Unofficial English Translation of the Judgment of the Court

SNC-Lavalin inc. (Terratech inc. et SNC-Lavalin Environnement

2020 QCCA 495

inc.) c. Deguise

 

 

 

 

COURT OF APPEAL

 

 

CANADA

 

 

 

PROVINCE OF QUEBEC

 

 

 

REGISTRY OF QUEBEC

 

 

 

Nos.:

200-09-008788-140

200-09-028788-153

200-09-038788-151

 

200-09-048788-159

200-09-058788-156

200-09-068788-154

 

200-09-108788-156

200-09-118788-154

200-09-128788-152

 

200-09-158788-155

 

 

 

 

(400-17-002016-091)

 

 

 

DATE:

April 6, 2020

 

 

 

2020 QCCA 495 (*)

CORAM:

THE HONOURABLE FRANÇOIS PELLETIER, J.A.

 

LORNE GIROUX, J.A.

 

GUY GAGNON, J.A.

(200-09-008788-140)*

SNC-LAVALIN INC. (formerly doing business as TERRATECH INC. and SNC- LAVALIN ENVIRONMENT INC.) and ALAIN BLANCHETTE

APPELLANTS – Defendants

v.

LISE DEGUISE AND CHRISTIAN YARD

RESPONDENTS – Plaintiffs

and

AIG INSURANCE COMPANY OF CANADA (formerly known as CHARTIS INSURANCE COMPANY OF CANADA) (as insurer of SNC-LAVALIN INC. and ALAIN BLANCHETTE), LLOYD'S UNDERWRITERS (as insurer of SNC-LAVALIN INC. and ALAIN BLANCHETTE), ZURICH INSURANCE COMPANY LTD. (as insurer of SNC- LAVALIN INC. and ALAIN BLANCHETTE), ACE INA INSURANCE (as insurer of SNC- LAVALIN INC. and ALAIN BLANCHETTE), CARRIÈRE B & B INC., AIG INSURANCE COMPANY OF CANADA (as insurer of CARRIÈRE B & B INC.), NORTHBRIDGE GENERAL INSURANCE CORPORATION (as insurer of CARRIÈRE B & B INC.), 9312-1994 QUÉBEC INC. (formerly known as CONSTRUCTION YVAN BOISVERT INC.), NORTHBRIDGE GENERAL INSURANCE CORPORATION (as insurer of 9312-

*See the full designations of the cases in Schedule 1 to the judgment.

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1994 QUÉBEC INC.), ST. PAUL INSURANCE COMPANY (as insurer of 9312-1994

QUÉBEC INC.), FRANCOIS MONTMINY RESPONDENTS - Defendants

and

CHUBB INSURANCE COMPANY OF CANADA (as insurer of SNC-LAVALIN INC. and

ALAIN BLANCHETTE)

RESPONDENT IN CONTINUANCE OF SUIT – Defendant

2020 QCCA 495 (*)

JUDGMENT

1

BACKGROUND 7

2

THE FIRST WAVE OF PROCEEDINGS DETERMINED AT TRIAL 7

2.1General facts10

2.1.1

Introduction 10

 

2.1.2

Chronological review

11

2.2Trials 25

2.2.1Court agreements 25

2.2.2Impleading of Lafarge and Marie De Grosbois 32

2.2.3Trial 33

2.3Judgments 34

2.3.1

Introduction

34

 

 

 

 

2.3.2

Main judgment

36

 

 

 

2.3.3

Judgment following the splitting of the proceeding

41

3

APPEALS

42

 

 

 

 

3.1

First series of appeals

42

 

 

3.2

Management of appeals

42

 

 

4

STRUCTURE OF JUDGMENTS 45

 

4.1

Foreword

45

 

 

 

 

4.2

Outline of the Main judgment

46

 

4.3Standard of review 47

5

PRELIMINARY REMARKS

48

 

6

LIABILITY OF CONTRACTORS

48

 

6.1

Ground No. 7: Liability under article 2118 C.C.Q.

49

6.1.1

Theory of the inapplicability of liability under article 2118 C.C.Q. 52

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6.1.2 Grounds of exemption under the legal scheme applicable to certain losses of

the work

56

6.2Ground No. 16, part 1: contractors/formworkers’ warranty of quality and the presumption of knowledge of the defect in article 1728 C.C.Q.; part 2: ground

concerning certain specific sequences 64

 

Ground No. 18: Absence of fault by the contractors/formworkers (2098 et seq.

C.C.Q.)

64

7

LIABILITY RESULTING FROM THE SALE OF DEFECTIVE CONCRETE 65

7.1Ground No. 9: Knowledge attributed to the concrete suppliers and to B&B

(common endeavour)

65

7.2 Ground No. 13: Absence of fault by CYB 74

7.3Ground No. 3: Application of the warranty of quality of the concrete suppliers

and of B&B

75

7.4Ground No. 7.1: Liability under article 2118 C.C.Q. and grounds of exemption

 

75

 

8

LIABILITY OF SNC AND GEOLOGIST BLANCHETTE

76

8.1Ground No. 1: Determination of geologist Blanchette’s faults 76

8.1.1

Criterion for assessing professional fault 76

 

8.1.2

Contesting the trial judge’s analysis of fault

80

8.1.2.1

Trial judgment

80

 

8.1.2.2

Analysis

81

 

 

8.1.2.3Multiplicity of faults 88

8.2Ground No. 2: Causal connection between geologist Blanchette’s faults and the damage 91

8.2.1

Reasons

91

 

 

8.2.2

Assessment of causation 92

 

 

8.2.3 Argument on the break in the chain of causation

92

8.2.3.1

The 2002 Bérubé report 93

 

 

8.2.3.2

The 2006 intervention of Marie De Grosbois

96

8.2.3.3

Additional studies requested in 2006

99

 

8.3 Ground No. 4: Extracontractual liability of SNC/Blanchette 101

8.3.1Confidentiality of geologist Blanchette’s reports 101

8.3.2Liability of geologist Blanchette to the plaintiffs 103

8.3.3Analysis of the causal connection 108

8.4

Ground No. 5: Starting point of Blanchette’s and SNC’s liability

11138.4.1

 

Geologist Blanchette’s knowledge of the use of his May 2003 report

113

8.4.2

The so-called “falsification” of the May 2003 report

118

 

8.5

Ground No. 8: Period of SNC/Blanchette’s liability

119

 

8.5.1

Theory of the Group 1 appellants 120

 

 

2020 QCCA 495 (*)

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8.5.2 Theory of the Group 2, 3 and 4 appellants

122

9APPORTIONMENT OF SOLIDARY LIABILITY OR LIABILITY IN SOLIDUM AND THE APPLICATIONS FOR FORCED INTERVENTION 124

9.1Introduction 124

9.2Grounds No. 6 and no. 19: Apportionment of liability between the defendants

and the various applications for forced intervention

125

9.2.1 Respective shares of each concrete supplier vis-à-vis B&B 129

9.2.2 Share of the contractors vis-à-vis the concrete suppliers and B&B and absence

of fault by the contractors/formworkers (Ground No. 18)

133

 

9.2.3

Share of certain self-builders vis-à-vis the concrete suppliers and B&B (Ground

No. 27)

156

 

 

9.2.4

Share of contractors and certain self-builders vis-à-vis SNC/Blanchette

160

9.2.5Share of tandems BL/B&B and CYB/B&B vis-à-vis SNC/Blanchette 164

9.2.6CYB’s applications for forced intervention against BL 171

9.2.7.

Defendants’ insurers

173

10

DAMAGES (general grounds) 174

10.1Ground No. 35: Establishment of a threshold volume of 0.23% of pyrrhotite in the aggregate for the assessment of damages 174

10.1.1 Background 174

10.1.2 Analysis

176

10.1.2.1The moment of the appearance of damage is indeterminate 176

The natural protection conferred by burying components of concrete

176

The inferences arising from the pyrrhotite level of 0.23%

179

 

 

10.1.2.2

Uncertain damage 185

 

 

 

 

10.1.2.3

The judge did not adhere to his analytical framework

189

 

The factors of the analytical framework are not cumulative

192

 

 

The factors of the analytical framework are not all of equal value

194

 

10.1.2.4

Absence of depreciation

196

 

 

 

10.1.3 Conclusion 197

 

 

 

 

10.2 Ground No. 36: Expert fees

198

 

 

 

10.2.1Background 198

10.2.2Analysis 200

10.2.2.1

The findings of solidary or in solidum liability 204

 

10.2.2.2

The agreements on expert fees 205

 

 

10.2.2.3

The usefulness of the expert reports

206

 

10.2.3 Conclusion 206

 

 

INTRODUCTION TO THE ANALYSIS OF ALL INSURANCE ISSUES

207

11 THE INSURANCE POLICIES OF THE CONCRETE SUPPLIERS, OF B&B, AND OF CERTAIN CONTRACTORS 210

2020 QCCA 495 (*)

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11.1 Ground No. 54: Nullity ab initio of the policies issued by AIG

210

 

(*)

Ground No. 54: Nullity ab initio of the policies issued by Northbridge

210

495

Ground No. 66: Period of application of the nullity ab initio

210

 

 

QCCA

11.1.1 The judgment under appeal

210

 

 

 

 

11.1.2 Analysis

217

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

2020

11.1.2.1

The applicable law

217

 

 

 

 

 

11.1.2.2

The period prior to December 1, 2007

220

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The judge’s method of analysis

220

 

 

 

 

 

 

The facts known to the insurer

222

 

 

 

 

 

 

The insurer’s duty to investigate

224

 

 

 

 

 

 

AIG in its capacity as excess insurer

234

 

 

 

 

 

Conclusion on nullity ab initio before December 2007

240

 

 

 

 

11.1.2.3

The period subsequent to November 2007

243

 

 

 

11.2Ground No. 67: The Prior Insurance and Non-Cumulation of Liability clause in the AIG and Northbridge policies 244

11.3 Ground No. 69: Exclusion of “pyrite”-related risk

249

11.4Ground No. 68: Effective date of the damage and of the insurance coverage

254

12 SNC’S INSURANCE POLICIES 258

12.1Ground No. 63: The multiplication of coverage for the 2009-2010, 2010-2011

and 2011-2012 insurance tower 261

12.1.1Background 263

12.1.2Analysis 267

12.1.2.1

The reference policy

267

12.1.2.2Presentation of the disputed insurance clauses 269

Clause 4.1 or 4.2, as the case may be 273

Clause 7.1.2 275

Clauses 6.5.1 and 6.5.2 277

12.1.2.3The tardiness of the insurers’ argument 283

12.1.3 Conclusion

284

 

 

 

 

12.2 Ground No. 61: Retroactive date in the ACE policy

284

 

12.2.1 Background

284

 

 

 

 

12.2.2 The judgment

285

 

 

 

12.2.3 Analysis

286

 

 

 

 

12.2.3.1

The follow form system

287

 

 

What is follow form?

 

287

 

 

 

Legal aspects of the follow form system 287

 

 

The application of the true follow form system to the facts of this case

293

The reference policy

294

 

 

 

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12.2.3.2

The concept of a retroactive limitation date

297

The inconsistency (2400 C.C.Q.) 298

 

The validity of the factual premises of ACE’s argument

301

12.2.4 Conclusion 301

 

12.3Ground No. 62: the share of each of SNC’s insurers in the award of damages

302

 

 

 

12.3.1 Analysis

302

 

12.3.1.1

The reference policy

303

12.3.1.2Allocation among the insurers of the damages awarded against SNC

304

12.3.2 Conclusion

308

 

 

12.4 Ground No. 64: Application of Ontario law to the Zurich policies

308

12.4.1 Background

308

 

 

12.4.2 Analysis

310

 

 

12.4.2.1

The follow form system

310

 

12.4.2.2The Choice of Law and Jurisdiction clause and 3119 C.C.Q. 311

A contract covering property or an interest situated in Quebec or that is subscribed in Quebec by a person resident in Quebec 315

The policyholder applies for the insurance in Quebec or the insurer signs or delivers

the policy in Quebec

316

12.4.3 Conclusion 318

 

12.5Ground No. 60: Erosion of the limits of the 2009-2010 tower 319 12.5.1 Background 320

12.5.2 Analysis

322

12.5.2.1The rights of injured third persons under domestic law and the insurance contract 327

Articles 3119 and 2414 C.C.Q. 327

The Choice of Law and Jurisdiction clause

334

 

12.5.2.2

Clauses 3.1 and 3.2 of the reference policy

332

12.5.3 Conclusion 337

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS ON THE 8788 FILES 340

2020 QCCA 495 (*)

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1 BACKGROUND

[1]This case was originally named the “pyrite case”. Over time, it developed into a genuine regional catastrophe that harmed hundreds, if not thousands, of residents in the Trois-Rivières area. Some have renamed it the “pyrrhotite case”.

[2]As an introduction, here is a rudimentary description of the problem at issue.

[3]Concrete is a highly resistant construction material frequently used to build foundations. It is manufactured by binding various aggregates, in particular sand and stone, using a paste often made of cement and water.

[4]Pyrrhotite is an iron sulphide found rarely in Quebec in deposits mined to extract concrete stone aggregate. A given quantity of this crucial element in this aggregate is deleterious because it may cause highly undesirable chemical reactions. The sulphide starts to oxidize when certain conditions are present. This process causes the concrete to expand internally, leading to the degradation of the foundation and therefore the weakening of the immovables resting on top.

[5]There is at least one deposit in the Trois-Rivières area whose rocks contain pyrrhotite. It was mined for the purpose of manufacturing concrete aggregate, which in many cases caused the above-described adverse consequences.

[6]Such is the backdrop against which the multiple proceedings in the “pyrrhotite case” are set. At the time this judgment was filed, these legal disputes were divided into three groups called [TRANSLATION] “waves”.1 The Honourable Michel Richard of the Superior Court rendered 69 judgments2 on the merits in the first group, while those in the second and third groups are still pending trial.

2020 QCCA 495 (*)

1

2

The second wave includes over 170 Superior Court files, while the third wave has over 90.

One of these judgments was corrected on July 21, 2014, to acknowledge the plaintiffs’

discontinuance (No. 400-17-002539-118, Doucet c. Construction Fré-Jean inc., 2014 QCCS 2718).

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2 THE FIRST WAVE OF PROCEEDINGS DETERMINED AT TRIAL

[7]As related by the judge, the first wave groups over 880 actions and concerns 832 immovables, including 446 single-family residences, 312 semi-detached residences, 56 multi-unit residential immovables and 18 commercial immovables.3

[8]The plaintiffs claim that major defects affect the solidity of their immovables’ foundations. Two hundred and ninety-nine plaintiffs describe themselves as self- builders.4 Others purchased their residence directly from the property developer or from the previous homeowner. The plaintiffs also include two administrators of new home warranty programs, the APCHQ’s Garantie des bâtiments résidentiels neufs [“GMN”]5 and Qualité Habitation [“QH”]. These administrators essentially claim the cost of repairs carried out or to be carried out under the contracts entered into pursuant to these programs.

[9]Below is a brief description of the principal parties who are being sued in one capacity or another:

-the individual sellers, where the circumstances so warrant;

-the general contractors or formworkers involved in building the foundations [the “contractors” when referred to collectively];

-“the concrete suppliers” [referred to collectively as such] who supplied the problematic concrete, either Construction Yvan Boisvert inc. [“CYB”] or Béton Laurentide inc. [“BL”];

-the corporation that mined the quarry where the deleterious aggregate was extracted, Carrière B&B inc. [“B&B”];6

-Alain Blanchette, the geologist who approved the use of aggregate extracted from the B&B quarry,7 and the successor to his employer, SNC-Lavalin Inc. [“SNC”] [referred to collectively as “SNC/Blanchette”]; 8

3Deguise c. Montminy, 2014 QCCS 2672 at paras. 14 and 16 [“Main judgment”].

4Main judgment at para. 19.

5On appeal: Raymond Chabot administrateur provisoire inc. in its capacity as the provisional administrator of the warranty program formerly administered by APCHQ inc.’s Garantie des bâtiments résidentiels neufs.

6As will be explained later, the trial judge condemned B&B with one or the other concrete supplier in their capacity as professional sellers and manufacturers.

2020 QCCA 495 (*)

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-the various insurance companies that entered into contracts with any of the parties being sued.

[10]The Superior Court judge was faced with a multiplicity of claims and took over the case management. After grouping together all the disputes, he asked the parties to simplify the proceedings, which counsel did professionally and with an open mind. The result was a special procedural context in which every party was named as either a plaintiff or a defendant. At the judge’s urging, the numerous plaintiffs grouped together to form only 69 Superior Court cases. Moreover, the multiple disputes amongst the defendants were incorporated into the defences as if there had been a formal forced intervention.

[11]Ultimately, and subject to some exceptions, the judge held the contractors, B&B with BL or CYB, depending on the case, SNC/Blanchette and their insurers liable. As between the various parties held liable, the judge apportioned liability in accordance with article 469 of the former Code of Civil Procedure.9

[12]The trial judgments concerning the first wave of proceedings resulted in the filing of over 800 appeals. The Court deals with the remaining 769 appeals in the group of judgments rendered today. The reasons that follow in this judgment address the common issues that concern most of the proceedings and, as such, are meant to be incorporated into all the other judgments. In keeping with the trial judge’s approach, the Court names it the “Main judgment”. Specific reasons that respond to particular issues, however, are recorded in the cases that concern them more directly.

[13]Before presenting the general facts, some remarks are necessary with respect to the quotations and footnotes in support of today’s judgments.

[14]The quotations are always verbatim and the few errors found therein were deliberately overlooked. Most references to case law, commentary, and evidence include the full citation to facilitate their retrieval. References to the evidence are

2020 QCCA 495 (*)

7

8

9

It appears that during the period relevant to the claims, Mr. Blanchette approved the use of the B&B aggregate, particularly in connection with various contracts for services.

SNC is being sued under the rights and obligations of Terratech (SNC-Lavalin Environment Inc.), a subsidiary for whom Mr. Blanchette worked at the relevant time.

CQLR, c. C-25; Judgment following the splitting of the proceeding (11 November 2014), Trois- Rivières, Sup. Ct. 400-17-002016-091 at para. 49 et seq. [“Judgment following the splitting of the proceeding”].

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exclusively according to exhibit number and the pagination of the joint schedules filed by the parties. The same applies to references to testimony.

2.1General facts

Introduction

[15]The trial judge did not devote a particular section to the chronological description of events at the origin of the proceedings. This observation is not a criticism of the chosen approach, especially since the judge’s findings of fact are generally accepted. A brief review of the most vital events is helpful to a proper understanding of the matter, however. This overview is based on the judge’s findings scattered throughout the judgments under appeal. It should be noted that this review concerns only the general facts of the matter, to the exclusion of those concerning the insurers’ involvement. That specific part of the proceedings will be addressed later.

[16]As an introduction to this review, it bears keeping in mind that the defective aggregate at the origin of every proceeding in the first wave came from the same quarry. That quarry belongs to B&B, which was incorporated in 1994 and whose shares at the time were held equally by CYB and André Bouvet ltée. In 2001, André Bouvet ltée sold its shares to BL. Therefore, throughout the period relevant to the proceedings, CYB and BL, through their representatives, together controlled the fortunes of B&B. Already president of CYB, Yvan Boisvert became president of B&B as well.

[17]CYB and BL are both active in the construction industry and specialize particularly in concrete manufacturing. In this capacity, and as the directing minds of B&B, they became leading actors in the drama that unfolded in the Trois-Rivières area.

[18]The trial judge noted that BL is responsible for B&B’s administration and provides its head office and labour. CYB is responsible for maintaining the heavy equipment used for operations and contributes personnel when required. Moreover, the concrete suppliers’ directors together decide how much stone to produce annually.10 Last, the sole B&B employee holds the position of head of operations in addition to the functions he already holds at BL.

2020 QCCA 495 (*)

10Main judgment at paras. 880 and 883.

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[19]CYB is managed by Yvan Boisvert, both shareholder and president, and Carl Poulin, director of production. BL’s fortunes at the relevant period were between the hands of a board of directors composed of representatives of its two shareholders, Gestion Bellemare inc., which owned 66 2/3%, and Lafarge Canada Inc.11 [“Lafarge”], which owned the remaining block of shares. At one time or another, the following people played an important role:

François Bellemare, BL director and B&B officer;

Tom Bellemare, BL president, director and officer and B&B director;

Michel Bergeron, BL executive and director;

France Côté, BL’s general manager and responsible for B&B billing and general administration;

Bernard Marcotte, BL director of operations as of May 2006 and former Béton Maskimo inc. officer.

[20]B&B’s mining site is located close to a similar site operated by a company called Carrière Maskimo inc. [“Maskimo”]. Maskimo is a competitor that performs the same activities as B&B, including the extraction of concrete aggregate.

[21]Having made these preliminary remarks, what follows is a brief narrative of the main events relevant to the proceedings.

Chronological review

[22]The B&B quarry started up operations in the second half of the 1990s. Its directors at the time did not consider it necessary to consult anyone to develop an operating plan. Nor did they seek the expertise of a geologist to better identify the types of rock likely to be extracted from the deposit in question. According to Yvan

Boisvert’s testimony, only part of the stone extracted from the B&B quarry was to be used to manufacture concrete while it was in operation.

[23]As of 1996, B&B became the exclusive supplier of concrete aggregate to its shareholder, CYB. At the same time, from 1996 to the fall of 1998, BL, who had not

2020 QCCA 495 (*)

11Member of the Lafarge Group, a global giant in the cement and concrete manufacturing industry.

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yet acquired any shares in B&B, procured aggregate from Maskimo and generally used cement produced by Lafarge to manufacture its concrete.

[24]In 1999, CYB asked a laboratory named Lab Journeaux, Bédard inc. to analyze aggregate samples extracted from the B&B quarry. The laboratory’s report did not note the presence of any iron sulphides and concluded that the risk of an alkali-aggregate reaction was low.

[25]In addition to this information, the evidence establishes that B&B had been supplying the concrete suppliers with concrete aggregate for some years without any of the problems of the nature now under review.12 As will be seen, these problems were caused by the aggregate produced by B&B and used exclusively by CYB and BL.

[26]Meanwhile, a problem with concrete expansion appeared for the first time in the Trois-Rivières area in late 2001. The anomaly resulted in approximately thirty proceedings questioning the quality of foundations poured during the period extending from 1996 to 1998. The aggregate used came from a quarry operated by

Maskimo, B&B’s neighbour.

[27]BL, who as we know occasionally procured aggregate from Maskimo at the time, found itself embroiled in some of these proceedings, in particular one that was frequently raised at trial. This litigation concerned a building housing a retail food store operating under the IGA banner for which BL had provided the concrete for the foundation.13

[28]Some believed that the cement, the quality of the concrete, or the recipe used for the mix caused the concrete expansion. Others believed that it was caused by the presence of aggregate containing iron sulphides, pyrite14 or pyrrhotite. The various hypotheses, especially those opposing the quality of the concrete and the presence of pyrite and pyrrhotite, persisted more than 10 years and affected the first wave of trials.

[29]In November 2001, concrete suppliers BL and CYB started hearing about issues with concrete degradation in the Trois-Rivières area. Bernard Marcotte, then a

12B&B sold aggregate to other concrete suppliers until 2001. B&B subsequently supplied concrete aggregate to only BL and CYB.

13The IGA case was settled out of court.

14Pyrite is an iron sulphide that is less reactive than pyrrhotite: Main judgment at paras. 94 and 267– 271.

2020 QCCA 495 (*)

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Maskimo officer, informed Michel Bergeron, a BL executive, that five foundations containing Maskimo stone were affected by their “pyrite” content and had to be demolished.15 Several days later, at least according to his notes taken at the time, Michel Bergeron gave this information to Carl Poulin of CYB. Poulin told him to take the necessary steps to have the stone from the B&B quarry tested.16

[30]In December of that same year, BL was served with a formal notice complaining about the state of the IGA foundation poured, as we know, with concrete containing Maskimo aggregate. Oddly enough, however, BL had on that occasion used cement from cement manufacturer Ciment St. Laurent17 [“CSL”], when it usually procured its cement from Lafarge.18

[31]The situation at neighbouring Maskimo was cause for concern for the B&B officers and the concrete suppliers. In January 2002, at the suggestion of Patrick Plante,19 Michel Bergeron contacted Professor Marc-André Bérubé of Université Laval for an opinion on the quality of the samples taken from the IGA foundation.

[32]In this same context, as a precursor to what was to become the pyrrhotite problem, B&B management, in this instance representatives of BL and CYB, planned to take steps to ensure that B&B produced quality aggregate.20 Below is a relevant excerpt from the minutes of a meeting held on January 23, 2002:

[TRANSLATION]

1.- After discussing the possible problems with the Maskimo St-Boniface stone, it was unanimously resolved to take the necessary steps to ensure that quality stone is produced. The following steps will be taken:

A.- Michel Bergeron will find a geologist to examine the quarry face and identify the right location before blasting.

2020 QCCA 495 (*)

15Main judgment at para. 277.

16Exhibit DSNC-4 (2001-2002), vol. 284 at 119861.

17Main judgment at paras. 173–176 and 274–275.

18Main judgment at paras. 175 and 273.

19Patrick Plante was employed as an engineer with LVM-Fondatech, which conducts audits in BL’s concrete plants.

20Main judgment at para. 339.

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B.- During the crushing period, Yvan Boisvert will provide a technician to regularly take samples. These samples will then be sent to Béton Laurentide, who will conduct the granulometry.

[Bold emphasis in original.]

[33]In a telephone conversation the next day, January 24, Professor Bérubé suggested to Michel Bergeron that he conduct a test called “total sulphur” on the B&B stone, and the task was assigned to Martin Perreault.21 Perreault picked up the B&B stone samples the same day from the BL offices. He sent them for analysis to Marie De Grosbois, a senior geologist at Lafarge.

[34]In February 2002, BL received the results of Lafarge’s chemical analysis of the B&B aggregate. The next day, Michel Bergeron contacted Ms. De Grosbois and, according to the trial judge, he understood from the explanations given that the stone was suitable to manufacture concrete. He also sent her the results of the 1999 alkali- aggregate tests conducted by Lab Journeaux, Bédard inc. on the B&B aggregate.22

[35]In March 2002, BL retained the services of Professor Bérubé to conduct a comparative analysis. Here is how Professor Bérubé described the objective of the work he was assigned:

[TRANSLATION]

Our mandate was to conduct a petrographic examination of that sample [B&B] and determine whether it was the same type of aggregate that Béton Laurentide had used to manufacture the concrete of the foundation walls of a commercial building in the Trois-Rivières area, which concrete displayed certain signs of degradation presumably associated with the oxidation of sulphides in this aggregate.23

[36]In May 2002, BL read Professor Bérubé’s petrographic examination report.24 It drew a parallel between the properties of the samples from the B&B quarry and the issues observed in the IGA building. It stated the following:

2020 QCCA 495 (*)

21Representative of Lafarge’s technical services. See Main judgment at paras. 294–298 and 310– 312 [these paragraphs contain some factual errors].

22Main judgment at paras. 298, 312, 340, 347 and 361.

23Exhibit DC-14 (4 May 2002), vol. 326 at 137012.

24Main judgment at paras. 300–306.

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[TRANSLATION]

To the extent that pyrrhotite actually caused the issues observed in the above- mentioned building and that its chemical composition is similar, there is every reason to believe that the aggregate examined could also cause the same type of issue because its sulphide content is significant.25

[37]Moreover, Mr. Bergeron’s contemporaneous handwritten notes record the contents of a discussion during which Professor Bérubé told him that he was convinced that the pyrrhotite had caused the concrete degradation in the IGA building. That telephone conversation took place on May 7, 2002.26

[38]In the following days, BL sent the Bérubé report to three Lafarge employees: Marie De Grosbois, Martin Perreault, and Serge Plante.27 The cover letter addressed to Ms. De Grosbois stated:

[TRANSLATION]

We are somewhat confused about this report, especially since your analyses indicated that there was no problem with using this stone to manufacture concrete. Do you think that this stone reacts more with one type of cement as opposed to another?

Awaiting your comments …

[39]The evidence reveals, however, that this question remained unanswered and that no one bothered to follow up.28

[40]In 2003, both of the concrete suppliers, BL and CYB, poured foundations using concrete containing B&B aggregate.29

[41]At the same time, a major protagonist in the proceedings before the Court, geologist Alain Blanchette, then employed by Terratech, a division of SNC, entered the scene.

2020 QCCA 495 (*)

25Exhibit DC-14 (4 May 2002), vol. 326 at 137015; Main judgment at paras. 302–305.

26Main judgment at para. 299.

27Main judgment at paras. 308–309 and 348.

28Main judgment at paras. 354–358, 362–365, 955–957, 967–969 and 972.

29Main judgment at para. 5.

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[42]Cement manufacturer CSL was the first to require his services. Without revealing the source of the aggregate to be analyzed, the cement manufacturer gave Mr. Blanchette stone extracted from the B&B quarry. CSL’s objective was to dispel any doubt CYB might have about the quality of its cement so that it would buy its cement from CSL.30

[43]Mr. Blanchette therefore conducted a petrographic examination of the B&B stone. His report concluded as follows:

[TRANSLATION]

I am of the opinion that, as concrete aggregate, this aggregate is not reactive to the Portland cement alkali. The percentage of quartz is moderate and the undulatory extinction is low to moderate.

The percentage of pyrite appears normal for igneous rock and this pyrite is known as a stable cubic form. My opinion is that this pyrite is not deleterious and there are no contraindications to using the aggregate in the cement concrete.

[44]In the spring of 2003, CYB received the report Mr. Blanchette had sent to his client CSL. CYB quickly sent it to BL. The evidence establishes that CYB and B&B also distributed it to certain contractors in the area.

[45]This was happening at the same time as the proceedings involving the Maskimo quarry. Counsel for Laboratoire de Construction 2000 inc., which was being sued, retained Mr. Blanchette’s services as an expert.

[46]According to the trial judge’s findings, Maskimo’s problems were well known in the Trois-Rivières area starting in the fall of 2003, more specifically in the construction industry.31 The Le Nouvelliste newspaper was monitoring the progress of the proceedings and published an article on Mr. Blanchette’s role. In an article titled

“Débat d’experts en vue”, journalist Brigitte Trahan reported statements she attributed to Mr. Blanchette:

[TRANSLATION]

30Main judgment at paras. 1228–1229 and 1313–1314.

31Main judgment at paras. 318 and 338.

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Certain experts say that it’s the pyrite. I disagree with that opinion. My theory at the moment is that the problem we have has nothing to do with pyrite.

[47]Several days after this article appeared, France Côté, BL’s general manager and responsible for B&B’s general administration, asked Mr. Blanchette to conduct a petrographic examination of three stone samples taken from the B&B quarry. She wrote:

[TRANSLATION]

We need to know the risks of using this stone to manufacture concrete in terms of the percentage of pyrite this stone contains.

[48]According to the trial judge, this service was requested following a telephone call during which Mr. Bergeron raised the article published in Le Nouvelliste during a discussion about the Maskimo quarry proceedings. The judge therefore drew the inference that Mr. Blanchette’s services were retained because of the opinion he gave to journalist Trahan and because of Mr. Blanchette’s good reputation.32

[49]The results of the analysis requested by Ms. Côté were sent to Mr. Bergeron in early January 2004. Geologist Blanchette’s conclusions on the presence of iron sulphides stated in particular:

[TRANSLATION]

-With respect to the presence of iron sulphides (pyrite and pyrrhotite), the percentage appears to be around 3% and these crystals are disseminated throughout the mass. They appear massive and not framboidal. My opinion is, given the low percentage of absorption of this stone, that the sulphides present offer no risk of concrete sulphation when used in good-quality concrete of normal density and do not present excessive cracking.

Consequently, considering all the results obtained, my opinion is that the crushed stone from Carrière B&B in Saint-Boniface is suitable concrete aggregate and can be used without risk of a deleterious reaction.

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32Main judgment at paras. 1191–1193.

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[50]Operations at the B&B quarry continued during 2004. In November, geologist Blanchette sent the parties concerned the results of a second petrographic examination. It read, in part:

[TRANSLATION]

-With respect to concrete of normal volumetric mass density poured on site and properly dosed, my opinion is that this aggregate may be used, but production must continue to be monitored to ensure that the percentage of iron sulphides does not increase compared to the sample analyzed.

-I am also of the opinion, considering the possible consequences, that a more detailed study of the quarry should be conducted to properly identify the lateral and vertical variations of the petrographic facies to be mined, and to detect any possible sectors with the best quality aggregate in terms of mineralogical composition.

Therefore, for the time being, in the absence of specific standards on the percentage of iron sulphides that concrete aggregate may present before it becomes problematic. The known percentages (5 to 7%) set certain limitations on the use of this material. Quarrying should be monitored to ensure that aggregate presenting more iron sulphides than what was analyzed is not available for sale. The examination of the quarry should target sectors presenting the least iron sulphides possible. A percentage of 5% or less (based on the crystalline form of the sulphides) should be targeted during quarrying.

[51]In early 2005, Radio-Canada broadcast an episode of the program La Facture during which geologist Blanchette stated that the problems observed in the foundations in the [TRANSLATION] “Maskimo cases” were due to factors other than the mere presence of sulphides.33

[52]Shortly afterward, in March 2005, counsel and experts involved in the Maskimo cases held a meeting. Contrary to the opinion expressed by geologist Blanchette, several experts said that they were of the view that the concrete degradation was caused by the presence of iron sulphides in the aggregate incorporated into the mixes.

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33Main judgment at para. 1150.

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[53]After visiting the Maskimo quarry, Mr. Blanchette submitted a report on compliance with accepted practices during tests conducted by Laboratoire de Construction 2000 inc.34 It should be noted that Mr. Blanchette also conducted petrographic examinations on aggregate from the Maskimo quarry under a contract for services granted by Laboratoire de Construction 2000 inc. to his colleague, expert Émile Hanna.

[54]In September 2005, shortly after having received a formal notice related to the Maskimo proceedings, the members of the BL board of directors were again faced with the experts’ conflicting theories on the quality of the aggregate. They then agreed to ask their shareholder Lafarge to assess the quality of the B&B stone. On September 26, 2005, representatives of Lafarge, including Ms. De Grosbois and engineer Éric Fontaine, met with the BL representatives to discuss the expert reports on the B&B stone. The minutes of that meeting are reproduced in full below:

[TRANSLATION]

PRESENT: Martin PERREAULT, LAFARGE - CEMENT

Isabelle LORD - LAFARGE CEMENT

Marie DEGROSBOIS - GEOLOGIST - LAFARGE

Eric FONTAINE - AGGREGATE ENGINEER- LAFARGE

Tom BELLEMARE - LAURENTIDE / CARRIÈRE B & B

France CÔTÉ - LAURENTIDE I CARRIÈRE B & B

Michel BERGERON - LAURENTIDE

Michel BERGERON briefly explained the purpose of the meeting:

To interpret the various reports dealing with pyrite.

Find one or more ways to ensure that our stone (B&B) is not dangerously reactive to sulphides.

After two (2) hours of discussion, MS. Marie DEGROSBOIS accompanied by France and Éric went to Carrière B&B and Maskimo to visually inspect and collect some stone samples.

At the same time, Richard gave Ms. DEGROSBOIS a stone sample taken from Carrière Continental.

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34Main judgment at paras. 198–199.

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Using these samples, Ms. DEGROSBOIS should be able to conduct tests comparable to the tests conducted by Marc André Bérubé, whose results were included in his report dated May 4, 2002.

[55]At the same time, B&B asked geologist Blanchette to conduct a third petrographic examination. Blanchette did so and sent the results to B&B in December

2005.35 His report stated:

[TRANSLATION]

-With respect to iron sulphides, thin laminae of pyrite and pyrrhotite were recognized and a chemical analysis of a composite sample revealed a percentage of 2.26%. The sulphides are recognized to be generally massive.

-Clause 4.2.3.5.2 (section on “Deleterious reactions of aggregates”) of CSA standard A23.1-04 states that “the presence of sulphides, such as pyrite, pyrrhotite, and marcasite, in the aggregate that may oxidize and hydrate with volume increase, or the release of sulphate that produces sulphate attack upon the cement paste, or both... "

-CSA standard A23.1-04 (or other Canadian and/or Quebec standards) does not specify, however, any maximum acceptable amount of sulphides in concrete aggregate.

-Concrete sulphation issues due to the presence of iron suphides remain marginal and rare in Quebec and the few recognized cases involved slightly clayey limestone aggregate containing framboidal sulphides.

-Iron sulphides recognized in the Carrière B&B aggregate were rather massive and the low percentage of absorption of this aggregate minimizes the potential for oxidation and subsequent sulphation.

-Consequently, based on the results obtained, I am of the opinion that the risk of concrete sulphation, normally dosed, with normal porosity, and using this aggregate, seems low to zero and should not constitute a limitation on the use of this aggregate.

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35Main judgment at paras. 1199 and 1213.

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-The percentage of iron sulphides may vary in this type of aggregate and periodic tests should be conducted to confirm the percentage of sulphides present.

[56]Ms. De Grosbois signed a report on her own analyses in which she concluded that the aggregate from Maskimo was similar to that from B&B.36 Below is what she wrote in this document dated January 31, 2006:

[TRANSLATION]

The two samples from Carrière Maskimo and Carrière B&B have comparable total amounts of sulphides: 3.8% in the Carrière Maskimo sample and 4.8% in the Carrière B&B sample. The vast majority of these sulphides are pyrrhotite (>90%), with minor amounts or small pyrite, pentlandite, and chalcopyrite inclusions in the pyrrhotite. The sample from Carrière Continental has a very low 0.03% sulphur content, and no sulphide was observed under the microscope. All observations and measures taken were limited to the available samples from the quarries under study and may not be representative of past or future aggregate production or the rocks as a whole.

It is impossible to say whether the measured amounts of sulphides in the form of pyrrhotite are deleterious in aggregate used to manufacture concrete because there is no acceptance criterion for aggregate related to the amount of sulphides in the current BNQ or CSA standards.

[57]A little later, in March, Alain Canuel and Martin Perreault of Lafarge met with the BL representatives and told them that Lafarge recommended that they stop using B&B aggregate.37 The trial judge had considerable reservations about the firmness of the recommendation in question, however, and wrote:

[TRANSLATION]

[949]It was only in 2006 that Lafarge grudgingly started to discuss the danger of using the aggregate.

[950]Laurentide was grudgingly informed of Lafarge’s position because the

Court notes that there is very surprisingly no evidence that the letter Lafarge

36Main judgment at paras. 363–364, 981–983, 988 and 995–996.

37Main judgment at paras. 950–951, 986 and 989–990.

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claims to have written to Laurentide telling it not to continue using the stone was sent.

[58]The judge also rejected Lafarge’s claim that it had told Yvan Boisvert about this opinion during a social gathering in April 2006.38

[59]In May 2006, Bernard Marcotte, who had also been involved in the saga that had shaken Maskimo, became director of operations at BL.39 He quickly sought to postpone the studies on the aggregate after discussions with the B&B officers and the concrete suppliers. He felt that it was imperative to know why Maskimo had been plagued with problems that seemed to have spared B&B up to then.40

[60]That is why France Côté first approached geologist Josée Duchesne of Université Laval. In reply to this request, Ms. Duchesne conducted a comparative examination of the 2006 B&B aggregate, the B&B stones from a core sample extracted from a foundation poured in 1999 and, last, stone drawn from a foundation poured by Maskimo in 1998. In June, she basically concluded that the three samples were comparable and that there was no obvious reason to explain why one stone rather than the others reacted in the concrete.41

[61]The B&B management felt that it had not received a sufficiently conclusive answer and turned to geologist Lucie Tremblay of IOS Services Géoscientifiques inc. At the same time, it asked geologist Blanchette to conduct another petrographic examination.42

[62]On August 31, 2006, geologist Tremblay submitted a report that again compared the samples examined by Ms. Duchesne.43 She found that the concrete was manufactured using the same type of aggregate, which [TRANSLATION] “... would, a priori, be suspected as potentially deleterious and likely to cause local expansion of

2020 QCCA 495 (*)

38Main judgment at para. 952.

39Main judgment at para. 307 (note 32) and 997; Pre-trial examination of Bernard Marcotte (25 May 2011), vol. 455 at 186582.

40Main judgment at paras. 1010–1019. In these paragraphs, the judge sometimes appears to confuse the contents of Josée Duchesne’s report with that of Lucie Tremblay’s report.

41Main judgment at paras. 1011–1014 [The judge erred in associating Josée Duchesne’s report with August 31, 2006, which is the date of Lucie Tremblay’s report]; Exhibit DC-10 (16 June 2006), vol. 326 at 136945.

42Main judgment at paras. 1017–1020 and 1199.

43Main judgment at para. 1017.

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the concrete”.44 She also wrote that a factor other than the slightly higher iron sulphide content in the Maskimo aggregate than in the B&B stone samples appeared to have played a role in the concrete deterioration. She therefore recommended that the composition of the concrete paste be studied.

[63]This led the B&B management to re-contact geologist Blanchette. On

September 7, 2006, B&B sent him a copy of Ms. Tremblay’s report and asked him to attend a meeting at their office. After that in-person meeting, geologist Blanchette submitted an offer of services that he enhanced shortly thereafter.45 He then proposed setting up an expansion-testing program spread out over one year. B&B agreed to that proposal.

[64]The tests in question concerned three aggregate samples. The first sample was from the Maskimo quarry reserves, and the two others were taken from different sectors of the B&B quarry.46 In addition, for each of these samples, geologist Blanchette had to use cement from different producers to verify the influence of that component on the percentage of concrete expansion.

44Main judgment at para. 1016.

45Main judgment at para. 1324.

46One of these sectors is identified as [TRANSLATION] “rich in garnet” and the other as [TRANSLATION] “rich in pyrite”. These names do not necessarily correspond to the characteristics of the stone found there but are instead designations used by B&B management.

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[65]In late October 2006, Mr. Blanchette sent another report unrelated to the expansion tests referred to above. It was a petrographic examination requested in August 2006, in which the geologist stated the following:

[TRANSLATION]

The petrographic number (NQ 2560-900) and the petrographic examination (ASTM C295) indicate that the sample analyzed is composed of anorthositic gabbro. The physical and mechanical properties appear very good, as demonstrated by the petrographic number and, in my opinion, meet the requirements for use as concrete aggregate. The iron sulphide content was assessed at 4.5% using a chemical analysis. There is currently no standard or specification concerning the percentage of iron sulphides that concrete aggregate may present. The percentage of iron sulphides measured, however, limits certain uses and I am of the opinion that the aggregate should not be used in architectural concrete or exposed aggregate concrete.

[66]In November 2006, B&B stopped producing aggregate to manufacture concrete.47 According to its officers, they decided to temporarily suspend production until they had disposed of considerable stone dust reserves. In reality, however, this suspension was permanent.

[67]As of that date and until 2007, BL used its stockpiles.48

[68]CYB, however, sold concrete containing B&B aggregate throughout 2007. It even used this concrete to erect its own immovables. Furthermore, in 2007, Carl Poulin, its director of production, used the aggregate for his personal home addition project. CYB purchased its last load of concrete stone from the B&B quarry in September 2007.49

[69]During that same period, Mr. Blanchette continued his work on the expansion- testing program agreed on with B&B. On June 5, 2007, he produced the first progress report on the situation after a four-month period. The report contained no recommendation on the use of the different aggregate samples studied.

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47Main judgment at para. 1021.

48Main judgment at paras. 181 and 1021.

49It should be noted, however, that it used its stockpiles until May 2008: Main judgment, para. 1022.

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[70]The same is not true for the following report on the situation after nine months, sent on November 28, 2007. To properly understand its scope, it should be recalled that the concrete suppliers were using only aggregate from the quarry sector described as [TRANSLATION] “rich in garnet” to manufacture concrete. In the section of that report titled “Synthesis and recommendation”, Mr. Blanchette wrote:

[TRANSLATION]

The three sources of aggregate present characteristics that meet the current standards for concrete aggregate. The percentage of oxidized fragments in the B&B quarry sample rich in pyrite is, however, of concern.

The percentages of iron sulphides are classified as being very high for the two aggregates from Carrière B&B and high in the case of Carrière Maskimo.

During the expansion tests, the results obtained with the B&B aggregate rich in pyrite are of concern. As a preventive measure, this aggregate should not be used as concrete aggregate.

The expansion percentages obtained with the B&B aggregate rich in garnet vary depending on the cement used.

The expansion percentages obtained with the Carrière Maskimo aggregate are low after nine months of curing.

[71]The trial judge found that the date this progress report was sent marked the end of the period of SNC/Blanchette’s liability.50

[72]In February or March 2008, a meeting was held between the B&B officers and the concrete suppliers. Back from vacation, Mr. Boisvert read geologist Blanchette’s latest report.

[73]In May 2008, after having exhausted the stockpiles at its plant, CYB stopped using B&B aggregate.51 As a result, the last time concrete was poured for a building covered by the trial judgment was on May 5, 2008.52

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50Main judgment at paras. 1318 and 1325–1326.

51Main judgment at para. 128.

52Main judgment at para. 5.

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[74]Shortly after, as of the fall of 2008 and more intensively during 2009, the concrete suppliers and B&B were assailed by formal notices claiming that their product was of poor quality.53 A series of legal proceedings instituted by over 850 plaintiffs then ensued.

[75]These proceedings caused a storm for B&B and the concrete suppliers. In February 2009, BL sold its shares in B&B to a CYB-related company.54 Tom Bellemare, BL’s representative on B&B’s board of directors, resigned from his position. Not long after, on July 23, 2009, B&B sold its land to Carrière P.C.M. (1994) inc. Last, on November 30, 2009, Lafarge ceased being a BL shareholder.

2.2Trials

Court agreements

[76]The Court briefly mentioned at the start of this judgment that the trial judge very quickly realized the scope of the issues and foresaw the multitude of suits likely to result. He therefore decided to manage all the proceedings by holding successive conferences uniting the protagonists identified as they appeared in the legal process.

[77]As a result, some 880 actions were grouped into 69 cases at trial.

[78]At the judge’s invitation, the plaintiffs summoned all the parties likely to have incurred liability for the alleged injury. The defendants agreed to proceed in a manner whereby they had to include their application for forced intervention in the allegations and conclusions of their defence to the principal actions.

[79]Below is a brief summary of the minutes of the management conferences, the contents of which ultimately shaped the way the proceedings unfolded as well as the conduct of the hearing:

[TRANSLATION]

Minutes of January 22, 2010

53Main judgment at para. 1024; Joint statement of the general facts (Groups 2-4) at 181.

54Main judgment at para. 180.

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4)GROUPING CASES FOR MANAGEMENT PURPOSES

The parties agree to group the cases by contracting general contractor.

The plaintiffs will institute proceedings by joining according to article 67 C.C.P., so that cases against one general contractor can be grouped together. Last, the plaintiff self-builders’ cases will be grouped by the name of the Concrete supplier or of the Quarry, according to the most common denominator.

9)RECOURSE IN WARRANTY

This refers to the recourses in warranty that may be raised in this kind of proceeding between the various defendants previously summoned.

By consent, it was suggested that the parties attend the next management session with a list of the parties that they would like to call in warranty, so that all the recourses to be exercised against another party already on the record may be subject to specific agreements to avoid accumulating potentially useless motions in the record.55

Minutes of September 10, 2010

11)RECOURSE IN WARRANTY

Mtre Lajoie asked that a mechanism equivalent to a recourse in warranty be found.

Mtre Lajoie was asked to prepare a form to cover this aspect of the recourse in warranty so that each party named in the proceeding will be able to ask the Court to rule on the potential recourses resulting from the state of the cases.

That agreement will be submitted at the next management session.56

Minutes of February 1, 2011

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55Minutes (22 January 2010), vol. 444 at 182218–182221.

56Minutes (10 September 2010), vol. 444 at 182298–182299.

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1.Welcome

After noting the excellent cooperation of counsel and the parties in the conduct of the case, the Court reminds counsel for the plaintiffs to pay specific attention so that all parties are sued in the principal actions to avoid calls in warranty and to facilitate the case management, as decided in previous meetings.57

Minutes of June 22, 2011

6.Individual defences (to be completed)

It is agreed that each party will file a written defence setting out the grounds for its contestation, which defence will apply to all the cases in which each party is involved.

Therefore, each individual defence will be considered by the Court to be applicable to all the cases and will constitute the written individual defence.58

Minutes of October 27, 2011

9)COURT AGREEMENT ON CALLS IN WARRANTY

Mtre Lajoie sent every party the draft court agreement on calls in warranty that is not yet ready for confirmation.

At the request of certain counsel representing the sellers being sued by the actual owners of some of the immovables concerned, it appears that the document prepared could allow some of these persons to avoid recourses in warranty, as is the case for the other direct interveners.

These persons will be asked to sign the agreement on the conduct of the proceeding at the same time that they file a defence that complies with the stated objectives.59

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57Minutes (1 February 2011), vol. 444 at 182341 and 182348.

58Minutes (22 June 2011), vol. 444 at 182399 and 182401.

59Minutes (27 October 2011), vol. 444 at 182496.

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Minutes of January 26, 2012

10.COURT AGREEMENT

The parties have read the document sent by Mtre Héon concerning the court agreement on calls in warranty.

That document was prepared by Mtre Lajoie and Mtre Bienjonetti and was amended following feedback from those who were interested in improving it.

The text was submitted to all parties and, following discussions held from the bench, all the parties agreed to accept the court agreement, with the result that:

THE COURT RENDERS THE FOLLOWING ORDER:

RECEIVES, CONFIRMS AND MAKES ENFORCEABLE the attached court agreement on calls in warranty and DECLARES that such contract binds every party currently a party to the pending proceedings.

The Court notes that Mtre Legault, on behalf of Lafarge, plans to reserve his position on accepting the court agreement.

Concerning the proceedings in warranty:

It is suggested that every party who files a defence by invoking its right to a recourse in warranty should indicate against whom this right is sought and in which file.60

[80]Note that one aspect of these agreements concerns the conduct of the principal actions. It had the effect in particular of creating a rather exceptional group of plaintiffs within the same case.61

[81]The other part concerns proceedings that can be described as subsidiary to the extent that they depend on the chain reaction resulting from the relationships between certain parties, be they contractual or sometimes even extracontractual.

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60Minutes (26 January 2012), vol. 444 at 182534.

61Main judgment at para. 29.

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[82]This last part was the subject of the agreement described in the minutes under the name [TRANSLATION] “court agreement” or [TRANSLATION] “court agreement on calls in warranty”. The judge confirmed the agreement during the management conference of January 26, 2012. It is useful to reproduce the agreement in full due to its repercussions on the conduct of the proceedings and the conclusions in the judgments under appeal:

[TRANSLATION]

COURT AGREEMENT

FOR THE PURPOSE OF THIS AGREEMENT, THE UNDERSIGNED DEFENDANTS STATE:

WHEREAS the signatories hereto (hereinafter the “defendants”) are all defendants in the above-described cases (hereinafter the “cases”);

WHEREAS the cases were instituted before the Superior Court in the judicial district of Trois-Rivières and cover the same type of dispute involving hundreds of owners of immovables whose concrete foundations are purportedly defective;

WHEREAS these owners essentially claim that the concrete in their building foundations was manufactured with aggregate containing pyrite and/or pyrrhotite, which they claim caused the premature degradation of the concrete;

WHEREAS all these cases are grouped and are subject to special case management by the Honourable Michel Richard, J.S.C.;

WHEREAS the defendants expect other similar cases to be added to those already existing, which will also be subject to special management by the Honourable Michel Richard, J.S.C.;

WHEREAS the defendants wish to avoid a multiplicity of anticipated applications for forced intervention (resulting anticipated recursory actions, calls in warranty, in sub-warranty or in sub-sub-warranty, or other recourses in warranty) between them, and waive prescription already acquired and the benefit of time elapsed for prescription purposes, applicable to such anticipated applications for forced intervention, where necessary;

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WHEREAS the defendants wish to simplify the procedure for instituting and defending such applications;

WHEREAS the defendants acknowledge that the institution of such anticipated applications for forced intervention, in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure (article 216 et seq. C.C.P.), would make the management of these cases even more complex and counter to the best interests of justice and the parties, contrary to the principles of proper administration and proportionality, in particular with respect to costs and time limits;

WHEREAS the defendants, however, do not wish to waive their rights and defences that may be exercised by an anticipated application for forced intervention;

WHEREAS the defendants therefore wish to enter into the following agreement dispensing them from instituting anticipated applications for forced intervention against each other, in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure (article 216 et seq. C.C.P.), and authorizing them to institute such applications by way of a simplified, accelerated procedure that will nonetheless allow the Court to render judgment as if such applications for forced intervention had been instituted as prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure;

THE DEFENDANTS THEREFORE ENTER INTO THE FOLLOWING AGREEMENTS:

1.The above-mentioned preamble forms an integral part of this agreement;

2.The defendants agree to proceed by evidence common to all the grouped cases, rather than with separate evidence for each separate case, it being understood that the specific facts of a case may also be adduced into evidence;

3.The defendants agree that the Court will apportion liability as between them, in accordance with article 469 C.C.P., where applicable, and make such condemnation enforceable between them;

4.The defendants agree to use the defences as a procedural method and means to introduce conclusions of the nature of an anticipated application

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for forced intervention against one or more defendants within the time limits to be determined by the Court;

5.The defence including the conclusions of the nature of an anticipated application for forced intervention will be titled [TRANSLATION] “defence and application for forced intervention” and must be signed electronically by counsel for the parties concerned, the defendants agree and waive direct service;

6.The defendants in the anticipated application for forced intervention will be dispensed from reappearing if they have already appeared in the principal action;

7.The defendants in forced intervention may reply to the conclusions sought against them by way of a defence included by amendment in a specific section in their own defence to the principal application within the time limits to be determined by the Court;

8.The parties irrevocably accept and agree that the Court will render judgment at the same time on the principal actions and on the conclusions in forced intervention set out in the defendants’ defences, the whole as if an anticipated application for forced intervention in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure had been submitted;

9.The Court’s judgment thus rendered will have the same effects and the same executory force as a judgment rendered according to the regular procedure and will be subject to the same recourses or appeals;

10.Each defendant waives in advance its right to ask that any judgment rendered against it hereunder be revoked or set aside on the ground that the rules of civil procedure regarding the institution of an anticipated application for forced intervention have not been followed;

11.The defendants agree that the Court may rule on any issue as long as it does not prejudice their respective rights, it being understood that this agreement is entered into for the purpose of avoiding a multiplicity of anticipated applications for forced intervention using the traditional procedure set out in the Code of Civil Procedure;

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12.The defendants waive prescription already acquired and the benefit of time elapsed for prescription purposes, applicable to every anticipated application for forced intervention made according to the terms of this agreement;

13.The provisions herein do not have the effect of preventing any signatory hereto from summoning by anticipated application for forced intervention, of the nature of a call in warranty or an impleading, a third person who is not already a defendant in the above-mentioned cases;

14.The defendants agree to have the Court confirm the agreement they have reached, the whole pursuant to its powers conferred by law;62

Impleading of Lafarge and Marie De Grosbois

[83]Some months before the hearing began, defendant Construction Fré-Jean inc. [“Fré-Jean”], sought authorization to implead Lafarge and Ms. De Grosbois as principal defendants in the action instituted by Noëlla Doucet and Guylaine Beauchemin.63 The judge granted that motion in a judgment rendered on March 13, 2012, and Lafarge and Ms. De Grosbois then sought leave to appeal. On April 26, 2012, Thibault J.A. granted leave and set the appeal hearing down for June.64

[84]The Court allowed the appeal and removed Lafarge and Ms. De Grosbois in July 2012, given that the plaintiffs opposed the impleading, that there was no apparent legal relationship between Fré-Jean and the Lafarge-De Grosbois duo, and to avoid breaching procedural fairness.65

Trial

[85]There is no doubt that the size of the trial was comparable to a major class action. The rules on the various legal relationships between the parties, however, made this particular avenue unattractive, with the result that the judge had to handle a multitude of individual actions. This weighed heavily on the trial’s conduct. In the Main judgment, the judge described the principal characteristics of this unconventional trial:

62Court agreement (18 January 2012), vol. 447 at 183673–183676.

63Sup. Ct. file No. 400-17-002539-118.

64Lafarge Canada inc. c. Construction Fré-Jean inc., 2012 QCCA 781.

65Lafarge Canada inc. c. Construction Fré-Jean inc., 2012 QCCA 1264.

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[TRANSLATION]

[96]All the cases and their exhibits have been digitized and processed by computer so that no paper document was dealt with at trial unless it had been digitized and inserted into the trial management tree-diagram.

[97]There were daily updates as the trial unfolded and each party had instant access to the daily additions and amendments through Dropbox, the information storage site agreed to by the parties.

[98]The Court notes the invaluable support of the Ministère de la Justice, who arranged the courtroom and provided all the equipment required to manage, digitize, send the information to every lawyer, and to annotate it for both the lawyers at the hearing and the public outside the courtroom.

[99]The resources made available to the parties and the Court greatly contributed to shortening the debates and facilitating the management of over 20,000 exhibits comprised of over 600,000 pages of text.

[100]None of this would have been possible if the parties had not unanimously agreed to proceed by way of computer technology and to define the terms needed to simplify and accelerate the hearings.

[102]It would not have been possible to manage and update all these cases on a daily basis had it not been for the greatly appreciated skill of Yves Demontigny, the technician chosen by the parties, who offered invaluable and indispensable support in preparing, managing, and updating documents while remaining attentive to the frequent developments inherent in managing this amount of information.

[103]By unanimous decision of the parties, the 70 court files were not physically present in the courtroom, such that any information added to the files was done through the minutes of the hearing or by the parties’ entering a document in the tree-diagram controlled by the computer technician according to a strict procedure observed throughout the trial.

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[106]This is why the trial lasted for 68 days of hearing and 9 days of pleadings, even though 185 witnesses were heard and 30 days were dedicated to experts.

[108]The parties conducted a great many pre-trial examinations (approximately 40), which considerably reduced the hearing time, given the scope of the subjects addressed.

[109]Last, the Court cannot fail to mention the work done by certain insurers to develop electronic spreadsheets to calculate the exact amount each insurer will have to pay on behalf of their respective insured based on the coverage dates, the content of their policy, and each insured’s share of liability, all while considering the recourses in warranty.

[Reference omitted.]

[86]It should be noted that the parties agreed to designate the constructions with the name [TRANSLATION] “sequence” and to identify them by number. There are several hundred in the first wave of proceedings. The judge adopted the vocabulary agreed to between the parties when drafting his judgments.

2.3Judgments

Introduction

[87]The trial judge accomplished a colossal task, which cannot go unnoted. The judge equipped himself with rather audacious means that he felt would accelerate the proceedings, in order to finish the hearing involving such a large number of parties and issues to be determined. Motivated by a sense of duty, he wanted to arrive at a just and fair conclusion as quickly as possible, in a case with characteristics that pushed the legal system to the limits of its capacities.

[88]At the same time, however, the use of new instruments can conceal traps, and the proceedings in question offered fertile ground for them to emerge.

[89]The judge therefore decided not to expressly rule on the actions in warranty contained in a very large number of defences. He believed he was authorized to do

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so by paragraph 3 of the court agreement on calls in warranty, which is reproduced here again to facilitate the reading of the judgment:

[TRANSLATION]

3.The defendants agree that the Court will apportion liability as between them, in accordance with article 469 C.C.P., where applicable, and make such condemnation enforceable between them;66

[90]Here is what the judge said in this regard:

[TRANSLATION]

[49]Several parties have asked the Court to rule on the recourses in warranty included in the defences filed.

[50]As the Court has noted, the court agreement addresses the recourses in warranty.

[51]Since the parties have agreed to have the Court apportion the liability of each defendant pursuant to the provisions of article 469 C.C.P., and since the Court has done so in each individual judgment in the files, there is no need to revisit these applications.67

[91]On appeal, several parties brought up this issue and faulted the judge for not having ruled on the calls in warranty.68

Main judgment

[92]In December 2013, the judge accepted the parties’ unanimous suggestion to split the proceeding in order to postpone to a later stage the apportionment of amounts to be paid by the defendants and their insurers, if any. First, he rendered 68 judgments ruling on the issues of liability and insurance, and issued the corresponding condemnations. He named one of these decisions the [TRANSLATION] “Main judgment”. Then the judge rendered a judgment following the splitting of the

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66Court agreement (18 January 2012), vol. 447 at 183675.

67Judgment following the splitting of the proceeding at paras. 49–51.

68In these judgments, the Court refers to them as [TRANSLATION] “applications for forced intervention”.

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proceeding in which he determined the share payable by each defendant or its insurer.

