Sateri (Shanghai) Management Limited v. Vinall
Page 92
Aero and on the ability of the agent to “alter the principal’s legal position”,
there is, as Ellis notes at 16-8, “some judicial sentiment toward restricting the
interpretation of “top management” to very senior persons exercising a
substantial amount of autonomous power”. Titles, on the other hand, are
almost irrelevant, since the title of “manager” or “vice-president” can have as
many meanings as does “agent”.
[75]
For example, in Empire Stevedores (1973) Ltd. v. Sparringa (1978),
19 O.R. (2d) 610 (H.C.), the plaintiff sought an injunction after the defendant,
who was nominally a vice-president during his final years with the plaintiff, left
the company, purchased another stevedoring company and successfully bid
against Empire for a number of contracts. The court declined to issue the
injunction sought by Empire and noted that, despite his title, the defendant
remained a “walking boss”, whose duties were limited to supervision of the
performance of the plaintiff’s contracts. Among the factors identified by the
court in doubting that he qualified as “top management” were that he was not
able to bid on jobs by himself, did not play a significant role in the planning or
financial side of the plaintiff’s business, and indeed, could not even make
minor variations in equipment contracts and that, as the defendant stated in
his affidavit, he did not have “any known prospects of advancement within
Empire to an off-the-dock post”.
[76]
Our Court of Appeal came to a similar conclusion regarding Paul
Darc, the erstwhile chief operating officer and chief financial officer of the
plaintiff company in 3464920 Canada Inc. v. Strother (2005),38 B.C.L.R. (4th)
159, 2005 BCCA 35. It declined to interfere with the trial judge’s finding that
Mr. Darc was not a fiduciary, citing the following comments from the trial
decision at para. 65:
[Mr. Darc’s] duties related to internal accounting and
administrative matters. He held the title of Chief Financial Officer
and managed a small staff, but he was not a director, he held no
equity, and Monarch was a small company where impressive titles
were readily available. He had no cheque signing authority. He
was not the company’s contact with either the studios from which
production was obtained or its agents who sold its tax shelters to
investors.
[77]
In Valco Cincinnati v. Dibe, [1987] 35 B.L.R. 281, the defendant had
been the branch manager and sole Canadian employee of the plaintiff
American company; the court looked at the ability of the alleged fiduciary to
exercise control and to alter the legal position of the company. Callon J. of
the Ontario High Court of Justice noted that while the defendant solicited
business while employed by the plaintiff, head office retained control over
pricing and credit approval, the selection of products to be made available
and most of the decisions about day to day operation, including the make,
model and features of the company car driven by the defendant. As such,
Dibe was found to be a “mere employee” who did not owe a higher duty,
either by virtue of being top management or as an agent.
[78]
Another way of looking at this test is that “top management” is limited
to those employees who have “the power and the ability to direct and guide
the affairs of the company”: R. W. Hamilton Ltd. v. Aeroquip Corp. (1988), 65