Good Spirit School Division No. 204 v Christ the Teacher Roman Catholic Separate School Division No. 212

QUEEN’S BENCH FOR SASKATCHEWAN

Citation: 2017 SKQB 109

Date:

Docket:

Judicial Centre:

2017 04 20

QB 118 of 2005

Yorkton

BETWEEN:

GOOD SPIRIT SCHOOL DIVISION NO. 204

- and -

PLAINTIFF

CHRIST THE TEACHER ROMAN CATHOLIC

SEPARATE SCHOOL DIVISION NO. 212 and

THE GOVERNMENT OF SASKATCHEWAN

DEFENDANTS

Counsel:

Robert W. Leurer, Q.C./Khurrum R. Awan

and Christina M. Kerby

for Good Spirit School

Division No. 204

Colin K. Hirschfeld, Q.C./

Curtis J. Onishenko

for Christ the Teacher Roman

Catholic Separate School Division No. 212

Sharon H. Pratchler, Q.C./Theodore J.C. Litowski,

Barbara C. Mysko and Thomson J. Irvine, Q.C.

for the Government of Saskatchewan

JUDGMENT

LAYH J.

APRIL 20, 2017

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page No.

1

PART ONE: OVERVIEW AND STATEMENT OF ISSUES

I.

INTRODUCTION

1

3

II.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES

III. CERTAIN PRELIMINARY FINDINGS

AND OBSERVIATIONS

5

IV.

WITNESS SUMMARY

A. GSSD’s Witnesses

B. CTT’s Witnesses

11

12

20

26

C. Government Witnesses

V.

A NECESSARY FRAMEWORK

27

36

39

A. Legislative and Constitutional Provisions

B. The Confederation Compromise

C. The Experience of the Provinces

PART TWO: DOES GSSD HAVE STANDING?

42

I.

HISTORY OF PROCEEDINGS RESPECTING STANDING

II.

PARTIES’ POSITIONS

A. GSSD’s Position

44

46

49

B. Defendants’ Position

III. ANALYSIS

A. Two Preliminary Questions

1. Standing on Behalf of Whom?

2. Can Only Beneficiaries of Separate

School Rights Have Standing?

B. Public Interest Standing

1. The Direction in Eastside Sex Workers

2. Serious Justiciable Issue

53

58

60

3. Does GSSD Have a Real Stake or

Genuine Interest?

4. An Effective Way to Bring the Issue

Before the Court

61

64

ii

PART THREE: IS ST. THEODORE ROMAN CATHOLIC

SCHOOL A SEPARATE SCHOOL?

75

84

PART FOUR: IS FUNDING OF ST. THEODORE ROMAN

CATHOLIC SCHOOL A PROTECTED CONSTITUTIONAL

RIGHT UNDER SS. 93(1) AND (3) OF THE

CONSTITUTION ACT, 1867?

I. DIVERGENT POSITIONS RESPECTING OPERATION

OF SS. 93(1) AND 93(3)

84

88

91

A. Essential Elements of GSSD’S Position

B. Essential Elements of the Defendants’ Position

C. Analysis

1. The Legal Framework of s. 93 of the

Constitution Act, 1867

2. Four Reasons Why the Denominational Aspects

Test Applies to s. 93(3)

91

95

a. Does case law support applying the

denominational aspects test to s. 93(3)

power?

96

b. Do unreasonable results arise if the

denominational aspects test is applicable

to s. 93(1) but not to s. 93(3) rights?

c. Does Government’s reliance on s. 93(3)

109

power give it carte blanche to avoid the Charter? 112

d. Does defendants’ evidentiary basis

preclude reliance on s. 93(3)?

116

II.

IS THE FUNDING OF NON-CATHOLIC STUDENTS

A RIGHT FOUND UNDER THE 1901 ORDINANCES

AND,IF SO, DOES THE RIGHT SATISFY THE

DENOMINATIONAL ASPECTS TEST?

118

120

A. Section 93(1) - A Two Step Inquiry

B. Essential Elements of GSSD’s Position

1. GSSD Submits 1901Ordinances Did Not Include

Right to Fund Non-Minority Faith Students

120

2. GSSD Submits Funding of Non-Minority Faith

Students is Not a Denominational Right

C. Essential Elements of the Defendants’ Position

1. Defendants Submit 1901 Ordinances Include

Right of Funding for Non-Minority Faith Students

2. Defendants Submit Funding of Non-Minority

127

128

iii

Faith Students Was a Denominational Right

D. Analysis

131

133

1. Conclusion: Section 93(1) Does Not Protect

Funding of Non-Minority Faith Students

2. The Basic Premise of the 1901 Ordinances

3. Judicial Authority and Guiding Principles

of Constitutional Interpretation

133

139

PART FIVE: IS FUNDING OF NON-MINORITY FAITH

STUDENTS AT ST. THEODORE ROMAN CATHOLIC

SCHOOL A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT UNDER S. 17(2) OF

THE SASKATCHEWAN ACT?

169

I.

ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THE DEFENDANTS’

POSITION

ANALYSIS

169

171

II.

PART SIX: DOES GOVERNMENT FUNDING VIOLATE S. 2(a)

OF THE CHARTER?

176

I.

II.

ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF GSSD’S POSITION

ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF DEFENDANTS’ POSITION

176

178

179

III. ANALYSIS

A. Is Charter Breach Axiomatic?

B. Going Beyond “Axiomatic” Charter Breach:

Obligation of State Neutrality

184

1. Freedom of Religion Embraces Obligation of

Religious Neutrality

2. The Principle of Religious Neutrality

3. Can a Non-Individual Advance a Claim for

Religious Freedom Under the Doctrine of

Religious Neutrality?

184

185

196

203

PART SEVEN: DOES GOVERNMENT FUNDING VIOLATE

S. 15 OF THE CHARTER?

I.

II.

POSITION OF THE PARTIES

ANALYSIS

203

205

A. A Preliminary Point: Section 15 Infringement

Follows s. 2(a) Infringement

B. A Recurring Theme – Must an Individual Show

Discriminatory Impact?

205

207

iv

PART EIGHT: DOES S. 1 OF THE CHARTER JUSTIFY

CHARTER VIOLATION?

215

I.

II.

BURDEN OF PROOF AND OAKES TEST

IS THERE A PRESSING OBJECTIVE TO FUND

NON-CATHOLIC STUDENTS?

218

220

III. PROPORTIONALITY

IV. A POINT OF CLARIFICATION: TIME FRAME

OF PRESSING OBJECTIVES

226

228

PART NINE: REMEDIES

APPENDIX 1 – The Education Act, 1995, ss. 53, 85, 87, 310

APPENDIX 2 – The Education Funding Regulations, ss. 3, 4

PART ONE: OVERVIEW AND STATEMENT OF ISSUES

I.

INTRODUCTION

In the spring of 2003 happenings in the village of Theodore,

[1]

Saskatchewan would become a flashpoint, bringing to a head a vital issue in

Saskatchewan education: the extent of separate school rights. That spring the

community of Theodore was faced with the decision of Yorkdale School

Division [Yorkdale] to close its community kindergarten to grade 8 school . Its

42 students would be bussed to the neighbouring school in Springside, 17

kilometres away on the Yellowhead Highway. After several unsuc cessful

efforts to keep their school open, a minority group of Roman Catholics using

the provisions of The Education Act, 1995,¹successfully petitioned the

Minister of Education to form Theodore Roman Catholic School Division.

After protracted negotiations with Yorkdale, the newly formed school division

purchased the school building and opened one school, St. Theodore Roman

Catholic School. The community saved its school but prompted one of the

most significant lawsuits in the province’s history.

[2]

St. Theodore Roman Catholic School adopted the attributes of a

Catholic school and offered a program that accorded with the usual operation

of a Roman Catholic separate school. When the school opened in 2003, 13 of

the 42 students were Roman Catholic or 31 percent of the student enrolment.

That percentage has varied since then from a high of 39 percent to a low of 23

percent. At trial, 26 students were enrolled at St. Theodore Roman Catholic

School. Nine are Catholic. Dwayne Reeve, former Director of

Education of Good Spirit Public School Division (the successor to Yorkdale)

[GSSD] estimated that 12 to 15 elementary students from the Theodore

¹SS 1995, c E-0.2

- 2 -

attendance area no longer attend St. Theodore Roman Catholic School and,

instead, attend school in Springside.

[3]

Basic to this litigation is an understanding of the historic

constitutional guarantee operative in three Canadian provinces – Alberta,

Saskatchewan and Ontario – that entitles Roman Catholics and Protestants to

petition the provincial government to create a separate denominational school

if they form a minority in a school attendance area. This right is an immutably

cast constitutional right under s. 93 of Constitution Act, 1867²and is

unquestioned in this action. Instead, what drives this litigation is the

provincial government’s policy to fund separate schools in Saskatchewan

based solely on student enrolment without regard to the religious affiliation of

students. As I understand GSSD’s position, it is not opposed to non-Catholic

students attending St. Theodore Roman Catholic School, but submits that the

historic constitutional protection of separate schools does not include the right

for the school to receive government funding for non–Catholic students who

attend the school. More significantly, GSSD submits that since such funding is

not constitutionally guaranteed, it is exposed to scrutiny under the Canadian

Charter of Rights and Freedoms³and infringes freedom of religion under

ss. 2(a) and equality rights under s. 15.

[4]

In essence then, this action, begun 12 years ago, poses two basic

questions. First, is government funding of non-minority faith students in

Saskatchewan’s separate schools a constitutionally protected component of

separate schools under s. 93 of the Constitution Act, 1867? The defendants,

²(U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, reprinted in RSC 1985, App II No 5

³Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to

the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11.

- 3 -

the Government of Saskatchewan [Government] and Christ the Teacher

Roman Catholic School Division [CTT], the successor to Theodore Roman

Catholic School Division, submit such funding is; GSSD submits such funding

is not. Second, if such funding is not constitutionally protected under s. 93 of

the Constitution Act, 1867, does it infringe ss. 2(a) and 15 of the Charter? The

Government and CTT submit it does not infringe the Charter; GSSD submits

it does infringe the Charter.

[5]

In an interlocutory fiat in August 2012, Justice Mills stated that at

its “simplest,” this case involves the ability of the Government to fund non-

denominational students attending a denominational school. With prescient

accuracy, he forewarned that “the case is much more complex than this si mple

statement, and if this matter were ever to proceed to trial…significant and

complex issues” would have to be adjudicated. That time has now come. If

funding of non-Catholic students at St. Theodore Roman Catholic School

violates Charter rights, then funding of any non-Catholic students in Catholic

schools in Saskatchewan similarly violates the Charter.

II.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES

[6]

Prior to the parties’ final arguments, I directed GSSD to provide

to the defendants a statement of the issues the court needed to address to

resolve this action. Upon receipt of the issues from GSSD, the Government

filed a statement of objection respecting the issues propos ing a different

statement. After considering the statement of issues exchanged between the

parties and the nature and content of the pleadings, I have determined the

issues that I must resolve in this lawsuit as follows:

- 4 -

1.

2.

Does GSSD have the requisite standing to bring this

constitutional action seeking the remedies it requests? If

“No,” GSSD’s action will be dismissed. [PART TWO]

If “Yes,” is St. Theodore Roman Catholic School a

legitimate separate school? If “No,” the result is apparent:

students cannot attend and governments cannot fund an

illegitimate school. [PART THREE]

3.

4.

If “Yes,” do ss. 93(1) and 93(3) of the Constitution Act,

1867 constitutionally protect legislation and government

action⁴that funds non-Catholic students at St. Theodore

Roman Catholic School? If “Yes,” GSSD’s claim must be

dismissed. [PART FOUR]

If “No,” does s. 17(2) of the Saskatchewan Act⁵, which

constitutionally guarantees no discrimination in the

distribution of money among any class of school, protect

legislation and government action that funds non-Catholic

students at St. Theodore Roman Catholic School? If “Yes,”

GSSD’s claim must be dismissed. [PART FIVE]

5.

If “No,” is the Government’s funding of non-Catholic

students at St. Theodore Roman Catholic School:

a.

b.

a violation of ss. 2(a) of the Charter; [PART SIX] or

a violation of s. 15 of the Charter? [PART SEVEN]

If “No,” to both questions GSSD’s claim must be

dismissed.

6.

If, “Yes,” does s. 1 of the Charter justify the violation of

the Charter as a reasonable limit prescribed by law as can

be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society?

If “Yes,” GSSD’s claim must be dismissed. [PART EIGHT]

4

Included as government action are actions of school boards because they operate under the authority of the

legislature: s. 32(1) of the Charter.

⁵4-5 Edward VII, c 42

- 5 -

7.

If, “No,” is GSSD entitled to the declarations it seeks?

[PART NINE]

[7]

Perhaps as important as identifying issues requiring adjudication

is identifying issues that need not be adjudicated. This case is not about

government funding of Catholic students attending St. Theodore Roman

Catholic School or any other separate school in Saskatchewan. The existence

of these schools and their funding is guaranteed by s. 93 of the Constitution

Act, 1867, even if incompatible with Charter rights.

[8]

Nor is this case an inquiry into the quality of education offered in

Saskatchewan’s public and separate schools, other than an understanding of

their broad character.

[9]

Nor is this case about the authority of Yorkdale to close Theodore

Elementary School in 2003. Under The Education Act, 1995 it had full

authority to make this decision.

III. CERTAIN PRELIMINARY FINDINGS AND OBSERVATIONS

[10]

Certain rather random preliminary observations and findings will

clarify and simplify issues as they arise in this judgment. I will state them at

the outset.

GSSD’s Sought Remedy

[11]

As a remedy, GSSD seeks a declaration that the legislative

provisions which implement the funding regime in Saskatchewan, specifically

- 6 -

sections 53, 85, 87 and 310 of The Education Act, 1995⁶and ss. 3 and 4 of The

Education Funding Regulations,⁷are unconstitutional to the extent they

provide funding to educate non-Catholic students attending Catholic separate

schools.

Public Section and Catholic Section Support

[12]

Indicative that this action has implications far beyond St.

Theodore Roman Catholic School is the support and leadership that GSSD has

received from the Public Section of the Saskatchewan School Board

Association [SSBA] in advancing this action and, similarly, the support and

leadership that CTT has received from the Catholic Section of the SSBA in

defending this action. The SSBA, established in the 1950s by a special Act of

the Legislature, consists of three main groups: the Public Section, the Catholic

Section and Conseil des écoles fransaskoises.

Various Funding Regimes

[13]

During the trial many sub-themes emerged about non-minority

faith students attending separate schools, including competition between the

public and separate school systems in programming and student transportation,

the role of public education in a modern society, inherent parental rights to

have educational choices for their children and the decline of religious

observance in public schools. These sub-themes are peripheral because

government funding is the linchpin of this action. Given finite government

resources for education, funding given to separate schools beyond their

mandate necessarily means funds not given to public schools. On the other

⁶ss 53, 85, 87 and 310 Appended as Appendix1

⁷RRS c E-0.2 Reg 20 - ss 3 and 4 Appended as Appendix 2

- 7 -

hand, without funding for non-minority faith students in separate schools, the

result is clear: enrolment in Saskatchewan’s 119 Catholic schools and a sole

Protestant school will be dramatically affected.

[14]

I heard voluminous testimony about the various iterations of

government funding given to Saskatchewan schools to suit shifting needs and

department policies. From 1905 to now, a significant, albeit varying,

component of provincial educational funding can be tracked to per student

grants. I heard much evidence about the funding arrangements between the

provincial government and Saskatchewan school boards, and specifically from

2003 when Theodore Roman Catholic School Division was formed, to the

current funding regime. Much of the evidence offered by GSSD was to show

the net funding loss occasioned Yorkdale and GSSD by the formation of the

Theodore Roman Catholic School Division.

[15]

In 2009 the province introduced a significant change in the

funding regime when it set and capped province-wide mill rates for education

taxes respecting public school divisions. Public school divisions were

obligated to use the new arrangement, but because separate school divisions

have a constitutional right to levy taxes to fund separate schools, they could

notify and advise municipal authorities of their right to set their own mill

rates. Before 2009, each school division set its own mill rate and raised

revenue based on the available property assessments. School divisions with

low property assessments suffered inequities. After the change, revenues were

equalized and offset by provincial funding from general revenue so richer and

poorer assessment levels across the province were flattened. The annual

funding formulae in use since 2009 are not easy to explain. They have

- 8 -

changed according to the Ministry’s objectives of achieving equity, simplicity,

transparency and accountability. Certain funded costs are simply on a per

student basis, like administration and governance. Others are less sensitive to

student enrolment since, for example, a larger school can more inexpensively

accommodate additional students than smalle r schools.

[16]

The various iterations of school funding in Saskatchewan are

determinative of this action. Regardless of the funding formula in vogue at any

time, the largest component of government funding is tied to student

enrolment. Simply stated, the more students, the more government funding.

Who is Catholic?

[17]

Another highly relevant matter in this action is understanding

who is Catholic. I accept the evidence of Dr. Robert Dixon, GSSD’s expert

witness, that proof of one’s Catholic identity is baptism in the Catholic

tradition, commonly evidenced by a baptismal certificate. A child is usually

baptized by a Catholic priest or, in the case of an emergency, by a Catholic lay

person.

Number of Non-Catholic Students in Catholic Schools

[18]

Another significant question that arises is the extent to which

non-Catholic students currently attend Catholic schools in Saskatchewan. Ken

Loehndorf, current executive director of the Catholic Section, testified that

sound statistical information is not readily available. I find this lack of

statistical information surprising since Catholic schools distinguish between

Catholic and non-Catholic students for sacramental participation. Only

- 9 -

Catholic students can participate in the three sacraments initiated during a

child’s tenure in a Catholic elementary school: First Eucharist (usually in

grade one or two), Reconciliation or Confession and Confirmation (usually in

grade seven). Non-Catholic students cannot participate in the sacraments,

although they are required to participate in religious instruction and liturgical

celebrations, including sacramental preparation.

[19]

When Mr. Loehndorf was director of the North Battleford Roman

Catholic School Division (later Light of Christ Roman Catholic School

Division), he tracked the number of non-Catholic students. Mr. Loehndorf

testified that on average, 30 percent of the students in the division’s schools

were non-Catholic with a lower percentage of approximately 20 percent in

English elementary schools and up to 35 percent in the French Immersion

Catholic schools.

[20]

Other statistical information respecting enrolment of non-

Catholics in Catholic schools comes from the Saskatoon Catholic Board of

Education’s confidential report dated November 10, 1978 prepared by the

Director of Education, W. Podiluk, based, in turn, on a confidential “Annual

Enrolment Review” prepared by Assistant Superintendent W. Coumont

[November 10, 1978 Confidential Report]. Although the information is now

nearly 40 years old, this action itself takes meaning from Saskatchewan’s

historical changes in demographics and school enrolment . The report shows

that from 1973 to 1978, the percentage of students in Catholic schools

increased from 26.22 to 27.08 percent of the total Saskatoon school

population. The most significant increases were in elementary schools,

increasing from 19.5 percent of the total school population in 1958 to 29.6

- 10 -

percent in 1978. In the same year, 22.9 percent of Saskatoon’s high school

population attended Catholic high schools.

[21]

Most significantly, the report includes the following data and

commentary respecting non-Catholic attendance at Saskatoon’s Catholic

schools:

Very few non-Catholics were enrolled in Catholic schools prior to

the fee-for-service agreement. Since that time, their numbers have

been increasing. In a five year period, the percentage of non-

Catholics in the elementary schools has increased from 3.41% to

10.02%.

…

If the present circumstances suggest a trend, it is possible that:

– In five years the non-Catholic population could

reach a total of 750 students which would

amount to 12.5% of the total population.

This report gives some indication that the enrolment of non-Catholic students

in Catholic schools was becoming prevalent by the 1970s.

Defendants Acting Independently

[22]

At trial, the defendants presented separate witnesses and

advanced positions independently of each other. Each prepared separate pre -

trial and trial briefs of law, each cross-examined GSSD’s witnesses

independently and advanced their defences as suited their interests. I do not

intend to conflate their positions but, not surprisingly, their positions are often

similar. I will draw distinctions in their positions when necessary.

- 11 -

A Basic Principle of Separate Schools

[23]

Perhaps surprising to many is the rather anti-intuitive reality that

under s. 49 of The Education Act, 1995 (as specifically permitted by

constitutional authority) a separate Catholic school cannot be created, for

example, in a community where Catholics are a majority and where a faith-

based school might receive its greatest endorsement. Separate schools are only

to protect Catholics or Protestants when they are in a minority in a school

attendance area.

Essentially Catholic Schools

[24]

As a final introductory comment, since Saskatchewan has only

one Protestant separate school, at Englefeld, the practical implications of this

decision primarily affect Roman Catholic schools. Therefore, throughout this

judgment I will commonly refer to separate schools as Catholic schools and

non-minority faith students as non-Catholic students.

IV. WITNESS SUMMARY

[25]

The parties presented approximately 11 weeks of evidence and

three days of argument. Over 6,100 pages have been transcribed from the trial

and hundreds of exhibits marked. Several experts and lay witnesses provided

testimony. Although I appreciate that a recitation of testimony in isolation of

an analysis is seldom advantageous, the wide interest in this judgment might

be best served by a brief synopsis of the witnesses and their testimony. I find

that resolution of the issues in this case is not primarily complicated by

- 12 -

divergent facts. The resolution of this case is highly dependent upon a legal

analysis and a consideration of largely uncontroverted facts.

A.

GSSD’s Witnesses

[26]

Dwayne Reeve became director of Yorkdale School Division in

2000, a position he held with successor divisions until 2015. In 2003 Yorkdale

amalgamated with the Yorkton Public School Division and then with the

Yorkton Regional High School Division on January 1, 2004 to become York

School Division. In turn, York School Division amalgamated with five other

school divisions in 2006 to create GSSD with Mr. Reeve continuing as

director. Mr. Reeve provided extensive testimony detailing his experiences

with closing several small rural schools during his tenure and the challenges

of providing effective education within budget limitations. He specifically

provided testimony respecting the closure of Theodore School and the

consequences to GSSD.

[27]

Dr. Robert Dixon (expert witness) holds several degrees including

a M.T.S. (Theology) and Ed. D. He has taught and written extensively

respecting all matters of Catholic education. In the conclusor y statements of

his report, he opined that the Roman Catholic elementary schools in the

Northwest Territories were established and maintained exclusively for the

education of Catholics. Non-Catholics were admitted only on an exceptional

basis. He opined that legislation empowering Catholic separate schools to

accommodate non-Catholic children would have conflicted with the mission of

Catholic schools as a community of believers gathered together for religious

education. Non-Catholics students were not part of that mission.

- 13 -

[28]

Dr. Irving Hexham (expert witness), professor in the Department

of Classics and Religion at the University of Calgary, was asked to provide a

report describing the extent to which evangelization and dissemination of faith

is a component of different religious practices. Dr. Hexham opined that certain

religions - the Hindus, Sikhs, and to a lesser extent Jews – are most concerned

with passing the faith to their next generation. Other religions – Buddhism,

Christianity, Islam and Mormonism – are committed to the dissemination of

their faith outside their community and to the next generation and embrace

education as a means of disseminating and evangelizing their faith.

[29]

Larry Huber has been the Executive Director of the Public

Section of the SSBA (successor to the Public Urban Caucus) since 2003. The

Public Section consists of 15 public school boards, which includes all the

public school boards except the three northern Saskatchewan school boards.

Previously, Mr. Huber was director of education of Regina Public School

Division from 1990 to 1998. He has been deeply involved in what has been

called the “mandate issue” of Catholic schools since he was director of the

Regina Public School Division in the 1990s.

[30]

Thomas Chell was Regional Director from 1997 to 2006 in

Region 1 of the Province (southeast portion including Yorkton), reporting to

the Ministry of Education. Mr. Chell described the challenges facing school

divisions during his tenure. He was familiar with the five year plan developed

by Yorkdale to deal with what he called "devastating declining enrolments." In

Mr. Chell's opinion, the closure of the Theodore School in 2003 was in the

best interests of the students and appropriately implemented by Yorkdale.

- 14 -

[31]

Lenore Pinder grew up on a farm near Springside. After her

daughter was born, Ms. Pinder considered moving to her parents' farm

allowing her daughter to attend Springside School as she had. Given the

spectre of rural school viability, she was concerned that before her daughter

finished grade 8, even the viability of Springside School might be

questionable. In her view, Springside School's viability had been imperilled

when the Theodore students did not come to Springside. Given her concerns

about the viability of Springside School, Ms. Pi nder chose to live in Yorkton.

[32]

Dr. Ayman Aboguddah, president of the Regina Huda (Muslim)

School since its inception in 1999, testified that the school has 430 students

enrolled and a waiting list of approximately 100 students. Initially, when

establishing the school, he thought a Muslim school, like Catholic schools,

would receive full government funding. When Muslims learned otherwise,

they established an independent school. Then, in 2001, the Huda School

became an associate school under the Regina Public School Division. Under a

2012 government policy, associate schools, including the Huda School, began

to receive 80 percent of the per-pupil funding available to public and Catholic

schools but no capital, infrastructure or transportation fundi ng. Dr. Aboguddah

explained that receiving full funding for non-Muslim students could address

the stigma and stereotyping that exists against Muslims. All but one teacher in

the Huda School are non-Muslim.

[33]

Dr. Roderic Beaujot (expert witness), Emeritus Pro fessor of

Sociology at the University of Western Ontario, prepared a report providing

demographic evidence of the religious affiliations found in Canada,

Saskatchewan and Alberta as taken from various census data.

- 15 -

[34]

Rabbi Jeremy Parnes serves Regina’s Jewish community as

spiritual leader at Beth Jacob Synagogue. Rabbi Parnes offers after-school

Hebrew classes to three groups. In recent years around 22 children have

attended, with 10 students currently attending. Rabbi Parnes testified that six

children from one non-Jewish family attended the Hebrew School, a benefit he

described in terms of "interfaith bridge building and building understanding

between faiths."

[35]

Jason Gordon currently is principal of Dr. Brass School in

Yorkton. In 1999, he was a half-time teacher in Theodore School and in

Saltcoats School, both elementary public schools within the Yorkdale School

Division. He was principal of Theodore School for two years before its closure

in 2003. While a teacher in Saltcoats (29 kilometres southeast of Yorkton) the

neighbouring school in Bredenbury closed. He testified that he observed

significant benefits when the Bredenbury students joined Saltcoats School: a

single grade seven classroom, new friendships between students and greater

ability for extracurricular sports. Mr. Gordon and two other teachers taught

three classes of multi-grade configurations prior to Theodore School's closure.

He testified that while teachers with teaching experience were able to handle

multi-grade classrooms, new teachers were challenged to meet curriculum

requirements. Mr. Gordon became the principal of Springside School upon the

closure of Theodore School. In his view, the attendance of the Theodore

students at Springside School would have created "a nice sized school" that

would have enhanced teaching and learning experiences.

[36]

Wayne Steen is a school board trustee and former chair of

Saskatchewan Rivers Public School Division, which includes the city of

- 16 -

Prince Albert and surrounding area. He also chaired the Public Section of the

SSBA from 2001 to 2009. Mr. Steen testified that Saskatchewan Rivers

developed a transportation policy in reaction to a policy that Prince Albert

Roman Catholic School Division instituted in June 2012 when it advertised in

a local newspaper that it would provide in-city bussing the following

September. Mr. Steen attributed a significant decrease in enrolment in Prince

Albert's public schools in 2012 and 2013 due to the Catholic division's bussing

policy. In 2014 Saskatchewan Rivers mirrored the competing bussing program

by offering bussing to grade 1 to 4 students living beyond 400 metre s of the

school and younger students living beyond 200 metres of the school. He

testified that public school enrolment immediately increased by 199 students,

adding that 150 students equates to approximately $1 million in government

funding. The new bussing policy cost $685,000.00 to purchase buses plus

annual operating costs of $260,000.00. As chair of the Urban Public Caucus

(predecessor to the Public Section of the SSBA), Mr. Steen produced a copy of

a letter he sent to Minister of Learning, Andrew Thompson, on June 10, 2005

(copied to Premier Calvert) written when he learned that the province had

cancelled the planned reference to the Court of Appeal respecting government

funding of non-Catholic students attending Catholic schools. Mr. Steen

advised the Minister that the Caucus expected the Minister to stand by his

commitment to proceed to a reference.

[37]

Audrey Trombley is a practicing Roman Catholic and chair of

South East Cornerstone Public School Division encompassing the cities of

Estevan and Weyburn and surrounding areas with an overlapping boundary

with Holy Family Roman Catholic School Division. Ms. Trombley testified

- 17 -

that several rural schools in the division are below or close to the minimum

threshold enrolments set out for automatic review by department regulation.

She testified that whenever the division closes schools or discontinues grades

in non-viable schools, the board is concerned about the potential establishment

of a separate school division given the experience in Theodore and in Wilcox

where separate schools have been created. Ms. Trombley explained that in

Radville the public school division operates a grade 7 to 12 school, but the

only kindergarten to grade 6 facility is the Catholic school. Several years ago,

a public and Catholic school division each operated an elementary school.

After a new Catholic school was built, the public school burned. The two

boards agreed that the Catholic board would operate the elementary school but

the agreement could be terminated upon two years' notice. The public school

division would now like to terminate the agreement and establish an

elementary public school but the board is waiting for the res ults of this trial

before moving forward.

[38]

Joelann Pister resides near Rhein, north of Yorkton within the

GSSD. She attended a Catholic school in Yorkton and was raised Catholic but

is now Lutheran. Ms. Pister served as a public school board trustee from 1993

to 2012 when the public schools in the villages of MacNutt, Ebenezer,

Bredenbury and Rhein were closed. Her three children, now adults, began

school in Rhein. She testified that her daughter , who was in grade 4, was the

only girl in her class at Rhein and, with triple grading, experienced difficulty

in math. After the closure of the Rhein school, her daughter entered a single

grade class in Yorkton where she was happier with girls her age. Ms. Pister

described her experience as a trustee during the closure of the Theodore

- 18 -

School, stating her inability to understand how another school division could

operate the school when the Government was "squeezing our funds." She

stated that although keenly interested in the outcome of this trial, she could

not have financially afforded to bring the action.

[39]

Larry Pavloff, with 30 years of teaching experience, is currently

chair of the Prairie Spirit Public School Division, a donut-shaped division

surrounding Saskatoon, including the growing cities of Martensville and

Warman north of Saskatoon. Mr. Pavloff testified that a Catholic school

division was formed in Martensville in 2010 and shortly amalgamated with

Greater Saskatoon Catholic School Division. By 2013, elementary school

enrolments had dramatically increased in Martensville and in Warman. In

March 2013, the provincial government announced that it was going to

construct joint use (Catholic/Public) schools in each city although neither a

Catholic parish nor a Catholic school division existed in Warman. After the

announcement, a Catholic school division was created in Warman. It, too,

immediately amalgamated with Greater Saskatoon Catholic School Division.

Each new school will accommodate 650 public school students and 450

Catholic students. The public board was conc erned because the building of a

Catholic school in Warman was announced even before a Catholic school

division was created. Also concerning were a digital sign erected in Warman

which read "Greater Saskatoon Catholic now represents Warman" and

pamphlets being mailed to all households in Warman announcing Catholic

education had arrived in Warman. Mr. Pavloff stated the board is concerned

that at a time of budget constraints, the province is building a Catholic school

- 19 -

and a public school on the same site and allowing Catholic students and non -

Catholic students to go to either school.

[40]

Bert Degooijer has served as trustee of Prairie Valley Public

School Division and predecessor boards since 1999. He is a practicing Roman

Catholic. His four children were educated in public schools. Prairie Valley

overlaps boundaries with Holy Family Roman Catholic School Division. In

2006, 11 rural schools in the public school division were put under review

because of declining enrolments. Eight were closed in 2007, including the

elementary school in Wilcox with an enrolment of 46 students The Wilcox

students were transported to Milestone public school where they attended for

one year. As a result of a one-year lag time then recently introduced into

legislation before a separate school could be opened following a public school

closure, a separate school division was not created until the next year. When it

was, all the Wilcox students enrolled in the newly created separate school in

Wilcox which continues to operate under the Holy Family Roman Catholic

School Division.

[41]

Sherry Todosichuk is currently deputy director of corporate

services and formerly superintendent of business administration with GSSD

from 2005 to 2016. Ms. Todosichuk described her involvement in the

preparation of the school division's budget and in audits of the division's

finances. Ms. Todosichuk provided to the court various detailed calculati ons

of the loss of government funding associated with the students attending St.

Theodore School.

- 20 -

B.

CTT’s Witnesses

In 2003 Kelly Kunz, his wife and three children lived in

[42]

Theodore. As a Roman Catholic, Mr. Kunz was instrumental in creating a

separate school division. Mr. Kunz provided three reasons why he wanted a

Catholic school in Theodore: Catholic education for his children, so his

autistic son would not have to be bussed to Springside and to maintain a

school in Theodore. Mr. Kunz explained the proc ess he followed with the

assistance of others to obtain the Minister's order creating a Catholic school

division. The new school division, with Mr. Kunz as its chair, then contracted

the administrative services of the Yorkton Catholic School Division with

which it amalgamated in 2005. In cross-examination Mr. Kunz accepted that

any attempt to create a separate Catholic school while Theodore School was

operative would have divided the community. As well, he accepted that of the

various options to keep a school in Theodore, the last resort the Save our

School Committee considered was to create a Catholic school division.

[43]

Dr. Ted Paszek (expert witness) is an adjunct professor at the

University of Alberta, trustee with Elk Island Catholic School Board and

sessional lecturer at Newman Theological College in Edmonton. He obtained a

PhD in 2012 after 35 years' experience in Catholic education. He (as well as

Dr. Frank Peters) was tendered as an expert in the historical, social and

political context of public and separate schools in Alberta and Saskatchewan.

His review of literature, legislation and court cases allowed him to opine that

no evidence exists of any prohibition of non-Catholic students attending

Catholic schools in Canada. To the contrary, he opined that non-Catholics

have attended Catholic schools. Dr. Paszek introduced historical evidence

- 21 -

from Prince Albert and Edmonton to show that before 1905 , Protestant

children attended Roman Catholic separate schools. He produced a copy of an

excerpt from the Saskatoon Daily Star, dated October 2, 1913 , that the first

Catholic separate school in Saskatoon would soon open and enrolment was not

restricted to Catholics. In his estimation, during his teaching tenure with two

Catholic schools in Edmonton, up to 25 percent of the students may have been

non-Catholic. Dr. Paszek provided his understanding of the School Ordinances

from 1884 to 1901 as indicative of no prohibition against non-Catholic

attendance at Catholic schools. He offered that the governme nt has always

provided grants to Catholic schools based on enrolment, never on religious

affiliation.

[44]

Dr. Frank Peters, Professor Emeritus, (expert witness) was raised

in Ireland, began teaching in Canada in 1965 and obtained his PhD in 1986 at

the University of Alberta. Dr. Peters provided an extensive review of his

interpretation of the School Ordinances, concluding that he was unable to find

any pre or post-1905 legislative provisions where a Catholic school board was

prevented from accepting non-minority faith students and, at no time, did a

student's religion play a part in eligibility to receive government funding.

[45]

Julian Pawlawski taught several years with the Saskatoon Roman

Catholic School Board and served 19 years as superintendent. He testified t hat

at one time the board counted the number of non-Catholic students attending

Saskatoon Catholic schools (by reference to their baptismal certificates)

because of a tuition exchange agreement between the Catholic and public

boards in Saskatoon. The public board paid the Catholic board for the non-

Catholic students enrolled in Catholic schools and the Catholic board paid the

- 22 -

public board for Catholic students enrolled in public schools. When the

agreement was discontinued, the Saskatoon Catholic board no longer counted

non-Catholic students in Catholic schools. From 1988 to 2007, as Executive

Secretary of the Catholic Section of the SSBA, he consulted with and assisted

several communities to explore creation of Catholic school divisions. He

attended a meeting in Theodore on March 12, 2003 where he explained to

parents that upon creating a Catholic school division, Catholic ratepayers

would pay their taxes to the Catholic school division and non-Catholics would

continue to pay to the public system irrespective of their children's attendance.

Mr. Pawlawski worked closely with Kelly Kunz. Mr. Pawlawski stated that he

was unconcerned that St. Theodore School would operate with a majority of

non-Catholic students since the admission policy of each Catholic school

division was and remains a local matter.

[46]

Expert witness, Dr. Thomas Groome Professor of Theology and

Religious Education at Boston College, lives in Newton, Massachusetts. He

presented testimony detailing the history of international Catholic education.

He testified that until the Reformation and Martin Luther's call fo r public

schools, the Catholic Church provided the only schools in the western world.

He distinguished between evangelizing - telling others what one believes - and

proselytizing - telling others what they should believe. Dr. Groome described

a world view of Catholic education citing examples from several countries in

different historical contexts.

[47]

Ken Loehndorf holds a post-graduate diploma in Catholic school

administration. For the past nine years he has been executive director of the

Catholic Section of the SSBA where he works in conjunction with the eight

- 23 -

Catholic school boards, Saskatchewan's bishops and the Ministry of

Education. He described himself as the "go -to person" respecting the

formation of Catholic school divisions in Saskatchewan. He described a

document titled "Protocol for the Formation of Roman Catholic Separate

School Divisions" which arose as a result of this action and was intended to

create a transparent process to ease the unrest between Catholic and public

school divisions. As well, since this action, the Catholic Section has

recommended guidelines for the admission of non-Catholic students in

Catholic schools encouraging principals to meet with non-Catholic parents to

advise them that they cannot vote nor seek election as a trustee and their

children are expected to participate in all faith related activities short of the

reception of the sacraments. Although the Catholic Section supports the

construction of joint use schools, it is unprepared to accept shared program

space since Catholic schools place importance on displaying religious

symbols, icons and crucifixes in classrooms and entranceways. In cross -

examination, Mr. Loehndorf accepted that a Catholic school's receipt of

funding for non-Catholic students means larger schools and an economy of

scale that permits a more varied program for Catholic students.

[48]

Dr. Ayaz Ramji is a pediatrician in Prince Albert whose three

sons attend or have completed their education at Catholic schools. He was

raised in England as a Muslim but attended a Roman Catholic private school.

He and his wife, raised Anglican, chose Catholic education because they

wanted a faith-based experience for their children. They value the choice

allowed them to educate their children in a faith-based school.

- 24 -

[49]

Kevin Wiens is a pastor at Forest Grove Community Church in

Saskatoon, a Mennonite Brethren denomination. He and his wife (a former

teacher at Saskatoon Christian School) have three children. The two oldest

attend St. Volodymyr Catholic School. When they decided whether their

children would attend either the Catholic or public schools located on the

same school grounds, they favoured St. Volodymyr because it was closer and

offered a theological theistic based education. Pastor Weins was

complementary of the theological and practical education his children are

receiving.

[50]

Irene Thompson has been a resident of Theodore since 1988. She

testified that Theodore's Catholic Church discontinued services in 1991. Ms.

Thompson, a practicing Catholic, has three adult children. Only her youngest

son attended St. Theodore School. She supported the creation of the separate

school and served as trustee until the board amalgamated. She testified that the

Catholic faith was clearly integrated into the daily operation of the school.

[51]

Carla Madsen and her husband, residents of Theodore, are United

Church members. Their two sons attended St. Theodore Roman Catholic

School. Ms. Madsen described her sons' positive experiences at St. Theodore

Roman Catholic School: academics, extracurricular activities, community-

mindedness and a focus on values and morals. Since her sons are not Catholic

they could not participate in sacramental celebrations in the school.

[52]

Dr. Michelle DuRussell is a pediatrician in Prince Albert. She and

her husband, both raised in the Christian (but non-Catholic) faith, have two

children, aged 8 and 10. They chose to educate their children in the Catholic

- 25 -

school system because the public school system did not stress faith and values.

They found a similar faith in the teachings offered at the Catholic school. She

testified that her children's experience has been positive. She summarized her

position as a parent and Christian as "pursuing education in a Catholic school

system as non-Catholics, but believers in the same Jesus, the same Bible."

[53]

Donald Bolen testified as the Bishop of Diocese of Saskatoon (but

who was about to become Archbishop of Regina). As Bishop, he ensures that

the teaching in all Catholic institutions, including Catholic schools, falls

within church doctrine. He testified that "visiting schools, meeting with

teachers, meeting with school trustees is…a part of a Bishop's life." Bishop

Bolen described ecumenism as the search for Christian unity within Christian

Churches, to bring reconciliation among Christians. He testified that a

Catholic school sees Jesus' life, death and resurrection as pivotal events in

human history and seeks to imbue and permeate Christian values through the

entire school. Bishop Bolen strongly favoured admission of non-Catholic

students in Catholic schools because they create a culture of encounter and

enrichment in a place where religion is respected and valued. Bishop Bolen

testified that "A Catholic school does not treat all religions as equal. It treats

all religions with respect."

[54]

Brian Boechler was Director of Yorkton Roman Catholic School

Division and of Theodore Roman Catholic Separate School Division after it

was formed. Both school divisions later amalgamated with other Catholic

school divisions to form CTT in 2010. He testified that a delegation from

Theodore met with the Yorkton Roman Catho lic School Division to air its

frustrations about the school's closure, asking if the board would provide

- 26 -

administrative services if a Catholic school board was formed in Theodore.

The board stated its disinclination to get involved in "local politics" but if a

new school division were created, the Yorkton Roman Catholic School Board

would consider options to provide administrative services. Mr. Boechler

attended the Theodore Roman Catholic School Division's first me eting on July

21, 2003. The two boards reached an agreement whereby Yorkton Roman

Catholic School Division provided administrative services to the newly

formed Theodore Roman Catholic School Division. Mr. Boechler led the

newly formed school board through the protracted negotiations with Yorkdale

to purchase the Theodore school building after St. Theodore Roman Catholic

School initially found accommodation in the community hall.

C.

Government Witnesses

[55]

Angela Chobanik is the Executive Director of the Education

Funding Branch of the Ministry of Education. She is responsible to calculate

and disperse the operating grants to all school divisions. Ms. Chobanik

provided detailed testimony of the budgeting and funding policies of the

department. She confirmed that independent schools receive 50 percent of the

provincial average per-student grants and associate schools receive 80 percent

of the provincial average per-student amount, but no infrastructure or capital

funding.

[56]

Timothy Anderson, his wife and their three children, live in

Yorkton. They are Baptists. Mr. Anderson strongly supported the education

his children receive at St. Michael’s Roman Catholic School and would be

- 27 -

extremely disappointed if he was denied the choice to send his children to a

publicly-funded, Christian, faith-based school.

[57]

Michael Sinclair is the rector of St. Paul's Anglican Cathedral in

Regina and also serves as the Dean of the Anglican Diocese of Qu'Appelle. He

and his wife, also Anglican, have three sons who attend Catholic school. They

chose and are pleased with Catholic education because it nurtures their

family's faith values and focuses on love, compassion and grace. In cross -

examination, Dean Sinclair accepted that his family received the benefit of a

fully funded, faith-based education which may be unavailable to other parents.

[58]

Ingrid Currie (Bintner) provided testimony respecting her father's

involvement in Bintner v Regina Public School Board District No. 4, (1965),

55 DLR (2d) 646 (SK CA), litigation that occurred when she was a young

child respecting public and separate school policies in place in Regina at that

time.

V.

A NECESSARY FRAMEWORK

A.

Legislative and Constitutional Provisions

[59]

In para. 59(h) of its statement of claim, GSSD seeks a declaration

that ss. 53, 85, 87 and 310 of The Education Act, 1995 and ss. 3 and 4 The

Education Funding Regulations, and “any legislative provisions” that

implement or authorize school funding offend s s. 2(a) and s. 15 of the Charter

to the extent they provide grants: 1) for the establishment and operation of St.

Theodore Roman Catholic School to educate non-Roman Catholic students;

and 2) to educate any non-minority faith students attending a separate school.

- 28 -

This legislation, says GSSD, is not constitutionally protected and therefore is

subject to Charter review.

