Grievance File Nos.: 2013.014  
2013.021  
2013.123  
IN THE MATTER OF AN ARBITRATION  
Under the Canada Labour Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. L-2  
B E T W E E N:  
TELUS INC.  
(the “Company”),  
- and -  
TELECOMMUNICATIONS WORKERS UNION  
(the “Union”),  
AND IN THE MATTER OF THE GRIEVANCES OF TRACY BAKER REGARDING  
ALLEGED UNJUST SUSPENSION AND TERMINATION.  
SOLE ARBITRATOR:  
APPEARANCES  
For the Union:  
Gordon F. Luborsky  
Marisa Pollock, Counsel  
Benjamin Katz, Counsel  
John Hockley, Business Agent  
Isabelle Miller, National Vice President  
Leighann Neal, Shop Steward  
Tracy Baker, Grievor  
For the Company:  
John D. R. Craig, Counsel  
Jackie VanDerMeulen, Counsel  
Deanah Shelly, Counsel  
Debbie Leclerc, Manager, TELUS  
Ronnie Olsen, Manager, TELUS  
Sofia Alonso, TELUS Labour Relations  
HEARD:  
March 3, 6, 7, November 24, 26, December 1, 2, 3 and 5, 2014,  
June 9, 10 and July 29, 2015, January 12, 14, May 10, 11, 12,  
June 6, 28, 30, September 18 and 30, 2016  
Toronto, Ontario  
DECISION:  
November 1, 2016  
January 9, 2018  
REASONS FOR DECISION:  
Page 2 of 196  
REASONS FOR DECISION  
I.  
Introduction  
With the consent of the parties I issued my Decisionwithout reasons concerning three  
[1]  
grievances filed by the Union on behalf of the Grievor, Ms. Tracy Baker, challenging as unjust:  
(i) a five-day disciplinary suspension without pay by letter dated November 12, 2012 for having  
allegedly “misappropriated company time, improperly “accessed [the Grievor’s] own personal  
account for non-work related reasons” and lack of professionalism when dealing with clients”  
(“Grievance No. 1”); (ii) the Grievor’s “first dismissalfrom employment effective January 11,  
2013 for alleged “refusal or neglect to report to work” (“Grievance No. 2”); and (iii) the  
Grievor’s “second dismissalfrom employment by letter dated March 11, 2013 addressed to the  
Union for alleged “inappropriate access and misuse of TELUS resources, breach of the corporate  
security policy, and failure to follow a management directive” (“Grievance No. 3”).  
[2]  
The Decision was rendered in a “bottom line” fashion on November 1, 2016 after  
reviewing and considering the extensive oral and documentary evidence and submissions  
presented by the parties over the 22 days of hearings that extended some two and one-half years  
in order to provide an expedited result, with the partiesagreement that I would retain  
jurisdiction to issue my fulsome Reasons for Decisionat a later date.  
[3]  
In my Decision I dismissed Grievance No. 1, the five-day suspension without pay.  
However, I allowed Grievance No. 2, the Grievor’s first dismissal effective January 11, 2013, as  
well as Grievance No. 3, the Grievor’s second dismissal by letter dated March 11, 2013. A copy  
of my Decision is attached hereto as Appendix A.  
[4]  
I accordingly ordered the Company “to reinstate the Grievor forthwith to the position she  
held on January 11, 2013 with compensation to make her whole for all losses calculated from  
that date to the date of her reinstatementamong other forms of relief set out in paras. 13 17 of  
the Decision, reproduced below:  
Remedy  
Page 3 of 196  
¶ 13. Having regard to the foregoing, the termination letter dated January 11, 2013 shall be  
removed from the Grievor’s employment record.  
¶ 14. The Company is ordered to reinstate the Grievor forthwith to the position she held as of  
the date of her termination on January 11, 2013, with compensation to make her whole for all  
losses calculated from that date to the date of her reinstatement.  
¶ 15. The termination letter dated March 11, 2013 shall also be removed from the Grievor’s  
employment record.  
¶ 16. The remedy in allowing the March 11, 2013 termination grievance is encompassed within  
the reinstatement and compensation order concerning the January 11, 2013 termination dealt with  
by Grievance No. 2.  
¶ 17. In addition to retaining jurisdiction to deliver Reasons for Decision in accordance with the  
parties’ agreement recorded above, I shall remain seized to resolve any dispute concerning the  
interpretation and/or implementation of the relief ordered herein and calculation of the  
compensation payable to the Grievor, as requested by the Union at the outset of these arbitration  
proceedings.  
[5]  
The following are now my detailed Reasons for Decision in determining these three  
grievances that also addresses a post-Decision remedial dispute between the parties. I am  
grateful to the parties for their forbearance that permitted me the additional time required to  
provide a comprehensive explanation of my findings and conclusions on the evidence and  
arguments submitted over this lengthy case.  
II.  
General Background and Overview of Grievances  
[6]  
The Company, interchangeably referred to as TELUS, is a Canadian national  
telecommunications provider of a wide range of telecommunications products and services  
including internet access, voice transmissions (landline and mobility), entertainment, healthcare,  
video and Internet Protocol Television (IPTV) having some 45,000 employees. Its Headquarters  
is located in Vancouver, British Columbia, but at all material times the events of the present  
grievances primarily arose out of the Company’s operations in Scarborough, Ontario, although  
there is a British Columbian involvement as well.  
[7]  
At the time of the relevant events the Grievor, Ms. Tracy Baker, lived in the City of  
Oshawa, Ontario, in her parents’ house, just east of Scarborough. She began her career with one  
of the Company’s predecessors in or about November of 1998 which was her first full-time job  
upon completing college at the age of 19 or 20, working in a call centre environment where she  
Page 4 of 196  
interacted with customers in connection with their telecommunications services. The Company  
acquired that predecessor corporation about one year later and over the next 13 or 14 years, the  
Grievor held various positions in the call centre with growing responsibilities in matters that  
included: (a) “Mike Activation”, referring to the two-way dispatch networks for new corporate  
clients; (b) “Loyalty and Retention”, which is a functional unit intended to secure the continuing  
patronage of customers (often with offers of what were described as “free perks”), where the  
Grievor also handled “escalated calls” from dissatisfied customers (usually concerning billing  
issues); (c) “Channel Care”, where she provided support for dealers on system issues and was  
cross-trained to oversee corporate accounts of various sizes and complexities; to finally handling  
(d) cellphone and related services for the Company’s largest corporate clients such as major  
banks, heath care facilities and governmental agencies requiring special skill and attention. In  
her last position as a Corporate Support Agent” (or “CSA”) the Grievor received “in-bound”  
calls from very large corporate clients where customer service is key to the Company’s  
competitiveness, and as such the Grievor was given broad discretion to issue credits (up to $400)  
and to add users or features to a customer’s account on her own initiative to satisfy the  
customer’s immediate and ongoing needs.  
[8]  
While the Grievor reported to the Company’s Scarborough office which is a call centre  
where hundreds work, she was permitted to work from her (parents’) home under the Company’s  
At Home Agent Program”, which is restricted to those employees who are felt to be trustworthy  
and able to work with minimum supervision. That Program is established under article 16 of the  
collective agreement which states in article 16.04 that in the event the Company decides to  
terminate the program: “The Company will normally provide sixty (60) days written notice to  
the participating employees and the Union…although it is recognized that in exceptional or  
unusual circumstances the Company may provide less than sixty (60) days’ notice.”  
[9]  
Prior to the events leading to the Grievor’s five-day suspension without pay and her  
subsequent discharge the Grievor had been working as an At Home Agent for six years, and  
there was no suggestion that the Grievor received discipline from the Company at any time, but  
certainly there was none during the two-year sunset clauseunder article 10.03 of the collective  
agreement (reproduced below) that requires the removal of such discipline from an employee’s  
record if clear during that period.  
Page 5 of 196  
[10] However the situation changed quickly in the fall of 2012.  
[11] The first discipline issued to the Grievor arose out of alleged events that occurred from  
June 13, 2012 to November 12, 2012 (hereinafter “Period 1”) resulting in a five-day suspension  
without pay served from Friday, November 9 until Friday, November 16, for reasons that are  
described in the following letter from the Grievor’s then manager, Ms. Debbie Leclerc, dated  
November 12, 2012:  
Subject: 5 Day Suspension  
Dear Tracy,  
This letter is confirmation of our meeting on November 8, 2012, and serves as written notice of  
your five day suspension with respect to your recent misconduct.  
Over the past several months, you have repeatedly and deliberately misappropriated company  
time by call avoidance, having excessive call pick up times, and by queue surfing. You have also  
accessed your own personal account for non-work related reasons, and you continue to  
demonstrate lack of professionalism when dealing with clients.  
During our investigative meeting on November 8, 2012, you failed to take accountability for your  
behavior. Tracy, this behavior is unacceptable. Your actions have resulted in calls being  
abandoned and have created a poor customer experience. In addition, it impedes our ability to  
meet customer service level targets and provide consistent, high quality service to our clients.  
I would like to clarify my expectations that:  
During company-paid time, it is imperative that you be performing work-related activities.  
You are expected to wear your headset and turn the volume/ringer on so that you can  
hear calls coming in.  
Immediately upon completion of a client call and the follow-up work associated with that  
call, and immediately after scheduled breaks, you are to place yourself back into an  
available state to take the next waiting call.  
You are expected to answer calls as soon as they come into your line with minimal delay.  
You are not to access your personal account using Knowbility or Smartdesktop for any  
reason.  
You are to conduct yourself in a professional manner with clients, using positive word  
choices and positive tone.  
The behaviors that you have been demonstrating are inexcusable and cannot be tolerated. Your  
conduct is contrary to TELUS’ expectations, and clearly acceptable (sic). In order to impress upon  
you the seriousness of this situation and convince you to take immediate steps to correct your  
behavior, you are suspended for five days as of Friday November 9, 2012. You are to report for  
work as scheduled on Friday November 16, 2012 at your scheduled start time. Please be advised  
that if the issues noted are not addressed, or if there are any other issues with performance or  
misconduct that arise, further disciplinary action will be taken up to and including dismissal.  
Page 6 of 196  
[12] The Union consequently filed its grievance “2013.021” dated November 16, 2012  
(Grievance No. 1) alleging that the discipline was without just cause in violation of articles 8 and  
10 of the collective agreement in effect from June 9, 2011 to December 31, 2015, the relevant  
portions of which are set out below:  
ARTICLE 8 MANAGEMENT RIGHTS  
8.01  
Unless otherwise explicitly agreed to in this agreement, management retains the exclusive  
right to manage its operations in all respects including the direction of the working forces.  
The Company agrees that any exercise of these rights shall not contravene the provisions  
of this agreement.  
ARTICLE 10 JUST CAUSE  
10.01 An employee who has successfully completed the probationary period, shall not, for  
disciplinary reasons, receive a written warning, suspension or be dismissed, except for  
just cause.  
An employee may request the presence of an available Union representative at a meeting  
between a manager and the employee if the purpose of the meeting is to impose  
discipline. The requested presence of a Union representative may be by way of  
teleconference where a Union representative is participating in either the At Home Agent  
or work styles program or any other situation where the parties mutually agree.  
Disciplinary action is to be confirmed in writing, with a copy to the Union  
10.03 Upon request from an employee, letters confirming disciplinary action of a written warning,  
or suspension of five (5) days or less, shall be removed from the employee’s file two (2)  
years after the date of the incident provided there are no incidents of a similar nature  
within that two year period. Upon request from an employee, all other letters confirming  
disciplinary action shall be removed from the employee’s file five (5) years after the  
incident provided there are no incidents of a similar nature within that five year period.  
[13] The Grievor’s “first dismissalwas issued to her by letter dated January 11, 2013 for  
“refusal or neglect to report to work” arising out of the Grievor’s absence from the workplace for  
alleged stress related illness beginning November 28, 2012 to that date (hereinafter “Period 3”),  
which was couriered to the Grievor’s home. The termination letter was signed by her new  
manager, Mr. Ronnie Olsen, who set out the following reasons for the Grievor’s termination:  
This letter is further to our correspondence dated January 7, 2013 and December 21, 2012, via  
letter regarding your absence from work since November 28, 2012.  
Page 7 of 196  
I have attempted to contact you via telephone and courier on the dates above. I specifically  
required that you contact me via telephone or report to work by today, Friday, January 11, 2013. In  
addition, several voice mail messages have been left for you by me and Health Services.  
The purpose of this letter is to inform you that we have terminated your employment with TELUS  
based on your refusal or neglect to report to work. To date, TELUS has not received any  
documentation which supports your absence from work. As well, you have not returned to work as  
directed.  
Your failure to report to work or provide sufficient information to explain your absence is totally  
unacceptable. Therefore your employment is terminated immediately. Your record of employment  
and final earnings will be forwarded under separate cover.  
[14] The Union responded to this first dismissal letter with its grievance “2013.014” dated  
January 21, 2013 (Grievance No. 2), claiming that the Company’s actions violated articles 4, 8,  
10 ET AL” and the terms of a Memorandum of Agreement set out at Appendix B East of the  
collective agreement under the title, “Team TELUS Flex Benefits”. The relevant portions of  
Article 4 and Appendix B East state:  
ARTICLE 4 DISCRIMINATION  
4.01  
The Company and the Union shall not discriminate on the basis of race, national or ethnic  
origin, colour, religion, age, sex, sexual orientation, marital status, family status, disability  
and conviction for which a pardon has been granted and as otherwise provided by the  
Canadian Human Rights Act, unless proper and just cause exists.  
MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT  
APPENDIX B EAST  
TEAM TELUS FLEX BENEFITS  
It is agreed and understood that Regular full-time and Regular part-time employees covered by  
appendix B will participate in the Team TELUS Flex Benefits plan as it is described on the TELUS  
intranet (“Team TELUS Flex Benefits Manual – For regular full-time and regular part-time team  
members covered by Appendix B of the collective agreement with the TWO”). In addition,  
Temporary employees covered by Appendix B will continue to participate in the team TELUS Flex  
benefits plan as it is described on the TELUS intranet (“Team TELUS Flex Benefits Manual – For  
temporary team members covered by Appendix B of the collective agreement with the TWU”).  
[15] I was not told the specific details of the Team TELUS Flex Benefits as they relate to  
short term disability absence (except for the testimony of Ms. Bargen, considered below). The  
details of that plan are apparently set out on an internal Intranet feed available to all employees.  
However I was informed that it provides substantially the same benefits that regular full-time  
Page 8 of 196  
employees in Western Canada receive under Appendix A West of the collective agreement,  
the relevant portions of which are as follows:  
MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT  
APPENDIX A WEST  
BENEFITS  
REGULAR EMPLOYEES:  
It is agreed and understood that Regular full-time and Regular part-time employees covered by  
Appendix A will be eligible to participate in the following benefit plans:  
Sickness or Non-Occupational Accident Disability Absence  
1. An employee who is unable to work because of sickness or non-occupational accident is  
eligible for short term disability benefits as provided for under the terms and conditions of the  
short term disability plan provided the employee’s absence meets the plan requirements in  
accordance with the following:  
Years of Service  
0 3 months  
Days at 100%  
Days at 70%  
Nil  
10  
25  
75  
100  
130  
Nil  
120  
105  
55  
30  
Nil  
4 months to 2 years  
3 years to 5 years  
6 years to 10 years  
11 years to 15 years  
16 years an over  
2. The Company agrees to expedite the payment of short term disability benefits providing the  
employee has followed the established claim procedures and the required documents have  
been received by the Company. Under normal conditions, the employee’s short term disability  
benefits payments will appear on their regular pay.  
3. An eligible employee will receive payment under the plan for the first two (2) weeks of absence  
pending receipt of the required medical documentation.  
[16] Also of some relevance in this case are articles 4.01 (Discrimination) and 8.01  
(Management Rights) that are set out below:  
ARTICLE 4 DISCRIMINATION  
4.01  
The Company and the Union shall not discriminate on the basis of race, national or ethnic  
origin, colour, religion, age, sex, sexual orientation, marital status, family status, disability  
and convection for which a pardon has been granted and as otherwise provide by the  
Canadian Human Rights Act, unless proper and just cause exists.  
ARTICLE 8 MANAGEMENT RIGHTS  
Page 9 of 196  
8.01  
Unless otherwise explicitly agree to in this Agreement, management retains the exclusive  
right to manage its operations in all respects including the direction of the working forces.  
The Company agrees that any exercise of these rights shall not contravene the provisions  
of this Agreement.  
[17] In the course of the grievance meetings between the parties to discuss the first dismissal  
grievance (Grievance No. 2), the Grievor was dismissed a second time by letter dated March 11,  
2013 for events that the Company alleged occurred between November 13, 2012 and November  
27, 2012 (hereinafter “Period 2”). That letter, written by Ms. Cheryl Fraser who is identified as  
the Company’s Senior Labour Relations Consultant was never delivered to the Grievor directly,  
but rather was addressed to the Union’s Business agent, Mr. John Hockley. It sets out the  
reasons for the Grievor’s second dismissal in relevant part as follows:  
Re:  
T. Baker Dismissal for Cause  
I am writing to advise you of the company’s position with respect to the above employee, who was  
terminated for cause effective January 11, 2013. As I discussed with you in the Step 3 grievance  
meeting, on November 27, 2012 the Company conducted an investigative meeting with Ms. Baker  
regarding her inappropriate access and misuse of TELUS resources, breach of the corporate  
security policy, and failure to follow a management directive.  
As you are aware, Ms. Baker’s employment was terminated for reasons unrelated to the alleged  
inappropriate actions. These inappropriate actions were not included in the reasons for termination  
as Ms. Baker had not returned to the workplace for a sufficient length of time to allow for this matter  
to be concluded. Notwithstanding this, the Company maintains that we have sufficient evidence to  
demonstrate that Ms. Baker engaged in actions that were inappropriate and in violation of the  
TELUS’ Ethics and Security Policies.  
Without prejudice to the Company’s position on grievance 2013.014, should Ms. Baker be  
reinstated as a result of the parties arbitrating the above matter (2013.014), this letter serves to  
advise that a second dismissal will be deemed to have been initiated effective today. The cause of  
the second dismissal is Ms. Baker’s inappropriate access and misuse of TELUS resources, breach  
of the corporate security policy, and failure to follow a management directive.  
[18] After seeking clarification of the Company’s March 11, 2013 letter and being advised by  
Ms. Fraser on May 8, 2013 that the Grievor’s alleged misconduct during her five-day suspension  
until her November 27, 2012 investigative meeting, “remains a legitimate basis on which  
TELUS would be entitled to terminate Ms. Baker’s employment” and that, “TELUS reserves the  
right to rely on this misconduct in the future”, the Union filed its grievance “2013.123” dated  
Page 10 of 196  
May 23, 2013 challenging the Company’s “second dismissalof the Grievor as unjust in  
violation of articles “8, 10, ET AL and any other provisions and statutes” (Grievance No. 3).  
[19] The parties agreed at the outset of the hearings into these matters that I was properly  
appointed and had jurisdiction to determine all three grievances submitted.  
III.  
Overview of Conclusions  
[20] On behalf of the Company, which acknowledged it had the burden to prove just cause for  
disciplining and discharging the Grievor, I heard testimony from Ms. Debbie Leclerc, who as a  
Manager of Business Client Experience” or “BCX Care” was the Grievor’s immediate  
supervisor in the fall of 2012, Mr. Ronnie Olsen, who as a Manager of Business Client Care”  
became one of the Grievor’s supervisors in the late fall and winter of 2012 2013, Ms. Diane  
Bargen, a Registered General Nurse (and former Registered Psychiatric Nurse who allowed that  
registration to lapse in 2002) working as a “Case Consultant” for the Company’s “Health  
Services” (referred to as “TELUS Health”) based in Burnaby, British Columbia, Ms. Jenny  
Reynolds who identified herself as “a Manager in Business and Corporate Departmentsbut at  
the relevant time was an acting manager, Mr. Vince Marasco, who was a Manager, BCX Care –  
Business Client Experienceand Mr. Cory Wain, who as the Company’s “Director of  
Information Servicestestified in reply about a technical issue that arose in the evidence.  
[21] The Grievor was the only witness called by the Union, who began her testimony before  
me on June 10, 2015. Her examination-in-chief took approximately one-half of a hearing day to  
complete; following which she was extensively cross-examined during the next four and one-half  
hearing days that stretched over a period of 11 months to May 10, 2016.  
[22] Within that interval I issued a Preliminary Award dealing with the Company’s mid-  
hearing demand for the production of the Grievor’s cellphone telephone records that I allowed,  
reported in Re Telus Inc. and TWU (Baker) (2016), 269 L.A.C. (4th) 400 (Can. Arb.) (Luborsky),  
where I also made the following observations about assessing the Grievor’s credibility to that  
date at paras. 41 and 42:  
¶ 41  
After some three and one-half days of cross-examination at the hands of skillful counsel,  
one’s arguable perception of the Grievor at this point might be of a person who is obviously tense,  
confused at times, and who has often been visibly distraught. At least one of the stated purposes  
Page 11 of 196  
of the Company’s demand for the production of the Grievor’s cellphone telephone records is to  
challenge the veracity of the Grievor’s testimony on matters that I have concluded are not  
collateral, but rather within the broad factual matrix or at least surrounding circumstances of the  
case before me. However, in assessing credibility to the extent it may be relevant to the  
issues in dispute, whether any deficiencies in the Grievor’s testimony are reflective of her  
general lack of sincerity in the sense of a deliberate attempt to mislead, which is what the  
Company apparently seeks to establish in part by its production demand herein, or reveals  
the discordant workings of an emotionally troubled mind that becomes exacerbated by  
various levels of stress now arguably on full display after several days of comprehensive,  
exacting and at times relentless cross-examination, which may be consistent with the  
Union’s apparent theory of the Grievor’s case, has yet to be determined.  
¶ 42  
That determination must obviously await the parties’ submissions in the fullness of time,  
when all of the evidence is finally before me.  
[Emphasis added]  
[23] While the Grievor’s cross-examination was certainly comprehensive, exacting and long,  
it was illuminating on the issue flagged in the foregoing excerpt of my Preliminary Award. By  
that point it was apparent that the overarching theory of the Company’s case was that the Grievor  
demonstrated she was a dishonest employee, who the Company described as “calculating and  
strategic”. The Company asserted that the Grievor acted in deliberate disregard of Company  
policies and reasonable expectations, whose claim of illness to the point of being incapable of  
attending work when instructed to do so could not be believed but rather was more consistent  
with an individual attempting to “flee” or “escape” the disciplinary consequences of her past  
misconduct. The Company stated I could give no weight to the Grievor’s testimony that was  
subject to serious credibility deficiencies, and thus it submitted it had just cause to terminate the  
Grievor’s employment in all of the circumstances of this case.  
[24] The Union’s broad theory of its case was that the Grievor had been a long-term employee  
with increasing responsibilities and a clear disciplinary record when she began exhibiting  
physical and then emotional difficulties amounting to a disability that snowballed and eventually  
culminated in her inability to attend work for medical reasons as substantiated by her physicians.  
The Union accordingly presented the Grievor as a person who had become deeply troubled and  
was subject to confusion, particularly where the Company’s instructions were unclear and its  
treatment of the Grievor unjust, that the Union claimed had occurred in this case. And to the  
extent the Grievor exhibited such confusion in actions during her employment or in her  
Page 12 of 196  
testimony before me, they were more consistent with and confirmatory of her general troubled or  
ill state of mind as a result of her ongoing mistreatment and reactive disability than a deliberate  
attempt to mislead the Company or me, which did not constitute just cause to terminate the  
Grievor’s employment while in a demonstrably vulnerable state.  
[25] This was one of those rare cases in which the Grievor’s exhaustive cross-examination by  
the Company, although at times excruciating, nevertheless assisted me in recognizing and  
accepting the Union’s submissions that the Grievor was exhibiting signs of a deeply troubled  
individual during her employment (and continuing afterwards) with ongoing physical and  
emotional disabilities consistent with her physiciansmedical certificates, whose actions and  
testimony before me were more reflective of an employee who did not intend to mislead or to be  
dishonest with either the Company or before me, particularly where I also found that much of the  
Grievor’s confusion was contributed to by the Company.  
[26] While the factual circumstances said to support the issuance discipline are intertwined,  
for analytical purposes it is convenient to divide the continuum of the many events leading to  
each instance of the Company’s discipline of the Grievor and the grievances from the Union that  
followed into three temporal periods that are referred to hereunder as: Period 1being the  
events leading to the Grievor’s five-day disciplinary suspension and the Union’s Grievance No.  
1; Period 2” leading to the Company’s March 11, 2013 “second dismissal” and the Union’s  
Grievance No. 3 (which was issued out of temporal order); and Period 3” corresponding to the  
events largely based on extensive medical documentation filed in this case that chronicle the  
Grievor’s physical and mental health from November 28, 2012 leading to the Grievor’s “first  
dismissalof January 11, 2013 which was disputed by the Union’s Grievance No. 2.  
[27] Thus as indicated by my Decision dated November 1, 2016, for the reasons set out below  
on all of the evidence and submissions before me, I ultimately came to the conclusion that in  
connection with Grievance No. 1, the Grievor was displaying physical and likely developing  
mental health problems during Period 1 of the narrative in this case leading to her first discipline,  
the five-day suspension without pay. Although I found that many of the Company’s allegations  
of misconduct during this timeframe were not proven or could not be relied upon for various  
reasons described below, the one area of misconduct that was shown on the evidence to have  
Page 13 of 196  
occurred on a balance of probabilities standard, were incidents of “call avoidance” that  
notwithstanding the Company’s inability to prove the other claims of inappropriate behavior in  
Ms. Leclerc’s letter of November 12, 2012, I concluded was sufficient to justify discipline at the  
level of sanction imposed on that occasion. This was the case even though it was also apparent  
on the evidence that the Grievor was showing the beginnings of physical and/or mental disability  
that she hadn’t clearly alerted the Company to, which the Company might have otherwise had  
the obligation to consider in modifying its response and offering reasonable accommodations.  
Nor could I find sufficient mitigating circumstances justifying the reduction in the quantum of  
discipline issued in that instance, even though I determined the quantum to be at the high end of  
an appropriate proportional response.  
[28] However the evidence supports the conclusion that the Grievor’s physical and developing  
mental distress was continuing, and that her disability was exacerbated during the “Period 2”  
events commencing on or about Tuesday, November 13 (which was during her five-day  
suspension) to Tuesday, November 27, 2012, which I also found that the Company contributed  
significantly to in ways described below and was too ready to jump to the worst conclusions  
about the Grievor’s motives and behavior without justification. On the evidence I concluded that  
the Grievor did not violate the collective agreement during this timeframe, and that any mistakes  
by the Grievor were mitigated by the Company’s contribution to the understandable confusion in  
her mind. But if the Company had grounds to discipline the Grievor for her actions during this  
period, which I would have assessed at the lowest in the range of acceptable sanctions, it chose  
not to exercise the right before discharging the Grievor for other reasons on January 11, 2013.  
Thus there is a valid argument that the Company’s attempt to assert separate alleged cause to  
terminate the Grievor’s employment two months later in its March 11, 2013 letter for events that  
the Company was aware of prior to terminating her on other grounds, constituted an improper  
attempt to expand or change its reasons for termination, rendering any legitimate discipline for  
proven misconduct during that period ineffective. Even if the Company had just cause to  
discipline the Grievor for any of the events of Period 2 from November 13 to 27, 2012, I found  
that discharge was not a proportionate response.  
[29] During Period 3 of the relevant events from November 28, 2012 to the Grievor’s first  
dismissal on January 11, 2013, I concluded on the evidence that was particularly drawn from the  
Page 14 of 196  
Grievor’s extensive cross-examination and the medical documentation filed in these proceedings  
by the Company, which was also in the possession of and thus known to the Company before it  
made its decision to dismiss the Grievor, that the Grievor was either legitimately ill or certainly  
believed she was as supported by her physiciansreports and incapable of attending work, which  
rendered the Company’s actions in terminating her employment for alleged “refusal or neglect to  
return to work” as unjust in all of the circumstances of this case.  
[30] For reasons that I will also explain below, I could only give limited weight to the  
opinions of the Company’s Case Consultant from TELUS Health, Ms. Diane Bargen, whose  
purported independence in evaluating the medical documentation provided by the Grievor’s  
physicians to support the Grievor’s ongoing absence as a person who was “totally disabled” was  
undermined by contacts from the Grievor’s new supervisor, Mr. Olsen, at the beginning of the  
Grievor’s appeal for short term disability (“STD”) benefits. Mr. Olsen told her that the Grievor’s  
reported medical problems were really improper attempts to avoid her termination that she knew  
was coming, which the evidence showed had tainted the reasonable assessment of her claim by  
TELUS Health from the outset. The revelations from Ms. Bargen’s cross-examination  
(doubtlessly unintended by the Company), were among the key considerations in my decision to  
allow the Union’s Grievance No. 2.  
IV.  
Overview of the Organization of these Reasons  
[31] To appreciate the reasons for my Decision on the grievances before me, it is necessary to  
go through the evidence of the events leading to my factual findings during each of the three  
temporal Periods itemized above in some detail. As the parties could see throughout their  
presentation of this case, in accordance with my usual practice I was typing a detailed transcript  
of the testimony and submissions (although not always verbatim) that by the end had  
mushroomed to over 500 pages in length. The documentation supporting the transcript and the  
extensive authorities later relied upon by the parties in argument, increased that size three-fold.  
[32] In order to marshal this considerable volume of material, I asked the parties to provide  
me with a point-form timeline of what they regarded to be the key events and documents as  
revealed by the evidence that I could then follow as a guide in dealing with the evidentiary  
disputes and issues submitted to me for determination in this case. In due course I received an  
Page 15 of 196  
outline from the Company listing 76 key factual events (that were cross-referenced to the  
essential documentation and oral testimony), and one from the Union listing 228 key events and  
documents. Thus in focusing on what the parties themselves considered to be the most important  
factual assertions and supporting documentation, I substantially adopted the Company’s timeline  
as supplemented by the Union’s contribution, which overlapped with the Company’s list in  
providing more detail that I incorporated as appropriate. Also, in arriving at my factual findings  
concerning each of these key events, I have explained my assessment of the evidence and the  
weight, if any, that I could give to it in arriving at my findings of fact to the extent possible as I  
recount the evidence surrounding each of these events, rather than deferring that explanation to  
the end of these lengthy Reasons when I consider the parties’ submissions in detail. In so doing I  
had the advantage of considering the specific evidence under consideration in the context of all  
of the evidence that was presented to me that may not have been apparent until I had heard all of  
the evidence and considered the parties’ submissions in this case.  
[33] For the most part, the events presented to me were well-documented that is a window  
through which the relevant facts may be recounted; although there was a hearsay character to a  
number of the assertions in some of this documentation that while admissible, became an factor  
in my later evaluation of the weight that I could give to certain allegations of fact that the  
Company relied upon to support the discipline. Moreover, all of the medical reports relied upon  
by the Grievor to substantiate her claims of illness (primarily during Period 3) were submitted  
into evidence by the Company from the Grievor’s records on file with TELUS Health with the  
Grievor’s (and the Union’s) consent.  
[34] These medical notes and opinions provided by the Grievor’s physicians were accepted  
into evidence for the truth of the information reported therein by the Grievor’s physicians, on  
which the Grievor was exhaustively cross-examined. It was never suggested that the medical  
documentation was other than what it purported to be; namely, the professional opinions of the  
Grievor’s physicians based on their consultations with and examinations of the Grievor at the  
time that the relevant events in the Grievor’s employment were unfolding. Nor was there any  
demand made by the Company that the Grievor’s physicians be required to testify in order to  
prove their medical observations and opinions as reflected in their reports. Rather, the Company  
disputed the sufficiency of this medical documentation to support the Grievor’s claims of  
Page 16 of 196  
underlying “total disability” justifying her absence from work (primarily during Period 3),  
arguing that they were insufficient for the Grievor to satisfy her onus to prove that she had a  
disability at all, amid the Company’s charges of improper “doctor shopping” for the medical  
opinions she wanted.  
[35] Also, I considered the Company’s general policy in responding to what it has referred to  
as “gaps” in performance of employees as part of the backdrop that has relevance to all three  
temporal periods under consideration, which provided me with an organizational perspective on  
which to view the expectations of the parties. In that regard the Company filed a document dated  
October 29, 2006 entitled, “Responses to Performance Improvement Gaps”, which is not  
disputed to be the Company’s “guideline” to the way it is expected to handle incidences of  
culpable misconduct, non-performance and absenteeism in the workplace. It constitutes a form  
of notice to employees and the Union of the Company’s practice in administering discipline in  
such matters through a progressive approach, while reserving the Company’s right to skip or add  
to the sequence of performance or discipline administration as circumstances dictate. It clearly  
makes a distinction between “culpable” and “non-culpable” performance issues requiring  
different corrective approaches, which as circumstances would later show the Company didn’t  
follow in its actions towards the Grievor.  
[36] In the normal course, the Company’s policy in the case of conduct deemed to be  
“culpable”, is to follow progressive discipline beginning at what it calls, “Step 1” which is a  
“Meeting of Concern, Coaching and Counselling”, all of which is acknowledged not to be  
disciplinary in nature, but rather is intended to alert the employee to the Company’s requirements  
with assistance in meeting those expectations. As a non-disciplinary meeting the parties also  
acknowledged that the specific criticisms about the employee’s performance raised in such  
meetings was not to be relied upon later as independent grounds supporting future discipline.  
The Company’s policy document goes on to announce a standard progressive disciplinary  
response in the event that the Meeting of Concern does not achieve the desired results, beginning  
at “Step 2” with a “Written Warning”, at “Step 3” with a “1st Suspension”, “Step 4” with a “2nd  
Suspension” that is finally dealt with by “Dismissal” where the required improvement in  
performance or conduct has not been accomplished, which is categorized as “Step 5” in the  
Company’s progressive disciplinary regime. Similar steps are documented by the Company in  
Page 17 of 196  
its policy for non-performance issues determined to be “non-culpable”, in circumstances where  
the employee is “Not Performing to Standard” and for “Absenteeism”, based on the issuance of  
escalating “Letters of Concern” to the employee that, if not satisfactorily addressed, may result in  
the non-culpable dismissal of the employee for inability to perform to the expected standards.  
And if an employee’s attendance fails to meet a reasonable expectation, dismissal may follow  
under the Company’s policy where an initial Meeting of Concernand four subsequent “Letters  
of Concern” have not resolved the matter, after the Company considers (and applies where  
appropriate) measures to reasonably accommodate any disabilities revealed by the  
circumstances.  
[37] On this latter point, the Company’s policy expressly states that, “If the cause of the  
absenteeism is due to a disability, TELUS will have to meet the duty to accommodate test prior  
to proceeding to dismissal” and also that, “The search for a suitable position (to accommodate  
the employee) may require a period of time.” Although the Company’s document also states that  
(as of 2006) its “Absenteeism Program is currently being developed”, any development in that  
regard was not identified in the evidence.  
[38] The Union’s eventual submission before me was that the Company failed to follow its  
own published policies in handling the Grievor’s alleged non-performance, culpable misconduct  
and absenteeism by the Company’s inexplicable “rush to judgement” of such a long-service  
employee in this case, by supervisors who had barely worked with her before. I ultimately  
concluded that the Union was substantially correct in that assessment.  
V.  
Period 1: June 13, 2012 November 12, 2012  
[39] My findings of fact concerning the events during this first temporal period are derived  
primarily from the testimony of Ms. Leclerc and Mr. Olsen, with support from Ms. Reynolds,  
Mr. Marasco and Mr. Wain for the Company, as documented by a cache of e-mails, memoranda  
and reports, and from the Grievor’s explanations at the time the events were unfolding and as  
offered in her testimony. Those findings may be summarized as follows.  
[40] Ms. Leclerc was a manager in two periods during 2012 from the beginning of January to  
the last week of March and then from July 1 to November 26 with spotty attendance in her last  
Page 18 of 196  
two weeks before she was off a second time until June 4, 2013 (which was after the Grievor had  
been dismissed). She was responsible for front-line Corporate Support Agents (or “CSAs”)  
handling service calls for large corporate clients identified as multimillion dollar companies,  
government agencies and health care systems, which she characterized as among “the most  
valuable that TELUS has and we have to keep them with us.” In describing the importance of  
this clientele (referred to as “platinum accounts”), Ms. Leclerc emphasized that, “At any time  
there are competitors that want to take that business, so it is imperative that our level of service is  
impeccable”. Providing exemplary customer service for these accounts is the expectation and  
goal of the Company.  
[41] The Grievor was one of those CSAs who was first assigned to Ms. Leclerc’s “Team” in  
May of 2012. However, since Ms. Leclerc was absent from work at the time until July 1, 2012,  
the Grievor initially reported to Ms. Jenny Reynolds who was the “acting team manager”,  
although she was also a member of the Union’s bargaining unit. Thus the evidence shows that  
Ms. Leclerc’s contact with the Grievor was limited to the four and one-half months from July 1  
until her discipline and events immediately following November 12, 2012 over the Grievor’s  
some 14 years of service to the Company, and even then there was little face-to-face contact  
between them. That is because the Grievor was one of only nine “At Home Agents” (hereinafter  
“AHA”) who were considered sufficiently reliable and competent to be permitted to work from  
their own homes with minimal supervision instead of working out of the Company’s  
Scarborough call centre with the remainder of Ms. Leclerc’s employees. These are regarded “the  
best of the best” or “elite” employees, and by that time the Grievor had been an At Home Agent  
for six years.  
[42] While I was provided with much information on how the Company connects the AHAs to  
its call centre operations (requiring that I digest a great amount of cyber-electronic terminology  
and what was loosely referred to as “TELUS-Speak”), it is sufficient to note that the AHA’s  
home working area is automatically connected to the call centre through appropriate electronic  
and computer equipment supplied by the Company in a manner making it virtually  
indistinguishable from a physical desk within the call centre itself. For purposes of this narrative  
I have avoided using the technical jargon and TELUS-Speak extensively pressed upon me except  
in a limited number of instances.  
Page 19 of 196  
[43] Consequently, a supervisor located in the Company’s Scarborough office can listen in  
real time to the AHA’s telephone conversations with clients and watch exactly what the AHA is  
seeing and doing on the computer screen (although apparently not in real time but rather via a  
“screen shot” record utilizing a computer software program known as “e-QUALITY) at the  
AHA’s location in handling a customer’s call. The Company provides all of the necessary  
computer hardware, software and connections to the AHA’s office through what is referred to as  
a “Virtual Private Network” or “VPN” line that is intended to allow the AHA to interact  
seamlessly with the call centre. Telephone calls are routed to the AHA’s location in the same  
way that such calls are distributed to CSAs working out of the Scarborough office. If the  
supervisor wishes to interact directly with the AHA, even while the AHA is dealing with an  
inquiry, there is a separate communication system (referred to as “MOC” which the Grievor  
called, “Communicator”) that electronically substitutes for physically standing beside and  
listening to the Corporate Support Agent while speaking to the customer.  
[44] As with all telephone agents (generally referred to as “Customer Service Agents”)  
working in the call centre, the AHAsactivities are contemporaneously recorded on a  
computerized log that documents every incoming and outgoing call, dropped call, hang-up, etc.,  
as well as tracking when the AHA is doing follow-up office work associated with the call, has  
technical problems requiring the cessation of service for a period of time or while taking a break  
for personal reasons. The AHAs typically wear a Company supplied headset and when a call  
comes in they will hear a “beep” in their ear that is also associated with an audible ring and  
flashing light on a display monitor (known as a “Plantronics” dial pad or “box” connected to the  
headset), and the customer’s account which is apparently identified through the telephone  
number immediately pops up on the AHA’s computer screen through a software facility known  
as “COSMO” that was described as the “application used to answer calls”. There are a number  
of additional software applications referred to in the testimony of witnesses and the  
documentation that were reviewed with me in some detail (including one called SMART  
DESKTOP) that are unnecessary to describe for purposes of the present narrative. It is sufficient  
to note that through COSMO and other application software the AHA has the relevant account  
information required to immediately address the customer’s inquiry or concern.  
Page 20 of 196  
[45] Like all Customer Service Agents generally, the AHA is expected to answer the call  
promptly (with a five second goal), and whenever a call is finished or dropped for different  
reasons (including a hang-up) and all work associated with that call has been completed (which  
typically involves making a notation to the customer’s account file of the outcome of the call),  
the AHA is marked as available for receiving the next telephone call from a customer and placed  
at the bottom of the electronic queue for receiving such calls, which can result in the Customer  
Service Agent sitting beside the telephone and computer screen for a period depending on call  
volumes at the time. Having a record of the AHA’s activities enables the Company to compile  
statistics on the employee’s performance (in terms of number of calls answered, “dead air calls”,  
time taken to deal with calls and supporting record-keeping work, personal time off, etc., referred  
to as Key Performance Indicators or “KPI”), which is judged against the standards established by  
the Company that are reviewed with the employee on a regular basis. In this regard Ms. Leclerc  
testified the Company’s productivity target for the CSAs was 32 calls per day.  
[46] Ms. Leclerc’s evidence is that of all of the Corporate Support Agents she managed during  
2012, the Grievor was the only one she ever received complaints about, which Ms. Leclerc  
responded to by providing additional coaching to the Grievor, although the evidence before me  
of such actual coaching was limited. This was in addition to the normal two coaching sessions  
per month and telephone monitoring provided by the manager for all agents on a regular basis,  
which Ms. Leclerc acknowledged are non-disciplinary.  
[47] Over the Union’s objection I permitted Ms. Leclerc to elaborate, as part of the general  
background to the present dispute based on her experience with the Grievor prior to the events  
leading to the Grievor’s five-day suspension without pay, on why Ms. Leclerc had developed “a  
poor opinion of the level of customer service” that the Grievor was providing which included,  
she claimed, “many instances of complaints”.  
[48] In explaining further, Ms. Leclerc offered her assessment that the Grievor, “had a very  
laid back approach when dealing on the phones she seemed as though she was uncaring when  
dealing with actual clients as opposed to a dealer (who may be more accepting of the internal  
jargon).” Ms. Leclerc also expressed the view that, “The way (the Grievor) conducted herself on  
the phone made (the clients) fell stupid” and consequently Ms. Leclerc said she noted, “There  
Page 21 of 196  
was frustration on the call that sometimes arose between (the Grievor) and clients”, prompting  
Ms. Leclerc to coach the Grievor “about (her) tone of voice”. It was not clear from the evidence  
whether Ms. Leclerc had come to these conclusions by actually listening to the Grievor, or on the  
basis of the reports of others considered below.  
[49] Notwithstanding these concerns, as well as the claimed importance of the Grievor’s role  
in dealing with what the Company considered to be its “platinum” clientele for which Ms.  
Leclerc testified “it is imperative that our level of service is impeccable”, the Grievor was not  
disciplined at that time for misconduct arising out of Ms. Leclerc’s stated observations (which on  
the evidence presented to me could only have occurred after July 1, 2012 when Ms. Leclerc  
returned from leave).  
[50] Moreover, no steps were taken by the Company to remove the Grievor’s privilege of  
working from her home under the AHA program as a trusted employee who required minimal  
supervision prior to the Grievor’s suspension on November 12, 2012, which the parties agreed  
the Company had the right to do at any time in the reasonable exercise of its managerial  
discretion.  
(a)  
June 26, 2012 Meeting of Concern  
[51] The first substantial notation of any complaint regarding the Grievor’s performance is an  
e-mail memorandum dated June 13, 2012 from Mr. Eric Mantha, who is identified on the e-mail  
as a “Client Service Manager”, which is addressed to Ms. Leclerc. Ms. Leclerc’s evidence is that  
she was on leave from the Company from the end of March 2012 until July 1, and Ms. Reynolds  
testified that she severed as acting manager for Ms. Leclerc from May 7 to July 1 of that year and  
then again for the second extended absence by Ms. Leclerc starting November 26, 2012.  
[52] Thus Ms. Reynolds, who was still in the bargaining unit at the time and didn’t become a  
member of management until June of 2014, was nevertheless directly responsible for the  
Grievor’s day-to-day supervision on June 13, 2012. Ms. Leclerc testified that Ms. Reynolds  
eventually received Mr. Mantha’s e-mail memorandum and provided it to Ms. Leclerc when the  
latter returned to work in July.  
Page 22 of 196  
[53] Over the Union’s objection, I permitted the Company to admit this memorandum into  
evidence for the limited purpose of setting the background circumstances in the same way that  
Ms. Leclerc’s earlier testimony of alleged complaints respecting the Grievor’s conduct prior to  
Ms. Leclerc’s second leave in 2012 had been admitted into evidence. I did not accept this  
document as proof of the allegations therein in the absence of testimony from Mr. Mantha to the  
extent it might have been relevant to the grievances before me (having noted that the information  
in Mr. Mantha’s memorandum was partially based on certain hearsay allegations of fact by the  
customer and thus in Ms. Leclerc’s hand constituted “double hearsay”). And the Company never  
provided me with the direct evidence to prove Mr. Mantha’s assertions in that e-mail, while as  
indicated later in this narrative it apparently relied upon those allegations of the Grievor’s  
misconduct as part of the grounds supporting the five-day suspension issued to the Grievor on  
November 12, 2012.  
[54] The e-mail from Mr. Mantha complains about the Grievor’s alleged mistreatment of a  
platinum account customer on June 12, 2012 and the Grievor’s subsequent conversation with the  
customer and Mr. Mantha (along with another TELUS representative identified as “Mike”) that  
Mr. Mantha claimed was, “arrogant, rude and uncooperative” and which he deemed to be  
“totally unacceptable”. It appears from Mr. Mantha’s memorandum that a dispute arose during  
the call when the Grievor asked Mr. Mantha and the other TELUS employee on the line to  
identify themselves and provide their employee numbers which they did, but when asked to do  
the same by Mr. Mantha the Grievor refused to reveal her name and TELUS number. Mr.  
Mantha’s memorandum also states that he contacted both the customer representative (who was  
on the call) and Mike the next morning, “To ensure I was not the only one having a bad  
perception of (the Grievor)” who “both confirmed they had the same perception”.  
[55] Responding to that alleged incident, Ms. Reynolds convened what the Company later  
characterized as its “First Meeting of Concernwith the Grievor on June 26, 2012, in accordance  
with its published guidelines in addressing such issues. Ms. Reynolds documented this meeting  
in an e-mail record she sent to herself that day but which the Exhibit submitted into evidence by  
the Company indicates she didn’t forward to Ms. Leclerc until November 2, 2012, nor was there  
any evidence that a record of this Meeting of Concern was provided to the Grievor who I  
consequently found didn’t receive it. Mr. Mantha’s allegations were discussed with the Grievor,  
Page 23 of 196  
who testified that she wasn’t given any documentation concerning the matter in advance and had  
little recollection except to remember her discussion with Ms. Reynolds that was not a face-to-  
face meeting but rather conducted over the telephone.  
[56] Ms. Reynoldsnotes confirmed by her testimony indicate an apparent dispute between  
the Grievor and Mr. Mantha on their call who the Grievor is reported to have described in those  
notes as “irritating her”, with the Grievor expressing security concerns (apparently over  
disclosing her name on the call) and the view that she did nothing wrong. Ms. Reynoldsnotes  
also record that she advised the Grievor to please provide (her TELUS identification number) to  
internal employee if they ever ask it” (sic) and that if the Grievor didn’t feel comfortable with  
something, to “keep (her management) in the loop so that if a complaint comes down the pipe we  
understand what is going on.” Then Ms. Reynoldsnotes indicate she told the Grievor that, “If  
someone asks (you) for (your TELUS number) or some type of information, please tell them to  
speak to your support person” and that the Meeting of Concern ended with Ms. Reynolds asking  
for and receiving the Grievor’s agreement that going forward” she would give her “support  
person a heads up if there is an issue”. (I was told that a “support person” is the TELUS-Speak  
terminology for an employee’s direct supervisor).  
[57] I found on the foregoing evidence that there was nothing about this specific incident or  
subsequent Meeting of Concern placing the Grievor on notice that she had done anything wrong  
and explicitly warning her of the possibility of discipline for repeating such conduct in the future.  
Rather, the message provided to the Grievor was confusing in that it suggested both that she  
should disclose her TELUS identification number to an internal TELUS employee when asked  
(without considering there was an outside customer on the call under review that might cause  
legitimate security concerns), while at the same time advising the Grievor that in the future she  
should keep her management “in the loop” and instruct people asking for her TELUS  
identification number to contact her support person. The evidence would later show that there  
was much confusion in the messages and in the way that management dealt with the Grievor  
over the ensuring four months, most if not all of it being of its own making.  
(b)  
Evidence of Developing Medical Issues  
Page 24 of 196  
[58]  
In the period after June 26 but before what the Company has characterized in its  
timeline as the “Second Meeting of Concern” with the Grievor convened on October 5, 2012, the  
evidence before me also shows there were things beginning to happen in the Grievor’s life that  
the Union points to as part of its “key events timeline” not only having a material impact on the  
Grievor’s performance and behavior during Period 1, but which later had a cascading effect on  
the circumstances leading to the Grievor’s “first dismissal” on January 11, 2013 by the end of  
temporal Period 3 in the narrative surrounding the three grievances in this case.  
[59] While working as an AHA the Grievor was in regular e-mail contact with Ms. Leclerc  
concerning her day-to-day activities (that was directly connected to the TELUS call centre  
through the VPN at the Grievor’s home), and those e-mail records indicate that the Grievor  
advised Ms. Leclerc of her need to be absent from work to attend medical appointments on  
September 14 and September 24, 2012.  
[60] This is substantiated by a medical record (under the title, “Patient Encounter History”)  
prepared by the Grievor’s family doctor, Aliya Adil, who reports that the Grievor was consulted  
on matters related to the results of a recent colposcopy examination, which is a procedure for the  
investigation of cervical cancer. The Grievor testified that this examination was prompted by the  
discovery of abnormal cells that need to be regularly checked for the risk of cancer; which was  
naturally concerning to a relatively young woman contemplating the possibility of having  
children. (As discussed below, she later had surgery for the removal of three large uterine  
fibroids approximately four months after her first dismissal).  
[61] The medical record also indicates the Grievor was complaining about “a bit of urine  
incontinence if coughs”, which the Grievor testified in the course of cross-examination was  
becoming an issue requiring her to be absent from her desk more often than usual for personal  
hygiene breaks, and was generally upsetting as a developing problem before the events at work  
precipitating what she claimed to be a major stress reaction, described below. The medical  
documentation submitted into evidence by the Company indicates that the next time the Grievor  
saw Dr. Adil was on November 15, 2012, which was during her five-day disciplinary suspension,  
and by then was complaining to Dr. Adil that she was urinating two to three times per hour.  
Page 25 of 196  
[62] I was cognizant of the need to be careful when scrutinizing such medical documentation,  
since outside of the reports of the objective results of clinical procedures, to the extent there may  
be a legitimate presumption that the patient is being truthful in self-reporting symptoms to the  
physician, which is then relied upon by the physician in diagnosis and treatment, that  
presumption is a rebuttable one that must only be accepted with care. This is particularly the  
case when claims of stress related illness are asserted, where there may be a tendency to question  
the reliability if not veracity of such claims in the context of an ongoing employment dispute.  
The Company expended a great amount of its cross-examination of the Grievor challenging the  
medical problems she reported to her physicians (as documented by their records) and alleging  
“doctor shopping” in further efforts to discredit those reports, which in my opinion were not only  
unsuccessful but tended to support the view of the Grievor as a very confused and troubled  
individual, that I will address later in these Reasons.  
[63] The significance of the September 24, 2012 medical report at this juncture is that it shows  
the Grievor’s later medical claims did not suddenly arise, but rather the emergence of problems  
related to what the Grievor testified was increasingly requiring her to be absent from her desk  
before any discipline was issued, sets the framework for the growing anxiety and distress that  
was in harmony with the Grievor’s descriptions of her medical problems that followed in the  
course of her lengthy cross-examination. And it is also consistent with the explosion of the  
reported symptoms developing as a result of the extreme stress she claims to have later been  
experiencing in the workplace, largely as a consequence of the confusing and inconsistent  
actions of management, described below.  
[64] In short, the medical documentation to this point as elaborated upon by the Grievor,  
discloses an individual who was, as of the end of September of 2012, already exhibiting some  
fragility in at least her physical condition and a certain confusion about and preoccupation with  
her developing medical problems, as corroborated by that documentation. It also forms the  
backdrop for assessing the veracity of the Grievor’s later statements to Ms. Leclerc, described  
below, and the Grievor’s actions in connection with Ms. Leclerc’s concern that by the end of  
October the Grievor seemed to be taking an inordinate amount of personal time off during the  
workday that the Grievor indicated was related to health issues requiring frequent bathroom  
Page 26 of 196  
breaks, as later borne out by the medical documentation in which she reported that she needed to  
urinate two to three times per hour.  
(c)  
October 5, 2012 Second Meeting of Concern  
[65] In the sequence of key events, the Company then points to what it characterizes as the  
“Second Meeting of Concern” with the Grievor more than three months after the First, that was  
documented in an e-mail from Ms. Leclerc to the Grievor dated October 12, 2012 confirming the  
details of their discussion on the matter that occurred the week before on October 5, 2012, which  
both Ms. Leclerc and the Grievor testified about. There is no suggestion that in the lead-up to  
their October 5 meeting that the Company had raised any criticisms of the Grievor’s quality or  
quantity of work during any of the regular bi-monthly meetings between Ms. Leclerc and the  
Grievor to review her “KPI numbers” as tracked by the Company’s activity log. On Ms.  
Leclerc’s testimony there should have been at least six such meetings in that timeframe.  
