
393 The complainant first suggested Mr. Johnson no longer referred to the reintegration plan as a  
draft. This argument ignored the second sentence, which indicated the department was open to  
discussion. The complainant cannot claim to wish to return to work and at the same time refuse  
to enter into discussions with her employer.  
394 The reference to seeking "proper advice" caused the complainant some concern. Again,  
when read in the context of all that had occurred, including the decision of Mr. Johnson to ask  
for an independent medical opinion, I do not see this as an act of reprisal, as contemplated by  
section 147 of the Code.  
26. Act of reprisal for Ms. Powell to send Zabia Chamberlain a pay stub when no deposit  
was made (exhibit 31 January 19)  
395 Again in exhibit 31, the respondent sent the complainant a copy of a statement indicating  
she was on leave without pay on January 19, 2010. In the view of the complainant, this amounted  
to an act of reprisal.  
396 I fail to comprehend how an employer acting in a transparent manner can be seen to be in  
contravention of section 147 of the Code. Indeed, in my view, the employer was required to  
ensure its employee was kept aware of her employment status.  
27. Act of reprisal to unilaterally impose leave action on February 25, 2010 (exhibit 63)  
397 This is the same allegation as I dealt with in paragraphs 386 to 391.  
398 It was at this point the complainant started to follow the second "list" of acts of reprisals she  
provided me. This list was confusing and often repetitive. In order to ensure I follow the list  
provided, I will use the words of the complainant to define the allegation and articulate her  
argument. Afterwards, I will analyze each of the allegations.  
28. Moving-transferring original assoc-DM responsible for workplace-Safety-  
Accommodation of me  
399 On February 2, 2009, an announcement was made in which Frank Vermaeten was  
introduced as Senior Assistant Deputy Minister, Skills and Employment Branch (SEB) (exhibit  
82). This is the position previously held by Ms. Jackson, who assumed the role of Senior  
Assistant Deputy Minister, Income Security and Social Development (ISSD). The complainant  
argued this was an act of reprisal.  
400 This evidence in my view proved there was movement within the senior levels of  
management within the department. I do not accept the submission of the complainant this  
proved there was a "shifting or bouncing of delegates". As a consequence, I am of the view there  
is no foundation to the allegation this could be considered an act of reprisal, in contravention of  
section 147 of the Code.  
401 I repeat my findings and conclusions in paragraphs 287(r) and 379 to 380.  
29. Department did NOT move me though department had authority + ability to move  
Her + any employee to another branch+building  
402 The complainant argued the Department of Human Resources and Skills Development had  
the authority to move her to another branch or even to another department. In support of this  
contention, the complainant referred me to the transfer of Ms. Jackson (exhibit 82).  
403 Her contention was the failure of the respondent to transfer her to another branch or  
department was an act of reprisal, in contravention of section 147 of the Code.  
404 This argument was in my view without foundation. The evidence was the respondent had  
opinions from the doctors of the complainant indicating she could not return to work. I could not  
expect the respondent to attempt to locate any work site at least until they were advised the  
complainant was able to indeed return to work and what, if any, limitations she had.  
405 I accept the evidence of Mr. Johnson that until he had consistent and reliable medical  
evidence indicating the full extent of the limitations of the complainant, he had no authority or  
responsibility to consider positions in other departments.  
406 For these reasons, I conclude this allegation cannot be considered an act of reprisal as  
alleged by the complainant.  
30. Mr. Fedyk was one of 3 executives who knew of the Safety-Accommodation matter that  
I had reported April-May 2008 before I left the building  
Mr. Fedyk was active on discussing + meeting on my matters to Summer 2010 up to his  
retirement  
He took NO action under his Authority to correct Workplace Safety + Accommodation  
matters other than sit in Two-streams of meetings and approve Threatening letters. and  
Give direction-alongside ADM Rallis to new-group of 2009 Delegates  
407 The complainant submitted Mr. Fedyk knew of the matters reported by her before she had  
left the building (exhibit 75). The complainant alleged Mr. Fedyk took no action with respect to  
correcting the occupational health and safety issues.  
408 There is no doubt in my mind Mr. Fedyk was aware of the essence of the concerns raised by  
the complainant. He was most likely aware of the allegations made by the complainant in 2008.  
409 However, an analysis of the evidence of Mr. Fedyk, who was called by the complainant, and  
the testimony of other witnesses does not support her allegation that: "He took NO action…" Mr.  
Fedyk was in a position where he oversaw people who had the responsibility of attempting to  
reintegrate the complainant. These people included Mr. Seguin and Mr. Johnson.  
410 Despite the suggestion of the complainant, Mr. Fedyk was not directly responsible for the  
reintegration of the complainant but rather oversaw those responsible. I conclude Mr. Fedyk did  
what he felt necessary. Although the complainant was not reintegrated, the blame cannot be  
attached to him as I find that he acted properly and without any improper motive or intent.  
411 The complainant did not convince me this was an act of reprisal contrary to section 147 of  
the Code. Furthermore, I do not accept the allegation Mr. Fedyk did nothing.  
31. Non-Response of ADM Louise Branch to Lawyer-email February 25, 2009  
412 Ms. Branch was Assistant Deputy Minister, Human Resources Services, until April 20, 2009  
(exhibit 106). Between January 28, 2009 and February 2, 2009, counsel for the complainant  
wrote to her (exhibit 3, tab A). The evidence is Ms. Branch did not respond to this letter and on  
April 20, 2009, she moved to the position of Executive Head, Service Management.  
413 The complainant argued Ms. Branch had the authority to resolve the issues raised in her  
grievance. However, the complainant submitted the failure to respond to the letter from counsel  
was evidence of unwillingness on the part of the respondent to deal with the issues.  
414 In paragraph 287(r), I refer to my concern that Ms. Branch did not respond to the letter from  
counsel. Unfortunately, Ms. Branch was not called as a witness to explain her decision. As noted,  
I am of the view a response from Ms. Branch might have been appropriate, but at the same time,  
I am not blind to the circumstances at this juncture.  
415 That said, in my view the respondent ought, in the interests of good labour relations, to have  
responded to the apparent invitations of the complainant through her lawyer for "ensuring a  
positive, respectful & meaningful fresh start". However, the failure to respond has not been  
proven to be an act of reprisal contrary to section 147 of the Code.  
32. ADM Branch had authority to resolve Safety, Harassment, Accommodation matters  
416 I repeat my findings and conclusions in paragraphs 412 to 415.  
33. Department had authority to relocate me + other Employees  
417 I repeat my findings and conclusions in paragraphs 412 to 415.  
34. no-Action of Employer in response to lawyer E-mail to use their Authority to transfer  
me to new position either EC-08 or with new EX-01 eligibility  
418 The complainant referred to the evidence of Ms. Achimov. In particular, Ms. Achimov  
identified an email chain with the complainant in April 2009 (exhibit 54). The emails confirm the  
complainant provided Ms. Achimov with her resume and asked for assistance in locating  
alternate employment.  
419 Ms. Achimov had little if any recollection of the complainant or any discussions with her.  
Her evidence was generic in nature, but she confirmed in considering the possibility of  
employment she would consider the availability of positions and the expertise of the employee.  
420 Despite the assertion of the complainant, Ms. Achimov did not testify the complainant ought  
to have been transferred, and her testimony disclosed nothing that could be characterized as  
revelatory of any disciplinary intent. I do not conclude the failure to transfer the complainant was  
an act of reprisal, in contravention of section 147 of the Code.  
35. No-Action of Employer to assist me in my own job-search efforts  
421 It is clear the complainant undertook some job searches (exhibits 54 and 102). The  
complainant submitted the respondent failed to assist her in this process.  
422 Without articulating her expectations, the complainant submitted the respondent did nothing  
to assist her in her search for alternate employment. In so doing, the complainant alleged this  
failure was an act of reprisal, in contravention of section 147 of the Code.  
423 With respect to this allegation, I do not agree. In other words, I am of the view the  
complainant did not prove there to be a violation of the Code.  
424 Even if I were to accept the respondent did nothing to assist her in looking for alternate  
employment, I do not accept there was a duty in the first place. Any duty the respondent had was  
to accommodate the complainant to the point of undue hardship. Given the medical reports  
provided to the respondent by the complainant, it was evident she was not able to work  
anywhere. Indeed, during her testimony, Dr. Stewart said it would be 2 to 3 years before the  
complainant could reintegrate into the workforce, and even then, there would be a need for a  
gradual-return-to-work plan.  
36. Significant threat, financial and Obstruction of Procedure-Policy  
425 The complainant referred to the third-party election form (exhibit 70), which she received  
twice, once in March 2009 and then again in August 2010. In her view, this was an act of  
reprisal.  
426 I repeat my findings and conclusions in paragraphs 287(aa), (bb) and (oo) in restating I find  
no foundation to this allegation.  
427 The complainant argued that the person she complained about "was allowed" to place her on  
sick leave in 2008 and 2010. The complainant described this action as very traumatic; however,  
it cannot be overlooked there was no direct contact between JA and the complainant after she  
had filed her complaint.  
428 Regardless, in my view, no matter how one considers this allegation, the signing or  
approving of leave, which benefited the complainant, cannot be considered an act of reprisal.  
429 The complainant applied to the CSST (exhibit 7, tab 18). She was required to complete a  
form entitled "Election to Claim under the Act (Rights against Third Party)" (exhibit 70). The  
complainant argued this was an act of reprisal.  
430 I repeat my findings and conclusions in paragraphs 287(aa), (bb) and (oo) in concluding this  
is not an act of reprisal as alleged by the complainant.  
431 Her claim for benefits from the CSST was denied, in part for a failure or refusal to complete  
the election form. This again is not an act of reprisal, first, because it was not an action of the  
respondent, and second, it was her choice not to complete this form, and she must assume the  
responsibilities for her actions.  
37. Threat of non-approved leave, dated back to Oct 2008, still being held over my head  
432 The complainant referred to exhibits 9 and 21 as evidence she was "threatened" by the fact  
her leave was not approved by the respondent on a timely basis. Her argument was this was an  
act of reprisal as it constituted a financial penalty or a potential of a financial penalty.  
433 With respect, I do not agree. Exhibit 9 was a series of requests for a second period of special  
leave made by the complainant to Mr. Johnson in April 2009. Mr. Johnson approved the request  
for sick leave but indicated he was not in a position to grant her a further period of special leave  
after February 20, 2009.  
434 With respect to the decision of Mr. Johnson concerning this request for special leave, he  
wrote to the complainant on May 13, 2009 (for the full exchange of communication see exhibit  
10, tabs 30 to 33). This email provided an explanation. This explanation was not accepted by the  
complainant, but at the same time, she did not file a grievance outlining her concerns.  
435 It is my view when the respondent decided whether or not to grant special leave (having  
already granted her a 5-month period of such leave), it exercised a discretionary power in the  
usual manner, and I have been provided with no evidence disclosing an improper motive in the  
exercise of this discretion. In other words, the complainant had no right to be granted special  
leave; she only had the right to request it. For this reason, I conclude this cannot be considered an  
act of reprisal, in contravention of section 147 of the Code.  
38. Leave-Actions always Retroactive by many many months which is a threat to me  
436 The complainant referred me to exhibit 21 to support her contention her leave requests were  
not granted on a timely basis. This exhibit was an internal email between Mr. Bertrand and  
Micheline Mainville concerning the leave applications of the complainant. It established in April  
2009 management was prepared to and indeed did grant special leave to the complainant from  
October 7, 2008 to February 20, 2009.  
437 It also established management needed medical information from the complainant to deal  
with her requests for medical leave.  
438 I accept the respondent did not deal with her requests as quickly as she would have liked.  
Some of the delays were lengthy. For instance, exhibit 21 does suggest there was a 2-month  
delay in dealing with a request for special leave. I can understand how this could be frustrating to  
the complainant, but I cannot conclude this was an act of reprisal. The complainant did not  
provide any evidence at all to prove her allegation. I was provided with no evidence regarding  
typical delays in such matters or why it was that the delay evinced an improper motive on the  
part of the respondent.  
439 The complainant did not prove section 147 of the Code had been violated by the actions of  
the respondent.  
39. Blackberry-charges financial threat, discipline, Anguish, confusion, Health-loss  
440 The complainant referred me to exhibit 97 to articulate her allegation of what she referred to  
as the respondent's "accusation" of her using her government-issued Blackberry to make  
unauthorized long-distance phone calls.  
441 On April 15, 2009, Mr. Bertrand wrote to the complainant and indicated there "was a charge  
of $374.27 for December attributable mostly to long distance charges. I would appreciate a  
justification for these charges given that they are significantly higher that [sic] normal  
Blackberry utilisation charges".  
442 The complainant noted there was a lengthy exchange of emails concerning this topic  
(exhibit 10, tabs 1 to 6, 8 to 11, and 18 and 21).  
443 This email was the commencement of a process that concluded on May 1, 2009 when Mr.  
Johnson wrote to the complainant (exhibit 10, tab 18) and said:  
We have confirmed that the phone number on the Backberry [sic] billing is still in use by Skills  
and Employment Branch (SEB). We have torn up the journal voucher that I was originally  
requested to sign and have asked that your name be removed from the Blackberry account that  
you had previously used in SEB. This issue is now closed. Thanks for your assistance in  
resolving the discrepancy.  
444 The complainant, on May 7, 2009, thanked Mr. Johnson for the clarification (exhibit 10, tab  
21). For the respondent this was the end of the issue, but it was not, in the eyes of the  
complainant.  
445 The complainant pointed out the phone number attached to the Blackberry had been hers,  
but she had returned it. The evidence also showed that the records of the respondent did not  
reflect she no longer had a Blackberry, and it was to this number the long-distance charges were  
associated.  
446 The complainant argued this was an act of reprisal. In my view, what was behind the  
position adopted by the complainant was the fact JA was the person who incurred the long-  
distance charges. She was made aware of this when she received the documents through her  
request for access to information.  
447 In any event, the respondent did what they needed to do given that they were unaware that  
she no longer held this number and that was to ask for an explanation about unusual telephone  
charges.  
448 The complainant responded to the questions, and this response was responsible for the  
resolution of the matter. I fail to see how this would constitute an act of reprisal contrary to  
section 147 of the Code.  
449 The situation may have caused the complainant some concern, but the actions of the  
respondent were not an act of reprisal.  
40. Serge's retirement caused the loss of the only Executive that was left in Department I  
felt I could turn to the only Executive that I felt comfortable with the following the  
accumulation of matters  
450 The complainant argued that on April 15, 2009 Mr. Bertrand retired. She described him as  
the only executive to whom she could turn. Although she acknowledged there was no blame to  
be attached to his retiring, she alleged this was an act of reprisal on the part of the respondent.  
451 The complainant submitted she suffered the anguish of wanting to wish him well but she  
now had to go to new representatives of the respondent.  
452 I listened very carefully to the explanation of the complainant as to why she thought this  
was an act of reprisal. Frankly, I am as confused now as I was then. Simply put, this allegation is  
without any foundation either in fact or in law. The retirement of Mr. Bertrand was not an act of  
reprisal, and it certainly did not violate section 147 of the Code.  
41. Announcement of New DG-delegate, and penalty to me of loss of Privacy + Dignity  
453 The email the complainant received from Mr. Bertrand on April 15, 2009 advised her the  
new director general of the Evaluation Directorate was going to be Mr. Johnson (exhibit 97). The  
complainant argued this was an act of reprisal.  
454 I am at a loss to understand how the complainant could suggest the internal movement of  
persons within the department was an act of reprisal. It simply makes no sense.  
455 I also repeat my findings and conclusions in paragraphs 287(v), 379 to 380 and 450 to 452.  
42. Trauma, shame, fear, dizzying blacking-vision, Nightmares of filling out and sending  
this Safety-form that was sent to me  
456 The complainant argued she suffered a penalty of "trauma, pain, fear, dizziness and  
nightmares" because she was required to complete an "Assault Related Incident Questionnaire"  
LAB 1079 (exhibit 107).  
457 The form was sent to the complainant, but it was clear the purpose of the form was for a  
possible claim for workers' compensation under the applicable legislation. In this case, because  
of the residency of the complainant, she was governed by the laws of Quebec. The applicable  
tribunal was the CSST.  
458 Regardless, the complainant decided to apply for such compensation and in so doing was  
required to complete this form. The complainant cannot have it both ways. She cannot hope to be  
entitled to this compensation and at the same time submit the requirement to fill out a form was  
an act of reprisal.  
459 Furthermore, I do not understand and the complainant failed to explain either in evidence or  
during her submission why she was so upset in having to fill out this form.  
460 In any event, I am not convinced the requirement to fill out this form in order to process an  
application for compensation was an act of reprisal and find it was not a violation of section 147  
of the Code.  
461 I repeat my findings and conclusions in paragraphs 287(e) and (f).  
43. No follow-up on Assault-Safety form though this form is much acknowledged  
462 Although this allegation, as described by the complainant above, seems to indicate that the  
respondent violated the Code by not "following-up" on the election or third-party form, her  
arguments on this point disclosed that her concerns lay elsewhere. The complainant, according to  
her submissions, did not reproach the respondent for not having followed up on her refusal to  
sign the form. Rather, her concerns were those that she had expressed earlier and which I have  
already commented on in this decision.  
463 The complainant argued exhibits 12, 14, 15, 115, and 10, tab 16 (paragraph 3) and tab 24,  
prove acts of reprisal by the respondent. I disagree.  
464 As of August 11, 2009, the complainant had decided to pursue a claim for compensation for  
an injury at work (exhibit 12). The response from Ms. Ladouceur to the complainant indicated  
for a federal government employee to be covered under CSST, he or she must be covered by  
Government Employees Compensation Act (R.S.C. 1985, c. G-5; GECA). Ms. Ladouceur further  
advised the complainant she must complete the election form (exhibit 12).  
465 There was an exchange of emails between the complainant and Ms. Ladouceur as a result of  
a letter dated May 13, 2009 received by the complainant (exhibit 115, page 12). In this letter, the  
complainant was advised as she had failed to return the election form, it appeared she did not  
wish to claim compensation under the GECA.  
466 Prior to that, during April 2009, there was an exchange of communication between the  
complainant, Christine Bouvier and others, where the complainant raised concerns about signing  
the election form as she did not believe the form was legal (exhibit 115). In my view, the  
representatives patiently and clearly explained the process. These explanations can be seen  
throughout the exhibits.  
467 Despite the submissions of the complainant, I conclude it was she who was entirely  
responsible for not receiving compensation under the GECA as administered by CSST. It was  
she who steadfastly decided not to sign the election form, despite it being fully and clearly  
explained to her. It was she who, on her own, determined the form was illegal as she did not feel  
there was a third party to be named.  
468 These decisions were without basis in fact or in law. If she felt as strongly about this as she  
argued, she could have completed the form and signed it under protest. But instead, she took the  
presumptive role of considering the form to be illegal and refused to sign it. Any consequences  
she suffered were at her hands. This was not an act of reprisal.  
469 The complainant, as was her right, filed an application for compensation. She was subject to  
the provisions of the GECA. The CSST administers these applications. As is the normal practice  
across this country, the CSST required the complainant to complete and sign what she called a  
"3rd party form" but which is in reality a subrogation form.  
470 The complainant testified and argued she felt this form to be illegal. Indeed, I concluded  
once the complainant read the words "federal public servant" as being "excluded", she read no  
further. This was typical of the complainant, who consistently read things out of context. Clearly,  
when one reads the entire document, especially the portion that apparently caused the  
complainant concern, she ignored the words "not acing in accordance with their work". These  
words place discretion on the administrators of the plan to determine if there might be a third-  
party action against a person, even an employee, who is not acting in accordance with their work.  
In my view, it was entirely inappropriate for the complainant to refuse to sign this election form  
and then to argue the presentation of the form to her was an act of reprisal.  
471 In other words, it was the intransigent position of the complainant, without considering the  
entirety of the document, that resulted in her refusal to sign it.  
472 She further argued the respondent acted in a manner that should be considered a reprisal by  
sending her the form. In fact, the complainant submitted each time she was sent this form, it  
constituted a separate act of reprisal. First and foremost, the complainant was not sent this form  
by the respondent; it was sent by the administrators of the GECA program who were employed in  
CSST.  
473 I find no support for this allegation. The form was sent to the complainant by CSST in the  
normal course of administering an application for workers' compensation benefits. The  
respondent cannot be held responsible for the process of an external body.  
474 Furthermore, even if I were to accept the proposition of the complainant the administrator of  
this program, Labour Canada, was her employer, I would still not find this to be an act of  
reprisal. It was the complainant who, without foundation in fact or in law, came to a conclusion  
the form was "illegal", and I would not hold the respondent responsible for this unsubstantiated  
conclusion.  
475 The complainant raised the Supreme Court of Canada decision of Bazley v. Curry, [1999] 2  
S.C.R. 534. This case concerned the issue of vicarious liability and whether a non-profit  
organization that operated residential care facilities for troubled children was responsible for an  
assault committed by one of its employees. Despite the submissions of the complainant, I  
conclude this case does not stand for the proposition the form is illegal. While it is a leading case  
in the field of vicarious liability, the Court was not asked and did not answer the question of the  
validity of the 3rd party form.  
476 In similar fashion, the complainant referred me to Reference re Broome v. Prince Edward  
Island, 2010 SCC 11. Again, this case does not stand for the proposition proposed by the  
complainant. This case also deals with vicarious liability.  
477 Whether JA was or was not acting within the scope of his employment was a matter to be  
determined by, in this case, the CSST, not the complainant.  
478 I repeat my findings and conclusions in paragraphs 287(aa), (bb), (oo), and 456 to 461 in  
finding this was not an act of reprisal as alleged by the complainant.  
479 I find the continued refusal of the complainant to sign an innocuous form and then  
submitting this was an act of reprisal of the respondent contrary to section 147 of the Code to be  
frivolous.  
44. Non-Lawfully-based threat Non-Procedurally-based threat Non-Policy-based threat  
480 The complainant referred me to exhibits 52 and 53, which deal with what she referred to as  
the 3rd party form. These exhibits were entitled "Employers' Guide to the Government  
Employees' Compensation Act" and "Federal Government Employees Third-Party Claims"  
respectively.  
481 She alleged the respondent required her to sign the 3rd party form. According to the  
complainant, whether it was the respondent or not was irrelevant. She argued what is relevant is  
this form was required to be signed in order for her to receive compensation benefits.  