[60]

Under the Constitution Act, 1867, provincial legislation enacted

under any head of provincial power, other than education – for example, under

the province’s jurisdiction over property and civil rights – is subject to

Charter scrutiny. The province’s jurisdiction over education, however, is not

as simple as other heads of provincial power. Jurisdiction over education is

unique because it illustrates an early Canadian endeavour to protect minority

rights. Justice Iacobucci framed his historical survey of Canada’s e xperience

with educational rights in the opening two sentences in Ontario English

Catholic Teachers’ Assn. v Ontario (Attorney General), 2001 SCC 15, [2001]

1 SCR 470 [English Catholic Teachers] stating, at para 1:

1. In many countries, education issues are matters of public policy,

to be decided by democratic debate. In Canada, we are in the rather

unusual position of having certain education rights constitutionally

entrenched in s. 93 of the Constitution Act, 1867. …

[61]

Each party, whether GSSD in advancing the action or the

defendants in defending the action, seeks to legitimize its position based on its

version of the constitutional rights referred to by Justice Iacobucci. G SSD

asserts rights under the Charter. The defendants assert rights originating at

confederation, as altered nearly 40 years later , in 1905, when Saskatchewan

gained provincial status under the Saskatchewan Act. The defendants say these

constitutionally entrenched rights protect public funding of non-Catholics

students.

[62]

Section 93 of the Constitution Act, 1867 reads as follows:

- 29 -

93. In and for each Province the Legislature may exclusively make

Laws in relation to Education, subject and according to the following

Provisions:

(1.) Nothing in any such Law shall prejudicially affect any Right

or Privilege with respect to Denominational Schools which any

Class of Persons have by Law in the Province at the Union:

(2.) All the Powers, Privileges, and Duties at the Union by Law

conferred and imposed in Upper Canada on the Separate Schools

and School Trustees of the Queen's Roman Catholic Subjects

shall be and the same are hereby extended to the Dissentient

Schools of the Queen's Protestant and Roman Catholic Subjects

in Quebec:

(3.) Where in any Province a System of Separate or Dissentient

Schools exists by Law at the Union or is thereafter established

by the Legislature of the Province, an Appeal shall lie to the

Governor General in Council from any Act or Decision of any

Provincial Authority affecting any Right or Privilege of the

Protestant or Roman Catholic Minority of the Queen's Subjects

in relation to Education:

(4.) In case any such Provincial Law as from Time to Time

seems to the Governor General in Council requisite for the due

Execution of the Provisions of this Section is not made, or in

case any Decision of the Governor General in Council on any

Appeal under this Section is not duly executed by the proper

Provincial Authority in that Behalf, then and in every such Case,

and as far only as the Circumstances of each Case require, the

Parliament of Canada may make remedial Laws for the due

Execution of the Provisions of this Section and of any Decision

of the Governor General in Council under this Section.

[63]

When Saskatchewan gained provincial status, s. 93(1) was

replaced with three new provisions under the Saskatchewan Act. Sections

93(2) to (4) remained, although s. 93(2) has never applied in Saskatchewan.

The provisions replacing s. 93(1) read as follow:

17. Section 93 of The British North America Act, 1867, shall apply

to the said province, with the substitution for paragraph (1) of the

said section 93, of the following paragraph:--

- 30 -

1. "Nothing in any such law shall prejudicially affect any right or

privilege with respect to separate schools which any class of

persons have at the date of the passing of this Act, under the terms

of chapters 29 and 30 of the Ordinances of the North-West

Territories, passed in the year 1901, or with respect to religious

instruction in any public or separate school as provided for in the

said ordinances."

2. In the appropriation by the Legislature or distribution by the

Government of the province of any moneys for the support of

schools organized and carried on in accordance with the said

chapter 29, or any Act passed in amendment thereof or in

substitution therefor, there shall be no discrimination against

schools of any class described in the said chapter 29.

3. Where the expression "by law" is employed in paragraph (3) of

the said section 93, it shall be held to mean the law as set out in

the said chapters 29 and 30; and where the expression "at the

Union" is employed, in the said paragraph (3), it shall be held to

mean the date at which this Act comes into force.

[64]

Section 17(1) added specificity by including protection for both

public and separate schools respecting “religious instruction.” As well, by

freezing rights and privileges as they were found in Chapters 29 and 30 of the

1901 Ordinances of the North-West Territories, Saskatchewan avoided the

more ambiguous provision of “by Law” found in s. 93(1) o f the Constitution

Act, 1867 or “by Law or practice” as in the Manitoba Act, 1870, SC 1870, c 3.

Section 17(2) disallowed any discrimination in government funding against

any class of school, a provision the defendants say provides a short and

obvious answer to this action, a type of trump card assuring equal funding of

separate and public schools. The original ss . 93(3) and (4) of the Constitution

Act, 1867 were unchanged under the Saskatchewan Act.

[65]

Regrettably, a certain amount of confusion results when referring

to the entirety of s. 93 of the Constitution Act, 1867 as it ultimately applies to

- 31 -

Saskatchewan. Sections 17(1) to (3) of the Saskatchewan Act replace

s. 93(1) of the Constitution Act, 1867. Logically, then, ss. 93(2), (3) and (4)

might have been sequentially renumbered. Furthermore, s. 93(2) has no

application to Saskatchewan and could have been deleted. More confusingly,

although s. 17(3) replaces s. 93(1), it has nothing to do with s. 93(1) but

instead clarifies s. 93(3) of the Constitution Act, 1867. Because s. 17(1) of the

Saskatchewan Act is largely modelled on s. 93(1) of the Constitution Act,

1867, and because most of the case law respecting s. 93(1) originates from

Ontario and Quebec, I often interchangeably refer to either section. Chief

Justice Dickson, in Mahe v Alberta, [1990] 1 SCR 342 [Mahe] stated that

jurisprudence respecting s. 93(1) is equally applicable to s. 17 of the Alberta

Act, 4-5 Edw VII, c 3 which is identical in wording to s. 17 of the

Saskatchewan Act. He wrote (at 381):

In view of the similar contexts in which s. 93(1) and s. 17

were introduced, it can be presumed that the shared phrase

carries the same meaning in each provision. Thus, the

jurisprudence on s. 93(1) of the Constitution Act, 1867 is

relevant in interpreting s. 17 of the Alberta Act.

[66]

By necessary invitation, Chapter 29 of The School Ordinance,

1901, ONWT 1901, c 29 is pivotal. The following provisions concern separate

school rights as they stood in 1901:

SEPARATE SCHOOLS

Separate Schools/Assessments

41 The minority of the ratepayers in any district whether Protestant

or Roman Catholic may establish a separate school therein; and in

such case the ratepayers establishing such Protestant or Roman

Catholic separate school shall be liable only to assessments of such

rates as they impose upon themselves in respect thereof.

Petition for erection

- 32 -

42 The petition for the erection of a separate school district shall be

signed by three resident ratepayers of the religious faith indicated in

the name of the proposed district; and shall be in the form prescribed

by the commissioner.

Qualification of voters

43 The persons qualified to vote for or against the erection of a

separate school district shall be the ratepayers in the district of the

same religious faith Protestant or Roman Catholic as the petitioners.

Notice of ratepayers’ meetings / Subsequent proceedings

44 The notice calling a meeting of the ratepayers for the purpose of

taking their votes on the petition for the erection of a separate school

district shall be in the form prescribed by the commissioner and the

proceedings subsequent to the posting of such notice shall be the

same as prescribed in the formation of public school districts.

Rights and liabilities of separate school districts

45 After the establishment of a separate school district under the

liabilities of provisions of this Ordinance such separate school

district and the board thereof shall possess and exercise all rights,

powers, privileges and be subject to the same liabilities and method

of government as is herein provided in respect of public school

districts.

(2) Any person who is legally assessed or assessable for a public

school shall not be liable to assessment for any separate school

established therein.

[67]

The elected trustees of a board of education, whether of a separate

or pubic school, had powers under s. 95:

Duties of trustees

95 It shall be the duty of the board of every district and it shall have

power:

…

Engage teacher

17. To engage a teacher or teachers duly qualified under the

regulations of the department to teach in the school or schools in

its charge on such terms as it may deem expedient; the contract

wherefor shall be in writing and may be in form prescribed by the

commissioner and a certified copy of such contract shall

forthwith be transmitted to the department;

Suspend or dismiss teacher

- 33 -

Suspend or dismiss teacher

18. To suspend or dismiss any teacher for gross misconduct,

neglect of duty or for refusal or neglect to obey any lawful order

of the board and to forthwith transmit a written statement of the

facts to the department;

Conduct of school

19. To see that the school is conducted according to the

provisions of this Ordinance and the regulations of the

department;

Teachers’ salary

20. To provide for the payment of teachers’ salaries at least once

in every three months;

Management of school

21. To make regulations for the management of the school subject

to the provisions of this Ordinance and to communicate them in

writing to the teacher;

[68]

Sections 131, 162 and 163 addressed the payment of fees by non-

residents, a provision CTT cites as significant in this action. These sections

state:

Free School

131 No fees shall be charged by the board of any district on account

of the attendance at its school of any child whose parent or lawful

guardian is a ratepayer of the district.

Application for education of nonresident children

162 The parent or lawful guardian of any child residing outside the

limits of any district may apply to the board for the admission of

such child to its school and it shall be the duty of the board to admit

such child:

Inspector’s statement required

Provided always that the board may demand that the application for

the admission of any nonresident child be accompanied by a

statement from the inspector of the district to the effect that the

accommodation of the school is sufficient for the admission of such

child;

Fees

Provided further that the board may demand from such parent or

guardian the payment of school fees at a rate not exceeding four

- 34 -

cents per day per family which fees shall be payable monthly in

advance and shall be calculated according to the number of actual

teaching days in each month.

Resident children

163 The parent or lawful guardian of any child residing within the

limits of any district and who is not a ratepayer thereof may send his

children to the school operated within the district subject to the

second provision of the next preceding section.

[69]

Chapter 29 also regulated the teaching of religion in both public

and separate schools:

Religious instruction

137 No religious instruction except as hereinafter provided shall be

permitted in the school of any district from the opening of such

school until one half hour previous to its closing in the afternoon

after which time any such instruction permitted or desired by the

board may be given.

Time for the Lord’s prayer

(2) It shall however be permissible for the board of any district to

direct that the school be opened by the recitation of the Lord’s

prayer.

Attendance not compulsory during religious exercise

138 Any child shall have the privilege of leaving the school room at

the time at which religious instruction is commenced as provided for

in the next preceding section or on remaining without taking part in

any religious instruction that may be given if the parents or guardians

do desire.

No pupil to be deprived of ordinary education

139 No teacher, school trustee or inspector shall in any way attempt

to deprive such child of any advantage that it might derive from the

ordinary education given in such school and any such action on the

part of any school trustee, inspector or teacher shall be held to be a

disqualification for and voidance of the office held by him.

[70]

Chapter 30 of The School Ordinance, 1901, ONWT 1901, c 30,

The School Assessment Ordinance, dealt with assessment issues, including

instances when property was jointly owned by a Protestant and Roman

- 35 -

Catholic owner. Other than assessment issues, Chapter 30 did not specify

separate school rights.

[71]

The Ordinances, incorporated by reference under the

Saskatchewan Act, are part of the Constitution of Canada.⁸Accordingly, the

rights afforded separate schools under the Ordinances cannot be lessened even

in face of Charter infringement under either ss. 2(a) or s. 15 because of s. 29

of the Charter. Respectively, these Charter provisions read as follows:

2. Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms:

(a) freedom of conscience and religion;

…

15. (1) Every individual is equal before and under the law and has

the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without

discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on

race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or

physical disability.

…

29. Nothing in this Charter abrogates or derogates from any rights or

privileges guaranteed by or under the Constitution of Canada in

respect of denominational, separate or dissentient schools.

[72]

The defendants state that funding of non-Catholic students at

Catholic schools is a right protected by s. 93 and, therefore, immune under

s. 29 from Charter review. GSSD says such funding goes beyond the

denominational elements of Catholic education so that the funding of non-

Catholics students is not an entrenched constitutional right. Accor dingly,

government action that funds non-Catholic students at Catholic schools is

exposed to review under the Charter.

8

Constitution Act,1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11, s 52(2); Schedule, Item

13.

- 36 -

B.

The Confederation Compromise

[73]

Section 93’s accommodation of separate school rights is rooted in

Canada’s history of state formation. Confederation required statesmanship and

compromise to bring together two founding nations, one with strong ties to

Britain and the other with strong ties to France; one English-speaking, the

other French-speaking; one essentially Protestant, the other Roman Catholic;

one a victor in war, the other vanquished in war.⁹In Reference re: Bill 30,

[1987] 1 SCR 1148 [Reference re Bill 30], the Supreme Court recognized the

s. 93 compromise as the “solemn pact,” “which made confederation possible.”

Justice Wilson cited Sir Charles Tupper in the House of Commons debates

offered 30 years after confederation at 1173 -1174):

. . . I say it within the knowledge of all these gentlemen...that but for

the consent to the proposal of the Hon. Sir Alexander Galt, who

represented especially the Protestants of the great province of

Quebec on that occasion, but for the assent of that conference to the

proposal of Sir Alexander Galt, that in the Confederation Act should

be embodied a clause which would protect the rights of minorities,

whether Catholic or Protestant, in this country, there would have

been no Confederation . . . . I say, therefore, it is important, it is

significant that without this clause, without this guarantee for the

rights of minorities being embodied in that new constitution, we

should have been unable to obtain any confederation whatever. That

is my reason for drawing attention to it at present.¹⁰

[74]

One must also understand the significance of religion and

language in pre-confederation Ontario and Quebec.¹¹At confederation and for

several decades after, the only religious groups were Roman Catholic and

9

Chief Justice Deschenes provides an insightful history of conquest to confederation in Protestant School Bd.

of Montreal v Minister of Education (1976), 83 DLR (3d) 645 (Que Sup Ct) [Protestant School Bd. of Montreal

v Minister of Education]

¹⁰Debates of the House of Commons, 6th Sess 7th Parl, 59 Vict 1896, col 2719 at 2724, March 3, 1896.

11

At the time of confederation Canada West (previously Upper Canada) and Canada East (previously Lower

Canada) were one province, Canada. For ease of reference I will refer to the former as Ontario, the latter as

Quebec.

- 37 -

largely French-speaking, and Protestants and invariably English-speaking.¹²

Religion permeated all aspects of life, particularly education. Deep seated

prejudices and conflicts existed between Catholics and Protestants.

Confederation united these religious and language factions into a workable

nation, particularly when minority groups of each religion were found in the

most populous uniting provinces of Ontario and Quebec.

[75]

Education had historically been the domain of the churches. The

Catholic Church showed little interest in abdicating its influence over

education in face of a movement toward publicly-funded common schools

developing in Ontario from 1840 to co nfederation. Dr. Dixon testified

extensively respecting the influence that Dr. Egerton Ryerson, a Methodist

minister, exerted on education in Ontario during his tenure as Superintendent

of Education from 1844-1867. His vision of education was to develop co mmon

or mixed schools, open to all, with an emphasis on civic duties and

development of the child with a religious component of sufficient breadth to

accommodate the faith of all Christians. Roman Catholics opposed these

developments, not just on the parochial scene, but directly from the Vatican.

Bishop Charbonelle, the Bishop of Toronto whom Dr. Dixon described as a

“warrior” against liberalism and common schools, issued a statement that

Roman Catholic parents who failed to send their children to Catholic schools

were committing a mortal sin and liable to eternal damnation.

[76]

In 1867, when legislative powers were divvied up between the

new federal and provincial governments, jurisdiction over education was

¹²Dr. Beaujot’s summary of the religious affiliation of the four about-to-unite provinces (Ontario, Quebec, New

Brunswick and Nova Scotia) shows 99.30% were either Roman Catholic or Protestant in 1861.

- 38 -

exclusively allocated to the provinces. Although s. 92 of the Constitution Act,

1867 was the repository of other provincial heads of power, education was

uniquely set out in s. 93. And while s. 93 used identical introductory wording

to grant power over education as was used for other enumerated powers, s. 9 3

restricted provincial power over education with the phrase, “subject and

according to the following Provisions.” Thereafter followed ss . 93(1) to (4).

They reserved certain powers to the federal government, thereby curtailing

provincial authority over education. Otherwise, education would have been

another enumerated power among the 16 heads of power described in s. 92,

without federal control or restriction. Sections 93(3) and (4) allowed the

federal government to provide redress if a province either abr ogated the rights

of denominational schools as they existed at union, or if augmenting such

rights, the province then abrogated them.

[77]

In this action, Government counsel repeatedly encouraged me to

accept the 1867 constitutional compromise accommodating minority Catholic

and Protestant schools as qualitatively “good.” I, though, hesitate to base my

analysis on this presumption. Instead, I accept that the historic compromise

embodied in s. 93 gave privileged status to Catholic and Protestant minorities,

described by the Court of Appeal of the Northwest Territories in Yellowknife

Public Denominational District Education Authority v Euchner , 2008 NWTCA

13, [2009] 3 WWR 10 [Yellowknife], (leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of

Canada denied at 2009 28593 (SCC)), as “the only religious groups

then of concern to the Fathers of Confederation.” My disinclination to anchor

my decision on the premise that the constitutional compromise is normatively

“good,” finds favour with statements of commentators such as Ir win Cotler

- 39 -

who wrote that s. 93 has caused more bitterness than any other section of the

Constitution¹³or M. H. Ogilvie who wrote that s. 93 "shackled the new nation

of Canada with the chains of nineteenth-century sectarian strife.”¹⁴

C.

The Experience of the Provinces

[78]

A proper understanding of this lawsuit requires an appreciation

for separate school rights across Canada. Although Charter rights are

consistent across Canada, separate school rights are glaringly inconsistent. Of

the four provinces entering confederation in 1867, only Ontario and Quebec

had denominational schools. Nova Scotia and New Brunswick (although the

latter only after much acrimony and the Privy Council’s decision in Maher v

Town Council of Portland, [1874] UKPC 83 (BAILLI) [Maher]) had no

denominational schools at confederation so s. 93(1) did not apply to them. Nor

did British Columbia or Prince Edward Island when it joined the union,

respectively, in 1871 and 1873. In 1949 , Newfoundland’s schools were

denominational and similarly protected by Term 17 of the Terms of Union of

Newfoundland with Canada (December 11, 1948). Newfoundland

constitutionally amended its denominational school system and discontinued

confessionally based schools in favour of a single public sc hool system after a

referendum in 1997.¹⁵Denominational school rights were never

constitutionally entrenched in the Northwest Territories ( Yellowknife).

13

Irwin Cotler, (Member of Parliament for Mount Royal from 1999 to 2015 and Minister of Justice and

Attorney General of Canada from 2003 to 2006) "Chapter 5: Freedom of Conscience and Religion (Section

2(a))" in Hon. Gérald-A. Beaudoin & Ed Ratushny, eds., The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 2d ed

(Toronto: Carswell, 1989) 65 at 168.

¹⁴M.H. Ogilvie, "What Is a Church by Law Established?" (1990) 28 Osgoode Hall LJ 179 at 219

¹⁵Constitution Amendment,1998 (Newfoundland Act), SI/98-25

- 40 -

[79]

In Quebec the Quiet Revolution of the 1960s replaced the primacy

of religion in schools with the primacy of language. In 1997 Quebec, using

s. 43 of the Constitution Act, 1982, rescinded denominational school rights

and replaced them with a language-based education system.¹⁶Accordingly, s.

93 no longer applies in Quebec.

[80]

When Manitoba gained provincial status in 1870, s. 93 of the

Constitution Act, 1867 was replaced by s. 22 of the Manitoba Act, 1870, (with

s. 22(3) identical to s. 93(4) of the Constitution Act, 1867), but with slightly

nuanced differences. It protected separate schools existing “by Law or

practice” and noticeably did not refer to separate schools being “thereafter

established.”¹⁷In 1870, Manitoba’s population was approximately equally

split between Roman Catholics and Protestants ( Brophy v Attorney-General of

Manitoba, [1895] AC 202 (PC) [Brophy]). One year later, Manitoba enacted a

true dual denominational school system. But with an influx of English-

speaking Protestants, the Province enacted the Public Schools Act¹⁸in 1890,

reversing the policy of the preceding years by creating a single, English, non-

denominational, tax-funded, school system. Catholics, obligated to pay taxes

to support the new common school, could send their children to Catholic

schools but at their expense. The City of Winnipeg sued a non-complying

Catholic taxpayer in Barrett v City of Winnipeg (1891), 19 SCR 374 [Barrett].

¹⁶Constitution Amendment,1997 (Quebec), SI /97-141

17

22. In and for the Province, the said Legislature may exclusively make Laws in relation to Education, subject

and according to the following provisions:-

(1) Nothing in any such Law shall prejudicially affect any right or privilege with respect to Denominational

Schools which any class of persons have by Law or practice in the Province at the Union:

(2) An appeal shall lie to the Governor General in Council from any Act or decision of the Legislature of

the Province, or of any Provincial Authority, affecting any right or privilege of the Protestant or Roman

Catholic minority of the Queen's subjects in relation to Education

¹⁸Public SchoolsAct, 53 Vic, ch 38

- 41 -

The Manitoba courts found the new Act inoffensive to s. 22(1) and valid. The

Supreme Court of Canada unanimously allowed Barrett’s appeal, a decision

reversed by the Judicial Council which gave little credence to concerns

advanced by Roman Catholics and the Church of England.

[81]

Catholic school supporters pressured the federal cabinet to act

remedially under s. 22(2) of the Manitoba Act, 1870. A reference in Brophy to

the Supreme Court asked whether the government could intervene to remedy

the rights of the Catholic minority. The Privy Council (again reversing the

Supreme Court) found that Parliament could intervene. It did. When Manito ba

rejected the federal commission’s proposals, the Conservative federal

government attempted to enact a remedial bill. The Liberal opposition blocked

its passage. The school question became a federal election issue in 1896 with

Wilfred Laurier claiming that by “sunny ways” a compromise with the

Manitoba government would satisfy the Catholic claims. The federal election

was fought on the School Question. A year later, Prime Minister Laurier

negotiated a compromise with Manitoba, with Pope Leo XIII’s approval. The

Manitoba School Question engendered a national firestorm that brought down

the federal Conservative government and spilled over into an acrimonious and

animated discussion of denominational schools just as Saskatchewan and

Alberta were in the throes of gaining provincial status.

[82]

In 1905, Saskatchewan and Alberta were carved out of the

Northwest Territories as new provinces. Each party in this action led

significant testimony and provided reference to several historical sources

(Sessional Papers, Hansard, School Board Reports and newspaper reports) to

illustrate the complexity, intensity and acrimony of the debates that

- 42 -

accompanied the passage of the Saskatchewan Act and the Alberta Act,

commonly called the Autonomy Bills. Religious education in the new

provinces was foremost among these debates and resulted in s. 17 of the

Autonomy Bills modifying s. 93(1) of the Constitution Act, 1867, as

previously cited.

PART TWO: DOES GSSD HAVE STANDING?

I.

HISTORY OF PROCEEDINGS RESPECTING STANDING

[83]

This trial is the sixth time within this action that the matter of

standing has come before the court in one form or another. From the outset of

this action, the defendants have questioned GSSD’s standing as a public

school board to advance its constitutional claim. Initially, in 2008, GSSD

applied to amend its pleadings respecting the constit utional dimensions of its

claim. Over the defendants’ objections that GSSD lacked standing to seek the

amendments, Justice Pritchard allowed the amendments ( York School Division

No. 36 v Theodore Roman Catholic School Division No. 138 , 2008 SKQB

384). Then, by fiat of August 27, 2012, Justice Mills declined CTT’s

application under former Rule 188 to determine a point of law and under

former Rule 173(a) to strike GSSD’s statement of claim, both advanced on the

assertion that GSSD did not have requisite standing (Good Spirit School

Division No. 204 v Christ the Teacher Roman Catholic Separate School

Division No. 212, 2012 SKQB 343). Justice Cameron of the Court of Appeal

declined CTT’s application seeking leave to appeal Justice Mills’ fiat ( Christ

the Teacher Roman Catholic Separate School Division No. 212 v Good Spirit

School Division No. 204, 2012 SKCA 99, 399 Sask R 278). However, Justice

- 43 -

Cameron was sensitive to CTT’s concerns that its ability to raise the matter of

standing might be seen as res judicata. Justice Cameron assured CTT that the

matter of standing would remain alive to trial, stating, at para. 21, that he was

“confident the trial judge will give the Separate School Division an open and

fair crack at this business of standing.”

[84]

Yet again, in May 2015, GSSD sought an amendment to its

statement of claim requesting that the Public Section of the SSBA be added as

a plaintiff, requesting that the action become a representative action, assuredly

to deal with the defendants’ ongoing concern that GSSD lacked standing. In a

fiat of May 1, 2015, Justice Mills found that given the proceedings taken to

that date, the defendants would suffer prejudice with such an amendment

unless the trial date was postponed, something neither party wished. G SSD’s

requested amendment was denied.

[85]

Finally, CTT brought a pre-trial application, asking that I

determine the issue of standing prior to trial. In a fiat of August 6, 2015 , I

declined the application stating that bifurcating the trial was practically ill -

advised and not in keeping with the governing principles of splitting issues for

adjudication (Unreported, August 6, 2015). So, now is the time to finally

reckon the issue of standing.

[86]

I have parsed the defendants’ arguments and find that they have

raised three essential but inter-related questions respecting standing. First,

CTT says that GSSD cannot even raise a constitutional question respecting

separate schools because it holds no separate school rights under s. 93 of the

Constitution Act, 1867. These rights belong exclusively to members of an

- 44 -

entitled group, Roman Catholics in this action. Second, even if the court

allows GSSD to argue a constitutional challenge respecting rights it does not

hold, the defendants say that GSSD cannot satisfy either of the two articulated

tests to gain standing to mount a Charter argument – the exceptional prejudice

test or the public interest test. Third, the defendants say that s s. 2(a) of the

Charter, which states that “everyone” is guaranteed freedom of religion, and

s. 15, which states that “every individual” has the right to equal protection

under the law without discrimination, disallows a litigant like GSSD, a

statutorily-created institution, to advance a claim of Charter infringement.

[87]

The first two positions the defendants advance are general in

nature and inter-related. I will address them and leave resolution of the third

question to the specific analysis of alleged breach of s. 2( a) of the Charter.

II.

PARTIES’ POSITIONS

A.

GSSD’s Position

[88]

GSSD asserts that it has appropriate standing under both tests,

exceptional prejudice and public interest. In relying upon the principle of

“exceptional prejudice,” GSSD seeks support from the long-standing decision

in Smith v Ontario, [1924] SCR 331 where, in 1924, the Supreme Court of

Canada allowed that if legislation prejudicially affects the rights of a plaintiff

differently than others, the plaintiff may be allowed standing to seek a

declaration of the legislation’s invalidity. GSSD argues that it represents its

non-Catholic ratepayers, parents and students, all of whom have been

exceptionally prejudiced by the impacts arising from the funding of non-

Catholic students in St. Theodore Roman Catholic School.

- 45 -

[89]

GSSD supports its exceptional prejudice position stating that it is

“inconceivable” that it would have brought this complex action before the

court as unnecessary litigation without a real interest in the outcome.

Additionally, it points to the long history of this action, including an initial

plan to refer the matter to the Court of Appeal, a plan the defendants later

refused.

[90]

In the alternative to exceptional prejudice, GSSD argues that it

meets the test of public interest standing, citing Canada (Attorney General) v

Downtown Eastside Sex Workers United Against Violence Society, 2012 SCC

45, [2012] 2 SCR 524 [Eastside Sex Workers] and Canada (Minister of

Justice) v Borowski, [1981] 2 SCR 575 [Borowski]. GSSD states it meets the

three criteria set out in Eastside Sex Workers. First, its claim discloses a

serious, important and substantial legal issue as set out at para 42 of Eastside

Sex Workers: “Once … the statement of claim reveals at least one serious

issue, it will usually not be necessary to minutely examine every pleaded

claim for the purpose of the standing question.” Second – “whether the

plaintiff has a real stake in the proceedings or is engaged with the issues they

raise” (para. 43) – GSSD compares its quest for standing to Mr. Borowski (in

Borowski), a prominent male anti-abortion crusader. As GSSD states, if Mr.

Borowski was held to have a genuine interest in abortion, notwithstanding “he

was not pregnant, not a doctor, nor the father of a fetus,” then GSSD should

have standing to challenge government funding of non-Catholic students in

Catholic separate schools. Third – that there must be an effective and practical

way to challenge the legality of state action – GSSD argues that it is only one

- 46 -

of few with the resources and expertise to bring forward this complete and

expensive litigation.

B.

Defendants’ Position

[91]

CTT argues, as a preliminary position, that GSSD has no ability

to even advance a constitutional challenge. It says rights -holders are “the only

appropriate persons, to assert the entitlements and request adjudication before

the Court.”¹⁹CTT states that the only parties who “should be raising the

content of the entitlements under s. 93 and s. 17 are the parties that possess

those entitlements themselves.”²⁰CTT suggests that statements in Ontario

Home Builders’ Association v York Region Board of Education (1994), 109

DLR (4th) 289 (Ont CA) [Ontario Home Builders’ Association CA] and Public

School Boards' Assn. of Alberta v Alberta (Attorney General), 2000 SCC 45,

[2000] 2 SCR 409 support its view (as will be discussed more fully in the

following analysis).

[92]

More explicitly, though, CTT maintains that aside from standing

afforded those whose rights are protected, the only other method to seek a

court’s adjudication of separate school rights, similarly to minority language

education rights or aboriginal and treaty rights, is via a constitutional

reference. CTT states, “Other than through such a [reference] process, the

interested groups are the appropriate persons, and the only appropriate

¹⁹CTT Trial Brief Para 20

²⁰CTT Trial Brief Para 25

- 47 -

persons, to assert the entitlements and request adjudication before the

Court.”²¹

[93]

If GSSD is allowed as a non-rights-holder under s. 93 to advance

a constitutional argument, CTT argues that GSSD cannot bring its claim

within either the exceptional prejudice rule or the public interest rule. It states

that GSSD has presented no evidence that it has suffered exceptional

prejudice. Although GSSD may suggest it has suffered loss of grant money, it

has also been spared expense because it has not had to educate students

attending St. Theodore Roman Catholic School. It points to GSSD’s nine years

of surplus budgets since the establishment of St. Theodore Roman Catholic

School. GSSD has been treated no differently in terms of funding than any

other school division, separate or public. It received funding according to

formulae applied equitably to all divisions and suffered no prejudice and

clearly no “exceptional prejudice.”

[94]

CTT cites Charlottetown (City) v Prince Edward Island (1998),

168 DLR (4^{t h}) 79 (PEI CA) [Charlottetown] as an appropriate example for

finding exceptional prejudice. There, the court found that the City of

Charlottetown was the appropriate authority for a community claiming to be

inadequately represented in the Legislature as the result of boundary change

legislation. Because the community as a whole suffered exceptional prejudice,

the city was appropriately granted standing. In comparison, CTT states that

GSSD “cannot be said to be the representative of the ratepayers of the public

school boards,” because it neither provided notice to nor consulted with its

ratepayers about this action. CTT states that GSSD seeks a remedy that is

²¹CTT Trial Brief Para 20

- 48 -

inimical to the interests of its ratepayers, particularly non-Catholic parents

whose children attend St. Theodore Roman Catholic School. In essence, if

GSSD is successful, it is these parents, not GSSD, whose interests are

exceptionally prejudiced.

[95]

Respecting the alternate grounds to gain standing – public interest

standing – CTT accepts the authority of Eastside Sex Workers and the three

criteria posed by the Supreme Court to gain such standing whether: (1) a

serious justiciable issue has been raised; (2) the plaintiff has a real stake or a

genuine interest in it; and (3) the pro posed suit is a reasonable and effective

way to bring the issue before the courts. CTT states that GSSD is not

concerned with religious freedoms or practices since it does not have any.

CTT argues that government funding of non-minority faith students does not

coerce any religious observance by anyone.

[96]

The Government questions whether the exceptional prejudice rule

is still a sound constitutional principle. Minimally, though, it concludes that

whether the principle continues, it requires (1) evidence of exceptional

prejudice; and (2) the prejudice must be to the plaintiff’s “personal,

proprietary or pecuniary rights.” The Government cites Charlottetown and

Cape Breton (Regional Municipality) v Nova Scotia (Attorney General), 2009

NSCA 44, 277 NSR (2d) 350 as examples of how persons collectively

suffering “exceptional prejudice” might bring an action through a municipal

corporation. The Government states that GSSD cannot advance an exceptional

prejudice argument because it “does not have authority to represent its

students, parents, or ratepayers broadly in relation to their freedom of religion

- 49 -

(or equality on the basis of religion) without explicit confirmation of that

authority from those individuals.”²²

[97]

The Government also states that GSSD fails to establish public

interest standing. GSSD is no different than any other public school division.

It has no ability to control the establishment of separate schools or the

admissions policies of separate school divisions.

III. ANALYSIS

A.

Two Preliminary Questions

1.

Standing on Behalf of Whom?

[98]

Throughout the trial, the defendants stated that GSSD presented a

moving target, leaving ambiguous exactly for whom it was litigating.

Although just a few months before trial Justice Mills declined GSSD’s

application to name the Public Section as a party and to make the action a

representative action under Rule 2-10 of The Queen’s Bench Rules, the

defendants remain concerned about the nature of the testimony provided by

many witnesses from various public school boards. The defendants considered

the testimony of these witnesses as contrary to Justice Mills’ order, a

disguised attempt to broaden the litigation beyond GSSD’s interests arising

from the closing of the Theodore School.

[99]

Clearly, the testimony of GSSD’s witnesses illustrated several

perceived problems with the growing numbers of non-Catholic students

²²Government Trial Brief Para 260

- 50 -

enrolled in Catholic schools throughout Saskatchewan. As exemplary of those

concerns, but not exhaustive, I heard testimony, respecting:

1. The costs of building new dual-purpose schools in

Saskatchewan which accommodate significant numbers of non-

Catholic students (as Larry Pavloff, Chair of the Prairie Spirit

Public School Division, testified happened in Warman);

2. The costs of providing competing, in-city, bus transportation

to public schools in response to generous transportation policies

offered by Catholic school divisions, even though the

transportation policy offended the public board’s ideals of

promoting physical exercise (as Wayne Steen, trustee with

Saskatchewan Rivers Public School Division, testified happened

in Prince Albert);

3. The interference with closing inefficient rural schools by

opening new Catholic schools (as Bert Degooijer, trustee of the

Prairie Valley Public School Division, testified happened with the

Wilcox School slated for closure in 2007);

4. The threat of communities recruiting the minority faith

(usually Catholic) to thwart closure of rural schools by

petitioning for a separate school board, thereby forcing public

boards to keep open high-cost and inefficient rural schools (as

testified by Audrey Trombley, trustee with Southeast Cornerstone

Public School Division);

- 51 -

5. The open competition for recruiting students as illustrated by

CTT’s advertising to increase enrolments (as solicited from Brian

Boechler, Director of Education at Christ the Teacher Roman

Catholic School Division until 2010, in cross-examination).

[100]

The nature of the testimony from these witnesses poses this

question: “On whose behalf is GSSD speaking and, therefore, seeking

standing?” If Justice Mills denied GSSD’s request to make its claim a

representative action, what consequence did his order have to GSSD’s

presentation of its case? Rule 2-10 states:

Re pre se ntative actions

2-10(1) If numerous persons have a common interest in the

subject of an intended claim, one or more of those persons

may make or be the subject of a claim or may be authorized

by the Court to defend on behalf of or for the benefit of all.

[101]

Did Justice Mills’ ruling restrict any attempt by GSSD to broaden

its claim beyond the closing of the Theodore School and its singular effect

upon GSSD? Justice Mills’ introductory statements in his unpublished fiat of

May 1, 2015 in this matter illustrate the involvement of both the Public and

Catholic Sections of the SSBA in this action and the effect this decision could

have “upon all students in the Province.” He stated:

[1] The issue of government funding for non-minority faith

students in minority faith schools has been a matter of

significant controversy for over a decade. …[The] public

section [of the SSBA] has lobbied for the elimination of

provincial government funding for non-Catholic students in

Catholic schools. A little over 10 years ago the Government

of Saskatchewan was close to making a reference to the

Saskatchewan Court of Appeal for a determination of this and

related issues. The Government changed its mind and the

reference did not move forward. At around the same time this

court case was commenced. The public section…is the driver

- 52 -

behind the commencement of this action. It determined that a

situation arising in Theodore would be a good factual nexus to

present to the court in respect of constitutional challenges

under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms to the

funding issue. The defendant, Christ the Teacher…was

assisted in its defence by the other provincial Catholic

divisions.

[2] Extensive informal discussion, court activity and

mediation have occurred over the past 10 years of this action.

Throughout, the public section…and the provincial Catholic

school board have been involved in every aspect of the case.

The extensive mediation efforts in an attempt to settle the

dispute were not restricted to representatives of the plaintiff

and the defendant alone but included the wider representatives

of the plaintiff and the defendant alone but included the wide

representatives of public and Catholic education in the

Province. All parties understood that the constitutional and

Charter issues raised in this case would impact upon all

students in the Province.

[102]

Certainly Justice Mills anticipated that the resolution of this

action would result in broad application across Saskatchewan. However, in

response to GSSD’s request to make the Public Section a party and the action

representative, Justice Mills continued:

[12] The defendants claim that prejudice to them will result

from the attempt at amendments of this area. I agree. This

case involves significant legal and factual issues. The plaintiff

chose many years ago to present the factual issues arising out

of Theodore. The question of standing arising out of those

factual issues has been a matter in the minds of all parties for

a considerable length of time. The attempt to amend the claim

to make this a representative action seems designed to assist

the plaintiff’s argument in respect of the standing issue. It has

had ample opportunity before this time to amend its pleadings

to deal with that matter. It has chosen not to until this late

stage.

[103]

Justice Mills stated that standing would be resolved within the

factual setting of Theodore School’s closing. Accordingly, I will approach the

matter of standing from the factual nexus that GSSD chose: the circumstances

- 53 -

and consequences of the closing of Theodore School. However, that being

said, I accept that the testimony of school board witnesses outside of GSSD

may be relevant and helpful to adjudicate other issues in this litigation. I

readily accept and endorse the statement of Justice Iacobucci in Windso r

Yearbook of Access to Justice (2002), 21 Windsor YB Access Just 3 “The

Charter: Twenty Years Later” at p 6. He wrote:

…one characteristic of Charter analysis is that it frequently

involves the consideration of broad policy issues involving

the competing interest of groups other than parties to the

dispute. This has had an impact not only upon the

participation of intervenors and the types of evidence that

courts are willing to consider, but also upon the very

likelihood that a court will consider an issue in the first place.

[Emphasis added]

[104]

Justice Iabobucci provides the evidentiary framework within

which I shall broadly consider evidence from parties other than those named in

the pleadings.

2.

Can Only Beneficiaries of Separate School Rights Have Standing?

[105]

As stated earlier, CTT makes a pre-emptory objection to GSSD’s

standing, even before addressing the issue of exceptional prejudice and public

interest. It states that s. 93 rights accrue only to specific, identifiable groups –

Catholics and Protestants – and, like minority language rights and aboriginal

rights, these rights cannot be challenged by anyone other than the right -

holders.²³

[106]

To advance this position CTT relies upon the Ontario Court of

Appeal decision in Ontario Home Builders' Association CA. The Association,

²³CTT Trial Brief Paras 15 and 25

- 54 -

representing Ontario home builders, applied for judi cial review of the York

Board of Education bylaws which imposed a development charge on new

building permits to offset capital costs of new school construction, with the

generated revenue distributed without distinction between public and separate

schools. The Association alleged that the bylaw infringed the constitutional

rights of the separate school boards to receive a proportionate share of the

revenues raised and that separate school supporters were not exempt from

paying assessments for public school purposes.

[107]

The Ontario Court of Appeal found the lower court erred in

granting the Association standing. The Association members may have had an

interest in not paying the charge, but they had no interest in proportional

allocation of funds to separate schools and even less in the overall education

funding model. At the Supreme Court (Ontario Home Builders' Association v

York Region Board of Education, [1996] 2 SCR 929 [Ontario Home Builders’

Association SCC], standing was assumed without deciding the matter,

apparently so the court could give a fulsome decision respecting the merits of

the s. 93(1) argument. The Supreme Court held that the Association failed to

prove that s. 93 rights had been derogated, even accepting that it had standing.

[108]

CTT compares GSSD’s claim to standing to the Association’s

claim and concludes that GSSD, like the Association, has no interest in

determining the constitutional rights held by Catholic schools to receive equal

funding to public schools.

[109]

I agree with the Ontario Court of Appeal. As it must have asked, I

also ask why a group of home builders would worry about whether the charge

- 55 -

they were obligated to pay was appropriately allocated to separate schools in

accordance with s. 93. They seemingly made no argument that they were

separate school supporters or that their interests were affected by the

allocation of the charges between separate and public schools. The court

correctly characterized their true interest as not paying the charge. The

Association’s concern about separate schools had a ring of disingenuousness.

In fact, one of the parties opposing the Assoc iation was a separate school

board which testified it suffered no prejudice under the allocation of the new

charge.

[110]

I do not see the Ontario Court of Appeal’s decision in Ontario

Home Builders’ Association CA going as far as CTT urges. The Association

was denied standing because it was solely interested in avoiding the charge. I

see ready distinction between the Associatio n’s feigned interests in separate

school rights and GSSD’s interests in this litigation. I accept GSSD’s assertion

of certain direct interests arising from non-Catholic students attending St.

Theodore Roman Catholic School: the loss of the non-Catholic Theodore

students and associated government funding; the loss in efficiencies and

educational opportunities associated with the anticipated higher enrolment in

Springside School; and the threat of other communities creating separate

schools in face of sound reasons to close a rural public school. These are

among the immediate and direct interests. But I also see GSSD’s broader

interests being affected as well, which I shall canvass later.

[111]

This conclusion is supported by Protestant School Bd. of

Montreal. There, the Protestant school boards sought standing, alleging that s.

93 protected not only religious rights but also language rights associated with

- 56 -

Protestant schools which were allegedly breached by the Official Languages

Act²⁴. The Attorney-General argued that the school boards were not persons

who were part of a “class of persons” under s. 93 of the Constitution Act,

1867, suggesting that only “physical persons,” not corporate bodies, held

rights under s. 93 since only individuals could have attributes of faith and

language.

[112]

I find that CTT suggests a similar restriction – that only a “class

of persons” who holds rights under s. 93 has standing to litigate those rights.

Chief Justice Deschenes, in Protestant School Brd. of Montreal v Minister of

Education, citing cases including Board of Education for Moose Jaw School

District No. 1 v Saskatchewan (Attorney General) (1975), 57 DLR (3d) 315

(Sask CA) [Moose Jaw School District] (where a public school board was

given standing to litigate the potentially adverse consequence of legislation

introducing provincial bargaining, including separate schools), stated at 649-

650:

… It matters little at the outset whether or not they have a

right to complain: the plaintiff School Boards are certainly

affected by the Official Language Act and, if the Act is

invalid, they have a "sufficient interest" to seek the judicial

declaration of legislative ultra vires.

Finally, during the last two years, the Supreme Court of

Canada has demonstrated a willingness to enlarge and

facilitate access to the courts, as in the cases of Thorson v A.-

G. Can. et al. (No. 2) (1974), 43 D.L.R. (3d) 1, [1975] 1

S.C.R. 138, 1 N.R. 225, and Nova Scotia Board of Censors v.

McNeil (1975), 55 D.L.R. (3d) 632, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 265, 32

C.R.N.S, 376. As this Court said on March 9th:

The Court must establish that the plaintiff

school boards are public oriented organisms

²⁴RSC 1985, c 31 (4^thSupp)

- 57 -

whose members are elected by all citizens,

within the limits of the right to vote given by

the Public Education Act. The Court must

establish that the school boards have a

responsible role to play in our society. Some of

them thought it was their duty to come to court

regarding the validity of legislation which, they

say, affects them. It is the opinion of the Court

the public interest compels us to hear them

entirely on this matter.

For these reasons, it is therefore the opinion of the Court that

the last issue of lack of standing, drawn from the alleged

absence of interest of the plaintiffs in this case, must also be

dismissed.

[113]

Like Chief Justice Deschenes, I accept that the more appropriate

test is being “affected” – obviously in a real way – and not necessarily having

a “right,” to sufficiently establish standing. I agree with his Lordship’s

characterization of public school boards: they are public oriented organisms,

their members are elected, and they have a responsible role to play in society.

The initial position advanced by CTT that GSSD must be a person holding

separate school rights before it can argue standing is not supported by the case

law. Noticeably, Chief Justice Deschenes went further than merely refuting the

notion that only holders of a constitutional right have standing. He distinctly

accepted the court’s earlier decision that the principle of “public interest”

compelled the court to hear the Protestant school boards “entirely on the

matter.”

- 58 -

B.