[66] However, Ms. Leclerc testified she received a complaint on October 4, 2012 regarding  
the Grievor’s interaction with a representative of one of the Company’s corporate clients named  
Robert Wong. Mr. Wong asserted by e-mail that in dealing with the Grievor on a billing issue,  
he didn’t appreciate what he alleged to be the Grievor’s, “attitude in handling my call and her  
laughing at me a couple of times while I tried to understand Telus Air Card contract and what  
happens to those Air Card when they are placed on Vacation Discount when their contract ends”  
(sic). Ms. Leclerc confirmed in her testimony that she never spoke directly with Mr. Wong; nor  
was there any evidence to suggest that Ms. Leclerc listened to a recording of that alleged  
telephone conversation, if one existed. (On this latter point I was led to believe on the evidence  
that such recordings were frequently preserved).  
[67] When Ms. Leclerc forwarded the customer’s e-mail to the Grievor on October 4 asking  
for comment, the Grievor responded within 15 minutes by return e-mail that she vaguely  
remembered the calland was sure that she tried to help Mr. Wong but that, “there might have  
been an English barrier because I kept repeating myself. As well I believe he couldn’t give me  
the aircard details or pin on the acct so therefore told him I was limited on what I could discuss.  
He was not satisfied.  
Page 27 of 196  
[68] Ms. Leclerc testified that in reviewing her records she then discovered (apparently for the  
first time) that there was another e-mail complaint about the Grievor more than three months  
earlier on June 25, 2012 (received while Ms. Leclerc was on leave) that was written by a TELUS  
employee concerning the alleged conduct of the Grievor in transferring a customer call that this  
TELUS employee did not consider appropriate. The e-mail charged that, “This is not the first  
time Tracy tries to push calls our way for stuff we have nothing to do with, but she also literally  
lied about it!” There was no indication that the Grievor was given any opportunity to answer  
these allegations, or, again, that Ms. Leclerc ever listened to a recording of the call to satisfy  
herself of the legitimacy of the complaint, if one existed.  
[69] Ms. Leclerc consequently convened a “Meeting of Concern” on October 5, 2012 with the  
Grievor that Ms. Leclerc documented in the following e-mail addressed to the Grievor a week  
later on October 12, 2012:  
This email is to outline our discussion that took place on Friday Oct 5. I have received complaints  
from clients advising you were argumentative and negative during their interactions with you. I  
understand there are always two sides to every story; however, you now understand the  
importance of tone and position word choices and how they can impact your call flow. This email is  
to outline my expectations of you going forward and should these behaviours arise again, I will  
have no alternative but to move to disciplinary action.  
Be aware of your tone – that’s all the client has to go with when dealing with clients over the phone.  
Project a happy helpful tone of voice.  
Use positive word choices. Just because you can’t give the client what they are asking for doesn’t  
mean we can’t position it in a positive way so they understand why we’re saying no.  
Any further complaints with regards to your interactions with clients, may result in disciplinary  
action being taken. Please be aware of tone and word choices and let’s ensure you IVR survey  
results and internet quality scores reflect this.  
[70] There are three issues that I noted from this evidence that was relevant to my  
consideration of Grievance No. 1 challenging the Grievor’s five-day suspension without pay.  
[71] First, in the face of the Grievor’s denials of any wrongdoing, all of the assertions of fact  
underlying this Meeting of Concern (as with the previous one handled by Ms. Reynolds) where  
not accepted as proof of the allegations; but rather were allowed to establish the background  
context of the discussions between the Grievor and Ms. Leclerc at that time. To the extent the  
Page 28 of 196  
Company later relied upon these alleged “customer complaints” as one of the grounds for issuing  
discipline to the Grievor, no direct evidence of such malfeasance was presented to me.  
[72] Second, the Meeting of Concern was non-disciplinary, and in preparing for the Meeting  
of Concern Ms. Leclerc reviewed her files to be in a position to discuss all reported instances of  
inappropriate conduct with the Grievor, with the express warning that, “Any further complaints  
with regards to (the Grievor’s) interaction with clients, may result in disciplinary action being  
taken”, indicating to the Grievor that she was in jeopardy for future alleged misconduct of this  
nature, but not at risk for being disciplined for the past alleged misconduct that was the subject of  
the Meeting of Concern.  
[73] To the extent the Company later, in its five-day suspension without pay to the Grievor  
dated November 12, 2012, appears to base the discipline in part on the past alleged “rudeness  
and unprofessional conduct”, any reliance on those past alleged events had already been spent as  
part of the Company’s published policy on the administration of culpable and non-culpable  
performance “gaps”, which I concluded the Company was not entitled to resurrect as separate  
incidents justifying discipline.  
[74] Lastly, as bad as Ms. Leclerc painted the Grievor’s tone and conduct with its highly  
valued platinum customers, there remained no suggestion at least until the Grievor’s five-day  
disciplinary suspension that it had lost confidence in the Grievor’s continuing ability to work in  
the privileged position as one of a handful of At Home Agents, which in my opinion undercuts  
the seriousness with which the Company professed to take the Grievor’s alleged “rude and  
unprofessional conduct” at the time, if not the veracity of those claims.  
(d)  
Allegations of Continuing Rude and Unprofessional Conduct  
[75] The only evidence I received on the issue of alleged rude and unprofessional conduct”  
by the Grievor after the October 5, 2012 Meeting of Concern, which is the period for which the  
Grievor was on notice of potential disciplinary consequences of such conduct, arises out of  
another e-mail communication dated October 30 ,2012 under the heading, “Employee Mentoring  
System” from a TELUS employee to Ms. Leclerc concerning the Grievor on what was identified  
under the “subject” line as, “Rude behavior with a client”. The reporting TELUS employee  
Page 29 of 196  
indicated he had “recently encountered a very angry and frustrated client” who was apparently  
raising a difficulty with retrieving data from her wireless device with a concern that all of the  
data on her device would be lost (which is a prospect that would be understandably upsetting). In  
the course of addressing the problem with the client, the reporting TELUS employee commented  
that the client said she asked to be transferred back to “Corp Billing as she wanted to officially  
complain about the last billing agent who was rude to her”, who was identified through the  
Company’s monitoring records as the Grievor. The TELUS writer of this e-mail then recounts  
what he claims the client told him of being, “almost in tears and very frustrated as she could not  
get a straight answer from (the) billing agent(emphasis added).  
[76] Ms. Leclerc did not confront the Grievor with these allegations at the time, but rather  
waited more than one week until the investigative meeting(as contemplated under the  
collective agreement) convened with the Grievor and her Union representative on November 8,  
2012 that will be described below, where in the course of telling the Grievor that Ms. Leclerc  
had, “listened to many calls where the conversations went sour because of word choices”, she  
stated: “And I’ve received many complaints where – one on October 30th where the client was  
in tears” (emphasis added). The Grievor denied that this was caused by her, stating further: I’d  
like to see that one because I have no idea what that’s about”. In the course of her discussion at  
the investigative meeting with the Grievor and her Union representative, Ms. Leclerc admitted  
that she “didn’t listen to the transaction” (which I infer from their reported discussion on the  
matter, was likely available for her review).  
[77] This was one of the incidents of “rude and unprofessional conduct” later relied upon by  
the Company in issuing the five-day suspension without pay in its November 12, 2012 letter of  
discipline and the only one that was after the meeting of October 5 that the Company identified  
as the “Second Meeting of Concern”. Aside from mischaracterizing the contents of the  
Employee Monitoring Service” e-mail by telling the Grievor that as a result of her actions the  
client “was in tears” when the term “almost in tears” was reported (and which is subject to a  
number of interpretations), I was asked to accept what amounted to double hearsay on a matter  
of some importance respecting the Grievor’s professionality, which in the face of the Grievor’s  
denials I could give little, if any, weight. That was particularly the case where the evidence also  
Page 30 of 196  
indicated the potential availability of a recording of this encounter that the Company neither  
provided nor explained why it couldn’t.  
[78] But even more importantly, it was clear that Ms. Leclerc who hadn’t listened to the  
impugned interaction herself, was nevertheless quick to condemn the Grievor on the strength of  
what others had alleged and without taking into account the contextual circumstances and maybe  
the reasonableness of the client’s conduct at that time. Indeed, throughout Ms. Leclerc’s  
consideration of allegations of rude and unprofessional conduct by the Grievor, it is clear on the  
evidence that although critical of the Grievor’s “tone” and her “word choices”, she never  
testified that the actually heard (either at the time of the alleged misconduct or afterwards via  
recordings) the Grievor speaking rudely or unprofessionally to any customer, that she dealt with  
by issuing any discipline in accordance with the Company’s progressive disciplinary policy at  
the time to address a “gap” in the Grievor’s performance for “culpable” misconduct.  
[79] What both parties point to as the next event in the narrative occurs on October 31, 2012.  
Ms. Leclerc confirmed in cross-examination that the Company introduced a new method of  
“scoring” the performance of Customer Service Agents in October 2012 that Ms. Leclerc utilized  
in compiling what amounted to a performance appraisal on the Grievor that she forwarded to the  
Grievor on October 31. The form (referred to as a “QCE Evaluation”) indicates that based on  
Ms. Leclerc’s recent listening to the Grievor’s interaction with an unidentified client caller, her  
performance was considered insufficient because of her “very low, quiet, non-engaging voice”  
that further criticized her “tone” as “completely low and unengaged; as well as not showing  
appropriate “empathy” with the client’s situation, that when consolidated with other measures of  
performance resulted in an overall score of only 60%. (Given my earlier observation, the fact  
that Ms. Leclerc didn’t take this opportunity to refer to any past “rude and unprofessional  
conduct” at the same time, undermines the veracity of those claims, at least to October 31).  
[80] Ms. Leclerc conceded that this document was not intended to be disciplinary in nature,  
but rather identified areas for future coaching and that it set out expectations on the matters  
criticized for follow-up purposes. That it achieved some of this goal seems apparent from the  
Grievor’s response to the QCE Evaluation, where she constructively asks Ms. Leclerc about  
certain technical elements that Ms. Leclerc replies to with further direction on the matter of her  
Page 31 of 196  
inquiry. However it did raise the question by Union counsel as to whether Ms. Leclerc found it  
odd that the Grievor, who had to that point been considered sufficiently trustworthy and  
competent to work as an At Home Agent for six years would suddenly have such difficulties,  
which Ms. Leclerc (not unreasonably) could not answer, although it was a fair observation.  
(e)  
Subsequent Events Leading to the Disciplinary Suspension  
[81] The next day, November 1, 2012, the Grievor asked Ms. Leclerc to provide her with a  
“Practitioner’s Assessment Form” referred to as “PAF”. In cross-examination, Ms. Leclerc  
confirmed that she had an earlier undocumented conversation with the Grievor during October,  
where Ms. Leclerc asked the Grievor about what appeared to Ms. Leclerc to be an inordinate  
amount time away from work that the Grievor was taking during the day (which is marked on the  
electronic log as “PERSONO AUX” for “Personal Auxiliary Time”, and also referred to as  
personal AUX”). In response, the Grievor referred to medical issues requiring additional  
personal AUX, and was advised by Ms. Leclerc that employees who needed more time off “to go  
to the bathroom” should have their doctor fill out a PAF, that Ms. Leclerc acknowledged saying  
in her testimony. I took from Ms. Leclerc’s reference to ‘going to the bathroom’ as knowing  
about the general claim by the Grievor of a problem in that area, although at a very base and  
vague level of comprehension at that point. The Grievor testified she had also raised the matter  
of her need for additional bathroom breaks with Mr. Mark Plumber, who was a management peer  
of Ms. Leclerc’s (and apparently former supervisor of the Grievor), who suggested that she get a  
PAF to authorize more time off for that purpose, as well.  
[82] The Practitioner’s Assessment Form is signed by the TELUS employee (referred to as a  
“Team Member”) authorizing his or her physician to answer a series of detailed questions  
identifying the employee’s, “Medical Condition” under subheadings that include, “Diagnosis”,  
“If providing a psychological diagnosis please complete DMS IV”, and “Describe signs and  
symptoms of the illness/injury of the Team Member”, along with particulars of the employee’s  
“Treatment” and “Rehabilitation”.  
[83] The form is intended to elicit short-form answers to specific questions designed to assess  
the employee’s “eligibility for benefits”. In singing the form, the employee expressly authorizes  
“TELUS Health Services to contact the practitioner in writing for any additional relevant  
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information that they may require for this purpose.” It will assist the future discussion of the  
Grievor’s subsequent claim for disability benefits under the “Team TELUS Flex Benefits” plan,  
by setting out this authorization that must be signed by the Team Member, as follows.  
I authorize the Practitioner identified below to release information about me that is relevant for the  
purpose of considering my eligibility for benefits and to establish my fitness for work and/or level of  
disability. This form may be released to TELUS Health Services situated in any province of  
Canada. I also authorized TELUS Health Services to contact the practitioner in writing for any  
additional relevant information that they may require for this purpose, provided a copy of the  
information request is sent at the same time to myself. It is understood that health information  
received by TELUS Health Services department will be kept in strict confidence. These consents  
are valid for six months or until I return to full-time employment, whichever shall first occur, unless I  
revoke them in writing.  
[84] Ms. Leclerc’s reaction to the Grievor’s request for a PAF in her testimony was equivocal;  
at one point referring to it as “coincidental” to the events that were happening with the Grievor’s  
employment but at another point in cross-examination conceding that she regarded it with some  
“suspicion” at the time. If that was the case, no evidence for the basis of any suspicion was  
expressly presented by the Company.  
[85] On the same day that she requested the PAF, the Grievor also informed Ms. Leclerc on  
November 1, 2012 that the Grievor had applied for an internal job posting in another TELUS  
department for a position as a “Business Analyst II”. Ms. Leclerc regarded this, too, a  
coincidence” as related to the ongoing employment issues with the Grievor. However I took  
this as evidence consistent with the actions of an employee, before the subsequent events leading  
to the discipline issued in this case, attempting to remove herself from a situation of potential  
future conflict with her supervisor.  
[86] On November 7, 2012, in preparing for the upcoming November 8, 2012 investigative  
meeting described below, Ms. Leclerc testified that she noticed from the review of screen shots  
of the Grievor’s computer through the e-QUALITY program, that the Grievor had accessed her  
personal TELUS mobility account on one occasion. This, according to Ms. Leclerc, was strictly  
forbiddenand in violation of the Company’s Ethics Policy that employees know about through  
taking an on-line “Integrity Course”, which the Company’s records indicated the Grievor  
completed on September 27, 2012. Since Corporate Support Agents had the ability to provide  
account holders with generous discounts, give free features and change rate plans, Mr. Leclerc  
testified that “from the temptation alone it is frowned upon by the Company” and she asserted in  
Page 33 of 196  
evidence it was the Company’s policy that, “under no circumstances can you access your own or  
family’s accounts”. In this case it is not suggested that other than accessing her account the  
Grievor in fact did anything to change the account.  
[87] When the Grievor was later confronted about this in the November 8, 2012 investigative  
meeting described below, and asked specifically what her understanding “of accessing  
Friends/Families or your own account was”, the Grievor responded that she “didn’t really know  
much about it”. While acknowledging that she did look at her own account on that occasion, she  
said she “didn’t change anything” on her account, and denied knowing about what Ms. Leclerc  
told her was the Company’s policy that such access was “a breach of security or ethics”. I  
concluded that this answer was entirely reasonable in the circumstances; although it is clear that  
Ms. Leclerc considered it “evasive”.  
[88] The Company’s “Ethics Policy” in effect as of February 2012 is a 33-page booklet that  
was entered into evidence, as was the on-line “Integrity in all Things” course that the Grievor  
completed on September 27, 2012, which is a 179-page document that employees access on-line  
(referred to as e-learning). When asked in cross-examination to point out the specific policy  
prohibiting an employee from looking at his or her own account, Ms. Leclerc couldn’t do so;  
although she indicated that there was a “case study” in the documents that clearly prohibited  
such conduct and that handling accounts for family or friends was also forbidden by the  
Company’s ethics. I was not shown the case study she referred to, nor was I given a copy of the  
specific policy (or page number in either of these documents) that expressly proscribed all  
contact for any purpose by an individual Customer Service Agent with his or her own account.  
[89] While there was reference in the Company’s Ethics Policy to prohibitions on employees  
self-dealing on matters for themselves or their friends and relatives under the heading, “Conflict  
of Interest” (on pages 27 – 32), which I carefully reviewed, it consists of six-pages of text  
(towards the end of a 33 paged document) on the general topic of conflict of interest that does  
not, in my assessment, express a clear rule to satisfy the test in Re KVP Co. and Lumber and  
Sawmill Workers’ Union, Loc. 2537 (1965), 16 L.A.C. 73 (Robinson), that affirms an employer’s  
right to unilaterally impose rules of conduct, provided they are: (1) not inconsistent with any  
collective agreement, (2) not unreasonable, (3) clear and unequivocal, (4) brought to the attention  
Page 34 of 196  
of the employee affected before acted on, (5) that warn the employee of the possible  
consequences of discharge from a breach of the rules, and (6) are consistently enforced. As I  
shall discuss later in these Reasons, in the absence of such clarity I could not find on the  
evidence before me that the Grievor knew or reasonably should have known about a Company  
rule ‘strictly forbidding’ such conduct at the time. And in any event, there was no allegation that  
the Grievor ever engaged in any form of “self-dealing” by merely viewing her own TELUS  
mobility account. This is not to suggest that the Company would not have legitimate concerns  
about a Customer Service Agent viewing his or her own account for the very reasons that Ms.  
Leclerc identified. But if the Company is going to discipline an employee for such conduct it has  
the onus to show a clear rule prohibiting such conduct that is consistently followed, which was  
not demonstrated on the evidence presented to me.  
[90] On November 2, 2012 the Grievor sent an e-mail to Ms. Leclerc alerting her to a problem  
related to her At Home system, in which the Grievor wrote that: “in COSMO I am getting two  
calls in at a time. So when I go into state after call work another call is waiting in my COSMO.  
Most of the time this ends up as a drop call.” As she explained in her testimony, the Grievor  
claimed she was experiencing a number of technical problems with her At Home office VPN  
connections and the laptop computer provided by the Company, and in this e-mail she alerted her  
manager to a problem that she believed was causing a high incidence of “dropped calls”.  
[91] Dropped calls occur when a telephone call waiting in the electronic queue isn’t there  
when the CSA answers (creating a situation of “dead air”), which Ms. Leclerc testified might  
happen on average once or twice per shift for a variety of reasons. In most instances of dropped  
calls the Corporate Support Agent doesn’t know if the customer is on the line, and so is  
instructed to wait several seconds while inviting an answer with a set script that is to be read  
before releasing the call (which is recorded on the electronic log as a gap in time).  
[92] In the responding e-mail from Ms. Leclerc, the Grievor was asked to “log out” and  
“reboot”, which the Grievor did and later reported that, “so far it looks okay! But just wanted to  
make sure you are aware of this!” This was the first record of a number of problems the Grievor  
would later claim she experienced with the systems in her At Home office. The Grievor testified  
that she brought a number of such concerns to Ms. Leclerc’s attention during this timeframe, and  
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may have sought assistance from the Company’s technical resources (described below) but  
received no response to her concerns.  
[93] Ms. Leclerc testified that the technical difficulties raised by the Grievor were not  
common, but she acknowledged they did happen from time to time and that there were ways to  
remedy these problems, such as shutting down and rebooting the system. However, Ms. Leclerc  
also testified that if rebooting didn’t work there was an internal TELUS service known as  
“Single Point of Contact” which was referred to as “SPOC” that was available to effect repairs or  
provide technical assistance where the system was operationally slow or when there was a  
problem with the “Virtual Private Network” or “VPN” line connection. Ms. Leclerc confirmed  
that when the VPN went down the At Home Agent was unable to receive any calls or e-mails  
which typically required help from SPOC to reinstate. SPOC was also available to remedy  
malfunctions with one of the many computer software applications as well as being the source  
for replacements, repairs and upgrades in hardware and other equipment required by the AHA to  
perform his or her work, including the Grievor’s laptop computer she used as an At Home Agent.  
[94] To highlight a developing issue that will become apparent in the description of events  
during Period 2 of the narrative in this case, aside from hearing much evidence from the Grievor  
about the problems she claimed to be having with her At Home office systems, Ms. Leclerc  
wasn’t asked whether in dealing with SPOC the CSA had to go through his or her manager, or  
was permitted to approach SPOC directly for the technical assistance considered necessary.  
Certainly there was no clear Company rule or policy on the matter ever identified. And as the  
evidence before me later demonstrated, the SPOC personnel did not seem to hesitate in dealing  
directly with an At Home Agent in the absence of express written or verbal authorization from a  
supervisor when approached by the AHA for technical assistance. Rather as Mr. Olsen later  
confirmed in his testimony, the SPOC technicians accept telephone calls from Customer Service  
Agents and issue a “ticket” that is logged as a point of reference for all work done by the SPOC  
technician in response to the request, and the usual practice is for the CSA to contact SPOC  
directly. Thus the Grievor testified she didn’t think there was anything wrong with personally  
dealing with SPOC on any issues related to the operational functionality of her At Home  
systems, and the supporting circumstances substantiated that view. Certainly there is no  
evidence before me indicating that Ms. Leclerc made it clear to the Grievor that she was either  
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not to contact SPOC on her own, or only to do so with the express advance permission of her  
supervisor. Moreover, to the extent that Mr. Olsen was later critical about the Grievor’s conduct  
in addressing her concerns with SPOC directly instead of first bringing those concerns to him,  
there was no evidence before me to show that Mr. Olsen (or any other supervisor) had expressly  
directed the Grievor to do so before the events for which she was later criticized and disciplined.  
(f)  
Allegations of “Call Avoidance”  
[95] While the foregoing events were occurring, a separate investigation was ongoing to  
determine whether the Grievor was engaging in the improper practice of “call avoidance”, which  
in the Grievor’s five-day disciplinary suspension letter dated November 12, 2012 is referred to as  
“misappropriated company time”. The investigation began with an incident on October 25, 2012  
involving Mr. Ronnie Olsen, who was a Manager of Business Client Care and a peer of Ms.  
Leclerc, supervising a similar unit of about 20 employees at the Scarborough call centre.  
[96] Mr. Olsen doesn’t know the Grievor at this point in time except to possibly notice her  
name on e-mail chains going out to the CSAs generally or when Ms. Leclerc directed her staff of  
some 20 individuals on October 23, 2012 to contact Mr. Vince Marasco (another peer manager)  
or Mr. Olsen if they required assistance while Ms. Leclerc was absent from work for personal  
reasons. The Grievor likewise didn’t know Mr. Olsen except maybe to see him around the call  
centre and his name on e-mails (or to receive a request from him as a supervisor for her home  
address in order to arrange for upcoming annual home visits of an At Home Agent which was  
apparently standard Company procedure). The records indicate that Ms. Leclerc was directing  
her staff to contact different supervisors (sometimes listing Mr. Olsen as one of several managers  
but not to any exclusive degree) on other matters that included the need to schedule overtime to  
handle an anticipated heavy workload after October 23, in Ms. Leclerc’s absence.  
[97] Beginning at least by the first week of November (if not earlier) I found on the evidence  
that Ms. Leclerc’s attendance had become understandably spotty due to the illness of her father,  
and there appeared to be some confusion as to who was responsible for the Grievor’s day-to-day  
activities at different times. As described further, Mr. Olsen testified that he became responsible  
for Ms. Leclerc’s employees on November 6, 2012, yet the only record of an announcement to  
that effect was an e-mail from Mr. Olsen himself dated November 13, 2012, in which he wrote to  
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Ms. Leclerc’s team: “As most of you know, Deb will be out of the office for the next week or  
two. While Deb is away please reach out to myself for any support you may need. Please free to  
message, email or call me.” (I came to the conclusion that Mr. Olsen was in error when he  
testified he began supervising Ms. Leclerc’s employees on November 6 because on all of the  
evidence presented to me Ms. Leclerc in fact conducted the subsequent disciplinary meeting with  
the Grievor on November 8 and thus was in the workplace at that time). Ms. Reynolds testified  
that she was acting manager in place of Ms. Leclerc from November 26, 2012. In addition, it is  
apparent from the record of e-mails sent by Ms. Leclerc to her staff that she was alerting them to  
her unavailability at different junctures in this timeframe with directions to seek the “support” of  
a number of different supervisors that did not identify a clear singular replacement for her, until  
Ms. Reynolds was identified as the “acting manager” for the Grievor’s “team”.  
[98] It wasn’t apparent to me that when Mr. Olsen stated in his November 13 e-mail, “While  
Deb is away please reach out to myself for any support you may need” (emphasis added), that  
this was intended as a clear managerial instruction that Ms. Olsen was now the only supervisory  
authority for all of Ms. Leclerc’s employees, including the Grievor. Rather, I concluded on a  
plain reading of those words that this was a general offer of assistance, to be used or not as the  
team member considered necessary, as opposed to what Mr. Olsen later asserted to be a directive  
that all matters pertaining to anything in the Grievor’s employment was to be referred to him, to  
the exclusion of all others.  
[99] Mr. Olsen, who made the decision to discharge the Grievor by November 28, 2012 for  
alleged misconduct after just over two weeks of dealing with her directly, and later wrote the  
discharge letter dated January 11, 2013 leading to Grievance No. 2, joined the Company in 2001  
selling telephones in one of the Company’s corporate stores, eventually becoming a front-line  
supervisor in 2005 and after “Leadership Training”, as a Manager of Business Client Care at the  
Scarborough call centre in February of 2012. He testified he knew Ms. Leclerc was experiencing  
personal issues prior to November 12, 2012 and that he was going to be “supporting her team”  
while she was away from the office. In that regard, Mr. Olsen was monitoring the queue of  
incoming calls to the centre at 8:30 a.m. on October 25 (apparently from a computerized station  
inside the call centre) when he noticed that three Corporate Support Agents were shown on the  
system as available but hadn’t received any calls for up to 30 or 35 minutes, which included the  
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Grievor, and he was concerned there might be a technical problem in properly routing incoming  
telephone calls to them.  
[100] Thus in an effort to test the system, Mr. Olsen called into the queue from an outside  
telephone number as if he was a customer. Since the Grievor was shown by the system as  
having waited the longest of the three CSAs at 35 minutes (and she was the only At Home Agent  
in that group), Mr. Olsen anticipated his call would be routed to the Grievor if the system was  
working properly. He noted through his monitoring of the system that he was connected to the  
Grievor’s VPN telephone line, and he could hear the telephone ringing from his end indicating  
that the call had gone through, but then after the telephone rang for 29 seconds the call was  
disconnected. This was far in excess of the goal of five seconds that Customer Service Agents  
were expected to answer each call, and there seemed to be no reason for the call to have been  
disconnected outside of the Grievor deliberately releasing the call.  
[101] Mr. Olsen anticipated the Grievor should have heard his call “beep” in the Grievor’s  
earphone along with an audible ringing sound and flashing light from the Plantronics box. At the  
same time the Grievor should have received through the COSMO application on her computer  
screen details of the telephone number and account that went with it, which Mr. Olsen could see  
from his call centre vantage-point, was populating the Grievor’s computer screen. When his  
telephone call was disconnected he could see by monitoring the system that the Grievor was  
reported doing “after-call work” (during which time she was not available for any new incoming  
call), following which she indicated by pressing a key on her computer (or some other device)  
that she was available for another call. When Mr. Olsen then tried to contact the Grievor through  
the independent office communicator referred to as “MOC” at 8:40 a.m. inquiring whether the  
Grievor was “available for a moment”, he received no reply to that and to his follow-up message  
at 8:47 a.m. asking: “Are you there?”  
[102]  
Mr. Olsen reported these observations in an e-mail to Ms. Leclerc, and the decision  
was made (apparently by both Ms. Leclerc and Mr. Olsen, although the evidence is vague on that  
point) to conduct what was referred to as an “AVAYA trace report”. The AVAYA trace report  
is a computer-generated record of the Grievor’s second-by-second activities from the beginning  
of each workday (usually between 8:00 a.m. and 9 a.m.) until the end of her scheduled shift  
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(often 4:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m.). Ms. Leclerc and Mr. Olsen decided to commence their trace of  
the Grievor’s activities going back to Friday, October 19 that continued until mid-day of  
Wednesday, November 7, for a total of 13 ½ shifts (during which time the Grievor worked 12 ½  
shifts from her home and one day from the call centre on November 6, 2012).  
[103] The concern raised by Mr. Olsen’s observations was that the Grievor might be engaging  
in the practice known as “call avoidance” (although, again, it was unclear in the evidence  
whether Ms. Leclerc, who had been supposedly monitoring the Grievor and having bi-monthly  
meeting with her, shared that concern). Call avoidance is typically revealed by the CSA hanging  
up on customers after only a few rings (resulting in the CSA going to the bottom of the queue for  
the next call which could take some time depending on call volume, which is also referred to as  
“queue surfing”), or taking too long to answer causing an unusual number of “dropped calls”  
when the client hangs up, or taking an inordinate amount of personal time off during the shift  
which under the Company’s standards should be no more than six minutes per day. Every time  
a call is dropped by the customer or released by the Grievor, the Grievor would be placed at the  
bottom of the queue and thus there might be some time again before another call is routed back  
to her. Such conduct has two immediate consequences: First, the customer is likely annoyed  
and dissatisfied with the level of service that is understandably concerning to the Company in a  
competitive environment. Second, it usually results in the customer calling back who is then  
placed into the queue to be serviced by a different CSA, thereby stretching the Company’s  
resources that may impact the Company’s capacity to deal with the customer demand.  
[104] It was in this timeframe that Ms. Leclerc had the discussion with the Grievor regarding  
her excessive personal AUX time off during her shift that prompted their conversation about the  
Grievor’s purported medical issues and the Grievor’s later request for a PAF to apparently  
substantiate her ‘need to go to the bathroom’.  
[105] I was taken through each day of the AVAYA trace report, along with being provided  
explanations of the various ways that the Grievor’s activities were coded by the system in some  
technical detail, which showed every second that she was on the system and available for a call;  
how long it took her to answer a call; the number of dropped calls; the number of “hang ups” by  
the Grievor; the amount of time she spent doing after-call work; and how much she spent on  
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personal AUX time off (that was in addition to the unpaid meal break and two 15-minute paid  
breaks during each shift). Ms. Leclerc and Mr. Olsen reviewed the data from the AVAYA trace  
report which was summarized in a “statistical analysis” that was also entered into evidence.  
[106] It is not necessary to go through all of the data presented to me. My general assessment  
of that data, without including the November 6 date when the Grievor worked from the  
Scarborough call centre, indicates that the Grievor rarely achieved the goal of answering  
incoming calls within five seconds of the ring (being just over 10% of the time); with about 22%  
of the calls answered between five and nine seconds; 40% answered between 10 and 19 seconds;  
almost 20% between 20 and 29 seconds and just over 9% not answered until the ringing  
extended more than 30 seconds. Ms. Leclerc testified the data revealed 156 instances of the  
Grievor not responding to telephone calls for 15 seconds or more over 12 ½ shifts. The data also  
showed that the longest ring times occurred on October 23 (which is recorded as 1 minute),  
October 30 (2 minutes 39 seconds), October 30 (1 minute 35 seconds) and November 1 (at 1  
minute 6 seconds). This was while the system indicated the Grievor was at her desk and marked  
as available to take a call. There were also seven “customer hang ups” during this interval and  
the Grievor hung up on 25 occasions before answering a call, usually within 30 seconds of a ring  
representing a significant departure from the expected norm of only “two or three per shift” that  
was the experience of Ms. Leclerc in such matters. The Grievor’s personal AUX time off  
outside of permitted meal and rest periods was also excessive when compared to the expected  
target of six minutes. Over the 12 ½ shifts that she worked as an At Home Agent the data  
indicates the Grievor took an average of 14 ½ minutes per day for personal time ranging from a  
low of 3.27 minutes on the full shift of October 25 to a high of 21.5 minutes on October 26.  
[107] I concluded from this data and the explanations provided by Ms. Leclerc and Mr. Olsen  
that ring times were much higher than what would normally be expected, as were the incidents of  
“hang ups” and “dropped calls” by the both the AHA and the customer. The data also supported  
the conclusion that the Grievor’s personal AUX time was significantly above the six minute  
expectation that AHAs would generally take in the course of a normal shift.  
[108] When confronted with the results of the AVAYA trace report in her examination-in-  
chief, the Grievor testified that as she had previously advised Ms. Leclerc, the Grievor was  
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experiencing a number of “system issues” that included an apparent problem with her  
Plantronics device causing her to lose calls when two came into her station at the same time.  
However, she admitted that because she started work early in the morning and didn’t want to  
disturb the other occupants of her house, she turned the ringer off (which she claimed was loud)  
that she testified she knew was against Company policy, with the result that she either missed or  
didn’t respond to calls as quickly as she should. While she apologized for that in testifying, it is  
clear she did not admit her misconduct or apologize at the time. In addition, she claimed to be  
having ongoing problems with her Virtual Private Network (“VPN”) crashing and requiring her  
to frequently “reboot” to get it running again (and later developed a problem with her laptop  
computer requiring its replacement), which she told Ms. Leclerc about but which Ms. Leclerc  
denied in her testimony.  
[109] Moreover, because of her increasing need to use the bathroom over this period, and  
anticipating that there would be enough time between calls to attend to those needs, the Grievor  
testified that, “I just thought it would be ok to go to the washroom” without specifically  
indicating her unavailability on the system for personal time off, which the Grievor also knew  
was against the Company’s policy. She conceded in her evidence-in-chief that: “I should have  
put myself into personal AUX and I know that was wrong.” In cross-examination the Grievor  
estimated each washroom break took “two to three minutes”, which viewed with the medical  
documentation later provided to the Company supports the finding that she was leaving her post  
for that duration at least “two to three times per hour”.  
[110] The Grievor denied that she was purposely trying to miss calls, stating: “That was not  
my intention at all. I got too relaxed I think working from home and I slacked a bit; and I am  
sorry”. When asked why she didn’t respond to Mr. Olsen’s MOC message at 8:40 a.m. on  
October 25, the Grievor testified she didn’t know who it was calling and didn’t use that system  
(which she referred to as “Communicator”) very often, indicating that she usually has that  
system closed because she gets messages from British Columbia for another employee also  
named Tracy Baker in error, and that the Communicator causes other operating systems to “lag  
(and) take longer for things to open”. (As an aside, the Company filed a number of e-mails that  
name the Grievor along with Mr. Olsen as one of at least 20 and sometimes double that number  
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of individuals copied on the e-mail, to support the Company’s position that the Grievor should  
have known who Mr. Olsen was at the time).  
[111] In re-examination, Mr. Wain who is the Company’s Director of Information Services,  
disputed the Grievor’s allegations of difficulties with the Plantronics box resulting in the dropped  
calls claimed by the Grievor, amid much technical backup and obvious expertise on the matter,  
causing me to doubt the reliability of the Grievor’s observations in that regard on a balance of  
probabilities standard.  
[112] Rather, as I shall elaborate upon later in these Reasons, I concluded from this evidence as  
corroborated, in my view, by the effect of her intense cross-examination, that the Grievor was  
taking chances with her timekeeping in response to a developing medical problem requiring  
frequent bathroom breaks, which she failed to report to her supervisor with sufficient clarity of  
detail to reasonably put the Company on notice of the possible need to accommodate an  
employee with a disability.  
[113] While she may not have intended to avoid calls, the effect of her timekeeping conduct  
that she knew to be against Company policy, coupled with her decision to disable the ringer on  
her Plantronics device so not to disturb others in the morning that she also knew to be against  
Company procedures, caused the Grievor to miss calls and inconvenience customers that  
justified a disciplinary response.  
[114] As I elaborate upon below, even employees who have a disability are required, in my  
opinion, to alert the employer about the disability in a clear and timely manner so to allow the  
employer to assess and if appropriate, accommodate the situation short of undue hardship. The  
fact that an employee has a developing disability affecting the employee’s work is not license for  
the employee to disregard the rules on his or her own initiative (or to be “slack” as the Grievor  
described about timekeeping issues), and in doing so in this case the Grievor placed herself at  
risk of receiving legitimate discipline, particularly given the lack of supervision and trust placed  
in the Grievor by the Company to perform to its reasonable standards, which the Grievor was  
aware of at the time.  
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[115] Whether the quantum of the penalty is affected by the disability (where the employee  
might be understandably embarrassed to discuss such personal matters with the employer and/or  
the problem develops gradually over time and may not be immediately apparent) is a matter to be  
considered when questions of mitigation arise as part of that determination.  
(g)  
Investigative Meeting of November 8, 2012 and Immediate Aftermath  
[116] Nevertheless, to Ms. Leclerc and Mr. Olsen the AVAYA trace data demonstrated classic  
call avoidance behavior. Thus Ms. Leclerc convened an investigative meeting with the Grievor  
and her Union representative, Mr. Brian Turner on Thursday, November 8, 2012. Mr. Morasco  
attended the meeting as a second member of management who kept notes that were entered into  
evidence. Since Mr. Marasco’s sole purpose in attending the meeting was to act as a Company  
witness and recorder of the discussions, both Ms. Leclerc and Mr. Marasco testified that his  
notes are considered “accurate”. The Grievor was given no advance notice of the specific items  
to be discussed and thus testified she was “very shocked that this was happening and I was very  
defensive” when she was unexpectedly confronted with a number of events going back several  
months (recognizing she was handling some 32 calls per day). Ms. Leclerc had prepared for the  
meeting with a number of typed questions covering her areas of concern under the headings,  
“Professionalism”, “Call Avoidance/Short Calls”, “Ring Time” and “Ethics”.  
[117] As their discussions around “Professionalism” and “Ethics” have already been dealt with  
above, it need not be repeated in detail except to note that the Grievor testified the reason she had  
accessed her own mobile phone account was to test the system as she was having difficulties  
with one of the software applications and wanted to see how it operated when she put in her own  
telephone number (which is cross-referenced to her account). While she didn’t say that  
expressly to Ms. Leclerc, the Grievor did tell her that she didn’t know that she was doing  
anything wrong and didn’t try to change anything in her own account.  
[118] Ms. Leclerc also went through the June 13, June 25 and October 4 incidents of alleged  
rude and unprofessional conduct before confronting the Grievor with the new allegations of such  
behavior on October 30, where Mr. Marasco’s notes indicate that the only thing that Ms. Leclerc  
said to the Grievor in relation to that incident was that the customer “was in tears” because of the  
Grievor’s behavior, which the Grievor stated was, “Not from me”. (I noted that Ms. Leclerc  
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provided none of the context of that October 30 event as disclosed by the more detailed e-mails  
and records filed with me, nor does it appear that this e-mail complaint was ever shared with the  
Grievor). Based on their discussion on the issue of Professionalism and Ethics, Ms. Leclerc  
concluded that the Grievor had breached Company’s “strict” policy prohibiting looking at her  
own account and, significantly to Ms. Leclerc, the Grievor was not prepared to acknowledge and  
take responsibility for her unprofessional and rude conduct.  
[119] When it came to details of the AVAYA trace report suggesting call avoidance, the  
Grievor had no recollection of Mr. Olsen sending her a MOC message on October 25, but did  
repeat the information in the prior e-mail to Mr. Leclerc complaining about technical difficulties  
with receiving two calls at the same time, causing her to lose calls. Except for the problem the  
Grievor claimed to be having with the Plantronics box, Mr. Marasco’s notes do not show that she  
told them about the additional technical issues that she later testified about, which is consistent  
with Ms. Leclerc’s evidence on the matter. Nor do they reflect the Grievor’s further testimony  
that she claimed to have reminded Ms. Leclerc about the problems she had already reported  
concerning her “VPN going down”, that Ms. Leclerc never responded to. Near the end of the  
investigative meeting, the Grievor’s evidence is that she asked Ms. Leclerc, ‘if it was OK to call  
SPOC to go over the issues and problems she was having with her systems’ so that Ms. Leclerc  
would know that “these were the issues (the Grievor) was having.”  
[120] The evidence before me does not reveal a clear or any answer to that question, and it is  
not reflected in Mr. Marasco’s notes; however those notes were limited to recording the answers  
to the specific questions that Ms. Leclerc asked, not to anything else discussed or independently  
raised by the Grievor. Rather, in response it appears the Grievor was advised that she was not to  
work for the rest of that day and on the following, Friday, November 9.  
[121] The Grievor returned with Mr. Turner, her Union steward, for a disciplinary meeting with  
Ms. Leclerc on Monday, November 12 to receive the letter of that date, reproduced above,  
imposing a five-day suspension for having “misappropriated company time”, improperly  
“accessed [the Grievor’s] own personal account for non-work related reasons”, and for “lack of  
professionalism when dealing with clients”. On this occasion Mr. Mark Plumber witnessed the  
issuance of discipline as the second member of management but was not called to give evidence.  
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Ms. Leclerc testified that she considered terminating the Grievor’s employment at that time  
given the seriousness of the Grievor’s misconduct, but decided upon a five-day suspension  
instead because of her length of her service and clear disciplinary record.  
[122] Thus Ms. Leclerc testified that the Grievor was advised she was suspended without pay  
for five working days effective Friday, November 9, 2012, returning to work on Friday,  
November 16, 2012. Ms. Leclerc also testified she told the Grievor that “at the end of the five-  
day suspension (the Grievor) was to return to the office and work from the office until further  
notice”. But there was no written notation of the cancellation of the Grievor’s At Home Agent  
status in the letter of discipline or any other letter to the Grievor at the time. And when  
questioned about it, the Grievor claimed that she didn’t remember ever being told that she was to  
report for work only at the call centre after her suspension. In that regard it is convenient to set  
out below the last paragraph of Ms. Leclerc’s November 12, 2012 disciplinary letter to the  
Grievor, which does not expressly tell the Grievor that her AHA status has been removed or that  
she is from that point on, only to work out of the Scarborough call centre:  
The behaviors that you have been demonstrating are inexcusable and cannot be tolerated. Your  
conduct is contrary to TELUS’ expectations, and clearly acceptable (sic). In order to impress upon  
you the seriousness of this situation and convince you to take immediate steps to correct your  
behavior, you are suspended for five days as of Friday November 9, 2012. You are to report for  
work as scheduled on Friday November 16, 2012 at your scheduled start time. Please be  
advised that if the issues noted are not addressed, or if there are any other issues with  
performance or misconduct that arise, further disciplinary action will be taken up to and including  
dismissal.  
[Emphasis added]  
[123] Indeed, I concluded it was not an unreasonable interpretation of this letter that the  
Grievor’s status as an At Home Agent was unaltered by the discipline and that the Grievor was  
instructed “to report for work as scheduled…at your scheduled start time” with no restrictions  
imposed on the location of the Grievor’s future work to the call centre only. Further to that, the  
evidence before me indicated that there was a significant amount of expensive electronic  
equipment provided by the Company to the At Home Agent, to enable the AHA to work from  
home (such as a computer, headsets, Plantronics box, etc.). Yet I found that there was nothing  
mentioned in the November 8 or 12 meetings; or suggested in the November 12, 2012 letter of  
discipline, requiring the Grievor to return that equipment to TELUS or to make arrangements for  
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its return. This is more in harmony with an intention not to remove the Grievor from her  
position as an At Home Agent, or at least that failure sufficiently obscures the matter to make  
any confusion the Grievor may have about her status, understandable as likely at the time.  
[124] At least in the Grievor’s mind, and having had the opportunity to watch the Grievor over  
many days of cross-examination where her tendency to react in a confused and disoriented  
manner while under pressure was apparent, I found from her actions at the time and afterwards in  
weighing all of the evidence on a balance of probabilities standard that she did not realized or  
perhaps even hear the verbal instructions from Ms. Leclerc that she would no longer be permitted  
to work from home given the obvious stress she was under during the disciplinary meeting.  
[125] In addition to the absence of any written directive clearly telling the Grievor that she was  
being removed from the AHA program and from that point on would only be permitted to work  
out of the Company’s Scarborough call centre, as the evidence later presented to me shows,  
when the Grievor did report for work at the call centre she wasn’t provided with her own desk,  
but rather was allowed to use any available desk with telephone and computer connections,  
which was the procedure followed for At Home Agents whenever they came into the  
Scarborough call centre to perform work. Thus from the Grievor’s perspective, when she  
worked in the call centre on Friday, November 16 and Monday, November 19, as described  
below, there would have been nothing to alert her of a change in her AHA status.  
[126] To be sure, the Union does not dispute that the Grievor was to work in the call centre  
after returning from her suspension. Mr. Turner, the Union steward who accompanied the  
Grievor at the November 12, 2012 disciplinary meeting, confirmed to Mr. Olsen in the  
subsequent investigative meeting held on November 27, 2012, described below, that Ms. Leclerc  
told the Grievor that, “I need you to work the office until further notice, which was consistent  
with Ms. Leclerc’s testimony on point. However, I found it significant that Mr. Marasco’s notes  
of the November 8 investigative meeting did not show any explicit notification or even threat by  
Ms. Leclerc to the Grievor that she was no longer considered to be an At Home Agent. I also  
noted that Mr. Marasco did not record anything recording Ms. Leclerc as having given the  
Grievor a clear direction in that regard. The Company did not produce Mr. Plumber as a witness  
to the events of the November 12 disciplinary meeting who may have shed light on the clarity of  
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Ms. Leclerc’s direction to the Grievor in that regard, but I don’t have that evidence. Accepting  
that Ms. Leclerc used the words, “I need you to work the office until further notice”, I found  
those words to be sufficiently general and vague not to clearly place the Grievor on notice of the  
Company’s expectations going forward.  
[127] In order to support the discipline that was to follow (during Period 2 described below)  
the onus is on the Company to prove that the Grievor’s supervisor told her in clear and  
unequivocal terms that: (a) she was no longer in the AHA program; and (b) that henceforth she  
was to report only to the call centre, which the Grievor knew or should have reasonably known at  
the time. On the equivocal message of the disciplinary letter on that point alone, I concluded the  
Company had not met its burden. And in the circumstances under which the evidence indicates  
the Grievor was told that Ms. Leclerc ‘needed her to work in the office until further notice’, at  
the end of a meeting that was understandably emotionally stressful to the Grievor, seemingly as a  
passing remark, does not have the sufficient clarity for the Company then to base its later  
discharge of the Grievor.  
[128] Given the consequences that the evidence later disclosed of the Grievor continuing to  
work at home on one day after her disciplinary meeting, the Company must show clarity in Ms.  
Leclerc’s direction in that regard, and its failure to do so undermines the very serious disciplinary  
response that it later imposed for the Grievor’s alleged “failure to follow a management  
directive”, which is relied upon as a ground for terminating the Grievor’s employment in its  
letter dated March 11, 2013.  
[129] Thus on the evidence presented to me consistent with all of the surrounding events before  
and afterwards, I concluded that it seemed most likely on a balance of probabilities standard that  
Ms. Leclerc’s statement, “I need you to work the office until further notice” was made at the end  
of the disciplinary meeting while the Grievor was upset and in the process of leaving the meeting  
room, that resulted in the Grievor simply not hearing or registering those instructions (and  
recognizing their import), that were never confirmed in writing at the time or subsequently  
throughout the ubiquitous e-mail correspondence between them.  
[130] After the November 12, 2012 disciplinary meeting, Ms. Leclerc asked Mr. Olsen to  
arranged for the Grievor’s VPN to be disconnected which was accomplished by 5:00 p.m. that  
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evening. As a result, the Grievor’s home office was no longer connected to the call centre and  
thus she was not receiving any telephone calls from customers or e-mails from supervisors that  
would otherwise be routed to her home office. The Grievor attended a chiropractor appointment  
that afternoon or evening as well, for a low back complaint and musculoskeletal concerns, for  
which she had been receiving ongoing treatment for the past month, and thus may not have been  
back to her home office before the VPN connection was disabled. Once disconnected from the  
system the Grievor had no direct e-mail contact with her supervisor from her home until the VPN  
was reconnected in the circumstances described below.  
(h)  
The Unfortunate Timing of Ms. Leclerc’s Absenteeism  
[131] The timing of the disconnection of the Grievor at the end of the day of Monday,  
November 12 is important in assessing what happened next, and, particularly, the legitimacy of  
Mr. Olsen’s criticisms (and later discipline) of the Grievor’s conduct based on the e-mail that he  
sent to Ms. Leclerc’s staff the next day.  
[132] Ms. Leclerc sent an e-mail in the morning of November 12 to her staff, which included  
the Grievor although it is likely the Grievor didn’t receive it before her VPN was disabled,  
advising them that because of a family medical emergency Ms. Leclerc would be away from  
work. If anything was needed in her absence to the end of the week of November 13 16 she  
wrote, “please reach out to Vince (Marasco), Lisa (Bruley) or Ronnie (Olsen) and with a little bit  
of luck, I will see you all next Monday” (November 19).  
[133] This was not a clear direction by Ms. Leclerc that the Grievor’s day-to-day employment  
now came under the exclusive responsibility of Mr. Olsen that was later asserted by the  
Company to support subsequent discipline to the Grievor related to the “second dismissal”, even  
if the Grievor had been capable of receiving this e-mail communication from Ms. Leclerc.  
VI.  
Period 2: November 13 November 27, 2012  
(a)  
Who’s In Charge?  
[134] Thus it was in the foregoing context that Mr. Olsen wrote his memorandum in the  
afternoon of Tuesday, November 13 to Ms. Leclerc’s complement of about 20 Corporate Support  
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Agents stating that in Ms. Leclerc’s absence, “please reach out to myself for any support you  
may need.” Of course, by this point the Grievor would not have received this e-mail because her  
VPN had been disabled and she wasn’t anywhere in the workplace. Later evidence would reveal  
that the earliest that the Grievor would have likely seen the e-mail from Mr. Olsen was on  
Thursday, November 15, when the Grievor printed off her e-mails at the call centre, with the  
Company’s knowledge, while the Grievor was on suspension status.  
[135] On Monday, November 19 (which was after the Grievor’s suspension), Ms. Leclerc  
advised her staff by e-mail that she had returned to work and instructed them to, “revert back to  
my support over Ronnie’s until further notice”, but was off work again on November 20 and 21,  
2012. Although the e-meal records indicate that Ms. Leclerc was working at the call centre on  
November 22 and 23, 2012 and had e-mail communications with the Grievor on both of those  
days, Ms. Leclerc left the workplace permanently by November 26, 2012 and testified that she  
didn’t return until June 4, 2013 which was after the Grievor’s termination. She had no further  
dealings with the Grievor, nor is there any indication that she communicated the results of what I  
found to be a very important meeting that she held with the Grievor in the late afternoon of  
Friday, November 23, which was Ms. Leclerc’s last working day.  
[136] She was temporarily replaced by Ms. Reynolds who wrote to Ms. Leclerc’s employees on  
Monday, November 26, 2012 the following e-mail message at 1:00 p.m. under the heading,  
“Where is Debbie?”  
Hello Team,  
Debbie will be on leave again effective immediately. As you know, her father is not well and she  
needs some time to be with him.  
My cell # is [omitted]. Please save it in your phone, just in case. If you are SICK or running late,  
please call me.  
If you need anything, please let me know.  
[137] In looking carefully at this e-mail, I noted that a copy is not shown going in the address  
header to Mr. Olsen as well (or indeed to any other manager), which is unfortunate given what  
Mr. Olsen later told me in testifying of the negative impressions he formed about the Grievor’s  
trustworthiness and credibility, described below. The Grievor sent the following e-mail to Ms.  
Reynolds immediately afterwards at 1:01 p.m. supporting the conclusion that the Grievor  
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reasonably understood that Ms. Reynolds was now in charge and was the one to be contacted in  
the event of any future absenteeism due to illness:  
Hello Jenny,  
Does this mean you are taking over her matters? Are you the new acting team manager?  
[138] There was no evidence that Ms. Reynolds dissuaded the Grievor of that apparent  
conclusion in any reply communication to her. When Ms. Reynolds was asked in cross-  
examination if she responded to the Grievor’s e-mail, Ms. Reynolds testified: “I don’t recall if I  
responded to that specific e-mail”. And notwithstanding suggesting earlier in her examination-in-  
chief that she understood Mr. Olsen was the Grievor’s supervisor at that time, when asked to  
clarify she testified: “I don’t remember”. Furthermore, when asked whether there is any  
practice of advising employees generally when a team member is moved from one supervisor’s  
team to another’s (thereby changing the team composition), Ms. Reynolds testified: “Yes I guess  
I could have, looking back; I didn’t do anything perfectly”. And in response to the specific  
question in cross-examination of whether Ms. Reynolds sent the Grievor an e-mail instructing  
her to report to Mr. Olsen, Ms. Reynolds testified: “I don’t remember”.  
[139] As later events would soon show, this was a very important juncture in the circumstances  
leading to the Grievor’s eventual termination for alleged just cause, where the identification of  
the Grievor’s direct supervisor during Ms. Leclerc’s spotty attendance and after she left the  
workplace permanently, was a central component of the Company’s rationale for dismissing the  
Grievor. On the above-noted testimony I not only found, in weighing all of the evidence, that  
there was no notification made by Ms. Reynolds that notwithstanding the obvious reading of  
their exchange of e-mails on November 26 that the Grievor would somehow know she was now  
supposed to report to Mr. Olsen, but I also came to the conclusion that Ms. Reynolds’  
equivocation on the matter was incredible. And this is not the only time I found unreliable if not  
overtly incredible testimony by other Company witnesses, as described below.  
(b)  
A General Perspective on Events During Period 2  
[140] The events during what is identified herein as Period 2during the two weeks from  
Tuesday, November 13 to Tuesday, November 27, 2012 are well documented; the real question  
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is why the Grievor did what she did and whether her actions (and her intentions underlying those  
actions) constituted proper grounds for any level of sanction, had the Company decided to  
discipline the Grievor in a timely manner, which it did not do. If her conduct did warrant a  
disciplinary response that the Company could impose two months after her termination for other  
reasons, was discharge appropriate?  
[141] The evidence is also conclusive that by the end of that brief two week period, Mr. Olsen  
had determined that the Grievor’s actions, as stated in the March 11, 2013 termination letter  
reproduced above, constituted a serious breach of trust” and “willful violation of TELUS  
policy” justifying the termination of the Grievor’s employment for alleged “inappropriate access  
and misuse of TELUS resources, breach of the corporate security policy, and failure to follow a  
management directive”.  