482 I repeat my findings and conclusions in paragraphs 287(aa), (bb) and (oo) and 462 to 479.  
This was not an act of reprisal as alleged by the complainant.  
483 I find the continued refusal of the complainant to sign an innocuous form and then  
submitting this was an act of reprisal of the respondent contrary to section 147 of the Code to be  
frivolous.  
45. Employer-Senior Executives not - acting to resolve upon receiving the complaint CLC  
s. 133(5) shows that they had Authority to Resolve, rather than allow matter to go for years  
of hearing-adjudication  
484 The complainant submitted, as she often did, the reason this matter was embroiled in  
lengthy hearings was because the respondent had not made efforts to resolve the issues. She  
alleged it was the respondent who had the authority to resolve this issue, and because it has not  
been, this matter has gone forward to hearing.  
485 First, I am aware the parties entered into mediation before the formal hearings commenced.  
I am obviously unaware of what went on during these discussions, but I do know there was  
obviously no settlement.  
486 Secondly, a resolution requires two or more parties to agree. I am not mandated with the  
responsibility to determine whether the failed discussions during mediation were the fault of  
either of the parties. But, I do conclude that it was clear the parties were unable to reach an  
agreement and that I have been presented with no evidence at all that would suggest that the  
respondent did not settle during the mediation process in order to retaliate against the  
complainant in any manner.  
487 I find that whatever happened in the negotiations was not an act of reprisal and certainly did  
not contravene section 147 of the Code.  
46. Significant Threat to Privacy, Dignity  
488 The complainant again argued the retirement of Mr. Bertrand as an act of reprisal. I repeat  
my findings and conclusions in paragraphs 450 to 452.  
489 She also alleged there were many persons who assumed responsibility for her file and this  
was a threat to her privacy and dignity and thus was an act of reprisal. I repeat my findings and  
conclusions in paragraphs 287(r) and 399 to 401.  
490 Throughout this period, several senior executives assumed responsibility over the file. Not  
surprisingly, these senior executives would delegate persons to oversee the progress of the  
matters. The respondent directed their attention to the reintegration of the complainant into the  
workforce with an acceptable return-to-work plan that met the identified requirements for  
accommodation.  
491 I can certainly understand the frustration of the complainant. It was indeed unfortunate she  
could not have been able to deal consistently with one person. That said, for the same reasons as  
I articulated with respect to Mr. Bertrand, I do not consider this to be an act of reprisal. Within  
any organization, the movement of employees is expected. This would mean new personnel  
might be responsible for the oversight of files and matters previously overseen by their  
predecessors.  
492 There is nothing nefarious about this, and I do not consider the movement of personnel to be  
an act of reprisal, and it certainly was not in contravention of section 147 of the Code.  
493 The complainant filed a complaint in April 2008 concerning the actions of her supervisor,  
whom she referred to as "the original aggressor". She left the workplace later that year. She filed  
a grievance (which has been dismissed) and four complaints pursuant to the Code,which are the  
subject matter of these hearings.  
494 In support of her allegations, the complainant referred to several exhibits (exhibits 76, 39,  
80, and 13, tab 3, pages 2, 5, 6 and 9, and exhibits 41, 40, 90, 27, 79, 77 and 26). She submitted  
first these exhibits established the fact a number of persons have been involved in her file. This is  
a conclusion of fact I make.  
495 She then specifically referred me to an email from Mr. Seguin, who on August 12, 2009  
indicated the respondent was not responsible to accept the unilateral demands of the complainant  
(exhibit 13, tab 3, page 2 of 9). In her view, this was an act of reprisal. In my view, although the  
email might have been drafted in a more sensitive manner, it was not an act of reprisal. It did not  
contravene section 147 of the Code as it discloses nothing more than the respondent's position on  
accommodation and discloses no intent that could be characterized as a violation of this article.  
496 The complainant voiced a concern exhibit 40 was an act of reprisal. In the body of this email  
between managers dated August 4, 2009, the author said, "If mediation is indeed cancelled, we  
will be giving her a final offer (i.e. no more leave and come back to work)". This email was not  
copied to the complainant.  
497 In similar fashion, the complainant argued exhibit 41 was an act of reprisal. She pointed out  
that this email dated August 5, 2009 between managers said:  
Hi Gina: I am unclear as to why Ms. Chamberlain has chosen to send her e-mail to both you and  
Mr. Fedyk. I can only surmise that she did not 'appreciate' the realities contained in my last  
correspondence with her, and has chosen to ignore or bypass me. I have been meeting and  
corresponding with Frank, Stephen Johnson of this Branch, and Daniel Trepanier of Labour  
Relations, on a regular basis. We agreed last Thursday that I would make one more conciliatory  
effort to arrange a meeting with Ms. Chamberlain, and that we may then have to be more  
'forceful' in our approach, if she continues to refuse to meet. As in this latest e-mail to you, she  
keeps insisting that the Department accept her unilateral 'accommodation' requirements, which  
are extravagant in the extreme, prior to agreeing to meet. I will attempt to have her cease  
corresponding directly with you, and I will continue to work closely with Frank and the others to  
expedite this matter.  
498 What was interesting was the complainant did not argue the factual basis of the emails,  
particularly exhibit 41 was inaccurate. She argued instead the reference to "final offer" (exhibit  
40) and "forceful" (exhibit 41) were acts of reprisals.  
499 I conclude these emails were internal emails outlining the direction the respondent wished to  
go. The actions proposed by the authors were not unreasonable given the undisputed fact the  
complainant continued to refuse to meet with the respondent. It is well-established law that  
accommodation requires participation from all affected parties, including of course the employee  
(Gibson). I repeat my findings and conclusions in paragraphs 319 to 321. The complainant did  
not at this time, or indeed at any time, fulfill her responsibility to assist in the development of a  
reintegration plan that would meet her needs for accommodation.  
500 This email showing proposed actions of the respondent was not an act of reprisal and did not  
contravene section 147 of the Code.  
501 Even if I were in error in concluding this alleged action of the respondent was not an act of  
reprisal, there was no evidence of any financial or other penalty suffered by the complainant that  
would bring it within the ambit of section 147.  
47. Delay in Accommodation  
502 The complainant referred me to exhibits 13, 39, 41, 76 and 80. She argued these documents  
prove the respondent delayed in accommodating her and this delay amounted to an act of  
reprisal.  
503 However, when read in their entirety, these documents confirmed the respondent, between  
August and September 2009, considered the reintegration of the complainant. The complainant  
argued this was a delay as it should have been the subject of discussion some time before as she  
had left work in 2008.  
504 My view of the evidence in its entirety was that the respondent had made efforts to  
accommodate the complainant since her departure, and in 2009, their efforts were more  
concerted. The evidence of Mr. Johnson in this regard supports this conclusion as he felt, based  
upon the documents supplied by the doctors of the complainant and the position of the  
complainant as more specifically described by her in her voice mail (exhibit 161), there was an  
opportunity to reintegrate her into the workplace.  
505 As it turned out, this attempt to reintegrate was unsuccessful as the complainant changed her  
mind about the office on Sparks Street, but I do not accept the submission of the complainant the  
respondent delayed in accommodating her; nor have I found any indicia of a disciplinary intent  
with respect to its handling of this matter.  
506 I therefore do not accept the contention of the complainant that this was an act of reprisal. I  
repeat my findings and conclusions in paragraphs 287(dd), 302 to 306, 322 to 323, 336 to 341  
and 402 to 406.  
48. Delay in leave-approval  
507 The complainant referred me to several exhibits in support of this allegation (exhibits 76,  
39, 80, 13 and 41).  
508 I accept the evidence supported the contention of the complainant her leave status was  
undetermined for periods of time. I, however, do not accept her contention this was an act of  
reprisal.  
509 I repeat my findings and conclusions in paragraphs 432 to 435.  
49. Threat of me of unknown pay status and of unknown pay actions  
510 The complainant referred me to exhibits 76, 39, 80, 13 and 41.  
511 In rejecting her submission, I repeat my findings and conclusions in paragraphs 432 to 435.  
50. Penalty to me of being bounced + moved from one Executive-Delegate to the Other  
Constantly over 2009  
512 The complainant referred me to exhibits 4, 13, 39, 76 and 80. The argument of the  
complainant was the respondent, by reassigning different persons to oversee her file, caused her  
anguish and this was an act of reprisal.  
513 In my view, there is no evidence to support the contention of the complainant. That said,  
based on the evidence I heard about the assignment of Ms. Branch and the retirement of Mr.  
Bertrand, I have no hesitation in concluding that the reorganizations caused by these two  
situations were entirely appropriate.  
514 I repeat my findings and conclusions in paragraphs 287(v), 379 to 380, 450 to 452 and 488.  
51. Penalizing me of legislated-Requirements for Fairness, Dignity, Respect,  
Accommodation, Harassment, Safety  
515 The complainant referred to exhibits 13, 39, 41, 76 and 80, which are internal management  
communications referring to the complainant's case, and alleged the respondent breached her  
human rights on the grounds of gender and health.  
516 The complainant did not expand on this argument, but suffice to say there was no evidence  
adduced to support the claim she had been discriminated against on the basis of gender or health.  
52. Personal threat of Aggression by Departmental Executive-Delegate  
517 The exhibits referred to by the complainant, being exhibits 13, 39, 41, 76 and 80, are  
internal communications within the management team. The messages dealt with the approach  
that should be taken with respect to the complainant.  
518 The complainant argued the internal communications were acts of reprisal. I do not accept  
her contention.  
519 It is quite appropriate, indeed expected, for an employer to collaboratively consider some  
employment issues as they impact individual employees. The messages confirmed the  
complainant was a valued employee and her employer wanted to have her return as a  
contributing member of their staff. Their internal discussions were to this end.  
520 When the complainant received these following her request for access to information, she  
apparently was upset. However, she did not satisfy me that the internal communications were  
acts of reprisal.  
521 The complainant was specifically upset about the contents of an email sent by Mr. Seguin to  
Ms. Rallis and others on August 5, 2009 (exhibit 41). It is useful to reproduce the email:  
Hi Gina: I am unclear as to why Ms. Chamberlain has chosen to send her e-mail to both you and  
Mr. Fedyk. I can only surmise that she did not 'appreciate' the realities contained in my last  
correspondence with her, and has chosen to ignore or bypass me. I have been meeting and  
corresponding with Frank, Stephen Johnson of this Branch, and Daniel Trepanier of Labour  
Relations, on a regular basis. We agreed last Thursday that I would make one more conciliatory  
effort to arrange a meeting with Ms. Chamberlain, and that we may then have to be more  
'forceful' in our approach, if she continues to refuse to meet. As in the latest e-mail to you, she  
keeps insisting that the Department accept her unilateral 'accommodation' requirements which  
are extravagant in the extreme, prior to agreeing to meet. I will attempt to have her cease  
corresponding directly with you, and I will continue to work closely with Frank and the others to  
expedite this matter.  
522 Mr. Seguin was appointed by the respondent to deal with the complainant's case. In the  
above email, he responded to a request from Ms. Rallis as to the next steps. I disagree the letter  
could reasonably be viewed as a threat. Perhaps the language could have been more neutral, but  
the outline of the situation was factually correct, at least insofar as the respondent viewed it, and  
disclosed no improper intention.  
523 Despite the contention of the complainant, I am not convinced these exhibits demonstrate an  
act of reprisal. I repeat my findings and conclusions in paragraphs 287(mm) and (rr), 311 to 316,  
336 to 337, 357, and 361 to 364.  
53. Refusal to Search for Accommodation  
524 The complainant testified that Mr. Seguin stated words to the effect that she was "out of her  
mind if she thought the department was going to sell her to another department". The evidence  
was this was said in the context of the complainant asking about relocating to another  
department.  
525 The complainant was offended by these words, but when viewed impartially, I conclude  
they were one of the highest forms of praise and a compliment. Mr. Seguin was not being  
aggressive or frightening in saying this, and the complainant adduced no evidence as to the intent  
of Mr. Seguin. Rather it was clear to me that when taken in context, these words were an  
acknowledgement the respondent appreciated the qualifications and capabilities of the  
complainant.  
526 The complainant referred me to exhibits 13, 39, 41, 76 and 80.  
527 I repeat my findings and conclusions in paragraphs 287(dd), 302 to 306, 328 to 329, 338 to  
341, 343 to 344 and 402 to 406.  
54. Refusal to grant-offer-arrange a meeting with a female-DG  
528 The evidence confirmed the complainant wished to deal with a female supervisor. This  
request was supported by her medical practitioners, both Dr. Goldstein and Dr. Stewart.  
529 The complainant referred me to exhibits 76, 39, 80, 13 and 41.  
530 I repeat the concerns I have over this simple request. Specifically, I repeat my findings and  
conclusions in paragraphs 287(hh) and 324 to 326.  
55. Refusal to grant-allow phone-calls from Virginia J.  
531 In rejecting this argument, I repeat my findings and conclusions in paragraphs 287(hh) and  
324 to 326.  
56. Breach by P. Seguin in contacting Law Firm & Psychologist  
532 The evidence was that Mr. Seguin did approach one of the lawyers retained by the  
complainant. This was done without the approval of the complainant.  
533 That said, I repeat my findings and conclusions in paragraphs 287(kk) and 365 to 369 in  
concluding this was not an act of reprisal or a violation of section 147 of the Code.  
57. ADM Fedyk approving threatening Letter  
534 The complainant referred me to exhibits 55 and 56, which are emails in which Mr. Fedyk  
invited Zabia Chamberlain to meet him, and he followed up on her initial complaint. As noted,  
this communication is before the time for which I determined I had jurisdiction.  
535 The complainant then referred me to, in her words, "Mr. Fedyk approving a threatening  
letter".  
536 I do not accept this as proof of an act of reprisal or a violation of section 147 of the Code as  
it is outside the temporal limits of my jurisdiction.  
58. Employer-Senior Executives not-Acting to resolve upon receiving the Complaint  
537 The complainant referred me to exhibit 5, tab 24, page 4 of 17, and exhibits 11, 32, 37, 57,  
72, 78, 113, 118, 135, 136, 157, 163 and 164 in support of her allegation the respondent did not  
treat her with civility, respect and dignity. Her submission was by the representatives of the  
respondent not locating alternate work for her, she was not accommodated, her health worsened  
and she was discriminated against on the basis of gender and health.  
538 On November 24, 2009, Ms. Rallis emailed Mr. Fedyk, in which she forwarded an email the  
complainant had sent to the former Board the same day. Exhibit 78 was a portion of this  
communication (the full email from the complainant to the former Board is found in exhibit  
113), and the complainant alleged this was a penalty or an act of reprisal. When viewed in its  
entirety, the complainant in her email made the statement that she felt the respondent should  
have "helped to restart in a new position & location more than one year ago".  
539 But the comment of the complainant must be viewed first and foremost as an opinion of the  
complainant, and secondly, it cannot be overlooked it was made in the context of the complaint  
process. I do not accept the contention of the complainant this exchange proved an act of  
reprisal.  
540 The complainant argued the actions of Ms. Rallis and Mr. Fedyk were unprofessional, but as  
pointed out by counsel for the respondent, there was no evidentiary basis for this argument to be  
made. Both of the impugned individuals were called as witnesses of the complainant, and if she  
was going to make this allegation, she should have put this to her own witnesses and allowed  
them to respond.  
541 In this regard, the complainant argued values, ethics and professionalism, as identified and  
defined in exhibit 5, tab 24, and exhibits 11, 32, 37, 57, 118, 135, 136 and 137, were breached.  
During the submission of the complainant, she raised the argument that her ability to examine  
Ms. Rallis was restricted by my order. In this regard, I reminded her Ms. Rallis was called by her  
without any restrictions initially; it was only when she requested Ms. Rallis be recalled that I set  
out restrictions on the nature of the questioning. I repeat my findings and conclusions in  
paragraphs 117 to 119 and 290 to 291.  
542 The complainant argued Ms. Rallis was disrespectful in her email to Mr. Fedyk (exhibit 78).  
Frankly, I am at a complete loss to understand her rationale for this argument. Ms. Rallis simply  
said "more from Ms. Chamberlain" when she forwarded the email the complainant had sent to  
the former Board.  
543 And even if I am incorrect and this was disrespectful, how was it an act of reprisal, as  
defined in section 147 of the Code?  
544 The complainant argued Ms. Rallis did not search for accommodation. The complainant  
argued the cubicle in Sparks Street did not respond to her request for accommodation as set out  
in her doctor's note. However, this argument seems to fly in the face of the evidence. The doctor  
notes at that period of time requested a work location away from the aggressor, and in fact, the  
complainant herself left three voice-mail messages with her new supervisor, Mr. Johnson  
(exhibit 161), saying that a Sparks Street location was acceptable.  
545 The first message was left in the morning of September 23, 2009, and the next messages  
were left in the morning of September 25, 2009. The messages were lengthy, and recordings of  
them were introduced as evidence (exhibit 161). In her third message, the complainant agreed a  
work location at the Sparks Street office would be acceptable, and she further indicated her  
psychologist was well aware of this possible proposal and was supportive. In the third message,  
the complainant said "… if location is PRI Sparks Street, permanent transfer, 3 year secondment  
whatever… ."  
546 Indeed, in this voice-mail message, the complainant goes into some detail about her  
psychologist's awareness of the location at Sparks Street and her approval and how she can get to  
the office along a safe route. Mr. Johnson replied by email on September 29, 2009, and on  
September 30, 2009, provided the complainant with a reintegration plan, indicating an office  
space on Sparks Street had been located. In this email, Mr. Johnson looked to set up a meeting  
with the complainant and her psychologist (exhibit 13, tab 14).  
547 Based on the voice-mail message of the complainant, one would have thought this matter  
had come to a close, but such was not the case. On October 9, 2009, the complainant responded  
to Mr. Johnson and rejected the proposed reintegration plan (exhibit 13, tab 17). In so doing, she  
referred to the notes of her physician written from June 2008 to January 2009.  
548 The email of the complainant was telling. Although confusingly written, she referred to the  
last year as a "waste" and reiterated her requests to be accommodated "with an overseas  
assignment with lost EX salary coverage, special leave and financial expenses".  
549 Despite the argument of the complainant, I do not agree the reintegration plan offered by the  
respondent can be interpreted as an act of reprisal. In fact, I conclude it was a legitimate proposal  
based upon the medical information in their possession and with the apparent initial approval of  
the complainant herself.  
550 The complainant argued it was an act of reprisal to receive the documents she had requested  
through an access-to-information request. In making this argument, the complainant stated that  
when she received the requested information, she realized there were new witnesses to the 2008  
incident of which she had not been aware. And, in her words, "I realized how stupid I was in  
pleading with the employer for basic fairness and rights".  
551 The respondent's fulfilment of its obligations with respect to her access-to-information  
request was not an act of reprisal, and with respect to her arguments overall in this section, I  
repeat my findings and conclusions in paragraphs 328 to 329, 335, 343 to 344, 386 to 391, 402 to  
406, 502 to 506 and 521 to 523.  
59. CLC s. 133(5) shows that they had Authority to Resolve, rather than allow matter to go  
to years of hearing-adjudication  
552 The complainant argued she was deprived of the right to accommodation and was  
discriminated against and this was a continual threat, disguised discipline, discriminatory actions  
and a continued penalty to her in that the Treasury Board policies were not upheld. Furthermore,  
the complainant argued to not have matters rectified and not separate her from a work hazard  
was a threat of discipline.  
553 In support of her contentions, she referred to exhibits 40, 78, 113 and 116.  
554 I repeat my findings and conclusions in paragraphs 328 to 329, 335, 343 to 344, 389 to 391,  
402 to 406, 502 to 506, 522 to 525 and 537 to 551.  
555 On August 4, 2009, there was an internal email sent by Mr. Pickering to Ms. Rallis,  
referring to an accommodation plan being developed by Mr. Seguin (exhibit 40). The  
complainant was not aware of this email and argued she was not aware management developed  
such a plan. This may be so, but I do not accept the position of the complainant that management  
developing an accommodation plan was an act of reprisal.  
556 She had been asking for a plan of reintegration, and indeed, the very next month, left three  
voice-mail messages about such a plan with Mr. Johnson (exhibit 161). I therefore do not accept  
this action of the respondent to be an act of reprisal.  
60. Breach of Values, Ethics, Professionalism  
557 The complainant argued the respondent violated their duty to ensure values, ethics and  
professionalism.  
558 I dealt with this repetitive argument and repeat my findings and conclusions in paragraphs  
328 to 329, 335, 343 to 344, 389 to 391, 402 to 406, 502 to 506, 524 to 527 and 537 to 551.  
61. Threatening letter many reprisals raised + noted in submission February 5, 2013  
559 The complainant argued on February 5, 2013 she made allegations of "many reprisals", and  
she referred to exhibits 31 and 116.  
560 Exhibit 116 was a letter from Mr. Johnson dated December 9, 2009 in which he outlined the  
current status of leave for the complainant and again requested she consider the reintegration  
plan forwarded at the end of September.  
561 The complainant alleged this was a threatening letter. Her argument was this letter changed  
her status and as such was a threat of discipline. In my view, this contention is without  
foundation.  
562 When read in its entirety, this letter is administrative in nature and was required to have  
been written. But more importantly, in the concluding paragraphs, Mr. Johnson encouraged the  
complainant to consider her options; as well, he indicated the department was open to discuss  
options with the assistance of a third party.  
563 In my view, this is not a letter that can be considered to be an act of reprisal, but rather it  
opened doors to resolution and invited the complainant to participate, which she did not.  
62. Financial Threat of being held at Excluded status  
564 This issue causes me concern.  
565 In May 2009, and for reasons that were not explained, the issue of whether or not the  
complainant was an employee excluded from the bargaining unit (exhibit 123) arose for the  
respondent. It appears neither the bargaining agent nor the complainant was approached about  
the deliberations, and in the eyes of the respondent, the complainant remained an "excluded  
employee".  
566 Suffice to say Mr. Johnson in his testimony admitted there was an error and the complainant  
should have been a non-excluded employee. Mr. Johnson categorized the error as administrative  
in nature. Although I find this categorization defensive, there was no evidence the error was  
made purposely or bore any relationship with the complainant's exercise of her rights.  
567 I have no difficulty in finding that the respondent's action had a negative impact on the  
complainant. Had this error not been made, the complainant would have had the benefit of union  
representation during these difficult times.  