Public Interest Standing

1.

The Direction in Eastside Sex Workers

[114]

Although all three parties raised the issue of exceptional

prejudice as a ground to establish standing, I have chosen to consider only the

public interest justification for two reasons. First, and primarily, I have

decided that GSSD has standing on the basis of public interest so there is no

need to consider whether GSSD has satisfied the exceptional prejudice test.

Second, I agree with the submissions of the Government that the principle of

exceptional prejudice may no longer persist given the nuanced rule s that now

guide public interest standing. In Hy and Zel’s Inc. v Ontario (Attorney

General), [1993] 3 SCR 675, Justice Major, at 694, noted that the principle

may have been subsumed “in view of the more liberal views relating to public

interest standing.”

[115]

The parties agree that the authoritative case establishing public

interest standing is Eastside Sex Workers where the Supreme Court held that

standing may lie with a plaintiff seeking to vindicate the public interest.

Justice Cromwell, writing for a unanimous court, stated at para. 37:

37 In exercising the discretion to grant public interest

standing, the court must consider three factors: (1) whether

there is a serious justiciable issue raised; (2) whether the

plaintiff has a real stake or a genuine interest in it; and (3)

whether, in all the circumstances, the proposed suit is a

reasonable and effective way to bring the issue before the

courts…

[116]

I adhere to Justice Cromwell’s caution at para. 20 that these “are

interrelated factors” and “should not be treated as hard and fast requirements

or free-standing, independently operating tests.” He suggested that the factors

- 59 -

should be weighed cumulatively, understanding the purposes of limiting

standing, and “applied in a flexible and generous manner.” As a counterpoint

to what factors allow standing, he cited three traditional concerns which

justify disallowing standing, implicitly permitting standing where these

concerns are absent.

[117]

First, Justice Cromwell identified the need of “screening out the

mere busybody” to ensure the court is “properly allocating scar ce judicial

resources.” I am satisfied that GSSD is not a “busybody” looking for

meaningless litigation. The funding of non-Catholic students at St. Theodore

Roman Catholic School resulted in both financial and educational

consequences at Springside School where the Theodore students would have

been accommodated. Justice Cromwell’s second concern was whether the

court had “the benefit of contending points of view of those most directly

affected by the determination of the issues.” I have no concern in this regard.

The court has had the benefit of strongly contested positions, ably argued in

great detail by experienced counsel. Third, Justice Cromwell suggested

limiting standing to preserve “the proper role o f courts and their constitutional

relationship to the other branches of government.” The Government originally

intended to ask the Court of Appeal to answer a reference question on the

subject of this action. I cannot see that allowing GSSD standing offends the

relationship between the judiciary and other branches of government. As has

often been said, “the judiciary is the guardian of the constitution.” ( Hunter v

Southam Inc., [1984] 2 SCR 145 [Hunter])

[118]

None of Justice Cromwell’s three cautions are trigger ed in

GSSD’s quest for standing. These cautions satisfied, I will explain why I am

- 60 -

also satisfied that the three requirements of standing as set out in Eastside Sex

Workers have been met.

2.

Serious Justiciable Issue

[119]

A justiciable issue, in a broad sense, is a matter capable of being

brought to trial. In the context of standing, Justice Cromwell referred to

previous Supreme Court decisions and, drawing from them, described the

requirements of a serious justiciable issue at para. 42, as follows:

42 To constitute a “serious issue”, the question raised must

be a "substantial constitutional issue" (McNeil, at p. 268) or

an "important one" (Borowski, at p. 589). The claim must be

"far from frivolous" (Finlay, at p. 633), although courts

should not examine the merits of the case in other than a

preliminary manner. For example, in Hy and Zel's, Major J.

applied the standard of whether the claim was so unlikely to

succeed that its result would be seen as a "foregone

conclusion" (p. 690) … In Canadian Council of Churches, the

Court had many reservations about the nature of the proposed

action, but in the end accepted that "some aspects of the

statement of claim could be said to raise a serious issue as to

the validity of the legislation" (p. 254). Once it becomes clear

that the statement of claim reveals at least one serious issue,

it will usually not be necessary to minutely examine every

pleaded claim for the purpose of the standing question.

[120]

I must ask whether the funding of non-Catholic students at

Catholic schools is a “substantial constitutional issue.” I need only refer to the

voluminous case law that has arisen since confederation respecting s. 93 rights

to conclude that this action triggers a substantial constitutional i ssue. Section

93 issues have been a frequent subject of constitutional litigation in Canada,

coming before the court in various ways: by constitutional reference

(Reference re Bill 30; Brophy), by Roman Catholic separate school supporters

(Barrett), and by private school supporters (Adler v Ontario, [1996] 3 SCR

- 61 -

609 [Adler]). This litigation, though, is novel. In 150 years of separate school

rights, never has a case considered whether or not government funding of non-

minority faith students is a constitutionally protected right.

[121]

I am confident that each party in this action understands the

import and consequence of this lawsuit, the “serious issue” the lawsuit raises.

Few lawsuits have greater impact than this action as evidenced by counsels’

extensive legal research, their obvious preparation, their ardent arguments at

trial’s closing, the length of the trial and the magnitude of public attendance at

court, particularly at the summation of the trial.

3.

Does GSSD Have a Real Stake or Genuine Interest?

[122]

Eastside Sex Workers asks whether the plaintiff has a real stake or

a genuine interest in the contested issue. Is GSSD seriously attempting to

resolve a dispute involving contested rights or, as Justice Laskin (as he then

was) asked in Borowski at 579, is it merely asking “questions in the abstract

merely to satisfy a person’s curiosity or perhaps his or her obsessiveness with

a perceived injustice in the existing law.” In this case, the answer is found in

the characterization of the proceedings offered by Justice Mills in his fiat of

May 1, 2015: the action has been a “matter of significant controversy for over

a decade” and has involved “wide representatives of public and Catholic

education in the Province.” Justice Mills referred to the “informal discussi ons,

court activity and mediation…over the past 10 years of this action,”

concluding with an observation that answers the inquiry whether GSSD has

raised a genuine interest in the litigation: “All parties understood that the

- 62 -

constitutional and Charter issues raised in this case would impact upon all

students in the Province.” I agree.

[123]

I am satisfied, in the words of Justice Laskin, that this litigation

does not merely pose “abstract” questions to assuage GSSD’s “curiosity.” Few

matters are more significant to a province’s interests than those that affect

children’s education. There is nothing frivolous in this lawsuit. Each party has

marshalled huge resources, not only to establish or challenge GSSD’s

standing, but to argue the merits of the constitutional questions the action

poses.

[124]

Specifically, GSSD cites government funding of non-Catholic

students attending St. Theodore Roman Catholic School as harming GSSD’s

interests. Dwayne Reeve and Sherry Todosichuk, deputy director of corporate

services with GSSD, explained that the loss of the Theodore students resulted

in reduced efficiencies and educational opportunities that would have

accompanied higher enrolments in Springside; loss of government funding

respecting the Theodore students; the negative impact upon GSSD considering

the closure of other rural schools because of the threat of creating a separate

school to circumvent such plans; frustration of the need to accommodate

shrinking enrolment in rural schools and sustain public education in the longer

term; and creation of a competitive publicly-funded separate school in

contradiction to the government’s drive for school division amalgamation

which was initially voluntary and later mandatory.

[125]

At the core of this litigation is the issue of financing education in

Saskatchewan and how the public purse should be spent within the reality of

- 63 -

constitutionally guaranteed separate schools. I accept Dwayne Reeve’s

testimony that when school enrolment falls below certain numbers, numerous

reasons support a decision to close the school. One reason is the lack of

economic efficiency. When finite dollars allocated to education are spent

inefficiently anywhere in Saskatchewan, everyone with an interest in

education is adversely effected. Because St. Theodore Roman Catholic School

remains open, Christ the Teacher Roman Catholic School Division continues

to receive government funding for a school with an enrolment of 26

kindergarten to grade 8 students in 2014-2015 when the public school was

slated for closure in 2003 with an enrolment of 42 students. St. Theodore

Roman Catholic School remains open 14 years after Yorkdale considered it a

non-viable school, following previous closures in the villages of MacNutt,

Bredenbury, Ebenezer and Rhein.

[126]

Quantifying its loss, GSSD, in its cross-examination of Angela

Chobanik, Executive Director of the Education Funding Branch of the

Ministry of Education, solicited testimony that in 2016 -2017, by virtue of St.

Theodore Roman Catholic School remaining operative, the province would

pay CTT approximately $220,370.58 in base instruction, $106,971.00 in

instructional resources funding, $10,200.00 in administration funding and

$3,960.00 in governance funding in addition to school operation and

maintenance. If St. Theodore Roman Catholic School were not operative, these

funds, GSSD states, would have been available to other public school

divisions in Saskatchewan and spent more effectively and efficiently.

- 64 -

[127]

I find that GSSD has shown that it has a real stake and a genuine

interest in determining whether St. Theodore Roman Catholic School is

entitled to receive government funding respecting non-Catholic students.

4.

An Effective Way to Bring the Issue Before the Court

[128]

Justice Cromwell provided a list of non-exhaustive considerations

in assessing the third criterion: the plaintiff’s capacity to marshal resources

and expertise to present the case, whether the issues will be presented in a

concrete factual setting, whether the public interest transcends the interests of

those most directly affected, and whether a realistic alternative exists for a

more efficient and effective use of judicial resources. At para 51 of Eastside

Sex Workers he stated:

51 …

 The court should consider the plaintiff's capacity to

bring forward a claim. In doing so, it should examine

amongst other things, the plaintiff's resources,

expertise and whether the issue will be presented in a

sufficiently concrete and well-developed factual

setting.

 The court should consider whether the case is of

public interest in the sense that it transcends the

interests of those most directly affected by the

challenged law or action…

 The court should turn its mind to whether there are

realistic alternative means which would favour a more

efficient and effective use of judicial resources and

would present a context more suitable for adversarial

determination. Courts should take a practical and

pragmatic approach. The existence of other potential

plaintiffs, particularly those who would have standing

as of right, is relevant, but the practical prospe cts of

their bringing the matter to court at all or by equally

or more reasonable and effective means should be

- 65 -

considered in light of the practical realities, not

theoretical possibilities. …

…

[129]

Justice Cromwell identifies “capacity to bring forward a clai m” as

a determinative of standing. Who, among the many persons potentially

affected by the results of this action, has the capacity to bring the action?

Saskatchewan parents hold strong opinions (as I heard during testimony of

some of those parents) respecting the issues before the court. However, I

doubt that parents on either side of this issue would feel sufficiently impacted

to commence constitutional litigation. Most individuals would be daunted by

the cost and time to see constitutional litigation to the end of trial and its

expected appeals.

[130]

Two parents from the GSSD attendance area, Joelann Pister and

Lenore Pinder, testified that they desired a determination of the constitutional

issues in this action. Each of them would lack financial ability to m ount the

resources to advance constitutional litigation, especially when, as an

individual parent whose children attend school for a finite time, their interest

may not be significant enough to endure the expense and time to seek an

answer. The duration of this lawsuit, launched in 2005, and decided at the trial

level in 2017 (with the possibility of appeals), exceeds the length of a child’s

school education.

[131]

The Government states that GSSD should be denied standing

because “neither the public school divis ions nor the SSBA met with or

consulted with ratepayers or parents in relation to the issues raised in this

- 66 -

action…”²⁵No evidence was led of any consultation with ratepayers.

However, school boards trustees are elected to represent parents, students and

the public to permit democratic control over education in a school division, as

provided by The Education Act, 1995. School democracy is representative

democracy founded on the principle of elected trustees representing ratepayers

and answerable to them through elections. I find it an odd result, as implied by

the Government, that parents more aptly have standing while the organization

that represents them is less apt to have standing. The provincial government

functions on the principles of representative de mocracy, similar to a school

board. It must understand that the lawfully taken actions of a school board in

advancing this action are as effective and legitimate as the government’s

action in defending it.

[132]

In Conseil du patronat du Quebec Inc. v Quebec (At torney

General), [1991] 3 SCR 685, Justice Chouinard’s dissenting reasons at the

lower court ((1988) 55 DLR (4^{t h}) 523) were accepted by Justice Lamer writing

for a unanimous Supreme Court, by simply making Justice Chouinard’s

reasons his own. Justice Chouinard identified the odd result of granting

standing to an employer while denying standing to the Conseil whose “purpose

is to promote the interests of a very large number of employers or firms, a

majority of whom appear to be unionized.” As he stated, “sur ely it has just as

much interest as each of its members does.”

[133]

As further support that school boards, not ratepayers, often

advance constitutional questions, I refer to the previously quoted statement in

Protestant School Brd. of Montreal v Minister of Ed ucation, at 649, where

²⁵Government Trial Brief Para 224

- 67 -

Justice Deschenes stated that “the plaintiff school boards are public oriented

organisms whose members are elected by all citizens, within the limits of the

right to vote given by the Public Education Act.” Given these statements, I

cannot find weakness with GSSD’s claim to standing only because it provided

no evidence that its position is supported by its ratepayers. I accept that

several school board elections have come and gone since the trustees of GSSD

initiated this litigation. That is when the ratepayers implicitly, if not expressly,

endorsed this litigation.

[134]

As Justice Cromwell, in Eastside Sex Workers, also required, I

find that GSSD has expended the resources necessary for a "well -developed

factual setting." The factual nexus of the action arising from the closure of

Theodore School has been thoroughly canvassed, particularly given the

lengthy and detailed testimony provided by the Director of Education, Dwayne

Reeve, and through cross-examination of Kelly Kunz who, as a member of the

Catholic faith, petitioned for the creation of a separate school board. Their

testimony revealed the reasons for closing Theodore School; the detailed plans

the school division made for its closure, including community meetings and

consultation; the efforts of the Theodore community to retain its school; the

formation of St. Theodore Roman Catholic School; the enrolment of non-

Catholic students in the school; and the consequences to GSSD’s ability to

control and manage its schools with an eye to accountability of the public

purse and effective education of its students. Marshalling these facts required

the type of resources and skills inherent in the administrative expertise

possessed by a public school division such as GSSD, and would be well

beyond the ability of almost any individual parent or ratepayer.

- 68 -

[135]

Although determining constitutional standing is dependent upon

the plaintiff’s ability to expend resources necessary for a well -developed

factual setting, I also recognize the defendants’ ability to marshal evidence

and argument to offer a vigorous counter position. CTT has received the

support of the Catholic Section of the SSBA. It has engaged with

representatives of the Public Section of the SSBA in pre -trial negotiations,

mediations, reference discussions and pre -trial motions. Clearly this issue is

hugely significant to Catholic education in Saskatchewan and beyond. Ken

Loehndorf testified about the interprovincial interest among Catholic

administrators. The Catholic Section and the Knights of Columbus have

helped fund the litigation. Dr. Paszek, one of CTT’s expert witnesses,

acknowledged interest in this case in Alberta's Catholic system. CTT also

enjoys the able and considerable assistance of the Government. I find that the

question of standing has received a vigorous, thorough and well -matched

evidentiary and legal airing.

[136]

I also find that another of Justice Cromwell’s criteria has been

satisfied, that "the case is of public interest in the sense that it transcends the

interests of those most directly affected by the challenged law or action."

Given evidence that a significant portion of enrolments in Catholic urban

schools is comprised of non-Catholic students, this litigation will obviously

have far-reaching consequences that transcend the interests of ratepayers in

either GSSD or CTT. Bert Degooijer, Chairperson of the Public Section,

testified about the Public Section’s efforts to garner funds to pursue an answer

to what the Public Section has called the “mandate question.” He testified that

13 of the Public Section's 15 member boards have financially supported this

- 69 -

litigation at various times, and 11 continue to do so. In my view, this

investment illustrates that what happens in Theodore will be important to

public and separate school boards of education throughout the province.

[137]

Of the guidance Justice Cromwell offered, I place considerable

importance on his instruction to inquire whether “there are realistic alternative

means which would favour a more efficient and effective use of judicial

resources.” In this vein, I agree with the statement in Sara Blake’s “Standing

to Litigate Constitutional Rights and Freedoms in Canada and the United

States,”²⁶drawn from the case law (Borowski, Nova Scotia Board of Censors v

McNeil [1976] 2 SCR 265 [McNeil] and Thorson v Attorney General of

Canada [1975] 1 SCR 138 [Thorson]), that before a court will allow a

concerned citizen to gain standing, “it may require him to attempt a resolution

of the issue by other means.”²⁷Citing Borowski, Thorson and McNeil, the

author suggests that before granting standing, courts have considered whether

the plaintiff has “engaged in political protests and lobbying, launched appeals

of administrative decisions as provided for by the challenged statute, and

requested Attorneys General to refer the law to the appropriate courts for

consideration of its validity.”

[138]

If these types of attempts to resolve a constitutional issue are a

measure of the legitimacy of standing, I find that GSSD has succeeded. It has

demonstrated a long-standing interest to determine the mandate question, well

before events in Theodore in 2003. Larry Huber, Executive Director of the

Public Section since 2003, described the concerns of the Urban Public Boards

²⁶Sara Blake in “Standing to Litigate Constitutional Rights and Freedoms in Canada and the United States,

“(1984) 16 Ottawa L Rev 66 at 72 [“Standing to Litigate”]

²⁷“Standing to Litigate”, at 71

- 70 -

Caucus, predecessor to the Public Section. During the late 1980s and early

1990s, the Caucus became concerned with the non-restrictive admission

policies at urban Catholic schools. While previously Catholic schools required

baptismal certificates and references from the parish priest, Mr. Huber

testified that these practices changed. As illustrative of its growing concern,

Regina Public School Division, under his directorship from 1990 to 1998,

sought a private legal opinion in 1997 respecting the mandate question. This

opinion was shared with the Saskatoon Public School Division and Minister of

Education, Patricia Atkinson. On April 20, 1998, Deputy Minister Craig

Dotson met with concerned directors of public school divisions. Minutes of

that meeting record “considerable discussion on issues of selective recruitment

[of non-Catholic students], competition [between Catholic and public schools],

and the implications of the legal opinion offered.”

[139]

Not only public boards were engaged in the evolving mandate

issue by the late 1990s. Twenty years earlier, in the November 10, 1978

Confidential Report, the Saskatoon Catholic School Board had already

identified looming issues that might arise from the growing numbers of non-

Catholic students in its elementary schools. Most significantly, this

confidential 1978 report contained an express caution:

All comparisons, particularly with the Public Board of

Education, must be carefully handled. We do not want an

open war for kids.

This lawsuit may be the type of “open war” the report’s author envisioned.

When parties cannot resolve disputes they often move to the courts. If, as long

as 40 years ago, the Saskatoon Roman Catholic School Board anticipated that

increased enrolment of non-Catholic students might instigate “an open war”

- 71 -

with the Public Board of Education, CTT’s current position (as endorsed and

supported by the Catholic Section) that GSSD should not have standing

appears disingenuous. The mandate question of Catholic schools has been

fomenting for 40 years, coming to a head in 2005 when GSSD commenced this

action. I see nothing in GSSD having standing that should be s urprising to

CTT. This action is more prophetic than surprising. The creation of Theodore

Roman Catholic School Division provided the factual nexus to drive litigation

that had long been brewing in the province. There is ample evidence that well

before this action Catholic and public school interests had been engaged in

high-level discussions, all in an effort to resolve the mandate issue.

[140]

Of these various efforts, I am particularly alive to the effort all

parties – Saskatchewan Justice, the Department of Education, and the Catholic

and Public Sections – took when they considered a formal reference to the

Saskatchewan Court of Appeal. Briefing notes prepared for The Department of

Education on September 7, 2006 by Wayne Beck, then Director of Education

in the Region 3 office, provide a concise history of how the constitutional

reference originated but ultimately did not proceed. The importance of the

proposed reference is evidenced by Cabinet’s involvement. It directed

Saskatchewan Learning to work with Saskatchewan Justice to explore the

possibility of a reference to the Court of Appeal. Mr. Beck wrote:

BACKGROUND:

 Over the years many of the public boards expressed

concerns about the funding of non-faith students in

Catholic schools.

 With the formation of Englefeld Protestant School

Division and Theodore Catholic Separate School

- 72 -

Division, in response to school closures, the concerns

were exacerbated.

 In June 2004, the Cabinet directed Saskatchewan

Learning to work with Saskatchewan Justice to explore

the possibility of a Constitutional Reference to the

Court of Appeal to develop questions to address the

areas of concern.

[141]

The possibility of a reference progressed to the point where

specific questions were formulated for the Court of Appeal’s determination.

As Mr. Beck stated in his briefing notes, the Catholic Section and the Public

Section were involved in drafting the questions, described by Mr. Beck as

follows:

. A consultative process was developed by

Saskatchewan Learning to draft sample questions

related to the issues of concern. Issues being

considered were:

o Does Section 17 of The Sask atchewan

Act give separate schools the

constitutional right to accept students

who are not of the minority faith?

o If separate school have a constitutional

right to accept non-minority faith

students, does the Government have the

authority to regulate or restrict that

right or to establish a maximum number

of non-faith students who may attend a

separate school?

o If the majority of students in a school

are not of the minority faith, is the

school a separate school within the

meaning of Section 17 of The

Sask atchewan Act.

o Does the Government have the authority

to base funding to separate schools only

on the number of students of the

minority faith or is there an obligation

- 73 -

to fund all students that attend the

school?

. The SSBA, the Urban Public Boards Caucus and the

Catholic Section were all part of the consultative

process to develop the questions.

[142]

The reference did not materialize. Mr. Beck’s notes explain why

and describe further events from February to June 2005:

 In February 2005, Cabinet directed the Departments of

Learning and Justice to proceed with the

Constitutional Reference process.

 In the spring of 2005, the Catholic Section of the

SSBA notified the Government that it was not in

support of the Constitutional Reference process, but

would rather explore other options to find solutions.

 In June 2005, the Cabinet gave direction not to

proceed with the Constitutional Reference process.

 In June 2005 seven new Catholic school divisions

were formed. Subsequently all seven school divisions

were disestablished and joined with larger Catholic

school divisions.

[143]

Mr. Beck explains that in June 2005, at the request of the Catholic

Section of the SSBA, Cabinet directed Saskatchewan Justice to ceas e

preparation of the reference.

[144]

The history of the cancellation of the reference augurs against

both the defendants’ objections to GSSD’s quest for standing. Initially, both

Cabinet and the Department of Learning endorsed a reference to seek answers

to the pressing constitutional questions. Saskatchewan Justice was instructed

to consult and prepare the constitutional questions. Court action was clearly

anticipated, the issues were readied and the mandate question was coming to a

head in a reference, an efficient and economical proceeding. That changed

- 74 -

when the Catholic Section of the SSBA decided not to participate and the

Government did not proceed. I fail to see how either CTT or the Government,

knowing that all parties were considering a constitutional reference, can object

when GSSD, a member of the Public Section of the SSBA, seeks answers to

questions posed in the reference.

[145]

If I were to pose the question whether GSSD took all necessary

steps “in order to make the question of [its] standing ripe for consideration” –

the inquiry applied in McNeil – I would, on the basis of the withdrawn

reference alone, find that it had. Moreover, I find evidence that even though

the reference was cancelled, GSSD, through the Public Section, participated in

further attempts to reach an agreement or understanding of the constitutional

rights of Catholic schools. As Mr. Huber testified, well after the action was

commenced, from November 2008 to October 2011, the Public Section

participated in 40 days of mediation with the Government and the Catholic

Section in an attempt to settle the issues raised in the action.

[146]

As Sara Blake described in her previously-referenced article,

“Standing to Litigate”, in determining the merits of standing, the court looks

for the plaintiff’s efforts to resolve an issue such as lobbying, political

protests, or a request to the Attorney General for a reference. Exemplary of

GSSD’s continued efforts to seek an answer to the constitutional conundrum is

the Public Section’s continued discussions and negotiations with successive

Ministers of Education and the Premier of Saskatchewan, hopeful of re -

initiating the cancelled reference. In correspondence of June 10, 2005 after th e

reference was cancelled, Wayne Steen of the Urban Public Boards Caucus

wrote to Premier Calvert, stating, “We believe that the Constitutional

- 75 -

Reference process needs to be put back on track and the time line that was

committed to be re-established.”

[147]

In summary, I find that GSSD has met the requisite tests to be

granted standing. To disallow standing on such a vital question with such

broad importance to the province would be tantamount to leaving an legal

lacuna respecting governmental action, alleged to be unconstitutio nal, without

judicial review.

PART THREE: IS ST. THEODORE ROMAN CATHOLIC SCHOOL A

SEPARATE SCHOOL?

[148]

GSSD argues that “St. Theodore is not a separate school.” GSSD

advances its position by first explaining the legitimacy of Yorkdale’s reasons

for closing the Theodore public school and then by examining the motives

why the community created a separate Roman Catholic school. GSSD states

that St. Theodore Roman Catholic School is a “community school,” not a

separate school. It states that prior to the petition for a separate school,

everyone anticipated that St. Theodore Roman Catholic School would have a

majority population of non-Catholic students in attendance. This fact was well

known by both the Catholic electors in the school attendance area and the

Government. St. Theodore Roman Catholic School opened with a majority of

non-Catholic students and continues to operate with a majority of non-

Catholic students.

[149]

The closure of Theodore’s public school and the creation of St.

Theodore Roman Catholic School are inexorably linked to rural depopulation

in Saskatchewan. I heard much evidence giving detail to two facts notoriously

- 76 -

known in Saskatchewan. First, Saskatchewan school boards often make

difficult decisions to close small rural schools and transport students to larger

centres – that has been happening in Saskatchewan for decades. Second, small

towns and villages see the closure of their schools as a death knell to the

community – a school closure can wring the last vestiges of commerce and

vitality from a community. In the early 2000s, the first fact faced Yorkdale

School Division; the second faced the village of Theodore.

[150]

Rural depopulation pitted the intentions of Yorkdale against the

interests of the community of Theodore. Tension was inevitable. I accept the

evidence of Dwayne Reeve. He provided a detailed explanation of the

Theodore school closure from his vantage point as Director of Education for

Yorkdale from 2000, continuing as director through two amalgamations with

other neighbouring school divisions until the formation of GSSD in 2005

where he continued as director until July 2015. Mr. Reeve’s directorship

coincided with a time when rural depopulation prompted school closures with

the provincial government providing strong incentives for school boards to

voluntarily amalgamate, incentives which later turned to mandatory

amalgamations. Clearly, Mr. Reeve’s tenure was commensurate with a time of

change and challenge. He arrived at Yorkdale after the board’s closure of

schools in the villages of Ebenezer and Wroxton. He oversaw the closure of

several schools in the division, including those in the villages of Bredenbury,

MacNutt, Rhein, Theodore and Willowbrook.

- 77 -

[151]

In a transcript of her examination for discovery read into the trial,

Darlene Thompson, the Government’s designated representative during pre -

trial questioning, explained that from 1996 to 2004 the number of school

divisions in the province contracted through voluntary initiatives from 118 to

approximately 80. The government decided to take further mandatory action

believing that voluntary amalgamations would not accomplish the goals of

fewer school divisions. By 2014-2015, 28 school divisions were present in

Saskatchewan: 18 public school, eight Roman Catholic, one Protestant and one

Conseil des écoles fransaskoises.

[152]

I also accept the evidence of Thomas Chell, witness for GSSD.

He testified about developments in Saskatchewan from 1997 to 2006 when he

was Regional Director with the Department of Learning for Region 1. He

described a Regional Director’s role as being the “eyes and ears for the

department,” reporting through monthly meetings with senior officials and,

similarly, meeting monthly with Directors of Education in his region. Mr.

Chell described these years as a “difficult time” in rural Saskatchewan. Rural

depopulation led to declining enrolment; crumbling infrastructure; increased

public expectations about programs and curriculum; schools using a fraction

of the space for which they were built; multi-grading; challenges with teacher

recruitment and retention in small centres; concerns and complaints about

rising mill rates; and dwindling budgets.

[153]

In summary, Mr. Reeve and Mr. Chell offered a myriad of reasons

to justify Yorkdale’s decision to close Theodore school. I find it unnecessary

- 78 -

to extensively review the reasons for and the manner in which Yorkdale went

about its decision. Under The Education Act, 1995, Yorkdale had statutory

authority to close the school and it acted throughout with the involvement and

approval of the Regional Director and the Department of Learning. Yorkdale

sought public input, provided ample statistical information to those requesting

it, and adhered to the legislation and department policy r especting school

closures. Yorkdale passed a motion of intention on December 16, 2002, stating

that the board would consider closing the Theodore School effective August

20, 2003 because of declining and low enrolment. Students would be

accommodated at Springside School, 17 kilometres distant, to bring its

enrolment to over 100 students. On April 28, 2003, the board moved that the

Theodore School be closed effective August 20, 2003. I find that Yorkdale

acted within the powers and duties of The Education Act, 1995 in closing

Theodore School and did so bona fide and responsibly. I heard no argument

from either defendant that Yorkdale acted inappropriately or without statutory

authority in closing Theodore School.

[154]

Now, turning to the efforts of the Theodore c ommunity to keep its

school open, I similarly observe that little is gained by extensively reciting the

numerous efforts that Theodore parents undertook to keep their school open.

Suffice it to say, community members were tenacious. They made several

presentations to the Yorkdale board, including proposals to close other

neighbouring schools (Springside and Willowbrook) instead of Theodore

- 79 -

which would have made Theodore School an “isolated” school to permit the

board to gain access to increased funding. They also asked the neighbouring

Shamrock School Division if it would incorporate their school district. They

proposed delaying closure, hopeful of increasing the school’s population.

They wrote letters to politicians, the Ministry and to Thomas Chell. They

formed a “Save Our School” committee. In these parental efforts I find little

unexpected about their efforts to save their school.

[155]

Respecting religious education, no evidence was presented that

anyone in Theodore was concerned about religious education i n Theodore

prior to the inevitability of the school’s closure. Kelly Kunz, a Catholic

ratepayer living in Theodore, provided frank testimony that the idea to create a

separate school division was brought forward by non-Catholic parents. I find

no evidence that Catholic parents in Theodore wished to educate their children

apart from the majority of non-Catholic children. Instead, both Catholics and

non-Catholics saw creation of a separate school, not as a constitutional right to

protect minority-faith education, but as an opportunity to keep their local

school open. The Education Act, 1995 provided the ready means to implement

that goal.

[156]

Nor was resorting to the separate school provisions of The

Education Act, 1995 a new-found idea in Saskatchewan to thwart a public

school division’s plans to close a rural school. I heard evidence from several

witnesses who testified that parents in Catholic -majority Englefeld,

Saskatchewan, a few years previously, invoked the separate school provisions

to create the Englefeld Protestant Separate School Division, the only

Protestant separate school division in Saskatchewan and with only one school.

- 80 -

[157]

The creation of Theodore Roman Catholic School Division was

unusual, but I find it to be a legitimate entity. The Catholic community in

Theodore followed the provisions of The Education Act, 1995 when it

petitioned for a separate school division. Accordingly, I will not explain, in

detail, the rather simple process that existed in 2003 to create a separate

school (a process that was subsequently amended to require a more prolonged

procedure). As a religious minority, Catholics in Theodore who chose to

attend a public meeting voted to create a separate school division. Neither the

Minister nor the government had any authority to veto that vote. In

compliance with the then-provisions of The Education Act, 1995, a petition

was submitted to the Minister to establish a Catholic school division. The

Education Act, 1995 states that the Minister “shall establish” a separate school

division by issuing the necessary documents.

[158]

Justice Wright in Saskatchewan Rivers School Division No. 119 v

Saskatchewan (Minister of Education), 2000 SKQB 390, 197 Sask R 218,

faced a similar issue when the public school division sought an order to quash

the Minister’s creation of St. Jude’s Roman Catholic School Division, which

soon amalgamated with a larger Roman Catholic school division. Justice

Wright stated:

[14] It must be remembered that the electors of the minority

faith in the West Central School District were exercising their

constitutional right. The obligation of the Minister to create a

separate school division at their behest is imposed upon him

by statute. That obligation finds its roots in The Constitution

Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, (U.K.),

1982, c. 11, The School Ordinance, O.N.W.T. 1901, c. 29 and

The Saskatchewan Act, 4-5 Edward VII, Chapter 42, of 1905

guaranteeing the rights of the minority ratepayers to establish

a separate school division. It is also noteworthy that it is not

- 81 -

electors of the minority faith, the only persons entitled to

notice, who are bringing this application.

[159]

I find that the late-come-upon idea for a separate school was a

means to an end – to keep an elementary school in Theodore by creating a

Roman Catholic school division. This newly created separate school division

with only one school – St. Theodore Roman Catholic School – soon

amalgamated with Yorkton Roman Catholic School Division and St. Henry

Roman Catholic School Division (in Melville, Saskatchewan) to become

Christ the Teacher Roman Catholic School Division, indicative that viability

of the new school division was better assured by joining established

neighbouring Roman Catholic School divisions. What the defendants say is

that once opened, the school was a true Catholic school and has operated as a

Catholic school ever since. As the Government puts it, the school “did

everything that was needed to ensure it offered and focused on a faith-based

education, from the priest who liberally sprinkled the school with holy water

to bless it, to the prayer said before every School Board meeting.”²⁸

[160]

The fact that a Catholic minority might create a Catholic school

without wanting their children to separate from the children of their non-

Catholic neighbours (indeed, where Catholic students would be a minority and

would be educated together with the majority-faith children) or that non-

Catholics would be eager to send their children to a Catholic school, was

beyond the imagination of the draftspersons of the Saskatchewan Act, or

Protestant and Catholic school leaders. Saskatchewan in 2003 had obviously

changed from Saskatchewan in 1905. I find that non-Catholic parents in

²⁸Government Trial Brief Para. 351

- 82 -

Theodore, like non-Catholic parents in other districts with Catholic schools,

chose to send their children to Catholic schools for various reasons.

Specifically, Carla Madsen, an active member of the United Church in

Theodore (the only church with regular services in Theodore) offered several

reasons why she comfortably sent her children to St. Theodore Roman

Catholic School: it was a “community school,” it was “close,” and it was

“important” that her children have a faith-based education.

[161]

I find that St. Theodore Roman Catholic School has honoured its

Catholic mandate in its classroom instruction and in the administration and

atmosphere of the school. I heard ample evidence that Catholic education is

based on the teachings and example of Jesus Christ, where the child’s spiritual

development is critical. I do not question whether St. Theodore Roman

Catholic School has fulfilled and continues to fill this mandate. Admittedly,

with only 26 students enrolled in 2014-2015 from kindergarten to grade 8, a

time might come when St. Theodore Roman Catholic School may have no

Catholic students enrolled. I muse at the oddity if a Roman Catholic school

were without Roman Catholic students.

[162]

The Minister had no authority to challenge any Catholic in

Theodore why he or she voted to create a separate school division. I agree

with the Government’s assertion that the decision to create a separate school

division rests with the religious minority.

[163]

The Government’s position at trial, though, is of a different spirit

than the views of the Ministry of Learning at the time of creation of the

Theodore Roman Catholic School Division. For example, the Briefing Note

- 83 -

prepared by Dr. Michael Littlewood, Executive Director of Schoo l

Legislation, on May 7, 2003, titled, “Issue: Process for Establishing a Roman

Catholic Separate School Division (Theodore)” candidly state d that what had

happened in Theodore was “inappropriate.” He wrote:

 The provisions for separate school divisions do not

exist to provide an alternative form of schooling for a

community. It is inappropriate for the provisions to be

used simply to maintain a school in a community in

which a public school is being closed.

[164]

Similarly, five months later, when St. Theodore Roman Catholic

School was operative, Dr. Littlewood’s Briefing Note of October 24, 2003,

titled, “Establishment of Roman Catholic Separate School Division in

Theodore” illustrates the department’s dissatisfact ion with happenings in

Theodore. Dr. Littlewood saw the “misuse of the constitutional provisions” as

undermining “the credibility and integrity” of the constitutional protections.

He wrote:

… the misuse of the constitutional provisions for purposes

unrelated to the provision of minority-faith education

undermines the credibility and integrity of the current

constitutional regime. It has the potential to inflame

relationships between public and separate school boards and

increases the potential for litigation in which the government

would be directly implicated.

[165]

Government viewpoints have changed from the time Dr.

Littlewood characterized the concerns of the Department of Learning in 2003

to the position the Government now takes in this lawsuit.

[166]

In any event, I find that St. Theodore Roman Catholic School is a

legitimate separate school. I deny the relief sought by GSSD that the court

- 84 -

should declare that St. Theodore Roman Catholic School is not a separate

school.

PART FOUR: IS FUNDING OF ST. THEODORE ROMAN CATHOLIC

SCHOOL A PROTECTED CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT UNDER SS. 93(1) AND

(3) OF THE CONSTITUTION ACT, 1867?

I. DIVERGENT POSITIONS RESPECTING OPERATION OF SS. 93(1)

AND 93(3)

A.

Essential Elements of GSSD’s Position

[167]

The interpretation of s. 93 is crucial in this action. It either allows

an aperture through which GSSD gains the chance to invoke the Charter or it

blocks Charter application. If funding of non-Catholic students is

constitutionally protected under s. 93, GSSD’s action fails because it loses the

opportunity to argue that the funding of non-Catholic students offends

ss. 2(a) and 15 of the Charter. Obviously GSSD argues for a narrow

interpretation of s. 93 rights; the defendants, a broad interpretation.

Nonetheless, common ground exists. Both seemingly agree that s. 93(1)

freezes and entrenches separate school rights as found in the 1901 Ordinances

so long as such rights fall within a doctrine called the “denominational

aspects” test. Both agree that this test was given its modern context by Justice

Beetz in Greater Montreal Protestant School Board v Quebec (Attorney

General), [1989] 1 SCR 377 [Greater Montreal]. Earlier uses of the term

“denominational aspects” can be found in Protestant School Brd. of Montreal

v Minister of Education and has been endorsed in subsequent Supreme Court

decisions: English Catholic Teachers; Mahe; and Reference re: Education Act

(Que.), [1993] 2 SCR 511 [Reference re Education Act (Que.)].

- 85 -

[168]

Since Justice Beetz’s articulation, the denominational aspects test

has since been frequently paraphrased and perhaps was most clearly adopted

by Chief Justice Dickson in Mahe in answer to a question he posed as follows

at 382-383:

In that case [Greater Montreal Protestant School Board v. Quebec

(Attorney General), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 377], Beetz J., writing for the

majority, held that the phrase "Right or Privilege with respect to

Denominational Schools" in s. 93(1) of the Constitution Act, 1867,

means that the section protects powers over denominational aspects

of education and those non-denominational aspects which are related

to denominational concerns which were enjoyed at the time of

Confederation. The phrase does not support the protection of powers

enjoyed in respect of non-denominational aspects of education

except in so far as is necessary to give effect to denominational

concerns. …

[169]

This articulation of the denominational aspects test does not

readily give up the nature of the test. A plainer introductory statement might

state the test as the types of allowances and conduct that must be afforded to

Catholic schools as being essential to their proper functioning, to ensure that

the goals of Catholicism and the Catholicity of the school are protected as

intended under the 1901 Ordinances (in Saskatchewan).

[170]

Insofar as s. 93(1) is concerned – that no provincial legislation

can lessen separate school rights existing at union – the parties apparently

agree: if provincial legislation falling outside of the denominational aspects

test is not constitutionally entrenched under s. 93(1) it may be exposed to

Charter review. However, the parties’ interpretation of s. 93(3) – that

provincial separate school legislation can be passed post -union – is a different

matter. The defendants lean heavily on their view of this constitutionally-

protected, provincial right. They say s. 93(3) gives the province a wide-

- 86 -

ranging ability to enact post-union separate school legislation with complete

immunity to Charter review. On the other hand, while GSSD also accepts that

s. 93(3) allows the province to enact separate school legislation after 1905 , it

submits that the denominational aspects test applies to both s. 93(1) and 93(3)

rights. The defendants separate s. 93(1) guaranteed rights, frozen at 1905,

from s. 93(3) rights created post-1905. They assert that while the

denominational aspects test applies to qualify s. 93(1) rights, it does not apply

to post 1905 legislation under the s. 93(3) power .

[171]

Relying upon Mahe and the principle that only denominational

aspects of education are protected, GSSD states that two steps are involved to

determine the extent of constitutional rights under s. 93. First, respecting

s. 93(1), the rights must have existed in law under the 1901 Ordinances and

they must be rights relevant to the denominational aspects o f separate schools.

Second, respecting s. 93(3), the rights may be enacted post -1905, but just like

constitutionally protected rights under s. 93(1), s. 93(3) rights will avoid

Charter scrutiny only if they either protect a denominational aspect of

education or a non-denominational aspect necessary to give effect to a

denominational aspect of education. Failing this test, legislation, whether

under the 1901 Ordinances (protecting existing rights) or post -1905 (creating

new school rights) is exposed to Charter scrutiny.

[172]

Whether the denominational aspects test applies to both s. 93(1)

and s. 93(3) powers, GSSD and the defendants are essentially at odds over the

meaning to be attributed to certain of Justice Wilson’s statements in Reference

re Bill 30. In that case, Ontario’s Attorney General posed reference questions

- 87 -

to the Ontario Court of Appeal, ultimately decided by the Supreme Court of

Canada, asking whether a Bill to fund Catholic high schools was a valid

exercise of the provincial power under ss. 93(1) or (3) of the Constitution Act,

1867. The court was asked to consider both subsections to obviate any further

controversy respecting rights of Roman Catholic school supporters. The court

found that Bill 30 was a valid exercise to add to the rights of Roman Catholic

school supporters under the combined effect of the opening words of ss. 93

and 93(3). The court also found the Bill a valid exercise of the province’s

power to return rights constitutionally guaranteed to separate schools by s.

93(1) of the Constitution Act, 1867 since a proper interpretation of rights at

confederation necessarily included funding Catholic high schools.

[173]

The defendants say that Justice Wilson found that the s. 93(3)

power stands independently from the rights under s. 93(1). The de fendants say

that Justice Wilson, without regard to the doctrine of “denominational

aspects,” straightforwardly stated that s. 93(3) powers are free from Charter

review. GSSD disagrees. It says that Justice Wilson’s statement is not as free -

ranging as the defendants suggest. Charter immunity follows s. 93(3)

legislation, but only, as Justice Wilson wrote, “in relation to denominational,

separate or dissentient schools.” GSSD emphasizes this phrase as pivotal in its

assertion that Justice Wilson did not say that the province’s exercise of its

plenary power over education was free from the denominational aspects test.

Only when the province legislates under its plenary power within the confines

of the denominational aspects test, i.e. “in relation to denominational, separate

or dissentient schools,” is the province a master of its own house. GSSD states

that since the Ontario legislation in question in Reference re Bill 30 was,

- 88 -

indeed, legislation of a denominational concern – the funding of Catholic

students in Ontario high schools – her statements must be read in that context.

B.

Essential Elements of the Defendants’ Position

[174]

The defendants proffer a nuanced approach to s. 93, saying it has

three components. The first is the opening phrase of s. 93 which grants a

general plenary legislative power to the province over education. Little need

be said of this general power as it confers similar powers as other provincial

powers under s. 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867. Any legislation respecting

education enacted solely under this general plenary power is subject to

Charter scrutiny.

[175]

In distinction to the general plenary power, the defendants

contend that s. 93(1) and s. 93(3) operate independently of each other, s. 93(1)

looking backward to freeze and protect rights as found in the 1901 Ordinance

and s. 93(3) looking forward to permit new legislated rights respecting

religious education in the province. Of these two subsections, the defendants

look principally to s. 93(3) since, in their view, s. 93(3) provides a legislative,

post-1905 right to the province to fund non-Catholic students in Catholic

schools. The defendants say that if the right to fund non-Catholic students lies

within s. 93(3) the court need neither delve into a historical analysis of the

1901 Ordinance to see if such right existed pre -union, nor decide whether

funding of non-Catholic students is a “denominational right” – both tasks

being required under a s. 93(1) analysis. The Government suggests that in the

interests of “judicial restraint” the funding of non-Catholic students can be

dealt with solely and quickly under s. 93(3). The Government interprets

Justice Wilson’s statements as providing blanket Charter immunity if post-

- 89 -

union legislation enacts religious minority education rights: “It authorises the

Province to go beyond the constitutionally protected rights which existed at

Confederation, even to the point of creating new separate school systems for

religious minorities.”²⁹

[176]

The defendants also rely upon the statements offered after

Reference re Bill 30, in Adler at para 48, as illustrative of the province’s broad

plenary powers under s. 93(3) where the court commented on the s. 93(3)

power:

48 One thing should, however, be made clear. The province remains

free to exercise its plenary power with regard to education in

whatever way it sees fit, subject to the restrictions relating to

separate schools imposed by s. 93(1). Section 93 grants…the power

to legislate with regard to public schools and separate schools.

