Date: 20180830  
Dockets: A-78-17 (lead file); A-217-16; A-218-16;  
A-223-16; A-224-16; A-225-16; A-232-16;  
A-68-17; A-74-17; A-75-17;  
A-76-17; A-77-17; A-84-17; A-86-17  
Citation: 2018 FCA 153  
CORAM:  
DAWSON J.A.  
DE MONTIGNY J.A.  
WOODS J.A.  
BETWEEN:  
TSLEIL-WAUTUTH NATION, CITY OF VANCOUVER, CITY OF  
BURNABY, THE SQUAMISH NATION (also known as the  
SQUAMISH INDIAN BAND), XÀLEK/SEKYÚ SIÝAM, CHIEF IAN  
CAMPBELL on his own behalf and on behalf of all members of the  
Squamish Nation, COLDWATER INDIAN BAND, CHIEF LEE  
SPAHAN in his capacity as Chief of the Coldwater Band on behalf of  
all members of the Coldwater Band, AITCHELITZ, SKOWKALE,  
SHXWHÁ:Y VILLAGE, SOOWAHLIE, SQUIALA FIRST NATION,  
TZEACHTEN, YAKWEAKWIOOSE, SKWAH, CHIEF DAVID  
JIMMIE on his own behalf and on behalf of all members of the  
TS’ELXWÉYEQW TRIBE, UPPER NICOLA BAND, CHIEF RON  
IGNACE and CHIEF FRED SEYMOUR on their own behalf and on  
behalf of all other members of the STK’EMLUPSEMC TE  
SECWEPEMC of the SECWEPEMC NATION, RAINCOAST  
CONSERVATION FOUNDATION and LIVING OCEANS SOCIETY  
Applicants  
and  
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA,  
NATIONAL ENERGY BOARD and  
TRANS MOUNTAIN PIPELINE ULC  
Respondents  
and  
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ALBERTA and  
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF BRITISH  
COLUMBIA  
Interveners  
Heard at Vancouver, British Columbia, on October 2-5, 10, 12-13, 2017.  
Judgment delivered at Ottawa, Ontario, on August 30, 2018.  
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT BY:  
CONCURRED IN BY:  
DAWSON J.A.  
DE MONTIGNY J.A.  
WOODS J.A.  
Date: 20180830  
Dockets: A-78-17 (lead file); A-217-16; A-218-16;  
A-223-16; A-224-16; A-225-16; A-232-16;  
A-68-17; A-74-17; A-75-17;  
A-76-17; A-77-17; A-84-17; A-86-17  
Citation: 2018 FCA 153  
CORAM:  
DAWSON J.A.  
DE MONTIGNY J.A.  
WOODS J.A.  
BETWEEN:  
TSLEIL-WAUTUTH NATION, CITY OF VANCOUVER, CITY OF  
BURNABY, THE SQUAMISH NATION (also known as the  
SQUAMISH INDIAN BAND), XÀLEK/SEKYÚ SIÝAM, CHIEF IAN  
CAMPBELL on his own behalf and on behalf of all members of the  
Squamish Nation, COLDWATER INDIAN BAND, CHIEF LEE  
SPAHAN in his capacity as Chief of the Coldwater Band on behalf of  
all members of the Coldwater Band, AITCHELITZ, SKOWKALE,  
SHXWHÁ:Y VILLAGE, SOOWAHLIE, SQUIALA FIRST NATION,  
TZEACHTEN, YAKWEAKWIOOSE, SKWAH, CHIEF DAVID  
JIMMIE on his own behalf and on behalf of all members of the  
TS’ELXWÉYEQW TRIBE, UPPER NICOLA BAND, CHIEF RON  
IGNACE and CHIEF FRED SEYMOUR on their own behalf and on  
behalf of all other members of the STK’EMLUPSEMC TE  
SECWEPEMC of the SECWEPEMC NATION, RAINCOAST  
CONSERVATION FOUNDATION and LIVING OCEANS SOCIETY  
Applicants  
and  
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA,  
NATIONAL ENERGY BOARD and  
TRANS MOUNTAIN PIPELINE ULC  
Respondents  
Page: 2  
and  
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ALBERTA and  
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF BRITISH  
COLUMBIA  
Interveners  
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT  
DAWSON J.A.  
Blank/En blanc  
Para.  
I.  
Introduction  
A. Summary of Conclusions  
1
4
II.  
The Project  
9
III.  
The Applicants  
15  
16  
21  
23  
25  
30  
35  
41  
45  
49  
50  
A.  
B.  
C.  
D.  
E.  
F.  
Tsleil-Waututh Nation  
City of Vancouver  
City of Burnaby  
The Squamish Nation  
Coldwater Indian Band  
The Stó:lō Collective  
G.  
H.  
I.  
Upper Nicola Band  
Stk’emlupsemc te Secwepemc of the Secwepemc Nation  
Raincoast Conservation Foundation and Living Oceans Society  
IV.  
V.  
The applications challenging the report of the National Energy Board and the Order  
in Council  
The legislative regime  
53  
54  
59  
63  
68  
69  
72  
72  
76  
81  
85  
88  
94  
99  
102  
A.  
B.  
C.  
The requirements of the National Energy Board Act  
The requirements of the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, 2012  
Consideration by the Governor in Council  
VI.  
The report of the National Energy Board  
VII. The decision of the Governor in Council  
VIII. Factual background  
A.  
B.  
C.  
D.  
E.  
F.  
Canada’s consultation process  
Prehearing matters and the Project application  
The scoping decision and the hearing order  
Challenges to the hearing order and the scoping decision  
The TERMPOL review process  
The applicants’ participation in the hearing before the Board  
Participant funding  
G.  
1.  
Tsleil-Waututh Nation  
Page: 3  
Para.  
Blank/En blanc  
The Squamish Nation  
2.  
3.  
4.  
5.  
6.  
7.  
103  
Coldwater Indian Band  
The Stó:lō Collective  
Upper Nicola Band  
SSN  
104  
105  
106  
107  
Raincoast Conservation Foundation and Living Oceans Society  
108  
H.  
I.  
Crown consultation effortsa brief summary  
109  
109  
110  
115  
1.  
2.  
3.  
Phase I (from 2013 to April 2014)  
Phase II (from April 2014 to February 2016)  
Phase III (February to November 2016)  
Post National Energy Board report events  
118  
1.  
2.  
3.  
The Interim Measures for Pipeline Reviews  
The Ministerial Panel  
Greenhouse gas assessment  
118  
121  
124  
IX.  
X.  
The issues to be determined  
Consideration of the issues  
125  
129  
A.  
The preliminary issues  
129  
133  
1.  
2.  
Trans Mountain’s motion to strike  
The applicants’ motion asking that the two affidavits of Robert Love, 143  
or portions thereof, be struck or given no weight  
(a)  
(b)  
The hearsay objection  
Relevance of evidence of Trans Mountain’s engagement with 153  
144  
the Indigenous applicants  
3.  
Canada’s compendiumThe Consultation Chronologies  
163  
170  
173  
175  
175  
B.  
Is the report of the National Energy Board amenable to judicial review?  
1.  
2.  
The decision of this Court in Gitxaala  
Was Gitxaala wrongly decided on this point?  
(a)  
Did the Court err by stating that only “decisions about legal  
or practical interests” are judicially reviewable?  
Forestethics Advocacy v. Canada (Attorney General)  
The jurisprudence which reviewed environmental assessment  
reports  
(b)  
(c)  
183  
185  
(d)  
(e)  
(f)  
The reference to inapplicable provisions of the Canadian  
Environmental Assessment Act, 2012  
Gitxaala thwarts review of the decision of the National  
Energy Board  
Conclusion on whether the report of the National Energy  
Board is amenable to judicial review  
187  
200  
202  
204  
204  
C.  
Should the decision of the Governor in Council be set aside on  
administrative law grounds?  
1.  
The standard of review to be applied to the decision of the Governor  
in Council  
(a)  
(b)  
The administrative law components of the decision  
The constitutional component  
206  
224  
228  
2.  
Did the Governor in Council err in determining that the Board’s  
Page: 4  
Blank/En blanc  
Para.  
report qualified as a report so as to be a proper condition precedent to  
the Governor in Council’s decision?  
(a)  
Was the Board’s process procedurally fair?  
230  
230  
237  
242  
(i)  
Applicable legal principles  
(ii)  
The asserted breaches of procedural fairness  
(iii) The failure to hold a full oral hearing and to allow  
cross-examination of Trans Mountain’s witnesses  
(iv)  
(v)  
Trans Mountain’s responses to the Information  
Requests  
The asserted deferral and delegation of the assessment 278  
of important information  
260  
(vi)  
Failing to provide adequate reasons  
292  
316  
321  
322  
(vii) Trans Mountain’s reply evidence  
(viii) Conclusion on procedural fairness  
Did the Board fail to decide certain issues before  
recommending approval of the Project?  
(b)  
(i)  
Did the Board fail to assess the risks and impacts  
posed by the Project to Burnaby?  
Did the Board fail to consider alternative means of  
carrying out the Project?  
335  
352  
375  
387  
388  
(ii)  
(iii) Did the Board fail to look at the West Alternative as  
an alternative route for the new pipeline?  
Did the Board fail to consider alternatives to the Westridge  
Marine Terminal?  
Did the Board err by failing to assess Project-related marine  
shipping under the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act,  
2012?  
(c)  
(d)  
(i)  
The deficiencies said to arise from the Board’s  
assessment of Project-related marine shipping under  
the National Energy Board Act  
411  
(ii)  
The Board’s consideration of Project-related marine  
shipping and its findings  
413  
431  
(iii) Was the Board’s assessment of Project-related marine  
shipping substantially adequate?  
(e)  
Did the Board err in its treatment of the Species at Risk Act?  
442  
446  
(i)  
Did the Board err by concluding that section 79 of the  
Species at Risk Act did not apply to its consideration  
of the effects of Project-related marine shipping?  
Did the Board substantially comply with its  
obligations under section 79 of the Species at Risk  
Act?  
(ii)  
451  
(iii) Was the Governor in Council obliged to comply with  
subsection 77(1) of the Species at Risk Act?  
Conclusion: the Governor in Council erred by relying upon  
the Board’s report as a proper condition precedent to the  
459  
465  
(f)  
Page: 5  
Para.  
Blank/En blanc  
Governor in Council’s decision  
3.  
The challenge of the Attorney General of British Columbia  
474  
477  
(a)  
Did the Governor in Council fail to comply with the  
obligation to give reasons?  
(b)  
Did the Governor in Council fail to consider the impact of  
Project-related shipping spill risks on the Province of British  
Columbia?  
481  
485  
D.  
Should the decision of the Governor in Council be set aside on the ground  
that Canada failed to consult adequately with the Indigenous applicants?  
1.  
2.  
3.  
The applicable legal principles  
The standard to which Canada is to be held in fulfilling the duty  
Application of the legal principles to the evidence  
485  
508  
511  
513  
(a)  
Was the consultation process deficient because of the design  
of the process selected and followed by Canada?  
(i)  
(ii)  
The consultation framework was unilaterally imposed  
The Board’s process is said to be inadequate for  
fulfilling consultation obligations  
515  
520  
(iii) The funding provided is said to have been inadequate  
533  
542  
(iv)  
The process allowed the Project to be approved when  
essential information was lacking  
(v)  
Conclusion on the adequacy of the process selected  
and followed by Canada  
548  
550  
(b)  
Was the consultation process deficient because of Canada’s  
execution of the process?  
(i)  
(ii)  
The need for meaningful two-way dialogue  
The implementation of the mandate of the Crown  
consultation team  
564  
575  
a.  
b.  
c.  
d.  
e.  
f.  
The Crown Consultation Report  
The experience of Tsleil-Waututh  
The experience of Squamish  
The experience of Coldwater  
The experience of Stó:lō  
The experience of Upper Nicola  
The experience of SSN  
Conclusion on the mandate of the Crown  
consultation team  
578  
579  
582  
585  
589  
593  
596  
598  
g.  
h.  
(iii) Canada’s reluctance to depart from the Board’s  
findings and recommended conditions and genuinely  
engage the concerns of the Indigenous applicants  
602  
629  
638  
(iv)  
Canada’s erroneous view that the Governor in  
Council could not impose additional conditions on the  
proponent  
(v)  
Canada’s late disclosure of its assessment of the  
Project’s impact on the Indigenous applicants  
Page: 6  
Para.  
Blank/En blanc  
(vi)  
Canada’s failure to dialogue meaningfully  
649  
649  
662  
669  
681  
728  
737  
a.  
b.  
c.  
d.  
e.  
f.  
The experience of Tsleil-Waututh  
The experience of Squamish  
The experience of Coldwater  
The experience of Stó:lō  
The experience of Upper Nicola  
The experience of SSN  
(vii) Conclusion on Canada’s execution of the consultation 753  
process  
E.  
F.  
Remedy  
Proposed Disposition  
764  
773  
I.  
Introduction  
[1]  
On May 19, 2016, the National Energy Board issued its report concerning the proposed  
expansion of the Trans Mountain pipeline system. The Board’s report recommended that the  
Governor in Council approve the expansion. The Board’s recommendation was based on the  
Board’s findings that the expansion is in Canada’s public interest, and that if certain  
environmental protection procedures and mitigation measures are implemented, and if the  
conditions the Board recommended are implemented, the expansion is not likely to cause  
significant adverse environmental effects.  
[2]  
On November 29, 2016, the Governor in Council accepted the Board’s recommendation  
and issued Order in Council P.C. 2016-1069. The Order in Council recited the Governor in  
Council’s acceptance of the Board’s recommendation, and directed the Board to issue a  
certificate of public convenience and necessity approving the construction and operation of the  
expansion project, subject to the conditions recommended by the Board.  
 
Page: 7  
A number of applications for judicial review of the Board’s report and the Order in  
[3]  
Council were filed in this Court. These applications were consolidated. These are the Court’s  
reasons for judgment in respect of the consolidated proceeding. Pursuant to the order  
consolidating the applications, a copy of these reasons shall be placed in each file.  
A.  
Summary of Conclusions  
[4]  
While a number of applicants challenge the report of the National Energy Board, as  
explained below, the Order in Council is legally the only decision under review. Its validity is  
challenged on two principal grounds: first, the Board’s process and findings were so flawed that  
the Governor in Council could not reasonably rely on the Board’s report; second, Canada failed  
to fulfil the duty to consult owed to Indigenous peoples.  
[5]  
Applying largely uncontested legal principles established by the Supreme Court of  
Canada to the factual record, a factual record that is also largely not contested, I conclude that  
most of the flaws asserted against the Board’s process and findings are without merit. However,  
the Board made one critical error. The Board unjustifiably defined the scope of the Project under  
review not to include Project-related tanker traffic. The unjustified exclusion of marine shipping  
from the scope of the Project led to successive, unacceptable deficiencies in the Board’s report  
and recommendations. As a result, the Governor in Council could not rely on the Board’s report  
and recommendations when assessing the Project’s environmental effects and the overall public  
interest.  
 
Page: 8  
[6]  
Applying the largely uncontested legal principles that underpin the duty to consult  
Indigenous peoples and First Nations set out by the Supreme Court, I also conclude that Canada  
acted in good faith and selected an appropriate consultation framework. However, at the last  
stage of the consultation process prior to the decision of the Governor in Council, a stage called  
Phase III, Canada’s efforts fell well short of the mark set by the Supreme Court of Canada.  
Canada failed in Phase III to engage, dialogue meaningfully and grapple with the real concerns  
of the Indigenous applicants so as to explore possible accommodation of those concerns. The  
duty to consult was not adequately discharged.  
[7]  
Accordingly, for the following reasons, I would quash the Order in Council and remit the  
matter back to the Governor in Council for appropriate action, if it sees fit, to address these flaws  
and, later, proper redetermination.  
[8]  
These reasons begin by describing: (i) the expansion project; (ii) the applicants who  
challenge the Board’s report and the Order in Council; (iii) the pending applications for judicial  
review; (iv) the legislative regime; (v) the report of the Board; and, (vi) the decision of the  
Governor in Council. The reasons then set out the factual background relevant to the challenges  
before the Court before turning to the issues raised in these applications and the consideration of  
those issues.  
II.  
The Project  
[9]  
No company may operate an interprovincial or international pipeline in Canada unless the  
National Energy Board has issued a certificate of public convenience and necessity, and given  
 
Page: 9  
leave to the company to open the pipeline (subsection 30(1) of the National Energy Board Act,  
R.S.C. 1985, c. N-7).  
[10] Trans Mountain Pipeline ULC is the general partner of Trans Mountain Pipeline L.P.  
(together referred to as Trans Mountain). Trans Mountain owns and holds operating certificates  
issued by the National Energy Board for the existing Trans Mountain pipeline system. This  
system includes a pipeline approximately 1,147 kilometres long that moves crude oil, and refined  
and semi-refined petroleum products from Edmonton, Alberta to marketing terminals and  
refineries in the central region and lower mainland area of British Columbia, as well as to the  
Puget Sound area in Washington State.  
[11] On December 16, 2013, Trans Mountain submitted an application to the National Energy  
Board for a certificate of public convenience and necessity (and certain amended certificates) for  
the Trans Mountain Expansion Project (Project).  
[12] The application described the Project to consist of a number of components, including: (i)  
twinning the existing pipeline system with approximately 987 kilometres of new pipeline  
segments, including new proposed pipeline corridors and rights-of-way, for the purpose of  
transporting diluted bitumen from Edmonton, Alberta to Burnaby, British Columbia; (ii) new and  
modified facilities, including pump stations and tanks (in particular, an expanded petroleum tank  
farm in Burnaby which would be expanded from 13 to 26 storage tanks); (iii) a new and  
expanded dock facility, including three new berths, at the Westridge Marine Terminal in  
Page: 10  
Burnaby; and, (iv) two new pipelines running from the Burnaby storage facility to the Westridge  
Marine Terminal.  
[13] The Project would increase the number of tankers loaded at the Westridge Marine  
Terminal from approximately five Panamax and Aframax class tankers per month to  
approximately 34 Aframax class tankers per month. Aframax tankers are larger and carry more  
product than Panamax tankers. The Project would increase the overall capacity of Trans  
Mountain’s existing pipeline system from 300,000 barrels per day to 890,000 barrels per day.  
[14] Trans Mountain’s application stated that the primary purpose of the Project is to provide  
additional capacity to transport crude oil from Alberta to markets in the Pacific Rim, including  
Asia. If built, the system would continue to transport crude oilprimarily diluted bitumen.  
III.  
The Applicants  
[15] A number of First Nations and two large cities are significantly concerned about the  
Project and its impact upon them, and challenge its approval. Two non-governmental agencies  
also challenge the Project. These applicants are described below.  
A.  
Tsleil-Waututh Nation  
[16] The applicant Tsleil-Waututh Nation is a Coast Salish Nation. It is a band within the  
meaning of the Indian Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-5 and its members are Aboriginal peoples within the  
   
Page: 11  
meaning of section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 and paragraph 5(1)(c) of the Canadian  
Environmental Assessment Act, 2012, S.C. 2012, c. 19, s. 52.  
[17] In the traditional dialect of Halkomelem, the name Tsleil-Waututh means “People of the  
Inlet”. Tsleil-Waututh’s asserted traditional territory extends approximately from the vicinity of  
Mount Garibaldi to the north to the 49th parallel and beyond to the south. The traditional  
territory extends west to Gibsons and east to Coquitlam Lake. The traditional territory includes  
areas across British Columbia’s Lower Mainland, including sections of the Lower Fraser River,  
Howe Sound, Burrard Inlet and Indian Arm.  
[18] Tsleil-Waututh’s traditional territory encompasses the proposed Westridge Marine  
Terminal and fuel storage facility expansion, and approximately 18 kilometres of pipeline right-  
of-way. Approximately 45 kilometres of marine shipping route will pass within Tsleil-Waututh’s  
asserted traditional territory.  
[19] Much of Tsleil-Waututh’s population of 500 people live in its primary community of  
Tsleil-Waututh, which is located on the north shore of Burrard Inlet, approximately 3 kilometres  
across the Inlet from the Westridge Marine Terminal.  
[20] Tsleil-Waututh asserts Aboriginal title to the land, water, air, marine foreshore and  
resources in Eastern Burrard Inlet. It also asserts freestanding stewardship, harvesting and  
cultural rights in this area. The Crown states that it assessed its duty to consult with Tsleil-  
Waututh on the deeper end of the consultation spectrum.  
Page: 12  
B.  
City of Vancouver  
[21] The City of Vancouver is the third most densely populated city in North America, after  
New York City and San Francisco. It has 69.8 kilometres of waterfront along Burrard Inlet,  
English Bay, False Creek and the Fraser River, with 18 kilometres of beaches and a 22-kilometre  
long seawall.  
[22] Approximately 25,000 residents of Vancouver live within 300 metres of the Burrard Inlet  
and English Bay shorelines.  
C.  
City of Burnaby  
[23] The City of Burnaby is the third largest city in British Columbia, with a population of  
over 223,000 people.  
[24] A number of elements of the Project infrastructure will be located in Burnaby: (i) the new  
Westridge Marine Terminal; (ii) the Burnaby Terminal, including thirteen new storage tanks and  
one replacement storage tank; (iii) two new delivery lines following a new route connecting the  
Burnaby Terminal to the Westridge Marine Terminal through a new tunnel to be drilled under  
the Burnaby Mountain Conservation Area; and, (iv) a portion of the main pipeline along a new  
route to the Burnaby Terminal.  
   
Page: 13  
D.  
The Squamish Nation  
[25] The applicant Squamish Nation is a Coast Salish Nation. It is a band within the meaning  
of the Indian Act and its members are Aboriginal peoples within the meaning of section 35 of the  
Constitution Act, 1982 and paragraph 5(1)(c) of the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act,  
2012. There are currently just over 4,000 registered members of the Squamish Nation.  
[26] The Squamish assert that since a time before contact with Europeans, Squamish have  
used and occupied lands and waters on the southwest coast of what is now British Columbia,  
extending from the Lower Mainland north to Whistler. This territory includes Burrard Inlet,  
English Bay, Howe Sound and the Squamish Valley. The boundaries of asserted Squamish  
territory thus encompass all of Burrard Inlet, English Bay and Howe Sound, as well as the rivers  
and creeks that flow into these bodies of water.  
[27] Squamish has three reserves located in and at the entrance to Burrard Inlet:  
i.  
Seymour Creek Reserve No. 2 (ch’ích’elxwi7kw) on the North shore close to the  
Westridge Marine Terminal;  
ii.  
Mission Reserve No. 1 (eslhá7an); and,  
iii.  
Capilano Reserve No. 5 (xwmelchstn).  
Also located in the area are Kitsilano Reserve No. 6 (senákw) near the entrance to False Creek,  
and three other waterfront reserves in Howe Sound.  
 
Page: 14  
[28] Project infrastructure, including portions of the main pipeline, the Westridge Marine  
Terminal, the Burnaby Terminal, two new delivery lines connecting the terminals, and sections  
of the tanker routes for the Project will be located in Squamish’s asserted traditional territory and  
close to its reserves across the Burrard Inlet. The shipping route for the Project will also travel  
past three Squamish reserves through to the Salish Sea.  
[29] Squamish asserts Aboriginal rights, including title and self-government, within its  
traditional territory. Squamish also asserts Aboriginal rights to fish in the Fraser River and its  
tributaries. The Crown assessed its duty to consult Squamish at the deeper end of the  
consultation spectrum.  
E.  
Coldwater Indian Band  
[30] The applicant Coldwater is a band within the meaning of section 2 of the Indian Act. Its  
members are Aboriginal peoples within the meaning of section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982  
and paragraph 5(1)(c) of the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, 2012. Coldwater, together  
with 14 other bands, comprise the Nlaka’pamux Nation.  
[31] The Nlaka’pamux Nation’s asserted traditional territory encompasses part of south-  
central British Columbia extending from the northern United States to north of Kamloops. This  
territory includes the Lower Thompson River area, the Fraser Canyon, the Nicola and Coldwater  
Valleys and the Coquihalla area.  
 
Page: 15  
[32] Coldwater’s registered population is approximately 850 members. Approximately 330  
members live on Coldwater’s reserve lands. Coldwater holds three reserves: (i) Coldwater Indian  
Reserve No. 1 (Coldwater Reserve) approximately 10 kilometres southwest of Merritt, British  
Columbia; (ii) Paul’s Basin Indian Reserve No. 2 located to the southwest of the Coldwater  
Reserve, upstream on the Coldwater River; and, (iii) Gwen Lake Indian Reserve No. 3 located on  
Gwen Lake.  
[33] Approximately 226 kilometres of the proposed pipeline right-of-way and four pipeline  
facilities (the Kamloops Terminal, the Stump Station, the Kingsvale Station and the Hope  
Station) will be located within the Nlaka’pamux Nation’s asserted traditional territory. The  
Kingsvale Station is located in the Coldwater Valley. The approved pipeline right-of-way skirts  
the eastern edges of the Coldwater Reserve. The existing Trans Mountain pipeline system  
transects both the Coldwater Reserve and the Coldwater Valley.  
[34] Coldwater asserts Aboriginal rights and title in, and the ongoing use of, the Coldwater  
and Nicola Valleys and the Nlaka’pamux territory more generally. The Crown assessed its duty  
to consult Coldwater at the deeper end of the consultation spectrum.  
F.  
The Stó:lō Collective  
[35] One translation of the term “Stó:lō” is “People of the River”, referencing the Fraser  
River. The Stó:lō are a Halkomelem-speaking Coast Salish people. Traditionally, they have been  
tribally organized.  
 
Page: 16  
[36] The “Stó:lō Collective” was formed for the sole purpose of coordinating and representing  
the interests of its membership before the National Energy Board and in Crown consultations  
about the Project. The Stó:lō Collective represents the following applicants:  
(a)  
Aitchelitz, Skowkale, Tzeachten, Squiala First Nation, Yakweakwioose, Shxwa:y  
Village and Soowahlie, each of which are villages and also bands within the  
meaning of section 2 of the Indian Act (the Ts’elxweyeqw Villages). The  
Ts’elxweyeqw Villages collectively comprise the Ts’elxweyeqw Tribe. Members  
of the Ts’elxweyeqw Villages are Stó:lō people and Aboriginal peoples within the  
meaning of section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 and paragraph 5(1)(c) of the  
Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, 2012; and,  
(b)  
Skwah and Kwaw-Kwaw-Apilt, each of whom are villages and also bands within  
the meaning of section 2 of the Indian Act (the Pil’Alt Villages). The Pil’Alt  
Villages are members of the Pil’Alt Tribe. Members of the Pil’Alt Villages are  
Stó:lō people and Aboriginal peoples within the meaning of section 35 of the  
Constitution Act, 1982 and paragraph 5(1)(c) of the Canadian Environmental  
Assessment Act, 2012. The Pil’Alt Villages are represented by the Ts’elxweyeqw  
Tribe in matters relating to the Project. (On March 6, 2018, Kwaw-Kwaw-Apilt  
filed a notice of discontinuance.)  
[37] The Stó:lō’s asserted traditional territory, known as S’olh Temexw, includes the lower  
Fraser River watershed.  
[38] The Stó:lō live in many villages, all of which are located in the lower Fraser River  
watershed.  
[39] The existing Trans Mountain pipeline crosses, and the Project’s proposed new pipeline  
route would cross, approximately 170 kilometres of the Stó:lō Collective applicants’ asserted  
Page: 17  
traditional territory, beginning from an eastern point of entry near the Coquihalla Highway and  
continuing to the Burrard Inlet.  
[40] The Stó:lō possess established Aboriginal fishing rights on the Fraser River (R. v. Van  
der Peet, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507, 137 D.L.R. (4th) 289). The Crown assessed its duty to consult  
Stó:lō at the deeper end of the consultation spectrum.  
G.  
Upper Nicola Band  
[41] The applicant Upper Nicola is a member community of the Syilx (Okanagan) Nation and  
a band within the meaning of section 2 of the Indian Act. Upper Nicola and Syilx are an  
Aboriginal people within the meaning of section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 and paragraph  
5(1)(c) of the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, 2012.  
[42] The Syilx Nation’s asserted traditional territory extends from the north past Revelstoke  
around Kinbasket to the south to the vicinity of Wilbur, Washington. It extends from the east  
near Kootenay Lake to the west to the Nicola Valley. Upper Nicola currently has eight Indian  
Reserves within Upper Nicola’s/Syilx’s asserted territory. The primary residential communities  
are Spaxomin, located on Upper Nicola Indian Reserve No. 3 on the western shore of Douglas  
Lake, and Quilchena, located on Upper Nicola Indian Reserve No. 1 on the eastern shore of  
Nicola Lake.  
 
Page: 18  
[43] Approximately 130 kilometres of the Project’s proposed new pipeline will cross through  
Upper Nicola’s area of responsibility within Syilx territory. The Stump Station and the Kingsvale  
Station are also located within Syilx/Upper Nicola’s asserted territory.  
[44] Upper Nicola asserts responsibility to protect and preserve the claimed Aboriginal title  
and harvesting and other rights held collectively by the Syilx, particularly within its area of  
responsibility in the asserted Syilx territory. The Crown assessed its duty to consult Upper  
Nicola at the deeper end of the consultation spectrum.  
H.  
Stk’emlupsemc te Secwepemc of the Secwepemc Nation  
[45] The Secwepemc are an Aboriginal people living in the area around the confluence of the  
Fraser and Thompson Rivers. The Secwepemc Nation is comprised of seven large territorial  
groupings referred to as Divisions”. The Stk’emlupsemc te Secwepemc Division (SSN) is  
comprised of the Skeetchestn Indian Band and the Kamloops (or Tk’emlups) Indian Band. Both  
are bands within the meaning of section 2 of the Indian Act. SSN’s members are also Aboriginal  
peoples within the meaning of section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 and paragraph 5(1)(c) of  
the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, 2012.  
[46] The Skeetchestn Indian Band is located along the northern bank of the Thompson River,  
approximately 50 kilometres west of Kamloops and has four reserves. Its total registered  
population is 533. The Tk’emlups Indian Band is located in the Kamloops area and has six  
reserves. Its total registered population is 1,322. Secwepemc Territory is asserted to be a  
 
Page: 19  
substantial landmass which encompasses many areas, including the area in the vicinity of  
Kamloops Lake.  
[47] The existing and proposed pipeline right-of-way crosses through SSN’s asserted  
traditional territory for approximately 350 kilometres. Approximately 80 kilometres of the  
proposed pipeline right-of-way and two pipeline facilities, the Black Pines Station and the  
Kamloops Terminal, will be located within SSN’s asserted traditional territory.  
[48] The SSN claim Aboriginal title over its traditional territory. The Crown assessed its duty  
to consult SSN at the deeper end of the consultation spectrum.  
I.  
Raincoast Conservation Foundation and Living Oceans Society  
[49] These applicants are not-for-profit organizations. Their involvement in the National  
Energy Board review process focused primarily on the effects of Project-related marine shipping.  
IV.  
The applications challenging the report of the National Energy Board and the Order in  
Council  
[50] As will be discussed in more detail below, two matters are challenged in this consolidated  
proceeding: first, the report of the National Energy Board which recommended that the Governor  
in Council approve the Project and direct the Board to issue the necessary certificate of public  
convenience and necessity; and, second, the decision of the Governor in Council to accept the  
recommendation of the Board and issue the Order in Council directing the Board to issue the  
certificate.  
   
Page: 20  
[51] The following applicants applied for judicial review of the report of the National Energy  
Board:  
Tsleil-Waututh Nation (Court File A-232-16)  
City of Vancouver (Court File A-225-16)  
City of Burnaby (Court File A-224-16)  
The Squamish Nation and Xálek/Sekyú Siý am, Chief Ian Campbell on his own  
behalf and on behalf of all members of Squamish (Court File A-217-16)  
Coldwater Indian Band and Chief Lee Spahan in his capacity as Chief of  
Coldwater on behalf of all members of Coldwater (Court File A-223-16)  
Raincoast Conservation Foundation and Living Oceans Society (Court File A-  
218-16).  
[52] The following applicants applied, with leave, for judicial review of the decision of the  
Governor in Council:  
Tsleil-Waututh Nation (Court File A-78-17)  
City of Burnaby (Court File A-75-17)  
The Squamish Nation and Xálek/Sekyú Siý am, Chief Ian Campbell on his own  
behalf and on behalf of all members of Squamish (Court File A-77-17)  
Coldwater Indian Band and Chief Lee Spahan in his capacity as Chief of  
Coldwater on behalf of all members of Coldwater (Court File A-76-17)  
The Stó:lō Collective applicants (Court File A-86-17)  
Upper Nicola Band (Court File A-74-17)  
Chief Ron Ignace and Chief Fred Seymour, on their own behalf and on behalf of  
all other members of Stk’emlupsemc te Secwepemc of the Secwepemc Nation  
(Court File A-68-17)  
Raincoast Conservation Foundation and Living Oceans Society (Court File A-84-  
17).  
Page: 21  
V.  
The legislative regime  
[53] For ease of reference the legislative provisions referred to in this section of the reasons  
are set out in the Appendix to these reasons.  
A.  
The requirements of the National Energy Board Act  
[54] As explained above, no company may operate an interprovincial or international pipeline  
in Canada unless the National Energy Board has issued a certificate of public convenience and  
necessity, and, after the pipeline is built, has given leave to the company to open the pipeline.  
[55] Trans Mountain’s completed application for a certificate of public convenience and  
necessity for the Project triggered the National Energy Board’s obligation to assess the Project  
pursuant to section 52 of the National Energy Board Act. Subsection 52(1) of that Act requires  
the Board to prepare and submit to the Minister of Natural Resources, for transmission to the  
Governor in Council, a report which sets out the Board’s recommendation as to whether the  
certificate should be granted, together with all of the terms and conditions that the Board  
considers the certificate should be subject to if issued. The Board is to provide its reasons for its  
recommendation. When considering whether to recommend issuance of a certificate the Board is  
required to take into account “whether the pipeline is and will be required by the present and  
future public convenience and necessity”.  
[56] The Board’s recommendation is, pursuant to subsection 52(2) of the National Energy  
Board Act, to be based on “all considerations that appear to it to be directly related to the  
   
Page: 22  
pipeline and to be relevant” and the Board may have regard to five specifically enumerated  
factors which include “any public interest that in the Board’s opinion may be affected by the  
issuance of the certificate or the dismissal of the application.”  
[57] If an application relates to a “designated” project, as defined in section 2 of the Canadian  
Environmental Assessment Act, 2012, the Board’s report must also set out the Board’s  
environmental assessment of the project. This assessment is to be prepared under the Canadian  
Environmental Assessment Act, 2012 (subsection 52(3) of the National Energy Board Act). A  
designated project is defined in section 2 of the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, 2012:  
designated project means one or more projet désigné Une ou plusieurs  
physical activities that  
activités concrètes :  
(a) are carried out in Canada or on  
a) exercées au Canada ou sur un  
federal lands;  
territoire domanial;  
(b) are designated by regulations made b) désignées soit par règlement pris en  
under paragraph 84(a) or designated in vertu de l’alinéa 84a), soit par arrêté  
an order made by the Minister under  
subsection 14(2); and  
pris par le ministre en vertu du  
paragraphe 14(2);  
(c) are linked to the same federal  
authority as specified in those  
regulations or that order.  
c) liées à la même autorité fédérale  
selon ce qui est précisé dans ce  
règlement ou cet arrêté.  
It includes any physical activity that is Sont comprises les activités concrètes  
incidental to those physical activities. qui leur sont accessoires.  
[58] The remaining subsections in section 52 deal with the timeframe in which the Board must  
complete its report. Generally, a report must be submitted to the Minister within the time limit  
specified by the Chair of the Board. The specified time limit must not be longer than 15 months  
after the completed application has been submitted to the Board.  
Page: 23  
B.  
The requirements of the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, 2012  
[59] Pursuant to subsection 4(3) of the Regulations Designating Physical Activities,  
SOR/2012-147, and section 46 of the Schedule thereto, because the Project includes a new  
onshore pipeline longer than 40 kilometres, the Project is a designated project as defined in part  
(b) of the definition of “designated project” set out in paragraph 57 above. In consequence, the  
Board was required to conduct an environmental assessment under the Canadian Environmental  
Assessment Act, 2012. For this purpose, subsection 15(b) of the Canadian Environmental  
Assessment Act, 2012 designated the National Energy Board to be the sole responsible authority  
for the environmental assessment.  
[60] As the responsible authority, the Board was required to take into account the  
environmental effects enumerated in subsection 5(1) of the Canadian Environmental Assessment  
Act, 2012. These effects include changes caused to the land, water or air and to the life forms that  
inhabit these elements of the environment. The effects to be considered are to include the effects  
upon Aboriginal peoples’ health and socio-economic conditions, their physical and cultural  
heritage, their current use of lands and resources for traditional purposes, and any structure, site  
or thing that is of historical, archaeological, paleontological or architectural significance.  
[61] Subsection 19(1) of the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, 2012 required the  
Board to take into account a number of enumerated factors when conducting the environmental  
assessment, including:  
the environmental effects of the designated project (including the environmental  
effects of malfunctions or accidents that may occur in connection with the  
 
Page: 24  
designated project) and any cumulative environmental effects that are likely to  
result from the designated project in combination with other physical activities  
that have been or will be carried out;  
mitigation measures that are technically and economically feasible and that would  
mitigate any significant adverse environmental effects of the designated project;  
alternative means of carrying out the designated project that are technically and  
economically feasible, and the environmental effects of any such alternative  
means; and  
any other matter relevant to the environmental assessment that the responsible  
authority, here the Board, requires to be taken into account.  
[62] The Board was also required under subsection 29(1) of the Canadian Environmental  
Assessment Act, 2012 to make recommendations to the Governor in Council with respect to the  
decision to be made by the Governor in Council under paragraph 31(1)(a) of that Acta  
decision about the existence of significant adverse environmental effects and whether those  
effects can be justified in the circumstances.  
C.  
Consideration by the Governor in Council  
[63] Once in receipt of the report prepared in accordance with the requirements of the  
National Energy Board Act and the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, 2012, the  
Governor in Council may make its decision concerning the proponent’s application for a  
certificate.  
[64] Three decisions are available to the Governor in Council. It may, by order:  
 
Page: 25  
“direct the Board to issue a certificate in respect of the pipeline or any part of it  
i.  
and to make the certificate subject to the terms and conditions set out in the  
report” (paragraph 54(1)(a) of the National Energy Board Act); or  
“direct the Board to dismiss the application for a certificate” (paragraph 54(1)(b)  
of the National Energy Board Act); or  
ii.  
iii.  
“refer the recommendation, or any of the terms and conditions, set out in the  
report back to the Board for reconsideration” and specify a time limit for the  
reconsideration (subsections 53(1) and (2) of the National Energy Board Act).  
[65] Subsection 54(2) of the National Energy Board Act requires that the Governor in  
Council’s order “must set out the reasons for making the order.”  
[66] Subsection 54(3) of the National Energy Board Act requires the Governor in Council to  
issue its order within three months after the Board’s report is submitted to the Minister. The  
Governor in Council may, on the recommendation of the Minister, extend this time limit.  
[67] Additionally, once the National Energy Board as the responsible authority for the  
designated project has submitted its report with respect to the environmental assessment,  
pursuant to subsection 31(1) of the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, 2012, the Governor  
in Council may, by order made under subsection 54(1) of the National Energy Board Act,  
“decide, taking into account the implementation of any mitigation measures specified in the  
report with respect to the environmental assessment … that the designated project”:  
(i) is not likely to cause significant  
adverse environmental effects,  
(i) n’est pas susceptible d’entraîner  
des effets environnementaux négatifs  
et importants,  
(ii) is likely to cause significant  
(ii) est susceptible d’entraîner des  
adverse environmental effects that can effets environnementaux négatifs et  
importants qui sont justifiables dans  
Page: 26  
be justified in the circumstances, or  
les circonstances,  
(iii) is likely to cause significant  
adverse environmental effects that  
cannot be justified in the  
circumstances;  
(iii) est susceptible d’entraîner des  
effets environnementaux négatifs et  
importants qui ne sont pas justifiables  
dans les circonstances;  
VI.  
The report of the National Energy Board  
[68] On May 19, 2016, the Board issued its report which recommended approval of the  
Project. The recommendation was based on a number of findings, including:  
With the implementation of Trans Mountain’s environmental protection  
procedures and mitigation measures, and the Board’s recommended conditions,  
the Project is not likely to cause significant adverse environmental effects.  
However, effects from the operation of Project-related marine vessels would  
contribute to the total cumulative effects on the Southern resident killer whales,  
and would further impede the recovery of that species. Southern resident killer  
whales are an endangered species that reside in the Salish Sea. Project-related  
marine shipping follows a route through the Salish Sea to the open ocean that  
travels through the whales’ critical habitat as identified in the Recovery Strategy  
for the Northern and Southern resident killer whales. The Board’s finding was  
that “the operation of Project-related marine vessels is likely to result in  
significant adverse effects to the Southern resident killer whale, and that it is  
likely to result in significant adverse effects on Aboriginal cultural uses associated  
with these marine mammals.”  
The likelihood of a spill from the Project or from a Project-related tanker would  
be very low in light of the mitigation and safety measures to be implemented.  
However, the consequences of large spills could be high.  
The Board’s recommendation and decisions with respect to the Project were  
consistent with subsection 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982.  
 
Page: 27  
The Project would be in the Canadian public interest and would be required by the  
present and future public convenience and necessity.  
If approved, the Board would attach 157 conditions to the certificate of public  
convenience and necessity. The conditions dealt with a broad range of matters,  
including the safety and integrity of the pipeline, emergency preparedness and  
response and ongoing consultation with affected entities, including Indigenous  
communities.  
VII. The decision of the Governor in Council  
[69] On November 29, 2016, the Governor in Council issued the Order in Council, accepting  
the Board’s recommendation that the Project be approved and directing the Board to issue a  
certificate of public convenience and necessity to Trans Mountain.  
[70] The Order in Council contained a number of recitals, two of which are relevant to these  
applications. First, the Governor in Council stated its satisfaction “that the consultation process  
undertaken is consistent with the honour of the Crown and the [Aboriginal] concerns and  
interests have been appropriately accommodated”. Second, the Governor in Council accepted the  
Board’s recommendation that the Project is required by present and future public convenience  
and necessity and that it will not likely cause significant adverse environmental effects.  
[71] The Order in Council was followed by a 20-page explanatory note which was stated not  
to form part of the Order in Council. The Explanatory Note described the Project and its  
objectives and the review process before the National Energy Board, and summarized the issues  
raised before the Board. The Explanatory Note also dealt with matters that post-dated the  
Board’s report and set out the government’s “response to what was heard”.  
 
Page: 28  
VIII. Factual background  
A.  
Canada’s consultation process  
[72] The first step in the consultation process was determining the Indigenous groups whose  
rights and interests might be adversely impacted by the Project. In order to do this, a number of  
federal departments and the National Energy Board coordinated research and analysis on the  
proximity of Indigenous groups’ traditional territories to elements of the Project, including the  
proposed pipeline right-of-way, the marine terminal expansion, and the designated shipping  
lanes. Approximately 130 Indigenous groups were identified, including all of the Indigenous  
applicants.  
[73] On August 12, 2013, the National Energy Board wrote to the identified Indigenous  
groups to advise that Trans Mountain had filed a Project description on May 23, 2013, and to  
provide preliminary information about the upcoming review process. This letter also attached a  
letter from the Major Projects Management Office of Natural Resources Canada. The Major  
Projects Management Office’s letter advised that Canada would rely on the National Energy  
Board’s public hearing process:  
to the extent possible, to fulfil any Crown duty to consult Aboriginal groups for  
the proposed Project. Through the [National Energy Board] process, the [Board]  
will consider issues and concerns raised by Aboriginal groups. The Crown will  
utilise the [National Energy Board] process to identify, consider and address the  
potential adverse impacts of the proposed Project on established or potential  
Aboriginal and treaty rights.  
[74] In subsequent letters sent to Indigenous groups between August 2013 and February 19,  
2016, the Major Projects Management Office directed Indigenous groups that could be impacted  
   
Page: 29  
by the Project to participate in and communicate their concerns through the National Energy  
Board public hearings. Additionally, Indigenous groups were advised that Canada viewed the  
consultation process to be as follows:  
i.  
Canada would rely, to the extent possible, on the Board’s process to fulfil its duty  
to consult Indigenous peoples about the Project;  
ii.  
There would be four phases of Crown consultation:  
a.  
b.  
c.  
“Phase I”: early engagement, from the submission of the Project  
description to the start of the National Energy Board hearing;  
“Phase II”: the National Energy Board hearing, commencing with the start  
of the Board hearing and continuing until the close of the hearing record;  
“Phase III”: consideration by the Governor in Council, commencing with  
the close of the hearing record and continuing until the Governor in  
Council rendered its decision in relation to the Project; and  
d.  
“Phase IV”: regulatory authorization should the Project be approved,  
commencing with the decision of the Governor in Council and continuing  
until the issuance of department regulatory approvals, if required.  
iii.  
iv.  
Natural Resources Canada’s Major Projects Management Office would serve as  
the Crown Consultation Coordinator for the Project.  
Following Phase III consultations, an adequacy of consultation assessment would  
be prepared by the Crown. The assessment would be based upon the depth of  
consultation owed to each Indigenous group. The depth of consultation owed  
would in turn be based upon the Project’s potential impact on each group and the  
strength of the group’s claim to potential or established Aboriginal or treaty  
rights.  
[75] On May 25, 2015, towards the end of Phase II, the Major Projects Management Office  
wrote to Indigenous groups, including the applicants, to provide additional information on the  
scope and timing of Phase III Crown consultation. Indigenous groups were advised that:  
Page: 30  
Canada intended to submit summaries of the concerns and issues Indigenous  
i.  
groups had brought forward to date and to seek feedback on the completeness and  
accuracy of the summaries. The summaries would be issued in the form of  
Information Requests, a Board hearing process explained below. Canada would  
also seek Indigenous groups’ views on adverse impacts not yet addressed by  
Trans Mountain’s mitigation measures. The Crown would use the information  
provided by Indigenous groups to refine our current understanding of the  
potential impacts of the project on asserted or established Aboriginal or treaty  
rights.”  
ii.  
Phase III consultation would focus on two questions:  
a.  
Are there outstanding concerns with respect to Project-related impacts to  
potential or established Aboriginal or treaty rights?  
b.  
Are there incremental accommodation measures that should be considered  
by the Crown to address any outstanding concerns?  
iii.  
Information made available to the Crown throughout each phase of the  
consultation process would be consolidated into a Crown Consultation Report.  
“This report will summarize both the procedural aspects of consultations  
undertaken and substantive issues raised by Aboriginal groups, as well as how  
these issues may be addressed in the process”. The section of the Crown  
Consultation Report dealing with each Indigenous group would be provided to the  
group for review and comment before the report was placed before the Governor  
in Council.  
iv.  
If Indigenous groups identified outstanding concerns there were a number of  
options which might “be considered and potentially acted upon.” The options  
were described to be:  
The Governor in Council has the option of asking the [National  
Energy Board] to reconsider its recommendation and conditions.  
Federal and provincial governments could undertake additional  
consultations prior to issuing additional permits and/or  
authorizations. Finally, federal and provincial governments can  
also use existing or new policy and program measures to address  
outstanding concerns.  
(underlining added)  
Page: 31  
B.  
Prehearing matters and the Project application  
[76] To facilitate participation in the National Energy Board hearing process, the Board  
operates a participant funding program. On July 22, 2013, the Board announced that it was  
making funding available under this program to assist landowners, Indigenous groups and other  
interested parties to participate in the Board’s consideration of the Project. To apply for funding,  
a party required standing as an intervener in the Board’s process.  
[77] On July 29, 2013, the Board released its list of issueswhich identified the topics the  
Board would consider in its review of the Project. The following issues of relevance to these  
applications were included:  
the need for the proposed Project.  
the potential environmental and socio-economic effects of the proposed Project,  
including any cumulative environmental effects that were likely to result from the  
Project, including those the Board’s Filing Manual required to be considered.  
the potential environmental and socio-economic effects of marine shipping  
activities that would result from the proposed Project, including the potential  
effects of accidents or malfunctions that might occur.  
the terms and conditions to be included in any recommendation to approve the  
Project that the Board might issue.  
the potential impacts of the Project on Indigenous interests.  
contingency plans for spills, accidents or malfunctions, during construction and  
operation of the Project.  
[78] On September 10, 2013, the Board issued Filing Requirements Related to the Potential  
Environmental and Socio-Economic Effects of Increased Marine Shipping Activities.This was  
 
Page: 32  
a guidance document intended to assist the proponent. The document described requirements that  
supplemented those set out in the Boards Filing Manual.  
[79] In particular, this guidance document required Trans Mountain’s assessment of accidents  
and malfunctions to deal with a number of things, including measures to reduce the potential for  
accidents and malfunctions, credible worst case spill scenarios together with smaller spill  
scenarios and information on the fate and behaviour of any spilled hydrocarbons. For all  
mitigation measures Trans Mountain proposed, it was required to describe the roles,  
responsibilities and capabilities of each relevant organization in implementing mitigation  
measures, and the level of care and control Trans Mountain would have in overseeing or  
implementing the measures.  
[80] On December 16, 2013, Trans Mountain formally filed its application, seeking approval  
to construct and operate the Project.  
C.  
The scoping decision and the hearing order  
[81] On April 2, 2014, the Board issued a number of decisions setting the parameters of the  
Project’s environmental assessment and establishing the hearing process for the Project. Three of  
these decisions are of particular relevance to these applications.  
[82] First, the Board issued a hearing order which set out timelines and a process for the  
hearing. The hearing order did not allow any right of oral cross-examination. Instead, the hearing  
order provided a process whereby interveners and the Board could submit written interrogatories,  
 
Page: 33  
referred to as Information Requests, to Trans Mountain. The hearing order also set out a process  
for interveners and the Board to compel adequate responses to their Information Requests, an  
opportunity for Indigenous groups to provide oral traditional evidence, and allowed both written  
arguments in chief and summary oral arguments.  
[83] Next, in the decision referred to as the scopingdecision, the Board defined the  
“designated project” to be assessed, and described the factors to be assessed under the Canadian  
Environmental Assessment Act, 2012 (and the scope of each factor). In defining the “designated  
project”, the Board did not include marine shipping activities as part of the “designated project”.  
Rather, the Board stated that it would consider the effects of increased marine shipping under the  
National Energy Board Act. To the extent there was potential for environmental effects of the  
designated project to interact with the effects of the marine shipping, the Board would consider  
those effects under the cumulative effects portion of the Canadian Environmental Assessment  
Act, 2012 environmental assessment.  
[84] Finally, the Board ruled on participation rights in the hearing. The Board granted  
participation status to 400 interveners and 1,250 commentators. All of the applicants before the  
Court applied for, and were granted, intervener status. Additionally, a number of government  
departments were granted intervener status; both Health Canada and the Pacific Pilotage  
Authority were granted commentator status.  
Page: 34  
D.  
Challenges to the hearing order and the scoping decision  
[85] Of relevance to issues raised in these applications are two challenges brought against the  
hearing order and the scoping decision.  
[86] The first challenge requested that all evidence filed in the hearing be subject to oral cross-  
examination. The Board dismissed this request in Ruling No. 14. In Ruling No. 51, the Board  
dismissed motions seeking reconsideration of Ruling No. 14.  
[87] The second challenge was brought by Tsleil-Waututh to aspects of both the hearing order  
and the scoping decision. Tsleil-Waututh asserted, among other things, that the Board erred in  
law by failing to include marine shipping activities in the Project description. This Court granted  
Tsleil-Waututh leave to appeal this and other issues. On September 6, 2016, this Court dismissed  
the appeal (2016 FCA 219). The dismissal of the appeal was expressly stated, at paragraph 21 of  
the Court’s reasons, to be without prejudice to Tsleil-Waututh’s right to raise the issue of the  
proper scope of the Project in subsequent proceedings.  
E.  
The TERMPOL review process  
[88] In view of the Projects impact on marine shipping, it is useful to describe this process.  
[89] Trans Mountain requested that the marine transportation components of the Project be  
assessed under the voluntary Technical Review Process of Marine Terminal Systems and  
Transshipment Sites (TERMPOL). The review process was chaired by Transport Canada and the  
   
Page: 35  
review committee was composed of representatives of other federal agencies and Port Metro  
Vancouver.  
[90] The purpose of the review process was to objectively appraise operational vessel safety,  
route safety and cargo transfer operations associated with the Project, with a focus on improving,  
where possible, elements of the Project.  
[91] The review committee did not identify regulatory concerns for the tankers, tanker  
operations, the proposed route, navigability, other waterway users or the marine terminal  
operations associated with tankers supporting the Project. It found that Trans Mountain’s  
commitments to the existing marine safety regime would provide for a higher level of safety for  
tanker operations appropriate to the increase in traffic.  
[92] The review committee also proposed certain measures to provide for a high level of  
safety for tanker operations. Examples of such proposed measures were the extended use of  
tethered and untethered tug escorts and the extension of the pilot disembarkation zone. Trans  
Mountain agreed to adopt each of the recommended measures.  
[93] The TERMPOL report formed part of Transport Canada’s written evidence before the  
National Energy Board.  
F.  
The applicantsparticipation in the hearing before the Board  
[94] The applicants, as interveners before the Board, were entitled to:  
 
Page: 36  
issue Information Requests to Trans Mountain and others;  
file motions, including motions to compel adequate responses to Information  
Requests;  
file written evidence;  
comment on draft conditions; and,  
present written and oral summary argument.  
[95] All of the applicants issued Information Requests, filed or supported motions and filed  
written evidence. Interveners who filed evidence were required to respond in writing to written  
questions about their evidence from the Board, Trans Mountain or other interveners.  
[96] All of the applicants filed written submissions commenting on draft conditions except for  
the City of Vancouver and SSN.  
[97] All of the applicants filed written arguments and all of the applicants except SSN  
delivered oral summary arguments.  
[98] Indigenous interveners could adduce traditional Indigenous evidence, either orally or in  
writing. Oral evidence could be questioned orally by other interveners, Trans Mountain or the  
Board. Tsleil-Waututh, Squamish, Coldwater, SSN, and Upper Nicola provided oral, Indigenous  
traditional evidence. The Stó:lō Collective formally objected to the Board’s procedure for  
introducing Indigenous oral traditional evidence and did not provide such evidence.  
Page: 37  
G.  
Participant funding  
[99] As previously mentioned, the Board operated a participant funding program. Additional  
funding was available through the Major Projects Management Office and Trans Mountain.  
[100] It is fair to say that the participant funding provided to the applicants by the Board and  
the Major Projects Management Office was generally viewed to be inadequate by them (see for  
example the affidavit of Chief Ian Campbell of the Squamish Nation). Concerns were also  
expressed about delays in funding. Funds provided by the Board could only be applied to work  
conducted after the funding was approved and a funding agreement was executed.  
[101] The following funds were paid or offered.  
1.  
Tsleil-Waututh Nation  
[102] Tsleil-Waututh requested $766,047 in participant funding. It was awarded $40,000, plus  
travel costs for two members to attend the hearing. Additionally, the Major Projects Management  
Office offered to pay $14,000 for consultation following the close of the hearing record and  
$12,000 following the release of the Board’s report. These offers were not accepted.  
2.  
The Squamish Nation  
[103] Squamish applied for $293,350 in participant funding. It was awarded $44,720, plus  
travel costs for one person to attend the hearing. The Major Projects Management Office offered  
     
Page: 38  
$12,000 for consultations following the close of the Board’s hearing record, and $14,000 to  
support participation in consultations following the release of the Board’s report. These funds  
were paid.  
3.  
Coldwater Indian Band  
[104] Coldwater was awarded $48,490 in participant funding from the Board. Additionally, the  
Major Projects Management Office offered an additional $52,000 in participant funding.  
4.  
The Stó:lō Collective  
[105] The Stó:lō Collective was awarded $42,307 per First Nation band in participant funding  
from the Board. Additionally, the Major Projects Management Office offered $4,615.38 per First  
Nation band for consultation following the close of the Board’s hearing record, and $5,384.61  
per First Nation band following the release of the Board’s report.  
5.  
Upper Nicola Band  
[106] Upper Nicola was awarded $40,000 plus travel costs for two members to attend the  
hearing and an additional $10,000 in special funding through the Board’s participant funding  
program. Additionally, the Major Projects Management Office offered Upper Nicola Band and  
the Okanagan Nation Alliance $11,977 and $24,000 respectively in participant funding for  
consultations following the close of the Board’s hearing record. The Okanagan Nation Alliance  
was offered an additional $26,000 following the release of the Board’s report.  
     