[142] Throughout this lengthy case I was never provided with a copy of the specific TELUS  
policy that the Grievor was alleged to have ‘willfully violated’ or a clear “corporate security  
policy” referred to in Ms. Olsen’s letter, justifying her summary dismissal. Mr. Olsen’s further  
reference to the Grievor having ‘failed to follow a management directive’ apparently referred to  
the Grievor’s alleged working from home when she was on suspension, and for working from  
home on November 20, 2012 as described below, which as noted above was undermined by a  
lack of clarity by Ms. Leclerc concerning the Grievor’s status after their November 12, 2012  
meeting, coupled with the overall uncertain communications from Ms. Leclerc to her staff and  
with Mr. Olsen, particularly surrounding the discussions with the Grievor in their November 23  
meeting described below (which was understandable given the personal distractions Ms. Leclerc  
was obviously experiencing at that time).  
[143] Nevertheless, but for the events beginning on November 28, 2012, it certainly is clear  
that Ms. Olsen believed the Company had all of the information respecting the Grievor’s alleged  
misconduct necessary to sustain the Grievor’s dismissal for just cause at that time, and it is not  
disputed that Mr. Olsen would have dismissed the Grievor on that day.  
(c)  
The Grievor and SPOC General Observations  
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[144] On the evidence of the Grievor’s and Ms. Leclerc’s discussions during their November 8  
and 12 meetings, consistent with the Grievor’s actions afterwards and her explanations of those  
actions in testifying before me, I have concluded that nothing was said to the Grievor as she left  
the November 12, 2012 disciplinary meeting that she could not approach SPOC directly for what  
appears to have been for two purposes: first, to address what she perceived to be difficulties with  
her At Home operating systems in order to get ready to return to work as an At Home Agent; and  
second, to properly document those difficulties in an effort to seek personal vindication or to  
further defend her conduct before Ms. Leclerc that led to her five-day suspension.  
[145] The documentation filed with me indicates the Grievor had directly approached SPOC in  
the past and that the practice of different managers on whether employees could contact SPOC  
concerning technical problems without their manager’s involvement or preapproval varied  
throughout the Company. Contrary to what Mr. Olsen’s later assertions on the matter, there was  
no evidence presented to me of a clear, unequivocal Company rule or policy applicable to all  
managers and reasonably communicated to the Grievor that employees in the Grievor’s position  
were prohibited from contacting SPOC on their own for assistance. Rather, the weight of  
evidence is to the contrary.  
[146] Also for the reasons stated above, I came to the conclusion that the Grievor hadn’t heard  
or didn’t realize on the basis of a clear instruction from Mr. Leclerc that she no longer could  
consider herself part of the AHA program and could only work from the call centre office in the  
future, at least until the situation was later clarified by Ms. Leclerc in circumstances reviewed  
below. This is based on a careful comparison of the testimonies of Ms. Leclerc, Mr. Olsen and  
the Grievor, along with my observations of the Grievor during many days of cross-examination  
on the minutia of her activities in this timeframe, leading to a determination of what seems most  
likely and consistent with all of the surrounding circumstances, and having regard to a  
consideration of the Grievor’s essential character as revealed by her lengthy cross-examination.  
[147] While one must be cautious in relying upon the demeanor of witnesses in assessing the  
evidence, my observations on the Grievor over so many hearing days revealed her character as a  
person who has the tendency to become disoriented and confused when placed under pressure  
that was on full display during her cross-examination. Moreover, given Ms. Leclerc’s absences at  
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crucial times in the events related to the grievances before me, I concluded there was reasonable  
uncertainty in the Grievor’s mind as to who was responsible for her day-to-day supervision  
during and immediately after the Grievor’s disciplinary suspension amongst not only the  
Grievor, but clearly Mr. Olsen as well. For example, the evidence shows that on days Mr. Olsen  
claimed the Grievor was supposed to report exclusively to him, there were contradictory e-mails  
indicating the Grievor was to report back to Ms. Leclerc and then to Ms. Reynolds.  
[148] All of these events were occurring against the backdrop of medical reports indicating the  
Grievor was experiencing more acute problems associated with the need to urinate several times  
per hour that combined with what was happening at work led to the development of a medically  
identified stress reaction at the time. The evidence of the Grievor’s deteriorating mental health  
was consistent, as indicated below, with Mr. Olsen’s testimony that the Grievor left their  
subsequent November 27, 2012 investigative meeting to discuss her alleged misconduct during  
this time period, in a “teary-eyed” state which had foretold (if not being the proximate cause for)  
the explosion of the substantiated medical disability that followed.  
(d)  
Mr. Olsen’s Perspective of Events at this Time  
[149] Thus Mr. Olsen, who had no real background with the Grievor and hadn’t been at the  
November 8 or 12 disciplinary meetings, but who suddenly considered himself to be in the  
position of the Grievor’s immediate supervisor in the absence of Ms. Leclerc and had likely  
formed a negative impression of her based on his participation in the AVAYA trace reports,  
testified that he received information on November 21, 2012 indicating the Grievor “was  
working at home after her suspension”, in the following circumstances.  
[150] Mr. Olsen saw the Grievor on Friday, November 16, 2012 when she attended at the  
Scarborough call centre at the conclusion of her five-day suspension, assisting her with “system  
related concerns”. The Grievor testified she went to the call centre that day because the laptop  
computer at her home office had ceased functioning (in her words it was “fried”), and hence she  
could only work from the call centre. Consistent with her usual practice as an At Home Agent,  
the Grievor was not given a permanent desk assignment but rather she was permitted to use any  
available desk in a relatively large setting. Certainly, there is no evidence that Ms. Olsen met her  
when she reported back to work or assigned her to her own desk. Rather, she was left on her  
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own to settle at whatever available work station she wanted as had always been the case while  
she was an At Home Agent.  
[151] The next working day for the Grievor was Monday, November 19. Mr. Olsen testified  
that he saw the Grievor in the call centre that day but didn’t talk to her explaining, “I support a  
team of 20 members and Debbie (Leclerc’s) team, so I rely heavily on the system to tell me  
where my team members were”; and he further noted that, “our office geographically has 200  
work stations around” making it difficult to see every one of his employees. Aside from  
contradicting Ms. Reynolds’ testimony that she was now “acting manager” for Ms. Leclerc’s  
team, what this told me is that Mr. Olsen spends a great amount of his time looking at a  
computer screen; not interacting directly with his employees. Mr. Olsen confirmed that “At  
Home Team members have the ability to sit where they want in the office” and that since he had  
meetings throughout the day, “I would have no indication (the Grievor) was not in the office.”  
The Grievor testified she couldn’t work from home that day because she was still waiting for a  
new laptop and hence could only do her work from the Company’s call centre office.  
[152] The foregoing circumstances are consistent with the documentation filed in this case that  
includes an e-mail from a “Technology Analyst II” in SPOC addressed to the Grievor on  
November 13, 2012, with a copy shown going to the Grievor’s supervisor, Ms. Leclerc, that  
stated: “Let me know when you are able to come to 300 Consilium Place (which is apparently  
SPOC’s location) so I can replace your laptop. It looks like the file system is corrupted you  
would require replacement laptop”. This corroborates the Grievor’s claim that there was a  
legitimate problem with her laptop computer that may have been ongoing for some time. The  
Company has never disputed that the Grievor’s laptop computer she normally used in the AHA  
program was inoperative at that time. Nor did it dispute that the Grievor had returned the  
defective computer to the Company by that time.  
[153] On Monday, November 19 the Grievor was working in the call centre and, as indicated  
above, Ms. Leclerc sent an e-mail to her staff including the Grievor at 11:31 a.m., advising them  
that she was back in the office and thus, “Please revert to my support over Ronnie’s until further  
notice”. At 3:29 p.m. the Technology Analyst II from SPOC wrote an e-mail addressed to Ms.  
Leclerc, with a copy to the Grievor, which is headed: “AHA laptop for laptop desktop  
Page 55 of 196  
replacement program – [Baker, Tracy]” and in the body of that e-mail the SPOC technician  
writes: “A laptop bundle (backpack) is ready for pickup for the above mentioned AHA. When  
will you be able to visit the Service Centre…to pick up the backpack for the agent?” The  
documentary evidence shows that Ms. Leclerc sent an e-mail to her staff later at 6:57 p.m., in  
which she advised them she wouldn’t be in the office tomorrow (i.e. November 20) but that, “If  
you need anything please reach out to Ronnie, or Lisa or Vince”.  
[154] I made two observations about this documentation and the testimony surrounding these  
events when considered in the context of all of the evidence I heard. First, the reference in this  
e-mail to the Grievor as an “AHA” is confirmatory of the Grievor’s belief at that time (i.e.  
November 19) that she was still an At Home Agent. Second, the evidence shows that Ms.  
Leclerc was working as the Grievor’s manager on that day, which the Grievor would also  
reasonably know. Ms. Leclerc didn’t reply to the e-mail in order to “correct” any mistake that  
the Grievor was no longer entitled to the privileges of the AHA program with a copy to the  
Grievor. The Grievor’s shift ended at or about 5:00 p.m. that day (while Ms. Leclerc was  
reporting that she had returned to her supervisory role) and the Grievor picked up the new laptop  
on her way home. There is no suggestion that the SPOC technician challenged the Grievor’s  
ability to receive the new laptop without her supervisor being present or even signing off on the  
exchange, which was consistent with the Grievor’s testimony that different managers had  
different practices when it came to letting staff deal with SPOC directly, and that consistent with  
her past experiences she didn’t think she was doing anything wrong.  
[155] The Grievor then connected the laptop to the Private Virtual Network (“VPN”) that had  
by that time been restored to her home office, and worked from home on Tuesday, November 20,  
2012, without incident. In fact Mr. Olsen testified he could see by monitoring the system that the  
Grievor was taking calls like any other Corporate Support Agent, but didn’t know that the  
Grievor was working from home because he is glued to a computer screen. Thus while working  
at home, there is no suggestion that the Grievor was shirking her responsibilities in performing  
her usual work for the Company, or that her work was deficient in any way. I reflected on this  
observation when I came to asses Mr. Olsen’s major concern (described below) that the  
Grievor’s conduct in working from home on November 20 was akin to “going behind my back”.  
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There was no evidence to suggest that Grievor was hiding herself from (at least) Mr. Olsen’s  
electronic eyes at the time.  
[156] Before reviewing Mr. Olsen’s subsequent reaction to the knowledge that the Grievor  
worked at home on Tuesday, November 20, 2012, it is instructive to first consider the actions of  
Ms. Leclerc. As indicated by the productions, Ms. Leclerc sent an e-mail to her team members  
on Wednesday, November 21 advising them that she continued to be off work that day, but that  
she would be back the next day, November 22, and in the interim stated: “If you need anything,  
please see Lisa, Ronnie or Vince.”  
[157] Mr. Olsen testified that the Grievor was instructed to report to him in Ms. Leclerc’s  
absence, which the documentary evidence doesn’t substantiate as Mr. Olsen was one of three  
different supervisors identified by Ms. Leclerc who the Grievor could consult in her apparent  
discretion. The Grievor testified that she didn’t know who in the Company she should be  
dealing with in Ms. Leclerc’s absence and didn’t feel that, “Ronnie (Olsen) was giving me any  
support”. The Grievor also testified in cross-examination that she worked at the call centre on  
Wednesday, November 21 because she wanted to meet with her Union steward, Mr. Turner, to  
clarify her status. There is no evidence before me concerning what, if anything, Mr. Turner told  
her. However, the Grievor’s evidence was that she was sufficiently confused about whether she  
should be working at home or in the call centre office after apparently speaking with Mr. Turner  
that she contacted Ms. Leclerc on November 21 to clarify the matter, which was not contradicted  
by Ms. Leclerc in her evidence. This does not appear to be the actions of an employee seeking to  
go behind management’s back, although it may be indicative of an employee suddenly realizing  
she may have made a mistake.  
[158] As noted below, Mr. Olsen found out on Wednesday, November 21 that the Grievor had  
worked from home the day before, and, believing he was exclusively in charge of the Grievor at  
that time, on his own initiative (i.e. without consulting with Ms. Leclerc) took steps to  
investigate what he came to consider to be “a serious breach of trust” on the Grievor’s part. But  
on the next day, Thursday, November 22, 2012, the documentation shows that Ms. Leclerc was  
back at work, and she wrote the following e-mail to the Grievor at 3:47 p.m. that was entitled,  
“New Laptop”:  
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Hi Tracy,  
I’m sorry I wasn’t able to meet with you today but I will meet with you tomorrow for sure. I’m going  
to put some time in my calendar and will send an invite in the morning. I understand while I was  
away you were issued a new laptop. I wasn’t aware of this and need some information off of it for  
asset inventory. Can you please bring the laptop with you into work tomorrow? Thanks in advance  
and we’ll talk tomorrow.  
Debbie  
[159] The foregoing e-mail leads to the inference that Ms. Leclerc had at least by that time read  
the previous e-mails from the SPOC technician that she was copied on, the first one being dated  
on November 13 while the Grievor was suspended and the second dated November 19  
identifying the Grievor as a member of the AHA program, which was the Grievor’s understating  
at the time as well, that I found was reasonable in the circumstances. Yet Ms. Leclerc said  
nothing in the foregoing e-mail to the Grievor dissuading her of the impression that she was still  
a member of that program. Rather, both the tone and content of Ms. Leclerc’s e-mail are  
consistent with the Grievor’s stated belief that she had done nothing wrong by approaching  
SPOC directly for technical assistance with her At Home operating systems, which she needed as  
an At Home Agent. Indeed it seems that Ms. Leclerc’s only concern at that point was to get  
information from the new laptop related to “asset inventory”.  
[160] While Ms. Leclerc testified in her examination-in-chief that she didn’t understand why  
the Grievor would need a new laptop because she was supposed to be working from the call  
centre (where computers are provided to the employees), her documented actions seem  
inconsistent where no criticism of the Grievor’s conduct was made by Ms. Leclerc at that time.  
Moreover, Ms. Leclerc agreed that there are instances where managers tell their employees that  
they can pick up laptops directly with their manager’s permission from SPOC, supporting the  
Grievor’s testimony of her understanding. There is no suggestion in Ms. Leclerc’s subsequent  
meeting with the Grievor or in any e-mail to the Grievor at the time that the Grievor was ‘going  
behind her back’ as the Grievor’s direct supervisor or acting improperly.  
[161] Ms. Leclerc indicated in her November 22 e-mail that she would meet with the Grievor  
the next day, which was Friday, November 23, 2012 and the evidence before me respecting that  
meeting is sketchy at best. I heard nothing from Ms. Leclerc about that meeting in either her  
examination-in-chief or cross-examination. However the Grievor produced a copy of an e-mail  
Page 58 of 196  
that she wrote to herself in order to memorialize the 3:15 p.m. meeting she had with Ms. Leclerc  
that day. In her notes, which from the e-mail header was written at 3:35 p.m., a mere 20 minutes  
after the commencement of the meeting and thus was reasonably contemporaneous, the Grievor  
wrote to remind herself that the following matters were discussed with Ms. Leclerc:  
1. Working in office until further notice  
2. November 9/2010 (sic) suspension started until November 15/2012 non pay  
3. Discussed why I got a new lap top and told her about issues in the office  
4. A lot of spoc tickets  
5. Advised her I want a copy of my green files and want to print things off  
6. Debbie took lap top  
[162] The Grievor testified in cross-examination that she had little recollection of the specific  
conversation in that meeting, except to confirm that as indicated by her notes, Ms. Leclerc told  
the Grievor that she would be working in the call centre until further notice, and that Ms. Leclerc  
took the Grievor’s new laptop because the Grievor would not need it (although the Grievor also  
testified that Ms. Leclerc, “didn’t explain much”). The Grievor also recalled telling Ms. Leclerc  
about the many SPOC tickets she had received because of the ongoing problems with her At  
Home office systems and that Ms. Leclerc had been copied on various e-mails with the SPOC  
technician indicating that the Grievor could pick up the laptop.  
[163] I infer from this evidence and the failure of the Company to ask Ms. Leclerc any  
questions about this meeting (even in reply) to dispute the Grievor’s version of events that,  
consistent with her conduct, the Grievor continued to be confused about whether she could work  
at home or not as of November 23, and consequently sought clarification from Ms. Leclerc who  
made it explicitly clear that the Grievor was only to work from the call center office, “until  
further notice”. I concluded that this was the first time any clear directive that the Grievor could  
only work from the call centre was made, thus resolving any confusion on the matter that the  
Grievor reasonably had until that time. Even then, telling the Grievor she was to work in the call  
centre “until further notice” (and without making arrangements for the removal of her At Home  
electronic equipment), is supportive of the Grievor’s impression that her essential status as an At  
Home Agent hadn’t changed. Furthermore, I found that even knowing that during her  
suspension the Grievor received “a lot of SPOC tickets” and the new laptop computer, which the  
Grievor fully disclosed, that Ms. Leclerc did not tell the Grievor she had done anything wrong or  
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faced disciplinary sanctions for that conduct. Ms. Leclerc took no steps to suspend or notify the  
Grievor of any pending disciplinary action as a result of events prior to that meeting.  
[164] The next scheduled workday for the Grievor was Monday, November 26, 2012, and by  
then Ms. Leclerc had permanently left her employment and the Grievor along with the other  
members of Ms. Leclerc’s team was advised to refer any issues to Ms. Reynolds, which the  
Grievor was still sufficiently confused about to seek clarification that Ms. Reynolds was now  
their acting manager, which was not disputed by Ms. Reynolds in any return e-mail to the  
Grievor at the time.  
[165] Yet Mr. Olsen testified that he was responsible for the Grievor at this time which is  
inconsistent with the foregoing evidence, and his actions and conclusions must be scrutinized in  
the foregoing context as an individual who was laboring under his own misconceptions of his  
responsibility and authority over the Grievor at that time.  
[166] Mr. Olsen evidence is that he found out on November 21 from one of the Union’s  
stewards who was inquiring as to the Grievor’s status that the Grievor had worked from home on  
November 20. Instead of consulting directly with the Grievor on the matter who was working  
out of the call centre that day (and the evidence would later show had only worked from home on  
the one day of Tuesday, November 20), Mr. Olsen contacted Ms. Heather Farrell, who has some  
managerial responsibility for the At Home Agent program, to inquire whether the Grievor’s VPN  
had been disabled. He received Ms. Farrell’s reply by e-mail at 5:44 p.m. (after the Grievor had  
left for the day), who wrote (with some TELUS-Speak) to Mr. Olsen, in part that: (a) “Turns out  
on November 13th (the Grievor) logged a bunch of tickets with SPOC (more than 5)…she also  
requested her history of tickets on November 13th”; (b) “The (SPOC) tickets ranged from having  
issues with (a specific software application), computer not rebooting, missing files, getting calls  
after log out and so on. So to remedy the tickets she was provided with a new laptop around  
November 19th”; (c) “At Home Program did not receive an email regarding the laptop swap.  
Agent logged a ticket on November 19th for not being able to login to Cisco VPN…”; (d) “SPOC  
had no idea (the VPN) was disabled so the agent couldn’t work from home and re-enabled it…”;  
and (e) “I have had (corporate) security re-disable the (VPN) as of 4:00 p.m. this evening.”  
Page 60 of 196  
[167] This response, which to Mr. Olsen meant that the Grievor had been improperly working  
while she was under suspension, and had been going directly to SPOC for assistance outside of  
his knowledge (as he considered himself to be her supervisor at the time) that from Mr. Olsen’s  
perspective was not permitted under Company policy, prompted Mr. Olsen to commence an  
investigation, again on his own initiative.  
[168] Ms. Leclerc was back at work on November 22 and 23 and in fact as noted above was  
dealing with the Grievor on some of these matter, but there is no evidence that Mr. Olsen  
discussed the situation with Ms. Leclerc on November 22 or November 23 while Ms. Leclerc  
was working in the call centre office, nor is there any suggestion that they coordinated their  
efforts or “investigation” in any way. As an aside it is to be noted that the Company never  
alleged that the Grievor was doing any “work” from home on November 20 in the sense of  
taking normal calls from customers and logging their requests, etc., for which she would not  
have been paid by the Company if she had. To Mr. Olsen, any contact by the Grievor with  
SPOC on anything to do with her operating systems (particularly during a period of time that Mr.  
Olsen considered himself to be her supervisor) constituted the performance of work that she was  
prohibited from doing, notwithstanding that she wasn’t being paid for such “work” and  
regardless of what her motives might have been. The Grievor later explained that the only thing  
she was doing at home during her suspension was trying to get things ready for her return to  
work after her suspension.  
[169] Thus Mr. Olsen took me through a detailed rendition of the results of his investigation  
into the Grievor’s conduct, and consequently I heard about some 20 different instances of the  
Grievor contacting SPOC herself for assistance with her computer systems in the period  
commencing November 13 up to and including apparent contacts on November 26 and the  
morning of November 27, 2012 (which of course was when Ms. Reynolds was the acting  
manager), none of which was ever disputed by the Grievor.  
[170] Each contact with SPOC generated a written “ticket” of SPOC’s involvement in the  
specific inquiries and request for assistance by the Grievor that was filed with me and  
exhaustively explained. While I heard much evidence about Mr. Olsen’s findings based on this  
documentation, it is not necessary to recount all instances of the Grievor’s contacts with SPOC  
Page 61 of 196  
over this timeframe. It is sufficient for present purposes and I so found that commencing on  
November 13 while on suspension, the Grievor contacted SPOC by telephone to receive a  
history of all of the SPOC tickets that she had requested going back to April 9, 2011, and that she  
had received technical assistance from SPOC for problems with her home office systems in the  
past. This was precisely what she had asked Ms. Leclerc about in their November 12, 2012  
disciplinary meeting, to which Ms. Leclerc doesn’t seem to have responded.  
[171] Among other things, the Grievor also asked SPOC for advice and assistance with the  
operational problems that she alluded to during her investigative and/or disciplinary meetings  
with Ms. Leclerc, including: (a) receiving two calls at the same time on her Plantronics device  
causing her to lose calls; (b) difficulties with the MOC communicator that she said caused her  
system to operate slowly; (c) difficulties with her home laptop computer that the Grievor claimed  
was “fried” and needed replacing (that was later substantiated by SPOC); (d) ongoing problems  
with a number of application software programs that she needed to perform her work; (e)  
inability to connect with the call centre from her home office because her VPN was disabled that  
prompted SPOC to reconnect her system to the network (since as indicated by Ms. Farrell’s e-  
mail SPOC was given no notification that the Grievor’s status as an At Home Agent had been  
revoked); and (f) a number of additional problems that the Grievor claimed she was having with  
the computers or operating systems that she was using while in the call centre after returning  
from her suspension in the period from November 16 to November 27, 2012.  
[172] From the results of his inquiries Mr. Olsen had formed the opinion that the Grievor was  
able to get her VPN restored by, “not being forthcoming with our SPOC team about the situation  
she was in regarding her discipline”. He also discovered that the Grievor had obtained a new  
laptop computer that she requested on November 13 which he testified was “very concerning  
because it was participating in work-related activities while being suspended”. He then testified  
that the Grievor, “was able to work from home on (November) 20th without (me) having any  
knowledge of this”, which Mr. Olsen perceived as the Grievor “going behind my back”. Mr.  
Olsen later referred to general “security concerns” respecting the Grievor’s conduct by working  
from home and/or ordering SPOC tickets “without permission”, but didn’t identify any explicit  
rule addressing such concerns in his testimony before me.  
Page 62 of 196  
[173] From Mr Olsen’s standpoint, the Grievor was not permitted to consult SPOC without his  
express permission and thus she should have been referring all of these matters to him as her  
immediate supervisor before contacting SPOC. Had she done so, Mr. Olsen testified the  
Company would have saved the unnecessary expenditure of SPOC resources and time on matters  
that Ms. Olsen would have been able to resolve (or more directly, to set the Grievor straight  
about) immediately. Consequently, Mr. Olsen summoned the Grievor and her Union steward,  
Mr. Turner, to an investigative meeting on November 27, 2012 to discuss the results of his  
inquiries into the Grievor’s conduct while on suspension and afterwards.  
(e)  
The Grievor’s Perspective of Events at this Time  
[174] When confronted with all of this, the Grievor maintained her belief that she had done  
nothing wrong. Having been unprepared for her disciplinary meeting with Ms. Leclerc on  
November 8, she wanted to get a history of all of her SPOC contacts in order to support her  
claim that she had been experiencing difficulties with her At Home systems for some time before  
she was disciplined. She also testified that she “didn’t think it was a big deal to call SPOC  
(while she was under suspension on November 13) to look into work-related issues” that she had  
been experiencing with her operating systems before her suspension, asserting that she was  
“trying to prepare myself to get back to work”. The Grievor insisted her ‘VPN would go down  
daily” and that she had other operating problems which she called SPOC directly for assistance  
and informed Ms. Leclerc about by e-mail. As an At Home Agent she had contacted SPOC on  
her own in the past without objection and she kept Ms. Leclerc informed of her efforts to get a  
replacement laptop, which she believed was all that was required.  
[175] The Grievor testified she didn’t know what was happening when Mr. Olsen contacted her  
in the call centre her before her lunch break on November 27, asking her to attend a meeting with  
him and her Union representative. After initially telling Mr. Olsen that she was scheduled to  
start a break, the Grievor testified, “two minutes later (Mr. Olsen) was hovering over me and he  
said, ‘Let’s meet’”. Notwithstanding she felt the need to go to the bathroom at that time, she  
went with Mr. Olsen to a meeting room where Mr. Vince Marasco was waiting. She thought that  
they might be meeting to discuss her earlier five-day suspension, and thus she brought with her  
all of the SPOC tickets to prove the difficulties she had been having with her At Home systems.  
Page 63 of 196  
(f)  
The November 27, 2012 Investigative Meeting  
[176] Thus Mr. Olsen convened a formal investigative meeting with the Grievor and her Union  
representative with Mr. Marasco taking notes, which were entered into evidence and purported to  
be an accurate record of what occurred. Consistent with the practice of TELUS supervisors in  
such situations, Mr. Olsen had prepared a series of typed questions in advance that he went  
through with the Grievor in the course of their meeting that lasted about one hour.  
[177] Mr. Olsen testified that at the outset of the meeting he could see that the Grievor had  
reams of SPOC tickets and papers with her that she was apparently relying on to defend her  
actions leading to her previous five-day suspension without pay. But Mr. Olsen made it clear he  
wasn’t interested in that.  
[178] Rather, Mr. Olsen asked the Grievor a series of questions taking her through the events  
after her suspension on November 12, that focused on the reasons why, during her time on  
suspension, she (a) had contacted SPOC without telling her supervisor; (b) had acquired a new  
laptop without her supervisor’s knowledge; (c) had arranged for her VPN to be reinstated; (d)  
hadn’t spoken with Mr. Olsen, who asserted he was her supervisor at the time, to receive  
permission for any of those actions; and (e) after her suspension she continued to contact SPOC  
herself about difficulties she was having with the office systems instead of referring all matters  
to Mr. Olsen. As an aside, it was never suggested by Mr. Olsen that any of the problems raised  
with SPOC, either during her suspension or while working in the call centre, were not genuine  
technical difficulties the Grievor believed she was having at that time. Also, Mr. Olsen testified  
that in deciding in advance the questions he would ask the Grievor, he was “looking for certain  
answers” and it is apparent that his investigation was designed to get the answers that he was  
looking for that, in his mind, would incriminate the Grievor. But that didn’t happen, leading to  
Mr. Olsen’s conclusion that she was “evasive”.  
[179] The Grievor’s response to Mr. Olsen’s questions was consistent with the testimony she  
gave before me and with all of the documentation related to the mixed and imprecise messages  
the Grievor was receiving from her supervision at that time. As reflected in the notes recorded  
by Mr. Marasco, the Grievor repeated that she didn’t know she couldn’t call SPOC while she  
was on suspension which she asserted, “was basically my time too” and that one of the reasons  
Page 64 of 196  
she contacted SPOC was to get the records of all of the SPOC tickets she had opened to address  
the problems she said she was having with her At Home systems. When pressed further by Mr.  
Olsen on why she contacted SPOC at all, she is recorded as saying: “Sorry, I was preparing  
myself for getting back to work so that I wouldn’t have any issues. My laptop didn’t work.”  
[180] When asked about her replacement laptop and whether she had permission from her  
supervisor to obtain the laptop, the Grievor told Mr. Olsen that, “I think that Debbie (Leclerc)  
was back by then. She was cc’d on the e-mails to SPOC. I didn’t want to bother Debbie since  
she was having personal issues.” The Grievor maintained that because she had copied Ms.  
Leclerc on her e-mails to SPOC concerning the laptop that she assumed she didn’t need to refer  
the matter to Mr. Olsen or to any of the other supervisors that Ms. Leclerc had previously  
identified she could contact for support in Ms. Leclerc’s absence.  
[181] When pressed as to why she came to work at the call centre on Friday, November 16 and  
Monday, November 19 when she claimed she thought she was still an At Home Agent, the  
Grievor explained that she couldn’t work at home because her laptop was “fried” and she only  
picked up the replacement laptop when she left work on November 19, by which time Ms.  
Leclerc was also back at work and had been copied on the e-mail from SPOC concerning the  
matter, leading the Grievor to believe that she was doing nothing wrong and was acting with the  
full knowledge and approval of Ms. Leclerc.  
[182] The Grievor confirmed that she reconnected her laptop to her At Home office system  
either that evening or the next day and worked from home on November 20, because she didn’t  
think she couldn’t. She had asked SPOC earlier to reconnect her VPN because she believed she  
was still going to be working as an At Home Agent. She told Mr. Olsen that the only person she  
contracted while working at home was her Union steward, Mr. Turner. (I inferred from what  
happened next, that Mr. Turner likely asked her why she was working from home at that time  
when she was supposed to be at the call centre, although I didn’t receive direct evidence on what  
the Grievor and Mr. Turner actually discussed on November 20).  
[183] In response to Mr. Olsen’s further questions about why she came back to the call centre  
on November 21, the Grievor told him she wanted clarification from Mr. Turner on her status as  
an At Home Agent (which is consistent with the above-noted inference). The Grievor also told  
Page 65 of 196  
Mr. Olsen that she had contacted Ms. Leclerc by e-mail that day as well to get clarification from  
her directly, but Ms. Leclerc didn’t respond. (And the evidence indicates that Mr. Olsen did not  
contact Ms. Leclerc or do anything to substantiate this claim by the Grievor). Mr. Turner then  
confirmed to Mr. Olsen that in the November 12 meeting with Ms. Leclerc, she told the Grievor  
that, “I need you to work the office until further notice”, which the Grievor maintained she  
hadn’t remembered, and that was why she was asking for clarification.  
[184] When confronted by Mr. Olsen that she had been seen in the call centre office on  
Thursday, November 15, which was the last day of her suspension, the Grievor explained that  
she wanted to print her e-mails that she couldn’t access while her home VPN was shut down.  
Mr. Marasco’s notes reflect at this point in the meeting that Mr. Marasco acknowledged he had  
given permission for the Grievor to come into the workplace to retrieve and print-off her e-mails.  
There was consequently no suggestion by Mr. Olsen that by viewing and printing her e-mails  
related to her work that the Grievor had been improperly “working” on that day.  
[185] When asked by Mr. Olsen why the Grievor didn’t contact him when she was having  
“AHA connection issues” the Grievor replied that, “I didn’t feel like I had support. I didn’t want  
to go to every Manager. I took ownership of my issues.” When next questioned by Mr. Olsen  
what the Grievor thought the cost to TELUS was for all of tickets that she had logged with  
SPOC, the Grievor responded, “No idea”. (As an aside, that “cost” wasn’t identified to me,  
either). And when offered at the end of the investigative meeting the opportunity to say ‘anything  
else you would like at this time’ the Grievor is recorded as responding:  
Yeah, I actually would. No one is really giving me full direction in regards to my at-home  
connection. I had to pay for my own move. If my at-home connection is going to be removed, I  
want that money back. I haven’t gotten e-mail responses from my managers. I’ve sent Debbie  
(Leclerc) e-mails in regards to system issues. She never got back to me. There have been many  
issues.  
[186] Mr. Olsen testified that on the basis of the Grievor’s answers, he had found the Grievor to  
be “really non-responsive” and that the Grievor “was being evasive”. Confirming the Grievor’s  
subsequent testimony on point, Mr. Olsen noted that at beginning of the investigative meeting  
the Grievor “had a stack of papers with her” and that “she seemed ready to defend the five day  
suspension.” But when Mr. Olsen started asking her his questions he testified that the Grievor,  
“seemed a little surprised” and that near the end of the meeting that the Grievor, “seemed a little  
Page 66 of 196  
teary-eyed, but not in a way that indicated we should stop the meeting.” Rather to Mr. Olsen the  
Grievor seemed, “calm” and the meeting ended shortly thereafter.  
[187] The Grievor testified she “didn’t understand what was going on.” She maintained that  
she answered Mr. Olsen’s questions as best as she could, but she became “really upset to the  
point I was balling” and that she felt, “really intimidated” and was “very bothered by the  
questions they asked me.” She further testified that, “I didn’t expect another investigative  
meeting; I didn’t know I couldn’t get a laptop. I just really wanted to have clarification of things  
and get back to work.”  
[188] In reviewing Mr. Marasco’s notes of the investigative meeting, I could find no basis for  
Mr. Olsen’s conclusion that the Grievor was “non-responsive” or “evasive” to the specific  
questions he asked. Out of the 56 questions that he asked (all but two directed to the Grievor that  
were asked of Mr. Turner), there were some 13 questions or comments intended to elicit a  
response from the Grievor identifying who she thought her manager was at any given time and  
whether she believe she had to get the manager’s permission for doing the things she did.  
[189] I found that none of her answers was unreasonable given her knowledge of circumstances  
as supported by the documentary evidence and timing of various events. For example:  
Question #1: Mr. Olsen asked the Grievor, “While your Manager…was out of  
the office during the week of November 12 16, who were you advised to contact  
during her absence?” (The notation beside this question indicates that he was  
expecting the Grievor to refer to Ms. Olsen’s November 13 e-mail instructing the  
employee to contact him). The Grievor nevertheless responded, “I believe  
(Debbie) sent an e-mail out for everyone for us to contact you (Ronnie), Vince  
and Lisa”. I found this was an accurate response given that the Grievor’s e-mail  
access had been disconnected by November 13 when Mr. Olsen distributed his e-  
mail.  
Question #2: Mr. Olsen then asked: “Did you receive an e-mail for support from  
myself?” which was a more direct reference to his November 13 e-mail. The  
Grievor responded, “I don’t remember. I’d have to check. I don’t remember.”  
Mr. Olsen interpreted this as being “evasive”; but the evidence supports the  
conclusion that the Grievor would not have likely received this e-mail until she  
printed off her e-mails on November 15 when she attended at the call centre. With  
all of the e-mails she was likely reviewing at that time it was not unreasonable  
that the Grievor would not be aware or remember Mr. Olsen’s November 13 e-  
mail.  
Page 67 of 196  
Question #9: In connection with the Grievor’s activities in contacting SPOC  
directly for assistance with her At Home systems while on suspension, Mr. Olsen  
asked: “Who else could you have contacted for that (permission)?” The Grievor  
responded, “Honestly, I didn’t think that was an issue”. This answer that Mr.  
Olsen interpreted as non-responsive is consistent with the Grievor’s practice of  
contacting SPOC directly in the past, as confirmed by the evidence.  
Question #13: Mr. Olsen asked: “If your computer was fried, what Manager was  
available for you to contact?” The Grievor responded: “No one. I don’t  
remember. I think that Debbie was back by then.” On the evidence before me  
this answer was reasonable as well. The Grievor had been communicating with  
Ms. Leclerc at that time.  
Questions #46 #47: With respect to the Grievor’s claimed efforts to have  
problems with her VPN connection to her At Home office addressed by SPOC,  
Mr. Olsen asked her which manager she contacted for permission, to which she  
responded, “I didn’t think I contacted anyone. I didn’t see it as a big concern. I  
didn’t want to harass anyone.” In following up, Mr. Olsen is then recorded as  
having asked: “Why did you not contact myself when you had these AHA  
connection issues?” I found that the Grievor’s recorded response, “Maybe,  
previously, I didn’t feel like I had support. I didn’t want to go to every manager.  
I took ownership of my issues”, was a reasonable one given her past direct  
dealings with SPOC, the less than clear instructions from Ms. Leclerc, in the  
context of the turmoil at the time concerning the identity of the Grievor’s  
supervisors which seemed to be changing on a daily basis.  
[190] One question that was not put to the Grievor, however, was whether the Grievor knew  
her direct supervisor from November 13, 2012 up to and including the date of the investigative  
meeting to whom all matters related to her day-to-day activities as a CSA were to be referred,  
was Mr. Olsen. This was obviously Mr. Olsen’s belief.  
[191] The Grievor testified that by the end of the November 27, 2012 investigative meeting she  
was, so distraught that I could barely speak, and I was crying and they told me to leave.”  
Instead of driving to work, the Grievor had started taking the bus after her suspension in order to  
lessen her daily stress. As she had a “major headache”, “didn’t feel well” and was “walking  
sideways” after exiting the bus on her way home after the investigative meeting, she went to an  
“urgent care” walk-in clinic in a plaza close to her home, where she was examined by one of the  
attending physicians who told that her she was “under stress”, as described further below.  
(g)  
The Grievor’s Medical State at this Time  
Page 68 of 196  
[192] After she was suspended by Ms. Leclerc the Grievor saw her family doctor, Dr. Adil, on  
November 15, 2012. The medical documentation that was in the Company’s possession before  
the Grievor’s first dismissal indicates the Grievor told Dr. Adil that the Grievor was urinating  
two to three times per hour, which the Grievor also reasserted in her testimony.  
[193] The Grievor’s evidence is that she consulted with Dr. Adil on the matter because Ms.  
Leclerc had suggested she could get a note from her doctor authorizing additional time off if she  
needed to use the washroom, but no doctor’s note was apparently provided to the Grievor on that  
occasion, or when the Grievor’s conversation with Ms. Leclerc on the matter occurred sometime  
earlier in late October.  
[194] After her meeting with Mr. Olsen on November 27, 2012, the medical documentation in  
the possession of the Company before the Grievor’s first dismissal indicates that the Grievor  
received a note from Dr. Bahman Torkian, the urgent care physician she saw that evening.  
Referring to the Grievor and dated November 27, 2012, it stated: “This note is to certify sickness  
causing medically unfit and unable to attend to work/school” for the period November 26 30,  
2012. Dr. Torkian also gave the Grievor a prescription for 10 pills of Apo-Lorazepam (0.5 mg.),  
which is a drug for the short-term relief of the symptoms of excessive anxiety that was to be  
taken “as needed”, that the record of her prescription purchases (also given to the Company)  
indicates the Grievor filled immediately.  
[195] I was subsequently advised (through the testimony of Ms. Bargen) that Lorazepam is the  
generic name for the commercial brand known as “Ativan”.  
(h)  
The Decision to Terminate the Grievor’s Employment  
[196] At or about the same time, Mr. Olsen had made the decision to terminate the Grievor’s  
employment for alleged just cause. He testified that he would have terminated her employment  
even if she didn’t have a recent five-day disciplinary suspension on her record, because of the  
seriousness of her misconduct during and after her disciplinary suspension. He explained that as  
a result of his investigation he concluded the Grievor knew she wasn’t to work from home, and  
that as an At Home Agent for the past five to six years, the Grievor also knew that “any  
connectivity issues, system issues, should have come to myself” (meaning, Mr. Olsen  
Page 69 of 196  
specifically). He also found that the Grievor had been “very evasive” during the investigative  
meeting and that in working from home, the Grievor ‘essentially went behind Mr. Olsen’s back  
by not telling Mr. Olsen about the VPN, laptop and working from home’. Mr. Olsen testified  
that, “based on that I felt she was completely untrustworthy after all of these scenarios.”  
[197] He consequently had e-mail communications with the Company’s Labour Relations  
Consultant, Cheryl Fraser, who helped prepare a termination letter based on the information  
provided by Mr. Olsen. At the bottom of the e-mail that Ms. Fraser wrote to Mr. Olsen with her  
suggestions for the appropriate wording of the termination letter, she also wrote: “Nice work on  
this one Ronnie” to which she attached a “smiley face” icon.  
[198] While the termination letter was written under Ms. Leclerc’s name, Mr. Olsen intended to  
sign and present it to the Grievor the next day the Grievor was expected into work at the call  
centre, on Wednesday, November 28, 2012. It is reproduced below:  
November 28, 2012  
Tracy Baker  
Channel Care Analyst II  
Subject: Termination of Employment  
Dear Tracy,  
An investigative meeting was held with you on November 27, 2012 regarding a breach of trust.  
Our investigation revealed that you inappropriately accessed and misused TELUS resources,  
breached our corporate security policy and failed to follow a management directive. Your actions  
were a willful violation of TELUS policy. During the investigation meeting you were evasive and  
failed to take responsibility for your actions.  
Your actions constitute a serious breach of trust, and violation of TELUS’ Ethics and Security  
Policies. The need for trust is pivotal to any ongoing employment relationship and you have  
undermined and irreparably harmed that bond of trust with your actions. Consequently, effective  
immediately your employment with TELUS is terminated.  
Your final pay will be processed as soon as possible and will include any payment that may be due  
under the terms of the collective agreement or in accordance with any provisions of the Canada  
Labour Code. Your Record of Employment will be mailed to you.  
Sincerely,  
Debbie Leclerc  
Page 70 of 196  
Manager, Business Solutions  
VII.  
Period 3: November 28, 2012 January 11, 2013  
[199] In its opening statement the Company described the Grievor as a “runaway employee”  
during this next period in the narrative of events leading to her “first dismissal” on January 11,  
2013, who the Company alleged was trying to do everything she could to avoid the termination  
she knew was coming, and whose claims of being ill with a stress/anxiety related disability  
(referred to in her last medical report as “major affective disorder”) to validate her continuing  
absenteeism during this period could not be believed.  
[200] In reviewing the totality of the evidence and considering the Grievor’s testimony during  
her examination-in-chief and cross-examination in the context of the supporting documentation  
and what seems most in harmony with all the surrounding circumstances I respectfully disagree  
with that characterization, although it was certainly Mr. Olsen’s and later, Ms. Bargen’s  
perception at the time. My findings during this temporal period are based on a careful review  
and evaluation of the testimony of these two Company witnesses along with the Grievor’s  
reports of her physical and emotional state as supported by the medical notes received from the  
Grievor’s physicians, that were in the Company’s possession and which it had the opportunity to  
consider before it decided to terminate the Grievor’s employment on January 11, 2013.  
(a)  
The Grievor Doesn’t Report for Work  
[201] Thus with Dr. Torkian’s note in hand, the Grievor didn’t report for work on Wednesday,  
November 28. Instead, she sent an e-mail to the person she believed to be her “acting manager”,  
Ms. Reynolds, at 9:44 a.m. advising her that, “I am sick today. My shift is 9AM 5PM. I called  
SMB WFM this morning as well to let them know.” This e-mail was forwarded to Mr. Olsen at  
11:01 a.m. that morning by Ms. Reynolds, which Mr. Olsen claimed he was “surprised again” to  
receive because, as he testified: “I had just had an investigative meeting with her and there were  
10 questions about who she should contact, and the next day she contacts Jenny Reynolds and  
not myself(emphasis added). This answer suggests a clear direction to the Grievor that Mr.  
Olsen was now responsible for all aspects of the Grievor’s day-to-day employment, including  
Page 71 of 196  
notifications for illness, was conveyed to her during the investigative meeting or at some point  
beforehand, which the evidence does not support.  
[202] Rather, in reviewing the e-mail of Ms. Reynolds to Ms. Leclerc’s team members dated  
November 26, 2012 in which she stated that, “If you are SICK or running late, please call me”  
(capitalization in original), and having regard to my findings as to her veracity in testifying on  
the matter, I found it was clear that the Grievor was doing exactly what she had been instructed  
to do in cases of absenteeism due to illness. Since Mr. Olsen was apparently not copied on Ms.  
Reynoldse-mail, I found that he was the one confused; and that the negative impression he  
formed of the Grievor reporting her illness to anyone other than Mr. Olsen as a further example  
of the Grievor going behind my back” was unjustified. At the very least, even if Mr. Olsen was  
the Grievor’s supervisor at that time, there is ample evidence to support the Grievor’s genuine  
confusion.  
[203] Thus to the extent that the Grievor may be criticized or even face legitimate discipline for  
her conduct during Period 2 from November 12 to November 27, 2012, where the documentary  
evidence shows that there was a virtual musical chairs of five supervisors circling in and out of  
the Grievor’s world in that timeframe (i.e. Debbie, Jenny, Vince, Lisa, Ronnie), with little to no  
communication amongst those supervisors on different aspects of the Grievor’s day-to-day  
employment, the Company’s contribution to that confusion must be weighed against it in  
mitigating any disciplinary finding.  
(b)  
The Grievor’s Claim for Short Term Disability  
[204] On Thursday, November 29, the Grievor visited the Brooklin Medical Centre where her  
doctor practiced, obtaining a note (from one of the physicians in the Centre, although the  
signature is illegible) that stated: “Patient unable to work for week effective from November 29,  
2012.” This note thus purported to cover the Grievor’s absence from work for medical reasons  
until Thursday, December 6, 2012.  
[205] The Grievor also saw her regular physician, Dr. Adil, at or about 5:41 p.m. that evening.  
Dr. Adil had been the Grievor’s “family physician” for only six months at that point and the  
“Patient Encounter History” of her visit with Dr. Adil is the written record that the doctor  
Page 72 of 196  
prepares contemporaneously with each visit. Consistent with the Grievor’s testimony, it records  
that the Grievor visited Dr. Adil to discuss feelings of extreme anxiety and stress, which after  
examination Dr. Adil diagnosed as: “Anxiety neurosis, hysteria and neurasthenia.” (I understood  
that neurasthenia is a condition generally characterized by fatigue, headache and irritability that  
is associated with depression or emotional stress).  
[206] Dr. Adil’s written record of the visit also indicates that they discussed in detail the  
reasons for the extreme anxiety the Grievor was feeling, which Dr. Adil described in her notes  
as, “+++stress at work”. The Grievor is also noted as advising Dr. Adil that her workplace, “is  
accusing her of not doing work properly…(and)…says basically work is trying to fire her.” In  
addition to recounting the Grievor’s reported symptoms that included difficulties sleeping,  
feelings of anxiety and crying (although no depression or suicidal tendencies), it reported she  
was offered “Ativan” that the Grievor was reluctant to use. In testifying the Grievor explained  
she had used Ativan before but, “didn’t like it at all” because it caused her to feel ‘flighty, sleepy  
and to slur her speech’, asserting that she was “not good with medication” and preferred instead  
to deal with such things “naturally” through exercise and diet. Dr. Adil nevertheless gave the  
Grievor at prescription for 30 tablets of Ativan in 0.5 mg dosage that the Grievor was to take  
nightly. While it appears that the prescription was unfilled, I noted that this was the same drug  
and dosage she had received at the walk-in clinic on November 27, which the documentation in  
these proceedings indicate the Grievor filled immediately. Dr. Adil’s medical record of their  
November 29 visit concluded with the notation that the Grievor was to be off work for one week,  
at which time there would be a follow-up assessment of the Grievor (which would have been  
Thursday, December 6, 2012).  
[207] Earlier the same day, the cellphone records filed in these proceedings (described further  
below) indicate that Mr. Olsen called the Grievor on her TELUS cellphone at 1:22 p.m., leaving  
a voice-mail message for her (the precise message being unclear in the evidence, but likely  
requesting that the Grievor contact Mr. Olsen). The cellphone records show that Mr. Olsen  
called the Grievor again at 9:33 a.m. on Monday, December 3, leaving another voice-mail  
message for her to call him.  
Page 73 of 196  
[208] Mr. Olsen’s testimony, supported by the Grievor’s cellphone records, was that the  
Grievor called Mr. Olsen on Monday, December 3, 2012 (at 10:53 a.m.) confirming her illness  
and inability to work. The Grievor spoke directly with Mr. Olsen, but she identified the date as  
December 2 in her testimony, which is likely in error (as to the precise date only) because that  
was a Sunday. (In later evaluating the evidence concerning the specific dates and frequency of  
such calls, I was cognizant of the fact that the Grievor was testifying at this time without the  
benefit of referring to her cellphone records to refresh her memory on the specific dates of her  
telephone or voice-mail contacts with Mr. Olsen, which were not admitted into evidence until the  
last day of her cross-examination in circumstances described below).  
[209] Mr. Olsen also sent the Grievor an e-mail at 12:06 p.m. on December 3, 2012 confirming  
their conversation that the Grievor needed to provide the Company with a Practitioner’s  
Assessment Form (“PAF”) in order to receive short term disability benefits (“STD”) while off  
work, a copy of which Mr. Olsen included as an attachment to the e-mail. It is instructive to read  
the following portions of the two page document that was attached to the PAF and addressed,  
“To the Practitioner”:  
To the Practitioner  
The purpose of this form:  
1. To enable the Occupational Health professional to assess the Team Member’s fitness for work  
or level of disability.  
2. To ensure your patient’s claim for disability benefit receives proper consideration.  
...  
Short term disability payments will be made available when a team member:  
has applied for STD by completing the required medical forms following an absence of 10  
consecutive days, and when the medical documentation substantiates the disability  
absence duration, and aligns with disability best practices. All medical documentation  
must be received in Health Services by specified dates or benefit payments will be  
jeopardized.  
has signed appropriate medical consents.  
is under the regular care of a licensed physician, and follows recommended treatment /  
rehabilitative plans as outlined.  
maintains regular and open communication with their manager and Health Services.  
Page 74 of 196  
provides additional medical documentation, by specified dates, as requested by Health  
Services.  
actively participates in all appropriate medical, rehabilitative, return to work and  
assessment processes.  
consults with a third party physician, appointed by the company, if required.  
where possible, schedules medical / rehab services so that they do not interfere with  
scheduled work.  
Obtains prior approval from Health Services to travel out of town or country. Travel  
cannot interfere with recovery or treatment schedule.  
[Emphasis added]  
[210] Notwithstanding the ability of the Company to require the Grievor to consult with a third  
party physician appointed by the Company, the Company never requested that the Grievor be  
examined by a physician of its choice in order to substantiate her claims of being unable to work  
due to reactive stress/anxiety (or “major affective disorder” as it was also described), in the  
context of her application for STD benefits and claimed unfitness to report for work.  
[211] Moreover, even though the PAF authorized the Company to speak directly with the  
Grievor’s physician in order to clarify the PAF or to seek additional information about the  
Grievor’s condition, this was not demanded by the Company in addressing what would later  
amount to the Company’s conclusion that the information provided by the Grievor’s physicians  
was insufficient to support a finding of total disability required to sustain both a short term  
disability claim and her right to remain off work.  
[212] Thus to the extent that the Company maintained that the Grievor was not really ill (or  
sick enough) to prevent her from reporting to work thereby justifying her dismissal, there was  
nothing outside of the medical documentation provided by the Grievor’s own physicians that was  
relied upon by the Company or submitted to me. As I noted throughout this case, the Company  
never challenged the information provided on the various medical forms by the Grievor’s  
doctors. Its position (at least up to the last PAF submitted by one of the Grievor’s physicians on  
January 8, 2013, on which I received no direct evidence to explain the Company’s rationale) was  
that the information provided on these forms and accompanying medical notes was insufficient  
Page 75 of 196  
to show that the Grievor was not fit for work in order to receive STD or to justify her continuing  
absence.  
[213] While a copy of the Company’s STD plan was not filed, Ms. Bargen testified that the  
Plan was paid directly by TELUS to full-time eligible employees (i.e. not through an insurance  
company), which granted employees up to 130 days of pay until the employee was in the  
position to apply for long term disability (“LTD”) benefits, the latter benefits being underwritten  
by a third-party insurance carrier. (This is consistent with the STD plan made available to  
employees in Western Canada, as indicated by Appendix A, reproduced above). Hence at the  
STD level of benefit coverage, it is TELUS that decides directly whether the employee is “totally  
disabled” in order to make the STD payments required under the collective agreement. The  
term, “totally disabled” as applied by TELUS is described in the various letters that later denied  
the Grievor’s STD claim, a sample of which is reproduced below.  
In order to qualify for short term disability benefits, an individual must be totally disabled from  
performing their job duties. “Totally Disabled” means “the team member has a medical impairment  
which prevents him/her from performing the essential work duties.  
[214] Mr. Olsen also confirmed in his December 3, 2012 e-mail that the Grievor had advised  
him she would be seeing her doctor “on Thursday December 8 (which must be a typographical  
error on his part because December 8 was a Saturday in 2012) and he asked the Grievor to  
“contact myself once the PAF has been submitted on Thursday.”  
(c)  
The Role of TELUS Health  
[215] Ms. Bargen, who as identified above is a Case Consultant in TELUS Health, generally  
described the TELUS Health unit as a facility within the Company that is intended to provide an  
independent assessment of employees’ claims of injury or illness for purposes of STD coverage  
and workplace accommodations in a manner that protects the confidentiality of the employees’  
medical information from operational personnel. She testified that the role of TELUS Health in  
the case of a claim for STD benefits is to review the medical documentation received from the  
employee’s physicians, and from that (and presumably any other necessary investigations) to  
determine whether the employee is “totally disabled” as that term is defined under the short term  
disability plan, in order to approve STD coverage.  
Page 76 of 196  
[216] Once a PAF was received in the TELUS Health office (located in Burnaby, B.C.), a file is  
opened and a Case Consultant is assigned to shepherd the file through the process; however, in  
addition to Ms. Bargen the record indicates at least two others were involved in dealing with the  
Grievor’s claim at various times; being Ms. Kathleen McLeod, an administrative coordinator,  
and Mr. Douglas Carra, described as a “Senior Case Consultant” who had some role in training  
Ms. Bargen, and is also identified on the written records as the “Disability Team Lead”. Mr.  