[93]There were three versions of the Main judgment: the original filed on June 12, 2014, and the corrected versions respectively dated July 31 and November 6 of that same year. Combined with the attached schedules, that judgment is 302 pages long and includes no less than 2,378 paragraphs.

[94]The judge conducted a detailed analysis of the issues relevant to liability, damages, and the insurance, and he drew a series of conclusions that he summarized as follows:

[TRANSLATION]

[2270] Based on its analysis, the Court arrives at the following conclusion:

(A) Plaintiffs

That the owner plaintiffs including the owner merchants are clients within the meaning of article 2098 C.C.Q. This applies to self-builders.

That, in that capacity, they benefit from the presumption in article 2118 C.C.Q.

That the plaintiffs suffered losses within the meaning of article 2118 C.C.Q.

That the serious defects affecting their properties occurred within five years of the construction, given the nature of the defect and its gradual, unavoidable development when the volume parameters of pyrrhotite are found in the aggregate.

That these defects started to exist as soon as the foundations were poured, and that the damage insurance policies were triggered as of this point.

(B) Carrière B & B inc.

That the liability of the B&B quarry arises from its status as manufacturer and specialized seller.

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That its liability is in solidum.

That it operated a common endeavour with concrete suppliers Béton Laurentide and Construction Yvan Boisvert inc.

That it failed to comply with the warranty of quality of its product.

(C) Concrete suppliers

That the liability of the concrete suppliers arises from their status as contractor, manufacturer, and specialized seller.

That they are subject to the obligations of contracts of enterprise.

That they failed to comply with the warranty of quality of their product.

(D)Contractors/formworkers

That the formworkers are specialized contractors who had turnkey contracts to build the works/foundations and that they are subject to the provisions of contracts of enterprise.

That they are bound to the warranty of quality and are presumed to know the defects of the works that they have carried out.

That the liability of the contractors arises from the provisions of the contracts of enterprise governing them.

That the presumption of liability of persons to whom it applies failed to rebut it.

(E) SNC Lavalin Inc. and Alain Blanchette

That SNC Lavalin Inc. and Alain Blanchette are liable in solidum for the damage caused to the plaintiffs for the period from May 2003 to November 28, 2007.

(F) Apportionment of liability

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That the apportionment of liability between the defendants is as follows for most of the residential cases, because certain actions will be addressed on their merits:

SNC Lavalin Inc. and Alain Blanchette

70%

Béton Laurentide inc. and/or Construction

 

Yvan Boisvert inc. and Carrière B & B inc.

25%

(That the 25% be divided in two, i.e., 12.5% for the concrete supplier at issue and 12.5% for the quarry)

Individual contractors and formworkers

5%

That the apportionment of liability between the defendants in the commercial cases will be determined based on each case and claim. The same applies for certain individual cases.

(G) Cause of damage

That the sole cause of the damage is the oxidation of the pyrrhotite in the aggregate.

That any immovable in which the pyrrhotite volume in the aggregate was established at over 0.23% has a defect that causes or has already caused the concrete to expand internally, resulting in the damage claimed.

(H) Actions of GMN and QH

That both GMN and QH have proved the merits of their actions against the enterprises with whom they are bound by contract, aside from rare exceptions.

That GMN’s assessment of damages to perform the work to be done is accepted.

That the actions against the contractors’ sureties are well founded for the amount of $40,000.

That the share of liability between the sureties and the enterprise is set at 0% for the sureties and 100% for the contractors, the whole as between them only.

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(I)Share of damages to apportion

That the plaintiffs are liable for the share of damages attributable to the contractors/formworkers/supervisors who were not sued.

(J)Method of reparation

That the method of correcting the damage is to rebuild the defective foundations or slabs, except where specifically provided in the individual judgments.

(K)Construction G. Therrien inc. and commercial damage

That Construction G. Therrien inc.’s contractual relationship is governed by the provisions of a contract of enterprise.

(L) Action in nullity ab initio

That the companies Northbridge and Chartis are bound to honour the insurance policies that they respectively issued, except as of December 1, 2007, the date on which their issued policies were cancelled.

That the exclusion clauses raised by these two insurers do not apply to these claims.

Given the limited result of this contestation, the expenses will be borne by each party.

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(M) Pyrite exclusion

That the exclusions related to pyrite do not relieve the insurers from having to pay for the damage caused by the oxidation of pyrrhotite, a very different mineral from pyrite.

(N) Insurance towers

That the insurance towers established to cover SNC Lavalin’s professional liability for each year concerned apply respectively to the claims filed and presented annually.

That the exclusions raised by the insurers of these towers to limit their coverage does not apply to these claims.

That the 2009-2010 tower was eroded based on the decisions in this judgment.

That Ace Insurance Company’s request to limit its insurance coverage by raising a retroactive date is rejected because it does not apply to these situations.

That the costs of this debate be borne by SNC’s liability insurance companies.

(O) Interest and additional indemnities

That the interest granted runs as of the date of this judgment.

That the additional indemnities be granted as of the date of this judgment, except with respect to the immovables that have not yet been repaired.

(P) Apportionment of damages between insurers

That all the insurers/damages covering a party held liable must apportion the damages between them pro rata as of the exact dates of the coverage included between the time the concrete was poured and the date of crystallization admitted by the parties.

[95]Among the major determinations that do not appear in the judge’s list in the above-reproduced paragraph is the determination of the damage ratings. Continuing

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the process aimed at shedding the most possible light, experts conducted a visual inspection after which each property was assigned a damage rating. At the hearing, the parties admitted that immovables with a damage rating of 1 or higher required intervention. Most of the immovables fell into that category. It must also be borne in mind that for the purpose of the hearing, the parties had a geological analysis conducted of concrete core samples taken from numerous foundations to quantify the sulphides (pyrite or pyrrhotite) in the samples.

[96]Furthermore, as the Court has previously noted, the judge did not issue any specific conclusions on the applications for forced intervention. He instead apportioned liability in accordance with article 469 of the former Code of Civil Procedure69 only as between the various parties held liable, as reflected in sub- paragraph (F) reproduced above.

Judgment following the splitting of the proceeding

[97]That judgment is dated November 11, 2014.

[98]To summarize, the judge addressed the issues on the actual apportionment of amounts based on continuous trigger, shared liability, solidarity, and experts’ fees.

[99]The amount of the various shares for each sequence was determined using sophisticated computer tools created by an actuary whose services had been retained by the insurer Intact. These tools were thoroughly analyzed, after which the parties all acknowledged their usefulness and reliability.70

[100]In the judgment following the splitting of the proceeding, the judge also dismissed the requests of several defendants to rule on the recourses in warranty.71 On November 20, 2014, the judge corrected clerical errors in that judgment in the conclusions concerning sequences 84, 638, and 682.

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69Judgment following the splitting of the proceeding at paras. 49–64.

70Main judgment at paras. 109–112; Judgment following the splitting of the proceeding at paras. 20– 26.

71Judgment following the splitting of the proceeding at paras. 3–14 and 49–51.

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3 APPEALS

3.1First series of appeals

[101]First, it should be noted that certain parties – both plaintiffs and defendants – appealed the 68 judgments, even before the judgment following the splitting of the proceeding was rendered.

[102]Motions to dismiss these first appeals were filed by parties who had not themselves filed an appeal. Thus, rather paradoxically, certain plaintiffs and defendants found themselves united by a common goal.

3.2Management of appeals

[103]On September 24, 2014, the Court granted the joint motion to dismiss and declared that the appeals filed before the trial judge had rendered the judgment following the splitting of the proceeding were premature.

[104]This first series of appeals clearly foreshadowed those to come once the judgment following the splitting of the proceeding was rendered. Therefore, it was exceptionally decided to manage the conduct of the future proceedings even before the appeals of judgments rendered that day were formally filed. The management of this unusual case required the use of extensive judicial resources. In this regard, the considerable cooperation of all counsel involved must be noted.

[105]SNC/Blanchette was a party to all the files at trial and appealed the judgments rendered in the 68 Superior Court cases. This first step having been taken, the Court issued various safeguard orders, including one suspending all time limits until April 10, 2015.

[106]During this suspension, the parties vainly tried to agree to limit the number of appeals. In the end, 803 appeals were filed, 769 of which were still pending during deliberations. It should be noted that these appeals might group both appellants and respondents together, which is why the appeal files were not necessarily closed after certain appellants’ appeals were dismissed in the course of the proceedings.

[107]Over the course of multiple management conferences held after the appeals were filed, the parties agreed to a number of unprecedented measures to adapt the

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procedure to the exceptional nature of the matter. The most salient measures concerned the following points:

i)Uniting the parties into four large groups: Group 1: SNC/Blanchette and their insurers; Group 2: B&B/concrete suppliers and their insurers; Group 3: Contractors and their insurers;

Group 4: Plaintiffs.

ii)Filing of joint statements of fact per group, first on the general facts, and second on the facts related to the insurance.

iii)The identification of all issues raised in the notices of appeal in order to draw up a complete list. The list approved by the parties includes over 70 items.

iv)The grouping of these issues under the following main headings:

Liability of SNC/Blanchette;

Liability of B&B and the concrete suppliers;

Liability of the contractors;

Apportionment between the various parties held liable and the applications for forced intervention;

Liability issues related to individual cases;

Issues relevant to the extent of the damage;

Issues relevant to SNC/Blanchette’s insurance policies;

Issues relevant to the other insurance policies.

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[108]The parties separated the briefs into two sections: a first section common to parties included in a same group and a second section in which each group member who so wished could submit its own arguments.

[109]Using this particular format and in the sequential order above, the Court heard together all 771 appeals72 that had not yet been determined in the fall of 2017. Earlier, in December 2016, the Court had allowed 29 appeals by the Zurich Insurance

Company Ltd. [“Zurich”] because of a failure to summon in due form.73

[110]The hearings took place over eight weeks during the 2017-2018 judicial year. The parties abandoned several grounds for appeal in the course of this exercise, reducing the number of grounds to be dealt with by the Court to 50.74

[111]The Court would like to note that the pleadings had to be amended throughout the proceeding.75 Numerous errors and typos were also corrected.76 As such, it is important to note that the judgments filed today confirm many corrections in the parties’ designations.

[112]In this respect, a remark regarding the pleadings in both the trial and appeal pyrrhotite files as a whole is in order. The Court observed many unusual situations and many errors by the parties, particularly in the designations and conclusions of the pleadings. Up to the very last minute, the Court drew the parties’ attention to several of the errors, some of which had a major impact on the conclusions. The fact remains, however, that it was impossible to correct every error so that the corrections might be reflected in the judgments’ conclusions. In such cases, responsibility falls to the parties.

[113]During a case management conference held in early December 2018, the parties again raised considerations regarding future orders splitting the proceedings

72Due to two discontinuances in the course of the appeal proceeding, today’s judgments cover 769 appeals.

73In December 2016, the Court allowed the appeals by Zurich, in its capacity as BL’s insurer:

2016 QCCA 2006 to 2016 QCCA 2010 and 2016 QCCA 2016 to 2016 QCCA 2039 inclusively. Moreover, during the hearing in April 2018, the Court also dismissed various appeals, even though this did not close the files per se.

74In the spring of 2018, at the Court’s request, the parties verified the Table of grounds abandoned/discontinued. The Court used the final version of the table dated May 10, 2018, as a validation tool while drafting.

75For example, notices of change of status and applications for substitution were filed.

76To name but one, some appellants made mistakes in their notices of appeal by erroneously designating certain respondents.

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so that the pecuniary condemnations could be apportioned. At the Court’s urging, all the parties confirmed their request in a letter in late 2018. The Court will therefore order the proceedings to be split in the conclusions of today’s judgments.

[114]During the same case management conference, the Court discussed with the parties the possibility of retaining the services of Yves Demontigny to manage the information with the assistance of complex computer tools.

[115]The pyrrhotite cases were taken under advisement on June 13, 2019, after the Ministère de la Justice had in fact retained Mr. Demontigny’s services.77

4 STRUCTURE OF JUDGMENTS

4.1Foreword

[116]The judge accepted that the oxidation of pyrrhotite in the aggregate from the B&B quarry caused the internal expansion of the concrete. He reached this conclusion after a careful analysis of the voluminous expert evidence adduced at trial. The parties did not question this finding on appeal.

[117]The judge also concluded that the presence of a certain quantity of this pyrrhotite in the aggregate incorporated into the concrete met the legal definitions of both a latent defect and a construction defect.78

[118]Last, the judge found that the presence of pyrrhotite, in almost all cases, caused the loss of the work within the meaning of article 2118 C.C.Q. He held that the loss had occurred within five years of the construction.79

[119]The grounds raised by some parties against the judge’s findings will be discussed in greater detail, in particular during the analysis regarding the contractors’ liability.

[120]Last and in general, the Court finds that it would have been preferable had the judge followed the sequence of contracts, as it would have helped shed light on the

77The Court notes the significant technical work of Mr. Demontigny, who was of great assistance, more specifically concerning the presentation of the figures in the conclusions of these judgments.

78Main judgment at paras. 794–795, 863–873, 928–935, 1101, 1141 and 2270.

79Main judgment at paras. 791–793 and 818–829.

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rules likely to directly impact on each party’s share of liability. This finding has consequences on the plan and analysis the Court has decided to adopt.

4.2Outline of the Main judgment

[121]After certain preliminary remarks [“chapter 5”], in accordance with the rule set out above, the Court will analyze the issues by chapter, generally following the most common order of the contracts entered into between the parties, that is:

The contracts of enterprise entered into between the owners and the general contractors or formworkers [“chapter 6”];80

The contracts of sale of concrete by the concrete suppliers and B&B

[“chapter 7”];

The contracts for professional services of geologist Blanchette and the issues related to his liability in general [“chapter 8”].

[122]The Court will then analyze the apportionment of solidary obligations or obligations in solidum and the applications for forced intervention [“chapter 9”].

[123]The Court will also analyze the general arguments on damages [“chapter 10”], as the more specific arguments are addressed in separate judgments.

[124]Finally, the Court will answer the arguments related to the insurance policies of the concrete suppliers, B&B, and certain contractors [“chapter 11”], as well as of SNC

[“chapter 12”].

[125]The parties will have noted that this plan does not systematically follow the order of the briefs and weeks of hearing described and discussed in paragraph [107](iv) of this judgment.

[126]At the outset, inspired by an intention comparable to the one that guided the trial judge, the Court identified and grouped the issues described in the inscriptions in appeal under eight headings. These headings served as a framework for the hearings, which were therefore held in the sequential order described in paragraph

80The adhesion contracts in the new home warranty programs signed by the contractors under which the warranty plan administrators sued the defendants are not on the list because they raise only a limited number of issues. These issues concern individual cases and will be dealt with in the judgments specific to the cases concerned.

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[107](iv). This meant that the regular appeal rules had to be relaxed as much as possible to allow judgments to be issued as quickly as possible.

[127]While this had many advantages, this novel approach was not without unexpected problems. As such, it was in some ways analogous to the trial judge’s approach.

[128]More specifically, it appeared that the order of the briefs and hearings did not always favour a logical, optimal consideration of the issues that had to be resolved to arrive at a solution. That is why the analysis below does not faithfully follow the initial approach, but relates more to the sequence of contracts.

4.3Standard of review

[129]Before starting the actual analysis, one final remark is called for.

[130]The pyrrhotite case is distinguished from the cases normally handled by the Court not only due to the unusual procedural rules put in place to arrive at a result within an acceptable time, but also because of the considerable volume of evidence adduced at trial. Even when trimmed down to the most important evidence, its reproduction on appeal required the preparation of over 470 volumes of approximately 400 pages each. These volumes were in addition to over 20 volumes dedicated to the reproduction of judgments, minutes, and pleadings of the joined issue. It should further be noted that the testimony was reproduced using a format of four pages to one.

[131]In this context, the highly relevant remarks by the Court in Berthiaume c. Réno-Dépôt inc. are worthwhile repeating:

[TRANSLATION]

The duty of deference regarding the general assessment of the evidence takes on critical importance with regard to complex, lengthy trials. Even working exhaustively, a trial judge cannot analyze every detail of the evidence, consider every precise aspect of this analysis, and justify all the reasons that

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will eventually explain the judge’s overall conclusions on the quality, weight, and effects of the evidence.81

[132]It has often been said that it is not for the appellate courts to retry the case, and there is no need to further expound on the reasons why this principle must apply in this matter.

5 PRELIMINARY REMARKS

[133]The purchasing parties base their actions in particular on the warranty of quality owed by the sellers and by the parties that the Civil Code associates with these sellers.82 In such matters, the orthodoxy of civil law generally requires that buyers choose between an action for reduction of the price and an action for cancellation of the sale.83

[134]In the highly particular context of this mega-trial and for their own reasons, the purchasing parties did not expressly make this choice. In practice, they agreed to treat their applications as claims for reduction of the price. This occasionally led to the unusual consequence where the parties bound to the warranty of quality were sometimes obliged to repay the full sale price, without restoration of the consideration for that price being offered.

[135]This particularity was neither appealed nor part of the debates per se before the Court, and it is therefore inappropriate to further discuss this subject, except to state that the conclusions in the Court’s judgments must not be understood to be an endorsement or, conversely, a repudiation of this result.

6 LIABILITY OF CONTRACTORS

[136]Nearly 60 general contractors were sued in the pyrrhotite cases.84 They built either residential or commercial immovables.85 Some were bound to the plaintiffs by a

81Berthiaume c. Réno-Dépôt inc., [1995] R.J.Q. 2796 at 2807 (C.A.). See also J.G. c. Nadeau, 2016 QCCA 167 at para. 79; Vidéotron, s.e.n.c. c. Bell ExpressVu, l.p., 2015 QCCA 422 at paras. 51–52.

82Article 1730 C.C.Q.

83Article 1726 C.C.Q.

84Main judgment at paras. 10 and 25.

85Main judgment at para. 10.

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contract of enterprise and some were bound by a contract of sale. In this last scenario, the contractors acted as property developers.86

[137]The formworkers were sued for having built the foundations that proved to be defective. In almost all these cases, the self-builders had retained their services in contracts to supply the concrete, the equipment, and the labour needed to complete the work. The judge characterized the contractual relationship binding these formworkers to their clients as a [TRANSLATION] “turnkey contract”.87

[138]The many appeals concerning the contractors’ liability are grouped into two classes of grounds: those common to all members of Group 3 or to some of them (the contractors and their insurers), and those raised individually by certain parties, which will be dealt with in specific judgments.88

[139]With respect to their liability, the contractors jointly raise three grounds, including Ground No. 7 on the application of article 2118 C.C.Q., Ground No. 16 on the warranty of quality and the presumption of knowledge of the defect, and, last, Ground No. 18 on the application of article 2098 et seq. C.C.Q.

6.1Ground No. 7: Liability under article 2118 C.C.Q.

[140]The trial judge determined that the contractors were bound by both the warranty against the loss of the work under article 2118 C.C.Q. and the warranty of quality pursuant to articles 1726 and 2103 C.C.Q.89 The reasons underlying his conclusions are set out in a number of paragraphs in the Main judgment.

[141]Under the heading [TRANSLATION] “7.1 Applicable notions: contract of enterprise and the presumption in 2118 C.C.Q.”,90 the judge listed the four elements essential to the application of the presumption in article 2118 C.C.Q. and explained why he felt that they were all present in this case:91

[TRANSLATION]

86Main judgment at paras. 1094–1096.

87Main judgment at paras. 1027 and 1101.

88Namely, those raised by Groupe immobilier Chaîné inc., Éric Chaîné and Geneviève Thériault, and Les Consultants René Gervais inc.

89Main judgment at paras. 1094–1101, 1141, and 2270.

90Main judgment at para. 787 et seq.

91See also Main judgment at paras. 1125 and 1127.

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[792]We are dealing with immovable works that have been affected by a loss and by a threat of a loss in the more borderline cases.

[793]As the Court has decided, the damage began as soon as the foundations were poured and appeared gradually and continuously. It is clear in the Court’s eyes that the loss within the meaning of article 2118 C.C.Q. occurred within five years of the construction.

[794]Some claim that it is not due to faulty construction or production (the contractors, the formworkers, and their insurers).

[795]With respect, the Court does not share their opinion because every immovable must be built in compliance with the applicable laws and regulations including, especially, the building codes and CSA standards. The experts have unanimously acknowledged that the codes apply in this instance.

[796]As we have seen, these standards prohibit deleterious substances from being used for concrete. As the Court has written, pyrrhotite is a deleterious substance according to this standard.

[797]Contractors are bound to an obligation of result and therefore cannot argue reasonable diligence in the performance of the work. They are responsible for coordinating and directing the work, which necessarily implies an obligation to supervise the quality and compliance of the various workers’ performance. The fact that an architect or an engineer was responsible for supervising the work does not relieve contractors from their own obligation to supervise and coordinate. Even when part of the performance of the work has been assigned to a subcontractor selected by the client, contractors responsible for coordinating and directing the overall work remain responsible for the supervision, quality control, and compliance of the work performed by subcontractors.92

[References omitted; emphasis added.]

[142]In the paragraphs that follow, the judge went on to discuss the grounds of exemption available to general contractors93 and those available to subcontractors.94

92See also Main judgment at paras. 1162–1176.

93Main judgment at paras. 798–809.

94Main judgment at paras. 810.

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He then rejected the contractors’ argument that geologist Blanchette’s fault relieves them of any obligation to the plaintiffs. He stated the following:

[TRANSLATION]

[805]The grounds of exemption in the rules of general law are set out in article

1470 C.C.Q. and include superior force, the fault of another person, or the fault of the owner.

[806]Although the legislature did not reproduce the grounds of exemption developed by the courts prior to 1994 regarding superior force or the fault of another person or of the owner, these grounds remain valid and may be raised by anyone involved in the construction, including the general contractor.

[807]Superior force must be something extremely serious that is unforeseeable.

[808]The fault of another person must also be beyond the control of those involved in the construction, unforeseeable, and irresistible. This other person cannot be a party to the contract or someone participating in the construction work.

[809]Last, contractors can raise the client’s fault in selecting the method of performance, if it can be established.

[810]Article 2119 C.C.Q. states that subcontractors may be relieved only by proving that the defects result from decisions of the contractor or from the expert opinions or plans of the architect or engineer.

[811]These contractors propose that they be relieved from any liability due to the fact that it was engineer Blanchette who committed errors in his expert opinion.

[812]The argument is tempting, but it does not apply. Blanchette’s services were not retained by the client plaintiffs and, to benefit from the exemption, they must prove the unforeseeability and irresistibility of the superior force that includes the fault of another person.

[813]Unforeseeability is assessed at the time of the contractual obligation according to the criterion of a reasonable person, while irresistibility is

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assessed according to a prudent and diligent person working in the area of activity.

[814]The legislator broadened the scope of the former article 1688 C.C.L.C. when it enacted article 2118 C.C.Q.

[815]The resulting presumption of liability is new law in that it subjects subcontractors to the presumption of liability for the work that they have performed, which was not covered by the former article 1688 C.C.L.C.

[816]The legal presumption of liability created by article 2118 C.C.Q. supplements contractual liability. That is why contractual or delictual liability or the seller’s warranty may be raised against those involved in the work. Moreover, as author Karim wrote, nothing prevents these recourses from being exercised at the same time and in the same application.

[References omitted; emphasis added.]

[143]The contractors and their insurers, in this case the members of Group 3, argue that the judge erred in concluding that article 2118 C.C.Q. applies.95

[144]In the alternative, they claim that the judge erred in law by disregarding their ground of exemption based on the existence of superior force.96 They contend that the damage was caused by other persons who did not participate in building the work. Similarly, they add that the judge erred in considering the concrete suppliers, B&B, and even SNC/Blanchette as parties to the contract of enterprise.97

[145]The Court will first consider the arguments concerning the inapplicability of the legal regime under article 2118 C.C.Q.

Theory of the inapplicability of liability under article 2118 C.C.Q.

[146]A brief contextual review is necessary.

[147]The trial judge held the contractors liable based on both the presumption established by article 2118 C.C.Q. and that arising under the rules on the warranty of quality related to contracts of sale. No error of principle vitiates the legal reasoning

95A.B.-3 at paras. 1–3.

96A.B.-3 at paras. 6–7.

97A.B.-3 at paras. 9–20.

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underpinning this conclusion. A few precisions are required, however, to shed greater light on the reasons why the argument of the Group 3 members cannot succeed.

[148]Before this Court, everyone, including the Group 3 members, agree that the matter falls primarily under the Code provisions on contracts of enterprise. The judge properly described the conditions of application for liability under article 2118 C.C.Q. He stated the following:

[TRANSLATION]

[791]Four elements are essential for the presumption of liability to apply. They

are:

a.an immovable work;

b.a total or partial loss of the work or at least the threat of a loss;

c.the loss must be due to:

1.faulty design; or

2.faulty construction; or

3.faulty production; or

4.defects in the ground.

d.the loss must occur within five years.

[149]In their appeal briefs as well as at the hearings, the Group 3 members contested the presence of only one of these conditions, the one described in paragraph (c).98 Therefore, in cases where there was a loss of the immovable work, the consensus on appeal is that this loss occurred within five years within the meaning of article 2118 C.C.Q.99

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98Subject to Ground No. 25, in appeal files 8835.

99In a recent decision, Lacour c. Construction D.M. Turcotte TRO inc., 2019 QCCA 1023, the Court ruled that the prescriptive period applicable to an action under article 2118 C.C.Q. is eight years when the defect appears gradually.

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[150]The Group 3 members believe that the problem with the foundations in this case is due to a latent defect and not faulty construction or production. That is why they claim their liability to the victims is based on the application of articles 2103 and 1726 C.C.Q., not article 2118 C.C.Q.100 According to these same Group 3 members, this argument alone should lead the Court to focus its analysis solely on the scope of their obligations under the rules on warranty of quality. That issue is addressed in Ground No. 16,101 where they contest the judge’s conclusions in this regard. In the legal environment of warranty of quality, the Group 3 members who entered into a contract of enterprise with the victims feel that they have proved that they were completely unaware of the defect and should only be required to restore the sale price of the concrete, to the exclusion of any obligation to repair the prejudice. Moreover, those who were bound to the victims by a contract of sale believe that their liability is limited to repaying the sale price of the immovable, after deducting the value of the land and the depreciation indicated in the spreadsheets.

[151]It is important to bear in mind the hierarchy of the application of the rules here. The structure of the drafting is important to clearly understanding the actual scope of the provisions that comprise the structured and hierarchical statutory scheme of the Civil Code. In the circumstances of this case, it is particularly apposite to refer to this hierarchy.

[152]Chapter VIII of Title Two on nominate contracts in the Book on Obligations deals with contracts of enterprise or for services. Division II concerns the rights and obligations of the parties. Its first subdivision is titled “General provisions applicable to both services and works”.102 Article 2103 C.C.Q., relied on by the Group 3 members, is in this subdivision. That provision is therefore part of a set of rules that describes the general rights and obligations resulting from any contract of enterprise or for services.

[153]However, article 2118 C.C.Q., repudiated by the Group 3 members, is in subdivision 2, titled “Special provisions as to works”.103 There is no dispute that works are involved here.

[154]Yet there is more. The legislator inserted article 2118 into an even more

precise division that deals specifically with “immovable works”. Again, nobody

100A.B.-3 at paras. 3–4.

101A.B.-3 at para. 5.

102Emphasis added.

103Emphasis added.

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disputes that this is precisely the subject matter of the proceedings under review. Incidentally, it should be noted that article 2117 et seq. C.C.Q. reproduced the legal liability of contractors previously provided in article 1688 C.C.L.C., while enhancing it in favour of the victims. This statutory scheme is in a way superimposed on the general regime of contractual liability when there is a loss of the work within the time set out in the provision. Social and public interest considerations are at the origin of this special scheme,104 which leaves little room for the notion of fault. It obeys its own rules and is applied only in limited cases.

[155]To put the proposed ground in its legal context, the Group 3 members ask the Court to determine that the specific rules on the subject matter that is at first glance contemplated by the proceedings under review do not apply and that the general rules apply by default. The principle that special rules prevail over general rules is established in interpretation matters,105 such that to succeed, the parties must prove that one or more elements prevent the special rules on legal liability from applying.

[156]The argument is essentially based on the assumption that there was no faulty construction in the cases under review because the problem with the foundations can be legally characterized as merely a latent defect. The Court finds that this proposal is unfounded.

[157]Of course, the concepts of latent defect and the faulty construction or faulty production of the work differ in some respects. However, that does not prevent overlap in certain scenarios.

[158]In the chapter on legal liability for the loss of the work, authors Sylvie Rodrigue and Jeffrey Edwards wrote:

[TRANSLATION]

Contrary to the defect covered by the seller’s warranty of quality, which is analyzed on the basis of loss of use, the legal liability defect of the contract of enterprise is instead considered from the perspective of a loss of the work. It is

104 Jacques Deslauriers, Vente, louage, contrat d’entreprise ou de service, 2nd ed. (Montreal: Wilson & Lafleur, 2013) at 813–814, Nos. 2475–2477; Sylvie Rodrigue & Jeffrey Edwards, “La responsabilité légale pour la perte de l’ouvrage et la garantie légale contre les malfaçons”, in Olivier F. Kott & Claudine Roy (eds.), La construction au Québec: perspectives juridiques (Montreal: Wilson & Lafleur, 1998) 409 at 413.

105See in this regard Richard Tremblay, L’essentiel de l’interprétation des lois (Cowansville, QC: Yvon Blais, 2004) at 57–59.

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possible, even probable, that the notions of loss of use and loss may overlap.106

[Emphasis added.]

[159]The Court is of the view that this is precisely what happened in the cases under review. There was both a loss of the work, which the Group 3 members acknowledge, as well as a considerable loss of use. This is a clear case of overlap, where the condition affecting the building foundations at issue can be characterized as both a latent defect within the meaning of article 1726 C.C.Q. and faulty construction or faulty production of the work within the meaning of article 2118 C.C.Q.

[160]In short, and that is the case here, the victims can enjoy the benefits of a dual compensation scheme; the more limited application arising from the presumption created by article 2118 C.C.Q. and the more general application arising from the rules on the warranty of quality.

[161]Since article 2118 C.C.Q. applies to every case under review involving a contractor,107 it becomes superfluous in a way to use the more general liability scheme arising from the warranty of quality. We might even add that it should not be used if the objective is to find causes of exoneration in addition to those provided in article 2119 C.C.Q.

[162]Like the trial judge, the Court therefore finds that the presumption of liability under article 2118 C.C.Q. applies. This finding therefore leads to the examination of the alternative argument proposed by the Group 3 members on the grounds of exemption they claim are available to them.

Grounds of exemption under the legal scheme applicable to certain losses of the work

[163]The 1991 Civil Code amended certain rules applicable to the legal liability of contractors, architects and engineers. Therefore, contrary to what existed previously,

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106Sylvie Rodrigue & Jeffrey Edwards, “La responsabilité légale pour la perte de l’ouvrage et la garantie légale contre les malfaçons”, in Olivier F. Kott & Claudine Roy (eds.), La construction au Québec: perspectives juridiques (Montreal: Wilson & Lafleur, 1998) 409 at 436. See also Vincent Karim, Contrats d’entreprise, contrat de prestation de services et l’hypothèque légale, 3rd ed. (Montreal: Wilson & Lafleur, 2015) at 217, No. 532.

107With one exception, see specific Ground No. 20.

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subcontractors are now subject to this liability, even if they have not entered into a contract of enterprise with the owner.

[164]In theory, contractors and subcontractors have an obligation of result under the legislative scheme in the event of loss of the work. In practice, given the unlikely possibility of exemption, this obligation of result is often closer to the maximum intensity obligation, in this case that of warranty.

[165]Under this legal scheme, the loss of the immovable work rests in principle on those who participated most directly in its construction. Article 2119 C.C.Q. lists a limited number of causes of exoneration that litigants subject to this scheme may raise. It reads as follows:

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2119. The architect or the engineer may be relieved from liability only by proving that the defects in the work or in the part of it carried out by him do not result from any error or defect in the expert opinions or plans he may have supplied or from any failure in the direction or supervision of the work.

The contractor may be relieved from liability only by proving that the defects result from an error or defect in the expert opinions or plans of the architect or engineer selected by the client. The subcontractor may be relieved from liability only by proving that the defects result from decisions of the contractor or from the expert opinions or plans of the architect or engineer.

Each may, in addition, be relieved from liability by proving that the defects result from decisions imposed by the client in selecting the land or

2119. L’architecte ou l’ingénieur ne sera dégagé de sa responsabilité qu’en prouvant que les vices de l’ouvrage ou de la partie qu’il a réalisée ne résultent ni d’une erreur ou d’un défaut dans les expertises ou les plans qu’il a pu fournir, ni d’un manquement dans la direction ou dans la surveillance des travaux.

L’entrepreneur n’en sera dégagé qu’en prouvant que ces vices résultent d’une erreur ou d’un défaut dans les expertises ou les plans de l’architecte ou de l’ingénieur choisi par le client. Le sous-entrepreneur n’en sera dégagé qu’en prouvant que ces vices résultent des décisions de l’entrepreneur ou des expertises ou plans de l’architecte ou de l’ingénieur.

Chacun pourra encore se dégager de sa responsabilité en prouvant que ces vices résultent de décisions imposées par le client dans le choix du sol ou des matériaux, ou dans le

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materials, or the subcontractors,

choix des sous-entrepreneurs, des

experts, or construction methods.

experts ou des méthodes de

 

construction.

[166]The Group 3 members concede108 that they cannot rely on the application of any of the causes listed in article 2119 C.C.Q.

[167]All agree that superior force (article 1470 C.C.Q.), the general cause of exoneration common to every obligation, is added to the list in article 2119 C.C.Q. The Group 3 members raise this exceptional ground in connection with the crucial factor that is the causal faults of persons they consider third parties to the construction, i.e., the concrete suppliers, B&B, and SNC/Blanchette.

[168]The Group 3 members thus claim that the judge erred in the legal characterization when he equated the concrete suppliers and B&B to subcontractors.

[169]The Court considers that the concrete suppliers and B&B may be characterized as materials suppliers and not subcontractors, as the Group 3 members correctly submit. The Court is of the opinion, however, that the judge’s error does not affect the contractors’ liability to those who benefit from the legislative scheme under article 2117 et seq. C.C.Q.

[170]This is how the Group 3 appellants present the argument in their appeal brief:

[TRANSLATION]

[6]Despite the foregoing, it is submitted that if article 2118 C.C.Q. applies to the Contractors, based on the evidence adduced, the judge should have concluded that the Contractors have successfully rebutted the presumption of liability in article 2118 C.C.Q. by establishing that the presence of pyrrhotite in the concrete aggregate is due to superior force, i.e., an unforeseeable and irresistible external event (article 1470 C.C.Q.).

[Reference omitted.]

[171]The criteria of exteriority, unforeseeability, and irresistibility are admittedly cumulative, such that the absence of any one of them nullifies the argument that there was superior force. In this case, the judge found that two of the criteria were

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108With the exception of engineering firm Les Consultants René Gervais inc.

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missing, as the defect was due to elements that were neither unforeseeable nor irresistible.109

[172]Without expressing an opinion on the criteria of irresistibility or unforeseeability, the Court finds that the criterion of exteriority is the primary obstacle to the argument of the Group 3 members, who write:

[TRANSLATION]

[16]Furthermore, as with any hardware store, internal systems seller, or brick supplier, materials suppliers are completely foreign to a construction site: they do not participate in completing the work and therefore must be considered third parties to the construction site. This is indeed what Professor Rousseau- Houle concluded in her work Les contrats de construction en droit public et privé:

[TRANSLATION]

Suppliers or manufacturers of components incorporated into the work do not perform the contract, and contractors, like architects, do not generally vouch for them. It would therefore be reasonable to admit that they may relieve themselves of liability by establishing the unforeseeable fact of suppliers or manufacturers.

[17]The judge also erred in law in finding that the faults of Carrière B&B, SNC, and Blanchette cannot relieve the Contractors of liability vis-à-vis the plaintiffs.

[18]Like the concrete suppliers, Carrière B&B, SNC, and Blanchette are actual third parties to the contract of enterprise because they were persons outside the construction site.

[References omitted; italics and underlining in original.]

[173]A comment is warranted regarding the source of this excerpt on which the Group 3 members’ argument is based. The excerpt as cited from the book by author Rousseau-Houle, later a member of the Court, is both incomplete and inappropriate in the current legislative context.

109Main judgment at paras. 1146–1154 and 1159–1176.

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[174]First, it is definitely not recommended to cite an excerpt from a passage that seemingly bolsters a position when the text as a whole dilutes the intended message. Below is the full text, including the part that was left out by counsel for the Group 3 members that does not bolster their position:

[TRANSLATION]

Suppliers or manufacturers of components incorporated into the work do not perform the contract, and contractors, like architects, do not generally vouch for them. It would therefore be reasonable to admit that they may relieve themselves of liability by establishing the unforeseeable fact of suppliers or manufacturers. Exemption will be rare, however, because in practice contractors and architects cannot merely claim that the materials were unsuitable or that the conditions of use were not compliant because they are competent enough to know if the materials are suitable and if they can be

used.110

[Underlining added; italics in original; reference omitted.]

[175]Moreover, author Rousseau-Houle was simply commenting on an interpretation of article 1688 C.C.L.C.

[176]Indeed, shortly before this, she wrote:

[TRANSLATION]

Third parties relied on for exemption, however, are most of the time participants in the act of building, and their legal situation is such that their fault cannot be raised by another participant in order to relieve or limit that participant’s own liability.111

[177]By introducing articles 2118 and 2119 C.C.Q., the legislator increased the legal liability of contractors, made subcontractors formally liable, and expressly subjected the contractors’ and subcontractors’ contractual liability to the warranty of quality owed by the sellers by enacting article 2103 C.C.Q.

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110 Thérèse Rousseau-Houle, Les contrats de construction en droit public et privé (Montreal: Wilson & Lafleur, 1982) at 367.

111Ibid.

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[178]Incidentally, as early as 1986, before the new Code came into force, this Court had recognized the argument that faulty construction within the meaning of article 1688 C.C.L.C. could result from the weakness of the materials used by a builder. On behalf of the Court, Nichols J.A. wrote:

[TRANSLATION]

With respect for the trial judge’s opinion, an exemption from proving the builder’s fault cannot, in my opinion, be considered to be an exemption from proving that the building perished due to faulty construction.

Faulty construction may exist without the builder being at fault. For example, it could be due to the weakness of the materials a builder used in good faith, in accordance with the required specifications. Despite this fact, the law presumes that the building perished due to the builder’s fault, and the builder has the burden of exculpating itself by proving superior force, fortuitous event, the owner’s fault, or an act by a third party.

This does not exempt the owner, however, from proving that the loss of the building is due to faulty construction.112

[Emphasis added.]

[179]Under the legal liability scheme of loss of the immovable work, therefore, it suffices to state that contractors are essentially accountable for the quality of the materials they incorporate into the work. Contrary to the arguments of the Group 3 members, the materials suppliers, in this case the concrete suppliers and B&B, are not third parties foreign to the construction, as indeed article 2117 C.C.Q. suggests. This provision actually enshrines the client’s right to examine the quality of the materials used, including, naturally, those that the contractors or subcontractors may have acquired from materials suppliers:

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2117. At any time during the construction or renovation of an immovable, the client, provided he does not interfere with the work, may examine the progress of the work, the quality of the materials

2117. À tout moment de la construction ou de la rénovation d’un immeuble, le client peut, mais de manière à ne pas nuire au déroulement des travaux, vérifier leur état d’avancement, la qualité des

112Foundation Co. of Canada Ltd. c. Golden Eagle Canada Ltd., [1986] R.L. 167 at 183 (C.A.).

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used and of the work performed,

matériaux utilisés et celle du travail

and the statement of expenses

effectué, ainsi que l’état des

incurred so far.

dépenses faites.

[180]That provision is new law. If the legislator decided to give the client a right enforceable against the contractor to examine the quality of the materials, it is among other things because the contract of enterprise grants the contractor the right to select the materials before they are incorporated into the work.113 In this regard, author Karim wrote:

[TRANSLATION]

4.Distinction with the freedom to choose the means of performing the work

1265. It is also important to draw a parallel between articles 2099 and 2117 C.C.Q. Even though the client is entitled to oversee the progress of the work performed by the contractor, the contractor remains free to choose the means of performing the work (choice of labour and materials, organization of work, etc.), except where otherwise stipulated in the contract. The effect of this autonomy in the performance of the work is that the client is prohibited from interfering in the performance of the work and the contractor becomes responsible for the work.114

[References omitted; emphasis added.]

[181]A crucial element is the fact that the legislator itself characterizes materials suppliers as “persons having taken part in the construction”:

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2726. A legal hypothec in favour of the persons having taken part in the construction or renovation of an immovable may not charge any other immovable. It exists only in favour of the architect, engineer, supplier of materials, workman and contractor or subcontractor for the work requested

2726. L’hypothèque légale en faveur des personnes qui ont participé à la construction ou à la rénovation d’un immeuble ne peut grever que cet immeuble. Elle n’est acquise qu’en faveur des architecte, ingénieur, fournisseur de matériaux, ouvrier, entrepreneur ou sous-entrepreneur, à

113Article 2099 C.C.Q.

114Vincent Karim, Contrats d'entreprise, contrat de prestation de services et l'hypothèque légale, 3rd ed. (Montreal: Wilson & Lafleur, 2015) at 501, No. 1265.

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by the owner of the immovable, or for the materials or services supplied or prepared by them for the work. It is not necessary to publish a legal hypothec for it to exist.

[Emphasis added.]

raison des travaux demandés par le propriétaire de l’immeuble, ou à raison des matériaux ou services qu’ils ont fournis ou préparés pour ces travaux. Elle existe sans qu’il soit nécessaire de la publier.

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[182]The right of preference over the immovable granted by law to materials suppliers is based on, inter alia, their relationship to the construction. The fact that the legislator does not provide for their solidarily liability in article 2118 C.C.Q. does not mean that they are third parties foreign to the construction.

[183]All this leads to the finding that the materials suppliers in this instance, the concrete suppliers and the quarry, do not meet the criterion of exteriority. Moreover, they cannot be differentiated from SNC/Blanchette in this analysis. The judge found that the plaintiffs’ injury was caused, at least in part, by the contributory faults of these players. The manufacturers’ and SNC/Blanchette’s faults are analogous in that they both contributed to the fundamental causes of the injury, that is, the sale of a defective product and its introduction into the affected works.

[184]In short, the presence of pyrrhotite in the concrete foundations is due to circumstances that are not external to at least one of the contractors’ legal obligations, that of incorporating only quality materials into the works. There is nothing here preventing the application of the presumption of liability under article 2118 C.C.Q. In the cases under review, therefore, the general contractors, the property developers,115 and the formworkers must answer to the victims for all the damage resulting from the faulty construction and production of the work due to the poor quality of the concrete incorporated into the immovables.116

115Article 2124 C.C.Q.

116Nonetheless, certain arguments in support of the existence of superior force are more relevant to the disputes between defendants, as analyzed in chapter 9.

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6.2Ground No. 16, part 1: contractors/formworkers’ warranty of quality and the presumption of knowledge of the defect in article 1728 C.C.Q.; part 2: ground concerning certain specific sequences

Ground No. 18: Absence of fault by the contractors/formworkers (2098 et seq. C.C.Q.)

[185]During the analysis of the previous ground, the Court determined that the contractors were fully liable to the victims under article 2118 C.C.Q.

[186]Grounds No. 16 and No. 18 concern the argument that the Group 3 appellants are relieved of all or part of their obligations under the rules governing contracts of enterprise.

[187]With respect to the grounds discussed in the analysis of Ground No. 7, it is evident that the arguments raised in support of that position are powerless to change the Court’s conclusions regarding the application of article 2118 C.C.Q.

[188]The Court finds that there is no practical interest in further considering the arguments developed in support of Ground No. 16117 with respect to the cases currently under review.118 As such, the Court has no opinion on the correctness of the trial judge’s conclusions on the merits of these arguments. These appeal judgments therefore do not hinder any new debate on these issues if by chance the context lends itself thereto during the upcoming proceedings.

[189]Ground No. 18119 will be implicitly addressed in the section on apportionment between the various parties held liable and the applications for forced intervention.

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117The same remark applies to part 2 of this ground, subject however to the clarifications required during the analysis of the applications for forced intervention. As a reminder, the owners of the five sequences concerned (693, 750, 73, 12, and 403) bought directly from the concrete suppliers and therefore have no contract of sale with the formworker.

118The specific case of sequence 27 (Ground No. 20) to which article 2118 C.C.Q. does not apply will be dealt with as an individual case as part of the individual judgments.

119Moreover, there is no need to deal with the argument on article 2100 C.C.Q. considering the application of article 2118 C.C.Q.

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7 LIABILITY RESULTING FROM THE SALE OF DEFECTIVE CONCRETE

[190]When the grounds raised in the various notices of appeal were being grouped together, seven of them concerned the liability of the Group 2 members (B&B and the concrete suppliers). Below is the general description:

Ground No. 3: Application of the warranty of quality of the concrete suppliers and of B&B;

Ground No. 7.1: Application of liability under article 2118 C.C.Q. of the Civil Code of Québec and the grounds of exemption;120

Ground No. 13: CYB argues that it committed no fault;

Ground No. 14: Causal connection broken between the facts alleged against CYB and the damages claimed;

Ground No. 15: BL argues that it committed no fault;

Ground No. 73: Discontinuance not taken into consideration by the trial judge;121

Ground No. 9: Knowledge attributed to the concrete suppliers and to B&B (common endeavour)

[191]In the course of the proceeding, the concrete suppliers abandoned Grounds No. 14 and No. 15. They are therefore no longer disputed. Only the Group 1 members now raise Ground No. 3.122

[192]Apart from these grounds, CYB, and to a lesser extent B&B,123 raise Ground No. 9 titled [TRANSLATION] Knowledge attributed to the concrete suppliers and to B&B (common endeavour). Logic requires that the Court consider the issue of liability resulting from the sale of the defective concrete by examining this ground.

120This ground is also raised by Éric Chaîné and Geneviève Thériault in the specific cases.

121This ground will be addressed in the judgments on this specific case.

122With the exception of the specific argument in the case of Groupe immobilier Chaîné inc.

123B&B supports certain arguments of CYB that the [TRANSLATION] “common endeavour” does not correspond to any legal concept and that the judge had no reason to disregard the separate legal personalities of the three corporations. It adds that, should the Court accept CYB’s argument that there was no common endeavour, this finding applies equally to CYB, BL, and itself.

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7.1Ground No. 9: Knowledge attributed to the concrete suppliers and to B&B (common endeavour)

[193]CYB124 and B&B contest the judge’s conclusion that a common endeavour existed. By way of an introduction, here is how the judge described the situation:

[TRANSLATION]

[872]All those who claimed that the sole cause was the oxidation of the pyrrhotite in the aggregate expressed the idea that without this aggregate, there would not have been any damage.

[873]This aggregate, with this concentration of sulphides, was not fit for its intended use, which was to manufacture concrete.

[874]It is too easy for B&B to claim that the concrete suppliers must support the consequences of using the aggregate in their mix and to conclude that the quarry must be exonerated.

[875]The fact is that Laurentide and CYB dedicated their resources to operating the quarry for their benefit, in particular as concrete suppliers.

[876]The two concrete suppliers managed the quarry according to specific terms.

[877]They each held 50% of the shares and nothing in the evidence indicates that either party had greater decision-making authority with priority over the other.

[878]From 2001 to 2009, a representative of each concrete supplier was a B&B director.

[879]B&B board meetings were rather informal and no real minutes were recorded.

[880]While Laurentide handled the administrative side by providing its head office and some of its employees, CYB focused its participation on maintaining the heavy equipment required to operate the quarry and also provided the occasional services of some of its employees.

124CYB refers here to Construction Yvan Boisvert inc. and its insurers, Aviva and St. Paul.

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[881]The two shareholders and directors designated Richard Beauchesne, a technician at Béton Laurentide, as head of Carrière’s operations.

[882]Carl Poulin, CYB’s engineer, was also involved in managing Carrière, as evidenced by DSNC-69.9 in particular.

[883]The directors from each concrete supplier met to decide together how much to produce annually or as needed to meet their production of concrete or other products.

[884]The Court finds that, for the purposes of the quarry’s production, Laurentide and CYB together pursued a common endeavour within the meaning attributed by the Court of Appeal in Industries Rocan inc. c. Emballages Alpha inc.

[885]Indeed, in 2009, when Laurentide sold 50% of its shares in Béton Boisvert to Boisvert’s company for $1 million (DSNC-69.2), in section 6.04 of the contract of sale both parties said that they [TRANSLATION] “jointly operated the corporation that mines a quarry”.

[886]It appears superfluous to invoke the doctrines of the corporate veil or alter ego to avoid the consequences of decisions made by all the partners that are Béton Laurentide, CYB, and Carrière B&B.

[887]It is also quite revealing that the mandates entrusted to Alain Blanchette (DSNC 21, DSNC 30 and DSNC 46) were sent on letterhead with the logos of both the concrete suppliers and Carrière, as is the fact that B&B was accepted as an insured in the Groupe Bellemare starting in 2004, and not as part of CYB.

[888]The same is true for the report sent by Carrière and the two concrete suppliers to the insurers in 2007 on their product’s quality.

[889]B&B’s liability was incurred not because of an issue with the extraction of the stone, but because of the deleterious properties of the aggregate.

[890]As evidenced by the minutes of a Carrière B&B meeting, exhibit DSNC 7 dated January 23, 2002, it is clear that the concrete suppliers were informed of Maskimo’s problems and that they unanimously decided to take the necessary steps as of that moment to ensure that they produced quality stone.

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[891]Following that meeting, the representatives of each concrete supplier were assigned very specific responsibilities with a view to achieving this objective of producing quality stone.

[892]The testimony of Tom Bellemare and that of François Bellemare reveal that the directors and various representatives of the concrete suppliers, who were the same that made up Carrière B&B, were at the very least aware of the potential problem of using their aggregate, mined several hundred metres from that of Maskimo.

[893]This is why the Court finds that the concrete suppliers and Carrière must together bear the consequences of using the aggregate.

[References omitted.]

[194]CYB contends that there was no common endeavour linking CYB, BL, and B&B. It submits that each corporation had a separate legal personality, which the judge erroneously ignored.

[195]It claims that BL and CYB are actually competitors on the residential and commercial concrete market in Mauricie. BL acquired its block of shares in B&B and became a 50% shareholder with CYB only in 2001. B&B was created in 1994, however, which in its opinion confirms its separate identity.

[196]CYB adds that a common endeavour is not itself a legal notion. It is at most a factual description used by the Court on only one occasion in a highly specific matter125 very different from the one under review.

[197]The separate legal personality of each of the three corporations is also reflected in the disputes between them in the different cases. For example, CYB seeks BL’s liability by accusing it of having hidden essential information from it. The two concrete suppliers, for their part, fault B&B for having sold them aggregate unfit to manufacture concrete. Initially, in addition to arguing that the defect was apparent to the concrete suppliers, B&B replied that the concrete suppliers were the actual manufacturers of the defective property and that the aggregate, a raw material, cannot itself be defective. It should be noted, however, that B&B has since abandoned this last argument.

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125Emballages Alpha inc. c. Industries Rocand inc., 2011 QCCA 1114 at para. 86.

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[198]At trial, the judge used the words [TRANSLATION] “common endeavour” in reference to the remarks by Forget J.A., upon whose reasons the decision in Emballages Alpha inc. was based.126 In the context of the cases currently under review, CYB and B&B correctly criticize the use of the term [TRANSLATION] “common endeavour” and the parallel drawn with Emballages Alpha inc. It has very few similarities with the situation experienced by the three entities at issue.

[199]Moreover, as CYB argues, the judge appears to have in fact concluded that a common endeavour existed for the purpose of operating the quarry. As such, he merged the two concrete suppliers and associated B&B as a partner:

[TRANSLATION]

[884]The Court finds that, for the purposes of the quarry’s production,

Laurentide and CYB together operated a common endeavour within the meaning attributed by the Court of Appeal in Industries Rocan inc. c. Emballages Alpha inc.

[886]It appears superfluous to invoke the doctrines of the corporate veil or alter ego to avoid the consequences of decisions made by all the partners that are Béton Laurentide, CYB, and Carrière B&B.

[Reference omitted.]

[200]The Court finds that CYB correctly submits that it did not pursue a [TRANSLATION] “common endeavour” as such with BL aside from acting as a B&B shareholder, a situation that falls primarily within the rules applicable to business corporations.

[201]That said, the argument is not determinative given that it is based solely on an awkward drafting of the judge’s reasons. Although it undermines the explanations provided, this awkwardness is not reflected in the conclusions of the judgments under appeal. For each action granted, the judge condemned only the concrete supplier who supplied the concrete and solidarily as between that supplier and B&B. Ultimately, he apportioned liability equally: 50% for the concrete supplier at issue and 50% for B&B.

126Emballages Alpha inc. c. Industries Rocand inc., 2011 QCCA 1114.

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[202]In other words, the judge never condemned BL, CYB, and B&B solidarily, which would have been the logical outcome of a [TRANSLATION] “common endeavour” linking the three corporations. Similarly, the two concrete suppliers were never jointly condemned for the damage suffered by any of the plaintiffs. Such a conclusion normally would have flowed from the existence of a [TRANSLATION] “common endeavour” between BL and CYB had the judge intended to take it into consideration.

[203]An overall review of the judgments under appeal reveals that, despite the language used in certain paragraphs of the Main judgment, the judge first determined that there were two [TRANSLATION] “common endeavours”, one linking B&B and BL and the other linking B&B and CYB. He then applied de facto the solidarity between common enterprises under article 1525 C.C.Q.:

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1525. Solidarity between debtors is not presumed; it exists only where it is expressly stipulated by the parties or provided for by law.

Solidarity between debtors is presumed, however, where an obligation is contracted for the service or operation of an enterprise.

The carrying on by one or more persons of an organized economic activity, whether or not it is commercial in nature, consisting of producing, administering or alienating property, or providing a service, constitutes the operation of an enterprise.

1525. La solidarité entre les débiteurs ne se présume pas; elle n’existe que lorsqu’elle est expressément stipulée par les parties ou prévue par la loi.

Elle est, au contraire, présumée entre les débiteurs d’une obligation contractée pour le service ou l’exploitation d’une entreprise.

Constitue l’exploitation d’une entreprise l’exercice, par une ou plusieurs personnes, d’une activité économique organisée, qu’elle soit ou non à caractère commercial, consistant dans la production ou la réalisation de biens, leur administration ou leur aliénation, ou dans la prestation de services.

[204]In the Court’s opinion, the conclusions in the judgments under appeal are well founded in this respect. The evidence reveals several integrated aspects between B&B and BL, and between B&B and CYB. Here are a few illustrations.

[205]The Court first recalls that CYB created B&B in 1994 in collaboration with a corporation named André Bouvet ltée. The two were equal shareholders. BL intervened only in 2001, when it purchased Bouvet’s block of shares.

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[206]During his pre-trial examination on April 26, 2011, Mr. Boisvert said that he had not wanted CYB to acquire Bouvert’s block of shares. He stated the following:

[TRANSLATION]

Q.Was there a change in Carrière B&B in two thousand and one (2001)?

A.In two thousand and one (2001), yes, there was.

In two thousand and one (2001), Mr. Bouvet decided to sell his shares and offered them to me. I was not very interested, I preferred a partner who... a partner who delivers, who buys stone to have enough of a volume of stone to make the quarry profitable, and... so I had a right...

a right of first purchase or refusal, so I refused. And Mr. Bouvet sold his fifty percent (50%) to Béton Laurentide.127

[Emphasis added.]

[207]BL was interested in the venture because it saw it as a business opportunity to promote its own operations. Asked about this, Tom Bellemare explained that the Trois-Rivières concrete market was becoming competitive and BL was looking for an independent source of aggregate and prices that would allow it to position itself favourably compared to the other industry players.128 In this regard, the testimony of Louis Lesage, a BL director, is very revealing:

[TRANSLATION]

Q.OK. With respect to the quarry, the reason that quarry was purchased, you talked about purchasing the quarry as such; what was the purpose of that purchase? Was it to have a secure supply source?

A.That’s it!

Q.At a cost... at a good cost?

A.The lowest cost possible.

Q.That's it. OK

127Pre-trial examination of Yvan Boisvert (26 April 2011), vol. 451 at 185103.

128Pre-trial examination of Tom Bellemare (17 May 2011), vol. 449 at 184171.

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A.It’s the same for the sand pits, we own sand pits because not only stone goes into concrete. It also has sand. Therefore, we hold... we’ve owned sand pits for many years.

Q.OK.

A.We buy some and we sell some.

So the quarry was... it was logical to have a quarry so that we wouldn’t depend on other quarries to be able to control our costs. It’s called vertical integration.129

[Emphasis added.]

[208]It can easily be inferred from all the evidence that CYB was similarly motivated. Moreover, the two concrete suppliers signed a written agreement130 in which B&B intervened. One of the stipulations stated that the shareholders had to contribute equally to the required investments and that they would share B&B’s operating revenues equally.

[209]Moreover, each concrete supplier agreed to loan services for the benefit of B&B. Under these agreements, the judge noted that BL [TRANSLATION] “handled the administrative side by providing its head office and the services of some of its employees” while, in the judge’s words, [TRANSLATION] “CYB focused its participation on maintaining the heavy equipment required to operate the quarry and also provided the occasional services of some of its employees”.131 After reading the testimony of the senior executives of BL and CYB, it emerges that the concrete suppliers considered that each one contributed equally.132

[210]While the evidence reveals some compartmentalization between the activities of competitors BL and CYB, the same cannot be said for the individual relationships between each concrete supplier and B&B. Most of the following elements were noted by the trial judge:

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129Examination of Louis Lesage (20 February 2013), vol. 469 at 191703–191704.

130Exhibit DDMT-12 (1 October 2002), vol. 363 at 152090–152092.

131Main judgment at para. 880.

132Cross-examination of Yvan Boisvert (30 January 2013), vol. 464 at 190270–190271. See also Pre- trial examination of Yvan Boisvert (26 April 2011), vol. 451 at 185132–185133; Pre-trial examination of François Bellemare (11 May 2011), vol. 448 at 184001–184002.

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-A director from each concrete supplier sat as a director of B&B at all times from 2001 to 2009.133 BL and CYB, each in its own way, oversaw B&B’s operations. Richard Beauchesne, the only employee paid by B&B, was also employed by BL, who paid him the other portion of his total remuneration;134

-B&B board meetings were informal, even non-existent;135

-B&B had no separate telephone line. Its letterhead identified both concrete suppliers and their respective telephone numbers. As BL’s France Côté explained, concrete purchasers needed the proper information to contact the concrete supplier with whom they did business;136

-A crucial element is that once the block of shares previously held by André Bouvet ltée was purchased, BL and CYB were the only concrete suppliers to procure concrete aggregate from the B&B quarry. Each of them, for the purpose of their own operations, ensured that they had a secure, cost- effective source so that they could compete with the other competitors.137

[211]The evidence establishes that legally, B&B is bound by the warranty of quality of the product sold under the same contractual chain binding the concrete supplier to the client with whom it did business. On appeal, neither concrete supplier individually nor B&B continued to question their status as a manufacturer.

[212]All this clearly leads to the finding that BL and B&B together operated a business to manufacture and sell concrete. The same is true for CYB and B&B. In both cases, there was vertical integration, to use Mr. Lesage’s expression. The Court concludes that BL and B&B together form a tandem of manufacturers and professional sellers, as do CYB and B&B.

[213]The law on this issue is clear: When professional sellers and manufacturers are held liable under the warranty of quality (articles 1726 and 1728 to 1730 C.C.Q.),

133Main judgment at para. 878.

134Main judgment at para. 881.

135Main judgment at para. 879.

136 Main judgment at para. 887; Pre-trial examination of France Côté (10 May 2011), vol. 452 at 85614–185615.

137Main judgment at para. 852; Exhibit DSNC-69.17 (18 July 2011), vol. 302 at 127106; Pre-trial examination of Yvan Boisvert (26 April 2011), vol. 451 at 185190; Pre-trial examination of François Bellemare (11 May 2011), vol. 448 at 184029.

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they can avoid the effects of the presumptions applicable to them only by establishing one of the causes of exoneration. These causes are limited for professional sellers and are even more so for manufacturers.138 In this case, none of these possibilities applies. In other words, tandems BL/B&B and CYB/B&B have not rebutted the presumptions of liability against them under article 1728 et seq. C.C.Q. Therefore, the conclusion is that the participants in each of these common enterprises are solidarily liable to the victims,139 as the trial judge correctly decided.

[214] Therefore, Ground of appeal no. 9 fails.