However, nothing in these reasons should be taken to mean that the

province’s legislative power is limited to these two school systems.

In other words, the province could, if it so chose, pass legislation

extending funding to denominational schools other than Roman

Catholic schools without infringing the rights guaranteed to Roman

Catholic separate schools under s. 93(1). …

[177]

The Government addresses the vernacular used by Justice Wilson

in Reference re Bill 30 when she describes s. 93(3) as a “plenary power”

saying that confusion has arisen from her characterization of the plenary

power. The Government suggests that the court has used the phrase “plenary

power” to describe different aspects of the province’s jurisdiction under the

opening phrase of s. 93 and under s. 93(3). As clarification, the Government

suggests a “first” and “second” plenary power. The first plenary power is the

province’s power over education in the sense that all the pr ovincial heads of

power in s. 92 are plenary giving the provinces jurisdiction to regulate within

²⁹Government Trial Brief Para. 15

- 90 -

the field of education. The second plenary power, the Government says, is

what the Supreme Court cited in Reference re Bill 30, more colloquially

known as the “section 93(3) power.” The Government states that s. 93(3)

allows the province to enact post-union legislation to deal with minority

religious education and permits the province to add to denominational school

rights without Charter scrutiny. The Government succinctly states its position:

“The issues of school attendance, school funding, and the creation of a

separate school are therefore not subject to Charter review and this action

should be dismissed on that basis.”³⁰

[178]

The defendants say that even if funding of non-Catholic students

was not part of the Ordinances of 1901, the province has the ability under

s. 93(3) to augment separate school rights under the s. 93(3) power, including

the funding of non-Catholic students at Catholic schools, all without Charter

scrutiny.

[179]

The Government contends that because the 1901 Ordinances are

silent as to student admission at separate schools, under the s. 93(3) plenary

power Saskatchewan has exercised the choice to not impose any restriction on

the attendance of non-minority faith students at separate schools. While the

Ordinance set up the structure of separate schools, it left the issue of

attendance to separate school boards and parents, thereby keeping the

government out of the arena of regulating a person’s religious values and

beliefs. Furthermore, because s. 53 of The Education Act, 1995 specifically

gives to boards of education of separate school divisions the same rights and

³⁰Government Trial Brief Para 7

- 91 -

powers as other school divisions, the Government posits both public and

separate schools have the authority to adopt an open attendance policy. This

statutory framework is an exercise of the province’s s. 93(3) power over

separate schools, free of Charter review.

[180]

The Government completes its distinction between s. 93 (3)

enabling powers and s. 93(1) protecting powers by submitting that the

denominational aspects test has never been used by any court to limit new

rights and privileges being granted by the province pursuant to its s. 93(3)

plenary power. The Government asserts that the denominational aspects test is

the domain of s. 93(1), creating a core of separate school rights and privileges,

not limiting an expansion of those privileges.

[181]

GSSD and the defendants present to the court widely different

interpretations of Justice Wilson’s statement. Ultimately, I must determine

whether GSSD’s interpretation of the statements in Reference re Bill 30 is

valid. If I agree with GSSD, Charter immunity will be limited to those rights

accorded under the 1901 Ordinances or any po st-1905 provincial legislation

under s. 93(3) only if they fall within the scope of the denominational aspects

test.

C.

1. The Legal Framework of s. 93 of the Constitution Act, 1867

[182] Given the parties’ discrepant positions, I must determine the

Analysis

operative framework of s. 93 of the Constitution Act, 1867. Case law shows s.

93 does not easily yield its meaning. Section 93(1) necessarily requires a

determination of the legal rights accorded separate schools under the 1901

- 92 -

Ordinances, a constitutionalized “snapshot.”³¹Depending on the province,

sometimes the snapshot includes rights given “by law” (as in Ontario) and

sometimes by “law or practice” (as in Manitoba), thereby requiring reference

to pre-union ordinances, statutes and practice s. As successive provinces

gained provincial status, s. 93 was altered, sometimes by adding nuanced

phrases, sometimes by deleting others, as under the Manitoba Act, 1870, and

sometimes by replacing entire provisions, as in the Saskatchewan Act.

[183]

The extensive s. 93 case law adds complication including cases

from the Privy Council and several from the Supreme Court of Canada both

before and after the Charter’s enactment.³²Threading a consistent and

coherent line of interpretation through these cases is chal lenging and

optimistic.

[184]

While the opening clause of s. 93 gives the provinces jurisdiction

over education, thereafter follow curtailments of this power. Section 93(1)

provides a guarantee, a minimum assurance, that a province cannot lessen the

rights of classes of persons respecting denominational schools as they stood at

the time of union or, as in Saskatchewan, under the 1901 Ordinances. If a

province did not have denominational schools at the time of union, no rights

were guaranteed under s. 93(1) and it was inoperative. Section 93(2) is of little

moment in this action since it manifestly applies only to the P rovinces of

Ontario and Quebec.

³¹A term Justice Gonthier used in Reference re Education Act (Que),at p 539; adopted by Justice Iacobucci in

Adler at para 42.

³²Barrett; Brophy; Ottawa Separate SchoolsTrustee v Mackell,[1917] AC 62 (PC) [Mackell]; Ottawa Separate

Schools Trustees v Ottawa Corporation,[1917] AC 76 (PC); Hirsch v Protestant School Commissioners of

Montreal,[1928] AC 200 (PC) [Hirsch]; Roman Catholic Separate School Board v The King, [1928] AC 363

(PC); Attorney General of Quebec v Greater Hull School Board, [1984] 2 SCR 575 [Greater Hull]; Reference

Re Bill 30; Greater Montreal; Reference Re Education Act (Que.); Ontario Home Builders’ Association (SCC);

Adler; Public School Boards’ Assn. of Alberta v Alberta (Attorney General), 2000 SCC 45, [2000] 2 SCR 409.

- 93 -

[185]

While s. 93(1) froze time to the 1901 Ordinance, s. 93(3) looked

forward and recognized not only that separate schools might exist at union but

that a province might decide after union to establish separate schools or add to

the rights of existing separate schools. Regardless, a right of appeal lay to the

Governor General in Council if the province undertook any act t hat abrogated

the rights of separate schools. And, under s. 93(4) , recourse lay with

Parliament to enact remedial legislation if a province failed to execute a

decision of the Governor General in Council.

[186]

Aside from Manitoba, notwithstanding the “invitation” under

s. 93(3), no province has legislatively established a system of faith-based

separate schools after union where none existed before. While Manitoba

Catholics attempted to exercise the appeal mechanism of s. 93(3) in the

Brophy matter in 1895 to invoke the remedial provision of s. 93(4), their

attempt was unsuccessful. Since Brophy, s. 93(3) and (4) have been referred to

in the case law to aid in interpreting s. 93 denominational rights (for example

Tiny Separate School Trustees v The King, (1928) AC 363 (PC) and Reference

re Bill 30), but the appeal powers under s. 93(4) have never been successfully

used even though the provision is now 150 years old.

[187]

To appreciate the workings of ss. 93(3) and (4) one must cast

one’s mind to legal principles of Canada’s Victorian age when legislation,

once passed, was supreme. No constitution protected freedom of religion,

speech or equality. In 1867 the protection of minority rights had to be

creatively accomplished. Sections 93(3) and (4) exemplified such means

respecting minority faith schools. Although never used, Parliament reserved

the right to step into the provincial realm of education if either the federal

- 94 -

cabinet thought that a province was not complying with s. 93 or a province did

not heed the cabinet’s decision under a s. 93(3) appeal.

[188]

Having studied the respective positions of the parties, particularly

in light of the Reference re Bill 30, I find that rights are constitutionally

protected and no provincial legislation can derogate from such rights so long

as:

1.

They are found under the 1901 Ordinances, concern a right

or privilege affecting a denominational school and are

enjoyed by a class of persons;

2.

They meet the requirements of the denominational aspects

test, i.e. the rights prejudicially affected relate to a

denominational aspect of education or

a

no n-

denominational aspect of education necessary to give effect

to denominational concerns (Greater Montreal and Mahe);

3.

4.

In addition to the inability of the legislature to derogate

from such protected rights, they are also immune from

Charter review because one constitutional document (the

Charter) cannot override the provisions of another

constitutional document (the Constitution Act, 1867); and

If constitutionally protected under s. 93(1), such rights

cannot be subsequently abrogated by provincial legislation

without exposing such diminishing legislation to appeal to

the cabinet.

[189]

On the other hand, rights under s. 93(3) allow provincial

legislation to augment existing rights or establish new denominational schools,

post union. These rights can be characterized as follows:

1.

Since newly enacted, they are not constitutionally

“guaranteed” under the Constitution Act, 1867 in the same

way as s. 93(1) rights so that, unlike s. 93(1) rights, a

- 95 -

province can remove or amend such rights and privileges as

it sees fit (at 1197-98 of Reference re Bill 30);

2.

Although subject to the province’s right to amend or repeal

such legislation, they are immune from Charter review, but

not because such rights are constitutionally guaranteed

under the Constitution Act, 1867, but because Charter

immunity comes from “the guaranteed nature of the

province’s plenary power to enact that legislation,” so long

as such rights are necessary to give effect to

denominational aspects of education and to non-

denominational aspects of education necessary to give

effect to denominational concerns.

3.

Similar to s. 93(1) rights, if the provincial legislature

abrogates rights under s. 93(3), an appeal lies to the cabinet

and Parliament can enact remedial legislation.

[190]

The defendants will strongly disagree with the insertion of the

underlined phrase in the above paragraph. They submit that s. 93(3) allows the

province to legislate, post-union, and most importantly that such legislation is

not subject to the denomination aspects test and Charter review. GSSD,

though, insists that the denominational aspects test applies to both s. 93(1) and

s. 93(3) powers and restricts Charter immunity to those rights necessary to

ensure the denominational rights of separate schools. I agree with GSSD’s

interpretation of the s. 93(3) power.

2. Four Reasons Why the Denominational Aspects Test Applies to

s. 93(3)

[191]

I have determined that legislation under ss. 93(1) and 93(3) can

be Charter-immune but to gain this immunity the legislation must be equally

- 96 -

subjected to the denominational aspects test. I have reached this decision for

four basic reasons:

1.

A review of the case law shows the denominational aspects

test has been applied to both s. 93(1) and s. 93(3) powers.

2.

Applying a denominational aspect test to pre-union

legislation but not to post-union legislation augurs

unreasonable results.

3.

Allowing legislation, unprotected under the 1901

Ordinances (and therefore exposed to Charter scrutiny), to

gain legitimacy under s. 93(3) as post-union legislation

(because it augments the rights of separate school) with the

consequence that it is Charter-immune without any

qualification of the denominational aspects test, gives the

Government carte blanche to enact any legislation it

chooses under s. 93(3) without Charter overview.

4.

The defendants, having premised their case on evidence

that funding of non-Catholic students was a right under the

1901 Ordinances, have chosen to advance their case under

s. 93(1) and cannot simultaneously advance their case

under s. 93(3) which necessarily requires evidence that the

impugned act or legislation arose after 1905.

[192]

I will address each of these four reasons, in turn, under separate

headings.

a. Does case law support applying the denominational aspects test to s.

93(3) power?

[193]

GSSD and the defendants are locked in a tug-of-war over the

meaning to be attributed to Justice Wilson’s statements in Reference re Bill

30. To illustrate its point, GSSD quotes Justice Wilson’s statement with bold

emphasis and, as a counterpoint, the Government does similarly with

underlined emphasis, as follows at p 1198:

…The section 93(3) rights and privileges are not guaranteed in the

sense that the s. 93(1) rights and privileges are guaranteed, i.e., in the

- 97 -

sense that the legislature which gave them cannot later passlaws which

prejudically affect them. But they are insulated from Charter attack as

legislation enacted pursuant to the plenary power in relation to

education granted to the provincial legislatures as part of the

Confederation compromise. Their protection from Charter review lies

not in the guaranteed nature of the rights and privileges conferred by

the legislation but in the guaranteed nature of the province's plenary

power to enact that legislation. What the province gives pursuant to its

plenary power the province can take away, subject only to the right of

appealto the Governor Generalin Council. But the province is master

of its own house when it legislates under its plenary power in

relation to denominational, separate or dissentient schools.

[194]

Seldom do litigants so strongly braced against each other se ek

support for their competing positions in the same judicial statement.

Respecting the underlined segment, the Government states the “rights and

privileges…enacted pursuant to the province’s plenary power…was the

bargain of confederation, and the Charter must respect it.”³³Respecting the

bolded segment, GSSD says the Justice Wilson “is not saying that the exercise

by the Province of its plenary power in education is beyond Charter review

for all purposes.”³⁴Only when the province enacts legislation “in rel ation to

denominational or separate or dissentient schools” is it Charter-immune, a

phrase GSSD equates to the denominational aspects test.

I am not surprised that the parties leverage Justice Wilson’s statement to

different ends. With respect, I find Justice Wilson’s statements respecting the

powers under s. 93(3) confusing since she interchangeably refers to the s.

93(3) power and to the general plenary power under the opening phrase of s.

93. I am unclear if she sees s. 93(3) power as completely separat e from the

general plenary power, as a subset of the general plenary power, or as the

³³Government Opening trial Brief Para 114.

³⁴GSSD Trial Brief Para 62

- 98 -

same power. The Government apparently also sees this quandary because, as

explained previously, it states that a measure of confusion has arisen from the

Supreme Court’s characterization of the plenary power over education.³⁵In

any event, Justice Wilson found that Ontario’s proposed funding of Catholic

high schools was constitutionally protected under s. 93(1) because, at

confederation, Roman Catholic separate school suppo rters had a right to have

their children receive an education, including instruction at the secondary

school level. Accordingly, because the proposed legislation only did what was

protected under pre-union school enactments contemplated by s. 93(1), she

found the funding of secondary Catholic schools was constitutionally

protected. And, being constitutionally protected, such funding was shielded

from Charter review, because one part of the constitution cannot override

another.

[195]

However, among the reference questions in Reference re Bill 30,

the court was asked whether the proposed legislation could also be

constitutionally upheld under the s. 93(3) power which allows post -union

legislation to augment separate school rights. Justice Wilson held that the

proposed legislation could fall within the province’s legislative ability under

s. 93(3), but such rights were not guaranteed in the same sense as s. 93(1)

rights. Unlike legislation in force at union, legislation enacted post -union

under s. 93(3) was subject to the province’s right to amendment and repeal. As

she said at p 1198, “the province is master of its own house when it legislates

under its plenary power in relation to denominational, separate or dissentient

35

Government Opening Trial Brief para. 102: “There is a measure of confusion in the Supreme Court’s

characterization of the plenary power over education. This confusion is linguistic – the phrase plenary is used to

describe multiple aspects of the provinces’ jurisdiction under section 93. The Court’s broad usage of the phrase

“plenary” is not incorrect, per se, but confusion arises between the inconsistent uses.”

- 99 -

schools.” Unlike pre-union rights and privileges which the province cannot

abrogate, s. 93(3) rights and privileges are subject to the right to appeal to the

federal cabinet. She wrote precisely on this point at p 1197:

… It is clear from the wording of s. 93(3) that post Confederation

legislation referred to in that subsection may be subsequently

amended or repealed by the legislature which passed it in a way

which affects rights or privileges initially granted by it. The only

recourse if such occurs is an appeal to the Governor General in

Council. It cannot be concluded, therefore, that rights and privileges

conferred by post-Confederation legislation under s. 93(3) are

“guaranteed” within the meaning of s. 29 in the same way as rights

or privileges under s. 93(1).

[196]

Having distinguished s. 93(1) rights as being guaranteed under

the Constitution Act, 1867 from s. 93(3) rights as lacking a similar guarantee,

the next question was whether s. 93(3) rights were insulated from Charter

review. If the province can add and subtract from separate school rights under

s. 93(3) with the only censure being an appeal to the Governor General in

Council, can such rights enjoy immunity from Charter review? One might

think that absent constitutional protection under the Constitution Act, 1867,

any post-union legislation affecting separate schools would be exposed to

Charter review. However, Justice Wilson found that s. 93(3) enactments

enjoyed a measure of Charter immunity because they were shielded by the

“guaranteed nature of the province’s plenary power to enact [such]

legislation.” She concluded at p 1199, stating:

64. I would conclude, therefore, that even if Bill 30 is supportable

only under the province's plenary power and s. 93(3) it is insulated

from Charter review.

[197]

This broad statement suggests that when a province accepts the

implicit invitation under s. 93(3) to pass legislation augmenting separate

school rights, the legislation gains Charter immunity notwithstanding that the

- 100 -

province can repeal it (subject to the right of appeal to the Governor General

in Council). This conclusion, at first glance, suggests that the defendants’

assertion may be correct: any legislation passed under the s. 93(3) power i s

Charter immune.

[198]

However, I find that Justice Wilson’s statements must be placed

in context of the specific articulation of the denominational aspects test.

Justice Wilson found that the proposed legislation to fund Catholic high

schools could be supported by either the s. 93(1) protection (since the

legislation reflected a pre-union right) or the s. 93(3) power (since it would

augment separate school rights). Justice Wilson did not invoke the

“denominational aspects test” in her analysis of either s. 93( 1) protection or s.

93(3) power (not surprisingly, because the test was not formalized until two

years later in Greater Montreal). However, all parties in this action agree that

s. 93(1) protection applies if the rights existed in pre -union law, but only if

they satisfy the denominational aspects test. While Justice Wilson does not

refer to the denominational aspects test, she nonetheless finds that the

proposed legislation is Charter-immune regardless whether it is enacted to

preserve rights under s. 93(1) or to enhance rights under s. 93(3). Even though

Justice Wilson did not expressly apply the “denominational aspects test” to

reach her conclusion respecting s. 93(1), the defendants accept the test is

appropriate to qualify Charter immunity under s. 93(1). If s. 93(1) enactments

draw the denominational aspects test without Justice Wilson’s express

application, I do not accept that the absence of Justice Wilson’s express

application of the test to s. 93(3) powers means she considered the test as

irrelevant to s. 93(3).

- 101 -

[199]

I am not surprised with the dearth of discussion respecting the

application of the “denominational aspect test” in Reference re Bill 30. Justice

Wilson’s statements were offered 40 years ago in the gap between two seminal

decisions from her court. Three years earlier, in 1984, in Greater Hull, the

court determined that a new system of school financing based on government

grants offended rights guaranteed by s. 93(1) because, among other reasons,

the legislation did not provide grants on a proportionate basis. Without using

the exact term “denominational aspects test,” Justice Chouinard approvingly

quoted Francois Chevrett, Herbert Marx & Andre Tremblay, Les problèmes

constitutionnels posés par la restructuration scolaire de l'île de Montréal,

(Québec, Department of Education, 1972) at 22 [Les problèmes

constitutionnels],who explained the intended purpose of s. 93(1) in words that

encapsulate the principles of the denominational aspects test. The quotation, in

translation, states:

[T]he spirit of s. 93 seeks to guarantee the denominational status of

education as that status existed in 1867, that is, in relation to

education provided in dissentient schools in the province and in the

schools of Montréal and Québec. In this regard, the ultimate aim of

the section is a religious one, and that aim was undoubtedly given

constitutional form. The question remains whether only that aim was

so treated, or whether certain concrete means of achieving it were as

well, namely a number of powers and administrative devices to

ensure that the denominational status of education would be

respected and maintained in practice. There is also no doubt of the

answer to this question: constitutional form was also given to a

number of means of achieving the result, and the wording of s. 93

itself seems clear in this regard, since it speaks of any "Right or

Privilege with respect to Denominational Schools" rather than

referring merely to "denominational schools".

[200]

This statement was the modern forerunner of the denominational

aspects test. Five years later (and two years after Reference re Bill 30), in

- 102 -

1989, in Greater Montreal, Justice Beetz approvingly cited and requoted the

Les problèmes constitutionnels statement. He then set out the authoritative

statement that s. 93(1) protects the denominational aspects of

denominational schools necessary to

give effect to denominational

guarantees. After Greater Montreal, his statement was repeatedly quoted whenever

s. 93(1) protected rights were set against a Charter challenge. (Among other

citations, Mahe and English Catholic Teachers; Hall (Litigation Guardian) v

Powers (2002), 213 DLR (4^{t h}) 308 (Ont Sup Ct) [Hall])

[201]

I also find that notwithstanding the absence of the term

“denominational aspects test” in Reference Re Bill 30 – as one would expect

since the decision pre-dates Greater Montreal – Justice Wilson essentially

provides an analysis of the legislation which models the denominational

aspects test. She carefully reviewed Ontario’s pre-union separate school

legislation and concluded that funding was “fully consistent with the clear

purpose of s. 93.” She wrote at p 1196 a statement that, just as aptly as the

statement of the learned authors or the formal denomi national aspect test

articulated by Justice Beetz, encapsulates the same principles:

… [separate schools in Ontario] were entitled to the proportionate

funding provided for in s. 20 of the Scott Act. This conclusion, it

seems to me, is fully consistent with the clear purpose of s. 93,

namely that the denominational minority's interest in a separate but

suitable education for its children be protected into the future. I

would therefore conclude…that Bill 30, which returns rights

constitutionally guaranteed to separate schools by s. 93(1) of the

Constitution Act, 1867, is intra vires the Provincial Legislature.

[Emphasis added.]

[202]

This statement is essentially a formulation of the denominational

aspects test. She finds that the proposed funding legislation was pivotal to

sustain Catholic education – a finding paralleling the denominational aspects

- 103 -

test. She then concludes that the legislation was Charter-immune under either

the s. 93(1) protection or the s. 93(3) power. To say that Justice Wilson’s

analysis requires the denominational aspects test as a necessary pre-condition

to determine Charter immunity under s. 93(1), but not s. 93(3), is a difficult

distinction to sustain.

[203]

Further clarity can be gleaned from Justice Wilson’s paraphrasing

and quoting of the Court of Appeal’s statement respecting Charter immunity

and separate school legislation. She wrote at p 1164:

…

The majority added by way of caveat that its decision in this case did

not mean that separate schools were completely immune from

scrutiny under the Charter. Not at all. They were shielded from

review only in their essential Catholicism. The majority stated at p.

576:

Laws and the Constitution, particularly the Charter, are

excluded from application to separate schools only to the

extent they derogate from such schools as Catholic (or in

Quebec, Protestant) institutions. It is this essential Catholic

nature which is preserved and protected by s. 93 of the

Constitution Act, 1867 and s. 29 of the Charter. The courts

must strike a balance, on a case by case basis, between

conduct essential to the proper functioning of a Catholic

school and conduct which contravenes such Charter rights

as those of equality in s. 15 or of conscience and religion in

s. 2(a). Thus, the right of a Catholic school board to dismiss

Catholic members of its teaching staff for marrying in a civil

ceremony, or for marrying divorced persons, has been

upheld as permissible conduct for a separate school board,

but would the same protection be afforded a board which

refused to hire women or discriminated on the basis of race,

national or ethnic origin, age or disability? [Emphasis added]

[204]

Justice Wilson’s comment, “Not at all” in response to the

rhetorical question whether separate schools were completely immune from

- 104 -

Charter scrutiny contradicts the defendants’ assertion that post -union

legislation is unshackled by the denominational aspects test.

[205]

The Government agrees that the formulation of the

denominational aspects test is a “recent” formulation. It states: “The fine

distinction between the two categories of protected rights [non-denominational

and denominational rights] is a recent formulation, though it has antecedents

in early Judicial Committee of the Privy Council jurisprudence.”³⁶I agree with

the Government’s statement of denominational aspects test “crystallizing in

the decision of Justice Beetz in Greater Montreal” (two years after Reference

re Bill 30). The “recent” formulation of the denominational aspects test,

crystallizing in Greater Montreal, explains why Justice Wilson did not

expressly name or endorse the denominational aspects test in her allowance of

the funding of Catholic high schools whether under s. 93(1) or s. 93(3). In

either instance such funding was a denominational aspect of Catholic

education or a non-denominational aspect necessary to give effect to a

denominational aspect of Catholic separate schools .

[206]

The Government also states, “The denominational aspects test

has, to date, never been used by the Supreme Court or any other Court as an

internal limit to new rights and privileges which may be granted by the

province pursuant to its plenary power in section 93(3).”³⁷This point may

well be accurate. But, one must ask the corollary question: “Has any case been

presented to the court where a ‘new’ or additional right has been given a

separate school and someone has challenged the addition of that new or

³⁶Government Opening Trial Brief Para 98

³⁷Government Opening Trial Brief Para 122

- 105 -

additional right as infringing the Charter?” I know of none and none was cited

to the court.

[207]

The appropriate interpretation of Reference re Bill 30 has been

the subject of comment by Peter W. Hogg in Constitutional Law of Canada,

loose-leaf (2016-Rel 1) 5^{t h}ed, vol 2 (Toronto:Carswell, 2016) at 57-9 [Hogg

or Constitutional Law] affirming that s. 93(3) powers are Charter-protected,

but only if they further the denominational aspect of separate schools. He

wrote:

It does not follow from the Ontario Separate School Funding

Reference that the Charter of Rights has no application to a law

establishing or extending a denominational school system of a kind

contemplated by s. 93(3). On the contrary, all of the Charter

guarantees, including the equality guarantee, apply to such a law,

with just one exception. The exception is that the law may

discriminate on the basis of religion to the extent necessary to give

the school system its denominational character. The exception is

what is decided by the Ontario Separate School Funding Reference.

But a denominational school law could not authorize discrimination

on the basis of race, or any other ground that was not necessary to

the denominational character of the schools. Nor could the law

provide for unreasonable search or seizure, or cruel and unusual

punishment, or anything else prohibited by the Charter, unless the

provision was necessary to the denominational character of the

schools. [Emphasis added.]

[208]

Professor Hogg’s commentary in Constitutional Law at 57-9

assists me in settling the dichotomous interpretation of Reference re Bill 30 in

favour of finding that regardless whether s. 93(1) or s. 93(3) rights are sought

to be shielded from Charter challenge, only those rights satisfying the

denominational aspects of separate school gain such protection. I agree with

Professor Hogg that the s. 93(3) power shelters legislation from Charter

review only if it satisfies the denominational aspects test.

- 106 -

[209]

Although I am satisfied that s. 93(3) power attracts the

denominational aspects test, I will address another Supreme Court decision the

Government and GSSD raised. In Adler, Jewish and Christian parents argued

that because Reference re Bill 30 ensured that Catholic secondary students

received funding, and because the government had historically funded public

secular schools, the government’s failure to fund other faith-based schools

infringed Charter rights. The Ontario Court of Appeal denied the applicants’

request, deciding that Catholic separate schools were constitutio nally unique

and that the public school system was solely secular and did not discriminate

because it did not provide public funding for religious education. I find that

the Supreme Court offered a complex analysis which, in my respectful view,

left ambiguity.

[210]

GSSD and the Government seized upon this ambiguity. Each cited

adjacent portions of Justice Iacobucci’s decision in Adler as supportive of its

contrary view of s. 93(3). Illustrative of the elusiveness of Justice Iacobucci’s

statements, GSSD cites paras. 47 and 49 of his decision, using ellipses to omit

paragraph 48; the Government cites paragraph 48 but omits paragraphs 47 and

49. I quote the three paragraphs bearing the original bold and underlined

emphasis placed by the Government:

47 This protection exists despite the fact that public school rights are

not themselves constitutionally entrenched. It is the province’s

plenary power to legislate with regard to public schools, which are

open to all members of society, without distinction, that is

constitutionally entrenched. This is what creates the immunity from

Charter scrutiny. To paraphrase Wilson J., in Reference Re Bill 30,

supra, at p. 1198, funding for public schools is insulated from

Charter attack as legislation enacted pursuant to the plenary

education power granted to the provincial legislatures as part of the

- 107 -

Confederation compromise. If the plenary power is so insulated, then

so is the proper exercise of it.

48 One thing should, however, be made clear. The province

remains free to exercise its plenary power with regard to

education in whatever way it sees fit, subject to the restrictions

relating to separate schools imposed by s. 93(1). Section 93 grants

to the province of Ontario the power to legislate with regard to

public schools and separate schools. However, nothing in these

reasons should be taken to mean that the province’s legislative power

is limited to these two school systems. In other words, the province

could, if it so chose, pass legislation extending funding to

denominational schools other than Roman Catholic schools without

infringing the rights guaranteed to Roman Catholic separate schools

under s. 93(1). See the words of Gonthier J., writing for the Court, in

Reference re Education Act (Que.), supra, at p. 551. However, an

ability to pass such legislation does not amount to an obligation

to do so. To emphasize, s. 93 defines the extent of the obligations of

the province to set up and fund denominational schools when public

schools are established. In this respect, it is a comprehensive code

thereby excluding a different or broader obligation regarding

denominational schools, while not restricting the plenary power of

the province to establish and fund such other schools as it may

decide.

49 Furthermore, it should be pointed out that all of this is not to say

that no legislation in respect of public schools is subject to Charter

scrutiny, just as this court’s ruling in Reference Re Bill 30 did not

hold that no legislation in respect of separate schools was subject to

Charter scrutiny. Rather, it is merely the fact of their existence, the

fact that the government funds schools which are, in the words of the

Lord Chancellor, in Brophy, supra, at p. 214, “designed for all the

members of the community alike, whatever their creed” that is

immune from Charter challenge. Whenever the government decides

to go beyond the confines of this special mandate, the Charter could

be successfully invoked to strike down the legislation in question.

[211]

Paragraph 47 takes its meaning from the preceding paragraph and

refers to Ontario’s legislation at confederation when Catholic parents could

choose to allocate taxes to either the local separate school or the common

school, giving them a choice between the two publicl y funded systems. Justice

Iacobucci found that this choice was “an integral part of the Confederation

compromise” and was therefore protected against Charter attack.

- 108 -

[212]

In paragraph 48, Justice Iacobucci states that under the plenary

power the province could fund all religious schools if it chose to, but without

any obligation to do so. Most significantly, I find paragraph 49 , which the

Government did not quote, is on point with the crux of this action. He affirms

that nothing in Reference re Bill 30 holds that all legislation respecting

separate schools will be Charter-immune. His statement that “this court’s

ruling in Reference re Bill 30 did not hold that no legislation in respect of

separate school was subject to Charter scrutiny” cannot be squared with the

Government’s statement in its trial brief that “The province’s plenary power

itself is not subject to Charter review. That power is a constitutional power

granted to the Legislature and is not affected by the Charter.”³⁸

[213]

Further, I do not see how Justice Iacobucci’s bold statement

accords with another statement the Government offers. In its opening trial

brief the Government gives a nod to certain application of the Charter to post-

union legislation, at least in limited instances. It states:

The Charter still applies to denominational school legislation which

exceeds the mandate of section 93 and the constitutional compromise

therein. For example, legislation which prohibited all persons of a

certain race from attending minority religious schools would very

probably violate the Charter, despite notionally pertaining to

separate school.³⁹

[214]

I agree with the Government statement that what “exceeds the

mandate of section 93 and the constitutional compromise therein” is the

measure of legislation that attracts potential Charter scrutiny. I disagree that

only egregious Charter infractions, such as racial discrimination, trigger

Charter review. I can think of no logical reason why exposure of legislation to

³⁸Government Trial Brief Para 27

³⁹Government Opening Trial Brief Para 124

- 109 -

Charter review would be dependent upon the seriousness of the Charter

infraction. Instead, saying legislation that exceeds the “mandate of s. 93”

(using the Government’s phrase) is subject to Charter review is simply

another way of saying what Justice Wilson said in Reference re Bill 30, that

legislation within “the clear purpose of s. 93” is immune from Charter

scrutiny. Both phrases, in my view, are a restatement of the denominational

aspects test.

b. Do unreasonable results arise if the denominational aspects test is

applicable to s. 93(1) but not to s. 93(3) rights?

[215]

The defendants’ position gives rise to unreasonable results. They

balance their position on the fulcrum of September 1, 1905, the date

Saskatchewan gained provincial status. All parties agree that if, on that date, a

right was found in the 1901 Ordinances it is saved from Charter review under

s. 93(1), so long as the right satisfies the denominational aspects test. If,

however, the province enacted separate school legislation after September 1,

1905, the defendants say it is Charter-immune under s. 93(3), without

qualification. Much confusion would arise from such a result.

[216]

For example, if after 1905 Saskatchewan created new

denominational schools for Jews (the defendants suggest creation of new

religious schools, not necessarily Protestant or Roman Catholic, is possible

under s. 93(3)), the rights of the Jewish schools would not be subject to

Charter review even if such rights did not meet the denominational aspects

test because the legislation (in the words of s. 93(3)) was “thereafter

established.” On the other hand, Catholic schools with rights intact as of 1901

would only have Charter immunity against provincial encroachment to the

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extent that the denominational aspects test applied to protect such rights. So,

furthering the example, the imagined and impugned provincial legislation

might disallow discrimination on the grounds of race when hiring teachers. In

face of a Charter challenge, if such discrimination failed the denominational

aspects test of both the Catholic and Jewish schools, Catholic schools could no

longer discriminate, but Jewish schools could discriminate because they were

established post-1905. This result illustrates the many difficulties with the

defendants’ assertion of the Charter-free status of post 1905 separate school

legislation. Charter infringement versus Charter immunity cannot be balanced

on such a capricious difference.

[217]

Nor can I accept the position that s. 93(3)’s invitation to

“thereafter establish” a system of separate or dissentient schools is so

powerful as to allow the result suggested by the Government, namely 1) to

permit the province to create a “new separate school system for religious

minorities;” and 2) to shield such legislation from Charter review. If, for

example, the province today were to use its s. 93(3) powers to create and fund

Jewish schools (clearly a minority in Saskatchewan) but refuse to create or

fund Buddhist schools, I can see no resort to the plenary power to shield such

obviously unequal treatment from Charter scrutiny.

[218]

I take a more restrictive view of the s. 93(3) power than the

defendants advocate. In light of the entirety of s. 93, s. 93( 3) permits, after

union, additional rights to be given to existing dissentient (Roman Catholic

and Protestant schools) and to establish dissentient schools in a province

where none existed at union. Although not particularly important to decide, I

view the expansive power of s. 93(3) being restricted to the creation of

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separate Roman Catholic and Protestant schools, not any type of religious

schools as the Government suggests. It is difficult to imagine that in 1867 the

Fathers of Confederation were concerned with protecting non-Christian

religions when the 1861 census data show 0.7% of the population of the

uniting provinces was not Catholic or Protestant. In any event, whether

granting additional rights to existing dissentient schools or creating dissentient

schools after union, Charter immunity is only gained if the additional rights

and privileges given to such separate schools are denominational rights. Rights

given post-1905 which do not protect a denominational aspect of minority

faith education can fare no better in withstanding a Charter challenge than

pre-union rights. Both must further a denominational aspect of minority faith

education. To gain Charter immunity, the quality of rights that impugned

legislation cannot take away from separate schools under s. 93(1) is the same

quality of rights that can be added to separate schools under s. 93(3). What the

province is constitutionally prevented from taking away under s. 93(1) is the

same that the province can constitutionally add under s. 93(3) – that is,

denominational rights. In either case, the legislation is free from Charter

review.

c. Does Government’s reliance on s. 93(3) power give it carte blanche

to avoid the Charter?

[219]

The defendants’ position respecting s. 93(1) and 93(3) gives the

impugned legislation an ever-present constitutional justification. If the plenary

power over education is so assured of Charter immunity, an easy avenue to

avoid Charter review presents itself whenever a right is not protected under s.

93(1) because it either was not found in the Ordinances or it was not a

denominational right. One can simply assert that the right is found in the s.

- 112 -

93(3) power as post-union action or legislation enlarging separate school

rights and cite Reference re Bill 30 as giving blanket immunity from Charter

review.

[220]

The Government attempted such an argument in Fancy v

Saskatoon School Div. No. 13, 1999 20579 () (SK HRT)

[Fancy]. The complainants alleged violation of The Saskatchewan Human

Rights Code, SS 1979, c S-24.1 which guaranteed the right to enjoy education

without discrimination because of race, creed or religion. Section 182 of The

Education Act, 1995 permitted the school board to open the school day with

the Lord’s Prayer or a Bible passage as the Minister of Education prescribed.

The complainants challenged both practices. The issue was whether the 1901

Ordinances constitutionally entrenched such practices and, consequently,

shielded them from human rights scrutiny (analogous to Charter scrutiny in

this action). The 1901 Ordinance stated that no religious exercises were

permissible except one half hour at the end of the school day but expressly

allowed the Lord’s Prayer as part of opening exercises at the board’s direction.

Former Justice Kenneth Halvorson found that the Ordinances shielded the

school board’s practice of reciting the Lord’s Prayer at the beginning of the

day. However, Saskatoon public schools were allowing Bible passages to be

read at varying times of the school day, not limited to after 3:30 p.m. The

Attorney General of Saskatchewan relied upon the province’s s. 93(3) power

and cited Reference re Bill 30 to support the practice of reading Bible

passages other than at the end of the day, essentially saying religious practices

could be broadened under the s. 93(3) power beyond the Ordinances to

immunize the legislation from human rights review (analogous to immunizing

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funding for non-minority faith students in this action). Mr. Halvorson

described the Attorney General’s position as follows:

[88] Insofar as s. 182(3) allows Bible readings at the school

opening, it is inconsistent with s. 137 of the 1901 Ordinance

which allows religious instruction after 3:30 pm. The

Attorney General advanced two reasons why the

constitutional protection of s. 137 remains to shield s. 182(3)

from the [Act]. Firstly, the Attorney General submits s. 182(3)

can be justified under the plenary powers of the Legislature to

legislate with respect to education under s. 93 of the

Constitution, as recognized by the Supreme Court of Canada

in Reference Bill 30, supra. Alternatively, it can be justified

as an example of the "living tree" approach to progressive

constitutional interpretation. As society evolves, the scope of

a constitutional provision can evolve with it, as recognized in

Edwards v. Attorney General for Canada , [1930] A.C. 124

(P.C.).

[221]

Mr. Halvorson gave little credence to either the plenary power or

the living tree argument, stating, “It is unnecessary for the Board of Inquiry to

venture very far down the road of plenary power and ‘living tree’

interpretation.” He found that the school board’s practices were not within the

mandate of the 1901 Ordinance and concluded, “The practice of Bible

readings in public schools must cease, and the Board of Inquiry so orders.”

[222]

I find that the Attorney General’s attempt in Fancy to invoke a

general plenary power to broaden provincial education legislation beyond the

ambit of the 1901 Ordinances to skirt Saskatchewan’s human rights legislation

is akin to its attempt in this action to suggest post-1905 legislation broadens

funding to non-Catholic students beyond the 1901 Ordinances regardless

whether such legislation meets the denominational aspects test.

[223]

Unlike the attempt by Saskatchewan’s Attorney General in Fancy

to invoke a plenary power to avoid human rights legislation concerning public

- 114 -

schools, I see no similar attempt in other jurisdictions in similar cases to

support post-union legislation in face of a Charter challenge. For example, in

Canadian Civil Liberties Association v Ontario (Minister of Education)

(1990), 65 DLR (4^{t h}) 1 (Ont CA) [Canadian Civil Liberties] the Ontario Court

of Appeal, without mention of any plenary power over education, held that a

provincial regulation providing for religious ins truction in public schools with

a curriculum of predominantly Christian teachings offended s s. 2(a) of the

Charter even though parents could have their children opt out of the class. Nor

in Zylberberg v Sudbury Board of Education (1988), 65 OR (2d) 641 (Ont CA)

[Zylberberg] did the board of education attempt to invoke the plenary power

when the Ontario Court of Appeal struck down a regulation requiring religious

exercises for the opening and closing of each school day in public schools as

being offensive to s. 2(a) of the Charter.

[224]

Hall exemplifies this point and, unlike Canadian Civil Liberties

and Zylberberg, concerns a separate school. The Catholic school board denied

permission to a grade 12 student to bring his boyfriend to the school prom as

such conduct “would be seen both as an endorsement and condonation of

conduct…contrary to the Catholic church teachings.” In granting an

interlocutory injunction restraining the school from preventing the student

from bringing his boyfriend to the prom, Justice MacKinnon held that the

school’s decision was not justified under s. 93(1), both because the specific

right in question was not in effect in 1867 and because the conduct in question

did not go to the denominational nature of a Catholic school. If the plenary

power under s. 93(3) could stand separately from s. 93(1), one would have

- 115 -

expected the Catholic School to have invoked such an argument. However, the

case is bereft of any discussion of the s. 93(3) power.

[225]

The absence of any attempt to invoke plenary powers to gain

Charter immunity in the above cases suggests that the Government, both in

this case and its attempted argument in Fancy, reaches for the s. 93(3) power

to avoid scrutiny under either the Saskatchewan Human Rights Code, SS 1979,

c S-24.1 or the Charter. If, as in Fancy, the impugned legislation is not

protected by the 1901 Ordinances, or goes beyond the denominational aspects

tests of s. 93(1), the Government suggests it can characterize the legislation as

a post-union augmentation of separate school rights under the s. 93(3) power.

Then, citing Reference re Bill 30, it argues that the legislation is immune from

Charter scrutiny with disregard to the denominational aspects test. The

Government attempts to use the province’s s. 93(3) power under s. 93(3) to

permit the province a free-wielding hand in giving non-denominational rights

to either separate schools (as in this action) or public schools (as in Fancy).

[226]

A dissentient school system must seek, at its core, to protect

aspects of education necessary to ensure the rights and privileges to educate

children in the tenets of the minority faith. I agree with the Government that

the implied allowance to create separate schools post -1905 informs the

interpretation of the s. 93(3) power. However, informing is not reinventing.

The s. 93(3) power does not enfranchise the province to reinvent the character

of separate schools and create any type of minority school rights as it might

choose without Charter scrutiny. Separate school rights created after 1905

(under s. 93(3)) must, in principle, be like separate school rights under the

Ordinances. They must protect a denominational aspect integral to the

- 116 -

education of the minority faith to be immune from Charter scrutiny. No power

gives licence to the province to create or maintain separate schools with

disregard to the denominational aspects of separate schools and to the Charter.

To be able to create a new regime of separate schools without a true

denominational aspect could not have been the intention of Parliament in 1905

and can find no favour under the Charter.

d. Does defendants’ evidentiary basis preclude reliance on s. 93(3)?

[227]

Throughout the trial the defendants have singularly asserted that

the right to admit and fund non-Catholic students is protected as a

denominational right under the 1901 Ordinances. They have argued that the

protection afforded Catholic schools emanates from s. 93(1) which they agree

attracts the censure of the denominational aspects test before being

safeguarded from Charter review. On the other hand, to genuinely advance the

s. 93(3) argument, they must assert that the right to admit and fund non-

Catholic students was, in relation to September 1 , 1905 and in the words of

s. 93(3), “thereafter established.” If the right to fund non-minority faith

students originated under the 1901 Ordinances and was not “thereafter

established,” s. 93(1), not s. 93(3), must apply. However, the defendants

presented significant evidence from expert witnesses, provided voluminous

excerpts from Hansard, vigorously cross-examined Dr. Dixon respecting the

status of Catholic schools under the 1901 Ordinances, and mounted detailed

and lengthy arguments, all to advance a contrary position: funding of non-

Catholic students was a right firmly anchored in the 1901 Ordinances and

enabled under legislation and regulation since then. Having singularly

mounted an evidentiary basis to establish that funding of non-Catholic

- 117 -

students was a guaranteed right under the 1901 Ordinances, the defendants

cannot, at the same time, invoke s. 93(3) which is predicated on rights being

established after 1905.

[228]

Indeed, once the defendants committed their position to proving

that the rights to admit and receive funding for non-Catholic students was part

of the 1901 Ordinances, it is impossible to present contrary evidence at the

same time that such rights were established after union. Although one might

be able to present arguments in the alternative, one cannot present facts in the

alternative. As the saying goes, “You cannot ride a horse in two directions at

the same time.” Constitutional protection must emanate from either ss. 93(1)

or 93(3), and each requires a unique factual underpinning. But one cannot

mount s. 93(3) arguments on s. 91(1) facts. In any event, regardless of the

direction the horse is ridden, it will encounter the obstacle of the

denominational aspects test before gaining the measure of Charter immunity

that the defendants advocate.