Carra’s professional qualifications (i.e. whether he held degrees as a Registered Nurse or other  
health practitioner) was not identified in the evidence. Another presumed administrative clerk  
named Ginny Burton was peripherally involved in processing the file at different junctures, as  
well. The TELUS Health records reveal that Ms. Bargen ceased any involvement in the  
Grievor’s file as of December 20, 2012, with Mr. Carra taking over her role from that time to the  
Grievor’s termination.  
[217] There is a computerized record of the dealings by the TELUS Health personnel with each  
file in what is referred to as a “Case Progress Note Report” (also referred to as “Case Progress  
Notes”), that the Case Consultants and administrative staff add to, more or less  
contemporaneously, in recording the receipt of documentation/e-mails and their specific dealings  
on a file (although there were exceptions to that practice with notations added later in time).  
This document was entered into evidence by the Company and relied upon as a comprehensive  
digest of the Company’s dealings with the Grievor’s disability claims through TELUS Health.  
These records helped piece together the details of conversations and correspondence between  
TELUS Health and the Grievor, along with communications between TELUS Health and  
TELUS operational management at various junctures in the narrative of this case.  
[218] Specifically, the Case Progress Notes as supplemented by the testimonies of Ms. Bargen,  
Mr. Olsen and the Grievor, along with the filed medical records, support the finding that by  
December 4, 2012 TELUS Health had received a copy of the Grievor’s November 29 medical  
note from Dr. Adil, and had also received copies of the earlier medical notes from Dr. Torkian  
dated November 27 and the physician in Dr. Adil’s office, also dated November 29, in or about  
this time (although the precise date of receipt is not clear).  
Page 77 of 196  
[219] Ms. McLeod addressed an e-mail to Ms. Leclerc advising her that TELUS Health  
received “a doctor’s note for Tracy today regarding an absence”. It asked Ms. Leclerc to forward  
a PAF to the Grievor’s doctor returning it to TELUS Health as soon as possible, since TELUS  
Health would not open a file for the Grievor until it received a PAF. Of course, Ms. Leclerc was  
no longer working at TELUS, and thus the e-mail eventually made its way to Mr. Olsen.  
However, Mr. Olsen’s e-mail of December 3 indicates that a PAF had already been forwarded to  
the Grievor by that time. For some unexplained reason, the Case Progress Notes Report shows  
that Ms. McLeod and Ms. Burton regularly sent e-mails updating the status of the Grievor’s STD  
claim with every new medical note submitted by her physicians to the attention of Ms. Leclerc  
(often without copying Mr. Olsen on the e-mail) until the Grievor’s termination on January 11,  
2013. This continued even after Mr. Keith Fischer sent an e-mail to Mr. Carra on December 31,  
2012 advising that Mr. Fischer was “supporting [the Grievor] right now while Debbie [Leclerc]  
is off, after which the TELUS Health communications were sent to both, but often did not  
include Mr. Olsen. The essential confusion on the management side as to who was responsible  
for the Grievor at this point is demonstrated by these records; and as it turned out I found that  
this continuing confusion materially impacted the Company’s dealings with the Grievor’s STD  
claim for reasons that will become apparent below.  
[220] On Thursday, December 6, the Grievor attended at a follow-up consultation by Dr. Adil.  
Dr. Adil provided a contemporaneous “Patient Encounter History” for the Company which was  
forwarded to TELUS Health. That document reported in relevant part that Dr. Adel outlined a  
diet and exercise plan for the Grievor (to address other immaterial medical issues) and that they  
discussed the treatment options for a large uterine fibrosis that included surgery (which had been  
a matter of some concern for a while that the Grievor testified she had been “upset” about) along  
with ordering lab tests for the Grievor. There was also an update on the Grievor’s “mood” which  
was described as “still not good”, indicating that the Grievor continued to be ‘a bit anxious’ for  
which she was receiving Ativan. And it revealed that the Grievor “will talk to a  
psychologist/counsellor on phone today”.  
[221] In her testimony the Grievor confirmed that at or about that time she was in contact with  
a counsellor who had been recommended through the Company’s Employee Assistance Program  
(“EAP”). Her evidence is that she received psychological counselling “over the telephone” to  
Page 78 of 196  
help her cope with her issues for “a couple of times or once a week, depending on our schedules”  
for “a couple of weeks” during this timeframe, which was not contradicted by the Company  
(although Ms. Bargen questioned the sufficiency of such counselling, as described below). The  
Grievor testified that she found this counselling “very helpful.”  
[222] On Friday, December 7, 2012, the Grievor saw Dr. Adil for the second time that week, in  
order to prepare the PAF requested by the Company, which required that she be examined again.  
In the Patient Encounter History of that examination (which was provided to the Company at  
some point in this timeframe), the Grievor’s doctor diagnosed her medical condition as, “anxiety  
neurosis, hysteria and neurasthenia”. The medical note describes the Grievor as an individual  
whose “stress at work” was “still ongoing”, which was characterized by Dr. Adil as, “+++stress”  
and “anxious[ness]”, and Dr. Adil also reported the Grievor would be “[speaking] with a  
counsellor today through work”. The medical record, consistent with the Grievor’s testimony  
indicates the Grievor continued to be unable to work, and it concludes that the Grievor would be  
reassessed in one week.  
[223] This examination was followed by Dr. Adil filling out the PAF required by the Company,  
that the fax signature line on that document indicates was transmitted by Dr. Adil’s office  
directly to the TELUS Health unit at 10:38 a.m. (Eastern Time) on Friday, December 7, 2012.  
The PAF was signed by the Grievor, expressly authorizing the Company to: “contact the  
practitioner in writing for any additional relevant information that they may require for [the  
purpose of establishing the employee’s fitness for work and/or level of disability].” As the  
evidence would later show, TELUS Health did not avail itself of that opportunity  
notwithstanding its stated concerns about the sufficiency or clarity of the information and detail  
provided by Dr. Adil.  
[224] The PAF was also signed by Dr. Adil who diagnosed the Grievor’s medical conditions as,  
“Stress/Anxiety”, and in describing the Grievor’s “signs and symptoms of the illness/injury”,  
wrote: “+++stress at work, anxiousness”. In itemizing the treatment that the Grievor was  
receiving, Dr. Adil wrote she was taking Ativan, counselling through her workplace sponsored  
Employee Assistance Program, and that she would be seeing an Obstetrician and Gynecologist  
(identified as Dr. J. P. Rubabaza) to be assessed for the treatment of large uterine fibroids (that  
Page 79 of 196  
ultimately might require surgery). Dr. Adil also noted on the PAF form that in her medical  
opinion the Grievor was temporarily unfit for work, and that the Grievor’s medical condition  
would need to be ‘reassessed in two weeks’.  
(d)  
Mr. Olsen’s Communications with TELUS Health  
[225] The Grievor’s cellphone records indicate that she called Mr. Olsen at 10:37 a.m. on  
December 7, 2012 which was about the same time the PAF was being faxed to TELUS Health in  
Burnaby. While I didn’t hear about the content of that telephone call, I infer from the Case  
Progress Notes Report that the Grievor told Mr. Olsen her PAF was being sent to TELUS Health.  
That is because the Case Progress Notes record that an e-mail from Mr. Olsen to Ms. McLeod  
was received in the morning of December 7, 2012 (with a copy to Ms. Fraser of Labour  
Relations) wherein Mr. Olsen wrote the following under the salutation, “Hi Kathleen”:  
I was advised by team member Tracy Baker that she was having her Doctor fill out and send a  
PAF yesterday, Thursday, December 5th. Can you please advise if you received it?  
This is a very specific situation regarding performance management that requires  
immediate attention, (sic) your quick reply is appreciated.  
[Emphasis added]  
[226] As an aside, December 5 in 2012 was a Wednesday (not a Thursday); with December 6  
and 7 falling on Thursday and Friday of that week. Mr. Olsen’s error in this regard is of no  
consequence as he took steps to follow up his e-mail with a direct telephone call to Ms. Bargen  
of TELUS Health on Monday, December 10, 2012 (apparently after speaking with Ms. Fraser  
who was also listening on the call). This call was documented by Ms. Bargen in the Case  
Progress Notes at 12:20 p.m. (Pacific Time) on December 10, 2012.  
[227] Once the Grievor provided TELUS Health with a signed PAF from her physician, a  
formal file was opened and Ms. Bargen was assigned as the Case Consultant on the file. Her role  
is to determine whether the medical information provided to the Company supports an  
employee’s claim of being “totally disabledin order to qualify for short term disability benefits.  
She testified that in a typical month she might be assigned 10 to 20 new files; and had received  
as many as 25 new files in one week. The Case Progress Notes indicate that her first substantive  
Page 80 of 196  
contact with the file occurred when Mr. Olsen called her. (At least, that is the very first entry  
that Ms. Bargen made on the Case Progress Notes Report in the Grievor’s file).  
[228] Mr. Olsen testified that in their telephone call, he provided Ms. Bargen with details of the  
Grievor’s recent employment issues and told her that “[he] was about to terminate Tracy when  
she called in sick”, which he told her was ‘concerning from a labour relations perspective. Mr.  
Olsen wanted to know when TELUS Health would deal with the Grievor’s disability claim “so  
we could have an understanding of what my next steps were going to be”. Mr. Olsen testified  
that Ms. Bargen, “shared with us that the claim had already been reviewed and was denied. She  
shared that with us at the outset of the call”. However, Mr. Olsen was advised that the Grievor  
had the right to appeal the rejection of the claim, and that Ms. Bargen would be communicating  
with the Grievor to receive more documentation that was required. Mr. Olsen testified that the  
reason he wanted to speak with Ms. Bargen, “was around the timelines and sharing with [Ms.  
Bargen] what had occurred in the [call centre] office”. In cross-examination he confirmed that at  
the time it was his opinion that the Grievor’s filing of a claim with TELUS Health for short term  
disability benefits was more related to her attempts at “fleeing discipline”.  
[229] Ms. Bargain testified that she came into work late on Friday, December 7, and thus didn’t  
review the PAF from the Grievor’s physician until the morning of Monday, December 10.  
(However, as indicated above, if in fact she did review the file that morning, she didn’t make any  
notation to that effect in the Health Services contemporaneous records.) She recalled the  
telephone call from Mr. Olsen and Ms. Fraser, who she testified, “wanted to give me some  
background information on the status of this employee, so that I would have a complete picture.”  
Ms. Bargen noted that Case Consultants have a list of pending claimsthat causes some  
administrative delay in dealing with individual files. However, when she reviewed the Case  
Progress Notes recording Mr. Olsen’s e-mail to Ms. McLeod of December 7, 2012, she  
interpreted the e-mail, “to mean that they wanted me to bring this case to the top of the list, to be  
addressed sooner rather than later.” And the evidence shows that is precisely what she did.  
[230] Ms. Bargen documented the December 10, 2012 telephone conversation with Mr. Olsen  
as her first substantive entry in the Case Progress Notes Report at 12:20 p.m. that day (Pacific  
Time), which Mr. Olsen confirmed in his testimony, “Seems very accurate”. Since this note is  
Page 81 of 196  
referred to later in the Case Progress Notes Report in circumstances described below, which I  
found had a material influence on the final decision on the Grievor’s claim, it is appropriate to  
set out Ms. Bargen’s note in its entirety as follows (with “TM” referring to the Grievor as a  
“Team Member” and “LR” referring to the TELUS “Labour RelationsDepartment):  
Attended a conference call at the request of the TM’s manager. He wanted to provide information  
on this case and also wanted LR (Cheryl Fraser) to be able to provide some information from their  
side as well.  
This TM was a work from home agent for the past 6 years. She has been employed at TELUS  
since 1998. There were issues with her performance and following an investigation, was  
suspended without pay for 5 days starting November 12, 2012. At that time her work from home  
privileges were revoked. During her suspension, she was trying to work from home, which caused  
additional breaches in security. Upon her return to work, she was required to work from the office.  
At that time there were additional performance issues that arose and she was asked to leave the  
workplace and not work or return to the office until specifically requested to do so by her manager.  
Her manager has tried to get in touch with her to arrange for her to come in following that incident,  
but he has not been able to reach her to set it up.  
The TM subsequently submitted the PAF for short term disability starting on November 28, 2012.  
The manager and LR identified that she has had very little sick time leading up to the particular  
claim, so are of the opinion that it is related to above situation.  
[Emphasis added]  
[231] If Ms. Bargen had determined that the Grievor was not eligible for STD benefits based on  
her review of the Grievor’s medical file prior to her telephone conversation with Mr. Olsen and  
Ms. Fraser on December 10, 2012, that is not what the Case Progress Notes Report says, which  
Ms. Bargen was writing into at the time to contemporaneously record her actions. Rather, the  
Report indicates that at 12:40 p.m., which was 10 minutes after the telephone conversation with  
Mr. Olsen, Ms. Bargen attempted without success to contact the Grievor for the first time for  
more information, writing the following in the Report log:  
Attempted to call the [Grievor] to discuss her claim. Left a message with a request to return my  
call. If she does not return my call, I will try again on Wednesday December 12, 2012. If she still  
does not return my call, I will deny the claim and notify her by written courier letter. The  
PAF that was submitted has minimal information on it and supports the likelihood that the  
problem is a workplace issue. The PAF indicates “+++stress at work and anxiety” with an aside  
that the [Grievor] has large uterine fibroids that will need to be removed at some point in the future.  
The physical medical condition would not support this sick leave since she has not seen the  
specialist as yet and possible surgery has not been booked.  
The physician has prescribed Ativan, but the dosage and frequency is not identified. The physician  
also indicated that the [Grievor] would be seeking counselling through the [EAP], but again no  
Page 82 of 196  
indication that the [Grievor] has followed through with this. The frequency of seeing the doctor was  
identified as “as needed”.  
[Emphasis added]  
[232] Contrary to Ms. Bargen’s and Mr. Olsen’s testimony, the foregoing Case Progress Notes  
support the finding that Ms. Bargen had not made the decision to deny the Grievor’s claim prior  
to their December 10 telephone conversation, which could only have been on the basis of a  
relatively short review of the Grievor’s medical documentation as of that morning, which if it did  
occur, she didn’t feel significant enough to document at the time. Instead of providing an  
independent assessment, and notwithstanding Ms. Bargen’s claims otherwise in her testimony  
before me, I concluded from a consideration of all of the evidence in context, that Mr. Olsen’s  
allegation that the Grievor’s absence was due to workplace performance issues became the lens  
through which Ms. Bargen evaluated the medical documentation which predisposed her towards  
viewing the matter as entirely a workplace dispute as opposed to the possibility of a legitimate  
health problem arising out of the workplace, regardless of the medical documentation she or the  
Company would later receive.  
[233] The evidence of Ms. Olsen’s telephone conversation with Ms. Bargen at the very  
beginning of her involvement with the Grievor’s file, in my assessment smacked of managerial  
interference which undermined any sense that Ms. Bargen was acting as an impartial arbiter of  
the medical documentation that I could rely upon as such. Rather, it cast her in the same net with  
Mr. Olsen and Ms. Fraser who were seeking to remove the Grievor from her employment as a  
person they believed to be deceitful and who had breached her position of trust. Anyone else  
reading the Grievor’s Case Progress Notes Report would see the record of Mr. Olsen’s  
allegations of workplace misconduct as the first substantial entry on the Report, which likely  
affected any independent perspective of the medical documentation.  
[234] Consistent with that viewpoint, in studying the Case Progress Notes after December 10,  
2012, it is apparent that the Grievor’s performance issues raised by Mr. Olsen in his telephone  
conversation with Ms. Bargen is repeatedly referred to as part of Ms. Bargen’s rationale in  
continuing to deny the sufficiency of the medical documentation provided by the Grievor’s  
physicians, notwithstanding the evidence also showing that her physicians were attempting to  
answer the demands for more information. And it may also explain why Ms. Bargen simply  
Page 83 of 196  
didn’t ask the Grievor’s physician(s) for clarifications if she thought the medical information on  
the PAF was deficient. That early notation in the Grievor’s Case Progress Notes Report  
recording Mr. Olsen’s allegations of disciplinable misconduct and marking her medical claims as  
an employment dispute was also referred to by others dealing with the Grievor’s health file, right  
up to the final assessment by the TELUS Health consulting physician, as described below.  
[235] Ms. Bargen testified that the information provided by Dr. Adil in the PAF was  
insufficient to substantiate any illness because the PAF did not use the proper terminology to  
describe a medically recognized condition or valid diagnosis that she found acceptable to her  
knowledge as a Registered Nurse (with experience as a Registered Psychiatric Nurse) and many  
years as a Case Consultant. Even though Dr. Adil indicated on the PAF that in her medical  
opinion the Grievor was ‘temporarily unfit for work’, Ms. Bargen testified that Dr. Adil’s  
diagnosis of “Stress/Anxiety” was not a recognized medical diagnosis, but rather it described a  
symptom. Dr. Adil’s answer to the “signs and symptoms of the illness” question asked for on  
the PAF as, “+++stress at work” and “anxiousness”, was also invalid terminology depicting no  
form of disease that would cause disability, according to Ms. Bargen. The fact that Dr. Adil  
referred to “stress at work” supported the conclusion that this was a workplace issue, in Ms.  
Bargen’s assessment. Also, the prescription listed in the PAF of Ativan was, to Ms. Bargen, not  
a proper “treatment” for the Grievor’s alleged condition; particularly where there was no dosage  
indicated or frequency of use, and where there was also no indication on the PAF that the  
Grievor had actually filled the prescription. And while acknowledging there was a reference to  
the Grievor seeking counselling, Ms. Bargen was concerned because there was no indication on  
the PAF that the Grievor was actually receiving counselling (with documentation identifying the  
name of the counsellor and dates of any counselling sessions) for any emotional or psychological  
disease, causing her therefore to reject that information as unsatisfactory.  
[236] Yet Ms. Bargen took no steps to contact Dr. Adil (in writing by e-mail or letter  
correspondence) to advise her what, specifically, was needed to remedy the deficiencies in the  
PAF to support the Grievor’s claim of being incapable of working that she had the right to do by  
the terms of the authorization signed by the Grievor or to seek clarification of Dr. Adil’s opinion.  
This was occurring against the backdrop of what Ms. Bargen described in testifying as her busy  
workload, and obvious pressure being placed on her by TELUS operational management to  
Page 84 of 196  
move the Grievor’s file “to the top of the list” so that Mr. Olsen could proceed with his stated  
intention to terminate the Grievor’s employment as soon as possible, which Ms. Bargen was  
aware of from the very beginning of her involvement. At this point it is apparent on the evidence  
of this and subsequent events that Mr. Olsen and Ms. Bargen believed the Grievor was  
attempting to use the “sick card” to avoid the termination that she knew was coming.  
[237] Consequently in the next encounter that Ms. Bargen had with the Grievor, the Case  
Progress Notes Report, consistent with Ms. Bargen’s testimony, records that Ms. Bargen spoke  
by telephone with the Grievor in the afternoon of Wednesday, December 12, 2012, and after  
receiving the Grievor’s answers to a medical questionnaire in which Ms. Bargen scored the  
Grievor’s “cooperation” on the form as “mixed” (because, as Ms. Bargen testified, the  
information she elicited from the Grievor through the questioning was not openly  
volunteered”), Ms. Bargen informed the Grievor that she would be denying her claim.  
[238] As corroborated by her notes, Ms. Bargen told the Grievor, “There is not sufficient  
justification to approve the claim particularly given the issues in the work place immediately  
prior to her submitting it(emphasis added), which supports the inference that Ms. Bargen’s  
mind was on the workplace issues immediately prior to the Grievor’s claim for disability  
benefits, as those issues had been described to her by Mr. Olsen, in viewing and assessing the  
medical documentation. Ms. Bargen also advised that another reason for denying the Grievor’s  
claim was that she was not receiving any significant treatment only Ativan and maybe  
counselling with the TELUS EAP program” with no indication of the dosage or the frequency of  
medication usage (which I noted parenthetically is not specifically requested on the PAF). Ms.  
Bargen informed the Grievor of her right to appeal the negative determination, which the Grievor  
said she would do.  
[239] This conversation was followed with a letter dated December 12, 2012 written by Ms.  
Bargen to the Grievor, reproduced in relevant part below.  
We have received and reviewed your recent Practitioner’s Assessment Form for Disability benefits.  
The medical information received is insufficient to confirm you eligibility for disability coverage  
based on the definition of total disability. The primary cause of your work absence as indicated  
on the PAF appears to be workplace related. The information provided states you are suffering  
from stress at work and anxiety. The degree of the two identified symptoms does not allow us to  
Page 85 of 196  
justify your complete incapacity to perform your regular duties for your employer. There is no  
confirmed formal treatment plan indicated other than the prescription of one medication with no  
identified dosage or frequency and the possibility of seeking counseling through the Employee  
Assistance Program.  
As the cause of your absence appears to be a workplace situation, we cannot consider your  
case for Disability benefits. Workplace matters are best addressed through open  
communications between the Team member and their manager and therefore, a work  
absence is not appropriate for your case.  
Accordingly, we have declined your claim for Short Term Disability benefits and we have advised  
your manager of our decision.  
Please contact your manager as soon as possible to discuss your return to work.  
If you disagree with this decision, please confirm to us, in writing, of your intent to appeal within 5  
business days of receipt of this letter.  
In addition, you will be required to submit any new medical information that you would like to bring  
to our attention as well as the medical information requested below. It will be our pleasure to review  
your file after receiving this information.  
Copy of your clinical notes including all dates of treatment over the past 6 months  
detailing the progression of your medical condition;  
Copy of confirmation of purchase of medication since the beginning of your disability  
and/or proof of other treatment prescribed (appointment schedule with the EAP as well as  
the name of the counsellor);  
Practitioner’s Assessment Form (PAF) duly completed by your physician. It must describe  
in detail the degree of severity of the observable symptomatology, the treatments  
currently under way and your response to these treatments, the schedule of appointments  
with your physician and any consultations, as well as the objective medical limitations that  
are incompatible with your regular duties and how these limitations prevent you from  
performing your regular duties.  
Any fees incurred in obtaining the above information are solely your responsibility.  
Please note that new medical information must be received in our office within 10 business days  
(14 calendar days) of receipt of this letter. If you are unable to meet this deadline for reasons  
beyond your control, please contact the undersigned to discuss the circumstances.  
[Emphasis added]  
[240] The Grievor received Ms. Bargen’s December 12 letter via courier at 4:10 p.m. (Eastern  
Time) on Thursday, December 13, 2012. The Grievor saw Dr. Adil before 9:00 a.m. the next  
day, on Friday, December 14 for her annual physical examination, which had apparently been  
scheduled for some time and wasn’t intended to address the Company’s requirement for a new  
Page 86 of 196  
PAF to support the Grievor’s appeal. The Patient Encounter History associated with that visit  
indicates that the Grievor was “upset” over her likely need for surgery to remove large uterine  
fibroids; but otherwise assessed the Grievor, as “healthy”. It was unclear on this record whether  
Dr. Adil was including the Grievor’s mental/emotional health along with her general physical  
condition in making that assessment, but consistent with the evidence of Dr. Adil’s subsequent  
dealings with the Grievor, I concluded it was not intended to cover the Grievor’s ongoing stress  
reaction to the circumstances at her workplace.  
[241] The Grievor scheduled a separate appointment with Dr. Adil to fill out a new PAF and  
review the other matters referred to in Ms. Bargen’s letter on Monday, December 17, in the late  
afternoon. However, Dr. Adil told the Grievor she would not be preparing another PAF as the  
original PAF contained all the information that Dr. Adil considered necessary to support her  
opinion that the Grievor continued to be temporarily unfit for work with a stress related illness.  
Nonetheless, Dr. Adil faxed 14 pages from the Grievor’s clinical file to TELUS Health  
containing all of the “Patient Encounter History” notes and records of all medications given to  
the Grievor over the past six months (as requested in Ms. Bargen’s denial letter), that included  
the Grievor’s prescription for 0.5 mg dosage of Apo-Lorazepam and references to her ongoing  
EAP counselling. These records also show that Dr. Adil had diagnosed the Grievor’s ailment as,  
“anxiety neurosis, hysteria, neurasthenia”, which did not affect Ms. Bargen’s evaluation because  
to her, the doctor did not use the proper terminology to describe any known medical condition.  
Ms. Bargen did not contact Dr. Adil in order to clarify her concerns, or to inform Dr. Adil what,  
precisely, she needed to substantiate a finding of total disability. Nor was there any suggestion of  
requiring the Grievor to be examined by another physician of the Company’s choice in order to  
substantiate Dr. Adil’s medical opinion on the PAF that the Grievor was ‘temporarily, totally  
disabled’ and unable to return to work.  
[242] In another Patient Encounter History that Dr. Adil prepared contemporaneously with her  
examination of the Grievor on December 17, 2012 (that was later provided to the Company), Dr.  
Adil reported in relevant part that the Grievor did not feel well enough to go back to work,  
stating: “bit anxious, ++stressed at work as work place is picking on her for minor things,  
impaired sleep/headache, not suicidal, not depressed, also anxious about uterine surgery…takes  
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Ativan p.m.” There was also a discussion recorded in the notes that suggested the Grievor “will  
try to go back to work on modified duties”, which did not occur.  
[243] The Grievor advised Ms. Bargen on December 17 that she intended to appeal TELUS  
Health’s initial decision to deny STD benefits. In Ms. Bargen’s Case Progress Notes Report of  
Tuesday, December 18, 2012 (at 2:44 p.m.), she wrote that she had “reviewed the additional  
medical information submitted by [the Grievor’s] doctor”, which she found to be “basically the  
same as what was provided in the original PAF”. As such, she concluded the information was not  
sufficient to reverse the denial of the Grievor’s claim for STD, writing, “The issue still appears to  
be a work place issue and is best resolved in the work place.”  
[244] Ms. Bargen consequently left a voice-mail message for the Grievor, which the Grievor  
returned on December 19, 2012. The Case Progress Notes Report as supported by Ms. Bargen’s  
testimony indicates that she then had the following conversation with the Grievor at or about  
11:23 a.m. (Pacific Time), formally advising her that her appeal had been denied:  
[The Grievor] called back. I notified her that we were unable to reverse the denial for her claim.  
She repeatedly said that she could not understand why. She stated that her manager was  
“harassing” her at work and were accusing her of not doing her job properly. I explained  
that these factors clearly indicate a workplace issue and that it is best resolved in the  
workplace through open communication between herself and her managers. She just kept  
saying that she couldn’t understand why she would be denied since the problem was stress and  
anxiety. I explained serval times that the issue was workplace related and was best resolved  
there, otherwise there would never be any resolution.  
She stated that she would be taking the issue to her union. She was also requesting that I send  
the original denial letter to her email because she does not have the original one she left it at her  
doctor’s office.  
[Emphasis added]  
[245] (As discussed later in these Reasons, this was the first time that the Grievor alleged her  
supervisor had been “harassing” her. This allegation of “harassing” behaviour became a focal  
point in the Company’s subsequent cross-examination of the Grievor and the granting of the  
Company’s request for an order disclosing the Grievor’s cellphone records.)  
[246] The Case Progress Notes Report entry at 12:01 p.m. (Pacific Time) on December 19,  
consistent with Ms. Bargen’s testimony on point, record that Ms. Bargen followed-up this  
telephone conversation with a formal letter written to the Grievor denying the Grievor’s appeal.  
Page 88 of 196  
This letter was delivered to the Grievor by courier and received by her in the afternoon of  
December 20, 2012.  
[247] The next entry in the Case Progress Notes, one minute later at 12.02 p.m. (Pacific Time)  
on December 19, 2012, records that Ms. Bargen had sent an e-mail to Mr. Olsen (copied to Ms.  
Fraser) advising that the Grievor’s appeal had been denied. That e-mail stated in relevant part:  
Hello Ronnie,  
This is to follow up with you about the leave that began on November 28, 2012 for your employee  
Tracy Baker.  
We initially received a Practitioner’s Assessment Form on December 3, 2012, and based on our  
review at that time, we determined that the medical information was insufficient to support the  
claim. The claim was subsequently denied and the Team Member was notified both verbally and in  
writing.  
The Team Member elected to appeal this denial and submitted additional medical information  
which was received on December 18, 2012 for our consideration.  
The additional medical information provided was insufficient to support this leave and does not  
correspond to the notion of total disability preventing her from performing her duties.  
Since the medical documentation is insufficient to support the claim and the Team  
Member’s eligibility for short-term disability has not been established, each day this Team  
Member is absent should be coded “AS” unpaid.  
A letter is being couriered to the Team Member today advising her of our review findings. She  
should receive the letter some time tomorrow. I have also spoken to her today and notified her of  
the denial. The Team Member informed me that she will be contacting her union representative to  
discuss next steps.  
Thank you.  
[Emphasis added]  
[248] I was advised by Ms. Bargen that the term, “AS” in the foregoing e-mail referred to  
“unpaid sick”, which was the way the Grievor’s continuing absence was to be coded for payroll  
purposes (to ensure that the Grievor would not be paid while off work). Mr. Olsen described this  
as the code for, “absence unpaid”.  
(e)  
The December 20, 2012 “Dividing Line”  
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[249] In considering the circumstances of Period 3 in this case leading to the Grievor’s first  
dismissal on January 11, 2013, the date of Thursday, December 20, 2012 emerges as a surprising  
dividing line of some significance. After that day, three events seem to be ongoing  
simultaneously over the next three weeks (although it should be noted that about half of that  
interval fell over the Christmas/New Year’s holiday period, where little happened).  
[250] First, Ms. Bargen left for vacation on December 20, 2012 and her involvement with the  
Grievor came to an end as of that date. She was replaced by Mr. Douglas Carra of TELUS  
Health who became responsible for the Grievor’s file as Senior Case Consultant. After receiving  
Ms. Bargen’s letter denying her second appeal of the Company’s decision to reject her claim for  
STD benefits, the Grievor contacted Mr. Carra by e-mail dated December 20, 2012 notifying him  
that she wanted to appeal the decision, and asking him what the appeal process was. Mr. Carra  
responded to the Grievor by e-mail dated December 21, 2012, telling her, in part: “We would be  
pleased to review medical information that has not been submitted previously” and giving her  
further instructions in that regard on the nature of the necessary medical information, which he  
advised the Grievor, “must be provided at your own expense and is required to be submitted  
within 10 days.”  
[251] In cross-examination, Ms. Bargen noted that employees were permitted two appeals of  
decisions by TELUS Health to deny their claims for benefits, which had been provided to the  
Grievor. However, Ms. Bargen also agreed that if the Grievor wanted to submit additional  
information after the second appeal, TELUS Health would have reviewed and considered it in  
potentially reversing its decision on STD eligibility, which is consistent with Mr. Carra’s e-mail  
of December 21, 2012 inviting the Grievor to submit any new medical information she had.  
[252] Second and likely prompted by Mr. Carra’s stated willingness to consider “medical  
information that was not submitted previously”, the Grievor began seeing another doctor named,  
Robert Verdonk, at or about the end of December 2012 in addition to Dr. Adil. The Grievor  
testified that she had seen Dr. Verdonk previously at a walk-in clinic located two blocks from her  
home, initially in connection with a sinus infection, but later began seeing him on a regular basis  
for the treatment of the Grievor’s ongoing anxiety and stress disorder, which she testified was  
causing her to “cry daily”. Ms. Bargen was asked about Dr. Verdonk’s appearance as the  
Page 90 of 196  
Grievor’s physician in her examination-in-chief. Although she had never dealt with Dr. Verdonk  
before, Ms. Bargen looked up Dr. Verdonk’s profile on the Ontario College of Physicians and  
Surgeons website indicating that Dr. Verdonk had been in the practice of family medicine since  
November 28, 2005. This document was filed with me on consent.  
[253] Ms. Bargen testified that while it was common for patients to have any number of  
specialists working along with the family doctor, she considered it “unusual” for the Grievor to  
have had two family doctors at the same time, being Dr. Adil and Dr. Verdonk that she believed  
might pose a health hazard for a patient if one family doctor didn’t know what the other was  
doing. The Grievor was cross-examined about this as well, with the suggestion that there was  
something wrong in the nature of improper “doctor shopping” by the Grievor securing the  
services of another family doctor at this time, along with maintaining her professional  
relationship with Dr. Adil, which the Grievor denied.  
[254] I could find no basis for the Company’s supposition. It was apparent from the Grievor’s  
testimony that by December 20 she had become somewhat dissatisfied with Dr. Adil’s attention  
to the written forms that TELUS Health required, and the Grievor continued to feel unwell as a  
result of ongoing anxiety and stress in spite of the treatment provided by Dr. Adil. Like any  
patient who is faced with the problem of a physician who is not providing the relief or level of  
attention the patient is seeking, the Grievor was entitled to look elsewhere for medical advice,  
which as the evidence later demonstrated helped the Grievor in coping with the problems she  
claimed to be experiencing at that time. Moreover, there is no suggestion that Dr. Verdonk  
wasn’t a qualified professional who didn’t provide appropriate medical services to the Grievor,  
that included his preparation of a new PAF dated January 8, 2013, which Ms. Bargen was asked  
about. That PAF, which will be described in detail below (along with Ms. Bargen’s assessment),  
factored significantly in my findings on whether the Grievor was disabled during Period 3, and  
certainly as of the date of her first dismissal on January 11, 2013.  
[255] The third ongoing event in this period was the evaluation of new medical documentation.  
Once Mr. Olsen became aware of Mr. Carra’s appointment as the new Case Consultant, he didn’t  
hesitate to make his perspective on matters known to Mr. Carra, thus continuing the pattern of  
attempting to influence the supposed independent assessment of the new medical documentation  
Page 91 of 196  
by TELUS Health. The Company didn’t call Mr. Carra as a witness to speak to the additional  
medical information received from a number of different physicians in the last three weeks to the  
Grievor’s termination, nor to explain his reasons for apparently rejecting that new information as  
having any effect on the Grievor’s claim for STD. Moreover, to the extent that I received a  
medical opinion from a Dr. Wilson, who was identified as the Consulting Occupational  
Physician of TELUS Health at the time (who according to Ms. Bargen worked one day per  
week), and who was purportedly given the Grievor’s file to assess whether it disclosed proof of a  
disability that would prevent her from attending work, in the absence of hearing from Dr. Wilson  
or Mr. Carra to indicate exactly what Dr. Wilson based his medical opinion on (particularly  
given Ms. Bargen’s testimony about the PAF submitted by Dr. Verdonk, reviewed below), I  
could not give that opinion much if any weight.  
[256] The Company’s failure to call Mr. Carra to explain why he found the additional medical  
information submitted by the Grievor’s physicians, and in particular, Dr. Verdonk’s final PAF  
insufficient to support the Grievor’s claim of being totally disabled and unable to work, having  
regard to the appropriate placement of the Company’s shifted onus in this case and particularly  
in view of Ms. Bargen’s later testimony of her assessment of that final PAF, left me with medical  
documentation from the Grievor’s physicians supporting the Grievor’s claim of being unfit for  
work that was not explicitly contradicted by the Company.  
(f)  
Mr. Olsen and the Grievor on the Road to Termination  
[257] The Grievor’s cellphone records confirm that after Mr. Olsen received Ms. Bargen’s e-  
mail of December 19 (at about noon) advising that the Grievor’s second appeal had been denied,  
he called the Grievor within two hours at 1:55 p.m. leaving a voice-mail message ordering the  
Grievor to report back to work on Friday, December 21, 2012. The Case Progress Notes indicate  
that Mr. Olsen’s call to the Grievor was made before the Grievor received Ms. Bargen’s formal  
letter of December 19 denying her second appeal. Those Case Progress Notes also show that the  
Grievor sent an e-mail to Mr. Carra at 2:48 p.m. on December 20, stating: “I received this letter  
today and I would like to appeal this decision. What is the appeal process?” The Grievor also  
sent an e-mail to Mr. Olsen in the morning of December 20 in response to his earlier voice-mail  
message, advising him that she would not be in to work because: “I am not feeling well today as  
Page 92 of 196  
I have an ear infection and a major headache.” She wrote to Mr. Olsen again by e-mail dated  
December 21, 2012 with a copy to TELUS Health, in which she advised that she was appealing  
the Company’s decision to decline her request for STD, and that, “My next doctor appointment  
is December 28 for follow up and more documentation will be submitted to health services. My  
family doctor has me off work until January 3, 2013.” She also sent Mr. Olsen a separate e-mail  
at 9:00 a.m. on December 21 stating: “My doctor has written me off work which health services  
is aware of. I will not be into work today as I am sick.”  
[258] It was clear on the evidence that Mr. Olsen wanted the Grievor to return to work  
immediately so that he could terminate her on Friday, December 21, 2012 as he was scheduled to  
leave on vacation at the end of that day until Wednesday, January 2, 2013. He intended to use  
the same termination letter prepared for the November 28, 2012, when the Grievor didn’t return  
to work because of claimed illness.  
[259] By then, however, the Grievor had notified Mr. Carra that she wished to appeal the  
Company’s decision, asserting that she continued to be ill and unable to work as confirmed by  
her doctor. Mr. Olsen’s subsequent actions are consistent with what I found to be his  
understanding that he could not terminate the Grievor’s services while her claim of being unwell  
and unable to work remained under active consideration by TELUS Health.  
[260] Mr. Olsen consequently sent the following letter to the Grievor dated December 21, 2012,  
directing her to report for work on January 2, 2013, reproduced in relevant part below:  
Re: Insufficient Medical Information/Report for Work  
You have been absent from work since November 28, 2012. The PAF you submitted does not  
support your absence from work. You were requested to provide additional medical documentation  
to support your absence, which has been reviewed. As you are aware, the additional medical  
information does not support your continued absence from work. As such, you are considered to  
be absent unauthorized.  
You were contacted via phone and directed to report to work today, Friday December 21, 2012.  
You have failed to report to work as directed.  
It is our expectation that you return to work immediately on Wednesday, January 2, 2013 at 9:00  
a.m. to provide additional medical information to support your absence. Failure to report to work or  
contact me to explain your continued absence will be considered job abandonment and may result  
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in the termination of your employment. I expect you to contact me immediately at [phone number  
redacted].  
[261] At or about the same time, Mr. Olsen sent an e-mail dated December 21 to Ms. Fraser  
with a copy to Mr. Carra of TELUS Health, advising them of his letter to the Grievor demanding  
her return to work on January 2, 2013, and confirming he would be on vacation until that date.  
(Mr. Olsen testified that he chose January 2 as the day for the Grievor’s return to work,  
notwithstanding acknowledging that he knew the Grievor had a medical appointment scheduled  
for December 28 and that she was asserting she had a note from her doctor excusing her from  
work until January 3, 2013).  
[262] In his e-mail of December 21, 2012 Mr. Olsen also directed the following comments to  
Mr. Carra, consistent with what I found to have been his past attempts to interfere with the  
independent evaluation of the Grievor’s medical documentation and to speed the process along  
so that he could dismiss the Grievor with minimal delay:  
Doug Could you please look out for more documentation from Tracy Baker today? She has  
indicated she is sending more medical to appeal the decline on her original appeal. Please advise  
ASAP if the additional medical provided will result in approving the claim.  
Based on the information I am aware of, I believe the reason for the claim started in the  
workplace, therefore should be resolved in the workplace.  
[Emphasis added]  
[263] In response to Mr. Olsen’s e-mail, Mr. Carra wrote to him later that day stating in part,  
that: “[The Grievor] has emailed me to request what information is required to submit an appeal.  
I have advised her that we require a detailed medical report from her MD to be provided within  
10 days.” The e-mail went on to inform Mr. Olsen that “just moments ago” TELUS Health had  
received “a letter from her therapist for an unrelated condition…not from an MD (which) does  
not provide sufficient information for us to reconsider her case.” This communication to Mr.  
Olsen was, from a review of the Case Progress Notes, before Mr. Carra had notified the Grievor  
that the information from her therapist was not acceptable, which was consistent with a view of  
TELUS Health as being more an arm of management than an impartial authority for assessing an  
employee’s entitlement to benefits under the Company’s STD plan.  
Page 94 of 196  
[264] In the period from December 21, 2012 to January 2, 2013, the documentary record  
consistent with the Grievor’s testimony confirms that the Grievor was taking steps to address her  
perceived compromised medical state and to provide TELUS Health with new medical  
information as instructed by Mr. Carra in support of her further appeal.  
[265] Thus during this interval the Grievor submitted a letter from her Chiropractor, Adam  
Armstrong, DC, dated December 21, 2012 describing a visit on November 12 for low back pain  
and the nature of the Grievor’s ongoing treatment for musculoskeletal concerns “for the last  
month”. (This was evidently the letter from her ‘non-MD’ therapist that Mr. Carra told Mr. Olsen  
he had dismissed out of hand as insufficient).  
[266] In the five-day period commencing Monday, December 17, 2012 to Friday, December  
21, 2012 inclusive, the documentary record indicates the Grievor had at least 15 separate  
communications with TELUS Health and/or management consisting of: (1) the Grievor’s  
telephone call to Ms. Bargen on December 17; (2) a voice-mail message from Ms. Bargen to the  
Grievor on December 18; (3) a responding voice-mail message from the Grievor to Ms. Bargen  
on December 19; (4) Ms. Bargen’s unsuccessful attempt to reach the Grievor by telephone on  
December 19 and leaving a voice-mail message to her; (5) a telephone call from the Grievor to  
Ms. Bargen on December 19 returning her earlier call; (6) Mr. Olsen’s voice-mail message of  
December 19 ordering the Grievor to return to work on December 21; (7) an e-mail  
communication from Ms. Bargen on December 19 enclosing a copy of Ms. Bargen’s earlier  
December 12 letter rejecting the Grievor’s earlier appeal (as previously requested by the  
Grievor); (8) Ms. Bargen’s formal letter rejecting the Grievor’s appeal on December 20; (9) the  
Grievor’s e-mail of December 20 to Mr. Carra notifying him of her request to appeal the  
Company’s latest denial of her STD claim; (10) the Grievor’s e-mail to Mr. Olsen dated  
December 20 advising him that she would not be reporting to work on December 21 because of  
continuing illness; (11) another e-mail from the Grievor to Mr. Olsen on December 21 advising  
she would be faxing additional documentation to TELUS Health; (12) an e-mail communication  
from Mr. Carra on December 21 acknowledging her appeal; (13) the Grievor’s apparent  
forwarding of a fax from Adam Armstrong, DC to TELUS Health on December 21; (14) receipt  
of Mr. Olsen’s letter of December 21 by courier delivery at 3:46 p.m. (advising the Grievor of  
her requirement to report for work at 9:00 a.m. on January 2, 2013); and (15) a voice-mail  
Page 95 of 196  
communication on December 21, 2012 from the Grievor to Mr. Olsen’s telephone at or about  
6:28 p.m. that evening, responding to the earlier message.  
[267] I shall have more to say about this level of communications between the parties, when I  
consider the Company’s submissions later in these Reasons that the Grievor’s testimony in its  
entirety could not be believed because she overstated the number of specific telephone contacts  
she had with Mr. Olsen in this timeframe amid her allegations that Mr. Olsen was “harassing”  
her. Certainly the evidence supports the finding that there was a great deal of contact (often in  
the form of voice-mail and e-mail communications) between the Grievor and various levels of  
TELUS Health and managerial officials during this period.  
[268] It was against the foregoing backdrop of communications before and immediately  
afterwards along with ongoing complaints of extreme stress and anxiety, that the Grievor was  
examined by Dr. Adil, at or about mid-day on December 21, 2012. Consistent with the Grievor’s  
testimony, Dr. Adil’s Patient Encounter History written at or about the time of the examination  
records Dr. Adil’s continuing diagnosis of: “Anxiety neurosis, hysteria, neurasthenia”. It notes  
that the Grievor reported her workplace was “harassing her” and that “work called her 3 times  
yesterday”. It states that the Grievor was experiencing more headaches and anxiety, with  
feelings of anxiousness, low energy and impaired sleep. As a result of the examination Dr. Adil  
prescribed “Pristiq” (an anti-depressant) and clonazepam (used in the treatment of panic  
disorders or anxiety), cautioning the Grievor against driving as these medications may cause  
drowsiness. And as requested by the Grievor, Dr. Adil promised to refer her to a psychiatrist to  
help her deal with these difficulties (although the Grievor testified that Dr. Adil ultimately did  
not send her to a psychiatrist, as originally promised).  
[269] There is a gap in the record over the Christmas holiday but immediately thereafter, the  
medical records produced through Dr. Adil’s office indicate that on December 26 the Grievor  
attended at the emergency department of an Oshawa Hospital Clinic for the treatment of “right  
lower quadrant pain”, the details of which remain vague in the evidence, but which appear to  
have been related to the Grievor’s ongoing gynecological issues.  
[270] On December 27, 2012, the Grievor saw Dr. Adil to consider a number of continuing  
problems for which she had been regularly consulting with Dr. Adil; including the Grievor’s  
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recent emergency attendance at the Oshawa Clinic for abdominal pain, her feelings of extreme  
anxiety and stress, and to review an upcoming appointment with Dr. Gregory Athaide, who is a  
specialist in Obstetrics & Gynecology, for a second opinion on her issues with uterine fibroids,  
bladder frequency and cervical dysplasia (apparently related to her colposcopy of abnormal  
cells). The Grievor testified that the appointment with the gynecological specialist had been  
scheduled for 10:30 a.m. on January 2, 2013 sometime earlier, which was the day that Mr. Olsen  
had in his December 21 letter directed her to report at 9:00 a.m. Her evidence was that Dr.  
Athaide’s office (located in Whitby) was about 45 minutes to one hour travel time from the  
Scarborough call centre, and that she had alerted Mr. Olsen to this appointment. Dr. Athaide’s  
medical report of the Grievor’s attendance at his office was entered into evidence to confirm her  
visit on January 2 (that was later provided to TELUS Health), which the Grievor testified she did  
not want to move as such appointments with medical specialists are difficult to get.  
[271] When cross-examined about Dr. Adil’s report on the Patient Encounter History for  
December 27 that described the Grievor’s mood was “stable”, and that while the Grievor was not  
suicidal, “she did not feel good enough to go to work”, the Grievor responded that she was  
“crying every day”, which is consistent with the medical reports. The Grievor also confirmed in  
cross-examination that between November 28 and December 27, she had seen Dr. Adil on seven  
occasions for treatment of her ongoing issues. She had also been to a walk-in clinic immediately  
after the November 27 investigatory meeting (with Dr. Torkian) and on December 31  
(considered below), for a total of nine medical visits over a period of about four and one-half  
weeks. (The Company later pointed to this as evidence of “doctor shopping”. However, I saw it  
as consistent with the dire physical and emotional crisis she felt herself descending into at the  
time).  
[272] On December 27, 2012 at the Grievor’s request, Dr. Adil’s office faxed a medical note  
dated December 21 from the Grievor’s primary Obstetrician & Gynecologist, Dr. J. P. Rubabaza  
to TELUS Health (documenting her 10th visit to a physician since November 27, not including  
her emergency attendance at the hospital). Consistent with the Grievor’s testimony and prior  
medical reports submitted into evidence, this document recorded an additional medical  
examination of the Grievor on December 21 in connection with a number of gynecological  
problems, including what is described as “crippling pain” while the Grievor was on her menses  
Page 97 of 196  
that had developed by that point, increased fatigue at such times that is reported as “affecting her  
life” and that she “has to miss work” as a result; a review of “abnormal cells” with the notation  
of “undergoing colposcopy”, and the ongoing problem of a large uterine fibroid which was  
upsetting to her.  
[273] The Grievor was also keeping TELUS Health apprised of her efforts to secure additional  
medical documentation to support her appeal of the Company’s denial of STD benefits in  
accordance with Mr. Carra’s earlier direction of December 20, sending an e-mail to Mr. Carra on  
December 28 confirming that a “specialist report” (from Dr. Rubabaza) had been sent to the  
attention of Diane Bargen the day before, and that the Grievor had other appointments scheduled  
for January 2, 2013 and January 9, 2013. She concluded by advising Mr. Carra that she was,  
“still gather(ing) more information”. This communication was duly confirmed in a responding e-  
mail from another administrative coordinator in TELUS Health on December 28, 2012, which  
also advised the Grievor that: “Health Services is currently experiencing higher than anticipated  
claim volumes. This is resulting in longer than normal response and adjudication times. We  
sincerely apologize for this delay and any inconvenience.” That same warning of increased  
response and adjudication times due to claim volumes was repeated in the record from TELUS  
Health to the end of the Grievor’s employment.  
[274] Both Mr. Olsen and the Grievor confirm that the Grievor contacted Mr. Olsen on  
December 28, 2012 (obviously utilizing the telephone number that Mr. Olsen referred to in his  
letter of December 21 that she was to use while he was on vacation, although that is not certain).  
Notwithstanding that both Mr. Olsen and the Grievor confirm this telephone communication, it  
was not included in the cellphone records later produced to me, causing me to question the utility  
of that as a definitive record of all of the telephone contact between the Grievor and Mr. Olsen in  
the relevant timeframe, which later was a topic of some contention between the parties and  
submissions by the Company in support of its claim that the Grievor’s testimony could not be  
believed in its entirety, as discussed below. Indeed, I was advised as part of the “stipulations” of  
the parties concerning the Grievor’s cellphone records submitted into evidence, those records  
only covered one telephone number from Mr. Olsen, which did not include other telephone  
numbers that he might have called the Grievor from in the course of these ongoing events. As  
discussed below, I concluded on that basis (combined with the corroborating evidence of  
Page 98 of 196  
telephone calls that were not recorded on the cellphone records) that those records did not  
disclose all of the telephone communications between the Grievor and Mr. Olsen.  
[275] Mr. Olsen’s evidence is that he remembered a telephone discussion with the Grievor on  
December 28 in which she informed him she wouldn’t be able to report for work on January 2  
because she had a doctor’s appointment that day. Mr. Olsen testified: “I told her I provided her  
with almost two weeks to be able to get back to work. If she had a doctor’s appointment she  
could change that over two weeks and I told her it was imperative she returned that day and if  
she was going to have more time off she would need to fulfill the requirements of medical  
documentation required from Health Services for the appeal.” In response to this, Mr. Olsen  
testified that the Grievor told him she “wasn’t going to return to work until her doctor said she  
was ok to”, which elicited Mr. Olsen’s reply to the Grievor that: “she would either need medical  
documentation to support that or she needed to report for work.”  
[276] As the year was ending on December 31, the Grievor had an urgent attendance at the  
CMC Medical Centre, which is a walk-in clinic located in a Wal-Mart store close to her home.  
She was treated for a sinus or general viral infection by Dr. Verdonk, who prescribed an inhaler  
for her, which she filled that day or the next.  
[277] The PAF later prepared by Dr. Verdonk states that December 31, 2012 was the date of  
first visit”; however the Grievor testified that she had in fact seen Dr. Verdonk before. While the  
Company pointed to this as a discrepancy undermining the Grievor’s credibility, I did not  
consider it material in this case. Regardless of any prior visits that the Grievor may have had  
with Dr. Verdonk, (and indeed I did not take the notation on the PAF as determinative of the first  
time that Dr. Verdonk had ever seen the Grievor as opposed to seeing the Grievor in connection  
with the matters related to her STD claim), the documentation filed with me indicates  
definitively that she began to see Dr. Verdonk afterwards on at least a weekly basis, for  
counselling and psychotherapy to help her in coping with ongoing anxiety and stress.  
(g)  
The Grievor’s Abortive Meeting with Mr. Olsen on January 2, 2013  
[278] The Grievor testified she was feeling very ill with a fever on January 2, 2013 as a result  
of the viral infection she had initially seen Dr. Verdonk about, less than 48 hours earlier, when  
Page 99 of 196  
she nevertheless reported to the Scarborough call centre at 9:00 a.m. as Mr. Olsen had instructed  
in his December 21, 2012 correspondence. While testifying that she should not have gone into  
work that day before her doctors had cleared her, and that she was still ill with an infection  
requiring her use of a puffer and medication, she felt that it was important that she meet with Mr.  
Olsen given that he told her it was “imperative” she do so, and even knowing that she would  
have to leave very soon afterwards for her scheduled appointment with Dr. Athaide at 10:30  
a.m., which she had told Mr. Olsen about in advance. She maintained in the face of relentless  
cross-examination that he didn’t know that Mr. Olsen intended to fire her that morning. Their  
meeting, or rather brief encounter, didn’t last very long.  
[279] Mr. Olsen’s testimony (as supplemented by an e-mail memorandum he wrote to himself  
five days later on January 7) is that the Grievor reported to him at the call centre at 9:10 a.m. As  
recorded in Mr. Olsen’s e-mail memorandum that he referred to in recounting the events, upon  
arriving the Grievor came to Mr. Olsen’s desk and advised him “that she was not feeling well  
and would have to leave for the day.” The Grievor told Mr. Olsen that, “she had a fever and  
could not stay.” Mr. Olsen responded by asking the Grievor, ‘to stay in a seat that he designated  
while he made phone calls to Health Services and Labour Relations’ but that the Grievor  
responded: “You won’t get them now (because) they are in the West”. Mr. Olsen nevertheless  
told the Grievor he would try to reach them and “to stay while (Mr. Olsen) made a few calls.”  
[280] Mr. Olsen then left for his office to supposedly make telephone calls to TELUS Health  
and to Ms. Fraser of Labour Relations. He testified he had already prepared a termination letter  
for the Grievor, which was the same letter he intended to give her on November 28, 2012 that  
was updated by changing the date of the letter and replacing his name for Ms. Leclerc’s on the  
signature line. While Mr. Olsen’s didn’t explain in testifying what, exactly, he needed to call  
TELUS Health and Labour Relations about; it seems a reasonable inference that he was inquiring  
about the status of the Grievor’s medical appeal to make sure he was able to issue the  
termination letter to her. I received no evidence concerning the outcome of that call, and the  
Case Progress Notes from TELUS Health do not record any call from Mr. Olsen to anyone in  
TELUS Health on that day, and certainly not just after 6:10 a.m. Pacific time, which is when Mr.  