568 The complainant asked that I order the repayment of her union dues, which were collected  
retroactively (exhibit 111). In considering this request, I am conscious of the fact the  
complainant should have been in a non-excluded position and yet she was advised by the  
respondent she was in an excluded position.  
569 I cannot determine how the outcome of this case might have changed or how the  
presentation might have differed, but I do know the complainant was impacted by this error,  
whether it was an administrative error as described by Mr. Johnson or something else.  
570 But, was this an act of reprisal, as contemplated by section 147 of the Code? In my view, the  
complainant did not adduce any evidence to convince me that whatever happened was a form of  
penalty. Furthermore, there was no evidence before me to allow a finding that whatever  
happened was as a result of the complainant's pursuit of protection under the Code.  
571 Consequently, I reluctantly conclude I am unable to address this issue in terms of providing  
the complainant with a remedy.  
63. Financial Penalty of Legal Fees and related legal-expenses  
572 This issue is directly tied to the issue I considered in paragraphs 564 to 571.  
573 But for the fact the respondent erred in considering the complainant an excluded employee,  
she may or may not have hired counsel. That said, I cannot overlook the evidence of the  
complainant that she did not request assistance from Canadian Association of Professional  
Employees (CAPE) even when she became aware she was represented by them.  
574 However, while I sympathize with the plight of the complainant in this regard, despite my  
reminders, she did not put any evidence forward to support a claim for legal fees or bailiff fees.  
575 Furthermore, as concluded above, I do not accept the contention of the complainant this falls  
within the definition of an act of reprisal, as contemplated by section 147 of the Code.  
64. CAPE wrote Nov/2008 to Spring 2010 affirming their good-faith position in declining  
representation  
576 The bargaining agent is not a party to these proceedings. Even if they were, it is my view  
correspondence from the bargaining agent to the respondent could in no way be considered an  
act of reprisal on the part of the respondent.  
65. Adjudicator verbally indicated there was nothing nefarious on the part of CAPE  
577 Whether this allegation is an accurate reflection of what I might have stated was not the  
issue. If one assumes that it was a correct comment, the question remains, how can the motives  
of the bargaining agent be considered an act of reprisal of the respondent? In my view, they  
cannot.  
66. Penalty of Ms. Dingwall's role shifting penalty to health, anguish, privacy, dignity  
578 The complainant referred me to exhibits 98, 89, 123, 17, and 5, tab 22, and exhibits 111 and  
112 to support her contention the shifting of the roles of Ms. Dingwall and other managers was  
an act of reprisal.  
579 While there may have been some anguish and confusion in the eyes of the complainant,  
there was no evidence or case law to support this contention.  
580 I repeat my findings and conclusions in paragraphs 287(v), 379 to 380, 407 to 411, 453 to  
455, 488 and 507 to 514.  
67. Significant Threat to Health, trauma  
581 The complainant argued exhibits 103, 86, 109 and 125, along with the letters from her  
doctor and psychologist, confirmed her health was being threatened. The complainant argued  
section 147 of the Code was therefore violated.  
582 When asked what the financial penalty was, the complainant suggested it was the fact she  
was in counselling, taking medications, not able to drive and having to fill out forms for the  
continuation of her disability insurance.  
583 In my view this argument must fail. This is not the intent of the Code. While the  
complainant might have been impacted by what she perceived to be inappropriate actions of the  
respondent, there was no evidence this resulted in a financial penalty or that the actions  
complained of were in any way or respect retaliatory in nature, and therefore, she did not  
establish a violation of section 147 of the Code.  
68. Breach of CLC 125, 126, 129 Holding me directly attached to work of Aggressor  
584 The complainant argued that on many occasions after she had left the workplace, she  
continued to receive what she referred to as "work related emails". In this regard, she referred me  
to exhibits 103, 86, 109 and 125.  
585 I repeat my findings and conclusion in paragraph 287(x) and reiterate under the  
circumstances this was not an act of reprisal. Furthermore, the respondent offered options to the  
complainant, any one of which would have stopped the receipt of any further offensive emails.  
She was not willing to accept them. She was therefore as much responsible for receiving the  
impugned emails as the respondent was and she did not perform any work as a result of receiving  
these emails.  
69. Continuing to Injure me with Trauma, fear, Anguish, breaching Human Rights  
grounds of Health + Gender  
586 The complainant argued she received work-related emails. She submitted that this was a  
"non-transparent breach of her workplace rights". It was to be noted the complainant  
acknowledged although she received these emails, she did not do any work on them.  
587 The complainant informed both Mr. Bertrand and Mr. Johnson she was not working on the  
emails, and her doctor and therapist wrote as to their traumatizing effect. I disagree with the  
contention of the complainant this was an act of reprisal.  
588 I repeat my findings set forth in paragraphs 287(x) and 584 to 585 with respect to the  
allegations of the complainant that she continued to receive work-related emails.  
589 The complainant argued she had a much heavier workload in her acting positions than her  
successors. Specifically, she referred me to a number of exhibits. The first exhibit was 109, an  
email from Bob Thomas in October 2009 in which he confirmed he acted as director for about a  
year. The complainant suggested this email indicated the organizational pressures of the job were  
diminished and that JA had  
… mellowed somewhat and seems to have learned from the experience. During the  
approximately one year that I was A/Director following your departure, it seemed to me that JA  
was making an effort not to be aggressive with me or to put unnecessary pressure on me.  
590 The complainant submitted Ms. Borysewicz testified the job in which the complainant had  
worked had been reduced by about 1/3 (exhibits 57 and 137). The complainant contended this  
was proof of her being discriminated against.  
591 In my view, she adduced no evidence to allow me to make a finding of discrimination. In  
other words, the complainant did not prove, to use her words, there was a "discriminately heavy  
workload which was a continued human rights breach on the ground of health and gender". More  
importantly, there was no proof that the workload she had in 2008 was an act of reprisal and in  
contravention of section 147 of the Code. Indeed, I also ask myself how it would be possible to  
prove that a situation that predated any complaint on her part could be considered to be an act of  
reprisal. Secondly, I note that I heard no evidence at all that would tie her workload into her  
gender or health.  
592 The complainant did search for alternate employment (exhibit 102), but she did not apply  
for 11 permanent EX-01 positions. These positions were identified in exhibit 137. The  
complainant argued she could not apply as many of the competitions were overseen by the  
alleged aggressor. She acknowledged she decided not to apply, not that she was prohibited. In  
fact, she was unable to respond to the question as to what she thought JA might have done in the  
oversight of these competitions had she applied. In response, she acknowledged JA might have  
had to withdraw from oversight had she applied for these positions.  
593 I repeat my findings and conclusions set out in paragraphs 338 to 344.  
70. No Safety, Harassment, Accommodation follow-up arranged for me effect Summer  
2009  
594 The complainant argued she was subject to "non procedural [sic], non transparent [sic] and  
continued discrimination on grounds of gender and colour" as the respondent had not taken steps  
to "separate" her from the "proven hazard". She referred me to exhibits 86, 103, 109 and 125.  
595 The basis of this allegation was centred on her receiving work-related emails. I repeat my  
findings and conclusions in paragraphs 287(x) and 584 to 588.  
71. No EX-salary  
596 A major component in the submission of the complainant was she should receive salary at  
the EX-01 level. This was the classification of the position she held in an acting capacity until  
October 2008. This request was raised by her in her grievance (which was dismissed) and her  
complaints under the Code.  
597 The complainant contended first she was "demoted" out of the classification level in which  
she was acting. Frankly, this is unsubstantiated in facts or in law. The complainant was in an  
acting position, and after 2.5 years, it concluded. This can in no way be considered a demotion.  
598 Furthermore, the complainant had the right to apply for positions at that classification level  
and chose not to. In fact, she testified she had even repassed her French-level exams and this  
would have been an asset to her application had she chosen to apply (exhibits 118 and 119). I  
repeat my findings and conclusions in paragraphs 338 to 344 and 589 to 593.  
599 The complainant argued she should have been considered under the employment equity  
policy (exhibits 135, 136 and 137). She contended this policy called for progressive measures  
and should have been applicable to her. However, she called no evidence to support this  
contention. For instance, she could have called someone to testify as to the purpose of the policy,  
how it is applied and why it should have been applied to her, but she chose not to and simply  
relied on her unfounded contention the policy should have applied to her. Also, she failed to  
establish any relationship at all between her actions in pursuing her legal rights and the  
respondent's failure to apply the policy to her. Finally, she also produced no evidence to indicate  
that she had raised this issue with the respondent and asked for the policy to be applied to her  
prior to filing her grievances and complaints.  
72. HRSDC-labour writes that my CSST file is closed financial-threat + Obstruction  
600 The complainant referred to exhibits 29, 36, 48, 81 and 116 and submitted the respondent  
was threatening her financially.  
601 First, exhibit 29 is an email from Labour Canada in December 2009, and this was not her  
employer. It is an exchange of emails about the 3rd party form with which the complainant took  
issue. I have already ruled on the 3rd party form or election form, but let me add the fact the  
complainant did not find the tone of the correspondence "nice" does not satisfy the test of it  
being an act of reprisal.  
602 This correspondence simply identifies the file was closed because the complainant had  
refused to sign the election form. This is an administrative letter, and I do not conclude it can in  
any way be considered an act of reprisal.  
603 As noted, I dealt with the allegations concerning the 3rd party form or election form in  
paragraphs 287(aa), (bb) and (oo) and 462 to 479, and I repeat my finding this was not an act of  
reprisal as alleged by the complainant.  
604 I find the continued refusal of the complainant to sign an innocuous form and then  
submitting this was an act of reprisal of the respondent contrary to section 147 of the Code to be  
frivolous.  
73. No Means of Compensation  
605 The complainant argued that exhibits 29 and 81 prove she had no means of compensation.  
606 I have spoken about her intransigent position not to sign the election form and repeat my  
findings and conclusions in paragraphs 287(aa), (bb) and (oo), 462 to 479, and 600 to 604.  
74. Salary-stoppage by Mr. Johnson announced in Dec 2009 letter as Will now happen  
607 The complainant argued she was subjected to a financial penalty, a refusal of pay, and an  
imposition of a threat of a financial penalty and this was proven in exhibits 77 and 13, tab 24,  
and exhibits 31 and 116, which she contended indicated the respondent would be stopping her  
pay and this amounted to "progressive wrongful constructive dismissal".  
608 There was no doubt these pieces of correspondence outlined the financial consequences to  
the complainant, but they can in no way be considered an act of reprisal. I find there was no basis  
in fact or in law for the complainant to make this argument and conclude it was frivolous in  
nature.  
609 I repeat my findings and conclusions in paragraphs 338 to 344, 589 to 593 and 596 to 599.  
75. ADM Rallis NOT taking action on Safety, Accommodation, Salary, Harassment  
610 The complainant referred me to exhibit 36 and alleged Ms. Rallis was not protecting her  
salary. Exhibit 36 is an email from Ms. Cyr dated March 4, 2010 to the complainant in which the  
author summarized the status of the GECA file. I do not accept this exhibit supported the  
allegation of the complainant.  
611 I dealt with the allegations concerning the 3rd party form or election form in paragraphs  
287(aa), (bb) and (oo), 462 to 479, and 600 to 606, and I repeat my finding this is not an act of  
reprisal as alleged by the complainant.  
612 I find the continued refusal of the complainant to sign an innocuous form and then  
submitting this was an act of reprisal of the respondent contrary to section 147 of the Code to be  
frivolous.  
613 The complainant argued the Record of Employment (exhibit 48) proved the respondent had  
a plan in place and it came to fruition. I frankly am at a loss to understand how the complainant  
could argue this given the uncontested evidence of Mr. Johnson, who indicated the issuance of  
this document was done in consultation with the complainant in order to assist her in receiving  
long-term disability.  
614 I repeat my findings and conclusions in paragraph 287(ss).  
76. Loss of Salary  
615 The complainant noted her arguments for this point would apply to the allegations  
enumerated 76 to 86.  
616 In making her submissions, the complainant referred me to exhibit 4, tab B, and exhibits 9,  
21, 22, 25, 28, 31, 39, 40, 41, 48, 49 (PRD 2800, 2801, 1013, 000511, 001710, 001712, 003022,  
001226), 50, 54, 63, 65, 66, 76, 92, 93, 95 and 147.  
617 The complainant argued exhibit 40 confirmed there was a plan in place to put her on leave  
without pay. She further argued the respondent took steps to implement this plan. Additionally,  
she argued this plan was in place during the meeting of September 2009 where she allegedly was  
told in a "violent manner" she was not going to be "sold to another department". I repeat my  
findings and conclusions made in paragraph 287(oo).  
618 It is clear the complainant did not appreciate the reality of the respondent being "more  
forceful" (exhibit 41), but this does not make it an act of reprisal. I repeat my findings and  
conclusions in paragraphs 287(ll) and (qq), 336 to 356, 361 to 364, and 496 to 501.  
619 The complainant asserted the respondent was always trying to "fire her". This allegation was  
constantly made by her without any foundation in facts or law. She was advised many times that  
simply because she made an assertion did not make it true. Despite these reminders, she  
continued to make these types of assertions and failed to call any evidence that might be  
supportive of her position.  
620 As an example of the unsupported contentions of the complainant, she argued the Record of  
Employment (exhibit 48) and exhibit 45, which was correspondence from Employment  
Insurance, "validate and corroborate fully the clear intent of the employer to dismiss me onto  
leave without pay". In my view, this type of argument was not only unfounded, it diminished the  
case of the complainant. The actions of the respondent were not "cruel retroactive dismissal" as  
alleged by the complainant and did not violate section 147 of the Code. The Record of  
Employment did not terminate the complainant; rather, it laid her off so she was able to apply for  
long-term disability.  
621 In exhibit 77, Mr. Fedyk sent an email on October 22, 2009 to Ms. Rallis and others  
describing a proposed correspondence to the complainant as an "excellent letter message is  
clear". The complainant clearly was upset about this when she became aware of its existence, but  
this was not an act of reprisal. I repeat my findings and conclusions in paragraphs 287 (qq), 336  
to 337, 357 and 359 to 364.  
622 Despite the allegations of the complainant, I conclude the respondent did not take  
disciplinary action and continues not to do so today.  
623 In her argument, the complainant raised issues of her leave without pay in 2008 (exhibits 22  
and 28). This issue was outside my jurisdiction as it precedes the time period that I may consider.  
624 The complainant argued that exhibit 4, tab B, specifically the March 10 and 12, 2009 letters  
from Labour Canada, demonstrated an obstruction of process and a breach of policy and  
procedure that a "proven aggressor" would be allowed to "charge her benefits". There was no  
evidence whatsoever to support this allegation that JA had "charged" her benefits.  
625 The importance of her classification to the complainant was demonstrated when she argued  
she expected to be paid, be returned to work in a few weeks and have her EX-01 career  
protected. She wanted to be appointed permanently to an EX-01 position. I repeat my  
conclusions and findings in paragraphs 596 to 599.  
77. Financial Penalty  
626 I repeat my findings and conclusions in paragraphs 615 to 625.  
78. Breach of CLC, breach of CHRA, breach of case law  
627 I repeat my findings and conclusions in paragraphs 615 to 625.  
79. Retroactive Salary-actions causing significant Trauma, confusion, Anguish  
628 I repeat my findings and conclusions in paragraphs 615 to 625.  
80. Unilateral pay-Actions imposed by Employer  
629 I repeat my findings and conclusions in paragraphs 615 to 625.  
81. Pay-Section Officers dealing with me to implement the Retroactive Unilateral Pay  
Actions  
630 I repeat my findings and conclusions in paragraphs 615 to 625.  
82. ROE unjust Constructive Dismissal  
631 I repeat my findings and conclusions in paragraphs 287(rr) and 615 to 625.  
83. Unjust Constructive Dismissal onto non-Salary  
632 I repeat my findings and conclusions in paragraphs 615 to 625.  
84. Employer's Forced + Unilateral pay-Action and Pay-stoppage  
633 I repeat my findings and conclusions in paragraphs 615 to 625.  
85. Employer unjustly Dismissing me onto Disability  
634 I repeat my findings and conclusions in paragraphs 615 to 625.  
86. Discriminating me on Grounds of Health  
635 I repeat my findings and conclusions in paragraphs 615 to 625.  
87. Refusal to Search for Accommodation  
636 At the outset, the complainant noted her arguments for this point would apply to allegations  
enumerated 87 to 92.  
637 In making her submissions, the complainant referred to exhibits 18, 19, 57, 72, 74, 75, 82,  
85, 86, 102, 103, 105, 106, 110, 127, 128, 137, 143, 144 and 145.  
638 The complainant argued her request for accommodation was initiated in April 2008. She  
alleged she could have been moved to another building then. She also argued the letter from her  
lawyer (exhibit 106) was not answered.  
639 I repeat my findings and conclusions in paragraphs 287(r) and 412 to 415.  
640 She also argued the fact Ms. Branch moved in 2009 and Mr. Fedyk testified he took no  
action with respect to exhibit 75 were acts of reprisal.  
641 I repeat my findings and conclusions in paragraphs 287(v), 379 to 380, 407 to 411, 450 to  
452, 488 and 512 to 514.  
642 She then alleged that after January 2009, although she was no longer being paid as an EX-  
01, she continued to receive work-related emails (exhibits 103, 104, 109, 85, 86 and 57).  
643 I repeat my findings and conclusions in paragraphs 287(x) and 578 to 588.  
644 Next, the complainant argued the testimony of Mr. Laviollette confirmed the department  
had mechanisms to relocate employees. As an example, she pointed out Ms. Jackson and Ms.  
Branch had been relocated (exhibits 82 and 106). However, she submitted the evidence of Mr.  
Trepanier was he did not talk to a return-to-work specialist; nor was he aware of other managers  
being contacted.  
645 In her view, this was an act of reprisal. I fail to see how this, even if it were an accurate  
representation of the evidence, could be viewed as an act of reprisal, in violation of section 147  
of the Code. The decision of the respondent not to consider relocating the complainant has to be  
considered in the context of the medical opinions provided. Simply put, based on these opinions,  
the complainant was not able to return to work.  
646 The complainant was particularly upset with portions of the testimony of Mr. Johnson. She  
reiterated her request for accommodation commenced in 2008, at which time she asked to be  
relocated to another building. This was not granted. She also requested she work with a female  
executive, and this was not provided. She described Mr. Johnson as testifying, "frankly I was  
annoyed". Upon a review of my notes, I do not recall this being said and conclude he was not  
annoyed as alleged by the complainant. Therefore, I do not concur with the submission of the  
complainant this was blatant gender and health discrimination.  
647 Mr. Johnson did testify the department was not willing to invest time to pick up the phone  
and call other departments, but it cannot be overlooked he said so in the context he was not  
certain the complainant was able to return to work. I disagree with the contention of the  
complainant this was a blatant refusal to search for alternate work.  
648 The complainant argued there was no accommodation offered in September 2009. She  
attempted to delineate between a plan of accommodation and the draft reintegration plan  
provided to her. She went so far as to argue the reintegration plan was one of discipline and  
demotion. This submission is without foundation and must be rejected outright. I repeat my  
findings and conclusions in paragraphs 544 to 551.  
649 She again argued she was entitled to protection under the employment equity policy. I repeat  
my findings and conclusions in paragraph 338 to 341 and 599.  
650 The complainant argued her privacy rights had been violated by Mr. Seguin, who called her  
psychologist. While I agree that Mr. Seguin had no business calling her doctor without her  
authority, there was no basis to find this act was an act of reprisal, as contemplated by the Code.  
Furthermore, there is no evidence Dr. Goldstein disclosed any information to Mr. Seguin. She  
was not called as a witness.  
651 The complainant again raised concerns about Mr. Johnson saving her voice-mail messages  
(exhibit 161). In my view, the complainant offered no legal or evidentiary foundation to claim  
this was an act of reprisal, as contemplated in section 147 of the Code.  
652 I repeat my findings and conclusions in paragraphs 287(cc), (dd), (ee), (ii) and (qq), 302 to  
306, 307 to 323, 328 to 341, 349 to 360, 402 to 406, 502 to 506, 537 to 551, and 618.  
653 The complainant argued the respondent violated section 133 of Code by pursuing a litigation  
of these matters rather than accommodating her needs. This argument is circular at best. The  
issues being litigated before me were as a result of complaints filed by the complainant. For her  
to argue the exercise of the right of the respondent to defend themselves against her allegations  
was a violation of the Code, in my view, is nonsensical.  
654 The complainant submitted by not accommodating her for over 5 years, the respondent has  
progressively demoted her and wrongfully dismissed her. In this regard, she acknowledged  
receiving disability benefits, but the complainant argued this would not have happened had the  
respondent fulfilled their obligations. When one looks at the case of the complainant, one quickly  
concludes her idea of accommodation is that all of her demands are to be met and there is no  
compromise. This approach is unsupported in law.  
88. Refusal to follow requirements requested by Doctors in early 2010  
655 I repeat my findings and conclusions in paragraphs 636 to 654.  
89. Refusal to Transfer and Reintegrate in new Position  
656 I repeat my findings and conclusions in paragraphs 636 to 654.  
90. Refusal to exhaust Duty to search for Accommodation  
657 I repeat my findings and conclusions in paragraphs 636 to 654.  
91. Discrimination of grounds of Health  
658 I repeat my findings and conclusions in paragraphs 636 to 654.  
92. Refusal to find + facilitate Transfer and Reintegration in new Position in another  
organization  
659 I repeat my findings and conclusions in paragraphs 636 to 654.  
93. No OHS follow-up on Assault-safety form 1070  
660 The complainant noted her arguments for this point would apply to allegations enumerated  
93 to 100.  
661 The complainant referred to exhibits 3, tab D, and 5, tab 22, and exhibits 11, 12, 14, 15, 17,  
36, 40, 42, 43, 44, 45, 47, 49, 50, 51, 58, 59, 61, 63, 72, 73, 74, 93, 96, 99, 107, 129, 130, 131,  
134, 129 and 147.  
662 The complainant argued until 2009, when she read case law from the former Board, she was  
unaware her rights were being violated, and this was an act of reprisal. This argument was  
unfounded in law, and her allegation there was information purposefully being withheld from her  
was unfounded. The complainant has not pointed to any document or piece of oral information  
that should have been provided to her by the respondent but was not. I therefore cannot conclude  
this is a violation of the Code or an act of reprisal.  