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6.  
SSN  
[107] SSN applied for participant funding in excess of $300,000 in order to participate in the  
Board’s hearing. It was awarded $36,920 plus travel costs for two members to attend the hearing.  
Additionally, the Major Projects Management Office offered $18,000 in participation funding for  
consultations following the close of the Board’s hearing record and $21,000 for consultations  
following the release of the Board’s report.  
7.  
Raincoast Conservation Foundation and Living Oceans Society  
[108] Raincoast was awarded $111,100 plus travel costs for two people to attend the hearing  
from the Board’s participant funding program. Living Oceans was awarded $89,100 plus travel  
costs for two persons to attend the hearing through the participant funding program.  
H.  
Crown consultation effortsa brief summary  
1.  
Phase I (from 2013 to April 2014)  
[109] In this initial engagement phase some correspondence was exchanged between the Crown  
and some of the Indigenous applicants. Canada does not suggest that any of this correspondence  
contained any discussion about any substantive matter.  
2.  
Phase II (from April 2014 to February 2016)  
[110] During the Board’s hearing process and continuing until the close of its hearing record,  
Canada continued to exchange correspondence with some of the Indigenous applicants.  
         
Page: 40  
Additionally, some informational meetings were held; however, these meetings did not allow for  
any substantive discussion about any group’s title, rights or interests, or the impact of the Project  
on the group’s title, rights or interests.  
[111] To illustrate, Crown representatives met with Squamish officials on September 11, 2015,  
and November 27, 2015. At these meetings Squamish raised a number of concerns, including its  
concerns that Squamish had not been involved in the design of the consultation process, that the  
consultation process was inadequate to assess impacts on Squamish rights and title and that  
inadequate funding was provided for participation in the Board’s hearing. Squamish also  
expressed confusion about the respective roles of the Board and Trans Mountain in consultations  
with Squamish.  
[112] Similarly, informational meetings were held with the Stó:lō Collective on July 18, 2014  
and December 3, 2015. Again, no substantive discussion took place about Stó:lō’s title, rights  
and interests or the impact of the Project thereon. The Stó:lō also expressed their concerns about  
the consultation process, including their concerns that the Board failed to compel Trans  
Mountain to respond adequately to Information Requests and the lack of specificity of the  
Board’s draft terms and conditions.  
[113] Informational hearings of this nature were also held with Upper Nicola and SSN in 2014.  
[114] It is fair to say that in Phase II Canada continued to rely upon the National Energy Board  
process to fulfil the Crown’s duty to consult. Canada’s efforts in Phase II were largely directed to  
Page: 41  
using the Information Request process to solicit concerns and potential mitigation measures from  
First Nations. Canada prepared tables to record potential Project impacts and concerns and to  
record and monitor whether those potential impacts and concerns were addressed in Trans  
Mountain’s commitments, the Board’s draft terms and conditions or other mitigation measures.  
3.  
Phase III (February to November 2016)  
[115] Crown representatives met with all of the Indigenous applicants in Phase III. Generally,  
the Indigenous applicants expressed dissatisfaction with the National Energy Board process and  
the Crowns reliance on that process. Individual concerns raised by individual Indigenous  
applicants will be discussed in the context of consideration of the adequacy of Canada’s  
consultation efforts.  
[116] Towards the latter part of Phase III, on August 16, 2016, the Major Projects Management  
Office and the British Columbia Environmental Assessment Office jointly sent a letter to  
Indigenous groups confirming that they were responsible for conducting consultation efforts for  
the Project, and that they were coordinating by participating in joint consultation meetings,  
sharing information and by preparing the draft Joint Federal/Provincial Consultation and  
Accommodation Report for the Trans Mountain Expansion Project” (Crown Consultation  
Report).  
[117] Canada summarized its consultation efforts in the Crown Consultation Report, which  
included appendices specific to individual Indigenous groups. Indigenous groups were generally  
provided with a first draft of the Crown Consultation Report, together with the appendix relevant  
 
Page: 42  
to that group, in August of 2016. Comments and corrections were to be provided in September  
2016. A second draft of the Crown Consultation Report, together with relevant appendices, was  
provided to Indigenous groups in November of 2016, with comments due by mid-November.  
I.  
Post National Energy Board report events  
1.  
The Interim Measures for Pipeline Reviews  
[118] On January 27, 2016, Canada introduced this initiative as part of a strategy to review  
Canadas environmental assessment processes. The Interim Measures set out five guiding  
principles to guide the approval of major pipeline projects:  
i.  
No proponent would be required to return to the beginning of the approval  
process. That is, no proponent would be required to begin the approval process  
afresh.  
ii.  
Decisions about pipeline approval would be based on science, traditional  
knowledge of Indigenous peoples and other relevant evidence.  
The views of the public and affected communities would be sought and  
considered.  
iii.  
iv.  
v.  
Indigenous peoples would be meaningfully consulted, and, where appropriate,  
accommodated.  
The direct and upstream greenhouse gas emissions linked to a project under  
review would be assessed.  
[119] Canada advised that it planned to apply the Interim Measures to the Project and that in  
order to do so it would: undertake deeper consultations with Indigenous peoples and provide  
funding to support participation in these deeper consultations; assess the upstream gas emissions  
associated with the Project and make this information public; and, appoint a ministerial  
   
Page: 43  
representative to engage local communities and Indigenous groups in order to obtain their views  
and report those views back to the responsible Minister.  
[120] The Minister of Natural Resources sought and obtained a four-month extension of time to  
permit implementation of the Interim Measures. The deadline for the Governor in Council to  
make its decision on Project approval was, therefore, on or before December 19, 2016.  
2.  
The Ministerial Panel  
[121] On May 17, 2016, the Minister announced he was striking a three-member independent  
Ministerial Panel that would engage local communities and Indigenous groups as contemplated  
in Canada’s implementation of the Interim Measures for the Project.  
[122] The Ministerial Panel held a series of public meetings in Alberta and British Columbia,  
received emails and received responses to an online questionnaire. The Ministerial Panel  
submitted its report to the Minister on November 1, 2016, in which it identified six high-level  
questionsthat “remain unanswered” that it commended to Canada for serious consideration.  
[123] The report of the Ministerial Panel expressly stated that the panel’s work was “not  
intended as part of the federal government’s concurrent commitment to direct consultation with  
First Nations” and that “full-scale consultation” was never the intent of the panel especially in  
the case of First Nations, where the responsibility for consultation fell elsewhere”. It follows that  
no further consideration of the Ministerial Panel is required in the context of consideration of the  
adequacy of Canada’s consultation efforts.  
 
Page: 44  
3.  
Greenhouse gas assessment  
[124] For completeness, I note that in November 2016, Environment Canada did publish an  
assessment estimating the upstream greenhouse gas emissions from the Project.  
IX.  
The issues to be determined  
[125] Broadly speaking, the applicants’ submissions require the Court to address the following  
questions.  
[126] First, is there merit in any of the preliminary issues raised by the parties?  
[127] Second, under the applicable legislative scheme, can the report of the National Energy  
Board be judicially reviewed?  
[128] Finally, should the decision of the Governor in Council be set aside? This in turn requires  
the Court to consider:  
i.  
What is the standard of review to be applied to the decision of the Governor in  
Council?  
ii.  
Did the Governor in Council err in determining whether the Board’s process of  
assembling, analyzing, assessing and studying the evidence before it was so  
deficient that the report submitted by it to the Governor in Council did not qualify  
as a “report” within the meaning of the National Energy Board Act? This will  
require the Court to consider:  
a.  
b.  
was the process adopted by the Board procedurally fair?  
did the Board err by failing to assess Project-related marine shipping  
under the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, 2012?  
   
Page: 45  
did the Board err in its treatment of the Species at Risk Act, S.C. 2002, c.  
c.  
d.  
e.  
29?  
did the Board impermissibly fail to decide certain issues before it  
recommended approval of the Project?  
did the Board impermissibly fail to consider alternatives to the Westridge  
Marine Terminal?  
iii.  
iv.  
Did the Governor in Council fail to comply with the statutory requirement to give  
reasons?  
Did the Governor in Council err by concluding that the Indigenous applicants  
were adequately consulted and, if necessary, accommodated?  
X.  
Consideration of the issues  
A.  
The preliminary issues  
[129] Before turning to the substantive issues raised in this application it is necessary to deal  
with three preliminary issues raised by the parties. They may be broadly characterized as  
follows.  
[130] First, as described above, a number of the applicants commenced applications  
challenging the report of the National Energy Board. Trans Mountain moves to strike on a  
preliminary basis the six applications for judicial review commenced in respect of the report of  
the National Energy Board on the ground that the report is not amenable to judicial review.  
[131] Second, the applicants ask that the two affidavits sworn on behalf of Trans Mountain by  
Robert Love, or portions thereof, be struck or given no weight on a number of grounds, including  
that Mr. Love had no personal knowledge of the bulk of the matters sworn to in his affidavits.  
   
Page: 46  
[132] Finally, the applicants object to the “Consultation Chronologies” found in Canada’s  
compendium.  
1.  
Trans Mountain’s motion to strike  
[133] In Gitxaala Nation v. Canada, 2016 FCA 187, [2016] 4 F.C.R. 418, at paragraph 125,  
this Court concluded that applications for judicial review do not lie against reports made  
pursuant to section 52 of the National Energy Board Act recommending whether a certificate of  
public convenience and necessity should issue for all or any portion of a pipeline. Accordingly,  
Trans Mountain seeks orders striking the six notices of application (listed above at paragraph 51)  
that challenge the Board’s report.  
[134] A comparison of the parties enumerated in paragraph 51 with those parties who challenge  
the decision of the Governor in Council (enumerated in paragraph 52) shows that all but one of  
the applicants who challenge the report of the National Energy Board also challenge the decision  
of the Governor in Council. For reasons not apparent on the record, the City of Vancouver  
elected to challenge only the report of the Board.  
[135] The City of Vancouver, supported by the City of Burnaby, Tsleil-Waututh, Raincoast and  
Living Oceans, responds to Trans Mountain by arguing that Gitxaala was wrongly decided on  
this point and that in any event, the applications should not be struck on a preliminary basis.  
[136] Those applicants who challenge both decisions are able to argue, and do argue, that in  
Gitxaala this Court determined that the decision of the Governor in Council cannot be  
 
Page: 47  
considered in isolation from the Board’s report; it is for the Governor in Council to determine  
whether the process followed by the Board in assembling, analyzing, assessing, and studying the  
evidence before it was so deficient that its report does not qualify as a “report” within the  
meaning of the National Energy Board Act.  
[137] Put another way, a statutory pre-condition for a valid Order in Council is a report from  
the Board prepared in accordance with all legislative requirements. The Governor in Council is  
therefore required to be satisfied that the report was prepared in accordance with the governing  
legislation. This makes practical sense as well because the Board’s report formed the factual  
basis for the decision of the Governor in Council.  
[138] It is in the context of these arguments that I turn to consider whether the applications  
should be struck on a preliminary basis.  
[139] The jurisprudence of this Court is uniformly to the effect that motions to strike  
applications for judicial review are to be resorted to sparingly: see, for example, Odynsky v.  
League for Human Rights of B’Nai Brith Canada, 2009 FCA 82, 387 N.R. 376, at paragraph 5,  
citing David Bull Laboratories (Canada) Inc. v. Pharmacia Inc., [1995] 1 F.C.R. 588, (1994),  
176 N.R. 48.  
[140] The rationale for this approach is that judicial review proceedings are designed to  
proceed with celerity; motions to strike carry the potential to unduly and unnecessarily delay the  
Page: 48  
expeditious determination of an application. Therefore justice is better served by allowing the  
Court to deal at one time with all of the issues raised by an application.  
[141] This rationale is particularly applicable in the present case where striking the applications  
would still leave intact the ability of all but one of the applicants to argue the asserted flaws in  
the Board’s report in the context of the Court’s review of the decision of the Governor in  
Council. Little utility would be achieved in deciding the motions when the arguments in support  
of them will be considered now, in the Court’s determination of the merits of the applications.  
[142] For this reason, in the exercise of my discretion I would dismiss Trans Mountain’s  
motion to strike the applications brought challenging the report of the National Energy Board. I  
deal with the merits of the argument that the report is not amenable to judicial review below at  
paragraph 170 and following.  
2.  
The applicantsmotion asking that the two affidavits of Robert Love, or  
portions thereof, be struck or given no weight  
[143] The applicants argue that the Love affidavits, or portions thereof, should be struck or  
given no weight on three grounds. First, the applicants argue that Mr. Love had no personal  
knowledge of the bulk of the matters sworn to in his affidavits so that his evidence should be  
disregarded as inadmissible hearsay. Second, the applicants argue that the affidavits contain  
irrelevant and impermissible evidence about Trans Mountain’s engagement and consultations  
with the Indigenous applicants. Finally, the applicants argue that the second affidavit  
impermissibly augments the evidence that was before the Board and the Governor in Council.  
 
Page: 49  
(a)  
The hearsay objection  
[144] In both impugned affidavits Mr. Love swore that “I have personal knowledge of the  
matters in this Affidavit, except where stated to be based on information and belief, in which  
case I believe the same to be true.” Notwithstanding this statement, on cross-examination, Mr.  
Love admitted that his first affidavit was based almost entirely on facts of which he had no  
personal knowledge and that his affidavit failed to disclose that he relied on information and  
belief to assert those facts. He largely relied on Trans Mountain’s lawyers to prepare the  
paragraphs of his affidavit of which he had no direct knowledge. The basis of his belief that his  
affidavit was truthful and accurate was his trust in other people. He frequently admitted that  
there were other Trans Mountain employees who had direct knowledge of the matters set out in  
his affidavit (cross-examination of Robert Love, June 19, 2017, by counsel for the City of  
Burnaby, page 14, line 17 to page 50, line 8).  
[145] Similarly, under cross-examination Mr. Love admitted that he had no personal  
knowledge of the contents of his second affidavit which dealt with Trans Mountain’s  
consultation with Squamish (cross-examination Robert Love, June 22, 2017, by counsel for  
Squamish, page 2, line 7 to page 11, line 4). When cross-examined by counsel for Coldwater,  
Mr. Love admitted that he was “largely” not involved with Trans Mountain’s engagement with  
Coldwater. Rather, “[i]t was the aboriginal engagement team who did the communications.”  
(cross-examination of Robert Love, June 22, 2017, by counsel for Coldwater, page 2, line 9 to  
page 2, line 21).  
 
Page: 50  
[146] Mr. Love is the Manager, Land and Rights-of-Way for Kinder Morgan Canada Inc., a  
company related to Trans Mountain. During his cross-examination by counsel for Squamish he  
described his role to be responsible for securing “all of the private land interest for the Trans  
Mountain Expansion Project and to obtain all utility crossings”. He was also responsible “for  
undertaking the land rights necessary to go through about 10 reserves that we have agreements  
with.” Later, on his cross-examination, he explained that prior to swearing his affidavit he “sat  
down with Regan Schlecker and went through most of the First Nation’s engagement and high-  
level [government] engagements that were happening here” because he had no direct  
involvement in those engagements. Regan Schlecker was Trans Mountain’s Aboriginal affairs  
manager.  
[147] On the basis of Mr. Love’s many admissions the applicants argue that Mr. Love’s  
evidence should be struck or given no weight.  
[148] Trans Mountain argues in response that the City of Burnaby failed to object to the Love  
affidavits on a timely basis. It also argues that on judicial review the parties can provide  
background explanations and summaries regarding the administrative proceeding below and that  
no applicant points to any important statements in the affidavits that were shown to be based on  
hearsay.  
[149] I begin by rejecting Trans Mountain’s argument that the arguments raised by Burnaby  
were raised too late and so should not be considered. While Burnaby may well not have raised its  
hearsay objection on a timely basis (see the order of the case management Judge issued on July  
Page: 51  
25, 2017), both the City of Vancouver and Squamish did object to the Love affidavits on a timely  
basis. Squamish adopts Burnaby’s objections (Squamish’s memorandum of fact and law,  
paragraph 133) and the City of Vancouver relies upon the cross-examination of Mr. Love  
conducted by counsel for Burnaby (Vancouver’s memorandum of fact and law, paragraph 109).  
On this basis, in my view, Burnaby’s arguments are properly before the Court.  
[150] With respect to Trans Mountain’s argument on the merits, I begin by noting that to the  
extent background statements and summaries are admissible on an application for judicial  
review, this admissibility is for the sole and limited purpose of orienting the reviewing Court. In  
any event and more importantly, affidavits must always fully and candidly disclose if an affiant  
is relying on information and belief and what portions of the affidavit are based on information  
and belief. In that event, the affiant must disclose both the sources of the information relied upon  
and the bases for the affiant’s belief in the truth of the information sworn to. This was not done  
in the present case.  
[151] Notwithstanding this failure, I do not see the need to strike portions of the Love  
affidavits. The affidavits are relevant for the purpose of orienting the Court. However, it is  
unsafe to rely on the contents of the Love affidavits for the purpose of establishing the truth of  
their contents unless Mr. Love had personal knowledge of a particular fact or matter. Because  
Mr. Love did not demonstrate any material, personal knowledge of Trans Mountain’s  
engagement with the Indigenous applicants, and because there is no explanation as to why an  
individual directly involved in that engagement could not have provided evidence, evidence of  
Page: 52  
Trans Mountain’s engagement must come from other sourcessuch as the consultation logs  
Trans Mountain placed in evidence before the Board.  
[152] As I have determined that it is unsafe except in limited circumstances to rely upon the  
contents of the Love affidavits to establish the truth of their contents, it is unnecessary for me to  
consider the applicants’ objection to the second affidavit on the ground that it impermissibly  
supplemented the consultation logs in evidence before the Board.  
(b)  
Relevance of evidence of Trans Mountain’s engagement with the  
Indigenous applicants  
[153] In answer to an Information Request issued by Squamish inquiring whether Canada  
delegated any procedural aspects of consultation to Trans Mountain, Canada responded:  
The Crown has not delegated the procedural aspects of its duty to consult to Trans  
Mountain. The Crown does rely on the [National Energy Board] review process to  
the extent possible to fulfill this duty, a process that requires the proponent to  
work with and potentially accommodate Aboriginal groups impacted by the  
project. The [National Energy Board] filing manual provides information to the  
proponent on the requirement to engage potentially affected Aboriginal groups.  
This does not constitute delegation of the duty to consult.  
(underlining added)  
[154] Based on this response, the Indigenous applicants argue that evidence of Trans  
Mountain’s engagement with them is irrelevant. It is necessary to consider this submission  
because it is an issue that transcends the Love affidavitsthere is other evidence of Trans  
Mountain’s engagement.  
 
Page: 53  
[155] I accept Trans Mountain’s submission that proper evidence of its engagement with the  
Indigenous applicants is relevant. I reach this conclusion for the following reasons.  
[156] First, the Indigenous applicants were informed by the Major Projects Management  
Office’s letter of August 12, 2013, that Canada would rely on the Board’s public hearing process  
“to the extent possible” to fulfil the Crown’s duty to consult. As Canada noted in its response to  
the Information Request, the Board’s hearing process required Trans Mountain to work with, and  
potentially accommodate, Indigenous groups impacted by the Project. Thus the Major Projects  
Management Office’s August 12 letter encouraged Indigenous groups with Project-related  
concerns to discuss those concerns directly with Trans Mountain. Unresolved concerns were to  
be directed to the National Energy Board. It follows from this that the Indigenous applicants  
were informed before the commencement of the Board’s hearing process that the Board and, in  
turn, Canada would rely in part on Trans Mountain’s engagement with them.  
[157] Thereafter, the Board required Trans Mountain “to make all reasonable efforts to consult  
with potentially affected Aboriginal groups and to provide information about those consultations  
to the Board.” The Board expressly required this information to include “evidence on the nature  
of the interests potentially affected, the concerns that were raised and the manner and degree to  
which those concerns have been addressed. Trans Mountain was expected to report to the Board  
on all Aboriginal concerns that were expressed to it, even if it was unable or unwilling to address  
those concerns”. (Report of the National Energy Board, page 46).  
Page: 54  
[158] Trans Mountain’s consultation was guided by the Board’s Filing Manual requirements  
and directions given by the Board during the Project Description phase.  
[159] This demonstrates that Trans Mountain’s consultation was central to the decision of the  
Board. Therefore, evidence of Trans Mountain’s efforts is relevant.  
[160] My second reason for finding proper evidence of Trans Mountain’s engagement to be  
relevant is that, consistent with Canada’s response to Squamish’s Information Request, a review  
of the Crown Consultation Report shows that in Section 3 Canada summarized “the procedural  
elements and chronology of Aboriginal consultations and engagement activities undertaken by  
the proponent, the [Board] and the Crown.” Elements of Trans Mountain’s engagement were  
summarized in the Crown Consultation Report, and therefore put before the Governor in Council  
so it could assess the adequacy of consultation. Elements that were summarized include Trans  
Mountain’s Aboriginal Engagement Program and the Mutual Benefit Agreements Trans  
Mountain entered into with Indigenous groups. Trans Mountain’s Aboriginal Engagement  
Program was noted to have provided approximately $12 million in capacity funding to  
potentially affected groups. As well, Trans Mountain provided funding to conduct traditional  
land and resource use and traditional marine resource use studies. As for the Mutual Benefit  
Agreements, as of November 2016, Canada was aware that 33 potentially affected Indigenous  
groups had signed such agreements with Trans Mountain. These included a letter of support for  
the Project.  
Page: 55  
[161] Canada’s reliance on Trans Mountain’s engagement also makes evidence about that  
engagement relevant.  
[162] Finally on this point, some Indigenous applicants assert that Trans Mountain’s  
engagement efforts were inadequate. Evidence of Trans Mountain’s engagement, including its  
provision of capacity funding, is relevant to this allegation and to the issue of the adequacy of  
available funding.  
3.  
Canada’s compendium—The Consultation Chronologies  
[163] In its compendium, Canada included schedules in the form of charts (referred to as  
“Consultation Chronologies”) which describe events said to have taken place. The Indigenous  
applicants assert that the schedules are interpretive, inaccurate, and incomplete and that they  
should not be received by the Court for two reasons.  
[164] First, the Indigenous applicants argue that the Consultation Chronologies summarize the  
facts as perceived by the Crown. As such, the material should have appeared in Canada’s  
affidavit and in its memorandum of fact and law. It is argued that Canada should not be  
permitted to circumvent page length restrictions on the length of its memorandum by creating  
additional resources in its compendium.  
[165] Second, the Indigenous applicants argue that the Consultation Chronologies are not  
evidence. Instead, the summaries are newly created documents that were not before the Board or  
 
Page: 56  
the Governor in Council. Their admission is also argued to be prejudicial to the Indigenous  
applicants.  
[166] Canada responds that, as the case management Judge noted in his direction of September  
7, 2017, “parties often include material in their compendia as an aid to argument. As long as the  
aid to argument is brief and helpful and is not anything resembling a memorandum of fact and  
law and as long as the aid to argument presents or is based entirely upon facts and data from the  
evidentiary record without adding to it, hearing panels of this Court usually permit it. Of course,  
there is a limit to this.”  
[167] I agree with the Indigenous applicants that the Consultation Chronologies must be  
approached with caution. For example, the Consultation Chronology in respect of the Coldwater  
Indian Band recites that on May 3, 2016, Canada emailed Coldwater a letter dated November 3,  
2015 sent in response to Coldwater’s letter of August 20, 2015. The Consultation Chronology  
also recites that the letter contained an offer to meet with Coldwater to discuss the consultation  
process and Project-related issues. However, Coldwater points to the sworn evidence of its Chief  
Councillor to the effect that the November 3, 2015 letter did not actually address the concerns  
detailed in Coldwater’s letter of August 20, 2015, and that the meeting was never arranged  
because the November 3, 2015 letter was not provided to Coldwater until May 3, 2016.  
[168] Thus, I well understand the concern of the Indigenous applicants. This said, this Courts  
understanding of the evidence is not based upon a summary in chart form which briefly  
summarizes the consultation process. The Court will base its decision upon the evidentiary  
Page: 57  
record properly before it, which includes the record before the Board and the Governor in  
Council, the affidavits sworn in this proceeding, the cross-examinations thereon, the statement of  
agreed facts, and the contents of the agreed book of documents. The sole permissible use of the  
Consultation Chronologies is as a form of table of contents or finding aid that directs a reader to  
a particular document in the record. On the basis of this explanation of the limited permissible  
use of the Consultation Chronologies there is no need to strike them, a point conceded by  
counsel for Coldwater and Squamish in oral argument.  
[169] For completeness, I note that Upper Nicola moved on a preliminary basis to strike  
portions of the second Love affidavit on the ground that the affidavit impermissibly recited  
confidential information. That motion is the subject of brief, confidential reasons issued  
contemporaneously with these reasons. After the parties to the motion have the opportunity to  
make submissions, a public version of the confidential reasons will issue.  
B.  
Is the report of the National Energy Board amenable to judicial review?  
[170] While I would dismiss Trans Mountains motion to strike the application on a  
preliminary basis, because some applicants do challenge the report of the National Energy Board  
it is necessary to decide whether judicial review lies, notwithstanding this Court’s conclusion to  
the contrary in Gitxaala.  
[171] The applicants who argue that, contrary to Gitxaala, the Board’s report is amenable to  
judicial review acknowledge the jurisprudence of this Court to the effect that the test applied for  
overruling a decision of another panel of this Court is whether the previous decision is  
 
Page: 58  
manifestly wrongin the narrow sense that the Court overlooked a relevant statutory provision,  
or a case that ought to have been followed: see, for example, Miller v. Canada (Attorney  
General), 2002 FCA 370, 220 D.L.R. (4th) 149, at paragraph 10. The applicants argue that  
Gitxaala was manifestly wrong in deciding that the Board’s report was not justiciable. The  
specific errors asserted are:  
a.  
Gitxaala was manifestly wrong in holding that only decisions about legal or  
practical interests are judicially reviewable”. The Court did not address case law  
that has interpreted subsection 18.1(1) of the Federal Courts Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.  
F-7 more broadly.  
b.  
c.  
The Court failed to deal with the prior decision of this Court in Forestethics  
Advocacy v. Canada (Attorney General), 2014 FCA 71, 390 D.L.R. (4th) 376.  
The Court failed to deal with prior jurisprudence of the Federal Court and this  
Court which did review environmental assessment reports prepared by a joint  
review panel.  
d.  
e.  
The Court referred to provisions of the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act,  
2012 that were inapplicable.  
The Gitxaala decision impermissibly thwarts the right to seek judicial review of  
the decision of the National Energy Board.  
[172] I will deal with each argument in turn after first reviewing this Court’s analysis in  
Gitxaala.  
1.  
The decision of this Court in Gitxaala  
[173] The Court’s consideration of the justiciability of the report of the Joint Review Panel  
began with its detailed analysis of the legislative scheme (reasons, paragraphs 99 to 118). The  
Court then turned to consider the proper characterization of the legislative scheme, which the  
 
Page: 59  
Court described to be a complete code for decision-making regarding certificate applications.”  
The Court then reasoned:  
[120] The legislative scheme shows that for the purposes of review the only  
meaningful decision-maker is the Governor in Council.  
[121] Before the Governor in Council decides, others assemble information,  
analyze, assess and study it, and prepare a report that makes recommendations for  
the Governor in Council to review and decide upon. In this scheme, no one but  
the Governor in Council decides anything.  
[122] In particular, the environmental assessment under the Canadian  
Environmental Assessment Act, 2012 plays no role other than assisting in the  
development of recommendations submitted to the Governor in Council so it can  
consider the content of any decision statement and whether, overall, it should  
direct that a certificate approving the project be issued.  
[123] This is a different rolea much attenuated rolefrom the role played by  
environmental assessments under other federal decision-making regimes. It is not  
for us to opine on the appropriateness of the policy expressed and implemented in  
this legislative scheme. Rather, we are to read legislation as it is written.  
[124] Under this legislative scheme, the Governor in Council alone is to  
determine whether the process of assembling, analyzing, assessing and studying is  
so deficient that the report submitted does not qualify as a “report” within the  
meaning of the legislation:  
In the case of the report or portion of the report setting out  
the environmental assessment, subsection 29(3) of the  
Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, 2012 provides  
that it is “final and conclusive,” but this is “[s]ubject to  
sections 30 and 31.” Sections 30 and 31 provide for review  
of the report by the Governor in Council and, if the  
Governor in Council so directs, reconsideration and  
submission of a reconsideration report by the Governor in  
Council.  
In the case of the report under section 52 of the National  
Energy Board Act, subsection 52(11) of the National  
Energy Board Act provides that it too is “final and  
conclusive,” but this is “[s]ubject to sections 53 and 54.”  
These sections empower the Governor in Council to  
consider the report and decide what to do with it.  
[125] In the matter before us, several parties brought applications for judicial  
review against the Report of the Joint Review Panel. Within this legislative  
Page: 60  
scheme, those applications for judicial review did not lie. No decisions about legal  
or practical interests had been made. Under this legislative scheme, as set out  
above, any deficiency in the Report of the Joint Review Panel was to be  
considered only by the Governor in Council, not this Court. It follows that these  
applications for judicial review should be dismissed.  
[126] Under this legislative scheme, the National Energy Board also does not  
really decide anything, except in a formal sense. After the Governor in Council  
decides that a proposed project should be approved, it directs the National Energy  
Board to issue a certificate, with or without a decision statement. The National  
Energy Board does not have an independent discretion to exercise or an  
independent decision to make after the Governor in Council has decided the  
matter. It simply does what the Governor in Council has directed in its Order in  
Council.  
(underlining added)  
[174] Having reviewed Gitxaala, I now turn to the asserted errors.  
2.  
Was Gitxaala wrongly decided on this point?  
(a)  
Did the Court err by stating that only decisions about legal or  
practical interests” are judicially reviewable?  
[175] Subsection 18.1(1) of the Federal Courts Act provides that an application for judicial  
review may be made by anyone directly affected by the matter in respect of which relief is  
sought” (underlining added). In Air Canada v. Toronto Port Authority, 2011 FCA 347, [2013] 3  
F.C.R. 605, this Court considered the scope of subsection 18.1(1) as follows:  
[24] Subsection 18.1(1) of the Federal Courts Act provides that an application  
for judicial review may be made by the Attorney General of Canada or by anyone  
directly affected by “the matter in respect of which relief is sought.” A “matter”  
that can be subject of judicial review includes not only a “decision or order,” but  
any matter in respect of which a remedy may be available under section 18 of the  
Federal Courts Act: Krause v. Canada, [1999] 2 F.C. 476 (C.A.). Subsection  
18.1(3) sheds further light on this, referring to relief for an “act or thing,” a  
failure, refusal or delay to do an “act or thing,” a “decision,” an “order” and a  
“proceeding.” Finally, the rules that govern applications for judicial review apply  
   
Page: 61  
to “applications for judicial review of administrative action,” not just applications  
for judicial review of “decisions or orders”: Rule 300 of the Federal Courts Rules.  
[28] The jurisprudence recognizes many situations where, by its nature or  
substance, an administrative body’s conduct does not trigger rights to bring a  
judicial review.  
[29] One such situation is where the conduct attacked in an application for  
judicial review fails to affect legal rights, impose legal obligations, or cause  
prejudicial effects: Irving Shipbuilding Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), 2009  
FCA 116, [2010] 2 F.C.R. 488; Democracy Watch v. Conflict of Interest and  
Ethics Commission, 2009 FCA 15, (2009), 86 Admin. L.R. (4th) 149.  
(underlining added)  
[176] To similar effect, in Democracy Watch v. Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner,  
2009 FCA 15, 387 N.R. 365, the Court wrote, at paragraph 10, that when administrative action  
does not affect an applicants rights or carry legal consequences, it is not amenable to judicial  
review”.  
[177] On the basis of these authorities the City of Vancouver, supported by the City of Burnaby  
and Raincoast and Living Oceans, argues that this Court erred by writing in paragraph 125 in  
Gitxaala that only decisions about legal or practical interestsare reviewable. The Court is said  
to have overlooked the established jurisprudence to the effect that “matter” as used in subsection  
18.1(1) denotes a broader category than merely decisions.  
[178] In my view, when the Courts analysis in Gitxaala is read in its entirety no such  
statement was made and no such error was made.  
Page: 62  
[179] In Gitxaala, the Court found that the only action to carry legal consequences was the  
decision of the Governor in Council. The environmental assessment conducted by the Joint  
Review Panel under the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, 2012 did not affect legal  
rights or carry legal consequences. Instead, the assessment played no role other than assisting in  
the development of recommendations submitted to the Governor in Council” (reasons, paragraph  
122). The same could be said of the balance of the report prepared pursuant to the requirements  
of the National Energy Board Act.  
[180] Put another way, on the basis of the legislative scheme enacted by Parliament, the report  
of the Joint Review Panel constituted a set of recommendations to the Governor in Council that  
lacked any independent legal or practical effect. It followed that judicial review did not lie from  
it.  
[181] Both the determination about the effect of the report of the Joint Review Panel and the  
conclusion that it was not justiciable were wholly consistent with Air Canada and Democracy  
Watch. It was therefore unnecessary for the Court to expressly deal with these decisions, or with  
subsection 18.1(1).  
[182] To complete this analysis, I note that the City of Vancouver also argues that it was  
prejudiced because the report of the National Energy Board did not comply with section 19 of  
the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, 2012 and because the Board’s process was unfair.  
However, any detrimental effects upon the City of Vancouver could have been remedied through  
a challenge to the decision of the Governor in Council; the City has not asserted that it suffered  
Page: 63  
any prejudice in the interval between the issuance of the Boards report and the issuance of the  
Order in Council by the Governor in Council.  
(b)  
Forestethics Advocacy v. Canada (Attorney General)  
[183] In this decision, a single Judge of this Court decided whether this Court or the Federal  
Court had jurisdiction to entertain applications for judicial review brought in respect of the  
Report of the Joint Review Panel for the Enbridge Northern Gateway Project. Justice Sharlow  
found jurisdiction to lie in this Court. The City of Vancouver argues that implicit in this decision  
is the conclusion the reports prepared by joint review panels under the Canadian Environmental  
Assessment Act, 2012 are judicially reviewable.  
[184] I respectfully disagree. At issue in Forestethics was the proper interpretation of section  
28 of the Federal Courts Act. The Court made no finding about whether the report is amenable to  
judicial reviewits only finding was that the propriety of the report (which would include  
whether it was amenable to judicial review) was a matter for this Court, not the Federal Court.  
(c)  
The jurisprudence which reviewed environmental assessment  
reports  
[185] The City of Vancouver also points to jurisprudence in which environmental assessment  
reports prepared by joint review panels were judicially reviewed, and argues that this Court erred  
by failing to deal with this jurisprudence. The authorities relied upon by Vancouver are: Alberta  
Wilderness Assn. v. Cardinal River Coals Ltd., [1999] 3 F.C. 425, 15 Admin. L.R. (3d) 25,  
(F.C.); Friends of the West Country Assn. v. Canada (Minister of Fisheries and Oceans), [2000]  
   
Page: 64  
2 F.C.R. 263, (1999), 169 F.T.R. 298 (C.A.); Pembina Institute for Appropriate Development v.  
Canada (Attorney General), 2008 FC 302, 80 Admin. L.R. (4th) 74; Grand Riverkeeper,  
Labrador Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), 2012 FC 1520, 422 F.T.R. 299; and, Greenpeace  
Canada v. Canada (Attorney General), 2014 FC 463, 455 F.T.R. 1, rev’d on appeal, 2015 FCA  
186, 475 N.R. 247.  
[186] All of these authorities predate Gitxaala. They do not deal with the “complete code” of  
legislation that was before the Court in Gitxaala. But, more importantly, in none of these  
decisions was the availability of judicial review put in issuethis availability was assumed. In  
Gitxaala the Court reviewed the legislative scheme and explained why the report of the Joint  
Review Panel was not justiciable. The Court did not err by failing to refer to case law that had  
not considered this issue.  
(d)  
The reference to inapplicable provisions of the Canadian  
Environmental Assessment Act, 2012  
[187] The City of Vancouver also argues that Gitxaala is distinguishable because it dealt with  
section 38 of the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, 2012, a provision that has no  
application to the process at issue here. The City also notes that Gitxaala, at paragraph 124,  
referred to sections 30 and 31 of the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, 2012. These  
sections are said not to apply to the Joint Review Panel at issue in Gitxaala.  
[188] I accept that pursuant to subsection 126(1) of the Canadian Environmental Assessment  
Act, 2012 the environmental assessment of the Northern Gateway project (at issue in Gitxaala)  
 
Page: 65  
was continued under the process established under the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act,  
2012. Subsection 126(1) specified that such continuation was to be as if the assessment had been  
referred to a review panel under section 38 of the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act,  
2012, and that the Joint Review Panel which continued the environmental assessment was  
considered to have been established under section 40 of the Canadian Environmental Assessment  
Act, 2012.  
[189] It followed that sections 29 through 31 of the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act,  
2012 did not apply to the Northern Gateway project, and ought not to have been referenced by  
the Court in Gitxaala in its analysis of the legislative scheme.  
[190] This said, the question that arises is whether these references were material to the Court’s  
analysis. To assess the materiality, if any, of this error I begin by reviewing the content of the  
provisions said to be erroneously referred to in Gitxaala.  
[191] Section 29 of the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, 2012, discussed above at  
paragraph 62, requires a responsible authority to ensure that its environmental assessment report  
sets out its recommendation to the Governor in Council concerning the decision the Governor in  
Council must make under paragraph 31(1)(a) of the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act,  
2012. Section 30 allows the Governor in Council to refer any recommendation made by a  
responsible authority back to the responsible authority for reconsideration. Section 31 sets out  
the options available to the Governor in Council after it receives a report from a responsible  
authority. Paragraph 31(1)(a), discussed at paragraph 67 above, sets out the three choices  
Page: 66  
available to the Governor in Council with respect to its assessment of the likelihood that a project  
will cause significant adverse environmental effects and, if so, whether such effects can be  
justified.  
[192] These provisions, without doubt, do apply to the Project at issue in these proceedings.  
Therefore, the Project is to be assessed under the legislative scheme analyzed in Gitxaala. It  
follows that Gitxaala cannot be meaningfully distinguished.  
[193] As to the effect, if any, of the erroneous references in Gitxaala, the statutory framework  
applicable to the Northern Gateway project originated in three sources: the National Energy  
Board Act; the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, 2012; and, transitional provisions  
found in section 104 of the Jobs, Growth and Long-Term Prosperity Act, S.C. 2012, c.19 (Jobs  
Act).  
[194] Provisions relevant to the present analysis are:  
subsection 104(3) of the Jobs Act which required the Joint Review Panel to set  
out in its report an environmental assessment prepared under the Canadian  
Environmental Assessment Act, 2012;  
subsection 126(1) of the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, 2012 which  
continued the environmental assessment under the process established under that  
Act; and,  
paragraph 104(4)(a) of the Jobs Act which made the Governor in Council the  
decision-maker under section 52 of the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act,  
2012 (thus, it was for the Governor in Council to determine if the Project was  
likely to cause significant adverse environmental effects and, if so, whether such  
effects could be justified).  
Page: 67  
[195] These provisions are to the same effect as sections 29 and 31 of the Canadian  
Environmental Assessment Act, 2012. I dismiss the relevance of section 30 to this analysis  
because it had no application to the environmental assessment under review in Gitxaala. Further,  
and more importantly, section 30 played no significant role in the Court’s analysis.  
[196] It follows that the analysis in Gitxaala was based upon a proper understanding of the  
legislative scheme, notwithstanding the Courts reference to sections 29 and 31 of the Canadian  
Environmental Assessment Act, 2012 instead of the applicable provisions.  
[197] Put another way, the error was in no way material to the Courts analysis of the  
respective roles of the Joint Review Panel, which prepared the report to the Governor in Council,  
and the Governor in Council, which received the panel’s recommendations and made the  
decisions required under the legislative scheme.  
[198] Indeed, the technical nature of the erroneous references was acknowledged by Raincoast  
in its application for leave to appeal the Gitxaala decision to the Supreme Court of Canada. At  
paragraph 49 of its memorandum of argument it described the Court’s error to be “technical in  
nature” (Trans Mountain’s Compendium, volume 2, tab 35). To the same effect, Vancouver does  
not argue that the Courts error was material to its analysis. Vancouver simply notes the error in  
footnote 118 of its memorandum of fact and law.  
[199] Accordingly, I see no error in the Gitxaala decision that merits departing from its  
analysis.  
Page: 68  
(e)  
Gitxaala thwarts review of the decision of the National Energy  
Board  
[200] Finally, Vancouver argues that subsection 54(1) of the National Energy Board Act and  
31(1) of the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, 2012 both make the Board’s report a  
prerequisite to the decision of the Governor in Council. As the Governor in Council is not an  
adjudicative body, meaningful review must come in the form of judicial review of the report of  
the Board. The decision in Gitxaala thwarts such review.  
[201] I respectfully disagree. As this Court noted in Gitxaala at paragraph 125, the Governor in  
Council is required to consider any deficiency in the report submitted to it. The decision of the  
Governor in Council is then subject to review by this Court under section 55 of the National  
Energy Board Act. The Court must be satisfied that the decision of the Governor in Council is  
lawful, reasonable and constitutionally valid. If the decision of the Governor in Council is based  
upon a materially flawed report the decision may be set aside on that basis. Put another way,  
under the legislation the Governor in Council can act only if it has a “report” before it; a  
materially deficient report, such as one that falls short of legislative standards, is not such a  
report. In this context the Board’s report may be reviewed to ensure that it was a “report” that the  
Governor in Council could rely upon. The report is not immune from review by this Court and  
the Supreme Court.  
 