Olsen testified he made his call.  
Page 100 of 196  
[281] Instead, the Case Progress Notes reveal that at 9:46 a.m. (Pacific Time) on January 2,  
2013 Ms. McLeod noted on the TELUS Health records that a medical note from the Grievor’s  
gynecologist, Dr. Rubabaza (dated December 21) had been received indicating the presence of a  
“fibroid 8*8 cms” with the notation of a recall appointment scheduled for the Grievor in four  
weeks. The Case Progress Notes also show that, at 9:49 a.m., Ms. McLeod sent an e-mail to  
Debbie Leclerc with a copy for Keith Fischer in which Ms. McLeod wrote in relevant part:  
Health Services received an updated Doctor’s Note for the above noted team member on  
December 28, 2012. It has been referred to our Case Consultant, Diane Bargen and will be  
reviewed as soon as possible.  
A decision will be made and communicated to you shortly.  
Health Services is currently experiencing higher than anticipated claim volumes; this is resulting in  
longer than normal response and adjudication times. We sincerely apologize for this delay and any  
inconvenience.  
If you have any questions regarding the status of this claim, please contact the case  
consultant directly.  
[Emphasis added]  
[282] There is no indication on this e-mail that Mr. Olsen was copied with this updated  
information, suggesting that in fact he did not receive it. Also, the reference in that e-mail to the  
“higher than anticipated claim volumes…resulting in longer than normal response and  
adjudication times” appears as an ongoing warning in the communications from TELUS Health  
to the end of the Grievor’s employment. This is consistent with a view of TELUS Health at this  
time of rushing files through the system and making mistakes, like the repeated misidentification  
of the Grievor’s supervisors throughout and the misdirection of important communications.  
[283] Notwithstanding the erroneous reference to Ms. Leclerc as the Grievor’s supervisor and  
referral to Mr. Fischer, I found on this documentary evidence and in particular the lack of any  
reference to Mr. Olsen’s purported telephone call to TELUS Health (which would have occurred  
before the health unit had opened) that: (a) Mr. Olsen likely never did contact TELUS Health on  
January 2; and (b) that the Grievor’s further appeal of the decision to deny STD benefits  
remained under active reconsideration by TELUS Health at that time. It is even unclear whether  
Mr. Olsen contacted Ms. Fraser of Labour Relations for direction, who did not testify in these  
proceedings. I make these findings notwithstanding Mr. Olsen’s testimony before me in which  
Page 101 of 196  
he stated that after I spoke with Health Services and Labour Relations(emphasis added) he  
returned with the updated termination letter that he intended to issue to the Grievor, only to find  
that the Grievor “was not back in the seat where I left her”, which Mr. Olsen further claimed had  
only been 10 minutes earlier. In my assessment, that was a lot to do in merely 10 minutes,  
leading me to question the reliability of that time estimate.  
[284] Given the inconsistencies of Mr. Olsen’s testimony with the documentary evidence and  
what seems more likely in the circumstances (particularly given the time of day that he claimed  
to have made the call to TELUS Health which would have been shortly after 6 a.m. Pacific  
Time), I found that Mr. Olsen’s evidence in this regard was unreliable if not deliberately  
incredible. Given what TELUS Health was advising Mr. Fischer by e-mail at the same time  
(who does not appear to be communicating with Mr. Olsen on the matter), that TELUS Health  
had received more medical documentation that was being assessed, it seems more likely on the  
totality of the evidence best in harmony with all surrounding circumstances that Mr. Olsen would  
not have received authorization to proceed with the Grievor’s termination that morning, had he  
in fact asked, because her claim remained under open consideration at that time.  
[285] Mr. Olsen consequently testified that he “walked around the floor looking for [the  
Grievor] and ran into Mark Plumber, who is a management peer, and who told him that he saw  
the Grievor leave the call centre. This was consistent with the Grievor’s evidence on point, who  
testified that she was feeling very unwell with a viral infection for which she was using an  
inhaler and taking medication. After waiting for a period of time for Mr. Olsen to return (which  
on the Grievor’s recounting seemed to be more than 10 minutes) and not wanting to be late for  
her scheduled appointment with Dr. Athaide, the Grievor admitted that she left. She confirmed  
that she saw Mr. Plumber while in the elevator on her way exiting the building, who she  
testified: “I told him I was sick and going home, and he said if I am sick to go home”. Mr.  
Plumber was not called as a witness in these proceedings to contradict that testimony or to  
dispute the Grievor’s assertions of her obvious medical distress at that time.  
[286] Thus Mr. Olsen recorded in his e-mail memorandum dated January 7, and repeated in his  
testimony before me, that: “[The Grievor] did not inform me that she was leaving. I did not  
receive a call, email or any other notification” (emphasis added). However, on the evidence  
Page 102 of 196  
before me, I found that Mr. Olsen’s assertion that he did not receive “a call, email or any other  
notification” from the Grievor not to be entirely accurate. He may not have received a telephone  
call or e-mail from the Grievor at that very moment, but he did later in the day from which he  
would reasonably have understood the reasons why she had left.  
[287] The uncontradicted evidence before me is that after leaving the call centre the Grievor  
attended her examination by Dr. Athaide at his office in Whitby (who, as indicated above,  
confirmed that attendance in his January 2 medical report that was later forwarded to TELUS  
Health). Sometime thereafter on that same day (the precise time being unclear) it is apparent that  
the Grievor saw Dr. Verdonk again, who provided the Grievor with a medical note dated January  
2, 2013 that stated: “Please excuse Tracy for work Jan 2 – 4 /13 for medical reasons. Thank  
you.” The fax signature line of the copy of this note received by TELUS Health indicates that it  
was faxed directly from Dr. Verdonk’s office at 4:00 p.m. (Eastern Time) that afternoon (which  
Ms. McLeod later acknowledged receiving in the Case Progress Notes Report entry for January 3  
at 2:46 p.m., Pacific Time).  
[288] The Grievor subsequently sent an e-mail to Mr. Olsen at 6:13 p.m. (Eastern Time) on  
January 2 asking for his assistance in obtaining a “release form” that she said “Douglas from  
Health Services” had indicated she could “get from work”, and advising him that her doctor had  
provided her with a note “for today being sick until Friday which I can fax to you”, that she also  
told him had been “forwarded to Health Services”.  
[289] Mr. Olsen interpreted the Grievor’s reference to a “release form” as a request for another  
Physician Assessment Form (PAF). And consistent with that, the Case Progress Notes Report at  
TELUS Health show that the Grievor sent an e-mail to Mr. Carra at 6:03 a.m. on Thursday,  
January 3, 2013, stating in relevant part that:  
As per our conversation yesterday, my doctor is requesting a release of information form. You  
indicated that you don’t have one to send to me. You also advised me I can get this form once I  
am back to work. I have sent an e-mail to Ronald Olsen to request this form. My doctor will send  
more information pertaining to what you are looking for below in your email. As soon as the  
release of information form is presented to the doctor (sic).  
[Emphasis added]  
Page 103 of 196  
[290] The Grievor sent another e-mail requesting this form to Mr. Olsen dated January 3, 2013  
at 9:48 a.m., asking Mr. Olsen to, “Please assist me with this by sending this to my email  
address”, and further advising him that: “I had worded this request incorrectly with the previous  
email I sent you last night.” (It is to be recalled that the first PAF requested for Dr. Adil’s use  
was also was provided by Mr. Olsen in an e-mail transmission to the Grievor, leading to the  
conclusion that the fact that Mr. Olsen was now asked to provide this form was not an unusual  
request). The cellphone records indicate that the Grievor also had a direct telephone conversation  
with Mr. Olsen on January 3, 2013 at 11:37 a.m. (which I did not hear evidence about but was  
likely related to her request), and that Mr. Olsen consequently sent another PAF for the Grievor’s  
doctor.  
[291] The evidence shows that the Grievor was taking further steps to provide Mr. Carra with  
additional medical information in support of her appeal of the Company’s denial of her claim for  
STD benefits, in compliance with Mr. Carra’s earlier instructions to her.  
[292] Thus on Friday, January 4, 2013, the Grievor attended again at Dr. Verdonk’s office  
receiving from Dr. Verdonk an updated medical certificate that stated: “Please excuse Tracy  
from work Jan 4/13 until Jan 12/13 for medical reasons. I will reassess her Jan 8/13.” The fax  
signature line on this document indicates it was faxed directly from Dr. Verdonk’s office to  
TELUS Health at 2:05 p.m. on January 4. The TELUS Health Case Progress Notes Report (as  
entered by Ms. McLeod) records receipt of this medical note on Monday, January 7, 2013 (which  
was the next business day) at 9:24 a.m., Pacific Time. Ms. McLeod accordingly sent an e-mail  
addressed to Debbie Leclerc at 9:26 a.m. that day advising Ms. Leclerc that Health Services had  
received Dr. Verdonk’s medical note. This e-mail does not show a copy being sent at the same  
time either Mr. Fischer or Mr. Olsen; however in a subsequent e-mail from Ms. McLeod to Mr.  
Fischer at 9:34 a.m. she forwarded that message to Mr. Fischer, with the notation, “Forwarding  
this to you because of Debbie (Leclerc’s) absence.” Consistent with the ongoing confusion by  
TELUS Health of exactly who was responsible for the Grievor at this time, it is evident from this  
documentation that Mr. Olsen did not receive Ms. McLeod’s e-mail and thus was not aware of  
Dr. Verdonk’s updated medical note.  
Page 104 of 196  
[293] The Grievor’s cellphone records confirm a telephone conversation the Grievor had with  
Mr. Olsen just afterwards at 2:55 p.m. in the afternoon of Friday, January 4, 2013, in the course  
of which Mr. Olsen told the Grievor that she must report for work at 9:00 a.m. on Monday,  
January 7, 2013 because there was insufficient medical proof of her claim. It is apparent from  
what happened next that this communication greatly upset the Grievor (which I found was not an  
unreasonable reaction given that she had just sent in her medical note from Dr. Verdonk to  
TELUS Health asking that she be excused for medical reasons until January 12).  
[294] As confirmed by the written documentation filed with me, the Grievor saw Dr. Adil  
shortly following Mr. Olsen’s telephone call on January 4, 2013, which Dr. Adil’s Patient  
Encounter History indicates was at 5:47 p.m. That record, consistent with the Grievor’s  
testimony shows that Dr. Adil was seeing the Grievor in connection with a continuing diagnosis  
of, “Anxiety neurosis, hysteria, (and) neurastheniaand was in an obvious upset state of mind. It  
reports on the Grievor advising Dr. Adil that her earlier appeal of the Company’s rejection of her  
claim for STD benefits had been rejected, and asking Dr. Adil for a further detailed medical  
report that she could submit to TELUS Health (as requested in Mr. Carra’s earlier e-mail that the  
Grievor evidently shared with Dr. Adil). It noted that the Grievor felt “stressed out for multiple  
things” that included her recent diagnosis with uterine fibroids (which she found  
“overwhelming”), a hostile work environment causing her to be “very stressed at work” with  
“impaired sleep”, “headaches”, being “very anxious” and “not able to go to work” for which Dr.  
Adil noted the Grievor was “on pristiq and clonazepam.” It also reported that the Grievor was  
‘recently sick due to cold/cough for which she had been seen in a walk-in clinicand that the  
Grievor told Dr. Adil: “she is sure work will fire her on Monday (January 7).” Dr. Adil also  
writes that the Grievor was crying during this conversation with her.  
[295] In response to the Grievor’s request of January 4 for a more detailed medical report that  
she could submit in support of her appeal, Dr. Adil sent a letter dated Monday, January 7, 2013  
by fax to the attention of Doug Carra of TELUS Health, which the fax signature line on that  
letter indicates was received by TELUS Health at 10:05 a.m. on Tuesday, January 8, 2013. That  
letter is reproduced in relevant part below:  
Dear Mr. Cara  
Page 105 of 196  
I am writing in response to your e-mail to my patient Tracy Baker. Tracy has been complaining of  
stress and emotional instability since November 2012. Basically she says she is going through a  
lot of stress at work. She states her work environment is getting more hostile and picky for her. As  
a result of this she cannot sleep properly, feels anxious, and has headaches on and off (lack of  
sleep).  
Furthermore, she states her recent diagnosis of uterine fibroids has been overwhelming on her.  
She has seen gynecologists Dr. Rubabaza and Dr. Athaide. She furthermore adds she is already  
stressed and worried about her abnormal pap smears (patient is being followed at Colposcopy for  
low grade cervical dysplasia since October 2011).  
Tracy has started Pristiq (50 mg) and Clonazepam (0.5 mg) on December 21, 2012 (Tracy is also  
being followed by a counsellor). She does not feel significant improvement so far and still does not  
feel good enough to return to work.  
Hopefully, this information will be sufficient for you. Please do not hesitate to contact me if any  
concerns arise.  
Truly Yours  
Dr. Aliya Adil”  
[296] Ms. McLeod confirmed on the Case Progress Notes Report, receipt of Dr. Adil’s letter by  
TELUS Health at 10:32 that day. Consistent with her general practice on this file, Ms. McLeod  
sent an e-mail notification to Mr. Fischer, with a copy to Debbie Leclerc, at 10:34 a.m. advising  
them that, “Health Services received an updated Doctor’s Note for [the Grievor] on January 8,  
2013 [which] has been referred to our Case Consultant, Diane Bargen and will be reviewed as  
soon as possible. A decision will be made and communicated to you shortly”. As in the previous  
e-mails of this type, Ms. McLeod noted that: “Health Services is currently experiencing higher  
than anticipated claim volumes; this is resulting in longer than normal response and adjudication  
times” for which she apologized for “this delay and any inconvenience”. The letter also invited  
the recipients to “please contact the case consultant directly” if they had “any questions  
regarding the status of this claim”. Similar to the previous letters alerting TELUS management  
to the new developments on the Grievor’s file, there was no indication that this e-mail was ever  
received by Mr. Olsen, which his later actions and testimony before me suggests was the case.  
[297] The Grievor, maintaining that she was not well enough to return to work, and relying on  
the medical notes from Dr. Verdonk and Dr. Adil that were faxed to TELUS Health, didn’t  
report at 9:00 a.m. on January 7, 2013 as directed by Mr. Olsen. However to Mr. Olsen, this was  
further confirmation of his view that the Grievor was trying to avoid the inevitable termination  
Page 106 of 196  
letter she knew was coming, without advance notice and medical authorization for her absence.  
Mr. Olsen had already updated the termination letter that he had previously intended to give to  
the Grievor by changing the date on that letter to January 7, 2013 (which was filed with me).  
Otherwise the discharge letter was the same as the one waiting for the Grievor on November 28,  
2012. But because the Grievor didn’t report to the call centre claiming that she remained ill and  
unable to work, it wasn’t given to her at that time.  
[298] Instead, Mr. Olsen sent the Grievor the following letter dated January 7, 2013 addressed,  
“Dear Tracy”, demanding that she “return to work immediately on Wednesday January 9, 2013”,  
or face certain employment consequences, which was delivered by courier to the Grievor’s home  
that same day at 1:59 p.m.  
Re Insufficient Medical Information/Report for Work  
You have been absent from work since November 28, 2012. The medical information you have  
submitted does not support your continued absence from work. You were requested to provide  
additional documentation to support your absence, which has been reviewed. As you are aware,  
the additional medical information does not support your continued absence from work. As such,  
you are considered to be absence unauthorized.  
You were contacted via phone and directed to report to work on Friday December 21, 2012. You  
failed to report to work as directed. You were subsequently contacted via both phone and letter on  
December 21, 2012 and advised to report to work on Wednesday January 2, 2013. You reported  
for work briefly that day; however you left the workplace without advising management and despite  
management’s direction to you to stay until they had an opportunity to speak with you. You were  
advised via phone on January 4, 2013 that you are required to report to work on Monday January  
7, 2013 at 9:00 a.m. You have once again failed to report to work as directed.  
It is our expectation that you return to work immediately on Wednesday January 9, 2013 at 9:00  
a.m. or provide additional medical information to support you absence. Failure to report to  
work or contact me to explain your continued absence will be considered job abandonment and  
may result in the termination of your employment. I expect you to contact me immediately  
at [telephone number redacted] or on my cell phone at [telephone number redacted].  
Yours truly,  
Ronnie Olsen  
Manager Business Client Care  
[Emphasis added]  
[299] When Mr. Olsen was asked in his examination-in-chief what prompted him to send the  
foregoing letter, he testified that: “I have a team member off since November 28 with no medical  
Page 107 of 196  
documentation to support her claim (emphasis added). Given that Tracy reported to work on  
January 2 and left, I didn’t know if she was ever going to return to be honest, and I wanted her to  
know the requirement to return to work on January 7, but didn’t.” It is apparent from that  
testimony that Mr. Olsen was not aware, or chose to ignore, the medical documentation that she  
submitted to TELUS Health on January 2, January 4 and January 7 (the latter one likely received  
by TELUS Health after he wrote his January 7 letter).  
[300] Having provided medical documentation to the Company prior to the return to work  
deadline of January 7 demanded by Mr. Olsen, there was no evidence before me to suggest that  
the Grievor intended to abandon her employment that Mr. Olsen had warned in this and previous  
correspondence would be the result of her failure to report for work. As I shall discuss later in  
these Reasons, I found that the Grievor was responding to the Company’s demands by  
submitting new medical documentation that Mr. Carra had previously indicated would be  
acceptable; and to her reasonable knowledge the Company hadn’t rejected her further appeal.  
Such conduct does not show an intention to ‘abandon’ one’s employment.  
[301] And consistent with that, the cellphone records later produced and submitted into  
evidence confirm that the Grievor contacted Mr. Olsen by telephone at 4:20 p.m. on January 7,  
2013 as demanded by Mr. Olsen in the last sentence of his letter. While there is little evidence of  
what, exactly, the two talked about, in answering a question in cross-examination as to why she  
told Dr. Adil that she thought she was going to be fired from work, the Grievor testified that  
she felt she was being pressured to come into work when she was not well, and had “told Ronnie  
that [the Grievor] was trying to get information”.  
[302] The informationthe Grievor was referring to was medical information not previously  
provided in support of her claim, that Mr. Carra had stated the Company would be “pleased to  
review” in his e-mail to the Grievor of December 21, 2012, and which the evidence supports the  
finding she was actively pursuing in seeing both Dr. Verdonk and Dr. Adil for the purpose of  
obtaining that new information.  
[303] As the apparent culmination of that effort, the Grievor attended a medical appointment  
with Dr. Verdonk on Tuesday, January 8, 2013. The Company already knew that Dr. Verdonk  
was going to reassess the Grievor on that date from the earlier medical note submitted to TELUS  
Page 108 of 196  
Health on January 4, described above, and from the Grievor’s January 3 e-mail to Mr. Carra  
“requesting a release of information form” that she told Mr. Carra would allow her doctor, “to  
send more information pertaining to what you are looking for below in your email” (referring to  
Mr. Carra’s earlier December 21 e-mail to the Grievor).  
[304] Mr. Olsen also knew that the Grievor was intending to have a doctor prepare another PAF  
for submission to TELUS Health to support her continuing absence as a result of his telephone  
contact with the Grievor in response to her request for the “release form”, as early as her e-mail  
to Mr. Olsen of January 2, 2013.  
(h)  
Dr. Verdonk’s PAF of January 8, 2013  
[305] It is in the foregoing context that the Grievor was examined by Dr. Verdonk on  
Tuesday, January 8, 2013, who then filled out and submitted to TELUS Health another  
Practitioner’s Assessment Form. A notation by Ms. McLeod on the Case Progress Notes Report  
at 10:21 a.m. (Pacific Time) on Wednesday, January 9, 2013 confirms that the new PAF was  
received by TELUS Health. She prepared a summary of the PAF indicating that the Grievor had  
been diagnosed with “major affective disorder/anxiety disorder”, that she had “uterine fibroids”,  
“abdominal pain (the cause of which had not been determined)”, had a possible viral infection  
“with reactive airway”, was taking “meds” (of unspecified nature), “sees (a doctor) weekly for  
supportive psychotherapy”, with “U/S pending” (which is presumed to refer to an ultrasound),  
and “expected RTW guarded; Feb. 07/2013” (understood to be reference to a guarded predictive  
return to work date of February 7, 2013).  
[306] The answers to the questions on this PAF are much more responsive, and detailed, than  
the answers on the previous PAF of December 7, 2012 prepared by Dr. Adil. In understanding  
exactly what this new PAF means (at least to an official of TELUS Health), I was assisted by the  
cross-examination of Ms. Bargen, who was extensively taken through the document.  
[307] Ms. Bargen was removed from having any responsibility as Case Consultant for the  
Grievor’s TELUS Health file after she left for vacation on December 20, 2012. She testified that  
she had returned to work before January 8, 2013, but she wasn’t reassigned to the Grievor’s  
claim because it had by then been taken over by Mr. Carra, who it was determined would  
Page 109 of 196  
continue to deal with the file in order to ensure “a consistent approach”. But for that decision it  
is apparent that Ms. Bargen would have likely been the Case Consultant responsible for  
assessing Dr. Verdonk’s latest PAF for the Grievor. Her testimony in cross-examination  
supports the conclusion that Dr. Verdonk’s PAF contained all of the information that TELUS  
Health usually looks for in accepting claims for STD benefits.  
[308] Thus in cross-examination Ms. Bargen was asked for her assessment of some of the  
answers written by Dr. Verdonk to the specific questions on the TELUS Health PAF form,  
without objection by the Company. In doing so, Ms. Bargen made it very clear that: “I had no  
dealings with this form at all; I did not make any decisions based on it” and that: “I can only  
state that I declined the initial appeal: Other than that it would just be me reading notes created  
by someone else (as) I was not involved.”  
[309] Having made it abundantly clear that she had nothing to do with assessing Dr. Verdonk’s  
January 8, 2013 PAF at the time, which she reiterated was now Mr. Carra’s responsibility, and  
about which she also claimed to know nothing, Ms. Bargen nevertheless offered the following  
assessment of the information provided by Dr. Verdonk on that PAF from her perspective as a  
Case Consultant with TELUS Health at the time.  
[310] Dr. Verdonk had ticked off the boxes on the PAF form indicating that the Grievor was  
suffering from “an illness” that had arisen “on the job” for which he was following up with the  
Grievor, “weekly”. When asked on the form to state his diagnosis of the Grievor’s medical  
condition, he wrote: “Major Affective Disorder”. In cross-examination Ms. Bargen agreed that,  
“this doctor had given a proper diagnosis” in the sense of using terminology recognized by  
medical practitioners as depicting a specific disability or disease.  
[311] The second question under the general heading of “Medical Condition” on the PAF  
asked: “If providing a psychological Diagnosis, please complete DMS IV.” I understood that  
“DMS IV” was a reference to the “Diagnosis and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders” (or  
“DMS”) published by the American Psychiatric Association, that is a “five axis model” designed  
to provide a comprehensive diagnosis of a patient’s mental health, used as well in Canada as a  
diagnostic tool and that “IV” referred to the latest version of that model. This part of the form  
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had been left blank by Dr. Adil in her December 7, 2012 PAF, however Dr. Verdonk completed  
this section of the PAF in detail, as reviewed below.  
[312] When questioned about “Axis I” (which is one of the factors for assessing mental disease  
in the DMS manual under the general rubric of psychological disorders), Dr. Verdonk wrote:  
“Major Affective Disorder/Anxiety Disorder”. In her cross-examination, Ms. Bargen confirmed  
that this terminology described a recognized “psychological disability”. Under “Axis II”  
(referring to the measure of personality disorders) Dr. Verdonk reported “P.D. NXD” which is  
understood to mean “personality disorder not yet determined.” For the PAF measure under “Axis  
III” (which in the DMS model refers to physical problems that may be relevant to diagnosing and  
treating mental disorders) Dr. Verdonk had written: “Uterine Fibrosis, Abdominal Pain (Not Yet  
Determined), Viral VRT with Reactive Airway”, which the Grievor’s medical history showed  
she was suffering from at the time (although it was not clear on the form what “VRT” that is  
handwritten, was referring to). Ms. Bargen confirmed that all of these were recognized criteria  
of analysis for the proper diagnosis and treatment of mental disorders by health care  
professionals.  
[313] In response to the next major question on the PAF asking the practitioner to, “Describe  
the signs and symptoms of the illness/injury of the Team Member”, Dr. Verdonk had written:  
“Depressed mood, unable to cope with life right now, intimidated by work supervisors, viral  
bronchitis with virus like symptoms, chronic abdominal pain (not yet determined) with diagnosis  
of uterine fibroids – frightens her”. In cross-examination Ms. Bargen agreed that the report of  
the Grievor’s “depressed mood” and being “unable to cope with life right now” was a sign of  
depression, which was consistent with one of the medications prescribed for the Grievor reported  
under the heading “Treatment”, that Ms. Bargen identified as “an anti-depressant”.  
[314] In answering the next question in the PAF to, “describe active treatment…including  
frequency and duration…” under the general heading of “Rehabilitation”, Dr. Verdonk wrote:  
“Sees me weekly for supportive psychotherapy”, which Ms. Bargen acknowledged was what she  
“was looking for”, as an appropriate type of “active treatment with a counsellor or therapist”.  
[315] Dr. Verdonk’s response to the next major question on the PAF asking for a description  
of, “the functional limitations that are impacting the Team Member’s ability to work”, was that  
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the patient is totally disabled, low energy, poor concentration, feeling overwhelmed,which  
Ms. Bargen acknowledged to be the description of “proper symptoms”. And in another question  
on the PAF asking for “any other relevant medical information that would assist us in the review  
of this case”, Dr. Verdonk wrote in legible part: “Patient very fragile right now – feels  
persecuted and abused,…[illegible]…has little insight into this medical situation, (and) the meds  
will take a month to have an effect”. Ms. Bargen agreed that the anti-depressant drug prescribed  
for the Grievor would take one month to impact the Grievor’s health.  
[316] Finally, Dr. Verdonk noted on the PAF, under the question: “What is the prognosis of  
the Team Member’s illness/injury with regards to return to work” that the Grievor’s return to  
work was “guarded”, and when asked for his medical opinion as to whether the Grievor was fit  
for work with or without modified duties, he ticked off the boxes that stated “unfit for work” and  
“temporarily”, with an expected return to work date of February 7, 2013.  
[317] When Ms. Bargen was directly asked in cross-examination whether she would have  
approved the Grievor’s claim on the basis of Dr. Verdonk’s PAF, she didn’t answer directly.  
She chose instead to say that ‘she would have reviewed it’. I inferred from Ms. Bargen’s  
testimony and her prevarication on that question, most in harmony with all of the surrounding  
circumstances, that if she had assessed the new PAF she most likely would have approved the  
Grievor’s claim for benefits under the Company’s STD plan, particularly where it was apparent  
on her testimony that Dr. Verdonk’s PAF addressed the specific deficiencies that Ms. Bargen  
criticized the earlier one provided by Dr. Adil. On this point I concluded that Ms. Bargen was  
less than candid, for the obvious reason that she did not want to seem being critical of a co-  
worker. But, to be clear, Ms. Bargen emphasized, repeatedly in her testimony, that she was no  
longer responsible for the Grievor’s file when the new PAF was presented to TELUS Health,  
suggesting that all questions on the matter should be directed to Mr. Carra.  
[318] Of course Mr. Carra was not called as a witness by either the Company or the Union, and  
thus any reason he may have had for rejecting the Grievor’s claims on the new medical  
information submitted by the Grievor in response to his earlier December 21, 2012 e-mail to her,  
including Dr. Verdonk’s PAF, was not presented to me. Based on a reading of the Case Progress  
Notes Report submitted by the Company to corroborate its dealings with the Grievor’s claim,  
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there is also a question of whether the Company even considered Dr. Verdonk’s PAF before  
making its final decision on her appeal.  
[319] In that Report, Mr. Carra is recorded as preparing a summary of the Grievor’s case for  
submission to Dr. Wilson at 5:17 p.m. (Pacific Time) on January 8, 2013, which was several  
hours before Ms. McLeod’s entry of 10:21 a.m. on January 9, 2013 that TELUS Health had  
received Dr. Verdonk’s updated PAF. It is noteworthy that in the record of Mr. Carra’s  
summary of the Grievor’s case for Dr. Wilson, he specifically included as part of the “Claim  
History” substantially all of the original note to file that Ms. Bargen wrote on December 10,  
2012 in which she reported the content of her first telephone conversation with Mr. Olsen and  
Ms. Fraser at the outset of the claim, reproduced above, where Mr. Olsen informed Ms. Bargen  
of the disciplinary circumstances leading up to the Grievor’s request for STD. He also stated in  
that entry the “Reason for seeking Dr. Wilson’s opinion/consultation” was: “Your opinion on  
the latest MD letter received and if the case should remain closed or allowed for a certain period  
of time.”  
[320] The Case Progress Notes Report indicates that the “latest MD letter” that Mr. Carra was  
referring to was Dr. Adil’s January 7, 2013 letter which was received by TELUS Health in the  
morning of January 8, 2013, as recorded by Ms. McLeod in her note of 10:32 a.m., that day. By  
that time, the Case Progress Notes indicate that Dr. Verdonk’s January 8, 2013 PAF had not been  
received. The first reference in the Case Progress Notes to the receipt of Dr. Verdonk’s PAF is  
Ms. McLeod’s notation at 10:21 a.m. on January 9, 2013.  
[321] The next relevant entry on the Case Progress Notes Report is from Ms. McLeod, who  
writes: “Dr. Wilson’s notes – January 09/2013 visit” at 4:41 p.m. on January 9, 2013 (which was  
after the acknowledged receipt of Dr. Verdonk’s recent PAF). As previously advised, Dr.  
Wilson is the consulting physician who comes into TELUS Health weekly to give an opinion of  
whether the medical documentation supports an employee’s claim for total disability benefits.  
[322] Ms. Bargen testified that she could not say what documentation was provided to Dr.  
Wilson. Her evidence is that the practice is to provide only the medical notes and PAFs without  
any of the Case Progress Notes Report commentary. But it is clear on the documentary evidence  
that more than that was provided to Dr. Wilson in this case, where the Case Progress Notes  
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Report confirms that Ms. Bargen’s record of her telephone conversation with Mr. Olsen on  
December 10, 2012 characterizing the Grievor’s alleged illness as really a workplace dispute,  
made it into Dr. Wilson’s file.  
[323] While the precise timing of the referral to Dr. Wilson is not clear on the Case Progress  
Notes Report, that record indicates that Mr. Carra prepared a letter to the Grievor, at 9:20 a.m. on  
Thursday, January 10, 2013, denying the Grievor’s claim, which will be reproduced later. This  
supports the finding that Dr. Wilson likely reviewed the file and submitted his opinion as to the  
sufficiency of the medical information, in the late afternoon of January 9, 2013. Dr. Wilson’s  
assessment is handwritten and is not dated. His signed opinion under the heading, “Tracy  
Baker” provides as follows:  
This is purely a workplace issue driven by performance deficiencies. She is currently being  
medicated for her emotional response to a workplace that is closely monitoring her poor  
performance. Her refusal to interact with the supervisory people in her workplace at this  
point is clearly a strategy to avoid termination.  
Uterine fibroids rarely are symptomatic. In fact most women don’t even know they have them.  
Other than heavy periods there is rarely a problem and are only removed surgically if the individual  
is finished having children and wants to have a hysterectomy to stop the heavy periods (she  
apparently is considering a pregnancy).  
Finally, this claim should not be approved for either of the stated reasons as there is no medical  
support for either.  
[Emphasis added]  
[324] Having considered the content and timing of Dr. Wilson’s letter, I found on all of the  
evidence consistent with the surrounding circumstances that, contrary to Ms. Bargen’s testimony  
on point, Dr. Wilson did have at least that portion of the Case Progress Notes Report recording  
Mr. Olsen’s initial report to Ms. Bargen as part of the “Claim History” on the circumstances of  
the Grievor’s discipline prior to leaving the workplace on sick leave commencing November 28,  
2012. This finding is supported by the first sentence of Dr. Wilson’s opinion that, “This is  
purely a workplace incident driven by performance deficiencies”, and his further conclusion in  
the third sentence that, “Her refusal to interact with the supervisory people in her workplace at  
this point is clearly a strategy to avoid termination”, that in my opinion is what he most likely  
derived from Ms. Bargen’s initial note to the Case Progress Notes Report, which was the fruit  
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of the poisonous tree” planted by Mr. Olsen and Ms. Fraser, to any independent assessment of  
the medical documentation.  
[325] Furthermore, given the timing of Dr. Wilson’s letter and the referral note from Mr. Carra  
that was prepared prior to receiving Dr. Verdonk’s new PAF (even though it is apparent on the  
documentary record that TELUS Health had it at the time), as well as the complete absence of  
any reference to the results of that PAF in Dr. Wilson’s opinion letter, I concluded that Dr.  
Wilson never reviewed it before rendering his opinion, or failed to give it appropriate weight  
(having regard to Ms. Bargen’s testimony on point). Alternatively, as I will elaborate upon when  
I consider my more detailed review of the law later in these Reasons, it is my opinion that the  
Company had the obligation to give the Grievor’s medical documentation a fair and reasonable  
assessment before rejecting her claim. Since neither Mr. Carra nor Dr. Wilson were called as  
witnesses to clarify exactly what Dr. Wilson considered in arriving at his final opinion, I draw an  
adverse inference on the matter against the Company. At the very least, the evidence before me  
was insufficient to satisfy the requirement of the Company to show that it considered all of the  
Grievor’s medical documentation before it decided to terminate her employment the next day,  
January 11, 2013, which I concluded on the foregoing evidence before me it had failed to do.  
[326] After receiving Dr. Wilson’s report, Mr. Carra records the following notification letter  
addressed to the Grievor’s home that notes her telephone contact number in his entry on the Case  
Progress Notes Report at 9:20 a.m. (Pacific Time) on January 10, 2013:  
Dear Tracy,  
Re: TELUS Short Term Disability  
We have completed our assessment of your claim and appeal for Short Term Disability benefits.  
In order to qualify for short term disability benefits, an individual must be totally disabled from  
performing their job duties. “Totally Disabled” means “the team member has a medical impairment  
which prevents him/her from performing the essential work duties.  
We adjudicate cases based on Disability Best Practices and universally applied Medical  
Guidelines. In addition, your case file was completed reviewed by our Medical Consultant, for his  
expert opinion.  
The body of the information and medical evidence provided confirms that your absence from work  
stems from workplace issues. There is no history of a pre-existing medical condition and any  
treatment being prescribed now is in reaction to the circumstances in the workplace. Without the  
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employment issues you are experiencing, there would be no reason for your work absence from  
November 28, 2012 to date.  
Accordingly, we are unable to support your claim for Short Term Disability benefits. Please contact  
your manager to arrange for an immediate Return to Work.  
Sincerely,  
Douglas Carra  
Disability Team Lead  
TEULS Corporate Health  
[327] Perhaps not unexpectedly given its customary treatment of this file, Ms. Ginny Burton  
noted the receipt of Dr. Verdonk’s new PAF at 9:58 a.m. (Pacific Time) on January 10, 2013,  
and thus she sent an e-mail to Debbie Leclerc (without copying either Keith Fischer or Ronnie  
Olsen) at 10:01 a.m. that day concerning the Grievor, advising Ms. Leclerc that Health Services  
had received “an updated PAF for the above-noted team member on January 9, 2013”, that it  
“has been referred to our Case Consultant…and will be reviewed as soon as possible”, and that,  
“a decision will be made and communicated to you shortly.” It invited Ms. Leclerc to refer “any  
questions respecting the status of this claim” to the case consultant directly. There is no question  
that Mr. Olsen never received this e-mail notification.  
[328] By that time, however, Mr. Carra had made his decision on behalf of TELUS Health, and  
the Case Progress Notes Report records that he notified Mr. Olsen first of his decision in an e-  
mail to Mr. Olsen at 12:55 p.m., with a copy to Ms. Fraser, reproduced below:  
Health Services has completed our assessment of Ms. Baker’s appeal for Short Term Disability  
benefits.  
Based on the information received, we are unable to approve her Disability case from November  
28, 2012 to date.  
We have now advised the Team Member of our decision and have couriered a letter outlining our  
position/rationale.  
We have not provided the Team Member with an option to appeal and have asked her to contact  
you to arrange for an immediate Return To Work.  
We have now closed our file.  
Page 116 of 196  
[329] The Case Progress Notes then record that Mr. Carra contacted the Grievor, second, by  
telephone at 12:58 p.m., (Pacific Time) on January 10, 2013 advising her that, “based on our  
complete review of her case file, including a review performed by our Medical Consultant, the  
reason for her absence for this period of time is the workplace situation and not a medical  
condition. I advised her that I have couriered a letter to her and have not offered an appeal  
within the decline letter. Advised her to contact her management immediately for a RTW.” The  
Company’s formal letter denying the Grievor’s appeal for STD benefits was received by the  
Grievor the next day, most likely around the same time she was fired.  
(i)  
The Grievor’s First Dismissal of January 11, 2013  
[330] The Grievor did not report to the Scarborough call centre on January 9, 2013 as  
previously demanded by Mr. Olsen, claiming that she remained unwell and unable to work. Her  
testimony supports the finding that she was anxious that returning to work under Mr. Olsen’s  
supervision would cause her to suffer additional mental distress given his “lack of support” and  
previous treatment of her. On the advice of Dr. Verdonk, she was taking medication for  
depression (that might take up to one month to have effect), receiving weekly psychological  
counselling; and on her doctor’s recommendation she didn’t anticipate being in a position to  
return to work until at least February 7, 2013. To the Grievor’s knowledge the information about  
her medical condition, which was included in the new PAF, was forwarded to TELUS Health  
immediately after her consultation with Dr. Verdonk on January 8. 2013. She also believed her  
absence was explained in the January 4 medical note from Dr. Verdonk that asked her to be  
excused from January 4 12 for medical reasons.  
[331] Shortly after hearing from Mr. Carra that her appeal was denied by TELUS Health, the  
Grievor’s cellphone records confirm she received a telephone call from Mr. Olsen at 4:18 p.m.,  
which was about 20 minutes after Mr. Carra’s telephone call. Mr. Olsen testified he left at least  
two voice-mail messages for her that afternoon and evening, telling her that because her third  
and final appeal had been denied she needed to return to work the next morning, Friday, January  
11, 2013. Since the Grievor’s cellphone records only indicate one telephone call from Mr. Olsen  
that day, the second call from Mr. Olsen must have been from another telephone not recorded by  
those records, or his memory is faulty (confirming my concerns about the utility of those  
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telephone records, discussed below). Had the Grievor reported for work, Mr. Olsen testified he  
would have dismissed her anyway for the events between November 13 and 27, 2012, for which  
Mr. Olsen already had a termination letter in hand.  
[332] But she didn’t show up for work, and thus Mr. Olsen decided to terminate the Grievor’s  
employment for her refusal or neglect to report to work”. He testified that, “based on that there  
was no documentation to support her absence that was ongoing since November 28, I decided to  
end her employment.”  
[333] Yet on the evidence before me, I concluded TELUS Health had Dr. Verdonk’s latest PAF  
by then, which Mr. Olsen did not know about. He accordingly prepared and signed the “first  
dismissal” letter dated January 11, 2013, reproduced above, which was couriered to the Grievor’s  
home. The records filed by the Company indicate that the letter of termination was received at  
the Grievor’s house at 4:01 p.m. that afternoon. The last two paragraphs of Mr. Olsen’s letter  
sets out the Company’s reasons for the termination:  
The purpose of this letter is to inform you that we have terminated your employment with TELUS  
based on your refusal or neglect to report to work. To date, TELUS has not received any  
documentation which supports your absence from work. As well, you have not returned to  
work as directed.  
Yours failure to report to work or provide sufficient information to explain your absence is  
totally unacceptable. Therefore, your employment is terminated immediately. Your record of  
employment and final earnings will be forwarded under separate cover.  
[Emphasis added]  
VIII.  
The Grievor’s Second Dismissal of March 11, 2013  
[334] There was no new information supporting discipline that the Company didn’t know when  
the Grievor was terminated on January 11, 2013 that was relied upon by the Company in issuing  
its second dismissalletter dated March 11, 2013. As described above, that letter was signed by  
Ms. Fraser of Labour Relations and delivered to the Union after the Step 3 grievance meeting  
concerning the Union’s Grievance No. 2 challenging the first dismissal letter and notice of the  
Grievor’s second dismissal was “deemed to have been initiated” as of March 11, 2013. In  
substance it is the same letter that Mr. Olsen intended to issue on November 28, 2012, January 2,  
2013 and January 7, 2013 to the Grievor directly, had she returned to work on those days. It  
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claims as grounds for termination, the “inappropriate access and misuse of TELUS resources,  
breach of the corporate security policy, and failure to follow a management directive” arising out  
of the Grievor’s alleged misconduct between November 12 and 27, 2012.  
[335] For ease of immediate reference Ms. Fraser’s March 11, 2013 letter to the Union is  
reproduced in relevant part below.  
I am writing to advise you of the company’s position with respect to the above employee, who was  
terminated for cause effective January 11, 2013. As I discussed with you in the Step 3 grievance  
meeting, on November 27, 2012 the Company conducted an investigative meeting with Ms. Baker  
regarding her inappropriate access and misuse of TELUS resources, breach of the corporate  
security policy, and failure to follow a management directive.  
As you are aware, Ms. Baker’s employment was terminated for reasons unrelated to the alleged  
inappropriate actions. These inappropriate actions were not included in the reasons for termination  
as Ms. Baker had not returned to the workplace for a sufficient length of time to allow for this matter  
to be concluded. Notwithstanding this, the Company maintains that we have sufficient evidence to  
demonstrate that Ms. Baker engaged in actions that were inappropriate and in violation of the  
TELUS’ Ethics and Security Policies.  
Without prejudice to the Company’s position on grievance 2013.014, should Ms. Baker be  
reinstated as a result of the parties arbitrating the above matter (2013.014), this letter serves to  
advise that a second dismissal will be deemed to have been initiated effective today. The  
cause of the second dismissal is Ms. Baker’s inappropriate access and misuse of TELUS  
resources, breach of the corporate security policy, and failure to follow a management  
directive.  
[Emphasis added]  
[336] By that time the Grievor had been continuously unemployed since her first dismissal on  
January 11, 2013. She had surgery for the removal of three uterine fibroids in early May of  
2013, requiring eight weeks recovery time during which she was unable to work. She testified  
that her first job after the surgery was in a part-time retail position that began on November 23,  
2013 extending over the Christmas holiday season for about 20 25 hours weekly, earning $9.00  
per hour without benefits until January 24, 2014.  
[337] After that she was able to find part-time employment commencing July 2014 as a  
Personal Support Worker providing assistance with daily needs of life for elderly and disabled  
clients working in the clients’ homes, for which she earned about $400 per week until March of  
2015, when she moved into another role as a service coordinator for the same employer earning  
$14 to $15 per hour that ended around April of 2015. In June of 2015 the Grievor found work  
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operating a food cart in Port Perry, Ontario selling hotdogs that paid $15 per hour for two days  
per week. She also testified that she worked in an Oshawa call centre earning $13 or $14 per  
hour beginning in September 2015 for about 40 hours per week that lasted until December 2015.  
She was then employed in part-time retail positions over the 2015 Christmas holiday season,  
followed by retail sales positions for irregular periods up to the end of her cross-examination on  
May 10, 2016.  
[338] There were no benefits associated with those positions and she earned much less than her  
approximate $46,000 annual salary plus benefits and RSP matching contributions that she had  
been receiving from TELUS before her dismissal.  
[339] As a consequence of her termination and intermittent low wage jobs since, she has cashed  
in all of her retirement savings. She testified at the conclusion of her evidence that she has had to  
borrow money from her parents in order to stay financially afloat and has “nothing right now”.  
IX.  
Assessing The Grievor’s Overall Credibility  
[340] The parties presented two fundamentally different views of the Grievor going to her  
essential credibility in this case.  
(a)  
The Parties’ Divergent Perspectives  
[341] On behalf of the Company, Mr. Craig submitted that the Grievor’s actions throughout her  
dealings with the Company over the many events leading to her five-day disciplinary suspension  
followed by her two dismissals, “could be characterized as calculating and strategic; not the  
actions of someone who is confused and incoherent.” Consequently the Company asserted the  
Grievor was not a credible witness whose claims should be denied.  
[342] The Company’s theory of the case is that the Grievor was engaged in deliberate “call  
avoidanceactivity, which is a serious breach of trust striking at the heart of the employment  
relationship that rewards the Grievor for not working while compromising the goodwill of the  
Company’s customers at significant financial risk to the Company. Such misconduct is  
particularly egregious when dealing with an At Home Agent who works without direct  
supervision, and thus the Company is particularly vulnerable. The Grievor violated her position  
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of trust and got caught. This coupled with her rude and unprofessional behaviour in performing  
her duties and breach of Company policies in accessing her own TELUS mobile phone account,  
justified a very stern disciplinary response rendering the five-day suspension imposed by the  
Company more than reasonable in the circumstances. (Indeed the Company asserted she was  
fortunate not to have been fired). However, when confronted with undeniable evidence from the  
AVAYA trace report documenting her deception, the Company claims that the Grievor then  
embarked upon an elaborate campaign” and “dishonest course of action at the beginning”  
following “a rationale pattern that was easily understandable” in an attempt to avoid the serious  
consequences of her wrongdoing. She attempted to “blame it on the system”, filing numerous  
SPOC tickets to support false claims of defects with her computer and VPN connection in an  
effort to explain away the obvious proof of her malfeasance, and to that end the Company  
asserted she “attempted to create a body of evidence to give her a defence”, and “maneuvered  
herself into a position where she could still work from home”, thereby continuing her pattern of  
deceitful behaviour. But then after being caught out a second time and summoned to an  
investigative meeting on November 27, 2012, the Grievor knew “the writing was on the wall and  
off she goes to a walk-in clinic to avoid responsibility,” in the Company’s submission. Knowing  
that she was going to be terminated, the Company contended the Grievor attempted to flee from  
discipline by making bogus claims of having a stress related disorder that was unsubstantiated  
and completely unproven by the Union. These were not the actions of a “confused and  
discombobulated” individual, but rather the deliberate behaviour of a devious, calculating mind,  
for which the Grievor’s termination was a just and proper result, according to the Company.  
[343] In addressing one of my questions about the weight I could give to the information in the  
documents and medical reports “in light of contradictions and mistakes or errors” that may  
appear in the testimony of witnesses, Company counsel answered that: “I think one of the  
advantages we have in this case is that we do have medical notes and records created  
contemporaneously by doctors… We (also) have Diane Bargen’s notes of conversations with the  
Grievor taken contemporaneously. We have investigative meeting notes, e-mail exchanges,  
SPOC tickets, largely contemporaneous, and the AVAYA trace report. Given the challenges of  
credibility you can go past that and look at the documents. The documents do give us a real  
insight into what actually happened” (emphasis added).  
Page 121 of 196  
[344] I agreed with that last Company submission (emphasized above), and thus as I reviewed  
hundreds of pages of witness testimonies, I compared the viva voce evidence of the witness with  
the largely contemporaneous documents in order to reconcile their testimony with that record.  
And where there were contractions in the testimonies of witnesses with the written records of  
events compiled at the time, I gave greater weight to the written record in arriving at my findings  
of fact set out above, to the extent I determined them to be most aligned with all of the  
surrounding circumstances on a balance of probabilities standard. This was particularly the case  
in my consideration of the Grievor’s testimony, which I subjected to a test of consistency with  
the written record presented best in harmony with the events she testified about in the process of  
arriving at my factual findings.  
[345] On behalf of the Union, Ms. Pollack and Mr. Katz painted an entirely different picture of  
the Grievor. Contrary to the Company’s characterization of her as a “calculating” and  
“strategic” person who devised an “elaborate plan” from “the very beginning” to defeat the  
Company’s legitimate expectations of honesty and integrity in the performance of her duties, the  
Union noted that the Grievor had a clear employment record and who, for years, worked  
satisfactorily from home which is a privilege accorded only to “the best of the best”. But  
according to the Union, the evidence supported the conclusion that the Grievor had also become  
a troubled person who needed clear direction from her supervisors and when placed under  
pressure becomed confused and disoriented, which is part of her essential character that was  
exhibited by her actions with her supervisors and in her testimony before me. As a result of the  
unsubstantiated accusations of misconduct and a “rush to judgment” by Mr. Olsen, the Union  
submitted the Grievor became seriously ill, as documented by the many physicians who  
examined and treated her at the time. This was not “calculated” but rather was in the nature of  
an uncoordinated, emotional response to a series of unfair circumstances typified by lack of  
direction or unclear instructions from her managers that were beyond the Grievor’s reasonable  
control, according to the Union.  
[346] While disputing that the Grievor engaged in rude and unprofessional misconduct, or had  
broken any clear Company rule in viewing her own mobile telephone account, the Union  
conceded in argument that the Grievor violated operating procedures related to her timekeeping  
obligations as an At Home Agent. But it was submitted the signs were there, if the Company had  
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reasonably inquired, supporting the conclusion that the Grievor was in the beginning stages of  
suffering from a medical disability eventually requiring additional bathroom breaks “two to three  
times per hour” combined with physical problems later requiring surgery that became  
“overwhelming” to the Grievor. The Grievor’s notification to Ms. Leclerc of these problems was  
largely ignored and thus the Grievor had to do the best she could on her own. The Grievor’s  
problems with the operating systems at her home were also ignored by Ms. Leclerc, according to  
the Union. The Grievor’s actions in contacting SPOC while she was on suspension and then  
arranging to replace her malfunctioning laptop computer were consistent with her past  
experience and with her reasonable belief that she was doing nothing wrong.  
[347] Given the unclear direction of Mr. Leclerc at the time she issued the November 12, 2012  
disciplinary letter, the evidence supported the conclusion that the Grievor was legitimately  
confused about her status as an AHA after her suspension. Then in an overreaction by Mr. Olsen  
and other Company officials, she was pushed over the edge as a result of unjust claims of  
misconduct, where from the Grievor’s perspective she had done nothing wrong. Far from being  
calculatingand strategic, the Grievor became injured as a result of the Company’s treatment  
of her; intentionally inflicting a degree of mental distress that they knew or ought to have known  
would cause her to suffer an extreme stress reaction, which is exactly what it did.  
[348] Thus in assessing the Grievor’s credibility the Union conceded that after many days of  
unrelenting cross-examination the Grievor’s testimony became unreliable as to the number of  
times that Mr. Olsen was calling her daily commencing on and after November 28, 2012. As  
noted below in context, the Grievor ultimately came to testify that Mr. Olsen was contacting her  
“three times per day”, that exacerbated her stress and feelings of being harassed. But the Union  
submitted that her unreliable testimony on that point did not materially affect her overall  
credibility which was consistent with the documentary record, that the Union also acknowledged  
I should rely upon in resolving conflicts in the testimonies of the witnesses.  
[349] Like all witnesses whose different portions of testimony may be accepted or rejected  
having regard to the reliability of the specific evidence tendered, the Union conceded that to the  
extent there were inaccuracies or exaggerations found in the Grievor’s testimony, they were not  
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on such material or essential matters to affect the overall confidence that I could have with her  
evidence.  
(b)  
General Observations on the Assessment of Credibility  
[350] On my review of the evidence, I found that Mr. Olsen was mistaken when he suggested  
the Grievor knew or should have known prior to the November 27 investigative meeting that all  
contact on matters related to her schedule and work assignments must be through him instead of  
Ms. Reynolds or any other supervisor. I also determined he was not credible when he testified  
he contacted TELUS Health and Labour Relations in the morning of January 2, 2013, returning  
from those calls only to find the Grievor had left from where he had told her to “stay” that he  
characterized as “fleeing” from discipline. I also found that at least two of the telephone calls (or  
voice-mail messages) he claims that he made or had with the Grievor (i.e. on December 28, 2012  
and January 11, 2013), were not corroborated by the cellphone records entered into evidence at  
the end of these arbitration proceedings, suggesting he may have misstated there as well.  
[351] I found that Ms. Bargen’s testimony was not reliable on the timing of when she first  
decided to deny the Grievor’s request for STD benefits. She testified it was before her initial  
telephone discussion with Mr. Olsen and Ms. Fraser on December 10, 2012, to apparently deflect  
any criticism that their telephone call might have influenced her assessment of the Grievor’s  
medical claim. I found based on the inconsistencies of her testimony with the Case Progress  
Notes Report that that wasn’t true. Given Ms. Bargen’s refusal to answer directly when asked  
whether Dr. Verdonk’s updated PAF would have been sufficient to support the Grievor’s claim  
of being totally disabled, I drew an adverse inference that was solidified by the Company’s  
failure to call Mr. Carra or Dr. Wilson to explain exactly what it was that caused them to reject  
the latest medical documentation submitted by the Grievor’s physicians, if they considered it at  
all. The preponderance of the uncontradicted evidence before me (particularly Ms. Bargen’s  
own assessment of the sufficiency of Dr. Verdonk’s answers to the questions on the PAF) led to  
my conclusion that the PAF supported the Grievor’s claim of being totally disabled.  
[352] I found that Ms. Reynolds’ testimony in her examination-in-chief that she either notified  
the Grievor or somehow the Grievor knew that as of November 26 she was to report to Mr.  
Olsen as her supervisor (notwithstanding Ms. Reynolds’ e-mail to all team members that she was  
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now the “acting manager”), was inconsistent with the documentary record and thus could not be  
believed, particularly given her repeated, “I don’t remember” or “I don’t recall” responses to  
straightforward questions on a central matter between the parties in cross-examination.  
[353] I thus determined that the testimony of these three Company witnesses lacked credibility  
on those points. But having found that to be the case, I did not conclude that everything else  
they have told me during their combined many days of evidence (in both chief and cross-  
examination of roughly equal proportions) must be wholly disregarded as incredible, as well.  