663 Despite the submission of the complainant, I have no evidence Ms. Jackson withheld the  
rights of the complainant under the Code. In my preliminary decision, I concluded the  
complainant did not exercise her Code right to refuse work in 2008. The allegation of the  
complainant in this matter is without factual foundation and furthermore predates the  
jurisdictional time frame determined by me.  
664 The complainant argued exhibit 5, tab 22, an email dated August 4, 2008, which was an  
analysis by Ms. Mainville sent to Ms. Dingwall, was only received by her in July 2010 following  
her access-to-information request. This may be so, but despite her contention, I do not accept this  
to be a "not transparent [sic] procedural treatment of the safety rights" of the complainant. This is  
an internal document, and there is nothing nefarious about it. Furthermore, the nature of the  
investigation of Ms. Jackson in 2008 is not a matter before me.  
665 The complainant spent a lot of time discussing the Assault Related Incident Form (exhibit  
107) submitted by her on April 16, 2009 (exhibit 115), which resulted in a "Hazardous  
Occurrence Investigation Form" being signed by Ms. Jackson on May 12, 2009 (exhibit 47). The  
complainant pointed out she did not receive exhibit 47 for about 14 months.  
666 In the form, Ms. Jackson indicated there were no witnesses to the incident referred to by the  
complainant. Despite the argument of the complainant this was false, I do not agree. There were  
witnesses to the general behaviour of the aggressor, but the complainant did not present evidence  
there were witnesses to the incident she referred to in her original complaint, that being the one  
occurring on January 10, 2008. I cannot therefore conclude the document signed by Ms. Jackson  
was false.  
667 I therefore conclude, despite the submissions of the complainant, there was no violation of  
her rights under the Code; specifically, there was no contravention of section 147.  
668 The complainant argued she did not fully comprehend the purpose of the form she sent  
(exhibit 115), but I do not accept this. I conclude she was competent enough to complete the  
form and this is evidenced by the exhibit itself. It is therefore unlikely she did not understand it.  
In any event, it is not an act of retaliation for the respondent to send her a pre-printed and  
commonly used form to complete.  
669 The complainant argued Ms. Rallis and other executive officials took no action to resolve  
the issues raised by her and most importantly did not act in accordance with their lawful duty  
towards her. She alleged there was a duty for the respondent to search for accommodation and by  
not doing so, their actions were discriminatory and penalized her by excluding her from her  
rights, her dignity, value ethics, fairness and transparency. In my view, the evidence was the  
respondent did attempt to deal with the ever-evolving demands for accommodation and their task  
was complicated by the actions of the complainant, her doctor and psychologist. In this regard, it  
is important to note there is no note from either of her doctors indicating she is able to return to  
work.  
670 The complainant argued the respondent, by not dealing with her leave for the period of  
October 2008 to February 2009 until May 2009, acted in contravention of section 147 of the  
Code. She argued this was a form of disguised discipline. Once again, the complainant made  
submissions without any basis.  
671 With respect to the time Sparks Street was arranged, the complainant argued it was 18  
months after she left the building and although it was a change of location, it was not a transfer  
away from the aggressor. I repeat my findings and conclusions in paragraphs 287(qq), 307 to  
323, 335 to 341, 349 to 350, 359 to 360, 392 to 394, 402 to 406, 502 to 506, 544 to 549 and 636  
to 654.  
672 The complainant repeated her argument Mr. Johnson was not willing to invest time to pick  
up the phone and call other departments. This is not an accurate summary of his evidence. He  
indicated that until he was aware of the limitations of the complainant, he was not prepared to  
call about other positions. I repeat my findings and conclusions in paragraphs 287(dd), 302 to  
306, 328 to 329, 335, 402 to 406 and 636 to 654.  
673 Mr. Johnson acknowledged he was aware of persons on loan to other departments and other  
locations, but as noted above, he was not willing to facilitate any relocation without knowing the  
extent of the limitations of the complainant. In my view, this is what any good manager would  
do and does not amount to an act of reprisal, in contravention of section 147 of the Code.  
94. Significant breach of CLC 125 and 129, given no protocol steps on Assault-form  
674 I repeat my findings and conclusions in paragraphs 660 to 673.  
95. Non-lawful Financial threat Non-lawful Financial-penalty  
675 I repeat my findings and conclusions in paragraphs 660 to 673.  
96. ADM Rallis is the Client ADM Rallis has taken No action to correct matters before  
her  
676 I repeat my findings and conclusions in paragraphs 660 to 673.  
97. Refusal and Denial of Procedural Help and Action from ADM Rallis  
677 I repeat my findings and conclusions in paragraphs 660 to 673.  
98. Unjust Dismissal onto to Non-Salary with NO upholding of Duty to exhaust  
accommodation  
678 I repeat my findings and conclusions in paragraphs 660 to 673.  
99. Unjust Constructive Dismissal and also Blocked non-lawfully from means of accessing  
injury-file  
679 I repeat my findings and conclusions in paragraphs 660 to 673.  
100. Forced to seek EI degrading, discriminating action of Dismissal  
680 I repeat my findings and conclusions in paragraphs 660 to 673.  
101. ADM Rallis took NO action other than forward email to D. Trepanier  
681 The complainant referred me to exhibit 44 to support her argument, which was confusing  
and disjointed at best.  
682 It was evident the complainant did not understand the legal identity of her employer. She  
suggested it was Ms. Rallis because she was identified by counsel for the respondent as "her  
client" (exhibit 131). Ms. Rallis was the lead representative of the employer with respect to  
safety issues in April 2009, but the complainant adduced no evidence or case law to support her  
argument that she was, under the PSLRA or the CLC, the employer. I reject this argument in its  
entirety. The employer is Treasury Board.  
683 The complainant also referred to exhibits 39, 40, 41, 47, 58, 59, 61, 74, 77, 78, 81, 84, 106,  
112, 123, 128 and 130.  
684 The complainant submitted that from January 2009 onward, there was a "withholding of  
workplace safety procedures, harassment procedures and duty to accommodate". She argued that  
the proof lay in the fact that Ms. Webber could not answer questions put to her during her  
testimony. I do not accept the argument of the complainant as it cannot be forgotten Ms. Webber  
was one of the many witnesses called by her with whom she had not spoken, despite my  
admonishments. I find that this, rather than any desire to effect reprisal on the complainant,  
accounts for her inability to respond to some questions.  
685 I reminded the complainant on many occasions the evidence of her witnesses was received  
by me as her evidence.  
686 The complainant referred to exhibit 58 and suggested Ms. Corneau, one of the witnesses,  
alluded to the fact she was encouraged not to testify. My notes do not indicate this to be the case.  
Ms. Corneau did not testify to this at all.  
687 The complainant submitted the respondent tampered with the investigation from April 2008.  
In support of this allegation, she referred to exhibits 58, 59 and 61, which were affidavits  
attesting to actions in 2008. The affiants were not interviewed by Ms. Jackson. What occurred in  
2008 is outside my jurisdiction.  
688 The complainant again argued that the report of Ms. Jackson to Labour Canada (exhibit 47)  
was untruthful.  
689 I repeat my findings and conclusions in paragraphs 666 to 667.  
102. Penalty of Respect, Dignity, and of Accommodation  
690 The complainant referred to exhibit 13, tab 20, and exhibits 18, 19, 39, 40, 41, 77, 78, 82,  
106, 112, 113, 116, 128, 130 and 137.  
691 The complainant again repeated many of the arguments she had already made.  
692 In her own words, she submitted the respondent "failed and refused to uphold their legal  
duties in search of accommodation, benefits and compensation and harassment policy and  
helping me return to work in other department and they refused legal duties to me for procedural  
transparency". This statement is simply the same argument phrased in different and confusing  
words but still without any legal basis. In making the argument, the complainant again raised her  
version of the testimony of Mr. Johnson that he "refused to pick up the phone and call other  
departments", the accuracy of which I have already opined on.  
693 I repeat my findings and conclusions in paragraphs 287(dd), (ff), (gg), (hh), (mm), (oo), (qq)  
and (ss), 302 to 306, 324 to 326, 335, 338 to 344, 392 to 394, 399 to 406, 418 to 420, 425 to 431,  
502 to 506, 524 to 527, 537 to 551, 596 to 599, and 607 to 654.  
694 The complainant argued the respondent did not comply with its lawful obligation to respect  
values, ethics, dignity and accommodation as set out in statute, particularly the FAA, Public  
Servants Disclosure Protection Act (S.C. 2005, c. 46), Employment Equity Act (S.C. 1995, c. 44),  
CHRA, Public Service Employment Act (S.C. 2003, c. 22, ss. 12, 13),and the Code. This  
argument was typical of the complainant, who often made unfounded allegations without any  
legal or factual basis.  
695 I repeat my findings and conclusions in paragraphs 287(v), 481 to 484, 488 to 501 and 512  
to 516.  
696 The complainant again argued her concerns about the remarks of Mr. Fedyk and Ms. Rallis  
in exhibits 77 and 78. I repeat my findings and conclusions in paragraphs 287(qq), 336 to 337  
and 357 to 364.  
697 The complainant submitted the language used by counsel for the respondent in her email of  
April 7, 2010 (exhibit 130) was an act of reprisal. Specifically, she referred to the words "you  
have failed to fulfill". This email relates to the election form or what the complainant referred to  
as the 3rd party form. I repeat my findings and conclusions in paragraphs 287(t), (aa), (bb) and  
(nn), 425 to 431, 455 to 480, and 600 to 606, in concluding this email is not an act of reprisal.  
698 The complainant argued, again, two things could have been done. She could have been  
relocated to another department and provided a female supervisor. There is no evidence or law to  
support her contention the alleged failure of the respondent to meet these demands amounts to  
discrimination on grounds of gender, health or skin colour. Nor is there any factual or legal  
foundation to support her allegation the respondent acted in a reckless manner.  
699 I repeat my findings and conclusions with respect to the female supervisor in paragraphs  
287(hh), 324 to 326 and 528 to 530. With respect to the relocation to another department, I  
repeat my findings and conclusions in paragraphs 287(dd), 302 to 306, 324 to 326, 328 to 329,  
343 to 344 and 402 to 406.  
700 The complainant also repeated her argument of the responsibility of the respondent to  
accommodate her. I have addressed the duty to accommodate and the alleged delay in paragraphs  
287(dd), 302 to 306, 324 to 326, 330 to 334, 343 to 344, 402 to 406, 502 to 506 and 537 to 551.  
701 The complainant also repeated her argument she should have been appointed under the  
employment equity program. I repeat my findings and conclusions in paragraphs 287(v), 338 to  
341 and 599.  
103. Though the request was made for Female supervisor, no such Accommodation was  
offered or arranged  
702 The complainant referred to exhibit 128 and repeated her argument she had been  
discriminated against because the respondent had not assigned her a female supervisor.  
703 I repeat my findings and conclusions in paragraphs 287(hh), 324 to 326, 528 to 530 and 699.  
104. Penalty of Loss of Career  
704 The complainant argued she had been "unjustly and constructively dismissed" because the  
respondent allegedly did not treat her as an employee and she has not been retroactively  
reinstated into an EX-01 position. She argued she was also "blocked from competing" for  
positions advertised. Additionally, she submitted these alleged penalties "protracted out put her  
into a full loss of my career".  
705 I have already ruled the complainant made a choice not to apply for the 11 positions she has  
often referred to, and I repeat my findings and conclusions in paragraphs 287(v), 338 to 341, 599  
and 701.  
706 I attempted many times to have the complainant define how she had been "unjustly,  
constructively dismissed", and she was never able to articulate a clear response. In my view,  
there is no evidence she has been dismissed by the respondent. She is presently on long-term  
disability. No termination letter was entered into evidence. The respondent has attempted to meet  
the accommodation requests of the complainant, and she has not accepted their suggestions. This  
does not amount to termination of employment.  
707 The respondent maintained the complainant is still an employee and has maintained the  
same status since 2009, when she left the workplace. It cannot be overlooked that during her  
testimony, Dr. Stewart testified about the complainant that it would be at least 4 years before she  
would be able to return to work.  
708 The complainant again raised the "direct work related emails" and what I have called the  
excessive workload. With respect to the emails, I repeat my findings and conclusions in  
paragraphs 287(x) and 584 to 588. And with respect to the workload, I repeat my findings and  
conclusions in paragraphs 338 to 344 and 589 to 593.  
709 The complainant raised a concern the evidence of Mr. Vermaeten was that his only concern  
respecting her receiving emails was one of security. This bothered the complainant, but it cannot  
be forgotten this was her witness. Furthermore, this is not evidence of retaliation.  
710 Once again, she referred me to exhibit 77 and the email of Mr. Fedyk to Ms. Rallis and  
others where he voices his opinion on a draft email using the words "excellent letter message is  
clear". I repeat my findings and conclusions in paragraphs 287(qq), 336 to 337, 357 to 364 and  
696.  
711 She also submitted refusing to relocate her to a new department amounted to dismissal.  
Again, the complainant made this statement without any basis either in fact or in law.  
712 Once again, she raised the issue of her allegation Mr. Johnson would not phone other  
departments. I repeat my findings and conclusions in paragraphs 287(dd), 302 to 306, 324 to  
326, 328 to 329, 343 to 344, 402 to 406 and 699.  
713 Again, the complainant argued she should have been appointed to a position by virtue of the  
employment equity program. I also repeat my findings and conclusions in paragraphs 287(v),  
338 to 341 and 701.  
105. Penalty of Desperation to keepmy employment and Career  
714 The complainant submitted her arguments under this heading apply also to points  
enumerated 106 and 107.  
715 The complainant submitted the receipt of the documents as a result of her access-to-  
information request surprised her in that the respondent would write such things about her.  
716 She also voiced a concern other employees had witnessed workplace violations by the  
"aggressor" long before she had filed her complaint.  
717 She accused the respondent of deciding to litigate these issues rather than attempt to resolve  
them. I repeat my findings and conclusions in paragraphs 287(dd), 302 to 306, 324 to 326, 328 to  
329, 343 to 344, 402 to 406 and 700.  
718 The complainant argued she could not understand why Mr. Johnson testified he was  
interested in accommodation, not safety issues, and he did not call other departments, and some  
of his voice-mail messages were "annoying". This summary does not reflect my findings of fact.  
I repeat my findings and conclusions in paragraphs 287(dd), 302 to 306, 324 to 326, 330 to 335,  
343 to 344, 402 to 406, 502 to 506, 537 to 551 and 700. Insofar as they relate to other  
departments and with respect to the voice-mail messages, I repeat my findings and conclusions  
in paragraphs 287(dd), (ii) and (qq), 302 to 306, 314, 317 to 321, 330 to 334, 349 to 360, 502 to  
506, 537 to 551, 651 to 652, and 693.  
719 I accept the contention of the complainant her health has deteriorated and her doctors  
indicated she would be capable of performing the duties of the job in which she was acting but  
only when her health concerns are stabilized.  
720 The complainant continued to make reference to what occurred in 2008 even though she  
acknowledged she was aware this fell outside the time frame for which I had determined I had  
jurisdiction.  
721 The complainant submitted exhibits 158, 102, 103 and 85 established she was still receiving  
work requests and these were threatening to her. I repeat my findings in paragraphs 287(x) and  
589 to 592 and 709.  
722 The complainant also argued the workload of the position she was acting in had been  
reduced. She referred to the email of Mr. Thomas and the testimony of Ms. Borysewicz. I have  
noted before that the complainant has adduced no evidence that would support such a contention,  
and I repeat my findings and conclusions in paragraphs 589 to 592 and 708.  
723 The complainant argued again she should have been appointed to other positions under the  
employment equity program. She argued she had requalified at the EX-01 level and had passed  
her French test. I do not disagree with her contention as to being capable, if she was cleared by  
her doctor. That said, I also repeat my findings and conclusions in paragraphs 287(v), 338 to 341,  
599, 701 and 705.  
106. Penalty of desperation to continue working  
724 I repeat my findings and conclusions in paragraphs 714 to 723.  
107. Penalty of Pleading and Desperation to keepmy employment and Career  
725 I repeat my findings and conclusions in paragraphs 714 to 723.  
108. Non-Action and Non-Response of Deputy Shuggart  
726 The complainant made reference to exhibits 4, 7, 28, 36, 49, 51, 55, 56, 70, 71, 72, 81, 83,  
84, 93, 102 and 147.  
727 Exhibit 72 was correspondence from the complainant to Mr. Shuggart with respect to the  
election form or 3rd party notice, as she referred to it. Mr. Shuggart did not respond, and the  
complainant alleged this was an act of reprisal. I repeat my findings and conclusions in  
paragraphs 287(t), (aa), (bb) and (nn), 425 to 431, 455 to 480, 600 to 606, and 697 in concluding  
there was no act of reprisal.  
728 The complainant argued what she referred to as the "non action [sic] of the deputy" violated  
the obligation of the respondent to her in the area of dignity, values, ethics and return to work. I  
repeat my findings and conclusions in paragraphs 287(v), 484 to 506 and 681 to 689.  
729 The complainant submitted the fact managers were meeting to discuss her case was an act of  
discrimination against her. Again, she provided no factual or legal basis for this submission, and  
I reject it. I repeat my findings and conclusions in paragraphs 287(ee) and (ff) and 330 to 334.  
730 The complainant also argued, again, the saving of her voice-mail messages over a period of  
3 years showed bad faith and bad intent. I have already rejected this argument, and I repeat the  
findings and conclusions in paragraphs 287(dd), (ii) and (qq), 302 to 306, 313 to 314, 317 to 321,  
330 to 334, 349 to 360, 502 to 506, 537 to 551, 618, 652, 693, and 718.  
731 The complainant argued the respondent "finalized" her employment. In rejecting this  
argument, I repeat my findings and conclusions in paragraphs 704 to 713.  
109. CAPE attending as "Observer" not as Representative This penalty is Imposed by  
Employer  
732 A meeting occurred on September 18, 2009, at which time the complainant was a non-  
excluded employee, this having just recently been determined. A representative from CAPE was  
therefore invited by the respondent to a meeting to discuss the complainant's case. However, the  
complainant had not agreed to have CAPE act as her representative, preferring to represent  
herself, but she did agree to have CAPE attend the meeting as an observer.  
733 I repeat my findings and conclusions in paragraphs 564 to 571.  
734 What happened in this case is confusing, and no evidence was called from either party to  
explain it. I do conclude, as admitted by Mr. Johnson, the situation is in no way attributable to  
the complainant. She, throughout the process, tried to get to the bottom of the matter.  
735 In her submissions, she stated this was a financial penalty as she incurred legal expenses  
throughout this matter. I agree with her submission there was a financial consequence, but I am  
not in agreement this was an act of reprisal.  
736 It cannot be overlooked the complainant admitted she made her own decision not to use  
CAPE. Furthermore, the record indicated she terminated the services of several lawyers and  
decided to go it alone. Finally, there is no evidence before me as to what was paid for the  
services she received.  
737 Consequently, I am of the view that as there was no act of reprisal, there is no remedy  
available to the complainant.  
110. Penalty of Health, trauma, fear, sorting and Reading privancy [sic] Documents  
738 The complainant referred to exhibits 49, 134 and 161 in support of her argument respecting  
this allegation of an act of reprisal.  
739 Exhibit 134 is an exchange of emails between the complainant and staff of the Public  
Service Labour Relations Board, which, according to the complainant, confirmed her fear and  
anxiety surrounding the hearings.  
740 In 2010, the complainant made a request for access to information, and exhibit 49 is a  
compilation of many of the documents received by the complainant in response to her request. In  
her submission, the complainant argued the documents were "devastating", and she wondered  
why the respondent would proceed through to adjudication.  
741 In summary, the complainant argued the respondent "is denying their legal duty to me by  
taking the position it is in these proceedings". Regardless of my ruling, it is clear the complainant  
continually took the position the respondent was not entitled to respond to her allegations. In  
other words, the position of the complainant was essentially her allegations were to be accepted  
without response and her submissions were the only submissions to be considered. This is not a  
reasonable conclusion to be drawn by me and ignores the rights of the respondent to take issue  
with allegations of this complainant or indeed any complainant.  
742 During her argument, she referred me to exhibit 6, tab 15, specifically an email sent to her  
on January 15, 2009 at 17:23 hours. This was an email from a co-worker that simply stated, "I  
am starting to see your name around here. Where are you? You didn't come back did you?" In  
the view of the complainant, this email was an act of reprisal, and although the author was not  
named in the complaint, the complainant attempted to include him as a perpetrator during her  
argument.  
743 There was absolutely no evidence adduced from the complainant or any of her numerous  
witnesses concerning this email. As such, the comments made by the complainant during  
argument are rejected as being without evidentiary proof whatsoever.  
744 In the same exhibit, there is a reference to an email exchange between Ms. Chamberlain and  
Mr. Bertrand in March 2009. According to the complainant, she was asking for a permanent  
appointment to an EX-01 position and to be located to a position away from Place du Portage.  
745 This again is a repetitive argument, and I repeat in my findings and conclusions in  
paragraphs 578 to 585, 596 to 599, 625, 642 to 643, 700 and 718.  
111. Penalty of health, trauma, fear to have read 16 months after that the Blackberry  
accusation was in fact due to the original-aggressor  
746 This argument of the complainant was a repeat of an earlier argument made by her  
respecting the use of her Blackberry by her former supervisor, the aggressor. She referred me to  
exhibits 49, 97, 161 and 162 and suggested as a result of her request for access to information,  
she learned JA had utilized her Blackberry and made long-distance phone calls, about which she  
was questioned by the respondent.  
747 In her view, this amounted to an act of reprisal and was a financial penalty as it disallowed  
her from returning to work. The complainant did not articulate why this would have  
"disallow[ed] her" from returning to work, and the evidence disclosed that it had no effect on this  
issue at all and was simply the result of a lack of information on the respondent's part.  
748 In rejecting this argument of the complainant, I repeat my findings and conclusions found at  
paragraphs 440 to 449.  
112. Penalty in Fall 2010 of no Procedural Follow-up to Safety and Harassment Continuing  
Breach of live matter going back to 2007-2008  
749 The complainant, in a disjointed and unorganized submission, most of which was repetitive  
in nature, attempted to articulate how this was an act of reprisal.  