Page: 69  
(f)  
Conclusion on whether the report of the National Energy Board is  
amenable to judicial review  
[202] For these reasons, I have concluded that the report of the National Energy Board is not  
justiciable. It follows that I would dismiss the six applications for judicial review which  
challenge that report. In the circumstance where the arguments about justiciability played a small  
part in the hearing I would not award costs in respect of these six applications.  
[203] As the City of Vancouver did not seek and obtain leave to challenge the Order in  
Council, it follows that the City is precluded from challenging the Order in Council.  
C.  
Should the decision of the Governor in Council be set aside on administrative law  
grounds?  
1.  
The standard of review to be applied to the decision of the Governor in  
Council  
[204] In Gitxaala, when considering the standard of review to be applied to the decision of the  
Governor in Council, the Court wrote that it was not legally permissible to adopt a “one-size-fits-  
all” approach to any particular administrative decision-maker. Rather, the standard of review  
must be assessed in light of the relevant legislative provisions, the structure of the legislation and  
the overall purpose of the legislation (Gitxaala, paragraph 137).  
[205] I agree. Particularly in the present case it is necessary to draw a distinction between the  
standard of review applied to what I will refer to as the administrative law components of the  
Governor in Council’s decision and that applied to the constitutional component which required  
     
Page: 70  
the Governor in Council to consider the adequacy of the process of consultation and, if  
necessary, accommodation. This is an approach accepted and urged by the parties.  
(a)  
The administrative law components of the decision  
[206] In Gitxaala, the Court conducted a lengthy standard of review analysis (Gitxaala,  
paragraphs 128-155) and concluded that, because the Governor in Council’s decision was a  
discretionary decision founded on the widest considerations of policy and public interest, the  
standard of review was reasonableness (Gitxaala, paragraph 145).  
[207] Canada, Trans Mountain and the Attorney General of Alberta submit that Gitxaala was  
correctly decided on this point.  
[208] Tsleil-Waututh, Raincoast and Living Oceans submit that the governing authority is not  
Gitxaala, but rather is the earlier decision of this Court in Council of the Innu of Ekuanitshit v.  
Canada (Attorney General), 2014 FCA 189, 376 D.L.R. (4th) 348. In this case the Court found  
the reasonableness standard of review applied to a decision of the Governor in Council  
approving the federal government’s response to a report of a joint review panel prepared under  
the now repealed Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, S.C. 1992, c. 37 (Canadian  
Environmental Assessment Act, 1992). The Court rejected the submission that the correctness  
standard applied to the question of whether the Governor in Council and the responsible  
authorities had respected the requirements of the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, 1992  
before making their decisions under subsections 37(1) and 37(1.1) of that Act. Under these  
provisions the Governor in Council and the responsible authorities were required to review the  
 
Page: 71  
report of the joint review panel and determine whether the project at issue was justified despite  
its adverse environmental effects.  
[209] This said, while deference was owed to decisions made pursuant to subsections 37(1) and  
37(1.1), the Court wrote that “a reviewing court must ensure that the exercise of power delegated  
by Parliament remains within the bounds established by the statutory scheme.” (Innu of  
Ekuanitshit, paragraph 44).  
[210] To the submission that Innu of Ekuanitshit is the governing authority, Tsleil-Waututh  
adds two additional points: first and, in any event, the “margin of appreciation” approach  
followed in Gitxaala is no longer good law; and, second, issues of procedural fairness are to be  
reviewed on the standard of correctness. Tsleil-Waututh’s additional submissions are adopted by  
the City of Burnaby.  
[211] I see no inconsistency between the Innu of Ekuanitshit and Gitxaala for the following  
reasons.  
[212] First, the Court in Gitxaala acknowledged that it was bound by Innu of Ekuanitshit.  
However, because of the very different legislative scheme at issue in Gitxaala, the earlier  
decision did not satisfactorily determine the standard of review to be applied to the decision of  
the Governor in Council at issue in Gitxaala (Gitxaala, paragraph 136). This Court did not doubt  
the correctness of Innu of Ekuanitshit or purport to overturn it.  
Page: 72  
[213] Second, in each case the Court determined the standard of review to be applied to the  
decision of the Governor in Council was reasonableness. It was within the reasonableness  
standard that the Court found in Innu of Ekuanitshit that the Governor in Council’s decision must  
still be made within the bounds of the statutory scheme.  
[214] Third, and finally, the conclusion in Innu of Ekuanitshit that a reviewing court must  
ensure that the Governor in Council’s decision was exercised “within the bounds established by  
the statutory scheme” (Innu of Ekuanitshit, paragraph 44) is consistent with the requirement in  
Gitxaala that the Governor in Council must determine and be satisfied that the Board’s process  
and assessment complied with the legislative requirements, so that the Board’s report qualified as  
a proper prerequisite to the decision of the Governor in Council. Then, it is for this Court to be  
satisfied that the decision of the Governor in Council was lawful, reasonable and constitutionally  
valid. To be lawful and reasonable the Governor in Council must comply with the purview and  
rationale of the legislative scheme.  
[215] Reasonableness review requires a court to assess whether the decision under review falls  
within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible on the facts and the law  
(Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190, at paragraph 47).  
[216] Reasonableness review is a contextual inquiry. Reasonableness “takes its colour from the  
context” (Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Khosa, 2009 SCC 12, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 339, at  
paragraph 59; Canada (Attorney General) v. Igloo Vikski Inc., 2016 SCC 38, [2016] 2 S.C.R. 80,  
at paragraph 57); in every case the fundamental question “is the scope of decision-making power  
Page: 73  
conferred on the decision-maker by the governing legislation.” (Catalyst Paper Corp. v. North  
Cowichan (District), 2012 SCC 2, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 5, at paragraph 18).  
[217] Thus, when a court reviews a decision made in the exercise of a statutory power,  
reasonableness review requires the decision to have been made in accordance with the terms of  
the statute: see, for example, Globalive Wireless Management Corp. v. Public Mobile Inc., 2011  
FCA 194, [2011] 3 F.C.R. 344, at paragraphs 29-30. Put another way, an administrative  
decision-maker is constrained in the outcomes it may reach by the statutory wording (Canada  
(Attorney General) v. Almon Equipment Limited, 2010 FCA 193, [2011] 4 F.C.R. 203, at  
paragraph 21).  
[218] The Supreme Court recently considered this in the context of a review of a decision of the  
Specific Claims Tribunal. The Tribunal is required by its governing legislation to adjudicate  
specific claims “in accordance with law and in a just and timely manner.” The majority of the  
Court observed that the Tribunal’s mandate expressly tethered “the scope of its decision-making  
power to the applicable legal principles.” and went on to note that the “range of reasonable  
outcomes available to the Tribunal is therefore constrained by these principles” (Williams Lake  
Indian Band v. Canada (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development), 2018 SCC 4, 417  
D.L.R. (4th) 239, at paragraphs 33-34).  
[219] With respect to Tsleil-Wauthuth’s two additional points, I believe the first point was  
addressed above. Reasonableness “takes its colour from the context.” To illustrate,  
reasonableness review of a policy decision affecting many entities is of a different nature than  
Page: 74  
reasonableness review of, say, a decision on the credibility of evidence before an adjudication  
tribunal.  
[220] The second point raises the question of the standard of review to be applied to questions  
of procedural fairness.  
[221] As this Court noted in Bergeron v. Canada (Attorney General), 2015 FCA 160, 474 N.R.  
366, at paragraph 67, the standard of review for questions of procedural fairness is currently  
unsettled.  
[222] As Trans Mountain submits, in cases such as Forest Ethics Advocacy Association v.  
Canada (National Energy Board), 2014 FCA 245, [2015] 4 F.C.R. 75, at paragraphs 70-72, this  
Court has applied the standard of correctness with some deference to the decision-maker’s  
choice of procedure (see also Mission Institution v. Khela, 2014 SCC 24, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 502, at  
paragraphs 79 and 89).  
[223] This said, in my view it is not necessary to resolve any inconsistency in the jurisprudence  
because, as will be explained below, even on a correctness review I find there is no basis to set  
aside the Order in Council on the basis of procedural fairness concerns.  
(b)  
The constitutional component  
[224] As explained above, a distinction exists between the standard of review applied to the  
administrative law components of the Governor in Council’s decision and the standard applied to  
 
Page: 75  
the component which required the Governor in Council to consider the adequacy of the process  
of consultation with Indigenous peoples, and if necessary, accommodation.  
[225] Citing Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests), 2004 SCC 73, [2004] 3  
S.C.R. 511, at paragraphs 61-63, the parties agree that the existence and extent of the duty to  
consult are legal questions reviewable on the standard of correctness. The adequacy of the  
consultation is a question of mixed fact and law which is reviewable on the standard of  
reasonableness. I agree.  
[226] Reasonableness review does not require perfect satisfaction (Gitxaala, paragraphs 182-  
183 and the cases cited therein). The question to be answered is whether the government action  
“viewed as a whole, accommodates the collective aboriginal right in question”. Thus, “[s]o long  
as every reasonable effort is made to inform and to consult, such efforts would suffice.” (Haida  
Nation, paragraph 62, citing R. v. Gladstone, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 723 and R. v. Nikal, [1996] 1  
S.C.R. 1013). The focus of the analysis should not be on the outcome, but rather on the process  
of consultation and accommodation (Haida Nation, paragraph 63).  
[227] Having set out the governing standards of review, I next consider the various flaws that  
are said to vitiate the decision of the Governor in Council.  
Page: 76  
Did the Governor in Council err in determining that the Board’s report  
2.  
qualified as a report so as to be a proper condition precedent to the  
Governor in Council’s decision?  
[228] The Board’s errors said to vitiate the decision of the Governor in Council were briefly  
summarized above at paragraph 128. For ease of reference I reorganize and repeat that the  
applicants variously assert that the Board erred by:  
a.  
b.  
c.  
d.  
breaching the requirements of procedural fairness;  
failing to decide certain issues before it recommended approval of the Project;  
failing to consider alternatives to the Westridge Marine Terminal;  
failing to assess Project-related marine shipping under the Canadian  
Environmental Assessment Act, 2012; and,  
e.  
erring in its treatment of the Species at Risk Act.  
The effect of each of these errors is said to render the Board’s report materially deficient such  
that it was not a “report” that the Governor in Council could rely upon. A decision made by the  
Governor in Council without a “report” before it must be unreasonable; the statute makes it clear  
that the Governor in Council can only reach a decision when informed by a “report” of the  
Board.  
[229] I now turn to consider each alleged deficiency.  
 
Page: 77  
(a)  
Was the Board’s process procedurally fair?  
(i)  
Applicable legal principles  
[230] The Board, as a public authority that makes administrative decisions that affect the rights,  
privileges or interests of individuals, owes a duty of procedural fairness to the parties before it.  
However, the existence of a duty of fairness does not determine what fairness requires in a  
particular circumstance.  
[231] It is said that the concept of procedural fairness is eminently variable, and that its content  
is to be decided in the context and circumstances of each case. The concept is animated by the  
desire to ensure fair play. The purpose of the participatory rights contained within the duty of  
fairness has been described to be:  
… to ensure that administrative decisions are made using a fair and open  
procedure, appropriate to the decision being made and its statutory, institutional,  
and social context, with an opportunity for those affected by the decision to put  
forward their views and evidence fully and have them considered by the decision-  
maker.  
(Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817, 174 D.L.R.  
(4th) 193, at paragraph 22).  
[232] In Baker, the Supreme Court articulated a non-exhaustive list of factors to be considered  
when determining what procedural fairness requires in a given set of circumstances: the nature of  
the decision being made and the process followed in making it; the nature of the statutory  
scheme, including the existence of an appeal procedure; the importance of the decision to the  
   
Page: 78  
lives of those affected; the legitimate expectations of the person challenging the decision; and,  
the choice of procedures made by the decision-maker.  
[233] Applying these factors, the City of Burnaby argues that the content of the procedural duty  
owed to it was significant.  
[234] Other applicants and the respondents did not make submissions on the content of the  
procedural duty of fairness.  
[235] Having regard to the adjudicative nature of the decision at issue, the court-like procedures  
prescribed by the National Energy Board Rules of Practice and Procedure, 1995, SOR/95-208,  
the absence of an unrestricted statutory right of appeal (subsection 22(1) of the National Energy  
Board Act permits an appeal on a question of law or jurisdiction only with leave of this Court)  
and the importance of the Board’s decision to the parties, I accept Burnaby’s submission that the  
content of the duty of fairness owed by the Board to the parties was significant. The parties were  
entitled to a meaningful opportunity to present their cases fully and fairly. Included in the right to  
present a case fully is the right to effectively challenge evidence that contradicts that case. I will  
consider below more precisely the content of this duty.  
[236] Having briefly summarized the legal principles that apply to issues of procedural fairness,  
I next enumerate the assertions of procedural unfairness.  
Page: 79  
(ii)  
The asserted breaches of procedural fairness  
[237] The City of Burnaby asserts that the Board breached a duty of fairness owed to it by:  
a.  
b.  
failing to hold an oral hearing;  
failing to provide Burnaby with an opportunity to test Trans Mountain’s evidence  
by cross-examination;  
c.  
failing to require Trans Mountain to respond to Burnaby’s written Information  
Requests and denying Burnaby’s motions to compel further and better responses  
to the Information Requests;  
d.  
e.  
delegating the assessment of critically important information until after the  
Board’s report and the Governor in Council’s decision;  
failing to provide sufficient reasons concerning:  
i.  
alternative means of carrying out the Project;  
ii.  
iii.  
iv.  
v.  
the risks, including seismic risk, related to fire and spills;  
the suitability of the Burnaby Mountain Tunnel;  
the protection of municipal water sources; and,  
whether, and on what basis, the Project is in the public interest.  
[238] Tsleil-Waututh submits that the Board breached the duty of fairness by restricting its  
ability to test Trans Mountain’s evidence and by permitting Trans Mountain to file improper  
reply evidence.  
[239] The Stó:lō submit that it was procedurally unfair to subject their witnesses who gave oral  
traditional Indigenous evidence to cross-examination when Trans Mountain’s witnesses were not  
cross-examined.  
 
Page: 80  
[240] Squamish briefly raised the issue of inadequate response to their Information Request to  
Natural Resources Canada, and the Board’s terse rejection of their requests for further and better  
responses from Natural Resources Canada, the Department of Fisheries and Oceans and Trans  
Mountain.  
[241] Each assertion will be considered.  
(iii) The failure to hold a full oral hearing and to allow cross-  
examination of Trans Mountain’s witnesses  
[242] It is convenient to deal with these two asserted errors together.  
[243] The applicants argue that the Board’s decision precluding oral cross-examination was “a  
stark departure from the previous practice for a project of this scale.” (Burnaby’s memorandum  
of fact and law, paragraph 160) that deprived the Board of an important and established method  
for determining the truth. The applicants argue that this was particularly unfair because Trans  
Mountain failed to participate in good faith in the Information Request process with the result  
that the process did not provide an effective, alternative method to test Trans Mountain’s  
evidence.  
[244] The respondents Canada and Trans Mountain answer that:  
The Board has discretion to determine whether a hearing proceeds as a written or  
oral hearing, and the Board is entitled to deference with respect to its choice of  
procedure.  
 
Page: 81  
The process was tailored to take into account the number of participants, the  
volume of evidence and the technical nature of the information to be received by  
the Board.  
Many aspects of the hearing were conducted orally: the oral Indigenous  
traditional evidence, Trans Mountain’s oral summary argument, the interveners’  
oral summary arguments and any reply arguments.  
Cross-examination is never an absolute right. A decision-maker may refuse or  
limit cross-examination so long as there is an effective means to challenge and  
test evidence.  
[245] I acknowledge the importance of cross-examination at common law. However, because  
the content of the duty of fairness varies according to context and circumstances, the duty of  
fairness does not always require the right of cross-examination. For example, in a multi-party  
public hearing related to the public interest, fairness was held not to require oral cross-  
examination (Unicity Taxi Ltd. v. Manitoba Taxicab Board (1992), 80 Man. R. (2d) 241, [1992]  
6 W.W.R. 35 (Q.B.); aff’d (1992) 83 Man. R. (2d) 305, [1992] M.J. No. 608 (C.A.)). The Court  
dismissed the allegation of unfairness because “in the conduct of multi-faceted and multi-party  
public hearings [cross-examination] tends to become an unwieldy and even dangerous weapon  
that may lead to disturbance, disruption and delay.”  
[246] Similarly, in Chippewas of the Thames First Nation v. Enbridge Pipelines Inc., 2017  
SCC 41, [2017] 1 S.C.R. 1099, the Supreme Court found that the Chippewas of the Thames were  
given an adequate opportunity to participate in the decision-making process of the Board  
(reasons, paragraph 51). This finding was supported by the Court’s enumeration of the following  
facts: the Board held an oral hearing; provided early notice of the hearing process to affected  
Indigenous groups and sought their formal participation; granted intervener status to the  
Page: 82  
Chippewas of the Thames; provided participant funding to allow the Chippewas of the Thames  
to tender evidence and pose formal Information Requests to the project proponent, to which they  
received written responses; and permitted the Chippewas of the Thames to make oral closing  
submissions. No right of oral cross-examination was granted (reasons, paragraph 52), yet the  
process provided an adequate right to participate.  
[247] These decisions are of course not determinative of the requirements of fairness in the  
present context.  
[248] The relevant context is discussed by the Board in its Ruling No. 14, which dealt with a  
motion requesting that the hearing order be amended to include a phase for oral cross-  
examination of witnesses. After quoting an administrative law text to the effect that procedural  
fairness is not a fixed concept, but rather is one that varies with the context and the interest at  
stake, the Board wrote:  
Here, the context is that the Board will be making a recommendation to the  
Governor in Council. The recommendation will take into account whether the  
pipeline is and will be required by the present and future public convenience and  
necessity. The Board’s recommendation will be polycentric in nature as it  
involves a wide variety of considerations and interests. Persons directly affected  
by the Application include Aboriginal communities, land owners, governments,  
commercial interests, and other stakeholders. The motion and several of the  
comments in support of it appear to place significant reliance on the potential  
credibility of witnesses. The Board notes that this is not a criminal or civil trial.  
The Board’s hearing also does not involve an issue of individual liberty. It is a  
process for gathering and testing evidence for the Board’s preparation, as an  
expert tribunal, of its recommendation to the Governor in Council about whether  
to issue a certificate under section 52 of the NEB Act. The Board will also be  
conducting an environmental assessment and making a recommendation under  
CEAA 2012.  
Hearing processes are designed individually and independently by the Board  
based on the specific circumstances of the application. Each process is designed  
to provide for a fair hearing, but the processes are not necessarily the same. For  
Page: 83  
this Application, the Hearing Order provides two opportunities to ask written  
information requests. There is also an opportunity to file written evidence, and to  
provide both written and oral final argument. For Aboriginal groups that also wish  
to present Aboriginal traditional evidence orally, there is an opportunity to do this.  
Regarding the nature of the statutory scheme, section 8 of the NEB Act authorizes  
the Board to make rules about the conduct of hearings before the Board. The  
Rules provide that public hearings may be oral or written, as determined by the  
Board. The Board has previously held fully written hearings for section 52 oil and  
gas pipeline applications. Hearings can also be oral, with significant written  
components, as is the case here. In addition to the hearing procedures set out in  
the Rules, the Board makes rules about hearing procedures in its Hearing Order  
and associated rulings and bulletins.  
….  
Additional legislative requirements for the Board’s public hearings are found in  
subsection 11(4) of the NEB Act, which requires that applications before the  
Board are to be dealt with as expeditiously as the circumstances and  
considerations of fairness permit, and within the time limit provided. This  
subsection of the NEB Act was added in 2012. For this Application, the legislated  
time limit, which is 15 months after the completeness determination is made, is 2  
July 2015.  
As the legislative time limits are recent, there is no legitimate expectation as to  
the hearing procedures that will be used to test the evidence. In this case, the  
Board has provided notice about the procedures that will apply.  
In the Board’s view, the legislation makes it clear that the Board is master of its  
own procedure and can establish its own procedures for each public hearing with  
regard to the conduct of hearings. This includes the authority to determine for a  
particular public hearing the manner in which evidence will be received and  
tested. In the circumstances of this hearing, where there are 400 intervenors and  
much of the information is technical in nature, the Board has determined that it is  
appropriate to test the evidence through written processes. All written evidence  
submitted will be subject to written questioning by up to 400 parties, and the  
Board.  
(underlining added, footnotes omitted)  
[249] Further aspects of the relevant context are discussed in the Board’s final report at page 4:  
For the Board’s review of the Project application, the hearing had significant  
written processes as well as oral components. With the exception of oral  
traditional evidence described below, evidence was presented in writing, and  
Page: 84  
testing of that evidence was carried out through written questions, known as  
Information Requests (IRs). Intervenors submitted over 15,000 questions to Trans  
Mountain over two major rounds of IRs. Hundreds of other questions were asked  
in six additional rounds of IRs on specific evidence. If an intervenor believed that  
Trans Mountain provided inadequate responses to its questions, it could ask the  
Board to compel Trans Mountain to provide a more complete response. Trans  
Mountain could do the same in respect of IRs it posed to intervenors on their  
evidence. There was also written questioning on various additional evidence,  
including supplemental, replacement, late and Trans Mountain’s reply evidence.  
The Board decided, in its discretion in determining its hearing procedure, to allow  
testing of evidence by IRs and determined that there would not be cross  
examination in this hearing. The Board decided that, in the circumstances of this  
hearing where there were 400 intervenors and legislated time limits, and taking  
into consideration the technical nature of the information to be examined, it was  
appropriate to test the evidence through written processes. In the final analysis,  
the written evidence submitted was subjected to extensive written questioning by  
up to 400 participants and the Board. The Board is satisfied that the evidence was  
appropriately tested in its written process and that its hearing was fair for all  
parties and met natural justice requirements. …  
(underlining added, footnote omitted)  
[250] Having set out the context relevant to determining the content of the duty of fairness, and  
the Board’s discussion of the context, the next step is to apply the contextual factors enumerated  
in Baker to determine whether the absence of oral cross-examination was inconsistent with the  
participatory rights required by the duty of fairness. The heart of this inquiry is directed to  
whether the parties had a meaningful opportunity to present their case fully and fairly.  
[251] Applying the first Baker factor, the nature of the Board’s decision is different from a  
judicial decision. The Board is required to apply its expertise to the record before it in order to  
make recommendations about whether the Project is and will be required by public convenience  
and necessity, and whether the Project is likely to cause significant adverse environmental effects  
that can or cannot be justified in the circumstances. Each recommendation requires the Board to  
Page: 85  
consider a broad spectrum of considerations and interests, many of which depend on the Board’s  
discretion. For example, subsection 52(2) of the National Energy Board Act requires the Board’s  
recommendation to be based on “all considerations that appear to it to be directly related to the  
pipeline and to be relevant”. The Board’s environmental assessment is to take into account “any  
other matter relevant to the environmental assessment that the [Board] requires to be taken into  
account” (paragraph 19(1)(j) of the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, 2012). The nature  
of the decision points in favour of more relaxed requirements under the duty of fairness.  
[252] The statutory scheme also points to more relaxed requirements. The Board may  
determine that a pipeline application be dealt with wholly in writing (Rule 22(1), National  
Energy Board Rules of Practice and Procedure, 1995). The Board is required to deal with  
matters expeditiously, and within the legislated time limit. When the hearing order providing for  
Information Requests, not oral cross-examination, was issued on April 2, 2014, the Board was  
required to deliver its report by July 2, 2015. In legislating this time limit Parliament must be  
presumed to have contemplated that pipeline approval projects could garner significant public  
interest such that, as in this case, 400 parties successfully applied for leave to intervene. One  
aspect of the statutory scheme does point to a higher duty of fairness: the legislation does not  
provide for a right of appeal (save with leave on a question of law or jurisdiction). However, as  
discussed at length above, the Board’s decision is subject to scrutiny in proceedings such as this.  
[253] The importance of the decision is a factor that points toward a heightened fairness  
requirement.  
Page: 86  
[254] For the reasons given by the Board, I do not see any basis for a legitimate expectation  
that oral cross-examination would be permitted. To the Board’s reasons I would add that such an  
expectation would be contrary to the Board’s right to determine that an application be reviewed  
wholly in writing. While the Board did permit oral cross-examination in its review of the  
Northern Gateway Pipeline, in that case the Board’s report discloses that intervener status was  
granted to 206 entitiesroughly half the number of entities given intervener status in this case.  
[255] Finally, the Board’s choice of procedure, while not determinative, must be given some  
respect, particularly where the legislation gives the Board broad leeway to choose its own  
procedure, and the Board has experience in deciding appropriate hearing procedures.  
[256] I note that when the Board rendered its decision on the request that it reconsider Ruling  
No. 14 so as to allow oral cross-examination, the applicants had received Trans Mountain’s  
responses to their first round of Information Requests; many had brought motions seeking fuller  
and better answers. The Board ruled on the objections on September 26, 2014. Therefore, the  
Board was well familiar with the applicants’ stated concerns, as is seen in Ruling No. 51 when it  
declined to reconsider its earlier ruling refusing to amend the hearing order to allow oral cross-  
examination.  
[257] Overall, while the importance of the decision and the lack of a statutory appeal point to  
stricter requirements under the duty of fairness, the other factors point to more relaxed  
requirements. Balancing these factors, I conclude that the duty of fairness was significant.  
Nevertheless, the duty of fairness was not breached by the Board’s decisions not to allow oral  
Page: 87  
cross-examination and not to allow a full oral hearing. The Board’s procedure did allow the  
applicants a meaningful opportunity to present their cases fully and fairly.  
[258] Finally on this issue, the Board allowed oral traditional Indigenous evidence because  
“Aboriginal people have an oral tradition that cannot always be shared adequately in writing.”  
(Ruling No. 14, page 5). With respect to Stó:lō’s concerns about permitting oral questioning of  
oral traditional evidence, the Board permitted “Aboriginal groups [to] choose to answer any  
questions in writing or orally, whichever is practical or appropriate by their determination.”  
(Ruling No. 14, page 5). This is a complete answer to the concerns of the Stó:lō.  
[259] I now turn to the next asserted breach of procedural fairness.  
(iv)  
Trans Mountain’s responses to the Information Requests  
[260] The City of Burnaby and Squamish argue that Trans Mountain provided generic,  
incomplete answers to the Information Requests and the Board failed in its duty to compel  
further and better responses.  
[261] During the oral hearing before this Court Burnaby reviewed in detail: Burnaby’s first  
Information Request questioning Trans Mountain about its consideration of alternatives to  
expanding the pipeline, tank facilities and marine terminal in a major metropolitan area; Trans  
Mountain’s response; the Board’s denial of Burnaby’s request for a fuller answer; Burnaby’s  
second Information Request; Trans Mountain’s response; the Board’s denial of Burnaby’s  
request for a fuller answer; the Board’s first Information Request to Trans Mountain questioning  
 
Page: 88  
alternative means of carrying out the Project; Trans Mountain’s response; the Board’s second  
Information Request; and, Trans Mountain’s response to the Board’s second Information  
Request. Burnaby argues that Trans Mountain provided significantly more information to the  
Board than it did to Burnaby, but the information Trans Mountain provided was still insufficient.  
[262] Squamish made brief reference in oral argument to the Board’s failure to order fuller  
answers about the Crown’s assessment of the strength of its claims to Aboriginal rights and title.  
[263] As can be seen from Burnaby’s oral submission, it brought motions before the Board to  
compel better answers in respect of both of Trans Mountain’s responses to Burnaby’s  
Information Requests.  
[264] I begin consideration of this issue by acknowledging that most, but not all, of Burnaby’s  
requests for fuller answers were denied by the Board. However, procedural fairness does not  
guarantee a completely successful outcome. The Board did order some further and better answers  
in respect of each motion. Burnaby must prove more than just that the Board did not uphold all  
of its objections.  
[265] The Board’s reasons for declining to compel further answers are found in two of the  
Board’s rulings: Ruling No. 33 (A4 C4 H7) in respect of the first round of Information Requests  
directed to Trans Mountain by the interveners, and Ruling No. 63 (A4 K8 G4) in respect of the  
second round of the interveners’ Information Requests. Each ruling was set out in the form of a  
letter which attached an appendix. The appendix listed each question included in the motions to  
Page: 89  
compel, organized by intervener, and provided “the primary reason” the motion to compel was  
granted or denied. Each ruling also provided in the body of the decision “overall comments about  
the motions and the Board’s decision”.  
[266] The Board set out the test it applied when considering motions to compel in the following  
terms:  
…the Board looks at the relevance of the information sought, its significance, and  
the reasonableness of the request. The Board balances these factors so as to satisfy  
the purpose of the [Information Request] process, while preventing an intervenor  
from engaging in a ‘fishing expedition’ that could unfairly burden the applicant.  
[267] In its decision the Board also provided general information describing circumstances that  
led it to decline to compel further answers. Of relevance are the following two situations:  
In some instances, Trans Mountain provided a full answer to the question asked,  
but the intervener disagreed with the answer. In these cases, rather than seeking to  
compel a further answer, the Board advised the interveners to file their own  
evidence in response or to provide their views during final argument.  
In some cases, Trans Mountain may not have answered all parts of an intervener’s  
Information Request. However, in those cases where the Board was of the view  
that the response provided sufficient information and detail for the Board to  
consider the application, the Board declined to compel a further response.  
[268] It is clear that the Board viewed Burnaby’s requests for fuller answers about Trans  
Mountain’s consideration and rejection of alternate locations for the marine terminal to fall  
within the second situation described above.  
Page: 90  
[269] The Board’s second Information Request to Trans Mountain on this point was answered  
by Trans Mountain on July 21, 2014, and its answer was served upon all of the interveners.  
Therefore, the Board was aware of this response when on September 26, 2014, it rejected  
Burnaby’s motion in Ruling No. 33.  
[270] That the Board found Trans Mountain’s answer to its second Information Request to be  
sufficient is reflected in the Board’s report, where at pages 241 to 242 the Board relied on the  
content of Trans Mountain’s response to its second Information Request to articulate Trans  
Mountain’s consideration of the alternatives to the Westridge Marine Terminal. At page 244 of  
the report, the Board found Trans Mountain’s “alternative means assessment” to be appropriate.  
The Board went on to acknowledge Burnaby’s concern that Trans Mountain had not provided an  
assessment of the risks, impacts and effects of the alternate marine terminal locations at Kitimat  
or Roberts Bank. However, the Board disagreed, finding that “Trans Mountain has provided an  
adequate assessment, including consideration of the technical, socio-economic and  
environmental effects, of technically and economically feasible alternative marine terminal  
locations.”  
[271] Obviously, Burnaby disagrees with this assessment. However, it has not demonstrated  
how the Board’s conduct concerning Burnaby’s Information Requests breached the requirements  
of procedural fairness. For example, Burnaby has not pointed to evidence that contradicted Trans  
Mountain’s stated reasons for rejecting alternative marine terminal locations. Trans Mountain  
stated that its assessment was based on feasibility of coincident marine and pipeline access, and  
technical, economic and environmental considerations of the screened alternative locations. Any  
Page: 91  
demonstrated conflict in the evidence on these points may have supported a finding that  
meaningful participation required Trans Mountain to provide more detailed information.  
[272] In support of its submission concerning procedural fairness Squamish pointed to a  
question it directed to Natural Resources Canada. It asked whether that entity had “assessed the  
strength of Squamish’s claim to aboriginal rights in the area of the proposed Project” and if so, to  
provide “that assessment and any material upon which that assessment is based.”  
[273] The response Squamish received to its Information Request was:  
The Crown has conducted preliminary depth of consultation assessments for all  
Aboriginal groups, including Squamish Nation, whose traditional territory  
intersects with or is proximate to the proposed pipeline right of way, marine  
terminal expansion and designated marine shipping lanes. (Depth of consultation  
assessments consider both potential impacts to rights and the strength of claim to  
rights.) The Crown’s depth of consultation assessment is iterative and is expected  
to evolve as the [Board] review process unfolds and as Aboriginal groups submit  
their evidence to the [Board] and engage in Phase III consultations with the  
Crown. The Crown has assessed depth of consultation for the Squamish Nation as  
“high.” This preliminary conclusion was filed into evidence [by the Major  
Projects Management Office] on May 27, 2015.  
The starting point for these assessments is to work with information the Crown  
has in hand, but Squamish Nation is invited to provide information that they  
believe could assist the Crown in understanding the nature and scope of their  
rights.  
(underlining added)  
[274] Squamish objected to the Board that its request was only partly addressed, and requested  
that Natural Resources Canada provide the material on which its assessment was based.  
Page: 92  
[275] In reply to Squamish’s motion to compel a further answer, Natural Resources Canada  
responded:  
In the context of the current hearing process, it is the view of [the Major Projects  
Management Office] that the further information and records sought by Squamish  
Nation will not be of assistance to the Panel in fulfilling its mandate.  
However, the Crown will communicate with the Squamish Nation in August 2015  
to provide further information on Phase III Crown consultation and the Crown’s  
approach to considering adverse impacts of the Project on potential or established  
Aboriginal and treaty rights. This forthcoming correspondence will summarize the  
Crown’s understanding of the strength of Squamish Nation’s claim for rights and  
title.  
[276] The Board denied Squamish’s request for a fuller answer on the primary ground that the  
information Squamish sought “would not contribute to the record in any substantive way and,  
therefore, would not be material to the Board’s assessment.”  
[277] Given the mandate of the Board, the iterative nature of the consultation process and the  
fact that direct Crown consultation would take place in Phase III following the release of the  
Board’s report, Squamish has not shown that it was a breach of procedural fairness for the Board  
not to compel a fuller answer to its question.  
(v)  
The asserted deferral and delegation of the assessment of  
important information  
[278] The City of Burnaby next argues that the Board impermissibly deferred “the provision of  
critically important information to after the Report stage, and after the [Governor in Council’s  
decision]” (memorandum of fact and law, paragraph 164). Burnaby says that by doing so, the  
Board acted contrary to the statutory regime and breached the principle of delegatus non potest  
 
Page: 93  
delegare. At this point in its submissions, Burnaby did not suggest what specific aspect of the  
statutory regime was contravened, or how the Board or the Governor in Council improperly  
delegated their statutory responsibility. At this stage, Burnaby deals with this as an issue of  
procedural fairness. I deal with the statutory scheme argument commencing at paragraph 322.  
[279] Burnaby points to a number of issues where it alleges that the Board failed to weigh the  
evidence and expert opinions put before it. Burnaby says:  
It provided expert evidence that the Project presents serious and unacceptable  
safety risks to the neighbourhoods that are proximate to the Burnaby Terminal as  
a result of fire, explosion and boil-over, and that Trans Mountain had failed to  
assess these risks.  
It established gaps in Trans Mountain’s geotechnical investigation of the tunnel  
option and a lack of analysis of the feasibility of the tunnel option.  
It identified significant information gaps with respect to the Westridge Marine  
Terminal, including gaps concerning: the final design; spill risk; fire risk;  
geotechnical risk; and, the ability to respond to these risks.  
It adduced evidence that the available fire response resources were inadequate.  
It demonstrated the risk to Simon Fraser University following an incident at the  
Burnaby Terminal because of the tunnel’s proximity to the only evacuation route  
from the University.  
[280] Burnaby argues that the Board declined to compel further information from Trans  
Mountain on these points, and instead imposed conditions that required Trans Mountain to do  
certain specified things in the future. For example, the Board imposed conditions requiring Trans  
Mountain to file with the Board for approval a report to revise the terminal risk assessments,  
including the Burnaby Terminal risk assessment, to include consideration of the risks not  
assessed (Board Conditions 22 and 129). Board Condition 22 had to be met at least six months  
Page: 94  
before Trans Mountain commenced construction; Condition 129 had to be met at least three  
months before Trans Mountain applied to open each terminal. Burnaby also notes that many  
conditions imposed by the Board were not subject to subsequent Board approval.  
[281] Burnaby argues that this process prevented meaningful testing of information filed after  
the Board issued its report recommending that the Project be approved. Further, the Governor in  
Council did not have access to the material to be filed in response to the Board’s conditions  
when it made its determination of the public interest.  
[282] Underpinning these arguments is Burnaby’s assertion that the “Board’s rulings deprived  
Burnaby of the ability to review and assess the validity of the alternatives assessment (or to  
confirm that one was made).” (memorandum of fact and law, paragraph 41).  
[283] I can well understand Burnaby’s concern—the consequence of a serious spill or  
explosion and fire in a densely populated metropolitan area might be catastrophic. However, in  
my respectful view, Burnaby’s understandable desire to be able to independently review and  
assess the validity of the assessment of alternatives to the expansion of the Westridge Marine  
Terminal, or other matters that affect the City, is inconsistent with the regulatory scheme enacted  
by Parliament. Parliament has vested in the Board the authority and responsibility to consider  
and then make recommendations to the Governor in Council on matters of public interest; the  
essence of the Board’s responsibility is to balance the Project-related benefits against the Project-  
related burdens and residual burdens, and to then make recommendations to the Governor in  
Council. In this legislative scheme, the Board is not required to facilitate an interested party’s  
Page: 95  
independent review and assessment of a project. It is not for this Court to opine on the  
appropriateness of the policy expressed and implemented in the National Energy Board Act.  
Rather, the Court’s role is to apply the legislation as Parliament has enacted.  
[284] The Supreme Court has recognized the Board’s “expertise in the supervision and  
approval of federally regulated pipeline projects” and described the Board to be “particularly  
well positioned to assess the risks posed by such projects”. The Supreme Court went on to note  
the Board’s “broad jurisdiction to impose conditions on proponents to mitigate those risks” and  
to acknowledge that it is the Board’s “ongoing regulatory role in the enforcement of safety  
measures [which] permits it to oversee long-term compliance with such conditions” (Chippewas  
of the Thames First Nation, paragraph 48). While the Supreme Court was particularly focused on  
the Board’s expertise in the context of its ability to assess risks posed to Indigenous groups, the  
Board’s expertise extends to the full range of risks inherent in the operation of a pipeline,  
including the risks raised by Burnaby.  
[285] Burnaby’s submission must be assessed in the light of the Board’s approval process. I  
will set out the Board’s approval process at some length because of the importance of this issue  
to the City of Burnaby and other applicants.  
[286] The Board described its approval process in Section 1.3 of its report:  
Trans Mountain’s Application was filed while the Project was at an initial phase  
of the regulatory lifecycle, as is typical of applications under section 52 of the  
NEB Act. As set out in the Board’s Filing Manual, the Board requires a broad  
range of information when a section 52 application is filed. At the end of the  
hearing, the level of information available to the Board must be sufficient to allow  
it to make a recommendation to the GIC that the Project is or is not in the public  
Page: 96  
interest. There also must be sufficient information to allow the Board to draft  
conditions that would attach to any new and amended CPCNs, and other  
associated regulatory instruments (Instruments), should the Project be approved  
by the GIC.  
The Board does not require final information about every technical detail during  
the application stage of the regulatory process. For example, much of the  
information filed with respect to the engineering design would be at the  
conceptual or preliminary level. Site-specific engineering information would not  
be filed with the Board until after the detailed routing is confirmed, which would  
be one of the next steps in the regulatory process should the Project be approved.  
Completion of the detailed design of the project, as well as subsequent  
construction and operations, would have to comply with:  
the NEB Act, regulations, including the National Energy  
Board Onshore Pipeline Regulations (OPR), referenced  
standards and applicable codes;  
the company’s conceptual design presented, and  
commitments made in the Application and hearing  
proceedings; and  
conditions which the Board considers necessary.  
The Board may impose conditions requiring a company to submit detailed  
information for review (and in some cases, for approval) by the Board before the  
company is permitted to begin construction. Further information, such as pressure  
testing results, could be required in future leave to open applications before a  
company would be permitted to begin pipeline operations. In compliance with the  
OPR, a company is also required to fully develop an emergency response plan  
prior to beginning operations. In some cases, the Board has imposed conditions  
with specific requirements for the development, content and filing of the  
emergency response plan (see Table 1). This would be filed and fully assessed at  
a condition compliance stage once detailed routing is known. Because the detailed  
routing information is necessary to perform this assessment, it would be  
premature to require a fully detailed emergency response plan to be filed at the  
time of the project application.  
While the project application stage is important, as set out in Chapter 3, there are  
further detailed plans, studies and specifications that are required before the  
project can proceed. Some of these are subject to future Board approval, and  
others are filed with the Board for information, disclosure, and/or future  
compliance enforcement purposes. The Board’s recommendation on the project  
application is not a final determination of all issues. While some hearing  
participants requested the final detailed engineering or emergency response plans,  
the Board does not require further detailed information and final plans at this  
stage of the regulatory lifecycle.  
Page: 97  
To set the context for its reasons for recommendation, the Board finds it helpful to  
identify the fundamental consideration used in reaching any section 52  
determination. The overarching consideration for the Board’s public interest  
determination at the application stage is: can this pipeline be constructed, operated  
and maintained in a safe manner. The Board found this to be the case. While this  
initial consideration is fundamental, a finding that a pipeline could be constructed,  
operated and maintained in a safe manner does not mean a pipeline is necessarily  
in the public interest as there are other considerations that the Board must weigh,  
as discussed below. However, the analysis would go no further if the answer to  
this fundamental question were answered in the negative, as an unsafe pipeline  
can never be in the public interest.  
(underlining added, footnote omitted)  
[287] The Board went on to describe how projects are regulated through their lifecycle in  
Chapter 3, particularly in Sections 3.1 to 3.5:  
3.0  
Regulating through the Project lifecycle  
The approval of a project, through issuance of one or more Certificate of Public  
Convenience and Necessity (CPCN) and/or orders incorporating applicable  
conditions, forms just one phase in the Board’s lifecycle regulation. The Board’s  
public interest determination relies upon the subsequent execution of detailed  
design, construction, operation, maintenance and, ultimately, abandonment of a  
project in compliance with applicable codes, commitments and conditions, such  
as those discussed in Chapter 1. Throughout the lifecycle of an approved project,  
as illustrated in Figure 4, the Board holds the pipeline company accountable for  
meeting its regulatory requirements in order to keep its pipelines and facilities  
safe and secure, and protect people, property and the environment. To accomplish  
this, the Board reviews or assesses condition filings, tracks condition compliance,  
verifies compliance with regulatory requirements, and employs appropriate  
enforcement measures where necessary to quickly and effectively obtain  
compliance, prevent harm, and deter future non-compliance.  
After a project application is assessed and the Board makes its section 52  
recommendation (as described in Chapter 2, section 2.1), the project cannot  
proceed until and unless the Governor in Council approves the project and directs  
the Board to issue the necessary CPCN. If approved, the company would then  
prepare plans showing the proposed detailed route of the pipeline and notify  
landowners. A detailed route hearing may be required, subject to section 35 of the  
National Energy Board Act (NEB Act). The company would also proceed with  
the detailed design of the project and could be required to undertake additional  
studies, prepare plans or meet other requirements pursuant to NEB conditions on  
any CPCN or related NEB order. The company would be required to comply with  
Page: 98  
all conditions to move forward with its project, prior to and during construction,  
and before commencing operations. While NEB specialists would review all  
condition filings, those requiring approval of the Board would require this  
approval before the project could proceed.  
Once construction is complete, the company would need to apply for the Board’s  
permission (or “leave”) to open the project and begin operations. While some  
conditions may apply for the life of a pipeline, typically the majority must be  
satisfied prior to beginning operations or within the first few months or years of  
operation. However, the company must continue to comply with the National  
Energy Board Onshore Pipeline Regulations (OPR) and other regulatory  
requirements to operate the pipeline safely and protect the environment.  
If the Project is approved, the Board would employ its established lifecycle  
compliance verification and enforcement approach to hold Trans Mountain  
accountable for implementing the proposed conditions and other regulatory  
requirements during construction, and the subsequent operation and maintenance  
of the Project.  
3.1 Condition compliance  
If the Project is approved and Trans Mountain decides to proceed, it would be  
required to comply with all conditions that are included in the CPCNs and  
associated regulatory instruments (Instruments). The types of filings that would  
be required to fulfill the conditions imposed on the Project, if approved, are  
summarized in Table 4.  
If the Project is approved, the Board would oversee condition compliance, make  
any necessary decisions respecting such conditions, and eventually determine,  
based on filed results of field testing, whether the Project could safely be granted  
leave to open.  
Documents filed by Trans Mountain on condition compliance and related Board  
correspondence would be available to the public on the NEB website. All  
condition filings, whether or not they are for approval, would be reviewed and  
assessed to determine whether the company has complied with the condition, and  
whether the filed information is acceptable within the context of regulatory  
requirements and standards, best practices, professional judgement and the goals  
the condition sought to achieve. If a condition is “for approval,” the company  
must receive formal approval, by way of a Board letter, for the condition to be  
fulfilled.  
If a filing fails to fulfill the condition requirements or is determined to be  
inadequate, the Board would request further information or revisions from the  
company by a specified deadline, or may direct the company to undertake  
additional steps to meet the goals that the condition was set out to achieve.  
Page: 99  
3.2 Construction phase  
During construction, the Board would require Trans Mountain to have qualified  
inspectors onsite to oversee construction activities. The Board would also conduct  
field inspections and other compliance verification activities (as described in  
section 3.5) to confirm that construction activities meet the conditions of the  
Project approval and other regulatory requirements, to observe whether the  
company is implementing its own commitments and to monitor the effectiveness  
of the measures taken to meet the condition goals, and ensure worker and public  
safety and protection of the environment.  
3.3 Leave to open  
If the Project is approved and constructed, the Board will require Trans Mountain  
to also apply, under section 47 of the NEB Act, for leave to open the pipelines and  
most related facilities. This is a further step that occurs after conditions applicable  
to date have been met and the company wishes to begin operating its pipeline and  
facilities. The Board reviews the company’s submissions for leave to open,  
including the results of field pressure testing, and may seek additional information  
from the company. Before granting leave to open, the Board must be satisfied that  
the pipeline or facility has been constructed in compliance with requirements and  
that it can be operated safely. The Board can impose further terms and conditions  
on a leave to open order, if needed.  
(underlining added, figures and tables omitted)  
[288] In Section 3.5 the Board set out its compliance and enforcement programs noting that:  
While all companies are subject to regulatory oversight, some companies receive  
more than others. In other words, high consequence facilities, challenging projects  
and those companies who are not meeting the Board’s regulatory expectations and  
goals can expect to see the Board more often than those companies and projects  
with routine operations.  
[289] No applicant challenged the accuracy of the Board’s formulation of its approval process  
and subsequent compliance verification and enforcement approach. The City of Burnaby has not  
shown how the Board’s multi-step approval process is either procedurally unfair or an improper  
delegation of authority. Implicit in the Board’s imposition of a condition, such as a condition  
requiring a revised risk assessment, or a condition requiring information regarding tunnel  
Page: 100  
location, construction methods, and the like, is the Board’s expectation that the condition may  
realistically be complied with, and that compliance with the condition will allow the pipeline to  
be constructed, operated and maintained in a safe manner. Also implicit in the Board’s  
imposition of a condition is its understanding of its ability to assess condition filings (whether or  
not the condition requires formal approval), and its ability to oversee compliance with its  
conditions.  
[290] Transparency with respect to Trans Mountain’s compliance with conditions is provided  
by the Board publishing on its website all documents filed by Trans Mountain relating to  
condition compliance and all related, responsive Board correspondence.  
[291] As for the role of the Governor in Council in such a tiered approval process, the recitals  
to the Order in Council show that the Board’s conditions were placed before the Governor in  
Council. Therefore, the Governor in Council must be seen to have been aware of the extent of  
the matters left for future review by the Board, and to have accepted the Board’s assessment and  
recommendation about the public interest on that basis.  
(vi)  
Failing to provide adequate reasons  
[292] The City of Burnaby next argues that the Board erred by failing to provide sufficient  
reasons on the following issues:  
a.  
b.  
c.  
d.  
alternative means of carrying out the Project;  
risks relating to fire and spills (including seismic risk);  
the suitability of the Burnaby Mountain Tunnel;  
the protection of municipal water sources; and,  
 