[229]

In summary, I do not accept the defendants can maintain that

funding of non-Catholic students is a post-1905 right or privilege with

automatic Charter-free status. The entirety of the defendants’ evidence

attempted to establish that funding of non-Catholic students was a right

protected by the 1901 Ordinances, not legislation enacted post -1905. I have

explained the inconsistent and unreasonable results if Charter immunity

balances on the temporal fulcrum of Saskatchewan’s status as a province.

Even if I were to consider that funding of non-Catholic students is a right

protected by post-1905 legislation, my reading of the case law would not give

such legislation automatic Charter, home-free status. Finally, if legislation or

- 118 -

action not part of the 1901 Ordinances can be considered a post-1905

augmentation of separate school rights which draws no censure from the

Charter, then any and all separate school rights enacted post -1905 are free of

Charter scrutiny while pre-1905 rights are not.

II. IS THE FUNDING OF NON-CATHOLIC STUDENTS A RIGHT

FOUND UNDER THE 1901 ORDINANCES AND, IF SO, DOES THE

RIGHT SATISFY THE DENOMINATIONAL ASPECTS TEST?

A.

Section 93(1) – A Two Step Inquiry

[230]

Engaging the protection of s. 93(1) requires satisfaction of the

two steps described in English Catholic Teachers at para 30. First, as applied

in the circumstances of this action, the right must be found in the 1901

Ordinances, be enjoyed by a class of persons and be prejudicially affected.

The second step, as described in Greater Montreal and thereafter coined the

“denominational aspects test,” is really an elaboration of the nature of

prejudice that must be found. To be guaranteed, the right must relate to a

denominational aspect of separate schools.

[231]

The first question is primarily answered by examining the

Ordinances and applying interpretative principles relevant to the unique task

of elevating ordinances enacted in 1901 by the North-West Territories

Legislative Assembly to the status of constitutional protection. During the

trial, the parties led monumental amounts of evidence to aid in the

interpretation of the 1901 Ordinances. Because Canada’s constitutional

protection of minority education originated in Central Canada and reflected

Catholic and Protestant attitudes during a Victorian era, the parties necessarily

provided evidence of religious and educational attitudes in Canada before and

- 119 -

during the confederation negotiations and nearly 40 years later when

Saskatchewan gained provincial status. As well, GSSD and CTT led evidence

respecting the changing theological teachings of the Catholic Church over

several decades, the political climate both in Canada and the North-West, and

local practices in various schools districts in the Territories. The parties

invested heavily in expert evidence including GSSD’s experts, Dr. Dixon, Dr.

Hexham, and Dr. Beaujot and CTT’s experts, Dr. Peters, Dr. Paszek and Dr.

Groome. Each party offered evidence from historical writings, voluminous

reports from Hansard respecting parliamentary and senate debates, Sess ional

Papers, newspaper clippings, letters, affidavits, census reports, and Northwest

Territories Reports, all efforts to convince the court that non-Catholic students

did or did not attend Catholic schools and receive funding as a right under the

1901 Ordinances.

[232]

Merely finding a right existed under pre -union law, however,

requires further examination of whether that right concerned a denominational

aspect of education, because s. 93(1) protects only those rights “with respect

to separate schools.” Non-denominational rights, even those found in the 1901

Ordinances, are not protected under s. 93(1).

- 120 -

B.

Essential Elements of GSSD’s Position

1.

GSSD Submits 1901 Ordinances Did Not Include Right to Fund Non-

Minority Faith Students

[233]

GSSD asserts that the 1901 Ordinances did not provide Catholic

schools a right to admit and receive commensurate funding for non-Catholic

students, and if such right existed under the 1901 Ordinances it was neither a

denominational right nor a non-denominational right of Catholic schools.

Encapsulating the parties’ evidentiary bases and legal arguments would

require a condensation of dozens of pages from trial briefs, volumes of

exhibits, and reference to hundreds of pages of trial transcripts. At best, I can

provide a summary of the parties’ respective arguments with findings of

seminal facts stated in the “Analysis” portion that follows.

[234]

GSSD presents several historic themes, attempting to establish the

religious, political and educational climate leading to the Saskatchewan Act, to

determine the nature of the rights and privileges that the 1901 Ordinances

protected. GSSD asserts that developments within the Catholic Church and

societal changes since 1905 cannot justify current funding of non-Catholic

students in Catholic schools because such funding does not honour the purpose

for which the schools were intended, namely to educate Cat holic children

separated from the non-Catholic majority. I will describe GSSD’s position

under the following sub-headings.

Historical Background of Separate Schools

[235]

GSSD points to Dr. Dixon’s report, that mid-nineteenth century

Canada saw a movement away from church operated and financed schools to

- 121 -

publicly funded, “mixed” schools, a movement that was anathema to Catholic

teachings. Pope Pius IX condemned mixed schools and in 1846 published Qui

Pluribus, a papal encyclical, with an attached Syllabus of Er rors, three of

which pertained to mixed schools. Denounced as a doctrinal error was the

following belief: “Catholics may approve of the system of educating youth

unconnected with Catholic faith and the power of the Church…” GSSD also

cites another papal encyclical of 1897 (Affari Vos) issued in response to the

Manitoba School Question and Bishop Tache’s response to changes in The

School Ordinance, ONWT 1894, c 9 (widely seen as diminishing Catholic

influence in schools. Both expressed a singular concern for education of

Catholic children in their parents’ faith, without any concern for the education

of non-Catholics. GSSD cites the historical record as illustrative that the

singular purpose of separate schools was to allow parents to educate their

children in the tenets of the Catholic faith, separate and apart from non-

Catholic children.

Development of Saskatchewan’s School Systems

[236]

GSSD points to historical reports of the Department of Education

showing that in 1905 public schools in Saskatchewan outnumbered separate

schools by approximately 100 to 1. From the first Ordinances in 1884 to

December 31, 1904, 1,212 public school divisions were formed in the

Territories with only 15 Roman Catholic and three Protestant separate schools

during that time. In Saskatchewan, in 1904 -1905, only seven Roman Catholic

and two Protestant separate schools are reported. GSSD also cites the

relatively few students attending Catholic separate schools compared to public

schools: in 1898 enrolment in Catholic separate schools was 739 students; in

- 122 -

other schools it was 16,015 students. GSSD does not articulate what

conclusions or inferences the court should draw from these statistics but

presumably the demand for separate Catholic education i n 1905 was neither

pressing nor predominant.

Non-Catholic Attendance at Catholic Separate Schools

[237]

GSSD states as “hardly surprising” that non-Catholic students

may have attended Catholic separate schools at or near 1905. Certain separate

schools evolved out of early mission schools, before the advent of public

schools, leaving “remnants” of non-Catholic students to continue attending

mission schools. Some separate schools, such as those operated by the Faithful

Companions of Jesus in Calgary, offered the amenities of a boarding school or

high school, thereby attracting non-Catholic students. Another reason for non-

Catholic attendance might have included remoteness of an accessible public

school. GSSD criticizes the paucity and quality of evidence CTT offers

respecting non-Catholic students’ attendance at Catholic schools and suggests

that if attendance of non-Catholic students had a denominational significance

to Catholic schools, historical evidence should be available, particularly when

CTT specifically directed its expert historians to conduct research into this

subject. GSSD asserts that whether or not some non-minority faith students

attended separate schools during the currency of the Ordinances is ultimately

irrelevant. Their attendance cannot change the denominational purpose for

separate Roman Catholic schools.

- 123 -

Evolved Catholic Doctrine

GSSD accepts that post-Vatican II (1962-1965) Catholic doctrine

[238]

evolved to be more accommodating of other faiths. However, GSSD suggests

that whether or not the 1901 Ordinances include the right of Catholics to

educate non-Catholic students cannot be determined by reference to shifting

Catholic theology. GSSD points out from the report of Dr. Peters, CTT’s

expert, that after Vatican II the Church “changed drastically” to permit

“greater trust between members of different religions and associating with one

another [no longer was]…seen as being a hazard to one’s eternal salvation as

it might have been a century ago.” GSSD says that a more accurate Catholic

description of non-Catholics in 1905 would have been as “schismatics” and

“heretics,” as Bishop Bolen testified. GSSD says that this Catholic sentiment

more appropriately reflects whether Catholic schools had or even wanted the

right to accept non-Catholic students in 1905.

Recent Attendance Trends

[239]

GSSD refers to the Saskatoon Catholic Board of Education’s of

November 10, 1978 Confidential Report and the statistical data showing

increasing enrolments of non-Catholic students in Catholic schools, quoting

the statement that “[b]esides the increased number of non-Catholic students in

our schools, there are other indicators which suggest we are being regarded as

an alternate school system rather than a separate school system for Catholics

only.” GSSD suggests that far from being a separate school system for

Catholics only, Catholic schools have become an alternate school system

providing a faith-based education in the Catholic tradition. It says that since

- 124 -

the 1978 Report, non-Catholic student attendance has become “a province-

wide phenomenon.” GSSD cites Mr. Pawlawski’s testimony that when he was

employed by the Saskatoon Catholic School Division around 1987, non-

Catholic enrolment was approximately 25 to 30 percent and Ken Loehndorf ’s

testimony that, on average, approximately 30 percent of students in North

Battleford’s separate school were non-Catholic at the end of his administration

at Light of Christ Roman Catholic School Division. This trend, GSSD

suggests, shows a veering away from the purpose of Catholic schools with a

“significant impact on the operations of Saskatchewan’s public schools.”

Public Christian Education in a Catholic Context

[240]

GSSD addresses the testimony presented by CTT’s non-Catholic

parent witnesses who have chosen to send their children to Catho lic schools:

John Anderson, Michael Sinclair, Carla Madsen, Kevin Weins, and Michelle

DuRussel, being of Christian persuasion, and Ayaz Ramji, being of the

Muslim faith (whose spouse is Christian). They testified that they preferred

the Christian values inherent in Catholic education over the secular education

offered in public schools. Since the principle of state neutrality has largely

driven historically predominant Christianity from public schools, Catholic

schools have become increasingly attractive to non-Catholic parents who

either endorse the Catholic faith or are prepared to accept its basic tenets as

superior to secular public education. Kevin Weins, a Mennonite pastor whose

two children attend St. Volodymyr Roman Catholic School in Saskatoon,

expressed these sentiments. When asked about the commonalities between his

faith and Catholicism, he explained that the “big one” was the “centrality of

the figure of Jesus Christ, his person, his crucifixion, his death, his

- 125 -

resurrection, his ascension, the triune God…[and] the role of the Bible as an

authoritative statement of how to live our life in accordance with God’s

direction.” As other parents, Pastor Weins believes that parents should have a

choice to send their children to either public or Catholic schools.

[241]

Julian Pawlawski, former Executive Secretary of the Public

Section of the SSBA, acknowledged that, “there are a very large number of

non-Catholic people who access Catholic schools … because of the faith

dimension.”

[242]

GSSD states this use of Catholic schools by non-Catholic parents

shows that a different purpose is now being served by Catholic schools, other

than ensuring that Catholic traditions are protected for Catholic s when they

are a minority in a school attendance area.

Evolution of the School Ordinances

[243]

GSSD refers to the evolution of the School Ordinances from 1884

to 1901. It suggests that the term “separate schools,” as used in the first

Ordinance in 1884, illustrates that the intent was to separate or detach

minority faith students from the majority. GSSD looks to the 1884 Ordinance

which required all schools to be designated either Protestant or Catholic,

whichever formed the majority in the district. The first established school was

the public school and all children would attend it. Only when a Protestant or

Catholic minority in the district wished to separate their children from the

majority was a separate school created. The essence of Catholic schools was to

separate from the majority, inimical to any suggestio n that the same

Ordinances countenanced admission and funding of non-Catholic students.

- 126 -

[244]

GSSD also looks to the 17 year period of School Ordinances from

1884 to 1901 and the widely accepted reality that amendments consistently

tended to erode minority control over education. As exemplary of this

tendency and the subsequent reaction of the Catholic Church, GSSD cites s. 25

of the 1884 Ordinance which permitted a separate school district to include

areas adjacent to an existing public school district. This mo re liberal

allowance to form a separate school was removed in the 1886 Ordinances,

limiting separate schools to the boundaries of existing public school districts.

A prominent Catholic clergyman in the North-West, Reverend Father Leduc,

expressed his concern that forming Catholic schools had become more

difficult and would be “fatal to the interests of the minority” since Catholics

residing within the limits of a public school district may not have been

numerous enough to form a “separate district” as they formerly could when

they were able to “join their fellow catholics residing immediately outside of

these limits.”⁴⁰GSSD cites Father Leduc’s writing as proof that the Catholic

leadership was solely concerned about educating Catholic children, not non -

Catholic children.

Historical Record

[245]

GSSD looks to the Sessional Papers (1894) as “replete” with the

sentiment that the primary Catholic concern during the amendments to the

Ordinances was control over the administration and educational content,

curriculum and books in Catholic schools. Church le aders focused on

maintaining Catholic doctrine and faith within separate schools, without

mention of educating non-Catholic students. GSSD states that only members

⁴⁰Pp. 61-97 of the SessionalPapers (No 40C) 1894

- 127 -

of the religious minority could petition for the creation of a separate school

and, when created, only members of that faith could vote for the election of

trustees. Having voted to separate, these minority-faith members would not

likely have wanted the right to educate the group from whom they separate d.

[246]

Respecting the Government’s reference to Hansard as illustrative

that non-minority faith students attended separate schools, GSSD cautions that

admitting the contents of Hansard debates as proof of facts does not accord

with judicially stated cautions. GSSD cautions against reliance upon

parliamentarians’ speeches because the school debates were coloured by

partisan bias and speakers often lacked comprehensive knowledge of the

situation in the West.

2.

GSSD Submits Funding of Non-Minority Faith Students is Not a

Denominational Right

[247]

Although GSSD maintains that no right existed under the 1901

Ordinances to admit and receive funding for non-Catholic students, it also

addresses the second step in the s. 93(1) analysis, that if such right existed it

did not protect a denominational aspect of Cathol ic education. Aside from the

historical record which GSSD says allows no other interpretation, it looks to

statements offered by the Privy Council in Hirsch and Reference re Education

Act (Que.) These two cases are significant. I have extensively referred to them

in my later analysis.

- 128 -

C.

Essential Elements of the Defendants’ Position

1.

Defendants Submit 1901 Ordinances Include Right of Funding for Non-

Minority Faith Students

[248]

The defendants say that a “snapshot” of the 1901 Ordinances

establishes a right for Catholic schools to admit and receive funding for non-

Catholic students. The Government asserts that the 1901 Ordinances were

silent as to admission of students and did not limit admission in separate

schools to the members of the minority faith. The Gove rnment relies upon the

absence of any provision in the 1901 Ordinances restricting attendance as

evidence that a right or privilege existed to admit non-minority faith students

in separate schools: “Nothing in the Ordinance restricted school attendance

based on religion.”⁴¹

[249]

The Government looks to Hansard and parliamentary debates as a

counterpoint to the evidence presented by GSSD’s expert, Dr. Dixon. The

Government suggests he offered “Ontario-centric” research with limited

western sources when he described the unlikelihood of non-Catholic students

attending Catholic schools before 1905. The Government suggests that a truer

picture of the intended result of incorporating the 1901 Ordinances lies in an

understanding made apparent from the Parliamentary debates of 1905. The

Government relies upon Prime Minister Laurier’s original introduction of the

Autonomy Bills into Parliament on February 21 , 1905 which, if passed, would

have carried the stronger minority school provisions of the North-West

Territories Act, 1875, SC 1875, c 49 not the 1901 Ordinance, into the new

provincial constitution. Laurier’s Minister of the Interior, Clifford Sifton,

⁴¹Government Trial Brief Para 56

- 129 -

resigned from Cabinet over his disagreement with Laurier’s proposed

education clause. The Government cites Laurier’s speech at the second reading

of a new Bill which benchmarked separate school rights to the 1901

Ordinances. Laurier acknowledged that amendments to the School Ordinances

in 1892 were met with opposition from Catholic interests as an abridgment of

their rights, and recalled that Catholics had complained to Ottawa asking for a

disallowance of the amendments. However, Laurier stated that the

amendments had been in force for 13 or 14 years and to avoid confusion, the

federal government would incorporate the Ordinances as they stood at the time

of union.

[250]

The federal government’s movement away from the original Bill ,

based on the North-West Territories Act,1875, to the 1901 Ordinances

engendered support from western Members of Parliament . Those members

characterized the West’s general acceptance of the status quo, reflected in the

1901 Ordinances, as workable with no ill-will toward the school system then

in practice. The Government offers this extensive history of the enactment of

s. 17(1), substantiated by the voluminous quotes from Hansard, to illustrate

that the 1901 Ordinances appropriately captured the satisfaction with separate

schools then in existence, including instances of non-minority students

attending separate schools.

[251]

The Government points to several of these instances to establish

that before 1905, admission of non-minority faith students in separate schools,

was a common practice and well within the knowledge of the members of

Parliament and the Senate. For example, MP John Crawford for Portage la

Prairie, Manitoba, quoting from an editorial in the Toronto Globe on March

- 130 -

20, 1905, spoke in Parliament specifically referring to separate schools in the

North-West Territories admitting non-minority faith students.

[252]

The Government also cites the mixed attendance at separate

schools in other than the North-West Territories. Manitoba Senator T.A.

Bernier reported that in Manitoba, pre-1890, Catholic schools contained over

30 percent English-speaking Protestant students. Senator Bernier also read

from a previous speech by the late Senator Boulton of Manitoba who told the

Upper House about a separate school in Manitoba run by Father DeCorby

which had also served Protestant children in the neighbourhood. ⁴²

[253]

CTT also offers its analysis respecting both fronts of the

denominational aspects doctrine: that admission and funding of non-Catholic

students is a right or privilege protected under s. 93(1) and is a denominational

right of Catholic separate schools. Respecting the existence of such right, CTT

asserts that the Ordinances did not expressly restrict the right to admit and

such restriction cannot be implied. Specifically, it looks to s. 45 of the 1901

Ordinances, emphasizing that “…separate school district and the board thereof

shall possess and exercise all rights, powers, privileges and be subject to the

same liabilities and method of government as is herein provided in respect of

public school districts.” If public school boards could accept all students,

regardless of religion, and if public and separate school boards were on equal

footing respecting their powers, then Catholic schools had similar right s of

admission.

⁴²Senate Debates (14 July 1905) at 708, IT. A. Bernier)

- 131 -

2.

Defendants Submit Funding of Non-Minority Faith Students Was a

Denominational Right

[254]

After asserting the existence of a right to admit and receive

funding for non-Catholic students, CTT asserts that such right is a

denominational right. Integral to the functioning of a separate school is the

right of management and control, including the r ight to set admission policy.

CTT asserts that members of the minority faith create separate schools

because of their objection to the “environment” of public schools, “not

necessarily who [is] there.” In support of the constitutionally guaranteed right

to control and manage separate schools, CTT cites several cases, Ottawa

Separate School Trustee v City of Ottawa (1916), 32 DLR 10 (PC); Hirsch;

Greater Hull at 585; Greater Montreal; Daly v Ontario (Attorney General),

(1997), 154 DLR (4^{t h}) 464 [Daly]; and Reference re Bill 30 with the statement

in Daly, at 492, perhaps best encapsulating CTT’s position:

…the right at issue includes as one of its significant elements the

right to manage and control a public institution. The constitutional

right is framed in terms that recognize that its enjoyment can only be

assured if the rights holders themselves are accorded responsibility

for the management and control of separate schools.

[255]

CTT asserts that the inclusion and education of non-Catholic

students has always been a core belief of Catholic separate schools. While an

earlier focus of the Catholic Church may have been on conversion or

proselytization, today evangelization – the spreading of the Word – is a major

goal of Catholic education. CTT cites Justice Beetz’s statement in Greater

Montreal that “the rights guaranteed by s. 93(1) do not replicate the law word-

for-word as it stood in 1867.” CTT asserts that the inclusion of non-Catholic

students “reflects a recent shift in Catholic beliefs and teachings ” and their

- 132 -

attendance remains a “fundamental belief at the core of Catholic education

today…”⁴³

[256]

CTT also asserts that Catholic schools’ right to receive funding

for non-Catholic students is a non-denominational aspect necessary to deliver

the denominational elements of Catholic education. This assertion is explained

in its trial brief as a type of necessary leveraging of the funding for non-

Catholic students to ensure adequate funding for Catholic schools:

211. The presence of non-minority faith students in separate

schools therefore allowed the separate school to obtain more funds

for its operation, allowing it to provide equivalent educational

opportunity to students, as well as to protect the denominational

character and environment. …And, because funding was directly tied

to the non-minority faith students, their presence ensured there

would be funding to help maintain and protect the denominational

character of the school.

212. As such, the funding of non-minority faith students in separate

schools represents a non-denominational aspect that is essential to

protect and maintain the denominational character.⁴⁴

[257]

After this review of the parties’ respective positions, I turn to the

pivotal issue in this action: does s. 93 protect the right of St. Theodore Roman

Catholic School to accept the attendance of non-Catholic students and permit

the Government to fund non-Catholic students attending the school and, by

necessary extension, to fund all non-Catholic students attending Catholic

schools in Saskatchewan?

⁴³CTT Trial Brief Para 205

⁴⁴CTT Trial Brief

- 133 -

D. Analysis

1.

Conclusion: Section 93(1) Does Not Protect Funding of Non-Minority

Faith Students

[258]

As previously stated, the s. 93(1) analysis asks two questions.

First, did the 1901 Ordinances include a right or privilege for Catholic schools

to admit and receive funding for non-Catholic students? Second, was the right

a denominational right or a non-denominational right necessary to give effect

to denominational concerns? The answer to both questions is “No.” My

reasons are based upon an analysis of the Ordinances as they developed from

1884 to 1901 and the principles of constitutional interpretation.

2.

The Basic Premise of the 1901 Ordinances

[259]

My overarching obligation is to give effect to the true intention of

Parliament in elevating the 1901 Ordinances to constitutional status. I begin

with a basic premise. The reason for the existence of separate schools was to

ensure that after the first public school was created in a school district, parents

of the minority faith could separate their children from the majority’s children

to inculcate their children in the minority’s faith, away and separate from the

influences of the majority. If separating students was the essential reason for

separate schools’ existence, I fail to see why the minority would

simultaneously seek a right to admit children of the majority faith from whom

they took deliberate action to separate. One act belies the other.

[260]

The adjectives “separate” and “dissentient” are repeatedly used in

s. 17(1) and s. 93(3). They describe the nature of a school different from the

school of the majority. “Separate” is not a term of great complexity. Various

- 134 -

on-line and standard dictionaries define “separate” as “to set, force, or keep

apart; to form a border or barrier between two areas or groups; to place in

different groups; to withdraw or break away.”⁴⁵“Dissentient” is defined as “in

opposition to a majority of official opinion”⁴⁶or “dissenting, especially from

the sentiment or policies of a majority.”⁴⁷To “dissent” from the majority is at

the heart of separate schools. I find Canada’s earliest reference to dissentient

schools in the Act of Union, 1840⁴⁸which abolished the legislatures of Upper

and Lower Canada and created the Province of Canada. Section XI of that Act

enshrined the concept of dissentient schools, stating:

… be it enacted, that whenever any number of the Inhabitants of any

Township or Parish professing a religious faith different from that of

the majority shall dissent from the regulations, arrangements, or

proceedings of the Common School Commissioners and it shall be

lawful for the Inhabitants so dissenting, collectively, to signify such

dissent in writing and…establish and maintain one or more schools.

[261]

From the outset, to create a separate or dissentient school has

meant exactly that – a school in which students of a minority faith are

separated and disunited from, or in dissent to, the students of the majority

faith. This constitutional right was accorded Protestant s and Catholics as early

as 1840 and continued under s. 93 of the Constitution Act, 1867 and 17(1) of

the Saskatchewan Act. As Meredith C.J.C.P. stated in Ottawa Separate School

Trustees v City of Ottawa, (1915), 24 DLR 497 (Ont SC) at 630, “The right

and privilege [protected in Ontario] was and is a right to separation…” And,

as Justice Iacobucci stated at para 54 in English Catholic Teachers, the

45

The Free Dictionary by Farlex, online: http://www.thefreedictionary.com/dissentient (1 March 2017)

⁴⁶English Oxford Living Dictionaries, online: <https://en.oxforddectionaries.com/definition/dissentient>(1

March 2017)

⁴⁷The Free Dictionary by Farlex, online: http://www.thefreedictionary.com/dissentient (1 March 2017)

48

The British North America Act, 1840, 3 & 4 Vict, c35, commonly called the Act of Union 1840, enacted in

July 1840 and proclaimed February 10, 1841.

- 135 -

purposed new funding arrangement introduced into Ontario did not

prejudicially affect Catholic schools because it preserved “the ‘separateness’

of separate schools.”

[262]

On this point, I find the opening paragraph of the Government’s

trial brief reveals a recurring theme. The Government argues that GSSD seeks

to use the Charter to separate students based on religion. The Government

states:

I. Introduction

This case raises a fundamental issue: does the Constitution require

that schools in Saskatchewan be segregated by religion? Does the

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms require religious

segregation of school children? The Government of Saskatchewan

submits that the Charter does not. Segregation is not constitutionally

required and in fact runs contrary to Charter values of equality and

respect for religious differences. The Charter of Rights cannot be

turned into a Charter of Segregation.

[263]

Similarly, CTT strongly objects to segregation of students and

lays fault with GSSD for advocating separating students in Saskatchewan

schools, comparing it to segregation in penal institutions. It states:

When one considers the fundamental constitutional principles of

democracy, constitutionalism, and protection of minority rights, it

becomes impossible to see a scenario anywhere in Canada where a

group in a public funded institution would be kept segregated from

everyone else, with the only exception being penal institutions.⁴⁹

[264]

The defendants’ statement inverts the question. If the

Government’s first rhetorical question – “Does the Constitution require that

schools in Saskatchewan be segregated by religions?” – had been posed in the

context of the autonomy debates of 1905, the time relevant in this inquiry, I

suspect that proponents of a single, publicly-funded school system would have

⁴⁹CTT Trial Brief Para 249

- 136 -

answered a resounding “No.” Proponents of denominational schools, largely

Catholic interests, on the other hand, would have answered a resounding

“Yes.” History shows that the latter prevailed and segregated schools have

since been Saskatchewan’s constitutional reality. As a premise of their entire

argument, the defendants must defend the principle of separate schools and,

from that vantage point, they must mount an awkward argument that, despite

their position being historically anchored in the constitutional right to separate

students based on religion, somehow Catholic schools now hold the right to

admit and receive funding respecting non-Catholic students from whom they

wished to separate.

[265]

The Government states that the Charter does not countenance

segregation of students based on religion. I agree. But the Charter must defer

to another constitutional document – s. 17 of the Saskatchewan Act which not

only countenances segregation by religion but provide s, by reference to the

1901 Ordinances, a detailed formula to implement segregation of students of a

minority faith. I agree that the Charter cannot be turned into a “Charter of

Segregation,” the position the Government attributes to GSSD. However, s. 17

of the Saskatchewan Act does segregate students because it supersedes the

Charter, leaving s. 17 an instrument of segregation as it was intended and as

denominational school proponents desired in 1905. The constitutional right to

segregate shields a Charter challenge and insulates separate schools from the

Charter values that the Government espouses in its opening paragraph. The

historical record shows that Catholic interests heavily lobbied for separate

school rights in 1905, but now they argue that segregation of students based

on religion is inappropriate and anti-Charter. Like it or not, the defendants

- 137 -

must accept the foundation of their case: separate schools were meant to

separate students. From this fact the defendants cannot escape and from it they

must advance their argument.

[266]

In the opening paragraph of its brief, the Government refers to

“segregation” as though it were a sullied concept. I would readily interchange

the term “segregated schools” for “separate schools” and join either term with

others used in s. 93, “dissentient schools” or “denominational schools.” The

defendants must support the principle of separate or segregated schools. Then,

if the defendants wish to gain traction with their argument, they face the

challenge of showing that despite the deliberate steps dissentient school

supporters must take to create separate schools, the dissenters simultaneously

have always wanted to include students of the group from whom they dissent.

Indeed, this manoeuvring creates a logical pretzel that remains unresolved by

blithely suggesting that GSSD supports segregation in Saskatchewan’s schools

and is anti-Charter. The defendants must accept that this lawsuit can happen

in Saskatchewan, but not for example in British Columbia, for one reason:

Saskatchewan has constitutionally protected separate schools and British

Columbia has not.

[267]

Dr. Dixon also raised a different point of view respecting

admission of non-Catholic students to an institution that desires to permeate

all aspects of education with Catholic ideals. Might non-Catholic students

lessen the community of faith, the ideal of a Catholic school? Dr. Dixon

concluded in his report that any legislative right to educate non-Catholic

students would have conflicted with the practice of fostering community in a

Roman Catholic school including assembling Catholic students in “a

- 138 -

segregated school building, sheltered originally from a predominantly

Protestant, sometimes anti-Catholic, environment.”

[268]

I question whether St. Theodore Roman Catholic School would

remain a Catholic school if, in the future, no Catholic children attended at the

school even though its teachers and trustees must be Catholic. I have difficulty

accepting that within the meaning of the 1901 Ordinances a school remains a

separate school when a critical proportion of the students is no longer Roman

Catholic.

[269]

In face of the defendants’ assertion that the enrolment of non-

Catholic students is a fundamental and historic part of the denominational

aspect of Catholic schools I find that Dr. Dixon’s report and the observations

of J.K. Donlevy in “Catholic Schools: The Inclusion of Non-Catholic

Students” (2002), 27 Can J Education 101 , suggest otherwise. The author

cautions against the over-enrolment of non-Catholic students in Catholic

schools after the broadened inclusivity of the Church under Vatican II. Such

concern belies any notion that Catholic interests in 1905 were concerned that

they had a constitutional right to educate non-Catholics. J. K. Donlevy writes:

School boards translate the above text [as laid out in Vatican II] to

their community through their inclusionary policies. The importance

of this policy cannot be overstated because, when it is deficient in

meeting the spirit of the text and balancing the overall purpose of

Catholic education, unintended consequences can occur that go to

the root of Catholicity within the school. Mulligan (1999) quoted an

Ontario Catholic school chaplain who said, “It is extremely difficult,

if not impossible, to maintain, let alone deepen, the Catholic

character of the school with . . . a large [32%] non-Catholic

population” (p. 182). The Ontario Catholic School Trustees

Association (2000) identified what they believed to be one of the

major issues facing Catholic education in: Our Catholic Schools: A

Report on Ontario’s Catholic Schools & Their Future, “many are

- 139 -

worried about internal factors that could threaten our existence. . . .

Many wondered if the increasing number of non-Catholic students

who are present in the secondary schools would change the tone of

the schools” (p. 17) [italics added]. Francis and Gibson (in press)

added to the concern of the Ontario school trustees, asking a question

about school ethos: “the presence of non-Catholic pupils may . . .

have a deleterious impact on the overall school ethos as reflected in

the attitude toward Christianity of the student body as a whole” (p.

18) [Italics original].

[270]

If the presence of non-Catholic pupils is considered to have a

deleterious impact on the Catholic ethos of Catholic schools at a time well

after the inclusionary doctrine of Vatican II was promulgated, I am reinforced

in my conclusion that in 1905 admission of non-Catholic students was not a

right that was in the minds of proponents of separate Catholic schools.

Although Mr. Donlevy cites concerns arising in Ontario, his comments were

made in an analysis of Saskatchewan’s Catholic school districts’ post-Vatican

inclusionary policy in admitting non-Catholic students.

3. Judicial Authority and Guiding Principles of Constitutional Interpretation

[271]

Not surprisingly, given over 150 years of interpreting s. 93,

judicial statements are numerous and variable. This variability caused Justice

Beetz, in Greater Montreal, after reviewing several interpretative principles,

some liberal and some restrictive, to caution against misusing either approach.

He said, “Both the restrictive and liberal methods of interpretation, when

misused, wrongly become rhetorical devices rather than rules of law.” This

statement forewarns that judicial opinions vary respecting the court’s

inclination to provide expansive or restrictive interpretations of s. 93(1) rights.

I will set out and apply interpretative principles germane to this inquiry using

the following subheadings.

- 140 -

First Principle – The Evolution of the School Ordinances

[272]

Justice Sharpe, in Daly, where denominational rights were at

issue, recognized that in an evolution of legislative enactments the last will of

the legislature is paramount. Accordingly, the evolution of school Ordinances

from 1884 to 1901 informs the court of their appropriate interpretation.

[273]

I heard from various non-legal experts how the Ordinances may

or may not have countenanced non-minority students attending separate

schools. The defendants provided newspaper articles and local historical

accounts to illustrate that non-Catholic students attended Catholic schools. In

my view, non-legal experts’ interpretation of statutes or anecdotal experiences

of school attendance are of limited assistance. Instead, I take my task from

Justice Wilson in Reference re Bill 30: look to the legislation above all else.

She said, with necessary insertions applicable to Saskatchewan:

It must be remembered…that [s. 17(1)] only protects rights and

privileges guaranteed by law [as found in the 1901 Ordinances]. Our

task therefore is to examine the laws in force prior to Confederation

[under the 1901 Ordinances] to see what rights or privileges they

gave.

[274]

In interpreting the 1901 Ordinances I must give expression to the

intention of s. 17. Foremost, I must find whether minority faith schools held a

right to accept non-minority students with attendant funding. To understand

the 1901 Ordinances one must understand the evolution of the Ordinances

from the first Ordinances in 1884 to the last in 1901.

[275]

The territorial Ordinances gained their legitimacy from the

federal government’s enactment of the first North-West Territories Act, 1869

providing territorial government power to pass Ordinances. In 1875 the Act

- 141 -

was amended to permit the territorial government to pass Ordinances to

establish schools and collect rates and specifically to create separate

Protestant and Roman Catholic schools when the adherents to these faiths

were in a minority.

[276]

The first territorial school Ordinance was enacted in 1884.

Previously, no schools were publicly funded in the Territories; only Protestant

or Catholic mission schools existed. The first Ordinance permitted electors to

petition for the formation of local school districts, each to be a minimum of 36

square miles with a minimum of 10 school age children. When formed,

trustees could hire teachers, procure suitable buildings and raise taxes. Every

district was designated as either Protestant or Catholic, depending on the

religious makeup of the majority of the population. The first school

established in the district was the public school that carried in its name

“Catholic” or “Protestant,” so that all public schools, as well as separate

schools, were religiously affiliated and carried a denominational moniker. All

children in a district attended the public school, unless a minority of the

ratepayers in any district, whether Protestant or Roman Catholic, established a

separate school district.

[277]

Separate school districts could be formed if any number of

property holders resident within any 36 square mile public school district or in

two or more adjoining pubic school districts, successfully petitioned the

Lieutenant-Governor. Upon the formation of such separate school district, the

Lieutenant-Governor then notified the board of trustees of any public school

district that included the whole or part of such separate school district within

its limits of the creation of the separate school district.

- 142 -

[278]

The 1884 Ordinance established a Board of Education, comprised

of one Catholic and one Protestant section, each with equal appointees and

each with power over the administration of the schools of its section, the

licensing of teachers, approval of textbooks and appointment of school

inspectors. Essentially, the Ordinance created a dual school syste m, largely

under religious control. This Ordinance was the apex of religious control over

education. Successive Ordinances whittled away religious influence over

schools in favour of a secular system, but retaining dissentient minority

schools. Power shifted from the Board of Education, separated into two

religious sections, to the Board of Education as a whole.

[279]

The 1884 Ordinance placed Catholic and Protestant schools on

identical and equal footing. Section 83 limited religious practices in all

schools to an opening prayer as adopted by the board of trustees. Section 84

disallowed religious instruction in any public or separate school until 3:00

p.m. and then only if permitted by the trustees and if children from other

religious faiths were permitted to withdraw. Section 85 implicitly

acknowledged that non-adherents to the first-formed school might be in

attendance since parents could have a child excused from religious instruction.

Section 85 read as follow:

85. Any child attending any school whose parent or parents or

guardian is or are of the religious faith different from that expressed

in the name of such school district, shall have the privilege of leaving

the school room at the hour of three o’clock in the afternoon, or of

remaining without taking part in any religious instructions that may

be given, if the parents or guardian so desire.

[280]

Public funding, called “aid” (equal to half of a teacher’s salary)

was given to both Protestant and Catholic schools from a General Revenue

- 143 -

Fund. Each school district met its general funding requirements from property

owners within each district who were of the same religious faith.

[281]

The territorial government effected several annual amendments to

the 1884 Ordinance. Sometimes the amendments subtly changed the wording

of the previous ordinance, and often quite significantly. Frequent renumbering

and rearranging of sections makes comparisons difficult. Amendments show a

distinct watering down of separate school rights originally paralleled on

Quebec’s model where Catholic or Protestant churches played a primary role

in school affairs. The Ordinances move incrementally away from this model to

a distinct state-controlled, non-sectarian school system with an option for

minority denominational districts.

[282]

In 1885 amendments introduced government grants to schools to

augment tax revenues, providing an annual grant of $2.00 for every child who

attended school 100 school days where the school was open only during one

term and $2.50 for every child who attended school 160 school days where the

school was open during both the winter and summer terms. Religious

instruction became impermissible in public schools until 3:00 p.m., but not in

separate schools. As well, in 1885 public schools no longer were required to

include “Roman Catholic” or “Protestant” in their name.

[283]

In 1886 restrictions were placed on the formation of separate

school districts, requiring the existence of a pre -existing public school before

a separate school district could be formed, a restriction continued in the 19 01

Ordinance. As well, the separate school district had to be coterminous with the

36 square mile boundaries of the public school and could no longer reach

- 144 -

beyond the boundaries to adjacent districts, a requirement that made formation

of a separate school district more difficult if the minimum number of students

was lacking. The 1886 amendments also clarified that separate schools could

be formed by either Protestant or Catholic ratepayers if they were a minority,

a stipulation not found in the 1884 Ordinance. The school of the majority,

whether called Protestant or Catholic, was the public school and its control

was placed in the hands of the Board of Education as a whole. Because the

majority formed the public school, the 1885 restriction on religious inst ruction

in public schools applied to the Protestant or Catholic majority while the

minority in a separate school had more generous privileges for religious

instruction.

[284]

In 1887 the members of the Board of Education changed from two

Protestant and two Catholic members to five Protestant and only three

Catholic, effectively giving Protestant members a majority in all decisions

involving the Board’s joint authority, including the formation of a uniform

system of inspection of all schools and the licensing of all teachers.

[285]

In 1888 the federal government created a Legislative Assembly of

25 members to replace the former Council of the Territories. Following, in

1892, while the Manitoba School Question was erupting, the Assembly passed

significant amendments to the School Ordinance. The Board of Education was

replaced with a Council of Public Instruction comprised of the Executive

Committee, and two Roman Catholic and two Protestant appointees, but

without voting power. Effectively, with the religiously-affiliated appointees

having no voting power, and with the real power of the Council of Public

Instruction lying with the Protestant majority of the Executive Committee,

- 145 -

Catholics no longer had effective input into the administrative authority of the

Council. The Council of Public Instruction was no longer divided into

Protestant and Catholic sections and had authority to examine, certify, train

and license teachers, to select texts and to impose duties upon inspectors who

were appointed by the Lieutenant-Governor in Council.

[286]

Under s. 6 of the 1892 Ordinance, the Lieutenant -Governor

appointed a Superintendent of Education for the Territories who held broad

authority over all schools to insure compliance with the Council’s rules and

regulations. Effectively, the 1892 Ordinance placed the general administration

of all schools, public and separate, in the hands of the Council of Public

Instruction.

[287]

Section 32 of the 1892 Ordinance continued minority schools. If a

minority of ratepayers, either Protestant or Catholic, wished to create a

separate school in any organized public school district, the ratepayers would

be liable only to the assessments of the rates they imposed upon themselves.

Once a separate school district was established, s. 36 assured that it would

“possess and exercise all rights, powers, privileges and be subject to the same

liabilities and method of government, as…provided in respect of Public

School Districts.” School district size was reduced to no more than 25 square

miles.

[288]

In 1901 the Assembly enacted another school Ordinance. Again,

its provisions showed a progression from the 1884 Ordinance, away from

religious to state control over education. The Ordinance abolished and

replaced the Council of Public Instruction with a Department of Education as a

- 146 -

branch of the public service. Premier of the Territories, Frederick Haultain,

became the first Commissioner of the Department, charged with the

administration, control and management of the department.

[289]

Although the 1901 Ordinance also established an Educational

Council of five members, requiring two to be Catholic, it was directed to

“consider such matters as may be referred to it” and to “report thereon to the

Lieutenant-Governor in Council.” Accordingly, “discussion and report” were

the only teeth given to the Council, making it only an advisory body with little

power. Religious control of schools was abandoned in favour of a department -

controlled administration. The Ordinance also restricted religious instruction

to the last half-hour of class per day for all schools, public and separate,

whereas the 1885 Ordinance applied this restriction only to public schools.

Other than this one-half hour allowance, separate schools were under the

control of the Department of Education.

[290]

Frederick Haultain (later Chief Justice of the Saskatchewan Court

of Appeal) was the driving force behind the 1901 Ordinance. He faced strong

criticism from the Roman Catholic leadership but denied that the Ordinances

deprived them of their rights, even though the evolution of the Ordinances

showed a distinct erosion of sectarian control in favour of a unitary system,

more similar to Ontario than the dual system of Quebec. Premier Haultain’s

statement in 1884, even before the most significant movement to government

control of schools exemplifies the trend of the Ordinances:

The responsibility for the general management of our schools, for the

educational policy of the Territories, and for the expenditure of the

school vote is above and beyond any sectarian difference.

Expenditure and control are inseparable, and so long as schools

- 147 -

continue to receive government grants, they will be subject to

government control.⁵⁰

[291]

In my review of the evolution of the School Ordinances , I find

that the territorial government was progressively moving to less religious

involvement in education with a strong inclination toward state, not sectarian,

control. I see little support that the 1901 Ordinances would have generously

included an expansion of separate school rights so that government grants

would have been purposively given to separate schools as a right to educate

students who were non-members of the dissentient faith.

[292]

The evolution of the School Ordinances, indisputably showing a

progression away from protecting predominantly Catholic interests in separate

schools, is only exemplary of a broader trend emerging in Saskatchewan’s

population on the eve of union as it moved toward a secular and largely

British view of society. One must remember, too, that the Catholic faith and

the French language were inextricably linked during the years leading to

union. Bill Waiser, in his recently published A World We Have Lost:

Saskatchewan Before 1905, (Markham, ON: Fifth House, 2016), as part of his

review of the province from “eighteen thousand years ago” to 19 05 and with a

historically impartial viewpoint, explained the growing ideals of

Saskatchewan’s population during the years preceding provincial status. Bill

Waiser’s assessment at pp 602 – 605 offers comments informative of the

context in which the 1901 School Ordinances should be interpreted:

That western society was to be British in sentiment and

character became more pronounced after the [North-West]

rebellion. …

⁵⁰Sessional papers of the Dominion of Canada: volume 17, fourth session ofthe seventh Parliament, session

1894 at 40C-14.

- 148 -

…

This Anglo-Canadian emphasis also led territorial politicians

to try to do away with French language and separate school

guarantees. French had been employed in territorial

government business as early as 1874 when the NWT Council

published a consolidation of its ordinances in both French and

English. … Separate schools, by contrast, were part of the

1875 NWT Act. The religious minority in any district

(Catholic or Protestant) could establish a separate school and

support it through self-assessment….

These aspects of territorial life had generated little

controversy – hardly any comment – up until 1885. But any

toleration quickly evaporated after the rebellion as the Anglo-

Canadian majority moved to affirm the British character of

the North-West. The general mood was that separate schools

and the use of French had been foisted on the region by

Ottawa and were not representative of the wishes and interests

of the dominant society. There was also a widespread belief

that French Canadians had failed the country because of their

sympathetic support of the Métis traitor Riel, while Roman

Catholics could not be trusted because they owed their

allegiance to Rome and the pope. The territorial government

in Regina was expected to set things right. … Legislators [in

the North-West] responded in 1889 by preparing two petitions

to Parliament, one calling for the repeal of French as an

official territorial language and the other for the repeal of

separate schools. During the debate over the resolutions, the

vocal majority questioned the legitimacy of official

bilingualism and separate schools, repeatedly pointing out

that local opinion had never been taken into consideration.

Nothing was done at the federal level, though, because

politicians in Ottawa were already grappling with the thorny

Manitoba schools question and did not want more

controversy. The simmering issues were simply dropped back

in the lap of the territorial government, effectively leaving it

up to Regina to take action. That it did in early 1892, when

the territorial government passed resolutions a bolishing the

official use of French and discontinuing the religious control

of schools in favour of a single government-run Council of

Public Instruction.