750 At the outset, the complainant argued the respondent submitted no evidence they were  
addressing the issues. She specifically referred to what she alleged to have been the evidence of  
Ms. Webber, who stated she had no knowledge of the status of the complainant.  
751 She further argued once again that Mr. Johnson testified he was not willing to "invest the  
time to phone other departments".  
752 I repeat my findings and conclusions in paragraphs 287(dd), (ii) and (qq), 302 to 306, 314,  
317 to 322, 324 to 326, 330 to 335, 343 to 344, 349 to 360, 402 to 406, 502 to 506, 537 to 551,  
618, 652, 693, 700, and 718.  
753 The complainant argued Mr. Johnson testified he was more interested in reintegrating her  
into the workforce than he was concerned about her health and safety. As a result, she argued  
this was reckless and amounted to unjust constructive dismissal.  
754 As noted, it is my view the respondent did in fact accommodate the complainant in  
attempting to reintegrate her into the workforce. I repeat my findings and conclusions in  
paragraphs 287(dd), 301 to 306, 324 to 326, 330 to 335, 343 to 344, 402 to 406, 502 to 506, 537  
to 551 and 700. The complainant adduced no evidence to support the priority of the respondent  
to reintegrate her into the workforce was a contravention of section 147 of the Code.  
755 In her argument, the complainant again argued the failure of the respondent to respond to  
her lawyer's letter to Ms. Branch in 2009 was an act of reprisal. I repeat my conclusions and  
findings in paragraphs 287(v), 379 to 380, 450 to 454, 512 to 514 and 641.  
756 The complainant again raised the issues of the election form, Mr. Bertrand's retirement and  
Mr. Johnson's request for an independent medical assessment. I repeat my findings and  
conclusions in paragraphs 287(t), (aa), (bb) and (nn), 407 to 411, 425 to 431, 450 to 452, 455 to  
480, 488, 512 to 514, 600 to 606, 697, and 727.  
757 The complainant submitted the allegedly late approval of leave and the lack of approval of  
her requests for transfers to other departments were acts of reprisal. She referred to these as  
"reckless refusals to address her issues". In making this argument, the complainant also referred  
to the actions of Ms. Jackson, which acts I have found occurred prior to my temporal  
jurisdiction.  
758 In rejecting her arguments, I repeat my findings and conclusions in paragraphs 287(dd), 301  
to 306, 324 to 326, 330 to 335, 343 to 344, 402 to 406, 502 to 506, 537 to 551 and 700.  
759 She then once again reviewed the history surrounding her application for workers'  
compensation (CSST), which was ultimately declined as she refused to file the required election  
form. Specifically, she referred me to exhibit 47, in which Ms. Jackson, on May 12, 2009, stated  
there were no witnesses in the hazardous occurrence investigation report.  
760 As noted by counsel for the respondent in her argument, the claim made by the complainant  
for coverage specifically made reference to an incident of January 10, 2008 (exhibit 107). I  
conclude there was no evidence to suggest there were witnesses to this specific incident. In  
coming to this conclusion, I acknowledge there was testimony establishing JA was loud and  
boisterous in 2008, but this testimony did not speak to the incident of January 10, 2008  
specifically.  
761 I conclude the hazardous occurrence investigation report signed by Ms. Jackson in 2009 was  
accurate to the best of her knowledge and this cannot be considered an act of reprisal.  
762 The complainant once again raised the issue of the third-party election form. I repeat my  
findings and conclusions set forth in paragraphs 287(t), (aa), (bb) and (nn), 425 to 431, 455 to  
480, 600 to 606, 697, and 727.  
763 In saying this, it is my conclusion the continued refusal of the complainant to sign this  
innocuous form and then claim it as an act of reprisal, contrary to section 147 of the Code, is  
frivolous at best.  
764 The complainant argued the respondent was in violation of paragraph 125.1(y) of the Code  
by allowing JA, whom she, at this point in the hearing, now referred to in the terms of "moron  
ape", to continue to work in the office and by continuing to train him and coach him. Although  
there was evidence to suggest subsequent to the 2008 investigation conducted by Ms. Jackson,  
JA did remain in his position and was coached, there was no evidence whatsoever that would  
allow me to conclude that the respondent's actions in this regard were done intentionally as a  
reprisal action.  
765 The complainant referred me to the Supreme Court of Canada cases of Bazley and Broome  
to support her contention the election form she was requested to sign was illegal. I repeat my  
findings and conclusions in paragraphs 287(t), (aa), (bb) and (nn), 425 to 431, 455 to 480, 600 to  
606, 697, 727, and 763 and reiterate the cases referred to by the complainant were of little  
assistance as they dealt with the issue of vicarious liability and not with the legality or illegality  
of an election form or subrogation form, which is utilized in virtually all workers' compensation  
schemes in this country.  
766 The complainant also argued the workload in her previous acting position had been reduced  
twice after her departure and while she was on leave she continued to receive what she referred  
to as "work emails" (exhibits 57, 100, 101, 103, 105, 109, 158, 159 and 160).  
767 I repeat in my findings and conclusions at paragraphs 287(x), 584 to 592, 708, 721 and 722.  
768 The complainant again argued she was precluded from applying for positions as the  
aggressor "oversaw these competitions". In rejecting her allegation this was an act of reprisal, I  
repeat my earlier findings and conclusions at paragraphs 592 to 593.  
769 In addition to the above arguments, the complainant made other arguments under this  
heading. They are as follows:  
1. "Non procedural and non transparent nature of handling the safety or my safety". I repeat  
my findings and conclusions set forth in paragraphs 287(dd), (ff), (gg), (hh), (mm), (oo),  
(qq) and (ss), 302 to 306, 324 to 326, 335, 343 to 344, 392 to 394, 399 to 406, 420, 425 to  
431, 502 to 506, 524 to 527, 537 to 551, 596 to 599, 607 to 654, and 693.  
2. The lack of involvement of CAPE. I repeat my findings and conclusions found in  
paragraphs 564 to 571 and 732 to 737.  
3. "Bouncing my file" from manager to manager was an "incredible penalty to me". I repeat  
my findings and considerations set forth at paragraphs 287(v), 379 to 380, 407 to 411,  
450 to 452, 488 and 512 to 514.  
4. She also argued the meeting in September 2009 was an act of reprisal, and in so doing,  
she described it as a violent meeting. I repeat my findings and conclusions set forth in  
paragraphs 287(z) and (oo) in rejecting her categorization of this meeting.  
113. Threat and Penalty of Employer NON-action  
770 I repeat my findings and conclusions found in paragraphs 749 to 769.  
114. It was Nov 16 2010 that I Petrin finally received leave-Record  
771 Similarly, the complainant referred me to various exhibits to argue the respondent had  
created a workplace environment that violated her safety rights. In particular, she referred me to  
exhibits 16 and 17, both of which were dated in 2008 and were not within the period determined  
by me to be relevant.  
772 The complainant submitted her allegations insofar as this item was concerned apply also to  
issues enumerated 115 to 120.  
773 The complainant went to great lengths to submit Ms. Dingwall and Ms. Mainville had made  
substantive errors in their categorization of her behaviour. In this regard, she referred me to  
emails transmitted in 2008 (exhibit 5, tab 22). Of course, as noted on several occasions before,  
this period of time is not within my jurisdiction, and therefore, nothing more need be said about  
this.  
774 Initially, she referred me to various email exchanges between representatives of the  
respondent and Isabelle Petrin (exhibits 91, 92, 93, 94 and 95) between October and December  
2010. Ms. Petrin was the representative of CAPE, and I repeat my findings and conclusions set  
forth in paragraphs 564 to 571 and 732 to 737.  
775 Most of the correspondence referred to by the complainant was between her and Ms. Petrin  
and has little or nothing to do with the issue before me. Therefore, I conclude this evidence is  
unhelpful to the complainant in her contention the respondent acted in a manner that constituted  
reprisal. The only evidence of employer involvement in this email exchange is exhibit 91, which  
constituted a response from counsel for the respondent to Ms. Petrin in which she clarified  
various statements made by the complainant. I do not find this was in any way an act of reprisal  
as alleged as there was no evidence of intent on the part of the respondent.  
776 She categorized the Record of Employment (exhibit 48) dated March 1, 2010, "coinciding"  
with the granting of sick leave without pay by Mr. Johnson on February 25, 2010 (exhibit 63), as  
"the first wave of unjust constructive dismissal". Her argument was the granting of sick leave  
without pay was done without her request; however, the evidence was clear the Record of  
Employment was issued in order to assist the complainant in her application for disability  
benefits.  
777 In my view, her categorization of this in the terms used by her are without foundation in fact  
or in law.  
778 The complainant traced her evolving status as an employee, which included the granting of  
various leaves up until 2010, her employment insurance benefits and her disability benefits. To  
use her words, this evolving status was a financial penalty affecting her continued benefits,  
salary and accrual of pension benefits.  
779 She described her application for benefits with Sun Life (exhibits 73 and 147) as demeaning  
in nature and a penalty to her. In totality, she stated the respondent put her in a "continued  
perpetual state of wrongful constructive dismissal", amounting to a "penalty to health, career,  
salary, financial penalty and threat of financial penalty".  
780 In my view, this again is an over-exaggeration by the complainant without any factual or  
legal basis.  
781 Of note, the submissions of the complainant further established she often misquoted  
persons. In her submission, she suggested counsel for the respondent accepted that the coding of  
her leave in December 2010 had been delayed by the respondent. Of note, in counsel's response  
to Ms. Petrin in December 2010 (exhibit 91), this is not what was said; rather, what was said is as  
follows: "It took time to complete the administrative coding and approvals".  
782 This is a far different situation than proposed by the complainant in her submissions. The  
respondent was not "holding her leave status in abeyance" but rather was dealing with it in an  
appropriate fashion. The complainant might not have liked the fact there was some time delay in  
coding and dealing with her requests, but this did not amount to an act of reprisal.  
783 Again, in an attempt to broaden my jurisdiction, and despite my constant admonishments,  
the complainant referred to situations and meetings from 2008 (exhibits 55 and 56). They are not  
matters before me.  
784 In this regard, the complainant again referred to pre-January 23, 2009 events in making  
reference to an email from Mr. Thomas (exhibit 109). This matter is not before me; nor are the  
purportedly inappropriate actions of the "aggressor as evidence [sic] by many of the witnesses  
called by the complainant". This is so as the purported actions of the "aggressor" occurred in  
2008, which predates the jurisdictional period found by me.  
785 The complainant suggested the evidence of Mr. Thomas and Ms. Borysewicz established the  
workload in the position in which the complainant was acting had been reduced on two  
occasions and this was an act of reprisal. I do not accept this categorization by the complainant  
and find there is no legal or factual basis for her making it. I repeat my findings and conclusions  
in paragraphs 287(x), 584 to 592, 708, 721, 722, 766 and 767.  
786 In conclusion, I determine that the complainant has failed to satisfy me there was any act of  
reprisal committed by the respondent, in violation of section 147 of the Code, under the present  
allegation.  
115. Penalty to me of Employer Non-Action  
787 I repeat my conclusions and findings set forth in paragraphs 771 to 786.  
116. I should not have to suffer Loss of Pay, Benefits, Accumulated Leave as a result of  
lengthy periods of Employer-Delegates NON Action  
788 I repeat my conclusions and findings set forth in paragraphs 771 to 786.  
117. Dec 2010 confirms that the Matter I face relates directly to acts-of-aggression  
Reported to Jackson April 2008 While At Work  
789 I repeat my conclusions and findings set forth in paragraphs 771 to 786.  
118. Penalty of inaccurate information on Aggression-findings  
790 I repeat my conclusions and findings set forth in paragraphs 771 to 786.  
119. Penalty of inaccurate information that suggest Pay-Section delays in coding  
791 I repeat my conclusions and findings set forth in paragraphs 771 to 786.  
120. Penalty of being held by Employer in non-approved unknown Leave-Pay status  
792 I repeat my conclusions and findings set forth in paragraphs 771 to 786.  
121. Refusal of Respectful treatment by F. Vermaeten  
793 The complainant argued Mr. Vermaeten refused "respectful treatment of me which was his  
legal duty under policy that he and those under him provide legal duties under the policies".  
Specifically, she referred me to exhibit 3, tab A, and exhibits 58, 59, 61, 82, 84 and 109.  
794 The complainant argued Mr. Vermaeten and the respondent acted in a manner that would be  
considered an act of reprisal under section 147 of the Code in "threatening to continuing [sic],  
recurring, financial penalty and salary penalty", therefore "holding me at a perpetual penalty of  
being refused to return to work". These words are confusing, and they are quite frankly  
unsupported by evidence or legal precedent. Stated another way, I conclude the allegations of the  
complainant in this regard were unfounded.  
795 According to the complainant, Mr. Vermaeten was responsible under the CHRA for a  
reasonable and exhaustive search for accommodation and work reintegration. Additionally,  
according to the complainant, he was responsible for the administration of the Code, in  
particular, safety matters reported by her.  
796 I have no issue in accepting the role of the respondent under both the CHRA and the Code,  
but I have noted there is a joint responsibility between the employer and the employee in issues  
involving accommodation. In this regard, I repeat my findings and conclusions in paragraphs  
315, 316 and 488 to 501.  
797 Mr. Vermaeten was called as a witness by the complainant and testified he replaced Ms.  
Jackson. As such, he was copied on some emails, which were referred to by the complainant as  
"work related emails". I do not accept the submission of the complainant Mr. Vermaeten testified  
his only concern was whether or not the complainant had sufficient security clearance to receive  
the aforementioned emails.  
798 Mr. Vermaeten's testimony was this was one of his concerns given the fact the complainant  
was no longer at the work site. Furthermore, he confirmed JA had received the coaching required  
as a result of the investigation conducted by his predecessor in 2008. He further testified in 2009  
he noted some distinct improvement in the behaviour of JA.  
799 This in my view is what was required of a manager assuming the responsibilities under the  
circumstances of this case.  
800 In my view, the true issue to the complainant was the treatment she received by JA as a  
result of her complaints filed in 2008. Over and over again, in her evidence and submissions, she  
made submissions the "aggressor" continued to be paid by the respondent and continued to be  
employed by the respondent.  
801 However, what disciplinary action or coaching occurred as a result of the complaint filed by  
the complainant in 2008 is not a matter over which I have any jurisdiction, and the complainant  
is not entitled to be advised of this in any event.  
802 The decision of the complainant to leave the workforce in 2008 is not a matter before me.  
What is before me are allegations of a breach of the Code filed by the complainant in 2009.  
Further, given that I am seized of a section 147 reprisal complaint, I do not find any evidence  
whatsoever that the respondent's handling of JA following the investigation report was in any  
way intended to be a reprisal against the complainant.  
803 Yet again, the complainant argued the requirement for her to sign the election form, or what  
she referred to as the third-party form, was a financial penalty and a threat of financial penalty  
and contravened the Code. I repeat once again my findings and conclusions set forth in  
paragraphs 287(t), (aa), (bb) and (nn), 425 to 431, 455 to 480, 600 to 606, 697, 727, and 749 to  
769.  
804 Again, the complainant argued the respondent had failed in their duty to accommodate. This  
time she alleged the respondent should have been discussing her reintegration as far back as  
2008. I repeat my findings and conclusions found in paragraphs 287(dd), 302 to 306, 324 to 326,  
330 to 335, 343 to 344, 402 to 406, 502 to 506, 537 to 551, 700 and 749 to 769.  
805 She again argued the failure to respond to her lawyer's letter in February of 2009 was an act  
of reprisal, contrary to section 147 of the Code. I repeat my findings and conclusions set forth in  
paragraphs 287(v), 379 to 380, 450 to 454, 512 to 514 and 641.  
806 Again, she argued there was no protection of her EX-01 status, which according to her  
should have been protected since 2008. This is a matter I have already discussed, and I repeat my  
findings and conclusions at paragraphs 287(x), 578 to 585, 596 to 599, 625 and 643.  
807 She again made reference to what she referred to as the inaccurate report of Ms. Jackson in  
2009 in which she indicated there were no witnesses. I repeat my findings and conclusions found  
in paragraphs 287(t), 596 to 599 and 615 to 625.  
122. Loss of my career, Loss of my established EX-career path  
808 Thecomplainant repeated in a rather convoluted and confusing manner several arguments in  
support of her contention under this enumerated allegation of an act of reprisal.  
809 At the outset, the complainant referred me to the testimony of Mr. Dugas and his affidavit  
(exhibit 57). Both the testimony and the affidavit of this individual are irrelevant to the matters  
before me as they simply go to the capabilities and abilities of the complainant, which are not  
matters at issue. In saying this, I accept the complainant was at all times a very competent and  
well-respected employee whom the respondent wished and still wishes to have return to the  
workforce.  
810 The complainant then referred to the cross-examination of her regarding her claim for  
disability benefits with Sun Life Financial. Specifically, she referred me to a letter dated July 28,  
2010 (exhibit 147), which approved the payment of benefits to her. The complainant argued this  
was an act of reprisal, but for reasons stated before, I fail to understand how a successful  
application for disability benefits can in any way be considered an act of reprisal. I repeat my  
findings and conclusions in paragraphs 287(rr), 581 to 583, 613 to 625 and 636 to 654.  
811 The complainant then made reference to an email exchange between Ms. Petrin, Sylvain  
Dufour and her in October 2010, respecting the request by CAPE to the respondent for the  
complainant's leave record. She categorized this exchange as a request for a reintegration into the  
workforce. However, when one reviews the entirety of the exchange, this is not at all what this is  
about. Also of note, in Ms. Petrin's originating email, she stated, "this member is also waiting to  
be contacted for her return to work following several incidents of harassment (including sexual  
assault)". The response to this email by Mr. Dufour was as follows:  
As for the return to work process, Ms. Chamberlain's consent is also required in order for the  
communication to go through CAPE on behalf of the employee. With all the information that has  
been shared regarding Ms. Chamberlain's allegations, I have never been advised that sexual  
assault was ever involved. Please note that HRSDC is committed to ensure that all employees  
work in a safe and harassment free environment.  
812 In my view, this email exchange confirmed the ever-evolving nature of the allegations  
initially raised by the complainant in 2008. Although the 2008 complaint is not before me, from  
a comparison point of view, it is most telling the evidence heard by me is a great departure from  
the allegations set forth by the complainant in 2008. The complainant has failed to establish any  
connection between this email exchange and her alleged "loss of my career, loss of my  
established EX career path" and has failed to establish any connection between this exchange  
and any violation of the Code.  
813 The complainant for some reason made reference to her curriculum vitae (exhibit 138), but  
as noted, this is not a matter of any relevance to the issues before me.  
814 She again made reference to the voice mails she left with Mr. Johnson in September 2009  
(exhibit 161). I repeat my findings and conclusions in paragraphs 287(dd), (ii) and (rr), 302 to  
306, 314, 317 to 321, 330 to 335, 349 to 360, 502 to 506, 537 to 551, 618, and 651 to 652.  
815 I have written about the complainant's attempt to locate alternate employment, and in this  
regard, for some reason she referred me to exhibit 102, which outlines some of her emails dated  
in 2008 and 2009 confirming she did search for alternate work either at the EX-01 or EC-08  
level. While this information would be relevant to the complainant's remedial claims in the event  
that her complaint were successful, given my findings, it is not relevant to the matters before me.  
816 She also referred to the testimony of Ms. Achimov and exhibits 54 and 69. According to the  
complainant, in April 2009, she was "unjustly wrongfully constructively dismissed with no  
salary". Once again, I have on numerous occasions decided there was no factual or legal  
substantiation to this allegation.  
817 Again without any connection to her allegations, the complainant submitted JA was  
involved in various competitions. In particular, she referred to a number of documents (exhibits  
49, # 3450, 107, 114, 118 and 158). She submitted once again she was "prohibited from  
applying" for various competitions, which JA oversaw. I have concluded before and reiterate this  
allegation is without foundation in fact or in law. During the course of the hearing, I asked her  
why she did not apply. In addition to not applying, she never advised the respondent of her  
concerns about applying so as to give them an opportunity to review the situation. Given the fact  
JA had been found to have committed some form of harassment in 2008, he would have had to  
withdraw from the oversight of these competitions if the name of the complainant had been  
under consideration.  
818 I conclude the complainant was not prohibited or precluded from applying for any position.  
She simply chose not to do so.  
819 Once again, the complainant referred to the election form, which I have dealt with on  
several occasions in this decision. However, in this case, she referred to in particular exhibit 49,  
# 1222, 1225 and 1226. At the bottom of # 1225 appears a salary calculation. The complainant  
submitted this confirmed she was an EX-01, not an EC-08. It cannot be overlooked this form was  
presented to the CSST by the respondent in response to the application for workers'  
compensation benefits by the complainant. The date of the alleged incident, being January 2008,  
is determinative of the salary level of the complainant, and it does not go to establish her as a  
permanent EX-01 as she argued.  
820 Finally under this heading, the complainant argued the testimony of Mr. Laviollette  
confirmed there were mechanisms to appoint her to other positions, even outside of the  
department. I agree this is what Mr. Laviollette testified to; however, he and several witnesses  
also testified no efforts could be made on behalf of the complainant by the respondent given the  
medical notes in their possession.  
821 I am not convinced the complainant proved the action of the respondent argued under this  
heading amounted to an act of reprisal in contravention of section 147 of the Code.  
123. Affirmation in Testimony and Affidavit of Repeated-Distasteful Aggression Inflicted  
822 The complainant acknowledged her arguments with respect to this enumerated allegation of  
an act of reprisal would apply to allegations enumerated 124 and 125.  
823 The complainant referred me to the testimony of Mr. Rondeau (exhibit 38), Ms. Corneau  
(exhibit 58), Ms. Bryson (exhibit 59) and Ms. Chaussé (exhibit 61).  
824 The testimony of Mr. Rondeau and his affidavit (exhibit 38) were irrelevant. All of the  
affidavits were presented to the Court in an application for judicial review commenced by the  
complainant. The affidavit of Mr. Rondeau and his testimony referred to his observations of the  
proceedings before the Court on July 29, 2010. In addition, he attested to his knowledge of the  
capabilities and abilities of the complainant, but this matter is not an issue before me.  
825 Similarly, the affidavits and testimony of Ms. Corneau (exhibit 58), Ms. Bryson (exhibit 59)  
and Ms. Chaussé (exhibit 61) were also irrelevant. The evidence and affidavits attest to  
observations of interactions between the complainant and JA in the time frame of 2007 through  
2008. These issues were not before me and not relevant as to whether or not the respondent acted  
contrary to the provisions of section 147 of the Code as of January 2009.  