Page: 101  
e.  
whether, and on what basis, the Project is in the public interest.  
[293] I begin my analysis by noting that the adequacy of reasons is not a “stand-alone basis for  
quashing a decision”. Rather, reasons are relevant to the overall assessment of reasonableness.  
Further, reasons “must be read together with the outcome and serve the purpose of showing  
whether the result falls within a range of possible outcomes.” (Newfoundland and Labrador  
Nurses’ Union v. Newfoundland and Labrador (Treasury Board), 2011 SCC 62, [2011] 3 S.C.R.  
708, at paragraph 14).  
[294] This is consistent with the Court’s reasoning in Dunsmuir where the Supreme Court  
explained the notion of reasonableness review and spoke of the role reasons play in  
reasonableness review:  
[47] Reasonableness is a deferential standard animated by the principle that  
underlies the development of the two previous standards of reasonableness:  
certain questions that come before administrative tribunals do not lend themselves  
to one specific, particular result. Instead, they may give rise to a number of  
possible, reasonable conclusions. Tribunals have a margin of appreciation within  
the range of acceptable and rational solutions. A court conducting a review for  
reasonableness inquires into the qualities that make a decision reasonable,  
referring both to the process of articulating the reasons and to outcomes. In  
judicial review, reasonableness is concerned mostly with the existence of  
justification, transparency and intelligibility within the decision-making process.  
But it is also concerned with whether the decision falls within a range of possible,  
acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and law.  
[48] The move towards a single reasonableness standard does not pave the way  
for a more intrusive review by courts and does not represent a return to pre-  
Southam formalism. In this respect, the concept of deference, so central to judicial  
review in administrative law, has perhaps been insufficiently explored in the case  
law. What does deference mean in this context? Deference is both an attitude of  
the court and a requirement of the law of judicial review. It does not mean that  
courts are subservient to the determinations of decision makers, or that courts  
must show blind reverence to their interpretations, or that they may be content to  
pay lip service to the concept of reasonableness review while in fact imposing  
their own view. Rather, deference imports respect for the decision-making process  
Page: 102  
of adjudicative bodies with regard to both the facts and the law. The notion of  
deference “is rooted in part in a respect for governmental decisions to create  
administrative bodies with delegated powers” (Canada (Attorney General) v.  
Mossop, 2008 SCC 9, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 554, at p. 596, per L’Heureux-Dubé J.,  
dissenting). We agree with David Dyzenhaus where he states that the concept of  
“deference as respect” requires of the courts “not submission but a respectful  
attention to the reasons offered or which could be offered in support of a  
decision”: “The Politics of Deference: Judicial Review and Democracy”, in M.  
Taggart, ed., The Province of Administrative Law (1997), 279, at p. 286 (quoted  
with approval in Baker, at para. 65, per L’Heureux-Dubé J.; Ryan, at para. 49).  
(underlining added)  
[295] Reasons need not include all of the relevant arguments, statutory provisions or  
jurisprudence. A decision-maker need not make an explicit finding on each constituent element  
leading to the final conclusion. Reasons are adequate if they allow the reviewing court to  
understand why the decision-maker made its decision and permit the reviewing court to  
determine whether the conclusion is within the range of acceptable outcomes.  
[296] I now turn to consider Burnaby’s submissions in the context of the Board’s reasons.  
Alternative means of carrying out the Project  
[297] Burnaby’s concern about alternative means of carrying out the Project centers on the  
Board’s treatment of alternative locations for the marine terminal. In Section 11.1.2 the Board  
dealt with the requirement imposed by paragraph 19(1)(g) of the Canadian Environmental  
Assessment Act, 2012 that an environmental assessment of a designated project must take into  
account “alternative means of carrying out the designated project that are technically and  
economically feasible”. The views of the Board are expressed in this section on pages 244  
through 245.  
Page: 103  
[298] Of particular relevance to Burnaby’s concern are the first two paragraphs of the Board’s  
reasons:  
The Board finds that Trans Mountain’s route selection process, route selection  
criteria, and level of detail for its alternative means assessment are appropriate.  
The Board further finds that aligning the majority of the proposed pipeline route  
alongside, and contiguous to, existing linear disturbances is reasonable, as this  
would minimize the environmental and socio-economic impacts of the Project.  
The Board acknowledges the concern raised by the City of Burnaby that Trans  
Mountain did not provide an assessment of the risks, impacts and effects of the  
alternate marine terminal locations at Kitimat, B.C., or Roberts Bank in Delta,  
B.C. The Board finds that Trans Mountain has provided an adequate assessment,  
including consideration of technical, socio-economic and environmental effects,  
of technically and economically feasible alternative marine terminal locations.  
[299] In my view, these reasons allowed the Governor in Council and allow this Court to know  
why the Board found Trans Mountain’s assessment of alternative means to be adequate or  
appropriatethe Board accepted the facts conveyed by Trans Mountain and found that these  
facts provided an appropriately detailed consideration of the alternative means. In my further  
view, the reasons, when read with the record, also allow the Court to consider whether the  
Board’s treatment of alternatives to the Westridge Marine Terminal were so materially flawed  
that the Board’s report was not a “report” that the Governor in Council could rely upon. This is a  
substantive issue I deal with below commencing at paragraph 322.  
Assessment of risks  
[300] Burnaby’s concerns about the assessment of risks centre on the Burnaby Terminal risk  
assessment, the Westridge Marine Terminal risk assessment, the Emergency Fire Response plan  
and the evacuation of Simon Fraser University.  
Page: 104  
Burnaby Terminal  
[301] The Board’s consideration of terminal expansions generally is found in Section 6.4 of its  
report. The Burnaby Terminal is discussed at pages 92 through 95 of the Board’s report. After  
setting out the evidence, including Burnaby’s evidence, at page 95 the Board expressed its  
reasons on the Burnaby Terminal as follows:  
The Burnaby Terminal is uphill of the neighborhood of Forest Grove. An issue of  
potential concern is the possibility, however remote, of a multiple-tank failure in a  
common impounding area exceeding the available secondary containment  
capacity under certain conditions. The Board would impose a condition requiring  
Trans Mountain to demonstrate that the secondary containment system would be  
capable of draining large spills away from Tank 96, 97 or 98 to the partial RI.  
Trans Mountain must also demonstrate that the secondary containment system has  
the capacity to contain a spill from a multiple-tank rupture scenario (Condition  
24).  
The City of Burnaby and the City of Burnaby Fire Department raised concerns  
about fire and safety risks at the Burnaby Terminal following, in particular, those  
associated with boil-overs. Trans Mountain claimed that boil-over events are  
unlikely, yet did not quantify the risks through rigorous analysis. The Board is of  
the view that a complete assessment of risk requires consideration of the  
cumulative risk from all tanks at a terminal. The Board would impose conditions  
requiring Trans Mountain to revise the terminal risk assessments, including the  
Burnaby Terminal, to demonstrate how the mitigation measures will reduce the  
risks to levels that are As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) while  
complying with the Major Industrial Accidents Council of Canada (MIACC)  
criteria considering all tanks in each respective terminal (Conditions 22 and 129).  
[302] With respect to the geotechnical design, the Board wrote at page 97:  
The Board acknowledges the concerns of participants regarding the preliminary  
nature of the geotechnical design evidence provided. However, the Board is of the  
view that the design information and the level of detail provided by Trans  
Mountain with respect to the geotechnical design for the Edmonton Terminal  
West Tank Area and the Burnaby Terminal are sufficient for the Board at the  
application stage. The Board notes that more extensive geotechnical work will be  
completed for the detailed engineering and design phase of the Project.  
Page: 105  
With regard to the selection of Seismic Use Group (SUG) for the design of the  
tanks, the Board notes that Trans Mountain has not made a final determination.  
Nevertheless, should the Project be approved, the Board will verify that Trans  
Mountain’s tanks have secondary controls to prevent public exposure, in  
accordance with SUG I design criteria, by way of Conditions 22, 24 and 129.  
[303] In my view, these reasons adequately allow the Court to understand why the Board  
rejected Burnaby’s evidence and why it imposed the conditions it did.  
Westridge Marine Terminal  
[304] The Board dealt with the Westridge Marine Terminal expansion in Section 6.5 of its  
report.  
[305] The Board expressed its views at pages 100 through 102. With respect to the design  
approach the Board wrote:  
Trans Mountain has committed to design, construct, and operate the Westridge  
Marine Terminal (WMT) in accordance with applicable regulations, standards,  
codes and industry best practices. The Board accepts Trans Mountain’s design  
approach, including Trans Mountain’s effort to eliminate two vapour recovery  
tanks in the expanded WMT by modifying the vapour recovery technology. The  
Board considers this to be a good approach for eliminating potential spills and fire  
hazards. The Board would impose Condition 21 requiring Trans Mountain to  
provide its decision as well as its rationale to either retain or eliminate the  
proposed relief tank.  
[306] With respect to the geotechnical design, the Board wrote:  
The Board acknowledges the City of Burnaby’s concern regarding the level of  
detail of the geotechnical information provided in the hearing for the Westridge  
Marine Terminal (WMT) offshore facilities. However, the Board is of the view  
that Trans Mountain has demonstrated its awareness of the requirements for the  
geotechnical design of the offshore facilities and accepts Trans Mountain’s  
geotechnical design approach.  
Page: 106  
To confirm that soil conditions have been adequately assessed for input to the  
final design of the WMT offshore facilities, the Board would impose conditions  
requiring Trans Mountain to file a final preliminary geotechnical report for the  
design of the offshore facilities, and the final design basis for the offshore pile  
foundation layout once Trans Mountain has selected the pile design (Conditions  
34 and 83).  
To verify the geotechnical design approach for the WMT onshore facilities the  
Board would impose Condition 33 requiring Trans Mountain to file a preliminary  
geotechnical report for the onshore facilities prior to the commencement of  
construction.  
The Board would examine the geotechnical reports upon receipt and advise Trans  
Mountain of any further requirements for the fulfilment of the above conditions  
prior to the commencement of construction.  
[307] I have previously dealt with Burnaby’s concern with the Board’s failure to compel further  
and better information from Trans Mountain at the hearing stage, and to instead impose  
conditions requiring Trans Mountain to do certain things in future. Burnaby’s concerns relating  
to the assessment of risks centre on this approach taken by the Board. Burnaby has not  
demonstrated how the Board’s reasons with respect to the Westridge Marine Terminal risk  
assessment are inadequate.  
Emergency fire response  
[308] The Board responded to Burnaby’s concerns about adequate resources to respond to a fire  
as follows at page 156:  
The Board shares concerns raised by the City of Burnaby Fire Department and  
others about the need for adequate resources to respond in the case of a fire. The  
Board finds the 6-12 hour response time proposed by Trans Mountain for  
industrial firefighting contractors to arrive on site as inadequate, should they be  
needed immediately for a response to a fire at the Burnaby Terminal. The Board  
would impose conditions requiring Trans Mountain to complete a needs  
assessment with respect to the development of appropriate firefighting capacity  
for a safe, timely, and effective response to a fire at the Westridge Marine  
Terminal (WMT) and at the Edmonton, Sumas, and Burnaby Terminals. The  
Page: 107  
conditions would require Trans Mountain to assess and evaluate resources and  
equipment to address fires, and a summary of consultation with appropriate  
municipal authorities and first responders that will help inform a Firefighting  
Capacity Framework (Conditions 118 and 138).  
[309] Again, Burnaby’s concern is not so much with respect to the adequacy of the Board’s  
reasons, but rather with the Board’s approach to dealing with Burnaby’s concerns through the  
imposition of conditionsin this case conditions that do not require formal Board approval. On  
this last point, the Board’s explanation of its process for the review of conditions supports the  
conclusion that an inadequate response to a condition, even a condition not requiring formal  
Board approval, would be detected by the Board’s specialists. Further, the Board oversees  
compliance with the conditions it imposes.  
[310] In any event, I see no inadequacy in the Board’s reasons.  
Suitability of the Burnaby Mountain Tunnel  
[311] The Board deals with the Burnaby Mountain Tunnel in Sections 6.2.2 and 6.2.3. The  
Board’s views, in part, are expressed as follows at pages 81 and 82:  
Regarding the City of Burnaby’s concern with Trans Mountain’s geotechnical  
investigation, the Board is of the view that the level of detail of the geotechnical  
investigation for the tunnel option is sufficient for the purpose of assessing the  
feasibility of constructing the tunnel. The Board notes that a second phase of  
drilling is planned for the development of construction plans at the tunnel portals,  
and that additional surface boreholes or probe holes could be drilled from the  
tunnel face during construction. The Board is of the view that both the tunnel and  
street options are technically feasible, and accepts Trans Mountain’s proposal that  
the streets option be considered as an alternative to the tunnel option.  
The Board is not aware of the use of the concrete or grout-filled tunnel installation  
method for other hydrocarbon pipelines in Canada. The Board is concerned that  
damage to the pipe or coating may occur during installation of the pipelines or  
grouting, and that there will be limited accessibility for future maintenance and  
Page: 108  
repairs. The Board is also concerned that there may be voids or that cracks could  
form in the grout. The Board would require Trans Mountain to address these and  
other matters, including excavation, pipe handing, backfilling, pressure testing,  
cathodic protection, and leak detection, through the fulfillment of Conditions 26,  
27 and 28 on tunnel design, construction, and operation.  
The Board would impose Condition 29 regarding the quality and quantity of  
waste rock from the tunnel and Trans Mountain’s plans for its disposal.  
The Board would also impose Condition 143 requiring Trans Mountain to  
conduct baseline inspections, including in-line inspection surveys, of the new  
delivery pipelines in accordance with the timelines and descriptions set out in the  
condition. The Board is of the view that these inspections would aid in mitigating  
any manufacturing and construction related defects, and in establishing re-  
inspection intervals.  
[312] Burnaby has not demonstrated how these reasons are inadequate.  
Protection of municipal water sources  
[313] While Burnaby enumerated this as an issue on which the Board gave inadequate reasons,  
Burnaby made no submissions on this point and did not point to any particular section of the  
Board’s reasons said to be deficient. In the absence of submissions on the point, Burnaby has not  
demonstrated the reasons to be inadequate.  
Public interest  
[314] Again, while Burnaby enumerated this issue as an issue on which the Board gave  
inadequate reasons, Burnaby made no submissions on the point.  
[315] The Board’s finding with respect to public interest is contained in Chapter 2 of the  
Board’s report where, among other things, the Board described the respective benefits and  
burdens of the Project and then balanced the benefits and burdens in order to conclude that the  
Page: 109  
Project “is in the present and future public convenience and necessity, and in the Canadian public  
interest”. In the absence of submissions on the point, Burnaby has not demonstrated the reasons  
to be inadequate.  
(vii) Trans Mountain’s reply evidence  
[316] At paragraph 71 of its memorandum of fact and law, Tsleil-Waututh makes the bare  
assertion that the Board “permitted [Trans Mountain] to file improper reply evidence”. While  
Tsleil-Waututh referenced in a footnote its motion record filed in response to Trans Mountain’s  
reply evidence, it did not make any submissions on how the Board erred or how the reply  
evidence was improper. Nor did Tsleil-Waututh reference the Board’s reasons issued in response  
to its motion.  
[317] Tsleil-Waututh argued before the Board that, rather than testing Tsleil-Waututh’s  
evidence through Information Requests, Trans Mountain filed extensive new or supplementary  
evidence in reply. Tsleil-Waututh alleged that the reply evidence was substantially improper in  
nature. Tsleil-Waututh sought an order striking portions of Trans Mountain’s reply evidence. In  
the alternative Tsleil-Waututh sought, among other relief, an order allowing it to issue  
Information Requests to Trans Mountain about its reply evidence and allowing it to file sur-reply  
evidence.  
[318] The Board, in Ruling No. 96, found that Trans Mountain’s reply evidence was not  
improper. In response to the objections raised before it, the Board found that:  
 
Page: 110  
Trans Mountain’s reply evidence was not evidence that Trans Mountain ought to  
have brought forward as evidence-in-chief in order to meet its onus.  
Trans Mountain’s reply evidence was filed in response to new evidence adduced  
by the interveners.  
Given the large volume of evidence filed by the interveners, the length of Trans  
Mountain’s reply evidence was not a sufficient basis on which to find it to be  
improper.  
To the extent that portions of the reply evidence repeated evidence already  
presented, this caused no prejudice to the interveners who had already had an  
opportunity to test the evidence and respond to it.  
[319] The Board allowed Tsleil-Waututh to test the reply evidence through one round of  
Information Requests. The Board noted that the final argument stage was the appropriate stage  
for interveners and Trans Mountain to make submissions to the Board about the weight to be  
given to the evidence.  
[320] Tsleil-Waututh has not demonstrated any procedural unfairness arising from the Board’s  
dismissal of its motion to strike portions of Trans Mountain’s reply evidence.  
(viii) Conclusion on procedural fairness  
[321] For all the above reasons the applicants have not demonstrated that the Board breached  
any duty of procedural fairness.  
 
Page: 111  
(b)  
Did the Board fail to decide certain issues before recommending  
approval of the Project?  
[322] Both Burnaby and Coldwater make submissions on this issue. Additionally, Coldwater,  
Squamish and Upper Nicola make submissions about the Board’s failure to decide certain issues  
in the context of the Crown’s duty to consult. The latter submissions will be considered in the  
analysis of the adequacy of the Crown’s consultation process.  
[323] Burnaby’s and Coldwater’s submissions may be summarized as follows.  
[324] Burnaby raises two principal arguments: first, the Board failed to consider and assess the  
risks and impacts of the Project to Burnaby, instead deferring the collection of information  
relevant to the risks and impacts and consideration of that information until after the decision of  
the Governor in Council when Trans Mountain was required to comply with the Board’s  
conditions; and, second, the Board failed to consider alternative means of carrying out the  
Project and their environmental effects. Instead, contrary to paragraph 19(1)(g) of the Canadian  
Environmental Assessment Act, 2012, the Board failed to require Trans Mountain to include with  
its application an assessment of the Project’s alternatives and failed to require Trans Mountain to  
provide adequate answers in response to Burnaby’s multiple Information Requests about  
alternatives to the Project.  
[325] With respect to the first error, Burnaby asserts that it is a “basic principle of law that a  
tribunal or a court must weigh and decide conflicting evidence. It cannot defer determinations  
post-judgment.” (Burnaby’s memorandum of fact and law, paragraph 142). In breach of this  
 
Page: 112  
principle, the Board did not require Trans Mountain to provide further evidence, nor did the  
Board weigh or decide conflicting evidence. Instead, the Board deferred assessment of critical  
issues by imposing a series of conditions on Trans Mountain.  
[326] With respect to the second error, Burnaby states that Trans Mountain failed to provide  
evidence about alternative routes and locations for portions of the Project, including the Burnaby  
Terminal and the Westridge Marine Terminal. Thus, Burnaby says the Board “had no  
demonstrated basis on the record to decide” about preferred options or to decide that Trans  
Mountain used “criteria that justify and demonstrate how the proposed option was selected and  
why it is the preferred option.” (Burnaby’s memorandum of fact and law, paragraph 133).  
[327] Coldwater asserts that contrary to paragraph 19(1)(g) of the Canadian Environmental  
Assessment Act, 2012, the Board failed to look at the West Alternative as an alternative means of  
carrying out the Project. Briefly stated, the West Alternative is an alternative route for a segment  
of the new pipeline. The approved route for this segment of the new pipeline passes through the  
recharge zone of the aquifer that supplies the sole source of drinking water for 90% of the  
residents of the Coldwater Reserve and crosses two creeks which are the only known, consistent  
sources of water that feed the aquifer. The West Alternative is said by Coldwater to pose the  
least apparent danger to the aquifer.  
[328] Trans Mountain responds that the Board considered the risks and impacts of the Project  
to Burnaby and determined that there was sufficient evidence to conclude that the Project can be  
constructed, operated and maintained in a safe manner. Further, it was reasonable for the Board  
Page: 113  
to implement conditions requiring Trans Mountain to submit additional information for Board  
review or approval throughout the life of the Project. This Court’s role is not to reweigh evidence  
considered by the Board.  
[329] Trans Mountain notes that the proponent’s application and the subsequent Board hearing  
represent the process by which the Board collects enough information to ensure that a project can  
be developed safely and that its impacts are mitigated. At the end of the hearing, the Board  
requires sufficient information to assess the Project’s impacts, and whether the Project can be  
constructed, operated and maintained safely, and to draft terms and conditions to attach to a  
certificate of public convenience and necessity, should the Governor in Council approve the  
Project. It follows that the Board did not improperly defer its consideration of Project impacts to  
the conditions.  
[330] To the extent that some applicants suggest that the Board acted contrary to the  
“precautionary principle” Trans Mountain responds that the precautionary principle must be  
applied with the corollary principle of “adaptive management”. Adaptive management responds  
to the difficulty, or impossibility, of predicting all of the environmental consequences of a  
project on the basis of existing knowledge. Adaptive management permits a project with  
uncertain, yet potentially adverse, environmental impacts to proceed based on mitigation  
measures and adaptive management techniques designed to identify and deal with unforeseen  
effects (Canadian Parks and Wilderness Society v. Canada (Minister of Canadian Heritage),  
2003 FCA 197, [2003] 4 F.C. 672, at paragraph 24).  
Page: 114  
[331] With respect to the assessment of alternative means, Trans Mountain notes that it  
presented evidence that it had conducted a feasibility analysis of alternative locations to the  
Westridge Marine Terminal and the Burnaby Terminal. Based on technical, economic and  
environmental considerations Trans Mountain had eliminated these options because of the  
significantly increased costs and larger environmental impacts associated with these alternatives.  
[332] Trans Mountain also argues that it presented evidence to confirm that its routing criteria  
followed the existing pipeline alignment and other linear facilities wherever possible.  
Additionally, it presented various routing alternatives to the Board. Trans Mountain’s preferred  
corridor through Burnaby Mountain was developed in response to requests that it consider a  
trenchless option through Burnaby Mountain (as opposed to routing the new pipeline through  
residential streets). Further, while it had initially considered the West Alternative route around  
the Coldwater Reserve, Trans Mountain rejected this alternative because it necessitated two  
crossings of the Coldwater River and involved geo-technical challenges and greater  
environmental disturbances.  
[333] Based on the evidence before it the Board found that:  
Trans Mountain provided an adequate assessment of technically and economically  
feasible alternatives, including alternative locations;  
the Burnaby Mountain corridor minimized Project impacts and risks;  
Trans Mountain’s route selection process and criteria, and the level of detail it  
provided for its alternative means assessment, were appropriate; and  
the Board imposed Condition 39 to deal with Coldwater’s concerns regarding the  
aquifer. This condition required Trans Mountain to file with the Board, at least six  
months prior to commencing construction between two specified points, a  
Page: 115  
hydrogeological report relating to Coldwater’s aquifer. This report must describe,  
delineate and characterize a number of things. For example, based on the report’s  
quantification of the risks posed to the groundwater supplies for the Coldwater  
Reserve, the report must “describe proposed measures to address identified risks,  
including but not limited to considerations related to routing, project design,  
operational measures, or monitoring”.  
[334] Trans Mountain submits that while the applicants disagree with the Board’s finding about  
the range of alternatives, the Board has discretion to determine the range of alternatives it must  
consider and it is not this Court’s role to reweigh the Board’s assessment of the facts.  
(i)  
Did the Board fail to assess the risks and impacts posed by  
the Project to Burnaby?  
[335] At paragraphs 278 to 291 I dealt with Burnaby’s argument that the Board breached the  
duty of procedural fairness by deferring and delegating the assessment of important information.  
This argument covers much of the same ground, except it is not couched in terms of procedural  
fairness.  
[336] The gist of Burnaby’s concern is reflected in its argument that “[i]t is a basic principle of  
law that a tribunal or court must weigh and decide conflicting evidence. It cannot defer  
determinations post-judgment.”  
[337] This submission is best considered in concrete terms. The risks the Board is said not to  
have assessed are the risks posed by the Burnaby Terminal, the tunnel route through Burnaby  
Mountain, the Westridge Marine Terminal, the lack of available emergency fire response  
 
Page: 116  
resources to respond to a fire at the Westridge Marine and Burnaby terminals and, finally, the  
risk in relation to the evacuation of Simon Fraser University following an incident at the  
Burnaby Terminal. Illustrative of Burnaby’s concerns is its specific and detailed argument with  
respect to the assessment of the risk associated with the Burnaby Terminal.  
[338] With respect to the assessment of the risks associated with the Burnaby Terminal,  
Burnaby points to the report of its expert, Dr. Ivan Vince, which identified deficiencies or  
information gaps in Trans Mountain’s risk assessment for the Burnaby Terminal. A second  
report prepared by Burnaby’s Deputy Fire Chief identified gaps in Trans Mountain’s analysis of  
fire risks and fire response capability.  
[339] Burnaby acknowledges that the Board recognized these gaps and deficiencies. Thus, it  
found that while Trans Mountain claimed that boil-over events are unlikely, Trans Mountain “did  
not quantify the risks through a rigorous analysis” and that “a complete assessment of risk  
requires consideration of the cumulative risk from all tanks at a terminal”. Burnaby argues,  
however, that despite recognizing this deficiency, the Board then failed to require Trans  
Mountain to provide further information and assessment prior to the issuance of the Board’s  
report. Instead, the Board imposed conditions requiring Trans Mountain to file for the Board’s  
approval a report revising the terminal risk assessments, including the Burnaby Terminal risk  
assessment, and including consideration of the risks not assessed (Conditions 22 and 129).  
[340] Condition 22 specifically required the revised risk assessment to quantify and/or include  
the following:  
Page: 117  
a.  
b.  
c.  
d.  
the effect of any revised spill burn rates;  
the potential consequences of a boil-over;  
the potential consequences of flash fires and vapour cloud explosions;  
the cumulative risk based on the total number of tanks in the terminal, considering  
all potential events (pool fire, boil-over, flash fire, vapour cloud explosion);  
the domino (knock-on) effect caused by a release of the contents of one tank on  
other tanks within the terminals and impoundment area(s), or other tanks in  
adjacent impoundment areas; and,  
e.  
f.  
risk mitigation measures, including ignition source control methods.  
[341] The Board required that for those risks that could not be eliminated “Trans Mountain  
must demonstrate in each risk assessment that mitigation measures will reduce the risks to levels  
that are As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) while complying with the Major Industrial  
Accidents Council of Canada (MIACC) criteria for risk acceptability.”  
[342] Burnaby concludes its argument on this point by stating that this demonstrates that when  
the Board completed its report and made its recommendation to the Governor in Council the  
Board did not have information on the risks enumerated in Condition 22, or information on  
whether these risks could be mitigated. It follows, Burnaby submits, that the Board failed in its  
duty to weigh and decide conflicting evidence.  
[343] Burnaby advances similar arguments in respect of the other risks described above.  
[344] In my view, Burnaby’s argument illustrates that the Board did look critically at the  
competing expert evidence about risk assessment. After weighing the competing expert reports,  
the Board determined that Burnaby’s evidence did reveal gaps and deficiencies in Trans  
Page: 118  
Mountain’s risk assessments. Burnaby’s real complaint is not that the Board did not consider and  
weigh conflicting evidence. Rather, its complaint is that the Board did not then require Trans  
Mountain to in effect re-do its risk assessment.  
[345] However this, in my respectful view, overlooks the Board’s project approval process, a  
process described in detail at paragraphs 285 to 287 above.  
[346] This process does not require a proponent to file in its application information about  
every technical engineering detail. What is required is that by the end of the Board’s hearing the  
Board have sufficient information before it to allow it to form its recommendation to the  
Governor in Council about whether the project is in the public interest and, if approved, what  
conditions should attach to the project. Included in the consideration of the public interest is  
whether the project can be constructed, operated and maintained safely.  
[347] This process reflects the technical complexity of projects put before the Board for  
approval. What was before the Board for consideration was Trans Mountain’s study and  
application for approval of a 150 metre-wide pipeline corridor for the proposed pipeline route. At  
the hearing stage much of the information filed with the Board about the engineering design was  
at a conceptual or preliminary level.  
[348] Once a project is approved, one of the next steps in the regulatory process is a further  
hearing for the purpose of confirming the detailed routing of a project. Only after the detailed  
route is approved by the Board can site-specific engineering information be prepared and filed  
Page: 119  
with the Board. Similarly, detailed routing information is necessary before things such as a fully  
detailed emergency response plan acceptable to the Board may be prepared and filed (report,  
page 7).  
[349] The Board describes the approval of a project to be “just one phase” in the Board’s  
lifecycle regulation. Thereafter the Board’s public interest determination “relies upon the  
subsequent execution of detailed design, construction, operation, maintenance and, ultimately,  
abandonment of a project in compliance with applicable codes, commitments and conditions”  
(report, page 19).  
[350] As stated above, implicit in the Board’s imposition of a condition is the Board’s expert  
view that the condition can realistically be complied with, and that compliance with the  
condition will allow the pipeline to be constructed, operated and maintained in a safe manner.  
After the Board imposes conditions, mechanisms exist for the Board to assess information filed  
in response to its conditions and to oversee compliance with its conditions.  
[351] Burnaby obviously disagrees with the Board’s assessment of risk. However, Burnaby has  
not shown that the Board’s approval process is in any way contrary to the legislative scheme.  
Nor has it demonstrated that the approval process impermissibly defers determinations post-  
judgment. Courts cannot determine issues after a final judgment is rendered because of the  
principle of functus officio. While this principle has some application to administrative decision-  
makers it has less application to the Board whose mandate is ongoing to regulate through a  
project’s entire lifecycle.  
Page: 120  
(ii)  
Did the Board fail to consider alternative means of carrying  
out the Project?  
[352] As explained above, Burnaby’s concern is that Trans Mountain did not provide sufficient  
information to allow the Board to conclude that Trans Mountain’s assessment of alternatives was  
adequate. Burnaby says that the Board simply accepted Trans Mountain’s unsupported assertion  
that the alternatives would result in “significantly greater cost, larger footprint and additional  
environmental effects, as compared to expanding existing facilities” without testing Trans  
Mountain’s assertion. Burnaby argues that evidence is required to support that assertion “so that  
the evidence may be tested by intervenors and weighed by the Board in determining whether the  
preferred location is the best environmental alternative and in the public interest.” (Burnaby’s  
memorandum of fact and law, paragraph 136).  
[353] I begin consideration of Burnaby’s submission with the observation that Burnaby’s  
challenge is a challenge to the Board’s assessment of the sufficiency of the evidence before it.  
The Board, as an expert Tribunal, is entitled to significant deference when making such a fact-  
based assessment.  
[354] Moreover, in my respectful view, Burnaby’s submission fails to take into account that  
paragraph 19(1)(g) of the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, 2012 does not require the  
Board to have regard to any and all alternative means of carrying out a designated project. The  
Board is required to consider only those alternative means that are “technically and economically  
feasible”.  
 
Page: 121  
[355] While Burnaby relies upon guidance from the Canadian Environmental Assessment  
Agency as to the steps to be followed in the assessment of alternative means, and also relies upon  
the guidance set out in the Board’s Filing Manual about the filing requirements for the  
consideration of alternatives, these criteria apply only to the treatment of true alternatives, that is  
alternatives that are technically and economically feasible.  
[356] I now turn to Burnaby’s specific concern that the Board simply accepted Trans  
Mountain’s assertion that Project alternatives would result in “significantly greater cost, larger  
footprint and additional environmental effects, as compared to expanding existing facilities”  
without testing this assertion. Burnaby argues that the Board was obliged to require that Trans  
Mountain provide evidence about alternative routes and locations for the Burnaby Terminal and  
the Westridge Marine Terminal so that the evidence could be tested by it and other interveners.  
[357] The impugned quotation comes from Trans Mountain’s response to Burnaby’s first  
Information Request (Exhibit H to the affidavit of Derek Corrigan). As previously referred to  
above at paragraph 269, in addition to Burnaby’s Information Requests, the Board also served  
two Information Requests on Trans Mountain questioning it about alternative marine terminals.  
[358] The preamble to the Board’s second Information Request referenced Trans Mountain’s  
first response to the Board in which it stated that it had considered potential alternative marine  
terminal locations based on the feasibility of coincident marine and pipeline access, and screened  
them based on technical, economic, and environmental considerations. The preamble also  
referenced Trans Mountain’s response that it had ultimately concluded that constructing and  
Page: 122  
operating a new marine terminal and supporting infrastructure would result in significantly  
greater cost, a larger footprint and significantly greater environmental effects as compared to the  
existing facilities. Based on this conclusion Trans Mountain did not continue with a further  
assessment of alternative termini for the Project.  
[359] One of the specific inquiries directed to Trans Mountain by the Board in its second  
Information Request was:  
Please elaborate on Trans Mountain’s rationale for the Westridge Marine  
Terminal as the preferred alternative, including details to justify Trans Mountain’s  
statement in [Trans Mountain’s response to the Board’s first Information Request]  
that constructing and operating a new marine terminal and supporting  
infrastructure would result in significantly greater cost, a larger footprint, and  
additional environmental effects, as compared to expanding existing facilities.  
[360] In its response to the Board, Trans Mountain began by explaining the consideration it had  
given the option of a northern terminal. Trans Mountain’s assessment ultimately “favoured  
expansion of the existing system south over a new northern lateral [pipeline] and terminal.” This  
assessment was based on the following considerations. The northern option involved:  
A 250 kilometre longer pipeline with a concomitant 10% to 20% higher project  
capital cost.  
Greater technical challenges, including routing through high alpine areas of the  
Coast Mountains, or extensive tunneling to avoid these areas. These technical  
challenges, while not determined to be insurmountable, resulted in greater  
uncertainty for both cost and construction schedule.  
Fewer opportunities to benefit from existing operations, infrastructure and  
relationships. These benefits involved both using the existing Trans Mountain  
right-of-way, facilities, programs and personnel, and the synergies flowing from  
other existing infrastructure such as road access, power, and marine infrastructure.  
Page: 123  
The inability to benefit from existing operations would increase the footprint and  
the potential impact of the northern option.  
[361] Based on these considerations, Trans Mountain concluded that expansion along the  
existing Trans Mountain pipeline route was the more favourable option because of the higher  
costs and the greater uncertainty of both cost and schedule that accompanied the northern option.  
[362] Trans Mountain then turned to explain its consideration of the alternative southern  
terminals. Five southern alternative locations were considered: (i) Howe Sound, which was  
eliminated because there was no feasible pipeline access west of Hope, it would require a new  
lateral pipeline from the Kamloops area, it involved extreme terrain and there was limited land  
available in close proximity for storage facilities; (ii) Vancouver Harbour, which was eliminated  
because there were no locations with coincident feasible pipeline access and no land for storage  
facilities; (iii) Sturgeon Bank, which was eliminated because there was no feasible land available  
in close proximity for storage facilities; (iv) Washington State, which was eliminated because it  
involved a longer pipeline and complex regulatory issues (including additional permits required  
by both Washington State and federal authorities); and, (v) Boundary Bay, which was eliminated  
because of insufficient water depth.  
[363] This left for consideration Roberts Bank. Trans Mountain conducted a screening level  
assessment based on “desktop studies” of technical, economic and environmental considerations  
for marine access, storage facilities and pipeline routing for a terminal at that location.  
Page: 124  
[364] After setting out the assumed technical configuration for the Roberts Bank dock, storage  
and pipeline, Trans Mountain reviewed the engineering and geotechnical considerations. While  
no unsurmountable engineering or geotechnical issues were identified, Trans Mountain’s  
assessment showed that relative to the Westridge Marine Terminal, the Roberts Bank alternative  
“required a significantly larger dock structure, a large new footprint for the storage terminal, a  
longer right of way, and a greater diversion from the existing corridor. The extent and cost of  
ground improvement necessary for the dock and storage terminal also presented a significant  
source of uncertainty.”  
[365] Trans Mountain then reviewed the relevant environmental considerations. Trans  
Mountain’s assessment showed that while both Westridge and Roberts Bank:  
… have unique and important environmental values, based on the setting the  
environmental conditions at Roberts Bank appeared to be more substantial and  
uncertain than at Westridge Terminal, particularly given the larger footprint  
required for the dock and storage terminal. Without effective mitigation accidents  
or malfunctions at Roberts Bank could result in greater and more immediate  
consequences for the natural [environment].  
[366] Trans Mountain then detailed the salient First Nations’ considerations. For the purpose of  
the screening assessment, Trans Mountain assumed First Nation concerns and interests to be  
similar to those for the Westridge Terminal and likely to include concerns for impacts on  
traditional rights, environmental protection, and potential interest in economic opportunities.  
[367] Trans Mountain then reviewed the land use considerations, concluding that relative to the  
Westridge Terminal “the Roberts Bank alternative would result in a greater change in land use  
both for the storage terminal and the dock structure. As surrounding development is less than that  
Page: 125  
for Westridge accidents or malfunctions at this location would be expected to affect fewer  
people.”  
[368] Trans Mountain’s assessment next looked to the estimated cost differences. While  
operating costs were not quantified for comparison purposes, “given the additional dock and  
storage terminal required these costs would be higher for the Roberts Bank alternative.”  
[369] The assessment then looked at marine access considerations. While Roberts Bank offered  
a shorter and relatively less complex marine transit:  
[T]here is an existing well established marine safety system for vessels calling at  
Westridge. Although Roberts Bank would allow service to larger vessels which  
would result in potentially lower transport costs for shippers and lower probability  
of oil spill accidents larger cargos result in potentially larger spill volumes. While  
the overall effect on marine spill risk was not determined it is expected that larger  
cargos would require a greater investment in spill response.  
[370] Trans Mountain then set out the conclusions it drew from its assessment. While the  
Westridge and Roberts Bank terminal alternatives each had positive and negative attributes,  
especially when viewed from any one perspective, overall Trans Mountain’s rationale for the  
Westridge Marine Terminal as a preferred alternative was based on the expectation that Roberts  
Bank would result in:  
Significantly greater costTrans Mountain estimated a $1.2 billion higher capital  
cost and assumed higher operating costs for the Roberts Bank alternative.  
A larger footprint and additional environmental effectsRoberts Bank would  
result in an additional storage terminal with an estimated 100 acres of land  
required, a larger dock structure with a 7 kilometre trestle, and a 14 kilometre  
longer pipeline that diverges further from the existing pipeline corridor.  
Page: 126  
[371] I have set out Trans Mountain’s response to the Board at some length because of the  
importance of this issue to Burnaby. In my view, two points arise from Trans Mountain’s  
response to the Board.  
[372] First, its response was not as conclusory as Burnaby’s submission might suggest. Second,  
Trans Mountain’s explanation for eliminating a northern alternative and the six, southern  
alternatives on the ground they were not technically or economically feasible was based on  
factual and technical considerations well within the expertise of the Board. To illustrate, the  
Board would have an understanding of the technical challenges posed when routing through high  
alpine areas. It would also be familiar with considerations such as the expense and environmental  
impact that accompany the construction of a longer pipeline, away from an existing pipeline  
corridor, or a new storage facility. The Board would have an appreciation of the need for  
coincident pipeline access and land for storage facilities and of the efficiencies that flow from  
things such as the use of existing infrastructure and relationships.  
[373] In relevant part, the Board’s conclusion on alternative means was:  
The Board finds that Trans Mountain’s route selection process, route selection  
criteria, and level of detail for its alternative means assessment are appropriate.  
The Board further finds that aligning the majority of the proposed pipeline route  
alongside, and contiguous to, existing linear disturbances is reasonable, as this  
would minimize the environmental and socio-economic impacts of the Project.  
The Board acknowledges the concern raised by the City of Burnaby that Trans  
Mountain did not provide an assessment of the risks, impacts and effects of the  
alternate marine terminal locations at Kitimat, B.C., or Roberts Bank in Delta,  
B.C. The Board finds that Trans Mountain has provided an adequate assessment,  
including consideration of technical, socio-economic and environmental effects,  
of technically and economically feasible alternative marine terminal locations.  
(underlining added)  
Page: 127  
[374] Burnaby has not demonstrated that the Board’s finding that Trans Mountain provided an  
appropriate level of detail in its alternative means assessment was flawed. This was a fact-based  
assessment well within the Board’s area of expertise.  
(iii) Did the Board fail to look at the West Alternative as an  
alternative route for the new pipeline?  
[375] In its project application, Trans Mountain initially proposed four alternative routes for the  
new pipeline through the Coldwater River Valley. These were referred to as the Modified  
Reserve Route, the East Alternative, the Modified East Alternative and the West Alternative.  
While initially its preferred route was identified to be the East Alternative, Trans Mountain later  
changed its preferred route to be the Modified East Alternative. Coldwater alleges that at some  
point early in the process Trans Mountain unilaterally withdrew the West Alternative from  
consideration without notice to Coldwater. Coldwater also alleges that the East and Modified  
East Alternatives pose the greatest risk of contaminating the aquifer that supplies drinking water  
to the Coldwater Reserve, and that the West Alternative is the only route to pose no apparent  
threat to the aquifer.  
[376] Before the Board, Coldwater argued that Trans Mountain did not adequately assess  
alternative locations for the new pipeline through the Coldwater River Valley. Coldwater  
requested that the Board require a re-examination of routing options for the Coldwater River  
Valley before any recommendation on the Project was made.  
[377] The Board, in its report, acknowledged Coldwater’s concerns at pages 241, 285 and 289.  
 
Page: 128  
[378] The Board noted, at page 245, that “the detailed route for the Project has not been  
finalized, and that this hearing assessed the general route for the Project, the potential  
environmental and socio-economic effects of the Project, as well as all evidence and  
commitments made by Trans Mountain regarding the design, construction and safe operation of  
the pipeline and associated facilities.”  
[379] At page 290 the Board found that Trans Mountain had not sufficiently shown that there  
was no potential interaction between the aquifer underlying the Coldwater Reserve and the  
proposed Project route. Therefore, the Board imposed Condition 39 requiring Trans Mountain to  
file a hydrogeological study to more precisely determine the potential for interactions and  
impacts on the aquifer and to assess the need for any additional measures to protect the aquifer,  
including monitoring measures (Condition 39 was described in greater detail above at paragraph  
333).  
[380] Coldwater argues that the Board breached its statutory obligation to consider alternative  
means of carrying out the designated project. Further, this breach cannot be cured at the detailed  
route hearing because at a detailed route hearing the Board can only consider limited routing  
options within the approved pipeline corridor. The West Alternative is well outside the approved  
corridor. Coldwater submits that the Board’s only option at the detailed route hearing is to  
decline to approve the detailed routing and to reject Trans Mountain’s Plan, Profile and Book of  
Reference (PPBoR); Coldwater says this is an option the Board would be unwilling to pursue  
given the Project’s post-approval momentum.  
Page: 129  
[381] I agree that at a detailed route hearing the Board may only approve, or refuse to approve,  
a proponent’s PPBoR. However, this does not mean that at a detailed route hearing the Board is  
precluded from considering routes outside of the approved pipeline corridor.  
[382] Subsection 36(1) of the National Energy Board Act requires the Board “to determine the  
best possible detailed route of the pipeline and the most appropriate methods and timing of  
constructing the pipeline.” This provision does not limit the Board to considering the best  
possible detailed route within the approved pipeline corridor. This was recognized by the Board  
in Emera Brunswick Pipeline Company Ltd. (Re), 2008 LNCNEB 10, at page 30.  
[383] Additionally, section 21 of the National Energy Board Act permits the Board to review,  
vary or rescind any decision or order, and in Emera the Board recognized, at page 31, that where  
a proposed route is denied on the basis of evidence of a better route outside of the approved  
pipeline corridor an application may be made under section 21 to vary the corridor in that  
location.  
[384] It follows that the Board would be able to vary the route of the new pipeline should the  
hydrogeological study to be filed pursuant to Condition 39 require an alternative route, such as  
the West Alternative route, in order to avoid risk to the Coldwater aquifer.  
[385] As the pipeline route through the Coldwater River Valley remains a live issue, depending  
on the findings of the hydrogeological report, it follows that Coldwater has not demonstrated that  
the Board breached its statutory obligation to consider alternative means.  
Page: 130  
[386] The next error said to vitiate the Board’s report is its alleged failure to consider  
alternatives to the Westridge Marine Terminal.  
(c)  
Did the Board fail to consider alternatives to the Westridge Marine  
Terminal?  
[387] In my view, this issue was fully canvassed in the course of considering Burnaby’s  
argument that the Board impermissibly failed to decide certain issues for recommended approval  
of the Project.  
(d)  
Did the Board err by failing to assess Project-related marine  
shipping under the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act,  
2012?  
[388] Tsleil-Waututh argues that the Board breached the requirements of the Canadian  
Environmental Assessment Act, 2012 by excluding Project-related marine shipping from the  
definition of the “designated project” which was to be assessed under that Act. In turn, the  
Governor in Council is said to have unreasonably exercised its discretion when it relied upon the  
Board’s materially flawed report—in effect the Governor in Council did not have a “report”  
before it and, thus, could not proceed to its decision. Tsleil-Waututh adds that the Board failed to  
comply with the requirements of subsection 31(1) of the Canadian Environmental Assessment  
Act, 2012 by:  
i.  
failing to determine whether the environmental effects of Project-related marine  
shipping are likely, adverse and significant;  
ii.  
concluding that the Project is not likely to cause significant adverse  
environmental effects; and,  
   
Page: 131  
iii.  
failing to determine whether the significant adverse environmental effects likely  
to be caused by Project-related marine shipping can be justified under the  
circumstances.  
[389] The significant adverse effect of particular concern to Tsleil-Waututh are the Project’s  
significant adverse effects upon the endangered Southern resident killer whales and their use by  
Indigenous peoples.  
[390] Tsleil-Waututh’s submissions are adopted by Raincoast and Living Oceans. To these  
submissions they add that the Board’s decision to exclude Project-related shipping from the  
definition of the “designated project” was not a discretionary scoping decision as Trans  
Mountain argues. Rather, the Board erroneously interpreted the statutory definition of  
“designated project”.  
[391] The definition of “designated project” is found in section 2 of the Canadian  
Environmental Assessment Act, 2012: see paragraph 57 above. The parties agree that the issue of  
whether Project-related marine shipping ought to have been included as part of the defined  
designated project turns on whether Project-related marine shipping is a “physical activity that is  
incidental” to the pipeline component of the Project. This is not a pure issue of statutory  
interpretation. Rather, it is a mixed question of fact and law heavily suffused by evidence.  
[392] In response to the submissions of Tsleil-Waututh, Raincoast and Living Oceans, Canada  
and Trans Mountain make two submissions. First, they submit that the Board reasonably  
concluded that the increase in marine shipping was not part of the designated project. Second,  
Page: 132  
and in any event, they argue that the Board conducted an extensive review of marine shipping.  
Therefore, the question for the Court becomes whether the Board’s assessment was substantively  
adequate, such that the Governor in Council still had a “report” before it such that the Board’s  
assessment could be relied upon. Canada and Trans Mountain answer that question in the  
affirmative.  
[393] Before commencing my analysis, it is important to situate the Board’s scoping decision  
and the exclusion of Project-related shipping from the definition of the Project. The definition of  
the designated project truly frames the scope of the Board’s analysis. Activities included as part  
of the designated project are assessed under the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, 2012  
with its prescribed list of factors to be considered. Further, as the Board acknowledged in  
Chapter 10 of its report, the Species at Risk Act imposes additional obligations on the Board  
when a designated project is likely to affect a listed wildlife species. These obligations are  
discussed below, commencing at paragraph 442.  
[394] This assessment is to be contrasted with the assessment of activities not included in the  
definition of the designated project. These excluded activities are assessed under the National  
Energy Board Act if the Board is of the opinion that any public interest may be affected by the  
issuance of a certificate of public convenience and necessity, or by the dismissal of the  
proponent’s application. On this assessment the Board is to have regard to all considerations that  
“appear to it to be directly related to the pipeline and to be relevant”. Parenthetically, to the  
extent that there is potential for the effects of excluded activities to interact with the  
Page: 133  
environmental effects of a project, these effects are generally assessed under the cumulative  
effects portion of the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, 2012 environmental assessment.  
[395] I begin my analysis with Trans Mountain’s application to the Board for a certificate of  
public convenience and necessity for the Project. In Volume 1 of the application, at pages 1-4,  
Trans Mountain describes the primary purpose of the Project to be “to provide additional  
transportation capacity for crude oil from Alberta to markets in the Pacific Rim including BC,  
Washington State, California and Asia.” In Volume 2 of the application, at pages 2-27, Trans  
Mountain describes the marine shipping activities associated with the Project. Trans Mountain  
notes that of the 890,000 barrels per day capacity of the expanded system, up to 630,000 barrels  
per day, or 71%, could be delivered to the Westridge Marine Terminal for shipment by tanker.  
To place this in perspective, currently in a typical month five tankers are loaded with diluted  
bitumen at the Westridge Marine Terminal, some of which are the smaller, Panamax tankers.  
The expanded system would be capable of serving up to 34 of the larger, Aframax tankers per  
month (with actual demand influenced by market conditions).  
[396] This evidence demonstrates that marine shipping is, at the least, an element that  
accompanies the Project. Canada argues that an element that accompanies a physical activity  
while not being a major part of the activity is not “incidental” to the physical activity. Canada  
says that this was what the Board implicitly found.  
[397] The difficulty with this submission is that it is difficult to infer that this was indeed the  
Board’s finding, albeit an implicit finding. I say this because in its scoping decision the Board  
Page: 134  
gave no reasons for its conclusion. In the second paragraph of the decision, under the  
introductory heading, the Board simply set out its conclusion:  
For the purposes of the environmental assessment under the CEAA 2012, the  
designated project includes the various components and physical activities as  
described by Trans Mountain in its 16 December 2013 application submitted to  
the NEB. The Board has determined that the potential environmental and socio-  
economic effects of increased marine shipping activities to and from the  
Westridge Marine Terminal that would result from the designated project,  
including the potential effects of accidents or malfunctions that may occur, will be  
considered under the NEB Act (see the NEB’s Letter of 10 September 2013 for  
filing requirements specific to these marine shipping activities). To the extent that  
there is potential for environmental effects of the designated project to interact  
with the effects of the marine shipping, the Board will consider those effects  
under the cumulative effects portion of the CEAA 2012 environmental  
assessment.  
(underlining added)  
[398] Having defined the designated project not to include the increase in marine shipping, the  
Board dealt with the Project-related increase in marine shipping activities in Chapter 14 of its  
report. Consistent with the scoping decision, at the beginning of Chapter 14 the Board stated, at  
page 323:  
As described in Section 14.2, marine vessel traffic is regulated by government  
agencies, such as Transport Canada, Port Metro Vancouver, Pacific Pilotage  
Authority and the Canadian Coast Guard, under a broad and detailed regulatory  
framework. The Board does not have regulatory oversight of marine vessel traffic,  
whether or not the vessel traffic relates to the Project. There is an existing regime  
that oversees marine vessel traffic. The Board’s regulatory oversight of the  
Project, as well as the scope of its assessment of the Project under the Canadian  
Environmental Assessment Act (CEAA 2012), reaches from Edmonton to  
Burnaby, up to and including the Westridge Marine Terminal (WMT). However,  
the Board determined that potential environmental and socio-economic effects of  
Project-related tanker traffic, including the potential effects of accidents or  
malfunctions that may occur, are relevant to the Board’s consideration of the  
public interest under the NEB Act. Having made this determination, the Board  
developed a set of Filing Requirements specific to the issue of the potential  
effects of Project-related marine shipping activities to complement the Filing  
Manual.  
Page: 135  
(underlining added, footnotes omitted)  
[399] Two points emerge from this passage. The first point is the closest the Board came to  
explaining its scoping decision was that the Board did not have regulatory oversight over marine  
vessel traffic. There is no indication that the Board grappled with this important issue.  
[400] The issue is important because the Project is intended to bring product to tidewater; 71%  
of this product could be delivered to the Westridge Marine Terminal for shipment by tanker.  
Further, as explained below, if Project-related shipping forms part of the designated project  
additional requirements apply under the Species at Risk Act. Finally, Project-related tankers carry  
the risk of significant, if not catastrophic, adverse environmental and socio-economic effects  
should a spill occur.  
[401] Neither Canada nor Trans Mountain point to any authority to the effect that a responsible  
authority conducting an environmental assessment under the Canadian Environmental  
Assessment Act, 2012 must itself have regulatory oversight over a particular subject matter in  
order for the responsible authority to be able to define a designated project to include physical  
activities that are properly incidental to the Project. The effect of the respondents’ submission is  
to impermissibly write the following italicized words into the definition of “designated project”:  
“It includes any physical activity that is incidental to those physical activities and that is  
regulated by the responsible authority.”  
[402] In addition to being impermissibly restrictive, the Board’s view that it was required to  
have regulatory authority over shipping in order to include shipping as part of the Project is  
Page: 136  
inconsistent with the purposes of the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, 2012 enumerated  
in subsection 4(1). These purposes include protecting the components of the environment that are  
within the legislative authority of Parliament and ensuring that designated projects are  
considered in a careful and precautionary manner to avoid significant adverse environmental  
effects.  
[403] The second point that arises is that the phrase “incidental to” is not defined in the  
Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, 2012. It is not clear that the Board expressly directed  
its mind to whether Project-related marine shipping was in fact an activity “incidental” to the  
Project. Had it done so, the Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency’s “Guide to Preparing  
a Description of a Designated Project under the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, 2012”  
provides a set of criteria relevant to the question of whether certain activities should be  
considered “incidental” to a project. These criteria are:  
i.  
the nature of the proposed activities and whether they are subordinate or  
complementary to the designated project;  
ii.  
whether the activity is within the care and control of the proponent;  
if the activity is to be undertaken by a third party, the nature of the relationship  
between the proponent and the third party and whether the proponent has the  
ability to “direct or influence” the carrying out of the activity;  
whether the activity is solely for the benefit of the proponent or is available for  
other proponents as well; and,  
iii.  
iv.  
v.  
the federal and/or provincial regulatory requirements for the activity.  
[404] The Board does not advert to, or grapple with, these criteria in its report. Had the Board  
grappled with these criteria it would have particularly considered whether marine shipping is  
Page: 137  
subordinate or complementary to the Project and whether Trans Mountain is able to “direct or  
influence” aspects of tanker operations.  
[405] In this regard, Trans Mountain stated in its application, on pages 8A-33 to 8A-34, that  
while it did not own or operate the vessels calling at the Westridge Marine Terminal, “it is an  
active member in the maritime community and works with BC maritime agencies to promote  
best practices and facilitate improvements to ensure the safety and efficiency of tanker traffic in  
the Salish Sea.” Trans Mountain also referenced its Tanker Acceptance Standard whereby it can  
prevent any tanker not approved by it from loading at the Westridge Marine Terminal.  
[406] The Board recognized Trans Mountain’s ability to give directions to tanker operators in  
Conditions 133, 134 and 144 where, among other things, the Board required Trans Mountain to:  
confirm that it had implemented its commitments to enhanced tug escort by  
prescribing minimum tug capabilities required to escort outbound, laden tankers  
and by including these minimum capabilities as part of its Tanker Acceptance  
Standard;  
file an updated Tanker Acceptance Standard and a summary of any revisions  
made to the Standard; and,  
file annually a report documenting the continued implementation of Trans  
Mountain’s marine shipping-related commitments noted in Condition 133, any  
instances of non-compliance with Trans Mountain’s requirements and the steps  
taken to correct instances of non-compliance.  
[407] To similar effect, as discussed below in more detail, Trans Mountain committed in the  
TERMPOL review process to require, through its tanker acceptance process, that tankers steer a  
certain course upon exiting the Juan de Fuca Strait.  
Page: 138  
[408] Trans Mountain’s ability to “direct or influence” tanker operations was a relevant factor  
for the Board to consider.  
[409] The Board’s reasons do not well-explain its scoping decision, do not grapple with the  
relevant criteria and appear to be based on a rationale that is not supported by the statutory  
scheme. As explained in more detail below, it follows that the Board failed to comply with its  
statutory obligation to scope and assess the Project so as to provide the Governor in Council with  
a “report” that permitted the Governor in Council to make its decision.  
[410] It follows that it is necessary to consider the respondents’ alternate submission that the  
assessment the Board conducted was, nevertheless, substantially adequate such that the Governor  
in Council could rely upon it for the purpose of assessing the public interest and the  
environmental effects of the Project. To do this I will first consider the deficiencies said to arise  
from the assessment of Project-related shipping under the National Energy Board Act, as  
opposed to its assessment under the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, 2012. I will then  
turn to the Board’s findings, as set out in its report, in order to determine whether the Board’s  
report was materially deficient or substantially adequate.  
(i)  
The deficiencies said to arise from the Board’s assessment  
of Project-related marine shipping under the National  
Energy Board Act  
[411] Had the Project been defined to include Project-related marine shipping, subsection 19(1)  
of the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, 2012 would have required the Board to  
 