- 149 -

[293]

This nonpartisan assessment of attitudes in the North-West as

Alberta and Saskatchewan tussled to become provinces is highly suggestive

that the territorial government felt that minority faith education, largely

championed by Catholic interests, was less a re quested right or privilege, but

more an obligation “foisted on the region by Ottawa.”

Second Principle – The “Solemn Pact”

[294]

A recurring theme respecting s. 93 is the principle that

constitutional accommodation to educate the Catholic and Protestant

minorities was critical in achieving confederation. Section 93 has been called

the “solemn pact,” (Québec (Procureur général) c Conseil scolaire de l'île de

Montréal, 1990 2677 (QC CA)); the “confederation compromise,”

(Reference re Bill 30); “one of the cardinal terms of the Confederation

arrangement,” (Reference Re Adoption Act, 1938, [1938] SCR 398 at 402); and

a “central consideration…leading to confederation.” ( Reference re Secession

of Quebec, [1998] 2 SCR 217). Few cases concerning s. 93 are without

reference to this principle. The defendants understandably rely upon the

principle, stating, “The importance of s. 93 to the Confederation compact

cannot be over-stated.”⁵¹

[295]

I question whether the principle of a “solemn pact” should weigh

as predominantly in interpreting s. 17(1) of the Saskatchewan Act as it has in

interpreting s. 93(1) of the Constitution Act, 1867 in cases dealing with

separate school legislation in Ontario and Quebec. The solemn pact was a

constitutional arrangement between the four original confederating colonies,

⁵¹Government Trial Brief Para 14

- 150 -

but essentially applicable only in Quebec and Ontario since New Brunswick

and Nova Scotia did not have separate schools. One might suggest that the

notion of a “solemn pact” is losing significance. In 1997 Quebec sought a

constitutional amendment under s. 43 of the Constitution Act, 1982 and

rescinded denominational school rights and replaced them with a language -

based education system.⁵²The Constitution Act, 1867 now includes s. 93A:

“Paragraphs (1) to (4) of section 93 do not apply to Quebec.” The “solemn

pact” between Ontario and Quebec has effectively become a part ner-less pact

since 1997.

[296]

Applying the “solemn pact” principle is less apparent given

Saskatchewan’s initiation to separate school rights. Canada had jurisdiction

over the North-West Territories for 35 years before Saskatchewan gained

provincial status. The North-West Territories became part of Canada in 1870

under the Rupert’s Land and North-Western Territory Order, not the British

North America Act from whence came the principle of the “solemn pact.”

Separate schools were brought to the North-West Territories, not by way of a

negotiated confederating “compromise,” but by federal legislation under s. 11

of The North-West Territories Act,1875, enacted when the North-West was

without representation in the federal government. Saskatchewan’s introduction

to separate schools was granted (some might say imposed) by federal

legislation from the outset and not by constitutional compromise.

⁵²Constitution Amendment,1997 (Quebec), SI /97-141

- 151 -

[297]

From 1870 the federal government held the constitutional ability

to create new provinces from the territories incorporated into Canada.⁵³In

1905, Saskatchewan was given provincial status by the Saskatchewan Act.

Saskatchewan gaining provincial status is different than the confederation of

four separate colonies in 1867. Saskatchewan’s provincial status was

accomplished by an Act of Parliament, the Saskatchewan Act. On the other

hand, confederation required an Act of the United Kingdom Parliament.

Interpreting s. 17(1) of the Saskatchewan Act might differ from interpreting s.

93(1) of the British North America Act, at least insofar as invoking the

“solemn pact” principle. Albeit, the Saskatchewan Act has constitutional

authority under s. 52(2) of the Constitution Act, 1982, but it originated from

something different than a pact between independently governed entities.

[298]

The author, C. Cecil Lingard, Territorial Government in Canada:

The Autonomy Question in the Old North -West Territories, (Toronto:

University of Toronto, 1946) at 196-197, after a thorough review of the 1901

Ordinances and the autonomy debates, offers his assessment respecting the

origins of the separate school provisions in the Saskatchewan Act. He would

not have considered that Saskatchewan had entered a “solemn pact,” quite the

contrary. He wrote:

The system of separate schools in the North-West was the result of

Dominion legislation, passed after it entered the Union, without its

request or assent, and at a time when there was little conception in

the general mind as to the modern non-sectarian public school. The

Dominion government had no precedent to support its claim that the

school system set up subsequent to 1875 or that in force in the

Territories in 1905 must be maintained by constitutional obligation

after the North-West assumed the rights and responsibilities of

⁵³The Northwest Territories Court of Appeal in Yellowknife provides a detailed and helpful review of the how

Rupert’s Land and the North-Western Territory became part of Canada.

- 152 -

provincial self-government. If the spirit as well as the B.N.A. Act

was to prevail, the new provinces were entitled to full constitutional

powers possessed by all the other provinces, except the two Canadas

who made their own compact with respect to separate schools. Such

are the views of the writer, after reading the debates and

correspondence relating to the constitutional question. [Emphasis

added.]

[299]

Mr. Lingard’s assessment lends support to the interpretation of

s. 17(1) as a constitutional document, but without the accompanying, rather

rigid notion that Saskatchewan entered a “solemn pact” with anyone, as was

the case between Ontario and Quebec. Nor does the notion that separate school

rights were a “solemn pact” accord with Bill Waiser’s characterization of the

sentiment in the North-West, “that separate schools … had been foisted on the

region by Ottawa and were not representative of the wishes and inter ests of the

dominant society.”

[300]

Even in Ontario the concept of a “solemn pact” may have less

sway since Quebec’s constitutional amendment has effectively left Ontario

alone among the four provinces of confederation, bound (seemingly with no

one else) to the original framing of s. 93(1) of the British North America Act.

[301]

In my assessment of the 1901 Ordinances, I might lessen the

strictures of the “solemn pact” principle insofar as interpreting

s. 17(1) of the Saskatchewan Act in comparison to other courts’ interpretation

of s. 93 of the Constitution Act, 1867. This action arises in Saskatchewan and,

unlike previous adjudications of separate school rights in Ontario and Quebec,

requires an interpretation sensitive to Saskatchewan’s history of separate

school rights. However, such lessening has not been determinative of my

- 153 -

ultimate decision that the 1901 Ordinances do not guarantee funding for non -

minority faith students in separate schools.

Third Principle – Changing Societal Norms

[302]

Section 93(1) is 150 years old; s. 17(1) is over 110 years old.

Many norms and expectations inherent in these constitutional provisions have

changed, including educational concepts and practices, but more particularly

religious practices, religious affiliations and societal norms. How should a

constitutional provision anchored in religious rights and attitudes from a

Victorian era, pertaining to Roman Catholics and Protestants, be interpreted in

a society which has become increasing secular and diverse?

[303]

Today, perched on the cusp of Canada’s Sesquicentennial, I find

appropriate the words of Chief Justice Deschenes in Protestant School Bd. of

Montreal v Minister of Education, a 1976 decision involving s. 93 rights.

Accepting that the court had to “breathe into an over 100 -year-old text a spirit

which would correspond to the new reality of Canadian society… without…

suddenly breaking away from tradition,” he insightfully stated:

…[we] shall then remember that the Fathers of Confederation, while

hoping to shape the future, never claimed to possess gifts of

clairvoyance or prophecy.

[304]

The Northwest Territories Court of Appeal, in Yellowknife, also

identified this theme and specifically addressed interpretation of

constitutionalized denominational rights in the face of changing social needs,

stating at para. 62 that a constitution “must be capable of responding to

changing social needs and legitimate public expectations.” If not, “what might

have been suitable for an earlier time and vastly different society would

- 154 -

prohibit interpretations rooted in the reality of the present.” The court

concluded that if alternate interpretations are reasonably available, “then

preference should be given to the interpretation that best accords with

constitutional norms and values, including Charter values.” One might ask, in

the words of the Northwest Territories Court of Appeal, whether 1905 in

Saskatchewan was an earlier time with a “vastly different society” and might

there now be “changing social needs and legitimate public expectations.”

[305]

Rather profound changes have occurred in the religious

affiliations of Saskatchewan’s population since 1905. Coincidentally, 1901

was also the year of census-taking in the North-West. Section 41 of the 1901

Ordinances (now s. 49 of The Education Act, 1995) provided the right to

create a separate school division when “a minority of the electors in a school

district, whether Protestant or Roman Catholic” followed a specified

procedure. The rights of these minority electors – whichever of the two was

fewer in number compared to the other – was constitutionally protected. Of

interest, however, in understanding and protecting minority rights of

Saskatchewan’s Catholics and Protestants, is the change in religious affiliation

since 1901.

[306]

Dr. Roderic Beaujot, Emeritus Professor of Sociology at Western

University, provided demographic evidence that in 1901 (the year closest to

Saskatchewan gaining provincial status) Catholics comprised 18.40% of the

population; Protestants 74.35%; other Christians 2.77%; other religious groups

3.33%; and no religious affiliation 1.15%. In 2011, census data show

Saskatchewan’s religions affiliations as Catholic 29.52%; Protestants 35.7 4%;

other Christians 6.83%; other religious groups 3.49%; and no religious

- 155 -

affiliation 24.4%. Expressed as a ratio, for every 100 Protestants there were

24.7 Catholics in 1901 and 82.6 in 2011. The Protestant category is the largest

group from 1901 to 2011, but declining from 74.4% in 1901 to 35.7 % in 2011.

In 2011 those with religious affiliations other than Protestant or Catholic, plus

those with no religious affiliation, represented 34.7% of the population, more

than Catholics and Protestants. Statistics Canada’s projections to 2031 suggest

that between 31.58% and 31.96% of Saskatchewan’s population will be

Catholic; between 34.68% and 35.06% will be Protestant; between 5.84% and

5.96% will be other Christians; other religious groups will be between 3.85%

and 4.42%; and those with no religious affiliation will be between 23.30% and

23.58%.

[307]

Dr. Beaujot’s report shows that in 1861, just before

confederation, 99.30% of the population in the four confederating provinces

was either Catholic or Protestant. The confederation compromise, equally and

only accommodating of Catholic and Protestant educational rights, bore a

strong semblance to the provinces’ religious reality. In 1901, 92.75% of

Saskatchewan’s population was either Catholic or Protestant, dropping to

approximately 65% of the population in 2011. Put another way, in 1901, the

allocation of rights and privileges to protect Catholics and Protestants

excluded only 7.25% of the population; in 2011 that protection excluded

34.80% of the population.

[308]

Protestant denominations have never been as homogenous in their

beliefs as the Roman Catholic faith with its singular allegiance to Rome. Since

the 1901 census, Protestant denominations have become even more distinct

from each other with the immigration to Saskatchewan of diverse Protestant

- 156 -

groups. Pastor Wiens testified that as a Mennonite, he would distinguish

himself from Protestants, preferring the term Anabaptist. Today in

Saskatchewan, unlike 1901 when Protestants were overwhelmingly the

majority and less disparate from each other, no single f aith or non-faith group

creates a majority. Given the diverse nature of groups considered “Protestant,”

the largest minority among minorities in Saskatchewan is Roman Catholic and

that “minority” has significantly increased from 18.40% of the province’s

population in 1901 to 29.52% in 2011. The continued protection of

Saskatchewan’s largest, most homogenous and historically growing minority

from the influences of smaller minorities might, in the minds of many

observers, show the apparent anachronism of constitutional protection of

Roman Catholic and Protestant minority rights in Saskatchewan.

[309]

The Court of Appeal of the Northwest Territories in Yellowknife

commented on the unexpected changes in religious affiliation that have

happened since the School Ordinances were first enacted. It stated at para. 43:

A review of the 1884 School Ordinance reveals that it was

based on a simpler societal structure than exists today. School

districts were either Protestant or Catholic. No other religious

affiliation was contemplated in the 1884 School Ordinance.

[310]

Religious affiliations have significantly changed. Has

Saskatchewan reached a point where, like the Court of Appeal in Yellowknife

stated, the court must realize that “what might have been suitable for an earlier

time and vastly different society would prohibit [constitutional] interpretations

rooted in the reality of the present?”

- 157 -

[311]

I also take guidance from Chief Justice Dickson in Hunter v

Southam Inc., [1984] 2 SCR 145 at 155 where he explained that interpreting

the constitution is fundamentally distinct from interpreting statutes:

A constitution, by contrast, is drafted with an eye to the future. Its

function is to provide a continuing framework for the legitimate

exercise of governmental power and, when joined by a Bill or

Charter of rights, for the unremitting protection of individual rights

and liberties. Once enacted, its provisions cannot easily be repealed

or amended. It must, therefore, be capable of growth and

development over time to meet new social, political and historical

realities often unimagined by its framers. The judiciary is the

guardian of the constitution and must, in interpreting its provisions,

bear these considerations in mind.

[312]

In my view, the “new reality” Chief Justice Dickson spoke about

is evident in Saskatchewan, as shown by the growing number of persons with

no religious affiliation, growing numbers of persons of non-Christian faiths

and the significantly expanded proportion of Roman Catholics in

Saskatchewan since 1901. Although my judicial task involves interpretation of

the 1901 Ordinances, I cannot be expected to be locked in a century-old mind-

set. An interpretation of s. 17(1) must be sensitive to twenty-first century

Saskatchewan realities. Accordingly, I am not apt to unnecessarily e nlarge

constitutional protection of Roman Catholic and Protestant rights in face of

Saskatchewan’s increasingly religiously diverse population.

Fourth Principle – Balance between Adaptation and Amplification

[313]

Courts have identified a tension between the dangers of freezing

rights of separate schools to 1867 (or 1901) on the one hand and being too

expansive and amplifying rights beyond their original intention on the other

hand. Interpreting at-union legislation should not leave separate schools

- 158 -

“forever in the educational wilderness of the enactments in force in 1867,” as

stated by Meredith C.J.C.P. in Ottawa Separate School Trustees v City of

Ottawa, at 501-2) but should be interpreted “to meet new circumstances and

needs as they arise” as stated by Viscount Cave L.C. in Hirsch. Justice

Iacobucci in Ontario Home Builders' Association SCC said that s. 93(1) does

not turn pre-union legislation from 1867 into “procrustean obligations” to

which modern education systems must conform.

[314]

As a counterpoint, though, Justice Iacobucci, in English Catholic

Teachers, after citing the concerns of an overly stagnant interpretation of

s. 93(1), tempered an overreaching of this c oncern to an unjustified

amplification of s. 93(1) rights that was never intended. He cautioned against

using the purposive approach to expand the original purpose of s. 93 and cited

Justice Beetz in Greater Montreal who rejected an approach to s. 93(1) that

would “improperly amplify the provision’s purpose” to transform s. 93(1) into

“a blanket affirmation of freedom of religion or freedom of conscience.”

[315]

This discussion begs the question – accepting that admission and

funding of non-minority students in separate schools under the 1901

Ordinances was not expressly stated – whether “new circumstances and needs”

have arisen since then to make funding of non-minority faith students in

separate schools a natural and necessary adaptation to accommodate separate

schools within the intent of s. 17(1). Or, is such funding an unwarranted

amplification of s. 17(1)’s purpose? I see little reason to move the indicator of

claimed denominational rights for funding of non-minority faith students from

silence in 1901 to amplification today.

- 159 -

[316]

I see as an example of amplification the position advanced by

CTT, that funding of non-Catholic students is now, and has always been, a

non-denominational aspect protected under s. 17(1) because funding for non-

minority students is necessary to permit the separate school “to obtain more

funds for its operation, allowing it to provide equivalent educational

opportunity to [minority-faith] students…”⁵⁴Admittedly, the cost of educating

Saskatchewan children is high. Ms. Chobaniak testified that the annual

education budget in Saskatchewan is approximately $1.2 billion, second only

to health care costs. However, I do not accept the logical extension of saying,

as CTT has said, that the presence of non-minority faith students has

historically "ensured there would be funding to help maintain and protect the

denominational character of the [separate] school." This position leads to an

obvious and disquieting question: how many non-minority students optimally

should attend Catholic schools to ensure their denominational aspect? I see the

practical benefit of separate schools receiving funding for non-minority faith

students to create greater financial viability to promote the tenets of Catholic

education, but I do not equate a practical benefit as creating a constitutional

right. I do not accept that the 1901 Ordinances gave separate schools the

constitutional right to leverage funds otherwise destined to public schools to

assure the denominational character of Catholic schools.

Fifth Principle – Implicit Rights

[317]

I agree with the defendants that nothing in the 1901 Ordinances

expressly restricts funding to only the minority faith students in a separate

school. The legislative absence of a restriction, though, can hardly create a

⁵⁴CTT Trial Brief Para 211

- 160 -

right “in law.” As Justice Wilson in Reference re Bill 30 stated, the right has

to exist “by law.” If the absence of an express prohibition creates a

constitutional right, separate school rights would be unlimited.

[318]

Perhaps, though, the claimed right was implicit. Case law

suggests that in examining pre-union law, the court must have an ear to what

might not have been express, but may have been implicit. In Reference re Bill

30, Justice Wilson stated that while a right may not have been expressly given

under Ontario’s pre-confederation school legislation, the court could find an

“implicit” right under the legislation which would satisfy the requirement

under s. 93(1). Citing Justice Wilson’s statement, Justice Sharpe in Daly found

that while the Scott Act (pre-union law in Ontario) did not give to school

trustees the right to prefer Roman Catholics when hiring teachers, he

concluded that separate school trustees had the “implicit legal right to prefer

those of the Roman Catholic faith when making employment decisions relating

to teachers.”

[319]

Accordingly, in this action, the mere absence of an express right

of separate schools to accept and receive funding for non-minority faith

students is not necessarily determinative of the non-existence of such a right.

Such a right might be implicit from other provisions of the 1901 Ordinances

and necessary to protect the denominational aspects of Catholic education. For

example, the earliest School Ordinance of 1884 implies that a student not of

the faith of the particular school might be in attendance. The court found

similarly in Yellowknife, stating:

44 The 1884 School Ordinance did not limit attendance at Catholic

or Protestant schools to students of the same religious faith. Section

85 expressly provided that a student attending a school of a different

- 161 -

denomination than his or her own need not take part in the religious

instruction, if any, offered by that school. This clearly implies that

students attending a particular school district did not have to be of

the same religion as indicated in the school district’s name.

[320]

However, one must bear in mind that the 1884 Ordinances

contemplated that all schools were denominational and even had to carry the

name “Roman Catholic” or “Protestant,” although they were public schools.

Not surprisingly then, students not of that religion may have attended such

school being the only school in the district.

[321]

Other reasons have been offered to explain why the 1884

Ordinance permitted a student’s exemption from religious instruction. Dr.

John Hiemstra, then Associate Professor of Political Studies at The King’s

University College in Edmonton, Alberta in Domesticating Catholic Schools

(1885-1905) The Assimilation Intent of Alberta’s Separate School System ⁵⁵

explains the exemption provision as an approach, “…thought necessary to

accommodate the variety of views within the multi-denominational Protestant

sector.”

[322]

The question at hand – the funding of non-minority faith

students in separate schools – presupposes that both a public and separate

school exist. Later versions of the Ordinances provided an exemption from

religious instruction to all parents in all schools, a provision still found in The

Education Act, 1995. I see nothing in s. 138 of the 1901 Ordinances allowing a

student to be exempted from religious instruction as proving non-minority

students were commonly in attendance at separate schools and thereby

creating a right of funding in favour of the separate school.

⁵⁵Paper given at the Canadian Political Science Association AnnualMeetings Dalhousie University, May 30 –

June 1, 2003

- 162 -

Sixth Principle – Rights Anchored in Law, not Voluntary Practice

The Supreme Court in Tiny Separate School Trustees v The King,

[323]

[1927] SCR 637 called for a purposive interpretation of s. 93 but it cautioned

that any rights had to be anchored in law, not in practice of a voluntary nature.

The court cited Mackell, where the Privy Council cautioned against elevating a

“practice” or a “privilege of a voluntary character” to a protected right, stating

at p. 655 :

…any practice, instruction or privilege of a voluntary

character, which, at the date of the passing of the Act, might

be in operation is not a “legal right or privilege …

[324]

I have misgivings about the defendants’ proof of attendance of

certain non-minority faith students in separate schools pre-dating 1905 as

proof of a right to receive funding. The defendants went to great effort to

gather rather anecdotal evidence that non-minority faith students attended

separate schools without known restriction of funding. I accept that several

instances could be found of non-Catholic students attending Catholic schools

and non-Protestants attending Protestant schools (as few as there were).

However, I cannot see that occasionally accommodating non-minority students

establishes a right in law or makes the right a denominational right.

[325]

Probably no greater percentage of non-Catholic students

attending Catholic schools can be found than in St. Theodore Roman Catholic

School where in 2012-2013 the number of Catholic students in attendance was

only 23 percent of the total. I do not accept the inverted rationale that allowing

a practice creates a right. I see nothing in the scattered incidents of attendance

immediately prior to and after 1905 or the prevalence of non-Catholic students

- 163 -

in today’s Catholic schools that make such practices a constitutional “right or

privilege” under the 1901 Ordinances.

[326]

Reference re Education Act (Que.) further supports the conclusion

that a practice does not make a constitutional right . In a five question

reference to the court, one question was highly relevant to the issue in this

action. It asked, “Does the Education Act…prejudicially affect the rights and

privileges protected by s. 93(1) and (2) of the Constitution Act, 1867 in its

provisions…which restrict access to these school boards to persons who

belong to the same religious denominations as that of these boards?” The

Supreme Court held that s. 93 did not confer a denominational right to admit

and educate non-minority faith students in separate schools. The court

accepted the decision of the Quebec Court of Appeal, writing at para. 130:

In the opinion of Beauregard J.A. the fact that at Confederation a

school board could admit or refuse to admit a child from another

religion was not an essential characteristic of the right to dissent. I

share his view when he says at p. 2585 that this situation “has

nothing to do with the right of a religious minority to dissociate itself

from the majority with respect to teaching in schools”.

[327]

In Reference re Education Act (Que), even though rural

dissentient schools could accept non-minority faith students “as a matter of

favour” prior to confederation, this silence did not confer a denominational

right to accept non-minority faith students. The court stated:

The mere possibility in view of the law’s silence of a dissentient

school accepting children from another denomination “as a matter of

favour” is not in my view a denominational right or privilege stricto

sensu. Could it nevertheless be part of what Beetz J. in G.M.P.S.B.

regards, to use the words of McCarthy J., as a non-denominational

aspect necessary to give effect to the denominational guarantees? I

refer here to attendance as related to financing. However, contrary to

what some may argue, the admission of children from other

denominations does not seem to have been particularly advantageous

- 164 -

for a dissentient school board. In particular, the trustees could only

impose taxes on parents of the dissentient faith, as provided in ss.

55(4), 57(1) and (5) and 58. I conclude that the admission of children

of other denominations was not a necessary factor to the

effectiveness of the constitutional guarantees and was not related

thereto. [Emphasis added]

[328]

In the urban municipalities in Quebec, denominational common

schools had express legislative authority, at confederation, to accept children

of other faiths. Nevertheless, at p 580-81, the court held that this was not a

right “with respect to denominational schools” within the meaning of s. 93(1).

The Education Act, 1995 could just as effectively restrict access to

denominational schools in the urban municipalities to students of the minority

faith.

[329]

Reference re Education Act (Que) confirms that Catholic separate

schools in Saskatchewan do not enjoy a right or privilege pursuant to s. 93 to

admit non-Catholic children, even if the 1901 Ordinances had provided

separate schools with the implied authority to admit non-Catholic students

(which I have not found). The fact that some non-minority faith students

attended separate schools should, in the words of the Supreme Court, be seen

“as a matter of favour.” I do not accept, though, that such attendance created a

denominational right.

[330]

I agree, too, with GSSD’s reliance upon Hirsch as support that

separate schools have a denominational right to exclude non-denominational

students to preserve their denominational character. The Privy Council struck

down a Quebec law that permitted Jews to be considered as Protestants for

separate school purposes. The court held that by permitting Jews to join

Protestants in forming separate schools, to appoint trustees and to have their

- 165 -

children attend Protestant schools, Protestant rights under s. 93(1) would be

infringed.

Seventh Principle – Changing Religious Attitudes

[331]

Another question may arise: what latitude should a religious

minority have in advancing changing religious views to support its

interpretation of rights and privileges? In this trial, evidence was offered that

the teachings of the Catholic Church have substantively changed, particularly

since Vatican II. As Dr. Groome, CTT’s expert witness suggested, the Church

may have once converted followers at the point of a sword, but today the

Church evangelizes. As Bishop Bolen described, Vatican II clearly moved the

Church away from considering non-Catholics as “schismatics” and “heretics,”

to a deeper acceptance of other faiths. Dr. Peters, CTT’s expert witness,

described changes to Catholic theology over the last 100 years as follows:

These understandings [that there is only one true Church] changed

drastically as a result of the Second Vatican Council and they are

continuing to evolve, in an uneven and hiccupping manner, in the

decades since. Members of other faiths discover that they share many

beliefs and preferences with Catholics as to how the world should be,

and the idea of the Catholic Church as a monolithic structure,

controlled dictatorially from Rome, has largely dissipated. There is

greater trust between members of different religions and associating

with one another is not seen as being a hazard to one’s eternal

salvation as it might have been a century ago.

[332]

To what extent should Catholic theologians be able to redefine

the tenets of their faith as they relate to education and claim these evolving

tenets as being protected, even though they have been “uneven and

hiccupping?” Justice Sharpe in Daly addresses this question, stating:

Accordingly, while I agree that in the final analysis, separate school

supporters are not at liberty to define for themselves the scope of

their constitutional rights and that it is necessary to subject their

- 166 -

claims to objective scrutiny, that review must necessarily take into

account the perspective of the minority claiming the benefit of the

constitutional right. The bona fide belief of the applicants that the

denominational character of their schools is threatened by s. 136 is

not determinative, but neither is it irrelevant. In particular, the court

must pay heed to and respect the religious convictions that underlie

that belief.

[333]

While the constitution must have a modern sensibility, claimed

rights cannot shift with variations in Catholic theology. In Daly v Attorney

General of Ontario (1999), 172 DLR (4^{t h}) 241 (Ont CA), the Ontario Court of

Appeal held that employing only Catholic teachers was a right of separate

schools under pre-confederation law given the “purpose and philosophy of

separate schools.” The court anchored its decision “at the time of

confederation,” considering “the prevailing attitudes of the day with respect to

religion.”

[334]

Dr. Peters, CTT’s expert witness, explained the Catholic

theological viewpoint a century ago, at the time of the 1901 Ordinances.

Associations outside the Catholic Church were “seen as being a hazard to

one’s eternal salvation,” a viewpoint that accords with Pope Pius IX’s

admonition in 1846 published in Qui Pluribus: it was an error for Catholics to

approve of a system of education unconnected with Catholic faith and the

Church. Taking Justice Sharpe’s statement that prevailing attitudes at the time

of confederation govern the interpretation of s. 93(1) of the Constitution Act,

1867, then, similarly, the prevailing attitudes of Catholicism in 1905 should

govern the interpretation of s. 17(1) of the Saskatchewan Act. Those attitudes

were described, even by CTT’s expert witnesses, as essentially intolerant of

non-Catholic religions, where associations with non-Catholics was hazardous

to one’s eternal salvation. That intolerance suggests that Catholics in 1905

- 167 -

would hardly have wanted or sought the constitutional right to bring non-

Catholic students into their schools.

[335]

Even if I accept, as I do, that Catholic theology has accepted a

more ecumenical and inclusive view of other religions, where evangelization

has replaced proselytization, where inclusion and accommodation of other

faiths is part of Catholic doctrine, and even if I accept that such shift warrants

constitutional protection under s. 17(1), I am left with one final question:

would this shift allow enrolment and funding of non-minority faith students to

become a denominational right of Catholic schools? I see the protection of

Catholic values for Catholic children, not the dissemination of Catholic values

to non-Catholic children, as the protected denominational aspect of Catholic

education, a finding I will elaborate upon under the next principle.

Eighth Principle – The Essence of a Catholic School and Denominational

Rights

[336]

Above all, the interpretation of constitutional documents must

give meaning to both the express and implied meaning of the 1901

Ordinances. I therefore have searched for the true purpose of s. 17(1). The

“class of persons” whose rights are protected under s. 17(1) obviously

includes Roman Catholics (Mackell), primarily Roman Catholic parents and

their children. Section 17(1) is not about the right of Catholics or Protestants

to gain ascendancy or influence in their community through the right to

educate children of other faiths. Section 17(1) is to ensure that future

generations of children, when their parents are in a religious minority

(Catholic or Protestant), are inculcated in the parents’ re ligious beliefs and not

absorbed into the values of the majority.

- 168 -

[337]

Catholic children are the primary beneficiaries of separate school

legislation, a truism recognized as early as 1895 in Brophy when the Privy

Council struck to the core of the constitutional protection to divine its true

purpose. Its statement pre-dates Saskatchewan’s provincial status and offers a

view that was known when the 1901 Ordinances were adopted as

Saskatchewan’s constitutional protection of separate schools. The Privy

Council in Brophy explained the underlying purpose of s. 93(1)’s protection of

the religious rights of the minority to educate its children, as would be quoted

and emphasized by Justice Wilson in Reference Re Bill 30, at 1174, nearly a

century later:

There can be no doubt that the views of the Roman Catholic

inhabitants of Quebec and Ontario with regard to education were

shared by the members of the same communion in the territory

which afterwards became the Province of Manitoba. They regarded it

as essential that the education of their children should be in

accordance with the teachings of their Church, and considered that

such an education could not be obtained in public schools designed

for all the members of the community alike, whatever their creed, but

could only be secured in schools conducted under the influence and

guidance of the authorities of their Church.

[338]

This purposive interpretation offered over 110 years ago shows

that the overarching reason for separate school s focuses on Catholic parents,

ensuring “that the education of their children should be in accordance with the

teachings of their church.” Section 17(1) was to allow the minority religion –

Protestant or Catholic – to remove their children from the influence of the

majority, so their children could be educated in the faith and values of their

religion, untrammelled by the domination of the larger group.

[339]

Inherent in protecting separate Catholic schools is the

understanding that perpetuating the Catholic faith is best accomplished when a

- 169 -

child adheres to the beliefs of his or her parents and, when in a minority, by

separating the child from members of other faiths to ensure an immersion in

Catholic faith. Many judicial statements have referred to the inculcation of

children in the faith of their parents as the paramount concern of separate

schools. In Daly, Justice Sharpe stated that the constitutionally protected goal

of Catholic separate schools was to transmit the Church’s teaching to children:

…The purpose of granting to Roman Catholics the right to funding

for separate schools and the right to elect trustees to manage their

own schools was to enable the teachings of the Roman Catholic faith

to be transmitted to the children of Roman Catholics …

[340]

Justice Sharpe drew a direct line from the right to rec eive

“funding” to the purpose of separate schools, namely to transmit Catholic

values to “children of Roman Catholics.”

[341]

In conclusion, applying a purposive interpretation to the 1901

Ordinances I find that Catholic separate schools have no constitutional right to

admit and receive funding for non-Catholic students. In any event, if such a

right were implicit, I do not find it to be a denominational right.

PART FIVE: IS FUNDING OF NON-MINORITY FAITH STUDENTS AT ST.

THEODORE ROMAN CATHOLIC SCHOOL A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT

UNDER S. 17(2) OF THE SASKATCHEWAN ACT?

I.

ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THE DEFENDANTS’ POSITION

[342]

The defendants say s. 17(2) of the Saskatchewan Act, provides a

full answer to this action because it requires the government to fund both

Catholic and public schools without discrimination. They say that s. 17(2)

essentially finesses the entirety of this lawsuit since it so directly and

emphatically states that public and separate school s must be funded equally.

- 170 -

[343]

Section 17(2) of the Saskatchewan Act reads as follows:

17(2). In the appropriation by the Legislature or distribution by the

Government of the province of any moneys for the support of

schools organized and carried on in accordance with the said chapter

29, or any Act passed in amendment thereof or in substitution

therefor, there shall be no discrimination against schools of any class

described in the said chapter 29.

[344]

In its trial brief, GSSD did not address s. 17(2) of the

Saskatchewan Act. Accordingly, I will canvass the defendants’ position and

offer my analysis. I will, however, state my conclusion here. I agree that

public schools and separate schools must be funded without discrimination.

But one must first determine the rights of separate schools to receive funding,

which begs the question in this lawsuit. Only upon answering this question are

public and separate schools entitled to the same level of funding without

discrimination.

[345]

The Government states that because s. 142 of The Education Act,

1995 provides that any child may attend a school where the child’s parents

live and s. 142(3) bars schools from charging tuition to any student, funding

must be provided equally to Catholic schools as to public schools. In its trial

brief, the Government provides wide-ranging reasons why Catholic schools

would be disadvantaged if government funding was denied to them respecting

non-Catholic students. The Government points out the obvious consequences

to Catholic schools if GSSD were successful, stating:

103. …the majority public schools board’s argument for a ban on

funding would inevitably have the effect of making it financially

difficult for the separate school to accept non-minority faith children.

104. At the same time, the majority public school board appears to

argue that it would be able to receive full funding for all students

- 171 -

attending its schools, without taking their religion into account. That

would clearly give a financial advantage to the public schools

compared to the separate schools.

105. Overall, it is hard to see how the majority public school’s

position is anything but discriminatory, and therefore contrary to s

17(2) of the Saskatchewan Act.

[346]

The Government then suggests that if public schools can accept

full funding regardless of their students’ religion and Catholic schools cannot,

the result would not be “fair.” The Government’s position is unique and bears

further direct quotation from its trial brief:

107. …[I]t [Good Spirit] wants the separate school boards to have

funding only for children of the minority faith attending its schools,

while the public school will receive full funding for all children at its

schools, regardless of religion. It is difficult to see how this is fair.

108. …It argues that children of the non-minority faith do not have

a right to the same level of funding, and hence education, if they

attend a separate school. They argue that minority separate school

boards should receive less money per student than the majority

public school boards receive. These arguments are not about fairness

and are contrary to s. 17(2).

[347]

Finally, the Government states that public and separate school s

must receive equal funding to protect notions of parental autonomy and

freedom of religion:

110. As well, tying funding to the religion of students comes very

close to an argument that the majority public school division believes

that it is entitled to have the non-minority faith children attend its

schools. That is completely contrary to the notions of parental

autonomy, freedom of religion – and fairness.

II.

ANALYSIS

The result would be strange if, as the defendants suggest,

[348]

s. 17(2) provided a simple and emphatic answer to the entirety of the

constitutional questions this litigation poses. Such an answer would obviate

- 172 -

the need to look at the rights accorded under the 1901 Ordinances, would

ignore applying the denominational aspects test and would render all judicial

determinations on this issue in Canada of little relevance. In my view,

s. 17(2) presupposes that separate schools are serving the purposes for which

they were intended – the perpetuation and protection of the minority’s faith

through separate education. The words of s. 17(2) expressly state that in the

distribution of money for the “support of schools organized and carried on in

accordance with…chapter 29” separate schools are to receive equal funding.

Schools not carried on in accordance with chapter 29 are not included in the

guarantee of equal funding. Section 17(2) does not finesse the entire

application of constitutional principles that have been the centre of this

lawsuit since its inception.

[349]

Justice Iacobucci in English Catholic Teachers upheld Ontario’s

proposed new provincial funding arrangements affecting public and separate

schools because the legislation continued to “preserve the ‘separateness’ of

separate schools.” Of deep importance to any funding of Catholic schools is

the protection of their right to remain separate. If Justice Iacobucci had found

that the newly proposed funding legislation in some manner adversely affected

the ability of Catholic schools to retain their “separateness” he would have

found the legislation encroached on guaranteed rights. If, as Justice Iacobucci

found, preserving separateness is the hallmark of separate school funding, then

preserving separateness is the requisite consideration that must be applied

before separate schools can claim equal funding under s. 17(2).

[350]

Section 17(2) could not have been intended, as the Government

suggests, to create a second publicly funded school system to provide choice

- 173 -

to parents. The Government repeatedly states that public funding for non-

Catholic students is necessary to provide choice to non-Catholic parents who

wish to enrol their children in Catholic schools. The Government states that

many non-Catholic parents “desire a choice of schools”⁵⁶and GSSD’s position

does not “sit comfortably with the concept of parental choice.”⁵⁷The

Government poses questions such as, “Why then, does the majority public

school division not want to respect the choice of school…made by children’s

parents, who best know the needs of their own children?”⁵⁸The Government

equates GSSD’s position not only with a denial of parental choice and

autonomy, but with a denial of parents’ “freedom of religion.”⁵⁹This case

takes on a strange dimension when a party (GSSD) cites government action as

infringing freedom of religion and the government defends its action, saying

that without the action, freedom of religion would be denied.

[351]

The religious freedom of non-Catholic parents wishing to send

their children to Catholic schools has not been infringed if funding is

unavailable for them. Parents are legislatively entitled to send their children to

religious schools of their choice, but such choice may be accompanied by a

financial obligation. This principle was clearly stated in Adler when Justice

Sopinka wrote, at para. 171, that the state’s refusal to fund non-Catholic

separate schools did not infringe freedom of religion because the Education

Act in Ontario (as in Saskatchewan) “allows for the provision of education

within a religious school or at home… [and the Act] does not compel the

[parents] to act in any way that infringes their freedom of religion.”

⁵⁶Government Trial Brief Para 313

⁵⁷Government Trial Brief Para 336

⁵⁸Government Trial Brief Para 350

⁵⁹Government Trial Brief Para 110

- 174 -

[352]

The defendants cannot advance a religious freedom argument on

the testimony of non-Catholic parents whose children are currently attending

Catholic schools. It is an odd religious freedom that does not provide an equal

measure of freedom to all citizens, but only to those whose principles are

commensurate with Catholic doctrine. Non-Christian parents, for example,

may not be too sympathetic to hear non-Catholic Christians complain if they

are unable to receive government funding to educate their children with

Christian values within a Catholic school. These non-Christian parents might

think that non-Catholic parents should be, like them, equally denied or equally

afforded the benefit of publicly-funded faith-based education.

[353]

Furthermore, if the purpose of separate schools is to provide

choice to parents, many regions of Saskatchewan do not have Catholic schools

so choice is largely restricted to urban centres. If choice is a government goal,

choice should be reasonably available to all. Better choice to no one (aside

from those constitutionally preferred), than choice to some based on the

whims of geography and acceptance of Catholic doctrine.

[354]

The Government’s position, that Catholic schools should receive

funding to educate students regardless of faith just like public schools, ignores

the genesis of separate schools and erases legal differences between public and

separate schools. Effectively the defendants would give Saskatchewan two

competing public school systems with little to legally dis tinguish them,

certainly not government funding. I see no grounds to think that the 1901

Ordinances were meant to create two parallel and competing public school

systems.

- 175 -

[355]

I disagree with s. 17(2) being leveraged to ensure ideals of

“freedom of religion – and fairness.”⁶⁰To the contrary, and ironically,

separate schools have been described in Reference re an Act to Amend the

Education Act (1986), 25 DLR (4^{t h}) 1 (Ont CA) as “mak[ing] it impossible to

treat all Canadians equally [since] [t]he country was founded upon the

recognition of…unequal educational rights for specific religious groups.”

After the Ontario Court of Appeal so pointedly described separate school

rights it also offered at p. 64 that the Charter (and its guarantees of religious

freedom) could remedy this unequal treatment, but that “a specific

constitutional amendment would be required to accomplish that.”

[356]

The defendants do not yield to the truism that s. 93 rights create

unequal treatment. Nor, assuredly is CTT interested in advocating for a

constitutional amendment. The defendants must accept that “unequal” and

therefore “unfair” treatment is inherent to separate school rights. The Supreme

Court has said so. To shift to GSSD an allegation that its position lacks

“fairness” is a sleight of hand that gains no traction.

[357]

Separate schools were not created to give rights or choice to the

majority. They were created so that a minority faith could separate their

children from the majority, the same majority the defendants now say has

always been their right to educate at public expense. The defendants advocate

that rights originally intended to protect Catholic minorities have morphed

into rights to protect certain elements of the non-Catholic majority by

invoking the legally uncertain rubric of “parental autonomy” and “fairness.”

⁶⁰Government Trial Brief Para 110

- 176 -

[358]

The Government also states that GSSD argues “that minority

separate school boards should receive less money per student than the majority

public school boards receive.”⁶¹Unless I missed a significant point in this

litigation, I heard no argument from GSSD that per pupil grants to Catholic

school divisions should be less than per pupil grants to public school

divisions.

[359]

In conclusion, I do not accept that s. 17(2) is a constitutional

guarantee that Catholic schools are automatically entitled to equal funding to

public schools with disregard to the faith-affiliation of students enrolled in

Catholic schools.

PART SIX: DOES GOVERNMENT FUNDING VIOLATE S. 2(a) OF THE

CHARTER?

I.

ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF GSSD’S POSITION

[360]

I have found that the admission and funding of non-Catholic

students in Catholic schools is not a protected right under the Saskatchewan

Act and is therefore not immune from Charter scrutiny. Accordingly, such

funding is open to a potential challenge under the Charter as infringing s. 2(a)

and s. 15.

[361]

GSSD leans heavily on Justice Estey’s statement in Reference re

Bill 30 that once the state passes discriminatory or preferential legis lation

outside the confines of the denominational education guarantees of the

Constitution, a violation of the Charter is “axiomatic.” He stated:

⁶¹Government Trial Brief Para 108

- 177 -

It is axiomatic (and many counsel before this Court conceded the

point) that if the Charter has any application to Bill 30, this Bill

would be found discriminatory and in violation of s. 2(a) and s. 15 of

the Charter of Rights…

[362]

GSSD says that Justice Estey’s statement provides a full answer :

except as protected by s. 17, state-funding of separate schools is contrary to

the Charter.

[363]

Since Justice Estey found that Bill 30 garnered protection under

s. 93, he did not provide an analysis for his broad statement. GSSD explains

his statement stating that funding of non-Catholic students infringes the

Charter because it violates the state’s duty of religious neutrality by endorsing

a particular religion and excluding others. Funding of non-minority faith

students confers benefits upon Catholics and Protestants not conferred upon

any other faith. In this case, government funding of non-Catholic students

attending Catholic schools has the effect of the government lending active

state support to the dissemination and evangelization activities of the Catholic

Church to non-Catholics, and the concomitant devaluing of other faiths. A

tenet of Catholicism is evangelization, a mission applied to non-Catholic

students in Catholic schools. GSSD points to the testimony of Brian Boechler,

Director of Education of Christ the Teacher until 2010. He testified that

teachers are trained to pass their faith to all students. Non-Catholic students

are required to attend and participate in all religious instruction, prayer and

religious celebrations. Mr. Boechler, during his examination for discovery

(read into the trial), stated that students who no longer wish to participate in

religious instruction may be asked to leave the school.

- 178 -

II.

ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF DEFENDANTS’ POSITION

[364]

While GSSD understandably relies heavily upon Justice Estey’s

statement as concluding that Charter breach is axiomatic, to my considerable

surprise neither defendant mentions or qualifies Justice Estey’s statement in

its extensive brief of law. The court is left without the assistance of an

opposing argument. Nevertheless, both defendants hold firmly that funding

non-Catholics students does not offend either s. 2(a) or s. 15 even if such

funding falls beyond the protection of s. 93. Furthermore, each submits that

any infringement is justified under s. 1 of the Charter as a reasonable limit on

such Charter rights.

[365]

CTT asserts that GSSD cannot prove that students are being

compelled to observe or involuntarily express religious beliefs or practices. It

argues that no individual has demonstrated an infringement of religious

freedom. Nor has GSSD been denied any religious freedom since it is an

institution which cannot hold a religious belief. CTT cites Professor Hogg’s

statement at para 37.1(b) in Constitutional Law that “the right to “freedom of

conscience and religion” in s. 3(1) does not apply to a corporation, because a

corporation cannot hold a religious belief or any other belief…”

[366]

The Government states that even if GSSD can claim public

interest standing, it is not released of its responsibility to prove infringement

in the usual way, in conformity with the tests developed through Charter

jurisprudence. The Government states that GSSD led no evidence from any

individual who was unable to practice his or her religion as he or she wished.