826 In addition, the complainant referred me to what she referred to as recent letters from her  
doctors (exhibits 154, 166 and 168). In paragraphs 287(cc), 127 to 146, 169 to 175 and 349 to  
356, I articulated my concerns as to the objectivity of her medical advisors. I repeat my findings  
and concerns in this regard.  
827 I have no hesitation in concluding the complainant is medically unfit to return to work. The  
respondent does not take issue with this conclusion, and the testimony of Mr. Johnson confirmed  
this fact. The respondent simply requested an independent medical examination due to the  
conflicting nature of the medical opinions provided by her physicians.  
828 The complainant herself submitted she has "no health to return to work".  
829 In my view, the attempt to articulate the respondent had acted in a manner in contravention  
of section 147 of the Code has not been made out by the complainant on this allegation.  
124. Trauma-of learning Nov 2010 that a nearby Co-worker was "warned" as far back as  
Fall 2007 to not talk  
830 I repeat my findings and conclusions in paragraphs 822 to 829.  
125. Severe fear, nightmares of whole Organization  
831 I repeat my findings and conclusions in paragraphs 822 to 829.  
126. Wrongful Constructive Dismissal Breach of all contractual Duties to Me  
832 The complainant, at the outset of her argument with respect to this enumerated allegation,  
confirmed her arguments would apply to her allegations enumerated 127 to 131 respectively.  
833 At the commencement of her argument on this allegation, the complainant referred me to an  
email she sent to the former Board on February 16, 2011 (exhibit 134). I reminded her this  
particular email was evidence of a statement of her allegations and concerns as of that date but  
not proof of the contents. In similar fashion, a chart provided by the complainant on July 21,  
2010 (exhibit 132), was evidence of a summary of various contentions submitted by the  
complainant.  
834 In support of her contention she had been "wrongfully constructively dismissed", the  
complainant relied upon an email she sent to counsel for the respondent on April 28, 2011  
(exhibit 73), a departmental organizational chart (exhibit 84), an email exchange between Ms.  
Petrin and the respondent in October 2010, previously referred to by me (exhibit 95), an email  
exchange between the complainant and counsel for the respondent in February 2012 (exhibit  
122), correspondence to the complainant from Sun Life Financial dated July 28, 2010 (exhibit  
147), correspondence from Dr. Stewart to the former Board dated July 15, 2013 (exhibit 166),  
and correspondence from Dr. Goldstein to the Chairperson of the Public Service Labour  
Relations Board dated July 22, 2013 (exhibit 168). Upon a review of each of these documents, I  
fail to see any interconnection between the contents thereof and the allegation of being  
"wrongfully constructively dismissed".  
835 Of note, the complainant spent some time analyzing her email exchange with counsel for the  
respondent in February 2012 (exhibit 122). She submitted Ms. Marcoux was the "Executive  
Director for Litigation". Based upon my review of this exhibit, I am confused as to the reference  
to the "Executive Director for Litigation". Counsel for the respondent identified this individual as  
the "HR contact" for the complainant. And this identification was as a result of a specific request  
made by the complainant.  
836 This type of inaccurate summation of evidence was typical of the complainant throughout  
the presentation of her case both in evidence and submissions. Despite being admonished by me  
as to the unhelpfulness of this type of approach, the complainant continued to exaggerate and  
misquote witnesses, testimony, law, documents, and positions of both counsel for the respondent  
and of the former Board.  
837 In saying this, it is important to note the complainant at no time articulated how these  
documents established her allegation of being terminated in the manner in which she alleged.  
127. Breach of Safety + Harassment Investigation procedures continued live issue from  
2007-2008  
838 I repeat my findings and conclusions in paragraphs 832 to 837.  
128. Penalty and Threat of no Courage to Return to employer  
839 I repeat my findings and conclusions in paragraphs 832 to 837.  
129. Penalty and Continued Threat and Continued Penalty of Living on Disability that is  
subject to conditions  
840 I repeat my findings and conclusions in paragraphs 832 to 837.  
130. Penalty to Health and financially of continually seeking independent-Assessments to  
inform Physicians required Submissions to Disability 2 and 3 times per year  
841 I repeat my findings and conclusions in paragraphs 832 to 837.  
131. Penalty of Contact with Employer in Executive-Director for Litigation-Labour  
Relations  
842 I repeat my findings and conclusions in paragraphs 832 to 837.  
132. Penalty of DelayedTime in studying the locations across the Ottawa-Gatineau region  
843 In support of her contention there was a delay in locating an alternate office in the  
Ottawa/Gatineau region, the complainant referred to various maps (exhibits 140, 141, 142 and  
149).  
844 Essentially, the complainant argued the finding of the Sparks Street location could have  
been done earlier and the failure to do so was an act of reprisal, contrary to section 147 of the  
Code.  
845 Specifically, the complainant referred to the failure of Ms. Branch to respond to the letter  
from her lawyer dated February 2009. I repeat my findings and conclusions in paragraphs  
287(v), 379 to 380, 450 to 454, 512 to 514 and 640 to 641.  
846 Overall, the complainant in her submission on this allegation overlooked the medical  
evidence she supplied in support of her absence. The respondent would have been ill-advised  
under the circumstances to do anything in support of the complainant's search for employment  
until such time as they had received clearance from her medical advisors indicating her ability to  
return to work.  
847 I repeat my findings and conclusions in paragraphs 287(dd), 302 to 306, 324 to 326, 330 to  
335, 343 to 344, 402 to 406, 502 to 506, 537 to 551, 700, 718 and 749 to 754.  
133. Continuing loss of Health  
848 The complainant confirmed her arguments in this identified allegation of an act of reprisal  
would apply equally to her allegation enumerated 134.  
849 Despite my hesitation to accept the objective nature of the evidence of the medical advisors  
for the complainant, I have no hesitation in concluding her health deteriorated over time. In  
coming to this conclusion, I have reviewed the contents of various documents referred me by the  
complainant (exhibits 57, 58, 59, 60, 148, 150, 151, 152, 153, 155, 165, 166 and 168)  
850 This, however, does not establish there was any act of the respondent amounting to a  
violation of section 147 of the Code.  
134. Continuing severe trauma severe agoraphobia and other bad health limitations  
851 I repeat my findings and conclusions in paragraphs 848 to 850.  
135. Severe impact on Family, severe impact on my ability to function as Mother, wife and  
Daughter  
852 The complainant submitted her family was impacted. In particular, she argued she needed  
someone to sleep with her, her aging parents needed her assistance and the relationship with her  
husband was impacted.  
853 I have no doubt what she was stating in submission was an accurate assessment; however, I  
note for the record there was no evidence adduced by the complainant to establish her allegations  
that this impact was the result of deliberate acts on the part of the respondent.  
136. Penalty of Odd-abnormal thing to Save a message continually for 3 years  
854 The complainant confirmed her argument insofar as this enumerated allegation of an act of  
reprisal applied also to allegations enumerated 137 to 140.  
855 In articulating her argument, she first referred me to exhibit 161, being the recording of her  
voice-mail messages left with Mr. Johnson in September 2009. She described this as an  
abnormal thing to do and a violation of her privacy rights.  
856 I repeat my findings and conclusions set forth in paragraphs 287(dd), (ii) and (qq), 303 to  
306, 314, 317 to 321, 330 to 335, 349 to 360, 502 to 506, 537 to 551, 618, 652, 693 to 718, and  
730. The complainant then reargued the failure to provide her with a female executive was a  
"road block" created by Mr. Johnson. I repeat my findings and conclusions set forth in  
paragraphs 287(hh), 324 to 326, 528 to 530, 699 and 702 to 703.  
857 The complainant also reiterated an argument she had made on several occasions being Mr.  
Johnson did not treat her as an employee and was unwilling to "invest the time to call around to  
other departments". I repeat my findings and conclusions set forth in paragraphs 287(dd), (ii) and  
(qq), 303 to 306, 314, 317 to 321, 330 to 335, 343 to 360, 402 to 406, 502 to 506, 537 to 551,  
618, 652, 693, 700, and 719.  
858 Additionally, I have reviewed my notes very carefully insofar as the evidence of Mr.  
Johnson was concerned. Despite the submission of the complainant, Mr. Johnson testified the  
complainant was still an employee. I accept his evidence, which is also supported by objective  
documentation.  
137. Breach of all contractual Duties to Me Breach of privacy  
859 I repeat my findings and conclusions in paragraphs 854 to 858.  
138. Severe Fear and Trauma of my Voice being videotaped in Executive House  
860 I repeat my findings and conclusions in paragraphs 854 to 858.  
139. Refusal-Denial to uphold CLC Safety policy and procedures of employer-Witness  
861 I repeat my findings and conclusions in paragraphs 854 to 858.  
140. Continuing Breach of live Workplace Safety Matter reported while at work and while  
on Salary  
862 I repeat my findings and conclusions in paragraphs 854 to 858.  
VI. Analysis of submission on law by the complainant  
863 Having completed a thorough analysis of the lengthy, confusing and oftentimes repetitive  
allegations of the complainant as to acts of reprisal by the respondent, it is useful to review and  
analyze her submissions on what she purported to be the legal issues before me.  
864 In this regard, at the commencement of her argument on legal issues, she presented a 24-  
page document entitled "Excerpt of cases and jurisprudence PSLRB December 2013". The  
complainant followed this document as an outline in her presentation of her submission as to the  
legal principles.  
865 The document entered broke the issues down into seven categories as follows:  
1. Federal Workplace Policies  
2. Duty to Accommodate and Human Rights  
3. Procedural Shams, Camouflage, Breach of Procedural Rights  
4. Canada Labour Code, Part II  
5. Post-Grievance/Complaints Continuing, Live and Subsequent Events  
6. Obstruction, Threat, Financial Threat: Third-Party Request  
7. Harassment, Violence, Constructive Dismissal  
866 It is my intention to analyze each of these points raised by the complainant.  
1. Federal workplace policies  
867 The complainant referred to the Treasury Board's document entitled Managers Handbook on  
Canada Labour Code Part II (exhibit 11) and their policy on Prevention and Resolution of  
Harassment in the Workplace (exhibit 32).  
868 The complainant submitted the purpose of these two documents was in part to ensure  
employees are provided the protection of the CHRA and the Code. I agree.  
869 The complainant did not convince me that under the circumstances of her case, the  
respondent was in contravention of section 147 of the Code. A detailed review of the evidence  
before me shows no violation of the Code or the Act, insofar as the complainant is concerned.  
The process allowed the complainant the opportunity to provide evidence of acts of reprisal on  
the part of the respondent that were in contravention of section 147 of the Code. She failed.  
870 The complainant argued she was required to retroactively pay her union dues. Under the  
circumstances of this case, I have concerns about the respondent requiring this of her. That said,  
I do not believe this amounts to an act of reprisal pursuant to section 147 of the Code. I repeat  
my findings and conclusions in paragraphs 586 to 593.  
2. Duty to accommodate and human rights  
871 In her submission, the complainant argued the respondent had failed to meet its duty to  
accommodate her needs and thus was in violation of the CHRA. In her view, the respondent  
ought to have found her employment in the department at another location or alternatively in  
another department entirely. The complainant did not, however, explain how this allegation  
relates to section 147 of the Code.  
872 In my decision, I have already addressed the evidence and facts surrounding some of these  
allegations, and I repeat my findings and conclusions in paragraphs 691 to 693, 720 to 721, 731  
to 733, 738 to 745 and 771 to 786.  
873 The complainant referred me to an earlier decision of the former Board (LaBranche, at para.  
112 to 116, 154, 158 to 161, 166, 168 to 171 and 177 to 182). The position of the complainant  
was she was disabled from the harassment she suffered in the workplace in 2008. In these  
circumstances, the complainant submitted the respondent failed to accommodate her needs.  
874 Her reference to LaBranche is unhelpful under the circumstances. I am faced with four  
complaints under the Code. Although I acknowledge there is an element of accommodation, and  
indeed Mr. Johnson testified this was his main objective, unlike in LaBranche, there was no  
factual evidence to support the contention of the complainant she was discriminated against on  
any of the grounds set forth in the CHRA.  
875 As I have noted, her new supervisor, Mr. Johnson, wanted to reintegrate her into the  
workforce as soon as possible. This was because the respondent recognized the significant  
abilities of the complainant. However, as also noted, at every turn, Mr. Johnson was faced with  
yet further and evolving medical opinions, which eventually led him to believe the complainant  
was unable to return to work in any capacity whatsoever, a position confirmed by the available  
medical evidence.  
876 Having read the medical opinions in his possession at the time of his drawing this  
conclusion and having heard the evidence of Dr. Stewart, it is my conclusion Mr. Johnson did  
not err or certainly was not unreasonable in arriving at this determination.  
877 The complainant referred to yet another case before this Board (Kelly, 2010 PSLRB 80, at  
para 103 to 111, 115, 117, 118 and 121). The complainant argued there was a duty on the  
respondent to "market" her to another department.  
878 There is no question the complainant did actively search for alternate employment. There is  
also evidence the respondent was concerned about whether or not she was ready to return to  
work.  
879 As a consequence, I do not view the Kelly decision in the same manner as the complainant.  
In Kelly, the grievor was capable and able to return to work. The issue in Kelly was whether the  
employer took adequate steps to assist the grievor in his search for employment. In this case, the  
respondent, as I have already found, had no such duty during the period in issue, given the  
complainant's health status.  
880 The complainant referred to another decision of the former Board (Giroux, 2008 PSLRB  
102, at para 138, 140 to 147, 152 to 153, 156, 157, 161 and 163 to 169). According to the  
complainant, this case stands for the proposition an employer is obliged to exhaust all reasonable  
avenues to accommodate.  
881 I do not take issue with the categorization of this case by the complainant. However, Giroux  
is again unhelpful to the complainant.  
882 The complainant did not tender any evidence she was able to return to the workforce. In  
fact, even though I take issue with the objectivity of Dr. Stewart, her uncontested evidence was  
in her medical opinion, the complainant would not be ready to return to work for at least four  
years.  
883 Although I have great empathy for the position of the complainant, she was not in a position  
to demand accommodation. This is the exactly what Mr. Johnson and his predecessors had  
concluded, and they were frustrated by the ever-evolving medical status of the complainant.  
884 The complainant referred to another decision of this Board (Lloyd v. Canada Revenue  
Agency, 2009 PSLRB 15).  
885 Despite the submission of the complainant, this case is of no assistance to her. In Lloyd, I  
concluded the grievor had certain medical issues and specific accommodation needs. These  
needs were definable. The employer failed to meet these specified needs, and as such, I  
concluded they had failed to accommodate the grievor.  
886 The complainant in this case had ever-evolving needs. They seemed to change at each  
attempt of the respondent to accommodate her. In addition, at each turn, the allegations made by  
the complainant as to the incidents in 2008 changed. This was a situation in which no employer  
would have been able to satisfy the complainant.  
887 The next case referred to by the complainant dealt with a "whistle blowing" provision of the  
Code (Chaves). Unlike the complainant in Chaves, the complainant did not adduce any evidence  
she had been in any way penalized financially or otherwise for complaining to her employer  
about the inappropriate actions of her supervisor in 2008. A full review of the evidence and  
allegations of the complainant disclose no act of reprisal by the respondent in contravention of  
section 147 of the Code.  
888 Therefore, in my view, Chaves does not support the complainant.  
889 The complainant then referred to another case of the former Board (Pruyn).  
890 Once again, in my view, the Pruyn decision is of no assistance to the complainant. In Pruyn,  
the Board Member concluded two things. First of all, the complainant exercised his right to  
refuse to work. That is not the case in this matter.  
891 Secondly, the Board Member concluded the employer disciplined the complainant and this  
discipline was associated to his refusal to perform work. As I have noted in this decision, I do not  
find the respondent acted in contravention of section 147 of the Code. Therefore, I do not believe  
Pruyn is of any assistance.  
892 In addition, the complainant referred to other cases (Tench v. Canada (National Defence,  
Maritime Forces Atlantic),2009 LNOHSTC 1, Birkett v. Canada (Human Rights Commission),  
2007 FC 428, and Lovell and Panula v. Canada Revenue Agency, 2010 PSLRB 91). Upon a  
review of these cases, it is my conclusion none of them are applicable in the circumstances.  
893 As I said at the outset, this case turns on whether or not the complainant established the  
respondent had acted in a manner that could be considered a reprisal contrary to section 147 of  
the Code. I have determined the evidence provided by the complainant did not establish this fact  
and that her case law on this issue did not lead me to change my mind on this issue.  
894 I have further concluded the respondent is subject to a duty to accommodate; however,  
under these circumstances, until such time as the complainant had a definable limitation and a  
resultant defined list of accommodations, it would have been imprudent of the respondent to  
attempt to do anything other than what it did. In other words, until such time as the medical  
advisors for the complainant could establish specifically what accommodation was necessary, the  
respondent did not possess a duty as submitted by the complainant.  
3. Procedural shams, camouflage, breach of procedural rights  
895 In the view of the complainant, she submitted this was a "major allegation". I have already  
drawn conclusions insofar as the complainant's allegations of procedural fairness and  
transparency are concerned, and I repeat my findings and conclusions in paragraphs 169 to 175,  
287(u), (x), (y) and (tt), 480 to 483, 584 to 588, 594 to 595, 614 to 615, 660 to 673, 690 to 701,  
712 to 713, and 749 to 769.  
896 In support of the complainant's submission, the complainant referred me to a case decided  
by the former Board (Tipple v. Deputy Head (Department of Public Works and Government  
Services), 2010 PSLRB 83, at para 323 and 326 to 328).  
897 The complainant argued that since in Tipple, no medical evidence was adduced to support  
the grievor's successful claim for psychological damage, this was proof of an act of reprisal as  
she was required to submit this information.  
898 It does not take one long to review Tipple to determine the facts are not similar. In Tipple,  
the grievor had been terminated and claimed he was psychologically damaged as a result of the  
actions of the employer. This is significantly different than the fact situation before me. The  
complainant claimed to be the subject of acts of reprisal as a result of her filing complaints under  
the Code.  
899 This argument is further evidence of the confusing nature of the complainant's argument.  
The fact that the grievor in Tipple was awarded damages by an adjudicator despite not having  
adduced medical evidence regarding his psychological state following his termination is not  
evidence that the respondent's request for such information in the complainant's case, to support  
her request for accommodation, was a reprisal action. In attempting to accommodate an  
employee, an employer will require medical evidence or information not just to support a claim  
but in order to fashion the appropriate remedy. Indeed, medical evidence is central in cases of  
accommodation.  
900 Next, the complainant referred me to another case (Gill v. Treasury Board (Department of  
Human Resources and Skills Development), 2009 PSLRB 19).  
901 The complainant submitted the adjudicator in that case concluded the employer had  
breached the grievor's procedural rights. I agree. However, the factual context in Gill is wholly  
different from the one before me. First, in Gill, the adjudicator found that the grievor's rights had  
been breached as the employer never gave him an opportunity to explain and clarify before  
administratively suspending him. No such failure is apparent here.  
902 Secondly, in Gill, the adjudicator did, as the complainant points out, draw a negative  
inference from the employer's failure to call a witness. Again, the factual underpinnings of that  
determination are wholly different from those before me. The complainant argued the respondent  
indicated in 2010 they were going to call Ms. Jackson, who conducted the investigation in 2008,  
to testify. The complainant alleged I should draw an adverse inference from the fact the  
respondent failed to call Ms. Jackson.  
903 The only evidence Ms. Jackson could have provided would have been with respect to the  
original complaint filed by the complainant in 2008, the conduct of her investigation and the  
drafting of her report. All of this predated my jurisdictional period of January 23, 2009.  
904 As a result, even if I were to draw an adverse inference, it would be of no relevance  
whatsoever to the matters before me in this case.  
905 The complainant referred to an older case before a predecessor Board (Thibault v. Treasury  
Board (Solicitor General Canada Correctional Service), PSSRB File No. 166-02-26613  
(19960909)). Thibault involved the acting position of a grievor who was terminated due to  
unsubstantiated allegations of him consuming alcohol. The adjudicator found the employer had  
not proven the grievor was guilty of any wrongdoing, but as the acting assignment was for a  
determinate period of time, the grievor was not reinstated.  
906 I do not accept the contention of the complainant that Thibault is applicable under the  
circumstances of this case. The complainant argued this related to her allegations enumerated  
104, 122 and 126, where she argued she had "lost her career". I repeat my findings and  
conclusions in paragraphs 704 to 713, 808 to 821 and 832 to 837.  
907 The next case referred to by the complainant (Leclair v. Treasury Board (Correctional  
Service of Canada),2010 PSLRB 49), in my view is of little or no relevance to the matter before  
me. The fact situation is distinguishable, and the issues addressed by the adjudicator in Leclair in  
no way are similar to the ones before me. In Leclair, the issues were whether there was a valid  
work refusal under section 128 and whether or not searching a "drug loo" was a "normal  
condition of employment".  
908 As a result, it is my view that Leclair is inapplicable.  
909 The complainant next raised yet another case decided by the predecessor Board (Robitaille  
v. Deputy Head (Department of Transport), 2010 PSLRB 70).  
910 Upon a review of this case, the fact situations are easily distinguishable. In Robitaille, the  
adjudicator determined the delays were as a direct result of the employer. As I have noted, the  
lengthy hearing in this case and the delay in the presentation of the case cannot be associated  
with actions of the respondent. It was the complainant who took well in excess of 50 full days of  
hearing, some of which were lengthened by the tardiness of the complainant and her  
unwillingness to accept the limited scope of the inquiry before me. I repeat my findings and  
conclusions in paragraphs 180 to 187.  
911 In addition, although the complainant argued the actions of the respondent were malicious  
and deliberate and therefore, Robitaille is applicable, she provided insufficient evidence to justify  
her allegations the respondent acted in a malicious manner.  
912 The complainant referred to a Federal Court decision (Anderson v. Canada (Attorney  
General), 2013 FC 1040). Anderson was an application for judicial review dismissed by the  
learned judge. Although the judge did speak about procedural rights under the harassment policy,  
the complainant did not convince me the decision was applicable to the case before me. Indeed,  
in Anderson, the issue of procedural rights arose out of the applicant's allegation that the  
department had not conducted a thorough investigation, which had led to the rejection of their  
harassment complaints. In this case, the complainant's complaint was upheld, and the manner in  
which it was conducted is not before me.  