Page: 139  
consider, and make findings, concerning the factors enumerated in section 19. In the present  
case, these include:  
the environmental effects of marine shipping, including the environmental effects  
of malfunctions or accidents that may occur in connection with the designated  
project, and any cumulative effects likely to result from the designated project in  
combination with other physical activities that have or will be carried out;  
the significance of these effects;  
mitigation measures that are technically and economically feasible that would  
mitigate any significant adverse effects of marine shipping; and,  
alternative means of carrying out the designated project that are technically and  
economically feasible. This would include alternate shipping routes.  
[412] I now turn to address the Board’s consideration of Project-related shipping.  
(ii)  
The Board’s consideration of Project-related marine  
shipping and its findings  
[413] I begin by going back to the Board’s statement, quoted above at paragraph 398, that  
“potential environmental and socio-economic effects of Project-related tanker traffic, including  
the potential effects of accidents or malfunctions that may occur” were relevant to the Board’s  
consideration of the public interest under the National Energy Board Act. In this context, in order  
to ensure that the Board had sufficient information about those effects, the Board developed the  
specific filing requirements referred to by the Board in the passage quoted above.  
[414] These filing requirements required Trans Mountain to provide a detailed description of  
the increase in marine shipping activities including: the frequency of passages, passage routing,  
 
Page: 140  
speed, and passage transit time; and, the alternatives considered, such as passage routing,  
frequency of passages and tanker type utilized.  
[415] Trans Mountain’s assessment of accidents and malfunctions related to the increase in  
marine shipping was required to include descriptions of matters such as:  
measures to reduce the potential for accidents and malfunctions to occur,  
including an overview of relevant regulatory regimes;  
credible worst case spill scenarios and smaller spill scenarios;  
the fate and behaviour of any hydrocarbons that may be spilled;  
the potential environmental and socio-economic effects of credible worst case  
spill scenarios and smaller spill scenarios, taking into account the season-specific  
behaviour, trajectory, and fate of the hydrocarbon(s) spilled, as well as the range  
of weather and marine conditions that could prevail during the spill event; and,  
Trans Mountain’s preparedness and response planning, including an overview of  
the relevant regulatory regimes.  
[416] Trans Mountain was required to provide information on navigation and safety including:  
an overview of the relevant regulatory regimes and the role of the different  
organizations involved;  
any additional mitigation measures in compliance with, or exceeding regulatory  
requirements, proposed by Trans Mountain to further facilitate marine shipping  
safety; and,  
an explanation of how the regulatory regimes and any additional measures  
promote the safety of the increase in marine shipping activities.  
[417] The filing requirements also required specific information relating to all mitigation  
measures related to the increase in marine shipping activities.  
Page: 141  
[418] I now turn to specifically consider Chapter 14 of the Board’s report and its consideration  
of the Project-related increase in marine shipping activities. Because the applicants’ primary  
concern centers on the Project’s impact on the Southern resident killer whales and their use, I  
will focus on the Board’s consideration of this endangered species, including spill prevention and  
the effects of spills. The Board did also consider and make findings about the impact of  
increased Project-related shipping on air emissions, greenhouse gases, marine and fish habitat,  
marine birds, socio-economic effects, heritage resources and human health effects.  
[419] The Board began by describing the extent of existing, future, and Project-related shipping  
activities. It then moved to a review of the regulatory framework and some federal improvement  
initiatives. The Board’s report describes how marine shipping is regulated under the Canada  
Shipping Act, 2001, S.C. 2001, c. 26 and administered by Transport Canada, the Canadian Coast  
Guard and other government departments.  
[420] The Board then moved, in Section 14.3, to the assessment of the effects of increased  
marine shipping, focusing on changes to the environmental and socio-economic setting caused  
by the routine operation of Project-related marine vessels. It noted that while it assessed the  
potential environmental and socio-economic factors of increased marine shipping as part of its  
public interest determination under the National Energy Board Act, the Board “followed an  
approach similar to the environmental assessment conducted under [the Canadian Environmental  
Assessment Act, 2012] … to the extent it was appropriate, to inform the Board’s public interest  
determination.”  
Page: 142  
[421] The Board went on to explain that in order to consider whether the effects of marine  
shipping were likely to cause significant environmental effects, it considered the existing  
regulatory scheme in the absence of any specific mitigation measures. This reflected the Board’s  
view that since marine shipping was beyond its regulatory authority, it did not have the ability to  
impose specific mitigation conditions to address environmental effects of Project-related marine  
shipping. The Board also explained that it considered any cumulative effects that were likely to  
arise from Project-related shipping, in combination with environmental effects arising from other  
current or reasonably foreseeable marine vessel traffic in the area.  
[422] Finally, before turning to its assessment of the Project’s effects, the Board stated that its  
assessment had considered:  
adverse impacts of Project-related marine shipping on Species at Risk Act  
(SARA)-listed wildlife species and their critical habitat;  
all reasonable alternatives to Project-related marine shipping that would reduce  
impact on SARA-listed species’ critical habitat; and,  
measures to avoid or lessen any adverse impacts, consistent with applicable  
recovery strategies or action plans.  
[423] The Board then went on to make the following findings and statements with respect to  
marine mammals generally:  
Underwater noise from Project-related marine vessels would result in sensory  
disturbances to marine mammals. The disturbance is expected to be long-term as  
it is likely to occur for the duration of operations of Project-related vessel traffic.  
When assessing the impact of Project-related shipping on specific species, the  
Board’s approach was to consider the temporal and spatial impact, and its  
reversibility.  
Page: 143  
Project-related marine vessels have the potential to strike a marine mammal,  
which could result in lethal or non-lethal effects. Further, the increase in Project-  
related marine traffic would contribute to the cumulative risk of marine mammal  
vessel strikes. The Board acknowledged Trans Mountain’s commitment to  
provide explicit guidance for reporting both marine mammal vessel strikes and  
mammals in distress to appropriate authorities.  
The Board accepted the evidence of the Department of Fisheries and Oceans and  
Trans Mountain to the effect that there were no direct mitigation measures that  
Trans Mountain could apply to reduce or eliminate potential adverse effects from  
Project-related tankers. It recognized that altering vessel operations, for example  
by shifting shipping lanes away from marine mammal aggregation areas or  
reducing marine vessel speed, could be an effective mitigation measure. However,  
these specific measures were outside of the Board’s regulatory authority, and out  
of Trans Mountain’s control. The Board encouraged other regulatory authorities,  
such as Transport Canada or Fisheries and Oceans Canada to explore initiatives  
that would aim to reduce the potential effects of marine vessels on marine  
mammals.  
The Board recognized initiatives currently underway, or proposed, and noted  
Trans Mountain’s commitment to participate in some of these initiatives. The  
Board imposed Condition 132 requiring Trans Mountain to develop a Marine  
Mammal Protection Program, and to undertake or support initiatives that focus on  
understanding and mitigating Project-related effects. Such Protection Program is  
to be filed prior to the commencement of Project operations.  
The Board explained that Condition 132 was meant to ensure that Trans Mountain  
fulfilled its commitments to participate in the development of industry-wide  
shipping practices in conjunction with the appropriate authorities. At the same  
time, the Board recognized that the Marine Mammal Protection Program offered  
no assurance that effective mitigation would be developed and implemented to  
address Project-related effects on marine mammals.  
The Board acknowledged the recommendation of the Department of Fisheries and  
Oceans that Trans Mountain explore the use of marine mammal on-board  
Page: 144  
observers on Project-related marine vessels. The Board expressed its agreement  
and set out its expectation that it would see an initiative of this type incorporated  
as part of Trans Mountain’s Marine Mammal Protection Program.  
[424] The Board also acknowledged Trans Mountain’s commitment to require Project-related  
marine vessels to meet any future guidelines or standards for reducing underwater noise from  
commercial vessels as they come into force.  
[425] The Board went on to make the following findings with specific reference to the Southern  
resident killer whale:  
The Southern resident killer whale population has crossed a threshold where any  
additional adverse environmental effects would be considered significant. The  
current level of vessel traffic in the regional study area and the predicted future  
increase of vessel traffic in that area, even excluding Project-related marine  
vessels, “have and would increase the pressure on the Southern resident killer  
whale population.”  
The Board expressed its expectation that Project-related marine vessels would  
represent a maximum of 13.9% of all vessel traffic in the regional study area,  
excluding the Burrard Inlet, and would decrease over time as the volume of  
marine vessel movements in the area is anticipated to grow. Therefore, while the  
effects from Project-related marine vessels would be a small fraction of the total  
cumulative effects, the Board acknowledged that this increase in marine vessels  
associated with the Project “would further contribute to cumulative effects that  
are already jeopardizing the recovery of the Southern resident killer whale. The  
effects associated with Project-related marine vessels will impact numerous  
individuals of the Southern resident killer whale population in a habitat identified  
as critical to the recovery”. The Board classified these effects as “high  
magnitude”. Consequently, the Board found that “the operation of Project-related  
Page: 145  
marine vessels is likely to result in significant adverse effects to the Southern  
resident killer whale.”  
The Board recognized that the “Recovery Strategy for the Northern and Southern  
Resident Killer Whale” prepared by the Department of Fisheries and Oceans  
identified vessel noise as “a threat to the acoustic integrity of Southern resident  
killer whale critical habitat, and that physical and acoustic disturbance from  
human activities may be key factors causing depletion or preventing recovery of  
resident killer whale populations.”  
The Board noted that the death of a Southern resident killer whale from a Project-  
related marine vessel collision, despite the low likelihood of such an event, would  
have population level consequences. The Board acknowledged that Project-  
related marine vessels would encounter a killer whale relatively often, however,  
“given the limited number of recorded killer whale marine vessel strikes and the  
potential avoidance behaviors of killer whales” the Board accepted the evidence  
of Trans Mountain and the Department of Fisheries and Oceans that the  
probability of a Project-related marine mammal vessel strike on a Southern  
resident killer whale was low.  
The Board expressed the view that the recovery of the Southern resident killer  
whale requires complex, multi-party initiatives, and that the Department of  
Fisheries and Oceans and other organizations are currently undertaking numerous  
initiatives to support the recovery of the species, including finalizing an action  
plan. The Board acknowledged Trans Mountain’s commitment to support the  
objectives and recovery measures identified in the action plan. The draft action  
plan included a detailed prioritized list of initiatives. The Board expressed its  
expectation that Trans Mountain would support these initiatives within the Marine  
Mammal Protection Program. The Board encouraged initiatives, including  
initiatives of the federal government, to prioritize and implement specific  
measures to promote recovery of the species.  
Finally, the Board concluded that “the operation of Project-related marine vessels  
is likely to result in significant adverse effects to the Southern resident killer  
whale.”  
Page: 146  
[426] The Board then considered the impact of marine shipping on the traditional use of marine  
resources by Indigenous communities, finding that:  
There would be disruptions to Indigenous marine vessels and harvesters, and this  
may disrupt activities or access to specific sites. However, in the Board’s view  
these disruptions would be temporary, occurring only during the period of time  
when Project-related tanker vessels are in transit. Thus, it was of the view that  
Indigenous marine vessel users would maintain the ability to continue to harvest  
marine resources and to access subsistence and cultural sites in the presence of  
these periodic and short-term disruptions.  
Therefore, the Board found that, with the exception of the effects on the Southern  
resident killer whale, the magnitude of effects of Project-related marine vessel  
traffic on traditional marine resource uses, activities and sites would be low.  
Given the low frequency, duration and magnitude of effects associated with  
potential disruptions, and Trans Mountain’s commitments to provide regular  
updated information on Project-related marine vessel traffic to Indigenous  
communities, the Board found that adverse effects on traditional marine resource  
uses, activities and sites were not likely and that, overall, Project-related marine  
traffic’s contribution to overall effects related to changes in traditional marine use  
patterns was not likely to be significant.  
Project-related marine traffic’s contribution to cumulative effects was found to be  
of low to medium magnitude, and reversible in the long term. The Board therefore  
found significant adverse cumulative effects associated with Project-related  
marine vessel traffic on traditional marine resource use was not likely to be  
significant, with the exception of effects associated with the traditional use of the  
Southern resident killer whale, which were considered significant.  
Recognizing the cultural importance of the killer whale to certain Indigenous  
groups, the Board found that “the increase in marine vessel traffic associated with  
the Project is likely to result in significant adverse effects on the traditional  
Aboriginal use associated with the Southern resident killer whale.”  
Page: 147  
[427] Finally, in Sections 14.4 to 14.6 the Board considered spill prevention. It made the  
following findings:  
The Board accepted the evidence filed by Trans Mountain regarding marine  
shipping navigation and safety, including the reports filed as part of the  
TERMPOL Review Process.  
Although a large spill from a tanker associated with the Project would result in  
significant adverse environmental and socio-economic effects, such an event is  
not likely.  
Even with response efforts, any large spill would result in significant adverse  
environmental and socio-economic effects.  
Trans Mountain, in conjunction with the Western Canada Marine Response  
Corporation, proposed appropriate measures to respond to potential oil spills from  
Project-related tankers. These proposed measures exceed regulatory requirements  
and would result in a response capacity that is double, and a delivery time that is  
half, that required by the existing planning standards. The Board gave substantial  
weight to the fact that the TERMPOL Review Committee and the Canadian Coast  
Guard did not identify any particular concerns with marine spill response  
planning associated with the Project.  
The environmental effects of a spill from a tanker would be highly dependent on  
the particular circumstances, such as the amount and the type of product(s)  
spilled, the location of the spill, the response time, the effectiveness of  
containment and cleanup, the valued components that were impacted, and the  
weather and time of year of the spill.  
A small spill, quickly contained, could have adverse effects of low magnitude,  
whereas a credible worst-case spill could have adverse effects of larger  
geographic extent and longer duration, and such effects would probably be  
significant. Moreover, spills could impact key marine habitats such as salt  
marshes, eelgrass beds and kelp forests, which could, in turn, affect the numerous  
species that rely upon them. Spills could also affect terrestrial species along the  
coastline, including SARA-listed terrestrial plant species.  
Page: 148  
Although impacts from a credible worst-case spill would probably be adverse and  
significant, natural recovery of the impacted areas and species would likely return  
most biological conditions to a state generally similar to pre-spill conditions. Such  
recovery might be as quick as a year or two for some valued components, or  
might take as long as a decade or more for others. Valuable environmental values  
and uses could be lost or diminished in the interim. For some valued components,  
including certain SARA-species, recovery to pre-spill conditions might not occur.  
Mortality of individuals of SARA-listed species could result in population level  
impacts and could jeopardize recovery. For example, the impact on a Southern  
resident killer whale of exposure to an oil spill potentially would be catastrophic.  
There is a very low probability of a credible worst-case event.  
The effects of a credible worst-case spill on the current use of lands, waters and  
resources for traditional purposes by Indigenous people would likely be adverse  
and significant. However, the probability of such a worst-case event is very low.  
[428] With respect to the Board’s reference to the report of the TERMPOL Review Committee,  
one of the topics dealt with in that report was Project routing. It was noted, in Section 3.2, that  
the “shipping route to and from Trans Mountain’s terminal to the open sea is well-established  
and used by deep sea tankers as well as other vessel types such as cargo vessels, cruise ships and  
ferries.” Later in the report it was noted that “Aframax class tankers currently use the proposed  
route, demonstrating that tanker manoeuvrability issues are not a concern.”  
[429] Notwithstanding, the Review Committee did make one finding with respect to the  
shipping route. Finding 9 was to the effect that “Trans Mountain’s commitment to require via its  
tanker acceptance process that Project tankers steer a course no more northerly than due West  
(270°) upon exiting the Juan de Fuca Strait will enhance safety and protection of the marine  
environment by providing the shortest route out of the Canadian” economic exclusion zone.  
Page: 149  
[430] Returning to the Board’s report, the end result of the Board’s assessment of the Project  
was that, notwithstanding the impacts of the Project upon the Southern resident killer whales and  
Indigenous cultural uses associated with them, with the implementation of Trans Mountain’s  
environmental protection procedures and mitigation, and the Board’s recommended conditions,  
the Project is not likely to cause significant adverse environmental effects. This was the Board’s  
recommendation under section 29 of the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, 2012.  
(iii) Was the Board’s assessment of Project-related marine  
shipping substantially adequate?  
[431] I begin with the Board’s description of its approach to the assessment of marine shipping.  
It “followed an approach similar to the environmental assessment conducted under” the  
Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, 2012 “to the extent it was appropriate”. Consistent  
with this approach, the Board’s filing requirements in respect of marine shipping required Trans  
Mountain to provide information about mitigation measures and alternativesfactors which  
subsection 19(1) of the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, 2012 require be considered in  
an environmental assessment.  
[432] Bearing in mind that the primary focus of the applicants’ concern about the Board’s  
assessment of Project-related marine shipping is the Board’s assessment of the adverse effects of  
the Project on Southern resident killer whales, the previous review of the Board’s findings  
demonstrates that the Board considered the Project’s effects on the Southern resident killer  
whales, including the environmental effects of malfunctions or accidents that might occur, the  
significance of those effects and the cumulative effects of the Project on efforts to promote  
 
Page: 150  
recovery of the species. The Board found the operation of the Project-related tankers was likely  
to result in significant, adverse effects to the Southern resident killer whale population.  
[433] Given the Board’s finding that the Project was likely to result in significant adverse  
effects on the Southern resident killer whale, and its finding that Project-related marine vessel  
traffic would further contribute to the total cumulative effects (which were determined to be  
significant), the Board found that the increase in marine vessel traffic associated with the Project  
is likely to result in significant adverse effects on the traditional Indigenous use associated with  
the Southern resident killer whale.  
[434] The Board then considered mitigation measures through the limited lens of its regulatory  
authority. It found there were no direct mitigation measures Trans Mountain could apply to  
reduce or eliminate potential adverse effects from Project-related tankers.  
[435] The Board stated that it considered all reasonable alternatives to Project-related marine  
shipping that would reduce the impact on SARA-listed species’ critical habitat. This would  
include the critical habitat of the Southern resident killer whale. As part of this consideration, the  
Board directed Information Request No. 2 to Trans Mountain. In material part, Trans Mountain  
responded that the only known potential mitigation measures relevant to the Salish Sea to reduce  
the risk of marine mammal vessel strikes would be to alter the shipping lanes in order to avoid  
sensitive habitat (that is areas where whales aggregate), and to set speed restrictions. Trans  
Mountain advised that shipping lanes and speed restrictions are set at the discretion of Transport  
Canada.  
Page: 151  
[436] Thereafter, the Board issued an Information Request to Transport Canada that, among  
other things, requested Transport Canada to summarize any initiatives it was currently  
supporting or undertaking that evaluated potential alternative shipping lanes or vessel speed  
reductions along the southern coast of British Columbia with the intent of reducing impacts on  
marine mammals from marine shipping. Transport Canada responded that it was “not currently  
contemplating alternative shipping lanes or vessel speed restrictions for the purpose of reducing  
impacts on marine mammals from marine shipping in British Columbia”. However, Transport  
Canada noted it was participating in the Enhancing Cetacean Habitat and Observation Program  
led by Port Metro Vancouver.  
[437] Transport Canada’s statement that it had no current intent to make alterations to shipping  
lanes or to impose vessel speed restrictions would seem to have pre-empted further consideration  
of routing alternatives by the Board.  
[438] This review of the Board’s report has shown that the Board in its assessment of Project-  
related marine shipping considered:  
the effects of Project-related marine shipping on Southern resident killer whales;  
the significance of the effects;  
the cumulative effect of Project-related marine shipping on the recovery of the  
Southern resident killer whale population;  
the resulting significant, adverse effects on the traditional Indigenous use  
associated with the Southern resident killer whale;  
mitigation measures within its regulatory authority; and,  
reasonable alternatives to Project-related marine shipping.  
Page: 152  
[439] Given the Board’s approach to the assessment and its findings, the Board’s report was  
adequate for the purpose of informing the Governor in Council about the effects of Project-  
related marine shipping on the Southern resident killer whales and their use by Indigenous  
groups. The Board’s report adequately informed the Governor in Council of the significance of  
these effects, the Board’s view there were no direct mitigation measures Trans Mountain could  
apply to reduce potential adverse effects from Project-related tankers, and that there were  
potential mitigation measures beyond the Board’s regulatory authority and so not the subject of  
proper consideration by the Board or conditions. Perhaps most importantly, the report put the  
Governor in Council on notice that the Board defined the Project not to include Project-related  
marine shipping. This decision excluded the effects of Project-related shipping from the  
definition of the Project as a designated project and allowed the Board to conclude that, as it  
defined the Project, the Project was not likely to cause significant adverse effects.  
[440] The Order in Council and its accompanying Explanatory Note demonstrate that the  
Governor in Council was fully aware of the manner in which the Board had assessed Project-  
related marine shipping under the National Energy Board Act. The Governor in Council was also  
fully aware of the effects of Project-related marine shipping identified by the Board and that the  
operation of Project-related vessels is likely to result in significant adverse effects upon both the  
Southern resident killer whale and Indigenous cultural uses of this endangered species.  
[441] Having found that the Governor in Council understood the Board’s approach and  
resulting conclusions, it remains to consider the reasonableness of the Governor in Council’s  
Page: 153  
reliance on the Board’s report to approve the Project. This is considered below, after considering  
the applicants’ submissions with respect to the Species at Risk Act.  
(e)  
Did the Board err in its treatment of the Species at Risk Act?  
[442] The purposes of the Species at Risk Act are: to prevent wildlife species from being  
extirpated or becoming extinct; to provide for the recovery of wildlife species that are extirpated,  
endangered or threatened as a result of human activity; and, to manage species of special concern  
to prevent them from becoming endangered or threatened (section 6).  
[443] Important protections are found in section 77 of the Act, which is intended to protect the  
critical habitat of listed wildlife species, and section 79, which is intended to protect listed  
wildlife species and their critical habitat from new projects. Listed wildlife species are those  
species listed in Schedule 1 of the Act, a list of wildlife species at risk. Sections 77 and 79 are set  
out in the Appendix to these reasons.  
[444] Raincoast and Living Oceans argue that as a result of unreasonably defining the  
designated project not to include Project-related marine shipping, the Board failed to meet the  
requirement of subsection 79(2) of the Species at Risk Act. As a result of this error they say it  
was unreasonable for the Governor in Council to rely upon the Board’s report without first  
ensuring that the Board had complied with subsection 79(2) of the Act with respect to Southern  
resident killer whales. They also argue that it was unreasonable for the Governor in Council not  
to comply with its additional, independent obligations under subsection 77(1) of the Species at  
Risk Act.  
 
Page: 154  
[445] I will deal first with the applicability of section 79 of the Act.  
(i)  
Did the Board err by concluding that section 79 of the  
Species at Risk Act did not apply to its consideration of the  
effects of Project-related marine shipping?  
[446] Section 79 obligates every person required “to ensure that an assessment of the  
environmental effects of a project is conducted” to:  
i.  
promptly notify the competent minister or ministers if the project “is likely to  
affect a listed wildlife species or its critical habitat.” (subsection 79(1));  
identify the adverse effects of the project on the listed wildlife species and its  
critical habitat (subsection 79(2)); and,  
ii.  
iii.  
if the project is carried out, ensure that measures are taken “to avoid or lessen  
those effects and to monitor them.” The measures taken must be taken in a way  
that is consistent with any applicable recovery strategy and action plans  
(subsection 79(2)).  
[447] Subsection 79(3) defines a “project” to mean, among other things, a designated project as  
defined in subsection 2(1) of the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, 2012.  
[448] The Board acknowledged its obligations under section 79 of the Species at Risk Act in the  
course of its environmental assessment (Chapter 10, page 161). However, because it had not  
defined the designated project to include Project-related marine shipping, the Board rejected  
Living Oceans’ submission that the Board’s obligations under section 79 of the Species at Risk  
Act applied to its consideration of the effects of Project-related marine shipping on the Southern  
resident killer whale (Chapter 14, page 332). Notwithstanding this conclusion that section 79 did  
not apply, for reasons that are not explained in its report, the Board did comply with the  
 
Page: 155  
obligation under subsection 79(1) to notify the responsible ministers that the Project might affect  
Southern resident killer whales and their habitat. The Board did this by letter dated April 23,  
2014 (a letter sent approximately three weeks after the Board made its scoping decision).  
[449] I have found that the Board unjustifiably excluded Project-related marine shipping from  
the Project’s description. It follows that the failure to apply section 79 of the Species at Risk Act  
to its consideration of the effects of Project-related marine shipping on the Southern resident  
killer whale was also unjustified.  
[450] Both Canada and Trans Mountain argue that, nonetheless, the Board substantially  
complied with its obligations under section 79 of the Species at Risk Act. Therefore, as with the  
issue of Project-related marine shipping, the next question is whether the Board substantially  
complied with its obligations under section 79.  
(ii)  
Did the Board substantially comply with its obligations  
under section 79 of the Species at Risk Act?  
[451] The respondents argue that, in addition to complying with the notification requirement  
found in subsection 79(1), the Board considered:  
the adverse impacts of marine shipping on listed wildlife species and their critical  
habitat;  
all reasonable alternatives to marine shipping that would reduce impact on listed  
species’ critical habitat; and  
measures, consistent with the applicable recovery strategies or action plans, to  
avoid or lessen any adverse impacts of the Project.  
 
Page: 156  
[452] Canada and Trans Mountain submit that as a result the Board met its requirements  
“where possible.” (Trans Mountain’s memorandum of fact and law, paragraph 120). On this last  
point, Trans Mountain submits that the Board lacked authority to impose conditions or otherwise  
ensure that measures were taken to avoid or lessen the effects of marine shipping on species at  
risk. Thus, while the Board could identify potential mitigation measures, and encourage the  
appropriate regulatory authorities to take further action, it could not ensure compliance with  
subsection 79(2) of the Species at Risk Act.  
[453] Canada and Trans Mountain have accurately summarized the Board’s findings that are  
relevant to its consideration of Project-related shipping in the context of the Species at Risk Act.  
However, I do not accept their submission that the Board’s consideration of the Project’s impact  
on the Southern resident killer whale substantially complied with its obligation under section 79  
of the Species at Risk Act. I reach this conclusion for the following reason.  
[454] By defining the Project not to include Project-related marine shipping, the Board failed to  
consider its obligations under the Species at Risk Act when it considered the Project’s impact on  
the Southern resident killer whale. Had it done so, in light of its recommendation that the Project  
be approved, subsection 79(2) of the Species at Risk Act required the Board to ensure, if the  
Project was carried out, that “measures are taken to avoid or lessen” the Project’s effects on the  
Southern resident killer whale and to monitor those measures.  
[455] While I recognize the Board could not regulate shipping, it was nonetheless obliged to  
consider the consequences at law of its inability to “ensure” that measures were taken to  
Page: 157  
ameliorate the Project’s impact on the Southern resident killer whale. However, the Board gave  
no consideration in its report to the fact that it recommended approval of the Project without any  
measures being imposed to avoid or lessen the Project’s significant adverse effects upon the  
Southern resident killer whale.  
[456] Because marine shipping was beyond the Board’s regulatory authority, it assessed the  
effects of marine shipping in the absence of mitigation measures and did not recommend any  
specific mitigation measures. Instead it encouraged other regulatory authorities “to explore any  
such initiatives” (report, page 349). While the Board lacked authority to regulate marine  
shipping, the final decision-maker was not so limited. In my view, in order to substantially  
comply with section 79 of the Species at Risk Act the Governor in Council required the Board’s  
exposition of all technically and economically feasible measures that are available to avoid or  
lessen the Project’s effects on the Southern resident killer whale. Armed with this information  
the Governor in Council would be in a position to see that, if approved, the Project was not  
approved until all technically and economically feasible mitigation measures within the authority  
of the federal government were in place. Without this information the Governor in Council  
lacked the necessary information to make the decision required of it.  
[457] The reasonableness of the Governor in Council’s reliance on the Board’s report is  
considered below.  
Page: 158  
[458] For completeness I now turn to the second argument advanced by Raincoast and Living  
Oceans: it was unreasonable for the Governor in Council to fail to comply with its additional,  
independent obligations under subsection 77(1) of the Species at Risk Act.  
(iii) Was the Governor in Council obliged to comply with  
subsection 77(1) of the Species at Risk Act?  
[459] Subsection 77(1) applies when any person or body, other than a competent minister,  
issues or approves “a licence, a permit or any other authorization that authorizes an activity that  
may result in the destruction of any part of the critical habitat of a listed wildlife species”. The  
person or body may authorize such an activity only if they have consulted with the competent  
minister, considered the impact on the species’ critical habitat and formed the opinion that: (a) all  
reasonable alternatives to the activity that would reduce the impact on the critical habitat have  
been considered and the best solution has been adopted; and (b) all feasible mitigation measures  
will be taken to minimize the impact on the critical habitat.  
[460] The Board accepted that:  
… vessel noise is considered a threat to the acoustic integrity of Southern resident  
killer whale critical habitat, and that physical and acoustic disturbance from  
human activities may be key factors causing depletion or preventing recovery of  
resident killer whale populations.  
(report, page 350)  
[461] It also accepted that the impact of a Southern resident killer whale being exposed to an oil  
spill “is potentially catastrophic” (report, page 398).  
 
Page: 159  
[462] Based on these findings, Raincoast and Living Oceans submit that Project-related  
shipping “may destroy” critical habitat so that subsection 77(1) was engaged.  
[463] I respectfully disagree. The Order in Council directed the Board to issue a certificate of  
public convenience and necessity approving the construction and operation of the expansion  
project. The Governor in Council did not issue or approve a licence, permit or other  
authorization that authorized marine shipping.  
[464] Further, subsection 77(1.1) of the Species at Risk Act provides that subsection 77(1) does  
not apply to the Board when, as in the present case, it issues a certificate pursuant to an order  
made by the Governor in Council under subsection 54(1) of the National Energy Board Act. I  
accept Canada’s submission that Parliament would not have intended to exempt the Board from  
the application of subsection 77(1) while at the same time contemplating that the Governor in  
Council was not exempted and was obliged to comply with subsection 77(1). This is particularly  
so given the Board’s superior expertise in assessing impacts on habitat and mitigation measures.  
If subsection 77(1) applied, the Board’s ability to meet its obligations was superior to that of the  
Governor in Council.  
(f)  
Conclusion: the Governor in Council erred by relying upon the  
Board’s report as a proper condition precedent to the Governor in  
Council’s decision  
[465] Trans Mountain’s application was complex, raising challenging issues on matters as  
diverse as Indigenous rights and concerns, pipeline integrity, the fate and behaviours of spilled  
hydrocarbons in aquatic environments, emergency prevention, preparedness and response, the  
 
Page: 160  
need for the Project and its economic feasibility and the effects of Project-related shipping  
activities.  
[466] The approval process was long and demanding for all participants; after the hearing the  
Board was left to review tens of thousands of pages of evidence.  
[467] Many aspects of the Board’s report are not challenged in this proceeding.  
[468] This said, I have found that the Board erred by unjustifiably excluding Project-related  
marine shipping from the Project’s definition. While the Board’s assessment of Project-related  
shipping was adequate for the purpose of informing the Governor in Council about the effects of  
such shipping on the Southern resident killer whale, the Board’s report was also sufficient to put  
the Governor in Council on notice that the Board had unjustifiably excluded Project-related  
shipping from the Project’s definition.  
[469] It was this exclusion that permitted the Board to conclude that section 79 of the Species at  
Risk Act did not apply to its consideration of the effects of Project-related marine shipping. This  
exclusion then permitted the Board to conclude that, notwithstanding its conclusion that the  
operation of Project-related marine vessels is likely to result in significant adverse effects to the  
Southern resident killer whale, the Project (as defined by the Board) was not likely to cause  
significant adverse environmental effects. The Board could only reach this conclusion by  
defining the Project not to include Project-related shipping.  
Page: 161  
[470] The unjustified exclusion of Project-related marine shipping from the definition of the  
Project thus resulted in successive deficiencies such that the Board’s report was not the kind of  
“report” that would arm the Governor in Council with the information and assessments it  
required to make its public interest determination and its decision about environmental effects  
and their justification. In the language of Gitxaala this resulted in a report so deficient that it  
could not qualify as a “report” within the meaning of the legislation and it was unreasonable for  
the Governor in Council to rely upon it. The Board’s finding that the Project was not likely to  
cause significant adverse environmental effects was central to its report. The unjustified failure  
to assess the effects of marine shipping under the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, 2012  
and the resulting flawed conclusion about the effects of the Project was so critical that the  
Governor in Council could not functionally make the kind of assessment of the Project’s  
environmental effects and the public interest that the legislation requires.  
[471] I have considered the reference in the Explanatory Note to the Order in Council to the  
government’s commitment to the proposed Action Plan for the Southern resident killer whale  
and the then recently announced Oceans Protection Plan. These inchoate initiatives, while  
laudable and to be encouraged, are by themselves insufficient to overcome the material  
deficiencies in the Board’s report because the “report” did not permit the Governor in Council to  
make an informed decision about the public interest and whether the Project is likely to cause  
significant adverse environmental effects as the legislation requires.  
Page: 162  
[472] There remains to consider the issue of the remedy which ought to flow from the  
unreasonable reliance upon the Board’s report. In my view, this is best dealt with following  
consideration of the adequacy of the Crown’s consultation process.  
[473] My conclusion that the Board’s report was so flawed that it was unreasonable for the  
Governor in Council to rely upon it arguably makes it unnecessary to deal with the argument  
advanced on behalf of the Attorney General of British Columbia. It is nonetheless important that  
it be briefly considered.  
3.  
The challenge of the Attorney General of British Columbia  
[474] As explained above at paragraphs 64 and 65, after the Board submits a report to the  
Governor in Council setting out the Board’s recommendation under section 52 of the National  
Energy Board Act about whether a certificate of public convenience and necessity should issue,  
the Governor in Council may, among other options, by order direct the Board to issue a  
certificate of public convenience and necessity. Irrespective of the option selected, the Governor  
in Council’s order “must set out the reasons for making the order” (subsection 54(2) of the  
National Energy Board Act). The Attorney General of British Columbia intervened in this  
proceeding to argue that, in breach of this statutory obligation, the Governor in Council failed to  
give reasons explaining why the Project is not likely to cause significant adverse environmental  
effects and why the Project is in the public interest.  
[475] The Attorney General also argued in its written memorandum, but not orally, that the  
Governor in Council failed to consider the “disproportionate impact of Project-related marine  
 
Page: 163  
shipping spill risks on the Province of British Columbia”. This failure is said to render the  
Governor in Council’s decision unreasonable.  
[476] In consequence, the Attorney General of British Columbia supports the request of the  
applicants that the Governor in Council’s Order in Council be set aside.  
(a)  
Did the Governor in Council fail to comply with the obligation to  
give reasons?  
[477] The lynchpin of the Attorney General’s argument is his submission that the Governor in  
Council’s reasons must be found “within the four corners of the Order in Council” and nowhere  
else. Thus, the Attorney General submits that it is impermissible to have regard to the  
accompanying Explanatory Note or to documents referred to in the Explanatory Note, including  
the Board’s report and the Crown Consultation Report. Read in this fashion, the Order in Council  
does not explain why the Governor in Council found the Project is not likely to cause any  
significant adverse environmental effects or was in the public interest.  
[478] I respectfully reject the premise of this submission. Subsection 54(2) does not dictate the  
form the Governor in Council’s reasons should take, requiring only that the “order must set out  
the reasons”. Given the legislative nature and the standard format of an Order in Council  
(generally a series of recitals followed by an order) Orders in Council are not well-suited to the  
provision of lengthy reasons. In the present case, the two-page Order in Council was  
accompanied by the 20-page Explanatory Note. They were published together in the Canada  
Gazette. Given this joint publication, it would, in my view, be unduly formalistic to set aside the  
 
Page: 164  
Order in Council on the ground that the reasons found in the attached Explanatory Note were  
placed in an attachment to the order, and not within the “four square corners” of the order.  
[479] Similarly, it would be unduly formalistic not to look to the content of the Board’s report  
that informed the Governor in Council when rendering its decision. The Order in Council  
specifically referenced the Board’s report and the terms and conditions set out in an appendix to  
the report, and expressly accepted the Board’s public interest recommendation. This conclusion  
that the Order in Council may be read with the Board’s report is consistent with this Court’s  
decision in Gitxaala, where the Court accepted Canada’s submission that the Order in Council  
should be read together with the findings and recommendations in the report of the joint review  
panel. This Court read the Order in Council together with the report and other documents in the  
record and found that the Governor in Council had met its statutory obligation to give reasons.  
[480] I therefore find that the Governor in Council also in this case complied with its statutory  
obligation to give reasons.  
(b)  
Did the Governor in Council fail to consider the impact of Project-  
related shipping spill risks on the Province of British Columbia?  
[481] I disagree that the Governor in Council failed to consider the impact of shipping spill  
risks. The Explanatory Note shows the Governor in Council considered that:  
The Board found the risk of a major crude oil spill occurring was low  
(Explanatory Note, page 10).  
The Board imposed conditions relating to accidents and malfunctions  
(Explanatory Note, page 13).  
 
Page: 165  
[482] Under the heading “Government response to what was heard” the Explanatory Note set  
out the following about the risk of spills:  
Communities are deeply concerned about the risk and impacts that oil spills pose  
to their land, air, water and communities. In addition to the terms and conditions  
related to spills identified by the NEB, land-based oil spills are subject to both  
federal and provincial jurisdiction. Federally regulated pipelines are subject to  
NEB regulation and oversight, which requires operators to develop  
comprehensive emergency management programs and collaborate with local  
responders in the development of these programs. B.C. also recently implemented  
regulations under the provincial Environmental Management Act to strengthen  
provincial oversight and require industry and government to collaborate in  
response to spills in B.C.  
The Government recently updated its world-leading pipeline safety regime  
through the Pipeline Safety Act, which came into force in June 2016. The Act  
implements $1 billion in “absolute liability” for companies operating major crude  
oil pipelines to clarify that operators will be responsible for all costs associated  
with spills irrespective of fault up to $1 billion; operators remain liable on an  
unlimited basis beyond this amount when they are negligent or at fault. The Act  
also requires proponents to carry cash on hand to ensure they are in a position to  
immediately respond to emergencies.  
With respect to ship source spills, the Government recently announced $1.5  
billion in new investment in a national Oceans Protection Plan to enhance its  
world-leading marine safety regime. The Oceans Protection Plan has four main  
priority areas:  
creating a world-leading marine safety system that  
improves responsible shipping and protects Canada’s  
waters, including new preventative and response measures;  
restoring and protecting the marine ecosystems and  
habitats, using new tools and research;  
strengthening partnerships and launching co-management  
practices with Indigenous communities, including building  
local emergency response capacity; and  
investing in oil spill cleanup research and methods to  
ensure that decisions taken in emergencies are evidence-  
based.  
The Plan responds to concerns related to potential marine spills by strengthening  
the Coast Guard’s ability to take command in marine emergencies, toughening  
Page: 166  
requirements for industry response to incidents, and by enhancing Indigenous  
partnerships.  
[483] While the Attorney General of British Columbia disagrees with the Governor in  
Council’s assessment of the risk of a major spill from Project-related shipping, there is no merit  
to the submission that the Governor in Council failed to consider the risk of spills posed by  
Project-related shipping.  
[484] I now turn to consider the adequacy of the consultation process.  
D.  
Should the decision of the Governor in Council be set aside on the ground that  
Canada failed to consult adequately with the Indigenous applicants?  
1.  
The applicable legal principles  
[485] Before commencing the analysis, it is helpful to discuss briefly the principles that have  
emerged from the jurisprudence which has considered the scope and content of the duty to  
consult. As explained in the opening paragraphs of these reasons, the applicable principles are  
not in dispute; what is in dispute is whether, on the facts of this case (which are largely agreed),  
Canada fulfilled its constitutional duty to consult.  
[486] The duty to consult is grounded in the honour of the Crown and the protection provided  
for “existing aboriginal and treaty rights” in subsection 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982. The  
duties of consultation and, if required, accommodation form part of the process of reconciliation  
and fair dealing (Haida Nation, paragraph 32).  
   
Page: 167  
[487] The duty arises when the Crown has actual or constructive knowledge of the potential  
existence of Indigenous rights or title and contemplates conduct that might adversely affect those  
rights or title (Haida Nation, paragraph 35). The duty reflects the need to avoid the impairment  
of asserted or recognized rights caused by the implementation of a specific project.  
[488] The extent or content of the duty of consultation is fact specific. The depth or richness of  
the required consultation increases with the strength of the prima facie Indigenous claim and the  
seriousness of the potentially adverse effect upon the claimed right or title (Haida Nation,  
paragraph 39; Rio Tinto Alcan Inc. v. Carrier Sekani Tribal Council, 2010 SCC 43, [2010] 2  
S.C.R. 650, paragraph 36).  
[489] When the claim to title is weak, the Indigenous interest is limited or the potential  
infringement is minor, the duty of consultation lies at the low end of the consultation spectrum.  
In such a case, the Crown may be required only to give notice of the contemplated conduct,  
disclose relevant information and discuss any issues raised in response to the notice (Haida  
Nation, paragraph 43). When a strong prima facie case for the claim is established, the right and  
potential infringement is of high significance to Indigenous peoples, and the risk of non-  
compensable damage is high, the duty of consultation lies at the high end of the spectrum. While  
the precise requirements will vary with the circumstances, a deep consultative process might  
entail: the opportunity to make submissions; formal participation in the decision-making process;  
and, the provision of written reasons to show that Indigenous concerns were considered and how  
those concerns were factored into the decision (Haida Nation, paragraph 44).  
Page: 168  
[490] Parliament may choose to delegate procedural aspects of the duty to consult to a tribunal.  
[491] The Supreme Court has found the Board to possess both the procedural powers necessary  
to implement consultation and the remedial powers to accommodate, where necessary, affected  
Indigenous claims and Indigenous and treaty rights. The Board’s process can, therefore, be relied  
on by the Crown to fulfil, in whole or in part, the Crown’s duty to consult (Clyde River (Hamlet)  
v. Petroleum Geo-Services Inc., 2017 SCC 40, [2017] 1 S.C.R. 1069, paragraph 34).  
[492] As referenced above at paragraph 284, the Supreme Court has described the Board as  
having considerable institutional expertise both in conducting consultations and in assessing the  
environmental impacts of proposed projects. Where the effects of a proposed project on  
Indigenous or treaty rights substantially overlap with the project’s potential environmental  
impact, the Board “is well situated to oversee consultations which seek to address these effects,  
and to use its technical expertise to assess what forms of accommodation might be available”  
(Clyde River, paragraph 33).  
[493] When the Crown relies on a regulatory or environmental assessment process to fulfil the  
duty to consult, such reliance is not delegation of the Crown’s ultimate responsibility to ensure  
consultation is adequate. Rather, it is a means by which the Crown can be satisfied that  
Indigenous concerns have been heard and, where appropriate, accommodated (Haida Nation,  
paragraph 53).  
Page: 169  
[494] The consultation process does not dictate a particular substantive outcome. Thus, the  
consultation process does not give Indigenous groups a veto over what can be done with land  
pending final proof of their claim. What is required is a process of balancing interestsa process  
of give and take. Nor does consultation equate to a duty to agree; rather, what is required is a  
commitment to a meaningful process of consultation (Haida Nation, paragraphs 42, 48 and 62).  
[495] Good faith consultation may reveal a duty to accommodate. Where there is a strong  
prima facie case establishing the claim and the consequence of proposed conduct may adversely  
affect the claim in a significant way, the honour of the Crown may require steps to avoid  
irreparable harm or to minimize the effects of infringement (Haida Nation, paragraph 47).  
[496] Good faith is required on both sides in the consultative process: “The common thread on  
the Crown’s part must be ‘the intention of substantially addressing [Aboriginal] concerns’ as  
they are raised […] through a meaningful process of consultation” (Haida Nation, paragraph 42).  
The “controlling question in all situations is what is required to maintain the honour of the  
Crown and to effect reconciliation between the Crown and the Aboriginal peoples with respect to  
the interests at stake” (Haida Nation, paragraph 45).  
[497] At the same time, Indigenous claimants must not frustrate the Crown’s reasonable good  
faith attempts, nor should they take unreasonable positions to thwart the government from  
making decisions or acting in cases where, despite meaningful consultation, agreement is not  
reached (Haida Nation, paragraph 42).  
Page: 170  
[498] In the present case, much turns on what constitutes a meaningful process of consultation.  
[499] Meaningful consultation is not intended simply to allow Indigenous peoples “to blow off  
steam” before the Crown proceeds to do what it always intended to do. Consultation is  
meaningless when it excludes from the outset any form of accommodation (Mikisew Cree First  
Nation v. Canada (Minister of Canadian Heritage), 2005 SCC 69, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 388,  
paragraph 54).  
[500] The duty is not fulfilled by simply providing a process for exchanging and discussing  
information. There must be a substantive dimension to the duty. Consultation is talking together  
for mutual understanding (Clyde River, paragraph 49).  
[501] As the Supreme Court observed in Haida Nation at paragraph 46, meaningful  
consultation is not just a process of exchanging information. Meaningful consultation “entails  
testing and being prepared to amend policy proposals in the light of information received, and  
providing feedback.” Where deep consultation is required, a dialogue must ensue that leads to a  
demonstrably serious consideration of accommodation. This serious consideration may be  
demonstrated in the Crown’s consultation-related duty to provide written reasons for the  
Crown’s decision.  
[502] Where, as in this case, the Crown must balance multiple interests, a safeguard requiring  
the Crown to explain in written reasons the impacts of Indigenous concerns on decision-making  
Page: 171  
becomes more important. In the absence of this safeguard, other issues may overshadow or  
displace the issue of impacts on Indigenous rights (Gitxaala, paragraph 315).  
[503] Further, the Crown is obliged to inform itself of the impact the proposed project will have  
on an affected First Nation, and, if appropriate in the circumstances, communicate its findings to  
the First Nation and attempt to substantially address the concerns of the First Nation (Mikisew  
Cree First Nation, paragraph 55).  
[504] Consultation must focus on rights. In Clyde River, the Board had concluded that  
significant environmental effects to marine mammals were not likely and effects on traditional  
resource use could be addressed through mitigation measures. The Supreme Court held that the  
Board’s inquiry was misdirected for the purpose of consultation. The Board was required to  
focus on the Inuit’s treaty rights; the “consultative inquiry is not properly into environmental  
effects per se. Rather, it inquires into the impact on the right(emphasis in original) (Clyde  
River, paragraph 45). Mitigation measures must provide a reasonable assurance that  
constitutionally protected rights were considered as rights in themselvesnot just as an  
afterthought to the assessment of environmental concerns (Clyde River, paragraph 51).  
[505] When consulting on a project’s potential impacts the Crown must consider existing  
limitations on Indigenous rights. Therefore, the cumulative effects and historical context may  
inform the scope of the duty to consult (Chippewas of the Thames, paragraph 42).  
Page: 172  
[506] Two final points. First, where the Crown knows, or ought to know, that its conduct may  
adversely affect the Indigenous right or title of more than one First Nation, each First Nation is  
entitled to consultation based upon the unique facts and circumstances pertinent to it (Gitxaala,  
paragraph 236).  
[507] Second, it is important to understand that the public interest and the duty to consult do  
not operate in conflict. As a constitutional imperative, the duty to consult gives rise to a special  
public interest that supersedes other concerns commonly considered by tribunals tasked with  
assessing the public interest. In the case of the Board, a project authorization that breaches the  
constitutionally protected rights of Indigenous peoples cannot serve the public interest (Clyde  
River, paragraph 40).  
2.  
The standard to which Canada is to be held in fulfilling the duty  
[508] As briefly explained above at paragraph 226, Canada is not to be held to a standard of  
perfection in fulfilling its duty to consult. The Supreme Court of Canada has expressed this  
concept as follows:  
Perfect satisfaction is not required; the question is whether the regulatory scheme  
or government action “viewed as a whole, accommodates the collective aboriginal  
right in question”: Gladstone, supra, at para. 170. What is required is not  
perfection, but reasonableness. As stated in Nikal, supra, at para. 110, “in …  
information and consultation the concept of reasonableness must come into play.  
So long as every reasonable effort is made to inform and to consult, such  
efforts would suffice.” The government is required to make reasonable efforts to  
inform and consult. This suffices to discharge the duty.  
(Haida Nation, paragraph 62)  
(underlining added)  
 
Page: 173  
[509] As in Gitxaala, in this case “the subjects on which consultation was required were  
numerous, complex and dynamic, involving many parties. Sometimes in attempting to fulfil the  
duty there can be omissions, misunderstandings, accidents and mistakes. In attempting to fulfil  
the duty, there will be difficult judgment calls on which reasonable minds will differ.” (Gitxaala,  
paragraph 182).  
[510] Against this legal framework, I turn to the design and execution of Canada’s four-phase  
consultation process. This process began in May 2013 with the filing of the Project description  
and ended in November 2016 with the decision of the Governor in Council to approve the  
Project and direct the issuance of a certificate of public convenience and necessity.  
3.  
Application of the legal principles to the evidence  
[511] The Indigenous applicants express a myriad of concerns and asserted deficiencies with  
respect to the consultation process. Broadly speaking, they challenge both the design of the  
process and the execution of the process.  
[512] I will deal first with the asserted deficiencies in the design of the process selected and  
followed by Canada, and then consider the asserted deficiencies in the execution of the process.  
(a)  
Was the consultation process deficient because of the design of the  
process selected and followed by Canada?  
[513] Generally speaking, the most salient concerns expressed with respect to the design of the  
consultation process are the assertions that:  
   
Page: 174  
i.  
The consultation framework was unilaterally imposed.  
ii.  
The National Energy Board process is inadequate for fulfilling consultation  
obligations.  
iii.  
iv.  
Insufficient funding was provided.  
The process allowed the Project to be approved when essential information was  
lacking.  
[514] Each assertion will be considered in turn.  
(i)  
The consultation framework was unilaterally imposed  
[515] There was no substantive consultation with the Indigenous applicants about the four-  
phase consultation process.  
[516] However, as Canada argues, the Crown possesses a discretion about how it structures a  
consultation process and how it meets its consultation obligations (Gitxaala, paragraph 203,  
citing Cold Lake First Nations v. Alberta (Tourism, Parks and Recreation), 2013 ABCA 443,  
566 A.R. 259, at paragraph 39). What is required is a process that allows Canada to make  
reasonable efforts to inform and consult (Haida Nation, at paragraph 62).  
[517] Canada’s four-phase consultation process is described above at paragraphs 72 through 75.  
While I deal below with the asserted frailties of the Board’s hearing process in this particular  
case, the Supreme Court has recently re-affirmed that the Crown may rely on a regulatory agency  
to fulfil the Crown’s duty to consult so long as the agency possesses the statutory powers to do  
what the duty to consult requires in the particular circumstances (Chippewas of the Thames,  
 
Page: 175  
paragraph 32). In the present case, no applicant asserts that the National Energy Board lacked  
any necessary statutory power so as to be able to fulfil in part the Crown’s duty to consult. It  
follows that Canada could rely upon a consultation process which relied in part on the Board’s  
hearing process, so long as Canada remained mindful of its constitutional obligation to ensure  
before approving the Project that consultation was adequate.  
[518] Canada implemented a five-phase consultation framework for the review of the Northern  
Gateway Project. In Gitxaala, this Court found that the framework was reasonable (Gitxaala,  
paragraph 8). When the two consultation frameworks are compared there is little to distinguish  
them. An additional first phase was required in the Northern Gateway framework simply because  
the project was reviewed by a joint review panel, not the Board.  
[519] Given Canada’s discretion as to how the consultation process is structured and the  
similarity of this consultation process to that previously found by this Court to be reasonable, I  
am satisfied that Canada did not act in breach of the duty to consult by selecting the four-phase  
consultation process it adopted.  
(ii)  
The Board’s process is said to be inadequate for fulfilling  
consultation obligations  
[520] A number of deficiencies are asserted with respect to the Board’s process and its  
adequacy for fulfilling, to the extent possible, consultation obligations. The asserted deficiencies  
include:  
The Board’s decision not to allow cross-examination of Trans Mountain’s  
evidence.  
 