7.2Ground No. 13: Absence of fault by CYB

[215]The trial judge attributed various faults to CYB, in particular:140

a)It failed to further question Professor Bérubé on the opinion in his report dated May 4, 2002;

b)Before 2005, it failed to insist on learning the opinion of Marie De Grosbois;

c)It failed to implement the plan that CYB, BL, and B&B had developed during the January 23, 2002, meeting;

d)It failed to adequately follow up on the potential problem with using aggregate extracted from the B&B quarry.

[216]In CYB’s opinion, the judge committed palpable and overriding errors in finding these faults. It raised this ground during the debates on the concrete suppliers’ liability to the victims. In such circumstances, the argument is of no interest because CYB was held solidarily liable with B&B as a manufacturer and professional seller, as the Court has just determined. This ground will warrant further consideration, however, during the analysis of the applications for forced intervention it is exercising against BL and SNC/Blanchette. Accordingly, the Court will deal with it in chapter 9

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138ABB Inc. v. Domtar Inc., 2007 SCC 50, [2007] 3 S.C.R. 461 at paras. 68–72; CNH Industrial Canada Ltd. c. Promutuel Verchères, société mutuelle d'assurances générales, 2017 QCCA 154 at paras. 31– 34.

139Article 1525 C.C.Q.

140Main judgment at paras. 898, 901, and 953–958.

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on the apportionment of solidary liability and liability in solidum and the applications for forced intervention.

7.3Ground No. 3: Application of the warranty of quality of the concrete suppliers and B&B

[217]The Group 1 appellants, SNC/Blanchette and their insurers, invoke in their favour the intensity of the obligation of the manufacturers, in this instance, tandems BL/B&B and CYB/B&B.

[218]They submit that the Court, contrary to the trial judge, should hold them fully liable because, to paraphrase the words of the Supreme Court in ABB Inc. c. Domtar Inc.,141 manufacturers are ultimately responsible for the quality of their product.

[219]Again, this argument is relevant only to the debates on the applications for forced intervention and the apportionment between the various parties held liable. The Court will therefore deal with this subject in chapter 9. For now, and to end the debate as primarily raised under Ground No. 3, suffice it to say that there is no merit to the argument that an indirect consequence of the intensity of the manufacturers’ obligation is that SNC/Blanchette and their insurers are relieved of any liability to the purchasers of the defective concrete.

7.4Ground No. 7.1: Liability under article 2118 C.C.Q. and grounds of exemption

[220]The concrete suppliers argue that the judge characterized them as subcontractors and consequently held them liable pursuant to article 2118 C.C.Q.

The Group 4 members maintain that the judge’s characterization is correct.

[221]The Court has already concluded that the concrete suppliers do not meet the legal characterization of subcontractors. Ground No. 7.1 raised by the concrete suppliers is therefore founded but, ultimately, has no impact on the conclusions because they are still liable under the warranty of quality.

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141ABB Inc. v. Domtar Inc., 2007 SCC 50, [2007] 3 S.C.R. 461.

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8 LIABILITY OF SNC AND GEOLOGIST BLANCHETTE

[222]In addition to holding the tandems liable for the sale of defective concrete, the judge held SNC and its employee, geologist Blanchette, liable to both the tandems that had retained their services to assess the quality of their aggregate and to the victims. Liability is contractual in the first situation and extracontractual in the second. The Group 1 members – SNC, geologist Blanchette and their insurers – contest these determinations.

[223]At the outset, any doubt as to the identity of geologist Blanchette’s client or clients should be dispelled. Considering the Court’s conclusions on the relationships between the businesses making up the tandems,142 it is clear that the geologist was bound to both the quarry and the concrete suppliers by contracts for services starting in late 2003. The following analysis reflects this determination.

8.1Ground No. 1: Determination of geologist Blanchette’s faults

[224]The Group 1 appellants attack the trial judge’s determinations that geologist Blanchette committed a contractual fault against the tandems and an extracontractual fault against the plaintiffs.

[225]The judge in fact found that between May 15, 2003, and November 28, 2007, geologist Blanchette was at fault in producing reports on the quality of B&B’s concrete aggregate that misled the tandems. The reports’ conclusions led them to mistakenly believe that they could incorporate the concrete aggregate from the B&B quarry into the concrete without the risk of any deleterious effects.143

Criterion for assessing professional fault

[226]The Group 1 appellants note that a professional like geologist Blanchette is subject to an obligation of means. He must behave as would any prudent and diligent professional in the same circumstances, taking into account his degree of specialization.144

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142See chapter 7 of this judgment.

143Main judgment at paras. 905, 912, 1221–1224, 1296–1297, 1304–1307, 1311, 1315 and 1846.

144Roberge v. Bolduc, [1991] 1 S.C.R. 374 at 436; Patrice Deslauriers & Emmanuel Préville-Ratelle,

“La responsabilité des professionnels” in École du Barreau, Collection de droit 2019-2020, vol. 5 “Responsabilité” (Montreal: Yvon Blais, 2019) 117 at 118.

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[227]The appellants claim that the trial judge failed to apply this criterion when assessing geologist Blanchette’s liability. Rather than considering the steps taken by the geologist to determine whether he had behaved like a reasonable professional in the same circumstances, the judge instead began with the result of his analysis and conclusion on the safety of the B&B aggregate and then assessed his behaviour a posteriori.

[228]That argument is unfounded. As St-Pierre J.A. wrote in 2016, [TRANSLATION] “...

to identify the nature of an obligation (of means, result, or warranty) is to determine the criteria used to analyze the alleged behaviour for the purpose of deciding whether this behaviour is faulty and if it potentially incurs liability.”145 While it is true that the judge did not state the nature of geologist Blanchette’s obligation, the evidence he relied on to find that Blanchette was at fault establishes that he conducted his analysis according to the criterion of an obligation of means and not an obligation of result.

[229]The judge first determined the nature and scope of the geologist’s obligation based on B&B’s written request that he received in October 2003. The object of that service requisition was twofold: to conduct a petrographic examination of the stone samples delivered to his laboratory in accordance with standard ASTM C295 and to inform the client, who needed to know, [TRANSLATION] “... of the risks of using this stone to manufacture concrete, with respect to the percentage of pyrite in that stone”.146

[230]The nature of this contract for professional services was confirmed by geologist Blanchette himself, who stated on cross-examination that his services had been retained to set [TRANSLATION] “the record straight”147 on the quality of the aggregate.

[231]According to the Group 1 appellants, the judge should have considered the work requested of geologist Blanchette as a summary examination. The geologist himself, however, when acting as an expert tasked with assessing the analysis by a construction laboratory of the Maskimo stone, stated that a petrographic examination

145London Life Insurance Company c. Long, 2016 QCCA 1434 at para. 140 (reasons of St-Pierre J.A.).

146Exhibit DSNC-21 (23 October 2003), vol. 284 at 120182; Main judgment at paras. 191, 1196, 1278 and 1290.

147Cross-examination of Alain Blanchette (19 February 2013), vol. 469 at 191520; Main judgment at para. 1279.

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should be conducted in accordance with standard ASTM C295 to obtain an in-depth assessment of concrete aggregate to determine the presence of deleterious minerals or phases such as sulphides.148 Moreover, he wrote in his report that, given the means available, a petrographic examination in accordance with standard ASTM C295 [TRANSLATION] “... engages the liability of a professional who must offer clear recommendations in the report on whether or not the materials should be used based on the proposed use”.149

[232]The elements below show that the judge analyzed the evidence of geologist

Blanchette’s liability according to the criteria of an obligation of means and not an obligation of result, as the appellants incorrectly claim:

faced with a specialized area outside his expertise, the judge relied on the opinions of a dozen experts to learn about the professional standards applicable to geologists and to assess geologist Blanchette’s behaviour at the time the facts occurred;150

the judge noted in particular the expert opinions of geologist Chris Rogers151 and engineers Charles Tremblay and Raymond Juneau152 to determine the good practices and assess whether geologist Blanchette behaved like another prudent and diligent professional would have behaved:153

the testimony of expert Rogers154 also justified the judge’s conclusion that the few warnings, reservations, and recommendations geologist Blanchette issued to his clients were late and of little use after he had unreservedly affirmed that the B&B aggregate was suitable to manufacture concrete;155

as the contract for services granted to geologist Blanchette in 2003 expressly referred to standard ASTM C295, the judge was certainly correct to assess

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148Exhibit DSNC-26 (16 June 2005), vol. 285 at 120219.

149Ibid.

150 Leduc c. Soccio, 2007 QCCA 209 at paras. 77–81, leave to appeal to SCC refused, 31968 (6 September 2007); Jean-Louis Baudouin, Patrice Deslauriers & Benoît Moore, La responsabilité civile, 8th ed., vol. 2 (Cowansville, QC: Yvon Blais, 2014) at 13–16, Nos. 2-11 to 2-13.

151Exhibit CYB-5 (10 November 2011), vol. 423 at 173416.

152Exhibit DC-24 (24 October 2011), vol. 425 at 174165 and 174167.

153Main judgment at paras. 1301–1302.

154Examination of Chris Rogers (3 May 2013), vol. 473 at 193137.

155Main judgment at para. 1258.

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the professional’s work based on the obligations imposed by this standard during a petrographic examination;156

the judge could also refer to the provisions of the code of ethics157 applicable to geologists at the time to assess the conduct of geologist Blanchette,158 especially since ss. 3.1.3 and 3.3.2 of that Code set out basic rules of prudence;159

the judge also analyzed the conduct of geologist Blanchette in light of the obligation of every service provider to properly and fully inform clients.160 This obligation to inform requires among other things that any risk with particularly serious effects be disclosed.161 In this case, based on the evidence adduced before him, the judge concluded that geologist Blanchette had misled his clients when he replied without nuance to the questions in the contracts for services;

last, the judge also considered the steps taken by geologist Blanchette in light of his duty of prudence162 to conclude that he issued his opinions without the most basic care.163

[233]Consequently, the appellants are incorrect to argue that the judge failed to assess geologist Blanchette’s professional conduct by applying the criterion of an obligation of means.

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156Main judgment at paras. 230, 240–242, 1245–1248 and 1303. [TRANSLATION] “To decide whether someone committed a fault in performing a mandate, the nature of the mandate granted and its scope must be known”: Lac St-Charles (Ville) c. Construction Choinière inc., J.E. 2000-1318 at para. 20 (C.A.).

157Exhibit DC-23 (2001-2011), vol. 326 at 137144.

158Main judgment at paras. 1259–1260.

159Jean-Louis Baudouin, Patrice Deslauriers & Benoît Moore, La responsabilité civile, 8th ed., vol. 2 (Cowansville, QC: Yvon Blais, 2014) at 2–4, No. 2-2.

160Article 2102 C.C.Q.; Éric Dunberry, “La responsabilité des professionnels”, in Olivier F. Kott &

Claudine Roy (eds.), La construction au Québec: perspectives juridiques (Montreal: Wilson & Lafleur, 1998) 459 at 489–491; Bank of Montreal v. Bail Ltée, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 554.

161In medical matters, see: Parenteau c. Drolet, [1994] R.J.Q. 689 at 706 (reasons of Baudouin J.A.) (C.A.).

162Hébert c. Centre hospitalier affilié universitaire de Québec, Hôpital de l’Enfant-Jésus, 2011 QCCA 1521 at paras. 58–63.

163Main judgment at paras. 251 and 1299.

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Contesting the trial judge’s analysis of fault

Trial judgment

[234]The judge noted several lapses in the geologist’s conduct compared to the standard of a prudent and diligent professional in the same circumstances to conclude that geologist Blanchette, and hence SNC, had committed a fault.

[235]The judge inferred from the reports submitted by geologist Blanchette and from his testimony that he was of the view that the rock from the B&B quarry was of low absorbency, not conducive to oxidization, and of very good quality.164 Even though he had noted the presence of iron sulphides (pyrite and pyrrhotite) in the aggregate, the geologist felt that the aggregate would be protected from the minerals it could contain, particularly sulphides, because it was granitic rock. The granitic nature of the rock would prevent any expansion due to oxidation.165

[236]According to the judge, geologist Blanchette therefore imprudently adhered to an erroneous professional opinion, causing him to mislead his clients by reassuring them as to the quality of the B&B aggregate and its use to manufacture concrete.166 When he provided his opinions, geologist Blanchette was nonetheless aware of the opinion of other experts that iron sulphides were causing the aggregate to expand.167 He had acted as an expert in the Maskimo case, located 500 metres from the B&B quarry and was well aware of the problem with concrete expansion.168

[237]The judge also faulted him for not having considered the applicable standards, in particular CSA standard A23.1 on the quality of concrete aggregate and the danger of oxidation and expansion due to sulphides, and standard ASTM C295 on petrographic examinations.

[238]Geologist Blanchette was consulted during the development of standard CSA A23.1,169 and even though that standard does not set a maximum percentage of pyrrhotite or sulphide content in aggregate, it clearly warns against the presence of

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164Main judgment at para. 1206.

165Main judgment at paras. 1207, 1218 and 1231.

166Main judgment at paras. 250–251, 1221–1224, 1233, 1294 and 1299.

167Main judgment at paras. 1218, 1234–1235, 1280 and 1285.

168Main judgment at paras. 193-206, 1211, 1237, 1261 and 1280–1285.

169Main judgment at para. 226.

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pyrite, pyrrhotite and marcasite in aggregate.170 He could not rely, however, solely on the absence of any quantification of the sulphide level in CSA standard A23.1. The geologist should not have disregarded the prohibition imposed by the standard with aggregate that produced excessive expansion in concrete given the consistently higher pyrrhotite content in the samples provided by his clients. The purported protection offered by the granitic nature of the rock was insufficient to justify such disregard.171

[239]The judge found that geologist Blanchette also breached standard ASTM C295 on petrographic examinations172 in that he failed to determine the presence of deleterious substances in the aggregate and limited himself to issuing reservations on the pop-outs and staining associated solely with architectural concrete.173 He also failed to differentiate the sulphide content in the aggregate analyzed.174 Consequently, the few recommendations and secondary reservations not to use the aggregate to manufacture architectural concrete were found to be late and of little use to his clients once he had replied that the B&B aggregate was suitable to manufacture their concrete, thereby misleading them.175

[240]Last, the judge concluded that geologist Blanchette had breached his ethical obligations under the code of professional ethics of geologists in force from 2001 to 2011.176 Given his knowledge of the experts’ opinions on the consequences of sulphides in the concrete aggregate, he issued an opinion without any nuance or warning, thereby misleading his clients when he had an obligation to make them understand the degree of uncertainty inherent in his observations and recommendations.177 In so doing, he also breached his obligation to clearly explain the facts, interpretations, uncertainties, and differences of interpretation on the subject.178

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170Main judgment at paras. 224–227, 230 and 235–236.

171Main judgment at paras. 1209–1210, 1212–1214, 1218–1221, 1234–1235, 1246–1248, 1272 and 1294–1295.

172Main judgment at paras. 229–230 and 240–242.

173Main judgment at paras. 1240–1245.

174Main judgment at para. 1303.

175Main judgment at paras. 1258 and 1293–1297.

176Exhibit DC-23 (2001-2011), vol. 326 at 137144.

177Main judgment at paras. 1259 and 1294–1298.

178Main judgment at para. 1260.

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Analysis

[241]In their brief, but particularly at the hearing, the Group 1 appellants attacked the trial judge’s conclusions on three fronts. They claim that the judge decided a posteriori based on the result rather than asking whether the geologist’s conduct was that of a reasonably competent professional in the same circumstances. They submit that geologist Blanchette based his opinion on the knowledge at the time that contemplated the danger of iron sulphides in more porous aggregate such as shale, whereas this case involved gabbro-granitic rock less prone to permeability. The appellants contend that the judge should have asked whether geologist Blanchette’s belief was reasonable, especially in light of the expert opinion of Bernard Erlin,179 whose services were retained by the appellants and to whom the judge made no reference in his decision. The appellants also argue that geologist Blanchette did include the appropriate warnings to his clients in his written reports.

[242]Determining fault is a question of mixed fact and law.180 As previously stated, expert evidence is usually necessary in matters of professional fault to allow courts to learn about the professional standards and determine whether the professional behaved as a prudent and diligent professional in the same circumstances normally would have behaved.181 In this regard, it should be noted that assessing the quality and weight of expert testimony is left to the court’s discretion.182 The rule regarding an appellate court’s deference to the trial judge’s factual inferences also applies to the credibility of expert witnesses and ordinary witnesses.183

[243]In this case, according to geologist Blanchette’s argument, even though the B&B aggregate contained iron sulphides, either pyrite or pyrrhotite, there was no danger in using it to manufacture concrete as long as it was granitic (gabbro) rock incorporated into good quality concrete. The rare cases of aggregate expansion due

179 Exhibit DSNC-86 (26 April 2012), vol. 407 at 168083. See also Exhibit DSNC-130, vol. 408 at 168149.

180Salomon v. MatteThompson, 2019 SCC 14 at para. 32; St-Jean v. Mercier, 2002 SCC 15,

 

[2002] 1 S.C.R. 491 at paras. 48 and 104.

 

 

 

181

Leduc c. Soccio, 2007 QCCA 209

at paras. 77–81, leave

to

appeal to

SCC refused, 31968

 

(6 September 2007); Jean-Louis Baudouin, Patrice Deslauriers & Benoît Moore, La responsabilité

 

civile, 8th ed., vol. 2 (Cowansville, QC: Yvon Blais, 2014) at 13–16, Nos. 2–11 to 2-13.

182

Martinez c. Péris

Construction

inc., 2013 QCCA 1008

at

para. 7;

Catherine Piché &

 

Jean-Claude Royer

Piché, La preuve civile, 5th ed. (Montreal: Yvon Blais, 2016) at 424–426,

 

No. 557.

 

 

 

 

 

183Lapointe v. Hôpital Le Gardeur, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 351 at 358; Simard Vincent c. Conseil de la nation Huronne-Wendat, 2010 QCCA 178 at para. 49.

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to sulphides only occurred in shale rock, which is more porous and permeable than granite.

[244]According to geologist Blanchette, the sole inconvenience caused by the sulphides in granitic concrete stone was purely esthetic due to sulphides on the periphery of the aggregate. These problems were limited to pop-outs and staining, which made this aggregate unsuitable for esthetic concrete.184

[245]His reports to CSL and the tandems between May 2003 and October 2006 were based on this position. That was also the position he defended during his testimony.185

[246]On top of this belief is the fact that no applicable standard dictated an acceptable maximum amount of iron sulphides in concrete aggregate. Indeed, that is what geologist Blanchette stated in his reports and repeated in his testimony.186

[247]Geologist Blanchette’s position is confirmed by expert Bernard Erlin, who recalled that there is no North American quantitative standard on the maximum sulphide content in concrete aggregate and wrote that the problems caused by the iron sulphides in the aggregate were limited to esthetic inconveniences (pop-outs and staining). He also agreed with the idea that the problem with oxidation and expansion was more likely to occur in porous stone and in concrete of poor quality.187 According to the expert, that was the state of knowledge at the time geologist Blanchette drafted his reports between 2003 and 2006.188

[248]The judge instead accepted the opinion of the other experts that the oxidation of pyrrhotite in the concrete aggregate and even in granitic rock was known at the time of geologist Blanchette’s reports, which should have led him to be more prudent in his opinions.189

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184See in particular the examination of Alain Blanchette (19 February 2013), vol. 469 at 191471.

185Examination of Alain Blanchette (19 February 2013), vol. 469 at 191454, 191463 and 191470; Cross-examination of Alain Blanchette (19 February 2013), vol. 469 at 191526, 191533 and 191544.

186In particular the examination of Alain Blanchette (19 February 2013), vol. 469 at 191463–191466; Cross-examination of Alain Blanchette (19 February 2013), vol. 469 at 191545.

187Exhibit DSNC-86 (26 April 2012), vol. 407 at 168083 and 168104–168108.

188Examination of Bernard Erlin (21 June 2013), vol. 478 at 195466 and 195468.

189Main judgment at paras. 243–253, 1218 and 1300–1303.

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[249]The judge also based himself on the opinion of experts Marc-André Bérubé,190 Michael Maher,191 and Chris Rogers,192 who clearly contradict the opinion of expert Erlin on this issue.

[250]Furthermore, geologist Blanchette’s own experience in the Maskimo quarry case193 should have convinced him to be more prudent in his opinions. In the spring or early summer of 2003, he was approached by a law firm representing the insurers of a construction laboratory and asked to assess whether the tests conducted on the Maskimo aggregate were consistent with good practice.194 He was also given expert reports on the degradation of concrete manufactured with Maskimo aggregate, which he read.195

[251]These expert reports blamed the degradation on the iron sulphides in the Maskimo aggregate, an aggregate that was similarly granitic (anorthositic gabbro) to that of B&B.196 The two quarries are 500 metres apart and in the same geological setting.197

[252]Even though geologist Blanchette and others instead blamed the degradation of concrete made with the Maskimo aggregate on the poor quality of the concrete and even of the cement, these expert opinions clearly establish that the oxidation of iron sulphides in granitic concrete and the concrete expansion were known at the time geologist Blanchette provided his opinion on the B&B stone.

[253]In his report, expert Chris Rogers rightly criticizes geologist Blanchette for having disregarded the existence of this documentation, which he had nonetheless read.198 There was no such mention by expert Erlin.

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190Report of Marc-André Bérubé (11 November 2011), vol. 406 at 167816–167884. See also Exhibit PMAB-1 (23 May 2013), vol. 406 at 167716.

191Exhibit DCH-2.1 (10 November 2011), vol. 420 at 172459.

192Exhibit CYB-5 (10 November 2011), vol. 423 at 173409–173411.

193Statement of general facts of the Main judgment, above at paras. [45]–[46] and [51]–[53].

194Ibid. at para. [53].

195Pre-trial examination of Alain Blanchette (15 September 2011), vol. 450 at 184854–184856; Cross- examination of Alain Blanchette (19 February 2013), vol. 469 at 191524 and 191526.

196Exhibit DC-5a (19 October 2001), vol. 324 at 136207–136211; Exhibit DC-5d (17 October 2002), vol. 324 at 136229–136235.

197Report of Inspec-Sol (13 July 2012), vol. 404 at 167013.

198Exhibit CYB-5 (10 November 2011), vol. 423 at 173415–173416. To the same effect, report of Marc-André Bérubé (11 November 2011), vol. 406 at 167873–167876 and 167884; Exhibit DC-24 (24 October 2011), vol. 425 at 174166 and 174169–174170.

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[254]In short, the Court finds that the judge’s conclusions that geologist Blanchette was imprudent are largely based on the evidence and are immune from intervention. He disregarded in particular the literature that discussed the danger of iron sulphides in concrete aggregate. These conclusions were even more justified in the context of geologist Blanchette’s observations that the B&B aggregate contained levels of iron sulphides that not only exceeded those observed in the Maskimo aggregate, but were even the highest he had ever seen.199

[255]Given the contracts for services entrusted to the geologist to assess the risks of using the B&B stone to manufacture concrete, the Group 1 appellants incorrectly claim that geologist Blanchette’s belief was reasonable according to the knowledge at the time.

[256]The appellants also rely on the opinion of expert Bernard Erlin in support of the argument that geologist Blanchette properly warned B&B about using aggregate containing iron sulphides to manufacture concrete, which is specifically required by standard ASTM C295 on petrographic examinations.200 Section 15 obliges the author of the report to discuss his or her findings and conclusions in words that are intelligible for those who must decide whether a material is suitable for use as concrete aggregate. The author must also describe the quality and quantity of any aggregate property or constituent recognized as deleterious. Moreover, the mandate entrusted to Blanchette in October 2003 expressly referred to that standard.201

[257]Standard ASTM C295 must be read together with CSA standard A23.1, which is the reference for preparing and applying cement concrete.202 While it does not set out any maximum sulphide content for concrete aggregate, clause 4.2.3.5.2 of CSA standard A23.1 contains a warning that aggregates that produce excessive expansion in concrete shall not be used for concrete “unless preventive measures acceptable to the owner are applied”.203

[258]In his report, expert Erlin asserted that geologist Blanchette complied with the standards’ requirements and adequately informed B&B of the potentially deleterious effects of sulphides in the concrete aggregate. The expert said that Mr. Blanchette

199Pre-trial examination of Alain Blanchette (15 September 2011), vol. 450 at 184875.

200Exhibit CYB-5.13, vol. 423 at 173541. See also Main judgment at paras. 229–230 and 240-242; Above at para. [231].

201Exhibit DSNC-21 (23 October 2003), vol. 284 at 120182.

202Above at para. [238].

203Main judgment at para. 225. See also Exhibit P-10 (1 May 2013), vol. 404 at 166893.

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warned B&B that the aggregate should not be used for architectural concrete because of the effects of sulphide oxidation on the concrete’s esthetic, that the aggregate should be used for normal density concrete of good quality, that production should be monitored to ensure that the percentage of iron sulphides did not increase compared to the analyzed sample, and that a more detailed study of the quarry should be conducted to properly identify those sectors with aggregate of a higher quality mineralogic composition.204

[259]That opinion was disputed by several other experts who were instead of the opinion that, given the circumstances and the state of knowledge at the time, geologist Blanchette breached his professional obligations by failing to recommend that the B&B aggregate should not be used to manufacture concrete.205

[260]The most cutting opinion was that of expert Chris Rogers, first in his expert report206 but primarily during his examination at trial of May 3, 2013. When questioned on the recommendations of geologist Blanchette in his opinions from 2003 to 2006, expert Rogers explained in visual terms why such recommendations were late and useless after the geologist had determined that the aggregate was suitable for manufacturing concrete:

A.He's already recommended that the material be used. He's saying that don't go above seven percent, but it's too late. The — he's already given approval or recommendation to use it in concrete. He could prevent — he's recommending not to get more than seven percent, I think, and he's indicating fairly simple ways of measuring the sulphides other than petrographic examination; but the horse is out of the stable.207

[261]The trial judge cannot be faulted for accepting that opinion.208

[262]Last, the Group 1 appellants claim that the judge failed to refer to expert Erlin or his opinion in the Main judgment.

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204Exhibit DSNC-86 (26 April 2012), vol. 407 at 168085.

205Report of Inspec-Sol (13 July 2012), vol. 404 at 167002–167014; Report of Marc-André Bérubé (11 November 2011), vol. 406 at 167884; Exhibit DC-24 (24 October 2011), vol. 425 at 174168– 174170.

206Exhibit CYB-5 (10 November 2011), vol. 423 at 173414–173416.

207Examination of Chris Rogers (3 May 2013), vol. 473 at 193137.

208Main judgment at paras. 1258, 1295, 1299 and 1301–1302.

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[263]That criticism is without merit. First, the trial judge was not bound to comment on each piece of the particularly abundant evidence when he rendered his decision.209 Moreover, it is clear from reading the Main judgment that the judge did not take into consideration that expert’s opinion.

[264]Last, the judge had several justifiable reasons for failing to refer to the opinion of the appellants’ expert:

expert Erlin limited his study exclusively to North American standards and did not refer to any French or European standards, unlike the other experts;210

at the time he drafted his report, he was unaware that geologist Blanchette had acted as an expert in the Maskimo case;211

he was also unaware that geologist Blanchette had read at least two expert reports blaming the degradation problems of the Maskimo concrete on the reaction of iron sulphides in the Maskimo aggregate;212

on cross-examination, he acknowledged that over the course of his career in petrography, he had never seen concrete aggregate containing 5 to 7% of iron sulphides;213

last, he acknowledged that had he observed such sulphide levels in concrete aggregate given to him for analysis by a client, “... I certainly would have provided cautions about the use of the aggregate”.214

Multiplicity of faults

[265]The argument was raised during the hearing that geologist Blanchette committed only one fault that extended from May 2003 to November 2007. That

209Lecavalier c. 9036-5560 Québec inc., 2015 QCCA 551 at para. 6.

210Report of Inspec-Sol (13 July 2012), vol. 404 at 167010; Report of Marc-André Bérubé (11 November 2011), vol. 406 at 167838; Exhibit DDMT-18a (19 June 2013), vol. 416 at 170940; Exhibit DCH-2.1 (10 November 2011), vol. 420 at 172462–172463; Exhibit DC-24 (24 October 2011), vol. 425 at 174088.

211Cross-examination of Bernard Erlin (21 June 2013), vol. 478 at 195527.

212Cross-examination of Bernard Erlin (21 June 2013), vol. 478 at 195531. See above at paras. [248]–Erreur ! Source du renvoi introuvable. and note 196.

213Cross-examination of Bernard Erlin (21 June 2013), vol. 478 at 195511.

214Cross-examination of Bernard Erlin (21 June 2013), vol. 478 at 195518.

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argument is inconsistent with the facts. On the contrary, even though these professional faults were of the same nature, they were all distinct and were all committed and repeated each time geologist Blanchette reassured his clients on the quality of the B&B concrete aggregate. Several reasons support this finding.

[266]First, the geologist’s reports were prepared further to separate requests. CSL requested the report of May 13, 2003,215 in circumstances described by geologist Blanchette in his testimony both at pre-trial examination and at trial216 and which the Court will have an opportunity to revisit during the review of Ground No. 5.217 That request for an expert opinion was made verbally.

[267]The December 2, 2003, report sent to B&B on January 6, 2004,218 was prepared following a written request signed by France Côté on October 23, 2003.219 The report of December 13, 2005,220 was in response to another written request by B&B dated September 8, 2005, this time signed by François Bellemare.221

[268]The record contains no written request for the reports of November 10, 2004, sent to B&B on November 18, 2004,222 and of August 25, 2006, sent on October 31, 2006.223 According to the judge, the request for this last report was made in August

2006.224 Last, the report of November 28, 2007,225 was the second progress report on the concrete expansion-testing program proposed by geologist Blanchette226 after he

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215 Exhibit DC-13 (13 May 2003), vol. 326 at 137006; Exhibit CYB-26 (13 May 2003), vol. 345 at 144927 (this exhibit includes the CSL transmission slip of May 13, 2003); Exhibit DSNC-71.4, vol. 305 at 128369 (this exhibit shows that CSL’s name as client was replaced by that of B&B). See also Statement of general facts of the Main judgment, above at paras. [41]–[43].

216Pre-trial examination of Alain Blanchette (25 September 2012), vol. 451 at 184957; Examination of Alain Blanchette (19 February 2013), vol. 469 at 191473–191474.

217See subsection 8.4 of this judgment.

218Exhibit DSNC-22 (6 January 2004), vol. 284 at 120184.

219Exhibit DSNC-21 (23 October 2003), vol. 284 at 120182.

220Exhibit DSNC-37 (13 December 2005), vol. 285 at 120350.

221Exhibit DSNC-30 (8 September 2005), vol. 285 at 120294.

222Exhibit DSNC-23 (18 November 2004), vol. 284 at 120191.

223Exhibit DSNC-49 (31 October 2006), vol. 285 at 120462.

224Main judgment at para. 1020.

225Exhibit DSNC-51 (28 November 2007), vol. 285 at 120493.

226Exhibit DC-9a (17 October 2006), vol. 326, p. 136849; Exhibit DC-9b (25 October 2006), vol. 326 at 136854.

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received a copy of geologist Lucie Tremblay’s report,227 dated August 31, 2006, from B&B and met with the B&B officers at their office.228

[269]The preceding paragraphs clearly illustrate the distinct circumstances and requests that gave rise to the separate reports produced by geologist Blanchette.

[270]Second, as each report revealed, the characteristics of the concrete aggregate analyzed by geologist Blanchette were different. Not only was the calibre of the aggregate analyzed variable according to the examinations, the nine-month progress report of November 28, 2007,229 was a comparative study of three distinct stones, two of which came from two different sectors of the B&B quarry and a third from the Maskimo quarry. Most importantly, the pyrite or pyrrhotite content, since geologist Blanchette did not differentiate between them, varied depending on the samples. The May 2003 report prepared for CSL230 indicated that the pyrite content was 1% to 2%. The petrographic examination conducted at B&B’s request in December 2003231 indicated an iron sulphide (pyrite and pyrrhotite) percentage of 3%. It increased from 5% to 7% in the November 2004 examination report,232 which led geologist Blanchette to advise against using this aggregate for architectural concrete, which was not produced by his clients.233

[271]In the petrographic examination report of December 2005,234 iron sulphides accounted for 2% to 3% of everything analyzed, resulting in a pyrite equivalent of 2.26%, while in the report of August 2006,235 geologist Blanchette noted approximately 4% to 5% of iron sulphides (essentially pyrrhotite and pyrite) in the sample. Last, in the nine-month expansion test report of November 2007, geologist Blanchette noted that the equivalent pyrite content was higher in the two B&B quarry samples (3.74% and 3.25%) and lower in the Maskimo quarry sample.236 He found the percentage of oxidized fragments in the pyrite-rich B&B quarry sample worrying

227Exhibit DSNC-46 (7 September 2006), vol. 285 at 120450; Exhibit DC-10 (31 August 2006), vol. 326 at 136958.

228Exhibit DSNC-46 (7 September 2006), vol. 285 at 120450; Above at paras. [296]–[299] and [304]– [305].

229Supra note 225.

230Supra note 215.

231Supra note 218.

232Supra note 222.

233Main judgment at para. 1223.

234Supra note 220.

235Supra note 223.

236Supra note 225.

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and for the first time concluded, as a preventive measure, that it should not be used as concrete aggregate.

[272]In his career, geologist Blanchette has generally encountered sulphide levels varying between 0.6% and 3% in the files he had to examine.237 He had to acknowledge that the sulphide levels in his reports for B&B were higher than any he had encountered in the past.238 This was already the case for the level of 5% in his December 2003 report for B&B,239 and the level of 5% to 7% in his November 2004 report240 were double what he had seen in his entire life.241

[273]Third, each time geologist Blanchette gave an opinion favouring the use of the B&B aggregate, he participated in increasing the number of concrete pourings contaminated by pyrrhotite and therefore of foundations degraded by oxidation and expansion, and thereby increased the number of victims and the amount of damage.

[274]The same is true for the subsequent reports. Each time geologist Blanchette concluded that the B&B aggregate could be used safely in construction concrete, despite iron sulphide contents that he had never seen throughout his career, he encouraged the incorporation of this aggregate into other concrete pourings and into new building foundations.

[275]It was only in his second report, nine months into the comparative concrete expansion-testing program of November 28, 2007, that geologist Blanchette recommended that the pyrite-rich B&B aggregate should not be used as concrete aggregate.242 His clients understood this recommendation to mean that they had to stop using all concrete aggregate from the quarry because it was the first time that geologist Blanchette said that it should not be used.243

[276]Even in this last case, the trial judge noted that geologist Blanchette could have acted as of February 2007. In fact, the schedules to the November 28, 2007, report reveal that the geologist had already noted in February 2007 that 30% of fragments observed displayed surface oxidation described as concerning.244 In the

237Main judgment at para. 1240.

238Main judgment at para. 1252.

239Supra note 218.

240Supra note 222.

241Main judgment at paras. 1253–1254.

242Exhibit DSNC-51 (28 November 2007), vol. 285 at 120493.

243See subsection 8.5 of this judgment on Ground No. 8.

244See the conclusion of Schedule A: Exhibit DSNC-51 (28 November 2007), vol. 285 at 120505.

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judge’s view, this 10-month delay by geologist Blanchette before conveying his concerns to his clients allowed the damage to continue increasing [TRANSLATION] “due to the use of the defective aggregate”.245

[277]What geologist Blanchette’s faults have in common is their nature. In every petrographic analysis conducted and in each report up to November 28, 2007, he failed to warn his clients of the risk associated with using defective concrete aggregate containing pyrrhotite. The above paragraphs establish, however, that these faults are distinct due to the specific circumstances of each request he received for a petrographic examination because of the characteristics of each sample analyzed and because, up to November 28, 2007, each report that was produced contributed to creating additional, distinct damage with every concrete pouring.

[278]The above analysis leads to the conclusion that the trial judge’s decision on geologist Blanchette’s faults is solidly based on both the expert and the lay evidence. Consequently, Ground No. 1 must fail.

8.2Ground No. 2: Causal connection between geologist Blanchette’s faults and the damage

[279]The Group 1 appellants next argue that if geologist Blanchette committed faults, they cannot be held liable vis-à-vis B&B and the concrete suppliers because there is no causal connection between these faults and the damage suffered.

[280]Ground No. 2 is raised in connection with the contractual liability arising out of the requests for professional services received by geologist Blanchette from the tandems as of October 23, 2003.246

Reasons

[281]The Group 1 appellants first submit that the trial judge failed to truly analyze the causal connection and considered only the geologist’s faulty conduct. His reasons on the causal connection are therefore insufficient.

[282]This argument has no merit. Taken as a whole, as they should be, the judge’s reasons clearly explain the basis of his decision.247 He expressly stated that geologist

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245Main judgment at para. 1320.

246Exhibit DSNC-21 (23 October 2003), vol. 284 at 120182.

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Blanchette’s erroneous opinions misled the tandems on the quality of the concrete stone.248

[283]Furthermore, once the judge determined that the pyrrhotite in the concrete aggregate was the sole cause of the degradation in the building foundations, the substance of geologist Blanchette’s opinions to the tandems on the quality of that aggregate left little room for doubt as to the causal effect between these repeated opinions and the damage suffered. As stated by the authors: [TRANSLATION] “[i]n most cases, the courts do not raise the issue of causation because there is a clear relationship between the fault and the damage”.249 In such circumstances, the judge was certainly not required to devote an entire section of his judgment to the causal connection, as the appellants incorrectly argue.

Assessment of causation

[284]Next, the appellants claim that the judge erred in law by ignoring certain factors establishing the absence of a causal connection between the professional’s faults and his clients’ damage. They raise in particular the fact that the clients acted without taking into account the opinions and advice proffered, that it was unreasonable for the clients to rely on geologist Blanchette’s reports, and that the damage suffered resulted instead from their own choices, negligence, or recklessness.

[285]Causation is a question of fact,250 which is why the trial judge’s determinations are owed deference in this matter.251 Victims of an injury must prove that the damage was the logical, direct, and immediate consequence of the fault.252 This direct and immediate causal connection is established on a balance of probabilities.253

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247SNC-Lavalin inc. c. Société québécoise des infrastructures (Société immobilière du Québec), 2015 QCCA 1153 at para. 33.

248Main judgment at paras. 912–913, 954, 1008, 1220–1224 and 1294.

249Jean-Louis Baudouin, Patrice Deslauriers & Benoît Moore, La responsabilité civile, 8th ed., vol. 1 (Cowansville, QC: Yvon Blais, 2014) at 712, No. 1-667.

250Salomon v. MatteThompson, 2019 SCC 14 at para. 32; St-Jean v. Mercier, 2002 SCC 15, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 491 at para. 104.

251Wightman c. Widdrington (Succession), 2013 QCCA 1187 at paras. 267–268, leave to appeal to SCC refused, 35438 (9 January 2014).

252Article 1607 C.C.Q.; Jean-Louis Baudouin, Patrice Deslauriers & Benoît Moore, La responsabilité civile, 8th ed., vol. 1 (Cowansville, QC: Yvon Blais, 2014) at 720, No. 1-683.

253Ibid. at 733, No. 1-703.

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[286]Here, and as will be seen below, although the Group 1 appellants have worded this ground of appeal as an error in law, they question only the trial judge’s reading of the evidence.

Argument on the break in the chain of causation

[287]More concretely, and even though they ardently defended themselves at the hearing, the appellants argue that the recklessness of geologist Blanchette’s clients is tantamount to a novus actus interveniens that broke the causal connection between the geologist’s faults and the damage.

[288]For this ground to succeed, they must prove, first, that the connection between the fault committed and the damage was completely broken or that it disappeared entirely, and second, a new connection based on a subsequent event totally unrelated to the initial fault.254 In all other instances, only the continuation of the same process involving two contributory faults can give rise to shared liability.255

[289]In support of their argument on the absence of a causal connection, the appellants raise the fact that the quarry and the concrete suppliers ignored the reports and recommendations of their own experts on the dangerousness of the B&B aggregate in 2002, even before the contract for services entered into with geologist Blanchette, and in 2006.

The 2002 Bérubé report

[290]After BL received a formal notice regarding the IGA building, one of the most discussed cases in the Maskimo quarry files, Michel Bergeron of BL asked geologist Professor Marc-André Bérubé to compare a B&B aggregate sample with the Maskimo aggregate used in the IGA foundation.256 He was asked whether the stone from the B&B quarry could produce the same deleterious effects as the Maskimo stone.257

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254Salomon v. Matte-Thompson, 2019 SCC 14 at paras. 91–93; Lacombe c. André, [2003] R.J.Q. 720 at 729 (C.A.).

255Ferme avicole Héva inc. c. Coopérative fédérée de Québec (portion assurée), 2008 QCCA 1053 at paras. 113–117, leave to appeal to SCC refused, 32778 (22 January 2009).

256Exhibit DC-19 (14 December 2001), vol. 326 at 137089.

257See the detailed circumstances surrounding that request in Statement of general facts of the Main judgment, above at paras. [35]–[37]. See also Main judgment at paras. 291–319.

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[291]This is what geologist Bérubé wrote in the conclusion of his report dated May 4, 2002:

[TRANSLATION]

... To the extent that pyrrhotite actually caused the issues observed in the above-mentioned building and that its chemical composition is similar, there is every reason to believe that the aggregate examined could also cause the same type of issue because its sulphide content is significant.258

[292]The appellants attach a great deal of importance to this report and argue that it was not followed by the quarry or the concrete suppliers. Despite this opinion warning about the reactive potential of the B&B aggregate, they continued mining it for 17 months, until October 23, 2003, the date a first contract for services was entered into with geologist Blanchette.259 In their brief,260 and even in their description of the facts,261 the appellants implicitly suggest that the tandems gave Blanchette a rubber- stamp mandate merely to obtain confirmation of a decision already made to mine the B&B aggregate.

[293]The appellants contend that geologist Bérubé’s report of May 2002 and the failure of the quarry and the concrete suppliers to follow it establish that there was no causal connection between geologist Blanchette’s later faults and the damage suffered.

[294]The appellants are incorrect. First, as geologist Bérubé himself acknowledged262 and as the judge noted,263 the geologist’s warning was not as clear and categorical as the appellants claim. Moreover, several weeks earlier, shareholder Lafarge sent Michel Bergeron of BL a report on the chemical analysis of the B&B aggregate.264 On February 22, 2002, Mr. Bergeron called Ms. De Grosbois at Lafarge for clarification of the report, which he did not understand. Ms. De Grosbois explained to him that the B&B stone was good.265

258Exhibit DSNC-14 (4 May 2002), vol. 284 at 120148–120152.

259Exhibit DSNC-21 (23 October 2003), vol. 284 at 120182.

260A.B.-1 at para. 90.

261Joint statement of general facts (Group 1) at paras. 178–180.

262Cross-examination of Marc-André Bérubé (29 May 2013), vol. 476 at 194403–194404. Moreover, at the time he wrote his report, he was unaware that the aggregate he was to analyze was being used to make concrete (at 194403).

263Main judgment at paras. 302–305.

264Exhibit DSNC-9 (21 February 2002), vol. 284 at 120083.

265Pre-trial examination of Michel Bergeron (28 April 2011), vol. 449 at 184457.

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[295]Second, at the time geologist Bérubé provided his opinion, the B&B quarry had already been operating for six years without any problem. Added to this was the fact that, at that time, there were other theories circulating to explain the degradation of the concrete manufactured with Maskimo aggregate, including poor concrete paste or even poor cement.

[296]That is why in his handwritten notes for November 29, 2001, Michel Bergeron of BL recorded a discussion with Patrick Plante. Mr. Plante told him that he had received a stone sample from Bernard Marcotte, then employed by Maskimo, and that their specialist had confirmed that the B&B stone could not cause the same problems facing Maskimo and that the problems would instead be with the cement.266

[297]The study to which Mr. Plante referred was the petrographic examination prepared by LVM Fondatec, whose report is dated January 4, 2002.267 That study, which Mr. Bergeron did not see,268 was in fact conducted at the request of Bernard Marcotte, who sneaked into B&B, his competitor at the time, surreptitiously took some concrete stone, and asked LVM Fondatec to compare the sulphide content in that stone with that of the Maskimo stone.269

[298]The January 4, 2002, report compared two samples, one from Maskimo270 and the other one from B&B, 271 for which petrographic examinations were conducted according to standard ASTM C295. The results were consistent with the information provided by Patrick Plante to Michel Bergeron, in that the sulphide content in the B&B aggregate was five times lower than in the Maskimo aggregate.272

[299]These hypotheses were not purely theoretical for BL, who briefly used the CSL cement instead of the cement from its supplier, Lafarge.273 At the time, it suspected that the concrete degradation it produced when it poured foundations with the

266Exhibit DSNC-4 (2001), vol. 284 at 119861; Main judgment at para. 359; Pre-trial examination of Michel Bergeron (28 April 2011), vol. 449 at 184476–184477.

267Exhibit DSNC-42 (31 January 2002), vol. 285 at 120392 (sent to Bernard Marcotte of Béton Maskimo on January 31, 2002).

268Pre-trial examination of Michel Bergeron (23 August 2012), vol. 450 at 184642–184643.

269Pre-trial examination of Bernard Marcotte (25 May 2011), vol. 455 at 186605; (26 May 2011), vol. 455 at 186654–186657. Mr. Marcotte says that this occurred in 2002, but report DSNC-42 was signed on January 2, 2002, so he clearly went to remove the concrete stone from his competitor B&B in the fall of 2001.

270Exhibit DSNC-42 (31 January 2002), vol. 285 at 120394–120397.

271Ibid. at 120400–120403.

272Pre-trial examination of Bernard Marcotte (26 May 2011), vol. 455 at 186655.

273Main judgment at paras. 172–176 and 273–275.

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Maskimo aggregate was caused by the cement powder or its incompatibility with the Maskimo stone.274

[300]The appellants have failed to establish that geologist Bérubé’s 2002 report is sufficient to break the causal connection between geologist Blanchette’s faults and the damage they caused to the tandems. Their suggestion that geologist Blanchette’s opinion was given merely to obtain a rubber stamp must also be rejected. Cross- examined at trial, the geologist stated that under the terms of the October 23, 2003, letter,275 his contract was not to reassure the tandems but instead to conduct a petrographic examination and provide his professional opinion on the risks of using that stone to manufacture concrete. He did not offer his interlocutor, Michel Bergeron of BL, any guarantee that would reassure him. His role was to set [TRANSLATION] “the record straight on the quality of the aggregate”.276 The trial judge clearly believed him,277 and the appellants have not shown any error in this conclusion.

The 2006 intervention of Marie De Grosbois

[301]In support of the same argument that the tandems acted despite their experts’ recommendations, the Group 1 appellants raise the events surrounding the 2006 opinion of Ms. De Grosbois of Lafarge.

[302]They note that the situation in September 2005 had considerably evolved, as revealed by the summaries of the BL board meeting on September 2, 2005,278 and of the meeting between B&B, BL, and Lafarge’s representatives on September 26, 2005.279 BL was then dealing with new claims in the Maskimo case and contradictory petrographic reports, in particular geologist Bérubé’s report of May 4, 2002,280 and those of geologist Blanchette dated January 6, 2004,281 and November 18, 2004.282

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274Pre-trial examination of François Bellemare (11 May 2011), vol. 448 at 184009–184010; Pre-trial examination of Tom Bellemare (17 May 2011), vol. 449 at 184197–184198.

275Exhibit DSNC-21 (23 October 2003), vol. 284 at 120182.

276Cross-examination of Alain Blanchette (19 February 2013), vol. 469 at 191519–191520.

277Main judgment at paras. 1189–1198 and 1278–1279.

278Exhibit DSNC-27 (2 September 2005), vol. 285 at 120285.

279Exhibit DSNC-32 (26 September 2005), vol. 285 at 120300, reproduced above at para. [54].

280Exhibit DSNC-14 (4 May 2002), vol. 284 at 120148–120152.

281Exhibit DSNC-22 (6 January 2004), vol. 284 at 120184.

282Exhibit DSNC-23 (18 November 2004), vol. 284 at 120191.

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[303]After these meetings, Ms. De Grosbois of Lafarge visited the B&B quarry and the Maskimo quarry and was tasked with conducting tests comparable to those conducted by geologist Bérubé in 2002.283

[304]Ms. De Grosbois’s report, dated January 31, 2006, found that the Maskimo and B&B aggregates were similar.284 In March of that same year, that report led to a verbal recommendation by Alain Canuel and Martin Perreault of Lafarge to BL’s representatives to stop using the B&B aggregate.285

[305]The appellants submit that the causal connection between geologist

Blanchette’s faults and the damage suffered by his clients was broken once these clients decided to continue operating the quarry despite Ms. De Grosbois’s report,

Lafarge’s recommendation, and the reports of geologists Josée Duchesne of Université Laval286 and Lucie Tremblay of IOS Services Géoscientifiques inc.287

[306]The trial judge correctly rejected that argument.

[307]First, his determination that Lafarge failed to establish that in the spring of 2006 it firmly recommended that the tandems stop using the B&B aggregate288 is consistent with the evidence adduced. Indeed, during the appeal hearing, counsel for the appellants did not question these findings and merely recalled the judge’s statement that Lafarge’s position on the danger of continuing to use the B&B aggregate was expressed [TRANSLATION] “grudgingly”.289 At the hearing, counsel described only the 2006 events as a [TRANSLATION] “serious warning” by Lafarge.

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283 Exhibit DSNC-32 (26 September 2005), vol. 285 at 120300. See also Main judgment at paras. 363–364.

284Exhibit DSNC-38 (31 January 2006), vol. 285 at 120362. The conclusion of that report is reproduced in the Statement of general facts of the Main judgment, above at para. [56].

285Statement of general facts of the Main judgment, above at para. [57]; Main judgment at paras. 950–951, 982, 986 and 989–990.

286Statement of general facts of the Main judgment, above at para. [60]; Main judgment at paras. 1010–1016. The request was made by letter to geologist Duchesne on May 29, 2006 (Exhibit DSNC-43 (29 May 2006), vol. 285 at 120409) and the report produced on June 16, 2006 (Exhibit DSNC-44 (16 June 2006), vol. 285 at 120411).

287Statement of general facts of the Main judgment, above at paras. [61]–[62]; Main judgment at paras. 1017–1019. Geologist Lucie Tremblay’s report is dated August 31, 2006 (Exhibit DSNC-45 (31 August 2006), vol. 285 at 120425).

288Main judgment at paras. 363–364, 948–952 and 1847–1862.

289Main judgment at paras. 949–950.

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[308]Therefore, the appellants have not shown any error in the following conclusions of the trial judge:

[TRANSLATION]

[1856] From all the witnesses heard in this regard, the Court notes that Lafarge verbally expressed reluctance to the company’s continuing to use the B&B aggregate but does not believe the version that their recommendation was to immediately stop as they wrote in the letter filed by Lafarge as DSNC- 39, which Laurentide never received.

[1859] Moreover, the fact that the people from Laurentide understood from the discussions in late March that further studies were required to determine whether their aggregate was deleterious is supported by the conclusion in Ms. De Grosbois’s report and by her testimony cited above that concludes thus. Which is what Mr. Marcotte of Laurentide decided to do by granting mandates to IOS and geologist Tremblay.

[309]Similarly, nothing in the conclusions of the reports by geologists Josée Duchesne of June 2006290 and Lucie Tremblay291 of August 2006 may be interpreted as a clear recommendation to stop using the B&B aggregate.

[310]Basically, it was not totally unreasonable in 2006 for the tandem officers to continue relying on geologist Blanchette.

[311]Moreover, at the time of Lafarge’s timid recommendation in 2006, after more than 10 years of use, the B&B aggregate had still not resulted in any claim, contrary to what had happened with the Maskimo stone. Furthermore, at that time, geologist Blanchette, whose services had been retained by the tandems, continued to reassure them about the quality of the B&B concrete aggregate.292

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290Exhibit DSNC-44 (16 June 2006), vol. 285 at 120411.

291Exhibit DSNC-45 (31 August 2006), vol. 285 at 120425.

292See in particular the testimony of Tom Bellemare, who declared that geologist Blanchette’s report of December 13, 2005 (Exhibit DSNC-37, vol. 285 at 120350) weighed heavily in the decision in favour of continuing to use the aggregate: Pre-trial examination of Tom Bellemare (23 August 2012), vol. 449 at 184388–184390.

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[312]The appellants’ argument on the broken chain of causation is rather surprising. At trial, SNC submitted in its defence that geologist Blanchette did not commit any fault because he was right in saying that if the oxidation of the pyrrhotite caused the concrete expansion, it was not due to the quality of the aggregate when the pyrrhotite was found in granitic rock, like at the B&B quarry. According to that defence, the oxidation of the pyrrhotite was instead due to the poor quality of the concrete manufactured by the two concrete suppliers and to the poor concreting by the formworkers.

[313]SNC incurred considerable expense before the trial to have expert opinions prepared to prove this theory,293 which was contested by the other parties who filed contrary opinions, and rejected by the trial judge, who spent over 250 paragraphs of the Main judgment considering it.294

[314]On appeal, SNC/Blanchette have changed tack. Not only do they no longer maintain that geologist Blanchette’s theory was correct, but in their second ground they now contend that in 2002 and in 2006, it was even unreasonable for the tandems to rely on the conclusions in the four reports Blanchette provided under his contracts for professional services. This about-face weakens their ground of appeal on the absence of a causal connection.

[315]Consequently, the evidence does not support a finding that the tandems295 broke the chain of causation between geologist Blanchette’s faults and the damage suffered by failing to follow Lafarge’s recommendation in 2006. Their faults result only in shared liability, as concluded by the trial judge.

Additional studies requested in 2006

[316]Last, and in addition, even in 2006, the reason for the deterioration of the concrete manufactured with Maskimo aggregate had not yet been clearly identified. The tandems then requested further studies to find out why the B&B aggregate, used for at least 10 years, was less reactive than the Maskimo aggregate. This task was assigned to Bernard Marcotte.

[317]A request was first sent to geologist Josée Duchesne of Université Laval, who could not explain why the Maskimo stone was more reactive in concrete than the

293Main judgment at paras. 448–454.

294Main judgment at paras. 433–692.

295See note 494 of this judgment.

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B&B stone. In conclusion, she recommended several other studies, including a detailed examination of the composition of the problematic concrete, in particular the quality and quantity of its ingredients.296

[318]This conclusion caused Mr. Marcotte to wonder about the quality of the cement paste, but Ms. Duchesne told him that she did not study cement pastes. He then turned to Lucie Tremblay of IOS297 who, in her report of August 31, 2006, concluded that even though the sulphide content appeared to be a little higher in the Maskimo concrete, there could be another factor to explain the cracking and the expansion. She added: [TRANSLATION] “A microscopic difference in the concrete paste could suggest a difference in composition and an avenue to explore. A study of the composition of the concrete paste is recommended.”298

[319]This last report was then sent to geologist Blanchette and was at the origin of his offer of services to set up a concrete expansion-testing program to take place over one year.299

[320]Geologist Blanchette presented a first offer of services on October 17, 2006, but Mr. Marcotte asked him to prepare a second one that he knew would be more costly, precisely because the geologist forgot to include tests with different brands of cement in the first offer.300

[321]These events clearly show that in the fall of 2006, the presence of iron sulphides in the aggregate was not the only cause identified as having the potential to cause the deterioration of the concrete. It follows that the tandems’ decision not to follow Lafarge’s [TRANSLATION] “grudging” recommendation301 cannot have broken the chain of causation between geologist Blanchette’s faults and the damage suffered. During his pre-trial examination, Bernard Marcotte stated that he eliminated the

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296Statement of general facts of the Main judgment, above at para. [60]. See also Exhibit DSNC-44 (16 June 2006), vol. 285 at 120411–120423.

297Pre-trial examination of Bernard Marcotte (26 May 2011), vol. 455 at 186680–186681.

298Exhibit DSNC-45 (31 August 2006), vol. 285 at 120425–120446.

299Statement of general facts of the Main judgment, above at paras. [61]–[62].

300Pre-trial examination of Bernard Marcotte (26 May 2011), vol. 455 at 186692. See the offer of services of October 17, 2006 (Exhibit DC-9a (17 October 2006), vol. 326 at 136849) and that of October 25, 2006 (Exhibit DC-9b (25 October 2006), vol. 326 at 136854). The difference between the two offers of services is that the second offer includes a new section 2.3 on the number of tests, some conducted with Type 10 cement from Lafarge, St-Constant and others with CSL and Ciment Québec cement.

301Main judgment at paras. 949–950.

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cement as a possible cause of the concrete degradation only in late 2007, after the second testing program progress report of geologist Blanchette was received.302

[322]The Group 1 appellants have failed to show that the chain of causation was broken. Therefore Ground No. 2 must fail.

8.3Ground No. 4: Extracontractual liability of SNC/Blanchette

[323]With their fourth ground, the appellants challenge the trial judge’s conclusion that geologist Blanchette’s contractual faults also gave rise to his extracontractual liability vis-à-vis the plaintiffs.303

[324]It is not disputed that the rule applicable is the one set out by the Supreme Court in Bank of Montreal v. Bail Ltée,304 when a third party, here the plaintiffs, claim that the violation of an obligation in a contract to which it is not a party, in this instance the contracts for services between geologist Blanchette and the other contracting parties, constitutes an extracontractual fault that causes the third party damage.

[325]The Group 1 appellants submit, however, that the petrographic examinations by geologist Blanchette are not documents that, by their nature, are destined to be distributed to third parties. They further submit that the judge did not thoroughly analyze the causal connection in matters of extracontractual liability of professionals.

Confidentiality of geologist Blanchette’s reports

[326]On this first point, the appellants invoke Wightman c. Widdrington (Succession)305 and Savard c. 2329-1297 Québec inc. (Hôtel Lord Berri inc.)306 to link the extracontractual liability of professionals towards third parties to the probability of the professional’s advice and opinions being distributed outside the limited circle of the other contracting parties.

302 Pre-trial examination of Bernard Marcotte

(26 May 2011), vol. 455 at 186643–186644.

The nine-month progress report for geologist

Blanchette’s testing program is dated November

28, 2007 (Exhibit DSNC-51 (28 November 2007), vol. 285 at 120493).

303Main judgment at paras. 1275–1309 and 1311, particularly paras. 1304–1307.

304Bank of Montreal v. Bail Ltée, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 554.

305Wightman c. Widdrington (Succession), 2013 QCCA 1187, leave to appeal to SCC refused, 35438 (9 January 2014).

306Savard c. 2329-1297 Québec inc. (Hôtel Lord Berri inc.), 2005 QCCA 705, leave to appeal to SCC refused, 31156 (2 March 2006).

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[327]They also argue that the petrographic analyses prepared by Blanchette constituted technical documents prepared exclusively for the benefit of the other contracting parties and even that his work was confidential.

[328]This last argument is based on a letter from François Bellemare to geologist Blanchette on September 8, 2005, asking him to conduct another petrographic examination. He further stated that the report must remain confidential and be given only to the people identified in the letter.307

[329]This request for confidentiality is explained by the content of a BL board meeting held the previous September 2. The minutes of that meeting308 describe the claims received relating to the concrete produced with the Maskimo aggregate and questions by the board members on the divergent opinions received on the quality of the B&B aggregate. During that meeting, it was decided to ask geologist Blanchette to conduct the same tests on that aggregate as those previously conducted in 2004.

[330]This was the only request for confidentiality made of geologist Blanchette, even though he produced five petrographic expert reports, if the May 2003 report prepared at CSL’s request is included.309 At the hearing, counsel for the appellants SNC/Blanchette acknowledged that the September 8, 2005, request for confidentiality310 emanated from the professional’s clients, who could waive it. In addition, the record shows that geologist Blanchette’s May 13, 2003, report prepared for CSL was sent to certain contractors.311 Moreover, contractors and certain plaintiffs also had access to reports prepared by geologist Blanchette at the request of his clients.312

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307Exhibit DSNC-30 (8 September 2005), vol. 285 at 120294.

308Exhibit DSNC-27 (2 September 2005), vol. 285 at 120285.

309 Exhibit DC-13 (13 May 2003), vol. 326 at 137006; Exhibit CYB-26 (13 May 2003), vol. 345 at 144927 (this exhibit includes the slip showing it was sent to CSL on May 13, 2003); Exhibit DSNC-71.4, vol. 305 at 128369 (this exhibit shows that CSL’s name as client was replaced by B&B).

310Exhibit DSNC-30 (8 September 2005), vol. 285 at 120294.

311Main judgment at paras. 207–211, 326–327, 1228–1230 and 1313–1317. See Exhibit CYB-24 (1 October 2003), vol. 345 at 144922; Exhibit CYB-25 (14 October 2003), vol. 345 at 144925.