913 In conclusion, the complainant briefly referred to five other decisions (Canada (Attorney  
General) v. Frazee, 2007 FC 1176, Basra v. Canada (Attorney General), 2010 FCA 24,  
Synowski v. Treasury Board (Department of Health), 2007 PSLRB 6, and Sharaf v. Deputy Head  
(Public Health Agency of Canada), 2010 PSLRB 79 and 2010 PSLRB 34). Although these cases  
speak of punitive actions, disguised discipline and financial penalty, the complainant did not  
satisfy me they were applicable in the situation before me.  
4. Canada Labour Code, Part II  
914 The complainant submitted the Code is preventative in nature and therefore should be given  
the broadest interpretation, given its remedial nature (see Snyder, Annotated Canada Labour  
Code). I accept this statement of the complainant as being accurate.  
915 The complainant argued she submitted her refusal to work in May 2009 (exhibit 13). In her  
view, this should have resulted in an investigation being conducted (Tench). It is with this  
contention I have an issue.  
916 The complainant filed a complaint with the respondent concerning actions of her supervisor  
dated January 2008. These complaints were investigated, and the respondent concluded the  
actions of her supervisor fell within the definition of harassment. However, the invocation of the  
refusal to work occurred in May 2009, in excess of a year later.  
917 Although the complainant was still receiving a salary at the time she filed her refusal to  
work, she was not at work. I accept I should not be too "ritualistic", but in my view, the  
legislation does require the employee to be at work in order to invoke their right to refuse to  
work. The former Board's earlier decision in Alexander v. Treasury Board (Department of  
Health), 2007 PSLRB 110, confirms this. In May 2009, the complainant was on leave, and she  
provided the respondent with notes from her physician indicating her inability to return to work.  
918 As noted in a case referred to by the complainant, the Code "cannot be used after the fact to  
pursue proceedings against the employer" (Sainte-Marie v. Canada Revenue Agency, 2009  
PSLRB 35).  
919 I draw this conclusion and accept the rationale of the adjudicator, who indicated an  
employee must "invoke the safety concern with sufficient clarity to alert the employer and to  
trigger the mechanism set out in the Code to investigate the employee's concern and, where  
necessary, the steps to take to address those concerns" (Gaskin v. Canada Revenue Agency, 2008  
PSLRB 96). I also draw the conclusion that this was not what occurred here. At no time did the  
complainant invoke her safety concern with sufficient clarity to alert the respondent to this fact  
and to trigger the investigatory mechanism set out in the Code. Rather, the complainant's  
difficulties with the respondent began life as a harassment complaint, which complaint the  
respondent found to be substantiated. The complainant's displeasure with the respondent's  
actions began following her receipt of the harassment investigation report and resulted in the  
complainant having to leave the workplace on sick leave. The present attempt to allege that she  
had left the workplace as the result of a work refusal under the auspices of the Code is simply an  
attempt on her part to recharacterize what actually occurred.  
920 The complainant again referred me to Leclair and suggested there was evidence of a threat  
to impose disciplinary action. I do not share the same view as the complainant. It is my opinion  
the complainant failed in establishing a threat was made to impose discipline on her.  
921 I accept the complainant's submission to the effect that it was her burden of proof to  
establish on a balance of probabilities the respondent violated s. 147 of the Code. Furthermore, I  
must consider whether or not the actions of the respondent were tainted with "retaliation against  
the complainant" (Babb v. Canada Revenue Agency, 2008 PSLRB 38). My conclusion is the  
complainant did not satisfy the burden of proof and did not provide evidence of retaliation.  
922 The complainant referred me to Vallée v. Treasury Board (Royal Canadian Mounted  
Police), 2007 PSLRB 52, in which a four-step criteria was outlined. The four steps are as  
follows:  
1. The complainant must have exercised his or her rights under Part II of the Code.  
2. The complainant must have suffered reprisals from the employer.  
3. The reprisals must have been of a disciplinary nature, as defined in s. 147 of the Code.  
4. There must be a direct link between the exercising of the complainant's rights and the  
actions taken against the complainant by the employer.  
923 I accept the summary proposed by the complainant in this matter as to the criteria outlined  
in Vallée. In stating this, I also reiterate my earlier conclusions that the complainant failed to  
meet any of the criteria outlined in Vallée.  
924 The complainant argued the purpose of the "whistle blower" provisions of the Code was to  
ensure a safe workplace for employees who refuse to work (Chaves). I accept this submission.  
925 The complainant submitted the word "danger" used in the Code must have a broad meaning  
(Kinhnicki and Dupuis v. Canada Customs and Revenue Agency, 2003 PSSRB 52). Making this  
submission, the complainant argued the proposed relocation of her to the Sparks Street location  
was a danger to her. In exploring this, the complainant made specific reference to the email she  
received from Mr. Henson. This email to the complainant stated, "I am starting to see your name  
around here. Where are you? You didn't come back did you?" As already determined, I do not  
accept the contention of the complainant this was an act of reprisal by the respondent. I repeat  
my findings and conclusions in paragraphs 425 to 431, 455 to 480, 600 to 606, 697, 727, 742 to  
745, 762, 765 and 803.  
926 I do not accept the submission of the complainant regarding the "election" form, which she  
reiterated. She chose not to sign this innocuous form and as a result was precluded from  
receiving workers' compensation benefits. In my view, this cannot be considered to be an act of  
reprisal by the respondent.  
927 I repeat once again my findings and conclusions set forth in paragraphs 287(t), (aa), (bb) and  
(nn), 425 to 431, 455 to 480, 600 to 606 and 697, 727, 749 to 769, and 803.  
928 The references by the complainant to Bazley and Broome were entirely unhelpful to her  
cause. These cases dealt with the issue of vicarious liability, not with the obligation of an  
employee to sign a third-party or subrogation form when making a claim for worker's  
compensation.  
929 The complainant provided no documentary evidence from a physician indicating her ability  
to return to work. As I have noted, the overwhelming nature of the documents provided by her  
physicians all indicated her inability to return to work.  
930 In addition, the complainant referred me to several other cases from the predecessor to this  
Board and the Federal Court of Appeal (Martin v. Canada (Attorney General), 2005 FCA 156;  
Laroche v. Canada (Attorney General), 2011 FC 1454; Canada Post Corporation v. Pollard,  
2008 FCA 305; and Alexander). In referring to these cases, the complainant submitted there was  
evidence the respondent did not investigate her allegations of an unsafe workplace.  
931 While this case was presented as a case of alleged retaliation, I have come to the conclusion  
that this case is really about the complainant's certainty that her case was not properly  
investigated and that she was improperly accommodated. Accommodation only occurs at a time  
when the employee, in this case the complainant, is capable of returning to work and has  
identified practices of the employer necessary to accommodate the limitations of the  
complainant. I have already concluded the complainant, throughout this process, had not  
provided documentation to support her return to work, and therefore, the duty to accommodate  
was not present. It seems to me that if no accommodation was owed by the respondent, there can  
be no claim that the failure to offer it was a reprisal or at least that making such a claim becomes  
problematic.  
932 As for her belief that the investigation was improperly conducted, she has not clearly alleged  
that the deficiencies in the investigation were the result of actions of the respondent that were in  
fact acts of reprisal. Rather, she has simply asserted that the investigation was not complete,  
without making reference to section 147 of the Code and what needs to be proven in such cases.  
Even had she made such an assertion, I would have had no hesitation in deciding that there was  
absolutely no evidence to support such an allegation.  
933 Finally, the complainant referred me to a case of the former Board to support her contention  
I should consider the "continuing and live nature" of the issues (Boivin v. Canada Customs and  
Revenue Agency, 2003 PSSRB 94). Boivin does not stand for the proposition submitted by the  
complainant. Indeed, despite the complainant's argument that the Code allowed for the making of  
complaints related to workplace stress or mental health and that placing him on sick leave fell  
within the ambit of section 145, the former Board held that the situation as presented by the  
complainant was not the type of situation contemplated by Part II of the Code. It also held that  
although "danger" has a broad meaning, it was not so broad as to cover an internal dispute or  
stressful situation and, finally, that the employer's actions were not disciplinary reprisals and  
were instead based on a genuine concern, regardless of the complainant's fitness. In Boivin, the  
adjudicator eventually concluded there was insufficient evidence to satisfy him of a claim of  
workplace bullying or harassment. I am unable to find anything in this decision that supports the  
complainant's case.  
5. Post-grievance/complaints continuing, live and subsequent events  
934 In addition to Boivin, the complainant also referred me to another case (Boivin, 2003 PSSRB  
23). This case was a preliminary ruling in which the adjudicator ordered an oral hearing be held  
to enable the complainant to present his case.  
935 In the second Boivin case, after evidence and oral submissions were made, the adjudicator  
eventually concluded there was no evidence to support the submission of the complainant there  
was workplace bullying or harassment.  
936 Consequently, I do not accept the contention of the complainant these cases are of assistance  
to her.  
937 The complainant referred to Leclair and suggested it stood for the proposition the Board  
should not perform an investigation as that is the responsibility of the employer when an  
employee exercises their right to refuse work. I take no issue with the position articulated by the  
complainant.  
938 The complainant then referred to another case (Hanna v. Deputy Head (Department of  
Indian Affairs and Northern Development), 2009 PSLRB 94), which she submitted supported her  
claim for legal fees, loss of EX-01 salary and reimbursement of leave. The grievor in Hanna had  
incurred legal expenses in defending himself in a harassment investigation and contested the  
employer's refusal to reimburse him for them. Insofar as her claim for legal fees is concerned, I  
repeat my findings and conclusions in paragraphs 572 to 575. Furthermore, I do not accept  
Hanna stands for the proposition submitted by the complainant as in that case the adjudicator  
found that the employer had not engaged in discipline in refusing to pay the legal expenses.  
939 The complainant referred to another case (Babb). She submitted this case supported her  
contention that her submissions are not moot. In accepting her contention in this regard, I note  
the respondent did not actively pursue a claim the complaints were moot.  
940 The complainant then referred again to the decision in LaBranche. I have concluded  
LaBranche is not helpful in the case before me and it is easily distinguishable from the facts in  
this matter.  
6. Obstruction, threat, financial threat: third-party request  
941 The complainant again referred to the third-party request. She specifically referred to Bazley  
and Broome.  
942 I repeat my findings and conclusions in paragraphs 287(t), (aa), (bb) and (nn), 425 to 431,  
455 to 480, 600 to 606 and 697, 727, 749 to 769, 803, and 927.  
7. Harassment, violence, constructive dismissal  
943 The complainant spent significant time reviewing two decisions from British Columbia: Sulz  
v. Attorney General et al., 2006 BCSC 99 (Trial Division), and Sulz v. Minister of Public Safety  
and Solicitor General,2006 BCCA 582 (Court of Appeal). It must be noted at the outset these  
cases are of limited usefulness in my analysis as they involve a lawsuit for damages commenced  
by a member of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police who had been harassed and forced to retire  
as a result. The issues in Sulz turned on tort law and the vicarious liability of employers, in  
particular the Crown, for acts of its employees. These issues and the discussions in Sulz are not at  
issue here.  
944 That said, the case is best known for the application of remedies and the awarding of  
damages against the government of the province of British Columbia when the action of the  
plaintiff against the Federal Crown was barred by statue. Again, this is of little assistance to my  
analysis of the fact situation before me.  
945 Furthermore, in Sulz, the evidence varied significantly between the plaintiff and the  
defendants. Despite these variances, the Court drew conclusions of facts, and their conclusions  
were not comparable to the allegations made by the complainant in the case before me.  
946 The complainant, in her argument, misquoted Sulz when she referred me to paragraph 144  
of the Trial Division decision and stated this paragraph established she was owed a duty of care.  
That is not what this paragraph states. It is useful to reproduce this paragraph in its entirety:  
A successful claim of negligence must demonstrate that the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of  
care, that the defendant breached that duty of care, and that damages or injury resulted from  
that breach.  
947 The complainant referred me to an arbitration award of Owen Shime, Q.C., dated February  
12, 2010 (Greater Toronto Airports Authority v. Public Service Alliance Canada, Local 0004  
(2010), 191 L.A.C. (4th) 277). According to the complainant, this case supported her claim for  
damages, in particular future loss of income and damages for mental distress, pain and suffering.  
948 Of particular note, the decision referred to by the complainant was reviewed and overturned  
insofar as the arbitrator's award for damages for mental distress, pain and suffering, and punitive  
damages was concerned (Greater Toronto Airports Authority v. Public Service Alliance of  
Canada, Local 0004, 2011 ONSC 487). As a consequence, in my view, the complainant's  
reliance upon the arbitral award is of little assistance to her.  
949 The complainant relied upon online text, Constructive Dismissal, written by Peter Neumann  
and Jeffrey Sack, Q.C., and published by Lancaster House. In particular, she referred me to  
chapter 8 of this text, entitled "Constructive Dismissal, Resignation and Constructive  
Resignation (Repudiation by Employee)".  
950 In the course of her argument regarding the above text, I asked her to identify when she  
claimed to have been "wrongfully constructively dismissed". She indicated she felt she was  
"wrongfully constructively dismissed" in February 2011 when the employer responded to her  
application for the judicial review of my original decision. In her view, the simple filing of a  
"Notice of Appearance" by the respondent "enunciated" its position.  
951 I find this claim to be unfounded in fact and in law. If I were to accept her contention, I  
would be sending a message to all employers if they respond in any way to claims made by  
employees, the response might be tantamount to wrongful dismissal. This is a finding I am  
unwilling to make.  
952 The complainant referred me to yet another case she felt was of assistance to her allegations  
(Drew v. Canadian National Railway Co., [2009] C.L.A.D. No. 159 (QL)). In my view, this case  
is easily distinguishable from the matter before me. The legal issues to be decided in Drew were  
those of the timeliness (which has already been decided here and is not reviewable at this stage),  
constructive dismissal and mitigation (which is not an issue here). At paragraph 6 of the award,  
the learned arbitrator stated as follows:  
In May 2006, Ms. Drew was examined by a doctor at the request of the insurer and was found to  
have recovered sufficiently to return to work. The company offered her a position with its GO  
operation. Ms. Drew refused the position and the company alleges that she thereby failed to  
mitigate any damages to which she would be entitled. I find that it was reasonable for Ms. Drew  
to refuse the position at GO and that she has not failed to mitigate any damages to which she  
would be entitled.  
953 In the case before me, the complainant did not provide medical information she was ready to  
return to work. Nor did she supply any evidence she had been dismissed, constructively or  
otherwise. It is my conclusion the complainant is now and continues to be an employee of the  
respondent on long-term disability, a view apparently shared by the respondent.  
954 Finally, the complainant referred to the decision in Court v. John Grant Haulage Ltd., 2010  
CIRB 498, in support of her submissions. I find that this decision is unhelpful to the position of  
the complainant. In John Grant, the employer admitted to having disciplined the complainant for  
having falsified documents, and the issue between the parties was whether or not it was, in so  
acting, bound to carry out the Code's investigation process prior to imposing discipline. In the  
case before me, the respondent has expressly denied having disciplined the complainant, and I  
have found that they have not done so.  
VII. Analysis of submissions of the respondent  
955 The respondent provided me with a memorandum of law, which outlined the main points on  
which they wished to make submissions.  
956 In addition, counsel provided me with a two-volume book of authorities, a "Summary of  
Medical Notes" and a "Summary of GECA Claim (CSST)".  
1. Nature of the proceedings  
957 Counsel referred me to my decision in this matter, which was upheld in the Federal Court of  
Appeal, and the application for review by the Supreme Court of Canada, which was dismissed  
(2010 PSLRB 130 and 2012 FCA 44; 2012 44683 (SCC)). In addition, counsel referred  
to the fact that my decision was also upheld after reconsideration by another member of the  
former Board (2012 PSLRB 127).  
958 At paragraph 114-115 of the preliminary decision, I found:  
114 In my view, I have very limited jurisdiction to hear the four complaints. I conclude that I can  
hear them, but only as they relate to allegations of reprisals to the grievor's exercise of her rights  
under the CLC that took place in the 90 days before the first complaint was filed. In other words,  
I have no jurisdiction to consider any complaint about any alleged reprisal that occurred before  
January 23, 2009, 90 days before April 23, 2009.  
115 To be clear, the grievor will be able to adduce evidence and make submissions about  
allegations of reprisals that occurred on or after January 23, 2009 under sections 133 and 147  
of the CLC. She will be entitled to present her case, but only as it relates to her allegations that  
the employer, as specified in subsection 133(1), "has taken action against" her "in contravention  
of section 147" on or after January 23, 2009.  
959 I accept the contention of the respondent as to the limitations on the nature of my inquiry in  
this matter. I clearly stated the limitations in the aforementioned decision, and nothing has  
changed.  
2. Did the respondent commit acts of reprisals against the complainant in 2009 by refusing  
to "accommodate her health needs", and if so, what is the appropriate remedy?  
960 Counsel for the respondent submitted the role of the Board in this matter is to determine  
whether or not the complainant has been subject to retaliation by the respondent as a result of her  
complaints filed pursuant to the Code (sections 133(1) and 147). I agree with counsel for the  
respondent in this regard.  
961 Counsel further argued the role of the Board is limited and does not include the jurisdiction  
to determine whether concerns over the health and safety of the complainant in the workplace  
were appropriately handled; nor does the Board have jurisdiction to examine labour relations,  
workplace safety and health matters when adjudicating on allegations of reprisals.  
962 Counsel submitted the role of the Board is to determine whether the actions of the  
respondent were disciplinary in nature and tainted with retaliation against the employee for the  
exercise of her rights under the Code (Ouimet v. Via Rail Canada Inc., 2002 CIRB 171, and  
Gaskin v. Canada Revenue Agency, 2013 FCA 36).  
963 Furthermore, counsel argued the purpose of the right to refuse to work should not be  
considered a vehicle for attaining other objectives under the Code or as a mechanism to deal with  
frustrations of the employee (Isinger v. TSI Terminal Systems Inc., 2013 CIRB 688).  
964 Counsel also argued in the matter before me, I determined the complainant had not  
exercised her right to refuse work in paragraphs 90 and 91 of my preliminary decision.  
965 Counsel noted the jurisprudence is clear and there is a three-step analysis insofar as inquiries  
under section 240 of the Code are concerned. This analysis is as follows (Leslie v. Canada Post  
Corporation, 2013 CIRB 694, Vallée, and Paquet v. Air Canada, 2013 CIRB 691):  
1. The complainant must establish that he or she has exercised some right under the Code  
and has been subject to some form of action or inaction by the employer as a result of the  
exercise of this right.  
2. The Board must be satisfied that the nature of the action or inaction of the employer is of  
the type contemplated by section 147 of the Code.  
3. If the action or inaction of the employer is considered to fall within the purview of  
section 147 of the Code, the Board must determine whether there is a sufficient nexus or  
connection between the alleged action of the employer and the exercise of the employee  
of his or her rights under the Code.  
966 The respondent submitted this is the nature of the analysis I must undertake, and in my  
view, it reflects the state of the law today.  
967 Insofar as the first criteria in my preliminary decision is concerned, I concluded the  
complainant had not exercised her right to refuse work. However, in stating this, I did conclude I  
had limited jurisdiction with respect to the four complaints she filed but only as they related to  
allegations of reprisals that took place in the 90-day period prior to the filing of the first  
complaint.  
968 Insofar as the second step in the analysis is concerned, counsel for the respondent argued the  
nature and definition of a "reprisal" implied an underlying "intention to harm" (Tanguay v.  
Statistical Survey Operations, 2005 PSLRB 43, Vallée, Chaves and Gaskin 2008). In the view of  
counsel for the respondent, no evidence was adduced to establish either an explicit or implicit  
intention on the part of the respondent to harm the complainant.  
969 Finally, with respect to the three-step analysis, counsel for the respondent argued there was  
an insufficient nexus or link between any actions taken by the respondent and the exercise of the  
complainant's rights under the Code. This linkage must be a "persuasive" one according to  
counsel for the respondent (Gaskin 2008).  
970 In concluding her opening comments, counsel for the respondent argued the remedial power  
of the Board is further constrained by the provisions of section 134 of the Code. In her view, this  
section sets out a range of remedies from maintaining the status quo, reinstating the employee,  
compensating the employee to the equivalent of remuneration and ordering the recision of an  
action taken by the respondent. She argued that these remedies are not the same as those of an  
adjudicator under the Act.  
a. Who bears the burden of proof?  
971 Counsel for the respondent argued in the case of a valid exercise of the right to refuse work,  
subsection 133(6) of the Code reverses the burden of proof. In all other instances, the respondent  
submitted the general principal of "he who asserts must prove" prevails (Anderson v. IMTT-  
Québec Inc., 2010 CIRB 606, and Leslie).  
972 Counsel referred me to paragraphs 44 to 47 of Ouimet, where the CIRB found as follows:  
(46) In addition, the former section 133 provided for a reverse onus in all complaints alleging  
a violation by the employer under section 147(a), but the Board only had jurisdiction in cases  
where the complainant had raised section 128 or 129. Therefore, the amendments to the Act  
demonstrate the legislator's intention with regard to this section. In this regard, also see the  
comments in Graham J. Clarke, Canadian Industrial Relations Board, supra, related to section  
133(6).  
(47) The Board concludes therefore that contrary to the situation in which section 128 or 129  
is raised and the burden of proof is reversed, in the instant case, the burden of proof applies  
normally.  
b. Is the alleged violation a continuing one?  
973 Counsel argued the contention of the complainant this was a "continuing matter" is not  
applicable to the circumstances before me (Galarneau et al. v. Treasury Board (Correctional  
Service of Canada), 2009 PSLRB 1).  
974 Counsel for the respondent argued subsection 133(6) of the Code was not triggered in this  
case because the complainant had not met the necessary requirements (Alexander).  
3. Rebuttal of arguments of the complainant  
975 Counsel for the respondent submitted the complainant did not establish the respondent had  
acted in a manner that could be considered an act of reprisal. In stating this, counsel noted there  
appeared to be three main alleged actions of the respondent complained about by the  
complainant. These were her leave applications, accommodation for her health-related needs and  
events surrounding her application for workers' compensation benefits.  