Witnesses make mistakes in their testimony through errors of perception while acting in the  
honest belief that they are being truthful. They may exaggerate or overstate/understate at times,  
particularly in describing events or irritants that they have a heightened sensitivity to, or that  
touch on matters of key importance to the exclusion of things they don’t care about as much,  
which hence doesn’t register with them to the same degree.  
[354] Also, it has been observed that witnesses may shade evidence, perhaps undiscerningly,  
reflecting their own self-interest in the outcome of the proceedings which shapes the way they  
perceive matters, all the while believing they are telling the truth. Justice Douglas. K. Gray of  
the Ontario Superior Court of Justice recognized this in evaluating the credibility of witnesses in  
Deplance v. Leggat Pontiac Buick Cadillac Ltd., [2008] O.J. No. 1420 (QL), providing the  
following insight at paras. 46 47, which I have adopted in assessing the testimony of the  
witnesses before me:  
¶ 46  
There are many factors that go into the assessment of credibility. Among other  
things, a trial judge must consider a witness’s powers of observation, his or her memory, the  
passage of time, any bias or partiality, interest in the outcome, and demeanour. Of singular  
importance is the inherent probability or reasonableness of a particular version of the facts, against  
the backdrop of uncontroverted facts: see O’Halloran J. A. in Faryna v. Chorny (1952), 2 D.L.R.  
354 (B.C.C.A.), at pp. 356-357. It is noted in the same case that demeanour alone is, generally  
speaking, an unreliable indicator of credibility.  
¶ 47  
It is not surprising that the evidence of witnesses will diverge, even on critical points.  
Memories fade with the passage of time. Quite naturally, the perspective of a witness will be  
affected by his or her interest in the outcome of the case. That witness’s memory of the  
events will be shaped by self-interest. Thus, two quite different versions of the events will  
often emerge. There is nothing sinister, or surprising, about this. It is simply human nature  
at work.  
[Emphasis added]  
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[355] Thus applying the foregoing premise, I concluded the disparate testimony by the Grievor  
and Mr. Olsen on the number of their telephone contacts between November 28, 2012 and  
January 11, 2013, which was a major point of contention said to undercut the entirety of the  
Grievor’s credibility, was neither “surprising” nor “sinister” given the passage of time and their  
differing perspectives on events that were shaped by self-interest.  
[356] In determining credibility questions, I agreed with the Company’s submission that the  
role of the adjudicator is to subject the witnesses’ stories (paraphrasing from the well-worn test  
in Faryna v. Chorny, [1951] B.C.J. No. 152, (B.C.C.A.) at para. 11) “to an examination of their  
consistency with the probabilities that surround the currently existing conditions”, which is to be  
assessed from each story’s “harmony with the preponderance of the probabilities which a  
practical and informed person would reasonably recognize as reasonable in that place in tin those  
conditions”. Some witnesses may get certain portions of an event rightand others wrong;  
one’s perceptions of events is also influenced by different witnesses background assumptions or  
beliefs, by which an event is then processed in the witness’s mind. But through the placement of  
each witness’s testimony within the context of all surrounding evidence against the backdrop of  
uncontroverted facts, the “true” story emerges on the confidence scale of the balance of  
probabilities standard, although assessing the truth of a matter is not an exact science.  
[357] To Mr. Olsen, it is apparent that his self-appointed stature as the Grievor’s supervisor in  
Ms. Leclerc’s absence (which appears to have been the intention of his November 13 e-mail)  
overtook any recognition of the mixed messages from Ms. Leclerc (as well as the timing of those  
messages and her differing practice concerning direct employee contacts with SPOC), and hence  
I must find that the Grievor’s understanding on those matters was reasonable in all of the  
circumstances being most consistent with the surrounding circumstances as documented by  
various e-mail communications.  
[358] But while I have determined on the preponderance of the evidence that Mr. Olsen was  
mistaken and that his testimony cannot be accepted on this and some other perceptions described  
above, I still found him an overall well-meaning witness, who acted with the belief that his  
testimony was generally accurate, albeit one who seemed prone to jump to unjustified  
conclusions on inadequate information or faulty assumptions where the Grievor was concerned,  
Page 126 of 196  
and with the exception of his testimony concerning his alleged early morning contact with  
TELUS Health on January 2, 2013, which I found to be overtly incredible having regard to the  
contemporaneous written records of such contacts normally kept by TELUS Health.  
[359] Just because I have found Mr. Olsen, Ms. Bargen and Ms. Reynolds to be incredible or  
unreliable in certain aspects of their testimony, does not require that I reject their testimonies in  
their entirety.  
(c)  
Challenges to the Grievor’s Credibility  
[360] Similar conclusions may be drawn from the evidence of some of the Grievor’s  
perceptions as well, given her self-interest in the outcome of these proceedings and her  
perspective on the events that particularly irritated her at the time (often while she was  
demonstrably distraught) that affected the reliability of different portions of her evidence about  
events that were many years in the past by the time she testified.  
[361] It is evident, as corroborated by the statements she made to Mr. Olsen and others at the  
time (documented in Mr. Marasco’s notes and the e-mail records), that as the Grievor was  
leaving the November 27 investigative meeting in a “teary-eyed” state, in her mind Mr. Olsen  
was not someone she could expect to receive any “support”, and thus it is most likely she had  
become understandably sensitive to any contact from or with him, and that such contact to her  
would take on a heightened alarm or threat than objectively might be the case. In considering  
the complexities of credibility, it is the subjective belief or mental state of the witness as revealed  
by the totality of the evidence that the adjudicator must consider, and conclusions on the  
witness’s subjective beliefs may very well be the difference between a finding that the witness is  
deliberately lying about events that he or she knows not to be true, from one who has an honest  
but mistaken belief in a version of reality that does not correspond with the objective facts.  
While the adjudicator must condemn the first, he or she must understand the second.  
[362] In particular application to the instant case, during the Grievor’s examination-in-chief she  
was asked about telephone calls from Mr. Olsen to the Grievor for the purpose of determining  
her disability status and for ordering her into work, which I also received evidence about from  
Mr. Olsen. In the course of the Grievor’s relatively brief examination-in-chief that took place on  
Page 127 of 196  
June 10, 2015, she testified that after the November 27 investigative meeting while she claimed  
to be ill and unable to work, Mr. Olsen contacted her (through her personal TELUS cellphone  
number) on January 2, 2013, leaving a voice-message that she later returned. The evidence from  
Mr. Olsen is that he contacted, or attempted to contact the Grievor by telephone on other  
occasions in the period after November 27, 2012 to January 11, 2013, which will be described  
below, but no more than what might be considered reasonable in the circumstances. Mr. Olsen’s  
testimony in this regard was not challenged by the Union in cross-examination. Nor did the  
Union allege in cross-examining Mr. Olsen that he had been “harassing” the Grievor by the  
frequency and nature of his telephone calls to her over this timeframe.  
[363] The Grievor’s testimony about her contacts from Mr. Olsen on January 2, 2013 was that,  
“(Mr. Olsen) called me when he knew I was off sick. I believe he called me three times in one  
day. I called him back and he wouldn’t let me get off the phone. He kept repeating over and  
over and over again that you have been denied (short term disability benefits) and need to come  
back to work immediately. I told him I need to look after my health.” The Grievor also testified  
in her examination-in-chief that they had “a few conversations before that” but that she: “didn’t  
return his (earlier) calls because I felt intimidated by him and he wasn’t pleasant to me”.  
[364] During the third day of the Grievor’s cross-examination held seven months later on  
January 14, 2016, and towards the end of a long hearing day, counsel for the Company began  
asking the Grievor about her contacts with Mr. Olsen after the November 27 investigative  
meeting to the Grievor’s termination on January 11, 2013.  
[365] By that point in her cross-examination, the Grievor’s answers to questions about her  
actions on a specific date or dates as revealed by the AVAYA trace reports in the period from  
October 19 to November 7, 2012, or her actions on certain days while on suspension where she  
contacted or didn’t contact various supervisors for “support” with the difficulties she claimed to  
be having with her At Home systems, were becoming increasing more in the nature of: “I have  
no idea”,…“I don’t remember”,…“I was never aware of it”,…“I don’t recall”,…“In the state of  
mind I was in, I don’t know”,…”It was a long time ago – I don’t know.”  
[366] Yet on the substantive question of whether she knew she was no longer an At Home  
Agent following her disciplinary meeting of November 12 when Company counsel put to her the  
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proposition that she really couldn’t expect that she would continue as an AHA, she steadfastly  
maintained: “I don’t know any reason why I wouldn’t”. And when pressed again on the  
substantive question of whether she suspected that “the likely next step” after her disciplinary  
meeting with Mr. Olsen on November 27 was going to be her termination, where counsel also  
suggested to her that, “You thought you were concerned your employment was going to be  
terminated”, she responded consistently before me that, “I didn’t know what was going on” and  
answered with the words, “not necessarily” when it was put to her on at least two occasions that  
she thought she was about to be fired.  
[367] As Company counsel was about to move into the Grievor’s claims that she was ill and  
unable to return to work when ordered by Mr. Olsen, suggesting (again, several times) that the  
real reason for her absence from work after November 27 was because she knew she was “faced  
with possible termination”, she answered in cross-examination that, “I didn’t know what was  
going on, but I wanted to focus properly on my health – that was my main priority at the time”.  
[368] I found these answers, in the face of the obvious mounting pressure of the intense  
questioning itself, to have been consistent throughout her testimony. However I noted that when  
confronted with allegations of her conduct on specific dates about specific events, she had more  
difficulties recalling those details, particularly as her cross-examination was extended over the  
period of almost one year. She did not have a record of her telephone calls to use in aide of  
pinpointing the specific dates of her telephone conversations with or voicemail messages from  
Mr. Olsen (which was only available at the end of her testimony). It was also apparent that she  
tended to become confused and disoriented while being placed under pressure to remember  
things she could not at that stage, which over time resulted in her answers on cross-examination  
becoming shorter (i.e. simply agreeing with counsel by responding “yes” to his questions,  
without the elaboration that she had previously offered). These occasions were also interrupted  
with periodic crying by the Grievor on the witness stand, some requiring a recess while she  
regained her composure, and her apparent need for more frequent bathroom breaks.  
[369] It was in this general milieu that the cross-examination then turned to a detailed survey of  
the Grievor’s contacts with Mr. Olsen while she was on disability leave of absence between  
November 28, 2012 and January 11, 2013, which by the time of her testimony had occurred  
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more than three years previously. As noted above, by this stage in the chronology of relevant  
events the Grievor had applied for benefits under the Company’s STD plan, referred to in  
Appendix B of the collective agreement. That Plan puts TELUS Health in the position of  
assessing such claims on behalf of the Company, as opposed to relying upon a third-party  
insurer. As discussed below, TELUS Health has an obligation under the collective agreement to  
act reasonably, fairly, and with appropriate due diligence in reviewing and assessing those  
claims, which includes asking appropriate questions and even arranging for third-party medical  
examinations of claimants in appropriate circumstances, that I found on the evidence to be  
lacking in this case.  
[370] On the next segment of her testimony in cross-examination, dealing specifically with her  
conversation with Mr. Olsen after she commenced her leave of absence for stress and anxiety  
related sickness, I found a number of her answers demonstrably unreliable, but understandable in  
the context of both the events occurring in that November 2012 January 2013 three-month  
period, the passage of time and what was evidently happening to her before my eyes by that  
point, in the face of aggressive questioning. Counsel for the Union didn’t object; and I found this  
part of the Grievor’s cross-examination illuminating for what I could infer about her essential  
character, and in particular how she reacted to periods of extreme stress, which she claimed to  
have been experiencing in the course of and after her investigative meeting with Mr. Olsen on  
November 27, 2012, resulting in her need to seek urgent medical attention and to take time off to  
treat symptoms of what was later diagnosed as an acute stress reaction or major affective  
disorder brought on to a substantial degree, if not entirely, by the treatment of her supervisors  
and what I determined to be oppressive circumstances at work.  
[371] In or about the last hour of her testimony on January 14, 2016 after three and one-half  
days of cross-examination, the Grievor asserted that when she left the workplace following the  
November 27, 2012 investigative meeting that Mr. Olsen, “called me every day if not two or  
three times a day”. The Grievor consequently testified in describing her state of mind at the  
time: “I was a mess; I wasn’t thinking clearly; I was crying a lot, yet (Mr. Olsen) was constantly  
calling me.” It was also elicited by counsel’s questions near the end of that day of cross-  
examination, that the Grievor felt Mr. Olsen “was harassing me and he kept calling me”. As a  
result, the Grievor testified she was “crying to (her Union Steward) on the telephone (because) I  
Page 130 of 196  
just couldn’t deal with (Mr. Olsen).” When pressed on whether Mr. Olsen contacted her on  
November 28 and November 29, the Grievor at first said, “every day” but when ask immediately  
about her recollection of her claimed conversation with Mr. Olsen on November 28, she stated:  
“I can’t recall the exact day, but I did speak to (Mr. Olsen). I told (the Union Steward) I can’t  
deal with him.” And shortly afterwards she testified that, “I wish I could have spoken to  
someone else (other than Mr. Olsen) because it wasn’t pleasant.” Ms. Bargen had earlier  
testified that the Grievor told her on December 19, 2012 that Mr. Olsen had been “harassing”  
her; which in response to questioning by Company counsel the Grievor defined in her testimony  
as: “(Mr. Olsen) just calling me – and not listening to me”. And when asked in cross-  
examination whether the telephone calls from Mr. Olsen by that time (i.e. around December 19,  
2012) had been daily, the Grievor claimed: “At least every day”; and she accepted Company  
counsel’s suggestion that such calls occurred, “sometimes two or three times a day”.  
[372] As reviewed above, I counted 15 occasions in which the Grievor contacted or was  
contacted by a representative of TELUS Health or the Company, including Mr. Olsen, in the  
five-day period from Monday, December 17, 2012 to Friday, December 21, 2012. While my  
finding confirms that Mr. Olsen was not calling the Grievor, “three times per day” during this  
interval, I determined she was having on average, three contacts with TELUS officials daily in  
connection with her ongoing disability claim in this timeframe. Also, I was sensitive to the  
likely reality that when people communicate through various media i.e. e-mail, voice-mail and  
telephone, there may be a tendency to conflate all of these communications in the mind of the  
recipient as direct telephone conversations, when in fact that is not the case. It isn’t particularly  
surprising that a witness might testify about having a number of telephone calls with an  
individual, when in fact communications have been through a variety of means. The point in the  
recipient’s mind is not so much the means of communication, but the message conveyed.  
[373] After this part of the Grievor’s cross-examination, the Company sought production of the  
Grievor’s personal cellphone records (which is through a TELUS account), “for the months of  
November 2012, December, 2012 and January 2013 for the sole purposes of responding to  
allegations made during the course of this arbitration”, which the Union opposed. The Union  
argued the requested documentation related to collateral facts that had nothing to do with the  
essential question before me of whether the Company had just cause to terminate the Grievor’s  
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employment while she was in the throes a legitimate disability. Moreover, the Union noted that  
it hadn’t asked the Grievor anything about the alleged harassing telephone calls from Mr. Olsen;  
it hadn’t cross-examined Mr. Olsen concerning any allegation of such calls; and it wasn’t relying  
upon “harassment” as a ground for challenging the Grievor’s termination, which was only  
elicited from the Grievor through the cross-examination of the Company.  
[374] The Company replied that its request for the cellphone records arose reasonably out of  
the Grievor’s cross-examination in which she made claims of “harassment” against her  
supervisor which the Company claimed it was “surprised” about and vehemently denied. It  
submitted that the Grievor’s cellphone records that would substantiate or disprove her claims of  
such telephone calls were relevant and necessary to “preserve fairness in the present arbitration  
proceeding”. Being an allegation raised by the Grievor in her cross-examination the Company  
submitted it was not “collateral” but rather intertwined with the factual matrix of this case,  
rendering the requested production order at least “arguably relevant” to the matters before me.  
Furthermore, the Company submitted that the production request was properly directed to  
undermining the Grievor’s general credibility as a witness, if it showed that her allegations were  
untrue.  
[375] As noted earlier in these Reasons, I allowed the Company’s request for the production  
order, but one that was more limited in nature and scope than initially sought by the Company in  
my Preliminary Award between these parties dated May 2, 2016, in Re Telus Inc. and TWU  
(Baker), supra. But in doing so, I alerted the parties to the elemental difference in the  
assessment of credibility from the witness who is found to have deliberately attempted to  
mislead, to one who is confused or unreliable about the facts at the time and/or as a result of a  
relentless interrogation during cross-examination, with these words from the third sentence in  
paragraph 41 (reproduced in its entirety above):  
However, in assessing credibility to the extent it may be relevant to the issues in dispute, whether  
any deficiencies in the Grievor’s testimony are reflective of her general lack of sincerity in the  
sense of a deliberate attempt to mislead, which is what the Company apparently seeks to establish  
in part by its production demand herein, or reveals the discordant workings of an emotionally  
troubled mind that becomes exacerbated by various levels of stress now arguably on full display  
after several days of comprehensive, exacting and at times relentless cross-examination, which  
may be consistent with the Union’s apparent theory of the Grievor’s case, has yet to be  
determined.  
Page 132 of 196  
[376] In due course when the Grievor’s cellphone records were retrieved and analyzed, they  
purported to reveal that Mr. Olsen did not contact the Grievor daily or several times per day  
anytime in the period from November 28, 2012 to January 11, 2013. Rather they showed that the  
Grievor made telephone calls to Mr. Olsen on her TELUS cellphone on six occasions, being  
December 3, December 7, December 21, 2012 and January 3, January 4 and January 7, 2013.  
(Mr. Olsen’s cellphone records only record five of these calls, the one on December 7 not  
reflected on his records). The cellphone records also show that Mr. Olsen made four outgoing  
calls to the Grievor’s cellphone number that went into the Grievor’s voicemail: November 29,  
December 3, December 19, 2012 and January 10, 2013.  
[377] The Grievor’s cellphone records did not reveal incoming calls to the Grievor’s device  
from Mr. Olsen that either went into the Grievor’s voicemail or were disconnected by Mr. Olsen  
prior to going into voicemail. Nor do they show outgoing calls from Mr. Olsen to the Grievor if  
he disconnected the call prior to it going into voicemail. Moreover, as indicated by the evidence  
reviewed above, Mr. Olsen’s and the Grievor’s testimonies indicate there were additional  
telephone calls or voice-mail messages between the Grievor and Mr. Olsen on December 28,  
2012 and January 11, 2013, which were not reflected anywhere in the Grievor’s cellphone  
records. In fact one of the parties’ “stipulations” concerning the Grievor’s cellphone records  
entered into evidence, was that “Mr. Olsen’s phone records are only in respect of number  
[redacted telephone number] and do not record outgoing calls to the Grievor from any other  
number, including [redacted number] and [redacted telephone number]”.  
[378] It is clear on the parties’ stipulations that the Grievor’s cellphone records submitted into  
evidence on the last day of her testimony was not a complete accounting of all of the telephone  
contacts between Mr. Olsen and the Grievor in the timeframe from November 28, 2012 to  
January 11, 2013. Rather there were other sources of direct telephone contact from Mr. Olsen,  
not reflected by the records presented to me.  
(d)  
Does Incredible Testimony on Part of a Story, Taint the Whole?  
[379] Based on the cellphone records, the Company argued that the Grievor’s testimony of  
being harassed by Mr. Olsen through his telephone contacts with her several times per day  
between November 28, 2012 and January 11, 2013, was incredible. Moreover, the Company  
Page 133 of 196  
submitted that once it had been shown that the Grievor’s testimony on the number of her  
telephone contacts with Mr. Olsen was untruthful, then nothing the Grievor testified of substance  
about could be believed, particularly in a case where she was asserting the type of medical  
disability that was heavily dependent on her accurate reports of symptoms to her physicians that  
relied on her general veracity, which the Company claimed the cellphone records had entirely  
undermined. In support of that proposition, the Company referred to Re Telecommunications  
Workers Union and Telus (Florestal), unreported award dated August 30, 2013 (Can. Arb.)  
(Moro), aff’d. by Que. C.A. November 6, 2015 and Toronto District School Board v. Canadian  
Union of Public Employees, Local 4400 (Naccarato), 2015 71806 (ON LA) (Steinberg)  
(hereinafter “TDSB” decision).  
[380] In the Florestal decision, supra, Arbitrator Moro considered the grievance of an  
employee who had been terminated as a result of unauthorized absenteeism and tardiness after a  
number of escalating administrative and disciplinary measures between March 9, 2010 and  
August 26, 2011. In assessing the employee’s credibility, the arbitrator relied on the following  
authority at para. 87 in the award:  
¶ 87  
In La prevue et la procedure en arbitrage de griefs, Wilson & Lafleur, 1994, pages 110  
and 111, author Louise Verschelden outlines the arbitrator’s responsibility in this regard as follows:  
(…)  
The evidence in arbitration depends both on the facts in dispute and the  
credibility of witnesses. Certain questions that do not appear relevant as regards  
the facts in dispute might be relevant nonetheless to demonstrating the witness’s  
credibility or lack thereof.  
It is the arbitrator’s responsibility to consider how much probative force to  
attribute to each testimony. The witness’s credibility is considered as it relates to  
various criteria, such as: the degree of recall, the clarity of statements, a  
witness’s possible motive for testifying in a certain way, his frankness and  
spontaneity or, conversely, his reticence, the testimony’s degree of coherence,  
etc.  
When testimony contains contradictions or hesitations, or reflects a lack of  
honesty, then the testimony must be rejected in whole and not just in part.  
Either the witness is credible or he is not.  
[Translated from French]  
[Underlining in original, emphasis added]  
Page 134 of 196  
[381] The case of Smith Transport Ltd. v. Lalonde, [1946] R.L. 232, 241 (S.C.) is cited by the  
author of the foregoing publication in a footnote as authority for the proposition that when  
testimony reflects a lack of honesty on a particular part, “then the testimony must be rejected in  
whole and not just in part”. The Company in the case before me submitted I must follow that  
principle in rejecting the testimony of the Grievor in its entirety where her evidence on the  
number of telephone calls she received from Mr. Olsen in the relevant timeframe was shown to  
be incredible, but I respectfully disagree. And in looking closer at is source, do not find that the  
author of the foregoing publication was suggesting that as an unqualified proposition at all.  
[382] On reviewing the source of that proposition, I noted Smith Transport Ltd. v. Lalonde,  
supra, was a 1945 decision of the Québec Superior Court. This case dealt with a claim by a  
transport truck company against the owner of a cow, who was alleged to have permitted the  
animal to walk on the roadway, forcing the plaintiff’s truck off the road resulting in damage to  
the 40 foot long vehicle. The sole witness called by the company was its driver (named  
“Vincelette”), who declared that he first saw a cow on the roadway only 5 or 10 feet from the  
front of his vehicle traveling at 25 miles an hour in the darkness and that to avoid hitting the cow,  
he drove his truck into the ditch. The court concluded that the driver’s testimony was incredible  
because it would have been impossible for a vehicle of that size travelling at that speed not to  
have hit the animal, leading to the conclusion that the driver’s further testimony about taking  
reasonable care in operating his vehicle could not be believed. In dismissing the plaintiff truck  
company’s claim for damages from the cow’s owner, the court said the following on the topic of  
assessing the overall credibility of a witness whose testimony on one part of the evidence could  
not be believed, at para. 15 [Translated from French]:  
¶ 15  
Considering that, for all the aforementioned reasons, the only witness of the plaintiff is  
therefore convicted of obvious errors, not to say lies; these errors are demonstrated in relation to  
facts that could be controlled by the defendant; on the other hand, there are other facts in the case  
that have been affirmed by Vincelette and that it was materially impossible for the defendant to  
control, the question that arises as to the latter facts is therefore the following: a witness has  
been convicted of errors and lies about important facts that can be controlled, can one then  
trust other facts stated by the same witness, without corroboration, and that it is impossible to  
control; we answer in the negative; the testimony of a witness is a whole, it is true or false, if it is  
true it must be accepted in its entirety, if it has been shown that it is false on essential facts  
and about which it was impossible for the witness to be mistaken, so the testimony must be  
rejected not only for the part of the one that was found false, but for all the rest.  
Page 135 of 196  
[Emphasis added]  
[383] It is clear from this excerpt that the court was focused on “important facts” or “essential  
facts and about which it is impossible for the witness to be mistaken” in applying any principle  
that the witness’s testimony “must be rejected not only for the part of the one that was found  
false, but for all the rest.” Noting that this case was decided some six years before the seminal  
decision of O’Halloran J.A. articulating the now recognized test for assessing credibility in  
Faryna v. Chorny, supra, but assuming that Smith Transport Ltd., supra is good law on point  
(which I question), I could not find on the evidence before me that the Grievor’s errors  
concerning the frequency of telephone calls from Mr. Olsen in the period from November 28,  
2012 to January 11, 2013 were so “essential and about which it is impossible for [the Grievor] to  
be mistaken” to undercut her credibility as a whole on the substantive issues between the parties.  
[384] Rather, given my conclusions about the Grievor’s state of mind generally during this  
timeframe, which I found on the basis of all of the medical evidence reflected a person who was  
deeply troubled and suffering from a major affective disorder; although I could not accept the  
Grievor’s testimony concerning the number of telephone calls she claimed to have received from  
Mr. Olsen as reliable, I nevertheless determined her overall testimony on the essential or material  
aspects of this case to be credible, consistent with what I found to be her honest perception and  
belief of events that were naturally shaped by her discomfort in dealing with Mr. Olsen.  
[385] While one must be very careful in relying on an individual’s demeanor in testifying as the  
foundation for determining essential facts in a case, my observations of the Grievor’s demeanor  
on the witness stand, particularly in cross-examination, were consistent with the way the  
documented medical notes and PAFs had portrayed her; leading to some confidence that the  
mental distress she is reported to have been experiencing from November 27, 2012 to January  
11, 2013, was most in harmony with not only the surrounding circumstances at the time, but also  
in her deportment as a witness before me.  
[386] Thus, just as I am not prepared to disregard all of the testimony of Mr. Olsen, Ms. Bargen  
and Ms. Reynolds, who I have found to be incredible or unreliable in certain parts of their  
testimony (and, at least in the case of Mr. Olsen, overtly so on matters that have a much more  
material relation to the substantive issues between the parties), I have concluded it is not  
Page 136 of 196  
appropriate to disregard the Grievor’s testimony in its totality as a result of finding that she  
exaggerated or misstated the number of telephone contacts from Mr. Olsen in the relevant  
timeframe, that in her mind would understandably constitute a form of “harassment”, even  
though I found she was mistaken in holding that view.  
[387] There are two other points supporting this conclusion.  
[388] First, on the evidence before me I could not be certain that there were no other telephone  
calls from Mr. Olsen, as the cellphone records are admittedly incomplete.  
[389] Second, given the many e-mails, voice-mails, telephone calls and couriered letters  
between the Grievor and various representatives of the Company as the Grievor’s STD claim  
was being processed in mid-December to the date of her termination, as documented above, I  
found that the Grievor was having as many as up to three contacts with TELUS officials per day,  
on average, during a substantial part of this time giving credence to what is the effect of her  
testimony, that such a high degree of contact with the Company’s representatives naturally  
contributed to her feelings of extreme stress and anxiety, as substantiated by the many  
contemporaneous medical reports of her physicians.  
[390] Nothing in the TDSB decision, supra, also relied upon by the Company, detracts from  
that conclusion. In TDSB, Arbitrator Steinberg considered the case of a school caretaker who  
was found to have been spending more than 50% of his working time resting or sleeping in a  
lounge that had been set up for that purpose. Even though the arbitrator found that parts of the  
caretaker’s testimony was truthful, he could not accept the credibility of the caretaker’s evidence  
as a whole, given the materiality of the incredible parts to the matter in dispute: see the  
discussion at paras. 82 88 and 128 13.  
[391] Returning to the question in paragraph 41 of my Preliminary Award between the parties,  
referred to above, I therefore found on the basis of all of the evidence before me, and as  
demonstrated by the extensive cross-examination of the Grievor in this case and the Grievor’s  
responses to that questioning, that the deficiencies in the Grievor’s testimony were not reflective  
of her general lack of sincerity in the sense of a deliberate attempt to mislead, but rather  
revealed, as I put it in my earlier Telus Inc. supra, decision: “the discordant workings of an  
Page 137 of 196  
emotionally troubled mind that becomes exacerbated by various levels of stress now arguably on  
full display after several days of comprehensive, exacting and at times relentless cross-  
examination.”  
X.  
Arguments and Analysis  
[392] Having thus disposed of the credibility question raised by the Company, and explained  
my findings on all of the “key facts” that the parties asked me to focus upon in their “point form”  
summaries, the parties’ arguments and my analysis thereof may be considered briefly in a way  
that consolidates my factual findings with the governing principles under the collective  
agreement.  
[393] The parties required four hearing days to argue this case, three by way of oral  
representations and the equivalent of one hearing day in extensive written reply. They agreed  
that I should bifurcate my analysis in the sense of determining first whether the Company  
violated the collective agreement by imposing any or all of the disciplinary measures in this case,  
remitting the details of the specific remedy back to the parties to resolve while remaining seized  
on that matter if they could not agree. Their submissions on the merits of the three grievances  
may be summarized as follows.  
(a)  
Overview of Company’s Submissions  
[394] On behalf of the Company, Mr. Craig acknowledged that the Company bore the onus of  
proving it had just case to discipline and then discharge the Grievor, as well as to show that the  
quantum of the penalty for each discipline was proportionate. On the evidence before me the  
Company submitted it had met its onus, justifying the dismissal of all three of the Union’s  
grievances, and that there was no basis on the evidence to exercise arbitral discretion to reduce  
the penalty for any discipline imposed.  
[395] The Company took me through a detailed review of the evidence in urging me to adopt  
its particular “theory” of how all the pieces of the factual puzzle fit together in this case. As  
noted above, the Company’s overarching submission was that the Grievor was a “calculating”  
“strategic” and “dishonest” person who in her inappropriate efforts to get away with call  
avoidance activities but was caught, then devised a scheme “from the beginning” to “blame it on  
Page 138 of 196  
the system” and to ‘maneuver her way back to becoming an At Home Agent’, and then tried to  
“flee” from the discharge she knew was coming by making unsubstantiated claims of becoming  
ill with a stress related ailment, which could not be believed. Consequently the Company  
submitted that it had just cause to impose a five-day suspension without pay for the many acts of  
misconduct relied upon by the Company in its November 12, 2012 disciplinary letter; and that it  
had just cause to terminate the Grievor for her demonstrated “refusal or neglect to report to  
work” as claimed in the Company’s discharge letter of January 11, 2013. The Company also  
asserted that it had independent grounds to terminate the Grievor for her claimed misconduct of  
inappropriately working from home while on suspension, working at home when she was  
supposed to be at the call centre, inappropriate requisition of SPOC tickets without permission  
while working at home and at the call centre, and general dishonesty in her dealings with her  
supervisors, giving rise to the Grievor’s just termination for “inappropriate access and misuse of  
TELUS resources, breach of corporate security policy, and failure to follow a management  
directive” as stated in the March 11, 2013 termination letter. The Company denied that it was  
attempting to “change the grounds” of the Grievor’s first termination on January 11, 2013.  
Rather it submitted that the Grievor’s second termination on March 11, 2013 relied upon  
independent grounds, which the Company was not prevented from raising because the collective  
agreement did not impose any time limits for taking action against the Grievor for such  
misconduct. As with the Grievor’s five-day suspension and first termination, the Company  
submitted no basis had been established for exercising arbitral discretion to reduce the penalty of  
discharge, given all of the circumstances of this case.  
[396] Finally, in the event that I determined that the Company did not have just cause to  
terminate the employment relationship on both of the discharge grievances before me, the  
Company submitted that I should exercise my remedial discretion not to order the Grievor’s  
reinstatement, but rather to compensate her with an appropriate award of damages (should the  
parties not be able to agree upon that quantum). Although an order of reinstatement is the norm  
in cases of this type, sometimes circumstances arise where it is practically impossible to do so,  
particularly where the employee has engaged in conduct or has said things (even during the  
arbitration hearings) that has irreparably undermined the relationships in the workplace. That  
principle applies here where, according to the Company, the Grievor’s charges of being  
“harassed” by her supervisor, Mr. Olsen, renders it unlikely that the Grievor will ever be able to  
Page 139 of 196  
sustain a productive working relationship with her supervisor again. In these circumstances the  
Company therefore submitted the disruption to the workplace would be such that any remedy  
should be limited to damages alone as opposed to reinstatement, in the event that the Grievor  
succeeded on the merits of both of her discharge grievances.  
[397] In addition to the cases relied upon to buttress its challenge of the Grievor’s general  
credibility, the Company also filed and/or referred to the following authorities in its initial oral  
argument and extensive written reply submissions: Re Telus Inc. and Telecommunications  
Workers Union, (Tonge), unreported award dated September 9, 2013 (Can. Arb.) (Davie), Telus  
Communications Inc. v. Telecommunications Workers Union, 2014 ABCA 199 (Alta. C.A.),  
Donald J.M. Brown & David M. Beatty, Canadian Labour Arbitration, 4th ed. (Toronto, Ont.:  
Canada Law Book, 2006) (WLNC), para. 7:4314 Use of the Prior Record, Falconbridge Ltd. v.  
U.S.W.A., Local 6855, 2002 CarswellOnt 5197 (Ont. Arb.) (Shime), A.P.C.E. v. Lethbridge  
Community College, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 727, 2004 CarswellAlta 533 (S.C.C.), Re Royal BC  
Museum and BCGEU (Steffen), 2016 Carswell 1812 (B.C. Arb.) (Sullivan), IPSCO  
Saskatchewan Inc. v. U.S.W.A., Local 5890, 1999 CarswellSask 967, 83 L.A.C. (4th) 396 (Sask.  
Arb.) (Stevenson), York Board of Education v. Canadian Union of Public Employees, Local 994  
(Gleiser Grievance), [1993] O.L.A.A. No. 11, 37 L.A.C. (4th) 257 (Ont. Arb.) (Burkett),  
Cambridge Memorial Hospital v. Service Employees International Union, Local 204 (Newman  
Grievance), [1996] O.L.A.A. No. 50, 59 L.A.C. (4th) 195 (Ont. Arb.) (Brent), Re Weyerhaeuser  
Canada Ltd. and I.W.A. Canada, Loc. 1-207, 1006 CarswellAlta 1591, 55 L.A.C. (4th) 398  
(Alta. Arb.) (Power), Windsor (City) v. Windsor (City) v. Windsor Municipal Employees’  
Canadian Union of Public Employees Local 543 (Leixner Grievance), [2011] O.L.A.A. No. 194,  
208 L.A.C. (4th) 130 (Ont. Arb.) (McLaren), Re Columbia Forest Products and Industrial Wood  
and Allied Workers of Canada, Local 1-2995 (Herbert Grievance), [1999] O.L.A.A. No. 547  
(Ont. Arb.) (Surdykowski) and Re Fleetwood Enterprises Co. and A.C.T.W.U., Local 1381, 1988  
CarswellOnt 5347 (Ont. Arb.) (Brandt).  
(b)  
Overview of Union’s Submissions  
[398] In a fashion paralleling the Company’s arguments, Mr. Katz on behalf of the Union  
meticulously took me through the evidence again, urging me to come to findings of fact  
Page 140 of 196  
consistent with the Union’s “theory” of what happened to the Grievor in this case most in  
harmony with all of the surrounding events and circumstances. Ms. Pollock then followed up  
with a comprehensive review of the legal principles from the governing authorities that in  
application to the specific factual findings it was asking me to make, were said to support the  
conclusion that all three Union grievances must be allowed. On its representations the Union  
therefore requested that I reinstate the Grievor to her previous position with full back pay and to  
make her whole for her losses, suggesting also that this was an appropriate case to award  
punitive damagesto the Grievor for the manner of her maltreatment by the Company.  
[399] While admitting that the Grievor’s timekeeping practices as an At Home Agent were not  
as they should have been, for which she apologized in these arbitration proceedings, in  
addressing its complaint under Grievance No. 1 the Union submitted that the Company had  
enough foreknowledge that ‘there was something going on’ with the Grievor through the  
Grievor’s request for time off to attend doctor’s appointments and for a PAF in order to  
accommodate her need for more bathroom breaksthat Ms. Leclerc was aware of, to have  
reasonably obligated the Company to make inquiries concerning the Grievor’s general health that  
might be affecting her performance at that time. Referring to the Company’s own published  
guidelines in how it addresses “gaps” in performance, the Union submitted that Ms. Leclerc  
should have met with the Grievor in a “Meeting of Concern” to consider all of the circumstances  
related to the Company’s stated dissatisfaction about the amount of personal AUX time the  
Grievor was taking by October of 2012, which would have reasonably alerted the Company to a  
developing medical reason for the Grievor’s need for more time off during her shift for  
“bathroom breaks”, and its failure to do so violated its own practices that was contrary to the  
expectations of the parties. While conceding that the Grievor’s timekeeping as documented by  
the AVAYA trace report was inappropriate, nevertheless any potential disciplinary response was  
mitigated by the Company’s failure in adhering to its own procedures, as well as its failure to  
exercise “due diligence” in exploring the reasons for the Grievor’s timekeeping issues before  
responding with any discipline. But even assuming that some discipline was appropriate for the  
Grievor’s timekeeping transgressions, the Union submitted that the Grievor’s substantiated  
medical problems at the time mitigated the quantum of any disciplinary response. That was  
particularly the case where, on the evidence before me, the Union submitted that the Company  
had failed to prove that the Grievor violated any known “policy” prohibiting her from accessing  
Page 141 of 196  
and reviewing her own TELUS mobile phone account (without changing any of the information  
on that account) and had failed to prove its allegation that the Grievor had committed any acts of  
“rude and unprofessional” misconduct in her dealings with any customers. On this latter point,  
the Union charged that the Company was in fact attempting to rely upon past allegations of rude  
and unprofessional misconduct for which the Grievor had already been subjected to two  
“Meetings of Concern”, and thus could not be resurrected to form the basis of further discipline  
or to support the quantum of the disciplinary penalty in the circumstances.  
[400] As for the Union’s Grievance No. 2, challenging the Company’s termination of the  
Grievor’s employment for alleged “refusal or neglect to report to work”, the Union submitted  
that Ms. Olsen’s precipitous contact with Ms. Bargen in an obvious attempt to influence the  
timing and outcome of TELUS Health’s determination of the Grievor’s claim for STD benefits,  
had “poisoned the well” so thoroughly, that afterwards to the very end of the Company’s  
assessment of the Grievor’s medical documentation, all of the TELUS Health officials were  
viewing the Grievor’s case as an ‘employment dispute that should be resolved in the workplace’  
instead of ever considering whether the Grievor was legitimately ill, even if that illness did arise  
directly or indirectly out of the Grievor’s treatment by TELUS management. Given the  
Company’s contractual obligation to provide short term disability benefits to an employee who  
was “totally disabled”, which was the obligation of the Company as opposed to any third-party  
insurer, the Union submitted that in reviewing the Grievor’s medical documentation supporting  
her claim that the Company had the obligation to act with due diligence, reasonably, and in good  
faith, consistent with an overall duty of fairness in the exercise of its responsibilities. Given the  
evidence that, at least by the time of Dr. Verdonk’s PAF, substantiated the Grievor’s legitimate  
absence from work for a “major affective disorder”, which Ms. Bargen affirmed as a legitimate  
medical condition, the Union submitted there was absolutely no basis on which the Company  
could have terminated the Grievor for just case at that time.  
[401] Finally, in considering the Union’s Grievance No. 3, it made two major points. First, it  
claimed that it was simply “too late” for the Company to dismiss the Grievor on March 11, 2013  
after it had already dismissed the Grievor two months earlier on January 11. There was no  
“new” information that the Grievor had somehow hidden from the Company when it chose to  
dismiss her for other reasons in January, which it did not or could not have reasonably known at  
Page 142 of 196  
the time of the first dismissal. Thus the Company’s second dismissal of the Grievor constituted  
an improper attempt at either changing the grounds of the Grievor’s original termination, or a  
‘second kick of the can’ to back up its earlier dismissal of the Grievor that it likely knew had no  
chance of withstanding scrutiny at arbitration. Second, even if the Company could dismiss the  
Grievor a second time so many months after the first dismissal, the Union submitted that the  
Company could not show that the Grievor had committed any misconduct in all of her actions  
between November 13 and 27, 2012, thereby rendering her second dismissal as unjust.  
However, even if some discipline was appropriate (perhaps arising out of her “mistake” in not  
realizing that she wasn’t to work from home after her suspension), the Union argued that the  
level of confusion over her instructions, the identity of the Grievor’s supervision and the  
workplace rules (or lack thereof) governing her actions during that period, mitigated against any  
disciplinary response.  
[402] In the course of its submissions the Union also referred me to the following cases and  
arbitral authorities in support: Brown & Beatty, Canadian Labour Arbitration, supra, para.  
7:2200 Alteration of Grounds, University of Ottawa v. I.U.O.E., Local 796-B, 1994  
CarswellOnt 1292, [1994] O.L.A.A. No. 21 (Ont. Arb.) (Bendel), Re United Steelworkers of  
America and Aerocide Dispensers Ltd., 1965 CarswellOnt 754, [1965] O.L.A.A. No. 1, 15  
L.A.C. 416 (Ont. Arb.) (Laskin), Re Gentec Building Products Ltd. and U.S.W.A., Loc. 1105  
(Batko) (2003), 119 L.A.C. (4th) 193 (Ont. Arb.) (Surdykowski), Re Waste Management of  
Canada Corporation and Teamsters Local Union No. 419, unreported decision dated February 5,  
2012 (Ont. Arb.) (McLean), Re Ontario Power Generation Inc. and Power Workers’ Union,  
Canadian Union of Public Employees, Local 1000 (Grievance of C.H.), unreported award dated  
January 9, 2015 (Ont. Arb.) (Davie), Faryna v. Chorny, supra, Ontario Public Service  
Employees Union (Lunario) v. Ontario (Community Safety and Correctional Services), 2015  
60425 (ON GSB) (Luborsky), Re Tenant Hotline and Peters and Gittens (1983), 10  
L.A.C. (3d) 130 (Ont. Arb.) (MacDowell), Re Bettenson’s Sand and Gravel Company Ltd. and  
United Food and Commercial Workers Union, Local 401 (Black), unreported award dated May 6  
2003 (Alta. Arb.) (Ponak), Re Air Canada and Canadian Air Line Employees’ Association  
(1981), 4 L.A.C. (3d) 68 (Can. Arb.) (Shime), Telus Communications Inc. v.  
Telecommunications Workers Union, 2012 39240 (CA LA) (Johnston), Ingersoll-  
Dresser Pump Canada Inc., v. International Association of Machinists, 2000 29544 (ON  
Page 143 of 196  
LA) (Haefling), Canadian National Railway v. U.T.U., 2005 CarswellNat 7295 (Can. Arb.) (M.  
G. Picher), Community Living Espanola v. Canadian Union of Public Employees, Local 2462  
(Maltais Grievance), 2006 5597 (ON LA) (Slotnick), United Food and Commercial  
Workers Canada, Local 175 v. Good Humor-Breyers, Simcoe, 2008 90156 (ON LA)  
(Cummings), Re Greater Toronto Airports Authority and P.S.A.C, Local 0004 (GV-008-04)  
(2010), 191 L.A.C. (4th) 277 (Can. Arb.) (Shime), rev’d. in part by Ont. Div. Ct. 2011 ONSC  
487, Re Atlas Copco Exploration Products and International Association of Machinists and  
Aerospace Workers, Local 2412 (McCharles), unreported award dated May 8, 2016 (Ont. Arb.)  
(Randall), Pacific Press v. C.E.P., Local 115-M, 1998) CarswellBC 2718, 73 L.A.C. (4th) 35  
(B.C. Arb.) (Bruce), Lumsden v. Manitoba, 2007 MBQB 227 (), Rev’ d. in part by Man.  
C.A., 2009 MBCA 18 (), Expertech Network Installation Inc. v. Unifor (Short Term  
Disability Grievances of C.S.), 2014 29946 (ON LA) (Stout) and A.M.A.P.C.E.O. v.  
Ontario (Treasury Board Secretariat),2015 19326 (ON GSB) (Herlich).  
[403] While I have read and considered all of the authorities submitted by the parties, many of  
which turn on the specific language of the relevant collective agreement in the context of the  
unique facts of each case, I need only refer to a limited number of those decisions in describing  
the principles that I applied in evaluating the specific contractual language and unique facts of  
the case before me.  
(c)  
Conclusions on Grievance No. 1 Five-Day Suspension  
[404] The Company’s letter of November 12, 2012 asserts that the Grievor’s conduct “[o]ver  
the past several months” justified the imposition of a five-day disciplinary suspension without  
pay on three grounds: First, it claims that the Grievor “repeatedly and deliberately  
misappropriated company time by call avoidance, having excessive call pick up times, and by  
queue surfing”. Second, it alleges that the Grievor inappropriately, “accessed [her] own personal  
account for non-work related reasons”. And third, it contends that the Grievor continued “to  
demonstrate lack of professionalism when dealing with clients” that was characterized in the  
evidence as “rude and unprofessional”.  
Page 144 of 196  
[405] Having regard to my findings of fact in this case, the second (i.e. viewing one’s own  
account) and third (i.e. rudeness and unprofessionalism) of these grounds may be disposed of  
summarily.  
[406] The evidence established that there was no “strict prohibition” in the form of any clear  
Company rule preventing employees from accessing and simply viewing their own TELUS  
mobility accounts. In spite of Ms. Leclerc’s references to the Company’s 33-page “Ethics  
Policy” booklet and 179 page on-line “Integrity in All Things” course that the Grievor signed off  
as completing on September 27, 2012, Ms. Leclerc could point to no explicit rule, although she  
did comment upon a “case study” somewhere in that documentation that was not specifically  
identified by her or in the Company’s argument and which I could not find on carefully  
reviewing this material. The Company does not dispute that the Grievor didn’t change anything  
on her mobility account and the Grievor asserts she wasn’t aware of any policy against her  
merely viewing her account for purposes that the Grievor claimed she did to “test” the proper  
functioning of one of her computer application programs. While there is nothing improper with  
a Company rule of this nature, a basic tenet of labour relations is the requirement that the  
employer show the existence of a clear rule that is not contrary to the collective agreement,  
brought to the employee’s attention, that warns the employee of the consequences of non-  
compliance and is consistently applied, before the employer can legitimately issue discipline to  
an employee who has violated that rule: Re KVP Co. and Lumber and Sawmill Workers’ Union,  
Loc. 2537, supra. The Company’s failure to prove the existence such a clear rule, undermines  
the legitimacy of any discipline imposed by the Company in the matter.  
[407] That is not the only instance of the Company disciplining the Grievor for her violation of  
a Company “rule” or “policy” that it did not discharge its onus to prove the existence of, on the  
evidence submitted before me. Most troublesome from the perspective of upholding the  
discipline issued to the Grievor in the Company’s March 11, 2013 “second dismissal” letter, was  
Mr. Olsen’s insistence that the Grievor had “gone behind my back” by consulting directly with  
SPOC about difficulties she claimed to be having with her At Home and call centre operating  
systems, and in securing a new laptop computer from SPOC without Mr. Olsen’s explicit  
preapproval, that was claimed to independently justify the Grievor’s termination for,  
“inappropriate access and misuse of TELUS resources, (and) breach of corporate security  
Page 145 of 196  
policy”. Those grounds of termination were unsupported by evidence to prove the existence of  
any clear rule and/or “corporate security policy”, consistently followed by the Company  
prohibiting the kind of contacts the Grievor admitted she had on her own with SPOC, which was  
part of the Company’s rationale in justifying her subsequent termination. In the absence of a  
clear rule that is shown to be consistently followed, it was not surprising that the Grievor would  
tell Mr. Olsen that she didn’t know she had done anything wrong. There was, however, much  
evidence on how different supervisors had different practices or expectations in connection with  
the Grievor’s dealings with SPOC, which undermined the entire premise of the Company’s  
March 11, 2013 termination of the Grievor, as I shall discuss later in these Reasons.  
[408] The Company’s assertion of the Grievor’s “lack of professionalism when dealing with  
clients” as one of the grounds for supporting the Grievor’s five-day disciplinary suspension  
issued on November 12, 2012, suffered from other evidentiary shortcomings. Based on the  
Company’s own guidelines on how it administers corrective discipline or takes administrative  
action for culpable and non-culpable “gaps” in performance, reviewed above, I concluded it was  
inappropriate for the Company to rely upon events raised during a “Meeting of Concern” as  
disciplinable in themselves. Article 10.04 of the collective agreement requires the Company to  
convene an “investigative meeting” in the presence of a Union representative (if requested by the  
employee) to address specific events that the Company is considering issuing discipline to the  
employee; however, the matters raised in a “Meeting of Concern” does not include Union  
participation. Thus any allegation of “lack of professionalism in dealing with a client” to support  
the five-day disciplinary suspension issued to Grievor, cannot be based on the matters raised  
with the Grievor during the June 26, 2012 “First” Meeting of Concern conducted by Ms.  
Reynolds, and the October 5, 2012, “Second” Meeting of Concern convened by Ms. Leclerc. To  
the extent that the November 12, 2012 disciplinary letter implies that it is relying on instances of  
alleged rude and unprofessional conduct committed by the Grievor, “over the past several  
months” such reliance is untenable to support legitimate discipline under the collective  
agreement. There is evidence of an employee “QCE Evaluationdated October 31, 2012  
performed on the Grievor where the Grievor was criticized for her “very low, quiet, non-  
engaging voice” and her “tone” that was evaluated as “completely low and unengaged”, but that  
was not disciplinary in nature or intent; rather being for counselling and instructional purposes  
that I found the Grievor responded to Ms. Leclerc positively. Moreover there was no suggestion  
Page 146 of 196  
therein that the Grievor had committed any acts of rude or unprofessional misconduct, at least up  
to that date.  
[409] The only event in the evidence purporting to support an allegation of culpable  
misconduct related to the Grievor’s “lack of professionalism in dealing with clients” as claimed  
in the November 12, 2012 disciplinary letter after the second Meeting of Concern, arises out of  
an Employee Monitoring communication dated October 30, 2012, under the heading, “Rude  
behaviour with client” that is a report on a conversation with a customer who alleged that the  
Grievor left the customer, “almost in tears” in the manner that the Grievor is claimed to have  
responded to the customer’s billing inquiry. The evidence before me shows that the Grievor was  
first asked about the alleged inappropriate conversation with the customer in the investigative  
meeting with Ms. Leclerc held more than one week later, on November 8, 2012, and when  
expressly confronted by Ms. Leclerc that the Grievor left the customer, “in tears” the Grievor  
denied that assertion. As supported by Mr. Marasco’s written notes of the questions and answers  
asked and given in that meeting, this was the only reference to the event raised by the Employee  
Monitoring e-mail during the November 8 2012 investigative meeting, but the Grievor’s answer  
was one of the reasons leading to the claim in the November 12, 2012 disciplinary letter that the  
Grievor “failed to take accountability for (her) behaviour” which to Ms. Leclerc was,  
“completely unacceptable”.  
[410] There were two fundamental problems with this evidence. First, the reported incident of  
unprofessional misconduct was introduced in the form of double hearsay (i.e. being what the  
customer told the TELUS employee who told Ms. Leclerc who then testified about it), as the sole  
basis for supporting any discipline for that incident. Even though an arbitrator has discretion to  
accept evidence that is not admissible in a court of law, the Ontario Divisional Court has stated  
that it is a denial of natural justice to sustain discipline entirely on the basis of hearsay evidence,  
as it is not possible to effectively cross-examine on the matter: See Re Girvin et al and  
Consumers’ Gas Co. (1973), 40 D.L.R. (3d) 509 (Ont. H. C., Div. Ct.).  
[411] This hearsay problem may have been avoided had Ms. Leclerc in fact listened to the  
recording of the impugned telephone discussion between the Grievor and the dissatisfied  
customer, which the evidence suggested was likely available, or to submit the actual recording  
Page 147 of 196  
into evidence as direct proof of the conversation that actually occurred in support of the  
Company’s claim that the Grievor had comported herself rudely and/or unprofessionally. But  
the Company did neither.  
[412] Second, it was patent on the documentation of the Employee Monitoring report and from  
Mr. Marasco’s notes of the November 8, 2012 investigative meeting that Ms. Leclerc misstated  
what had been described in the e-mail communication from Employee Monitoring. That e-mail  
described the customer as being “almost in tears” while Ms. Leclerc told the Grievor that the  
customer was left, “in tears”, which the Grievor stated was “not from me”. While this was an  
obvious error by Ms. Leclerc, the Grievor’s accurate response is then relied upon as proof of the  
Grievor being ‘non-responsive’ or ‘evasive’ to the questions asked of her in that meeting, leading  
to the conclusion in the disciplinary letter that she ‘failed to take accountability for her  
behaviour. This highlights the caution that I had to apply to anything recorded by the notes of  
that investigative meeting in my assessment of the evidence as a whole. From Ms. Leclerc’s  
testimony it is clear that she prepared typed questions that she was going to ask the Grievor in  
advance of the investigative meeting, that on review I found were substantially of what could  
inelegantly be characterized as the “gotcha” variety, which is to say that they were questions  
primarily designed to elicit a specific response that would compromise the Grievor. And in true  
“Catch 22” fashion, if the Grievor didn’t respond with the anticipated answer that would  
incriminate her, she was labelled “unresponsive” and “evasive” and as a person who “failed to  
take accountability”, which I concluded is precisely what happened here, rendering those notes  
of little if any actual probative worth in assessing the grievances before me. I came to the same  
conclusion about the value of the prepared investigative questions later asked by Mr. Olsen on  
November 27, 2012, that his own testimony confirmed left the Grievor in actual tears.  
[413] Consequently, not only did the Company fail to prove any violation of a clear rule  
prohibiting the Grievor’s access to her own mobility account, but the findings of fact lead to the  
conclusion that the Company failed to discharge its onus to show any “lack of professionalism  
when dealing with customers” in the form of rude or unprofessional misconduct, as the basis for  
discipline on a just cause standard.  