Page: 176  
The Board’s treatment of oral traditional evidence.  
The Board’s timeframe which is said not to have provided sufficient time for  
affected Indigenous groups to inform themselves of the complexity of the Project  
and to participate with knowledge of the issues and impacts on them.  
The Board’s failure to consult with affected Indigenous groups about any of the  
decisions the Board made prior to or during the hearing, including the list of  
issues for the hearing, the panel members who would hear the application, the  
design of the regulatory review and the environmental assessment, the decision-  
making process and the report and its recommendations.  
The failure of the Board’s process to provide the required dialogue and  
consultation directly with Canada in circumstances where it is said that  
consultation in Phase III would be too little, too late.  
[521] It is convenient to deal with the first four deficiencies together as the Board’s choice of  
procedures, its decision-making process and its ultimate decision flow from its powers as a  
regulator under the National Energy Board Act and the Canadian Environmental Assessment  
Act, 2012.  
[522] As explained above, the Supreme Court has found that meaningful Crown consultation  
can be carried out wholly or in part through a regulatory process (Chippewas of the Thames,  
paragraph 32). Prior to this decision, concern had been expressed about the tension said to result  
if a tribunal such as the Board were required both to carry out consultation on behalf of the  
Crown and then adjudicate on the adequacy of the consultation. The Supreme Court responded  
that such concern is addressed by observing that while it is the Crown that owes the  
constitutional duty to consult, agencies such as the Board are required to make legal decisions  
that comply with the Constitution. The Supreme Court went on to explain, at paragraph 34, that:  
Page: 177  
When the [Board] is called on to assess the adequacy of Crown consultation, it  
may consider what consultative steps were provided, but its obligation to remain a  
neutral arbitrator does not change. A tribunal is not compromised when it carries  
out the functions Parliament has assigned to it under its Act and issues decisions  
that conform to the law and the Constitution.  
(underlining added)  
[523] Applying these principles to the submissions before this Court, and bearing in mind that  
at this point I am only addressing submissions with respect to the adequacy of the design of the  
consultation process, the Board was required to provide a process that was impartial and fair and  
in accordance with its statutory framework and the Constitution.  
[524] As explained above, section 8 of the National Energy Board Act authorizes the Board to  
make rules about the conduct of hearings before it, and the Board’s rules allow the Board to  
determine whether public hearings held before it are oral or written. Section 52 of the National  
Energy Board Act requires the Board to render its report to the Minister within strict timelines. It  
follows that the Board could decide not to allow oral cross-examination, could determine how  
oral traditional evidence would be received and could schedule the hearing to comply with  
section 52 of the National Energy Board Act so long as, at the end of the hearing, it was satisfied  
that it had exercised its responsibilities in a manner that was fair and impartial and consistent  
with its governing legislation and section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982.  
[525] Similarly, the Board was authorized as a neutral arbitrator to make the decisions required  
of it under the legislation, including decisions about which issues would be decided during the  
hearing, the composition of the hearing panel and the content of its ultimate report. So long as  
these decisions were made in a manner that was fair and impartial, and in accordance with the  
Page: 178  
legislative scheme and subsection 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 they too were validly  
made. The Indigenous applicants have not shown that any additional dialogue or process was  
required between the Board and the Indigenous applicants in order for the Board’s decision to be  
constitutionally sound.  
[526] Put another way, when the Board’s process is relied on in whole or in part to fulfil the  
obligation to consult, the regulatory hearing process does not change and the Board’s role as  
neutral arbitrator does not change. What changes is that the Board’s process serves the additional  
purpose of contributing to the extent possible to the constitutional imperative not to approve a  
project if the duty to consult was not satisfied.  
[527] I now consider the last deficiency said to make the Board’s process inadequate for  
fulfilling even in part the duty to consult: the failure of the Board’s process to provide the  
required consultation directly with Canada.  
[528] The Indigenous applicants do not point to any jurisprudence to support their submission  
that Canada was required to dialogue directly with them during the Board’s hearing process (that  
is, during Phase II) and I believe this submission may be dealt with briefly.  
[529] As stated above, meaningful Crown consultation can be carried out wholly through a  
regulatory process so long as where the regulatory process relied upon by the Crown does not  
achieve adequate consultation or accommodation, the Crown takes further steps to meet its duty  
Page: 179  
to consult by, for example, filling any gaps in consultation on a case-by-case basis (Clyde River,  
paragraph 22).  
[530] In the present case, Phase III was designed in effect to fill the gaps left by the Phase II  
regulatory processPhase III was to focus on outstanding concerns about the Project-related  
impacts upon potential or established Indigenous or treaty rights and on any incremental  
accommodation measures that Canada should address. Leaving aside the question of whether  
Phase III adequately addressed gaps in the consultation process, a point dealt with below, the  
Indigenous applicants have not shown that the consultation process required Canada’s direct  
involvement in the regulatory process.  
[531] For all of these reasons, I am satisfied that the Board’s process was adequate for fulfilling  
its consultation obligations.  
[532] The next concern with respect to the design of the consultation process is that it is said  
that insufficient participant funding was provided.  
(iii) The funding provided is said to have been inadequate  
[533] Two Indigenous applicants raise the issue of inadequate funding: Squamish and SSN.  
[534] Squamish sought participant funding of $293,350 to participate in the Board process but  
was granted only $44,270, plus travel costs for one person to attend the hearing. Canada later  
provided $26,000 to Squamish to participate in consultation following the close of the Board  
 
Page: 180  
hearing record. The Squamish appendix to the Crown Consultation Report notes that the British  
Columbia Environmental Assessment Office also offered Squamish $5,000 in capacity funding  
to participate in consultations.  
[535] Chief Campbell of the Squamish Nation provided evidence that the funding provided to  
Squamish was not adequate for Squamish to obtain experts to review and respond to the 8  
volume, 15,000 page, highly technical Project application. Nor, in his view, was the funding  
adequate for Squamish to undertake a comprehensive assessment of the impacts of the Project on  
Squamish rights and title. He notes that Squamish’s limited budget is fully subscribed to meet the  
needs of its members and that the sole purpose of Squamish’s involvement in the hearing and  
consultation process was “defensive: to protect our rights and title.”  
[536] SSN requested in excess of $300,000 for legal fees, expert fees, travel costs, meeting  
attendance costs and information collecting costs. It received $36,920 in participant funding, plus  
travel for two representatives to attend the hearing. Canada later offered $39,000 to SSN to  
participate in consultation following the close of the Board hearing record. The British Columbia  
Environmental Assessment Office also offered some capacity funding.  
[537] SSN states that Canada knew that SSN requested funding in largest part to complete a  
traditional land and resource use study. It states that Canada knew that such studies had been  
completed for other Indigenous groups in relation to the Project, but that neither Canada nor the  
proponent had undertaken such a study for SSN.  
Page: 181  
[538] I accept that the level of participant funding provided constrained participation in the  
process before the National Energy Board by the Squamish and the SSN. However, as Canada  
submits, it is difficult to see the level of participant funding as being problematic in a systematic  
fashion when only two applicants address this issue.  
[539] In Gitxaala, this Court rejected the submission that inadequate funding had been  
provided for participation before the joint review panel and in the consultation process. The  
Court noted, at paragraph 210, that the evidence filed in support of the submissions did:  
… not explain how the amounts sought were calculated, or detail any financial  
resources available to the First Nations outside of that provided by Canada. As  
such, the evidence fails to demonstrate that the funding available was so  
inadequate as to render the consultation process unreasonable.  
[540] Much the same can be said of the evidence filed on this application. While SSN did  
append its request for participant funding as Exhibit D to the affidavit of its affiant Jeanette  
Jules, at the time this application was submitted SSN had not determined which expert or experts  
would be hired, it could not advise as to how many hours the expert(s) would likely bill or what  
the expert(s)’ hourly rate(s) would be. The information provided was simply that it was expected  
that $80,000 was required to prepare a traditional land use study and that an additional $30,000  
was required as the approximate cost of a wildlife study. No information was provided by either  
applicant about financial resources available to it.  
[541] The evidence has not demonstrated that the level of participant funding was so  
inadequate as to render the entire consultation process unreasonable.  
Page: 182  
(iv)  
The process allowed the Project to be approved when  
essential information was lacking  
[542] The final deficiency asserted with respect to the structure of the consultation process  
relates to the nature of the Board’s process for approving projects. A number of Indigenous  
applicants argue that Canada’s reliance upon the Board’s hearing process was unreasonable in  
circumstances where potential impacts to title and rights remained unknown because studies of  
those potential impacts, and of the measures proposed in the Board’s report to mitigate potential  
impacts, were left to a later date after the Governor in Council approved the Project. It is argued  
that without identification of all of the impacts of the Project Canada cannot rely on the Board’s  
assessment of impacts to fulfil the duty to consult.  
[543] Commencing at paragraph 286 above, I describe in some detail the Board’s approval  
process in the context of the submission of the City of Burnaby that the Board’s approval process  
was procedurally unfair because of what Burnaby characterized to be the deferral and delegation  
of the assessment of important information.  
[544] Beginning at paragraph 322 above, I deal with the submissions of the City of Burnaby  
and Coldwater that the Governor in Council erred in determining that the Board’s report  
qualified as a report because the Board did not decide certain issues before recommending  
approval of the Project. Consideration of the concerns advanced by Coldwater with respect to the  
Board’s failure to deal with the West Alternative begins at paragraph 375 above. At paragraphs  
384 and 385, I conclude that the pipeline route through the Coldwater River Valley remains a  
live issue.  
 
Page: 183  
[545] This places in context concerns raised by Coldwater and other applicants about the  
reasonableness of Canada’s reliance on a process that left important issues unresolved at the time  
the Governor in Council approved the Project.  
[546] In my view, this concern is addressed by the Supreme Court’s analysis in the companion  
cases of Clyde River and Chippewas of the Thames where the Supreme Court explained that the  
Board’s approval process may itself trigger the duty to consult where that process may result in  
adverse impacts upon Indigenous and treaty rights (Clyde River, paragraphs 25 to 29; Chippewas  
of the Thames, paragraphs 29 to 31).  
[547] Examined in the context of Coldwater’s concerns about the West Alternative and the  
protection of Coldwater’s aquifer, this means that the Board’s decision about the detailed  
pipeline routing in the vicinity of the Coldwater Reserve will trigger the duty to consult because  
Canada will have knowledge, real or constructive, of the potential impact of that decision upon  
Coldwater’s aquifer located beneath the Coldwater Reserve. Once the duty is triggered, the  
Board may only make its decision if it informs itself of the impacts to the aquifer and takes the  
rights and interests of Coldwater into consideration before making its final decisions about  
pipeline routing and compliance with Condition 39 (Chippewas of the Thames, paragraph 48).  
Canada will remain responsible to ensure that the Board’s decision upholds the honour of the  
Crown (Clyde River, paragraph 22). This is, I believe, a full answer to the concern that the  
consultation framework was deficient because certain decisions remain to be made after the  
Governor in Council approved the Project.  
Page: 184  
(v)  
Conclusion on the adequacy of the process selected and  
followed by Canada  
[548] In Clyde River and Chippewas of the Thames the Supreme Court provided helpful  
guidance about the indicia of a reasonable consultation process. Applying those indicia:  
The Indigenous applicants were given early notice of the Project, the Board’s  
hearing process, the framework of the consultation process and Canada’s  
intention to rely on the National Energy Board process, to the extent possible, to  
discharge Canada’s duty to consult.  
Participant funding was provided to the Indigenous applicants both by the Board  
and Canada (and the provincial Crown as well).  
The Board’s process permitted Indigenous applicants to provide written evidence  
and oral traditional evidence, to question both Trans Mountain and the federal  
government interveners through Information Requests and to make written and  
oral closing submissions.  
The regulatory framework permitted the Board to impose conditions upon Trans  
Mountain that were capable of mitigating risks posed by the Project to the rights  
and title of the Indigenous applicants.  
After the Board’s hearing record closed and prior to the decision by the Governor  
in Council, Canada provided a further consultation phase, Phase III, designed to  
enable Canada to deal with concerns not addressed by the hearing, the Board’s  
proposed conditions and Trans Mountain’s commitments.  
Canada understood, and advised the Indigenous applicants, that if Indigenous  
groups identified outstanding concerns in Phase III there were a number of  
options available to Canada. These included asking the National Energy Board to  
reconsider its recommendations and conditions, undertaking further consultations  
prior to issuing additional permits or authorizations and the use of existing or new  
policy and program measures to address outstanding concerns.  
 
Page: 185  
[549] I am satisfied that the consultation framework selected by Canada was reasonable. It was  
sufficient, if properly implemented, to enable Canada to make reasonable efforts to inform itself  
and consult. Put another way, this process, if reasonably implemented, could have resulted in  
mutual understanding on the core issues and a demonstrably serious consideration of  
accommodation.  
(b)  
Was the consultation process deficient because of Canada’s  
execution of the process?  
[550] Canada argues that the consultation process allowed for deep consultation both in form  
and in substance. In particular it notes that:  
The Indigenous applicants were given early notice of the proposed Project, the  
Board hearing process and the consultation process, as well as Canada’s intention  
to rely on the Board’s process, to the extent possible, to discharge Canada’s duty  
to consult.  
The Board required that Trans Mountain extensively consult before filing its  
application so as to attempt to address potential impacts by way of project  
modifications and design.  
Participant funding was provided to the Indigenous applicants by both Canada  
and the Board.  
The Indigenous applicants were afforded the opportunity before the Board to  
provide oral traditional and written evidence, to ask questions of Trans Mountain  
and the Federal interveners, and to make both written and oral submissions. The  
Board’s report formulated conditions to mitigate, avoid or otherwise address  
impacts on Indigenous groups, and explained how Indigenous concerns were  
considered and addressed.  
Canada ordered an extension of the legislative timeframe for the Governor in  
Council’s decision and met and corresponded with the Indigenous applicants to  
Page: 186  
discuss concerns that may not have been adequately addressed by the Board and  
to work together to identify potential accommodation measures.  
Canada developed the Crown Consultation Report to inform government  
decision-makers and sought feedback from the Indigenous applicants on two draft  
versions of the Crown Consultation Report.  
Canada reviewed upstream greenhouse gas emission estimates for the Project,  
struck a Ministerial Panel to seek public input and held a workshop in Kamloops.  
Canada developed additional accommodation measures including an Indigenous  
Advisory and Monitoring Committee, the Oceans Protection Plan and the Action  
Plan for the Recovery of the Southern Resident Killer Whale.  
Canada gave written reasons for conditionally approving the Project that showed  
how Indigenous concerns were considered and addressed.  
[551] While in Gitxaala this Court found that the consultation process followed for the  
Northern Gateway project fell well short of the mark, Canada submits that the flaws identified by  
the Court in Gitxaala were remedied and not repeated. Specific measures were taken to remedy  
the flaws found in the earlier consultation. Thus:  
i.  
Canada extended the consultation process by four months to allow deeper  
consultation with potentially affected Indigenous groups, greater public  
engagement and an assessment of the greenhouse gas emissions associated with  
the Project.  
ii.  
iii.  
The Order in Council expressly stated that the Governor in Council was “satisfied  
that the consultation process undertaken is consistent with the honour of the  
Crown and that the concerns and interests have been appropriately  
accommodated”. Reasons for this conclusion were given in the Explanatory Note.  
Canada shared its preliminary strength of claim assessments in August 2016 to  
allow Indigenous groups to comment on the assessments. Canada’s ultimate  
assessments were set out in the Crown Consultation Report.  
Page: 187  
Canada’s officials met and dialogued with Indigenous groups. As well, several  
iv.  
Ministers met with Indigenous groups. While the Governor in Council accepted  
the report of the National Energy Board, in addition to the Board’s conditions the  
Crown Consultation Report contained a commitment to design, fund and  
implement an Indigenous Advisory and Monitoring Committee for the Project and  
the Explanatory Note referenced two new initiatives: the Economic Pathways  
Partnership and the Oceans Protection Plan.  
v.  
In order to ensure that the Governor in Council received accurate information,  
two drafts of the Crown Consultation Report were distributed for comment and  
Indigenous groups were invited to provide their own submissions to the Governor  
in Council.  
vi.  
The consultation was based on the unique facts and circumstances applicable to  
each Indigenous group. The Crown Consultation Report contained a detailed  
appendix for each potentially affected Indigenous group that dealt with:  
background information; a preliminary strength of claim assessment; a summary  
of the group’s involvement in the Board and Crown Consultation process; a  
summary of the group’s interests and concerns; accommodation proposals; the  
group’s response to the Board’s report; the potential impacts of the Project on the  
group’s Indigenous interests; and the Crown’s conclusions.  
[552] I acknowledge significant improvements in the consultation process. To illustrate, in  
Gitxaala this Court noted, among other matters, that:  
requests for extensions of time were ignored (reasons, paragraphs 247 and 250);  
inaccurate information was put before the Governor in Council (reasons,  
paragraphs 255-262);  
requests for information went unanswered (reasons, paragraphs 272, 275-278);  
Canada did not disclose its assessment of the strength of the Indigenous parties’  
claim to rights or title or its assessment of the Project’s impacts (reasons,  
paragraphs 288-309); and,  
Page: 188  
Canada acknowledged that the consultation on some issues fell well short of the  
mark (reasons, paragraph 254).  
[553] Without doubt, the consultation process for this project was generally well-organized,  
less rushed (except in the final stage of Phase III) and there is no reasonable complaint that  
information within Canada’s possession was withheld or that requests for information went  
unanswered.  
[554] Ministers of the Crown were available and engaged in respectful conversations and  
correspondence with representatives of a number of the Indigenous applicants.  
[555] Additional participant funding was offered to each of the applicants to support  
participation in discussions with the Crown consultation team following the release of the  
Board’s report and recommendations. The British Columbia Environmental Assessment Office  
also offered consultation funding.  
[556] The Crown Consultation Report provided detailed information about Canada’s approach  
to consultation, Indigenous applicants’ concerns and Canada’s conclusions. An individualized  
appendix was prepared for each Indigenous group (as described above at paragraph 551(vi)).  
[557] However, for the reasons developed below, Canada’s execution of Phase III of the  
consultation process was unacceptably flawed and fell short of the standard prescribed by the  
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court. As such, the consultation process fell short of the required  
mark for reasonable consultation.  
Page: 189  
[558] To summarize my reasons for this conclusion, Canada was required to do more than  
receive and understand the concerns of the Indigenous applicants. Canada was required to  
engage in a considered, meaningful two-way dialogue. Canada’s ability to do so was constrained  
by the manner in which its representatives on the Crown consultation team implemented their  
mandate. For the most part, Canada’s representatives limited their mandate to listening to and  
recording the concerns of the Indigenous applicants and then transmitting those concerns to the  
decision-makers.  
[559] On the whole, the record does not disclose responsive, considered and meaningful  
dialogue coming back from Canada in response to the concerns expressed by the Indigenous  
applicants. While there are some examples of responsiveness to concerns, these limited examples  
are not sufficient to overcome the overall lack of response. The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence  
repeatedly emphasizes that dialogue must take place and must be a two-way exchange. The  
Crown is required to do more than to receive and document concerns and complaints. As this  
Court wrote in Gitxaala, at paragraph 265, speaking of the limited mandate of Canada’s  
representatives:  
When the role of Canada’s representatives is seen in this light, it is of no surprise  
that a number of concerns raised by Aboriginal groupsin our view, concerns  
very central to their legitimate interestswere left unconsidered and undiscussed.  
This fell well short of the conduct necessary to meet the duty to consult.  
[560] Further, Phase III was to focus on two questions: outstanding concerns about Project-  
related impacts and any required incremental accommodation measures. Canada’s ability to  
consult and dialogue on these issues was constrained by two further limitations: first, Canada’s  
unwillingness to depart from the Board’s findings and recommended conditions so as to  
Page: 190  
genuinely understand the concerns of the Indigenous applicants and then consider and respond to  
those concerns in a genuine and adequate way; second, Canada’s erroneous view that it was  
unable to impose additional conditions on Trans Mountain.  
[561] Together these three factors led to a consultation process that fell short of the mark and  
was, as a result, unreasonable. Canada then exacerbated the situation by its late disclosure of its  
view that the Project did not have a high level of impact on the established and asserted rights of  
the Indigenous applicantsa disclosure made two weeks before they were required to submit  
their final response to the consultation process and less than a month before the Governor in  
Council approved the Project.  
[562] I begin the analysis by underscoring the need for meaningful two-way dialogue in the  
context of this Project and then move to describe in more detail the three significant impediments  
to meaningful consultation: the Crown consultation team’s implementation of their mandate  
essentially as note-takers, Canada’s reluctance to consider any departure from the Board’s  
findings and recommended conditions, and Canada’s erroneous view that it lacked the ability to  
impose additional conditions on Trans Mountain. I then discuss Canada’s late disclosure of its  
assessment of the Project’s impact on the Indigenous applicants. Finally, I review instances that  
show that as a result of these impediments the opportunity for meaningful dialogue was  
frustrated.  
[563] The jurisprudence of the Supreme Court on the duty to consult is clear. The Indigenous  
applicants were entitled to a dialogue that demonstrated that Canada not only heard but also gave  
Page: 191  
serious consideration to the specific and real concerns the Indigenous applicants put to Canada,  
gave serious consideration to proposed accommodation measures, and explained how the  
concerns of the Indigenous applicants impacted Canada’s decision to approve the Project. The  
instances below show how Canada fell short of its obligations.  
(i)  
The need for meaningful two-way dialogue  
[564] As a matter of well-established law, meaningful dialogue is a prerequisite for reasonable  
consultation. As explained above at paragraphs 499 to 501, meaningful consultation is not  
simply a process of exchanging information. Where, as in this case, deep consultation is  
required, a dialogue must ensue and the dialogue should lead to a demonstrably serious  
consideration of accommodation. The Crown must be prepared to make changes to its proposed  
actions based on information and insight obtained through consultation.  
[565] The need for meaningful dialogue exists and operates in a factual context. Here, Phase III  
was a critically important part of the consultation framework. This was so for a number of  
reasons.  
[566] First, Phase III was the first opportunity for the Indigenous applicants to dialogue directly  
with Canada about matters of substance, not process.  
[567] Second, the Board’s report did not deal with all of the subjects on which consultation was  
required. For example, the Board did not make any determinations about the nature and scope of  
asserted or established Indigenous rights, including title rights. Nor did the Board consider the  
 
Page: 192  
scope of the Crown’s duty to consult or whether the duty was fulfilled. Nor did Trans Mountain  
in its application, or the Board in its report, assess how the residual effects of the Project, or the  
Project itself, could adversely impact traditional governance systems and claims to Aboriginal  
title (Crown Consultation Report, sections 1.4, 4.3.4 and 4.3.5). Canada was obliged to consult  
on these issues.  
[568] Third, neither Trans Mountain nor the Board assessed the Project’s impacts on a specific  
basis for each affected Indigenous group. Rather, Trans Mountain assessed the effects related to  
Project construction and operations (including potential accidents and malfunctions) that might  
impact biophysical resources and socio-economic components within the Project area, and the  
Indigenous uses, practices and activities associated with those resources. This approach was  
accepted by the Board (Board report, pages 51 to 52).  
[569] Finally, Phase III began in earnest with the release of the Board’s report and finalized  
conditions. This report contained findings of great importance to the applicants because the  
Board’s findings led Canada to conclude that the Project had only a minor-to-moderate impact  
on the Indigenous applicants. As a matter of law, this conclusion directly affected both the depth  
of consultation required and the need for accommodation measures. The following two examples  
illustrate the importance of the Board’s findings to the Indigenous applicants.  
[570] The first example concerns the assessment of the Project’s potential impact on freshwater  
fishing. The Board found that the proposed watercourse crossings designs, mitigation measures,  
reclamation activities and post-construction monitoring were appropriate and that they would  
Page: 193  
effectively reduce the extent of effects on fish and fish habitat. Watercourse crossings would be  
required to comply with federal and provincial laws and regulations and would require permits  
under the British Columbia Water Sustainability Act, S.B.C. 2014, c. 15. The Board agreed with  
Trans Mountain’s self-assessment of the potential for serious harm in that the majority of  
proposed watercourse crossings would not constitute serious harm to fish for the purposes of the  
Fisheries Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-14 (Board report, pages 183 and 185).  
[571] The Stó:lō have a constitutionally protected right to fish on the Fraser River, a right  
affirmed by the Supreme Court of Canada. In the Stó:lō appendix to the Crown Consultation  
Report, Canada concluded that Project construction and routine maintenance during operation  
would be expected to result in a minor-to-moderate impact on the Stó:lō’s freshwater fishing and  
marine fishing and harvesting activities (Stó:lō appendix, pages 26 and 27). This assessment  
flowed directly from the Board’s conclusion that Project-related activities could result in low-to-  
moderate magnitude effects on freshwater and marine fish and fish habitat and the Board’s  
conclusion that its conditions, if the Project was approved, would either directly or indirectly  
avoid or reduce potential environmental effects on fishing activities (Stó:lō appendix, pages 24  
and 25).  
[572] The second example relates to the ability of Indigenous groups to use the lands, waters  
and resources for traditional purposes. The Board found that this ability would be temporarily  
impacted by construction and routine maintenance activities, and that some opportunities for  
certain activities, such as harvesting or accessing sites or areas of traditional land resource use,  
would be temporarily interrupted. The Board was of the view that these impacts would be short-  
Page: 194  
term, as they would be limited to brief periods during construction and routine maintenance, and  
that these effects would be largely confined to the Project footprint for the pipeline, associated  
facilities and the on-shore portion of the Westridge Marine Terminal site. The Board found these  
effects would be reversible in the short to long term, and low in magnitude (Board report, page  
279). The Board also found that:  
Project-related pipeline, facility and Westridge Marine Terminal construction and  
operation, and marine shipping activities were likely to have low-to-moderate  
magnitude environmental effects on terrestrial, aquatic and marine species  
harvested by Indigenous groups as a whole (Board report, pages 204, 221 to 224  
and 362);  
Construction of the Westridge Marine Terminal, the pipeline and associated  
facilities were likely to cause short-term temporary disruptions to Indigenous  
community members accessing traditional hunting, trapping and plant gathering  
sites (Board report, page 279); and,  
Project-related marine shipping activities were likely to cause temporary  
disruptions to activities or access to sites during the period of time Project-related  
tankers were in transit (Board report, page 362).  
[573] Based on these findings, Canada concluded that the impact of Project construction and  
operation and Project-related marine shipping activities on Tsleil-Waututh’s and Squamish’s  
hunting, trapping and plant gathering activity would be negligible-to-minor. The Project’s impact  
on these activities was assessed to be minor for the Stó:lō and SSN, and minor-to-moderate for  
Coldwater and Upper Nicola.  
Page: 195  
[574] The critical importance of the Board’s findings to the Indigenous applicants mandated  
meaningful dialogue about those findings. I now turn to consider Canada’s execution of Phase III  
of the consultation process, commencing with the mandate of the Crown consultation team.  
(ii)  
The implementation of the mandate of the Crown  
consultation team  
[575] While Canada submits that the members of the Crown consultation team were not mere  
note-takers, the preponderance of the evidence is to the effect that the members of the Crown  
consultation team acted on the basis that, for the most part, their role was that of note-takers who  
were to accurately report the concerns of the Indigenous applicants to the decision-makers.  
[576] My review of the evidence begins with the explanation of the team’s mandate found in  
the Crown Consultation Report. I then move to the evidence of the interactions between the  
Crown consultation team and the Indigenous applicants during the consultation process.  
[577] First, a word of explanation about the source of the evidence cited below. Unless  
otherwise noted, the evidence comes from meeting notes prepared by Canada. It was Canada’s  
practice to prepare meeting notes following each consultation meeting, to send the draft notes to  
the affected Indigenous group for comment, and then to revise the notes based on the comments  
received before distributing a final version. The parties did not take issue with the accuracy of  
meeting notes. As shown below, where there was any disagreement on what had been said, the  
minutes set out each party’s view of what had been said.  
 
Page: 196  
a.  
The Crown Consultation Report  
[578] Section 3.3.4 of the Crown Consultation Report dealt with Phase III of the consultation  
process. Under the subheading “Post-NEB Hearing Phase Consultation” the report stated:  
The mandate of the Crown consultation team was to listen, understand, engage  
and report to senior officials, Aboriginal group perspectives. The Minister of  
Natural Resources and other Ministers were provided a summary of these  
meetings.  
b.  
The experience of Tsleil-Waututh  
[579] At a meeting held on April 5, 2016, Erin O’Gorman of Natural Resources Canada  
“highlighted her mandate to listen and understand [Tsleil-Waututh’s] perspective on how  
consultations should be structured, and move this information for decision. No mandate to  
defend the current approach.”  
[580] In the course of the introductions and opening remarks at a meeting held September 15,  
2016, “Canada stressed that the Crown’s ultimate goal is to understand the position and concerns  
of the [Tsleil-Waututh] on the proposed Trans Mountain Expansion project.”  
[581] At a meeting held on October 20, 2016, Canada’s representatives advised that “[o]ur  
intention is to provide a report to cabinet and include all first Nations consulted, we are open to  
having [Tsleil-Waututh] input review and representation in that report, together with mitigation  
and accommodation measures.” In response, a representative of Tsleil-Waututh “indicated he did  
not want consultations and a report of concerns to [Governor in Council]: that has occurred and  
   
Page: 197  
does not work.” The response of the federal representatives to this was that “it was sufficient to  
convey information to the [Governor in Council] depending on how it’s done.”  
c.  
The experience of Squamish  
[582] On October 6, 2016, the Major Projects Management Office and the British Columbia  
Environmental Assessment Office jointly wrote to Squamish in response to a letter from  
Squamish setting out its views on the outstanding deficiencies in the Board review process and  
requesting a review of the consultation approach the Crown was taking to inform forthcoming  
federal and provincial decisions in respect of the Project. Under the heading “Procedural  
Concerns” Squamish was advised:  
The Crown Consultation Team’s objective has always been to work with  
Squamish and other Aboriginal groups to put forward the best information  
possible to decision makers within the available regulatory timeframe, via this  
Consultation and Accommodation Report. Comments and input provided by  
Squamish will help the Crown Consultation Team to accurately convey  
Squamish’s interests, concerns, and any specific proposals.  
The Crown is now focused on validating the key substantive concerns of  
Squamish, and has requested feedback on an initial draft report so that the Crown  
can include draft conclusions in a subsequent revision that will include the  
Crown’s assessment of the seriousness of potential impacts from the Project on  
Aboriginal Interests, specific to each Aboriginal group.  
At this stage in the process, following a four month extension of the federal  
legislated time limit, for a decision on the Project (required by December 19,  
2016), we continue to want to ensure that Squamish’s substantive concerns with  
respect to the Project, [Board] report (including recommended terms and  
conditions), and related proposals for mitigation or accommodation are accurately  
and comprehensively documented in the Consultation and Accommodation  
Report.  
(underlining added)  
 
Page: 198  
[583] At the only consultation meeting held with Squamish, Canada’s consultation lead  
referenced the ethics the team abided by during each meeting with Indigenous groups: “honesty,  
truth, pursuing the rightful path and ensuring that accurate and objective, representative  
information is put before decision-makers.”  
[584] He later reiterated that “[i]t is the Crown’s duty to ensure that accurate information on  
these outstanding issues is provided to decision-makers, including how Squamish perceives the  
project and any outstanding issues.”  
d.  
The experience of Coldwater  
[585] At a meeting held with Coldwater on March 31, 2016, prior to the start of Phase III, the  
head of the Crown consultation team explained that:  
… the work of the Crown consultation team, to develop a draft report that helps  
document the potential impacts of the project on [Coldwater] rights and interests,  
will be the vehicle through which the Crown documents potentially outstanding  
issues and accommodation proposals. It may appear as though the Crown is  
relying solely on the [Board] process, however it is not. It is leading its own  
consultation activities and will be overlaying a separate analytical framework (i.e.  
the impacts-on-rights lens).  
[586] At a meeting on May 4, 2016, discussing, among other things, the effect of the Project on  
Coldwater’s aquifer the Crown consultation team advised:  
For specifics such as detailed routing, it is the [Board] which decides those. The  
responsibility that the Crown consultation team has is to make sure these issues  
are reflected in the Crown consultation report, so they can be considered by  
decision makers.  
(underlining added)  
 
Page: 199  
After Coldwater expressed its strong preference for the West Alternative Canada’s  
representatives responded that:  
[t]his issue is one which is very detailed, and will need to be recorded carefully  
and accurately in the Crown consultation Report. The Crown consultation report  
can highlight that project routing is a central issue for Coldwater.  
(underlining added)  
[587] At a consultation meeting held on October 7, 2016, again in the context of discussions  
about Coldwater’s aquifer, one of Canada’s representatives:  
… acknowledged that the aquifer hasn’t been fully explored, but explained that  
the [Board] process has analysed the Project and that the Crown will not be taking  
an independent analysis beyond that. This is because the [Board] is a quasi-  
judicial tribunal with significant technical expertise. The Crown (federally and  
provincially) will not undertake an independent analysis of potential corridor  
routes. That said, the Crown will take Coldwater’s concerns back to decision  
makers.  
Coldwater asked what the point of consultation was if all that was coming from  
the Crown was a summary report to the [Governor in Council].  
(underlining added)  
[588] In the later stages of the meeting during a discussion headed “Overview of Decision  
Making”, Coldwater stated that based on the discussion with the Crown to date it did not seem  
likely that there would be a re-analysis of the West Alternative or any of the additional analysis  
Coldwater had asked for. Canada’s representatives responded that:  
[The Crown’s] position is that the detailed route hearing process and Condition 39  
provide avenues to consider alternative routes, however the Crown is not  
currently considering alternative routes because the [Board] concluded that the  
applied for pipeline corridor is satisfactory. The Crown will ensure that  
Coldwater’s concerns about the route are provided to the Cabinet, it will then be  
Page: 200  
up to Cabinet to decide if those concerns warrant reconsideration of the current  
route.  
(underlining added)  
e.  
The experience of Stó:lō  
[589] An email sent from the Major Projects Management Office following an April 13, 2016,  
consultation meeting advised that:  
The Crown consultation team for [the Trans Mountain expansion] and the  
forthcoming Ministerial Representative (or Panel) will hear views on the project  
and whether there are any outstanding issues not addressed in the [Board’s] final  
report and conditions or [Environment Canada’s] assessment of upstream  
greenhouse gas emissions. This will provide another avenue for participants to  
provide their views on the upstream [greenhouse gas] assessment for [Trans  
Mountain expansion]. Any comments will be received and given consideration by  
the Government of Canada.  
(underlining added)  
[590] On May 12, 2016, the Stó:lō wrote to the Minister of Natural Resources, the Honourable  
James Carr. It wrote about the Crown Consultation Report that:  
… we understood [Canada’s representative] Mr. Neil to say that the federal  
decision-maker will be the Governor-in-Council and that [Natural Resources  
Canada], further to this Crown consultation, will not make recommendations with  
respect to this project. Instead, its report to the Governor-in-Council will be a  
summary of what it heard during its consultations with aboriginal peoples with  
some commentary. We further understood Mr. Whiteside [another federal  
representative] to say that the Governor-in-Council cannot, based on Crown  
consultations, add or make changes to the Terms and Conditions of the project as  
set out by the [Board]. If we have misunderstood these representations, we would  
appreciate being informed in writing. If we have not misunderstood these  
representations, we believe that [Natural Resources Canada] is misinterpreting its  
constitutional obligations and the authority of federal decision-makers.  
(underlining added)  
 
Page: 201  
[591] The Stó:lō went on to observe that “[a] high level of consultation means more than  
simply gathering information on aboriginal interests, cross checking those with the Terms and  
Conditions of the project and reporting those findings to the federal decision-maker.” And that  
“[a] simple ‘what we heard’ report is inadequate to this task and the Governor-in-Council must  
be aware of its obligation to either reject or make changes to the project to protect and preserve  
the aboriginal rights, title and interests of the Stó:lō Collective.”  
[592] The Minister responded on July 15, 2016. The Minister agreed that addressing concerns  
required more than gathering and reporting information from consultation sessions and advised  
that if the Stó:lō Collective identified concerns that had not been fully addressed by the Board’s  
terms and conditions consultation would “include efforts to preserve the Aboriginal rights in  
question.” The Minister encouraged the Stó:lō Collective “to work with the Crown consultation  
team so that the Stó:lō Collective’s interests are fully understood and articulated in the Crown  
Consultation and Accommodation Report(underlining added). The Minister added that “[a]ny  
accommodation measures or proposals raised during Crown consultations will be included in this  
report and will inform the Government’s decision on [the Project].”  
f.  
The experience of Upper Nicola  
[593] At a meeting held on March 31, 2016, after Chief McLeod expressed his desire for Upper  
Nicola’s “intentions to be heard by decision makers, and asked that all of the information shared  
today be relayed to Minister Carr”, Canada’s representatives responded that “senior decision  
makers are very involved in this project and the Crown consultation team would be relaying the  
outcomes and the meeting records from the meeting today up the line.” Canada’s Crown  
 
Page: 202  
consultation lead noted that “wherever possible he would like to integrate some of the  
Indigenous words Chief McLeod spoke about into the Crown consultation report as a mechanism  
to relay the important messages which the Chief is talking about.”  
[594] At a meeting on May 3, 2016, immediately prior to the release of the Board’s report and  
recommendations, Canada’s consultation lead “reiterated the current mandate for the Crown  
consultation team, which is to listen, learn, understand, and to report up to senior decision  
makers” (underlining added). Upper Nicola’s legal counsel responded that “the old consultation  
paradigm, where the Crown’s officials meets with Aboriginal groups to hear from them their  
perspectives and then to report this information to decision makers, is no longer valid.”  
[595] Towards the end of the meeting, in response to a question about a recent media story  
which claimed that the Prime Minister had instructed his staff to develop a strategy for approving  
Trans Mountain, a senior advisor to Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada advised that he had  
“received no instructions from his department that would change his obligation as a public  
servant to ensure that he does all he can to remain objective and impartial and to ensure that the  
views of Aboriginal groups are appropriately and accurately relayed to decision makers.” The  
Crown consultation lead added that the “Crown consultation team has no view on the project. Its  
job is to support decision makers with accurate information(underlining added).  
g.  
The experience of SSN  
[596] In an email of July 7, 2015, sent prior to the release of the Board’s draft conditions, SSN  
was advised by the Major Projects Management Office that the Federal “Crown’s consultation  
 
Page: 203  
will focus on an exchange of information and dialogue on two key documents”, the Board’s draft  
conditions and the draft Crown Consultation Report. With respect to the Crown Consultation  
Report, the email advised that the focus would be to determine whether the Crown has  
adequately described the Aboriginal group’s participation in the process, the substantive issues  
they have raised and the status of those issues (including Aboriginal groups’ views on any  
outstanding concerns and residual issues arising from Phase III)(underlining added).  
[597] In a later email of June 17, 2016, SSN were informed that:  
The objective of the Crown consultation team moving forward is to consult  
collaboratively in an effort to reach consensus on outstanding issues and related  
impacts on constitutionally protected Aboriginal and treaty rights, as well as  
options for accommodating any impacts on rights that may need to be considered  
as part of the decision-making process. The status of these discussions will be  
documented in a Consultation and Accommodation Report that will help inform  
future decisions on the proposed project and any accompanying rationale for the  
government’s decisions.  
(underlining added)  
h.  
Conclusion on the mandate of the Crown  
consultation team  
[598] As this review of the evidence shows, members of the Crown consultation team advised  
the Indigenous applicants on a number of occasions throughout the consultation process that they  
were there to listen and to understand the applicants’ concerns, to record those concerns  
accurately in the Crown Consultation Report, and to pass the report to the Governor in Council.  
The meeting notes show the Crown consultation team acted in accordance with this role when  
discussing the Project, its impact on the Indigenous applicants and their concerns about the  
Project. The meeting notes show little or no meaningful responses from the Crown consultation  
team to the concerns of the Indigenous applicants. Instead, too often Canada’s response was to  
Page: 204  
acknowledge the concerns and to provide assurance the concerns would be communicated to the  
decision-makers.  
[599] As this Court explained in Gitxaala at paragraph 279, Canada was required to engage,  
dialogue and grapple with the concerns expressed to it in good faith by the Indigenous groups  
impacted by the Project. Meaningful dialogue required someone representing Canada  
empowered to do more than take notessomeone able to respond meaningfully to the  
applicants’ concerns at some point in time.  
[600] The exchanges with the applicants demonstrate that this was missing from the  
consultation process. The exchanges show little to facilitate consultation and show how the  
Phase III consultation fell short of the mark.  
[601] The consultation process fell short of the required mark at least in part because the  
consultation team’s implementation of its mandate precluded the meaningful, two-way dialogue  
which was both promised by Canada and required by the principles underpinning the duty to  
consult.  
(iii) Canada’s reluctance to depart from the Board’s findings  
and recommended conditions and genuinely engage the  
concerns of the Indigenous applicants  
[602] During Phase III each Indigenous applicant expressed concerns about the suitability of  
the Board’s regulatory review and environmental assessment. These concerns were summarized  
and reported in the appendix to the Crown Consultation Report maintained for each Indigenous  
 