976 Insofar as the allegations for leave were concerned, counsel for the respondent argued in  
April 2009, the complainant no longer reported to Mr. Bertrand as he had retired, and she  
therefore had a new supervisor, Mr. Johnson, to whom she was to report. Mr. Johnson met with  
Mr. Bertrand and discussed the issues surrounding the complainant, and as a result thereof, a  
large amount of communication went from the respondent to the complainant.  
977 Counsel questioned how a refusal to approve special leave after February 20, 2009 (exhibit  
10, tab 16) could be considered an act of reprisal under section 147 of the Code.  
978 Counsel for the respondent argued the documents provided by the complainant to her  
employer from her doctors initially indicated a date for return to work, with certain conditions.  
979 For instance, initially, the complainant's physicians indicated she would be able to return to  
work in January 2009 provided she was accommodated in a "safe location", which was defined  
as another floor at Place du Portage. When this condition was met by the respondent, her  
physician indicated the complainant would have to be relocated to another building. The  
submission of the respondent was if this was to be considered an act of retaliation in  
contravention of section 147 of the Code, there needed to be a nexus to the refusal of the  
employee to work. According to the respondent, such nexus simply did not exist.  
980 The events surrounding the application by the complainant for workers' compensation  
benefits, in the view of the respondent, do not meet the definition of an act of reprisal as set forth  
in section 147 of the Code. The respondent argued this was a straightforward issue of a  
requirement in the legislation for the complainant to sign the necessary documentation, in this  
case, the election form or a form of subrogation. Such forms exist in virtually all jurisdictions in  
Canada.  
981 The respondent stated it simply was not an act of reprisal.  
982 Furthermore, with respect to the report signed by Ms. Jackson indicating there were "no  
witnesses", counsel for the respondent argued this was in fact an accurate statement. The  
document, when read in its entirety, made reference to an incident that occurred in January 2008,  
that being the original complaint filed by the complainant in April 2008. Again, counsel for the  
respondent argued this was not an act of reprisal.  
983 Counsel reviewed various corrective measures claimed by the complainant. The following  
represents a summary of the position adopted by the respondent:  
1. The complainant argued an appropriate remedy would include reintegration and  
accommodation. In so doing, the complainant argued she should be permanently  
appointed to the EX-01 position, being a position in which she acted for a period of time.  
Counsel for the respondent argued such remedy is outside my authority.  
2. Counsel for the respondent addressed the claim by the complainant for the reimbursement  
of legal fees. It was noted by counsel the complainant had failed to provide any proof  
fees were paid by the complainant or what those fees were, and therefore, there should be  
no award for this claim.  
3. Counsel addressed the claim by the complainant for the approval of special leave.  
Counsel argued in order to consider this request, I must determine the failure to grant the  
special leave was an act of reprisal and it was linked to the exercise of the complainant's  
right to refuse work. Counsel argued the complainant had failed to establish either of  
these elements, either in fact or in law.  
4. Counsel addressed the complainant's submission the granting of sick leave to her should  
be retracted. For the same reasons noted with respect to special leave, counsel for the  
respondent argued this remedy ought not to be granted.  
984 Counsel argued the Federal Court has decided there was no procedural duty to accommodate  
(Canada (Attorney General) v. Cruden, 2013 FC 520). In particular, counsel referred me to  
paragraphs 62 through 73, where the learned trial judge addressed the implications of the often-  
cited decision of the Supreme Court of Canada, British Columbia (Public Service Employee  
Relations Commission) v. BCGSEU (Meiorin), [1999] 3 S.C.R. 3.  
985 Counsel further submitted the duty to accommodate relating to the disability and illness of  
the complainant does not equate to a failure to comply with the Code (Riche v. Treasury Board  
(Department of National Defence), 2013 PSLRB 35). Additionally, counsel noted  
accommodation does not have to be perfect; it need only be reasonable (Riche; King v. Treasury  
Board (Correctional Service of Canada), 2011 PSLRB 122; Ontario (Director, Disability  
Support Program) v. Tranchemontagne, 2010 ONCA 593; McGill University Health Centre  
(Montreal General Hospital) v. Syndicat des employés de l'Hôpital général de Montréal,2007  
SCC 4; Jensen v. Deputy Head (Department of the Environment),2009 PSLRB 153; Zaytoun v.  
Canadian Food Inspection Agency, 2010 PSLRB 35, and Lafrance v. Treasury Board (Statistics  
Canada), 2009 PSLRB 113).  
986 Counsel reiterated the overwhelming jurisprudence supported her contention there is no  
expectation of a perfect accommodation; rather, reasonable accommodation to the point of undue  
hardship is the standard expected of employers.  
987 Counsel submitted that in reviewing the medical information provided to the respondent by  
the complainant, the efforts of the respondent to accommodate her needs as defined by her  
medical personnel were, at the very least, a reasonable attempt to accommodate her.  
988 A summary of the timeline of events, according to counsel for the respondent, established  
the reasonableness of the attempt to accommodate, and the following represents a summary of  
what the respondent submits occurred in this case:  
1. In April 2008, when the complainant filed her original complaint, the respondent offered  
to move her to another sector, but this offer was declined (exhibit 7, tab 4).  
2. In June 2008, when medical leave was first granted to the complainant, the expected date  
of return was September 2008, and the request for accommodation was to find a suitable  
work location either on the first or second floor of the building in which the complainant  
worked (exhibit 6, tab 2, and exhibit 10, tab 1, page 9 of 9).  
3. In September 2008, the respondent emailed the complainant and discussed various  
workstations on the second floor (exhibit 6, tab 3). According to counsel for the  
respondent, this is proof of an attempt to accommodate.  
4. In October 2008, the respondent was told by the complainant she was not ready to return  
to work, and she declined the second-floor office space referred to by the respondent in  
September 2008. Exhibit 6 is a compilation of emails between the respondent and the  
complainant that outline the search for a workstation in an attempt to accommodate the  
request of the complainant.  
5. In December 2008, the complainant expressed her thanks for the efforts of the respondent  
(exhibit 6, tab 11) and took no issue with the work location. However, around this time,  
she filed her grievance (exhibit 3, tab a-1), in which the corrective action requested  
included the demand for the reimbursement of sick leave, a relocation to a safe workplace  
(either the Department of Foreign Affairs or the United Nations) and payment at the EX-  
01 salary level at least until March 2009.  
6. It was only in January 2009 the complainant advised the respondent she was unable to  
work at Place du Portage (exhibit 4, tab a-5). The correspondence from Dr. Goldstein of  
May 11, 2009 (exhibit 4, tab a-7) was not provided to the respondent at the time, which is  
telling, according to the respondent. Rather, the complainant provided the respondent  
with a note from Dr. Goldstein dated May 22, 2009, which indicated reintegration within  
three weeks at a location "far away from the Place du Portage Environment".  
7. Counsel for the respondent noted in the response to this medical note, the supervisor for  
the complainant asked for a meeting to discuss "a gradual and respectful reintegration to  
the workplace". Rather than agreeing to a meeting, the complainant responded in writing  
(exhibit 10, tab 37), asking for an accommodation and reintegration plan. This was even  
though her supervisor, Mr. Johnson, had specifically suggested a meeting to discuss this  
reintegration plan.  
8. Within two weeks, the supervisor for the complainant worked in conjunction with a  
human resources consultant (Mr. Trepanier) and prepared a reintegration plan for the  
complainant. The testimony of Mr. Johnson was he was not prepared to provide this plan  
to the complainant without discussing it first.  
9. Exhibit 10, tab 42, is a compilation of emails to the complainant culminating in an email  
from her dated July 30, 2009, the first point of which states, "this week, please do act  
productively and kindly to simply finalize resolution and accommodation". Counsel for  
the respondent suggested it should be noted at no time did the complainant ever agree to  
meet with the respondent. In the view of the respondent, the tripartite process anticipated  
in issues of accommodation was lacking the input from the employee. There needed to be  
a discussion between the respondent and the complainant prior to the finalization of any  
accommodation plan.  
10. In August 2009, Mr. Seguin had a discussion with the complainant, which lasted  
approximately 2½ hours. This discussion was by way of a telephone call, and he felt  
significant progress had been made (exhibit 10, tab 45). At around this time, counsel for  
the respondent noted the complainant was involving her union representative (exhibit 10,  
tabs 47 and 48).  
11. On September 16, 2009, a meeting finally occurred in which the complainant was  
present. Counsel for the respondent acknowledged there were two versions with respect  
to what occurred at the meeting, but, in any event, the overall purpose was to discuss  
reintegration. That said, the uncontested evidence of the witnesses, including the  
complainant, was she at no time was prepared to discuss reintegration; rather, she wanted  
to read from a prepared statement. The respondent argued this did not satisfy the  
obligation of the complainant to participate in accommodation efforts as part of the  
tripartite process.  
12. Nonetheless, subsequent to this meeting, the complainant left three voice-mail messages  
with her supervisor, Mr. Johnson (exhibit 161). Counsel for the respondent argued the  
most crucial aspect of these messages was the fact the complainant indicated her  
willingness to report to work at a location on Sparks Street.  
13. Counsel for the respondent noted as a result of these voice mails, he developed a  
reintegration plan (exhibit 13, tab 14), which he sent to the complainant on September 30,  
2009. In so doing, he confirmed the location of her workplace to be on Sparks Street and  
offered to meet with the complainant and her psychologist to discuss any issues. Counsel  
for the respondent argued the complainant refused to meet, again in non-compliance of  
her obligations as part of the tripartite process required in issues of accommodation. In  
fact, counsel for the respondent noted the position the complainant took was the draft  
reintegration plan was an act of discipline. The respondent submitted such was not the  
case and any issues the complainant might have had would probably have been dealt with  
at the meeting being proposed by her supervisor.  
14. On October 7, 2009, Dr. Goldstein wrote a letter addressed to "To Whom It May  
Concern". It is useful to reproduce the last paragraph of this letter (exhibit 4, tab A-10),  
which stated:  
For her health, she needs an immediate change in supervisor and a direct female  
supervisor for her reintegration (consistent with my letter of June 3rd, 2009). I do not  
approve her meeting with officials who have treated her insensitively in recent months,  
and I ask that she not be put in a situation where she has to meet with the employer  
without the presence of both a neutral party and her own representative. I am aware of  
and have offered to provide emotional support to her in any way I can for the upcoming  
meetings. So as not to breach practitioner-patient confidentiality, please send your  
written health questions via Mrs. Chamberlain. I will work with her physician to assess  
and approve her reintegration and accommodation.  
15. Counsel for the respondent reminded me of the testimony of her supervisor, who, when  
faced with receipt of the letter from Dr. Goldstein of October 7, 2009, concluded she was  
not objective and could not be relied upon. As a result, counsel for the respondent noted  
on October 23, 2009 the complainant's supervisor requested an independent medical  
evaluation (exhibit 13, tab 24). Counsel submitted this was the right of the respondent  
and was on all fours with the fact situation before it.  
989 Counsel for the respondent submitted her client had actively pursued reasonable efforts to  
accommodate the complainant, had offered to meet with the complainant to discuss the proposed  
reintegration plans, and was faced with the outright refusal of the complainant to participate in  
any meaningful way or in any way at all with the process. As such, counsel argued the duty to  
accommodate had been met by the respondent in this case.  
990 In support of the contention of counsel for the respondent, she referred me to Canadian  
Food Inspection Agency v. Public Service Alliance of Canada, 2014 OHSTC 1, and Hydro-  
Québec v. Syndicat des employé-e-s de techniques professionnelles et de bureau d'Hydro-  
Québec, section locale 200 (SCFP-FTQ),2008 SCC 43.  
991 Counsel for the respondent responded to the submission of the complainant respecting the  
failure of Ms. Branch to respond to correspondence of her lawyer. This letter was dated February  
25, 2009 (exhibit 3, tab a-1), and shortly thereafter, the grievance filed by the complainant had  
been referred to adjudication. Counsel for the respondent submitted such a response was not  
necessary from the employer, in particular from Ms. Branch.  
992 Counsel for the respondent then argued with respect to the contention of the complainant as  
to a delay in providing a final-level reply to the grievance. Counsel noted under the  
circumstances, this was irrelevant to the matters before me, and even if it were, the alleged delay  
in the "universe of grievances" was not exceptional.  
993 Counsel for the respondent noted in the second complaint filed by the complainant, she  
submitted that she was in "an involuntary refusal to work situation". Counsel for the respondent  
argued this classification of employee does not exist in fact or in law. In making this submission,  
counsel for the respondent noted in October 2009, the medical notations in the possession of the  
respondent indicated the complainant could not return to work. It was at this time the  
complainant refused the offer to relocate to the Sparks Street location.  
994 Counsel for the respondent argued the request for medical notation from the respondent and  
indeed the request for an independent medical examination, which the complainant argued to be  
an act of reprisal, were in fact within the rights of the respondent.  
995 Counsel for the respondent took issue with the complainant insofar as her allegation she was  
not appointed to an EX-01 position through the employment equity program was concerned. At  
the time of these appointments, the complainant was not medically able to return to work.  
996 Insofar as the complainant's allegations on the forwarding of "work related emails" were  
concerned, counsel for the respondent pointed out her supervisor had offered at least two options  
to resolve the issue to the complainant, both of which were not acceptable. As a result, counsel  
for the respondent argued this cannot be considered as an act of reprisal as alleged by the  
complainant. Furthermore, counsel noted the evidence of the complainant was she did not do  
anything with respect to these emails.  
997 Counsel then reviewed the "jurisprudence" presented by the complainant in her argument.  
These seven points raised by the complainant in her argument were addressed as follows:  
1. Federal Workplace Policies counsel denied all of the allegations raised by the  
complainant except in so far as her submission that upon return to her substantive  
position in October 2008, the respondent ought to have deducted union dues, was  
concerned. Counsel for the respondent was clear in her admission this was an error, albeit  
administrative in nature, but did not acknowledge this to be an act of reprisal.  
2. Duty to Accommodate and Human Rights counsel for the respondent distinguished the  
LaBranche, Kelly, Giroux, Lloyd, Chaves and Pruyn cases on the facts.  
3. Procedural Shams, Camouflage, Breach of Procedural Rights counsel for the  
respondent argued the complainant's references to Gill, Thibault, Tipple, Leclair, Court  
and Robitaille were of little assistance to her argument.  
4. Canada Labour Code, Part II - Counsel for the respondent distinguished all of the cases  
referred to by the complainant in her argument in this regard.  
5. Post-Grievance/Complaints continuing, Live and Subsequent Events counsel for the  
respondent submitted the cases referred to by the complainant were of little or no  
assistance and denied there was any act of reprisal.  
6. Obstruction, Threat, Financial Threat: Third-Party Request counsel for the respondent  
reiterated her previous argument for the complainant to complete and sign the "election  
form", which was referred to by the complainant as the "3rd party form", was legislative  
in nature and not an act of reprisal. The failure of the complainant to sign this form was  
the reason she was unable to receive workers' compensation benefits.  
7. Harassment, Violence, Constructive Dismissal counsel for the respondent argued the  
reference to cases by the complainant were of little value to her argument. Overall,  
counsel noted when asked by me when she was constructively dismissed, the answer was  
February 2011, at which time the respondent had provided a notice of appearance to the  
judicial review commenced by the complainant. This is past the complaint period and  
should not be entertained; furthermore, it was unsubstantiated in fact or in law. Counsel  
specifically referred to the Record of Employment issued to the complainant, wherein the  
respondent noted she was laid off for medical reasons, and there was no reference to  
termination.  
998 With respect to the concept of constructive dismissal, counsel for the respondent argued  
such was not necessarily applicable in the federal jurisdiction (Gaskin 2008, at paragraph 69).  
999 Counsel argued the Supreme Court of Canada had determined an employee can claim to  
have been constructively dismissed where the employer "… unilaterally makes a fundamental or  
substantial change to the employee's contract of employment a change that violates the  
contract's terms the employer is committing a fundamental breach of the contract that results in  
its termination …" (Farber v. Royal Trust Company, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 846). Counsel argued the  
complainant did not provide evidence to support such a contention and therefore, her claim of  
being constructively dismissed was unfounded.  
1000 Counsel argued the position of the complainant, which was the respondent had not  
appropriately accommodated her needs, was not constructive dismissal (Breast v. Whitefish Lake  
First Nation, 2010 CHRT 10). Counsel pointed out the conclusion of this tribunal was, first and  
foremost, when a duty to accommodate does exist, the complainant cannot expect "perfect"  
accommodation. In this particular case, the tribunal determined the refusal of the complainant to  
accept a position offered to him and to hold out for his "preferred prior job" was a failure on the  
part of the complainant to facilitate in the accommodation process. Counsel argued this same  
conclusion should apply to the complainant in this matter.  
1001 Counsel noted the Ontario Court of Appeal dealt with the issue of a "poisoned workplace"  
for the purposes of constructive dismissal (General Motors of Canada Ltd. v. Johnson, 2013  
ONCA 502). In paragraphs 66 through to 71 of this case, the Court recognized an objective  
standard must apply to determine if the claim of constructive dismissal is founded. In this  
particular case, the Court of Appeal overturned the trial judge's findings of a poisoned work  
environment, resulting in the constructive dismissal of the respondent in that case. Counsel  
submitted this case should also be considered insofar as the claims of the complainant in this  
matter are concerned.  
1002 In further support of the position adopted by the respondent and espoused by their counsel,  
I was referred to a number of other cases (Restauronics Services Ltd. v. Nicolas, 2004 BCCA  
130; Robichaud v. Canada (Treasury Board), [1987] 2 S.C.R. 84; and Brown v. Pronghorn  
Controls Ltd., 2011 ABCA 328).  
1003 Counsel argued I should not consider the opinions of the doctors for the complainant as  
being objective. In counsel's opinion, they became advocates for the complainant, and as such,  
the respondent was well within their rights to request an independent medical examination.  
VIII. Overall analysis  
1004 At the outset, it is important I decide whether I have jurisdiction to consider the allegations  
of the complainant post-December 10, 2009. This is the day upon which the last complaint was  
filed. In my view, the law is clear and confirms that I have no jurisdiction to consider anything  
past December 10, 2009 (LaBranche).  
1005 Secondly, I wish to reiterate a Code complaint is not a vehicle to address all workplace  
issues (Boivin).  
1006 As can be seen by my detailed analysis of all of the allegations made by the complainant  
with respect to her submission the respondent had acted in a manner that could be considered a  
reprisal as a result of her filing complaints and in contravention of section 147 of the Code, I  
simply do not accept she has met the threshold.  
1007 In drawing this conclusion, I must state it was extremely difficult to consider many of the  
allegations of the complainant to be credible when she argued such positions as the retirement of  
Mr. Bertrand being an act of reprisal and the filing of a Notice of Appearance to her application  
for judicial review being an act of reprisal tantamount to termination.  
1008 Despite this difficulty, I went to great lengths to objectively consider each and every one of  
the over 160 allegations of acts of reprisal proposed by the complainant. And my conclusion is  
she failed to provide sufficient or indeed any evidence to substantiate her complaints.  
1009 As I said earlier in the decision, this really was a case of accommodation. In saying this, it  
is also certain to me the complainant expected a level of accommodation that can only be  
described as unreasonable.  
1010 I accept the summary of events from 2008 through to September 2009 as submitted by  
counsel for the respondent and set forth in paragraph 988. This is an accurate and unbiased  
reflection of what occurred and is substantiated by both written and oral evidence. Further, I  
accept any obligation on the part of the respondent to accommodate the needs of the complainant  
in this case were met. More will be said later on this topic.  
1011 When one considers in detail the efforts at accommodation made by the respondent, the  
immediate conclusion is the respondent was stymied at every turn. In this regard, during their  
submission, counsel for the respondent provided me with a chart of the timeline of events. I  
found this chart to be extremely useful, and I am attaching a copy of it to this decision.  
1012 What is patently obvious is despite the attempt of the respondent to offer reintegration  
plans to the complainant based upon the medical evidence provided by her, the complainant,  
each and every time, refused to even meet with representatives of the respondent to discuss  
where such plans might be improved.  
1013 The most obvious example of this occurred in September 2009 when the respondent, at the  
suggestion of the complainant, found an office in the Sparks Street premises. In so finding this,  
her supervisor provided her with a draft reintegration plan in writing and offered her the  
opportunity to meet with him in the presence of her psychologist to discuss the plan and the  
implementation thereof.  
1014 The complainant did not have the courtesy to respond to this for in excess of two weeks  
and only then responded by providing a letter from Dr. Goldstein, which was a complete  
departure from all previous medical notes provided.  
1015 This behaviour of the complainant falls well below the expectations of an employee who is  
demanding accommodation from her employer. The complainant cannot expect "perfect"  
accommodation (see Riche, King, Tranchemontagne, Sexton, Jensen, Zaytoun, Breast and  
Lafrance).  
1016 Furthermore, and most importantly, as discussed earlier in my decision (paragraphs 319 to  
320), it is the responsibility of an employee to do their part in assisting the employer in the  
development of the appropriate reintegration plan. This simply did not occur in this case. The  
complainant was intransigent in her stance of refusing to enter into any discussions with the  
respondent, even when offered the opportunity of having her psychologist present.  
1017 What is sad and unfortunate in my view is the intransigent stance of the complainant was  
fertilized by the enabling behaviour of both her medical doctor and her psychologist.  
1018 In my view, there is no doubt the complainant suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder,  
but in my view, her physicians dealt with these symptoms in a manner that was not entirely  
helpful. In saying this, it is most noteworthy to reiterate my findings in paragraphs 287(e) and  
(f), 354 to 356, and 459 to 461. These references are with respect to the testimony of Dr. Stewart  
concerning her "belief" JA had masturbated behind the chair of the complainant in 2008.  
1019 It is indicative of the enabling attitude of her medical doctor.  
1020 I have reviewed all of the evidence and conclude that whether I look at the allegations  
separately, together or as a whole, the complainant has not proven any act of retaliation.  
1021 As a consequence to my findings, I conclude without hesitation the complainant has failed  
to establish any act of reprisal, and therefore, I dismiss all four complaints forthwith.  
1022 For all of the above reasons, I make the following order:  
IX. Order  
1023 The four complaints are dismissed.  
March 24, 2015.  
George Filliter,  
a panel of the Public Service Labour Relations and Employment Board  
Appendix  
Chronology / Timeline  
Date modified:  
2015-08-07  


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