312Examination of Bryan Tranquille (Construction Daniel Provencher inc.) (21 January 2013), vol. 463 at 189796; Letter to Mtre Bienjonetti (6 February 2013), vol. 484 at 197416; Pre-trial examination of Jonathan Massé (Coffrage Réal Bergeron inc.) (7 June 2012), vol. 455 at 186794–186795; Examination of Paul Dargis (Construction Paul Dargis inc.) (23 January 2013), vol. 464 at 190050– 190051.

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[331]Last, in principle, the criteria of the professional’s knowledge of the identity of those who relied on his opinions and of the use of his work compared to its initial destination are not relevant to determining liability.313 This matter does not concern the special relationship between lawyers and their clients, as was the case in Savard.314 Consequently, the argument on confidentiality does not tend to establish that geologist Blanchette had no obligation of diligence to the plaintiffs, as the appellants argue.

Liability of geologist Blanchette to the plaintiffs

[332]Wightman and Savard illustrate one facet of professional liability, but there are others. This is discussed by authors Baudouin, Deslauriers, and Moore when they examine the fault of omission:

[TRANSLATION]

1-186 Relevance of the distinction – With respect to the fault of omission, the confusion of certain authors and in certain decisions is more apparent than real. Some claim that omission is a fault only if there is a specific duty or obligation to act. We see here an influence of the common law which, for liability, requires a “duty to act” as a precondition of legal analysis. This statement is not accurate in the civil law and should be qualified. ... Moreover, and more fundamentally, while it is certain that a pure and simple omission is a fault when there is a specific obligation to act, an obligation is not indispensable for extracontractual fault. The general duty to behave as a prudent and diligent person in article 1457 C.C. while complying with the rules imposed is sufficient to ground a fault of omission, in the absence of a legal or regulatory provision specifically contemplating any required activity on the part of the debtor. This is particularly the case for the failure to correct or warn of a possible danger. It is therefore appropriate in this respect to beware of an analogy with the common law or the criminal law, which, for its part, sets out a series of specific duties or obligations. Thus, the Criminal Code does not regulate the obligation to assist a person in danger, whereas this same obligation is now codified in civil law. Even in the absence of such a text,

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313Wightman c. Widdrington (Succession), 2013 QCCA 1187 at para. 220.

314Savard c. 2329-1297 Québec inc. (Hôtel Lord Berri inc.), 2005 QCCA 705 at para. 96.

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however, the courts could have found liability for a fault of omission in relation to the general duty not to cause injury to another.315

[333]In this case, geologist Blanchette’s contractual faults may certainly be analyzed as being of the same nature. His obligation was to [TRANSLATION] “set the record straight” for his clients on the quality of their concrete aggregate. By wrongly adhering to an erroneous theory, he failed to warn them of the significant risks to the safety of the buildings resulting from the use of the B&B concrete aggregate.

[334]The courts have long recognized that, in the event of a contractual fault of this nature, there might be extracontractual liability to third parties other than the contracting party. In Ross v. Dunstall,316 a firearms manufacturer was liable for injuries to a third party who had purchased the firearm from a reseller because it had failed to inform potential users of a latent defect in the weapon that could make it dangerous to use once reassembled after cleaning.317

[335]Similarly, a contractor who did not comply with the conditions of a snow removal contract with the transportation minister by failing to clear snow from the road to the agreed width and by failing to signal the danger created by its breach was liable for the accident of a third-party road user at a location the Court of Appeal characterized as a [TRANSLATION] “trap”.318

[336]Laval Fortin Ltée c. Lavoie319 concerned a general contractor working on a municipality’s water and sewer systems who entrusted part of the work to a subcontractor. During the work, due to the subcontractor’s fault, the respondent had an accident and was injured when he fell into a hole in the sidewalk while on his bicycle. The Court decided that the appellant, the general contractor, had a duty to supervise the work site, whether it performed the work itself or entrusted it to a subcontractor. In such circumstances, it was considered that the general contractor had an obligation to protect the public from the dangers inherent in the work itself.

315Jean-Louis Baudouin, Patrice Deslauriers & Benoît Moore, La responsabilité civile, 8th ed., vol. 1 (Cowansville, QC: Yvon Blais, 2014) at 178–179, No. 1-186. See also Wightman c. Widdrington (Succession de), 2013 QCCA 1187 at paras. 216–229; Vibron Ltd. c. Patrick Garneau & Associés inc., 2011 QCCA 1166 at paras. 46–47.

316Ross v. Dunstallso / Ross v. Emery (1921), 62 S.C.R. 393.

317That judgment was rendered well before General Motors Products of Canada Ltd. v. Kravitz, [1979] 1 S.C.R. 790, which recognized the automatic transfer of the manufacturer’s warranty of quality to the subsequent purchaser before it was enshrined in article 1442 C.C.Q.

318Boucher c. Drouin, [1959] B.R. 814 (B.R. Qc).

319Laval Fortin Ltée c. Lavoie, [1990] R.R.A. 1 (C.A.).

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The fact that it failed to adequately perform this obligation to supervise was a fault that gave rise to the third party’s action against the general contractor rather than the subcontractor.

[337]As stated by the Supreme Court in Bail Ltée,320 the contractual content may facilitate the third party’s task of proving extracontractual liability when, as in Boucher c. Drouin,321 the snow removal contract between the contractor and the State was also for the clear benefit of road users. This element is not, however, essential to engage the other contracting party’s liability to a third party.

[338]Here, geologist Blanchette’s contractual faults vis-à-vis his other contracting parties and the extracontractual faults raised by the third-party plaintiffs are of the same nature: the fact that he failed to warn them of the danger to the integrity of the buildings of using aggregate containing pyrrhotite. These faults need not be distinct,322 but the third party must establish that its action is based on a separate legal obligation independent of the contract.323 The other contracting party may be held extracontractually liable even in the absence of a contractual fault to the extent that this party breached its general duty to act reasonably so as not to interfere with the legitimate interests of third parties.324

[339]In a contractual context, the Supreme Court stated that the contractual relationship, the obligations contained in the contract, and the failure to perform the contractual obligations are all relevant circumstances in assessing delictual fault.325 With respect to professionals, this Court has defined other relevant criteria as indicators to assess whether the professional relationship extends beyond the client to create an obligation to third parties. In particular, the Court identified the context in which the various players function, their level of business knowledge, the varying degree of the parties’ antagonism, good or bad faith, and compliance with the legislation and rules of professional ethics. These criteria were identified by the Court

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320Bank of Montreal v. Bail Ltée, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 554 at 583–584.

321Boucher c. Drouin, [1959] B.R. 814 (B.R. Qc).

3223952851 Canada inc. c. Groupe Montoni (1995) division construction inc., 2017 QCCA 620 at para. 37.

323Ibid. at para. 39; Reliance Construction of Canada Ltd. c. Commerce & Industry Insurance Co. of Canada, [2001] R.R.A. 587 at 593 (C.A.).

324Bank of Montreal v. Bail Ltée, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 554 at 582–583; 3952851 Canada inc. c. Groupe Montoni (1995) division construction inc., 2017 QCCA 620 at paras. 41–42.

325Bank of Montreal v. Bail Ltée, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 554 at 581.

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in Savard326 and concern more specifically an attorney but may be adapted to the work of a geologist.

[340]Among these criteria, compliance with the rules of professional ethics is particularly relevant here.

[341]Section 5 of the Geologists Act327 states that the practice of the profession of geologist includes such scientific activities as identifying, observing, characterizing, interpreting or modeling geological phenomena, including geophysical and hydrogeological phenomena. Only a geologist may, within the framework of an activity referred to in section 5, give professional advice or an opinion or make a report in relation to mining, petroleum or gas resource exploration, development, operation or project assessment activities (section 6).

[342]Under section 7 of the Act, a geologist must attest, authenticate by affixing his or her seal, certify, or sign any opinion or report relating to an exclusive act which was prepared by the geologist or under his or her immediate supervision.328 Under section 23 of the Professional Code,329 the very existence of the Ordre professionnel des géologues du Québec is primarily justified by the protection of the public.

[343]More specifically, under the code of professional ethics in force from 2001 to 2011,330 geologist Blanchette was professionally responsible for considering the interests of the public and even the foreseeable consequences of his recommendations and his professional activities on the property of others:

[TRANSLATION]

Section 3 – Responsibilities of geologists and geophysicists

3.1.1Responsibilities: geologists/geophysicists are aware that their responsibilities fall into the following areas:

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326Savard c. 2329-1297 Québec inc. (Hôtel Lord Berri inc.), 2005 QCCA 705 at para. 99.

327Geologists Act, CQLR, c. G-1.01.

328A member of the Ordre des ingénieurs du Québec is not prohibited from engaging in exclusive acts reserved for geologists under ss. 5 and 6 of the Act: Ibid. s. 11.

329Professional Code, CQLR, c. C-26.

330Exhibit DC-23 (2001-2011), vol. 326 at 137144–137151.

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Responsibilities to the client-employer who has given them a mandate;

Responsibilities to the public (community), through the more long-term consequences that may result from their work, their decisions, and their recommendations;

Responsibilities for the information or the training they provide and the potential contribution of their work to the advancement of geological and geophysical knowledge.

3.3 Responsibilities to the community

3.3.1Consequences of professional activities: in every aspect of their work, geologists/geophysicists are aware of their obligations to the community. They will consider the foreseeable consequences of their recommendations and their professional activities on the life, health, and property of others and on the preservation of the natural environment and natural resources of future generations.

[344]The Code of ethics of geologists currently in force331 essentially repeats the same obligation in the first paragraph of section 6:

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6.Geologists must consider the foreseeable consequences that their professional activities may have on society, in particular on the health, safety and property of others, and on the quality of the environment.

6.Le géologue doit tenir compte des conséquences potentielles de ses travaux sur la société, notamment sur la santé, la sécurité et les biens de toute personne ainsi que sur la qualité de l’environnement.

[345]These ethical standards are relevant because they identify a legal standard of care required of geologist Blanchette distinct from his contractual obligation to his clients, i.e., [TRANSLATION] “the separate legal obligation independent of the contract” contemplated in Groupe Montoni332 and Reliance Construction.333

331Code of ethics of geologists, CQLR, c. G-1.01, r. 2.2.

3323952851 Canada inc. c. Groupe Montoni (1995) division construction inc., 2017 QCCA 620 at para. 39.

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[346]Moreover, the obligational content of the contracts for services was not stipulated for the sole benefit of the other contracting parties. This was not an obligation outside the sphere of any of the geologist’s extracontractual obligations stipulated solely for the benefit of his clients, as was the case in Alliance Assurance Company Limited et al. v. Dominion Electric Protection Company Limited, 1969.334 In that matter, under the contract between the respondent security company and the insured, the respondent was to alert the fire department if the alarm system at the insured’s premises was triggered. This unusual obligation benefitted only the insured- other contracting party, and the insurer, a third party, could not argue that the respondent company’s fault made it liable to third parties. The obligation to alert the fire department was stipulated for the sole benefit of the insured. This is precisely why the Supreme Court distinguished this judgment from its later judgment in Bail Ltée.335

[347]In this case, pursuant to the contracts for professional services, geologist Blanchette had to conduct a petrographic examination of the B&B concrete stone and reveal the risks of using the stone to manufacture concrete based on its iron sulphide content. This obligation was not outside the sphere of any of the geologist’s extracontractual obligations because he was required under his code of professional ethics to consider, [TRANSLATION] “in every aspect of [his] work”, the foreseeable consequences of his recommendations on the property of others. Therefore, the performance of his work had certain benefits for third parties who were going to use the concrete prepared with the B&B aggregate to pour foundations for their residential or commercial buildings. It follows that the Group 1 appellants’ argument on the absence of the geologist’s distinct obligation of diligence to the third-party plaintiffs must fail.

Analysis of the causal connection

[348]Nor is there any merit to the appellants’ other argument that the trial judge did not thoroughly analyze the causal connection between geologist Blanchette’s faults and the damage suffered by the plaintiffs.

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333 Reliance Construction of Canada Ltd. c. Commerce & Industry Insurance Co. of Canada, [2001] R.R.A. 587 at 593 (C.A.). See above at para. [338].

334Alliance Assurance Company Limited et al. v. Dominion Electric Protection Company Limited, 1969 [1970] S.C.R. 168 at 172–173.

335Bank of Montreal v. Bail Ltée, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 554 at 584.

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[349]It is important to recall that causation is basically a question of fact.336 At the time he provided his reports and his opinions to the other contracting parties, geologist Blanchette could not have been unaware that the concrete aggregate he said was not deleterious would be used for the construction of residential and commercial buildings, as evidenced by the following excerpts from his cross- examination of February 19, 2013:

[TRANSLATION]

Q.OK. Let’s start the chain. Is it correct that you were obviously not surprised that it was for Carrière B&B, given that “Béton... Bétonnière

Boisvert, Béton Laurentide”, appears on their letterhead?

A.I would not have been surprised by being told that...

Q.Indeed, Mr. Bergeron told you...

A.

... they...

Q.

... as you said, it was to set the record straight...

A.Yes.

Q.

... you knew that it was not an aggregate seller who sold concrete, is

 

that true?

A.Excuse me?

Q.You knew that Béton Laurentide sold concrete?

A.Yes, yes I know, I knew that.

Q.And that the concrete sold by Béton Laurentide would be used for the construction of immovables. I see that you may not have understood that it was for residences, but for immovables, can we start with that?

A.They made concrete. I had... I had no other knowledge, they’re a concrete manufacturer who likely has a diversified market, with different types of products, like any concrete manufacturer.

336See above at para. [285].

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Q.So, you weren’t surprised that the concrete was going to be used for residential, for example? That’s not something....

A.It was possible, yes.

Q.No, no, but it goes without saying. If someone advises a concrete supplier, it goes without saying that the person can assume, except if reservations are made, that the concrete it produces may be used for residential, commercial, ... is that correct?

A.Yes, yes, of course.337

[350]In addition, in his reports of November 18, 2004,338 and of October 31, 2006,339 geologist Blanchette was dealing with iron sulphide contents of 5 to 7% and 4.5% and recommended that the B&B aggregate not be used for architectural concrete or exposed aggregate concrete. When cross-examined at trial, the geologist had to acknowledge that there was therefore no restriction on using the B&B aggregate for concrete in a residential building because it was not exposed aggregate concrete.340

[351]The trial judge could therefore find that, even though geologist Blanchette, in his report of November 18, 2004, was dealing with sulphide levels twice as high as he had ever seen before, [TRANSLATION] “[h]e continued to claim, despite everything, that the aggregate was suitable to manufacture concrete that he knew would be residential foundation concrete”.341

[352]Given his ethical obligations, geologist Blanchette therefore knew or ought to have known that his failure to warn the other contracting parties of the dangers in using concrete aggregate with this iron sulphide content was likely to cause damage to those who poured building foundations with concrete incorporating the B&B aggregate.342

[353]Furthermore, geologist Blanchette himself decided to share his opinion on the harmful effect of pyrite in concrete aggregate with the community. In October 2003,

337Cross-examination of Alain Blanchette (19 February 2013), vol. 469 at 191527–191528.

338Exhibit DSNC-23 (18 November 2004), vol. 284 at 120191.

339Exhibit DSNC-49 (31 October 2006), vol. 285 at 120462.

340Cross-examination of Alain Blanchette (19 February 2013), vol. 469 at 191541–191542.

341Main judgment at para. 1254.

342See Reliance Construction of Canada Ltd. c. Commerce & Industry Insurance Co., [2001] R.R.A. 587 at 593-594 (C.A.).

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an interview with the geologist, presented as an expert whose services had been retained by an insurance company in the Maskimo quarry dispute, appeared in Le Nouvelliste newspaper.

[354]According to the article in Le Nouvelliste, geologist Blanchette did not believe that pyrite was causing the cracks in the foundations of the new houses in the region. The article quoted the geologist as stating: [TRANSLATION] “My theory at the moment is that the problem has nothing to do with pyrite”. He said in particular that, unlike the problems experienced in Montreal, pyrite in Trois-Rivières was not used for fill under the foundations but directly for the foundation concrete. He added that the Maskimo pyrite was more chemically stable because of its cubic shape and therefore could not have caused the cracks in the house foundations. Last, he stated that he believed it had to be one of four elements used to manufacture concrete: the stone, the sand, the water, or the cement, without specifying which one. Still according to the journalist, he repeated that the concrete problem, however, had nothing to do with pyrite.343

[355]During his pre-trial examination, the geologist tried to minimize the scope of that article and his purported statements. He said that the journalist did not question him. At most, it was an informal telephone conversation lasting barely seven minutes. He simply told the journalist that pyrite was not necessarily the issue and that every element had to be considered. He did not review the article prior to its publication.344

[356]On January 18, 2005, during a broadcast of La Facture, a show on Radio- Canada, geologist Blanchette again offered his opinion. This time, he clearly blamed the cracks in the concrete manufactured with the Maskimo aggregate on the quality of the cement instead of on the pyrite.345 At the time he offered this opinion concerning the Maskimo case, the geologist had already produced a report for CSL on the quality of the B&B concrete aggregate346 and two reports for B&B, BL, and CYB on the same topic.347

[357]It is true that the article in the Nouvelliste and geologist Blanchette’s brief appearance on La Facture concerned the Maskimo quarry dispute. It would be

343Exhibit DC-4 (14 October 2003), vol. 324 at 136204.

344Pre-trial examination of Alain Blanchette (22 October 2012), vol. 451 at 185028–185030.

345Exhibit DC-7 (18 January 2005), vol. 326 at 136833 (8 min 20 s.).

346Exhibit CYB-26 (13 May 2003), vol. 345 at 144927.

347Exhibit DSNC-22 (6 January 2004), vol. 284 at 120184; Exhibit DSNC-23 (18 November 2004), vol. 284 at 120191.

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surprising, however, for an owner who had asked a contractor to build an immovable whose foundations were poured between May 2003 and November 2007 with concrete composed of B&B aggregate to have taken the time to inquire into the source of the aggregate. The same is true for a self-builder. What everyday readers and television audiences understood from the opinion given was that pyrite had not caused the problems with the concrete in the foundations.

[358]It is also true that the newspaper article and television interview concerned only pyrite. This element is of no consequence. The testimony of geologist Blanchette clearly reveals that he made no distinction between pyrite and pyrrhotite in his reports from 2003 to 2006. The study covered iron sulphides, including undifferentiated pyrite and pyrrhotite.348

[359]Geologist Blanchette did not publicly express these opinions in the context of a contractual relationship. He was not speaking to the other contracting parties, but to the population at large, in particular the Trois-Rivières population. He himself agreed to express his professional opinion to the general population and should have been more aware of his ethical obligation to the community and the foreseeable consequences of his recommendations to his clients on the property of others. In this sense, and even though these opinions concerned the Maskimo concrete aggregate, they are relevant to the issue of the causal connection between the geologist’s contractual and extracontractual faults to the tandems and the plaintiffs.

[360]Last, the appellants raise the Supreme Court decision in R. v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd.349 to argue in favour of a [TRANSLATION] “thorough analysis of the causal connection in matters of extracontractual liability of professionals”350 to avoid abuse and the possibility of geologist Blanchette’s indeterminate or unlimited liability.

[361]This argument is rejected. First, the criterion of “unlimited liability” is from the common law and is not an independent principle in Quebec civil law, which refers solely to the concepts of fault, damage, and the causal connection to assess extracontractual liability.351

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348Pre-trial examination of Alain Blanchette (15 September 2011), vol. 450 at 184865 and 184887– 184888; Examination of Alain Blanchette (19 February 2013), vol. 469 at 191440 and 191485.

349R. v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd, 2011 SCC 42, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 45 at paras. 97–101.

350A.B.-1 at paras. 123–127.

351See Wightman c. Widdrington (Succession), 2013 QCCA 1187 at paras. 218–219 and 247–248.

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[362]Second, this case is not a situation where the class of plaintiffs is unidentifiable, indeterminate, or even unlimited. At the time geologist Blanchette provided his opinions contrary to the standard of prudence set out in his code of ethics, the community for whose benefit the standard was drafted was identifiable and was not indeterminate:

i)the geologist’s reports concerned only aggregate from the B&B quarry;

ii)the reports concerned only aggregate used to manufacture concrete;

iii)every time geologist Blanchette provided an opinion that misled his clients, he contributed to increasing the number of plaintiffs, that is, the number of owners of buildings whose foundations were poured using concrete manufactured with the B&B aggregate;

iv)the potential plaintiffs could all be identified from the purchase orders or invoices for concrete filed by the tandems.

[363]Ultimately, the Group 1 appellants have failed to establish that the trial judge erred in deciding that geologist Blanchette’s contractual faults against the other contracting parties resulted in his extracontractual liability to the plaintiffs. Ground No. 4 must therefore fail.

8.4Ground No. 5: Starting point of Blanchette and SNC’s liability

[364]In addition to the reports produced between 2004 and 2007 at the request of B&B, BL and CYB, geologist Blanchette had previously conducted a petrographic analysis of the B&B concrete aggregate at the request of CSL.352

[365]The trial judge determined that SNC/Blanchette’s liability began in May 2003, on the date of that report,353 and not on January 6, 2004, the date on which geologist Blanchette sent B&B his report of December 2, 2003.354

[366]While geologist Blanchette’s liability to B&B, BL, and CYB is contractual for the reports sent as of January 6, 2004, it can only be extracontractual for the report sent

352General statement of facts in the Main judgment, above at paras. [42]–[44].

353 Exhibit DC-13 (13 May 2003), vol. 326 at 137006; Exhibit CYB-26 (13 May 2003), vol. 345 at 144927; Exhibit DSNC-71.4, vol. 305 at 128369.

354Exhibit DSNC-22 (6 January 2004), vol. 284 at 120184.

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to CSL in May 2003 because the professional services provided at that time were rendered at the request of CSL, a cement manufacturer.

Geologist Blanchette’s knowledge of the use of his May 2003 report

[367]The appellants contest the trial judge’s determination that the geologist is liable as of mid-May 2003. First, they raise what they believe to be a determinative error of fact by the judge. Contrary to what the judge states in paragraphs 1313 to 1316 of the Main judgment, they argue that geologist Blanchette did not know how CSL planned to use his May 2003 report or that it might be sent to a third party.

[368]It is useful to quote in extenso paragraphs 1313 to 1317 setting out the trial judge’s main determinations on geologist Blanchette’s liability as of May 2003:

[TRANSLATION]

[1313] What of the impact of the opinions issued by Mr. Blanchette to St. Lawrence Cement in May 2003 (DC-13)? He provided this opinion to St. Lawrence Cement so that it could sell its cement products to CYB, a major concrete supplier that it wanted as a client.

[1314] Mr. Blanchette’s report was supposed to convince CYB that the B&B aggregate could be used with the St. Lawrence cement, because it was the aggregate that he analyzed. Geologist Blanchette stated in his report that the aggregate contained pyrite, that pyrite was not deleterious, and that it was acceptable to use the B&B aggregate for the cement concrete.

[1315] As with the reports requested by the concrete suppliers and B&B, geologist Blanchette’s opinion very clearly concluded that the B&B aggregate could be used to manufacture concrete.

[1316] Geologist Blanchette knew how St. Lawrence Cement intended to use his report. That report ended up in the hands of CYB, who used it without Mr. Blanchette’s permission but with the permission of St. Lawrence Cement, to whom the opinion was addressed. That opinion was sent to contractors who had wondered about the quality of the B&B aggregate.

[1317] The Court finds that geologist Blanchette is liable as of the date of that report, that is, in May 2003.

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[369]Geologist Blanchette said that Bruce Labrie, a CSL representative known to the geologist, brought the stone samples that were the subject of the May 2003 report to Terratech. It was a verbal request. No purchase order was found. Mr. Labrie would bring samples to Terratech once or twice a year, then he and the geologist would have a coffee together. In May 2003, Mr. Labrie asked to see geologist Blanchette and verbally explained what he wanted him to do with the samples. The geologist was not told the source of the stone, but this practice is not unusual with clients. Last, the geologist said that he was not told that the report would be sent to individual people.355

[370]The evidence further reveals that CSL wanted to sell its cement to CYB and asked geologist Blanchette for the May 2003 report to prove that its cement was compatible with the B&B stone.356 On June 3, 2003, CYB sent BL the May 2003 report,357 but according to Tom Bellemare of BL, Robert Ganz of CSL verbally told him that CSL had had the B&B aggregate analyzed and that the stone was [TRANSLATION] “suitable” for concrete aggregate.358 In October 2003, CYB sent that report to contractors.359

[371]Last, at trial, Jean-Claude Leduc, who was CSL’s director of technical services in 2003, filed a copy of geologist Blanchette’s May 2003 report along with the CSL transmission slip.360 On cross-examination, he said that the report had not been prepared for CSL but for the client, and that it was normal for the client to receive a copy.361 He also explained why CSL paid for the cost of the petrographic examination in May 2003 for the benefit of its client, CYB:

[TRANSLATION]

Q.So, I’ll repeat my question, the technical department, at no charge, ....

355Pre-trial examination of Alain Blanchette (25 September 2012), vol. 451 at 184957; (22 October 2012), vol. 451 at 185032; Examination of Alain Blanchette (19 February 2013), vol. 469 at 191473–191474.

356Pre-trial examination of Yvan Boisvert (27 April 2011), vol. 451 at 185262; Pre-trial examination of Pierre St-Pierre (CYB director in 2002-2003) (10 June 2011), vol. 457 at 187554–187555.

357Exhibit CYB-23 (3 June 2003), vol. 345 at 144919.

358Pre-trial examination of Tom Bellemare (17 May 2011), vol. 449 at 184208–184209.

359Above at para. [330] and note 311.

360Exhibit CYB-26, Petrographic report of Terratech (13 May 2003), vol. 345 at 144927; Examination of Jean-Claude Leduc (31 January 2013), vol. 464 at 190317.

361Cross-examination of Jean-Claude Leduc (31 January 2013), vol. 464 at 190325.

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A.Uh-huh.

Q.

... analyzed the aggregate from a potential client.

A.Uh-huh.

Q.What was the purpose of this?

A.Well, it was to curry favour with the client.

Q.Ok.

A.Possibly to get them as a client.

Q.But, wasn’t it also to verify the quality of the aggregate, wasn’t that the purpose?

A.That’s what the laboratory was asked to do.

Q.Ok. So, the purpose of the request to SNC in May two thousand and three (2003) was to obtain a report...

A.Uh-huh.

Q.

... on the quality of the aggregate, is that correct?

A.Correct.

Q.Knowing that this aggregate was going to be mixed with the powder that you were going to sell if purchased by the client?

A.Yes.

Q.And supplied in houses in Trois-Rivières, was that the objective?

A.Yes.362

[372]It is correct to conclude from the evidence that geologist Blanchette did not know that the analyzed aggregate came from the B&B quarry or that his May 2003

362Ibid. at 190325.

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report was going to be sent to CYB. This is insufficient to conclude, as the appellants do, that the judge committed a palpable error when he wrote in paragraph 1316 of the Main judgment that geologist Blanchette knew how CSL would use his analysis report.

[373]The very wording of the conclusions in the report sent to CSL in May 2003 shows that the geologist knew that CSL had asked him to determine the quality of the aggregate with a view to incorporating it into the cement concrete. This is what the last two paragraphs clearly establish:

[TRANSLATION]

4.0 Conclusion

I am of the opinion that, as concrete aggregate, this aggregate is not reactive to the Portland cement alkali. The percentage of quartz is moderate and the undulatory extinction is low to moderate.

The percentage of pyrite appears normal for igneous rock and this pyrite is known as a stable cubic form. My opinion is that this pyrite is not deleterious and there are no contraindications to using the aggregate for the cement concrete.363

[Emphasis added.]

[374]In this context, it matters little that the geologist was not informed that his report was going to be sent to the tandems. The same is true for the fact that he was unaware of the source of the aggregate. He himself admitted that it was not unusual for Terratech to receive samples from unidentified sources and that this did not affect the results of the requested test or the procedure.364

[375]Therefore, the arguments raised by the Group 1 appellants that the damage was unforeseeable in May 2003 and that the reasons in the Main judgment supporting the conclusion that geologist Blanchette is liable do not apply to the May 2003 report for CSL must be rejected.

363Exhibit CYB-26 (13 May 2003), vol. 345 at 144927.

364Pre-trial examination of Alain Blanchette (25 September 2012), vol. 451 at 184957.

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[376]The header on each page of the May 2003 report, like all the other subsequent petrographic examinations prepared at the request of the tandems, indicates that it was conducted in accordance with standard ASTM C295. The report is therefore of the same nature and, like all the other reports, assessed the quality of the aggregate with a view to its incorporation into concrete.

[377]CSA standard A23.1 therefore applied to this report and required geologist Blanchette, even in the absence of an express request from the client, to consider the warning that aggregates that produce excessive expansion in the concrete shall not be used for concrete unless preventive measures are applied. The geologist’s conclusion that the pyrite was not deleterious and that the analyzed aggregate could be used for concrete was therefore faulty.365

[378]Moreover, and as was seen during the review of geologist Blanchette’s faults,366 when the geologist concluded that the pyrite in the stone samples submitted for analysis by CSL was not deleterious and that this aggregate could be used for concrete, the state of knowledge at the time was to the contrary. Indeed, expert Chris Rogers, whose opinion was accepted by the trial judge,367 stated in his expert report that geologist Blanchette’s May 2003 report was one of the documents submitted for his expert opinion.368 The same is true for the expert report of Charles Tremblay and Raymond Juneau.369

[379]Because geologist Blanchette knew that CSL was asking him to determine the quality of aggregate that was going to be used for cement concrete, the ethical obligations in the code of professional ethics, analyzed above during the review of his extracontractual liability (Ground No. 4),370 also applied when the May 2003 report was prepared. Once again, the fact that the source of the aggregate and CSL’s intention to give the report to CYB were unknown to him does not mean that the consequences of geologist Blanchette’s fault for the tandems and the plaintiffs were unforeseeable. Blanchette’s fault against the third parties who used the aggregate is the same as the fault he committed against CSL, but the action of the third parties is

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365Above at paras. Erreur ! Source du renvoi introuvable.–[239] and [256]; Main judgment at paras. 223–227, 1167, 1200–1201, 1246–1248 and 1291.

366Above at paras. [236], [246]–[248] and [256]–[261].

367Main judgment at para. 1301.

368Exhibit CYB-5 (10 November 2011), vol. 423 at 173405.

369Exhibit DC-24 (24 October 2011), vol. 425 at 174131–174132. See also Main judgment at para. 1302.

370Above at paras. [332]–[347].

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based on a separate legal obligation independent of the contract arising from, in particular, the geologist’s ethical obligations.371

The so-called “falsification” of the May 2003 report

[380]Last, the appellants raise a so-called “falsification” of the May 2003 report to defeat any claim by the tandems against them. They contend that the report sent by geologist Blanchette to CSL identifies CSL as the client,372 while in the version sent to clients of the quarry and the concrete suppliers, CSL’s name was replaced by B&B.373

[381]This argument must be rejected. First, the content of the report itself was not changed. Second, CSL asked that the aggregate be analyzed for the benefit of a potential client with the idea of sending it to the client.374 The client would then be able to use it for its own purposes, and changing the name of the initial recipient has no impact on the value of the report produced or the liability that may result from it.

[382]The Group 1 appellants have failed to establish any palpable error that alone would justify the Court’s intervention on the issue of May 2003 as the date their period of liability began, and Ground No. 5 must therefore fail.

[383]It follows that the appellants SNC/Blanchette are not liable for buildings whose foundations were poured with concrete composed of aggregate from the B&B quarry prior to May 15, 2003. The judge identified three sequences in this situation: numbers 507, 639, and 672.375

8.5Ground No. 8: Period of SNC/Blanchette’s liability

[384]The trial judge also held SNC/Blanchette liable from May 15, 2003, the time of the report prepared by Terratech for CSL, to November 28, 2007, when the second progress report was sent to B&B, after nine months of comparative tests conducted by geologist Blanchette between the B&B and Maskimo aggregate.376

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371Above at paras. [338]–[347].

372Exhibit CYB-26 (13 May 2003), vol. 345 at 144927.

373Exhibit DSNC-71.4, vol. 305 at 128369. See also Main judgment at para. 211.

374Above at para. [371] and note 361.

375Main judgment at paras. 1326–1327.

376Exhibit DSNC-51 (28 November 2007), vol. 285 at 120493.

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[385]Several parties contest this last date. Group 1 believes that it is too long and that their liability must end at an earlier date, sometime between 2003 and 2006. The quarry, the concrete suppliers, the contractors and certain plaintiffs also claim that the judge erred and that SNC/Blanchette’s liability should instead extend beyond November 28, 2007.

Theory of the Group 1 appellants

[386]First, the appellants submit that the trial judge considered this issue globally rather than conducting a separate analysis of geologist Blanchette’s liability for each year in the period from May 2003 to November 2007.

[387]This argument has no merit. There was nothing to justify the judge conducting an analysis by period or by [TRANSLATION] “windows”, as counsel for SNC/Blanchette argued at the hearing. Faced with evidence that was particularly abundant and often contradictory, the judge rightly conducted a global analysis. He did not have to analyze each element separately. The appellants have provided no source for their proposal, and for good reason.

[388]The appellants’ arguments in support of Ground No. 8 are merely a disguised attempt to repeat the arguments already unsuccessfully raised regarding geologist Blanchette’s faults377 and, above all, regarding the causal connection.378 These are questions of fact, and the appellants are asking the Court to retry the case. That is not the role of an appellate court.

[389]By inferring that it was unreasonable for the tandems to rely on geologist

Blanchette’s reports based on an accumulation of facts, reports, and meetings occurring between 2002 and 2006, the appellants’ argument is again inconsistent with the theory they defended until 2010 and at trial that the geologist was right to maintain that the problems were not caused by pyrrhotite.

[390]Moreover, contrary to what the appellants argue, the trial judge did not ignore the various elements they raise. He considered the deteriorating situation with the Maskimo aggregate,379 the 2002 opinions of Professor Bérubé and of Lafarge,380

377See the analysis of Ground No. 1, particularly paras. [241]–[277].

378See the analysis of Ground No. 2, especially paras. [239]Erreur ! Source du renvoi introuvable.–[300] on expert Bérubé’s 2002 opinion and paras. [239] – [239] on Lafarge’s 2006 recommendation and the additional studies ordered the same year.

379Main judgment, namely paras. 272–338, 342, 363, 899–900, 938, 1150–1152, 1168, 1211, 1218, 1223, 1237, 1261, 1276, 1280–1285, 1299, 1306 and 1328.

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Lafarge’s 2006 recommendation,381 the meeting of September 26, 2005, at BL,382 the reports of Josée Duchesne and Lucie Tremblay,383 and geologist Blanchette’s testing program.384

[391]The judge analyzed all the evidence and concluded that geologist Bérubé had misled his clients by writing in his reports that the B&B aggregate was suitable for the manufacture of concrete despite the presence of sulphides.385

[392]His conclusion that those who read the geologist’s reports understood and accepted that the B&B aggregate was suitable for the manufacture of concrete and was not deleterious is firmly based on the evidence, in particular the testimony of the principal protagonists.386

[393]Moreover, the judge also assessed the tandems’ behaviour and held that liability is shared.387 An apportionment of liability is more in line with the evidence adduced than the novus actus interveniens the Group 1 appellants raise again here, much as they unsuccessfully pleaded in Ground No. 2.388

[394]Last, the appellants’ argument with respect to the creditor’s obligation to minimize damage (article 1479 C.C.Q.) does not apply here.

[395]In contractual matters, as was the case for the relationship between geologist Blanchette and the tandems as of October 2003, the creditor has a duty, [TRANSLATION] “... once the creditor realizes that the debtor has not performed its obligation, to try to mitigate the injury suffered as much as possible”.389 Indeed, the

380Main judgment at paras. 292–319 and 339–365.

381Main judgment at paras. 964–996 and 1847–1863.

382Main judgment at paras. 964–966 and 973.

383Main judgment at paras. 1010–1019, 1859 and 1867–1869.

384Main judgment at paras. 1318–1324.

385Main judgment at paras. 1218, 1231, 1233, 1258 and 1294.

386Main judgment at paras. 1221–1229, 1294–1297 and 1821. See Pre-trial examination of Tom Bellemare (17 May 2011), vol. 184220–184222; Pre-trial examination of Richard Beauchesne (16 May 2011), vol. 448 at 183817; Pre-trial examination of Michel Bergeron (28 April 2011), vol. 449 at 184503; Pre-trial examination of Yvan Boisvert (27 April 2011), vol. 451 at 185298 and 185302–185303; Pre-trial examination of Jonathan Massé (formworker) (7 June 2012), vol. 455 at 186790–186791, 186794–186795 and 186809.

387Main judgment at paras. 953–959, 1308–1309 and 1325–1332.

388Above at paras. [284]–[288].

389Jean-Louis Baudouin, Pierre-Gabriel Jobin & Nathalie Vézina, Les obligations, 7th ed. (Cowansville, QC: Yvon Blais, 2013) at 929 at No. 772.

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judgments raised by the appellants in support of their argument all illustrate situations where creditors of the obligation, after realizing that their contracting parties were in default, neglected to reduce the damage.390

[396]In this case, the trial judge determined that the tandems continued to rely on geologist Blanchette’s opinions until November 28, 2007. The requirement in article 1479 C.C.Q. therefore cannot apply. In fact, the argument appears instead to be another attempt by the appellants to argue that the causal connection was broken.

[397]Accordingly, the trial judge rightly rejected appellants SNC/Blanchette’s argument that their period of liability ended before November 28, 2007.391

Theory of the Group 2, 3 and 4 appellants

[398]Other parties – the quarry and the concrete suppliers, the contractors and certain plaintiffs – also challenge the judge’s determination. They claim that the period of geologist Blanchette’s liability extends past November 28, 2007, the date of his second progress report after nine months of testing.392 This report was in fact the last one produced by the geologist. In their brief, these appellants do not indicate the date on which SNC/Blanchette’s liability should end but, at the hearing, counsel for certain plaintiffs indicated that it should end when CYB’s stockpile of aggregate was depleted. To quote counsel, nine [TRANSLATION] “houses” were affected.

[399]The argument is based on the wording of geologist Blanchette’s recommendations in his report of November 28, 2007, after nine months of a twelve- month expansion-testing program. Three coarse aggregates were used for the program: the B&B aggregate described as [TRANSLATION] “rich in pyrite”, the B&B aggregate described as [TRANSLATION] “rich in garnet”, and the Maskimo aggregate.393

[400]The expressions [TRANSLATION] “rich in pyrite” and [TRANSLATION] “rich in garnet” are not scientific classifications. These descriptions were used by the BL staff, namely to identify the specific sectors of the B&B quarry.394 The geologist used these

390Bazinet c. Wood Gundy Inc., [1997] R.R.A. 273 at 274 (C.A.) (reasons of Baudouin J.A.); Caron c. Voyer, 2013 QCCA 1335 at paras. 134–138; Lebel c. 9067-1959 Québec inc., 2014 QCCA 1309 at paras. 39–57, leave to appeal to SCC refused, 36084 (12 March 2015).

391Main judgment at paras. 1318–1324.

392Exhibit DSNC-51 (28 November 2007), vol. 285 at 120493.

393Ibid. at 120494.

394Pre-trial examination of François Bellemare (11 May 2011), vol. 448 at 184021 and 184031– 184032; Pre-trial examination of Bernard Marcotte (25 May 2011), vol. 455 at 186607.

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classifications in his November 28, 2007, report so that his clients would understand to which sectors of the quarry his report was referring.395

[401]In the conclusions of this report, geologist Blanchette recommended that, as a preventive measure, the B&B aggregate [TRANSLATION] “rich in pyrite” should not be used for concrete aggregate.396

[402]The appellants state that the aggregate [TRANSLATION] “rich in pyrite” that the report recommended should no longer be used was not mined by B&B for concrete aggregate, which is true.397 Since the geologist never issued any reservations in his reports on the use of aggregate from the sector [TRANSLATION] “rich in garnet”, they argue that the judge therefore erred in deciding that the period of SNC/Blanchette’s liability should end with the November 28, 2007, report.

[403]While it is true that geologist Blanchette’s recommendation concerned solely the sector [TRANSLATION] “rich in pyrite”, while only the sector [TRANSLATION] “rich in garnet” was being mined, the evidence nonetheless reveals that those responsible for operating the B&B quarry understood at the time that the negative recommendation of November 28, 2007, applied to the entire quarry.

[404]This is particularly the case for Bernard Marcotte, BL’s director of operations, who had amended geologist Blanchette’s initial offer of services for the testing program. During his pre-trial examination, he said that for them, the recommendation of November 28, 2007, applied to all the aggregate that geologist Blanchette had analyzed, especially since [TRANSLATION] “it was the first time that Mr. Blanchette said not to use the stone”.398 Carl Poulin and Yvan Boisvert of CYB understood the same thing from the report, the only difference being that they stated that they read it only in the winter of 2008, when Mr. Boisvert returned from vacation.399

[405]Therefore, the trial judge’s determination that SNC/Blanchette’s liability ended on November 28, 2007, is firmly supported by the evidence adduced and the quarry,

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395Pre-trial examination of Alain Blanchette (15 September 2011), vol. 450 at 184860–184862; Cross- examination of Alain Blanchette (19 February 2013), vol. 469 at 191538.

396Exhibit DSNC-51 (28 November 2007), vol. 285 at 120499. The full text of these conclusions is found in the Statement of general facts of the Main judgment at para. [70].

397Cross-examination of Alain Blanchette (19 February 2013), vol. 469 at 191508.

398Pre-trial examination of Bernard Marcotte (26 May 2011), vol. 455 at 186701–186702.

399Pre-trial examination of Carl Poulin (3 June 2011), vol. 457 at 187408–187410 and 187415– 187416; Pre-trial examination of Yvan Boisvert (30 January 2013), vol. 464 at 190261.

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the concrete suppliers, the contractors, and certain plaintiffs have failed to establish any palpable error in this respect.

[406] For these reasons, all the appeals related to Ground No. 8 must be dismissed.

9APPORTIONMENT OF SOLIDARY LIABILITY OR LIABILITY IN SOLIDUM AND THE APPLICATIONS FOR FORCED INTERVENTION

9.1Introduction

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[TRANSLATION]

400This refers to Ground No. 3 on the application of the warranty of quality of the concrete suppliers and of B&B, and Ground No. 13 on the absence of CYB’s fault. The same is true for Ground No. 18 with respect to the contractors.

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[1325] In summary, the Court apportions liability with respect to the recourses in warranty as follows:

SNC/Blanchette is liable for 70% of the damage from May 2003 to November 27, 2007;

Each concrete supplier and the quarry are liable for 25% of the damage caused during this period, i.e., 12.5% each;

The contractors/formworkers are liable for 5% of the damage caused during this period;

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9.2Ground nos. 6 and 19: Apportionment of liability between the defendants and the various applications for forced intervention

[TRANSLATION]

401Main judgment at para. 1325; Judgment following the splitting of the proceeding at paras. 3–14 and 49–51.

402CQLR, c. C-25.

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8.The parties irrevocably accept and agree that the Court will render judgment on the principal actions and at the same time its judgment on the conclusions in forced intervention set out in the defendants’ defences, the whole as if an anticipatory application for forced intervention in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure had been submitted before the Court;403

403Court agreement (18 January 2012), vol. 447 at 183675.

404Prévost-Masson v. General Trust of Canada, 2001 SCC 87, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 882 at para. 26.

405Chapter 6 of this judgment.

406Chapter 7 of this judgment.

407Chapter 8 of this judgment.

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[TRANSLATION]

To paraphrase Professor Chabas, there is a major difference between a solidary obligation and an obligation in solidum. Solidary obligations are joint partial obligations for which it is said that all may be claimed from a single person, whereas obligations in solidum are whole obligations for which one alone may be claimed. In practice, and vis-à-vis the creditor, the two appear identical. In law, the situation is different. If solidary obligations were to become plural again, they would be partial debts. Obligations in solidum, on the contrary, are plural debts for total reparation for which the creditor may obtain the value of only one.

The logic differs with respect to indivisibility. In reality, each debtor owes only that debtor’s share, as in a solidary obligation. One single debt is divided into several fractions. Nonetheless, the object of the obligation cannot be divided. One debtor may therefore be compelled to pay the entire debt. That debtor, however, does not represent the other debtors (as opposed to solidarity) and does not owe the whole amount (as opposed to an obligation in solidum).

In summary, according to the classical theory, an obligation in solidum is quite distinct from indivisibility and solidarity. In conclusion, to paraphrase a mid- 20th century French text: a solidary obligation is a whole obligation of debtors who reciprocally represent each other in their relationships with the creditor; an indivisible obligation is a whole obligation resulting from the very object of

408For example, situations of perfect solidarity exist where one of the debtors does not have to bear any share vis-à-vis the others. It is therefore not perfectly accurate to unequivocally state that [TRANSLATION] “Solidary obligations are joint partial obligations” or [TRANSLATION] “If solidary obligations were to become plural again, they would be partial debts.

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the obligation; an obligation in solidum is a whole obligation, without anything further.

[References omitted; italics in original]

the share of certain self-builders vis-à-vis the concrete suppliers and B&B;

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409Frédéric Levesque, L’obligation in solidum en droit privé québécois (Cowansville, QC: Yvon Blais, 2010) at 114–115.

410Article 1458 C.C.Q.

411Article 1478 C.C.Q.

412For example, the injury suffered by a buyer may be caused by both a latent defect and contributory faults, as was the case in Ferme avicole Héva inc. c. Coopérative fédérée de Québec (portion assurée), 2008 QCCA 1053.

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the share of the contractors and certain self-builders vis-à-vis SNC/Blanchette;

the share of tandems BL/B&B and CYB/B&B vis-à-vis SNC/Blanchette;

Respective shares of each concrete supplier vis-à-vis B&B

413According to the table of abandoned grounds of appeal confirmed by the parties, BL did not abandon its Ground No.19, while it did abandon Ground No. 6 on December 13, 2017.

414In its written submissions as appellant for Ground No. 6 (section 2), B&B opposed the argument that the defect was apparent to the concrete suppliers, to exonerate itself of its share of liability. This argument was not repeated at the hearing, however, even though the following appears in the Minutes of December 12, 2017: [TRANSLATION] “Should the Court conclude that the calls in warranty have been determined, Mtre Mignault abandons Ground No. 19 – section 2 for the portion corresponding to B&B’s fault recognized as 12.5%. It maintains its call in warranty, however, should the Court find that the recourses in warranty have not been determined.”

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[TRANSLATION]

[875]The fact is that Laurentide and CYB dedicated their resources to operating the quarry that was mined for their benefit, in particular as concrete suppliers.

[TRANSLATION]

[192]As previously seen, the trial judge, in accordance with article 469 C.C.P., apportioned between the various co-debtors shared liability to Prima as follows: 45% for Nortex, 45% for SIA and 10% for the CDB architects. The

415See above at para. [193] et seq.

416Manac inc./Nortex c. The Boiler Inspection and Insurance Company of Canada, 2006 QCCA 1395.

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architects have now been exempted from any liability by the judgment in file 500-09-013877-030, so the issue now is whether Nortex and SIA should assume between them an equal share of the joint liability to Prima or whether, as SIA claims, Nortex should assume all of this liability.

[194]In support of its argument, SAI first argues that its contract with Nortex includes a warranty clause whose effect is to compel the second party to exempt the first party of any liability arising from the sale of the product. SIA also argues that, even without this warranty clause, it committed no fault in this case: despite its ignorance, if it is liable to Prima for the defect in the Arcoplast, the manufacturer should ultimately be fully liable for the consequences of that defect, in accordance with the principle set out by the Supreme Court in Kravitz.

[195]I will start with the second ground. A reading of the trial judgment, which does not explicitly discuss this point, nonetheless suggests that the judge held

Nortex and SIA equally liable for Prima’s damage because they were both involved in developing the product and in the project leading to its installation at Prima.

[196]SIA claims that its involvement was instead pursuant to the technical assistance clause in the contract between itself and Nortex, a clause that stated:

[TRANSLATION]

For the purposes of this agreement, the manufacturer will supply the basic materials, technical assistance, samples, and all the technical documentation required for the material used.

At some point, SIA encountered problems and turned to Nortex, who gave it access to the services of the Centre. SIA merely followed the Centre’s directions, recommendations, and suggestions.

[197]The evidence, however, appears to reveal a level of involvement beyond this technical assistance and, on this point, I do not believe that SIA has managed to establish a palpable and overriding error in the judge’s assessment of the evidence. Even though the Supreme Court in Kravitz used very strong terms when referring to the manufacturer’s ultimate liability, the circumstances of this case are rather those of a common project, even if it were admitted that SIA played a less important role than Nortex. The fact

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remains that it actively participated in developing Arcoplast (it even owned – at least at the time – the “Arcoplast” trademark, it was responsible for obtaining the product certification from the Canadian agricultural authorities, and it paid directly for the services it obtained from the Centre) and marketing the product, particularly to Prima. The evidence does not support that it was merely a passive seller: on the contrary, it was a partner in the Arcoplast adventure.417

[References omitted; emphasis added.]

417Ibid. at paras. 192 and 194–197.

418Ferme avicole Héva inc. c. Coopérative fédérée de Québec (portion assurée), 2008 QCCA 1053.

419Ibid. at para. 120.

420This involved many judgments grouped into one: Ferme avicole Héva inc. c. Boréal Assurances agricoles inc., 2006 QCCS 1392.

421Ferme avicole Héva inc. c. Coopérative fédérée de Québec (portion assurée), 2008 QCCA 1053 at para. 120.

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1537. Contribution to the payment of a solidary obligation is made by equal shares among the solidary debtors, unless their interests in the debt, including their shares of the obligation to make reparation for injury caused to another, are unequal, in which case their contributions are proportional to the interest of each in the debt.

1537. La contribution dans le paiement d’une obligation solidaire se fait en parts égales entre les débiteurs solidaires, à moins que leur intérêt dans la dette, y compris leur part dans l’obligation de réparer le préjudice causé à autrui, ne soit inégal, auquel cas la contribution se fait proportionnellement à l’intérêt de chacun dans la dette.

[…]

422Examination of Louis Lesage (20 February 2013), vol. 469 at 191703–191704.

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Share of the contractors vis-à-vis the concrete suppliers and B&B and the absence of fault by the contractors/formworkers (Ground No. 18)

4.2.3.5.2 Other reactions

Aggregates that produce excessive expansion in concrete through cement- aggregate reaction other than alkali reactivity shall not be used for concrete unless preventive measures acceptable to the owner are applied.

Note: Although rare, significant expansions may occur due to reasons other than alkali-aggregate reaction. Such expansions might be due to the following:

(a)the presence of sulphides, such as pyrite, pyrrhotite, and marcasite, in the aggregate that might oxidize and hydrate with volume increase or the release of sulphate that produces sulphate attack upon the cement paste, or both;

(b)….427

423Main judgment at paras. 80, 91–94, 254, 433, 641, 704, 783, 870, 1388–1389, 1958–1959 and 2270.

424Main judgment at paras. 868, 873, 893, 908–909, 912, 922–924, 927, 931–932, 937, 1101, 1110, 1181–1188, 1390 and 2270.

425Main judgment at paras. 87–88, 825–829, 1101, 1141 and 2270.

426Main judgment at paras. 235, 249, 464, 783, 933–935, 1149 and 1167.

427Main judgment at para. 225. See also Exhibit P-10 (1 May 2013), vol. 404 at 166893.

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[Bold emphasis in original.]

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[TRANSLATION]

[1143] The Court has determined that the contractors/formworkers and developers are governed by the provisions of a contract of enterprise and article 2100 of the Civil Code of Québec that requires them to act in the best interests of their clients, with prudence and diligence, to carry out the work in accordance with usage and good practice and to ensure that the work carried out is in conformity with the contract.

[1144] In all cases, these persons have an obligation of result and performance that goes even beyond strict contractual obligations.

[1145] Authors Karim and Quinn are of the view that the obligation to deliver a work in accordance with good practice is an obligation of result.

[1146] The National Building Code forms part of this good practice.

[1147] The National Building Code refers to CSA standards A23.1 and A438- 00.

[1148] During their May 2012 meeting, the experts unanimously acknowledged that the National Building Code applies to any concrete production or concreting work.

[1149] Standard CSA A23.1 is central to these debates, as was previously stated.

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[1150] As the evidence reveals, the contractors and formworkers knew about the problem encountered by Béton Maskimo. These facts were certainly made public in 2003 through articles in the Le Nouvelliste newspaper and the La Facture television show. They discussed these problems amongst themselves and even during meetings of the Association de la construction du Québec de la Mauricie. To borrow the expression used by certain witnesses, [TRANSLATION] “it was talked about in the industry”.

[1151] Certain contractors even expressed their concern to the concrete suppliers, while others had tests conducted by experts.

[1152] In the Court’s opinion, the extent of the Maskimo cases in the region should have persuaded these contractors to pay greater attention than they did to the “pyrite” problems and to ask additional questions about the product they were using.

[1160] Contractors bound to an obligation of result cannot exonerate themselves by raising the fault of a subcontractor because they are responsible for directing the work and supervising the quality and compliance of the performance by the various workers.

[1161] The contractors are solidarily liable to the plaintiffs within the meaning of article 1523 as set out in article 2118.

[1162] Nor can SNC/Blanchette’s faults exempt the contractors from their liability to the plaintiffs.

[1170] The evidence reveals that at the time of the constructions at issue, the problem with expanding foundations was widespread in the region’s construction industry.

[1171] A prudent and diligent contractor would have acted with care.

[1172] Prudence is the quality of those who, considering the scope and consequences of their actions, take steps to avoid any potential errors, faults,

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or misfortunes by refraining from anything they believe could be a source of damage.

[1173] The evidence reveals that none of the contractors were familiar with the concrete standards, and this applies to the formworkers.

[1174] As was previously stated, ignorance of the standards is not an excuse.

[1175] The contractors argue that they cannot be liable because they relied on the concrete suppliers, themselves concrete specialists.

[1176] Due to the presumptions of knowledge of the defects against them, the obligations of prudence and diligence, and especially the obligation to act in accordance with good practice, including the National Building Code, the Court concludes that the contractors cannot be relieved of all liability for the plaintiffs’ damage. They will therefore be condemned solidarily.

[1177] The outcome is the same for contractors who acted as professional sellers and are subject to the presumptions in articles 1728 and 1729 C.C.Q.

[1178] Under these presumptions, they have a duty to know the goods that they sell and are presumed to know the defects of those goods. To be unaware of them is itself a fault.

[1179] It should not be forgotten that under article 2103, a contractor must supply property of good quality.

[References omitted; emphasis added.]

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428Main judgment at paras. 1129–1180 and 2270.

429Chapter Erreur ! Source du renvoi introuvable. of this judgment.

430Main judgment at paras. 1083–1087, 1118–1121 and 2270.

431Article 2118 C.C.Q.

432Article 1728 C.C.Q.

433Article 1729 C.C.Q.

434The judge stated that the concrete suppliers owe the contractors a warranty of quality. Main judgment at paras. 932 and 937.

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1458. Every person has a duty to honour his contractual undertakings.

Where he fails in this duty, he is liable for any bodily, moral or material injury he causes to the other contracting party and is bound to make reparation for the injury; neither he nor the other party may in such a case avoid the rules governing contractual liability by opting for rules that would be more favourable to them.

1458. Toute personne a le devoir d’honorer les engagements qu’elle a contractés.

Elle est, lorsqu’elle manque à ce devoir, responsable du préjudice, corporel, moral ou matériel, qu’elle cause à son cocontractant et tenue de réparer ce préjudice; ni elle ni le cocontractant ne peuvent alors se soustraire à l’application des règles du régime contractuel de responsabilité pour opter en faveur de règles qui leur seraient plus profitables.

435It should be noted, however, that certain formworkers did not buy the concrete directly from the tandems (see Ground No.16 section 2, sequences 693, 750, 73, 12, and 403). It was instead the plaintiffs who directly bought the defective concrete. This finding does not affect the liability of these formworkers to these plaintiffs given the application of article 2118 C.C.Q. Moreover, the applications for forced intervention of these formworkers against either tandem cannot be based on the warranty of quality because there is no contract of sale. In these circumstances, the tandems’ liability to the formworkers is extracontractual, as is that of SNC/Blanchette. There is therefore perfect solidarity between these debtors.

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1729. In a sale by a professional seller, a defect is presumed to have existed at the time of the sale if the

property malfunctions or

deteriorates prematurely in comparison with identical property or property of the same type; such a presumption is rebutted if the defect is due to improper use of the property by the buyer.

1729. En cas de vente par un vendeur professionnel, l’existence d’un vice au moment de la vente est présumée, lorsque le mauvais fonctionnement du bien ou sa détérioration survient prématurément par rapport à des biens identiques ou

de mêmes espèces; cette présomption est repoussée si le défaut est dû à une mauvaise utilisation du bien par l’acheteur.

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[TRANSLATION]

[28]... the application of the rule set out in that article has the practical effect of implementing not a double, but rather a triple presumption in favour of the buyer, that is, that there is a defect, that the defect existed prior to the contract of sale, and last, that there is a causal connection linking the defect to the deterioration or malfunction.437

436Article 1729 C.C.Q.

437CNH Industrial Canada Ltd. c. Promutuel Verchères, société mutuelle d'assurances générales, 2017 QCCA 154 at para. 28. See also Groupe Royal inc. c. Crewcut Investments Inc., 2019 QCCA 1839 at para. 27.

438The courts recognize very few grounds of exemption. These include establishing that the malfunction or premature deterioration of the property is due to improper use by the buyer, the fault of a third party or superior force. See Demilec inc. c. 2539-2903 Québec inc.,

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1726. The seller is bound to warrant the buyer that the property and its accessories are, at the time of the sale, free of latent defects which render it unfit for the use for which it was intended or which so diminish its usefulness that the buyer would not have bought it or paid so high a price if he had been aware of them.

The seller is not bound, however, to warrant against any latent defect known to the buyer or any apparent defect; an apparent defect is a defect that can be perceived by a prudent and

1726. Le vendeur est tenu de garantir à l’acheteur que le bien et ses accessoires sont, lors de la vente, exempts de vices cachés qui le rendent impropre à l’usage auquel on le destine ou qui diminuent tellement son utilité que l’acheteur ne l’aurait pas acheté, ou n’aurait pas donné si haut prix, s’il les avait connus.

Il n’est, cependant, pas tenu de garantir le vice caché connu de l’acheteur ni le vice apparent; est apparent le vice qui peut être constaté par un acheteur prudent et diligent sans avoir besoin de recourir à un expert.

2018 QCCA 1757 at para. 46; CNH Industrial Canada Ltd. c. Promutuel Verchères, société mutuelle d'assurances générales, 2017 QCCA 154 at paras. 31–34.

439It is worth stating that these sulphides are a natural component of the extracted rock. It follows that their presence cannot be considered a defect in the rock. In other words, the aggregate itself was not defective, but the concrete mixes in which they were included were defective because this type of aggregate is unsuitable for this type of use.

440Article 1729 C.C.Q.

441Compagnie Northland Corporation c. Billots Sélect 2000, s.e.n.c., 2007 QCCA 51 at paras. 69–76.

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diligent buyer without the need to resort to an expert.

[Emphasis added.]

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[41]In the case at bar, the category of sellers that interests us most is that of the manufacturer. Manufacturers are considered to be the ultimate experts with respect to the goods, because they have control over the labour and materials used to produce them: J. Edwards, La garantie de qualité du vendeur en droit québécois (1998), at p. 289. Moreover, buyers are entitled to expect that manufacturers guarantee the quality of the products they design

and market. Consequently, manufacturers are subject to the strongest

442CNH Industrial Canada Ltd. c. Promutuel Verchères, société mutuelle d'assurances générales, 2017 QCCA 154.

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presumption of knowledge and to the most exacting obligation to disclose latent defects.443

[Underlining added.]

[63]As mentioned above, this Court noted in Kravitz that, in the context of the warranty against latent defects, the manufacturer and professional seller of a defective good are presumed to be in bad faith (p. 798). In that case, the Court went even further, however, refusing to allow the manufacturer to transfer its liability to the dealer despite the dealer’s professional knowledge (at p. 798):

What is the situation when, as in the case at bar, the manufacturer has sold a new thing to a dealer who is himself a professional seller? If the latter is presumed to be aware of the defects when he resells the thing, does it not follow that he is also presumed to be aware of them when he buys it from the manufacturer? While this reasoning could have some appeal in certain circumstances, it cannot serve to exempt the manufacturer from his liability for latent defects in the thing he has manufactured when he sells it to a dealer who is responsible for reselling it. The manufacturer of a defective thing must assume the ultimate responsibility for his incompetence, actual or presumed. The bad faith of the professional seller toward the nonprofessional buyer does not convert the “dol” of the manufacturer toward his dealer into an act of good faith; ...445

[Underlining in original.]

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[TRANSLATION]

[97]Hutchinson then claims that Coop, like the Kiamika and Héva farms, cannot benefit from the presumption of knowledge of the defect because it is a professional seller. The Court also rejects this argument. The Supreme Court

443ABB Inc. v. Domtar Inc., 2007 SCC 50, [2007] 3 S.C.R. 461 at para. 41.

444General Motors Products of Canada v. Kravitz, [1979] 1 S.C.R. 790.

445ABB Inc. v. Domtar Inc., 2007 SCC 50, [2007] 3 S.C.R. 461 at para. 63.

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recently reaffirmed that professional buyers, even though they have a heightened duty to be vigilant at the time of the sale, still benefit from the presumption that the seller knew about the defect.25

_________________________

25ABB Inc. v. Domtar Inc., 2007 SCC 50, [2007] 3 S.C.R. 461 at para. 44.

[Underlining added.]

[42]In the context of the warranty against latent defects, the buyer’s expertise is also relevant to the analysis, but for a different purpose than the seller’s expertise. Whereas the seller’s expertise serves to determine the scope of his or her obligation to disclose, that of the buyer serves, rather, to assess whether the defect is latent or apparent. Thus, the more knowledge a buyer has of a good being purchased, the more likely it is that a defect in that good will be considered apparent. An apparent defect is one that the buyer either detected at the time of the sale or could have detected given his or her knowledge (article 1523 C.C.L.C. and article 1726, para. 2 C.C.Q.). Buyers therefore have an obligation to inform themselves by carrying out a reasonable inspection of the good. In all cases, the test is whether a reasonable buyer in the same circumstances could have detected the defect at the time of the sale.

[Emphasis added.]

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446Ferme avicole Héva inc. c. Coopérative fédérée de Québec (portion assurée), 2008 QCCA 1053.

447ABB Inc. v. Domtar Inc., 2007 SCC 50, [2007] 3 S.C.R. 461 at para. 54.

448Ibid. at para. 42.

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[TRANSLATION]

[1146] The National Building Code forms part of this good practice.

[1147] The National Building Code refers to CSA standards A23.1 and A438- 00.

[1148] During their May 2012 meeting, the experts unanimously acknowledged that the National Building Code applies to any concrete production or concreting work.

[1149] CSA standard A23.1 is central to these debates, as was previously stated.

[1173] The evidence reveals that none of the contractors were familiar with the concrete standards, and this applies to the formworkers.

[1174] As was previously stated, ignorance of the standards is not an excuse.

449The second paragraph of article 1478 C.C.Q. may apply to contractual matters, but in a situation such as this, the buyer victim’s contributory fault involves less an apportionment within the meaning of article 469 C.C.P. than a reduction of the manufacturer sellers’ obligation. At best, this last provision applies only by analogy, because it concerns apportionment between solidary debtors, neither of which are the buyers or the sellers.

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4.2.3.5.2 Other reactions

Aggregates that produce excessive expansion in concrete through cement- aggregate reaction other than alkali reactivity shall not be used for concrete unless preventive measures acceptable to the owner are applied.

Note: Although rare, significant expansions may occur due to reasons other than alkali-aggregate reaction. Such expansions might be due to the following:

(a)the presence of sulphides, such as pyrite, pyrrhotite, and marcasite, in the aggregate that might oxidize and hydrate with volume increase or the release of sulphate that produces sulphate attack upon the cement paste, or both;

(b)….451

[Bold emphasis in original.]

450Jean-Louis Baudouin, Patrice Deslauriers & Benoît Moore, La responsabilité civile, 8th ed., vol. 2 (Cowansville, QC: Yvon Blais, 2014) at 293–294, No. 2-252, referring to Caisse populaire de Charlesbourg c. Michaud, [1990] R.R.A. 531 (C.A.).

451Main judgment at para. 225. See also Exhibit P-10 (1 May 2013), vol. 404 at 166893.

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[TRANSLATION]

[236]It is acknowledged that neither the Canadian nor the Quebec standards establish a maximum percentage of iron sulphide in the coarse aggregate used to manufacture concrete, contrary to the European standard.

452Main judgment at para. 2269.

453Particularly the cross-examination of expert Simon Blais (25 June 2013), vol. 479 at 195576 et seq.

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[TRANSLATION]

[932]Buyers in any capacity are entitled to expect that the property sold and manufactured by the concrete suppliers complies with the standards. Buyers are entitled to assume that the concrete does not contain minerals that will produce the deleterious effects encountered.

454

455Main judgment at para. 232.

456Main judgment at paras. 228 and 232–235. See also Minutes of the discussions (10-11 May 2012), vol. 404 at 166810.

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[933]The concrete suppliers had to comply with CSA standard A23.1, in particular section 5.5.2., and standards NQ-2921-900 and NQ-2560-114.

[Emphasis added.]

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[TRANSLATION]

[206]As of 2003, there were thus two opposing theories regarding the concrete expansion and cracking: one was that the expansion was caused by the iron sulphides, and the other blamed it on the poor quality of the concrete or even the cement.

[276]At that time, in 2001, industry insiders thought that the cement could be causing the degradation and also believed that the damage to the IGA building was due more to a shock caused by trucks unloading.

457Main judgment at para. 1152.

458Main judgment at para. 1150.

459Main judgment at paras. 206–208, 273, 276–279, 348–351, 900, 1003–1004, 1227 and 1764.

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[TRANSLATION]

[1000] Mr. Marcotte recalled the conclusions of Fondatech, whom he had asked in 2001 to compare the B&B and Maskimo stones. It had concluded that the Maskimo stone was five times more reactive than the B&B stone.

[1001] Mr. Marcotte was not satisfied with only the Blanchette reports. He visited Carrière B&B before he accepted the position with Béton Laurentide.

[1002] He testified that visually, the Carrière Maskimo stone was rather black with a lot of rust on the top, whereas when he visited Carrière B&B, he observed visual differences in that Carrière B&B had many blue and purple veins that were not observed at Carrière Maskimo.

[1003] He believed, at that time and based on his knowledge, that the problem he was facing was more one of cement/pyrite and not pyrite alone.

[1004] It must be said that his professional experiences led him to continue doubting the appropriateness of the cement as such, because he knew of cases in Nevada with similar problems where the cement had been accepted as the cause.

[1005] Indeed, it was only in 2009 that the cement was conclusively eliminated as a probable cause of the concrete expansion.

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[TRANSLATION]

460Main judgment at para. 1005.

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[320]The Court notes that, on behalf of CYB, Carl Poulin as director of production found it necessary to write to client Construction DM Turcotte on September 23, 1998, to reassure it about the “alarming facts” related to major damage to foundations caused by pyrite following a report broadcast on “Enjeux” on September 22, 1998 (EJT-4), and to convey their commitment to producing quality concrete and its constituent materials.

[321]Many contractors had heard about the Maskimo cases, which occurred in the early 2000s (+2002). The witnesses were Alain Deshaies, Claude Ferron, Daniel Rheault, Éric Chaîné, Francis Bouchard, Gilles Veillette, Jean Champagne, Louis Martel, Réjean Fradette, and Yves Paris.

[322]Daniel Rheault said that he asked Michel Bergeron of Béton Laurentide whether his concrete was at risk and that Bergeron reassured him. He said that he made this inquiry in 2000.

[323]Éric Chaîné said that he learned about the Maskimo case from Constructions Daniel Levasseur, whose constructions were located in the same sector as his. The Court finds that he knew about the pyrite in 2003. Mr. Chaîné confirmed that he read about in the newspapers. He said that he even demanded a letter from CYB to reassure a client. He said that happened in 2004. He could not find the letter.

[324]Gilles Veillette said that the pyrite cases were [TRANSLATION] “talked about” during meetings of the Association provinciale des constructeurs d’habitation du Québec (ACQ).

[325]Jean Champagne said that he asked Michel Bergeron whether Laurentide was having the same kind of problem as Maskimo. That was in 2002, because he was starting his business. He was reassured by Mr.

Bergeron’s reply.

[326]Others were directly involved in pyrite cases involving Maskimo, as was the case with Construction Daniel Provencher in 2001.

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[327]That company demanded a document from CYB, with which it had started doing business, attesting that their concrete was suitable. He was given Terratech’s DC 1 report of May 5, 2003, the one prepared at the request of St. Lawrence Cement.

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[TRANSLATION]

[338]This testimony reveals the following:

Many contractors built for themselves or for family members certain constructions that were damaged by concrete expansion;

461[932] Buyers in any capacity are entitled to expect that the property sold and manufactured by the concrete suppliers complies with the standards. Buyers are entitled to assume that the concrete does not contain minerals that will produce the deleterious effects they encountered.

[937]Therefore, the concrete suppliers are liable to the self-builders, the contractors and the formworkers pursuant to the warranty of quality under articles 1726 and 1730 and the rules governing contractual liability, as set out in article 1458 C.C.Q. [Emphasis added.]

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[TRANSLATION]

190 – In Quebec, the doctrine has generally characterized the warranty as an indivisible obligation by its nature. The same solution was adopted by our courts with respect to both eviction and defects. Note that the divisibility or indivisibility of an obligation depends on its object. The object of a warranty, however, is property free of latent defects. This object cannot be physically divided. Therefore, the property must be provided entirely free of defects. It is not enough to deliver part of the property or that only part of the property is free of defect. Nor can the object be intellectually divided. The property might be indivisible, but not the notion of it being free of latent defects. It is entirely free or not at all free, and property that is partially free of a defect does not satisfy the warranty. The warranty must be performed one time and therefore segmented performance is not possible.

462See above at para. [456] et seq.

463This may refer to the total sale price in the event of a cancellation, or part of the sale price in the event there are only grounds for a reduction.

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193 – ... Nonetheless, the warranty’s indivisibility has certain consequences on the direct action. The buyer has discretion to exact the indivisible performance of the warranty by both the actual and deemed immediate vendor. Similarly, under article 2900 C.C.Q, the interruption of prescription with regard to one of the co-debtors has effect with regard to the others.464

[References omitted.]

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[TRANSLATION]

[5]The Farms will be compensated by Agriculture Canada according to the

Act, that is, for the “market value” of the property destroyed, over $900,000.

Today they ask that the Coop pay the additional loss suffered in the amount of

464 Jeffrey Edwards, La garantie de qualité du vendeur en droit québécois, 2d ed. (Montreal: Wilson & Lafleur, 2008) at 86–88, Nos. 190 and 193.

465Ferme avicole Héva inc. c. Coopérative fédérée de Québec (portion assurée), 2008 QCCA 1053.

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$2 million, representing the cost of “reorganizing production” and “the impact on marketing” following the premature disappearance of their flocks.

[56]Kiamika and Héva do not seek the restoration of the sale price of the chicks ($22,000 or $1 per chick) because they have already received it as compensation from Agriculture Canada. The debate instead concerns “all damages suffered by the buyer” for which the seller is liable if it “was aware or could not have been unaware of the latent defect” (article 1728 C.C.Q.).466

[Emphasis added.]

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[TRANSLATION]

[130]The Court finds that the trial judge did not err in finding that the Kiamika and Héva farms committed a fault by continuing their production, which had the effect of aggravating the injury they suffered.

466Ferme avicole Héva inc. c. Boréal Assurances agricoles inc., 2006 QCCA 1392 at paras. 5 and 56. Although the text of article 1728 C.C.Q. applies here, it should be noted that the wording has changed slightly since May 1, 2014: “If the seller was aware or could not have been unaware of the latent defect, he is bound not only to restore the price, but also to make reparation for the injury suffered by the buyer”. [Emphasis added.]

467Ferme avicole Héva inc. c. Coopérative fédérée de Québec (portion assurée), 2008 QCCA 1053.

468See above at para. [149].

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[505] The judge distinguished them as follows:

[TRANSLATION]

[1326] The preceding apportionment of liability applies to the residential constructions whose concrete was poured between May 15, 2003, and November 27, 2007.

[1329] The Court notes that none of the commercial buildings have foundations that were poured outside the reference periods. In theory, therefore, the apportionment should follow the same guidelines.

[1330] Several commercial constructions, however, were carried out according to summary plans with integrated specifications imposed by professional engineers, particularly with respect to CSA standard A23.1. Moreover, it appears from the evidence that some of these constructions were completed under the supervision of professionals.

469See Kosoian v. Société de transport de Montréal, 2019 SCC 59 at paras. 128–129.

470For the reasons stated below in para. [534] et seq., however, there is no need to intervene in the judge’s conclusions not to award costs or expert fees.

471Article 1525 C.C.Q.

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[1331] After analyzing these cases and considering the contractual liability of the contractor responsible for specifically adhering to the specifications, and considering the liability of the engineer responsible for supervising the construction, apportionment in these files as between the co-defendants will be on a case-by-case basis.

[Reference omitted.]

[506]

[507]

473

Share of certain self-builders vis-à-vis the concrete suppliers and B&B (Ground No. 27)

2020 QCCA 495 (*)

472Main judgment at para. 1516 et seq.; Groupe immobilier Bel-Rive inc. c. Construction G. Therrien inc., 2014 QCCS 2739. See A.B.-4 at paras. 272–282.

473See above at para. [480].

474It should be noted that the trial judge did not discuss the Consumer Protection Act, CQLR, c. P- 40.1. This Act was not debated during the appeal hearings. Without issuing any opinion on the issue, in the rare cases where the CPA could have been relevant (e.g., the self-builders who purchased concrete directly from the concrete suppliers), the path taken here essentially arrives at the same result with respect to compensating the plaintiffs.

475A.B.-5 at para. 112.

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[TRANSLATION]

[2250] The formworkers responsible for building the foundations are considered contractors. Some plaintiffs characterized as self-builders failed to sue the formworker responsible for completing the work.

[2251] The Court finds that these plaintiffs must assume this 5% share of liability. The Court cannot make the other defendants assume it because, according to article 1478 C.C.Q., each defendant assumes only its share in proportion to its fault.

[2252] Furthermore, article 1481 C.C.Q. does not apply here because that provision applies only when a party is exempted by an express provision of an Act. In these cases, however, the contractors are deemed liable for the damage pursuant to article 2118 C.C.Q. and other provisions discussed in this judgment.

[2253] Here, the co-debtors’ obligations are based on faults, on contracts. In such cases, the presumption of liability under article 2118 C.C.Q. applies.

[2254] After analyzing all the cases, it appears that each time a victim sued the contractor/formworker, the latter was held partly liable because a formworker, a specialized contractor, is required to erect a foundation. Indeed, whenever the concrete supplier erected the foundation, it was specified in its statement of account.

[2255] From its analysis of the motions to institute proceedings of victims who did not sue their contractor, the Court notes from the wording of the motions that the plaintiffs merely sued the concrete suppliers, the quarry and SNC/Lavalin, without worrying about contractors whose liability is nevertheless presumed.

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[2256] This is why the Court finds that the plaintiffs should bear the share of liability of the contractors who were not sued.

[513]

[TRANSLATION]

CONSIDERING that the contractor who built the foundation was not sued, that the plaintiff must bear that contractor’s share, and that, consequently, the damage recognized must be reduced by 5%;478

[TRANSLATION]

[1101] The Court concludes that:

476Plaintiff Guy Thibodeau in file 400-17-002119-101; Bourassa c. Construction Yvan Boisvert inc. (Béton Yvan Boisvert), 2014 QCCS 2685 at paras. 369–376.

477Plaintiff Groupe immobilier Chaîné inc. in file 400-17-002516-116; Groupe immobilier Chaîné inc. c. Construction Yvan Boisvert inc. (Béton Yvan Boisvert), 2014 QCCS 2713 at paras. 41–47.

478For example, see Bourassa c. Construction Yvan Boisvert inc. (Béton Yvan Boisvert), 2014 QCCS 2685 at paras. 22, 28, 37, 42, 47, 65, 70, 106, 124, 141, 151, 199, 208, 275, 308, 315, 334, 398, 461 and 515.

479A.B.-5 at paras. 113–116.

480Note that the tandems presented no arguments as respondents on this ground of appeal by the self-builders.

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(d) The self-builders:

Are not contractors within the meaning of the cases cited;

Are clients according to the provisions of the contract of enterprise;

Benefit from the presumption of liability in 2118 C.C.Q.481 [Emphasis added.]

481See also Main judgment at para. 2270 A).

482Main judgment at para. 937.

483Claude Joyal Inc. c. CNH Canada Ltd, 2014 QCCA 588.

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Share of contractors and certain self-builders vis-à-vis

SNC/Blanchette

484Frédéric Levesque, L’obligation in solidum en droit privé québécois (Cowansville, QC: Yvon Blais, 2010) at 114–115.

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[533]

That argument ignores the direct obligations, albeit from different sources, incumbent upon the Group 1 and Group 2 members to the contractors.

[TRANSLATION]

485 CQLR, c. C-25; Chartré c. Exploitation agricole et forestière des Laurentides Inc., 2002 R.J.Q. 1623 at para. 49 (C.A.).

486See Kosoian v. Société de transport de Montréal, 2019 SCC 59 at paras. 128–129.

487La Malbaie (Ville de) c. Entreprises Beau Voir inc., 2014 QCCA 739 at paras. 46–47. See also Couture c. Laboratoire d'essais Mequaltech inc., 2014 QCCA 585 at paras. 17–18; Lac-St-Charles (Ville de) c. Construction Choinière inc. (2000), AZ-50077338 at para. 60 (C.A.); Denis Ferland & Benoit Emery, Précis de procédure civile du Québec, 5th ed., vol. 1 (Cowansville, QC: Yvon Blais, 2015) at 967–968 and 970–971, Nos. 2548 and 2554.

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[53]It is alleged that SNC-Lavalin focussed the debate on the quality of the concrete manufactured and used.

[54]This defence invoked by SNC was intended to make the concrete suppliers and contractors, among others, support part if not all of the liability.

[55]Some of the parties invoked the fact that to counter SNC’s argument, they had to retain experts whose assessments concerned the quality of the concrete manufactured and used, in a context where the vast majority of the experts opined that the sole cause of the concrete expansion was the oxidation of the pyrrhotite, which was revealed clearly during the experts’ meeting in May 2011.

[56]The Court is asked to make SNC bear the costs of these “recourses in warranty” under the pretext that it alone succumbed.

[57]As we know, that was not the case. The defendants in question were found liable solidarily or in solidum.

[58]The defences invoked had merit and led to a presentation that took place in the context of the principal applications.

[59]Ruling on the fees and costs of the recourses in warranty among the principal defendants, the Court finds that each defendant must pay its own costs because each is liable solidarily or in solidum for the damage recognized.

[60]The debates held dealt with a new subject, that is, the tangible effects of pyrrhotite oxidation. All of the experts were of the view that these cases were unique in Canada in several regards.

[61]Overall, the work of the experts was useful and was done collaboratively such that the parties were able to avoid the unnecessary duplication of expert assessments. That resulted in presentations by the experts who divided the subjects of analysis among themselves. The testimony was rendered in an empirical and highly profitable manner, without redundancy. Each testimony allowed the Court to further its understanding of the phenomena at issue and their solutions.

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[62]All of the defendants invested in expert assessments for their benefit, which, it is true, had the effect for several of the defendants of supporting the plaintiffs in regard to the cause of the concrete expansion.

[63]The Court does not consider it appropriate to apportion the share of expert fees incurred by each party among the defendants.

[64]The fees were clearly negotiated among the defendants, and the Court does not find it appropriate to apportion them otherwise.488

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[TRANSLATION]

[45]The appellants argue that the judge’s reasons to grant the call in warranty against the Ville themselves justify their right to costs.

[46]Trial judges enjoy wide latitude when awarding costs. Given the important deference owed to these types of decisions, this Court will intervene only if there is an error of principle or if it is clear that costs were erroneously awarded.

[47]In this case, the appellants have not established that the conclusion granting the call in warranty without costs was actually an injustice.489

[536]The claims of self-builders who did not sue their formworker against SNC/Blanchette should also be granted without reduction.

488Judgment following the splitting of the proceeding at paras. 53–64.

489La Malbaie (Ville de) c. Entreprises Beau Voir inc., 2014 QCCA 739 at paras. 45–47.

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490In this regard, see Groupe Royal inc. c. Crewcut Investments Inc., 2019 QCCA 1839 at paras. 79– 80, citing Société du Vieux-Port de Montréal inc. c. Patel, 2019 QCCA 1493 at para. 37; La Malbaie (Ville de) c. Entreprise Beauvoir inc., 2014 QCCA 739; Péribonka (Municipalité de) c. Gagnon, 2015 QCCA 547; Laval (Ville de) c. Di Minno, 2008 QCCA 1882.

491In this regard, see Birdair inc. c. Danny’s Construction Company Inc., 2013 QCCA 580.

492Article 2100 C.C.Q.

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493ABB Inc. v. Domtar Inc., 2007 SCC 50, [2007] 3 S.C.R. 461 at para. 57.

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[TRANSLATION]

[890]As evidenced by exhibit DSNC 7 dated January 23, 2002, the minutes of a Carrière B&B meeting, it is clear that the representatives of the concrete suppliers were aware of Maskimo’s problems and that they unanimously decided to take the necessary steps as of that moment to ensure that they produced quality stone.

[TRANSLATION]

The aggregate submitted [B&B] is of the same petrographical nature as that [Maskimo] found in the concrete of the foundation walls of the building in the Trois-Rivières region referred to in the report’s introduction, concrete supplied by Béton Laurentide. ... To the extent that pyrrhotite actually caused the issues observed in the above-mentioned building and that its chemical composition is similar, there is every reason to believe that the aggregate examined could also cause the same type of issue because its sulphide content is significant.495

494As will be seen later, CYB cannot dissociate itself from BL’s fault, as it is attempting to do with Ground No. 13, by being wilfully blind to the risks associated with using the aggregate.

495Exhibit DSNC-14 (4 May 2002), vol. 284 at 120152.

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[TRANSLATION]

[304]The Court notes from Marc-André Bérubé’s testimony on his report to

Laurentide that he wanted to warn it about using the B&B stone to manufacture concrete, although he acknowledged at the hearing that his message could have been more specific.

[305]His recommendation is expressed in conditional terms because he concluded that to the extent that pyrrhotite caused the issues observed in the Trois-Rivières region, in his report he wrote that the B&B stone could cause the same type of issue. That report, as will be seen, was forwarded to Lafarge for its opinion.

[306]In his report, Marc-André Bérubé indicated that the sulphide content was considerable, with a sulphur content of .52%, or the equivalent sulphide volumetric of more or less 0.7%, that is, 50% in pyrite and pyrrhotite.

[References omitted.]

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[TRANSLATION]

We need to know the risks of using this stone to manufacture concrete with respect to the percentage of pyrite contained in this same stone.496

[Emphasis added.]

496Exhibit DSNC-21 (23 October 2003), vol. 284 at 120182.

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[TRANSLATION]

[953]The Court finds that Béton Laurentide, Construction Yvan Boisvert, and Carrière B&B were negligent.

[954]All three relied on the erroneous opinions of Alain Blanchette and Marie De Grosbois that their product was suitable and could be used to manufacture concrete and that it was not deleterious.

[955]What more could they have done?

[956]Ask Marc-Antoine Bérubé about his DSNC 14 opinion, insist on knowing Ms. De Grosbois’ opinion after she was sent exhibit DSNC-14, implement the program they themselves developed during their January 7, 2002, meeting (DSNC-7).

[957]Mr. Bergeron’s perplexity over the result of DSNC-14 that he shared with Lafarge should have prompted the concrete suppliers to obtain a clear answer to the question posed to Lafarge, their advisor, in 2002 and led it to require an answer.

[958]In the Court’s eyes, these faults contributed to the damage suffered by the victims.

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[TRANSLATION]

[912]In this case, both the concrete suppliers and the quarry committed causal faults, as did SNC and geologist Blanchette.

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[TRANSLATION]

[905]Up to a certain point, they [the tandems] were justified in relying on the opinion of the professionals they consulted.

[Emphasis added.]

497See in particular Bourque c. Poudrier, 2013 QCCA 1663; Clouâtre c. Factory Mutual Insurance Company, 2011 QCCA 1690; Charron c. Macara (2004), AZ-50270944 (C.A.); Chartré c. Exploitation agricole et forestière des Laurentides Inc., [2002] R.J.Q. 1623 (C.A.).

498In this regard, see chapter 8 of this judgment, under Ground No. 8.

499At the hearing of December 12, 2017, BL and B&B abandoned the argument that SNC/Blanchette should bear more than 70% of the liability.

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500Main judgment at paras. 1313–1317.

501See above at para. [364] et seq.

502See above at paras. [532]–[535]. Note that the Court will deal with certain arguments specific to CYB under Ground No. 36, in chapter 1010 of this judgment.

503This apportionment also applies to the sequences covered by Ground No. 27.

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[TRANSLATION]

[336]During his pre-trial examination, Yvan Boisvert of CYB confirmed that the pyrite cases started to be rather well known in 2003, and that they were cause for concern because they were the subject of much discussion in Mauricie. He confirmed that he started to ask questions starting in 2003.

[339]Concrete suppliers Laurentide and CYB and the B&B quarry were aware of the possible issues with the Maskimo stone starting in 2002. This is very apparent from the minutes of their January 22, 2002, meeting (DSNC-7). As of that moment, they were concerned with taking [TRANSLATION] “the necessary steps to ensure that they produced quality stone.”

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[894]Therefore, the argument that B&B’s liability should be assessed based solely on information that Yvan Boisvert personally said he did not learn from Thomas Bellemare is rejected. In fact, it appears from the evidence that Mr. Bellemare was more involved in the Carrière file than Mr. Boisvert was.

[895]Mr. Boisvert attended the January 2002 meeting, and the Court notes that as of that moment, he was aware of the problem facing Carrière B&B.

[896]Even if Mr. Boisvert said that he learned of certain reports only during this trial, the Court doubts the reliability of his memory, especially since he placed great trust in his business partner to manage the file.

[897]Indeed, Carl Poulin, the engineer working for CYB and for Mr. Boisvert, testified that Mr. Boisvert did not want him involved in the quarry any more than was necessary.

[898]Therefore, Mr. Boisvert has only himself to blame for the failure to follow up of which he complains.

[899]The Court adds that Mr. Boisvert himself testified that he learned about

Maskimo’s problem from the general publicity surrounding it.

[900]Below is what he said in his pre-trial examination of April 27, 2011:

[TRANSLATION]

As of two thousand and three (2003), some people were starting to say that it was the stone, OK, and some were saying that it was the cement. We didn’t hide, we took our samples, nobody asked us...in any event, to take... it wasn’t... it wasn’t standards, so we took stone samples and we sent them to Terratech.

[901]A reasonably informed man in the same circumstances would have continued to monitor the development of the potential problem with using the aggregate he was producing, if necessary.

[953]The Court finds that Béton Laurentide, Construction Yvan Boisvert, and Carrière B&B were negligent.

[Emphasis added.]

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504Pursuant to the principle of deference to the judge’s findings on costs and expert fees.

505Main judgment at paras. 2294 [corrected on July 31, 2014] and 2295, and their equivalent in each trial judgment.

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10 DAMAGES (GENERAL GROUNDS)

10.1Ground No. 35: Establishment of a threshold volume of 0.23% of pyrrhotite in the aggregate for the assessment of damages

Background

[583]The appellants SNC/Blanchette, CYB, Aviva, and St-Paul Insurance, as well as certain contractors and their insurers, collectively submit on appeal that evidence of a pyrrhotite volume of 0.23% in the coarse aggregate does not on its own allow a distinction to be made between the buildings with no apparent damage (rating lower than 1) and those requiring repairs.

[584]In particular, they challenge the following paragraph of the Main judgment:

[TRANSLATION]

[1390] Thus, once the evidence establishes a pyrrhotite volume of 0.23% or more, the defects are proven, and extensive damages will in all probability materialize, except in the specific situations discussed.

[585]SNC/Blanchette argue that the expert evidence did not establish the duration of the latency period before a defect occurs in the affected immovable. They add that despite a pyrrhotite level of 0.23%, it is possible for the contaminated concrete to escape the usual consequences resulting from this deleterious element. In short, the

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damages invoked for the 116 immovables concerned by this ground of appeal506 are, at best, uncertain damages.

[586]Alternatively, the appellants criticize the fact that the judge did not take into account the probable life expectancy of the damaged components of the concrete.

They argue that this is a determinative error because of the judge’s refusal to apply

[TRANSLATION] “substantial depreciation” on the immovables in question, although it is possible that the damages claimed will occur only at the very end of the building’s useful life.

[587]CYB, its insurers Aviva and St-Paul, and some of the contractors agree with the arguments of SNC and of geologist Blanchette. In addition, they note that the judge did not use his own analytical framework to decide on the state of the damage of 116 of the immovables at issue.

[588]In summary, for the purpose of this ground of appeal, the appellants question the certainty of the damages because of the lack of evidence and of any tangible manifestation of concrete degradation.

[589]Some of the appellants – but in their capacity as respondents in the appeals filed by Alexis Beaupré (sequence 714) and the Diamond/Beaulieu couple (sequence 836) – concede that the judge erred when determining the pyrrhotite level found in the foundation walls of the immovables at issue in these appeals and that for these two sequences, the level is actually greater than 0.23%. However, they maintain their challenge on appeal by repeating the argument that evidence of a pyrrhotite level of 0.23% is insufficient on its own to support a judgment against them.

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506The appellants in groups 2 and 3 confirmed at the appeal hearing on January 17, 2018, that they contested the compensation of 114 sequences (22, 75, 77, 83, 89, 104, 111, 112, 115, 122, 127, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 156, 157, 159, 173, 197, 209, 215, 216, 219, 220, 275, 276, 288, 300, 319, 327, 344, 347, 351, 357, 359, 365, 366, 369, 371, 372, 379, 390, 396, 420, 429, 430, 433, 441, 476, 482, 485, 518, 523, 532, 549, 555, 561, 568, 582, 585, 587, 588, 592, 598, 608, 614, 616, 622, 624, 628, 633, 635, 639, 640, 641, 666, 669, 679, 682, 688, 700, 717, 719, 720, 725, 729, 740, 760, 769, 771, 772, 776, 790, 793, 799, 806, 807, 808, 813, 814, 838, 843, 851, 852, 853, 854, 902, 963, 964, 965 and 966). At the same hearing, the appellants in Group 1 agreed to use that list. In addition, at the appeal hearing on January 18, 2018, the parties involved agreed to add sequences 714 and 836, resulting from grounds of appeal 51 and 52, which were abandoned, to the list of contested immovables.

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Analysis

[590]The appellants have divided their arguments into four sub-issues. In accordance with their main argument, which can be summarized as the plaintiffs’ lack of evidence, they submit that (i) the moment of the appearance of damage remains indeterminate to this day, (ii) the damage is uncertain, (iii) the judge disregarded his own analytical framework for the purpose of finding the appellants liable, and finally, (iv) the judge did not apply a reasonable depreciation factor based on the probable life expectancy of the damaged immovables. It is worth reviewing each of these grounds of challenge in detail.

The moment of the appearance of damage is indeterminate

[591]The appellants submit that none of the experts who testified at trial was able to determine the exact latency period of the deleterious effects related to the presence of pyrrhotite in the concrete after which serious damage would affect the immovable.

[592]That argument does not challenge the judge’s conclusion that pyrrhotite is a highly deleterious element that is a hundred times more reactive than pyrite. Nor do the appellants contest the measurement standard retained by the judge, that is, the volumetric content of pyrrhotite (“VPO”).507 However, the appellants refuse to consider a pyrrhotite level of 0.23% as a certainty that the damage will appear.

[593]The appellants’ position is based on an erroneous interpretation of the evidence according to which burying components of concrete provides absolute natural protection against the deleterious consequences of pyrrhotite. It also relies on the unfounded idea that the damage affecting an immovable presenting a pyrrhotite level of 0.23% or more should be corroborated by visible evidence.

The natural protection conferred by burying components of concrete

[594]The appellants submit that burying components of concrete confers natural protection against the deleterious effects related to the presence of pyrrhotite.

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507See Exhibit DC-26 (18 April 2013), vol. 429 at 175927.

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[595]That submission invites the Court to undertake an exhaustive review of the evidence for the purpose of re-interpreting it508 and to conclude that no damage can occur to defective components of concrete buried into the ground. The appellants submit that in the absence of tangible signs of alteration of the concrete on the parts above ground, there is no evidence of damage. In cases of [TRANSLATION] “minor” damage, simply waterproofing the exposed components of concrete would be sufficient

[596]The evidence established that the natural protection conferred by burying components of concrete is far from absolute.509 In fact, it is of relative effectiveness because it depends, among other things, on a humidity level that is [TRANSLATION] “neither too high, nor too low”.510 Essentially, these are ideal conditions capable of slowing the progression of concrete expansion, conditions that are not necessarily found in all the soil used to backfill the defective concrete.

[597]When asked to comment on the situation of the foundation walls of certain commercial immovables, the expert Tagnit-Hamou suggested that backfilling the foundation walls was far from a bulwark against the progression of damage:

[TRANSLATION]

The concrete in the foundation, even when backfilled on both sides, is exposed to conditions that are favourable to the processes of oxidation and of

sulphation.511

[Emphasis added.]

[598]The appellants insist that the conditions of exposure of the foundation walls at issue in this appeal were not established, thereby suggesting that their argument was not rejected. Through that argument, they are subtly reversing the burden of proof by

508It should be noted that the trial judge dealt with this issue mainly in connection with the commercial immovables (Main judgment at paras. 403–404, 710–714, and 1488–1496; Groupe immobilier Bel- Rive inc. c. Construction G. Therrien inc., 2014 QCCS 2739 at para. 2). The conclusions he drew

must nevertheless be reviewed in the context of this ground of appeal.

509 Main judgment at paras. 1385 and 2263–2264; Minutes of June 28 and 29, 2012, vol. 444 at 182588; Exhibit DC-26 (April 18, 2013), vol. 429 at 175920–175921; Report of Tagnit-Hamou and Loïc Divet (9 July 2012), vol. 404 at 167101; Cross-examination of Charles Tremblay (2 May 2013), vol. 472 at 192965.

510Exhibit DCGT-4.1 (20 June 2013), vol. 415 at 170571.

511Letter from Arezki Tagnit-Hamou (9 July 2013), vol. 405 at 167600.

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requiring the plaintiffs to show that their immovable was not in an environment capable of countering the deleterious effects of pyrrhotite on concrete.

[599]The conditions in which the concrete was buried were discussed mainly by the experts to describe the kinetics of the chemical reactions and the extent of the concrete degradation (speed and intensity of the oxidation process) in the presence of stimulating factors found in the immediate environment of the contaminated components (concentration of oxygen, humidity level, temperature, etc.).512

[600]Except for the footings,513 where the humidity saturation level is more likely to be favourable to the preservation of these types of components,514 the defence’s experts did not specifically opine on the saturation levels of the other concrete components (foundation walls and slabs).

[601]In addition, the appellants did not establish that the foundation walls and the slabs of the residential immovables for which the owners were compensated fell within the same category as the footings. Moreover, the experts who testified at trial did not attempt to make this connection.

[602]Finally, the appellants’ argument disregards the content of the expert reports filed for each of the disputed sequences.515 Those reports led to the preparation of the Table of sulphides,516 which was determinative evidence in the assessment of damages. The reports contain similar conclusions whose wording may vary from one report to another but essentially emphasize the existence [TRANSLATION] “of a risk that the phenomenon of concrete expansion develops”, [TRANSLATION] “a significant risk of premature degradation”, or [TRANSLATION] “a risk of premature degradation” of the concrete.517

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512Report of Arezki Tagnit-Hamou and Loïc Divet (9 July 2012), vol. 404 at 167082.

513In this regard, see the analysis performed in the specific judgments concerning the commercial sequences (grounds nos. 40, 43, and 44) in appeal files 8848.

514Exhibit DCGT-4.1 (20 June 2013), vol. 415 at 170571.

515Most of the expert assessments were prepared by Inspec-Sol. Others, however, were prepared by, inter alia, Géosol, whose conclusion for sequence 760 states that [TRANSLATION] “your foundations will likely sustain significant damage because of the presence of pyrrhotite and will eventually need to be rebuilt”: Exhibit P-393.47A (30 October 2012), vol. 212 at 89133.

516Exhibit DC-26 (18 April 2013), vol. 429 at 175913 et seq.

517 For example, Exhibit P-293.54 (10 July 2012), vol. 230 at 97023; Exhibit P-293.50A (29 May 2013), vol. 230 at 96931; Exhibit P-293.47 (17 October 2011), vol. 230 at 96771.

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[603]At trial, it was therefore up to the defendants, not the plaintiffs, to establish that the immovables in question were located in an ideal environment for humidification – [TRANSLATION] “neither too high, nor too low” – to counter the conclusions in the expert reports filed in support of the plaintiffs’ claims. However, the defendants did not attempt to present such evidence.

[604]It is also worth noting that at the stage of evidence of damage, other than the issue of the alleged protection conferred by burying the concrete into the soil, the appellants’ challenge was based mainly on the visual inspection of the immovable conducted by the experts, without any other form of more thorough verification.518

[605]The evidence showed the limits of this method, in particular its inability to reveal the actual progression of the concrete degradation process for the buried portion. However, the inspections did show, during the experts’ second visit, the speed and significance of the phenomenon related to the expansion of the contaminated concrete on the visible portion.519 That anomaly, in several cases at least, had not been noted during the experts’ first visit a few months earlier.520

[606]In short, the blanket statement that burying the components of concrete is sufficient on its own to counter the devastating effects related to the presence of pyrrhotite in the concrete is not as absolute as the appellants submit. Rather, the evidence on a balance of probabilities supports the inferences drawn by the judge related to the pyrrhotite volume of 0.23% in the coarse aggregate.

The inferences arising from the pyrrhotite level of 0.23%

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518See Main judgment at paras. 37–38.

519Main judgment at paras. 66–69.

520For example, sequences 24 (0+ to 1+), 200 (0+ to 2-) and 447 (0 to 1). See Exhibit DC-26 (18 April 2013), vol. 429 at 175913 et seq.

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[607]According to the appellants, the evidence of the foreseeability of damage is not preponderant because of the indeterminate latency period of the phenomenon of oxidation related to the presence of pyrrhotite. That argument clearly disregards large portions of the evidence on which the judge relied to conclude that in all probability, defects would certainly arise in the components of concrete containing a pyrrhotite level of 0.23% or more.521

[608]The judge stated that he was of the opinion that [TRANSLATION] “undeniably, without the presence of a sufficient quantity of iron sulphide in the aggregate, there would not have been any oxidation or expansion”522 and that [TRANSLATION] “the damage started to exist as of the moment the concrete was poured”.523 He found that the percentage of pyrrhotite in the coarse aggregate was [TRANSLATION] “the most important factor to consider in the assessment of the concrete expansion”,524 in particular for the immovables considered to have no apparent damage.

[609]The percentage of 0.23% VPO accepted by the judge corresponds to the lowest volumetric level of pyrrhotite revealed by the evidence presented in defence from which it was possible to see signs of damage justifying a rating of 1 or more.525

[610]In addition, the fact that the deleterious effects related to the presence of a sufficient quantity of pyrrhotite are progressive and at first found in microscopic quantities inside the concrete is not challenged on appeal.526

[611]An important observation must be made from the foregoing. If a pyrrhotite level of 0.23% is capable of producing visible deterioration of the concrete, it can be inferred from that fact that the phenomenon of expansion related to the presence of this deleterious element necessarily started well before the damage became apparent.527 This fact alone considerably reduces the scope of the conclusions that the appellants would like to draw from a rating of 0 attached to an immovable that, at least in appearance, shows no signs of damage.

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521Main judgment at para. 1389–1390 and 2270 G).

522Main judgment at para. 717.

523Main judgment at para. 782.

524 Main judgment at

para. 1386. See, inter alia, the examination of Marc-André Bérubé

(27 June 2013), vol.

480 at 195971.

525Main judgment at para. 1388–1389.

526Main judgment at paras. 704, 783, and 825.

527Main judgment at para. 783.

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[612]The Table of sulphides also shows that three immovables with visible damage and pyrrhotite levels close to 0.23% were identified.528 It should also be noted that most of the immovables for which the claim was contested showed a level equal to or greater than 0.3% of pyrrhotite in the coarse aggregate. A joint report filed by six experts states:

[TRANSLATION]

The volumetric content of pyrrhotite has a significant impact on damage mechanisms in the concrete of the foundation walls.529

[613]In addition, the experts Gagnon and Bérubé drew the following conclusion, which applies to the majority of the sequences at issue in this appeal:

[TRANSLATION]

According to experience acquired through over 15 years of working in the Maskimo cases (Bérubé 2011: Section 5.9), an average volumetric content of pyrrhotite in the coarse aggregate as low as 0.30% is sufficient to generate damage requiring the replacement of the foundations.530

[614]In short, there is a direct correlation between the pyrrhotite level in the concrete and the virulence of the oxidation provoked by the presence of this deleterious element. Because the 0.23% VPO level is largely exceeded for most of the immovables in question, the certainty of damage within a foreseeable period is further supported.

[615]Commentators have recognized the validity of this conclusion with respect to the issue of the foreseeability of the defect:

[TRANSLATION]

Three main types of defects are recognized. First, it may be a material defect when the property delivered has deteriorated or broken (for example, a pleasure boat whose hull was damaged and is falling apart). The defect can only be foreseeable. The presence of pyrite (or pyrrhotite) in the crushed rock placed under the foundations provides a good example: even if it has not yet

528Sequence 196 (0.26%), 397 (0.27%), and 634 (0.26%).

529Exhibit DC-38 (15 October 2012), vol. 404 at 166791.

530Exhibit DCGT-4.1 (20 June 2013), vol. 415 at 170567.

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provoked the deformation of the foundations and other structural elements at the time of the judicial application, it will be characterized as a defect if the purchaser establishes that the deformations are foreseeable.531

[Emphasis added.]

[616]For those who believe that the level of 0.23% was set arbitrarily or is too generous to the plaintiffs, it is worth noting that the European standard tolerates a total sulphur level of 1% for aggregate, while the level of pyrrhotite must not be greater than 0.1%, which corresponds to 0.16% of pyrrhotite by volume.532 As we can see, that standard is much more onerous than the one accepted by the judge.

[617]In this regard, it cannot be excluded that, in other cases related to the presence of pyrrhotite, a judge could find that a level lower than 0.23% could nevertheless be sufficient to constitute evidence of damage.

[618]From the foregoing we can see that, by setting the level at 0.23% in these cases, the judge provided a safety margin beyond which he could consider himself convinced on a balance of probabilities that the damage was certain to occur in the immovables affected by that pyrrhotite level.

[619]Abundant expert evidence was presented in support of that idea.

[620]The expert Charles Tremblay stated that [TRANSLATION] “the critical threshold where there will be no damage is surely situated between zero (0) and zero point two (0.2)”.533 He also wrote that the buildings said to be without damage will present significant damage in the coming years, as the delay in appearance is influenced by the lower pyrrhotite level.534

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531Pierre-Gabriel Jobin & Michelle Cumyn, La vente, 4th ed. (Montreal: Yvon Blais, 2017) at 211–212, No. 168. See also 3223701 Canada inc. c. Darkallah, 2018 QCCA 937.

532Exhibit DC-24 (24 October 2011), vol. 425 at 174088 and 174166–174167; Report of Marc-André

Bérubé (11 November 2011), vol. 406 at 167838; Examination of Marc-André Bérubé (28 May 2013), vol. 476 at 194330; Examination of Marc-André Bérubé (27 June 2013), vol. 480 at 195957.

533Examination of Charles Tremblay (10 June 2013), vol. 477 at 194734.

534Exhibit DC-33 (5 October 2012), vol. 429 at 175959. See also Exhibit DC-35 (13 December 2012), vol. 429 at 175981.

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[621]The expert Bérubé is of the view that there is [TRANSLATION] “zero tolerance for pyrrhotite”.535 He stated that an acceptable threshold is between 0 and 0.2%.536

[622]The expert Denis Roy is of the view that corrective work is required as of 0.3%.537 He added that the concrete in place would certainly not have a normal life expectancy and that corrective work would be required.538

[623]The expert Divet stated in cross-examination that the fact that a residence is visually sound does not mean that it is not affected by the phenomenon.539 The same expert also distanced himself from the appellants’ argument that pyrrhotite in concrete could remain in a latent state for an indeterminate period:

[TRANSLATION]

Q.But also the reverse; if there is no appearance, but there is pyrrhotite inside, there is no certainty that damage will occur one day – it can remain latent indefinitely?

A.If the conditions conducive to the phenomena of oxidation and sulphation are united at a given time, the phenomenon could occur.

Q.Could occur, but it’s not a certainty?

A.It’s not a certainty; it will depend mainly on the quantity of pyrrhotite.

Q.And how do you explain the number of houses with pyrrhotite levels that are nonetheless significant but where no damage has appeared after seven, eight years?

A.I’m afraid that there will be damage within less than ten years.

Q.But you’re not certain?

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535Examination of Marc-André Bérubé (28 May 2013), vol. 476 at 194330.

536Examination of Marc-André Bérubé (27 June 2013), vol. 480 at 195957.

537Examination of Denis Roy (6 May 2013), vol. 473 at 193319.

538Ibid. at 193311.

539Cross-examination of Loïc Divet (16 May 2013), vol. 474 at 193564.

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A.Because we didn’t go see the condition of the concrete in place.540 [Emphasis added.]

[624]The expert then concluded his reasoning with the following statement:

A.The message that I especially wanted to get across is that we are in the latency period now, and we cannot see visual defects, but unfortunately, in a few years, the defects will appear.541

[Emphasis added.]

[625]Regarding the impact on the value of the defective property, the expert Tremblay was categorical when asked whether he would recommend purchasing a building whose foundation walls were affected by a pyrrhotite level of 0.23%. His answer leaves no room for doubt:

A.No; well … not at point twenty-three (0.23); no, I would not recommend it.542

[626]In short, there is solid evidence that reassured the judge regarding the occurrence of the damage, knowing that starting at a pyrrhotite level of approximately 0.23%, [TRANSLATION] “unfortunately, in a few years, the defects will appear”.543

[627]With such preponderant evidence, it is not surprising that the judge chose to dismiss the appellants’ argument, repeated on appeal with the utmost indifference to the standard of review applicable in such matters.544 Moreover, in another passage of the main judgment, the judge stated:

[TRANSLATION]

540Cross-examination of Loïc Divet (16 May 2013), vol. 474 at 193564. He stated that [TRANSLATION]

“the latency period varies depending on the various parameters that impact the kinetics” at

193600–193601. See also Report of Arezki Tagnit-Hamou and Loïc Divet (9 July 2012), vol. 404

at 167084 and 167119-167121; Cross-examination of Loïc Divet (16 May 2013), vol. 474 at 193623: [TRANSLATION] “the indispensable condition, the driving force of the reactions, is the presence of pyrrhotite”.

541Cross-examination of Loïc Divet (16 May 2013), vol. 474 at 193623.

542Cross-examination of Charles Tremblay (2 May 2013), vol. 472 at 192969.

543Cross-examination of Loïc Divet (16 May 2013), vol. 474 at 193623.

544P.L. c. Benchetrit, 2010 QCCA 1505 at para. 24.

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[1947] Depending on the volume of pyrrhotite in the aggregate, which varied over the years, in particular because of the rock vein where the aggregate came from, the chemical reactions took more or less time to appear. It was only a question of time, however, because according to the expert evidence, the phenomenon is irreversible.

[1948] The insurers argue that despite the presence of pyrrhotite in the concrete, it is likely, in their view, that the damage will never occur.

[1949] This shows why these cases are unique, as the experts unanimously acknowledged. Once pyrrhotite is found in sufficient volume, it is on the contrary probable that the damage will occur according to the evidence.

[Emphasis added.]

[628]The appellants SNC/Blanchette find some support in their expert Khayat’s presentation,545 and they ask us to consider it as if the task of assessing the evidence falls naturally within the role of an appellate court. But the argument put forth by that expert was not accepted by the judge,546 nor was the argument advanced by the expert Maher.547 The appellants do not point out any error in the judge’s decision to accept one expert assessment rather than another.548 In this case, the judge decided to accept the argument put forward by the majority of the experts who testified at trial. There is nothing suggesting that this assessment of the evidence was exercised in a manner that was not judicious.

[629]In short, the inference of damage drawn from a pyrrhotite level of 0.23%, in particular with respect to the certainty of its occurrence, rests on probative evidence supported by a majority of experts.

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545Exhibit DSNC-129a (June 2013), vol. 419 at 171979–172009.

546Main judgment at paras. 614–639. Moreover, the experts Arezki Tagnit-Hamou and Loïc Divet vigorously contested the theory of the expert Khayat: Report of Arezki Tagnit-Hamou and Loïc Divet (9 July 2012), vol. 404 at 167089 et seq.

547Main judgment at para. 1949. In addition, the experts Tagnit-Hamou and Divet reject the opinion of the expert Maher on the causes of the oxidation of the pyrrhotite: Report of Arezki Tagnit-Hamou and Loïc Divet (9 July 2012), vol. 404 at 167104.

548P.L. c. Benchetrit, 2010 QCCA 1505 at paras. 27–29.

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Uncertain damage

[630]To be compensable, the damage must be lawful, certain, and direct. In contractual matters, the foreseeability of the damage at the time the obligation was contracted must be added to these three conditions.549 Authors Baudouin, Deslauriers, and Moore present these notions as follows:

[TRANSLATION]

1-333 The position set out in the case law – The Quebec courts have long affirmed that in matters of extracontractual liability, all direct injury, regardless of its foreseeability, must be compensated. That rule is now codified in article 1607 C.C.Q. Foreseeability is a specific condition attached only to injury resulting from the non-performance of a contractual obligation. The rule therefore confirms the requirement of a direct causal connection between the fault and the injury, because determining whether injury is direct amounts, in reality, to ruling on that connection.550

1-357 General principles – All injury, present or future, must be compensated, provided that it is certain. This rule, followed in the case law, is codified in article 1611 C.C.Q. Compensating an uncertain injury, that is, an injury that will probably not occur, would be akin to condoning the creditor’s unjust enrichment at the debtor’s expense. The certainty of the damage, however, is assessed in a relative manner. The courts do not insist on absolute certainty, but rather mere probability. It is therefore sufficient to establish that the damage alleged will in all probability occur. … In this regard, judges have a discretionary margin of assessment that takes into account the proven facts and the specific circumstances of the case and inevitably introduces a certain amount of subjectivity.

549Art. 1613 C.C.Q.; Jean-Louis Baudouin, Pierre-Gabriel Jobin & Nathalie Vézina, Les obligations, 7th ed. (Cowansville, QC: Yvon Blais, 2013) at 922, No. 767. In contractual liability cases, the claim for compensation must be made by the contracting party or its successors by particular title. In addition, [TRANSLATION] “in contractual matters, the assessment of material damage must take into account the existing price at the time of the repair. The assessment must therefore be done in accordance with the market price on the day of the non-performance or breach of the contract or at the time the repair of the damage was carried out”: Vincent Karim, Les obligations, 4th ed., vol. 2 (Montreal: Wilson & Lafleur, 2015), nos. 1992 and 2004 [references omitted].

550Jean-Louis Baudouin, Patrice Deslauriers & Benoît Moore, La responsabilité civile, 8th ed., vol. 1, (Cowansville, QC: Yvon Blais, 2014) at 374, No. 1-333.

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1-359 Fixedness of the injury – The second essential condition to the compensation of future injury is that it must be able to be accurately assessed at the time the Court liquidates it. …551

1-368 Analysis in contractual matters – … Foreseeability must therefore be assessed as at the day the contract was concluded and by applying an abstract criterion: what damages would a reasonably prudent and diligent contracting party have foreseen in the circumstances? It is normal that compensation may not vary greatly as a result of external factors, meaning events or changes in situation that arise after entering into the undertakings, which the parties could not have anticipated and over which they have no control. The foreseeability of the damage must therefore be assessed based on data known to the parties. The contrary would amount to admitting that the most minimal non-performance could result, by a cascade effect, in an order to pay very significant amounts and unduly enrich the creditor at the expense of the debtor.552

[References omitted; underlining added; italics and bold emphasis in original.]

[631]The foregoing discussion responds largely to the appellants’ second argument that the damage is uncertain. There is solid expert evidence supporting the conclusion that in the presence of a pyrrhotite level of 0.23%, it is only a question of time before the oxidation of the pyrrhotite results in damage.553

[632]The appellants criticize the judge for having accepted evidence that did not support the finding that the contaminated immovables would [TRANSLATION] “inevitably” or [TRANSLATION] “necessarily”554 sustain damage. However, the certainty

551Jean-Louis Baudouin, Patrice Deslauriers & Benoît Moore, La responsabilité civile, 8th ed., vol. 1, (Cowansville, QC: Yvon Blais, 2014) at 397–399, nos. 1-357 and 1-359. See also Frédéric Levesque, Précis de droit québécois des obligations, (Cowansville, QC: Yvon Blais, 2014) at 228, No. 438: [TRANSLATION] “It is not possible, however, to award damages to a victim to compensate an injury that is purely potential. The situation is different when the injury, although future, appears to be the certain and direct extension of a current situation and is capable of immediate observation and assessment”.

552Jean-Louis Baudouin, Patrice Deslauriers & Benoît Moore, La responsabilité civile, 8th ed., vol. 1 (Cowansville, QC: Yvon Blais, 2014) at 406–408, No. 1-368.

553Main judgment at para. 1389. See also Exhibit DC-33 (5 October 2012), vol. 429 at 175959.

554A.B.-6 at para. 1 et seq.

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to which the judge was held is altogether different. It is not [TRANSLATION] “absolute or scientific certainty”, but rather [TRANSLATION] “relative certainty, measured in light of the rule of the balance of probabilities”.555

[633]In addition, the case law confirms that [TRANSLATION] “injury that takes time to develop but that is closely connected to the fault is no less of an immediate and direct consequence”.556

[634]In Montréal (Ville de) c. Scanlan, the Court stated:

[TRANSLATION]

[56]When the trial judge chooses a rate of partial permanent incapacity from a well-defined range, this does not imply that the future injury is uncertain. It is clear from the judgment that the trial judge was convinced that the eventual arthroplasty would result in damages. This conclusion flows logically from the opinions of Drs. Laurin and Duhaime. The uncertainty, if any, was limited to the resulting rate of incapacity. That said, determining the rate of partial permanent incapacity is a matter of discretion for the trial judge who heard the testimonies and assessed the probative value of the expert reports submitted before him.557

[635]In Lacasse c. Octave Labrecque ltée, the Supreme Court, per Justice LeBel explained the standard of proof by presumption in connection with the notion of certainty in the following terms:

[TRANSLATION]

It is also necessary to apply the relevant standard of proof. For proof by presumption, it is not necessary to establish scientific certainty. The most rational conclusion based on the known facts must be sought. The continuum

555Bourassa c. Germain, [1997] R.R.A. 679 at 682 (Qc. C.A.), cited in Videotron, s.e.n.c. c. Bell

ExpressVu, l.p., 2015 QCCA 422 at para. 84, leave to appeal to SCC refused, 36414 (15 November 2015). See also, with respect to causation in medical liability cases, Snell v. Farrell, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 311 at 330: “Medical experts ordinarily determine causation in terms of certainties, whereas a lesser standard is demanded by the law”. Although it is a common law case, it has been cited by the Court in subsequent judgments, for example, Laforce c. Dumont, J.E. 2003-959 (Qc. C.A.).

556 Promutuel Bagot, société mutuelle d'assurances générales c. Boutique du foyer de Saint- Hyacinthe inc., 2014 QCCA 1314 at para. 32.

557Montréal (Ville de) c. Scanlan, 2011 QCCA 614 at para. 56.

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between the improbable, the hypothetical, the possible, the probable, and the certain is not always clear. The inductive exercise leading to the recognition of a presumption of fact, in accordance with the civil standard of probability, may leave a margin of doubt. It does not usually result in absolute or scientific certainty – to the extent that these two notions merge – nor the certainty most often required in criminal law, i.e., proof beyond a reasonable doubt. It entails the acceptance of a solution as the most plausible, the most reasonable, based on the accepted facts and after noting that no other known factor seems to explain the observed factual situation in such a rational manner …558

[Bold emphasis in original.]

[636]The judge accepted that a percentage of 0.23% VPO fell within a range that was well circumscribed by the expert evidence. As part of his discretionary power, he identified [TRANSLATION] “the breaking point” beyond which he was convinced that the damage would occur in the foreseeable future in these cases. The exact moment of their appearance remains nevertheless dependant on the speed of the progression of the oxidation. Its progress is geometrically variable depending on the pyrrhotite concentration level in the concrete and the conditions in which it is located. These contingencies in no way make the damage hypothetical, however.

[637]The expert evidence allowed the judge to adopt a rational solution based on serious and concordant presumptions of fact according to which the damage would inevitably occur in all the immovables affected by a pyrrhotite level of 0.23% or more. In this case, the judge simply accepted the evidence pertaining to the acceptability of that submission.

[638]The evidence adduced at trial therefore goes well beyond the mere presence of a deleterious material in the foundations of the buildings. The scientific evidence established with [TRANSLATION] “relative certainty”559 the existence of damage the significance of which is not in doubt. In short, the existence of the defect, its seriousness, and the certainty that it will occur are subsumed in this case in the 0.23% VPO level accepted by the judge.

[639]The appellants’ second argument does not further their case.

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558Lacasse c. Octave Labrecque ltée, [1995] R.R.A. 596 at 603 (Qc. C.A.).

559Bourassa c. Germain, [1997] R.R.A. 679 at 682 (Qc. C.A.).

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The judge did not adhere to his analytical framework

[640]The appellants make much of the fact that the judge did not apply his analytical framework from start to finish before deciding whether the immovables that appeared to be free from damage should nevertheless be the subject of compensation. It is worth reproducing the paragraph of the Main judgment on which this argument is based:

[TRANSLATION]

[2260] Applying the legal rules discussed and the conclusions set out in the Main judgment, the Court will analyze the specific judgments by verifying the following elements:

The damage rating

The volumetric content of pyrrhotite in the coarse aggregate, which is the most important factor to consider. The table of sulphides will be used to that end.

The table is very important. The one used by the Court is identified as the Table of sulphides (excluding SNC). It is the most complete table and deals with each of the claims under consideration.

Upon analysis of the table, it should be noted that certain cases (sequences) were analyzed by either the group of experts or by Inspec-Sol and sometimes by both groups.

As a result of the sulphide content (volumetric) in the coarse aggregate (%) and the experts’ specific calculation of the percentage of pyrrhotite by volume, the Court assigned high value to this data, especially since the group of experts deemed it appropriate to disclose to the Court that the data generated by Inspec-Sol was valid by sending the summary of their October 10, 2012, meeting.

The Court notes that the experts did not consider calculations useful for the cases where the damage rating was high.

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The type of construction at issue (without a basement) and the consequences of the conditions of exposure

The date the foundations were poured

The conclusions of the expert reports submitted

The specific testimony heard in each case

The admissions of damage made in connection with the analysis of the applicable principles of law

The plaintiffs’ purchase contracts for the houses when required

Verifying whether the contractors/formworkers were sued by the plaintiffs

The formal notices.

[641]In this case, the appellants’ criticisms are based on a narrow reading of the paragraphs in question and ignore the central thrust of the Main judgment, according to which, at least for the majority of cases, a 0.23% VPO level is sufficient to find the debtors liable.

[642]There is a clear distinction between the alleged obligation placed on the judge to use all the factors of the analytical framework set out in the Main judgment and the need to apply only the relevant factors of that framework for the purpose of deciding the cases at issue.560

[643]In the first situation, the obligation imposed on the plaintiffs to satisfy each of these factors is excessive and completely at odds with the analytical approach proposed by the judge in the Main judgment. However, among all the factors listed, ignoring the one that forms the basis of liability is a mixed error of fact and law.

[644]In fact, there is nothing in the judgment to suggest that the various analytical factors are cumulative or even that they carry the same weight. In addition, the

appellants can very well complain that the judge did not apply his analytical

560In Groupe immobilier Chaîné inc. c. Construction Yvan Boisvert inc. (Béton Yvan Boisvert), 2014 QCCS 2713 at paras. 25–31, the appellants criticized the judge for not taking into account the factors set out in para. 2260 of the Main judgment.

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framework, but they do not indicate how the result of the case would have been different if he had conducted another balancing exercise.

The factors of the analytical framework are not cumulative

[645]The appellants see a contradiction between the analytical framework referred to in paragraph 2260 of the Main judgment and the following statement made by the judge, who, they claim, intervened prematurely in the judgment:

[TRANSLATION]

[1377] Thus, despite the fact that the cases submitted were not among the most serious, they eloquently demonstrate the need to perform corrective work, especially when the volume of pyrrhotite is greater than that accepted by the Court. However, the Court will proceed with the analysis of each case based on parameters such as the conditions of exposure, particularly in the case of businesses and multi-unit immovables without basements.

[Emphasis added.]

[646]It is true that the judge says in that excerpt that his analysis will be based on predetermined factors. He took care, however, to identify the context in which those factors were likely to play a role, in particular [TRANSLATION] “for the businesses and multi-unit immovables without basements”. Further on in the judgment, that context was specified in the following terms:

[TRANSLATION]

[1514] Thus, the nature of the construction in the commercial actions (without basements), the types of contract because several of them were concluded with self-builders, and the damaged sections resulting from the enlargement of existing buildings require the Court to address the amount of damages in a particular way, which will be the subject of specific judgments in connection with each of the commercial actions.

[647]The judge had previously taken care to state that certain [TRANSLATION]

“specific cases” would lend themselves better to a specific analysis:

[TRANSLATION]

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[1392] As noted, the Court found only a few cases that did not meet this criteria (0.23%), and accordingly, the action brought by those owners will be addressed as specific cases in the judgment dealing with them.

[648]The analytical framework specifically provides a factor related to [TRANSLATION]

“the type of construction at issue (without a basement) and the consequences of the conditions of exposure”. It is therefore not surprising that the judge undertook to verify each case [TRANSLATION] “on the basis of parameters such as the conditions of exposure, particularly in the case of businesses and multi-unit immovables without basements”.

[649]The foregoing highlights the idea that the factors set out in paragraph 2260 must be read and applied with discernment and in accordance with their purpose. A complete reading of the Main judgment allows for a better understanding of the relevance of each factor and excludes the proposition that the finding against the appellants is the result of a contradictory analytical process.

[650]In the judge’s view, the immovables without basements, in particular the commercial immovables, were [TRANSLATION] “specific cases”,561 which is not the situation of the vast majority of the immovables at issue. The factor – damage ratings – had limited effects because [TRANSLATION] “a general admission was made that any immovable with a rating of 1 or more requires repairs in any event”.562 The evidence of the date on which the foundation was poured served only to verify whether the claim was within the liability period of the debtors and whether it coincided with the insurance policy periods. Although the expert reports filed by the plaintiffs are an important factor, the appellants did not specifically challenge them. The judge stated that he heard the testimony of 65 plaintiffs.563 During the hearing, to simplify the evidence, the parties recorded the following admission in the minutes of hearing:

[TRANSLATION]

The formal notices and notices of disclosures are filed by consent. It was agreed among counsel that if the plaintiffs testified, they would say what is

561Groupe immobilier Bel-Rive inc. c. Construction G. Therrien inc., 2014 QCCS 2739 at paras. 2–3. See also Groupe immobilier Chaîné inc. c. Construction Yvan Boisvert inc. (Béton Yvan Boisvert), 2014 QCCS 2713 at paras. 25–26.

562Main judgment at para. 2261.

563Main judgment at para. 1383.

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written in the formal notices and notices of disclosure, without admitting that the cracks in these cases are related to pyrrhotite or pyrite.564

[651]Finally, the factors – admission of damage – and – evidence of purchase contracts – were never an issue of contestation in regard to the properties in question.

[652]The foregoing reveals that the judge had to pay attention to certain factors solely to the extent of their relevance. The plaintiffs’ situation resulted clearly, if not solely, from the application of the principal factor set out in the analytical framework, that is, the volumetric content of pyrrhotite in the coarse aggregate. The appellants are therefore wrong to claim that the judge contradicted himself by accepting the factor related to the pyrrhotite level when, for the sequences concerned by that ground, the other factors were more or less relevant.

[653]The appellants reply that, for the immovables with a damage rating of less than 1, the judge undertook to analyze the Table of sulphides565 and the specific reports filed by the owners. This argument does not withstand analysis.

[654]To analyze the claims, the judge used the Table of sulphides (without the participation of SNC), which he considered complete. According to that table, the vast majority566 of the sequences meet the threshold of 0.23% VPO, while most of them have a level of 0.30% or higher. A specific analysis of this issue by the judge, assuming that it was omitted, would not have changed anything in the outcome of the case. As for the expert reports filed by the owners, at the risk of repetition, their conclusions were not contradicted by any specific expert reports.

[655]In short, the factors listed in paragraph 2260 of the Main judgment were anything but cumulative.

The factors of the analytical framework are not all of equal value

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564Minutes of November 21, 2012, vol. 445 at 182734.

565Exhibit DC-26 (18 April 2013), vol. 429 at 175913 et seq.

566Sequence 115 is at 0.10 (grounds 37 and 51), sequence 359 is at 0.22 (ground 37) as is sequence 429 (ground 37). These grounds of appeal were the subject of a settlement, but these sequences are nevertheless part of the table of the 114 sequences, although their levels are lower than 0.23%.

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[656]In the Main judgment, the judge frequently reiterated the determinative weight he gave to the volumetric content of pyrrhotite in the coarse aggregate:

[TRANSLATION]

[717]Undeniably, without a sufficient quantity of iron sulphide in the aggregate, there would not have been any oxidation or expansion.

[783] From its analysis, the Court finds:

that the concrete degradation is due to the oxidation of the pyrrhotite in the aggregate, which was of a sufficient volume to provoke deleterious reactions within the meaning of CSA standard A 23.1.

[1386] The expert evidence unequivocally has revealed that it is the percentage of pyrrhotite by volume that is the most important factor to consider in the assessment of the concrete expansion.

[1389] Above that threshold, in accordance with the evidence, it is a question of time before the oxidation of the pyrrhotite causes damage. That is what the experts found and why the Court considers the threshold of 0.23% by volume of P0 to be that above which damage will appear, if it has not already.

[1390] Thus, once the evidence establishes a pyrrhotite level by volume of 0.23% or more, the defects are proven and the extensive manifestation of the damages will in all probability materialize, except in the specific situations discussed.

[Emphasis added.]

[657]It is therefore not surprising that the importance of that factor is emphasized again in the analytical framework in the following terms: [TRANSLATION] “The

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volumetric content of pyrrhotite in the coarse aggregate, which is the most important factor to consider”.567

[658]It is primarily because of that factor that the judge reached the following conclusion:

[TRANSLATION]

[2270] Based on its analysis, the Court arrives at the following conclusion:

(G)Cause of damage

That the sole cause of the damage is the oxidation of the pyrrhotite in the aggregate.

That any immovable in which the pyrrhotite volume in the aggregate was established at over 0.23% has a defect that causes or has already caused the concrete to expand internally, resulting in the damage claimed.

[Bold emphasis in original.]

[659]By prioritizing this factor over all the others, the judge simply applied the predominant theory supported by probative expert evidence to the circumstances of the case. That theory convincingly advanced the idea that the volumetric content of pyrrhotite in the coarse aggregate was the decisive factor in determining the actual damage to the immovables affected by this deleterious element.

Absence of depreciation

[660]In the alternative, the appellants invoke the end of the useful life of the foundation walls and the possibility that no damage will occur before that stage.568

[661]It is recognized that the award of damages must not result in the enrichment of the creditor,569 hence the importance of applying fair depreciation of the damaged

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567Main judgment at para. 2260.

568See, inter alia, Luc Lachance & Guillaume C. Branconnier, “Le passage du temps sur la structure de l’immeuble : vétusté ou vice caché?” (2015) 117 R. d. N. 245 at 245–284.

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property on the basis, in particular, of its age and obsolescence. As a guide, a certain line of cases indicates that the useful life of concrete foundation walls is approximately 100 years.570

[662]In this case, the common expert of the parties, Daniel Raymond, had originally concluded on a physical depreciation of between 3% and 9%. To that end, the expert used a life expectancy of 55 years for the contaminated components of concrete.571 However, the parties agreed to reduce the depreciation proposed by the expert by 50%.572

[663]It is highly likely that the compensated owners will have the corrective work done quickly, even before the appearance of tangible signs of degradation or before any aggravation of already-observed damage to the foundations. That is in fact consistent with the judge’s conclusion that [TRANSLATION] “any property for which the pyrrhotite volume in the aggregate was established as being greater than 0.23% has a defect that is leading or has already led to the internal expansion of the concrete, resulting in the damage claimed”.573

[664]A different depreciation could have been applied to the buildings with a rating lower than 1 in view of the evolving process of oxidation of the pyrrhotite. Nevertheless, the judge’s conclusions that [TRANSLATION] “the damage started to exist as of the moment the concrete was poured”574 and [TRANSLATION] “the vast majority of the properties entered on the list of immovables without damage should not be considered as such”575 call for deference.

[665]The judge exercised his discretion. The range of possibilities in this area is broad. He could have applied a different solution while remaining within the limits of a

569Frédéric Levesque, Précis de droit québécois des obligations (Cowansville, QC: Yvon Blais, 2014) at 394, No. 752.

570The useful life of poured concrete foundations was established at 100 years compared to 50 years for those made of concrete blocks (Bellehumeur c. Doucet, 2016 QCCQ 8572 at paras. 62–69). Lacoursière J. found that for a building constructed in 1917, the foundations were at the end of their useful life at 93 years out of 105 years (Alloul c. Lewis, 2015 QCCS 3819 at paras. 106 and 265). More modern concrete foundations have a useful life of 100 years (Penafiel c. Néron, 2012 QCCS 6186 at paras. 72–76, appeal discontinued on May 22, 2013).

571For example, sequence 13 [Schedules 1 and 2] (28 June 2013), vol. 378 at 157566–157567.

572Admission on the depreciation rates (6 June 2013), vol. 447 at 183644; Main judgment at paras. 1347–1354.

573Main judgment at para. 2270.

574Main judgment at para. 782.

575Main judgment at para. 1385.

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rational assessment based on a balance of probabilities. The solution chosen is clearly within the available possibilities and does not give rise to the Court’s intervention.

Conclusion

[666]The expert evidence accepted by the judge allowed him to conclude that a pyrrhotite level of 0.23% corresponded to certain damage of the contaminated components of concrete. The appellants did not submit any argument to contradict the evidence establishing on a balance of probabilities that concrete having a pyrrhotite level of 0.23% in the coarse aggregate was [TRANSLATION] “diseased concrete”.576

[667]Moreover, the evidence in the record shows that the judge made a factual error by concluding that the buildings identified by sequence numbers 714 and 836 did not have a pyrrhotite level equal to or greater than 0.23%. The admission made by the parties concerned on this issue calls for the reversal of the specific judgments concerning those sequences.

[668]Accordingly, Ground 35 is rejected. However, the appeals filed by Alexis Beaupré (sequence 714) and the Diamond/Beaulieu couple (sequence 836) are allowed, with legal costs, and their respective re-amended motions to institute proceedings are granted with costs fixed in accordance with the tariff of judicial fees for a case on the merits lasting one day.

10.2 Ground No. 36: Expert fees

[669]The appellant CYB and its insurers [collectively referred to as “CYB”] submit that the judge made a palpable and overriding error by refusing to award CYB judicial fees and costs, including the expert fees incurred for its defence and its application for forced intervention, in regard to which it claims to have succeeded against SNC.

[670]CYB claims to have paid over $1 million in expert fees for its defence and its application for forced intervention against SNC. It argues that, in view of the results obtained at trial, costs should be awarded in its favour.

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576Main judgment at para. 828; Examination of Arezki Tagnit-Hamou (17 May 2013), vol. 474 at 193716–193717.

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Background

[671]The debate at trial concerning the defendants’ liability was focused mainly on two theories. First was the theory put forward by the plaintiffs, who considered the fault of geologist Blanchette, a party related to SNC, to be a significant cause of their damage. There was also the theory submitted in defence by SNC/Blanchette seeking to place the blame on the tandems and the contractors, alleging against them inter alia the defective quality of the concrete caused by a poor manufacturing technique aggravated by a defective incorporation process.

[672]During the trial, CYB had to defend itself on three fronts. First, with respect to the application of the regime of legal warranty invoked by the plaintiffs. Second, regarding SNC’s theory based on the concrete suppliers’ fault for having used a poor concrete manufacturing technique. Last, CYB was also blamed for [TRANSLATION]

“failing to ensure the quality of its product”,577 in particular by neglecting to take into account certain information disclosing the presence of a deleterious element in the aggregate used to make the concrete sold to its clients.

[673]The application of the regime of legal warranty left CYB with little leeway considering how obvious the evidence of the defect was. However, the theory put forward by SNC led to a strategic reconciliation between the plaintiffs, B&B, the concrete suppliers, and the contractors for the common purpose of establishing geologist Blanchette's faults and the cause of the concrete degradation. That concerted approach sought first of all to ensure that the plaintiffs included SNC/Blanchette among their debtors because of the extracontractual faults committed against them. It also allowed the tandems to rebut the allegation of poor manufacturing by invoking different causes at the origin of the damage, namely geologist Blanchette's fault and the oxidation of the pyrrhotite.

[674]The reconciliation had its limits, however. During the presentation of the common evidence, the tandems supported SNC in contesting the position of the plaintiffs and that of their experts concerning the inferences related to a pyrrhotite level in the coarse aggregate and in arguing that there was no damage with respect to certain specific sequences. Not to mention the application made to the judge by the defendants, including CYB, to reduce the plaintiffs’ expert fees.578

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577Main judgment at para. 1101 b).

578Judgment following the splitting of the proceeding at para. 41.

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[675]There was also the debate concerning CYB pursuant to which the concrete supplier was found to be at fault for having neglected to ensure the quality of its concrete before selling it. In this regard, it should be noted that this issue was decided based on mere lay evidence.

[676]It is also useful to recall the existence of the judicial contract among the parties.579 It sought to avoid a cascade of applications for forced intervention likely to arise among the defendants. They were therefore exempt from having to file applications for forced intervention against each other in the usual way, and they agreed to present common evidence, while asking the judge to render judgment as if such applications had been formally filed.580

[677]It was in that very particular procedural context that arose the issue of the expert fees incurred by CYB to counter the argument invoked by SNC against the tandems and to establish geologist Blanchette's fault. That expert evidence was not specifically related to the application for forced intervention, however, but arose in the context of common evidence.

[678]It should be added that the treatment of the defendants regarding costs was the same for all of them, that is, they each had to bear their own expert fees.581 Only CYB contests that conclusion.

Analysis

[679]Trial judges have broad discretion when ruling on expert fees. The opportunity for intervention in this regard is rather narrow, as authors Denis Ferland and Benoit Emery note:

[TRANSLATION]

Principles applicable to the intervention of the Court of Appeal regarding expert fees

1-2548 – With respect to judgments ruling on expert fees, the Court of Appeal will not intervene unless it is convinced that the trial judge improperly exercised the judicial discretion conferred by law, that his or her decision is based on a palpable and overriding error in the assessment of the relevant

579Judicial contract (18 January 2012), vol. 447 at 183673 et seq.

580Judgment following the splitting of the proceeding at paras. 5–8 and 13.

581Judgment following the splitting of the proceeding at para. 136.

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factors or an erroneous principle, or that it results in actual or manifest injustice, or if the trial judge failed to rule on expert fees.582

[References omitted; bold emphasis in original.]

[680]CYB submits three grounds in support of its application to reverse the conclusions on costs including expert fees.583 It argues that a finding against a defendant of in solidum or solidary liability is not an obstacle to obtaining an order for the reimbursement of expert fees incurred in the context of an application for forced intervention against its co-debtor. It adds that the agreement reached among the parties concerning the payment of technical expenses was not intended to determine the apportionment of expert fees. Finally, it submits that its expert reports were used in favour of the plaintiffs’ case.

[681]In the judgment following the splitting of the proceeding, the judge addressed the issue of expert fees at length. Below are a few relevant excerpts from the judgment on that subject:

[TRANSLATION]

[35]Some of the defendants ask it to do so and suggest that the plaintiffs’ costs be entirely supported by SNC, who is blamed for having focussed the debate on issues that were not retained. The same parties invoke having even supported and endorsed the merits of the victims’ claims. The Court does not accept their suggestion.

[36]Overall, the trial became necessary not only to rule on the cause of the damage – the main subject at the heart of the dispute – but also on the share of liability incumbent on each of the parties involved in the process of manufacturing, delivering, and authorizing the components of the affected foundations. Each party put the blame on another or several others for not having acted properly.

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582Denis Ferland & Benoit Emery, Précis de procédure civile du Québec, 5th ed., vol. 1 (Cowansville, QC: Yvon Blais, 2015) at 967–968, No. 1-2548. These comments were made with reference to the new Code of Civil Procedure but may be transposed to this case. See Denis Ferland & Benoit Emery, Précis de procédure civile du Québec, 4th ed., vol. 1 (Cowansville, QC: Yvon Blais, 2003) at 717–739.

583The parties agreed that expert fees would be considered part of the judicial fees: Minutes of July 21, 2010, vol. 444 at 182274.

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[37]As noted above, most of the defendant parties were represented by their respective insurers.

[38]Several of the defendants’ insurers deemed it appropriate to invoke textual arguments in defence. Some of those insurers presented evidence in support of their arguments.

[39]The Court finds that the plaintiffs’ costs will be shared among the defendants in proportion to the respective findings of liability against them. This manner of proceeding ensures respect for the specific cases in which liability was shared in a different way to take into account the particularities of certain claims, like in the case of the commercial cases, and for the parties who were not found liable.

[41]The Court is also asked to mitigate the plaintiffs’ expert fees.

[42]There is no reason to do so here. The defendants rightly insisted that the plaintiffs prove the admissibility of their claim, and in so doing, the plaintiffs had to call upon experts. Those expert reports were useful, and the expenses incurred in their regard are reasonable.

[43]In this regard, the Court applies the principles set out in Michaud c. Équipements ESF inc.

ii. REGARDING THE RECOURSES IN WARRANTY

[53]It is alleged that SNC-Lavalin focussed the debate on the quality of the concrete manufactured and used.

[54]This defence invoked by SNC was intended to make the concrete suppliers and contractors, among others, support part if not all of the liability.

[55]Some of the parties invoked the fact that to counter SNC’s argument, they had to retain experts whose assessments concerned the quality of the concrete manufactured and used, in a context where the vast majority of the experts opined that the sole cause of the concrete expansion was the

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oxidation of the pyrrhotite, which was revealed clearly during the experts’ meeting in May 2011.

[56]The Court is asked to make SNC bear the costs of these “recourses in warranty” under the pretext that it alone succumbed.

[57]As we know, that was not the case. The defendants in question were found liable solidarily or in solidum.

[58]The defences invoked had merit and led to a presentation that took place in the context of the principal applications.

[59]Ruling on the fees and costs of the recourses in warranty among the principal defendants, the Court finds that each defendant must pay its own costs because each is liable solidarily or in solidum for the damage recognized.

[60]The debates held dealt with a new subject, that is, the tangible effects of pyrrhotite oxidation. All of the experts were of the view that these cases were unique in Canada in several regards.

[61]Overall, the work of the experts was useful and was done collaboratively such that the parties were able to avoid the unnecessary duplication of expert assessments. That resulted in presentations by the experts who divided the subjects of analysis among themselves. The testimony was rendered in an empirical and highly profitable manner, without redundancy. Each testimony allowed the Court to further its understanding of the phenomena at issue and their solutions.

[62]All of the defendants invested in expert assessments for their benefit, which, it is true, had the effect for several of the defendants of supporting the plaintiffs in regard to the cause of the concrete expansion.

[63]The Court does not consider it appropriate to apportion the share of expert fees incurred by each party among the defendants.

[64]The fees were clearly negotiated among the defendants, and the Court does not find it appropriate to apportion them otherwise.

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[136]All the defendants will bear their own expert fees and disbursements without recourse against the defendants;584

[Underlinig added; reference omitted.]

The findings of solidary or in solidum liability

[682]CYB’s first argument is based on this passage from the judgment following the splitting of the proceeding: [TRANSLATION] “the Court finds that each defendant should bear their own costs since they are each liable solidarily or in solidum for the damage recognized”.585

[683]CYB is correct that, in principle, a finding of liability regarding several solidary or in solidum debtors does not deprive one of them from seeking reimbursement from the others equivalent to their respective interest in the debt, including the expert fees incurred to establish the merits of the right asserted.

[684]CYB errs, however, by isolating that passage from the rest of the Main judgment, which, it should be recalled, is the result of a joint hearing on the case in chief and the applications for forced intervention. That method permitted the judge to take a broad look at the dispute as a whole, and he ultimately concluded that all the expert reports allowed him to form an opinion on a new subject raising complex scientific questions. In this regard, the expert reports of SNC, like those of CYB including those submitted by the other parties, generally contributed to furthering the judge’s understanding of the phenomena related to the presence of pyrrhotite in the aggregate and to identifying the best solutions to compensate the plaintiffs.

[685]The judge was also dealing with a multitude of interests that were sometimes divergent and sometimes concurring, such that an adversary on one day became an ally the next. Faced with this mosaic of positions, it is not surprising that the judge chose to consider the issue of expert fees globally rather than on a piecemeal basis.

[686]In addition, there is no connection between the objective sought by the expert reports filed by CYB and the facts accepted against it underlying the judge’s conclusion that the concrete supplier had [TRANSLATION] “failed to ensure the quality of its product”.

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584Judgment following the splitting of the proceeding at paras. 35–43, 53–64, and 136.

585Judgment following the splitting of the proceeding at para. 59.

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[687]The supposed victory over SNC that CYB sees in the unequal apportionment of liability favourable to it can in no way be attributed to the merits of its arguments to establish geologist Blanchette's faults or to counter the argument of a defective process. It lies above all in the seriousness of its fault,586 which was found to be less significant than Blanchette’s faults. CYB thus succumbed in part for a separate fault that it committed, even if its lesser seriousness played in its favour at the time liability was apportioned.

[688]In short, the causes of the damage flowed from the expert evidence presented by all the parties and debated in the context of the principal applications, while the percentage of liability entailed only a question of fact concerning the assessment of the seriousness of the faults at issue, regarding which the expert reports were of limited usefulness.

The agreements on expert fees

[689]On or about November 1, 2010, an agreement was reached among the defendants [TRANSLATION] “concerning the payment of the technical experts’ fees”.587 The agreement was confirmed by judgment on November 3, 2010:

[TRANSLATION]

[5]ORDERS all the parties concerned by this agreement to comply with it and with the apportionment of the resulting costs and payments, the whole in accordance with the terms of the agreement and its schedules attached hereto, which form an integral part of this judgment;588

[690]CYB contests the following passage from the judgment following the splitting of the proceeding: [TRANSLATION] “These [expert] fees were clearly negotiated among the defendants, and the Court does not find it appropriate to apportion them otherwise”.589 It submits that the judge interpreted the agreement as the defendants’ renunciation of their right to claim their own expert fees, which does not constitute an agreement on their apportionment.590

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586Article 1478 C.C.Q.

587Order rendered on November 3, 2010, vol. 489 at 199534.

588Ibid. at 199529.

589Judgment following the splitting of the proceeding at para. 64.

590A.B.-6 at para. 82.

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[691]It is true that the agreement in question concerns so called [TRANSLATION]

“technical” fees, but there nothing suggesting that the judge gave it a different scope, as CYB claims, or that he committed any reviewable error in this regard.

[692]Moreover, the judge gave ample reasons for his decision on the fees on other grounds. A reading of the Table of fees591 shows that the defendants, to varying degrees, chose to incur significant expert fees to support their theory of the case. The judge found that all that evidence allowed him to [TRANSLATION] “further [his] understanding of the phenomena at issue and their solutions”.592 CYB has not established how its situation is different from that of the other co-defendants.

The usefulness of the expert reports

[693]In Abdelnour c. Banque HSBC, the Court ruled as follows on the issue of the necessity and usefulness of an expert report:

[TRANSLATION]

[40] The trial judge explained that:

[TRANSLATION]

[79]The defendant is awarded all costs, including expert fees totalling $52,362.26, because the report prepared by the defendant’s expert was necessary and useful.

[41]There is no need to review this largely factual determination.

[42]First, it should be noted that, to the extent that the awarding of costs, including expert fees, is a matter of discretion, the Court will intervene only rarely to vary the decision of the trial judge in this respect.593

[Emphasis added.]

[694]CYB argues that its expert reports supported the plaintiffs’ efforts in their explanation of the causes of the concrete expansion. It claims to suffer injustice due

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591Re-amended table of fees, vol. 484 at 197219.

592Judgment following the splitting of the proceeding at para. 61.

593Abdelnour c. Banque HSBC, autrefois Banque Hongkong du Canada, 2006 QCCA 1348 at paras. 40–42.

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to the refusal to reimburse its expert fees, while it is ordered to pay those of the plaintiffs who made the same argument.

[695]It was not altruism that made CYB support the plaintiffs’ efforts. The theory advanced by its experts served primarily its own interests because, it should be recalled, SNC had focussed the debate on deficiencies related to concrete manufacturing techniques. The theory also allowed the same argument invoked by SNC in its defence and pleaded at the forced intervention stage to be set aside.

CYB’s expert reports were of no relevance, however, to counter the argument related to its own negligence and the legal warranty that it owed.

[696]Moreover, there is no evidence in the record establishing that CYB’s expert reports were more determinative on the outcome of the case than the other expert reports filed by the parties, in particular those of the plaintiffs.

[697]CYB addressed the issue of expert fees using a traditional framework. However, the volume of files, the number of expert reports, and the special case management that occurred in this case urge us to show deference to the solution adopted by the judge. The judge established the terms of the presentation of the expert evidence, heard the experts’ testimony during the trial, and assessed their reports. He was therefore in the best position to decide the weight to give to that evidence. Despite the relevance of CYB’s expert reports, the judge decided not to apportion the expert fees in its favour on the ground that they were more determinative than the other expert reports filed into evidence.

[698]CYB has not established that the judge’s findings on the usefulness of all the expert reports prevented him from concluding that each of the defendants should pay their own expert fees.

Conclusion

[699]As the Court noted above, the fact that the recourse in warranty was maintained does not, on its own, give a right to costs.594 CYB did not establish that the judge’s decision concerning expert fees contains an actual injustice or that it is based on an error in principle. Accordingly, the Court rejects this ground of appeal.

————————————————————————————————

594La Malbaie (Ville de) c. Entreprises Beau Voir inc., 2014 QCCA 739 at paras. 45–47.

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INTRODUCTION TO THE ANALYSIS OF ALL INSURANCE ISSUES

[700]In parallel with the issues related to liability and damages, the parties raise various grounds of appeal, most of which relate to the interpretation of the insurance policies at issue. Their grounds of appeal cover a broad spectrum from arguments espousing a complete absence of coverage to those evoking certain limitations, while some parties argue for an extension of insurance coverage.

[701]First, the appeals invite the Court to rule on the context surrounding the taking effect of the various insurance policies held by the concrete suppliers and by B&B, which policies it is asked to declare null ab initio. In this regard, the various appellants adopt contradictory positions on which the Court must rule. As alternative arguments, the insurers of the concrete suppliers and of B&B also invoke clauses, limitations, and exclusions595 of a contractual nature with respect to which they allege the judge committed reviewable errors.

[702]Next, the Court must turn its attention to SNC’s liability insurance policies.

Like the insurers of the concrete suppliers, of B&B, and of certain contractors, SNC’s insurers contest several of the judge’s conclusions for the purpose, inter alia, of limiting or denying coverage to their insured. The contractors, in their capacity as injured third persons, and their insurers have joined the debate by challenging some of the ways in which SNC’s insurers have interpreted their policies.

[703]This was a brief overview of the various issues raised in the insurance component of the pyrrhotite cases. Let us now consider each of these grounds more fully.

11THE INSURANCE POLICIES OF THE CONCRETE SUPPLIERS, OF B&B, AND OF CERTAINS CONTRACTORS

[704]Between April 1, 2003, and December 1, 2009, Northbridge General Insurance

Corporation [“Northbridge”] (formerly Lombard), covered as primary and excess insurer the activities of Gestion Bellemare inc. [“Bellemare”], a group of companies in which BL operated. BL was added by a rider to Bellemare’s policy on September

15, 2004, while B&B was added on March 30, 2004. AIG Insurance Company of

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595The insurers of certain contractors submit that an exclusion in their policies of the same nature as those of the insurers of the concrete suppliers and of B&B is applicable.

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Canada [“AIG”] (formerly Chartis) was Bellemare’s excess insurer from November 1, 2004, until December 1, 2009. AIG provided umbrella insurance coverage.

[705] Northbridge was also CYB’s primary and excess insurer from February 1, 2006, to March 31, 2010. B&B was added to that policy on April 1, 2009.

[706]It should also be noted that from September 10, 2002, to September 10, 2007, Northbridge was the insurer of Béton Maskimo, while AIG was the insurer of Laboratoire de Construction 2000 inc.

[707]Northbridge and AIG challenge the judge’s decision not to declare their policies null from the time they first took effect and invoke articles 2408 and 2410 C.C.Q. Those insurers are of the view that they should not have to cover the liability of the concrete suppliers and of B&B with respect to the events related to the pyrrhotite cases because of the breach by their insureds, at the relevant time, of their duty to represent all the facts known to them that were likely to materially influence the setting of the premium, the appraisal of the risk, or the decision to cover it.

[708]Conversely, the concrete suppliers as well as the contractors and their insurers are of the view that the judge erred in finding that the policies were null as of December 2007 and February 2008, as the case may be. They submit that Northbridge and AIG are bound to provide coverage beyond those dates.596

[709]These grounds of appeal rely on the application of the legal principles concerning nullity ab initio. An analysis of these principles requires a review of the relevant evidence in connection with the circumstances invoked by the appellants.

[710]As an alternative ground, Northbridge and AIG submit that the liability of their insureds lies in a single event at the origin of a single loss. This argument seeks to limit the indemnification by application of the clause titled “Prior insurance and non- cumulation of liability” as understood by these insurers.597

[711]Northbridge and AIG also invoke an exclusion clause concerning “pyrite” against their insureds. The same argument is advanced by the insurers of some of the contractors whose policies contain a similar clause. This ground of appeal is raised despite the evidence of the presence in the concrete of a deleterious element called pyrrhotite found by the judge to be the cause of the degradation of the

596These are grounds of appeal 54, 55, and 66.

597This is ground of appeal 67.

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foundations of the various immovables for which a claim was presented to the insurers.598

[712]Finally, the insurers of the concrete suppliers and of B&B argue that the judge erred in concluding that the damage started to exist as soon as the concrete was poured. Their position and that of their experts is that there was a delay of several months before the damage occurred.599

11.1Ground No. 54: Nullity ab initio of the policies issued by AIG

Ground No. 55: Nullity ab initio of the policies issued by Northbridge

Ground No. 66: Period of application of the nullity ab initio

The judgment under appeal

[713]The trial judge devoted close to 350 paragraphs to the review of the insurers’ grounds of defence concerning nullity ab initio.600

[714]He conducted an analysis of the risk assessment process, concentrating first on the process in place at Northbridge,601 and then subsequently on the one used by AIG.602 The judge noted that at Northbridge, the underwriting department has a reference tool, the [TRANSLATION] “Lombard Manual”, in addition to the support of an office of inspectors that includes engineers. In particular, the Manual advises underwriters to be well informed about the operations of insureds and encourages them to ask any questions deemed useful to their assessment.603 At AIG, the underwriters do not have written standards. They apply their own assessments, and in particular situations, the most trusted criterion is the exclusion of risk.604

[715]The judge then conducted a detailed analysis of the facts surrounding the issuance of the policies and their renewals for each of the insurers.605 In particular, he accepted that adding BL and B&B to Bellemare’s policy in 2004 was done

[TRANSLATION] “without a hitch”,606 and that for the 2006–2007 renewal, despite the

598This is ground of appeal 69.

599This is ground of appeal 68.

600Main judgment at paras. 1574–1916.

601Main judgment at paras. 1586–1593.

602Main judgment at paras. 1673–1686.

603Main judgment at paras. 1585–1592.

604Main judgment at paras. 1681–1684.

605Main judgment at paras. 1594–1728.

606Main judgment at para. 1606.

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fact that underwriter Lessard recommended to her superiors that a “pyrite” exclusion be included in the Bellemare policy (BL and B&B), Northbridge decided to renew the coverage without restriction as of December 1, 2006.607 Finally, the insurance coverage was renewed in 2007–2008, although Northbridge was aware of several losses due to “pyrite” and knew that their claims adjuster had sent them a series of documents regarding the assessment of aggregate submitted at the request of BL and of B&B.608

[716]The judge also analyzed the risk assessment conducted by AIG, who agreed to be the umbrella-type excess liability insurer of Bellemare (BL and B&B) as of 2004.609 He noted that for underwriter Legault, the absence of a reservation by the primary insurer was determinative in the assessment of the pending claims at the time of the policy renewals and that she never questioned it and never sought information from that insurer with respect to its conduct.610 Nor did she take into account at the time of the 2006 renewal the complaints made against BL in connection with foundation problems.611

[717]Before addressing the issue of nullity ab initio per se, the judge analyzed

Northbridge’s role as the insurer of Maskimo612 and of AIG, who insured Laboratoire de Construction 2000 inc.613 He also considered the role played by the broker AON in relation to Bellemare.614

[718]The judge began the analysis of the application to declare the policies null ab initio by recalling the applicable principles, the burden of proof incumbent upon the insurers, and the elements that had to be proved.615

[719]He then set out the concealment alleged by the insurers against their insureds. Northbridge criticized B&B and the concrete suppliers for not informing it at the time it issued the initial policies that it had known since 2002 that their stone contained pyrite and pyrrhotite and that this could lead to a serious problem. It also claims that they should have informed it, following the analyses of the stone conducted in 2006, that

607Main judgment at paras. 1630–1635 and 1640.

608Main judgment at paras. 1642–1646.

609Main judgment at paras. 1673–1691.

610Main judgment at para. 1686.

611Main judgment at para. 1688.

612Main judgment at paras. 1660–1672.

613Main judgment at paras. 1692–1710.

614Main judgment at paras. 1711–1728.

615Main judgment at paras. 1729–1734.

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B&B’s and Maskimo’s products were problematic. Accordingly, it argues, they had the obligation to inform the insurer of the various reports prepared on the sulphide content of the stone from the B&B quarry and those comparing that stone to Maskimo’s.616

[720]AIG makes the same criticisms but adds that BL did not inform it, as it should have, about what was said during the board of directors meeting held on September 2, 2005,617 during which its management questioned the scope of Marc-André

Bérubé’s report in connection with the reports of geologist Blanchette.

[721]Based on his analysis of the evidence, the judge listed the facts that the insureds and the insurers knew or are deemed to have known in 2004, at the time the insurance was taken out:

[TRANSLATION]

[1768] What are the facts that the insureds were confronted with in 2004 at the time the insurance was taken out?

They were aware that Béton Maskimo was experiencing concrete expansion problems;

Those problems started to appear in late 2001 and became worse over time;

The determination of the cause of those problems gave rise to a

debate among the experts, some of whom thought that it was the pyrite (the aggregate) while others (including Mr. Blanchette) thought that this substance had nothing to do with the damage (DSNC-20);

The expert Bérubé had told them verbally that the damage sustained by Maskimo was caused by oxidation of the pyrrhotite, which is what that expert wrote in his report DSNC- 13 addressed to the owner of the IGA, not to the insureds;

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616Main judgment at para. 1735–1736.

617Exhibit DSNC-28 (2 September 2005), vol. 285 at 120289; Main judgment at para. 1737.

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Laurentide was involved in the IGA case, but the concrete was poured using Maskimo aggregate and cement from Ciment St- Laurent, two components that it had not used for several years;

They were questioned about the reactivity of the B&B aggregate in 2002;

The majority of the experts consulted on the subject confirmed that their aggregate was good for manufacturing their concrete (Mr. Blanchette and Ms. De Grosbois);

Contrary to Béton Maskimo, Laurentide was not facing claims in connection with their product; (it was only in September 2007 that the first cases involving B&B occurred);

The IGA case was settled in 2004 by Laurentide with the participation of their then-insurers;

In report DSNC-14 from May 2002 concerning the comparison between their aggregate and Maskimo’s, the following conclusion was reached:

[TRANSLATION]

To the extent that pyrrhotite actually caused the issues observed in Maskimo’s IGA case and that its chemical composition is similar, there is every reason to believe that the aggregate examined could also cause the same type of problem because its sulphide content is significant.

[1769] Let us now review what the insurers knew at this period in 2004 (or were presumed to know).

[1770] The Court considers that the insurers knew or are deemed to have known, either as the insurer of Béton Maskimo or as the insurer of Laboratoire de Construction 2000 inc., that:

their respective insureds were involved in the many claims directed (there were about 30) against Béton Maskimo and Laboratoire de Construction 2000 inc.;

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the experts differ in opinion on the cause of the expansion, as we have seen;

those claims totalled several million dollars in damages;

the Bérubé report (DSNC-13), prepared for the owner of the IGA, ended up in the possession of the experts Hanna and Blanchette, whom the insurers had retained as experts in the Maskimo cases;

the insurers were aware of the pyrite problems to the point of associating that word with exclusion;

in September 2003, the insurance broker Vézina Dufault inc. sent Lombard exhibit DLL-47, which is an exhaustive memorandum on the problem that Béton Maskimo was facing.

[1771] The insurers were thus aware of the risks associated with the phenomena of expansion because of the claims they had handled, because of their knowledge that the Trois-Rivières area had a problem related to pyrite and pyrrhotite, and because the Quarry was located in St-Boniface, like the quarry of its neighbour, B&B.

[Reference omitted.]

[722]With respect to the alleged concealments, the judge stated that contrary to what the insurers claimed, the insureds had not been aware since 2002 that a serious problem could result from the use of their stone. They asked themselves many questions, but their discussions with the experts they consulted did not support a finding that the stone was the cause of the problems. Indeed, Lafarge and geologist Blanchette, whom the insureds consulted, concluded that their stone did not cause any problems of the sort Maskimo was facing.618

[723]The trial judge was of the view, however, that to comply with their duty to disclose, the insureds should have provided the insurers with the report that the expert Marc-André Bérubé had prepared at their request in 2002.619 In that report, Mr. Bérubé indicated that if the expansion problems observed in the case of the IGA

618Main judgment at paras. 1775–1778 and 1780.

619Exhibit DSNC-14 (4 May 2002), vol. 284 at 120148.

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supermarket building were caused by pyrrhotite, the B&B aggregate could cause the same type of problem because its sulphide content was significant.620

[724]In the judge’s opinion, however, in light of the evidence and the insurer’s conduct, this concealment was not sufficiently significant to influence the insurers’ decision.621 He noted that in 2004, none of the insurers had been sued and that in 2002, the IGA case was settled out-of-court with BL’s insurers the time.622 He also noted that in 2005, there were some discussion about claims related to pyrrhotite, and that in 2006, after considering a “pyrite” exclusion clause, the insurer changed its mind and renewed the policy without exclusions.623 In addition, Northbridge even had in its possession several documents referring to the problem,624 and despite everything, the policy was again renewed in 2007.625 The judge criticized Northbridge and AIG’s lack of rigour and stated that a reasonable insurer would have at least complied with its own analysis procedures.626 Accordingly, he found that the failure to provide the May 2002 report prepared by the expert Bérubé was not a material concealment by the insureds and that he could not find that the policies were null ab initio.627

[725]With respect to the duties of the insurer and the underwriter, the judge found that they are required to know about their insureds’ operations, their risks, and the standards applicable to their products.628

[726]In his view, the fact that the quarry and the concrete suppliers sought information on their products from experts does not constitute concealment because the experts unanimously confirmed that the products were good. The other expert assessments that the insurers complained they did not obtain did not suggest that the B&B aggregate could not be used. That was the case in particular with the reports of

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620See the Statement of general facts of the Main judgment at paras. [35] and [36]; Main judgment at paras. 1778–1779 and 1781–1783.

621Main judgment at paras. 1784–1785.

622Main judgment at paras. 1786 and 1809; Exhibit DSNC-14 (4 May 2002), vol. 284 at 119869; Exhibit DSNC-72.10, vol. 308 at 129297.

623Main judgment at paras. 1787–1791 and 1797.

624In particular, Exhibits DLL-25, vol. 331 at 138908; DLL-31, vol. 331 at 138924; DLL-33, vol. 331 at. 138959; DLL-34.1, vol. 331 at 138980; DLL-34.2, vol. 332 at 139086.

625Main judgment at paras. 1792–1803.

626Main judgment at paras. 1804–1808.

627Main judgment at para. 1810.

628Main judgment at paras. 1811–1818.

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geologist Blanchette629 because the judge noted that these reports confirmed the quality of the product in the insureds’ eyes and would certainly not have led the insurers to refuse to cover them.630

[727]As for the letter dated April 26, 2006, signed by Mr. Alain Canuel of Lafarge, indicating that it was in BL’s interest to immediately cease using the aggregate from the B&B quarry to manufacture concrete,631 the judge found that it had not been proved that this letter had been provided to BL.632 According to the judge, the reports of Ms. De Grosbois of Lafarge,633 of Josée Duchesne dated June 16, 2006,634 and of Lucie Tremblay dated August 31, 2006,635 do not support the conclusion that the B&B aggregate had a deleterious effect. It cannot therefore be inferred from the information in these reports that they would have influenced the insurers had they been provided to them.636

[728]The judge also analyzed Northbridge’s conduct at the time of the 2007 renewal and found that the insurer knew as much as the insureds and nevertheless renewed the policies. In the trial judge’s view, the insurer was not required to rely exclusively on the statements of its insureds and had the duty to submit the files to its internal expert, who was available. The knowledge of “pyrite” problems in the area of Trois- Rivières by the contractors, the concrete suppliers, and the quarries as of 2002 also applied to the insurers in this case. The judge found that the insurers’ files and the admissions of their representatives had proved the notoriety of the information.637

[729]However, the trial judge found that the report of geologist Blanchette dated November 28, 2007, prepared after nine months of tests,638 in which the author stated that he had concerns about the B&B aggregate in the area of the quarry designated as being rich in pyrite and recommended as a preventive measure that it not be used as concrete aggregate, should have been provided to the insurers. That report would have allowed them to asses the risks, especially since it was prepared at the time of

629At para. 1845 of the Main judgment, the judge refers to Exhibits DSNC-22, vol. 284 at 120184; DSNC-23, vol. 284 at 120191; DSNC-37, vol. 285 at 120350; DSNC-49, vol. 285 at 120462.

630Main judgment at paras. 1819–1822 and 1845–1846.

631Exhibit DSNC-39 (26 April 2006), vol. 285 at 120373.

632Main judgment at paras. 1847–1862.

633Exhibit DSNC-40 (31 January 2006), vol. 285 at 120377.

634Exhibit DSNC-44 (16 June 2006), vol. 285 at 120411.

635Exhibit DSNC-45 (31 August 2006), vol. 285 at 120425.

636Main judgment at paras. 1864–1869.

637Main judgment at paras. 1831–1844.

638Exhibit DSNC-51 (28 November 2007), vol. 285 at 120493.

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the policy renewals.639 Accordingly, he found that the policies were null ab initio as of the time of their renewal, that is, December 1, 2007, for Northbridge with respect to Bellemare and February 1, 2008, for AIG with respect to CYB.640

[730]Finally, Mr. François Houle testified on behalf of the insurers on the analysis that a reasonable insurer would have performed in the context of issuing and renewing the insurance policies in this case. He has 39 years’ experience in the insurance industry, including 20 as lead underwriter for an insurance company.641

[731]The trial judge found that a reasonable insurer would have at least investigated further as of 2006, when Northbridge was informed of the steps taken by Bellemare in the context of the questions raised by the insureds. A reasonable insurer would have submitted everything to its inspection department. Mr. Houle’s testimony did not convince the judge to declare null the policies issued to the concrete suppliers and to the quarry. On the contrary, it strengthened his conviction that a reasonable insurer would have acted differently before December 2007.642

[732]After conducting this thorough analysis, the trial judge declared null ab initio the insurance policies of Bellemare (Northbridge and AIG) as of December 1, 2007, and those of CYB (Northbridge) as of February 1, 2008.

Analysis

[733]On appeal, Northbridge and AIG contest the trial judge’s decision to declare the policies null only as of December 1, 2007, with respect to Bellemare (BL and B&B) and as of February 1, 2008, with respect to CYB. The contractors and their insurers, with the support of BL, CYB, and certain plaintiffs challenge the judge’s decision to cancel the insurance policies as of December 1, 2007, for Bellemare and as of February 1, 2008, for CYB based on the report of geologist Blanchette dated November 28, 2007.

The applicable law

[734]The legal principles applicable to the nullity ab initio of insurance policies on the grounds of concealment or misrepresentation by the client or the insured are not

639Main judgment at paras. 1870–1874.

640Corrected Main judgment (6 November 2014) at para. 49.

641Main judgment at paras. 1875–1876.

642Main judgment at paras. 1807 and 1877–1916.

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really challenged. They are set out in articles 2408 to 2411 of the Civil Code of Québec and are worth citing:

495 (*)

2408. The client, and the insured if the insurer requires it, is bound to represent all the facts known to him which are likely to materially influence an insurer in the setting of the premium, the appraisal of the risk or the decision to cover it, but he is not bound to represent facts that the insurer knows or is presumed to know because of their notoriety, except in answer to inquiries.

2409. The obligation with respect to representations is deemed properly met if the representations are such as a normally provident insured would make, if they were made without material concealment and if the facts are substantially as represented.

2408. Le preneur, de même que l’assuré si l’assureur le demande, est tenu de déclarer toutes les circonstances connues de lui qui sont de nature à influencer de façon importante un assureur dans l’établissement de la prime, l’appréciation du risque ou la décision de l’accepter, mais il n’est pas tenu de déclarer les circonstances que l’assureur connaît ou est présumé connaître en raison de leur notoriété, sauf en réponse aux questions posées.

2409. L’obligation

relative

aux

déclarations

est

réputée

correctement exécutée lorsque les déclarations faites sont celles d’un assuré normalement prévoyant, qu’elles ont été faites sans qu’il y ait de réticence importante et que les circonstances en cause sont, en

substance, conformes à la déclaration qui en est faite.

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2410. Subject to the provisions on statement of age and risk, any misrepresentation or concealment of the facts by either the client or the insured nullifies the contract at the instance of the insurer, even with respect to losses not connected with the risks so misrepresented or concealed.

2411. In damage insurance, unless

2410. Sous réserve des dispositions relatives à la déclaration de l’âge et du risque, les fausses déclarations et les réticences du preneur ou de l’assuré à révéler les circonstances en cause entraînent, à la demande de l’assureur, la nullité du contrat, même en ce qui concerne les sinistres non rattachés au risque ainsi dénaturé.

2411. En matière d’assurance de

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the bad faith of the client is established or unless it is established that the insurer would not have covered the risk if he had known the facts, the insurer remains liable to the insured for such proportion of the indemnity as the premium he collected bears to the premium he should have collected.

dommages, à moins que la mauvaise foi du preneur ne soit établie ou qu’il ne soit démontré que le risque n’aurait pas été accepté par l’assureur s’il avait connu les circonstances en cause, ce dernier demeure tenu de l’indemnité envers l’assuré, dans le rapport de la prime perçue à celle qu’il aurait dû percevoir.

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[735]The applicable rule is that of spontaneous declaration: the client is under the positive obligation to declare proprio motu a fact or event that is relevant to the risk, even in the absence of any questions or questionnaires submitted to the client.643

[736]The facts that are likely to “materially influence an insurer in the setting of the premium, the appraisal of the risk or the decision to cover it” are relevant to the risk

(2408 C.C.Q.). The burden of proving relevance lies with the insurer. If it seeks to establish that it would not have accepted the risk had it known the facts in question, it must establish not only that it would not itself have accepted the risk, but also that a reasonable insurer would not have accepted it.644 This is what one author refers to as subjective evidence and objective evidence.645

[737]The client is not bound to represent facts that the insurer knows or is presumed to know because of their notoriety, except in answer to inquiries (2408 C.C.Q.). The Supreme Court teaches us that the applicable standard to determine whether an undisclosed fact was notorious is that of the reasonably competent insurer insuring similar risks in the industry covered by the policy.646

[738]If the insurer succeeds in demonstrating that the information omitted was relevant to the acceptance of the risk, the insured may avoid the penalty of nullity by establishing that it nevertheless conducted itself like a normally provident insured in

643Didier Lluelles, Droit des assurances terrestres, 6th ed. (Montreal: Thémis, 2017) at 237, No. 333.

644CGU, compagnie d'assurances du Canada c. Paul, 2005 QCCA 315 at para. 2.

645François Duprat, “Questions de nullité : le passé de l’assuré” (2004) 202 Développements récents en droit des assurances 43 at 53.

646Canadian Indemnity Co. v. Canadian Johns-Manville Co., [1990] 2 S.C.R. 549 at 589.

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accordance with article 2409 C.C.Q.647 The expression “normally provident insured” refers to the notion of the [TRANSLATION] “reasonable person”.648

[739]The issue of the nullity ab initio of an insurance policy raises only questions of fact or, at best, questions of mixed law and fact. Accordingly, appellate intervention is subject to the standard of palpable and overriding error.649 That is the case in particular, when, as in this case, the trial judge conducts a thorough and careful analysis of the abundant evidence covering a period of several years.650

[740]For the purposes of analysis, it is useful to distinguish between two periods: the period prior to December 1, 2007, and the period starting on December 1, 2007.

The period prior to December 1, 2007

[741]The appellants Northbridge and AIG allege that the trial judge committed what they refer to as three palpable and overriding errors in his application of articles 2408 and 2409 C.C.Q.:

the judge analyzed a continuum of facts that were often subsequent to the subscription dates, whereas he should have conducted an analysis of the known prior facts;

he wrongly characterized as [TRANSLATION] “notorious” facts that were not consistent with the criteria in the case law or with the facts justifying such characterization;

the judge imposed a standard of investigation on the insurers that exceeded their obligations.

[742]Moreover, AIG complains that the trial judge wrongly confused its knowledge as the excess insurer with that of Northbridge, the primary insurer.

The judge’s method of analysis

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647 Compagnie mutuelle d'assurances Wawanesa c. GMAC Location ltée, 2005 QCCA 197 at para. 24; Didier Lluelles, Droit des assurances terrestres, 6th ed. (Montreal: Thémis, 2017) at 244– 246, No. 345.

648Smith c. Desjardins, 2005 QCCA 1046 at para. 37.

649Falduto c. Compagnie d'assurance-vie Federated du Canada, 2008 QCCA 438 at para. 28, leave to appeal to SCC refused, 32614 (4 September 2008), [2008] 2 S.C.R. vii.

650Vidéotron, s.e.n.c. c. Bell ExpressVu, l.p., 2015 QCCA 422, leave to appeal to SCC refused, 36414 (15 October 2015), [2015] 3 S.C.R. vi.

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[743]The insurers fault the trial judge for having analyzed a continuum of facts subsequent to the subscription dates, whereas he should have conducted an analysis of the prior facts. The appellants submit the example of paragraph 1785 of the Main judgment where the judge stated that [TRANSLATION] “the conduct of the insurers, over time, is highly significant in the assessment of the relevance of the alleged concealment”.

[744]That argument does not withstand the most cursory analysis. The trial judge found that the insureds should have sent Marc-André Bérubé’s comparative report from May 2002651 to their insurers before the first policy was issued to BL and B&B in April 2004.652

[745]In 2006, for purely commercial reasons, Northbridge decided to renew the policy without limiting the coverage653 and without imposing a “pyrite” exclusion, although it had been discussed.654 What is more, the insurer also renewed the policy in 2007 although it had received Mr. Bérubé’s May 2002 report from the insured through its claims adjuster.655

[746]Mr. Bérubé’s report was provided to Mr. Bouchard, the claims adjuster, by

Ms. France Côté of BL, with whom the claims adjuster met in October 2007. Ms. Côté then sent him a series of documents and expert reports prepared by Terratech, as well as the comparative assessment of geologist Lucie Tremblay dated August 31, 2006. Mr. Bérubé’s 2002 report was included in these documents.

[747]On October 25, Bouchard the claims adjuster sent Northbridge a detailed report of his meetings with Ms. Côté, BL’s general manager, and with Mr. Christian Deshaies, a controller at Bellemare, the insured. The documents provided by Ms. Côté were attached to that report.

[748]Mr. Bouchard’s report and all the documents provided by Ms. Côté from BL were sent to Lombard’s claims department. Mr. Mario Carier of Northbridge’s claims department received them, read the conclusions, and found that they revealed nothing. He says that he skimmed the expert reports and that he learned nothing new

651Exhibit DSNC-14 (4 May 2002), vol. 284 at 120148.

652See para. [723], above.

653Exhibit DLL-53, 2006-2007, vol. 333 at 139909, 139925, and 139941.

654 Exhibit DLL-69 (13 and 14 November 2006), vol. 334 at 140312; Exhibit DLL-27 (15 November 2006), vol. 331 at 138914.

655Exhibit DLL-33 (16 October 2007), vol. 331 at 138958; Exhibit DLL-34.1 (25 October 2007), vol. 331 at 138979; Cross-examination of Mario Carier (29 April 2013), vol. 472 at 192774.

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from Mr. Bouchard’s report.656 In cross-examination, he stated that he did not send these documents to the underwriting department because they added nothing to the file and [TRANSLATION] “there was nothing conclusive in them”.657

[749]From these facts, the trial judge drew the logical conclusion that the insurer could not claim in 2003, when the first policy was issued, that the alleged concealment was “likely to materially influence an insurer in the setting of the premium, the appraisal of the risk or the decision to cover it”, when it was not the case for the 2006 and 2007 renewals after the information was disclosed.658

[750]What is more, at the time of the disclosure in the fall of 2007, the insureds had received the first claims alleging the degradation of the concrete manufactured with the aggregate from the B&B quarry, which was not the case at the time when the previous years’ policies were issued. This is what the judge states in paragraph 1803 of his judgment, in which he notes the inference to be drawn from the insurer’s decision to renew the policy in 2007 after having duly received the documents that it faults the insureds for not providing to it earlier:

[TRANSLATION]

[1803] Claiming at trial that providing those documents related to the Maskimo cases would have had a material impact on their assessment of the risk to the point of excluding it is opportunistic discourse that their own conduct does not support, especially since at the time these documents were provided, the risk was supported by validly made claims.

[751]If that information had been determinative to the decision to insure, as the insurer claims, it would have provided more justification for refusing to renew the policy in 2007 than for issuing it in 2003. Nevertheless, it was renewed.

The facts known to the insurer

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656Examination of Mario Carier (26 April 2013), vol. 471 at 192680–192681.

657Cross-examination of Mario Carier (29 April 2013), vol. 472 at 192774.

658See para. [724], above.

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[752]Next, the appellants argue that the judge erred in considering [TRANSLATION]

“notorious” the fact that Northbridge was Maskimo’s insurer such that the insurer was presumed to know about the problems related to “pyrite” in the Trois-Rivières area.659

[753]The appellants are mistaken. They confuse the facts known to the insurer with those the insurer is presumed to know “because of their notoriety” (2408 C.C.Q.). Professor Vincent Caron warns against the risk of such confusion:

[TRANSLATION]

It is important not to confuse the facts that the insurer indeed knows and the notorious facts that the insurer is presumed to know. In the first case, only the evidence of the insurer’s actual knowledge is sufficient to justify the insured’s silence, whereas in the second situation, the insured’s burden of proof is much higher in regard to the notoriety of the facts it must establish, hence the importance for the insurer to apply the right legal characterization.660

[Reference omitted.]

[754]In this case, Northbridge was Maskimo’s insurer from September 10, 2002, to September 10, 2007. The 2002–2003, 2003–2004, and 2004–2005 policies bear numbers 0868337 01, 0868337 02, and 0868337 03, respectively. For the 2005–2006 and 2006–2007 period, they bear numbers 0711247 00 and 0711247 01.661

[755]On November 14, 2006, Mr. Mario Carier sent an email to Mr. Marc Duguay, who was the senior manager of commercial underwriting at the time. The message was sent in the context of internal discussions at Northbridge on the issue of a possible “pyrite” exclusion in BL’s and B&B’s policy via Bellemare.662 At the end of his message, Mr. Carier wrote the following: [TRANSLATION] “We have a similar pyrite exclusion in policy 0868337”.663 He thus established that the insurer knew about the

659A.B.-8, paras. 47–60 (Northbridge and AIG) and 176–181 (Northbridge). See also Outline of arguments of Northbridge and AIG on grounds 54, 55, and 66 at para. 10b) and note 14; Outline of arguments of de Northbridge on grounds 55 and 66, paras. 2–3.

660Vincent Caron, “Étendue de l’obligation de déclaration” in Jurisclasseur Québec, vol. “Contrats nommés II”, fasc. 16 (Montreal: LexisNexis, 2017) at para. 19. See also Éric Blais, “L’incidence de la notion de connaissance présumée de l’assureur à l’égard de son devoir d’enquête lors de l’évaluation initiale du risque” in (2003) 185 Développements récents en droit des assurances 89 at 100.

661Exhibit DLL-42, vol. 332 at 139456, 139468, 139481, 139498, and 139512.

662See para. [752], above.

663Exhibit DLL-69 (13 and 14 November 2006), vol. 334 at 140313.

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Béton Maskimo insurance file. In fact, when examined at trial, Mr. Carier explained that he [TRANSLATION] “went through every file containing the name Maskimo looking for Carrière Maskimo”.664 This is not presumed knowledge based on notoriety, but actual knowledge of the facts. Between April 2003 and September 10, 2007, Northbridge was the insurer of Maskimo and of BL and B&B.

[756]The trial judge could certainly conclude that Northbridge was aware of the Maskimo cases and in particular the information attached to the email sent on March 29, 2003, to Marc Duguay from Bernard Marcotte, who was working at Béton Maskimo at the time.665 In that letter, Mr. Marcotte described the concrete crumbling problems experienced since 2001 and referred to the expert assessments attributing the cause to the use of stone containing pyrite and pyrrhotite in the concrete. He also referred to the 13 cases that were the subject of complaints and their potential cost, which could reach $1 million.

[757]At the time Mr. Carier was reviewing the Maskimo file, he participated in the internal discussion at Northbridge on the issue of whether a “pyrite” exclusion should

be added

to the Bellemare policy,

which was due for renewal on December

1, 2006.666

As discussed above, the

2006–2007 policy was renewed without any

exclusion, as was the 2007–2008 policy.

The insurer’s duty to investigate

[758]The insurers also argue that the trial judge imposed a standard of investigation on them that exceeded the obligations of an insurer. They submit that the insurer’s obligation to investigate is minimal and secondary and concerns only elements characterized as notorious or related to the proposing insured itself.

[759]In particular, Northbridge claims that it was not aware of the proximity between the Maskimo quarry and the B&B quarry. That statement, like the entire theory put forward by the insurer is unfounded, because the judge’s criticism for not following its own underwriting guidelines are amply justified by the evidence. The following analysis demonstrates this.

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664Examination of Mario Carier (26 April 2013), vol. 471 at 192670.

665Exhibit DLL-47 (29 September 2003), vol. 333 at 139655.

666See para. [745], above.

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[760]B&B was added to the Bellemare policy in March 2004667 following a request from the broker made by email,668 but without a complete application. The documents provided by the broker AON state the following as B&B’s line of work: [TRANSLATION] “Open air/sand and gravel mines (blasting by a sub-contractor)” without indicating the specific location.669

[761]The Manual prepared by Northbridge, which is the reference manual for its underwriters,670 quantifies the insurance risks for a concrete supplier and a quarry. At trial, Réjean-Jacques Giroux, the director of the Québec office at the time, explained them in the following terms:

[TRANSLATION]

A.… So, the manual says this: for a 3291, a concrete manufacturer, what should an underwriter look at?

It’s simply … 1, it’s to consider in the Best because in the manual, each line of work, each IBC code is determined by … we call it a Best Guide, is numbered from 1 to 10, 1 being a low risk, 10 being a high risk. So in the case that concerns us, if we take the case of Béton Laurentide or a concrete manufacturer, code 3291; code 3291 is rated level 3 for the underwriter. Whether it’s new business or a renewal, the underwriter knows from the outset that it’s low risk. The only question that will appear on the side at some point, or a “warning”, is: is there quality control?

So, we knew at that point, in the case of Thomas Bellemare, from the information provided by Mr. Plourde, that there had indeed been quality control in place for quite some time.

So, let’s consider the case of quarries, quarry 1403; what’s a quarry? It’s a hole, with sand, with pebbles; so for quarries, in the Best Guide it’s level 6, which means that it’s a medium risk.

Mtre ANTOINE ST-GERMAIN, counsel for Northbridge Insurance:

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667See Exhibit DLL-48, 2003-2004, vol. 333 at 139670; Exhibit DLL-1, 2003-2004, vol. 330 at 138267.

668Exhibit DLL-48, 2003-2004, vol. 333 at 139704.

669 Exhibit DLL-48, 2003-2004, vol. 333 at 139708; Cross-examination of Robert Plourde (1 May 2013), vol. 472 at 192898.

670Exhibit DLL-39 (August 2002), vol. 332 at 139264.

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Q.Why?

A.Why is it a medium risk? There are two (2) things that arise at some point, which the underwriter must consider; it’s … it’s attractive.

THE COURT

Q.It’s what?

A.It’s attractive. That means that children may wander around it, and ATVs, so we have to find … we want to verify, for example, the previous losses, if we know about that, if there were any previous losses, or we call it bodily injury because there were children wandering around, therefore as the insurer, we’ll probably require that the site be fenced in, or that the site, for example, be monitored.

And the other – in a quarry; what is done in a quarry? Blasting. So, the reason we ask that question is simple, if there’s blasting and there’s adjacent structures – when we say “adjacent structures” we’re talking about roads, electrical towers, residences, we’re talking about, for example, any type of structure – so, a stone, when it … it can easily reach two (2), three (3) kilometres distance. So it’s important for us to properly analyze, when they’re blasting, that everything is under control.

So, it’s those two (2) elements, that’s the reason why it’s considered medium risk.671

[762]In its introduction, the Manual sets out the steps that the underwriter must take to assess the risks related to the client’s liability:

This manual is designed to provide you with a step by step process to underwrite liability risks.

First, you must assess the exposure. Are the losses to develop from the premises/operations, products, completed operations or the additional coverages e.g. personal injury?

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671Examination of Réjean-Jacques Giroux (24 April 2013), vol. 471 at 192389.

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To assess the exposure you have to know the policy, the coverages, the exclusions and equally important you have to understand the operation of the insured. Your resources include:

Loss Control (both personnel and written material)

Class Hazard Guide

Best Underwriting Guide

Claims Department

Insurance Periodicals

Newspapers

Head Office

Property Manuals

The Broker

Do not be afraid to ask questions.672

[763]When he was cross-examined, however, Mr. Giroux was forced to admit that he never asked BL where the aggregate used to manufacture the concrete came from.673 He also admitted that neither he nor underwriter Doris Lessard asked any questions related to the specific operations on the concrete supplier, the quarry, or their location. In 2004, when BL and B&B were added to the Bellemare policy, he deemed it unnecessary in view of the small percentage that concrete work and the operation of the quarry represented in the Bellemare file, as well as the income generated.674

[764]In addition, in November 2006, while discussions were being held on the issue

of whether a “pyrite” exclusion should be added to the Bellemare policy for BL and B&B, Ms. Chantale Lebel of Bellemare sent an email with attachments to the broker AON to explain to him the voluntary preventive measures taken by B&B and

672Exhibit DLL-39 (August 2002), vol. 332 at 139271.

673Cross-examination of Réjean-Jacques Giroux (25 April 2013), vol. 471 at 192509.

674Ibid. at 192514.

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BL to ensure the quality of the concrete aggregate. Three days later, Mr. Robert Plourde, a broker at AON, forwarded these documents to underwriters Réjean- Jacques Giroux and Doris Lessard at Northbridge.675

[765]In the document, Ms. Lebel explained first that stone samples [TRANSLATION]

“from our quarry and from another quarry” were taken and sent to Terratech for analysis under the supervision of geologist Blanchette, whose phone number she provided. She said that the same laboratory also conducted a comparative assessment of the aggregate and the cement powder and that an expansion-testing program had been implemented. She also said that an analysis of the stone was conducted [TRANSLATION] “rigorously after each blast”. Finally, she attached to her message an example of an analysis conducted by Terratech and the proposal concerning the testing program.

[766]At trial, Mr. Réjean-Jacques Giroux had to admit that he did not seek information about what [TRANSLATION] “other quarry” Ms. Lebel was referring to, nor did he communicate with geologist Blanchette, whose phone number he had, to verify what the comparative aggregate assessments and the testing programs consisted of. He said that the reason was that he did not think it was important.676

[767]Although earlier he had said that it was important for underwriters to perform a proper analysis when there is blasting,677 the reference to blasting in Ms. Lebel’s email did not prompt him to go to the quarry himself or to send one of the six full-time inspectors available to him (two in Québec and four in Montreal). Nor did he ask for copies of or review the attachments to the email.678

[768]It is not a matter here of imposing an undue obligation to investigate on the insurers, as the appellants claim. Rather, the evidence reveals that Northbridge did not follow its own guidelines in assessing the risk. The trial judge was correct in finding that Northbridge did not follow the requirements of its own underwriting manual.679

[769]What is more, in cross-examination, Mr. Giroux revealed that over the years while Northbridge was the insurer of both CYB and Bellemare, there were no

675Exhibit DLL-25 (27 November 2006), vol. 331 at 138907.

676Cross-examination of Réjean-Jacques Giroux (25 April 2013), vol. 471 at 192513.

677See the excerpt from the examination of Réjean-Jacques Giroux at para. [761], above.

678Cross-examination of Réjean-Jacques Giroux (25 April 2013), vol. 471 at 192484 and 192513– 92514.

679Main judgment at paras. 1652, 1774, 1806, and 1881.

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discussions between the Northbridge underwriter responsible for CYB and the one responsible for Bellemare.680

[770]The applicable rule in this case is that set out by Cory J. of the Supreme Court in Coronation Insurance Co. v. Taku Air Transport Ltd., citing Lord Mansfield in the English case Carter v. Boehm:681

The insured has no obligation to provide any information that is generally available. The insurer may not rely on an applicant to provide information on prevailing circumstances in an industry or to do the insurer's work of evaluating the risk. In Lord Mansfield's words (at p. 1910):

There are many matters, as to which the insured may be innocently silent -- he need not mention what the under-writer knows -- Scientia utrinque par pares contrahentes facit.

An under-writer can not insist that the policy is void, because the insured did not tell him what he actually knew; what way soever he came to the knowledge.

The insured need not mention what the under-writer ought to know; what he takes upon himself the knowledge of; or what he waves being informed of.

In this case the insurers had within their own grasp information which would have provided a more accurate assessment of the risk entailed by the policy. At a minimum, the insurers should have scrutinized their own records before issuing the policy. They did not meet the standards required of an insurer operating in this field. Having failed in exercising the required standard of diligence, the insurers cannot escape liability to the passengers on the policy because the insured also failed in its duty.

I believe that in the case at bar the information available in the files of the insurers and that available to the public concerning the accident record of

680Cross-examination of Réjean-Jacques Giroux (25 April 2013), vol. 471 at 192514–192515.

681Carter v. Boehm (1766), 97 E.R. 1162, 3 Burr. 1905.

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Taku should be considered information that an insurer would be presumed to know. It is information that would readily become notorious to a reasonably competent underwriter working in the field of aviation. Thus the appellant insurers failed to meet the duty imposed by the Canadian Indemnity case.682

[771]CYB became Northbridge’s insured on February 1, 2006, and was so until March 31, 2010.683 Northbridge called the underwriter Micheline Chénard from its Montreal office to testify. She was not involved in the file at the time of the 2006 subscription. She became involved only in 2007, at the time of the first renewal.

[772]During her examination at trial, Ms. Chénard said that CYB made its first pyrite-related claim in October 2008.684 She said that following that claim and before the 2009–2010 policy renewal, there were some discussions with the claims department and the director of the underwriting department and that she learned at that time that Northbridge also insured Bellemare and that there were several pending losses related to “pyrite” in the file. That was when she decided to add the “pyrite” exclusion for the 2009–2010 renewal.685

[773]She said that she was not aware of the claim in the file involving Bergeron/Lacharité and the APCHQ in which CYB was a defendant in warranty,686 or of the claim in the Gélinas/Marchand file in which CYB was sued in sub-sub- warranty.687 According to Ms. Chénard, had she been informed of the claims in 2006 and 2007, verifications would probably have been made with the claims department.688

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682Coronation Insurance Co. v. Taku Air Transport Ltd., [1991] 3 S.C.R. 622 at 637 and 640–641.

683Joint statement of facts regarding insurance issues at 152.

684Examination of Micheline Chénard (25 April 2013), vol. 471 at 192551–192552 and 192555; Exhibit DLB-29, vol. 337 at 141512. This is sequence 262 concerning a building located at 315

Fafard Street: Exhibit DLB-16 (6 October 2008), vol. 336 at 141035; Exhibit DLB-24 (10 April 2013), vol. 336 at 141290, paras. 2–3.

685Examination of Micheline Chénard (25 April 2013), vol. 471 at 192555.

686Ibid. at 192553; Exhibit DLL-32 (9 October 2007), vol. 331 at 138925; Exhibit DSNC-68.37, vol. 300 at 126598.

687Examination of Micheline Chénard (25 April 2013), vol. 471 at 192554; Exhibit DLB-30, vol. 337 at 141514; Exhibit DSNC-68.37, vol. 300 at 126598. This is S.C. file No. 400-17-001228-069. It is not one of the files in question here. It was settled out of court.

688Examination of Micheline Chénard (25 April 2013), vol. 471 at 192557.

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[774]Moreover, on April 10, 2013, among the admissions made by its counsel,689 CYB acknowledged that the following claims had not been reported to Northbridge before the “pyrite” exclusion in CYB’s policy took effect on March 31, 2009:

Sequence 31 (Sup. Ct. No. 400-17-002278-105), Julie Stoycheff and Dany Querry, 1330 Antoine-Dalmas Street. The motion to institute proceedings refers to the discovery of cracks in June 2009 and disclosure to the contractor Paul Dargis during the same time period,690 but the APCHQ’s opinion dated June 8, 2009, indicated that the contractor had already been informed in writing of the existence of the first cracks in October 2008;691

Sequence 32 (Sup. Ct. no. 400-17-002119-101), Claude Carrier, 1340 Antoine-Dalmas Street. Formal notice sent to the contractor Paul Dargis on October 6, 2008;692

Sequence 249 (Sup. Ct. no. 400-17-002016-091), Lise Deguise and Christian Yard, 71 Éloïse Street. Formal notice served on CYB on July 16, 2009;693

Sequence 256 (Sup. Cy. no. 400-17-002278-105), Marie-Andrée Cimon, 275 Fafard Street. Formal notice sent to Construction Paul Dargis on March 11, 2009.694

[775]Regarding the Bergeron/Lacharité file, which Ms. Chénard said she was not aware of,695 she was confronted in cross-examination with the recourse in sub- warranty brought by CYB against B&B696 and with a letter dated October 12, 2007, from Mario Carier of Northbridge to Christian Deshaies of B&B informing him that a lawyer from Northbridge’s legal department had been given the mandate to appear.697 At that time, in October 2007, B&B had been insured by Northbridge since March 30, 2004.

[776]Ms. Chénard said that the document was probably available at the claims department at the time B&B was added to CYB’s policy in April 2009 but that she did

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689Exhibit DLB-24 (10 April 2013), vol. 336 at 141290.

690Re-amended motion to institute proceedings (12X) (21 November 2013), vol. 10 at 3732, paras. 122–128.

691Exhibit GMN-31C (8 June 2009), vol. 46 at 18927.

692Exhibit P-35 (6 October 2008), vol. 220 at 92573.

693Exhibit P-2 (15 July 2009), vol. 200 at 84035.

694Exhibit GMN-256C (11 March 2009), vol. 97 at 40833.

695See para. [773], above.

696Exhibit DLL-60 (9 October 2007), vol. 334 at 140120–140122.

697Ibid. at 140116–140117.

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not see it herself.698 She added that the only way she could have known that the insured CYB had filed a recourse in warranty against B&B, another insured, would have been to talk to the claims department.699 She had already admitted that, although the underwriting manual specifically directs underwriters to consult the claims department,700 she did not do so at the time of the 2007 renewal.701

[777]Finally, she admitted that there was nothing in her computer system at Northbridge indicating to her, at the time she insured B&B in April 2009, that this

quarry had already been insured by the same insurer since 2004. She found out about that only in February 2009 when she received an email from Ms. Sylvie Leblanc, underwriting analyst, informing her that CYB was probably going to buy B&B, which was insured under the Bellemare policy and that there were pyrite problems. She also told her that under no circumstances should the “pyrite” exclusion in the CYB policy be removed.702

[778]Ms. Chénard acknowledged that she had access to the information in

Bellemare’s underwriting file at Northbridge at the time but said that she did not get into the details of the file, relying instead on the summary information provided to her by Ms. Leblanc and the broker Pépin.703

[779]Had Ms. Chénard consulted the claims department between 2007 and April 2009, she would have noted that in the Bergeron/Lacharité file, CYB, who was sued in warranty by Construction Levasseur, had in turn called B&B in sub-warranty.

The latter action was reported to Northbridge’s claims department in Montreal by the broker AON in a 32-page fax dated October 9, 2007.704 That led to Mario Carier’s reply on October 12, 2007, referred to in paragraph [775]. In addition, Mr. Carier had known since at least October 11, 2007, that CYB was a 50% shareholder in B&B with BL.705

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698Cross-examination of Micheline Chénard (25 April 2013), vol. 471 at 192571.

699Re-examination of Micheline Chénard (25 April 2013), vol. 471 at 192572.

700See the excerpt of the Manual cited in para. [762], above.

701Cross-examination of Micheline Chénard (25 April 2013), vol. 471 at 192567.

702The latter statement is unclear. In February 2009, the “pyrite” exclusion had not yet been added to the CYB policy. It was added only when the 2009–2010 renewal took effect on March 31, 2009. It is likely, however, that Northbridge had already decided in February 2009 to add this exclusion.

703Cross-examination of Micheline Chénard (25 April 2013), vol. 471 at 192569–192571.

704Exhibit DLL-32 (9 October 2007), vol. 331 at 138926.

705Exhibit DLL-71 (24 April 2013), vol. 334 at 140321; Examination of Mario Carier (26 April 2013), vol. 471 at 192678.

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[780]Moreover, with respect to the claim in the Bergeron/Lacharité file and in the Gélinas/Marchand file, it is far from certain that it is aggregate from the B&B quarry. Carl Poulin and Yvan Boisvert both testified that they could not determine whether the concrete at issue in the claims had been supplied by CYB or if it came instead from Béton Maskimo.706 As for the Bergeron/Lacharité file, Carl Poulin added that in view of the photos of the cracks noted on the foundations and considering those he had noted in another file, he was of the view that these cracks had not been caused by the presence of iron sulphides but were instead structural cracks or cracks resulting from the removal of concrete.707

[781] Also in the Bergeron/Lacharité file, the contractor in question, Daniel Levasseur, stated at trial that it was concrete from the Maskimo quarry.708 In addition, the foundations of the residence had already been demolished and rebuilt when CYB was informed.709 Finally, these two files were settled by CYB’s insurer at the time.710 The fact that CYB called B&B in sub-warranty711 cannot be considered determinative on the issue of the origin of the aggregate. It was simply a way for the concrete supplier to protect its rights.

[782]Leaving aside the claims in the Bergeron/Lacharité and Gélinas/Marchand files, there were three claims that were not reported to Northbridge before the “pyrite” exclusion was added to the CYB policy on March 31, 2009. A fourth occurred on July 16, 2009.712

[783]Although BL713 and B&B informed Northbridge of at least six claims, it chose not to impose the “pyrite” exclusion at the time of the 2006–2007 renewal of the Bellemare policy on December 1, 2006, or even in the 2007–2008 renewal. The appellant Northbridge in no way established that it would have acted otherwise with

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706Pre-trial examination of Carl Poulin (3 June 2011), vol. 457 at 187407; Pre-trial examination of Yvan Boisvert (26 April 2011), vol. 451 at 185146.

707Pre-trial examination of Carl Poulin (3 June 2011), vol. 457 at 187407–187408.

708Cross-examination of Daniel Levasseur (30 January 2013), vol. 464 at 190240.

709Pre-trial examination of Carl Poulin (2 June 2011), vol. 457 at 187322.

710Pre-trial examination of Yvan Boisvert (26 April 2011), vol. 451 at 185150.

711Exhibit DLL-32 (9 October 2007), vol. 331 at 138944.

712Exhibit P-2 (15 July 2009), vol. 200 at 84035. In addition, with respect to this claim, the claim of Claude Carrier, and the claim of Julie Stoycheff and Dany Querry, the insurer was aware on November 2, 2009, because it was then in a position to respond and deny coverage: Exhibit DLL- 10 (2 November 2009), vol. 330 at 138634.

713Exhibit DLL-69 (13 and 14 November 2006), vol. 334 at 140313; Examination of Mario Carier (26 April 2013), vol. 471 at 192669; Exhibit DLL-68 (19 April 2013), vol. 334 at 140299, para. 28.

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respect to its insured CYB had it been informed of the claims that it alleges CYB did not tell it about.

[784]As discussed above, underwriter Micheline Chénard did not consult the claims department before accepting the risk.714 During her cross-examination, she stated that when she works on an underwriting file for the first time, as was the case for the addition of a quarry to the CYB policy, she usually goes instead to see a senior underwriter such as her team leader, who underwrote the risk in 2006, or her director. When questioned by the judge on this specific issue, she admitted that she did not go see either of them when she started working on the CYB file for the 2007 renewal.715

AIG in its capacity as excess insurer

[785]The appellant AIG was the umbrella-type excess insurer of BL and B&B from November 1, 2004, to December 1, 2009.

[786]Like the primary insurer, Northbridge, AIG complains that BL and B&B did not provide it with all the information that would have shown that the risk was not insurable. It raises its own argument, however, criticizing the trial judge for having confused its knowledge in its capacity as excess insurer with that of Northbridge, the primary insurer.

[787]AIG asserts that as the excess insurer, it had only limited communication with the primary insurer, who was its competitor. The primary insurance taken out by Bellemare from Northbridge is a separate contract from the excess insurance provided by AIG. The latter insurance was taken out by Bellemare directly with AIG.

[788]That argument cannot be accepted. The trial judge properly explained the distinction between the primary insurer and the excess insurer when he analyzed the risk assessment process at AIG (formerly Chartis):

[TRANSLATION]

[1673] Chartis issued umbrella-type excess insurance policies to Gestion Bellemare (Bellemare inc.), including Béton Laurentide and Carrière B&B for five consecutive periods between November 1, 2004, and December 1, 2009.

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714See para. [776], above.

715Cross-examination of Micheline Chénard (25 April 2013), vol. 471 at 192568–192569.

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[1674] Northbridge (Lombard) acted as the primary insurer.

[1675] Chartis intervened in the Bellemare file pursuant to the request of the broker Aon, whom Lombard had informed that it wanted to reduce its coverage of the Bellemare Group from $9 million to $2 million.

[1676] In Chartis’s view, Bellemare was not too great a risk, nor was it a complex, large-scale risk.

[1677] Because it already insured concrete suppliers, it did not consider it necessary to see the site of its operations.

[1678] Chartis explained that as the excess insurer, its role is to intervene once the primary insurer’s coverage is exhausted, such that it does not deal with primary losses. It was even submitted that it deals only with major losses.

[1679] However, Chartis analyzes the losses reported by the primary insurer, to whom they are provided first.

[1680] The application for insurance was received in October 2004 (DCH-7).

[1681] Contrary to the underwriters at Lombard (Northbridge), Chartis’s underwriters had no written standards or information bulletins to refer to, despite the fact that Chartis was specialized in complex, large-scale files.

[1682] In fact, underwriters applied their own subjective assessments, and the most reliable criterion was to exclude a risk in specific situations, as Mr. Charbonneau confirmed. In the event of doubt, the rule seems to have been to refrain.

[1683] According to underwriter Ms. Legault, underwriters have a duty to gather all the information before accepting or refusing a risk. In her view, an underwriter’s guidelines lie in the claims analysis and the limits set out in his or her letter of authority.

[1684] She testified that when analyzing claims, she looks carefully at how they were handled by the primary insurer, whether the file has been closed or remains pending, and the reserve set by the primary insurer in assessing the risk. …

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[1685] At the same time, she explained the lack of direct contact with the primary insurer by the fact that it is a competitor of her company.

[1686] She said that the lack of reserves set by the primary insurer was determinative in the assessment of the pending claims at the time of the policy renewal. She never questioned it and never asked the primary insurer whether it had simply denied coverage or what the reason was.

[Reference omitted.]

[789]While it is true that in his review of the issue of nullity ab initio, the judge did not always separately identify the evidence concerning the primary insurer and that specifically concerning AIG in its capacity as excess insurer, his conclusion is supported by the evidence adduced with respect to both Northbridge and AIG, as we will now see.

[790]Underwriter Isabelle Legault, who was responsible for this file at AIG as of the 2006 renewal, said at trial that she did not communicate with the primary insurer. There were no written instructions in this regard, but that was the message she received from her superiors, in particular André Charbonneau. Nor did she communicate with the insured, but only with the insured’s broker, although there was no internal standard or recommendation made by Mr. Charbonneau preventing her from calling the insured.716

[791]AIG’s risk analysis was based on the insured Bellemare’s applications, which were submitted annually by the broker AON. These applications included schedules setting out the prior claims reported to the primary insurer, Northbridge.717

[792]The appellant AIG argues that in the applications received from the broker

AON for 2005 and 2006, B&B’s activities in the section concerning sales revenue were listed as “sandpit”, not stone quarry,718 which led the underwriter to analyze the risk as being limited to a sand quarry.719 According to the appellant, had the insured indicated that it was a stone quarry, there might have been further investigation

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716Cross-examination of Isabelle Legault (29 April 2013), vol. 471 at 192754–192756.

717Exhibits DCH-7A to DCH-7D, vol. 338-339 at 142116–142359.

718Exhibit DCH-7B, 2005–2006, vol. 339 at 142167; Exhibit DCH-7C, 2006–2007, vol. 339 at 142194.

719Examination of Isabelle Legault (29 April 2013), vol. 471 at 192731.

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because it is not at all the same risk. There would have been a request for soil testing.720

[793]In cross-examination, André Charbonneau, the senior underwriter at AIG and a mentor for young underwriters, acknowledged that AIG’s application form does not include any requirement in that regard.721 In addition, in the application for the first policy, in 2004, there was a specific reference to Bellemare’s website and a screenshot of its activities, where the word “quarry” appeared.722 The website even indicated the range of crushed stone products offered by Bellemare’s quarries.723

[794]Mr. Charbonneau had to admit that the insured’s website clearly satisfied the requests of AIG, who required in its application that the insured attach its [TRANSLATION] “brochures, advertisements, or any other descriptive literature concerning the products”.724 He also had to admit that, before the initial acceptance of the Bellemare risk in 2004, AIG thus knew that the insured operated a stone quarry and that no prior assessment of the aggregate conducted by the insured was requested.725

[795]Also at trial, underwriter Legault said that in 2006, the word “pyrite” meant absolutely nothing to them,726 whereas their senior underwriter, Mr. Charbonneau, had known of its deleterious nature since at least 2004.727 He said that [TRANSLATION] “it’s clear that bells go off when you hear the word pyrite, the same way that bells go off when you hear certain other words in insurance”.728 In 2007, he was aware of the damage that a certain quantity of pyrite in concrete could cause.729 He even said that the fact that the presence of “pyrite” in the rock used to make concrete could result in foundation damage was known to AIG’s underwriters. 730

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720Cross-examination of André Charbonneau (30 April 2013), vol. 472 at 192836.

721Ibid. at 192836–192837.

722Exhibit DCH-7A, 2004-2005, vol. 338 at 142116, 142118–142119, and 142139.

723Exhibit DLL-50, 2003-2004, vol. 333 at 139807.

724Cross-examination of André Charbonneau (30 April 2013), vol. 472 at 192839.

725Ibid.

726Examination of Isabelle Legault (29 April 2013), vol. 471 at 192734.

727Cross-examination of André Charbonneau (30 April 2013), vol. 472 at 192831.

728Examination of André Charbonneau (30 April 2013), vol. 472 at 192828.

729Ibid. at 192830; Cross-examination of André Charbonneau (30 April 2013), vol. 472 at 192831.

730Cross-examination of André Charbonneau (30 April 2013), vol. 472 at 192831–192832.

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[796]On November 10, 2006, Bellemare’s broker signed an application for insurance that contained two lists of claims related to four files concerning complaints about cracks in foundations. At least two of those claims referred to “pyrite”.731

[797]According to underwriter Isabelle Legault, the first thing she looks at when analyzing prior losses is the [TRANSLATION] “closed” or [TRANSLATION] “open” status of the claim. Next, she analyzes the primary insurer’s handling of the claim in detail to find out whether a payment was made or whether a reserve was set. If the claim file was closed by the primary insurer, perhaps with a payment, she does not need to ask the broker any questions. If the claim is open, she looks at the type of claim and verifies whether a reserve was set for it. Depending on the type of claim and whether the reserve is significant, she will ask the broker questions, but never the primary insurer, because AIG is on the risk in excess of the $2 million of coverage provided by the primary insurer.732

[798]In this case, the underwriter did not communicate with either the insured or the broker to find out where BL’s aggregate came from. Because she was not familiar with “pyrite” and its problems, she also had no discussion with Mr. Charbonneau or with an engineer. She did not seek information from the claims department because it was not standard practice at AIG to do so.733 She added that the word “pyrite” would have meant something to her if the insured had provided her with the information that it failed or refused to give her. Considering that the claims were at zero and closed and that there had been no payment, that meant that the primary insurer had investigated, and she therefore did not take it into account.734

[799]Based on the information provided by the broker AON, the Bellemare policy was renewed by AIG on December 1, 2006.735

[800]On November 14, 2007, Ms. Hélène Tremblay from the broker AON sent the

primary insurer Northbridge’s loss history for the previous two years to Mr. Louis-Philippe Ferland, an AIG underwriter. In reference to a claim for damage to a foundation, the following handwritten note appears at the end of list: [TRANSLATION]

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731Exhibit DCH-7C, 2006-2007, vol. 339 at 142269–142270 and 142276–142277.

732Examination of Isabelle Legault (29 April 2013), vol. 471 at 192723–192725 and 192733–192734.

733Cross-examination of Isabelle Legault (29 April 2013), vol. 471 at 192754–192757.

734Ibid. at 192761–192762.

735Exhibit DCH-1C, 2006-2007, vol. 338 at 141942.

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“Pyrite. According to Lombard, that’s the subject, and it will last +10 years. We denied liability”.736

[801]Underwriter Isabelle Legault did not handle the application to renew the policy for 2007–2008,737 but at trial, Mr. André Charbonneau said that if the underwriters at the time had consulted him with a similar document, he would have said [TRANSLATION] “Whoa, there’s pyrite; stop”.738

[802]On December 1, 2007, AIG issued the Bellemare policy for the 2007–2008 period based on the information provided by the broker AON. It did not contain any pyrite exclusion.739 It was only at the time of the 2008–2009 renewal that a pyrite exclusion was added to the Bellemare policy. It was added retroactively from February 1, 2008, by a rider bearing the date February 15, 2010.740

[803]The claim made against BL in the case of the IGA building was not reported to AIG.741 Underwriter Isabelle Legault stated at trial that if that claim had been disclosed, she would have asked the broker questions to obtain further details.742 When she was informed during cross-examination that in August 2002, the IGA file was closed without the insurer having to pay anything,743 she had to acknowledge that this file would not have changed her assessment of the risk because she would have treated it the same way as the information received from the primary insurer in regard to files that were closed without any payment having been made or with reserves set at zero.744

[804]The evidence reveals that the judge did not confuse the knowledge of the excess insurer, AIG, with that of the primary insurer, Northbridge. The evidence supports his rejection of AIG’s nullity ab initio argument.

[805]AIG felt reassured in its status of excess insurer and wrongly relied on the $2 million [TRANSLATION] “cushion” assumed by the primary insurer to disregard losses

736Main judgment at para. 1701; Exhibit DCH-13, vol. 339 at 142407–140410.

737Examination of Isabelle Legault (29 April 2013), vol. 471 at 192734–192735.

738Examination of André Charbonneau (30 April 2013), vol. 472 at 192828. See also at 192830.

739Exhibit DCH-1D, 2007-2008, vol. 338 at 141981.

740Ibid. at 142024.

741Exhibit DCH-11 (19 April 2013), vol. 339 at 142368, paras. 6–7, 10, and 13–14; Exhibit DLL-38 (7 March 2013), vol. 334 at 140298.

742Examination of Isabelle Legault (29 April 2013), vol. 471 at 192742.

743Exhibit DSNC-72.10, vol. 308 at 129296.

744Cross-examination of Isabelle Legault (29 April 2013), vol. 471 at 192762–192763.

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under a certain amount.745 That is why the excess insurer did not concern itself with losses reported by the broker when they were declared closed, at zero, or closed with a small amount. Because of the $2 million cushion, they were considered to be of little importance.746

[806]For the same reason, the Laboratoire de Construction 2000 inc. file, which was under the responsibility of another department in the civil liability division at AIG, was not discussed internally even though it concerned an error in the analysis made in the assessment of aggregate containing pyrite. According to underwriter Isabelle Legault, it was not a large-scale claim justifying an internal discussion between the department in charge of professional liability and the department in charge of contractors’ civil liability.747

[807]The testimony of the senior underwriter André Charbonneau was similar, even though he had over 30 claims for foundations that had sustained damage from

“pyrite” and for which AIG had paid out its entire $1 million limit of liability. Accordingly, those claims were not brought to the attention of underwriter Legault or senior underwriter Charbonneau at the time of underwriting the risk for BL and B&B, even though the file contained several expert assessments concerning “pyrite” with respect to Maskimo.748

[808]Also, AIG did not conduct itself like a reasonable insurer in assessing BL’s and B&B’s risk. Not only did the underwriters have no written instructions or information bulletins, but also, according to Mr. Charbonneau’s admission, the assessment of the risk was always subjective.749

[809]While the absence of communication between the excess insurer and the primary insurer, its competitor, is understandable, the same is not true of the absence of communication between the excess insurer and the client. There is nothing justifying the fact that the insurer spoke only to the broker in this case.

[810]The elements identified above show that the trial judge’s conclusion that a reasonable insurer should have acted differently is just as valid for AIG as it is for Northbridge.750 That is the case in particular for AIG’s failure to obtain the most basic

745Examination of André Charbonneau (30 April 2013), vol. 472 at 192815 and 192822.

746Cross-examination of André Charbonneau (30 April 2013), vol. 472 at 192831.

747Examination of Isabelle Legault (29 April 2013), vol. 471 at 192737–192739.

748Cross-examination of André Charbonneau (30 April 2013), vol. 472 at 192840–192844.

749Ibid. at 192836.

750Main judgment at paras. 1909 and 1916.

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information on the insured’s operations from the client and the broker and for its failure to consider the information related to the claims that were reported to it. For these reasons, the Court cannot accept the arguments submitted by AIG.

Conclusion on nullity ab initio before December 2007

[811]In addition to the specific arguments discussed above, the appellants Northbridge and AIG reiterate in appeal the list of documents, reports, and recommendations submitted to BL and CYB and B&B between 2002 and 2007 by geologists Bérubé and Blanchette, as well as by Lafarge, which they say should have been disclosed to them by their insureds.751

[812]The judge reviewed this argument in detail in paragraphs 1757 to 1874 of the Main judgment. The assessment of this complex, abundant evidence by the trial judge warrants deference,752 and the appellants are unable to point to a palpable error that could justify appellate intervention. They simply propose a different reading of all these elements and repeat an argument that the trial judge rejected in a well- reasoned judgment. No obvious or flagrant error in the judge’s assessment of the evidence can be inferred from the reconsideration proposed by the appellants.753

[813]The argument raised by the appellants at the hearing –whereby geologist

Bérubé’s comparative assessment dated May 4, 2002,754 which according to the judge should have been disclosed to the insurers, could not be understood unless they were also provided with the report prepared by the same expert on behalf of the owners of the IGA further to the analysis of the concrete in the foundations755 – is without merit.

[814]The report prepared for the owners of the IGA concerned the concrete aggregate from the Maskimo quarry, whereas the report addressed to BL specifically concerned the stone from the B&B quarry. In addition, a reading of the introduction and the conclusion of the latter report is sufficient to dispel any ambiguity.

[815]The appellants’ assertion that the insureds’ failure to disclose accountant Louis Lesage’s response during the March 29, 2006, meeting between the representatives

751These documents and reports are set out in paragraphs 1735 to 1737 of the Main judgment.

752See para. [739], above.

753Regroupement des CHSLD Christ-Roi (Centre hospitalier, soins longue durée) c. Comité provincial des malades, 2007 QCCA 1068 at paras. 54–55; P.L. c. Benchetrit, 2010 QCCA 1505 at para. 24.

754Exhibit DSNC-14 (4 May 2002), vol. 284 at 120148.

755Exhibit DSNC-13 (9 May 2002), vol. 284 at 120113.

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of BL and those of Lafarge756 constitutes concealment is even less valid. During that meeting, Lafarge’s representatives verbally explained the scope of the January 31, 2006, report prepared by Marie De Grosbois and addressed to Martin Perreault of Lafarge concerning the similarities between the concrete aggregate of Maskimo and that of B&B.757

[816]At trial, Groupe Bellemare’s chief financial officer, accountant Louis Lesage, who was present at that meeting, said that he understood that Lafarge wanted BL to stop using B&B’s concrete stone altogether because it was reactive. In Mr. Lesage’s view, according to Lafarge’s representatives present at the meeting, the conclusions of Ms. De Grosbois’s analysis meant that they had to stop using it. He says that further to Lafarge’s actions, he became much more aware that they had to seriously consider perhaps ceasing its use.758

[817]This issue was the subject of a thorough analysis by the trial judge in paragraphs 1847 to 1863 of the Main judgment. He found not only that Ms. De Grosbois did not make a categorical recommendation to stop using B&B’s aggregate,759 but also that the accountant Lesage was the only one who understood that Lafarge recommended at that meeting that they cease using the B&B aggregate and that Lafarge’s representatives were not credible on this issue:

[TRANSLATION]

[1856] From all the witnesses heard in this regard, the Court notes that Lafarge verbally expressed reluctance to the company’s continuing to use the B&B aggregate but does not believe the version that their recommendation was to immediately stop as they wrote in the letter filed by Lafarge as DSNC- 39 and that Laurentide never received.

[1860] The Court expresses the sentiment it felt consistently throughout the testimony of Lafarge’s representatives, who, one after the other, were hesitant and reluctant to acknowledge specific facts, and who, moreover, stuck to fixed versions, ignoring what their neighbour was doing, whereas the events of

756Exhibit DSNC-121.11 (27 November 2012), vol. 318 at 133620, paras. 7–9.

757Exhibit DSNC-38 (31 January 2006), vol. 285 at 120362.

758Examination of Louis Lesage (20 February 2013), vol. 469 at 191757–191759 and 191767– 191768.

759Main judgment at paras. 1854–1855.

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March 2006 culminating in the position taken by Lafarge results from steps in which everyone involved in the company played an active role. For example, how can we assign much credibility to Mr. Canuel, who in the same breath said that he presented Ms. De Grosbois’s report to Laurentide’s representatives but that he did not speak to the author and did not provide it to the people who were asking for it.760

[818]On appeal, Northbridge and AIG did not attempt to challenge the judge’s findings on those events. They now argue that the failure to disclose the accountant

Lesage’s perception is in itself concealment within the meaning of article 2408 C.C.Q.

[819]Accountant Lesage never sat on B&B’s board of directors, and his mandate as a director of BL as of March 1999 ended on May 31, 2005. He admits that he knew nothing about technical issues or geology.761 He said that he read Terratech’s reports but that he did not understand them, except for the conclusions.762 Following the March 19, 2006, meeting, he reminded the others that he was the chief financial officer and that it was not up to him to decide whether to continue using the aggregate.763 After the meeting, the people in charge of BL decided to wait at least until the arrival of Bernard Marcotte, which reassured Mr. Lesage, who believed Mr. Marcotte had technical experience.764

[820]Requiring the insureds to disclose the reluctance expressed by one of the participants in a meeting of which no summary was prepared and during which the participant had no decision-making power is an unreasonable and abusive application of articles 2408 and 2409 C.C.Q. To accept such a proposition would be tantamount to granting the insurer the power to manage the insured’s business.

[821]The rejection of the arguments of the appellants Northbridge and AIG entails the rejection of grounds 54, 55, and 66 with respect to the period prior to December 2007.

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760Main judgment at paras. 1856 and 1860.

761Exhibit DSNC-72.27, vol. 311 at 130583; Examination of Louis Lesage (20 February 2013), vol. 469 at 191682, 191686, 191697, 191699, 191702–191703, and 191725–191726.

762Cross-examination of Louis Lesage (20 February 2013), vol. 469 at 191773–191774; Re- examination of Louis Lesage (20 February 2013), vol. 469 at 191779.

763Examination of Louis Lesage (per curiam), (20 February 2013), vol. 469 at 191759 and 191767.

764Examination of Louis Lesage (20 February 2013), vol. 469 at 191702–191703; Re-examination of Louis Lesage (per curiam), (20 February 2013), vol. 469 at 191768–191769.

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The period subsequent to November 2007

[822]The concrete suppliers (BL and CYB), the contractors and their insurers, as well as certain plaintiffs have appealed the trial judge’s decision cancelling the insurance policies issued by Northbridge and AIG as of December 1, 2007, for Bellemare, and as of February 1, 2008, for CYB. He found that the insureds’ failure to disclose geologist Blanchette’s nine-month progress report on the expansion-testing program dated November 28, 2007,765 to the insurers constituted concealment.

[823]In support of this ground, the appellants submit that the report indicates that, as a precautionary measure, the aggregate from the B&B quarry, which is [TRANSLATION] “rich in pyrite” should not be used as concrete aggregate. The geologist did not make the same recommendation with respect to the aggregate referred to as [TRANSLATION] “rich in garnet”.766 Because in fact only the aggregate [TRANSLATION] “rich in garnet” was used by the insureds to make the concrete used for the foundations of the buildings at issue in this case, the November 28, 2007, report could not be considered a fact that had to be disclosed to the insurers.

[824]This argument is essentially the same as the one raised by the Group 2 and 3 appellants and their insurers and the Group 4 appellants to challenge the trial judge’s finding that SNC/Blanchette’s liability towards them ended on November 28, 2007.

[825]The appellants’ argument must be rejected for the same reasons that their argument that SNC/Blanchette’s liability should extend beyond November 28, 2007, was dismissed under ground 8. The evidence clearly shows that the persons in charge of the B&B quarry understood that the negative recommendation of November 28, 2007, applied to the entire quarry, not just the sector that was [TRANSLATION] “rich in pyrite”.

[826]In view of the standard of review applicable here, the alternative argument of the Group 2, 3, and 4 appellants must also be rejected. According to that argument, even if the November 28, 2007, report had been disclosed to Northbridge and AIG, they would necessarily have reacted in the same as they had the previous year by renewing the policies.

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765Exhibit DSNC-51 (28 November 2007), vol. 285 at 120493; Main judgment at para. 1870–1871.

766Exhibit DSNC-51 (28 November 2007), vol. 285 at 120499. The full text of the conclusions is reproduced in the statement of general facts in para. [70], above.

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[827]In this case, unlike the previous reports, the November 28, 2007, report was the first time that geologist Blanchette recommended completely stopping the use of

B&B’s concrete aggregate. Moreover, that recommendation was made at about the same time the concrete suppliers stopped procuring aggregate from B&B.767 Finally, as the trial judge noted, that report was disclosed at the time the insurers had to assess the risk to decide whether to renew the policies.768

[828]For these reasons, ground 66 raised by the Group 2, 3, and 4 appellants for the period subsequent to December 1, 2007, cannot succeed. It follows that grounds of appeal 54, 55, and 66 must all be rejected.

11.2Ground No. 67: The Prior Insurance and Non-Cumulation of Liability clause in the AIG and Northbridge policies

[829]This is an alternative ground raised by the appellants Northbridge and AIG in the event their ground concerning nullity ab initio is not accepted.769

[830]This ground is based on the presence of the following clause in AIG’s excess policy from 2004 to 2009:

767Main judgment at paras. 1021–1022.

768Main judgment at para. 1870.

769See AIG’s amended notices of appeal (21 September 2016) at paras. 8b), 29–37 and 55;

Northbridge’s amended notices of appeal (21 September 2016) at paras. 89(2) and 124–133 and the conclusions sought in appeal.

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1.PRIOR INSURANCE AND NON-CUMULATION OF LIABILITY

It is agreed, that if any loss is also covered in whole or in part under any other excess policy issued to the Insured prior to the inception date hereof, the Company’s limit of liability as stated in Item I of the Declarations shall be reduced by any amounts due [to] the Insured on account of any such loss under such prior insurance.770

[831]This clause is not found in Northbridge’s excess policy for the policy periods from December 1, 2006, to December 1, 2009. However, according to Part VIII, it is a follow form policy, which must follow the provisions of the AIG policy.771

[832]On the basis of the definitions of “property damage” and “occurrence” set out in AIG’s umbrella liability insurance policies, the appellants Northbridge and AIG argued that there was only one occurrence within the meaning of the policy and only one loss. The purpose of the non-cumulation clause is to limit the amount payable for damage caused by a single occurrence, even if the damage occurs during several successive policy periods. Its effect is therefore to reduce the amount payable by the insurer in each of the subsequent annual policies by the amount already paid by the prior excess policies for damage attributable to the same loss arising from the same occurrence.772

[833]This defence was rejected by the trial judge. In the absence of Canadian precedent on the interpretation of this type of clause, the judge drew inspiration from American case law and commentary on the origin and scope of the clause. He found that it had not been developed for the situation in this case, which involves several losses, several claims, and several faults alleged against the insureds with several claims submitted by different persons for continuous or progressive damage affecting different property.773

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770 Exhibit DCH-1A, 2004–2005, vol. 338 at 141877; Exhibit] DCH-1B, 2005–2006, vol. 338 at 141917; Exhibit DCH-1C, 2006–2007, vol. 338 at 141955; Exhibit DCH-1D, 2007–2008, vol. 338 at. 141993; Exhibit DCH-1E, 2008–2009, vol. 338 at. 142038.

771See Exhibit DLL-21, vol. 331 at 138848, first subparagraph of paragraph II of the “Coverage” section.

772See Defence of AIG (11 November 2011), vol. 14 at 5271–5273, paras. 9–10 a) and c); Defence of Northbridge (10 November 2011), vol. 14 at 5277–5282, paras. 33. These defences are reproduced at paragraphs 2224–2225 of the Main judgment.

773Main judgment at paras. 1963–1970.

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[834]The trial judge also found that, according to American commentary, an argument similar to one raised by AIG and Northbridge was considered invalid and moot when, as in this case, the Court applied a pro rata method of apportioning damages based on each insurer’s policy period. The trial judge stated the following in regard to the non-cumulation clause set out in the AIG’s excess insurance policy:

[TRANSLATION]

[2226] The Civil Code of Québec does not address the validity of this type of clause.

[2227] American commentary indicates that an argument similar to the one made by Chartis and Northbridge was found invalid and even moot in a case where the Court applied the pro rata method. By applying a pro rata method, the Court is attributing different damage to each of the insurers, that is, the damage that occurred during a given period of time (or of coverage). Thus, logically, no other insurer can end up having to indemnify the insured for the same damage, thereby excluding the application of such non-cumulation of liability clauses from a conceptual standpoint.

[835]On appeal, Northbridge and AIG invoke essentially the same arguments they raised unsuccessfully before the Superior Court. They criticize the judge for having refused to apply a clause that is clear. In their view, it is a standard clause, and its interpretation is a question of law subject to the standard of review of correctness.

[836]The appellants submit that the definitions of “property damage” and of “occurrence” in AIG’s excess policy justify the application of the non-cumulation clause. It is worth citing these definitions:

3.PROPERTY DAMAGE

The term "Property Damage" shall mean:

(a)physical injury to or destruction of tangible property, which occurs during the policy period, including loss of use thereof at any time resulting therefrom; or

(b)loss of use of tangible property, which has not been physically injured or destroyed provided such loss of use is caused by an occurrence during the policy period.

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8.OCCURRENCE

With respect to Personal Injury and Property Damage the term "Occurrence" means an event, including continuous or repeated exposure to conditions, which results in Personal Injury or Property Damage neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the Insured. All such exposure to substantially the same conditions shall be deemed one occurrence.774

[837]In the appellants’ view, because an “occurrence” includes the “continuous or repeated exposure to conditions” and because “[a]ll such exposure to substantially the same conditions shall be deemed one occurrence”, there can be only one “occurrence” in this case. They submit that [TRANSLATION] “in other words, in this case, all the property damage caused by the concrete containing aggregate from the

B&B quarry is considered a single ‘occurrenceʼ within the meaning of the policies issued by AIG”.775 Although the term “loss” is not defined in the policy, the appellants argue that there is only one loss arising from a single event or “occurrence”. That is what justifies the application of the Prior Insurance and Non-Cumulation of Liability clause.

[838]At the hearing, counsel for AIG acknowledged that his argument that the non- cumulation clause is applicable here relies entirely on the premise that there is only one “occurrence” in this case.

[839]The issue of whether there is only one “occurrence” in this case is not a question of law as the appellants submit. At best, it is mixed question that can be resolved only by the application of the policy to a set of facts. The trial judge’s decision on this issue therefore calls for deference and is subject to the standard of palpable and overriding error.

[840]Taken in context, the word “occurrence” means [TRANSLATION] “an event that results in personal injury or property damage causing a loss”. The trial judge rejected

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774AIG’s umbrella-type excess policy: Exhibit DCH-1C, 2006–2007, vol. 338 at 141942 and 141953– 141954. See also Exhibits DCH-1A to DCH-1E, vol. 338 at 141875–141876, 141915–141916, 141953–141954, 141991–141992, and 142036–142037.

775Outline of arguments of AIG and Northbridge on ground 67 at para. 11. See also A.B.-8 at para. 79.

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the premise set out in the appellants’ outline of arguments and found that, in the circumstances, there could not be only one loss and thus only one “occurrence”:

[TRANSLATION]

[1945] Under the policies, continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same conditions is an occurrence. That is the case here.

[1946] We are faced with particular problems here, consisting of progressive and continuous damage found in a multitude of constructions built with aggregate containing pyrrhotite that was used in the concrete mixture manufactured by the two concrete supplies and that was poured during the period from 2003 to 2008.

[1947] Depending on the volume of pyrrhotite in the aggregate, which varied over the years, in particular because of the rock vein where the aggregate came from, the chemical reactions took more or less time to appear. It was only a question of time, however, because according to the expert evidence, the phenomenon is irreversible.

[1969] We are in the presence of several losses, several claimants, and several faults alleged against the insureds. The Court finds that this non- cumulation clause was not developed for the purpose of application in this type of file where there are several claims by different persons for continuous and progressive damage.

[841]This finding by the trial judge is firmly grounded in the evidence adduced. It is sufficient to mention the following elements:

more than 800 buildings were affected by the degradation of the concrete of their foundations;

these buildings belong to a multitude of owners;

the concrete was purchased from two distinct concrete suppliers and was poured on different dates;

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the pyrrhotite content varied with each pour, depending on the rock vein mined at the B&B quarry.

[842]In view of the standard of palpable and overriding error applicable here, the appellants have not succeeded in showing that the judge erred in finding on the basis of the evidence that there was only one “occurrence” in this case.

[843]The rejection of their argument of the existence of a single “occurrence” is sufficient to entail the rejection of Ground 67.

11.3Ground No. 69: Exclusion of “pyrite”-related risk

[844]At trial, the insurers Northbridge and AIG invoked a “pyrite” exclusion against

Bellemare and CYB. With respect to Northbridge, the exclusion was added by a rider to Bellemare’s policy for the period from December 1, 2008, to December 1, 2009, and to CYB’s policy for the period from March 31, 2009, to March 31, 2010. As for AIG, a similar exclusion was added to Bellemare’s policy for the period from

December 1, 2008, and December 1, 2009.

[845]The trial judge ruled out the application of these exclusion clauses on the principal ground that the exclusion concerned only pyrite, whereas the degradation sustained by the concrete of the foundations of the buildings was caused by pyrrhotite, which is a different substance, as appears from paragraphs 1958 to 1962 of the Main judgment:

[TRANSLATION]

[1958] The evidence heard establishes that the oxidation of the pyrrhotite is the sole cause of the damage, that this ore is different from pyrite, and that it is found in rocks in nature.

[1959] It is a different substance. There is nothing in the evidence that would allow the Court to conclude that the damage results in whole or in part from pyrite, quite on the contrary. The unanimous view of the experts is that the damage was caused by the oxidation of pyrrhotite.

[1960] It is true that the aggregate contained pyrite, but that is not what caused the damage. It is not because the parties identified their files as being pyrite- related that pyrrhotite is incorporated into the exclusion. The insurers are experts when it comes to risk.

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[1961] The Court notes that in 2002, Lombard, who insured Maskimo at the time, drafted an exclusion that specified pyrrhotite.

[1962] Accordingly, any exclusion concerning only pyrite is not applicable to these cases.

[846]With respect to the insureds Bellemare and CYB, the issue of the scope of the “pyrite” exclusion is now moot.776 The dismissal of their appeals and those of their insurers in regard to the period of application of nullity ab initio (Grounds 54 and 55) confirmed the judge’s conclusion finding Northbridge’s and AIG’s policies null ab initio as of December 1, 2007, for Bellemare and as of February 1, 2008, for CYB.777 The exclusion clauses were added to Bellemare’s and CYB’s policies after those two dates.

[847]The issue is not moot, however, for Northbridge in its capacity as the insurer of Trois-Rivières Cimentier inc., a formworker whose services were retained by contractor Julien Matteau et Fils inc. to construct the concrete slab of an outdoor terrace for Normand Valois, the owner of a residence. That is sequence number 647.778

[848]The exclusion clause in the policy issued by Northbridge for TroisRivières Cimentier inc. was in effect for the period from April 8, 2011, to April 8, 2012. It reads as follows:

[TRANSLATION]

Description: Pyrite Exclusion Endorsement

Text: … This insurance does not apply to “bodily injury”, “property damage”, or “personal injury and advertising injury” arising directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, from pyrite, or any aggregate or granular substance containing pyrite. This exclusion applies regardless of any other contributing or aggravating

776This applies to both section 1 and section 2 of the appellants’ brief.

777Main judgment at paras. 1870, 1871, and 2270 L) amended by the corrected judgment dated July 31, 2014, at para. 49.

778Exhibit P-323, May 4, 2011, vol. 208 at 87528; Re-amended motion to institute proceedings (18X), October 16, 2013, vol. 8 at 3098, paras. 585–590. See also the Defence of Trois-Rivières Cimentier inc. (28 June 2012), vol. 14 at 5392.

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cause or event that contributes concurrently or in any sequence to the “bodily injury”, “property damage”, or “personal injury and advertising injury”. We will have no duty to defend the insured against any “suit” seeking damages for “bodily injury”, “property damage”, or “personal injury and advertising injury”.779

[849]According to the allocation spreadsheets, Northbridge, in its capacity as the insurer of Trois-Rivières Cimentier inc., owed $44.38 to Mr. Valois.780

[850]The issue of the “pyrite” exclusion is also not moot for the insurer Royal & Sun Alliance Insurance Company of Canada (“RSA”), who insured seven contractors. The following table indicates the name of each contractor and the date on which the exclusion took effect:

 

Name of insured contractor

 

 

Date the exclusion

 

 

 

 

took effect

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

9245-2077 Québec inc. (formerly known

as

June 6, 2011781

 

Constructions Daniel Hardy inc.)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Les Constructions Levasseur (2003) inc.

 

 

April 1, 2011782

 

Normand Houle Construction

 

 

September

 

 

 

23, 2011783

 

 

Les Constructions Camille Veillette & Fils inc.

 

 

November 1, 2011784

 

Robert Lebel Construction inc.

 

 

June 14, 2011785

 

Coffrage G. Gauthier inc.

 

 

June 10, 2010786

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779Exhibit DNTRC-1, vol. 338 at 141849.

780Judgment following the splitting of the proceeding, sequence 647 – Normand Valois.

781Exhibit Dcontractors-37, 2011–2012, vol. 368 at 154122–154123; Exhibit Dcontractors-38, vol. 368 at 154144.

782The exclusion clause is not included in this contractor’s policy: Exhibit Dcontractors-41, 2011– 2012, vol. 368 at 154247. However, in view of the admissions related to the table of insurers (Main judgment at para. 29 o) iv.) and the absence of contestation by the respondents, it will be assumed that the “pyrite” exclusion took effect on April 1, 2011.

783The exclusion clause is not included in this contractor’s policy: Exhibit Dcontractors-55, 2011– 2012, vol. 369 at 154636. For the reasons set out in the previous note, it will be assumed that the “pyrite” exclusion took effect on September 23, 2011.

784Exhibit Dcontractors-29, 2011–2012, vol. 368 at 153861 and 153864.

785Exhibit Dcontractors-45, 2011–2012, vol. 369 at 154330 and 154332.

786Exhibit Dcontractors-57, 2010–2011, vol. 370 at 154733–154734, and 154737.

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9045-8597 Québec inc. (DBA Coffrages Sanschagrin)

February 21, 2011787

[851]The wording of the “pyrite” exclusion clause is essentially the same in the policies of all the contractors insured by RSA:

[TRANSLATION]

TOTAL PYRITE-RELATED RISK EXCLUSION

This insurance does not apply to actual or alleged liability arising out of claims related to loss, damage, or costs:

(A)caused directly or indirectly by pyrite or materials containing pyrite in any form and in any quantity whatsoever;

(B)in any way related to pyrite or materials containing pyrite in any form and in any quantity whatsoever:

This exclusion applies regardless of any other cause or event that contributes at any time whatsoever to such loss, damage, or costs.

[852]The insurers Northbridge, in their capacity as the insurer of Trois-Rivières Cimentier inc., and RSA both argue that the exclusion clause is clear and does not require interpretation. To the extent that the concrete stone that caused the degradation contains pyrite in addition to pyrrhotite, the exclusion applies because the clause concerns not only pyrite, but also aggregate and materials containing pyrite.

[853]That argument cannot succeed. Northbridge’s exclusion clause excludes, in particular, property damage [TRANSLATION] “arising directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, from pyrite, or any aggregate or aggregate material containing pyrite”.788 With respect to the insurer RSA, the insurance excludes claims for damage [TRANSLATION]

“caused directly or indirectly by pyrite or materials containing pyrite” or [TRANSLATION] “in any way related to pyrite or materials containing pyrite”.789

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787Exhibit Dcontractors-27, 2011–2012, vol. 367 at 153800, 153802, and 153804.

788See para. [848], above.

789See para. [851], above.

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[854]The trial judge found that the clause was not applicable because pyrite was not the cause of the damage.790 That finding is consistent with the evidence adduced at trial. Pyrite and pyrrhotite are different substances with different characteristics and different properties, in particular in that pyrrhotite is a hundred times more reactive than pyrite.791 In addition, after analyzing the expert evidence,792 the trial judge found that in this case, pyrrhotite was the sole cause of the damage to the concrete in the foundations793 and that pyrite was not involved in the problems at issue in the proceedings.794 None of the parties challenged these findings on appeal.

[855]The interpretation put forward by the appellants disregards the existence or absence of any causal connection between pyrite and the damage. Thus, assuming the damage was caused by the presence of a radioactive substance in the aggregate, that damage would not be covered if only even a small quantity of pyrite was present, even if that substance played no role in the occurrence of the damage. Taken to the extreme, it is even possible to imagine a situation where a stone containing pyrite is projected against an adjacent house as a result of a blasting operation in the quarry.

The insurer could invoke the “pyrite” exclusion, in the absence of any causal connection between the presence of pyrite and the damage suffered.

[856]The respondents in Groups 1, 3, and 4 also claim that the “pyrite” exclusion clause is clear in that it applies only to that substance and therefore cannot concern pyrrhotite. The possibility that the same clause can have two such different meanings is sufficient to create an ambiguity in this case.795

[857]The existence of an ambiguity requires an interpretation of the contract that seeks to discover the intention of the parties at the time it was formed.796 There is no evidence in this case establishing the common intention of the parties at the time the

“pyrite” exclusion was added to Northbridge’s insurance contract with Trois-Rivières Cimentier inc. or in the insurance contract between RSA and the contractors listed in the table set out in paragraph [850].

790 Main judgment at paras. 1956 and 1958–1960. The latter paragraphs are reproduced in para. [845], above.

791Main judgment at paras. 367–370, 375, and 393.

792See in particular the report signed on October 15, 2012, by six experts retained by various parties: Exhibit DC-38 (15 October 2012), vol. 404 at 166789.

793Main judgment at para. 80, 91–94, 254, 433, 704, 783, 870, and 1958–1959.

794Main judgment at para. 93.

795Didier Lluelles & Benoît Moore, Droit des obligations, 3rd ed. (Montreal: Thémis, 2018) at 883, No. 1580.

796Ibid. at 888, No. 1587; Art. 1425 C.C.Q.

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[858]Nothing in the evidence reveals the context in which the “pyrite” exclusions were added to the contractors’ policies, such that it is not possible to know the intention of the parties. Evidence of that context would have been even more important considering that, during the same time period, RSA issued liability insurance policies containing exclusions covering both pyrite and pyrrhotite to contractors.797

[859]The burden of establishing that an exclusion clause in an insurance policy applies rests with the insurer.798 In this case, Northbridge and RSA failed to establish that the parties to the insurance contracts containing a “pyrite” exclusion intended to exclude both damage caused by pyrrhotite and damage caused by pyrite. Accordingly, Ground 69 must be rejected.

11.4Ground No. 68: Effective date of the damage and of the insurance coverage

[860]Northbridge and AIG also challenge the trial judge’s finding that the damage caused by the oxidation of the pyrrhotite in the concrete aggregate started to exist on the day the concrete was poured.

[861]This issue is related to the policy period of the insurance policies issued by the insurers. Under those policies, the insurer protects against the pecuniary consequences of civil liability that the insured may incur because of bodily injury or property damage. To be covered, the damage must take place during the period set out in the contract and be the result of an occurrence within the territorial limits of the coverage. Property damage is defined as [TRANSLATION] “any deterioration or destruction of tangible property” and occurrence is defined as [TRANSLATION] “any

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797See in particular the policy issued on January 26, 2011, to Construction Cossette & Lafontaine inc.

(Exhibit DIA-13a, 2011–2012, vol. 397 at 164381), the policy covering the period from May 8, 2011, to May 8, 2012, issued to 9111-5717 Québec inc. (Insurance policy, 2011–2012, vol. 403 at 166785–166786), and the policy for the period from October 19, 2011, to October 19, 2012, issued to Construction Mario Gélinas ltée (Exhibit DIA-8b, 2011–2012, vol. 397 at 164211– 164213).

798 Lombard General Insurance Company of Canada c. Factory Mutual Insurance Company, 2013 QCCA 446 at para. 42 (reasons of Rochette J.A.); Commercial Union Cie d'assurance du Canada c. Pentagon Construction Canada Inc., [1989] R.J.Q. 1399 (C.A.) at 1404 (reasons of Nichols J.A.); Catherine Piché & Jean-Claude Royer, La preuve civile, 5th ed. (Montreal: Yvon Blais, 2016) at 103, No. 160; Jean-Louis Baudouin, Patrice Deslauriers & Benoît Moore, La responsabilité civile, 8th ed., vol. 2 (Cowansville, QC: Yvon Blais, 2014) at 555, No. 2-530.

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accident, including the continuous or repeated exposure to risks of essentially the same nature”.799

[862]The trial judge found that the property damage in this case was the result of the oxidation of the pyrrhotite in the concrete aggregate that led to the expansion and cracking of the concrete in the foundations.800 None of the parties contested this finding of fact.

[863]Once it has been determined that the property damage was caused by an occurrence – in this case, the continuous exposure to pyrrhotite in the foundations, the damage and the occurrence still must have occurred during the period covered by the insurance policy. The difficulty thus arises from the fact that the process of oxidation, expansion, and cracking of the concrete is progressive and continuous and that it extends over a relatively long period from the moment the concrete is poured until the date the damage crystalizes.801

[864]In such cases, it is more difficult to establish when the damage occurred for the purpose of triggering an insurance policy. The Court of Appeal for Ontario explained this in Alie v. Bertrand & Frere Construction Co.:

[91]Bertrand and Lafarge both had primary and excess insurance policies in place for each of the policy periods from 1986 to 1992. Once having found that the plaintiffs had suffered a loss because of property damage caused by an occurrence, in order for any particular insurance policy to be required to respond and cover the loss on behalf of the insured, the property damage must have taken place during the policy period. The policies are “triggered” to respond to the claim only when there is an occurrence resulting in property damage suffered during the policy period, no matter the timing of the initial precipitating cause or event. The issue, therefore, is when did the property damage occur in this case?