Page: 205  
applicant (Tsleil-Waututh appendix, pages 7-8; Squamish appendix, page 4; Coldwater appendix,  
pages 4-5; Stó:lō appendix, pages 12-14; Upper Nicola appendix, pages 5-6; SSN appendix, page  
4). These concerns related to both the Board’s hearing process and its findings and recommended  
conditions. The concerns expressed by the Indigenous applicants included:  
The exclusion of Project-related shipping from the definition of the “designated  
project” which was to be assessed under the Canadian Environmental Assessment  
Act, 2012.  
The inability to cross-examine Trans Mountain’s witnesses, coupled with what  
were viewed to be inadequate responses by Trans Mountain to Information  
Requests.  
The Board’s recommended terms and conditions were said to be deficient for a  
number of reasons, including their lack of specificity and their failure to impose  
additional conditions (for example, a condition that sacred sites be protected).  
The Board’s findings were generic, thus negatively impacting Indigenous groups’  
ability to assess the potential impact of the Project on their title and rights.  
The Board’s legislated timelines were extremely restrictive and afforded  
insufficient time to review the Project application and to participate meaningfully  
in the review process.  
The Board hearing process was an inappropriate forum for assessing impacts to  
Indigenous rights, and the Board’s methods and conclusions regarding the  
significance and duration of the Project’s impacts on Indigenous rights were  
flawed.  
[603] However, missing from both the Crown Consultation Report and the individual  
appendices is any substantive and meaningful response to these concerns. Nor does a review of  
the correspondence exchanged in Phase III disclose sufficient meaningful response to, or  
dialogue about, the various concerns raised by the Indigenous applicants. Indeed, a review of the  
record of the consultation process discloses that Canada displayed a closed-mindedness when  
Page: 206  
concerns were expressed about the Board’s report and was reluctant to depart from the findings  
and recommendations of the Board. With rare exceptions Canada did not dialogue meaningfully  
with the Indigenous applicants about their concerns about the Board’s review. Instead, Canada’s  
representatives were focused on transmitting concerns of the Indigenous applicants to the  
decision-makers, and nothing more. Canada was obliged to do more than passively hear and  
receive the real concerns of the Indigenous applicants.  
[604] The evidence on this point comes largely from Tsleil-Waututh and Coldwater.  
[605] I begin with the evidence of the Director of Tsleil-Waututh’s Treaty, Lands and  
Resources Department, Ernie George. He affirmed that at a meeting held with representatives of  
Canada on October 21, 2016, to discuss Tsleil-Waututh’s view that the Board’s process was  
flawed such that the Governor in Council could not rely on its report and recommendations:  
81.  
Canada expressed that it was extremely reluctant to discuss the  
fundamental flaws that [Tsleil-Waututh] alleged were present in relation to the  
[Board] process, and even prior to the meeting suggested that we might simply  
need to “agree to disagree” on all of those issues. In our view Canada had already  
determined that it was not willing to take any steps to address the issues that  
[Tsleil-Waututh] identified and submitted constituted deficiencies in the [Board]  
process, despite having the power to do so under CEAA and NEBA and itself  
stating that this was a realistic option at its disposal.  
(underlining added)  
[606] Mr. George was not cross-examined on his affidavit.  
[607] Canada’s reluctance was firmly expressed a few days later at a meeting held on October  
27, 2016. Mr. George affirmed:  
Page: 207  
101. [Tsleil-Waututh] raised its concern that although the [Board] reached  
similar conclusions as [Tsleil-Waututh] that oil spills in Burrard Inlet would cause  
significant adverse environmental effects, it disagreed with Drs. Gunton and  
Broadbent’s conclusions as to the likelihood of spills occurring. [Tsleil-Waututh]  
then asked Canada whether it agreed with those conclusions. Canada was unable  
to respond because it did not bring its risk experts to the meeting. [Tsleil-  
Waututh] rearticulated its view that such risks were far too high.  
102. At this point, despite the critical importance of this issue, Canada advised  
[Tsleil-Waututh] that it was unwilling to revisit the [Board’s] conclusions and  
would instead wholly rely on the [Board’s] report on this issue. We stated that we  
did not accept Canada’s position, that further engagement on this subject was  
required, and that we would be willing to bring our experts to a subsequent  
meeting to consider any new material or new technology that Canada might  
identify.  
(underlining added)  
[608] This evidence is consistent with the meeting notes prepared by Canada which reflect that  
Canada’s representatives “indicated that government would rely on the [Board’s] report”. The  
notes then record that Tsleil-Waututh’s representatives inquired “if the [Government of Canada]  
was going to rely on the [Board’s] report, there was an openness to discuss matters related to  
gaps in the [Board’s] report and what had been ignored.” In response, “Canada acknowledged  
[Tsleil-Waututh’s] views on the [Board] process, and indicated that it could neither agree or  
disagree: both [Tsleil-Waututh] and [Canada] had been intervenors and neither could know how  
the [Board] panel weighed information provided to it.”  
[609] Coldwater provided similar evidence relating to its efforts to consult with Canada about  
the Project’s impacts on its aquifer at meetings held on May 4, 2016 and October 7, 2016.  
[610] On May 4, 2016, representatives of Coldwater expressed their view that the West  
Alternative was a much better pipeline route that addressed issues the Board had not addressed  
Page: 208  
adequately. As set out above, Canada’s representatives responded that for “specifics such as  
detailed routing, it is the [Board] which decides those” and added that “[t]he responsibility that  
the Crown consultation team has is to make sure these issues are reflected in the Crown  
consultation report, so they can be considered by decision makers.”  
[611] Canada again expressed the view that the Board’s findings were not to be revisited in the  
Crown consultation process at the meeting of October 7, 2016. In response to a question about  
the West Alternative, Canada’s representatives advised that in the Phase III consultation process  
it was not for Canada to consider the West Alternative as an alternate measure to mitigate or  
accommodate Coldwater’s concerns. The meeting notes state:  
The Crown replied that the [Board] concluded that the current route is acceptable;  
however the Panel imposed a condition requiring the Proponent to further study  
the interaction between the proposed pipeline and the aquifer. Tim Gardiner  
acknowledged that the aquifer hasn’t been fully explored, but explained that the  
[Board] process has analyzed the Project and that the Crown will not be taking an  
independent analysis beyond that. This is because the [Board] is a quasi-judicial  
tribunal with significant technical expertise, the Crown (federally and  
provincially) will not undertake an independent analysis of potential corridor  
routes. That said, the Crown will take Coldwater’s concerns back to decision  
makers.  
(underlining added)  
[612] Canada went on to express its confidence in Board Condition 39 and the detailed route  
hearing process.  
[613] Later, in response to Coldwater’s concern that the Board never considered the West  
Alternative, the meeting notes show that Canada’s representatives:  
… acknowledged Coldwater’s concerns, and explained that when the West  
Alternative was no longer in the [Board’s] consideration, the Crown was not able  
Page: 209  
to question that. [Mr. Whiteside] acknowledged that from Coldwater’s  
perspective this leaves a huge gap. Mr. Whiteside went on to explain that the  
Proponent’s removal of the West Alternative “is not the Crown’s responsibility.  
We are confined to the [Board] report.”  
(underlining added)  
[614] Finally, in the course of an overview of decision-making held at the end of the October 7,  
2016 meeting, Canada advised it was not considering alternative routes “because the [Board]  
concluded that the applied for pipeline corridor is satisfactory.” Canada added that “[t]he Crown  
will ensure that Coldwater’s concerns about the route are provided to the Cabinet, [and] it will  
then be up to Cabinet to decide if those concerns warrant reconsideration of the current route.”  
[615] As this Court had already explained in Gitxaala, at paragraph 274, Canada’s position that  
it was confined to the Board’s findings is wrong. As in Gitxaala, Phase III presented an  
opportunity, among other things, to discuss and address errors, omissions and the adequacy of  
the recommendations in the Board’s report on issues that vitally concerned the Indigenous  
applicants. The consequence of Canada’s erroneous position was to seriously limit Canada’s  
ability to consult meaningfully on issues such as the Project’s impact on each applicant and  
possible accommodation measures.  
[616] Other meeting notes do not record that Canada expressed its reluctance to depart from the  
Board’s findings in the same terms to other Indigenous applicants. However, there is nothing  
inconsistent with this position in the notes of the consultation with the other applicants.  
Page: 210  
[617] For example, in a letter sent to Squamish by the Major Projects Management Office on  
July 14, 2015, it was explained that the intent of Phase III was:  
not to repeat or duplicate the [Board] review process, but to identify, consider  
and potentially address any outstanding concerns that have been raised by  
Aboriginal groups (i.e. concerns that, in the opinion of the Aboriginal group, have  
not been addressed through the [Board] review process).  
[618] Later, Squamish met with the Crown consultation team on September 11, 2015, to  
discuss the consultation process. At this meeting Squamish raised concerns about, among other  
things, the adequacy of Canada’s consultation process. In a follow-up letter counsel for  
Squamish provided more detail about the “Squamish Process”—a proposed process to enable  
consideration of the Project’s impact upon Squamish’s interests. The process included having  
community concerns inform the scope of the assessment with the goal of having these concerns  
substantively addressed by conditions placed on the Project proponent.  
[619] Canada responded by letter dated November 26, 2015, in which it reiterated its position  
that:  
… there are good reasons for the Crown to rely on the [Board’s] review of the  
Project to inform the consultation process. This approach ensures rigour in the  
assessment of the potential adverse effects of the Project on a broad range of  
issues including the environment, health and socio-economic conditions, as well  
as Aboriginal interests.  
[620] The letter went on to advise that:  
Information from a formal community level or third-party review process can be  
integrated into and considered through the [Board] review process if submitted as  
evidence. For the Trans Mountain Expansion Project, the appropriate time to have  
done so would have been prior to the evidence filing deadline in May 2015.  
Page: 211  
[621] Canada went on to express its confidence that the list of issues, scope of assessment and  
scope of factors examined by the Board would inform a meaningful dialogue between it and  
Squamish.  
[622] In other words, Canada was constrained by the Board’s review of the Project. Canada  
required that evidence of any assessment or review process be first put before the Board, and any  
dialogue had to be informed by the Board’s findings.  
[623] A similar example is found in the Crown’s consultation with Upper Nicola. At the  
consultation meeting held on September 22, 2016, Upper Nicola expressed its concern with the  
Board’s economic analysis. The Director General of the Major Projects Management Office  
responded that “as a rule, the [Governor in Council] is deferential to the [Board’s] assessment,  
but they are at liberty to consider other information sources when making their decision and may  
reach a different conclusion than the [Board].” The Senior Advisor from Indigenous and  
Northern Affairs Canada added that “the preponderance of detail in the [Board] report weighs  
heavy on Ministers’ minds.”  
[624] No dialogue ensued about the legitimacy of Upper Nicola’s concern about the Board’s  
economic analysis, although Canada acknowledged “a strong view ‘out there’ that runs contrary  
to the [Board’s] determination.”  
Page: 212  
[625] Matters were left that if Upper Nicola could provide more information about what it said  
was an incorrect characterization of the economic rationale and Indigenous interests, this  
information would be put before the Ministers.  
[626] Put another way, Canada was relying on the Board’s findings. If Upper Nicola could  
produce information contradicting the Board that would be put before the Governor in Council; it  
would not be the subject of dialogue between Upper Nicola and Canada’s representatives.  
Canada did not grapple with Upper Nicola’s concerns, did not discuss with Upper Nicola  
whether the Board should be asked to reconsider its conclusion about the economics of the  
Project and did not explain why Upper Nicola’s concern was found to lack sufficient merit to  
require Canada to address it meaningfully.  
[627] As explained above at paragraph 491, Canada can rely on the Board’s process to fulfil, in  
whole or in part, the Crown’s duty to consult. However, reliance on the Board’s process does not  
allow Canada to rely unwaveringly upon the Board’s findings and recommended conditions.  
When real concerns were raised about the hearing process or the Board’s findings and  
recommended conditions, Canada was required to dialogue meaningfully about those concerns.  
[628] The Board is not immune from error and many of its recommendations were just that—  
proffered but not binding options for Canada to consider open-mindedly, assisted by its dialogue  
with the Indigenous applicants. Phase III of the consultation process afforded Canada the  
opportunity, and the responsibility, to dialogue about the asserted flaws in the Board’s process  
and recommendations. This it failed to do.  
Page: 213  
(iv)  
Canada’s erroneous view that the Governor in Council  
could not impose additional conditions on the proponent  
[629] Canada began and ended Phase III of the consultation process operating on the basis that  
it could not impose additional conditions on the proponent. This was wrong and limited the  
scope of necessary consultation.  
[630] Thus, on May 25, 2015, towards the end of Phase II, the Major Projects Management  
Office wrote to Indigenous groups to provide additional information on the scope and timing of  
Phase III consultation. If Indigenous groups identified outstanding concerns after the Board  
issued its report, the letter described the options available to Canada as follows:  
The Governor in Council has the option of asking the [National Energy Board] to  
reconsider its recommendation and conditions. Federal and provincial  
governments could undertake additional consultations prior to issuing additional  
permits and/or authorizations. Finally, federal and provincial governments can  
also use existing or new policy and program measures to address outstanding  
concerns.  
[631] Canada expressed the position that these were the available options throughout the  
consultation process (see, for example, the meeting notes of the consultation meeting held on  
March 31, 2016, with Coldwater).  
[632] Missing was the option of the Governor in Council imposing additional conditions on  
Trans Mountain.  
[633] At a meeting held on April 13, 2016, after Canada’s representatives expressed the view  
that the Crown could not add additional conditions, the Stó:lō’s then counsel expressed the  
 
Page: 214  
contrary view. She asked that Canada’s representatives verify with their Ministers whether  
Canada could attach additional conditions. By letter dated November 28, 2016 (the day before  
the Project was approved), Canada, joined by the British Columbia Environmental Assessment  
Office, advised that “the Governor in Council cannot impose its own conditions directly on the  
proponent as part of its decision” on the certificate of public convenience and necessity.  
[634] This was incorrect. In Gitxaala, at paragraphs 163 to 168, this Court explained that when  
considering whether Canada has fulfilled its duty to consult, the Governor in Council necessarily  
has the power to impose conditions on any certificate of public convenience and necessity it  
directs the National Energy Board to issue.  
[635] In the oral argument of these applications Canada acknowledged this power to exist,  
albeit characterizing it to be a power unknown to exist prior to this Court’s judgment in Gitxaala.  
[636] Accepting that the power had not been explained by this Court prior to its judgment in  
Gitxaala, that judgment issued on June 23, 2016, five months before Canada wrote to the Stó:lō  
advising that the Governor in Council lacked such a power and five months before the Governor  
in Council approved the Project. The record does not contain any explanation as to why Canada  
did not correct its position after the Gitxaala decision.  
[637] The consequence of Canada’s erroneous position that the Governor in Council lacked the  
ability to impose additional conditions on Trans Mountain seriously and inexplicably limited  
Canada’s ability to consult meaningfully on accommodation measures.  
Page: 215  
(v)  
Canada’s late disclosure of its assessment of the Project’s  
impact on the Indigenous applicants  
[638] As explained above at paragraph 488, the depth of the required consultation increases  
with the seriousness of the potentially adverse effect upon the claimed title or right. Canada’s  
assessment of the Project’s effect on each Indigenous applicant was therefore a critical aspect of  
the consultation process.  
[639] Canada ultimately assessed the Project not to have a high level of impact on the exercise  
of the Indigenous applicants’ “Aboriginal Interests” (a term defined in the Crown Consultation  
Report to include “asserted or established Aboriginal rights, including title and treaty rights.”).  
The Project was assessed to have a minor impact on the exercise of the Aboriginal Interests of  
Squamish and SSN, a minor-to-moderate impact on the Aboriginal Interests of Coldwater and  
Stó:lō and a moderate impact on the Aboriginal Interests of Tsleil-Waututh and Upper Nicola.  
[640] This important assessment was not communicated to the Indigenous applicants until the  
first week of November 2016, when the second draft of the Crown Consultation Report was  
provided (the first draft contained placeholder paragraphs in lieu of an assessment of the  
Project’s impact). Coldwater, Upper Nicola and SSN received the second draft of the Crown  
Consultation Report on November 1, 2016, Squamish and Stó:lō on November 3, 2016 and  
Tsleil-Waututh on November 4, 2016. Each was given two weeks to respond to the draft Crown  
Consultation Report.  
 
Page: 216  
[641] By this point in time Squamish, Coldwater, Stó:lō and SSN had concluded their  
consultation meetings with Canada and no further meetings were held.  
[642] Tsleil-Waututh did have further meetings with Canada, but these meetings were for the  
specific purposes of discussing greenhouse gases, the economic need for the Project and the  
Oceans Protection Plan.  
[643] Upper Nicola did have a consultation meeting with Canada on November 16, 2016, at  
which time it asked for an extension of time to respond to the second draft of the Crown  
Consultation Report. In response, Upper Nicola received a two-day extension until November  
18, 2016, to provide its comments to Canada. Canada’s representatives explained that “Cabinet  
typically requires material one month ahead of a decision deadline to enable time to receive and  
review the report, translate etc. and that we’ve already reduced this down to enable a second  
round of comments.”  
[644] Importantly, Canada’s Crown consultation lead acknowledged that other groups had  
asked for more time and the request had been “communicated to senior management and the  
Minister loud and clear.” Canada’s consultation lead went on to recognize that the time provided  
to review the second draft “may be too short for some to contribute detailed comments”. There is  
no evidence that Canada considered granting the requested extension so that the Indigenous  
groups could provide detailed, thoughtful comments on the second draft of the Crown  
Consultation Report, particularly on Canada’s assessment of the Project’s impact. Nor does the  
record shed any light on why Canada did not consider granting the requested extension. The  
Page: 217  
statutory deadline for Cabinet’s decision was December 19, 2016, and the Indigenous applicants  
had been informed of this.  
[645] Ultimately, the Governor in Council approved the Project on November 29, 2016.  
[646] The consequence of Canada’s late communication of its assessment of the Project’s  
impact was mitigated to a degree by the fact that from the outset it had acknowledged, and  
continues to acknowledge, that it was obliged to consult with the Indigenous applicants at the  
deeper end of the consultation spectrum. Thus, the assessment of the required depth of  
consultation was not affected by Canada’s late advice that the Project, in its view, did not have a  
high level of impact on the claimed rights and title of the Indigenous applicants.  
[647] This said, without doubt Canada’s view of the Project’s impact influenced its assessment  
of both the reasonableness of its consultation efforts and the extent that the Board’s  
recommended conditions mitigated the Project’s potential adverse effects and accommodated the  
Indigenous applicants’ claimed rights and title. For this reason, the late delivery of Canada’s  
assessment of the Project’s impact until after all but one consultation meeting had been held  
contributed to the unreasonableness of the consultation process.  
[648] I now turn to review instances that illustrate Canada’s failure to dialogue meaningfully  
with the Indigenous applicants.  
Page: 218  
(vi)  
Canada’s failure to dialogue meaningfully  
a.  
The experience of Tsleil-Waututh  
[649] Tsleil-Waututh had conducted its own assessment of the Project’s impact on Burrard Inlet  
and on Tsleil-Waututh’s title, rights and interests and traditional knowledge. This assessment,  
based on the findings of six independent experts and the traditional knowledge of Tsleil-Waututh  
members, concluded, among other things that:  
The likelihood of oil spills in Burrard Inlet would increase if the Project is  
implemented, and because spilled oil cannot be cleaned up completely, the  
consequences in such circumstances would be dire for sensitive sites, habitat and  
species, and in turn for the Tsleil-Waututh’s subsistence economy, cultural  
activities and contemporary economy.  
Any delay in spilled oil cleanup response would decrease significantly the total  
volume of oil which could be cleaned up, and in turn increase the negative effects  
and consequences of a spill.  
The direct effects of marine shipping are likely to add to the effects and  
consequences of spilled oil, which in turn will further amplify the negative effects  
of the Project on Tsleil-Waututh’s title, rights and interests.  
Tsleil-Waututh could not accept the increased risks, effects and consequences of  
even another small incident like the 2007 spill at the Westridge Marine Terminal  
or the 2015 MV Marathassa oil spill, let alone a worst-case spill.  
[650] In the view of Tsleil-Waututh, the Board erred by excluding Project-related shipping  
from the Project’s definition. Tsleil-Waututh was also of the view that the Board’s conditions did  
not address their concerns about marine shipping. For example, Tsleil-Waututh noted that very  
few of the Board’s conditions set out desired outcomes. Rather, they prescribed a means to  
secure an unspecified outcome.  
   
Page: 219  
[651] At the consultation meeting of October 27, 2016, Canada’s representatives repeatedly  
acknowledged Tsleil-Waututh’s view that the Board’s conditions were not sufficiently robust,  
that Project-related shipping ought to have been assessed under the Canadian Environmental  
Assessment Act, 2012 and that the Board’s failure to do so resulted in the further failure to  
impose conditions on marine shipping.  
[652] However, when the discussion turned to how to address Tsleil-Waututh’s concerns,  
federal representatives noted that “proposals to strengthen marine shipping management,  
including nation to nation relationships, would take time to develop and strengthen.” They went  
on to express optimism:  
… that progress toward a higher standard of care could occur over the next few  
years with First Nations, at a nation to nation level, particularly on spill response  
and emergency preparedness capacities. As baseline capacities increased, risks  
would be reduced.  
[653] This generic and vague response that concerns could be addressed in the future, outside  
the scope of the Project and its approval, was Canada’s only response. Canada did not suggest  
any concrete measures, such as additional conditions, to accommodate Tsleil-Waututh’s  
concerns about marine shipping.  
[654] Nor did Canada propose any accommodation measures at the meeting of October 28,  
2016. At this meeting, Tsleil-Waututh sought further discussion about the Project’s definition  
because, in its view, this issue had to be resolved if the Project was to be sent back to the Board  
for reconsideration. Canada’s representatives responded that this was a matter for consideration  
Page: 220  
by the Governor in Council and “it was understood that the scope of the [Board’s] review would  
be litigated.”  
[655] Nor did Canada respond meaningfully to Tsleil-Waututh’s concerns in the Crown  
Consultation Report or in the Tsleil-Waututh appendix.  
[656] The appendix, after detailing Tsleil-Waututh’s concerns responded as follows:  
Sections 4.2.6 and 5.2 of this Report provide an overview of how the Crown has  
considered accommodation and mitigation measures to address outstanding issues  
identified by Aboriginal groups. Accommodations proposed by Tsleil-Waututh  
that the Crown has not responded to directly via letter will be otherwise actively  
considered by decision-makers weighing Project costs and benefits with the  
impacts on Aboriginal Interests.  
(underlining added)  
[657] Section 4.2.6 of the Crown Consultation Report referred to the proposed Indigenous  
Advisory and Monitoring Committee and to recognition of the historical impacts of the existing  
Trans Mountain pipeline. The nascent nature of the Indigenous Advisory and Monitoring  
Committee is shown by the listing of possible roles the committee “could” play.  
[658] Section 5.2 of the Crown Consultation Report dealt with Canada’s assessment of the  
adequacy of consultation. It contains no response to Tsleil-Waututh’s specific concerns that the  
Board’s conditions were not sufficiently robust, that Project-related shipping ought to have been  
assessed under the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, 2012, and that the Board’s failure  
to do this resulted in the further failure to impose conditions on marine shipping. Section 5.2 did  
Page: 221  
provide Canada’s limited response to concerns about the appropriateness of the Board’s review  
process:  
With respect to perceived inadequacies in the [Board] review process, the Crown  
notes the Government’s commitment to modernize the [Board] and to restore  
public trust in federal environmental assessment processes. The Crown further  
notes that consultations on these processes have been launched and will include  
the engagement of Indigenous groups. Overall, however, Government, through its  
Interim Strategy, indicated that no project proponent would be sent back to the  
beginning, which mean [sic] that project [sic] currently undergoing regulatory  
review would continue to do so within the current framework.  
[659] Canada has not pointed to any correspondence in which it meaningfully addressed Tsleil-  
Waututh’s concern that the Board’s conditions were not sufficiently robust and that Project-  
related shipping should not have been excluded from the Project’s definition.  
[660] Tsleil-Waututh raised valid concerns that touched directly on its asserted title and rights.  
While Canada strove to understand those concerns accurately, it failed to respond to them in a  
meaningful way and did not appear to give any consideration to reasonable mitigation or  
accommodation measures, or to returning the issue of Project-related shipping to the Board for  
reconsideration.  
[661] While Canada moved to implement the Indigenous Advisory and Monitoring Committee  
and the Oceans Protection Plan, these laudable initiatives were ill-defined due to the fact that  
each was in its early planning stage. As such, these initiatives could not accommodate or  
mitigate any concerns at the time the Project was approved, and this record does not allow  
consideration of whether, as those initiatives evolved, they became something that could  
meaningfully address real concerns.  
Page: 222  
b.  
The experience of Squamish  
[662] At the one consultation meeting held in Phase III with Squamish on October 18, 2016,  
Squamish took the position throughout the meeting that it had insufficient information about the  
Project’s impact on Squamish to make a decision on the Project or to discuss mitigation  
measures. Reference was made to a lack of information about the fate and behaviour of diluted  
bitumen if spilled in a marine environment. Squamish also expressed the view that the Governor  
in Council was equally unable to make a decision on the Project because of research and  
information gaps about diluted bitumen.  
[663] Canada responded:  
The Crown recognized that there are uncertainties and information gaps which  
factor into the project decision. Most decisions are not made with perfect  
certainty. For instance, fate and behaviour of diluted bitumen in the marine  
environment has been identified as an information gap. The Crown is happy to  
discuss the level of uncertainty but is unsure how the [Governor in Council] will  
weigh these issues, such as whether they will decide that uncertainties are  
acceptable for the project to move forward. It should be noted that the [Governor  
in Council] can send the [Board] recommendation and any terms and conditions  
back to the [Board] for reconsideration.  
(underlining added)  
[664] The meeting notes do not reflect that any discussion ensued about the fate and behaviour  
of diluted bitumen in water. This is not surprising because the Crown consultation team had  
effectively told Squamish that any discussion would not factor into the Governor in Council’s  
deliberation and ultimate decision.  
 
Page: 223  
[665] In a letter dated the day before the Project was approved, Canada and the British  
Columbia Environmental Assessment Office wrote jointly to Squamish responding to issues  
raised by Squamish. With respect to diluted bitumen the letter stated:  
Squamish Nation has identified concerns relating to potential spills as well as the  
fate and behaviour of diluted bitumen. The [Board’s] Onshore Pipeline  
Regulations (OPR) requires a company to develop and implement management  
and protection programs in order to anticipate, prevent, mitigate and respond to  
conditions that may adversely affect the safety and security of the general public,  
the environment, property and, company’s personnel and pipelines. A company  
must follow the legal requirements identified in the National Energy Board Act  
and its associated regulations, other relevant standards, and any conditions  
contained within the applicable Project certificates or orders.  
[666] This generic response is not a meaningful response to Squamish’s concern that too little  
was known about how diluted bitumen would behave if spilled and that this uncertainty made it  
premature to approve the Project.  
[667] The letter went on to review Board conditions, planned government initiatives (such as  
the Area Response Planning Initiative, Transport Canada’s commitment to engage with British  
Columbia First Nations on issues related to marine safety and the Oceans Protection Program).  
The letter also referenced research that the Government of Canada was conducting on the  
behaviour and potential impacts of a diluted bitumen spill in a marine environment. While  
laudable initiatives, they too did not respond meaningfully to Squamish’s concern that more  
needed to be known before the Project was approved.  
[668] There is nothing in Canada’s response to show that Squamish’s concern about diluted  
bitumen was given real consideration or weight, and nothing to show any consideration was  
given to any meaningful and tangible accommodation or mitigation measures.  
Page: 224  
c.  
The experience of Coldwater  
[669] Coldwater’s concerns about the Project’s impact on its aquifer were described above at  
paragraphs 609-610 in the context of Canada’s unwillingness to depart from the Board’s findings  
and recommended conditions.  
[670] As explained at paragraph 610, when, during the consultation process, Coldwater  
suggested an alternate route for the pipeline that in its view posed less risk to its drinking water,  
Canada advised that it is the Board that decides pipeline routing, and the role of the Crown  
consultation team was to make sure the issue of an alternate route was reflected in the Crown  
Consultation Report so that it could be considered by the decision-makers.  
[671] Later during the May 4, 2016 meeting, in response to a question from Coldwater about a  
detailed route hearing, Brian Nesbitt, a contractor made available to answer questions about the  
Board, responded:  
Brian explained that the Governor in Council would approve the approved,  
detailed route, but that if someone doesn’t agree with that route they can  
intervene, say a detailed route hearing is required, and propose an alternative  
route. He stated that the burden of proof is essentially flipped and the landowner  
has the onus to show that the best route is somewhere other than the approved  
route.  
Brian provided an overview of the Detailed Route Approval Process (DRAP).  
Alternative routes, even outside the approved ROW corridor, can be proposed. In  
those cases it falls to the intervening party to make the case for why that route is  
the best one. In Brian’s experience, these arguments have been made in past  
hearings and sometimes they are successful. He provided the example of a  
pipeline going through a wooded area where inner city kids would go. If an  
alternative route is identified in the detailed route hearing, the proponent has to  
apply for a variance. This might require Governor in Council decisions,  
depending on how the CPCN is worded. Brian emphasized that the burden of  
establishing a better route lies with the landowner.  
 
Page: 225  
(underlining added)  
[672] A senior advisor for Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada then agreed that Coldwater  
would require a very significant variance, a departure of about 10 kilometres from the approved  
pipeline right-of-way.  
[673] Counsel for Coldwater, Melinda Skeels, then replied:  
Melinda stated that it does not sound reasonable to expect Coldwater to mount the  
kind of evidence needed to make the case for that alternative. In her view, this  
issue needs to be addressed before a certificate is issued. It cannot wait until after.  
Melinda stated that it did not seem like a detailed route hearing is a realistic  
option that would assist in addressing Coldwater’s routing concerns.  
Coldwater’s recollection is that: Joseph, Tim and Ross were in  
general agreement, particularly given the significance of the  
variance and the fact that the onus would be shifted to Coldwater.  
The Crown’s position is that: The Crown officials would neither  
have agreed with or disagreed with the above statement.  
[674] The senior advisor for Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada responded:  
… reflecting this concern in the Crown Consultation Report is one way to have it  
before decision makers prior to a decision on the certificate. He said that the  
routing issue goes to the heart of the CPCN and that the Crown may need to send  
the Project back to the [Board] to address this.  
[675] As explained at paragraph 587 above, Coldwater’s request for an analysis of the pipeline  
route was revisited at the October 7, 2016, consultation meeting. Canada acknowledged that the  
aquifer had not been fully explored, but expressed confidence in the Board’s Condition 39.  
Page: 226  
[676] In response:  
Coldwater expressed its concern that, given the momentum behind the project  
following a [Governor in Council] approval, it will take a major adverse finding  
in the Condition 39 report for the West Alternative to become viable. They argued  
that their aquifer concerns would not be sufficiently mitigated by moving the  
pipeline within the 150m approved route corridor as part of a detailed route  
hearing, because the West Alternative was well outside that recommended  
corridor. Coldwater asked if an approved route corridor had ever been changed  
because of a report released following a GIC approval.  
The [Board] asserted that detailed route hearings in the past had led to routes  
being changed for various reasons; however he (Brian Nesbitt) was personally  
unaware of a route being moved outside an approved corridor. However, it is  
possible if the situation warrants.  
The Crown replied that Condition 39 was put in place because the Board felt that  
evidence did not provide enough certainty about the impact of the Project on  
Coldwater’s aquifer. That knowledge gap will have to be addressed, to the  
[Board’s] satisfaction, prior to construction commencing. The Crown appreciates  
that the Condition does not provide certainty about the possibility of changing the  
pipeline corridor; however the presence of the Condition indicates that the  
[Board] is not satisfied with the information currently available.  
(underlining added)  
[677] In the Crown Consultation Report Canada acknowledged that a pipeline spill associated  
with the Project could result in minor to serious impacts to Coldwater’s Aboriginal Interests:  
The Crown acknowledges the numerous factors that would influence the severity  
and types of effects associated with a pipeline spill, and that an impacts  
determination that relates the consequences of a spill to specific impacts on  
Aboriginal Interests has a high degree of uncertainty. The Crown acknowledges  
that Coldwater relies primarily on an aquifer crossed by the Project for their  
drinking water, as well as subsistence foods and natural resources, and are at  
greater risk for adverse effects from an oil spill. To address the concerns raised by  
Coldwater during the post-[Board] Crown consultation period, [Environmental  
Assessment Office] proposes a condition that would require, in addition to  
[Board] Condition 39, characterization of the aquifer recharge and discharge  
sources and aquifer confinement, and include an assessment of the vulnerability  
of the aquifer.  
Page: 227  
(underlining added, footnote omitted)  
[678] Throughout the consultation process, Canada worked to understand Coldwater’s  
concerns, and the British Columbia Environmental Assessment Office imposed a condition  
requiring a second hydrogeological report for approval by it. However, missing from Canada’s  
consultation was any attempt to explore how Coldwater’s concerns could be addressed. Also  
missing was any demonstrably serious consideration of accommodationa failure likely flowing  
from Canada’s erroneous position that it was unable to impose additional conditions on the  
proponent.  
[679] Canada acknowledged that the Project would be located within an area of Coldwater’s  
traditional territory where Coldwater was assessed to have a strong prima facie claim to  
Aboriginal title. In circumstances where Coldwater would bear the burden of establishing a  
better route for the pipeline, and where the advice given to Coldwater by the Board’s technical  
expert was that he was personally unaware of a route being moved out of the approved pipeline  
corridor, Canada placed its reliance on Condition 39, and so advised Coldwater. However, as  
Canada acknowledged, this condition carried no certainty about the pipeline route. Nor did the  
condition provide any certainty as to how the Board would assess the risk to the aquifer.  
[680] At the end of the consultation process, and at the time the Project was approved, Canada  
failed to meaningfully engage with Coldwater, and to discuss and explore options to deal with  
the real concern about the sole source of drinking water for its Reserve.  
Page: 228  
d.  
The experience of Stó:lō  
[681] As part of the Stó:lō’s effort to engage with the Crown on the Project, Stó:lō prepared a  
detailed technical submission referred to as the “Integrated Cultural Assessment for the Proposed  
Trans Mountain Expansion Project”, also referred to as “ICA”. A copy of the ICA was filed with  
the Board.  
[682] The ICA was based on surveys, interviews, meetings and workshops held with over 200  
community members from approximately 11 Stó:lō bands. The ICA concluded that the Project  
posed a significant risk to the unique Indigenous way of life of the Stó:lō, threatening the cultural  
integrity and survival of core relationships at the heart of the Stó:lō worldview, identity, health  
and well-being. The ICA also contained 89 recommendations which, if implemented by Trans  
Mountain or the Crown, were believed by Stó:lō to mitigate the Project’s adverse effects on  
Stó:lō.  
[683] To illustrate the nature of the recommendations, section 17.2 of the ICA deals with  
recommendations to mitigate the Project’s impact on fisheries. Section 17.2.1 deals with  
Management and Planning in the context of fisheries mitigation. The recommended Management  
and Planning mitigation measures are:  
17.2.1 Management and Planning  
5.  
Stó:lō Fishing representatives will participate in the development and  
review of Fisheries Management Plans and water course crossing EPPs before  
construction and mitigation plans are finalized.  
6.  
Stó:lō representatives will provide input on proposed locations for  
Hydrostatic test water withdrawal and release.  
 
Page: 229  
7.  
[The proponent] will consult with Stó:lō representatives to develop the  
Emergency Response Plans in the study area.  
8.  
Stó:lō representatives will consult with community members to determine  
appropriate restoration plans for water crossings including bank armouring, seed  
mixes or replanting requirements.  
9.  
Stó:lō fishing representatives must be notified if isolation methods will not  
work and [the proponent] is considering another crossing method.  
10.  
Stó:lō representatives must be notified as soon as a spill or leak, of any  
size, is detected.  
11.  
During water quality monitoring program, anything that fails to meet or  
exceed established guidelines will be reported to a Stó:lō Fisheries Representative  
within 12 hours.  
[684] These measures are specific, brief and generally measured and reasonable. If  
implemented they would provide more detail to the Board’s generic conditions on consultation  
and require timely notification to the Stó:lō of events that may adversely impact their interests.  
[685] During the Board’s Information Request process, the Stó:lō pressed Trans Mountain to  
respond to their 89 recommendations but Trans Mountain did not provide a substantive response.  
Instead, Trans Mountain provided a general commitment to work with Stó:lō to develop a  
mutually-acceptable plan for implementation.  
[686] The Board did not adopt any of the specific 89 recommendations made by the Stó:lō in its  
terms and conditions.  
[687] At a meeting held with the Crown consultation team on April 13, 2016, before the release  
of the Board’s report, the Stó:lō provided an overview of the development of the ICA and  
Page: 230  
expressed many concerns, including their dissatisfaction with their engagement with Trans  
Mountain.  
[688] The Stó:lō representative stated that, among other things, Trans Mountain was directed  
by the Board to include Indigenous knowledge in Project planning, but did not. By way of  
example, the Stó:lō explained that the Fraser River is a tidal (at least up to Harrison River),  
meandering river, with a wandering gravel bed that is hydrologically connected to many  
wetlands and waterways crossed by the Project. A map of historical waterways was provided in  
the ICA, along with a table listing local and traditional knowledge of waterways crossed by the  
Project. None of this information was considered in Trans Mountain’s technical reports. In  
Stó:lō’s view, Trans Mountain’s assumptions and maps about the Fraser River were wrong and  
did not include their traditional knowledge. A year after the ICA was provided to Trans  
Mountain the Stó:lō met with Trans Mountain’s fisheries manager who had never seen the ICA  
or any of the technical information contained in it.  
[689] Additionally, Stó:lō provided details about deficiencies identified in Trans Mountain’s  
evidence filed with the Board about Stó:lō title, rights, interests and Project impacts. For  
example, Trans Mountain’s evidence was to the effect that the Stó:lō had no traditional plant  
harvesting areas within the Project area. However, the ICA identified and mapped several plant  
gathering sites within the proposed pipeline corridor. Another example of a deficiency was Trans  
Mountain’s evidence that there were no habitation sites in the Project area; however, the ICA  
mapped three habitation sites within the proposed pipeline corridor and two habitation sites  
located within 50 metres of the pipeline corridor.  
Page: 231  
[690] At a later consultation meeting held September 23, 2016, the Stó:lō reiterated that a key  
concern was their view that the Board’s process had failed to hold the proponent accountable for  
integrating Stó:lō’s traditional use information into the assessment of the Project. The draft  
Crown Consultation Report overlooked evidence filed by Stó:lō about their traditional land use.  
Instead, the report repeated oversights in Trans Mountain’s evidence presented to the Board. For  
example, Stó:lō noted the Crown was wrong to state that “[n]o plant gathering sites were  
identified within the proposed pipeline corridor”. The Stó:lō had explained this at the April 13,  
2016 meeting.  
[691] The Stó:lō Collective was not confident that Trans Mountain would follow through on  
commitments to include local Indigenous people or traditional knowledge in the development of  
the Project unless the Board’s terms and conditions required Trans Mountain to regularly engage  
Stó:lō communities in a meaningful way.  
[692] Canada’s representatives confirmed that the Stó:lō Collective was looking for stronger  
conditions, more community-specific commitments and more accountability placed on Trans  
Mountain so that conditions proposed by Stó:lō became regulatory requirements.  
[693] The Crown consultation team met with Stó:lō once after the release of the Board’s report,  
on September 23, 2016.  
[694] During this meeting the “Collective noted with great concern that the [Board] report  
came out May 19th, that the [Governor in Council’s] decision is due Dec. 19th, and that the  
Page: 232  
Crown was just meeting now (Sept. 23) to consult on the [Board] report with so many potential  
gaps left to discuss and seek to resolve with tight timelines to do so”.  
[695] At this meeting the Crown consultation team presented slides summarizing the Board’s  
conclusions. The Stó:lō noted their disagreement with the following findings of the Board:  
-
“Ability of Aboriginal groups to use the lands, waters and resources for  
traditional purposes would be temporarily impacted” by construction and routine  
maintenance activities, and that some opportunities for certain activities such as  
harvesting or accessing sites or areas of [Traditional Land and Resource Use] will  
be temporary interrupted.”;  
-
“Project’s contribution to potential broader cultural impacts related to  
access and use of natural resources is not significant.”; and,  
-
“Impacts would be short term, limited to brief periods during construction  
and routine maintenance, largely confined to the Project footprint for the  
pipeline… Effects would be reversible in the short to long term, and low in  
magnitude.”  
(emphasis in original)  
[696] The Stó:lō pointed to the potential permanent impact of the Project on sites of critical  
cultural importance to Stó:lō and the Project’s impacts related to access and use of natural  
resources.  
[697] With respect to sites of critical cultural importance, the Stó:lō explained that none of the  
information contained in their ICA influenced the design of the Project or was included in the  
Project alignment sheets. The failure to include information about cultural sites on the Project  
alignment sheets meant that various geographic features known to Stó:lō and the proponent were  
not being factored into Project effects, or avoidance or mitigation efforts. In response to  
questions, Stó:lō confirmed that even though Trans Mountain was well aware of Stó:lō sites of  
Page: 233  
importance, as detailed in the ICA, Trans Mountain had not recognized them on the right-of-way  
corridor maps. Stó:lō believed this afforded the sites no protection if the Project was approved.  
[698] With respect to Lightning Rock, a culturally significant spiritual and burial site, the Stó:lō  
noted that Trans Mountain planned to put a staging area in proximity to the site which, in the  
view of the Stó:lō, would obliterate the site. The Board had imposed Condition 77 relating to  
Lightning Rock. This condition required Trans Mountain to file a report outlining the  
conclusions of a site assessment for Lightning Rock, including reporting on consultation with the  
Stó:lō Collective. However, Stó:lō Cultural Heritage experts had not been able to meet with  
Trans Mountain to participate in Lightning Rock management plans since September 2015. This  
was a source of great frustration.  
[699] The Stó:lō suggested that the Board’s conditions should specifically list the Indigenous  
groups Trans Mountain was required to deal with instead of the generic “potentially affected  
Aboriginal groups” referenced in the Board’s current conditions.  
[700] The Stó:lō also requested that they be involved in selecting the Aboriginal monitors  
working within their territory as contemplated by the Board’s conditions. For example,  
Condition 98 required Trans Mountain to file a plan describing participation by “Aboriginal  
groups” in monitoring construction of the Project. Stó:lō wanted to ensure these monitors were  
sufficiently knowledgeable about issues of importance to the Stó:lō.  
Page: 234  
[701] The September 23, 2016, meeting notes do not indicate any response or meaningful  
dialogue on the part of the Crown consultation team in response to any of Stó:lō’s concerns and  
suggestions.  
[702] Interestingly, at the November 16, 2016, consultation meeting with Upper Nicola, the last  
of the consultation meetings and the only consultation meeting held after Canada provided the  
second draft of the Crown Consultation Report setting out Canada’s assessment of the Project’s  
impacts, the Crown consultation lead explained:  
… “potentially affected Aboriginal groups” has been noted by many Aboriginal  
groups as too vague in the recommended conditions, and this phrase is repeated  
throughout the 157 conditions. Makes reference to how the Crown’s consultation  
and accommodation report does address specific Aboriginal groups. Discussed  
another point on the [Board] condition for “Aboriginal monitors”—where  
communities would not [sic] want locally knowledgeable Aboriginal people to  
fulfil this role and not someone from farther afield.  
[703] Notwithstanding apparently widespread concern about the Board’s generic use of the  
phrase “potentially affected Aboriginal groups” and the need for locally-selected Indigenous  
monitors, and despite Canada’s ability to add new conditions that would impose the desired  
specificity, Canada failed to meaningfully consider such accommodation.  
[704] Canada and the British Columbia Environmental Assessment Office purported to respond  
to two of Stó:lō’s concerns in their letter of November 28, 2016, to the Stó:lō: the concerns about  
Traditional Ecological Knowledge and sites of cultural importance.  
[705] The Crown “acknowledges the Stó:lō Collective’s view that the [Board] and the  
proponent overlooked traditional knowledge within the development of the [Board] conditions  
Page: 235  
and Project design.” The Crown discusses these issues in Sections III and IV of the Stó:lō  
Collective appendix (pages 13, 29 and 30 respectively).  
[706] I deal with the Stó:lō appendix beginning at paragraph 712 below. As explained below,  
the Stó:lō appendix does not deal meaningfully with the concerns about Traditional Ecological  
Knowledge and sites of cultural importance.  
[707] The Crown made two more points independent of the Stó:lō Collective appendix. First, it  
expressed its understanding that the Stó:lō could trigger a detailed route hearing. Second, it  
encouraged the Stó:lō Collective to continue discussions with the proponent.  
[708] In connection with the detailed route hearing, the Crown advised that “[w]ithin the scope  
of such a hearing exists the potential for the right-of-way to move locations.” There are three  
points to make about this response. First, as explained above at paragraphs 380 to 384, at a  
detailed route hearing the right of way may only move within the approved pipeline corridor,  
otherwise an application must be made to vary the pipeline corridor; second, the onus at a  
detailed route hearing is on the person requesting the alteration; and, third, Canada failed to  
consider its ability to impose additional conditions, likely because it was operating under the  
erroneous view it could not. The ability to trigger a detailed route hearing provided no certainty  
about how potential adverse effects to areas of significant importance to the Stó:lō would be  
dealt with. This was not a meaningful response on Canada’s part.  
Page: 236  
[709] As to the Crown’s suggestion that the Stó:lō Collective continue its discussions with the  
proponent, no explanation is given as to why this was believed to be an appropriate response to  
the concerns of the Stó:lō in light of the information they had provided as to the proponent’s  
unwillingness to deal directly with them on a timely basis, or in some cases, at all.  
[710] The November 28, 2016, letter also referenced the four accommodation measures the  
Stó:lō requested in their two-page submission to the Governor in Council. The first asked for a  
condition to “outline and identify specifics regarding Trans Mountain’s collaboration with and  
resourcing of the Stó:lō Collective to update construction alignment sheets and EPPs to reflect  
information provided in the Integrated Cultural Assessment” (March 2014). The Stó:lō were told  
“The recommendations included in the Stó:lō Collective’s two-page submission of November  
17, 2016 will be provided directly to federal and provincial decision makers.”  
[711] Leaving aside the point that the letter was sent the day before the Project was approved,  
none of this is responsive, meaningful, two-way dialogue that the Supreme Court requires as part  
of the fulfillment of the duty to consult.  
[712] Nor is any meaningful response provided in the Stó:lō appendix to the Crown  
Consultation Report. This is illustrated by the following two examples. First, while the appendix  
recites that the Stó:lō Collective recommended 89 actions that would assist Trans Mountain to  
avoid or mitigate adverse effects on their Aboriginal Interests there is no discussion or indication  
that Canada seriously considered implementing any of the 89 recommended actions, and no  
explanation as to why Canada did not consider implementing any Stó:lō specific  
Page: 237  
recommendation as an accommodation or mitigation measure. Second, while the appendix  
acknowledges that the Stó:lō provided examples of Traditional Ecological Knowledge which  
they felt the proponent and the Board ignored in the Project design, environmental assessment  
and mitigation planning, no analysis or response to the concern is given.  
[713] In the portion of the appendix that deals with Canada’s assessment of the Project’s  
impacts on the Stó:lō, the Crown relies on the conclusions of the Board to find that the impacts  
of the Project would be up to minor-to-moderate. Thus, for instance, the appendix repeats the  
Board’s conclusion that if the Project is approved, the Board conditions would either directly or  
indirectly avoid or reduce potential environmental effects associated with hunting, trapping and  
gathering. In an attempt to deal with the specific concerns raised by the Stó:lō about the  
adequacy of the Board’s report and its conditions, the appendix recites that:  
… the proponent would implement several mitigation measures to reduce  
potential effects to species important for the Stó:lō Collective’s hunting, trapping,  
and plant gathering activities. The proponent is committed to minimizing the  
Project footprint to the maximum extent feasible, and all sensitive resources  
identified on the Environmental Alignment Sheets and environmental tables  
within the immediate vicinity of the [right-of-way] will be clearly marked before  
the start of clearing.  
[714] While the second draft of the Crown Consultation Report was revised to reference the  
plant gathering sites identified by Stó:lō in the ICA and in the April and October consultation  
meetings, Canada continued to rely upon the Board’s findings without explaining, for example,  
how the Board’s finding that “Trans Mountain adequately considered all the information  
provided on the record by Aboriginal groups regarding their traditional uses and activities.”  
(report, page 278) was reliable in the face of the information contained in the ICA.  
Page: 238  
[715] Nor does Canada explain the source of its confidence in the proponent’s commitments in  
light of the concerns expressed by the Stó:lō that Trans Mountain had failed to follow through on  
its existing commitments and that without further conditions Stó:lō feared the proponent would  
not follow through with its commitments to the Board.  
[716] With respect to the Stó:lō’s concerns about a Project staging area at Lightning Rock, the  
appendix noted that Lightning Rock was protected by Board Condition 77 which required the  
proponent to file with the Board an archaeological and cultural heritage field investigation  
undertaken to assess the potential impacts of Project construction and operations on the  
Lightning Rock site. The appendix goes on to note that:  
However, given that this is a sacred site with burial mounds, Stó:lō Collective  
have noted that any Project routing through this area is inappropriate given the  
need to preserve the cultural integrity of the site and the surrounding area. For the  
Stó:lō Collective, the site surrounding Lightning Rock should be a “no go” area  
for the Project.  
[717] However, Stó:lō’s position that Lightning Rock should be a “no go” area is left  
unresolved and uncommented upon by Canada.  
[718] Another Stó:lō concern detailed by Canada in the appendix, but unaddressed, is the  
concern of the Stó:lō Collective that the locations of various other culturally important sites do  
not appear on Trans Mountain’s detailed alignment sheets. Examples of such sites include  
bathing sites within the 150 metre pipeline right-of-way alignment at Bridal Veil Falls, and an  
ancient pit house located within the pipeline right-of-way. None of these sites are the subject of  
any Board condition.  
Page: 239  
[719] The appendix recites Canada’s conclusion on these concerns of the Stó:lō as follows:  
With regards to specific risk concerns raised by the Stó:lō Collective, the  
proponent would implement several mitigation measures to reduce potential  
effects on physical and cultural heritage resources important for the Stó:lō  
Collective’s traditional and cultural practices. The proponent has also committed  
to reduce potential disturbance to community assets and events by implementing  
several measures that include avoiding important community features and assets  
during [right-of-way] finalization, narrowing the [right-of-way] in select areas,  
scheduling construction to avoid important community events where possible,  
communication of construction schedules and plans with community officials, and  
other ongoing consultation and engagement with local and Aboriginal  
governments.  
[720] This is not meaningful, two-way dialogue in response to Stó:lō’s real and valid concerns  
about matters of vital importance to the Stó:lō.  
[721] Canada adopts a similar approach to its assessment of the Project’s impact on freshwater  
fishing and marine fishing and harvesting at pages 24 to 27 of the Stó:lō appendix.  
[722] The section begins by acknowledging the Stó:lō’s deeply established connection to  
fishing and marine harvesting “which are core to Stó:lō cultural activities and tradition,  
subsistence and economic purposes.”  
[723] After summarizing each concern raised by the Stó:lō, Canada responds by adopting the  
Board’s conclusions that the Project’s impact will be low-to-moderate and that Board conditions  
will either directly or indirectly avoid or reduce potential environmental effects on fishing  
activities.  
Page: 240  
[724] In the course of this review Canada acknowledges the Board’s finding that “Project-  
related activities could result in low to moderate magnitude effects on freshwater and marine fish  
and fish habitat, surface water and marine water quality.” Appendix 12 to the Board report  
defines a moderate impact to be one that, among other things, noticeably affects the resource  
involved.  
[725] Canada also acknowledges that during the operational life of the Project fishing and  
harvesting activities directly affected by the construction and operation of the Westridge Marine  
Terminal would not occur within the expanded water lease boundaries.  
[726] Further, impacts on navigation, specifically in eastern Burrard Inlet, would exist for the  
lifetime of the Project, and would occur on a daily basis. Project-related marine vessels also  
would cause temporary disruption to the Stó:lō Collective’s marine fishing and harvesting  
activities. These disruptions are said “likely to be temporary when accessing fishing sites in the  
Burrard Inlet that require crossing shipping lanes, as community members would be able to  
continue their movements shortly after the tanker passes.” This too would occur on a daily basis  
if the Westridge Marine Terminal were to serve 34 Aframax tankers per month.  
[727] Missing however from Canada’s consultation analysis is any mention of the Stó:lō’s  
constitutionally protected right to fish, and how that constitutionally protected right was taken  
into account by Canada. Also missing is any explanation as to how the consultation process  
affected the Crown’s ultimate assessment of the impact of the Project on the Stó:lō. Meaningful  
Page: 241  
consultation required something more than simply repeating the Board’s findings and conditions  
without grappling with the specific concerns raised by the Stó:lō about those same findings.  
e.  
The experience of Upper Nicola  
[728] Throughout the consultation process, Upper Nicola raised the issue of the Project’s  
impact on Upper Nicola’s asserted title and rights. The issue was raised at the consultation  
meetings of March 31, 2016, and May 3, 2016, but no meaningful dialogue took place. Canada’s  
representatives advised at the March meeting that until the Board released its report Canada did  
not know how the Project could impact the environment and Upper Nicola’s interests and so  
could not “yet extrapolate to how those changes could impact [Upper Nicola’s] Aboriginal rights  
and title interests.”  
[729] The issue was raised again, after the release of the Board’s report, at the consultation  
meeting of September 22, 2016. Upper Nicola expressed its disagreement with Canada’s  
assertion in the first draft of the Crown Consultation Report that potential impacts on its title  
claim for the pipeline right-of-way included temporary impacts related to construction, and  
longer-term impacts associated with Project operation. In Upper Nicola’s view, construction did  
not have a temporary impact on its claim to title. Upper Nicola also stated that Canada had  
examined the Project’s impact on title without considering impacts on governance and  
management, and concerns related to title, such as land and water issues. The meeting notes do  
not record any response to these concerns.  
 
