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between the putative tort of harassment and intentional infliction of mental suffering with
regard to the degree and subjectivity of compensable injury.
[708] The expansion of compensable injury into the realm of subjectively assessed emotional
upset runs contrary to authority. In Mustapha v. Culligan of Canada Ltd., 2008 SCC 27 at
para 9, the Supreme Court of Canada held that, “[t]he law does not recognize upset,
disgust, anxiety or agitation or other mental states that fall short of injury.” In Healey v.
Lakeridge Health Corp., 2011 ONCA 55 at para 65, the Ontario Court of Appeal ruled
that because of the multifactorial and highly subjective nature of emotional distress,
“[t]he law quite properly insists upon an objective threshold to screen such claims and to
refuse compensation unless the injury is serious and prolonged.”
[709] Because the putative tort of harassment does not insist upon an objective threshold for
limiting compensable injury, its existence is at odds with this clear line of authority.
Moreover, pinning tort compensation to a subjective experience of injury that is not
objectively verifiable create serious evidentiary issues that could expose defendants to
unforeseen liability. The better view is to link tort liability to objective determinations of
injury including that which is verified by the testimony of medical professionals.
[710] The defendants acknowledge that in John v. Cusak, 2015 ONSC 5004 at para 38, the
court characterized the existence of the tort as a “live legal issue”.
Analysis
[711] In Desjardins, the plaintiff pleaded four different torts, being intentionally interfering
with contractual relations, inducing breach of contract, engaging in sexual harassment in
the workplace and deceit. The court considered the motion to strike the claim based on
the defendant’s position that it disclosed no reasonable cause of action. Regarding the
claims for deceit, intentionally interfering with contractual relations and inducing breach
of contract, the court found, among other things, that the statement of claim was not
sufficiently pleaded to address the required elements of each tort. This left the tort of
sexual harassment to be considered on its own.
[712] The plaintiff’s pleading regarding sexual harassment appears to have been based
specifically on a contravention of the Ontario Human Rights Code, R.S.O. c. H.19. Part
1 deals with harassment in employment. The court noted that s. 46.1(2) of the Code did
not permit the plaintiff to bring an action based solely on an infringement of Part 1.
Because of its rulings on the other three torts, it held that the plaintiff could not assert a
claim of sexual harassment.
[713] This case can be distinguished from the case at hand because Mr. Merrifield does not
allege a violation of the Human Rights Code. He does not claim that he was harassed in
employment on any of the grounds set out in s.5(2) of the Code (race, ancestry, place of
origin, colour, ethnic origin, citizenship, creed, sexual orientation, gender identity, gender
expression, age, record of offences, marital status, family status or disability).
Accordingly, Desjardins does not assist the defendants.