Page 148 of 196  
[414] However, my findings of fact surrounding the events and circumstances supporting the  
Company’s claim in the November 12 disciplinary letter that the Grievor had, “repeatedly and  
deliberately misappropriated company time by call avoidance, having excessive call pick up  
times, and by queue surfing” led to a different conclusion.  
[415] Call avoidancetypified by permitting excessive ring times in the hope that the  
customer will hang up, and “queue surfing” that results from disconnecting customer calls  
(thereby bumping them to the bottom of the queue), is recognized as a very serious form of  
employee misconduct by employees engaged in call centre work. In a previous arbitration  
decision between these parties concerning the Union’s challenge of a five-day disciplinary  
suspension for call avoidance issued to an employee named, Simone Tonge, (reported in Telus  
Inc. and T.W.U. (Tonge), supra), who was also an At Home Agent, Arbitrator Davie considered  
much technical evidence of the same nature presented to me involving the use of computer-  
generated data (in the form of the AVAYA trace report and the e-QUALITY capture of the  
AHA’s computer screen) recording the frequency of disconnected calls and excessive ring times.  
In describing the Company’s legal onus in a case of this nature, which relies heavily on the  
computer-generated data, the arbitrator stated the following at page 36:  
I start first with the matter of legal onus. I agree with the Employer’s submission that it bears an  
onus to establish, on a balance of probabilities, that the grievor engaged in culpable misconduct  
which warranted the imposition of the 5-day disciplinary suspension. The Employer’s onus and  
legal burden of proof is not to establish that its technological architecture and call routing  
technology is always reliable. The Employer’s onus is to prove, on a balance of probabilities, just  
cause for discipline, and the appropriateness of the level of discipline imposed. The Employer has  
sought to meet that burden through the viva voce evidence of its witnesses and its use of the Ring  
Time Reports, Avaya Trace Reports and the e-Quality Capture video. It maintains that this is clear,  
cogent and convincing evidence of the greivor’s call avoidance behavior.  
In this case the grievor was disciplined for repeatedly disconnecting calls and for permitting calls to  
ring excessively before answer the call. The issue (and Employer onus) therefore is whether the  
Ring Time Reports, the Avaya Trace Reports and the eQuality Capture prove on a balance of  
probabilities that the grievor “repeatedly released client calls without making any attempt to deal  
with the client.” Does this data also prove on a balance of probabilities that “on numerous  
occasions you failed to answer a client call ringing through to your line for an extended period of  
time…”?  
[416] Notwithstanding a finding of occasions where the technology did not function as it  
should, on the evidence in that case the arbitrator concluded the Company had discharged its  
onus, as described above, to prove that Tonge was permitting excessive ring times (in the  
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obvious anticipation that the caller would hang up), but not that she was also deliberately  
releasing calls. Thus in determining whether a five-day suspension was appropriate, the  
arbitrator reduced the penalty to a one-day suspension without pay because the Company had not  
proven excessive dropped calls, which was one of the stated grounds for imposing the discipline.  
The arbitrator explained her reasoning for that result as follows at pp. 50 1:  
As I view this as serious misconduct I agree that it warrants a suspension, and not merely  
corrective counselling or an oral or written reprimand. In this regard I am also influenced by the  
repetitive nature of the misconduct. The conduct here was not just an isolated or occasional  
occurrence. In more than 60% of the calls routed to the grievor on the 9 days captured by the  
Avaya Trace Reports the grievor allowed the call to ring to more than 20 seconds. A written  
warning, or mere reinforcement of the Employer’s expectation that calls must be answered  
promptly, would not bring home to the grievor the seriousness with which this conduct is viewed.  
I agree that arbitrators shouldn’t micromanage discipline for Employers and tinker with discipline  
that falls within the range of a reasonable response to misconduct. However I am also of the view  
that the goal of discipline should not only be punitive. Discipline should be used to correct behavior  
and improve performance. This is particularly true where, as here, the Employer is faced with a  
relative long service employee (for this industry) with no prior discipline. I am therefore troubled by  
the fact that the Employer immediately jumped to a severe 5-day suspension without first bringing  
to the grievor’s attention the fact that she had excessively high ring times and a high incidence of  
disconnected calls, and without giving her the opportunity for corrective action. …  
It is apparent from the letter suspending the grievor that the Employer imposed a 5-day suspension  
also because it considered the grievor to have engaged in 2 distinct types of misconduct and call  
avoidance behavior. One was the act of permitting calls to ring excessively. That misconduct has  
been proven. The other was “repeatedly [releasing] client calls without making any attempt to deal  
with the client”. As indicated herein that alleged misconduct has not been proven on a balance or  
probabilities. If the Employer had proven that the grievor deliberately connected and then  
immediately disconnected calls I would be much more willing to uphold the 5-day suspension. But  
this misconduct has not been proven on a balance of probabilities and the severity of the penalty  
should reflect that fact.  
For all of these reasons, and in light of the grievor’s length of discipline free service, I have  
concluded that a 5-day suspension is not just or within the range of reasonable responses to the  
“excessive ringing” misconduct which has been proven. I therefore order and direct that the 5-day  
suspension be removed from the grievor’s record and a 1-day suspension be substituted in its  
place. The grievor is to be made whole with respect to lost wages and benefits in respect of the  
other 4 days.  
[417] I adopted the same principles in assessing the evidence before me. Consequently, I  
concluded the Company satisfied its onus to show on a balance of probabilities that the Grievor  
was engaged in call avoidance behaviour between October 19 and November 7, 2012, typically  
permitting excessive ring times by not answering calls in a timely manner or at all, queue surfing  
in the form of disconnected calls from numerous hang ups by the customer and calls released by  
Page 150 of 196  
the Grievor, and by taking an excessive amount of personal AUX time when compared to the  
Company’s standard of six minutes per shift. This is even accepting the Grievor’s testimony that  
she was experiencing technical difficulties with some of her operating systems; which might  
explain individual instances where calls were allowed to ring excessively or disconnected at the  
Grievor’s end, but that does not reconcile with the pattern of excessive ring times and of dropped  
calls recorded by the computer-generated data over at least the 12 ½ shifts when the Grievor was  
working from her home. When she worked one shift from the call centre on November 6, her  
numbers were consistent with the expected norm for instances of dropped calls and her ring  
times were within Company guidelines lending further support for a finding of the Grievor’s  
culpability in the matter.  
[418] The foregoing conclusion was reinforced by the Grievor’s admissions (both in her  
examination-in-chief and in cross-examination) that she had deliberately turned off the “ringer”  
on the Plantronics box so as not to disturb the other occupants of the house in the early morning,  
which she knew to be against the Company’s procedures; and that she was taking additional  
bathroom breaks (which could require two to three minutes per break, perhaps several times per  
hour) without placing her system in a state of “personal AUX” which she also knew was the  
Company’s expectation in such circumstances. She admitted that she, “got too relaxed I think  
working from home and I slacked a bit”, for which she apologized at arbitration but not directly  
to the Company at the time, which I found she wrongly continued to deny in the face of  
substantial objective evidence to the contrary. As an At Home Agent she was in a position of  
trust with respect to her timekeeping and service obligations for the “platinum clients” she  
handled, where the Company had little direct ability to watch over her; however, it is also fair to  
observe that the Company was able to closely monitor her activities electronically, tending to  
mute the true vulnerability of the Company in the circumstances.  
[419] I considered the Grievor’s claim of having difficulties with the Plantronics box and other  
technical issues that might explain the excessive ring times or dropped and released calls, and  
there was some evidence supporting that claim. I accept the Grievor’s testimony, consistent with  
the documentary evidence in the form of e-mails to Ms. Leclerc, that she raised concerns about  
the Plantronics device seemingly bumping calls when two came in at the same time, which the  
evidence also supports the conclusion that Ms. Leclerc didn’t respond to, or effectively to, at the  
Page 151 of 196  
time. However, with six years of experience as an AHA, and a person who did not hesitate to  
contact SPOC on her own to report deficiencies with her operating systems, the level of technical  
difficulties she described does not correspond to the pattern of repeated and excessive dropped  
and released calls confirmed by the computer-generated data.  
[420] Thus on the evidence before me, I concluded that the Company satisfied its onus to  
demonstrate that it had just cause to discipline the Grievor for a pattern of call avoidance activity  
in the form of both excessive ring times and queue surfing, where it had also shown on the  
evidence assessed on a balance of probabilities standard that: (a) the Grievor was aware of the  
Company’s expectations; (b) those expectations were not unreasonable or contrary to any  
provision of the collective agreement; and (c) the Grievor knowingly, and deliberately, breached  
her obligations in the matter, even if she didn’t “intend” the obvious consequences of her actions  
in compromising customer service. This was the same basic test I applied to all of the instances  
of discipline imposed by the Company for alleged culpable misconduct.  
[421] However that leaves the additional question, pursued by the Union, of whether the  
penalty of a five-day suspension without pay was a proportionate response to the Grievor’s  
wrongdoing, particularly where the Company failed to demonstrate that the Grievor had engaged  
in rude and unprofessional conduct towards customers or violated any Company policy in  
accessing her own mobile account, both of which were included among the reasons said to  
justify such a high penalty. Alternatively, even if the penalty for call avoidance alone was a  
proportional response, the Union submitted this was an appropriate case to exercise arbitral  
discretion to reduce the penalty where the evidence supported the conclusion that the Grievor  
was suffering from a medical condition explaining, at least in part, why she needed more  
personal AUX time and was less then properly attentive to her duties because of her need for  
additional relief periods, perhaps up to several times per hour. Given Ms. Leclerc’s knowledge  
by November 1, 2012 when the Grievor requested a PAF to authorize more bathroom breaks, the  
Union argued that Ms. Leclerc had the obligation to inquire into the matter, in order to determine  
whether an accommodation for the Grievor was necessary, before taking the extreme step of  
imposing discipline in the circumstances of the present case.  
Page 152 of 196  
[422] In the Tonge decision, supra, acts of call avoidance involving both excessive ring times  
and queue surfing by releasing calls, were considered sufficiently serious by Arbitrator Davie to  
warrant a five-day disciplinary suspension on its own. However, the penalty was reduced to a  
one-day suspension where the Company failed to prove that in addition to permitting excessive  
ring times Tonge had engaged in queue surfing by deliberately releasing calls, which was one of  
the grounds for which discipline was imposed.  
[423] In the case before me I have found that the Company has satisfied its onus to prove that  
the Grievor engaged in both call avoidance activities. Given the seriousness of that behaviour in  
a call centre environment, and the fact that as an At Home Agent the Grievor was in a position of  
trust where the Company was more vulnerable to such misconduct, as well as its exposure to real  
financial risk if the Company lost one of its “platinum customersas a result, I concluded that a  
five-day disciplinary suspension was not disproportionate to the potential harm of the Grievor’s  
acts of call avoidance alone, without considering the other grounds that the Company purported  
to rely upon in supporting the discipline. Even though I assess the length of the suspension at the  
high end of a reasonable range in such circumstances, I like many arbitrators subscribe to the  
general view expressed by Arbitrator Davie in the except quoted above, and Arbitrator  
Surdykowski in Columbia Forest Products, supra, at para. 45 that, “an arbitrator should not  
interfere with the measure of the discipline imposed by an employer unless it is not in the  
“ballpark”; that is, unless it is out of all proportion to the misconduct which has been established  
(as opposed to merely alleged)”. Absent other mitigating circumstances, I concluded that the  
measure of discipline imposed in the present case was within an acceptable limit.  
[424] But as reviewed above, I also found on the evidence that was corroborated, in my view,  
by the effect of her cross-examination, that the Grievor was taking chances with her timekeeping  
and proper attention to her duties in response to a developing medical problem requiring frequent  
bathroom breaks that were becoming an increasing problem, which she failed to report to her  
supervisor with sufficient clarity of detail to reasonably put the Company on notice of the  
possible need to accommodate an employee with a disability. Should that be a mitigating  
consideration justifying the reduction in the penalty?  
Page 153 of 196  
[425] While the Grievor’s developing medical situation may explain her misconduct it does not  
excuse it. Even employees who have a disability are required, in my opinion, to alert the  
employer about the disability in a clear and timely manner so to allow the employer to assess and  
if appropriate, accommodate the situation short of undue hardship. The employer should not be  
in the position of having to “guess” that there “might” be a problem in the absence of notice to  
the employer of an emerging problem (whether explicitly or by clear necessary implication from  
all of the circumstances). The fact that an employee has a developing medical disability  
affecting the employee’s work is not license for the employee to disregard the rules on his or her  
own initiative (or to be “slack” as the Grievor described about timekeeping issues), and in doing  
so in this case the Grievor placed herself at risk of receiving legitimate discipline, particularly  
given the absence of supervision and thus higher trust placed in the Grievor by the Company to  
perform to its reasonable standards, which the Grievor was aware of at the time.  
[426] While the evidence of an emerging disability (that was probably imperceptible by the  
Grievor at the beginning) might be a consideration to justify a reduction in the five-day  
disciplinary suspension issued by the Company, in order to give effect to that there must be  
evidence that the Grievor has done her part, too. The search for a reasonable accommodation is  
a cooperative venture of the employee, employer and trade union: See Central Okanagan School  
District No. 23, v. Renaud, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 970, 95 D.L.R. (4th) 577 (S.C.C.). In the  
circumstances of the instant case, it starts with the Grievor making it reasonably clear to her  
supervisor, Ms. Leclerc, that she has a developing medical problem to then shift the obligation to  
the Company to make additional inquiries, working with the Grievor and the Union to seek an  
appropriate adjustment in perhaps the Grievor’s schedule, location of work, and/or additional  
personal AUX time, to reasonably accommodate what the Union claims was an emerging  
disability. Although Ms. Leclerc had some general information to suspect there might be a  
problem, she wasn’t required to speculate on matters related to the Grievor’s personal health; and  
the Grievor was insufficiently forthcoming and clear on the matter to obligate the Company to  
make reasonable inquiries.  
[427] Having failed to reasonably alert Ms. Leclerc to her difficulties in a timely manner or at  
all, the Grievor wasn’t entitled to take her own self-help remedies by breaking the clear  
Company procedures related to the performance of her duties as an At Home Agent, who is  
Page 154 of 196  
expected to be at her desk in order to take calls in a timely manner in accordance with the  
Company’s standards. She ran the risk of legitimate disciplinary action where she dealt with her  
difficulties by violating the known expectations of the Company, without clearly alerting the  
Company about her difficulties, in order to permit the parties, jointly, to consider appropriate  
accommodative measures.  
[428] These difficulties were not so embarrassing to excuse her from making her medical  
condition known (which she could have done confidentially by reporting them to TELUS  
Health), if she expected the Company to provide reasonable accommodations for her need to  
attend the bathroom more frequently. And the sanction of a five-day suspension without pay (as  
opposed to a more lengthy suspension or perhaps termination), is not so extreme to trigger the  
appropriate reduction of the penalty having regard to her undisclosed medical condition, in the  
circumstances of the present case.  
[429] Finally, I considered whether to order the Company to reissue the November 12, 2012  
disciplinary letter by taking out its references to the breach of any Company rule related to the  
viewing of the Grievor’s personal mobile phone account and to the allegation that she “lacked  
professionalism when dealing with clients”, which were not proven by the Company, in order to  
correct the Grievor’s disciplinary record.  
[430] But I didn’t because there is a shelf-life to such disciplinary letters where article 10.03 of  
the collective agreement permits, “upon request from an employee” the removal of a notice of  
disciplinary action respecting a suspension of five days or less “from the employee’s file two (2)  
years after the date of the incident provided there are no incidents of a similar nature within that  
two year period.” Since the parties are well beyond the two years “after the date of the incident”  
giving rise to the five-day disciplinary suspension, consideration of that issue is moot at this  
stage.  
[431] Consequently for the foregoing reasons, I concluded in my “bottom line” Decision that  
the Union’s Grievance No. 1 must be dismissed.  
(d)  
Conclusions on Grievance No. 2 January 11, 2013 Discharge  
Page 155 of 196  
[432] Arbitrators are able to look at individual events from the distance of time, that permits an  
appreciation of each in the context of all of the events before and afterwards which will not have  
been immediately apparent to the parties. From that perspective I concluded that after the  
November 12, 2012 disciplinary meeting between the Grievor and Ms. Leclerc, there were many  
miscommunications, misunderstandings and lost opportunities, eventually cascading into an  
employment disaster for the Grievor. What happened in my assessment, looking at all of the  
evidence in proper context, was not the unintended consequences of the Grievor’s “deliberate”,  
“dishonest” and “strategic” thinking as submitted by the Company, but rather is more aptly  
described as an “uncoordinated” if not “chaotic” and mostly emotional reaction to circumstances  
unleashed by the early and quick and thoroughly unjustified determination by Mr. Olsen that the  
Grievor had “gone behind my back” and therefore “could not be trusted” to continue in an  
employment relationship with the Company; and thus everything the Grievor did after their  
November 27, 2012 investigative meeting was viewed through the narrow prism of an attempt to  
avoid the inevitable termination that she knew was coming.  
[433] Against this backdrop, the Union’s second grievance arises out of Mr. Olsen’s letter to  
the Grievor dated January 11, 2013, in which he informs her that, “we have terminated your  
employment with TELUS based on your refusal or neglect to report for work”, where it was also  
asserted, “TELUS has not received any documentation which supports your absence from work”  
and that the Grievor had “not returned to work as directed”, thereby justifying her termination,  
“immediately”.  
[434] My findings of fact, however, indicated there was a significant body of medical  
documentation that the Grievor provided to the Company and relied upon in confirming her  
claim of being “totally disabled” and thus incapable of reporting for work. Given its perspective  
on the matter, though, the Company was viewing the Grievor as dishonest, who was falsifying  
her claims of illness in order to “flee” discipline. This was more than a dispute among medical  
professionals about whether the Grievor’s symptoms constituted any form of disability. Rather  
the Company based its decision to issue the severest form of workplace discipline on its belief  
that the Grievor was a liar; she knew she wasn’t ill or so ill that she couldn’t work and was being  
dishonest to the Company about it.  
Page 156 of 196  
[435] In order to properly apply my factual findings on the circumstances leading to and  
resulting in the Grievor’s first dismissal on January 11, 2013 to the contractual and legal tests in  
a case of this nature, it is necessary to consider what the collective agreement requires in terms of  
the Company’s obligation to reasonably assess the Grievor’s claim of being totally disabled,  
having regard to any due diligence obligations in the collective agreement, as well as the legal or  
shifting burden imposed on the parties to prove the existence of an illness sufficient to excuse the  
Grievor from working.  
[436] Appendix B of the collective agreement is a negotiated “Memorandum of Agreement”  
requiring the Company to provide “Team TELUS Flex Benefits” that are more particularly  
described on the Company’s Intranet but which (consistent with Ms. Bargen’s testimony)  
includes the obligation to indemnify regular full-time employees with up to 130 days of full  
salary (depending on years of service) where the employee is “totally disabled” and consequently  
unable to work. The parties’ agreement does not, as seen in some collective agreements, require  
a third-party insurer to make the decision on whether the employee is eligible for an STD benefit  
that the parties have ceded to the independent assessment of the insurance company. Instead, the  
decision to provide or not to provide STD benefits is the Company’s decision to make.  
[437] But that decision-making authority is not unrestrained. As with the exercise of the  
Company’s right to “manage its operations in all respects including the direction of the working  
forces” under article 8.01 of the collective agreement, which is subject to the terms of the  
collective agreement expressly limiting that right, the Company’s determination of whether the  
employee is entitled to STD benefits is not to be exercised at its whim or unbridled will. In order  
to give a provision like Appendix B any efficacy, there is a presumption that managerial  
discretion conferred under the collective agreement shall be exercised in good faith; that all  
relevant factors must be taken into account; and that no extraneous or irrelevant matters will be  
considered. See Arbitrator Swan’s discussion in Re Meadow Park Nursing Home and Service  
Employees International Union, Local 220, 1983 CarswellOnt 2487, 9 L.A.C. (3d) 137 (Ont.  
Arb.) (Swan), at paras. 15 17. More recently, in Bhasin v. Hrynew, 2014 SCC 71, [2014] 3  
S.C.R. 495 (S.C.C.), the Supreme Court of Canada has affirmed the fundamental premise that,  
“parties generally must perform their contractual duties honestly and reasonably and not  
capriciously or arbitrarily (per Cromwell J. at para. 63), which labour arbitrators have adopted as  
Page 157 of 196  
the “general organizing principle” for the interpretation, administration and enforceability of  
collective agreement terms (also referred to as “the principle of good faith collective agreement  
administration”) in defining the limits of managerial discretion: Per Arbitrator Sims in Re  
Global Edmonton and Unifor Local M-1 (Edmonton Meal Periods), 2015 CarswellNat 8138, 125  
C.L.A.S. 47, 263 L.A.C. (4th) 363 (Alta. Arb.) (Sims), at paras. 85 93, and also see Re K-Bro  
Linen Systems Inc. and Teamsters Local Union 8478 (0018), 2015 CarswellOnt 16236, 124  
C.L.A.S. 2651, 262 L.A.C. (4th) 425 (Ont. Arb.) (Luborsky). It is my opinion that these  
prescriptions apply to the Company’s administration of the STD plan, as well.  
[438] The Company’s right to determine whether an employee is disabled, requiring the  
Company to offer reasonable accommodations short of undue hardship is also subject to the  
overriding obligation to comply with human rights legislation, which is recognized by the parties  
in article 4.01 of the collective agreement prohibiting discrimination “on the basis  
of…disability…and as otherwise provided by the Canadian Human Rights Act, unless proper  
and just cause exists.”  
[439] Within the foregoing context, the proper placement of the initial onus in cases involving  
claims for STD benefits is with the employee, who must show on a balance of probabilities  
standard that he or she is “totally disabled” with an affliction or injury that reasonably prevents  
the employee from attending work. The employer is not required to prove that the employee  
isn’t sick or sick enough not to attend work.  
[440] The Alberta Court of Appeal has made this distinction clear in a previous decision  
between these parties in Telus Communications Inc. v. Telecommunications Workers’ Union,  
supra. In that case, an arbitrator reinstated an employee who had been discharged when he  
claimed he was ill and thus couldn’t attend work due to an attack of “severe diarrhea”, but then  
was seen at a ballpark pitching in a slo-pitch tournament during working hours while he was  
supposed to be recuperating at home. When an arbitrator allowed the Union’s grievance on the  
grounds that the Company hadn’t discharged its onus to prove that the employee wasn’t sick or  
too sick that he couldn’t attend work, the decision was quashed on judicial review, which was  
upheld on appeal. In describing the proper placement of the onus in cases of this nature, the  
Court of Appeal said the following at para. 25:  
Page 158 of 196  
¶ 25  
At the arbitration hearing, Telus had to establish just cause for terminating the grievor.  
Once a prima facie case is made out, the grievor bears the onus to refute it. Then, the arbitrator  
must decide whether Telus proved just cause for termination. The question of whether the  
grievor was too sick to work was central to whether Telus had just cause to dismiss the  
grievor. This question required the arbitrator to weight all the available evidence. Instead,  
the arbitrator focused on the fact that Telus did not adduce direct evidence that the grievor was not  
sick. In our view, it was unreasonable for the arbitrator to require Telus to prove that the grievor  
was in fact sick and to resolve the critical finding about whether the grievor was sick on the basis of  
Telus’s onus alone. Instead, the arbitrator was required to weigh all of the evidence and  
determine whether the grievor had falsely called in sick.  
[Emphasis added]  
[441] Thus in a discharge such as the one before me where the Grievor has refused to attend  
work because of an alleged illness preventing her from doing so, the foregoing provides  
guidance that in determining whether the Company has discharged its onus to prove just cause to  
terminate the Grievor’s employment, I am required to weight all of the available evidence in  
answering the central question of whether the Grievor “had falsely called in sick” or, as applied  
in present circumstances, to weigh all of the evidence to determine whether the Grievor’s claim  
that she was too sick to attend work in order to refute just cause for termination was false, where  
the Company has otherwise satisfied its onus on the matter.  
[442] In considering that “central question” in Ontario Power Generation Inc., supra,  
(hereinafter “OPG”), Arbitrator Davie assigned the initial onus onto the employee to show that  
he was suffering from an illness preventing the employee from attending work in order to receive  
disability benefits. The facts of that case are instructive for their similarities with the factual  
circumstances before me (even though it did not involve a discharge), which I adopt as guidance  
to the manner in which I ought to assess the medical documentation submitted to me, and thus  
will extensively review that case for instructional purposes.  
[443] In the OPG case, the employee was involved in a conflict with his supervisor for several  
days causing him to experience symptoms of anxiety and stress. The employee knew he would  
likely receive discipline on the same day he left the workplace on December 6, 2013 (advising  
his supervisor by voice-mail that he was going home because of illness) and then produced a  
doctor’s note (described as the “notepad variety”) signed by a physician of a walk-in clinic he  
obtained that day, stating the employee had been seen in urgent care and would be off work “due  
to anxiety”. This was followed with two notes from the employee’s personal physician, who  
Page 159 of 196  
wrote on the first, “This patient would benefit from counselling” and on the second, “This patient  
will be unfit and unable to work until further notice.” The employee’s doctor then submitted a  
more detailed form provided by the employer referred to as a “Medical Absence Report” or  
“MAR” to the administrators of the employer’s sick leave plan (Morneau Shepell), in which he  
reported the primary diagnosis of “adjustment disorder – anxiety with depressed mood”  
indicating that the employee had been referred to “EAP program at work for counselling” but  
that the employee was “unfit for any type of work” due to his “inability to concentrate, problem  
solve or socialize presently.” The employee told a case worker for Morneau Shepell that he felt  
“harassed by his supervisor due to constant behavioural corrections” and that his stress was  
increasing. However, the case worker concluded the employee’s absence “was not supported by  
objective medical information” and the employer, suspecting the employee was really attempting  
to avoid discipline with false claims of being sick, and thus was not truthful in the matter,  
refused the employee’s claim for benefits covering his period of absence from the workplace.  
[444] In dealing with the union’s grievance in the OPG case challenging the employer’s refusal  
to provide the sick leave benefits for the period of the employee’s absence, Arbitrator Davie first  
addressed the question of “onus” as follows at p. 17:  
First, there is no dispute that the onus is on the grievor to prove on a balance of probabilities that  
he was absent from work because of an illness that rendered him unfit for work. It is the grievor  
who must establish with evidence satisfactory to the Employer (and ultimately in the case of a  
grievance with evidence satisfactory to an arbitrator) that he was sick and unable to work and thus  
entitled to the sick leave benefits set out in the collective agreement.  
[445] At p. 17 19 the arbitrator considered the amount and quality of medical information  
required to be provided by an employee seeking sick leave benefits, accepting the general  
principles adopted by Arbitrator Surdykowski in Hamilton Health Sciences Corp. v. O.N.A.  
(2007), 167 L.A.C. (4th) 122 at paras. 25 and 27, as follows:  
In Hamilton Health Sciences Corp., supra, the arbitrator noted that the amount of medical  
information required to be provided by an employee seeking sick leave benefits may change  
depending on the stage of the absence at which the information is sought.  
¶ 25  
As a matter of general principle in that latter respect, what is required is  
sufficiently reliable information to satisfy a reasonable objective employer that the  
employee was in fact absent from work due to illness or injury, and to any benefits  
claimed (see, Arbitrator Swan’s comments in Re St. Jean de Brebeuf Hospital and  
C.U.P.E., Loc. 1101 (1977), 16 L.A.C. (2d) at pp. 204 206). As a general matter, the  
least intrusive non-punitive interpretive approach that balances the legitimate  
business interests of the employer and the privacy interests of the employee is  
Page 160 of 196  
appropriate. But what the employer is entitled to, and concomitantly what the employee  
is required to provide, will first and foremost depend on what the collective agreement or  
legislation provide in that respect.  
¶ 27  
The several layers of legitimate employer interests suggest that there is more  
than one stage to the process that is engaged when an employee seeks the benefit of  
the sick leave provisions in a collective agreement. It also suggests that the employer  
will generally be entitled to less information at the initial stage than at a  
subsequent stage. The employer’s desire for more information, or its genuine concern  
for an employee’s well-being or desire to assist the employee, do not trump the  
employee’s privacy rights. Nor do questions of expediency or efficiency. In the absence  
of a collective agreement provision or legislation that provides otherwise the  
employer is entitled to know only that the employee is unable to work because she  
is ill or injured, the expected return to work date, and what work the employee can  
and cannot do. A document in which a qualified medical doctor certifies that an  
employee is away from and unable to work for a specified period due to illness or  
injury is prima facie proof sufficient to justify the absence. Unless the collective  
agreement (or less likely, legislation) stipulates otherwise, it will also be sufficient to  
sufficient to (sic) qualify the employee for any applicable sick benefits for that period. To  
require more invites an unnecessary invasion of the employee’s privacy. In order to  
obtain additional confidential medical information, the employer must demonstrate a  
legitimate need for specific information on an individual case-by-case basis. That is, for  
sick benefit purposes an employer has no prima facie right to an employee’s  
general medical history, a diagnosis, a treatment plan, or a prognosis other than  
the expected date that the employee will be able to return to work with or without  
restrictions.  
[Emphasis added]  
[446] Then Arbitrator Davie articulated the proper test in assessing the employee’s claim for  
sick leave benefits, applying that test to the facts of the OPG case from which the following  
excerpts at pp. 26 28 and 29 are immediately relevant to the circumstances before me:  
I must decide whether the grievor’s absence from work was medically required and whether he is  
entitled to sick leave benefits. In addressing that issue what the Morneau Shepell case manager  
though about the quality of the medical evidence presented in support of the absence is in some  
ways immaterial. Arbitrators must make their own assessment of the medical information  
having regard to the context and all of the relevant circumstances under which the medical  
information was obtained and provided.  
The only medical evidence before me which deals with the grievor’s fitness for work on the days for  
which sick leave is claimed is the MAR. It is the form required by the Employer and in it a medical  
practitioner, subject to professional obligations, certified that the grievor was unfit for work because  
he has adjustment disorder, with anxiety and depressed mood, and was “unable to concentrate,  
problem solve or socialize presently.” There is no medical evidence to the contrary before me.  
Page 161 of 196  
There can be little doubt that the grievor’s workplace conflict is part and parcel of the reason why  
he was absent from work on the days for which sick benefits are claimed. That fact alone however  
is not sufficient to detract from the probative value of the medical certification found in the MAR.  
The fact that workplace issues and potential discipline caused or contributed to the  
depressed mood, stress and anxiety, does not mean that the illness and the symptoms are  
not bona fide or incapacitating.  
In the result and on the medical evidence before me I am satisfied on a balance of probabilities that  
the grievor was ill and unable to work as a result of that illness so that he was entitled to paid sick  
leave. The medical evidence to support that claim is the MAR. There is no evidence to the  
contrary. Notwithstanding the circumstances which may have caused the grievor to leave  
the workplace on December 6, 2013 I can’t simply ignore or discount that medical evidence.  
I find the MAR is sufficient to support the grievor’s claim that he suffered from an illness the  
severity of which made it unreasonable for the Employer to expect him to attend work and perform  
his job.  
[Emphasis added]  
[447] The OPG case, supra, thus affirms the following principles that I have found to be  
applicable in the very similar factual circumstances of the case before me.  
[448] First, the onus is on the Grievor to demonstrate that she has an illness preventing her  
from attending work. Subject to the terms of a collective agreement to the contrary (which are  
not present in the instant case), the bar for establishing such an illness is not a high one, and at  
least initially it is satisfied by a less intrusive revelation that the Grievor has an affliction  
preventing her from attending work that is not required to include details of the diagnosis, a  
treatment plan, or prognosis other than the expected date that the Grievor will be able to return to  
work with or without modifications.  
[449] Second, a medical form of the type required by the Company in the present case, the  
PAF”, signed by the Grievor’s physician(s) that certifies the Grievor is unable to work, “is  
prima facie proof sufficient to justify the absence”. In accordance with the release signed by the  
Grievor in presenting the PAF, the Company has the right to ask the reporting physician(s)  
questions to clarify their opinions as to the Grievor’s fitness to work or to obtain additional  
medical information from them; as well as the ability to require the Grievor to submit to a  
medical examination by a physician of the Company’s choice if the Company has legitimate  
concerns about the sufficiency of the medical information provided by the Grievor’s physicians.  
The Company can’t simply turn a blind eye to that ability in rejecting out-of-hand the certified  
Page 162 of 196  
medical opinions of both of the Grievor’s physicians that the Grievor was totally disabled and  
temporarily unable to attend work.  
[450] Third, where a dispute arises between the parties on whether the medical evidence  
supports the Grievor’s inability to attend work, as arbitrator I must make my “own assessment of  
the medical information having regard to the context and all of the relevant circumstances under  
which the medical information was obtained and provided.” This must include the events  
leading to the November 27, 2012 investigative meeting and circumstances resulting in the  
discipline issued to the Grievor on November 12, 2012 as part of my consideration of whether  
the Grievor is making false claims of becoming totally disabled.  
[451] Fourth, even where there is evidence, as there is in the present case, that a workplace  
conflict “is part and parcel of the reason why (the Grievor) was absent from work on the days for  
which sick benefits are claimed”, that alone is not sufficient to detract from the probative value  
of the medical certification found in a PAF. The fact that workplace issues and potential  
discipline caused or contributed to the Grievor’s diagnosis on the PAFs by Dr. Adil of  
“Stress/Anxiety” or by Dr. Verdonk of a “major affective disorder” that in the opinion of both of  
these professionals rendered the Grievor “unfit for work”, as certified on each of the PAFs that  
they signed, does not mean that the reported illness and the symptoms are not bona fide or  
incapacitating. The consistent refrain in the Company’s evidence is that the Grievor’s claims of  
being “totally disabled” and unable to work must be rejected (and more than that, she must be  
deliberately lying about it), because the medical condition certified by her physicians arose out  
of a workplace dispute that, in the minds of both Mr. Olsen and Ms. Bargen (and seemingly Dr.  
Wilson as well) needs to be resolved in the workplace; or as Ms. Bargen put it to the Grievor on  
December 19, 2012: “I explained several times that the issue was workplace related and was  
best resolved there, otherwise, there would never be any resolution”.  
[452] Adopting the principles from the OPG case, however, that kind of thinking arbitrarily  
denies the possibility of a legitimate illness arising out of circumstances in the Grievor’s  
workplace. Consequently I concluded on the evidence before me in the present case that, instead  
of asking themselves the question of whether the Grievor had a mental affliction preventing her  
from working on the basis of the medical certifications presented (and/or by her physicians’  
Page 163 of 196  
answers to any questions and/or independent medical assessments that the Company was entitled  
to require of the Grievor at the time), TELUS Health and Mr. Olsen discounted if not completely  
ignored the medical evidence because of the circumstances leading to the Grievor’s medical  
claim, and thus wouldn’t consider the possibility that the Grievor might have an illness arising  
out of those circumstances. I, like Arbitrator Davie in the OPG award, supra, “can’t simply  
ignore or discount that medical evidence.” That medical evidence, in my assessment, not only  
supports the conclusion that the Grievor was “totally disabled” under the Company’s STD plan  
as that term was defined by Ms. Bargen, but that the substantial if not proximate cause of the  
Grievor’s extreme mental pain and suffering as certified by her physicians, was the general  
conduct of the Company towards her at a vulnerable time, and by Mr. Olsen in particular in at  
least the two weeks leading up to the Grievor’s need for urgent medical care after leaving the  
“investigative meeting” on November 27, 2012 in a “teary-eyed” state, which the Company  
knew or ought to have known it was inflicting on the Grievor.  
[453] In Expertech Network Installation Inc., supra, Arbitrator Stout was faced with a similar  
situation to the one before me (although not nearly as egregious), where the employer required  
employees who were claiming short term disability benefits (referred to as “SDB”) under the  
parties’ Income Protection Plan (referred to as “IPP”) that was administered for the employer by  
a management firm called, “OIS”, to have their physician fill out a form certifying the  
employee’s inability to attend work. When the OIS rejected an employee’s claim for SDB  
benefits because of its view that the information provided by the employee’s physician did not  
disclose a known medical reason for the employee’s absence, the arbitrator stated the following  
at para. 42 touching on the probative weight to be given to the information on such forms:  
¶ 42 In my view, it is clear under the IPP that an employee must provide more than a physician’s  
note to qualify for SDB benefits (in excess of five consecutive work days). The evidence necessary  
to support such claim must be in the “required form(s)”, which would include the [Attending  
Physician’s Statement] and any other form(s) required by OSI. It seems to me that an employee  
need not provide any information beyond the information sought in the required form(s). In other  
words, the Company and their agent OSI are obligated to seek out the information that they need  
to assess the claim and seek clarification from the employee’s physician, if necessary.  
[454] Then in considering the propriety of the employer’s refusal (through OSI) to accept the  
information on the medical form as supporting a medical reason for the employee’s absence, and  
while acknowledging the expected close personal relationship between the employee and his  
Page 164 of 196  
physician requiring a natural skepticism to the information provided, Arbitrator Stout wrote at  
paras. 50 51:  
¶ 50  
The nature of the relationship between a physician and their patient, as described above,  
means that medical evidence submitted by a treating physician must be carefully scrutinized.  
Under the IPP, it is not enough for a physician to simply state that an employee is unable to work  
without providing objective medical evidence to support the claim and answering appropriate and  
reasonable inquiries.  
¶ 51  
At the same time, it is inappropriate for the Company or OSI to deny a claim at first  
instance and advise an employee that they have simply not submitted adequate evidence. The  
Company and OSI have an obligation in each case to advise the employee or their physician of the  
nature of the concern and seek an explanation or elaboration. If the employee or their physician  
fail to provide an explanation or elaborate on the claim, then the Company may make a decision  
based on the medical evidence they have been provided. Again, the decision of the Company or  
OSI may later be reviewed by an arbitrator to determine if it was correct based on the medical  
evidence that was submitted.  
[455] As in the foregoing case, Ms. Bargen was acting as the Case Consultant on behalf of  
TELUS Health charged with the responsibility of assessing the sufficiency of the medical  
documentation supporting the Grievor’s claim. She has medical training as a Registered Nurse,  
but she is not a medical doctor as are Dr.’s Adil and Verdonk. (I simply don’t know what, if any,  
medical qualifications that Mr. Carra has because that evidence was not presented). As between  
the opinions of the Grievor’s physicians who have examined her and have expressed their views  
of the Grievor’s ability to attend work (that are governed by their professional ethics) with that of  
Ms. Bargen and Mr. Carra who are employees of the Company and, as the evidence shows, were  
subjected to persistent interference from Mr. Olsen that I found in looking at all of the evidence  
in this case to have compromised their true independence in the matter, there is a tendency to  
give greater weight to that of the Grievor’s physicians, notwithstanding the need to also look  
carefully at the physicians’ opinions in accounting for potential bias that may be the result of the  
close relationship between doctor and patient. Having considered all of those factors, I found it  
appropriate to give overall greater weight to the opinions of the Grievor’s physicians on the  
matter of the Grievor’s fitness to attend work.  
[456] Although article 8.01 of the collective agreement confers a broad discretion on the  
Company to “manage its operations in all respects”, when Ms. Bargen and Mr. Carra act as Case  
Consultants in administering the Company’s STD plan as provided for employees in the West  
and the East under Appendix A and B of the collective agreement, respectively, they also have  
Page 165 of 196  
the implied contractual duty to act fairly, reasonably, in good faith, to take all relevant  
considerations into account, and not consider any irrelevant factors, and perhaps most  
importantly, not to act arbitrarily.  
[457] Holding the role of “gatekeepers” to the STD plan, which is an important benefit that the  
Union has negotiated for employees who have become ill or injured and therefore need income  
stability at a time of obvious vulnerability, Ms. Bargen and Mr. Carra enjoy a particular trust  
with the employees as well (although I would not go as far to suggest it is a fiduciary trust). But  
certainly part of that trust in properly administering the short term disability plan for the benefit  
of ill and injured employees is the obligation to ensure that before summarily rejecting an  
employee’s claim because of their view that it does not objectively support a medical condition  
that is responsible for the employee’s absenteeism, is to make reasonable inquiries of the  
employee’s physician, that may extend to requiring another medical evaluation of the employee  
in appropriate circumstances, before rejecting the employee’s claim outright. To do otherwise  
without compelling reasons established by the evidence would, in my opinion, be contrary to the  
expectation that they would exercise due diligence in the assessment of every claim, as opposed  
to arbitrary conduct that the parties to the collective agreement would not have reasonably  
contemplated in agreeing to the provisions in the Company administered short term disability  
plans under Appendix A and B.  
[458] Advancing that line of analysis, in the case before me the evidence is conclusive that both  
Ms. Bargen’s and Mr. Carra’s conduct fell below that expectation, seemingly being more intent  
to move the matter expeditiously in order to: (a) satisfy Mr. Olsen’s repeated entries to complete  
their review so he could proceed with the Grievor’s termination; (b) relieve what Ms. Bargen  
referred to as a heavy workload, anyway; that was (c) consistent with the repeated apologies  
issued by TELUS Health while the Grievor’s entitlement to STD benefits was being determined  
as a result of, “higher than anticipated claim volumes…resulting in longer than normal response  
and adjudication times…sincerely apologi(zing) for this delay and any inconvenience.”  
[459] While Ms. Bargen was entitled to question whether Dr. Adil’s characterization of the  
Grievor’s diagnosis on the December 7, 2012 PAF as “Stress/Anxiety” was the proper  
terminology to depict any known medical condition (taking an obviously technical medical  
Page 166 of 196  
dictionary approach as opposed to what any layman would read otherwise), it is my opinion that  
the expectations of due diligence on her part obligated Ms. Bargen to at least make reasonable  
inquiries of Dr. Adil, for clarification or to convey information about what TELUS Health  
needed to hear in order to assess the Grievor’s absence for claims of a stress related disability.  
[460] That is a reasonable expectation, in my view, because whenever employers use a pre-  
printed form that they require the physician to fill out, there is a great deal of potential  
miscommunication between the health professional and the benefit provider on what, exactly, the  
benefit provider is looking for in order to substantiate a claim. Ms. Bargen’s failure to do so, at a  
minimum, was more consistent with a desire to move the matter along than to fulfill her due  
diligence expectations, and in that regard her consequential dismissal of Dr. Adil’s PAF as being  
insufficient to support the Grievor’s claim of total disability was arbitrary, if not an exercise in  
bad faith, given the overt pressure being exerted on her by Mr. Olsen and Ms. Fraser for a quick  
determination by TELUS Health. Ms. Bargen’s due diligence expectation may have also  
extended to the obligation for the Company to obtain another medical assessment on the Grievor  
by a physician of the Company’s choice, which was the Company’s right reserved under the PAF  
signed by the Grievor, if she continued to have a reasonable doubt on the matter after giving Dr.  
Adil a fulsome opportunity to address Ms. Bargen’s concerns.  
[461] The same conclusion arises out of an examination of Mr. Carra’s conduct later on. Here I  
do not have direct evidence from Mr. Carra to know what, exactly, he did and when he did it  
from which I am entitled to draw an adverse inference against the Company to the extent that  
there is any confusion on the timing of critical events that may benefit the Grievor’s cause.  
Nevertheless, the evidence of the Case Progress Notes Report before me supports the finding that  
Mr. Carra most likely submitted the Grievor’s medical file (along with much of the note to file  
from Ms. Bargen’s record of her first telephone contact by Mr. Olsen as part of the “background”  
of the case) to Dr. Wilson at or about 5:17 p.m. on January 8, 2013, which was at least 17 hours  
before Ms. McLeod recorded the receipt of Dr. Verdonk’s PAF at TELUS Health at 10:21 a.m.  
on January 9, 2013.  
[462] Having considered Ms. Bargen’s reluctant testimony on the sufficiency of Dr. Verdonk’s  
subsequent PAF, particularly given Ms. Bargen’s admissions in cross-examination, I concluded  
Page 167 of 196  
from her evidence and indeed I read Dr. Verdonk’s medical report independently, as objectively  
supporting the Grievor’s claim of being unfit for work on a temporary basis and in receipt of  
drug therapy and weekly counselling with the “guarded” expectation that she would not be able  
to return to work until February 7, 2013 because of a diagnosed condition of “major affective  
disorder”, which Ms. Bargen conceded to be a recognized medical affliction.  
[463] Mr. Carra’s apparent disregard for Dr. Verdonk’s PAF most likely reflects a finding that  
he didn’t review that report, or even consider it after the file was submitted to Dr. Wilson for his  
medical opinion. Alternatively, if it was considered by both Mr. Carra and Dr. Wilson (which is  
nowhere implied in Dr. Wilson’s report), the Company’s failure to call either of them to explain  
the reasons for rejecting Dr. Verdonk’s PAF, where the evidence supports the conclusion that the  
PAF would have been acceptable to Ms. Bargen had she continued to act as the Case Consultant,  
leaves me with medical documentation in the form of a Company mandated PAF objectively  
supporting the Grievor’s claim that was not contradicted by anything submitted by the Company,  
where the Company could have at least put either Mr. Carra or Dr. Wilson on the witness stand  
for that purpose, but chose not to.  
[464] The same situation that I face in assessing the foregoing medical documentation was also  
confronted by Arbitrator McLean in Waste Management of Canada Corporation, supra. That  
case dealt with an employee who became depressed following the death of his mother-in-law in  
India, and thus after being examined by his family doctor who diagnosed “adjustment disorder  
with depressive and anxiety symptoms” and counselled the employee “to travel to India with his  
wife to support her”, completed a weekly indemnity insurance form on the employee’s behalf in  
which he indicated that the employee was unable to work but should be able to return in 4 6  
weeks (at p. 2). The weekly indemnity plan was administered by the Manulife Insurance  
Company which denied the claim because it’s “Case Manager” determined, “the medical  
evidence does not support a disabling condition of such severity that would prevent (the  
employee) from performing the essential duties of (his) job” (at p. 3), and thus the employee was  
ordered by the employer to return to work. However, the employee didn’t get the message  
because he was with his wife in India at the time and consequently he was fired by the employer  
under the “deemed quit” provision of the collective agreement because of his absence for three  
consecutive work days without leave and without a reason satisfactory to the employer. In  
Page 168 of 196  
assessing the evidence presented in that case, and noting that the medical reports prepared by the  
employee’s doctor “were accepted before me at face value” without the doctor being required to  
testify (just as the medical documentation in the instant case was tendered before me), the  
arbitrator upheld the union’s grievance and ordered the employee’s reinstatement with  
compensation, primarily on evidentiary grounds that the arbitrator explained at pp. 8 9:  
The fundamental problem with the employer’s position is that it does not address the fact that the  
only evidence before me is that the Grievor has a medical excuse for all the days he was  
absent. The employer did not challenge the union’s medical evidence – that evidence is that the  
Grievor was unable to work on all of the days in question. The evidence that disputes the Grievor’s  
ability to work is simply that of a case worker at Manulife and, perhaps, a “medical consultant” at  
Manulife. There is no reason for me to prefer the Manulife opinion over that of the Grievor’s  
physician particularly since the Grievor’s doctor saw the Grievor at the time of his illness and  
symptoms. There is no reliable evidence before me that seriously throws into question the  
Grievor’s medical condition. Quite simply, on the evidence, he was unable to work for the entire  
period in question. While the company had the right to challenge the Grievor’s fitness to work it  
could only do so through an alternative medical opinion. It could not simply require the Grievor  
to work contrary to the advice of his doctor. I also note that in travelling to India to be with his  
wife the Grievor was following the explicit suggestion of his doctor.  
I appreciate that the company is suspicious of the medical information provided. However, I have  
to make a decision on the evidence before me and not on suspicions.  
[Emphasis added]  
[465] The Company in the case before me has failed to address the same “fundamental  
problem” with the quality of its evidence to counter the Grievor’s claim of being totally disabled.  
Also, as I shall address further below, Mr. Olsen was demanding that the Grievor report for work  
at the same time the evidence shows she was receiving advice from her physicians to remain off  
work, at least until February 7, 2013 and, I must find, had an honest and reasonable belief that  
she should remain off work until then because of her ongoing disability. I determined there was  
nothing “false” or “dishonest” about the Grievor’s belief in that regard.  
[466] Thus contrary to Mr. Olsen’s claim in his January 11, 2013 termination letter delivered to  
the Grievor, I concluded on all of the evidence before me that the Grievor did not ‘refuse or  
neglect to report to work’ without reasonable excuse, being her ongoing disability as certified by  
her physicians, and her honest belief as a result that she was incapable of working at that time.  
She in fact provided TELUS Health with much medical documentation supporting her ongoing  
absence due to a disability affirmed by her doctors, culminating in the January 8, 2013 PAF from  
Page 169 of 196  
Dr. Verdonk that Mr. Olsen knew the Grievor was pursuing from his direct dealings with her on  
the matter (i.e. in order to forward the required form) some five days earlier on January 3, 2013,  
contrary to the assertion in the January 11, 2013 termination letter. And there was nothing  
improper in the Grievor’s refusal of Mr. Olsen’s order in his January 7, 2013 letter to her that she  
“return to work as directed” on January 9, 2013, because his order in that regard was invalid  
under the collective agreement where I found the Grievor was legitimately ill and entitled to  
STD benefits, if not illegal under human rights proscriptions.  
[467] I am therefore left with the inevitable conclusion that Mr. Olsen terminated the Grievor’s  
employment on January 11, 2013 when she was suffering from a recognizable diagnosis of  
“major affective disorder” for which she was undergoing both drug and psychological  
counselling and was “unfit for work”. Any termination of the Grievor under such circumstances  
in the guise of culpable misconduct is wrongful, a violation of the just cause prescription in the  
parties’ collective agreement and likely a breach of governing human rights legislation, as well.  
[468] While the foregoing is sufficient to dispatch the Company’s claims of just cause in its  
termination of the Grievor on January 11, 2013, and is the primary reason on which I have  
allowed the Union’s Grievance No. 2, there is another issue that I asked the parties to address in  
argument that bears answering in these Reasons. Prior to argument I had asked the parties to  
consider the following question (among a number of questions posed):  
If an employee has an honest and reasonable belief that she is sick and unable to return to work; and part of  
that belief arises from visits to her doctor who has written to the employer and authorized time off for illness;  
can the employee then be terminated for not attending at work in a disciplinary sense where the employer  
does not believe the absence is justifiable because of lack or absence of medical information provided by  
the employee’s doctor? Or does that really only go to whether the employee is entitled to STD benefits  
during the absence?  
[469] My question really goes to what was also flagged by the Alberta Court of Appeal’s  
handling of the dispute between these parties in Telus Communications Inc. v.  
Telecommunications Workers’ Union, supra. As reviewed above, the employee in that case was  
terminated because he claimed he was sick with an attack of “severe diarrhea”, when his  
participation in a slo-pitch tournament while he was supposed to be recuperating at home  
suggested that he had falsely claimed he was ill in order to have the time to play ball. In  
concluding at para. 25 in the decision that the arbitrator had erred because “it was unreasonable  
Page 170 of 196  
for the arbitrator to require Telus to prove that the grievor was sick on the basis of Telus’s onus  
alone”” the Court of Appeal stated that: “Instead, the arbitrator was required to weigh all of the  
evidence and determine whether the grievor had falsely called in sick.”  
[470] In application to the present case, this foregoing direction raises the requirement to  
consider what, exactly, is in the Grievor’s mind when she didn’t return to work on January 9 as  
directed by Mr. Olsen? On the evidence before me of the Company’s reasoning at the time,  
consistent with the Company’s submission in argument that the Grievor was “deliberate” and  
“calculating” in her “dishonesty” and “deception”, she was discharged because the Company  
believed she was making a false claim of being sick and unfit to work in order to avoid the  
inevitable termination that she knew was coming. She is being terminated not because there is a  
legitimate dispute between the parties as to whether she is in fact ill or so ill that she cannot  
return to work (which might be the topic of some debate amongst the medical practitioners), but  
rather the basis of the Company’s disciplinary action is that she is being dishonest on the matter,  
which is a conscious, deliberate act, that if proven I agree is incompatible with her employment  
relationship. This requires the Company to demonstrate on the balance of probabilities that the  
Grievor intended to deceive the Company on the matter of her fitness to work, thereby  
supporting the mental element necessary to show that she lied or falsified the true reasons for her  
absence, which is a serious employment offence.  
[471] On the evidence before me I have found that the Company failed to satisfy its onus on the  
matter in addition to my primary finding that the medical documentation did support the  
Grievor’s claim of being totally disabled and unable to work. But even if the medical evidence  
had not established her total disability at the time, or to put it another way, if the Company had  
been correct that the medical documentation did not substantiate the existence of any known  
medical disability causing her to be “totally disabled” as that term was defined under the STD  
plan (which may be subject to some legitimate interpretation and differences of opinion among  
medical professionals), I nevertheless concluded on reviewing the totality of the Grievor’s  
conduct that the Grievor had an honest belief that she was disabled and unable to work as of  
January 11, 2013, which was reasonable given the advice and medical treatment provided to her  
by her physicians, when she was terminated by the Company.  
Page 171 of 196  
[472] This leads to the question I asked the parties of whether termination or any disciplinary  
response is appropriate for an employee who is found to have had the honest yet mistaken belief  
that he or she has a medical disability justifying the employee’s absenteeism and that returning to  
work will actually cause the employee harm. What if the employee has the subjective belief that  
he or she cannot attend at work because of a disability certified by a physician that is objectively  
wrong. Instead of terminating the employee when he or she is wrong, isn’t the appropriate result  
to deny the employee disability benefits for the period of time the employee is off work and  
unable to prove that he or she is ill, or so ill that he or she cannot attend work?  
