emission standards in place, Part 2 would not come into operation. In any event, even when
Part 2 does apply, the operator of a facility can pay any required compensation to the Minister by
way of credits, not cash. And, if all covered facilities stay below their prescribed emissions
limits, no compensation of any sort is payable. This is not the statutory profile of a tax, i.e., of a
levy that has a primary purpose of raising revenue for general purposes.
 Taking all of the relevant factors into account, it is evident that the excess emissions
charge imposed under Part 2 of the Act is not a tax.
If Part 1 or 2 does impose a tax, is s. 53 of the Constitution Act, 1867
 In light of the conclusion that the Act does not impose taxes, it is not strictly necessary to
consider the arguments based on s. 53 of the Constitution Act, 1867. However, in the interest of
completeness, I will deal with the impact of s. 53 should the Act be seen as imposing a tax.
 As noted above, s. 53 requires that bills “for imposing any Tax or Impost” must originate
in the House of Commons. In interpreting s. 53, the Supreme Court has focussed on its root
constitutional purpose. Thus, in 620 Connaught Ltd. v Canada (Attorney General), 2008 SCC 7
at para 4,  1 SCR 131 [Connaught], the Court indicated that s. 53 gives effect to the basic
democratic principle that the Crown may levy taxes only with the consent of elected
representatives. Justice Major explained this as follows in Eurig Estate:
In my view, the rationale underlying s. 53 is somewhat broader. The provision
codifies the principle of no taxation without representation, by requiring any bill that
imposes a tax to originate with the legislature. My interpretation of s. 53 does not prohibit
Parliament or the legislatures from vesting any control over the details and mechanism of
taxation in statutory delegates such as the Lieutenant Governor in Council. Rather, it
prohibits not only the Senate, but also any other body other than the directly elected
legislature, from imposing a tax on its own accord.
In our system of responsible government, the Lieutenant Governor in Council
cannot impose a new tax ab initio without the authorization of the legislature. As
Audette J. succinctly stated in The King v. National Fish Co.,  Ex. C.R. 75, at p.
83, “[t]he Governor in Council has no power, proprio vigore, to impose taxes unless
under authority specifically delegated to it by Statute. The power of taxation is
exclusively in Parliament.”
The basic purpose of s. 53 is to constitutionalize the principle that taxation
powers cannot arise incidentally in delegated legislation. In so doing, it ensures
parliamentary control over, and accountability for, taxation. As E. A. Driedger stated in
“Money Bills and the Senate” (1968), 3 Ottawa L. Rev. 25, at p. 41: