Here, similarly, the resource amounts are a standard or yard-stick used to tax the corporation, and
are not themselves the subject-matter of the tax. See also: Victuni Aktiengesellschaft v Quebec
(Minister of Revenue),  1 SCR 580 at 583.
 I acknowledge the Defendants’ point, that the context of these cases is very different.
None of them is directly on point or governs the characterization of the CCTA Tax, and some of
them rely on factors not applicable here. Nonetheless, they do two things that are important.
First, they show that in assessing the subject-matter of a taxation statute the analysis cannot stop
at the thing which affects the amount of the tax (e.g., income or production). Second, they show
that assessing the subject-matter of a taxation statute must be based, as with statutory
interpretation in general, on the charging section looked at in light of the statute as a whole.
When that is done, the subject-matter of the CCTA Tax, which is the corporation itself, becomes
 The Defendants emphasize, I think fairly, that the reality under the CCTA is that the
taxes payable under that statute are entirely (at least for a larger corporation) set by the taxes
calculated on production, by virtue of the fact that since 2008 the capital tax rate has been zero
percent. Under s. 13.1 of the CCTA, the difference between the resource surcharge and the
capital tax is always equal to the resource surcharge, because the capital tax is zero.
 That current choice to set the capital tax rate at zero – even if it has now persisted for
over a decade – does not, however, change the overall structure and intent of the statutory
scheme which gives rise to the CCTA Tax. The option remains open to the Saskatchewan
government to set the capital tax rate at the level they choose, and the provision in s. 13.1 to
calculate the tax owing as the positive difference between the two amounts remains in effect. The
nature of a statutory scheme cannot change over time depending on the tax rate used by the
government. A zero rate is not equivalent to repeal or statutory amendment, and the Defendants’
argument would make it so.
 The Defendants also dispute the relevance of the small business deduction given under s.
14.1 of the CCTA for showing that the CCTA Tax is a tax on corporations, not a tax on resource
proceeds. They note the various ways in which taxation statutes can offer deductions unrelated to
the tax itself. I accept their general observation on this point and agree that this deduction is not
determinative of the characterization of the CCTA Tax. I also accept the Defendants’ point that
the payment of the CCTA Tax by instalments, and the absence of lien rights, are not
determinative. But they are all relevant. And they, along with the rest of the CCTA, and
especially the terms of s. 13.1 making the tax payable dependent on both the resource surcharge
and the capital tax, reveal that the CCTA Tax is part of the Saskatchewan government’s scheme
for taxing resource corporations, not part of a scheme for taxing resources produced in
 The Defendants accuse the Plaintiffs of irrationality because the Plaintiffs challenge the
resource surcharge but accept the Freehold Production Tax. The Defendants submit that the two
taxes are “virtually identical” (emphasis in original) so that it makes no sense to challenge one
but accept the other. Even if the Defendants are correct, however, I am not sure how that is
relevant to, or advances, my interpretation of the subject matter of the CCTA Tax, and its
inclusion in the NPI Agreement. Answering that question depends on the interpretation of the
NPI Agreement and the CCTA, not on its similarity to, or difference from, the Freehold
Production Tax, or on whether the Defendants are acting irrationally or inconsistently.