Page: 242  
[730] Nor did Canada respond meaningfully to Upper Nicola’s position that the Project would  
render 16,000 hectares of land unusable or inaccessible for traditional activities. Upper Nicola  
viewed this to constitute a significant impact that required accommodation of their rights to  
stewardship, use and governance of the land and water. Canada’s response was to acknowledge a  
letter sent to the Prime Minister in which numerous Indigenous groups had proposed a mitigation  
measure to ensure they would have a more active role in monitoring and stewardship of the  
Project. Canada stated that it saw merit in the proposal and that a response to the letter would be  
forthcoming.  
[731] On November 18, 2016, Upper Nicola wrote to the Crown consultation lead to highlight  
its key, ongoing concerns with the Project and the consultation process. With respect to title,  
Upper Nicola wrote:  
There were areas which the Crown has determined that we have a strong prima  
facie claim to Aboriginal title and rights. The Crown must therefore acknowledge  
the significant impacts and infringements of the Project to Upper Nicola/Syilx  
Title and Rights, including the incidents of Aboriginal title which include: the  
right to decide how the land will be used; the right of enjoyment and occupancy  
of the land; the right to possess the land; the right to the economic benefits of the  
land; and the right to proactively use and manage the land and adequately  
accommodate these impacts, concerns and infringements. This has not yet been  
done.  
(underlining added)  
[732] Canada and the British Columbia Environmental Assessment Office wrote to Upper  
Nicola on November 28, 2016, the day before the Project was approved, to respond to the issues  
raised by Upper Nicola. The only reference to Upper Nicola’s asserted title is this brief  
reference:  
Page: 243  
Impacts and Mitigation: In response to comments received, the Crown has  
reviewed its analysis and discussion in the Consultation and Accommodation  
Report on the direct and indirect impacts of the Project on Syilx (Okanagan)  
Nation’s rights and other interests. In addition, Upper Nicola identified that the  
study titled “Upper Nicola Band Traditional Use and Occupancy Study for the  
Kingsvale Transmission Line in Support of the Trans Mountain Expansion  
Project” (Kingsvale TUOS) had not been specifically referenced in the Syilx  
(Okanagan) Nation appendix. Upper Nicola resent the Kingsvale TUOS to the  
Crown on Friday, November 18 and in response to this information, the Crown  
reviewed the Kingsvale TUOS, summarized the study’s findings in Syilx  
(Okanagan) Nation’s appendix, and considered how this information changes the  
expected impacts of the Project on Syilx (Okanagan) Nation’s Aboriginal rights  
and title. As a result, conclusions were revised upward for Project impacts on  
Syilx (Okanagan) Nation’s freshwater fishing activities, other traditional and  
cultural activities, as well as potential impacts on Aboriginal title.  
(underlining added)  
[733] No response was made to the request to acknowledge the Project’s impacts and  
infringement of Upper Nicola’s asserted title and rights.  
[734] In the Upper Nicola appendix, Canada acknowledged that the Project would be located  
within an area of Syilx Nation’s asserted traditional territory where Syilx Nation was assessed to  
have a strong prima facie claim to Aboriginal title and rights. Canada then asserted the Project to  
have “minor-to-moderate impact on Syilx Nation’s asserted Aboriginal title to the proposed  
Project area.” Canada did not address Upper Nicola’s governance or title rights in any detail.  
Canada did refer to section 4.3.5 of the Crown Consultation Report but this section simply  
reiterates the Board’s findings and conditions and the requirement that the proponent continue  
consultation “with potentially affected Aboriginal groups”.  
Page: 244  
[735] Missing is any explanation as to why moderate impacts to title required no  
accommodation beyond the environmental mitigation measures recommended by the Board—  
mitigation measures that were generic and not specific to Upper Nicola.  
[736] Throughout Phase III, Upper Nicola had proposed numerous potential mitigation  
measures and had requested accommodation related to stewardship, use and governance of the  
water. No response was given as to why Canada rejected this request. This was not meaningful,  
two-way dialogue or reasonable consultation.  
f.  
The experience of SSN  
[737] Canada met with SSN twice during Phase III. At the first meeting, on August 3, 2016,  
SSN expressed the desire to have consultation go beyond the environmental assessment process  
which they felt was insufficient to tackle the issues that affected their territory. SSN sought to  
move forward on a nation to nation basis and wished to formalize a nation to nation consultation  
protocol using the Project as a starting point for further consultation.  
[738] In response, Canada and representatives of British Columbia asked that the SSN be  
prepared to review a draft memorandum of understanding for consultation about the Project  
(affidavit of Jeanette Jules, paragraph 70).  
[739] The meeting notes reflect that at the first meeting on August 3, 2016, SSN also raised as  
accommodation or mitigation measures that: the Project conditions be more specific with respect  
to safety and emergency preparedness response, warning notifications to communities and  
 
Page: 245  
opportunities for training; and, that there be provision for both a spillage fee and a revenue tax  
imposed on the proponent for the benefit of SSN. The meeting notes do not reflect any dialogue  
or response from Canada to these proposals.  
[740] On September 9, 2016, the Crown consultation lead sent a two-page draft memorandum  
of understanding to the SSN (two pages not including the signature page).  
[741] At the second and last meeting on October 6, 2016, the SSN advised that they desired the  
proponent to submit to a review of the Project by the SSN, but that the proponent was unwilling  
to undergo another review. The SSN also repeated their desire for the federal and provincial  
Crowns to allow SSN to impose a resource development tax on proponents whose projects are  
located in the SSN’s traditional territory. In response, the Crown raised the difficulty in  
implementing the tax and having the Project undergo assessment by the SSN before the  
mandated decision deadline of December 19, 2016.  
[742] At this meeting Canada sought comments on the draft memorandum of understanding.  
Jeanette Jules, a counsellor with the Kamloops Indian Band swore in an affidavit filed in support  
of SSN’s application for judicial review that:  
At [the October 6, 2016] meeting, the majority of the time was spent on  
discussing the content of the [memorandum of understanding], that is, what would  
engagement with the Crowns on the Project look like. We did not spend any time  
discussing the routing of the pipeline Project at Pipsell or SSN’s concerns about  
the taking up of new land in the Lac du Bois Grasslands Protected area, although I  
did voice concerns about those issues again at that meeting. At the end of the  
meeting, the Crowns committed to revising the [memorandum of understanding]  
and to setting up another meeting to discuss it with us.  
(underlining added)  
Page: 246  
[743] The meeting notes state that toward the end of the meeting SSN expressed the desire to  
have a terrestrial spill response centre stationed in their reserve. SSN contemplated that funding  
for the centre should be raised through a per-barrel spillage fee charged on product flowing  
through the pipeline.  
[744] Thereafter, no memorandum of understanding was finalized and no further meetings took  
place between Canada and the SSN. Ms. Jules swears that:  
I fully expected that between our last meeting with Canada and the Province of  
BC and the [Governor in Council] decision to approve the Project, we would  
come to an agreement on the terms of a [memorandum of understanding] and  
have had meaningful engagement with the Crowns about pipeline routing and  
SSN’s other concerns raised in its final argument.  
[745] Ms. Jules was not cross-examined on her affidavit.  
[746] In the November 28, 2016, letter sent to the SSN by Canada and the British Columbia  
Environmental Assessment Office they wrote:  
We also would like to take this opportunity to provide you with additional  
information or responses to concerns that Stk’emlúps te Secwèpemc Nation has  
raised with the Crown.  
At the October 6, 2016 meeting with SSN, in addition to reiterating SSN’s plan on  
undertaking its own assessment of the project, SSN outlined a proposal for an  
SSN resource development tax that they charge directly to proponents whose  
projects are in their traditional territory, and that SSN wants the federal and  
provincial Crown’s to make the jurisdictional room necessary for the tax to be  
implemented. These proposals have been added to the SSN specific appendix for  
consideration by decision makers.  
[747] This is not a meaningful response to the proposals made by the SSN. The only response  
made to the resource development tax during the consultation meetings was the difficulty this  
Page: 247  
would pose to meeting Canada’s decision deadline (notwithstanding that SSN had sought  
consultation on a broader basis than the Projectthe Project was contemplated by SSN to be a  
starting point).  
[748] The SSN appendix to the Crown Consultation Report faithfully records SSN’s concerns  
about the review process, noting, in part, that:  
SSN stated that the [Board] hearing process is an inappropriate forum for  
assessing impacts to their Aboriginal rights. SSN also expressed concern about  
the [Board] process’ legislated timelines and the way these timelines were  
unilaterally imposed on them. SSN considers this timeline extremely restrictive  
and does not believe it affords SSN sufficient time to review the application and  
participate meaningfully in the review process. SSN has stated that their ability to  
participate in the process is further hampered by a lack of capacity funding from  
either the [Board] or the Crown. SSN has expressed a view that related regulatory  
(i.e. permitting) processes are not well-coordinated, which they believe results in  
an incomplete sharing of potential effects to SSN Interests. They refer to the  
perceived disconnected process between the proposed Project and proposed Ajax  
Mine application review. SSN are not satisfied with the current crown  
engagement model and the lack of addressing SSN’s needs for a nation-to-nation  
dialogue about their concerns and interests, and have proposed that the Crown  
develop a [memorandum of understanding] to address these issues and provide a  
framework for the dialogue moving forward.  
SSN have requested Nation-to-Nation engagement related to the broader issue of  
land management and decision making within their territory. SSN requested a  
consultation protocol agreement be developed, starting with a [memorandum of  
understanding] for Nation-to-Nation consultation, which would take the form of a  
trilateral agreement between SSN, BC and Canada. SSN recommended a  
framework of sustainable Crown funding to participate in the [memorandum of  
understanding] process, leading to a sustainable funding model to support  
ongoing land use management within SSN’s territory.  
At the October 6, 2016 meeting, SSN outlined a proposal for an SSN resource  
development tax that they charge directly to proponents whose projects are in  
their traditional territory. SSN wants the federal and provincial Crown’s [sic] to  
make the jurisdictional room necessary for the tax to be implemented.  
(underlining added)  
Page: 248  
[749] Missing from the appendix is any advice to the Governor in Council that Canada  
committed to providing a draft memorandum of understanding to SSN and any advice about the  
status of the memorandum of understanding. Also missing is any indication of what, if any,  
impact this had on Canada’s view of the consultation process.  
[750] In the SSN appendix Canada acknowledged that “the Project would be located within an  
area of Tk’emlúps te Secwe’pemc and Skeetchestn’s traditional territory assessed as having a  
strong prima facie claim to Aboriginal title”. Canada had also assessed its duty to consult SSN as  
being at the deeper end of the consultation spectrum.  
[751] Notwithstanding, Canada did not provide any meaningful response to SSN’s proposed  
mitigation measures, and conducted no meaningful, two-way dialogue about SSN’s concerns  
documented on pages 3 to 7 of the SSN appendix.  
[752] This was not reasonable consultation as required by the jurisprudence of the Supreme  
Court of Canada.  
(vii) Conclusion on Canada’s execution of the consultation  
process  
[753] As explained above at paragraphs 513 to 549, the consultation framework selected by  
Canada was reasonable and sufficient. If Canada properly executed it, Canada would have  
discharged its duty to consult.  
 
Page: 249  
[754] However, based on the totality of the evidence I conclude that Canada failed in Phase III  
to engage, dialogue meaningfully and grapple with the concerns expressed to it in good faith by  
the Indigenous applicants so as to explore possible accommodation of these concerns.  
[755] Certainly Canada’s consultation team worked in good faith and assiduously to understand  
and document the concerns of the Indigenous applicants and to report those concerns to the  
Governor in Council in the Crown Consultation Report. That part of the Phase III consultation  
was reasonable.  
[756] However, as the above review shows, missing was a genuine and sustained effort to  
pursue meaningful, two-way dialogue. Very few responses were provided by Canada’s  
representatives in the consultation meetings. When a response was provided it was brief, and did  
not further two-way dialogue. Too often the response was that the consultation team would put  
the concerns before the decision-makers for consideration.  
[757] Where responses were provided in writing, either in letters or in the Crown Consultation  
Report or its appendices, the responses were generic. There was no indication that serious  
consideration was given to whether any of the Board’s findings were unreasonable or wrong.  
Nor was there any indication that serious consideration was given to amending or supplementing  
the Board’s recommended conditions.  
[758] Canada acknowledged it owed a duty of deep consultation to each Indigenous applicant.  
More was required of Canada.  
Page: 250  
[759] The inadequacies of the consultation process flowed from the limited execution of the  
mandate of the Crown consultation team. Missing was someone representing Canada who could  
engage interactively. Someone with the confidence of Cabinet who could discuss, at least in  
principle, required accommodation measures, possible flaws in the Board’s process, findings and  
recommendations and how those flaws could be addressed.  
[760] The inadequacies of the consultation process also flowed from Canada’s unwillingness to  
meaningfully discuss and consider possible flaws in the Board’s findings and recommendations  
and its erroneous view that it could not supplement or impose additional conditions on Trans  
Mountain.  
[761] These three systemic limitations were then exacerbated by Canada’s late disclosure of its  
assessment that the Project did not have a high level of impact on the exercise of the applicants’  
“Aboriginal Interests” and its related failure to provide more time to respond so that all  
Indigenous groups could contribute detailed comments on the second draft of the Crown  
Consultation Report.  
[762] Canada is not to be held to a standard of perfection in fulfilling its duty to consult.  
However, the flaws discussed above thwarted meaningful, two-way dialogue. The result was an  
unreasonable consultation process that fell well short of the required mark.  
[763] The Project is large and presented genuine challenges to Canada’s effort to fulfil its duty  
to consult. The evaluation of Canada’s fulfillment of its duty must take this into account.  
Page: 251  
However, in largest part the concerns of the Indigenous applicants were quite specific and  
focussed and thus quite easy to discuss, grapple with and respond to. Had Canada’s  
representatives met with each of the Indigenous applicants immediately following the release of  
the Board’s report, and had Canada’s representatives executed a mandate to engage and dialogue  
meaningfully, Canada could well have fulfilled the duty to consult by the mandated December  
19, 2016 deadline.  
E.  
Remedy  
[764] In these reasons I have concluded that the Board failed to comply with its statutory  
obligation to scope and assess the Project so as to provide the Governor in Council with a  
“report” that permitted the Governor in Council to make its decision whether to approve the  
Project. The Board unjustifiably excluded Project-related shipping from the Project’s definition.  
[765] This exclusion of Project-related shipping from the Project’s definition permitted the  
Board to conclude that section 79 of the Species at Risk Act did not apply to its consideration of  
the effects of Project-related shipping. Having concluded that section 79 did not apply, the Board  
was then able to conclude that, notwithstanding its conclusion that the operation of Project-  
related vessels is likely to result in significant adverse effects to the Southern resident killer  
whale, the Project was not likely to cause significant adverse environmental effects.  
[766] This findingthat the Project was not likely to cause significant adverse environmental  
effectswas central to its report. The unjustified failure to assess the effects of Project-related  
shipping under the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, 2012 and the resulting flawed  
 
Page: 252  
conclusion about the environmental effects of the Project was critical to the decision of the  
Governor in Council. With such a flawed report before it, the Governor in Council could not  
legally make the kind of assessment of the Project’s environmental effects and the public interest  
that the legislation requires.  
[767] I have also concluded that Canada did not fulfil its duty to consult with and, if necessary,  
accommodate the Indigenous applicants.  
[768] It follows that Order in Council P.C. 2016-1069 should be quashed, rendering the  
certificate of public convenience and necessity approving the construction and operation of the  
Project a nullity. The issue of Project approval should be remitted to the Governor in Council for  
prompt redetermination.  
[769] In that redetermination the Governor in Council must refer the Board’s recommendations  
and its terms and conditions back to the Board, or its successor, for reconsideration. Pursuant to  
section 53 of the National Energy Board Act, the Governor in Council may direct the Board to  
conduct that reconsideration taking into account any factor specified by the Governor in Council.  
As well, the Governor in Council may specify a time limit within which the Board shall  
complete its reconsideration.  
[770] Specifically, the Board ought to reconsider on a principled basis whether Project-related  
shipping is incidental to the Project, the application of section 79 of the Species at Risk Act to  
Project-related shipping, the Board’s environmental assessment of the Project in the light of the  
Page: 253  
Project’s definition, the Board’s recommendation under subsection 29(1) of the Canadian  
Environmental Assessment Act, 2012 and any other matter the Governor in Council should  
consider appropriate.  
[771] Further, Canada must re-do its Phase III consultation. Only after that consultation is  
completed and any accommodation made can the Project be put before the Governor in Council  
for approval.  
[772] As mentioned above, the concerns of the Indigenous applicants, communicated to  
Canada, are specific and focussed. This means that the dialogue Canada must engage in can also  
be specific and focussed. This may serve to make the corrected consultation process brief and  
efficient while ensuring it is meaningful. The end result may be a short delay, but, through  
possible accommodation the corrected consultation may further the objective of reconciliation  
with Indigenous peoples.  
F.  
Proposed Disposition  
[773] For these reasons I would dismiss the applications for judicial review of the Board’s  
report in Court Dockets A-232-16, A-225-16, A-224-16, A-217-16, A-223-16 and A-218-16.  
[774] I would allow the applications for judicial review of the Order in Council P.C. 2016-1069  
in Court Dockets A-78-17, A-75-17, A-77-17, A-76-17, A-86-17, A-74-17, A-68-17 and A-84-  
17, quash the Order in Council and remit the matter to the Governor in Council for prompt  
redetermination.  
 
Page: 254  
[775] The issue of costs is reserved. If the parties are unable to agree on costs they may make  
submissions in writing, such submissions not to exceed five pages.  
[776] Counsel are thanked for the assistance they have provided to the Court.  
“Eleanor R. Dawson”  
J.A.  
“I agree.  
Yves de Montigny J.A.”  
“I agree.  
Judith Woods J.A.”  
Page: 255  
APPENDIX  
National Energy Board Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. N-7  
52 (1) If the Board is of the opinion  
that an application for a certificate in  
respect of a pipeline is complete, it  
shall prepare and submit to the  
Minister, and make public, a report  
setting out  
52 (1) S’il estime qu’une demande de  
certificat visant un pipeline est  
complète, l’Office établit et présente  
au ministre un rapport, qu’il doit  
rendre public, où figurent :  
(a) its recommendation as to whether  
or not the certificate should be issued  
for all or any portion of the pipeline,  
taking into account whether the  
a) sa recommandation motivée à  
savoir si le certificat devrait être  
délivré ou non relativement à tout ou  
partie du pipeline, compte tenu du  
pipeline is and will be required by the caractère d’utilité publique, tant pour  
present and future public convenience le présent que pour le futur, du  
and necessity, and the reasons for that pipeline;  
recommendation; and  
(b) regardless of the recommendation  
that the Board makes, all the terms  
and conditions that it considers  
b) quelle que soit sa recommandation,  
toutes les conditions qu’il estime  
utiles, dans l’intérêt public, de  
necessary or desirable in the public  
rattacher au certificat si le gouverneur  
interest to which the certificate will be en conseil donne instruction à l’Office  
subject if the Governor in Council  
were to direct the Board to issue the  
certificate, including terms or  
conditions relating to when the  
certificate or portions or provisions of  
it are to come into force.  
de le délivrer, notamment des  
conditions quant à la prise d’effet de  
tout ou partie du certificat.  
(2) In making its recommendation, the (2) En faisant sa recommandation,  
Board shall have regard to all  
considerations that appear to it to be  
directly related to the pipeline and to  
be relevant, and may have regard to  
the following:  
l’Office tient compte de tous les  
facteurs qu’il estime directement liés  
au pipeline et pertinents, et peut tenir  
compte de ce qui suit :  
(a) the availability of oil, gas or any  
a) l’approvisionnement du pipeline en  
other commodity to the pipeline;  
pétrole, gaz ou autre produit;  
(b) the existence of markets, actual or b) l’existence de marchés, réels ou  
potential;  
potentiels;  
(c) the economic feasibility of the  
c) la faisabilité économique du  
Page: 256  
pipeline;  
pipeline;  
(d) the financial responsibility and  
d) la responsabilité et la structure  
financial structure of the applicant, the financières du demandeur et les  
methods of financing the pipeline and méthodes de financement du pipeline  
the extent to which Canadians will  
have an opportunity to participate in  
the financing, engineering and  
ainsi que la mesure dans laquelle les  
Canadiens auront la possibilité de  
participer au financement, à  
l’ingénierie ainsi qu’à la construction  
du pipeline;  
construction of the pipeline; and  
(e) any public interest that in the  
Board’s opinion may be affected by  
the issuance of the certificate or the  
dismissal of the application.  
e) les conséquences sur l’intérêt public  
que peut, à son avis, avoir la  
délivrance du certificat ou le rejet de  
la demande.  
(3) If the application relates to a  
(3) Si la demande vise un projet  
designated project within the meaning désigné au sens de l’article 2 de la Loi  
of section 2 of the Canadian canadienne sur l’évaluation  
Environmental Assessment Act, 2012, environnementale (2012), le rapport  
the report must also set out the  
Board’s environmental assessment  
prepared under that Act in respect of  
that project.  
contient aussi l’évaluation  
environnementale de ce projet établi  
par l’Office sous le régime de cette  
loi.  
(4) The report must be submitted to  
the Minister within the time limit  
specified by the Chairperson. The  
(4) Le rapport est présenté dans le  
délai fixé par le président. Ce délai ne  
peut excéder quinze mois suivant la  
specified time limit must be no longer date où le demandeur a, de l’avis de  
than 15 months after the day on which l’Office, complété la demande. Le  
the applicant has, in the Board’s  
opinion, provided a complete  
application. The Board shall make the  
time limit public.  
délai est rendu public par l’Office.  
(5) If the Board requires the applicant (5) Si l’Office exige du demandeur,  
to provide information or undertake a relativement au pipeline, la  
study with respect to the pipeline and  
the Board, with the Chairperson’s  
approval, states publicly that this  
subsection applies, the period that is  
communication de renseignements ou  
la réalisation d’études et déclare  
publiquement, avec l’approbation du  
président, que le présent paragraphe  
taken by the applicant to comply with s’applique, la période prise par le  
the requirement is not included in the  
calculation of the time limit.  
demandeur pour remplir l’exigence  
n’est pas comprise dans le calcul du  
délai.  
(6) The Board shall make public the  
(6) L’Office rend publiques, sans  
Page: 257  
dates of the beginning and ending of  
délai, la date où commence la période  
the period referred to in subsection (5) visée au paragraphe (5) et celle où elle  
as soon as each of them is known.  
se termine.  
(7) The Minister may, by order,  
extend the time limit by a maximum  
of three months. The Governor in  
(7) Le ministre peut, par arrêté,  
proroger le délai pour un maximum de  
trois mois. Le gouverneur en conseil  
Council may, on the recommendation peut, par décret pris sur la  
of the Minister, by order, further  
recommandation du ministre, accorder  
extend the time limit by any additional une ou plusieurs prorogations  
period or periods of time.  
supplémentaires.  
(8) To ensure that the report is  
(8) Afin que le rapport soit établi et  
présenté en temps opportun, le  
ministre peut, par arrêté, donner au  
président instruction :  
prepared and submitted in a timely  
manner, the Minister may, by order,  
issue a directive to the Chairperson  
that requires the Chairperson to  
(a) specify under subsection (4) a time a) de fixer, en vertu du paragraphe (4),  
limit that is the same as the one un délai identique à celui indiqué dans  
specified by the Minister in the order; l’arrêté;  
(b) issue a directive under subsection  
6(2.1), or take any measure under  
b) de donner, en vertu du paragraphe  
6(2.1), les instructions qui figurent  
subsection 6(2.2), that is set out in the dans l’arrêté, ou de prendre, en vertu  
order; or  
du paragraphe 6(2.2), les mesures qui  
figurent dans l’arrêté;  
(c) issue a directive under subsection  
6(2.1) that addresses a matter set out  
in the order.  
c) de donner, en vertu du paragraphe  
6(2.1), des instructions portant sur une  
question précisée dans l’arrêté.  
(9) Orders made under subsection (7)  
are binding on the Board and those  
(9) Les décrets et arrêtés pris en vertu  
du paragraphe (7) lient l’Office et les  
made under subsection (8) are binding arrêtés pris en vertu du paragraphe (8)  
on the Chairperson. lient le président.  
(10) A copy of each order made under (10) Une copie de l’arrêté pris en vertu  
subsection (8) must be published in  
the Canada Gazette within 15 days  
after it is made.  
du paragraphe (8) est publiée dans la  
Gazette du Canada dans les quinze  
jours de sa prise.  
(11) Subject to sections 53 and 54, the (11) Sous réserve des articles 53 et 54,  
Board’s report is final and conclusive. le rapport de l’Office est définitif et  
sans appel.  
53 (1) After the Board has submitted  
its report under section 52, the  
53 (1) Une fois que l’Office a présenté  
son rapport en vertu de l’article 52, le  
Page: 258  
Governor in Council may, by order,  
refer the recommendation, or any of  
gouverneur en conseil peut, par décret,  
renvoyer la recommandation ou toute  
the terms and conditions, set out in the condition figurant au rapport à  
report back to the Board for  
reconsideration.  
l’Office pour réexamen.  
(2) The order may direct the Board to (2) Le décret peut préciser tout facteur  
conduct the reconsideration taking dont l’Office doit tenir compte dans le  
into account any factor specified in the cadre du réexamen ainsi que le délai  
order and it may specify a time limit  
within which the Board shall complete  
its reconsideration.  
pour l’effectuer.  
54 (1) After the Board has submitted  
its report under section 52 or 53, the  
Governor in Council may, by order,  
54 (1) Une fois que l’Office a présenté  
son rapport en application des articles  
52 ou 53, le gouverneur en conseil  
peut, par décret :  
(a) direct the Board to issue a  
a) donner à l’Office instruction de  
certificate in respect of the pipeline or délivrer un certificat à l’égard du  
any part of it and to make the  
certificate subject to the terms and  
conditions set out in the report; or  
pipeline ou d’une partie de celui-ci et  
de l’assortir des conditions figurant  
dans le rapport;  
(b) direct the Board to dismiss the  
b) donner à l’Office instruction de  
application for a certificate.  
rejeter la demande de certificat.  
(2) The order must set out the reasons (2) Le gouverneur en conseil énonce,  
for making the order.  
dans le décret, les motifs de celui-ci.  
(3) The order must be made within  
three months after the Board’s report  
under section 52 is submitted to the  
Minister. The Governor in Council  
may, on the recommendation of the  
Minister, by order, extend that time  
limit by any additional period or  
periods of time. If the Governor in  
Council makes an order under  
(3) Le décret est pris dans les trois  
mois suivant la remise, au titre de  
l’article 52, du rapport au ministre. Le  
gouverneur en conseil peut, par décret  
pris sur la recommandation du  
ministre, proroger ce délai une ou  
plusieurs fois. Dans le cas où le  
gouverneur en conseil prend un décret  
en vertu des paragraphes 53(1) ou (9),  
subsection 53(1) or (9), the period that la période que prend l’Office pour  
is taken by the Board to complete its  
reconsideration and to report to the  
Minister is not to be included in the  
calculation of the time limit.  
effectuer le réexamen et faire rapport  
n’est pas comprise dans le calcul du  
délai imposé pour prendre le décret.  
(4) Every order made under subsection (4) Les décrets pris en vertu des  
Page: 259  
(1) or (3) is final and conclusive and is paragraphes (1) ou (3) sont définitifs  
binding on the Board.  
et sans appel et lient l’Office.  
(5) The Board shall comply with the  
order made under subsection (1)  
within seven days after the day on  
which it is made.  
(5) L’Office est tenu de se conformer  
au décret pris en vertu du paragraphe  
(1) dans les sept jours suivant sa prise.  
(6) A copy of the order made under  
subsection (1) must be published in  
the Canada Gazette within 15 days  
after it is made.  
(6) Une copie du décret pris en vertu  
du paragraphe (1) est publiée dans la  
Gazette du Canada dans les quinze  
jours de sa prise.  
Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, 2012, S.C. 2012, c. 19, s.52  
2(1) designated project means one or  
more physical activities that  
2(1) projet désigné Une ou plusieurs  
activités concrètes :  
(a) are carried out in Canada or on  
a) exercées au Canada ou sur un  
federal lands;  
territoire domanial;  
(b) are designated by regulations made b) désignées soit par règlement pris en  
under paragraph 84(a) or designated in vertu de l’alinéa 84a), soit par arrêté  
an order made by the Minister under  
subsection 14(2); and  
pris par le ministre en vertu du  
paragraphe 14(2);  
(c) are linked to the same federal  
authority as specified in those  
regulations or that order.  
c) liées à la même autorité fédérale  
selon ce qui est précisé dans ce  
règlement ou cet arrêté.  
It includes any physical activity that is Sont comprises les activités concrètes  
incidental to those physical activities. qui leur sont accessoires.  
5 (1) For the purposes of this Act, the 5 (1) Pour l’application de la présente  
environmental effects that are to be loi, les effets environnementaux qui  
taken into account in relation to an act sont en cause à l’égard d’une mesure,  
or thing, a physical activity, a  
designated project or a project are  
d’une activité concrète, d’un projet  
désigné ou d’un projet sont les  
suivants :  
(a) a change that may be caused to the a) les changements qui risquent d’être  
following components of the  
environment that are within the  
causés aux composantes ci-après de  
l’environnement qui relèvent de la  
Page: 260  
legislative authority of Parliament:  
compétence législative du Parlement :  
(i) fish and fish habitat as defined in  
subsection 2(1) of the Fisheries Act,  
(i) les poissons et leur habitat, au sens  
du paragraphe 2(1) de la Loi sur les  
pêches,  
(ii) aquatic species as defined in  
subsection 2(1) of the Species at Risk  
Act,  
(ii) les espèces aquatiques au sens du  
paragraphe 2(1) de la Loi sur les  
espèces en péril,  
(iii) migratory birds as defined in  
(iii) les oiseaux migrateurs au sens du  
subsection 2(1) of the Migratory Birds paragraphe 2(1) de la Loi de 1994 sur  
Convention Act, 1994, and  
la convention concernant les oiseaux  
migrateurs,  
(iv) any other component of the  
(iv) toute autre composante de  
environment that is set out in Schedule l’environnement mentionnée à  
2; l’annexe 2;  
(b) a change that may be caused to the b) les changements qui risquent d’être  
environment that would occur  
causés à l’environnement, selon le cas  
:
(i) on federal lands,  
(i) sur le territoire domanial,  
(ii) in a province other than the one in (ii) dans une province autre que celle  
which the act or thing is done or  
where the physical activity, the  
designated project or the project is  
being carried out, or  
dans laquelle la mesure est prise,  
l’activité est exercée ou le projet  
désigné ou le projet est réalisé,  
(iii) outside Canada; and  
(iii) à l’étranger;  
(c) with respect to aboriginal peoples, c) s’agissant des peuples autochtones,  
an effect occurring in Canada of any  
change that may be caused to the  
environment on  
les répercussions au Canada des  
changements qui risquent d’être  
causés à l’environnement, selon le cas  
:
(i) health and socio-economic  
conditions,  
(i) en matière sanitaire et socio-  
économique,  
(ii) physical and cultural heritage,  
(ii) sur le patrimoine naturel et le  
patrimoine culturel,  
(iii) the current use of lands and  
(iii) sur l’usage courant de terres et de  
resources for traditional purposes, or  
ressources à des fins traditionnelles,  
Page: 261  
(iv) any structure, site or thing that is  
of historical, archaeological,  
paleontological or architectural  
significance.  
(iv) sur une construction, un  
emplacement ou une chose  
d’importance sur le plan historique,  
archéologique, paléontologique ou  
architectural.  
19 (1) The environmental assessment  
of a designated project must take into  
account the following factors:  
19 (1) L’évaluation environnementale  
d’un projet désigné prend en compte  
les éléments suivants :  
(a) the environmental effects of the  
a) les effets environnementaux du  
designated project, including the  
projet, y compris ceux causés par les  
environmental effects of malfunctions accidents ou défaillances pouvant en  
or accidents that may occur in résulter, et les effets cumulatifs que sa  
connection with the designated project réalisation, combinée à celle d’autres  
and any cumulative environmental activités concrètes, passées ou futures,  
effects that are likely to result from the est susceptible de causer à  
designated project in combination  
with other physical activities that have  
been or will be carried out;  
l’environnement;  
(b) the significance of the effects  
b) l’importance des effets visés à  
referred to in paragraph (a);  
l’alinéa a);  
(c) comments from the public or,  
with respect to a designated project  
that requires that a certificate be  
issued in accordance with an order  
c) les observations du public ou,  
s’agissant d’un projet dont la  
réalisation requiert la délivrance d’un  
certificat au titre d’un décret pris en  
made under section 54 of the National vertu de l’article 54 de la Loi sur  
Energy Board Act, any interested  
party that are received in  
accordance with this Act;  
l’Office national de l’énergie, des  
parties intéressées reçues  
conformément à la présente loi;  
(d) mitigation measures that are  
d) les mesures d’atténuation  
technically and economically feasible réalisables, sur les plans technique et  
and that would mitigate any  
économique, des effets  
significant adverse environmental  
effects of the designated project;  
environnementaux négatifs importants  
du projet;  
(e) the requirements of the follow-up  
program in respect of the designated  
project;  
e) les exigences du programme de  
suivi du projet;  
(f) the purpose of the designated  
f) les raisons d’être du projet;  
project;  
Page: 262  
(g) alternative means of carrying out  
the designated project that are  
g) les solutions de rechange réalisables  
sur les plans technique et économique,  
technically and economically feasible et leurs effets environnementaux;  
and the environmental effects of any  
such alternative means;  
(h) any change to the designated  
project that may be caused by the  
environment;  
h) les changements susceptibles d’être  
apportés au projet du fait de  
l’environnement;  
(i) the results of any relevant study  
i) les résultats de toute étude  
conducted by a committee established pertinente effectuée par un comité  
under section 73 or 74; and  
constitué au titre des articles 73 ou 74;  
(j) any other matter relevant to the  
environmental assessment that the  
responsible authority, or if the  
environmental assessment is referred  
to a review panel the Minister,  
requires to be taken into account.  
j) tout autre élément utile à  
l’évaluation environnementale dont  
l’autorité responsable ou, s’il renvoie  
l’évaluation environnementale pour  
examen par une commission, le  
ministre peut exiger la prise en  
compte.  
29 (1) If the carrying out of a  
29 (1) Si la réalisation d’un projet  
désigné requiert la délivrance d’un  
certificat au titre d’un décret pris en  
vertu de l’article 54 de la Loi sur  
designated project requires that a  
certificate be issued in accordance  
with an order made under section 54  
of the National Energy Board Act, the l’Office national de l’énergie,  
responsible authority with respect to l’autorité responsable à l’égard du  
the designated project must ensure that projet veille à ce que figure dans le  
the report concerning the  
rapport d’évaluation environnementale  
environmental assessment of the  
designated project sets out  
relatif au projet :  
(a) its recommendation with respect to a) sa recommandation quant à la  
the decision that may be made under  
paragraph 31(1)(a) in relation to the  
décision pouvant être prise au titre de  
l’alinéa 31(1)a) relativement au projet,  
designated project, taking into account compte tenu de l’application des  
the implementation of any mitigation  
measures that it set out in the report;  
and  
mesures d’atténuation qu’elle précise  
dans le rapport;  
(b) its recommendation with respect to b) sa recommandation quant au  
the follow-up program that is to be  
implemented in respect of the  
designated project.  
programme de suivi devant être mis en  
oeuvre relativement au projet.  
Page: 263  
31 (1) After the responsible authority  
with respect to a designated project  
31 (1) Une fois que l’autorité  
responsable à l’égard d’un projet  
has submitted its report with respect to désigné a présenté son rapport  
the environmental assessment or its  
reconsideration report under section  
29 or 30, the Governor in Council  
may, by order made under subsection  
54(1) of the National Energy Board  
Act  
d’évaluation environnementale ou son  
rapport de réexamen en application  
des articles 29 ou 30, le gouverneur en  
conseil peut, par décret pris en vertu  
du paragraphe 54(1) de la Loi sur  
l’Office national de l’énergie :  
(a) decide, taking into account the  
implementation of any mitigation  
measures specified in the report with  
respect to the environmental  
assessment or in the reconsideration  
report, if there is one, that the  
designated project  
a) décider, compte tenu de  
l’application des mesures  
d’atténuation précisées dans le rapport  
d’évaluation environnementale ou, s’il  
y en a un, le rapport de réexamen, que  
la réalisation du projet, selon le cas :  
(i) is not likely to cause significant  
adverse environmental effects,  
(i) n’est pas susceptible d’entraîner  
des effets environnementaux négatifs  
et importants,  
(ii) is likely to cause significant  
(ii) est susceptible d’entraîner des  
adverse environmental effects that can effets environnementaux négatifs et  
be justified in the circumstances, or  
importants qui sont justifiables dans  
les circonstances,  
(iii) is likely to cause significant  
adverse environmental effects that  
cannot be justified in the  
(iii) est susceptible d’entraîner des  
effets environnementaux négatifs et  
importants qui ne sont pas justifiables  
dans les circonstances;  
circumstances; and  
(b) direct the responsible authority to  
issue a decision statement to the  
proponent of the designated project  
that  
b) donner à l’autorité responsable  
instruction de faire une déclaration  
qu’elle remet au promoteur du projet  
dans laquelle :  
(i) informs the proponent of the  
decision made under paragraph (a)  
with respect to the designated project  
and,  
(i) elle donne avis de la décision prise  
par le gouverneur en conseil en vertu  
de l’alinéa a) relativement au projet,  
(ii) if the decision is referred to in  
subparagraph (a)(i) or (ii), sets out  
conditions which are the  
(ii) si cette décision est celle visée aux  
sous-alinéas a)(i) ou (ii), elle énonce  
les conditions que le promoteur est  
tenu de respecter relativement au  
implementation of the mitigation  
Page: 264  
measures and the follow-up program  
projet, à savoir la mise en oeuvre des  
set out in the report with respect to the mesures d’atténuation et du  
environmental assessment or the  
reconsideration report, if there is one  
that must be complied with by the  
programme de suivi précisés dans le  
rapport d’évaluation environnementale  
ou, s’il y en a un, le rapport de  
proponent in relation to the designated réexamen.  
project.  
Species at Risk Act, S.C. 2002, c. 29  
77 (1) Despite any other Act of  
77 (1) Malgré toute autre loi fédérale,  
Parliament, any person or body, other toute personne ou tout organisme,  
than a competent minister, authorized autre qu’un ministre compétent,  
under any Act of Parliament, other  
than this Act, to issue or approve a  
licence, a permit or any other  
authorization that authorizes an  
activity that may result in the  
habilité par une loi fédérale, à  
l’exception de la présente loi, à  
délivrer un permis ou une autre  
autorisation, ou à y donner son  
agrément, visant la mise à exécution  
d’une activité susceptible d’entraîner  
destruction of any part of the critical  
habitat of a listed wildlife species may la destruction d’un élément de  
enter into, issue, approve or make the  
authorization only if the person or  
l’habitat essentiel d’une espèce  
sauvage inscrite ne peut le faire que  
body has consulted with the competent s’il a consulté le ministre compétent,  
minister, has considered the impact on s’il a envisagé les conséquences  
the species’ critical habitat and is of  
the opinion that  
négatives de l’activité pour l’habitat  
essentiel de l’espèce et s’il estime, à la  
fois :  
(a) all reasonable alternatives to the  
activity that would reduce the impact  
on the species’ critical habitat have  
been considered and the best solution  
has been adopted; and  
a) que toutes les solutions de rechange  
susceptibles de minimiser les  
conséquences négatives de l’activité  
pour l’habitat essentiel de l’espèce ont  
été envisagées, et la meilleure solution  
retenue;  
(b) all feasible measures will be taken b) que toutes les mesures possibles  
to minimize the impact of the activity seront prises afin de minimiser les  
on the species’ critical habitat.  
conséquences négatives de l’activité  
pour l’habitat essentiel de l’espèce.  
(1.1) Subsection (1) does not apply to (1.1) Le paragraphe (1) ne s’applique  
the National Energy Board when it  
issues a certificate under an order  
made under subsection 54(1) of the  
pas à l’Office national de l’énergie  
lorsqu’il délivre un certificat  
conformément à un décret pris en  
vertu du paragraphe 54(1) de la Loi  
Page: 265  
National Energy Board Act.  
sur l’Office national de l’énergie.  
(2) For greater certainty, section 58  
(2) Il est entendu que l’article 58  
applies even though a licence, a permit s’applique même si l’autorisation a été  
or any other authorization has been  
issued in accordance with subsection  
(1).  
délivrée ou l’agrément a été donné en  
conformité avec le paragraphe (1).  
79 (1) Every person who is required  
by or under an Act of Parliament to  
ensure that an assessment of the  
environmental effects of a project is  
conducted, and every authority who  
makes a determination under  
79 (1) Toute personne qui est tenue,  
sous le régime d’une loi fédérale, de  
veiller à ce qu’il soit procédé à  
l’évaluation des effets  
environnementaux d’un projet et toute  
autorité qui prend une décision au titre  
des alinéas 67a) ou b) de la Loi  
canadienne sur l’évaluation  
environnementale (2012) relativement  
à un projet notifient sans tarder le  
projet à tout ministre compétent s’il  
est susceptible de toucher une espèce  
sauvage inscrite ou son habitat  
essentiel.  
paragraph 67(a) or (b) of the  
Canadian Environmental Assessment  
Act, 2012 in relation to a project,  
must, without delay, notify the  
competent minister or ministers in  
writing of the project if it is likely to  
affect a listed wildlife species or its  
critical habitat.  
(2) The person must identify the  
adverse effects of the project on the  
listed wildlife species and its critical  
habitat and, if the project is carried  
out, must ensure that measures are  
taken to avoid or lessen those effects  
and to monitor them. The measures  
must be taken in a way that is  
(2) La personne détermine les effets  
nocifs du projet sur l’espèce et son  
habitat essentiel et, si le projet est  
réalisé, veille à ce que des mesures  
compatibles avec tout programme de  
rétablissement et tout plan d’action  
applicable soient prises en vue de les  
éviter ou de les amoindrir et les  
surveiller.  
consistent with any applicable  
recovery strategy and action plans.  
(3) The following definitions apply in (3) Les définitions qui suivent  
this section.  
s’appliquent au présent article.  
person includes an association, an  
organization, a federal authority as  
defined in subsection 2(1) of the  
Canadian Environmental Assessment  
personne S’entend notamment d’une  
association de personnes, d’une  
organisation, d’une autorité fédérale  
au sens du paragraphe 2(1) de la Loi  
Act, 2012, and any body that is set out canadienne sur l’évaluation  
in Schedule 3 to that Act.  
environnementale (2012) et de tout  
organisme mentionné à l’annexe 3 de  
Page: 266  
cette loi.  
projet  
project means  
(a) a designated project as defined in  
subsection 2(1) of the Canadian  
Environmental Assessment Act, 2012  
a) Projet désigné au sens du  
paragraphe 2(1) de la Loi canadienne  
sur l’évaluation environnementale  
or a project as defined in section 66 of (2012) ou projet au sens de l’article 66  
that Act;  
de cette loi;  
(b) a project as defined in subsection  
2(1) of the Yukon Environmental and  
Socio-economic Assessment Act; or  
b) projet de développement au sens du  
paragraphe 2(1) de la Loi sur  
l’évaluation environnementale et  
socioéconomique au Yukon;  
(c) a development as defined in  
subsection 111(1) of the Mackenzie  
Valley Resource Management Act.  
c) projet de développement au sens du  
paragraphe 111(1) de la Loi sur la  
gestion des ressources de la vallée du  
Mackenzie.  
FEDERAL COURT OF APPEAL  
NAMES OF COUNSEL AND SOLICITORS OF RECORD  
A-78-17 (LEAD FILE); A-217-16;  
DOCKETS:  
A-218-16; A-223-16; A-224-16;  
A-225-16; A-232-16; A-68-17;  
A-74-17; A-75-17; A-76-17;  
A-77-17; A-84-17; A-86-17  
TSLEIL-WAUTUTH NATION et  
al. v. ATTORNEY GENERAL OF  
CANADA et al.  
STYLE OF CAUSE:  
VANCOUVER, BRITISH  
COLUMBIA  
PLACE OF HEARING:  
OCTOBER 2-5, 10, 12-13, 2017  
DAWSON J.A.  
DATE OF HEARING:  
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT BY:  
CONCURRED IN BY:  
DE MONTIGNY J.A.  
WOODS J.A.  
AUGUST 30, 2018  
DATED:  
APPEARANCES:  
Maxime Faille  
Scott A. Smith  
Paul Seaman  
FOR THE APPLICANT, TSLEIL-  
WAUTUTH NATION  
Susan Horne  
K. Michael Stephens  
Rebecca Robb  
FOR THE APPLICANT, CITY OF  
VANCOUVER  
Gregory McDade  
Michelle Bradley  
FOR THE APPLICANT, CITY OF  
BURNABY  
F. Matthew Kirchner  
Emma K. Hume  
Michelle Bradley  
FOR THE APPLICANTS, THE  
SQUAMISH NATION (ALSO  
KNOWN AS THE SQUAMISH  
INDIAN BAND), XÀLEK/SEKYÚ  
SIÝAM, CHIEF IAN CAMPBELL  
Page: 2  
ON HIS OWN BEHALF AND ON  
BEHALF OF ALL MEMBERS OF  
THE SQUAMISH NATION,  
COLDWATER INDIAN BAND,  
CHIEF LEE SPAHAN IN HIS  
CAPACITY AS CHIEF OF THE  
COLDWATER BAND ON  
BEHALF OF ALL MEMBERS OF  
THE COLDWATER BAND  
Crystal Reeves  
Elin Sigurdson  
FOR THE APPLICANT  
UPPER NICOLA BAND  
Jana McLean  
Joelle Walker  
FOR THE APPLICANTS,  
AITCHELITZ, SKOWKALE,  
SHXWHÁ:Y VILLAGE,  
SOOWAHLIE, SQUIALA FIRST  
NATION, TZEACHTEN,  
YAKWEAKWIOOSE, SKWAH,  
CHIEF DAVID JIMMIE ON HIS  
OWN BEHALF AND ON BEHALF  
OF ALL MEMBERS OF THE  
TS’ELXWÉYEQW TRIBE  
Sarah D. Hansen  
Megan Young  
FOR THE APPLICANTS, CHIEF  
RON IGNACE AND CHIEF FRED  
SEYMOUR ON THEIR OWN  
BEHALF AND ON BEHALF OF  
ALL OTHER MEMBERS OF THE  
STK’EMLUPSEMC TE  
SECWEPEMC OF THE  
SECWEPEMC NATION  
Margot Venton  
Dyna Tuytel  
FOR THE APPLICANTS,  
RAINCOAST CONSERVATION  
FOUNDATION AND LIVING  
OCEANS SOCIETY  
Jan Brongers  
Bruce Hughson  
Dayna Anderson  
Liliane Bantourakis  
Sarah Bird  
FOR THE RESPONDENT,  
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF  
CANADA  
Jon Khan  
Ashley Caron  
Page: 3  
Maureen Killoran, Q.C.  
Olivia Dixon  
FOR THE RESPONDENT, TRANS  
MOUNTAIN PIPELINE ULC  
Sean Sutherland  
Paul Johnston  
Keith Bergner  
Toby Kruger  
FOR THE RESPONDENT,  
NATIONAL ENERGY BOARD  
Marta Burns  
Doreen Mueller  
FOR THE INTERVENER,  
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF  
ALBERTA  
Thomas R. Berger, O.C., Q.C.  
Monique Pongracic-Speier  
FOR THE INTERVENER,  
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF  
BRITISH COLUMBIA  
SOLICITORS OF RECORD:  
Gowling WLG (Canada) LLP  
Vancouver, British Columbia  
FOR THE APPLICANT, TSLEIL-  
WAUTUTH NATION  
Hunter Litigation Chambers  
Vancouver, British Columbia  
FOR THE APPLICANT, CITY OF  
VANCOUVER  
Ratcliff & Company LLP  
North Vancouver, British Columbia  
FOR THE APPLICANT, CITY OF  
BURNABY  
Ratcliff & Company LLP  
North Vancouver, British Columbia  
FOR THE APPLICANTS, THE  
SQUAMISH NATION (also known  
as the SQUAMISH INDIAN  
BAND), XÀLEK/SEKYÚ SIÝAM,  
CHIEF IAN CAMPBELL on his  
own behalf and on behalf of all  
members of the Squamish Nation,  
COLDWATER INDIAN BAND,  
CHIEF LEE SPAHAN in his  
capacity as Chief of the Coldwater  
Band on behalf of all members of  
the Coldwater Band  
Mandell Pinder LLP  
Vancouver, British Columbia  
FOR THE APPLICANT,  
UPPER NICOLA BAND  
Miller Titerle + Company LLP  
Vancouver, British Columbia  
FOR THE APPLICANTS,  
AITCHELITZ, SKOWKALE,  
Page: 4  
SHXWHÁ:Y VILLAGE,  
SOOWAHLIE, SQUIALA FIRST  
NATION, TZEACHTEN,  
YAKWEAKWIOOSE, SKWAH,  
CHIEF DAVID JIMMIE on his own  
behalf and on behalf of all members  
of the TS’ELXWÉYEQW TRIBE  
Miller Thomson LLP  
Vancouver, British Columbia  
FOR THE APPLICANTS,CHIEF  
RON IGNACE and CHIEF FRED  
SEYMOUR on their own behalf and  
on behalf of all other members of the  
STK’EMLUPSEMC TE  
SECWEPEMC of the  
SECWEPEMC NATION  
Ecojustice  
Calgary, Alberta  
FOR THE APPLICANTS,  
RAINCOAST CONSERVATION  
FOUNDATION AND LIVING  
OCEANS SOCIETY  
Nathalie G. Drouin  
Deputy Attorney General of Canada  
FOR THE RESPONDENT,  
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF  
CANADA  
National Energy Board Legal Services  
Calgary, Alberta  
Osler, Hoskin & Harcourt LLP  
Calgary, Alberta  
FOR THE RESPONDENT,  
NATIONAL ENERGY BOARD  
FOR THE RESPONDENT, TRANS  
MOUNTAIN PIPELINE ULC  
Alberta Justice and Solicitor General  
Edmonton, Alberta  
FOR THE INTERVENER,  
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF  
ALBERTA  
Ministry of Justice  
Victoria, British Columbia  
FOR THE INTERVENER,  
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF  
BRITISH COLUMBIA  


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