The Government’s objection to GSSD’s allegation of Charter infringement

- 179 -

overlaps with its objection respecting standing and forms a recurring theme:

GSSD is not the person to have brought this action and is not entitled to seek

the remedies it claims. The Government states that s. 2(a) provides freedom of

religion to “everyone,” but “given the nature of religious beliefs, only natural

persons can have a right under s. 2(a).”⁶²

[367]

The defendants qualify the essence of religious freedom as

seminally explained by Chief Justice Dickson in R v Big M Drug Mart Ltd.,

[1985] 1 SCR 295 [Big M]. The Government accepts that freedom of religion

“requires the government to be neutral on the iss ue of religion, and not to give

preference to one religion over another.”⁶³However, the Government relies

upon Mouvement laique québécois v Saguenay (City), 2015 SCC 16 [2015] 2

SCR 3 [Mouvement laique québécois] submitting that any governmental

preference of one religion over another must be more than “trivial or

insignificant.” It states that infringement of state neutrality must typically be

“coercive or intrusive in nature.”⁶⁴The Government asserts the impugned

government action of funding non-Catholic students at Catholic schools is not

coercive and no individual’s religious beliefs or practice has been threatened.

III. ANALYSIS

A.

Is Charter Breach Axiomatic?

[368]

Some might suggest that Justice Estey’s forceful statement , in

Reference re Bill 30, is obiter. After all, he provides no detailed analysis of

⁶²Government Trial Brief Para 273

⁶³Government Trial Brief Para 286

⁶⁴Government Trial Brief Para 291

- 180 -

either s. 2(a) or s. 15 and instead states a conclusion absent reference to case

law.

[369]

I am loath to qualify or dismiss Justice Estey’s emphatic

statement. It illustrates the starting point of his entire analysis, that “but for”

the presence of a saving constitutional provision, proposed legislation granting

funding to Catholic high schools, but no other religious schools, is contrary to

the Charter. He states that Bill 30 would have violated the Charter unless

shielded by separate school rights under s. 93 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

Justice Estey’s statement is not tentative; it is forceful. “Axiomatic” is not an

equivocal word. “Axiomatic” is equivalent to “self -evident,” “obvious,”

“clear,” or “it goes without saying.” Similarly, he used an equally charge d

phrase to describe that shy of constitutional protection, the impugned

legislation “would be found discriminatory and in violation…of the Charter.”

He did not say, for example, “might be contrary to t he Charter,” “potentially

is Charter offensive,” or “arguably discriminatory.” Nor was Justice Estey

ambivalent about the specifics of Charter violation. He cited the violation of

both freedom of religion and equality. He refers to both the Constitution Act,

1867 and specifically to s. 2(a) and s. 15 of the Charter.

[370]

I cannot imagine a Supreme Court Justice casually or carelessly

offering such a vital statement respecting the constitutional rights of separate

schools on such a significant and often-litigated issue. Nor does Justice

Estey’s statement stand alone. In Adler, Justice Iacobucci offered a similar

statement, starting from the opposite point of the constitutional analysis – that

an equality argument failed only because s. 93 saved it. At paras. 26 and 27 he

said:

- 181 -

26. The appellants advance, in essence, two Charter

arguments. The first is that s. 2(1)’s guarantee of freedom of

religion requires the province of Ontario to provide public

funding for independent religious schools. The second is that,

by funding Roman Catholic separate and secular public

schools at the same time as it denies funding to independent

religious schools, the province is discriminating against the

appellants on the basis of religion contrary to s. 15(1) .

27. I propose to deal with these arguments in turn. As will

be explained more fully below, it is my opinion that the

s. 2(a) claim fails because any claim to public support for

religious education must be grounded in s. 93(1) which is a

“comprehensive code” of denominational school rights. With

regard to the appellants’ equality argument, this claim fails

because the funding of Roman Catholic separate schools and

public schools is within the contemplation of the terms of

s. 93 and, therefore, immune from Charter scrutiny.

Put slightly differently, but as accurately, Justice Iacobucci might have said

that the legislation resulted in a violation of religious freedom and in unequal

treatment, saved only by the constitutional guarantees of s. 93.

[371]

Yet another example of the axiomatic result of unequal treatment

inherent to separate schools but saved by s. 93 is found in Reference re Bill 30

where Justice Wilson approvingly cited the Ontario Court of Appeal’s

statement respecting Bill 30 as infringing the Charter, save for s. 93 (at p

1164):

These educational rights, granted specifically to...Roman Catholics

in Ontario, make it impossible to treat all Canadians equally. The

country was founded upon the recognition of special or unequal

educational rights for specific religious groups in Ontario...

Then, indicative of her approval of the above statement, and in her own words ,

at p 1197, Justice Wilson stated, “special treatment guaranteed by the

constitution to denominational, separate or dissentient schools [is protected]

even if it sits uncomfortably with the concept of equality embodied in the

- 182 -

Charter…” Admittedly, “sits uncomfortably” is not as emphatic as Justice

Estey’s statement that Bill 30 would be “in violation” of the Charter.

Nevertheless, “sitting uncomfortably” connotes Charter-infringement, saved

only by the constitutional guarantees under s. 93.

[372]

These statements emanating from the Supreme Court and pointing

to offence of s. 2(a) and s. 15, but for the shielding constitutional protection of

s. 93, are consistent and powerful. These pronouncements are tantamount to

saying that separate school legislation in the three provinces that provide

unequal educational rights for Roman Catholics and Protestants are prima

facie in violation of the Charter.

[373]

As a simple truism, when a government body provides direct

payment to any religious group – in this case Roman Catholics and Protestants

– to the exclusion of all other religious groups, a Charter violation is

axiomatic. Such preferential treatment cannot be Charter compliant, except of

course, if another part of the constitution condones such payment and, in that

instance, only to the limited extent of such condonation.

[374]

The Charter itself implies that s. 93 separate school rights are

offensive to freedoms guaranteed by the Charter. Hence the need for s. 29 of

the Charter – that nothing in the Charter would abrogate any rights

guaranteed by the Constitution of Canada respecting “denominational separate

or dissentient schools.” The necessary corollary of s. 29 is that those aspects

of separate schools not guaranteed by the Constitution of Canada would be

abrogation of Charter rights. The Ontario Court of Appeal, as quoted in

Reference Bill 30 at p. 1164, said as much: “Section 29 of the Charter makes

- 183 -

it clear that minority education rights … are not to be abrogated by ss. 2(a) or

15.”

[375]

Note, too, the statement offered by Brad A. Elbert & Mark C.

Power in Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms , 4^{t h}ed, (Toronto:

LexisNexis Butterworth, 2005) at 247, in the chapter entitled Freedom of

Conscience and Religion, a statement the authors anchored in the ratio

decidendi of Reference re Bill 30. They concluded that the Supreme Court

endorsed a basic principle: that respecting funding of religious education,

excepting s. 93 schools which “are in a special place to which others cannot

aspire,” contemporary Canadian society and the Court are committed to non-

denominational education and state neutrality. The authors wrote:

In fact, to justify the conclusion in Reference re Bill 30, it could be

argued that one cannot look to history alone, but rather must also

draw conclusions about contemporary society and the meaning of

equality and religious freedom today. If section 93 schools are in a

special place to which others cannot aspire, the Supreme Court of

Canada must be concluding that contemporary society is generally

committed to non-denominational education and state neutrality with

respect to funding of religious education, except in the case of this

historical anomaly. Thus, section 29 of the Charter helps define

section 2(a) and to protect religious funding that would otherwise be

in violation of the Charter’s commitment to religious freedom and

equality.

[376]

The authors point to the Supreme Court’s characterization of s. 93

schools necessarily being in a “special place” to which other schools cannot

aspire. I agree that if not for this special place, i.e. when rights are not

constitutionally protected under s. 93, separate schools are subject to the

Charter and specifically the state’s duty of religious neutrality.

- 184 -

[377]

I agree with GSSD’s characterization of Justice Estey’s statement

in Reference re Bill 30: that “as soon as the Government and Catholic schools

step outside the sheltered confines of s. 17 of the Saskatchewan Act, a

violation of the Charter follows.”⁶⁵

B.

Going Beyond “Axiomatic” Charter Breach: Obligation of State

Neutrality

1. Freedom of Religion Embraces Obligation of Religious Neutrality

[378] Given the Supreme Court’s statements that separate school

funding for only certain faiths is “unfair” and “unequal,” (save for protection

under s. 93) I cannot conclude otherwise. Justice Estey and Justice Wilson,

having found that the extension of funding to Catholic secondary schools was

protected under s. 93, had no need to give specific reasons why state funding

of certain, but not all, religious schools is contrary to Charter values.

However, I will articulate why Charter rights have been violated because I

must necessarily provide an analysis under s. 1 of the Charter.

[379]

GSSD, perhaps anticipating that I would look for a further

evidentiary and legal basis for a Charter breach, states that “the funding of

non-Catholics in Catholic schools violates…the Government’s duty of

religious neutrality owed to the collective citizenry."⁶⁶

[380]

Two issues must be determined to resolve the parties’ opposing

views respecting the state’s duty to remain religiously neutral. First, I must

determine whether funding of non-Catholic students to attend Catholic schools

⁶⁵GSSD Trial Brief Para 143

⁶⁶GSSD Trial Brief Para 144

- 185 -

offends the Government’s duty of religious neutrality. Second, and as

contentiously argued by the defendants, I must determine whether a public

school board, as an institution created by statute and not as an individual, can

argue that the government has violated its duty to remain religiously neutral.

2. The Principle of Religious Neutrality

[381]

The duty of state neutrality requires neutrality between religions.

Chief Justice Dickson in Big M, at p 296, said as much over 30 years ago:

“[t]he protection of one religion and the concomitant non-protection of others

imports a disparate impact destructive of the religious freedom of society.”

[382]

This litigation provides another opportunity for the courts to

define the evolving doctrine of state neutrality respecting religion. Professors

Rosalie Jukier and José Woehrling have described the doctrine of religious

neutrality as the Supreme Court’s recognition of an “implicit consequence of

freedom of religion.”⁶⁷The Charter, in embracing the ideals of freedom of

religion and conscience, does not expressly address the state’s obligation to

remain religiously neutral. In Mouvement laïque québécois, Justice Gascon

stated that the Charter, in guaranteeing freedom of religion and conscience,

does not expressly impose religious neutrality from the state:

[71] Neither the Quebec Charter nor the Canadian Charter expressly

imposes a duty of religious neutrality on the state. This duty results

from an evolving interpretation of freedom of conscience and

religion.

⁶⁷Rosalie Jukier and José Woehrling, Religion and the SecularState in Canada (Madrid:servicio publicaciones

facultad derecho Universidad Complutense Madrid, 2015) at 171

- 186 -

The Canadian courts have read a developing principle into s. 2(a) t hat

government action and legislation cannot favour one religion over another,

except for the allowance under s. 93 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

[383]

The evolving nature of the state’s duty of neutrality respecting

religion referenced by Justice Gascon will present challenges as Canada grows

increasingly pluralistic. Professor Bruce Ryder, in “State Neutrality and

Freedom of Conscience and Religion^”(2005), 29 SCLR 169, has described

Canada’s movement from a Christian-centric state to a pluralistic state,

forewarning that the course will be an “uneasy transition.” He wrote at p. 169:

While religion has always been a significant force in Canadian

public life, the relationship between religious and state authority has

changed profoundly. An explicit and implicit alliance between state

norms and the teachings of the dominant Christian religions, long

taken for granted, has been steadily challenged, especially in the last

half century. The state is now conceived, in popular and

constitutional discourses, as officially secular yet supportive of

religious pluralism and multiculturalism. The path from a de facto

Christian state to a secular pluralist state is not easily travelled….

We are still in the early stages of trying to work out what it means

for the Canadian state to e [sic] both officially secular and supportive

of religious pluralism. In this period of uneasy transition the

respective roles of secular and religious norms in shaping public

policy are matters of considerable political debate and scholarly

attention.

[384]

In Mouvement laïque québécois, Justice Gascon began his

discussion of the evolving nature of the concept of religious neutrality by

citing Justice LeBel’s statement in Congrégation des témoins de Jéhovah de

St-Jérôme-Lafontaine v Lafontaine (Village), 2004 SCC 48, [2004] 2 SCR 650

(which, although in dissent, was not contradicted by the majority). Noticeable

is Justice LeBel’s description of a new constitutional concept in Canadian law.

It merits quotation:

- 187 -

[66] The duty of neutrality appeared at the end of a long evolutionary

process that is part of the history of many countries that now share

Western democratic traditions. Canada’s history provides one

example of this experience, which made it possible for the ties

between church and state to be loosened, if not dissolved. There

were, of course, periods when there was a close union of

ecclesiastical and secular authorities in Canada. European settlers

introduced to Canada a political theory according to which the social

order was based on an intimate alliance of the state and a single

church, which the state was expected to promote within its borders.

Throughout the history of New France, the Catholic church enjoyed

the status of sole state religion. After the Conquest and the Treaty of

Paris, the Anglican church became the official state religion,

although social realities prompted governments to give official

recognition to the status and role of the Catholic church and various

Protestant denominations. This sometimes official, sometimes tacit

recognition, which reflected the make-up of and trends in the society

of the period, often inspired legislative solutions and certain policy

choices. Thus, at the time of Confederation in 1867, the concept of

religious neutrality implied primarily respect for Christian

denominations. One illustration of this can be seen in the

constitutional rules relating to educational rights originally found,

inter alia, in s. 93 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

[67] Since then, the appearance and growing influence of new

philosophical, political and legal theories on the organization and

bases of civil society have gradually led to a dissociation of the

functions of church and state; Canada’s demographic evolution has

also had an impact on this process, as have the urbanization and

industrialization of the country. Although it has not excluded

religions and churches from the realm of public debate, this

evolution has led us to consider the practice of religion and the

choices it implies to relate more to individuals’ private lives or to

voluntary associations (M. H. Ogilvie, Religious Institutions and the

Law in Canada (2nd ed. 2003), at pp. 27 and 56). These societal

changes have tended to create a clear distinction between churches

and public authorities, placing the state under a duty of neutrality.

Our Court has recognized this aspect of freedom of religion in its

decisions, although it has in so doing not disregarded the various

sources of our country’s historical heritage. The concept of neutrality

allows churches and their members to play an important role in the

public space where societal debates take place, while the state acts as

an essentially neutral intermediary in relations between the various

denominations and between those denominations and civil society.

- 188 -

[385]

Justice Gascon then gave more concrete shape to the state’s

obligation to be religiously neutral, again describing the doctrine as an

“evolution.” He stated, at paras. 72, 74-76 of Mouvement laïque québécois:

[72] …the evolution of Canadian society has given rise to a concept

of neutrality according to which the state must not interfere in

religion and beliefs. The state must instead remain neutral in this

regard. This neutrality requires that the state neither favour nor

hinder any particular belief, and the same holds true for non-

belief…. It requires that the state abstain from taking any position

and thus avoid adhering to a particular belief.

…

[74] By expressing no preference, the state ensures that it preserves a

neutral public space that is free of discrimination and in which true

freedom to believe or not to believe is enjoyed by everyone equally,

given that everyone is valued equally. I note that a neutral public

space does not mean the homogenization of private players in that

space. Neutrality is required of institutions and the state, not

individuals… On the contrary, a neutral public space free from

coercion, pressure and judgment on the part of public authorities in

matters of spirituality is intended to protect every person’s freedom

and dignity. The neutrality of the public space therefore helps

preserve and promote the multicultural nature of Canadian society

enshrined in s. 27 of the Canadian Charter. Section 27 requires that

the state’s duty of neutrality be interpreted not only in a manner

consistent with the protective objectives of the Canadian Charter, but

also with a view to promoting and enhancing diversity…

[75] … The state may not act in such a way as to create a preferential

public space that favours certain religious groups and is hostile to

others. It follows that the state may not, by expressing its own

religious preference, promote the participation of believers to the

exclusion of non-believers or vice versa.

[76] When all is said and done, the state’s duty to protect every

person’s freedom of conscience and religion means that it may not

use its powers in such a way as to promote the participation of

certain believers or non-believers in public life to the detriment of

others. It is prohibited from adhering to one religion to the exclusion

of all others. …Today, the state’s duty of neutrality has become a

necessary consequence of enshrining the freedom of conscience and

religion in the Canadian Charter and the Quebec Charter. [Emphasis

added.]

- 189 -

[386]

In my view, these descriptions of the state’s duty to remain

religiously neutral, are a mirror of the previously quoted statements of Justice

Estey and Justice Wilson. Separate schools for Roman Catholics and

Protestant minorities are, by definition, contrary to this duty, saved only by s.

93 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

[387]

Separate schools, when envisioned as early as the Act of Union,

1840 and continued in 1867 and again in 1905, perhaps cannot be criticized

for favouring one religion over another since the only two existing religious

prevalent (indeed existent) at the time – Roman Catholic and Protestant – had

equal rights. However, in today’s Canada, no newly enacted l egislation would

be constitutionally permissible if it provided benefits to Roman Catholics and

Protestants but no other religious groups. So, if separate school s are, by

definition, contrary to the doctrine of neutrality, any constitutionally

unprotected attribute of separate schools is highly suspect of offending the

state’s duty of religious neutrality.

[388]

The Government, citing Mouvement laique québécois, states that

funding of non-Catholic students at Catholic schools should be excused

because it is “trivial or insignificant” whereas an infringement of state

neutrality must typically be “coercive or intrusive in nature.” I agree with the

general principle but I disagree with the Government’s application of the

principle. The government’s decision to fund non-minority faith students at

separate schools proves an obvious – Justice Estey would have preferred

“axiomatic” – public preference for the ideals of Catholicism and

Protestantism shown to no other religion. This preference is neither trivial nor

insignificant.

- 190 -

[389]

To establish the extent of the state’s duty of religious neutrality,

the defendants refer to S.L. v Commission scolaire des Chênes, 2012 SCC 7,

[2012] 1 SCR 235 [S.L.]. In that case, Justice Deschamps stated at para. 31

that “absolute neutrality does not exist” and “absolutes hardly have any place

in the law.” In S.L., certain Catholic parents asked to have their children

exempted from participating in an ethics and religious cultures course in

Quebec schools, claiming they were denied the right to educate their children

in their own religious beliefs. The court held that the state’s duty of religious

neutrality was not so broad as to support an order exempting students from a

course of study that provided an even-handed exposure to world religions.

[390]

Justice Deschamps’ statement must be taken in context. I find a

difference between the state sponsoring an ethics and religious course aimed

to even-handedly expose students to various world religions and the state

funding Catholic schools to educate non-Catholic students in the teachings of

the Catholic faith. Catholic schools do not have an obligation to provide an

even-handed approach to expose students to other religious beliefs, an

assurance given by Chief Justice McLachlin in Loyola High School v Quebec

(Attorney General), 2015 SCC 12, at para 160, [2015] 1 SCR 613 where she

stated “…requiring a religious school to present the viewpoints of other

religions as equally legitimate and equally credible is incompatible with

religious freedom.” However, when the state, at public expense, funds and

thereby promotes the interest of the Catholic faith by enabling it to

disseminate its teachings to non-Catholic students in a manner denied to any

other religious group, the state has infringed its duty of religious neutrality.

- 191 -

[391]

I heard rather equivocal testimony about the character of Catholic

education respecting non-Catholic students. On one hand, I heard that

Catholicism infuses the entirety of a school’s program – one of the reasons

why Catholic school boards insist upon separate buildings for Catholic

schools, and why teachers and school board trustee must be Catholic. On the

other hand, I also heard that Catholic schools are accommodating of other

faith backgrounds. I heard testimony that non-Catholic students are

evangelized, not proselyted. However, I do not accept that Catholic theology

is as benign toward acceptance of non-Catholic beliefs as some witnesses

suggested.

[392]

I accept the testimony of Bishop Donald Bolen. He explained the

Church’s movement toward ecumenism as being the search for Christian unity

within Christian churches. Bishop Bolen and Mr. Leuer, counsel for GSSD,

engaged in cross-examination with Mr. Leuer reading to Archbishop Bolen an

excerpt from the papal encyclical of 1897 published after the Manitoba School

Question:

Similarly, it is necessary to avoid at all costs, as most dangerous,

those schools in which all beliefs are welcomed and treated as equal,

as if in what regards God and divine things, it makes no difference

whether one believes rightly or wrongly and takes up with truth or

error. You know well, Venerable Brethren, that every school of this

kind has been condemned by the church, because nothing can be

more harmful or better calculated to ruin the integrity of the faith and

to turn aside the tender minds of the young from the way of truth.

[393]

Then followed the respectful and candid exchange between Mr.

Leuer and Bishop Bolen:

- 192 -

Q. ….what room exists in today's Catholic schools for a statement

like that?

A. So the -- the central part of the quotation that…we've read is

"Those schools in which all beliefs are welcomed and treated as

equal, as if in what regards God and divine things, it makes no

difference whether one believes rightly or wrongly and takes up with

truth or error". That sounds very much like what Pope Benedict

[2005-2013] described as relativism; right? So this would be from

much earlier, from an earlier century, a fairly accurate description of

– of relativism. But it doesn't matter so much what you believe, that

every belief is equal. That if you put it in religious terms, all paths

are a path to God of – of equal value. Everybody is entitled to their

own opinion. You can't -- you can't rightly say that your convictions

are true, and another's aren't true. So I think that that stands as -- as a

statement. It would be phrased probably a little differently today.

…But stands…as a statement that we would hold.

Q. But what about the notion that this document, at least as I

interpret it, is criticizing the notion that all beliefs are welcomed and

treated as equal. Would that speak to today's Catholic school?

A. A Catholic school does not treat all religions as equal. …It treats

all religions with respect. But it's working, not from a Buddhist

perspective, it's working from a Catholic…perspective. It's working

with Jesus Christ as the heart of faith, as the description of what it is

to be fully human. The values that are taught at a Catholic school

may have some similarity, may have some common ground with

values of other religious traditions, but they come out of the

Christian tradition and out of Christian lived experience. … So there

is a difference between openness, desire to encounter, desire to enter

into dialogue with the other -- a religious tradition of the other. And

to say that all are equal, and to distance one's self from the question

of truth or error. Because a Catholic school should never distance

itself from the question of truth or error. It should be about the

pursuit of truth. [Emphasis added.]

[394]

Bishop Bolen clarifies that Catholic Church doctrine is not

equivocal about “truth or error.” At the heart of Catholic schools is a theistic

Catholic view, understandably and correctly fostered in Catholic schools, but

offensive to the state’s duty of neutrality when state-promoted beyond

constitutional protection.

- 193 -

[395]

Bishop Bolen’s doctrinally-based response that a “Catholic school

does not treat all religions as equal” is re iterated in “Catholic Schools: The

Inclusion of Non-Catholic Students”, where Mr. Donlevy cautions that non-

Catholic parents must understand the Catholic mandate of Catholic schools

and, just like Bishop Bolan, cites Pope Benedict XVI’s writings respecting

ecumenism and relativism, to conclude:

It is further arguable that the school board has an obligation to

provide non-Catholic parents and students with a clear understanding

that the Catholic Church does not accept that all churches are the

same in their spiritual effect and the affect of their faith.

In this postmodern world it is not seen as politically correct or

intellectually valid to claim any superiority to the truth. However,

that is exactly the position taken by the Catholic Church in Dominus

Iesus (Congregation, 2000a; Congregation, 2000b) and it should not

be avoided by a lay Catholic Board of Education. The Church

accepts and embraces ecumenism but it sees religious relativism as

the greatest current threat to the Faith (Ratzinger, 1996). [Emphasis

added.]

[396]

Justice Gascon in Mouvement laique québécois stated that

government action in the form of Christian prayer in city council meetings

cannot be “turned into…preferential space for people with theistic beliefs.”

Reciting a Christian prayer before council meetings is not a time-consuming

or costly action when compared to the attendance and public funding of non-

Catholic students in Catholic schools. If an adult having to hear a Christian

prayer before the opening of a city council meeting is not considered a

“trivial” or “insignificant” infringement of state neutrality, then, by

comparison, nor can funding of non-Catholic children in Catholic schools.

[397]

Even if Catholic education’s predominant goal for non-Catholic

students is evangelical or ecumenical, I find that allowing one faith group the

- 194 -

opportunity, at public expense and incommensurate with rights of other faiths,

to model the virtues of its religion to non-members is an advantage that

offends the state’s duty of neutrality. In part, I base this view on testimony

proffered by Dr. Aboguddah, the president of the Huda School. His te stimony

allowed me to draw two conclusions. First, he understood (and accepted

within the framework of the constitution) that the funding of Catholic schools

in Saskatchewan, although assured, is inherently discriminatory: the Huda

School receives no capital funding and only 80 percent of the per pupil

funding received by public and Catholic schools. However, moving beyond the

constitutional rights of Catholic schools, and putting the Huda School on

parallel grounds with Catholic schools (except for the lat ter’s constitutionally

guaranteed status to educate Catholic students) he asked why the Huda School

cannot receive funding to educate non-Muslim students, just like Catholic

schools receive funding to educate non-Catholic students. The Huda School

does not discriminate against hiring non-Muslim teachers (unlike Catholic

schools). The majority of its teaching staff is non-Muslim. Dr. Aboguddah

testified that the Huda School would welcome non-Muslim students to its

growing school of 430 students (in 2016) which would provide an opportunity

to build bridges with the broader Canadian community to reduce the

stereotyping and negative image affecting the Muslim community in light of

recent world events.

[398]

By comparison, Bishop Bolen accepted that the Catholic Church

has benefitted from admission of non-Catholic students as providing an

opportunity for parents and children to adopt a positive view of the Catholic

Church. He testified that the Catholic Church also has not had the best public

- 195 -

image and admitted that among a “significant constituency of people” the

Church in Canada faces a negative image, answering, “Yes…there are parts of

our society who view the Church very negatively.”

[399]

In my view, if both Catholic and Muslim institutions are

advantaged by having non-adherent students attend their schools, and the

former receives government funding to heighten this advantage and the latter

receives none, the principle of state neutrality toward religion is offended. As

Justice Gascon stated, in Mouvement laïque québécois, “neutrality requires

that the state neither favour nor hinder any particular belief...”

[400]

I accept, as well, the evidence of Dr. Hexham, GSSD’s expert

witness who testified that a number of non-Catholic faith traditions, including

Mormons, Muslims and Hindus, also consider evangelism or dissemination of

faith to non-members as an important component of their faiths. Current

government policy of funding only Catholic schools for the attendance of non-

Catholic students preferentially favours the Catholic faith among many faiths

that value evangelism.

[401]

Government funding of non-Catholic students at Catholic schools

creates state-sponsored advantage to Catholic parents. As CTT has agreed,

Catholic schools’ receipt of funding for non-Catholics students allows a

Catholic school “to obtain more funds for its operation”⁶⁸than would

otherwise be possible. This ability to receive funds unrelated to the enrolment

of Catholic students, an advantage that goes beyond rights protected by s. 93,

means that state action gives the Catholic faith an advantage to leverage funds

⁶⁸CTT Trial Brief Para 211

- 196 -

from non-Catholic students to ensure a better quality of Catholic education

than Catholic schools would receive without access to such funding. While

parents who enrol their children in other faith-based schools in Saskatchewan

must accept the constitutional advantage of Catholic schools receiving 100

percent government funding to protect Catholic parents’ right to educate their

children in the tenets of their faith, they should not have to accept that, in

addition to this benefit, the government provides a further “leveraging”

advantage. In my view, this advantage, unprotected by s. 93, proves that the

government is not acting neutrally between religions.

3. Can a Non-Individual Advance a Claim for Religious Freedom Under the

Doctrine of Religious Neutrality?

[402]

Having concluded that funding of non-Catholic students at

Catholic schools violates the principle of state neutrality, I turn to the

defendants’ argument that a school division, like GSSD, cannot advance a

freedom of religion or equality argument. Both look to the Charter’s

introduction of the ss. 2(a) and s. 15 rights, namely that the nouns “everyone”

and “every individual” qualify the persons entitled to those rights. Given this

apparent qualification, CTT states that a violation of Charter rights must be

based on the “personal, or subjective experience of individuals,”⁶⁹and only

upon proof of the infringement of the “rights of a natural person.”⁷⁰The

Government, too, advocates the same position. It argues that Charter rights

“are deeply personal,”⁷¹and meant “to ensure equality in their creation and

⁶⁹CTT Trial Brief Para 229

⁷⁰CTT Trial Brief Para 234

⁷¹Government Trial Brief Para 274

- 197 -

application of laws to individuals.”⁷²[Emphasis original] The Government

argues that proving an infringement of a Charter right must be “rooted in the

personal experiences of individuals”⁷³and grounded in “the centrality of the

individual.”⁷⁴

[403]

In my view, the defendants have mounted an argument that would

apply if the impugned legislation was neutral on its face and an individual

with a particular religious belief wished to prove that the legislation had a

disparate and deleterious impact upon her. For example, if the basis of the

claim was infringement of an individual’s religious freedom, before gaining a

remedy the individual would have to prove the honesty and sincerity of her

belief to show that the otherwise neutral government action worked a disparate

impact upon her. In this light, I agree with CTT’s looking to Syndicat

Northcrest v Amselem, 2004 SCC 47, [2004] 2 SCR 551, [Amselem] as

illustrative of this principle. However, what must be remembered in Amselem

is that, unlike this case which involves the funding of Catholic schools, the

impugned by-law in Amselem was neutral in its effect. In Amselem, Jewish

purchasers of certain condominium units failed to thoroughly read the

declaration of co-ownership which prohibited certain balcony structures – a

clearly neutral provision enacted before Mr. Amselem purchased his unit. As a

practicing Jew, Mr. Amselem erected a succah on his balcony fulfilling the

biblically mandated obligation of dwelling in such small temporary huts

during the annual nine-day Jewish religious festival of Succot. The Supreme

Court found that Mr. Amselem was sincere and honest in his religious beliefs

⁷²Government Trial Brief Para 275

⁷³Government Trial Brief Para 277

⁷⁴Government Trial Brief Para 278

- 198 -

and the impugned, albeit neutral, by-law had an impact that violated his

freedom of religion.

[404]

Unlike Amselem, this action presents an obvious Charter

infringement since the impugned government action countenanced by

provisions of The Education Act, 1995 and the Education Funding Regulations

is not neutral. Rather, on its face, the government provides funding pre cisely

on the basis of religion – to Catholic schools for the education and attendance

of non-Catholic students. Case law has distinguished the types of questions

raised in cases like Amselem from the question raised in this litigation. In

Public School Boards’ Assn. of Alberta v Alberta (Attorney General), 1998

ABCA 94, 158 DLR (4^{t h}) 267 [Public School Board’s Association], the court

acknowledged at para. 63 that certain legislation, on its face, can expressly or

implicitly infringe Charter rights. It stated at para. 63:

63. This is not a case in which the legislation on its face

conveys either an express or implicit Charter breach, and thus

evidence of impairment is essential. Because no evidence has

been introduced establish such effect, we also decline to deal

with it.

[405]

I agree with the Court of Appeal’s implicit direction: one must

first determine whether the impugned legislation “on its face conveys …

Charter breach.” In certain instances the state’s breach of religious neutrality

will be glaringly apparent; in others, subtle. For example, if legislation

allowed Anglicans to claim a charitable exemption for tithing, but di sallowed

all other religions the same privilege, the court would hardly have to hear

from a Mennonite, for example, that she held an honest and sincere belief that

tithing was religiously significant before determining that the law, on its face,

violated the state’s duty of religious neutrality. Why would a court need to

- 199 -

hear evidence from a Mennonite to reach this conclusion when the legislation,

on its face, so obviously is not religiously neutral? In such an instance, why

could not a fair-minded Anglican seek court intervention to argue that such

discriminatory legislation offends the state’s obligation to remain religiously

neutral? Indeed, in this action, I heard evidence (previously summarized) from

Audrey Trembley and Bert Degooijer, both public schoo l trustees and

practicing Roman Catholics. They explained the adverse consequences their

public school boards have experienced because of government funding of non -

Catholic students in Catholic schools.

[406]

The most formative decision respecting freedom of re ligion pre-

dates much of the Supreme Court’s express articulation of the doctrine of state

neutrality. In Big M, Justice Dickson (as he then was) rejected the argument

that a Charter challenge had to be launched by an individual who advanced

the Charter right. Justice Dickson looked to the qualities of the law being

challenged as being of foremost importance in determining whether s. 2(a) had

been violated, not the qualities of the person who might have alleged the

violation. He stated, at p 314:

The argument that the respondent, by reason of being a

corporation, is incapable of holding religious belief and

therefore incapable of claiming rights under s. 2(a) of the

Charter, confuses the nature of this appeal. A law which

itself infringes religious freedom is, by that reason alone,

inconsistent with s. 2(a) of the Charter and it matters not

whether the accused is a Christian, Jew, Muslim, Hindu,

Buddhist, atheist, agnostic or whether an individual or a

corporation. It is the nature of the law, not the status of the

accused, that is in issue. …

[407]

I am aware that Big M, unlike this action, dealt with a corporation

faced with a penal offence. But the principle in Big M is equally applicable to

- 200 -

this action. Just as one cannot be convicted under an unconstitutional statute,

one cannot receive government funding under an unconstitutional statute.

More precisely, if a corporation cannot be convicted and fined under an

unconstitutional enactment anchored in the Christian notion of a holy day of

rest, nor can a Catholic school division receive government funding under an

unconstitutional enactment based solely on the religious affiliation of the

recipient. I see no legal difference between the two situations.

[408]

Big M, although decided more than 30 years ago, closely paral lels

this action. Although the phrase “religious state neutrality” is not found in Big

M, the centrality of the principle is unmistakeable. Justice Dickson found that

obligatory Sunday closings of a corporately owned business infringed

religious freedoms without proof of the religious beliefs of Big M Drug Mart –

it had none – but rather on the “nature of the law.” He found that when the

legislation required everyone to keep holy the Lord’s Day of Christians, the

state violated the Charter. He stated “The protection of one religion and the

concomitant non-protection of others imports disparate impact destructive of

the religious freedom of the collectivity.” His statement is powerful when

applied in the context of the favourable government treatment Catholi c

schools receive in Saskatchewan when they receive funding to educate non-

Catholic students.

[409]

Justice Dickson also anchored his analysis in light of the remedies

available to Big M Drug Mart Ltd. upon proof of Charter infringement. While

s. 24 of the Charter speaks to a wide range of “appropriate and just” remedies

available to an individual who has proven an infringed Charter right, s. 52 of

the Constitution Act, 1982 provides a broader more emphatic remedy, a

- 201 -

remedy GSSD has specifically pleaded. Respectively, s. 24 of the Charter and

s. 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982 state:

24(1) Anyone whose rights or freedoms, as guaranteed by this

Charter, have been infringed or denied may apply to a court of

competent jurisdiction to obtain such remedy as the court

considers appropriate and just in the circumstances.

[Emphasis added.]

52(1) The Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of

Canada, and any law that is inconsistent with the provisions

of the Constitution is, to the extent of the incons istency, of no

force or effect.

[410]

The Charter is part of the “Constitution of Canada,” and, as

referenced in s. 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982, any law that infringes the

Charter is of no force or effect. Government action that on its face infringes

the state’s duty of neutrality, as found in Big M and as I have found in this

instance, is subject to the consequences of s. 52 and must be declared of no

force and effect. In my view, Justice Dickson’s statement at p 313 of Big M is

as clear as it is applicable in this action:

Section 24(1) sets out a remedy for individuals (whether real

persons or artificial ones such as corporations) whose rights

under the Charter have been infringed. It is not, however, the

only recourse in the face of unconstitutional legislation.

Where, as here, the challenge is based on the

unconstitutionality of the legislation, recourse to s. 24 is

unnecessary and the particular effect on the challenging party

is irrelevant.

Section 52 sets out the fundamental principle of constitutional

law that the Constitution is supreme. The undoubted corollary

to be drawn from this principle is that no one can be

convicted of an offence under an unconstitutional law. …

[411]

Big M establishes that if a law on its face is unconstitutional,

recourse to s. 24 is unnecessary. And, if the supremacy of the Constitution

dictates that no one can be convicted under an unconstitutional law, then,

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equally so, no one can receive government funding under an unconstitutional

law. Furthermore and in the context of this action, if no indi vidual associated

with Big M Drug Mart Ltd. had to prove his or her subjective religious beliefs

were infringed, nor does an individual associated with GSSD have to prove

that his or her religious beliefs were violated by the funding of non-Catholic

students in Catholic schools.

[412]

The principles stated in Big M are basic in a constitutional

democracy. To allow a clearly unconstitutional law to stand would be

tantamount to giving the government a free hand to violate norms of public

law, awaiting a better, more appropriate person to bring the argument. Lord

Diplock in R v Inland Revenue Commissioners; Ex parte National Federation

of Self-Employed and Small Businesses Ltd., [1982] AC 617 at 644 explained

this principle:

[I]t would, in my view, be a grave lacuna in our system of

public law if a pressure group like the federation…were

prevented by outdated technical rules of locus standi from

bringing the matter to the attention of the court to vindicate

the rule of law and get the unlawful conduct stopped. …

[413]

Applied to this case, Lord Diplock’s words are powerful. Put

starkly, if the Government is unconstitutionally funding non-Catholic students

to attend Catholic schools, the court must provide redress. If the court imposes

stringent rules to the nature of the person seeking redress rather than

examining the nature of the law, then public confidence in democratic

institutions is endangered.

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[414]

In summary, GSSD has proved that the government’s funding of

Catholic schools respecting non-Catholic students is an infringement of ss.

2(a) of the Charter.

PART SEVEN: DOES GOVERNMENT FUNDING VIOLATE S. 15 OF THE

CHARTER?

1.

POSITION OF THE PARTIES

[415]

Since I have found that funding Catholic schools respecting the

attendance of non-Catholic students infringes the state’s obligation to remain

religiously neutral, whether the same government action also infringes s. 15

equality rights may yield an obvious answer. A favouring of the members of

one religion must necessarily mean discrimination against the members of

other religions. However, since the parties have asked for an adjudication of

all issues, I will offer more specific findings respecting equality rights under

s. 15. The question is this: does funding Catholic schools respecting non-

Catholic students, government action I have found infringes the principle of

state neutrality under s. 2(a), also constitute an infringement of equal benefit

of the law without discrimination based on religion under s. 15(1)?

[416]

Section 15(1) states:

15. (1) Every individual is equal before and under the law and

has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the

law without discrimination and, in particular, without

discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin,

colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.

[417]

GSSD says the evidence establishes two separate violations of

equality under and before the law. First, funding of non-Catholic students in

Catholic schools is discriminatory because, at public expense, members of the

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Catholic faith can evangelize and promote good will toward Catholicism but

other faith groups do not have an equal benefit to similarly evangelize and

promote good will toward their faith. Second, such funding discriminates

between parents who seek a faith-based education for their children and find a

commonality with Catholic education and those parents who equally wish a

faith-based education but do not find a commonality with Catholic education.

[418]

The Government, on the other hand, describes equality in

discursive terms, stating that equality rights in this case should be about

“raising the bar for protected minorities [presumably Catholic minorities] not

lowering it for the benefit of the majority.”⁷⁵Again, as with its s. 2(a)

analysis, the Government leans on its argument that an infringement of s.

15(1) can only be made out by showing “an infringement on behalf of an

individual claimant.” Relying upon Withler v Canada (Attorney General),

2011 SCC 12, [2011] 1 SCR 396 [Withler], the Government states that the

centrality of the individual is pivotal. Inequality is made out only when a law

perpetuates prejudice or disadvantage or negatively ster eotypes individuals.⁷⁶

[419]

CTT’s main objection to GSSD’s claim of s. 15 infringement is

essentially a restatement of its objections to GSSD having standing: GSSD is

not an individual, and thus it has no religion. CTT states that GSSD, as a

public school board, is treated equally to separate school boards since it

receives funding for all students who attend its schools, including Catholic

students. CTT asserts that even if GSSD can rely upon the testimony of

individuals, none showed discrimination. It states that even the Huda School

⁷⁵Government Trial Brief Para 320

⁷⁶Government Trial Brief Para 219

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receives some government funding for its students, including non-Muslims

students if any were to attend: “Rather than being discriminated against..[the

Huda School] was actually receiving public funding to further…religious

education.”⁷⁷

II.

A.

ANALYSIS

A Preliminary Point: Section 15 Infringement Follows s. 2(a)

Infringement

[420]

In my view, in an instance where the state has violated its duty of

religious neutrality under s. 2(a) of the Charter by conferring a benefit upon

one religion (the funding of Catholic schools respecting the attendance of non -

Catholic students, a benefit unprotected by s. 93) but not upon other religions,

an axiomatic result follows: the state has discriminated against and has

unequally treated adherents of other religions. I see no other possible

conclusion. The state must remain neutral regarding religion, not only to

guarantee freedom of religion under s. 2(a), but also to prevent discrimination

based on religion under s. 15.

[421]

The Supreme Court has offered several statements that reinforce

the view that breach of state neutrality respecting religion is concomitant with

discrimination based on religion. One infringement is inexorably linked to the

other. In S.L. Justice Deschamps wrote at para. 17:

…Canadian courts have held that state sponsorship of one

religious tradition amounts to discrimination against others.

[Emphasis added.]

⁷⁷CTT Trial Brief Para 247.

- 206 -

[422]

Three years later in Mouvement laique québécois Justice Gascon

approvingly cited Justice Deschamps’s statement and characterized as

discrimination the reciting of a Christian prayer at council meetings given the

state’s favouring of one religion over other beliefs. At para. 64 he referred to

discrimination arising from the state’s disregard to its duty of neutrality:

Sponsorship of one religious tradition by the state in breach

of its duty of neutrality amounts to discrimination against all

other such traditions. If the state favours one religion at the

expense of others, it imports a disparate impact that is

destructive of the religious freedom of the collectivity. In a

case such as this, the practice of reciting the prayer and the

By-law that regulates it result in the exclusion of Mr.

Simoneau on the basis of a listed ground, namely religion.

That exclusion impairs his right to full and equal exercise of

his freedom of conscience and religion. The discrimination of

which he complains relates directly to the determination of

whether, on the one hand, the prayer is religious in nature and

whether, on the other hand, the City is entitled to have it

recited as it did. [Case authorities omitted.] [Emphasis added]

[423]

I also find that Justice Estey’s emphatic statement in Reference re

Bill 30 draws no distinction between the breach of s. 2(a) religious freedoms

and s. 15 protection against religious discrimination when separate school

rights exceed s. 93 guarantees. As quoted earlier, he wrote:

It is axiomatic (and many counsel before this Court conceded

the point) that if the Charter has any application to Bill 30,

this Bill would be found discriminatory and in violation of s.

2(a) and s. 15 of the Charter of Rights… [Emphasis added.]

[424]

In holding that a breach of state neutrality respecting religion

under s. 2(a) of the Charter augurs for an accompanying breach of s. 15

equality rights, I am also guided by Justice Iacobucci’s statement in Adler. At

para. 32 he characterized s. 93 rights as “entrenched inequality.” Accordingly,

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if rights exceed s. 93 protection, this “entrenched equality” becomes exposed

to the Charter’s guarantee of equality “before and under the law.”

[425]

Similarly, Justice Wilson in Reference re Bill 30 stated that the

“special treatment” that separate schools receive “sits uncomfortably with the

concept of equality embodied in the Charter.” When this “special treatment”

is unprotected by s. 93 the equality provisions of the Charter come to the fore

to limit unequal or discriminatory treatment under s. 15.

[426]

Both Justice Iacobucci and Wilson describe separate school rights

in terms of unequal treatment based on religion. If separate school rights are

inherently discriminatory even when protected by s. 93, I must accept that

conferring yet more rights to Catholic schools than was intended under s. 93

must amplify this unequal and discriminatory treatment.

B.

A Recurring Theme – Must an Individual Show Discriminatory

Impact?

[427]

In what continues to be the Supreme Court’s leading case on s. 15

discrimination, Law Society of British Columbia v Andrews, [1989] 1 SCR 143

at 170 [Andrews], the court stated that s. 15(1) of the Charter provides four

essential rights: 1) the right to equality before the law; 2) the right to equality

under the law; 3) the right to equal protec tion of the law; and 4) the right to

equal benefit of the law. These rights are granted "without discrimination."

[428]

Andrews initiated a two-part test to determine whether equality

rights have been infringed, a test which has been continued and refined in

Withler and repeated in Quebec (Attorney General) v A., 2013 SCC 5 at paras

- 208 -

325 and 327, [2013] 1 SCR 61 [Quebec v A]. The test requires two questions

to be affirmatively answered:

1.

Does the law create a distinction that is based on an

enumerated or analogous ground?

2.