[473] In addressing that question the Union referred (among others) to Re Gentek Building  
Products Ltd., supra, where Arbitrator Surdykowski considered the case of an employee who  
suffered a workplace injury on July 16, 2001 and was performing light duties when the Workers  
Compensation and Insurance Board (“WSIB”) certified on March 6, 2002 that he was able to  
return to his regular work, but the employee was afraid that if he went back on production he  
could injure himself further, and that the medication that he was on could cause him to be a  
danger to himself or other employees in the production area” (at p. 198), and thus refused the  
direct order of his “Materials Control Manager”, Mr. Russell, on March 20, 2002 to return to his  
previous job as an operator “because his doctor told him not to” and he was awaiting a further  
report on his ability to perform regular duties from a physiatrist (a specialist in physical medicine  
and rehabilitation). The employee gave Mr. Russell another doctor’s letter on March 19, 2002  
expressing an opinion that the employee could not return to regular duties, but that did not  
changed the employer’s decision relying on the earlier WSIB assessment on the matter, instead.  
However, when the employer consequently terminated the employee for “insubordination” his  
subsequent grievance was allowed. After reviewing the medical documentation in the context of  
all of the surrounding circumstances, the arbitrator concluded it objectively supported the  
employee’s honest fear of re-injuring himself, which was held to be reasonable grounds for  
refusing the employer’s order to return to work, at p. 209:  
Where an employee reasonably believes that complying with an employer’s order will endanger  
his health and safety, he is entitled to refuse to comply (see, for example, Re Lilly Industries Inc.  
and U.S.W.A., Loc. 13292-02 (Derouchie) (2000), 86 L.A.C. (4th) 397 (Dumoulin)). I am satisfied  
on the basis of the medical information available to him at the time, the grievor had an objectively  
reasonable belief that he could further injure himself if he returned to his regular operator’s job as  
direction March 20, 2002. I am therefore satisfied that the grievor was entitled to refuse to comply  
with Russell’s order, and that the Company therefore did not have just cause to discipline him. I  
Page 172 of 196  
may have arrived at a different conclusion if suitable accommodation had been offered and refused  
by the grievor, but that is not the case. (Although even if some discipline was justified, discharge  
was clearly excessive. A suspension for the balance of the shift would have been a more than  
adequate disciplinary beginning in the circumstances.)  
[474] Notwithstanding the employer’s belief in Gentek Building Products Ltd., supra, that the  
employee was “malingering” after being cleared by the WSIB to return to his regular duties,  
Arbitrator Surdykowski stated that the WSIB’s assessment did not excuse the employer from its  
obligation to “re-examine the situation in light of the new information, including conducting an  
appropriate investigation and assessment of the situation, before compelling the employee to  
return to his regular duties, as follows at pp. 211 212:  
Belatedly or not, the fact that on March 20, 2002 the grievor provided medical information that  
conflicted with the WSIB’s decision, and which the WSIB could not have had when it made its  
March 6, 2002 determination. The Company was obliged to give serious consideration to this new  
information, and to re-examine the situation in light of the new information, including conducting an  
appropriate investigation and assessment of the situation. For example, the Company could have  
asked the grievor for additional medical information. It could have asked the grievor to undergo an  
independent medical examination (as it did in the course of the proceeding). The grievor could  
have refused to do so, but his refusal would then have been a relevant consideration. The  
Company could have asked the grievor what accommodation he required, or the Union whether it  
had any accommodation or other suggestions. The Company failed to do any of this, or to properly  
consider all of the information available or its duty to accommodate under the Code.  
The Company was obliged to seriously consider all of the available information and the grievor’s  
apparent continuing disability, and to assess the grievor’s need for accommodation in the operator  
job, which it had offered before but not on March 20, 2002. The Company failed to do so, and its  
failure constitutes a violation of the Code. The Company was not entitled to peremptorily order the  
grievor to return to his regular operator job without giving proper consideration to his ability to  
perform the job and his need for accommodation in that respect. The grievor was entitled to refuse  
the Company’s ultimatum.  
[475] On the facts before me I concluded that the Grievor had a similar, reasonable belief that if  
she returned to the workplace under the charge of Mr. Olsen that she was, and would continue, to  
suffer from such a level of mental distress to give legitimacy to her contention that she could not  
return for the sake of her health. Where an employee has an honest but mistaken belief that she  
is incapable of returning to work because of illness, an employer might deny the Grievor  
payment for short term disability benefits that are dependent upon a “total disability” preventing  
the employee from reporting to work. But in the absence of the showing of a mental intention to  
defy a legitimate order to return to work, for reasons that the employee knows or ought to know  
Page 173 of 196  
are untrue or false, it is my opinion that an employer cannot sustain the employee’s termination  
on a just cause standard for that refusal to work, alone.  
[476] That is what the Company has to contend with in the present case. Given my finding that  
the Grievor not only had an honest belief that she was incapable of returning to the workplace  
when ordered to do so by Mr. Olsen, but that any return to work would actually damage her  
further as supported by the objective evidence, I concluded she had an independent right to  
refuse to work, at least until any disagreement among the medical professionals concerning her  
capabilities had been resolved. Since TELUS Health took no steps to inquire further into the  
Grievor’s medical condition by commissioning its own medical assessment that it was entitled to  
do as a result of the release signed by the Grievor on the PAF form, there is no evidence before  
me to contradict the reasonableness of the Grievor’s belief. Even if one could dispute that the  
Grievor was suffering from a recognized medical illness and thus she and her doctors were  
mistaken that she was suffering from a known disability (which was not my finding in the  
present case but were Ms. Bargen’s and Mr. Olsen’s opinions on the matter), in the absence of  
the Company discharging its onus to prove that the Grievor deliberately falsified the reasons for  
her absence (i.e. that knowing she wasn’t really ill she claimed she was sick to avoid the  
consequences of her past misconduct or a workplace that had become unpleasant to her), the  
Company has not established just cause to terminate her employment because of dishonesty on  
this alternative ground for allowing the Union’s Grievance No. 2.  
[477] The Company also submitted an authority in answering my question directed at the  
subjective beliefs of the Grievor, referring me to the case of Fleetwood Enterprises Ltd., supra.  
In that decision, Professor Brandt upheld the discharge of an employee who did not report for  
work when ordered because of a subjective belief that to do so would compromise his health  
after having sustained an earlier workplace injury for “mechanical low back pain”. That decision  
is distinguishable from the present case where there was a finding that the employee’s own  
doctor (an orthopedic surgeon who had been called by his family doctor for a consultation on the  
matter) had provided an opinion that the employee was capable of returning to light duties (that  
were available for the employee). In the face of that evidence, Professor Brandt concluded at  
para. 78 that not only was there insufficient evidence to support the employee’s claim he could  
not return to any work, but that the opinion of his orthopedic surgeon included “the very specific  
Page 174 of 196  
recommendation that he be returned to light duties.” This finding led to the conclusion that the  
employee did not have an honest belief on reasonable grounds that he could not return to work  
on the duties offered by the employer, thereby justifying the employee’s termination for cause.  
[478] Those factual circumstances are very different than the facts before me where I have  
found that the Grievor had a reasonable, continuing belief that she could not return to the  
workplace, consistent with the totality of her behaviour since November 27, 2012 and as  
supported by the medical advice of her physicians, justifying her refusal to report for work as  
demanded by Mr. Olsen. It would only be after some form of credible, independent assessment  
of the Grievor’s medical condition supporting the viewpoint of TELUS Health on the matter, that  
the Grievor’s continuing refusal to report for work might pass the line of reasonableness, thereby  
undermining the honesty of her belief and entitling the Company to take disciplinary action if  
she didn’t return to work afterwards. On the facts before me, TELUS Health never got to that  
point, deciding instead to deny the Grievor’s claim on its narrow view that this was really a  
workplace dispute that should be resolved in the workplace, thus acting arbitrarily on the matter  
that was contrary to its obligations of due diligence and fair administration of the collective  
agreement.  
[479] Consequently, for all of the foregoing Reasons, I determined in my original “bottom line”  
Decision that the Company did not have just cause to terminate the Grievor on January 11, 2013,  
and thus I was compelled to allow the Union’s Grievance No. 2.  
(e)  
Conclusions on Grievance No. 3 March 11, 2013 Discharge  
[480] The Union’s Grievance No. 3 was also allowed for a number of reasons.  
[481] In its March 11, 2013 letter of discharge addressed to the Union, Ms. Fraser asserted  
various grounds said to justify the Grievor’s second dismissal, which were the same reasons that  
Mr. Olsen relied upon in the previous letters he intended to give to the Grievor as early as  
November 28, 2012. No new grounds were advanced by Ms. Fraser that Mr. Olsen hadn’t  
intended to dismiss the Grievor for previously.  
[482] In the second paragraph of the March 11, 2013 letter (reproduced above) Ms. Fraser  
writes: “Notwithstanding [the Grievor’s termination for other reasons on January 11, 2013] the  
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Company maintains that we have sufficient evidence to demonstrate that Ms. Baker engaged in  
actions that were inappropriate and in violation of the TELUS’ Ethics and Security Policies”.  
[483] Yet no specific stipulation in its 33-page booklet entitled, “Ethics Policy” was identified  
by the Company in evidence or referred to in argument, that Ms. Fraser is purported to be  
referring to in the March 11, 2013 letter to support the Grievor’s second dismissal. No specific  
“Security Policy” that Ms. Fraser was also relying upon as part of the stated reasons justifying  
the Company’s second dismissal of the Grievor was identified by the Company in the evidence  
or referred to in argument, either.  
[484] The last paragraph of Ms. Fraser’s March 11, 2013 letter then goes on to explicitly  
itemize the purported grounds upon which “a second dismissal will be deemed to have been  
initiated effective today”. They are described as: (1) “Ms. Baker’s inappropriate access and  
misuse of TELUS resources”; (2) “breach of the corporate security policy”; and (3) “failure to  
follow a management directive”.  
[485] As extensively chronicled above, I have found on the evidence before me that the  
Company failed to prove misconduct by the Grievor to satisfy its onus that it had just case to  
terminate the employment relationship for any of these claimed grounds of termination.  
[486] It is convenient to first deal first with the Company’s allegation that the Grievor failed to  
follow a management directive. In fact the evidence reveals that there were two purported  
management directives” that the Grievor is alleged to have wrongly disregarded.  
[487] First there was the instruction given by Ms. Leclerc near or at the very end of the  
November 12, 2012 meeting with the Grievor and her Union representative, Mr. Turner, where I  
have found that Ms. Leclerc said: “I need you to work the office until further notice” as later  
confirmed by Mr. Turner to Mr. Olsen in the subsequent November 27, 2012 investigative  
meeting. The Grievor testified that she didn’t remember being told that she must work from the  
office after serving her five-day disciplinary suspension, which I found on the evidence she had  
good reason to be confused about.  
[488] As previously noted, while Ms. Leclerc’s letter of discipline stated, “I would like to  
clarify my expectations”, following which the letter itemized six matters related to the  
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performance of the Grievor’s duties that she was to adhere to in the future, the letter says nothing  
about requiring the Grievor to work in the call centre office “for the foreseeable future” or at all;  
and it doesn’t mention anything from which the Grievor would reasonably recognize that her  
essential status as an At Home Agent, which she had enjoyed for the previous six years with a  
spotless discipline record from which she had serviced the Company’s “elite” clientele, was  
rescinded. Moreover, the Company took no steps at the time to reassign the Grievor to a specific  
desk in the Scarborough call centre and it took no action to arrange for the return of her At Home  
equipment. When the Grievor attended at the Scarborough call centre on November 16 and 19,  
she used any available desk as she had done in the past, as an At Home Agent. This conduct (or  
really absence thereof) is more supportive of the conclusion that Ms. Leclerc didn’t intend to  
remove the Grievor’s status as an At Home Agent on a permanent basis, if at all.  
[489] Before the Company can discipline the Grievor for breach of any legal directive by a  
member of management, the Company must show that it has given the Grievor a reasonably  
clear instruction, which I concluded on the evidence before me was lacking or at least confusing  
in this case. At most, on the evidence I found that the Grievor was mistaken as to Mr. Leclerc’s  
intention in the matter, which was understandable in the circumstances. The mistake was  
remedied when Ms. Leclerc met with the Grievor on Friday, November 23, 2012, taking no  
action at the time to impose discipline on the Grievor for any misconduct. Even if discipline was  
appropriate for such a mistake, which I think questionable, given the circumstances it would in  
my opinion have only properly attracted a sanction at the lowest end of the Company’s policy on  
“Reponses to Performance Improvement Gaps”, which in the case of culpable misconduct would  
have been a “Meeting of Concern, Coaching and Counselling” at Step 1 of the policy. That is all  
that is proportionate to the circumstances of the Grievor’s mistake where the evidence does not  
demonstrate a deliberate attempt to defy managerial authority, and where the Company has been  
found to have contributed by not being sufficiently clear on the matter with the Grievor.  
[490] The second “management directive” identified in the evidence arises out of Mr. Olsen’s  
e-mail of November 13 to Ms. Leclerc’s “team” in which he writes: “While Deb is away please  
reach out to myself for any support you may need. Please feel free to message, email or call  
me.” In my assessment, this e-mail does not constitute a clear managerial directive to the  
Grievor that Mr. Olsen was now the responsible supervisory authority for the Grievor, and that  
Page 177 of 196  
all matters related to the Grievor’s day-to-day work were to be referred to Mr. Olsen to the  
exclusion of any other manager, notwithstanding the earlier (and concurrent) e-mails from Ms.  
Leclerc advising her team members that in her absence they could refer issues to any one of  
“Vince, Lisa or Ronnie”. To the extent that Mr. Olsen had the impression that he was the  
Grievor’s only “support” he was mistaken; tragically as it turned out for the Grievor who Mr.  
Olsen wrongly believed was “going behind my back” and was thus “untrustworthy” when she  
didn’t refer everything after his November 13 e-mail to him alone.  
[491] The Grievor was on suspension status without access to her normal Company e-mails on  
November 13 and thus didn’t receive Mr. Olsen’s e-mail at the time. Her subsequent  
explanation to Mr. Olsen that she didn’t remember ever receiving that e-mail was credible for  
that reason alone. However, she was receiving e-mails from SPOC related to her new laptop  
computer when she was in the call centre office that were copied to Ms. Leclerc from which she  
would reasonably assume that Ms. Leclerc remained her supervisor, and Ms. Leclerc advised the  
Grievor along with the rest of her team that she had reassumed her responsibilities on Monday,  
November 19, which was a critical date in dealing with the new laptop computer. Ms. Leclerc  
was also communicating directly with the Grievor as her supervisor on November 22 and 23, the  
latter date being the crucial meeting between them where Ms. Leclerc clarified her intentions for  
the Grievor’s work location and her need for a new laptop, without a hint of issuing discipline in  
doing so, suggesting that no discipline was immediately apparent to her arising out of the  
Grievor’s conduct. Ms. Reynolds then notified Ms. Leclerc’s team on November 26 that from  
that point on, Ms. Reynolds was their acting manager.  
[492] In these circumstances I found that there was no “management directive” that the Grievor  
was to refer all matters to Mr. Olsen, and thus the Company did not establish that the Grievor did  
anything wrong when she did not deal exclusively with Mr. Olsen as her supervisor in that  
critical two-week timeframe from November 13, 2012 to November 27, 2012.  
[493] The second ground that Ms. Fraser relies upon to support the March 11, 2013 dismissal is  
the Grievor’s alleged inappropriate access and misuse of TELUS resources”. This apparently  
relates to three matters: (1) the Grievor’s contacts with SPOC for the purpose of obtaining her  
records of past and ongoing difficulties she claimed to have been experiencing with her At Home  
Page 178 of 196  
computer systems and program applications; (2) her contacts with SPOC for purposes of  
obtaining a new laptop computer to replace the one that she said was “fried” and which SPOC  
confirmed was defective; and (3) contacts that the Grievor had with SPOC after she began  
working at the Scarborough call centre. My evidentiary findings canvassed above leads to the  
conclusion that the Company has failed to discharge its onus to prove any misconduct by the  
Grievor on the basis of her failure to adhere to a clear, consistently applied rule in each case.  
[494] Specifically, the evidence shows that the supervisors had various practices when it came  
to authorizing their employees to deal directly with SPOC, and that Ms. Leclerc and Mr. Olsen  
had different expectations in that regard. The Grievor’s actions as they related to direct contact  
with SPOC were in line with Ms. Leclerc’s practices, and thus without clearly advising her of a  
change in the practice, which I found was not done, I concluded she did nothing wrong by  
contacting SPOC on her own.  
[495] For the same reason, I found she did nothing wrong by contacting SPOC in relation to the  
acquisition of a new laptop computer for use in her work on behalf of the Company. The fact  
that: (a) the SPOC technician did not hesitate in dealing with the Grievor directly about a new  
computer without her supervisor’s explicit preapproval or signature; and (b) that the SPOC  
technician was keeping Ms. Leclerc informed of his dealings with the Grievor on the matter  
(referring to her as an At Home Agent as well, without comment from Ms. Leclerc) supports the  
Grievor’s claim that she didn’t know she was doing anything wrong. Ms. Leclerc didn’t seem to  
be particularly concerned about it either, as indicated by her e-mail communication to the  
Grievor on November 22 expressing only a concern over its proper accounting for “inventory”  
purposes, in a tone that is neither challenging nor critical of the Grievor for any violation of some  
clear Company policy on the matter.  
[496] After the Grievor began working in the Scarborough call centre, most of those days being  
under the continuing direction of Ms. Leclerc (on at least November 19, 22 and 23), there is  
nothing in the evidence suggesting that the Grievor was given an unequivocal instruction by any  
person recognized as her supervisor at the time, on how she was expected to handle the need to  
obtain the services of SPOC while working in the call centre. She continued to do what she had  
always done in contacting SPOC on her own.  
Page 179 of 196  
[497] On this second ground upon which Ms. Fraser bases the Grievor’s dismissal on March  
11, 2013, I therefore concluded there was nothing submitted in the evidence to support just, or  
any cause for the Grievor’s termination.  
[498] Finally, with respect to the third ground that Ms. Fraser relies upon in order to justify the  
Grievor’s second termination on March 11, 2013, being the Grievor’s alleged “breach of  
corporate security policy”, as previously noted, no specific “security policywas identified by  
the Company in evidence that the Grievor is supposed to have breached. This claim apparently  
arises out of Mr. Olsen’s concern that the Grievor “worked” from home on November 13, 2012  
by contacting SPOC for tickets in order to document her history of operational problems she  
claimed to be having with her At Home systems; she had instructed SPOC to have her VPN  
connection restored at her home; and thereafter in fact worked from home on November 20 when  
it is claimed she knew she was supposed to be working in the call centre.  
[499] As extensively reviewed above, all of these claims were refuted by the evidence which  
shows: (a) the direction from Ms. Leclerc to work from the call centre “until further notice” was  
sufficiently unclear to put the Grievor on notice that her essential status as an At Home Agent  
had been removed; (b) she was doing no “work” at home in the sense of her usual activities in  
handling customer service calls, but rather wanted to “get ready to return to work” as she  
honestly explained to Mr. Olsen in their investigative meeting on November 27 while reasonably  
believing she was still and At Home Agent who was doing nothing other than what she had been  
permitted to do in the past by Ms. Leclerc in directly dealing with SPOC; and (c) when she did  
work from home on November 20, 2012, which I found on the evidence she did by mistake  
largely contributed to by the unclear instructions from Ms. Leclerc, she did absolutely nothing  
out of her usual duties that would compromise the security and safety of the Company’s  
enterprise. In fact, Mr. Olsen was watching the Grievor’s activities on November 20 through a  
computer screen from his office in the call centre, without noticing anything improper in the  
manner that she conducted business as a Corporate Support Agent for the “platinum customers”  
she continued to service throughout this time.  
Page 180 of 196  
[500] Consequently on all of the grounds asserted by Ms. Fraser to support the Company’s  
decision to issue a second letter of dismissal on March 11, 2013, I concluded there was no just  
cause established for the Company’s action in terminating the Grievor’s employment.  
[501] There is little wonder that the Grievor, who by that time the medical evidence shows was  
experiencing increasing problems with incontinence in the context of gynecological difficulties  
and developing symptoms of a stress related disability as a result of events that were occurring at  
the workplace, after being summoned to an investigative meeting without knowing what the  
meeting was for, and then answering some 56 written questions that I have found (consistent  
with Ms. Leclerc’s apparent practice) were designed more to entrap or incriminate the Grievor in  
order to justify her termination for cause, was left “teary-eyed” and in need of urgent medical  
care that was ongoing from all of the medical evidence submitted when the Grievor’s  
employment was terminated on January 11, 2013.  
[502] While the foregoing is sufficient to uphold the Union’s Grievance No. 3 on the merits of  
the case, it was the Union’s position that the Grievor was terminated on January 11, 2013 at a  
time she was incapable of working. And then for good measure the Company purported to fire  
her a second time on March 11, 2013, just in case the first one didn’t stick. According to the  
Union that second discharge was consequently an abuse of process justifying a declaration that  
the second dismissal was null and void, and notwithstanding the merits of that second dismissal,  
should be overturned for two procedural reasons that are intended to preserve fairness.  
[503] The first arises out of an arbitration award by Professor Laskin (before he became Chief  
Justice of Canada) whose 1965 decision in Aerocide Dispensers Ltd., supra, stands for the  
recognized rule that holds the employer “fairly strictly to the grounds upon which it has chosen  
to act against an employee who consequently feels himself aggrieved” (at para. 24). This rule is  
seen as one of elemental procedural fairness, prohibiting the employer from adding to the  
grounds for discipline that the employer knew or ought to have reasonably known about at the  
time that the discipline was first imposed.  
[504] However, there are many exceptions to that principle. One permits the employer to raise  
new grounds for the discipline that the employer could not have reasonably been aware of at the  
time the original discipline was imposed because of surreptitious conduct by the employee.  
Page 181 of 196  
Another allows the general reliance on similar incidents or events that are closely related to  
and/or which provide further examples of those on which the employer initially relied in  
imposing the discipline. Arbitrators will permit references to subsequent conduct in assessing  
credibility or determining an appropriate remedy or penalty in a particular case. And “even  
when an employer is held to the original grounds it gave to justify its decision, it is generally  
recognized that an employer may exercise its disciplinary powers a second time based on the  
reasons it was not allowed to raise”: Per Brown & Beatty, Canadian Labour Arbitration, supra,  
at para. 7:2200 (Alternation of Grounds). Arbitrator Randall has succinctly summarized the  
relevant considerations in cases of this nature in Atlas Copco Exploration Products, supra, as  
follows at pp. 6 -7:  
The parties rely on more than a dozen cases. In my view, it is unnecessary to drill down very  
deeply into these authorities. The general principles are clear and have been adopted by the vast  
majority of arbitrators, both in Ontario and Canada wide.  
1) Arbitrators have refused to permit employers from introducing evidence of wronging that is not  
closely related to the grounds for discharge initially communicated to the Grievor. It is unfair to  
the grievor and prejudicial to his or her defense to conclude otherwise.  
2) However, arbitrators will allow employer to add grounds that were unknown to the employer  
and/or not easily discernible to it at the time the employer affected discipline.  
[505] Another procedural rule adopted by arbitrators to combat abuse of the grievance and  
arbitration process is to require the employer to impose discipline in a timely manner after the  
event(s) justifying the discipline are known by the employer. In the absence of a provision in the  
collective agreement to the contrary, which normally imposes relatively short time limits  
(whether mandatory or directory) on the employee’s obligation to notify the employer of an  
alleged violation of the collective agreement as soon as the circumstances giving rise to the  
alleged violation are known or ought to have been known by the employee, there is a general  
presumption in the arbitral authorities that the employer is expected to issue discipline for  
employee misconduct that it knows or ought to know about in a timely manner as well.  
[506] Thus in the University of Ottawa case, supra, Arbitrator Bendel allowed a union  
grievance where the employer had delayed dismissing the employee for an alleged theft more  
than four months after the employer became aware of the circumstances, which if true, would  
justify the imposition of discipline. Whether on the theory that the delay constituted a form of  
employer condonation of the alleged offence, or a denial of “natural justice”, or effectively  
Page 182 of 196  
undercut the employee’s opportunity to defend himself, or was contrary to a “general arbitral  
principle” that undue delay invalidates disciplinary action (all of which were extensively  
reviewed at para. 36 in the award), the arbitrator dismissed the grievance because, “whichever  
theory on the expeditious application of discipline is adopted, the delay in the present case was  
indefensible” (at para. 43).  
[507] A similar result for an unjustified” delay of seven months in imposing discipline of a  
one-day suspension for the employee’s breach of a health and safety regulation that the employer  
knew about at the time of the infraction, befell the employer in the case of Good Humor-Breyers,  
Simcoe, supra, where Arbitrator Cummings summarized the arbitral rule on the matter as follows  
at para. 12:  
¶ 12  
In determining whether to allow a grievance because of delay in imposing discipline,  
arbitrators have looked at the length of the delay,, the reasons for the delay and whether the delay  
is prejudicial (see for example, AGF Industries Ltd. and A.B.G.W.I.U., (1998), 75 L.A.C. (4th) 336).  
Both parties agree that the delay is long, more than 7 months. In AGF Industries Ltd., the arbitrator  
wrote, (at page 341) “while there is no ready pronouncement regarding the quantum of time that  
will be sufficient to trigger arbitral scrutiny, a certain range can be inferred form the cases. Thus it  
appear that while a delay measured in days gives rise to concern, one that is measured in weeks,  
and certainly, in months, most definitely will.” The delay of seven months in this case is more than  
enough to require an examination of the reasons and the potential for prejudice.  
[508] The case of Community Living Espanola, supra, deals with both the conduct of an  
employer in adding grounds for a dismissal and unreasonable delay in making those grounds  
known to the employee, consolidating the above-noted principles. In Community Living  
Espanola, Arbitrator Slotnick considered the fate of a “caregiver” at a facility providing services  
to the developmentally handicapped, who made two medication errors thereby compromising the  
health of residents on August 31 and September 1, 2005, which the employer knew about on  
September 2 but didn’t convene an investigation meeting into the matter until September 27, and  
then didn’t terminate the employee until October 18, 2005, seven weeks after the alleged  
misconduct. One week before the termination, on October 11, the employee missed a shift for  
which she was not disciplined, but just before the arbitration hearing to deal with her discharge  
case, the employer notified the union that it intended to rely also on the missed shift as an  
example of another “medication error” because as a result of the employee’s failure to report to  
work the residents did not receive their medications on time.  
Page 183 of 196  
[509] In dealing first with the union’s claim that the allegation of an additional medication error  
in sustaining the October 18 termination was an improper attempt to add to or change the  
grounds of the termination, the arbitrator wrote the following in prohibiting the employer from  
relying upon that additional ground, at pp. 6- 7:  
As the union points out, the general rule, dating back to Re Aerocide Dispensers Ltd. and USWA  
(1965) 15 L.A.C. 416 (Laskin), is that the employer will be held to the reasons for discharge that  
were advanced at the time of discharge. Brown and Beatty’s Canadian Labour Arbitration (at  
paragraph 7:2200) sums up the reasoning as follows: “Altering the grounds on which disciplinary  
action is defended is widely seen as raising questions about the employer’s bona fides and the  
fairness of the disciplinary procedure.” As the arbitrators in the Aliments Interbake and Loyalist  
College cases pointed out, exceptions to this rule may occur where the additional grounds are  
related to the original reason for termination or were unknown to the employer at the time of the  
termination. Here, despite the employer’s attempts to transform the missed shift into a medication  
error, the missed shift cannot be said to be related to the medication incidents cited in the  
termination letter. Many of the cases on adding new incidents speak of the prejudice that can  
result to the union and the employee where new grounds are added. In the case before me, the  
prejudice is magnified by the fact that the employer advised the union of this new ground on the  
eve of the hearing.  
[510] Then the arbitrator nullified the employee’s termination thus allowing the grievance in its  
entirety because the employer waited what was considered to be an unreasonable amount of time  
in convening an investigation meeting into the matter resulting in the employee’s termination  
seven weeks from the time the employer knew about medication errors, for the following reasons  
at p. 17 that emphasizes the need for the showing of prejudice that the arbitrator concluded the  
union had satisfied in overturning the discipline on this procedural ground alone:  
Having carefully reviewed the cases, I believe the proper approach is for the arbitrator to nullify the  
discipline without hearing the merits only where the union can establish that the employer’s delay  
has caused prejudice to the grievor. Indeed, in nearly all the cases where the arbitrator has  
nullified the discipline because of delay, the prejudice to the grievor, rather than a general principle  
against delay, is the real focus of the concern. The prejudice may take different forms such as  
condonation, inability to remember a routine task from weeks or months earlier, loss of an  
important witness but it is the common factor in most of the cases.  
[511] In assessing the foregoing authorities in application to the case before me, it is my  
opinion that the Company’s actions in issuing its March 11, 2013 letter amounts to an expansion  
of the original grounds for termination and an abuse of the grievance and arbitration procedures.  
If permitted, the Company could take a piecemeal approach to disciplining an employee by  
spreading out different grounds for discipline over time; on the theory that if the employer is  
unsuccessful on one, it may be able to succeed on an alternate ground of discipline later on,  
Page 184 of 196  
thereby continuing the uncertainty faced by the Grievor and Union in a matter that the collective  
agreement contemplates will be dealt with expeditiously.  
[512] Indeed, one of the reasons given by the Company on why it could not wait until the  
Grievor believed she was well enough to return to work in order to discipline her for alleged  
misconduct, was the need to avoid delay in labour relations that has an inherent interest in speed  
and certainty, which in my opinion applies full circle in importing the Company’s obligation to  
rely on all known reasons for the Grievor’s termination at the same time, so that they may all be  
disposed of together. In the present case where the Company was aware of all of the  
circumstances supporting all grounds on which it purported to rely upon to substantiate both the  
first and second dismissals at the time of the first dismissal on January 11, 2013, I concluded that  
the Union demonstrated valid reasons for the exercise of arbitral discretion to prohibit the  
Company from expanding the original grounds of dismissal raised by the Company in the form  
of the Grievor’s second dismissal on March 11, 2013 as an abuse of process, being an alternate  
basis for allowing the Union’s Grievance No. 3.  
[513] I was less concerned about any real prejudice shown by the Company’s failure to make  
its additional grounds for termination known until two months after the January 11, 2013 first  
dismissal, given that the collective agreement does not contain an express provision requiring the  
issuance of discipline within any set timeframe after the circumstances supporting the discipline  
are known or reasonably should have been known by the Company. Nevertheless, the prejudice  
to the Grievor by an ongoing delay affecting her ability to marshal a fulsome defense to the  
Company’s claims would crystalize at some point, and so its delay is not completely open-ended,  
but I concluded that was not the case by the time the Company finally issued its March 11, 2013  
termination letter to the Union.  
[514] However, regardless of my determinations on the two procedural objections raised by the  
Union to invalidate the second dismissal, I concluded that the specific grounds relied upon by the  
Company to support the March 11, 2013 termination letter signed by Ms. Fraser were  
nevertheless not established on the evidence that it presented in this case.  
[515] For all of the foregoing reasons, I therefore allowed the Union’s Grievance No. 3 in my  
earlier “bottom line” Decision.  
Page 185 of 196  
XI.  
Post-Decision Remedial Dispute  
[516] This leaves the final remedial question to address in this case, as well as a post-Decision  
dispute on the issue of remedy.  
[517] The Company argued that if the dismissal grievances were allowed, I should not order the  
Grievor’s reinstatement to her former positon as a Corporate Support Agent. Instead it submitted  
that the Grievor’s conduct in claiming that her supervisor “harassed” her, made her return to the  
workplace so problematic, that it justified the exercise of arbitral discretion to award her  
damages in lieu of reinstatement. In support the Company relied upon a line of authority where  
arbitrators have concluded that because of the employee’s conduct in the course of relevant  
events leading to the employee’s dismissal, up to and including the employee’s deportment  
during the arbitration hearing, the employment relationship may be found to be so incompatible  
(for both culpable and non-culpable reasons) to make it inappropriate to order reinstatement in  
the circumstances.  
[518] Thus in the Lethbridge Community College case, supra, the Supreme Court of Canada  
affirmed the ability of arbitrators to compensate an employee with damages instead of ordering  
reinstatement, in striving for “lasting, practical solutions to workplace problems” (per Iacobucci  
J. at para. 54). That decision occurred in the context of an arbitration award concerning an  
employee who had been terminated because she was incapable of performing the essential  
requirements of her positon, convincing the arbitrator that there was no practical value in  
reinstating such a person to her previous employment situation, who ordered appropriate  
compensation in lieu. In describing the positions of the parties in the matter, Iacobucci J. also  
noted at para. 50 that, “The parties and the Court of Appeal cite a number of decisions where  
jurisdiction to substitute an award of damages in lieu of reinstatement was exercised in what  
have been termed “exceptional” or “extraordinary circumstances”.  
[519] The arbitral authorities filed by both parties before me are consistent with the viewpoint  
that reinstatement with appropriate compensation for an employee found to have been dismissed  
without just cause is the presumptive remedy in such cases, which an arbitrator has discretion to  
commute to an award of monetary damages alone, but only where the arbitrator concludes that  
Page 186 of 196  
such extraordinary circumstancesexist to justify this form of relief in furtherance of achieving  
a practical and functional resolution of the dispute.  
[520] For example, in Royal BC Museum, supra, Arbitrator Sullivan ordered damages in lieu of  
reinstatement of an employee who he found to have been so resistant to a reorganization  
affecting her position that she was insubordinate with her supervision and coworkers in a way  
that was “disrespectful and inappropriate and warranted discipline”. However, the arbitrator also  
determined that termination was not a proper response to the ongoing misconduct. Nevertheless,  
the arbitrator concluded that given the basis of the dispute (i.e. the employee being entirely  
dissatisfied with her new position as a result of the reorganization where the essential dispute  
would likely continue) that, “the facts of the case are also very clear that the usual remedy of  
reinstatement is not at all a viable option” (at para. 118, emphasis added).  
[521] The arbitrator then cited the case of De Havilland Inc. v. CAW-Canada, Local 112,  
[1999] O.L.A.A. No. 767 (Ont. Arb.) (Rayner) in applying the following factors that were  
identified “as relevant to a determination as to whether damages in lieu of reinstatement should  
be awarded in a given case” (at para. 119):  
1. The refusal of coworkers to work with the grievor.  
2. Lack of trust between the grievor and the employer.  
3. The inability or refusal of the grievor to accept responsibility for any  
wrongdoing.  
4. The demeanour and attitude of the grievor at the hearing.  
5. Animosity on the part of the grievor towards management or coworkers.  
6. The risk of a “poisoned” atmosphere in the work place.  
[522] Applying similar considerations, in Re Tenant Hotline, supra, Arbitrator MacDowell  
rejected an employer’s alternate submission that the arbitrator substitute damages in lieu of  
reinstatement of two employees who had been terminated for “insubordination” which the  
arbitrator found had occurred, but did not warrant the extreme penalty of discharge. The  
arbitrator noted at p. 138 that, “a finding that there is no just cause for discharge leads almost  
inevitably to a direction that the aggrieved employee should be reinstated”, giving the following  
reasons for ordering the employees’ reinstatement (at p. 144):  
…The grievors’ conduct, when viewed objectively, was not so outrageous as to make it  
impossible for their colleagues to work with them and does not justify the extreme course  
of depriving the grievors of their jobs. In addition, it is to be hoped that the passage of time and  
Page 187 of 196  
this arbitration award will have a cathartic effect; and that the unhappy events of March, 1982, will  
be viewed in the perspective of the years of satisfactory relations which preceded them. Given the  
maturity of which all of the individuals involved in this matter are capable, I am not satisfied that  
these working relationships cannot be restored. The fact that the grievors may not command the  
esteem which they once did should not deprive them of their right to reinstatement altogether.  
[Emphasis added]  
[523] Adopting the same principles, the only discipline for which I have found the Company  
had any basis, was the Grievor’s five-day suspension for having “misappropriated company  
time” in the form of “call avoidance”, which the Company did not consider sufficiently  
egregious to warrant her dismissal. In spite of the Company’s failure to prove the other grounds  
relied upon in the November 12, 2012 disciplinary letter, I held that a five-day suspension was an  
appropriate penalty, albeit at the high end of a proportionate response that was explainable but  
not excused by the Grievor’s developing medical problems. The fact that the Grievor admitted  
and apologized for her wrongdoing during the arbitration proceedings gave me confidence that  
she would be able to successfully reintegrate into the workplace, notwithstanding the one  
negative mark in an otherwise clear disciplinary record over her 14 years of employment.  
[524] In considering whether I should award damages in lieu of the Grievor’s reinstatement for  
two dismissals which, as I have found, were unwarranted on the evidence before me, I could find  
no basis for denying her the traditional expectation in cases of this nature for reinstatement with  
damages to compensate her for all of her losses as a result of the Company’s wrongful conduct.  
Notwithstanding my finding that the Grievor complained to Ms. Bargen that Mr. Olsen was  
“harassing” her, which she did not refer to in her examination-in-chief but only repeated when  
prompted to do so in cross-examination, I did not consider that kind of language in the  
circumstances to be so egregious to justify “the extreme course of depriving the [Grievor] of  
[her] job” (per Arbitrator MacDowell in Re Tenant Hotline, supra, at p. 144).  
[525] Mr. Olsen testified that the Company had some 45,000 employees; and that in the  
Scarborough call centre there were 200 separate desks to accommodate the many CSRs working  
there under the direction of a number of different managers, including Mr. Plumber and Mr.  
Marasco who on the evidence before me appear to have had a continuing convivial relationship  
with the Grievor. In such an environment there is nothing to support a realistic fear that the  
Grievor’s presence will have “poisoned” the workplace, regardless of any ongoing ‘hard  
Page 188 of 196  
feelings’ between Mr. Olsen and the Grievor, where from my assessment the Grievor was the sad  
loser in that exchange, having sustained extreme mental distress as a result.  
[526] I therefore denied the Company’s request to award the Grievor damages in lieu of  
reinstatement, ordering instead at para. 14 in my original Decision that the Grievor be reinstated  
“forthwith” to her position at the time of her dismissal on January 11, 2013, “with compensation  
to make her whole for all losses calculated from that date to the date of her reinstatement.”  
[527] I used the words, “all losses” deliberately to convey my intention that in addition to  
reinstatement, damages for unjust dismissal may properly include more than the wages lost by  
the Grievor during her period off work (accounting for her mitigation income that will reduce  
that amount), but rather included losses that may reasonably and foreseeably flow from the  
breach of contract, including the manner of its breach. I heard uncontradicted testimony that the  
Grievor had to cash in her retirement savings (which the Company would otherwise contribute  
to) and borrowed money in order to sustain herself over the several years following her  
termination on January 11, 2013 to the date of reinstatement (which may attract interest  
payments), and that she was off work for eight weeks following surgery in May of 2013 that  
presumably would have been covered for benefits under the Company’s welfare plans. Thus  
claims for the reinstatement of the Grievor’s retirement savings and/or any pension contributions  
otherwise payable by the Company, including potential interest on such losses to the date of the  
reinstatement of those benefits, might be available to the Grievor under the terms of my make  
whole remedial order. Under the rubric of “all losses” I also intended to cover any legitimate  
claims of “punitive damages” raised by the Union in argument, with attendant recovery for  
proven instances of general and/or mental distress damages, properly flowing from the manner of  
the Grievor’s mistreatment.  
[528] Notwithstanding its initial reference to a demand for “punitive damages” arising out of  
the Company’s conduct towards the Grievor, the Union did not pursue that claim in further  
argument, nor did it assert a demand for “general damages” arising out of the nature of the  
Grievor’s termination, even though it had filed with me Arbitrator Shime’s leading decision in  
Re Greater Toronto Airports Authority, supra, which awarded significant general damages for  
employer misconduct that was found to have been so egregious as to constitute bad faith.  
Page 189 of 196  
[529] Consequently, after issuing my “bottom-line” Decision on November 1, 2016, in which I  
expressly reserved jurisdiction “to deliver Reasons for Decision in accordance with the parties’  
agreement” and remained seized to resolve any dispute concerning “the relief ordered herein and  
calculation of the compensation payable to the Grievor”, my expectation was that the Grievor  
would be immediately reinstated and that the parties would then engage in good faith discussions  
to resolve the compensation also payable to the Grievor, with any dispute to be remitted to me  
for a relatively quick resolution of the matter.  
[530] In adopting the foregoing procedure I had hoped to avoid any prejudice to the Grievor  
occasioned by the considerable delay that I expected in marshalling all of the evidence before me  
into the kind of comprehensive review in setting out my Reasons that the parties were obviously  
anticipating, given the extensive documentation submitted over the two and one-half years that  
the parties had taken to complete their case.  
[531] Having heard nothing from the parties for seven months after issuing my Decision, I was  
surprised when I received a letter from Ms. Pollock, counsel for the Union, on May 30, 2017,  
who advised that while the Company had reinstated the Grievor in compliance with my remedial  
order, it had “refused to engage in any discussions with the union regarding compensation.”  
Counsel’s letter is reproduced in relevant part below:  
Since the issuance of the bottom line decision in the above noted matter on November 1, 2016, the  
employer has reinstated Ms. Baker but has refused to engage in any discussions with the union  
regarding compensation.  
Enclosed is a copy of our letter to employer counsel dated February 8, 2017, together with a  
spreadsheet prepared by the union with respect to compensation owing. Also enclosed is a copy  
of the employer’s response dated April 7, 2017.  
The union requests that a conference call be scheduled to address the employer’s refusal to deal  
with compensation for the grievor.  
[532] The foregoing correspondence enclosed a copy of a letter from the Company’s counsel,  
Mr. Craig, dated April 7, 2017, who in responding to the Union’s earlier spreadsheet of the  
Grievor’s alleged losses caused by her unjust dismissal, wrote the following:  
Dear Ms. Pollock:  
As you know, remedy in this case was a significant issue. TELUS made substantial submissions to  
Arbitrator Luborsky on this issue (I refer to our written reply submissions in particular). It is  
Page 190 of 196  
reasonable for TELUS to take the position that it is entitled to review Arbitrator Luborsky’s  
full award, and specifically his reasons on remedy, prior to engaging in substantive  
discussions with the Union to resolve whatever compensation may be owed in respect of  
the grievor’s losses.  
Following receipt and review of the full award, there will no doubt be discussions between TELUS  
and the Union to resolve compensation for the grievor. In anticipation of those discussions, I can  
tell you that we will probably have many questions about the spreadsheet you provided on March  
15, 2017. The spreadsheet was provided in PDF form with no explanatory cover letter or  
memorandum. It is very difficult to understand. One simple example is the fact that several cells of  
the spreadsheet are highlighted in yellow with no explanation as to what the highlighting means. It  
would probably expedite resolution of the compensation issue if you were to provide a written  
explanation of the methodology and assumptions underlying the spreadsheet. It would also likely  
expedite matters if you were to provide copies of the relevant portions of the grievor’s tax returns  
for 2013, 2014, 2016 and 2016.  
Yours truly,  
John Craig  
[Emphasis added]  
[533] I was subsequently advised by the Company that in view of its position on the matter, it  
would not be appropriate to schedule a telephone conference to review the Union’s spreadsheet,  
and thus I did not.  
[534] I nevertheless find the Company’s conduct to be contrary to my remedial order by  
imposing a condition that the Company did not identify or agree upon with the Union at the time  
that they consented to me issuing a “bottom line Decision” on an expedited basis, without  
obtaining judicial authorization for a “stay” of my Decision, being in the nature of an  
independent actionable wrong.  
[535] I cannot comment about the specific claims for compensation made by the Union in its  
spreadsheet without hearing any necessary evidence and the submissions of the parties on the  
matter. I can only request that with the issuance of these comprehensive Reasons for Decision,  
that the Company will now be moved to enter into substantive, good faith discussions with the  
Union to resolve the outstanding issue of the Grievor’s compensation, given the Company’s  
position in its letter of April 7, 2017 that: “It is reasonable for TELUS to take the position that it  
is entitled to review Arbitrator Luborsky’s full award, and specifically his reasons on remedy,  
Page 191 of 196  
prior to engaging in substantive discussions with the Union to resolve whatever compensation  
may be owed in respect of the grievor’s losses.”  
[536] To the extent that that may be a valid position for the Company to take in the  
circumstances, it is only appropriate that the Union have the same ability to evaluate and  
reconsider its remedial demands in view of my specific findings of fact and conclusions on the  
evidence as set out in these extensive Reasons for Decision, ‘prior to engaging in substantive  
discussions with the Company to resolve whatever compensation may be owed in respect of the  
Grievor’s losses’.  
[537] Consequently, I remit back to the parties to discuss and agree upon the appropriate,  
“compensation to make [the Grievor] whole for all losses calculated from [January 11, 2013] to  
the date of her reinstatement” (emphasis added), as stated in my bottom-line Decision, consistent  
with my findings and conclusions herein on the totality of the evidence submitted to me during  
this very long case.  
[538] If the parties cannot reach agreement on that matter, I continue to remain seized to  
determine it for them. In that event the parties (or either one of them) may contact me to  
reconvene an oral hearing for the purpose of resolving any outstanding remedial issues, to be  
scheduled in the usual course.  
XII.  
Disposition  
[539] Thus for the foregoing reasons, as awarded by my earlier “bottom line” Decision the  
Union’s first grievance (File No.: 2013.021) challenging the Company’s five-day suspension  
without pay that was served by the Grievor from November 9 to November 16, 2012, was  
dismissed.  
[540] The Union’s second grievance (File No.: 2013.014) alleging unjust termination for the  
Grievor’s “first dismissal” on January 11, 2013 was allowed.  
[541] The Union’s third grievance (File No.: 2013.123) alleging unjust termination for the  
Grievor’s “second dismissal” by letter dated March 11, 2013 was also allowed.  
Page 192 of 196  
[542] The Company was ordered to remove the termination letters dated January 11, 2013 and  
March 11, 2013 from the Grievor’s employment file. It is anticipated that the record of her five-  
day suspension without pay will have already been removed (or may immediately be removed on  
the Grievor’s request) from her file by operation of article 10.03 of the collective agreement to  
the present date.  
[543] In the event the Company may legitimately refer to that record in the future, it is directed  
to include the portions in these Reasons for Decision dismissing all claims against the Grievor  
for alleged “lack of professionalism when dealing with clients” and for having “accessed [the  
Grievor’s] own personal account for non-work related reasons” in violation of Company policy,  
which were not sustained on the evidence. The record of her five-day suspension should also be  
clarified by including those portions of these Reasons for Decision dealing with the  
circumstances under which the Grievor was found to have engaged in inappropriate timekeeping  
practices arising, in part, out of a developing medical condition.  
[544] The parties have confirmed that the Grievor’s employment has already been reinstated to  
the position she held as of the date of her first termination on January 11, 2013 in compliance  
with my earlier Decision. For purposes of clarity, consistent with the make whole remedy  
ordered in the Decision, the Grievor’s seniority is to be reinstated as well.  
[545] However the Company has wrongly failed to compensate the Grievor (or at least to  
engage in substantive, good faith discussions in order to refer any dispute on the matter to me for  
relatively quick resolution) for all of her losses in breach of my Decision, where I ordered at  
paragraph 14 the Company: “to reinstate the Grievor forthwith to the position she held on  
January 11, 2013 with compensation to make her whole for all losses calculated from that date to  
the date of her reinstatement” (emphasis added). The passage of time has likely contributed to  
the quantum of her losses arising out of her unjust dismissal, which are increasing and she  
continues to suffer prejudice as a result.  
[546] I therefore re-order what I did in my original Decision, which the Company has deemed it  
unnecessary to follow without obtaining judicial authorization for a stay of the remedial order;  
that the Company is to forthwith make the Grievor whole for all losses arising out of the  
Company’s violation of the collective agreement that are evidently continuing to the present  
Page 193 of 196  
date. Given the parties’ agreement that I would remit all remedial issues back to them as  
appropriate after rendering my original Decision for their resolution which has yet to be  
attempted by the Company, and consistent with the Company’s stated condition before entering  
into substantive settlement discussions with the Union, the Union and the Company may both  
reassess and reconsider their remedial positions and demands in light of my specific findings of  
fact and conclusions as set out in these Reasons for Decision that both parties now have the  
benefit of reviewing, in anticipation of their future, good faith dialogue concerning the Grievor’s  
appropriate recompense.  
[547] As requested at the outset of these proceedings, I shall continue to remain seized to  
resolve any dispute concerning the interpretation and/or implementation of my Decision  
consistent with these Reasons for Decision and the calculation of the quantum of damages, “to  
make her whole for all losses” payable by TELUS to Ms. Tracy Baker if the parties cannot settle  
the matter themselves.  
DATED AT MARKHAM, ONTARIO THIS 9TH DAY OF JANUARY, 2018.  
“G. F. Luborsky”  
Gordon F. Luborsky,  
Sole Arbitrator  
Page 194 of 196  
APPENDIX A  
IN THE MATTER OF AN ARBITRATION  
B E T W E E N:  
TELUS INC.  
(Hereinafter referred to as “the Company”),  
- and -  
TELECOMMUNICATIONS WORKERS UNION  
(Hereinafter referred to as “the Union”),  
AND IN THE MATTER OF THE GRIEVANCES OF TRACY BAKER REGARDING  
ALLEGED UNJUST SUSPENSION AND TERMINATION.  
SOLE ARBITRATOR:  
APPEARANCES  
For the Union:  
Gordon F. Luborsky  
Marisa Pollock, Counsel  
Benjamin Katz, Counsel  
John Hockley, Business Agent  
Isabelle Miller, National Vice President  
Leighann Neal, Shop Steward  
Tracy Baker, Grievor  
For the Company:  
John D. R. Craig, Counsel  
Jackie VanDerMeulen, Counsel  
Deanah Shelly, Counsel  
Debbie Leclerc, Manager, TELUS  
Ronnie Olsen, Manager, TELUS  
Sofia Alonso, TELUS Labour Relations  
HEARD:  
March 3, 6, 7, November 24, 26, December 1, 2, 3 and 5, 2014,  
June 9, 10 and July 29, 2015, January 12, 14, May 10, 11, 12,  
June 6, 28, 30, September 18 and 30, 2016  
Toronto, Ontario  
DECISION:  
November 1, 2016  
D E C I S I O N  
[1]  
The parties agree I have jurisdiction to determine three grievances filed by the Union on  
behalf of the Grievor, Ms. Tracy baker, disputing the Company’s imposition of a five-day  
suspension without pay and subsequent termination of the Grievor’s employment  
Page 195 of 196  
[2]  
The first grievance (File No.: 2013.021) challenges a five-day suspension without pay  
imposed from November 9 to November 16, 2012 (“Grievance No. 1”).  
[3]  
He second grievance (File No.: 2013.014) alleges the Grievor was unjustly dismissed  
effective January 11, 2013 (“Grievance No. 2”).  
[4]  
The third grievance (File No.: 2013.123) claims the Grievor was unjustly dismissed a  
second time by letter dated March 11, 2013 (“Grievance No. 3”).  
[5]  
Over a period of some two and one-half years, I heard testimony from seven witnesses  
and reviewed many hundreds of pages of documentation and legal authorities during 22 days of  
evidence and submissions related to the foregoing grievances.  
[6]  
Following receipt of the Company’s final written reply submissions on September 30,  
2016, I conducted a thorough review of all of my notes of the testimony of the witnesses,  
documents, oral and written submissions and the legal authorities presented to me by the parties.  
[7]  
After concluding that review, I wrote the following e-mail to counsel for both parties on  
October 29, 2016:  
Dear Counsel:  
Since receiving the final written submissions of the Company on September 30, I have now  
completed a detailed review of all of the evidence, submissions and authorities presented to me in  
the course of this lengthy arbitration proceeding. While I am not in a position to issue my written  
Reasons for decision at the present time, and likely will not for 2 3 months given the sheer  
volume of materials that I intend to address in the Award, I have nevertheless arrived at my final  
decision on all three grievances. With the consent of both parties, I am therefore prepared to  
release my bottom line Decision on the grievances without reasons in the upcoming week,  
provided the parties expressly agree that I retain jurisdiction to issue my full Reasons for decision  
at a later date.  
Please advise accordingly.  
[8]  
In response, I received the following e-mail communication from Ms. Pollock on behalf  
of the Union in the early afternoon of October 30, 2016: “The union agrees to receive a bottom  
line decision now, followed later by your full written reasons.” Later that afternoon, Mr. Craig,  
counsel for the Company, wrote via e-mail: “TELUS also agrees. Thanks.”  
[9]  
Consequently, with the consent of the parties and on the understanding that I shall retain  
jurisdiction to issue my Reasons for Decision at a later date, I have set out below my “bottom  
line” Decision respecting each of the grievances before me.  
Page 196 of 196  
Grievance No. 1 Five Day Suspension  
[10] This grievance is dismissed.  
Grievance No. 2 January 11, 2013 Discharge  
[11] This grievance is allowed.  
Grievance No. 3 March 11, 2013 Discharge  
[12] This grievance is allowed.  
Remedy  
[13] Having regard to the foregoing, the termination letter dated January 11, 2013 shall be  
removed from the Grievor’s employment record.  
[14] The Company is ordered to reinstate the Grievor forthwith to the position she held as of  
the date of her termination on January 11, 2013, with compensation to make her whole for all  
losses calculated from that date to the date of her reinstatement.  
[15] The termination letter dated March 11, 2013 shall also be removed from the Grievor’s  
employment record.  
[16] The remedy in allowing the March 11, 2013 termination grievance is encompassed within  
the reinstatement and compensation order concerning the January 11, 2013 termination dealt  
with by Grievance No. 2.  
[17] In addition to retaining jurisdiction to deliver Reasons for Decision in accordance with  
the parties’ agreement recorded above, I shall remain seized to resolve any dispute concerning  
the interpretation and/or implementation of the relief ordered herein and calculation of the  
compensation payable to the Grievor, as requested by the Union at the outset of these arbitration  
proceedings.  
DATED AT MARKHAM, ONTARIO THIS 1ST DAY OF NOVEMBER, 2016.  
“G. F. Luborsky”  
Gordon F. Luborsky,  
Sole Arbitrator  


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