Does the distinction create a discriminatory impact?

[429]

The first question requires proof of an enumerated or analogous

ground as a basis of a distinction. Distinction requires that the claimant has

been treated differently than others – either denied a benefit granted to others

or borne a burden not imposed upon others – due to a religion. In this instance,

the government action of funding Catholic schools for the attendance of non -

Catholic students, while no other religion receives such treatment, creates a

distinction based on the enumerated ground of religion. The first question is

answered affirmatively.

[430]

The second question asks whether the distinction creates a

discriminatory impact. Justice McIntyre described discrimination in Andrews

at p. 174 as a distinction “which has the effect of imposing burdens,

obligations or disadvantages on such individual or group not imposed upon

others, or which withholds or limits access to opportunities, benefits, and

advantages available to other members of society.”

[431]

At this point, in finding a discriminatory impact, I take a different

view than either GSSD or the defendants. The defendants continue to argue

their position that GSSD must show that an individual suffered a

discriminatory impact. Just as the defendants insisted that only harmed

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individuals have a right to standing and, further, that only individuals can

establish s. 2(a) infringement, they continue to argue that proof of specific

prejudice or stereotyping of an individual is necessary to pro ve discrimination

and a s. 15(1) violation. I do not agree with this restrictive approach.

[432]

Again, as I found in the s. 2(a) analysis, challenged legislation

can be of two types. Less frequently, the impugned legislation violates the

Charter on its face requiring the legislation to be struck down under s. 52 of

the Constitution Act, 1982. Such was the case in Big M. As stated previously,

the Alberta Court of Appeal in Public School Board’s Association recognized

this principle. It identified that some legislation on its face conveys a Charter

breach and no evidence is required of anyone’s impairment. On the other

hand, some impugned legislation is neutral on its face (as previously discussed

under the s. 2(a) analysis respecting the Amselem case) but may have an

unexpected discriminatory impact upon certain individuals. In these instances,

an individual must prove that his or her freedoms have been disparately

impacted by the otherwise neutral legislation.

[433]

In my view, this action involves legislation and gover nment

action that on its face is based on religion: Catholic schools receive

government funding (which, of itself is unequal treatment as the Supreme

Court has said, albeit protected), but more importantly, Catholic schools also

receive government funding for non-Catholic students which I have found is

not constitutionally protected. The government action, permitted by the

impugned provisions of The Education Act, 1995 and The Education Funding

Regulations, draws distinctions based on religion. Catholic schools receive

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complete funding for the attendance of non-Catholic students, but no other

faith-based schools receive funding for non-adherent students.

[434]

The impugned legislation in this case is not “neutral” legislation,

as it was in Withler, a case referred to by all parties. In that case, the claimant

widows had to show that the legislation had a disparate or discriminatory

impact upon them. As the surviving spouses of federal employees, they

received a suite of benefits upon their spouses’ deaths. The claimants alleged

they were discriminated against based on their deceased husbands’ ages. The

court found the law created a distinction, but did not find the distinction

perpetuated prejudice or stereotyping. The age-based rules were effective to

meet the claimants’ needs and achieved important goals to ensure retiree

benefits were meaningful. As a full suite of benefits meant to cover the

competing interests of various age groups, the court found the distinction

based on age was appropriate to address different needs.

[435]

Because government funding of Catholic schools respecting non-

Catholic students is grounded in government action that is unconstitutional on

its face as ostensibly permitted by The Education Act, 1995 and The Education

Funding Regulations, I find that the nature of this legislation, not the nature of

unequal treatment individuals might prove they have received, governs the

result. This is what Big M stated. When the government funds Catholic

schools respecting non-Catholic students, which I have found is an

unconstitutionally protected benefit to the Catholic faith, but does not equally

fund other faith-based schools to educate non-adherents, discrimination is

evident on the face of the enabling legislation and regulations.

- 211 -

[436]

GSSD has not argued that the discrimination is evident in the

“nature of the law” (as Justice Dickson stated in Big M). Instead it seemingly

has accepted the burden of proving that the funding distinction has created a

discriminatory impact. I accept that GSSD makes a strong argument that

certain individuals and groups have suffered a discriminatory impact.

[437]

Similar to the violations of the government’s duty of religious

neutrality, GSSD looks to two violations of equality under s. 15. First, the

legislation discriminates between Catholic s and non-Catholics in relation to

the funding of non-adherents in faith-based schools. Second, the legislation

discriminates between those parents who, desiring a faith-based education, are

comfortable with a Catholic education and those parents who desire a non-

Catholic faith-based education (and both wanting full government funding).

[438]

I have found that through its witnesses, GSSD has established a

discriminatory impact. Sensibility tells me that since only Catholic schools

receive full funding to admit non-adherents, Catholic schools are able to

attract non-Catholic students while other faith-based schools that must charge

tuition are less able to attract non-adherents. Associate schools like the Huda

School receive only 80 percent of the provincial average per -student funding.

If the Huda School wished to attract non-Muslim students (as Dr. Aboguddah

said it would), it would not receive government funding for the attendance of

non-adherent students as Catholic schools receive. The Huda school would

have to charge its ordinary tuition of $2,500 .00 for the first child and lesser

amounts for more children, as well as $1,800 .00 annual transportation fee.

- 212 -

[439]

GSSD also refers to the testimony of Dr. Aboguddah and Ms.

Chobanik. They testified that independent and associate schools wishing to

admit non-adherents must absorb all costs of funding infrastructure and capital

funding (just as they constitutionally must accept when educating their own

students). I accept Dr. Aboguddah’s testimony that with 430 students in the

Huda School using all available space, and with 100 students on its waiting

list for the past four years, it is financially unable to accommodate non-

Muslim students. Discriminatory impact is obvious in my view. If the Huda

School received complete government funding for non-Muslim students as

Catholic schools receive for non-Catholic students, the Huda School and non-

Muslim parents would enjoy significant benefits, similar benefits the

defendants argue now accrue to Catholic schools and non-Catholic parents:

schools can leverage a greater source of funds to educate their adherents and

Saskatchewan parents would have, in the words of the defendants, greater

“parental choice,” “parental autonomy,” “freedom of religion,” and “fairness.”

These benefits should be equally available to all religious schools and all

parents, or to none.

[440]

I also accept Rabbi Parnes’s testimony that certain advantages

would accrue to the small Jewish school in Regina if it received complete

government funding for non-Jewish students. Historically, approximately 22

students attend once-a-week classes. Rabbi Parnes testified that recently, six

non-Jewish students have attended the religious classes offered in the

synagogue. A ready comparison comes to mind. In Regina there exists a

Jewish interest in creating a viable Jewish school that would welcome non-

Jewish students; in Theodore there exists a Catholic interest in keeping open a

- 213 -

Catholic school that accepts non-Catholic students. Fully funded non-

adherents are admittedly necessary in either instance to make either school

viable. Discrimination is obvious: Catholics in Theodore receive a

constitutionally protected advantage to educate their children in the tenets of

Catholic faith only because non-Catholic students are fully funded; Jews in

Regina cannot avail themselves of the same benefits.

[441]

Again, since I find that the funding of Catholic schools for the

attendance of non-Catholic students is discriminatory on its face, I will make

rather cursory findings of further discriminato ry impact. I accept, largely from

the testimony of Dr. Aboguddah, that many religious faiths wish to advance

societal acceptance and awareness of their faith traditions to the larger

community. Allowing one faith – Catholics – the ability to inculcate Catholic

values into a broader community at public expense but disallowing others,

particularly smaller religious groups like Muslims and Hindus, implies a

message that some faiths are more valued than others. Asking non-Catholic

parents to accept the unequal treatment of the s. 93 guarantee is a

constitutionally inescapable reality, but asking non-Catholic parents to accept

yet further Catholic rights to educate non-adherents while they are denied

those rights is further proof of a discriminatory impact.

[442]

Finally, I find that given a group of non-Catholic parents who

wish a faith-based education for their children (like Carla Madsen, Michelle

DuRussell, Kevin Wiens, Dean Mike Sinclair and John Anderson – all

Christians), a distinction is drawn between those parents who are comfo rtable

in Catholic doctrine so they can receive a faith-based, government funded

education for their children and those parents who are not comfortable with

- 214 -

Catholic doctrine and cannot avail themselves of this benefit. I see the

impugned legislation as perpetuating an advantage to the interests of the first

group of parents and effectively deeming the interests of the second group as

less worthy of state support.

[443]

Wishing to deal with each party’s position, I make a final

reference to the Government’s position respecting s. 15 equality rights. In its

trial brief the Government states:

320. The Charter’s equality rights protection is about raising

the bar for protected minorities, not lowering it for the

majority. When a public service is available, but that

availability is legitimately limited, the solution is not to

restrict the availability of the service even more. It is to make

the service as available as possible within the existing

framework. That is the essence of Saskatchewan’s approach to

the admissions policies of separate schools.

[444]

I again see an inversion of the issues when the Government states

that equality rights should raise the bar to protect “minorities” [presumably

Roman Catholics in this action] and should not lower the bar to benefit the

“majority” [presumably public school divisions like GSSD]. This statement

suggests that the interests of Roman Catholics, as a minority, require raising

the bar of equality rights to further protect their interests. This position does

not accord with the repeated statements of the Supreme Court. It has variously

described existing separate school rights under s. 93 as creating a “privileged

status on religious minorities” (Adler, at para 33); a status which may “sit

uncomfortably with the concept of equality embodied in the Charter”

(Reference re Bill 30 at 1197); and which gives a “special status to particular

classes of people” (Adler, at para 32). Given these authoritative statements, I

cannot accept that GSSD’s position lacks merit because it fails to raise the bar

- 215 -

even further to protect what the Supreme Court has repeatedly called

“unequal” rights. The defendants fail to acknowledge that the bar is already

unequal, that Catholic and Protestant minorities have long held rights that

make equal treatment of Canadians impossible. The defendants are in an

awkward position to convince the court that seeking to lessen certain rights

(but only those that are not constitutionally protected), is advocating

inequality. I see nothing in GSSD’s position that seeks to lessen the

denominational rights of Catholics to educate Catholic children. GSSD seeks

only to keep this inequality in check by challenging the benefits Catholic

schools hold under legislation it argues (and I have found) is unprotected by

s. 93.

[445]

In conclusion, I find that the impugned provisions of The

Education Act, 1995 and The Education Funding Regulations that enable

funding to Catholic schools respecting the attendance of non-Catholic students

infringes equality rights under s. 15(1).

PART EIGHT: DOES S. 1 OF THE CHARTER JUSTIFY CHARTER

VIOLATION?

I.

BURDEN OF PROOF AND OAKES TEST

[446]

GSSD has proven that funding of non-Catholic students in

Catholic schools is not protected by s. 93 of the Constitution Act, 1867 and is

contrary to ss. 2(a) and 15 of the Charter. Now the defendants must accept the

burden of proving that the Charter infringements can be demonstrably

justified in a free and democratic society under s. 1. Section 1 states:

The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights

and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits

- 216 -

prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and

democratic society.

[447]

The standard of proof incumbent upon the defendants is the

preponderance of probability, without any presumption of constitutionality.

Manitoba (Attorney General) v Metropolitan Stores (MTS) Ltd., [1987] 1 SCR

110.

[448]

All parties agree that Chief Justice Dickson’s statements in R v

Oakes, [1986] 1 SCR 103 [Oakes] lead the s. 1 analysis. Chief Justice

McLachlin explained and applied the Oakes test in Adler. Applied to this case,

the s. 1 inquiry can be posed as follows: Is providing funding to Catholic

schools respecting non-Catholic students a reasonable limit on Charter rights

and demonstrably justifiable in a free and democratic society? The onus is on

CTT and the Government to establish that such funding is justified. To do so,

the defendants must show that the funding has an objective of pressing and

substantial concern in a free and democratic society and the objective is

proportionate to and not outweighed by the effect of the infringing action.

Proportionality requires proof that continued funding is rationally connected

to the objective; that it impairs the right or freedom as little as possible; and

that there is proportionality between the effects of the funding and the

objective sought.

[449]

Put in numerical sequence, the Oakes test requires a total of four

inquiries, as summarized by Professor Hogg (Hogg: Constitutional Law of

Canada at 38-8(b)):

- 217 -

1.

2.

3.

4.

Sufficiently important objective: The law must pursue an objective

that is sufficiently important to justify limiting a Charter right.

Rational connection: The law must be rationally connected to the

objective.

Least drastic means: The law must impair the right no more than is

necessary to accomplish the objective.

Proportionate effect: The law must not have a disproportionately

severe effect on the persons to whom it applies.

[450]

The Oakes test has endured for three decades. Chief Justice

Dickson set out a “stringent standard of justification” before the court will

permit a justification for Charter infringement. The proponent of the

infringing law must provide a strong demonstration that the co ntinued exercise

of the rights “would be inimical to the realization of collective goals of

fundamental importance.”⁷⁸Accordingly, the Government and CTT must prove

to the court that the continued funding of Catholic schools respecting the

attendance of non-Catholic students, although it violates the state’s duty of

religious neutrality and provides unequal benefits on the basis of religion,

remains a “reasonable limit” of these infringed freedoms that “can be

demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.” Ordinarily, as Chief

Justice Dickson stated, evidence would be required to demonstrate the limit

and its reasonableness unless certain elements of the s. 1 analysis are obvious

or self-evident.

⁷⁸Oakes, at p 136.

- 218 -

II.

IS THERE A PRESSING OBJECTIVE TO FUND NON-CATHOLIC

STUDENTS?

[451]

Does the funding of non-Catholic students in Catholic schools

have a “pressing and substantial” objective in a free and democratic society?

Relying upon the evidence of Angela Chobanik and non-Catholic parent

witnesses, CTT identifies two pressing and substantial objectives to justify the

funding of Catholic schools respecting non-Catholic students. CTT states its

first objective as follows:

258 …First, the aim is to provide each student in the Province of

Saskatchewan an equitable opportunity to education regardless of

where they live. The Province has a pressing interest in educating

children in the Province for socioeconomic reasons.⁷⁹

[452]

I see nothing in the objective of equitable educational opportunity

that is linked to funding non-Catholic students in Saskatchewan’s Catholic

schools. This objective – to provide opportunity for education regardless

where students live – must be an objective of all Canadian provinces,

including provinces without separate schools. These provinces seemingly meet

this objective without separate schools. I fail to see that if a province has

separate schools, funding non-minority students within those schools is

necessary to provide students with an education “regardless of where they

live.” Nor do I find assistance is afforded CTT in its s. 1 justification by

offering that the province has an interest in educating children for

“socioeconomic reasons.” This vague and general statement provides no

justification for funding non-Catholic students in Catholic schools.

⁷⁹CTT Trial Brief Para 258

- 219 -

[453]

CTT offers a second pressing and substantial objective for the

Government’s continued funding of non-Catholic students in Catholic schools:

the importance of parental choice. CTT states:

258 … A second objective of the funding of education is to provide

parents with a choice in terms of how they best feel their children

should be educated. Parents are entitled to have their children receive a

free education, regardlessof religion. That choice represents a pressing

objective as it is widely recognized that parents are generally in the best

position to assess the educational needs of their children. The current

system of education allows for that choice to those who send their

children to separate schools and to provide funding for those who

choose to opt out of the public or separate school to establish their own

religious school.

…

260. …the admission and funding of non-minority faith students at

separate schools supports the objective of equitable opportunity for

education across the Province. …[T]he funding of all students,

regardless of religion helps reach and achieve the goal of ensuring a

sufficient level of funding is present for allschools, regardless of creed

or religion, to provide equal opportunity.

261. As for the objective of parental choice, the admission and funding

of nonminority faith students in separate schools gives a substantial

number of parents a choice as to the education of their children. The

funding support provided to associate schools and independent schools,

i.e. funding regardless of the religion of students, again gives parents of

all faiths and beliefs financial support for options for the education of

their children. Albeit the current system does not fully fund all religious

alternatives, it is a far preferable situation to the Plaintiffs attempt to

segregate Catholic separate schools and preclude support outside of the

public school system.

[454]

CTT’s asserted objective of providing parental choice is also

problematic. In suggesting that a pressing objective for funding non-minority

faith students is to give “a substantial number of parents a choice as to the

education of their children,” CTT acknowledges what I have already found

violative of Charter rights: choice given to some parents based on religious

beliefs, but not to others, is a breach of the state’s duty of religious neutrality.

- 220 -

Government action that I have found to be Charter-infringing cannot become

Charter-justifying.

[455]

I also disagree with CTT’s assertion that a “far preferable

situation” lies if the Government’s funding of non-minority students at least

gives some choice to some parents rather than giving no choice to any parents.

If such choice is based on a parent’s unique religious beliefs, if such choice

gives advantage to a particular faith group, and if such c hoice is publicly

funded, then contrary to being a “pressing and substantive objective,” the

choice shows the state’s disregard for religious neutrality. An objective that

itself contradicts Charter values cannot justify Charter infringement.

[456]

Now I turn to the s. 1 argument presented by the Government. I

find nothing in its brief of law or argument that attempts to offer a pressing

objective to justify the continued Charter infringement of funding non-

minority faith students in separate schools. Although the Government

summarizes the principles of law that apply in a s. 1 analysis, and includes in

its brief of law a heading, “B. Application to the Evidence,” it states no

objectives of the continued funding and, therefore, no evidence in support of

any objectives. It is as though the Government is satisfied that its case lay

with opposing an allegation of Charter violation and, if a violation were

found, that s. 1 could not justify the infringement.

III. PROPORTIONALITY

[457]

Although the defendants have not met the first requirement of a s.

1 Charter justification and the question of proportionality does not arise, for

the sake of completeness I will offer conclusions how I would have

- 221 -

determined proportionality if necessary. Proportionality requires proof t hat

funding of non-Catholic students is rationally connected to the pressing and

substantial objective of the infringing legislation, that such funding impairs

the right to religious neutrality as little as poss ible and that the benefits of the

impugned government action outweigh the harm suffered by those respecting

whom freedoms are denied.

[458]

CTT has described as the objective of funding non-Catholic

students the necessity of “ensuring a sufficient level of funding is present for

all schools, regardless of creed or religion, to provide equal opportunity.”⁸⁰I

fail to see a rational connection between this alleged objective and the funding

of non-Catholic students at Catholic schools. In my view, quite the contrary:

the public system of education in Saskatchewan ensures that all students,

regardless of creed or religion, are admitted and funded. Public schools are

legislatively obligated to educate all students. On the other hand, I heard no

evidence from any of the defendants’ witnesses that Catholic schools are

prepared to accept enrolment of all students to ensure educational opportunity

“regardless of creed or religion.” For example, if a student is a vocal advocate

of rights contrary to Catholic doctrine such as abortion rights or same -sex

marriage, will she be permitted to enrol in a Catholic school? These students,

though, regardless of their personal beliefs, and whether Catholic or non-

Catholic, must be accepted in public schools. Accordingly, I see no rational

connection between CTT’s asserted objective that the Government must

ensure that there is “a sufficient level of funding…present for all schools,

⁸⁰CTT Trial Brief Para 260

- 222 -

regardless of creed or religion” and the funding of non-Catholic students in

Catholic schools.

[459]

As part of the proportionality test, the Government must also

demonstrate through evidence that its alleged objectives of funding non -

Catholic students only minimally interferes with the state’s obligation to

remain religiously neutral. In my view, the best (and perhaps only) way that

the government can minimally offend its duty to remain religiously neutral is

to accept s. 93 of the Constitution Act, 1867, which the Supreme Court has

said makes equal treatment of religions impossible, and not augment or

complement these unbalanced religious rights with further e mpowering rights.

I cannot see how the “special or unequal educational rights” ( Reference re Bill

30 at 1199) already given to Catholics do not become even more “special” and

more “unequal” when additional rights are given to them to receive funding to

educate non-Catholic students.

[460]

A further element of the proportionality test requires that the

benefits of the impugned government action must outweigh the harm suffered

by the infringing law. I see such harm, a harm that drives this litigation, in the

thwarting of public school boards’ decisions to close rural schools which have

experienced diminished enrolments. Testimony at trial and from read-ins from

examination for discovery prove separate school rights have been used to

circumvent public school closures, often and ironically, concurrently with the

Government’s voluntary, then mandatory, rationalization of the number of

school boards in the province. Darlene Thompson, the Government’s

representative during discovery, explained that the Humboldt Rural School

Division closed the Englefeld public school with plans to bus students to

- 223 -

Watson. The Protestant minority in the community established a Protestant

"separate" school which, in turn, admitted a majority of non-Protestant

students and received full funding.

[461]

Similarly, Ms. Thompson also explained that Prairie Valley

School Division closed the Wilcox public school because of minimal

enrolment. Bert Degooijer, trustee of the Prairie Valley School Division when

the public school was closed, explained the reasons for closure and the plan to

transport the students to Milestone’s public school where the Board believed it

could provide superior educational programming at less cost. Students from

Wilcox attended the Milestone school for one year. After the separat e Catholic

school division was operative in the following school year, all the children

from Wilcox, including those who were attending the Milestone public school,

enrolled in the Wilcox separate school. Today St. Augustine Roman Catholic

School continues to operate under the Holy Family Roman Catholic Separate

School Division with 55 students enrolled.

[462]

Between the Englefeld and Wilcox experience, Theodore Roman

Catholic School Division was formed in 2003 and eventually amalgamated

with other Roman Catholic school divisions to form Christ the Teacher Roman

Catholic School Division. I am satisfied that St. Theodore Roman Catholic

School was formed, not because of a desire to have Catholic education in

Theodore, but to keep open a school that the public schoo l division

legitimately had a right to close. These are the harms caused by continued

government funding of non-minority faith students at separate schools.

- 224 -

[463]

These examples illustrate to me that a constitutional provision

originally meant to protect minority religious rights in education have been

harnessed for a different purpose. I see the impugned government action not

only unrelated to the defendants’ alleged objective of equality in education

and parental choice (objectives I have found neither pressing nor substantial),

but I see the impugned legislation as creating a result that undermines the

reasonable and statute-authorized decisions of school boards to close rural

schools to fulfil their mandate of effective education and accountability to

taxpayers. I accept that the planned closure of a rural school is invariably met

with some local opposition. From the testimony of several trustees of rural

public school boards, I accept as well that looming in these decisions is the

threat that the local religious minority, be it Protestant or Catholic, will use

the constitutional guarantee of a separate school to thwart a reasoned decision

to close rural schools when enrolment numbers merit their closing. These

results of the impugned government action have occasioned harm and are

unrelated to the objectives CTT has attempted to assert.

[464]

Finally, I also find that funding of non-minority faith students in

separate schools does not minimally impair the duty of neutrality and is

inimical to the growing reality that Saskatchewan, like the rest of Canada, is

becoming a far more complicated mosaic of religious (and non-religious)

traditions. A modern Saskatchewan community needs to address religious

intolerance and discrimination, often arising and rooted, not o nly at home, but

as diversely as international conflicts. In a free and democratic province,

Saskatchewan needs to be sensitive to lingering notions of traditional

Christian privileges.

- 225 -

[465]

I endorse the statements offered by Chief Justice McLachlin at

para 722 in Adler when describing applicable principles of proportionality

under s. 1 she identified the need for “encouragement of a more tolerant

harmonious multicultural society,” stating the goal of a free and democratic

country is “fostering multiracial and multicultural harmony.” These goals

might justify otherwise Charter-infringing legislation, not the defendants’

assertion that legitimate goals include parental choice for some (but not all)

and the unusual assertion that funding non-Catholic students ensures a

“sufficient level of funding is present for all schools, regardless of creed or

religion.”

[466]

I also find that the directive of s. 27 of the Charter has specific

application in a case involving religious guarantees of religious neutrality,

specifically in a s. 1 analysis. It states:

27. This Charter shall be interpreted in a manner consistent with the

preservation and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of

Canadians.

[467]

The Supreme Court in Big M and in Edwards Books and Art Ltd.

(R v Edwards Books and Art Ltd., [1986] 2 SCR 713) stated that religion

forms an integral part of the multicultural heritage of Canada. Government

action advancing these principles may survive a Charter challenge in a free

and democratic society, but not government action further expanding

constitutionally unprotected separate school rights, rights which Justice

Iacobucci at para 641 in Adler has called “entrenched inequality.”

- 226 -

IV. A POINT OF CLARIFICATION: TIME FRAME OF PRESSING

OBJECTIVES

[468]

Although I have concluded that the defendants have not

demonstrated a justification under s. 1 for the Charter infringement, I will

make certain findings of fact that might be significant to an appellate court. A

well accepted principle of the s. 1 analysis is the need to find the pressing

objective of the impugned law as it existed at the time the law was created. In

the instance of this litigation, that date may be difficult to ascertain because

the admission and consequential funding of non-minority students has been an

evolution, not marked discretely as, for example, the enactment of an

infringing statute.

[469]

Larry Huber, with over 50 years of experience in Saskatchewan

education, including several years as Director of Education for Regina Public

School Division, has had a long association with the concerns of the Public

Section respecting the government’s funding of non-Catholic students in

Catholic schools. He testified that the predecessor to the Public Section, the

Urban Public Boards Caucus, an ad hoc group of urban public school boards,

came together concerned about the change in practice of Catholic School

Boards’ admission policies. He testified that in the late 1980s, Catholic boards

of education moved from a clear policy of admitting only Catholi c students to

admitting more non-Catholic students. Government funding followed these

students. Mr. Huber testified this new admission policy “was something that

happened over a period of time.” He was uncertain if the Catholic boards’ new

admission policy “was an encouragement or an openness to accepting non-

Catholic students.”

- 227 -

[470]

Mr. Huber’s testimony that this trend had developed by the late

1980s is confirmed by the November 10, 1978 Confidential Report. At that

time, Saskatoon Catholic School Division must have kept records of non-

Catholic students attending its schools since Mr. Coumont was able to

comment that, “In a five year period prior to the report, the percentage of non-

Catholics in the elementary schools has increased from 3.41% to 10.02%.” I

accept that non-Catholic students had begun attending Catholic schools in

significant numbers by the 1970s. Mr. Coumont also forewarned, “We do not

want an open war for kids. At no time should we be actively trying to recruit

non-Catholics. Our target population must be the Catholic community.”

Obviously, the beginnings of the mandate question were already in the making

in the mid- 1970s.

[471]

Mr. Huber testified that by 1997 the Regina Public School

Division had become so concerned with the growing number of no n-Catholic

students attending Regina’s Catholic Schools that it sought a legal opinion

respecting the mandate issue. This opinion was shared with the Saskatoon

Public School Division and, in turn, with the Minister of Education. At least

from that time, 1997, the government has been aware that public school boards

have been concerned with the liberal admission policies of Catholic school

boards and the government’s continued funding of non-Catholic students in

Catholic schools.

[472]

I state this history of the increasing numbers of non-Catholic

students being admitted to Catholic schools to establish that any pressing and

substantial objectives that either CTT or the Government advance under s. 1

must be anchored in the objectives of government action starting as early as

- 228 -

the 1970s, coming to the fore in the 1990s, and continuing to the present day. I

heard no evidence from the defendants stemming from this time frame to

establish a pressing and substantial objective in funding non-minority faith

students in separate schools.

[473]

The evidence suggests that what prompted government funding of

non-Catholic students was not driven by any momentous government policy

choice. Ms. Chobanik testified that the department does not track the number

of non-Catholic students in Catholic schools. It simply funds separate schools

on a per-pupil basis, just as it does for public schools, without inquiry as to

the students being of the minority faith.

PART NINE: REMEDIES

[474]

I have determined the issues in this action as follows:

1.

2.

3.

GSSD has requisite standing to seek judicial review of the

Government’s action in funding non-minority faith students

in separate schools in Saskatchewan.

St. Theodore Roman Catholic School is a separate school,

properly constituted within the meaning o f The Education

Act, 1995.

The Constitution Act, 1867 does not provide a

constitutional right to separate schools in Saskatchewan to

receive provincial government funding respecting non-

minority faith students because funding respecting non-

- 229 -

minority faith students is not a denominational right of

separate schools.

4.

Section 17(2) of the Saskatchewan Act, which provides

constitutional protection against discrimination in the

distribution of moneys payable to any class of school, only

protects separate schools to the extent they admit students

of the minority faith.

5.

Provincial government funding of non-minority faith

students attending separate schools is a violation of the

state’s duty of religious neutrality under s. 2(a) of the

Charter.

6.

7.

Provincial government funding of non-minority faith

students attending separate schools is a violation of

equality rights under s. 15(1) of the Charter.

The Charter violations, as found, are not reasonable limits

as can be demonstrably justified in a free and de mocratic

society.

[475]

Having found that funding of non-minority faith students violates

ss. 2(a) and 15(1) of the Charter and cannot be justified under

s. 1, I declare, pursuant to s. 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982, that those

provisions of The Education Act, 1995 and The Education Funding

Regulations, to the extent that the Government of Saskatchewan has provided

- 230 -

funding grants to separate schools respecting students not of the minority

faith, are of no force and effect.

[476]

Appreciating that the implementation of this declaration will

cause significant repercussions in the province , this declaration is stayed until

June 30, 2018.

[477]

Respecting costs I accede to the recommendation made by GSSD

and CTT that the matter of costs shall be reserved to be spoken to foll owing

14 days’ notice by any party to return this matter to me.

[478]

As a final comment, I recognize the herculean efforts counsel for

the Government of Saskatchewan, Christ the Teacher Roman Catholic School

Division and Good Spirit School Division devoted to this trial. They stinted no

effort and spared no zeal in advocating for their clients’ interests. I am

appreciative of their assistance to the court.

_____________________________

D.H. LAYH

APPENDIX 1

The Education Act, 1975

Powers and duties of separate school divisions

53(1) On the establishment of a separate schooldivision pursuant to this Act,

that division and the board of education of the division shall possess and exercise

the same rights and powers and be subject to the same liabilities and method of

government as other schooldivisions continued or established pursuant to this Act.

(2) Where, the minority religious faith, whether Protestant or Roman Catholic,

has established a separate schooldivision, a property owner is to be assessed with

respect to his or her property:

(a) in the case of a member of the minority religious faith, as a taxpayer of

the separate schooldivision;

(b) in any other case, as a taxpayer of the public schooldivision.

…

Duties of the board of education

85(1) Subject to section 86, to any directive of the minister and to the duties of the

conseil scolaire with respect to the division scolaire francophone and any fransaskois

schoolin a francophone education area, a board of education shall:

(a) administer and manage the educational affairs of the schooldivision in

accordance with the intent of this Act and the regulations;

(b) exercise general supervision and control over the schools in the school

division and make any bylaws with respect to schoolmanagement that may

be considered necessary for effective and efficient operation of the schools;

(c) subject to the otherprovisions of this Act, approve administrative

procedures pertaining to the internal organization, management and

supervision of the schools,but educational supervision authorized by the board

of education is to be subject to the approval of the department;

(d) provide and maintain schoolaccommodation, equipment and facilities

considered necessary and adequate for the educational programs and

instructional services approved by the board of education for each of its schools;

(e) appoint and employ under written contract qualified teachers for the

schools of the school division, and any principals and other assistantsas the

board of education considers necessary;

(f) prescribe, subject to sections 156 to 162, the age and time at which pupils

may be admitted to kindergarten and grade 1 in any schoolin the school

division;

(g) determine what schoolany of the children of the schooldivision shall attend;

(h) determine what classrooms and schools are to be maintained in operation

in the school division;

(i) subject to section 120, determine and define the boundaries of school

districts in the schooldivision and make any changes to the boundaries that

may be considered necessary;

(j) subject to the regulations, authorize and approve the courses of study

that constitute the instructional program of each schoolin the school division;

(k) subject to the regulations, furnish transportation services to pupils and

to children attending kindergarten or prekindergarten programs to and from

schoolthat may be considered by the board of education to be necessary to

ensure access of pupils and children attending kindergarten or prekindergarten

programs to, and regular attendance in, the schools ofthe schooldivision;

(l) subject to section 169, provide programs of instruction to the pupils resident

in the school division at the cost of the schooldivision and at reasonable

- 2 -

convenience to the pupils;

(m) prescribe, subject to sections 156 to 162, procedures for the administration

of the provisions of this Act with respect to regular schoolattendance by pupils;

(n) subject to the regulations, register and administer home-based education

programs;

(o) suspend orexpel pupils for cause,subject to sections 154 and 155;

(p) determine the location of, and make provision for, a head office of the

board of education;

(q) employ any staff considered necessary for the efficient management and

execution of the policies, programs and business ofthe board of education;

(r) keep a full and accurate record of the proceedings,transactions and

financial affairs of the board of education;

(s) appoint an auditor for the board of education who is a member in good

standing of an accounting profession recognized pursuant to The Management

AccountantsAct, The Certified General AccountantsAct, 1994 or The Chartered

AccountantsAct, 1986 to audit the books and accounts ofthe board of education

at least once in each fiscal year, but no person shall be appointed:

(i) who is then, or was during the preceding year, a member of the board

of education;

(ii) who is then, or was during the preceding year, chief financial officer

of the schooldivision;

(iii) who has then,or had during the preceding year, an interest in

a contract made by the board of education other than in a contract

appointing that person as auditor; or

(iv) who is then, or was during the preceding year, employed by the

board of education in any capacity except that of auditor;

(t) procure a corporate seal for the board of education;

(u) require that all funds in the control of the board are kept in a chartered

bank or credit union, to be paid out in any manner that the board may

determine;

(v) prepare or cause to be prepared any reports and returns concerning

statistical data, budgetary information and reports respecting the operation

of the board of education and its schools that may be required from time to

time by the minister;

(w) prescribe procedures with respect to the design, maintenance and

supervision of schoolaccommodation for the purposes ofmaintaining

satisfactory standards ofcomfort, safety and sanitation for the pupils and

other users of the accommodation;

(x) define, regulate and control the uses,in addition to the regular school

program, to which schoolbuildings and other facilities of the school division

may be put during both schooland out-of-schoolhours;

(y) contract, in writing, with teachers and other personnelrequired for the

administration of the services of the board, and terminate those contracts for

cause in accordance with the provisions of this Act;

(z) participate in programs approved by the minister for the education and

training of teachers;

(aa) subject to the regulations,furnish pupils with textbook, library book,

reference book or other learning resource services at the cost of the school

division;

(bb) insure and keep insured the schoolbuildings and the equipment,

- 3 -

furnishings and property of the schooldivision;

(cc) keep in force a policy of insurance for the purpose of indemnifying:

(i) the board of education and its employees with respect to any claim

for damages to property or for personal injury or death arising from

any program, activity or service authorized or provided by the board of

education, or from any approved activity mentioned in section 232;

(ii) the board of education and teachers employed by the board of

education with respect to any claim for damages arising from the

performance of duties and functions of teachers pursuant to this Act that

are required or approved by the board of education;

(iii) the schooldivision with respect to any claim for damages arising

out of arrangements of the board of education for the transportation of

persons to and from schoolor to and from other places for the purpose of

engaging in activities authorized by the board of education; and

(iv) in the board of education’s discretion, parents and citizen volunteers;

(dd) subject to the other provisions of this Act and the regulations, establish

and approve policies and procedures respecting the formation, membership,

elections, responsibilities and operation of schoolcommunity councils.

(2) Repealed. 1996, c.45, s.6.

…

Powers of board

87(1) Subject to the powers of the conseil scolaire with respect to the division

scolaire francophone and minority language instruction programs, a board of

education may:

(a) employ, or retain the services of, any ancillary personnelthat may be

considered necessary to administer the policies and programs of the board of

education;

(b) enter into agreements for any purpose considered necessary and

advantageous to the quality and efficiency of educational and related services

with:

(i) other boards of education;

(ii) the conseil scolaire;

(iii) Repealed. 1998, c.21, s.37.

(iv) municipalities;

(v) specialized institutions;

(vi) universities;

(vii) departments of the Government of Saskatchewan;

(viii) governments of otherprovinces of Canada or an agency of any of

those governments;

(ix) the Government of Canada or an agency of that Government;

(x) any Indian band;

(c) enter into agreements with other boards of education or with the conseil

scolaire or with Indian bands for the purpose of providing, procuring or

administering jointly any service of mutual benefit and convenience;

(d) enter into agreements with Indian bands with respect to the payment of

compensation to the board of education for the loss of taxes, levies or grants

in lieu of taxes resulting from lands within the schooldivision being set apart

as an Indian reserve;

(e) furnish educational supplies and food services at a nominal cost to pupils

or, where it is considered advisable by the board of education,at the cost of

- 4 -

the schooldivision;

(f) subject to the regulations, approve textbooks, library books,reference

books and other learning resources;

(g) approve of and provide for membership in provincial and national

educational associations by the board of education and officers of the board of

education, and provide for attendance at meetings of those associations;

(h) authorize expenditures with respect to functions and activities that have

been approved by the board of education with respect to a schoolcommunity

council;

(i) acquire by gift, devise or bequest real or personal property of any kind on

behalf of the schooldivision, for the purposes ofthe schooldivision, subject to

the terms, if any, of the gift, devise or bequest and, notwithstanding any other

provision of this Act, shall dispose of any real or personal property acquired in

accordance with those terms;

(j) invest any moneys of the board of education in any security or class of

securities authorized for investment of moneys in the general revenue fund

pursuant to The Financial Administration Act,1993;

(k) dispose of any investment made pursuant to clause (j) in any manner, on

any terms, and in any amount that the board of education considers expedient;

(l) subject to section 347 and to the regulations, dispose of or lease property

of the schooldivision and grant easement over any of the real property of the

schooldivision;

(m) become a member of a co-operative association or a credit union or

hold additional shares of which the board of education becomes the owner by

application of the dividends;

(n) provide for any meetings, seminars, workshops and conventions of

members of the board of education, members of schoolcommunity councils,

electors and teachers that may be considered advisable for the purposes of

educational planning and development in the schooldivision;

(o) Repealed. 2006, c.18, s.12.

(p) grant leave of absence to teachers and other employees of the board of

education;

(q) provide scholarships,bursaries or similar awards for the purposes ofthe

attendance of teachers and pupils at post-secondary institutions;

(r) provide for the payment of a gratuity or an annual allowance to any

employee of the board of education on retirement on account of age and may,

in its discretion, adjust or revise the annual allowance of that employee in

subsequent years;

(s) pay from funds of the schooldivision the employer’s contribution to an

approved pension plan to which the board of education and its employees, other

than teachers, are parties under a contract for that purpose;

(t) in the case of a separate schooldivision, prescribe the qualifications of

teachers who are to provide religious instruction;

(u) pay, for membership in an association of trustees organized in the province,

the appropriate sumset out in a schedule of fees adopted by the association at

an annual convention or by the executive committee of the association pursuant

to a direction of the association at an annual convention,and submitted to

the minister and approved by the minister, but, where the minister does not

approve a schedule of fees submitted to him or her, the last schedule of fees

approved by the minister continues to apply;

- 5 -

(v) provide for the collection of a reasonable sum from pupils for:

(i) the purposes ofrecovery of inadvertent or accidental damage or loss of

schoolproperty resulting from acts of the pupils that are not necessarily

attributable to wilful neglect or disregard for schoolproperty;

(ii) the purposes offees or dues with respect to student organizations

and related activities approved by the school;

(w) with respect to any schoolthat is not situated in a schooldistrict, close

the schoolor discontinue one or more grades or years taught in the school;

(x) with respect to any school situated in a schooldistrict, in accordance with

sections 87.1 to 87.7 but subject to section 87.8, close the schoolor discontinue

one or more grades or years taught in the school;

(y) where it is considered advisable and expedient by the board of education

to provide certain instructional services at schools or institutions outside

the schooldivision, enter into agreements with boards of education of other

schooldivisions, conseils scolaires or the governing bodies of any agencies or

institutions approved by the department to furnish the desired services;

(z) where provision is made by the board of education for the attendance of a

pupil at a schooloutside the schooldivision, provide for payment to the parent

or guardian of that pupil any sumthat the board of education may determine

on account of, or in lieu of, the cost of transportation;

(aa) offer courses during a summer vacation and charge a fee to individuals

who enrol in the courses;

(aa.1) co-operate in, participate in or facilitate the co-ordination,

administration or provision of educational programs for children who are not

yet eligible to be enrolled in kindergarten in a schoolin the schooldivision

pursuant to clause 85(1)(f);

(bb) by resolution, provide for or authorize any actions, procedures or policies

that are ancillary to or necessary for the carrying out of any duties or the

exercise of any powers imposed or conferred on it by this Act.

(2) Repealed. 2008, c.11, s.5.

(3) Repealed. 2008, c.11, s.5.

…

Operating grants to boards of education

310(1) Subject to subsection (2), the regulations and any directive of the minister,

the minister shall pay to each board of education an operating grant for the period

commencing on April 1 in one year and ending on March 31 of the following year.

(2) The minister may deduct from any annual operating grant payable to a board

of education the amount of the fees for membership in an association recognized

and approved for the purposes ofclause 87(1)(u) unless:

(a) on or before December 1 in any year, the board of education requests the

minister, in writing, not to make the deduction; and

(b) the minister approves the request mentioned in clause (a).

- 6 -

APPENDIX 2

The Education Funding Regulations

Application

3(1) These regulations apply to operating grants and capital grants payable for

the period commencing on April 1, 2009 and ending on the date on which these

regulations are repealed:

(a) to boards of education and the conseil scolaire pursuant to sections 310

to 315 of the Act; and

(b) to registered independent schools,including historical high schools,and

to any other educational institution and organization pursuant to section 19

of The Government Organization Act.

(1.1) Pursuant to section 19 of The Government Organization Act, these

regulations apply to operating grants payable to qualified independent schools for

the period commencing on April 1, 2012 and ending on the date on which Part III.1

of these regulations is repealed.

(2) The minister shall distribute operating grants pursuant to these regulations

on a monthly basis or at any otherintervals that the minister may determine.

Operating grants

4(1) In this section:

(a) “fiscal year” means:

(i) in clause (2)(a), the fiscal year of the board of education or conseil

scolaire, being the period commencing on September 1 in one year and

ending on August 31 of the following year; and

(ii) except in clause (2)(a), the fiscal year of the Government of

Saskatchewan, being the period commencing on April 1 in one year and

ending on March 31 of the following year;

(b) “separate school board” means the board of education of a separate

schooldivision.

(2) In calculating the operating grants payable to a board of education or the

conseil scolaire for any fiscal year, the minister may take into account:

(a) the final approved budget of the board of education or conseil scolaire,

as the case may be, for the relevant fiscal year of the board of education or

conseil scolaire;

(b) the minister’s estimates of revenues available to the board of education

or conseil scolaire, as the case may be, for the relevant fiscal year of the

Government of Saskatchewan, including:

(i) education property taxes;

(ii) grants in lieu of taxes;

(iii) in the case of a board of education,the board of education’s

percentage of licence fees charged by the municipality respecting

trailers and mobile homes located within the school division;

(iv) tuition revenue and other fees;

(v) federal grants;

(vi) interest on investments and assets; and

(vii) such other revenue as the minister may determine;

(c) the minister’s estimates of expenses incurred by the board of education or

conseil scolaire, as the case may be, for the relevant fiscal year of the

Government of Saskatchewan, including:

(i) the effects of inflation on expenses outlined in the final approved

- 7 -

budget of the board of education or conseil scolaire for the government’s

previous fiscal year; and

(ii) teachersalary increases;

(d) financial information furnished by the board of education or conseil

scolaire, as the case may be, in consultations with the minister or at the

request of the minister; and

(e) such other matters as the minister determines may be relevant to the

funding of educational programs for pupils, kindergarten children and

children who are not yet eligible to be enrolled in kindergarten.

(3) Without restricting the generality of clause (2)(b), if a separate schoolboard,

pursuant to subsection 288(7) of the Act, determines mill rates for a particular

taxation year that are higher than those determined by the Lieutenant Governor in

Council for that taxation year, the minister, given the final approved budget of the

separate schoolboard, shall reduce the operating grant payable to the separate

schoolboard by the amount by which the tax revenue allocated to the separate

schoolboard based on the mill rates set by the separate schoolboard for that

taxation year exceeds the tax revenue that would otherwise have been allocated to

the separate schoolboard based on the mill rates set by the Lieutenant Governor in

Council for that taxation year.

(4) Without restricting the generality of clause (2)(b), if a separate schoolboard,

pursuant to subsection 288(7) of the Act, determines mill rates for a particular

taxation year that are lower than those determined by the Lieutenant Governor in

Council for that taxation year, the funding requirements of the separate school

board shall be deemed to have decreased and the minister shall refrain from

increasing the operating grant payable to the separate school board.