[92]That question is easily answered when the precipitating event and the damage are effectively simultaneous, for example, where property is destroyed by fire. However, where the precipitating event is the introduction of a defective product into a structure, together with the ongoing deterioration of

799Exhibit DLL-17, vol. 330 at 138660–138661. The wording of the AIG policies is similar, although in English: Exhibit DCH-1A, 2004–2005, vol. 338 at 141869–141876.

800Supra note 793.

801Admission regarding the date of crystallization (27 May 2013), vol. 447 at 183623.

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the product, acted on by outside forces over time, the timing of the damage to property, as defined, may not be clear, or even determinable with precision.802

[865]Drawing inspiration from that same judgment, the trial judge found that the method referred to as Continuous Trigger or Triple Trigger Theory was applicable in this case. The Court of Appeal for Ontario explained how this method applies to determine the applicable policies and their periods of application:

[98]The fourth approach is the Continuous Trigger or Triple Trigger Theory. Under this theory, the property damage is effectively deemed to have occurred from the initial exposure to the time when the damage became manifest or ought to have become manifest to the plaintiffs, and if alerted, to the insured. In that case, all policies in effect over that period are called upon to respond to the loss.

[114]Under the triple trigger theory, where damage is continuous and progressive, is caused by exposure to a harmful or defective substance, and in some cases by further exposure to exacerbating conditions, then only manifests itself while the damage is progressing or after it has fully developed, the damage is said to occur from the first exposure to the date of discovery of the extent of the damage (or the date when it could reasonably have been discovered). Because all of the relevant policies are called upon to respond to the loss, by applying the triple trigger or continuous trigger theory, the court can apportion the liability equitably among the insurers. To the extent that the amount of deterioration during each policy period cannot be determined, the court is in this case using a “theory” to fill an evidentiary gap.803

[866]Applying the Continuous Trigger method, the trial judge found that the damage started to exist as soon as the concrete was poured.804

[867]Northbridge and AIG contest that finding. They submit instead that the damage could not have started before the expiration of a period of at least 20 months after the date on which the concrete was poured.

802Alie v. Bertrand & Frere Construction Co. Ltd., 62 O.R. (3d) 345 at paras. 91–92 (Ont. C.A.).

803Ibid. at paras. 98 and 114. See also Groupe Royal inc. c. Crewcut Investments Inc., 2019 QCCA 1839 at para. 132 et seq.

804Main judgment at paras. 782–783.

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[868]The issue of whether the damage occurred during the policy’s coverage period is not a question of law, but at best a mixed question because it requires the application of the policy provisions to findings of fact.805 The trial judge’s decision in this regard warrants deference, and the test for appellate intervention is that of palpable and overriding error.

[869]The judge’s finding that the damage resulting from the oxidation of pyrrhotite started as of the date the concrete was poured was based on his analysis of the expert reports filed and the experts’ testimony on this specific issue.806 He accepted the conclusions set out in the expert reports of Arezki Tagnit-Hamou and Loïc Divet807 and the opinion expressed by geologist Marc-André Bérubé.808

[870]Moreover, the judge rejected the opinions expressed by the experts of the insurers Northbridge and AIG – engineers Émile Hanna809 and Michael Maher810 – and provided ample reasons for his decision.811 The experts of those insurers formed their opinions based on visual inspections. In the cases where core samples were taken, they were not analyzed with a scanning electronic microscope, which according to the evidence is the most reliable way to detect oxidation and its effects.812

[871]In addition, the expert Hanna, who conducted tests on core samples taken from buildings, had to acknowledge during cross-examination that, after 20 months, the concrete he had analyzed showed signs of cracking that had to have occurred before the end of that period.813 This observation affected the probative value of that expert’s position and justified the judge’s decision to depart from his theory that the

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805Alie v. Bertrand & Frere Construction Co. Ltd., 62 O.R. (3d) 345 (Ont. C.A.) at para. 100.

806Main judgment at paras. 693–783 and 1941–1949.

807 See in particular the

report of Arezki Tagnit-Hamou

and Loïc Divet (9 July 2012),

vol. 404

at 167076; the report

of Arezki Tagnit-Hamou and

Loïc Divet (4 February 2013),

vol. 404

at 167126; Main judgment at paras. 716–732.

 

 

808Examination of Marc-André Bérubé (28 May 2013), vol. 476 at 194338–194339; Main judgment at paras. 733–734.

809Expert report of Émile Hanna (7 December 2012), vol. 417 at 171124; Expert report of Émile Hanna (30 May 2013), vol. 417 at 171227.

810Exhibit DCH-2.2 (10 November 2011), vol. 420 at 172575; Exhibit DCH-6 (21 December 2012), vol. 420 at 172622.

811Main judgment at paras. 735–782 and 1948–1949.

812Main judgment at paras. 751–752 and 758.

813Cross-examination of Émile Hanna (12 June 2013), vol. 477 at 194909–194911.

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phenomenon of pyrrhotite oxidation could not have started until after 20 months from the date the concrete was poured.814

[872]It should be recalled here that the assessment of the quality and probative value of the testimony of these experts was within the trial judge’s discretion815 and that the rule that an appellate court owes deference to such factual inferences applies equally to the credibility of expert witnesses as to that of lay witnesses.816 Northbridge and AIG failed to establish a palpable and overriding error that in itself would have justified the Court’s intervention on the issue of the date on which the damage started within the meaning of the policies.

[873]Last, it is worth noting that Northbridge did not always defend the position that the damage started to exist only after at least 20 months from the time the concrete containing the defective aggregate was poured. In 2009, when the claims adjuster informed Bellemare that the insurer was denying coverage to its insured in a claimant’s file, Northbridge opined that the damage started as of the moment the concrete was poured. This appears clearly from the following excerpt from a letter dated January 9, 2009:

[TRANSLATION]

The concrete deterioration process caused by the presence of pyrite or pyrrhotite is a gradual process that starts as soon as the aggregate is incorporated into the concrete mix and continues until the defective concrete is replaced. The policy that we issued to you is an occurrence-based policy, which insures only damage that occurs during the policy period, provided that it is covered damage.817

[874] For these reasons, Ground 68 must be rejected.

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814Main judgment at paras. 773–782.

815Martinez c. Péris Construction inc., 2013 QCCA 1008 at para. 7; Catherine Piché & Jean-Claude Royer, La preuve civile, 5th ed. (Montreal: Yvon Blais, 2016) at 424–426, No. 557.

816Lapointe v. Hôpital Le Gardeur, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 351 at 358–359; Simard Vincent c. Conseil de la nation Huronne-Wendat, 2010 QCCA 178 at para. 49.

817Exhibit DLL-9.1 (9 January 2009), vol. 330 at 138628–138629.

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12SNC’S INSURANCE POLICIES

[875]The insurers of SNC are also dissatisfied with their treatment under the judgment a quo. To understand the nature of their challenge properly, it is worth providing a brief explanation at the outset of the insurance structure established by SNC and its insurers.

[876]For all of the relevant policy periods, SNC had insurance coverage provided by

AIG, Lloyd’s Underwriters [“Lloyd’s”], Zurich, and ACE INA Insurance818 [“ACE”].

[877]These insurers were all involved in a system of multiple liability insurance policies referred to as an “insurance tower”.819 Each year, they agreed to occupy a position in an insurance tower and expose themselves, based on that position, to having to indemnify the insured or injured third persons if applicable, for damage caused further to an error, an omission, or a negligent act triggering the insured’s professional liability.

[878]The amount of overall coverage provided to SNC corresponded to the total of the coverage provided by each insurer who was a member of the insurance tower. According to a pre-established sequential order, each insurer was called upon to respond to claims until its coverage was exhausted. Their duties were triggered once the previous insurer’s coverage was exhausted and so on until all the claims reported on an annual basis were settled or until all the coverage in the tower was exhausted.

[879]It should also be noted that SNC’s insurers agreed to use a system called “follow form”. This implies that at the base of the insurance tower, there is a so-called “reference policy”,820 which sets out the terms and conditions that all the subsequent insurers are supposed to apply with a certain rigour. In short, the various insurance

818Further to a merger between ACE INA Insurance and Chubb Insurance Company of Canada in 2016, notices of continuance of proceeding were filed by Chubb. Nevertheless, the text of this judgment retains the name ACE in the interest of consistency with the Main judgment.

819See Main judgment at para. 1941 et seq. and Schedule IV (Table of Insurance Towers).

820Further to a compromise reached by the parties on this issue, the judge used the term [TRANSLATION] “reference policy”. When describing a system of excess insurance in the commentary, however, authors often refer to the [TRANSLATION] “primary policy” (Sébastien Lanctôt, Julie Devroede & Hugo Filiatrault, “Les assurances primaires et excédentaires revisitées” (2010) 44 R.J.T. 51 at 62). The parties in these files do not agree as to which insurer should be considered the [TRANSLATION] “primary insurer”. The judge was of the view that it was not necessary to decide the issue in this case. See Main judgment at paras. 1980–1983. In the interest of consistency with the Main judgment, the term [TRANSLATION] “reference policy” will be used in this judgment.

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policies making up the tower were supposed to be the same in principle with respect to their fundamental aspects.

[880]In this case, the policies making up the various towers at issue in the dispute are policies issued on the basis of claims made against SNC and reported to its insurers. The insurance clause common to all these policies provides that they are in this category:

1.1THEREFORE Insurers hereby agree to indemnify the Insured up to but not exceeding in aggregate the Limit of Liability stated in the Schedule for any sum which the Insured may become legally obligated to pay arising from any Claim made against the Insured and reported to Insurers during the Period of Insurance.821

[Emphasis added.]

[881]In addition, SNC, either directly or through an insurance captive,822 as the case may be, was required to bear a substantial retention of up to $7 million.

[882]It is also worth noting that SNC’s insurance policies are “Worldwide” policies.

They therefore provide the insured with coverage in all the territories in which it does business.

[883]The first ground raised by SNC’s insurers seeks to limit the insurance coverage to the insurance tower formed for the 2009–2010 policy period, even if the liability of their insured extends over more than one year.823 In addition, the insurers824 note that the amount of this coverage has already been eroded by claim expenses of over $11 million incurred in Alberta to settle a dispute involving SNC in that province. The contractors and their insurers contest this reduction in coverage.825

[884]ACE challenges the coverage provided to SNC. This insurer raises against its insured and the injured third persons a clause in its policy providing a retroactive date pursuant to which no claim arising from an error committed before March 31, 2006, is covered, and which would release the insurer in this case from all obligations related

821Exhibit P-13-2, 2009–2010, vol. 488 at 199085.

822An insurance captive is a retention vehicle pursuant to which the insured bears a portion of the insurance coverage burden.

823This is ground of appeal 63.

824Except for ACE.

825This is ground of appeal 60, also raised by the appellant ACE.

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to claims arising from the pyrrhotite cases.826 In the event this ground were to fail, ACE asks the Court to establish the respective share of each of SNC’s insurers in the indemnification of its insured.827

[885]Finally, Zurich raises an additional ground. It argues that according to its policy, and despite the content of the reference policy, which makes Quebec law applicable to all the policies making up the 2009–2010 insurance tower, only Ontario law applies to its situation. According to Ontario law, it is generally not possible for injured third persons to bring a direct action against an insurer. In addition, under

Ontario law, the erosion of coverage by the costs associated with an insured’s claim expenses is permitted.828

12.1Ground No. 63: The multiplication of coverage for the 2009–2010, 2010– 2011 and 2011–2012 insurance tower

[886]The appellants with respect to this ground are the liability insurers of SNC/Blanchette.829 As discussed above, the liability of SNC is sought by a host of claimants [“injured third persons”830] for damage caused in part by the negligent acts831 of geologist Blanchette that occurred in the context of contracts for services concluded with the tandems.

[887]Well after the judicial proceedings were brought, some of the insurers, with SNC’s agreement,832 raised a limitation of coverage set out in their policies against the injured third persons. This limitation arises from the amalgamation of various insurance clauses raised by the insurers in support of grouping together in one sole claim all the claims made against SNC over a three-year period (aggregation clause)

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826This is ground of appeal 61.

827This is ground of appeal 62.

828This is ground of appeal 64.

829To simplify the text, the insureds will be identified simply as SNC.

830Article 2501 C.C.Q. provides the possibility for an injured third person to bring an action directly against the insurer. In the context of this appeal, the interest of the injured third persons to bring their action directly against the insurers is not challenged (except implicitly by Zurich, through ground 64), except to say that the content of the policies at issue circumscribes their scope. Through ground of appeal 60, the contractors claim to be part of this group.

831For the purpose of this judgment and to avoid unnecessary repetition, the words “negligent act” also include the errors and omissions of geologist Blanchette.

832Exhibit DZ-2 (6 July 2011), vol. 371 at 155265; Examination of Antonio Alfieri (20 November 2013), vol. 482 at 196973–196974.

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for damage caused to the foundations by the deleterious effect of pyrrhotite in the concrete.

[888]This submission is supplemented by another idea, that during the 2009–2010 policy period, SNC informed its insurers of the various occurrences that subsequently gave rise to claims in connection with the negligent act of its geologist.833 According to the insurers, the claims made after the 2009–2010 policy period should be considered to have been made during that period.

[889]In short, the negligent act alleged here is the unifying element in the claims justifying their inclusion under the 2009–2010 insurance coverage.

[890]The interpretation given by the insurers to the clauses in their policy seeks to limit the coverage granted for the claims related to the pyrrhotite cases to a single policy period even though the claims extend over more than one year and their total amounts are greater than that of the annual coverage. The injured third persons, for their part, seek to have their claims treated as claims made and reported during the various policy periods concerned.

[891]The insurers’ approach is hardly more satisfactory for SNC, who must now consider the impact that the consequences of the negligent acts of geologist Blanchette may have on its assets,834 at least in regard to the excess portion of the claims that are not covered by the renewed policies.

[892]This reality makes it difficult to understand SNC’s complacent attitude at trial with respect to the insurers’ interpretation, which at first glace seems unfavourable to the insured’s interests. On this issue, the Superior Court has previously found that more or less obvious agreements between an insurer and its insured resulting in an unjustified limitation of coverage to the detriment of the rights of injured third persons may not in principle be set up against the injured third persons.835 In this case, the Court finds that the balance of probabilities indicates that these agreements were strategic in nature and that it is appropriate to apply that conclusion.

[893]In any event, the judge rejected the interpretation proposed by the insurers and limited the temporal scope of the disputed clauses to the policy period set out in

833A foundation of the insurers’ theory rests on the idea that geologist Blanchette committed only one negligent act underlying all the occurrences related to the pyrrhotite cases.

834Article 2644 C.C.Q. sets out the rule that the property of a debtor is the common pledge of its creditors.

835Air liquide Canada inc. c. Canadian American Tank Lines Inc., 2011 QCCS 1108 at para. 110.

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the policy schedules. He also found that they applied in accordance with the dates the claims were made against SNC and reported to the insurers.836

[894]The limitation invoked by the insurers and rejected by the judge is based on the following premises: (1) geologist Blanchette committed only one negligent act, (2) that negligent act underlies the occurrences for which claims were made against SNC, (3) the policies authorize the aggregation, unlimited in time, of the claims related to that negligent act, and finally, (4) even if they occurred after the policy period, the claims grouped together into [TRANSLATION] “one single claim”837 are covered by only the policies in force at the time of the initial notice of occurrence resulting from the negligent act common to all these claims.

[895]The issue is therefore whether the interpretation accepted by the judge, according to which the various claims made triggered coverage extending over more than one policy period, is supported by the wording of the policies and the applicable principles of interpretation. For the purpose of this exercise, it will be necessary to review the various clauses invoked by the insurers and assess their true scope in the context of a policy underwritten on a “claims made and reported” basis, while keeping in mind that this is not a legal characterization and therefore cannot prevail over the policy wording.838

[896]There is also another aspect of the contestation submitted by certain injured third persons, according to which the insurers are barred from invoking a limitation of coverage to only one policy period on the ground that the argument was not raised in a timely manner. This ground involves the conduct of the insurers who renewed the policies over several years without ever disclosing the limitation now invoked to their insured. This aspect will be addressed at the end of the analysis.

[897]Finally, it should be noted that SNC chose not to appeal the conclusions of the judgment rejecting the interpretation suggested by the insurers. In addition, during the appeal hearing, it did not ask to be heard on this issue.

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836See in particular the Main judgment at paras. 1971–2207.

837A.B.-7 at para. 105.

838Reid Crowther & Partners Ltd. v. Simcoe & Erie General Insurance Co., [1993] 1 S.C.R. 252 at 261.

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Background

[898]As explained in the introduction, the policies at issue in this case operate on the basis of claims made to SNC and reported to its insurers. True “claims-made” policies protect the insured in principle against all claims made during the policy period specified in the policy.839 The “claims made and reported” category includes an additional requirement whereby the insured must report any claim made by an injured third person to the insurer during the policy term.840

[899]In the case before us, SNC’s contractual duty to report takes the form of a “Claims Status Report”.841 This way of proceeding borrows in many regards from the legal duty imposed on the insured to report to the insurer in advance all the facts which are likely to “materially influence” the setting of the premium, the appraisal of the risk, or the decision to cover it (2408 C.C.Q.).

[900]A policy in the “claims made and reported” category often contains a clause seeking to exclude from coverage any occurrences842 and circumstances843 that could potentially give rise to claims where such information is known to the insured before the start of the policy term. The policies at issue in this case contain this type of clause.

[901]In this case, the insurers raise no exclusion or limitation for the insurance tower covering the period from March 31, 2009, to March 31, 2010, other than the coverage limit specified for that period.

[902]It is appropriate here to review the chronology of the principal events related to this ground of appeal.

839Ibid. at 260.

840Jean-François Gagnon, “La portée des exclusions relatives aux réclamations et aux actes fautifs antérieurs dans les polices sur base de réclamation présentée” in Développements récents en droit des assurances (2005) 222 143 at 147.

841Exhibits P-17A to P-17E, vol. 488 at 199366–199390. There is also a document titled Loss Record Report prepared for the purpose of policy renewals, but it can also provide an indication of the expected losses. The document summarizes the losses of the past 10 years.

842Bryan A. Garner & Henry Campbell Black, Black’s Law Dictionary, 10th ed. (Saint Paul, MN: West,

2014) sub verbo “Occurrence”: “Something that happens or takes place; specif., an accident, event, or continuing condition that results in a personal injury or property damage that is neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of an insured party”.

843Bryan A. Garner & Henry Campbell Black, Black’s Law Dictionary, 10th ed. (Saint Paul, MN: West,

2014) sub verbo “Circumstance”: “An accompanying or accessory fact, event, or condition, such as a piece of evidence that indicates the probability of an event”.

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[903]In December 2009, SNC provided a “Claims Status Report”844 and a “Loss Record Report”845 to the broker AON, to the attention of its insurers. These documents refer to four separate claims based on as many occurrences related to the pyrrhotite cases and the likelihood of 150 future claims for a potential loss assessed at that time at $22,550,000.846

[904]The notice accompanying the “Loss Record Report” specified in particular that it was being provided to the insurers “[f]or the sole purpose of: Professional Indemnity Insurance Renewal”.847

[905]In early 2010, the policy renewal process for the insurance tower in force from March 31, 2010, to March 31, 2011, proceeded in the usual way. The insurers were already in possession of four claims invoking SNC’s liability and could expect to receive 150 others. Significantly, the coverage granted at the time of this renewal was increased by $10 million with no other exclusion or limitation added to the renewed policies.

[906]In 2010, legal proceedings were brought directly against the insurers by the parties. The insurers produced their first written defence in November 2011. It can be assumed that at that stage of the progression of the court cases, they were already well aware of SNC’s situation.

[907]The “Claims Status Report” dated December 14, 2010, added to the information that the insurers already had. It contained the following statement:

Claims by various plaintiffs are coming in at a steady rate and as of today, we are looking at over 650 claims from individuals that have been made against the concrete suppliers [2], contractors [20], and a gravel supplier [1], specialized contractors [8] as well as SNC-Lavalin.

[Redacted.]

We understand the number of notice of claims have attained the threshold of 650 plaintiffs. The plaintiffs are more or less all alleging the same root cause of the cracks in the foundations to their homes.

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844Exhibit P-17A (22 December 2009), vol. 488 at 199366.

845Exhibit DSNC-159 (December 2009), vol. 323 at135530.

846This potential loss includes the total damages for which SNC could be held liable.

847Exhibit DSNC-159 (December 2009), vol. 323 at 135530 [emphasis added].

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[Redacted.]

As of this moment, the common expert appointed by the court on damages Mr. Daniel Raymond has assessed approximately 215 homes and the average values of damages are approximately $110,000 per home. [The rest of this paragraph is redacted].848

[908]Despite this worrisome context, the renewal of the 2011–2012 tower proceeded as it had in the past. On that occasion, total coverage was even increased by $20 million without the insurers adding any exclusion to the coverage granted or informing their insured of a coverage limitation in regard to future claims that had already been announced.

[909]At the same time, the insurers Lloyd’s and Zurich, participants in the insurance tower for the periods in question, agreed to provide a Reinstatement extension and an Endorsement to SNC. The Reinstatement provides the following:

lt is agreed that, upon notification to the lnsurers during the Period of this Policy of any Claim made against the lnsured or of circumstances which are likely to give rise to a Claim, this Policy shall be deemed to be reinstated for such amount, if any, as may ultimately be paid by the lnsurers in respect of such Claim so as to remain in force during the Policy period for the lndemnity or amount stated in the Schedule of this Policy, provided always that the amounts so reinstated shall not exceed an amount equal to the said lndemnity or amount.

lt is the intention of this extension that the sums thus reinstated shall provide cover in respect of subsequent Claims or losses which are totally unrelated to the Claims or circumstances that gave rise to the Claims already notified.849

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848Exhibit P-17B (14 December 2010), vol. 488 at 199372. It should be noted that SNC’s Claims Status Reports filed in the court record, covering the period from December 22, 2009, to January 31, 2013, are heavily redacted and reveal fragmented information (Exhibits P-17A to P-17E, vol. 488 at 199366–199390). However, a simple calculation shows that the 650 claims already received by SNC were assessed at the time at approximately $71,500,000, i.e., $110,000 per house. It became apparent at trial that this assessment underestimated the extent of the damage.

This could explain the insured’s lack of enthusiasm on appeal to support the theory of the insurers, who are now facing over 1,000 claims related to the pyrrhotite cases: Main judgment at para. 2065.

849 Exhibit P-15-2, 2011–2012, vol. 488 at 199300. See also Exhibit P-15-3, 2011–2012, vol. 488 at 199324.

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[Bold emphasis in original.]

[910]The judge described the significance of the increase in insurance coverage in the Lloyd’s and Zurich policies in the following terms:

[TRANSLATION]

[2095] At the time of that same renewal, in early 2011, Lloyd’s and Zurich issued what is referred to as a “reinstatement extension”, found at page 24 of 26 of the 2011 Lloyd’s policy and in “endorsement #4” in the 2011 Zurich policy. The effect of that clause was to increase coverage for claims with no connection to a claim already reported. The additional coverage was 35 million for the 2011–2012 tower and 45 million for the 2012–2013 tower.850

[Emphasis added.]

[911]An interim report dated July 31, 2011, provided by SNC to its insurers indicated that the situation continued to deteriorate:

Claims by various plaintiffs, are coming in at a steady rate and as of today, we are looking at over 800 claims from individuals that have been made against the concrete suppliers [2], contractors [20]. And gravel supplier [1], specialized contractors [8] as well as SNC-Lavalin.

Moreover, claims from commercial entities are making their way into the process.851

[912]There is also the other report dated December 19, 2011,852 which essentially reiterated the report of July 31, 2011, at least from what can be understood given the limited reading possible due to its significant redaction.

[913]Finally, the insurers’ initial defences filed in November 2011 make no reference to their interpretation according to which only the 2009–2010 tower is applicable to all the claims made against SNC in the pyrrhotite cases.853 Among the

850Main judgment at paras. 2094–2095; Exhibit P-15-2, 2011–2012, vol. 488 at 199300; Exhibit P-15- 3, 2011–2012, vol. 488 at 199324.

851Exhibit P-17C (31 July 2011), vol. 488 at 199376.

852Exhibit P-17D (19 December 2011), vol. 488 at 199381.

853In fairness to the insurers, it should be noted that the motions to institute proceedings did not directly involve the 2010–2011 and 2011–2012 insurance towers. However, the insurers were

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members of the 2009–2010 tower, only the insurers Zurich, on June 27, 2013, and ACE, on November 18, 2013, decided to invoke this limitation in their re-amended defence. The insurers Lloyd’s and AIG never put forth this argument but simply submitted on appeal that it could be inferred from the facts of the case and the wording of their policy.

Analysis

The reference policy

[914]SNC and its insurers are involved in a system of successive annual insurance policies that have been renewed without interruption since 2006.854 For all those years, the policy wording remained practically unchanged. The risk was underwritten for each policy period by the same insurers and on the same conditions, with the exception, however, of the amount of coverage and the amount of the premium, which increased at the time of each annual renewal. Finally, SNC always remained the principal insured.

[915]The joint statement of facts855 and in particular the testimony of Andrew Choi, underwriter for ACE,856 indicate that SNC’s insurance policies were consistently renewed over the relevant years, covering identical one-year policy terms.857 Without elaborating any further on this subject, and with respect for the judge’s opinion on the issue,858 this was clearly a process of [TRANSLATION] “reinstatement of a contract upon its expiry, usually for the same term and on the same conditions, subject to amendment of the monetary clauses”.859

[916]During the period from 2009 to 2013, no insurer other than the appellants and no policy other than those making up the various insurance towers involved in this

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aware as of the production of the interim report dated July 31, 2011, that the coverage granted by the 2009–2010 tower might be grossly insufficient.

854Main judgment at para. 1987.

855Joint statement of facts regarding insurance issues (SNC) at paras. 21–45.

856Re-examination of Andrew Choi (21 November 2013), vol. 483 at 197149–197150.

857The renewal process followed by SNC and its insurers is of course complex. However, each annual assessment of the risk resulted in the renewal of coverage with policy wording that was practically unchanged from one year to the next.

858Main judgment at paras. 1984 and 2057.

859Hubert Reid, Dictionnaire de droit québécois et canadien, 5th ed. (Montreal: Wilson & Lafleur,

2015) sub verbo “renouvellement/renewal”.

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dispute were concerned by notices given by SNC in connection with the pyrrhotite cases.

[917]This context brings to light the presumption that a “claims made and reported” insurance policy authorizes an insured to have a reasonable expectation of obtaining complete coverage that is maintained on a continuous basis by virtue of the renewal of its policies.860

[918]At this stage of the analysis, it is now necessary to consider the disputed clauses invoked by the insurers to verify whether their content is ambiguous.861 If so, the interpretation of these clauses must be based on the reasonable expectations of the parties and on the general principles of interpretation applicable in insurance, in particular:

1)In the event of ambiguity, the contract must be interpreted against its author (contra proferentem).

2)Coverage provisions should be construed broadly and exclusion clauses should be construed narrowly.862

[919]One last remark is in order before moving on to the analysis per se. None of the parties argued that the disputed clauses are fundamental insurance clauses entailing the application of the standard of review based on error of law. Rather, the parties were content to describe their understanding of these clauses, which in this case leads to diametrically opposed results depending on the position taken, despite their common submission that the clarity of the clauses requires no interpretation. The judge considered these divergent points of view and drew conclusions on the combined effect of the disputed clauses. This Court owes deference to those

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860Reid Crowther & Partners Ltd. v. Simcoe & Erie General Insurance Co., [1993] 1 S.C.R. 252 at 271. In this case, the principle of reasonable expectation applies because of the ambiguity surrounding certain clauses of the policy, as discussed below in the judgment.

861As Lluelles states, [TRANSLATION] “ambiguity or obscurity does not result solely from the diverging views of litigants on the scope of a clause”. Didier Lluelles, Droit des assurances terrestres, 6th ed. (Montreal: Thémis, 2017) at 113–115, Nos. 152–154. Authors Baudouin, Jobin & Vézina express a similar opinion: [TRANSLATION] “the fact that some parties have a divergent interpretation does not necessarily mean that there is actually an ambiguity”. Jean-Louis Baudouin, Pierre-Gabriel Jobin & Nathalie Vézina, Les obligations, 7th ed. (Cowansville, QC: Yvon Blais, 2013) at 493, No. 413.

862Reid Crowther & Partners Ltd. v. Simcoe & Erie General Insurance Co., [1993] 1 S.C.R. 252 at 269.

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conclusions unless it is established that the contested conclusion is affected by a palpable and overriding error.863

Presentation of the disputed insurance clauses

[920]Although it is well established that divergent points of view on the application of an insurance clause are not evidence of ambiguity, in this case the insurers challenge the interpretation of the disputed clauses accepted by the judge and suggest substituting their own interpretation. The interaction of the various insurance clauses in the reference policy raised some complex issues of application that authorized the judge to engage in such analysis. The insurers see palpable and overriding errors in his analysis. Let us examine this more closely.

[921]The insurers provide three levels of support for their position. The first draws the Court’s attention to the definitions section of the reference policy and in particular clause 4.1 of the AIG policy or 4.2 of the Lloyd’s policy, which define the word “claim” in the same way.864 That definition is not a concern for the purpose of deciding the issue. However, the insurers focus on the second paragraph of these clauses, which provides for the possibility, under certain conditions, of grouping together the claims arising from the same negligent act as if they were only one claim:

4.1Claim

Means:

[clause 4.1.1 or 4.2.1 depending on the policy] A written or oral demand from a third party requesting compensation for damages arising out of, or an allegation by a third party of, an error, omission or negligent act by the lnsured in the conduct of their Professional Duties.

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863Immeubles Régime XV inc. c. Indigo Books & Music Inc., 2012 QCCA 239 at paras. 9–10; Groupe Trans-inter inc. c. Ragusa Canada inc., 2012 QCCA 2033 at para. 17.

864As discussed above, there is a dispute between the members of the tower with respect to the identification of the “reference policy”. Because the wording of the disputed clauses in the two policies is practically identical, the parties invited the Court to refer to either of them indiscriminately.

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[second paragraph of clause 4.1 or 4.2 depending on the policy] Claims arising from a single error, omission, or negligent, dishonest, fraudulent criminal or malicious act, or breach, or loss or destruction or damage shall be considered a single Claim regardless of the number of lnsureds or the number of third parties making a Claim.865

[Emphasis added.]

[922]The insurers then go directly to the section of the policy titled “CLAIM CONDITIONS – INSURED DUTIES IN THE EVENT OF CLAIM”. Here, in their argument, they point to clause 7.1.2. To better situate the wording of that clause, it is worth also reproducing the preceding clause (7.1.1):

7.1lt is a condition precedent to lnsurers' liability under this Policy that:

7.1.1Upon receipt by or on behalf of the lnsured of notice whether written or oral of intention by any person or body to make a Claim against the lnsured or of any allegation of any error, omission or negligent act which might give rise to such a Claim or on the discovery of any such error, omission or negligent act the lnsured shall notify the Claim Officer for transmission to lnsurers of such receipt, allegation or discovery in accordance with the Claim Procedures below.

7.1.2If during the subsistence hereof the lnsured shall become aware of any occurrence which may subsequently give rise to a Claim against them by reason of any error, omission or negligent act and shall during the subsistence hereof give written notice to the Claim Officer, for transmission to lnsurers of such occurrence, any Claim which may subsequently be made against the lnsured arising out of that error, omission or negligent act shall be deemed to have been made during the subsistence hereof.866

[Emphasis added.]

[923]According to the interpretation suggested by the insurers, clause 7.1.2 allows SNC and the injured third persons to benefit from insurance coverage for claims

865

Exhibit

P-13-1,

2009–2010,

vol. 488

at 199055–199056;

Exhibit

P-13-2,

2009–2010,

vol. 488

 

at 199087. The judge noted that the texts remained identical for each of the policies after 2009:

 

Main judgment at paras. 2013, 2025, and 2033.

 

 

 

 

866

Exhibit

P-13-1,

2009–2010,

vol. 488

at 199070–199071;

Exhibit

P-13-2,

2009–2010,

vol. 488

at 199099.

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arising from an occurrence caused by the negligent act alleged against geologist Blanchette. Also according to the insurers, these are claims for which the source was known to SNC as of the 2009–2010 policy period even though the claims were made after the expiry of that period, [TRANSLATION] “whereas they would otherwise have been excluded by the “prior knowledge” exclusion set out in clause 6.5 of the AIG policy and the Lloyd’s policy for the subsequent policy periods”.867

[924]According to the insurers, the policies in question create two types of groups. The first groups claims together according to the negligent act that caused the occurrences (clause 4.1 or 4.2, as the case may be). The second concerns claims reported after expiry of the policy term but whose cause is an occurrence reported in writing to the insurer during the term of that policy. These claims are considered to have been made during the policy period in which notice was given (clause 7.1.2).

[925]Finally, the insurers’ argument leads us to the section of the policy titled “EXCLUSIONS”, in particular clause 6.5:

This policy does not cover any liability or Claim whatsoever arising out of:

6.5 Any circumstance or occurrence:

6.5.1Which has been notified to lnsurers on any other policy of insurance effected prior to the inception of this Policy;

6.5.2Known to the lnsured prior to the inception of this Policy.868

[926]Such clauses, referred to as “prior knowledge” clauses, exclude from coverage the circumstances and occurrences already reported to a previous insurer by notice to that effect. They are in any event excluded from coverage when the insured was aware of the information before the policy took effect. Clause 6.5.2 is particularly significant when the insured failed to report circumstances and occurrences of which it was aware before the start of the policy period.

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867A.B.-7 at para. 127.

868 Exhibit P-13-1, 2009–2010, vol. 488 at 199065–199066; Exhibit P-13-2, 2009–2010, vol. 488 at 199095. The judge noted that this provision is found in the AIG policy and in the Lloyd’s policy for each year: Main judgment at para. 2047.

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[927]Reduced to its simplest terms, the insurer’s argument is essentially that the claims received by SNC over a three-year period in connection with the negligent act of geologist Blanchette are all one single claim (clause 4.1 or 4.2, as the case may be) and deemed to have been reported during the policy period of March 31, 2009, to March 31, 2010 (clause 7.1.2).

[928]Under the guise of a generous approach this interpretation actually limits the coverage provided to the insured SNC to a single policy period.

[929]The judge rejected the possibility that a reasonable interpretation of these clauses could give such a limited result. He noted that clause 4.1 or 4.2, as the case may be, is found in the “DEFINITIONS” section, not in the “CLAIM CONDITIONS” section. He also explained that a claim requires a specific notice from the insured during the policy period in progress and that the clause cannot apply to claims that have not yet arisen without borrowing from a clause in another policy, which would be contrary to article 2403 C.C.Q.

[930]Next, he focussed on exclusion clause 6.5. He said he was of the view that clause 6.5.1 concerns previous insurers, not the current insurers. In addition, he found that clause 6.5.2 excludes from coverage the circumstances and occurrences known to the insured before the policy took effect. He added that this exclusion must be read together with article 2408 C.C.Q., which sets out the insured’s disclosure obligations. The judge stated:

[TRANSLATION]

[2054] Obviously, an insurer does not want to become liable for risks arising from circumstances known by an insured and not disclosed to the insurer. That is what generally underlies applications to cancel an insurance policy ab initio under article 2410 of the Civil Code of Québec.

[931]He also stated that the exclusion is not applicable to the 2009–2010 tower because [TRANSLATION] “the insurers agreed to cover” the risk for that period.869 For the subsequent periods, the judge found that SNC complied with its disclosure obligations870 and that the policies in force for those successive periods did not contain any clearly worded exclusion clause excluding from coverage the

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869Main judgment at para. 2055.

870Exhibits P-17A to P-17E, vol. 488 at 199366–199390.

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circumstances and occurrences reported before the start of the term of the policies concerned by the claims.871

[932]Next, the judge moved on to the analysis of section 7 (claims conditions). He found that SNC’s contractual duty to report in writing an occurrence discovered during the policy period corresponded to the legal obligation set out in article 2470 C.C.Q., which requires the insured to “notify the insurer of any loss which may fall under the coverage, as soon as he becomes aware of it”. The absence of any reaction from the insurers to the subsequent notices received from SNC reinforces the idea that the renewed policies never excluded the risks reported. The judge added:

[TRANSLATION]

[2106] In addition, by interpreting clause 7.1.2 as they do, the insurers are substantially changing the nature of coverage by transforming a “Claims- Made” policy into an “occurrence”-based policy because, since in their view it is the same occurrence, only the 2009 tower applies.

[933]Let us now consider the disputed clauses in further detail. Clause 4.1 or 4.2, as the case may be

[934]The insurers submit that clause 4.1 or 4.2, as the case may be, allows for a grouping that is unlimited in time of the claims made against the insured due to the single fault (the negligent act) of geologist Blanchette. As discussed in the context of the analysis of the geologist’s liability,872 the hypothesis of the single fault turned out to be unfounded in light of the evidence heard at trial.

[935]In addition, the idea of a grouping of claims that is unlimited in time must be rejected because it is contrary to the wording of the policies that have a term of one year.

[936]Essentially, the insurers propose an extension of the scope of clause 4.1 or 4.2, as the case may be, beyond the term of the 2009–2010 policies, by grouping together the claims that occurred after their term, even if those claims had not yet been made to SNC during the period covered by those policies. They also criticize the judge for finding that clauses of that nature are stipulated solely for the insured’s

871Main judgment at paras. 2076–2077.

872See chapter 8 of this judgment, more specifically the analysis under Ground No. 1.

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benefit and seek only to avoid the application of multiple deductibles. The insurers are of the view that the clause protects them as well, because of the limitation of coverage that it supposedly contains.

[937]The insurers argue that upholding the judge’s decision on this issue would have the effect of making the $2 million deductible set out in the policy applicable to each individual claim made against SNC. They are wrong.

[938]The insurers’ argument that if their interpretation is rejected, there would be as many deductibles as there are claims, is untenable. The judge’s reasons clearly show that the grouping together of claims is possible, but only within the applicable policy periods in accordance with the dates of the claims made against SNC and reported to the insurers. That interpretation of clause 4.1 or 4.2, as the case may be, is consistent with the limited term of the policies as set out in the relevant clauses and with the purpose of the clause.

[939]To accept the interpretation proposed by the insurers would be tantamount to including in the policy an unwritten exclusion likely to transform an advantage clearly stipulated for the insured’s benefit (to avoid the application of multiple deductibles in a given period) into a limitation of coverage in favour of the insurer (limitation of coverage to a single policy period).

[940]That argument must therefore be rejected.

Clause 7.1.2

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[941]First, to appreciate the relevance of clause 7.1.2, it must be borne in mind that

SNC’s policies were consistently renewed without the insurers considering it necessary to add any exclusion or limitation whatsoever.

[942]In this case, the reference policy refers to two types of notices, which must not be confused. The first seeks to notify the insurer of the circumstances known to the client that would allow the insurer to better identify the risk covered. This type of notice, already set out in article 2408 C.C.Q., concerns the disclosure of circumstances which, depending on the situation, may indicate liability without necessarily resulting in a claim being made against the insured during the policy period in progress. The second concerns the actual occurrence873 caused by the negligent act of the insured. Again, it is important to distinguish between the notice of occurrence and the resulting claim, which can occur at different times.

[943]Clause 7.1.2 is found in the “CLAIMS PROCEDURES” section. It is concerned with a notice of occurrence made during the policy period even if the resulting claim is not made against the insured until after that period. It is therefore not strictly speaking a “notice of circumstance” clause. Rather, it should be understood as a “notice of occurrence” clause, even if this type of notice actually provides an overview of future claims related to the occurrence that was notified.

[944]Unlike the situation in clause 4.1 or 4.2, as the case may be, which seeks to provide an advantage to the insured by protecting it against the application of multiple deductibles, clause 7.1.2 directly affects the scope of coverage. It provides additional coverage to the insured for claims occurring after the policy term, the source of which is however an occurrence notified in writing during the term of the same policy.

[945]In the event the policy is not renewed, this clause prevents the insured from falling between two stools within the meaning expressed by LeBel J. in the Supreme

Court’s judgment in Jesuit Fathers:

[25]… Many claims-made policies offer even more restricted coverage. For example, the policy might exclude from coverage any negligence of which the insured is aware prior to the coverage period even if no claims have been made. This leaves the insured in the situation where, although consistently

873According to Couch on Insurance: “An occurrence is generally defined as “an accident, including a continuous or repeated exposure to conditions, which results in bodily injury or property damage neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured”. Lee R. Russ et al., Couch on Insurance 3d, 3rd ed., 1995 (looseleaf), No. 126.69.

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insured over a period of years, there are still certain claims that do not fall within the purview of the policy — namely, claims where the underlying damages (and related negligence) are discovered in one policy period but the claim is not made by a third party until a subsequent period. The current insurer may then be off the hook, while a new insurer will require an exclusion of the potential claims in its policy. The insured will fall between two stools.874

[Reference omitted.]

[946]The insurers’ argument that the 2009–2010 policies cover all the claims, including those made after the initial period, disregards the very specific context in which clause 7.1.2. applies. In this case, there is no new insurer that “will require an exclusion of the potential claims” arising from an occurrence during the period covered by a previous insurer. Here, the insurers concerned are all their own successors, and the renewed policies are virtually identical from one year to the next, except for the amount of the premium and the amount of coverage.

[947]In reality, the notices provided by SNC to its insurers were intended, in the event the policies were not renewed, to protect it against claims likely to be made during a subsequent policy period. These notices were also intended to prevent an insurer from raising against SNC an exclusion clause based on its prior knowledge in the context of a policy renewal.

[948]If, after receiving SNC’s notices during the 2009–2010 policy period, the insurers had wanted to protect itself for the subsequent years, they could have chosen to exclude the risk related to the pyrrhotite cases for the future, or at least limit the scope of coverage upon renewal of the policies. In such circumstances, however, under clause 7.1.2, those same insurers would have remained liable for claims made after the 2009–2010 period in connection with the occurrence notified during that period.

[949]In choosing to maintain uniform and consistent coverage throughout the course of the renewals, the possibility of “gaps in coverage”,875 as the Supreme Court put it, never arose. Because the evidence shows that the policies were consistently

874 Jesuit Fathers of Upper Canada v. Guardian Insurance Co. of Canada, 2006 SCC 21, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 744 at para. 25.

875Reid Crowther & Partners Ltd. v. Simcoe & Erie General Insurance Co., [1993] 1 S.C.R. 252 at 266; Jesuit Fathers of Upper Canada v. Guardian Insurance Co. of Canada, 2006 SCC 21, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 744 at paras. 25–26.

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renewed without limitation or exclusion, SNC could therefore expect full coverage from the renewed policies, without needing to resort to the application of clause 7.1.2.

[950]Some might respond that this interpretation places the obligation on the insurer renewing a policy to cover a risk that has become certain because it concerns an occurrence already notified under the previous policy. That argument disregards the fact that the central element of a claims-made policy is the claim itself, not the occurrence underlying it.876 The risk that the insurer guarantees in this type of policy is the unknown number of claims even if the underlying source was already disclosed to the insurer in a previous notice.

[951]A parallel can also be drawn with the notice of circumstance given to the insurer in the context of a claims-made policy, before it takes effect. That type of notice does not allow a precise assessment to be made of the claims likely to be connected to the circumstance notified or even to be certain that there will be a claim one day. In principle, however, the information does not prevent the insurer either from covering the risk related to potential claims arising from that previously declared circumstance or from excluding it, as the case may be.

[952]In short, the interpretation put forward by the insurers would once again transform an additional protection stipulated for the insured’s benefit into a limitation of coverage in favour of the insurers. This result, which is incongruous with the legitimate expectations of an insured, must be rejected in view of the suppletive principle of interpretation based on [TRANSLATION] “reasonableness”,877 particularly in the context of a policy that has been continually renewed.

Clauses 6.5.1 and 6.5.2

[953]The insurers caution against any interpretation that rejects the application of clause 7.1.2 to the facts of this case, stating that they are of the view that if the future claims that were unknown during the 2009–2010 policy period are not grouped together, they will be rejected under exclusion clauses 6.5.1 or 6.5.2 of the policies.

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876 Jesuit Fathers of Upper Canada v. Guardian Insurance Co. of Canada, 2006 SCC 21, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 744 at para. 23.

877 Jean-Louis Baudouin, Pierre-Gabriel Jobin & Nathalie Vézina, Les obligations, 7th ed (Cowansville, QC: Yvon Blais, 2013) at 495, No. 415.

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[954]At the risk of repetition, it is worth noting that the insurer did not raise any exclusion clause based on prior knowledge against SNC. The policies were renewed without ever adding an exclusion for future claims or any notice stipulating a new limitation of coverage. The renewals even gave rise to increases in coverage despite the notices given by SNC to its insurers. These facts show that the insurers knowingly chose to accept the risk of future claims. In that context, the discussion surrounding exclusion clauses 6.5.1 and 6.5.2 is moot and is aimed primarily at showing the logic of the reference policy.

[955]The judge was correct in concluding that, in the context of a system of insurance involving successive annual policies, it was unreasonable to interpret the reference policy as meaning that the clause requiring the insured to disclose the factors likely to affect the assessment of the risk exempted the insurer from expressly excluding that risk on the basis of the insured’s prior knowledge. The judge stated:

[TRANSLATION]

[2070] Mere knowledge of circumstances by the insured cannot ground an exclusion in the context of reasonable expectations.

[2071] A subsequent insurer is justified in denying coverage when a claim was notified to a previous, different insurer under a claims-made policy. The reason is very simple: it is up to the previous insurer to cover the risk under its own claims-made policy.

[2072] The insurers in question gradually became aware of the circumstances and the claims through reports P-17. This is where the provisions of articles 2408 and 2409 come into play.

[956]The exclusions set out in clause 6.5 of the reference policy must be put back into context. They aim primarily to shift the risk to the previous insurer to whom the occurrences and circumstances alleged against the insured were previously notified. This manner of proceeding avoids all possibility of double compensation while allowing the insured to maintain continuous insurance coverage:

[TRANSLATION]

In this scenario, therefore, there is no gap in the insured’s insurance coverage. If a claim is made against the insured pursuant to such facts and

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circumstances, it will fall under the responsibility of the insurer whose policy was in effect at the time the facts were notified to it.878

[957]They also seek to sanction the insured who conceals material facts by failing to disclose all the occurrences and circumstances known to it at the time of taking out a new insurance policy.

oClause 6.5.1

[958]Clause 6.5.1 of the AIG and Lloyd’s policies exclude from coverage the circumstances and the occurrences previously notified to an insurer “on any other policy of insurance effected prior to the inception of this Policy”. The Zurich policy excludes the circumstances and claims “which have been notified to an lnsurer during any other policy which was effective prior to the inception date of this policy”.879

[959]It should be recalled that the 2009–2010 insurance tower falls within a system of insurance that includes successive annual policies involving the same insurers with insurance policies containing clauses that remained practically unchanged since the first renewal.

[960]Clause 6.5.1 concerns circumstances or occurrences that were notified to an insurer involved in another policy (“Insurers on any other policy”). Clause 4.8 provides that the insurers bound by the insurance contract are those named on the policy’s signature page.

[961]The foregoing shows that the insurer “on any other policy of insurance effected prior to the inception date of this policy” referred to is necessarily a different insurer than those involved in the insurance towers, whereas in this case, the previous insurer is the same as the signatory of the renewed policy.

[962]Clause 6.5.1 aims to exclude from coverage the notices of circumstances or of occurrences made to a previous insurer under another policy. In so doing, the

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878Jean-François Gagnon, “La portée des exclusions relatives aux réclamations et aux actes fautifs antérieurs dans les polices sur la base de réclamation présentée” in (2005) 222 Développements récents en droit des assurances 143 at 151.

879The claims are related to an occurrence caused by the negligent act of the insured. There is no fundamental difference between Lloyd’s clause 6.5.1 (Prior knowledge clause) and Zurich’s

(Retroactive limitation clause), which both exclude, on certain conditions, an occurrence or its counterpart, the claim. However, the Zurich policy is not the reference policy in the towers.

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insurers wanted to protect themselves against the possibility of double compensation by two separate insurers presented with a claim for the same occurrence.

[963]If the insurers wanted to be included in the terms “Insurers on any other policy”, they had to stipulate it clearly and provide that this wording also concerned the situation of the renewed policies. This ambiguity in the text, if ambiguity it is, must be resolved in favour of the insured and the injured third persons, and against the insurers.

[964]The judge was thus correct in stating:

[TRANSLATION]

[2069] So because the policies must be interpreted as a whole, and each clause must be construed in light of the others, why did the insurers not specify what would happen if these circumstances were disclosed to it, since the previous insurers for the purpose of the application of the 2010–2011 and 2011–2012 policies are themselves [previous insurers] because they were on the risk in 2009–2010, and even since 2006, as the evidence reveals.

[965]The 2013 judgment rendered by the Court of Appeal for Ontario in Onex Corporation v. American Home Assurance Company880 clarifies the debate on the scope of clause 6.5.1 of the AIG and Lloyd’s policies. The parties did not refer to it, however.

[966]That judgment was rendered in the context of a complex dispute concerning liability insurance policies covering defence costs for the directors of Onex who were also acting as directors of an American subsidiary, Magnatrax. The directors were insured under the Onex policy and under a run-off liability policy issued to Magnatrax on the eve of the day on which it used the American Chapter 11 proceedings to obtain creditor protection.

[967]In the context of the reorganization of Magnatrax, and with the Court’s authorization, the representative of the ordinary creditors brought an action against the directors of Onex and two directors of Magnatrax alleging that they used their control of Magnatrax to enrich themselves at its expense. The case was settled out of

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880Onex Corporation v. American Home Assurance Company, 2013 ONCA 117, leave to appeal to SCC refused, 35341 (3 October 2013), [2013] 3 S.C.R. ix.

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court, but the defence costs incurred by Onex and its directors totalled over $35 million, and the costs of the settlement were over $9 million.

[968]The costs incurred by the directors of Onex while they were acting as directors of Magnatrax were partially covered by the Magnatrax policy up to the limit of liability. Onex and its directors then claimed the amount of the costs incurred exceeding the limit of liability under the Magnatrax policy from Onex’s insurers under Onex’s policies at the time.

[969]Onex’s claim invoked its 2002–2003 and 2004–2005 policies for the faults committed by Onex’s directors at the time. The dispute resulted in two judgments of the Court of Appeal for Ontario, one of which was rendered in 2013881 and the other in 2015.882

[970]The issue in the 2013 judgment concerned the concurrent application of clause 7(c) of the 2002–2003 Onex policy and clause 4(d) of the 2004–2005 Onex policy. The first clause required an insured to report an event likely to lead to a claim under the 2002–2003 policy even if the claim would only be confirmed after the expiry of the policy. The second clause excluded from coverage claims based on faults that had been the subject of a notice under a previous policy to which the policy at issue succeeded.

[971]In that judgment, the Court of Appeal for Ontario applied the prior notice exclusion. It found that, while the 2002–2003 policy was in effect, Onex had indeed informed its insurer of the action brought against its directors. However, the Court had to interpret a prior knowledge clause (clause 4(d)) that was very different from the one in clause 6.5 of the AIG policy. Unlike that policy (or even the Lloyd’s policy), clause 4(d) of the Onex policy expressly excluded from coverage the facts or occurrences likely to constitute a negligent act that could lead to a claim and for which the insured had given notice “under any policy of which this policy is a renewal or replacement or which it may succeed in time”.

[972]The Onex clause thus specifically addressed the insured’s prior knowledge in the context of policies renewed by the same insurer, which is not the situation contemplated in this case by clause 6.5.1 of the AIG and Lloyd’s policies. That clause

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881Ibid.

882Onex Corporation v. American Home Assurance Company, 2015 ONCA 573, leave to appeal to SCC refused, 36679 (14 April 2016), [2016] 1 S.C.R. vi.

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focusses instead on the insured’s prior knowledge of circumstances or occurrences previously reported to another insured, as discussed above.

[973]Had clause 6.5.1 been worded the same way as Onex’s clause, the issue of the insured’s prior knowledge would be of greater relevance because it could then be claimed with a certain degree of confidence that the reference policy had incorporated a determinative element of an occurrence-based policy. That is clearly not the case here.

[974]In short, the judge’s finding that [TRANSLATION] “[a] subsequent insurer is justified in denying coverage when a claim was notified to a previous, different insurer under a claims-made policy”883 is reasonable and does not warrant the Court’s intervention.

oClause 6.5.2

[975]Clause 6.5.2 concerns the duty to disclose the circumstances and occurrences known to the insured before the insurer agrees to cover the risk. This is only natural in the context of a contractual relationship based on the principle of uberrimae fidei.

[976]This principle requires the insured to declare honestly all the circumstances known to it, as a normally provident insured would do. In exchange, the insured may count on the utmost good faith of the insurer, who will have all the relevant information needed to assess the onerousness of the risk it is being asked to cover.884

[977]In short, clause 6.5.2 seeks to protect the insurer against an insured who is negligent or who conceals material facts when making its representations. That it not the situation here.

The tardiness of the insurers’ argument

[978]The insurers were informed of the individual claims and of the circumstances related to the pyrrhotite cases on December 22, 2009. Other similar reports followed

on December 14, 2010, July 31, 2011, and December 19, 2011. None of these

883Main judgment at para. 2071 [emphasis added].

884Canadian Indemnity Co. v. Canadian Johns-Manville Co., [1990] 2 S.C.R. 549; Brunet c. Axa Assurances inc, 2016 QCCA 832. In regard to article 2408 C.C.Q., see in particular Assurance-Vie Desjardins-Laurentienne inc. c. Poirier-Wilson, [2003] R.R.A. 1098 (Qc. C.A.).

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notices led to a specific exclusion of the risk or a limitation of coverage. On the contrary, the coverage under the 2010–2011 insurance tower was increased by $10 million, and the coverage under the 2011–2012 insurance tower was increased by $20 million.

[979]In response to a request made by the trial judge for the insurance coverage details for 2010 and 2011, counsel for the insured SNC stated for the first time on July 6, 2011, that only the 2009–2010 policy is relevant in this case.885

[980]Moreover, it was only in June and November 2013 that two insurers (Zurich and ACE), members of the different towers involved in the dispute with the injured third persons, raised for the first time that coverage was limited to only one policy period. In the best-case scenario, close to 41 months had elapsed between the first claims that were grouped together and the limitation now invoked by the insurers. In fact, 24 months had elapsed between the insurers’ initial defence and their amended defences that raised this limitation for the first time.

[981]In his treatise published in 1992, Les contrats d’assurance terrestres, Professor Jean-Guy Bergeron stated:

[TRANSLATION]

Not raising the defence and instead keeping it in reserve in case the other grounds fail is a serious indication of a reasonable insurer’s intention to waive it. In our view, such an attitude on the part of the insurer is incompatible with the good faith that must encompass the insurer-insured relationship.886

[982]Although it is true that the motions to institute proceedings do not involve the 2010–2011 and 2011–2012 towers, it should nevertheless be noted that it was not up to third parties (the plaintiffs) to assess the complete insurance coverage that SNC had at the time, nor to determine whether such coverage was sufficient. However, the information available to the insurers as of July 31, 2011, allowed them to anticipate with a certain degree of precision that the coverage would be insufficient if the scenario under consideration was limited to the 2009–2010 tower. The records show that they raised this issue only in November 2013, despite the fact that they were well aware of the state of the cases when they submitted their first defences in November 2011.

885Exhibit DZ-2 (6 July 2011), vol. 371 at 155265.

886Jean-Guy Bergeron, Les contrats d’assurance terrestre, vol. 2 (Sherbrooke: SEM, 1992) at 376.

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[983]While the insurers’ tardiness in raising the issue of coverage being limited to a single policy period cannot be considered a peremptory exception (fin de non- recevoir) in regard to this ground of appeal, it does, however, weaken its scope and its value.

Conclusion

[984]The insurers were not successful in establishing that the judge’s interpretation of the various insurance clauses in dispute is tainted by a palpable and overriding error. Without agreeing with his entire analysis, we can however confirm that the judge was correct in concluding that the 2009–2010, 2010–2011, and 2011–2012 towers887 applied in accordance with the claims made and reported during the policy period then in effect.

12.2Ground No. 61: Retroactive date in the ACE policy

Background

[985]ACE agreed to be an excess insurer in the various insurance towers put into place to cover the professional liability of its insured SNC during a period extending from March 31, 2006, to March 31, 2012. The evidence revealed that it participated in these towers under a system referred to as “follow form”.

[986]ACE submits that the claims made against SNC starting in the fall of 2009 in connection with the pyrrhotite cases are based on the allegation of a single negligent act committed by geologist Blanchette. This single fault took place before March 31, 2006.

[987]ACE also argues that its policies, by reference or by express statement,888 contain a retroactive date set at March 31, 2006, which excludes from its coverage claims arising from the negligent acts of SNC occurring before that date. The insurer submits that the claims made against SNC as of 2009 in connection with a negligent act that occurred before March 31, 2006, are therefore not covered by its policies.

887The judge dismissed an application to correct the Main judgment by adding the coverage provided by the 2012–2013 insurance tower because the policies making up that tower were not submitted at trial: Corrected Main judgment (31 July 2014) at paras. 37–47. That decision is not challenged on appeal.

888ACE submits that its policies contain a retroactive date or the statement “as per expiry” in reference to such a date.

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[988]There is the report of geologist Blanchette provided in October 2006 in which he warns against using the aggregate that turned out to be defective due to the presence of pyrrhotite.889 ACE excludes this apparent contradiction with the theory of the single fault prior to March 31, 2006, by submitting that this report was prepared after the representatives of Lafarge suggested in March 2006 that BL stop using that aggregate. ACE claims that there is no causal connection between the negligent act related to the 2006 report and the damages claimed by the plaintiffs arising from the use of the defective aggregate that came from the B&B quarry.

[989]The principal issue raised by this ground of appeal is whether ACE, who agreed to involve itself in a system called “follow form”, could specify in its policies a retroactive date (March 31, 2006) by which it excluded from the coverage it provided claims based on a negligent act occurring before that date, when the reference policy contains no such limitation.

The judgment

[990]The judge accepted from the evidence that SNC’s insurance application insisted on a system referred to as “follow form”. He found that ACE’s documentation showed that this insurer had taken note of the requirement. In particular, the documentation referred to the use by ACE of “true follow form” or “straight follow form”.890 The judge was of the view that the insertion of a retroactive date in some of the ACE policies was inconsistent with that system and said he was of the view that [TRANSLATION] “the evidence unequivocally shows that SNC never had the intention of negotiating or accepting a clause that limited coverage as significantly as the one regarding the exclusion of prior acts that the ACE policy contained”.891 In other words, the judge found that there was an inconsistency that could not be set up against SNC (2400 C.C.Q.).892

[991]The judge also noted that changes to an insurance contract must be made by a rider. The existence of a retroactive date in the ACE policy that was renewed for the 2008–2009 policy period893 was an amendment to the original insurance contract.

889Exhibit DSNC-49 (31 October 2006), vol. 285 at 120462.

890Main judgment at para. 1989.

891Main judgment at para. 2157.

892Main judgment at para. 2159 et seq.

893 Exhibit DACE-2.2., 2007–2008, vol. 370 at 154971; Exhibit DACE-21, 2007–2008, vol. 371 at 155177. The evidence shows that the policy applicable to the 2007–2008 period contains no reference to a retroactive date. On this issue, see the cross-examination of Andrew Choi (21 November 2013), vol. 483 at 197113–197114.

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ACE therefore had the burden of establishing that it clearly informed SNC of the reduction in its liability pursuant to that change. In the judge’s view, it failed to do so, contrary to the requirements of article 2405 C.C.Q., a provision of public order.894

[992]Surprisingly, the judge said he was also of the view that the ACE policies contained no true retroactive date. Only documents incidental to its policies contained such a reference.895 He therefore rejected the criticism that SNC neglected to carefully read the documents issued by ACE.896

[993]Finally, the judge found that ACE’s tardiness in raising this limitation was akin to a waiver on its part.897

Analysis

[994]It is not necessary to engage in the interpretation of the ACE policies to conclude that on their face, some of them contain a reference to a type of retroactive limitation date.898 The presence of such a reference in the ACE policies is clear from the documentation filed into evidence,899 at least as of the 2008–2009 policy period.900 In fact, this reference is found until the 2011–2012 policy, which states “Retroactive date: March 31, 2006”.901

[995]The reference to a retroactive date set at March 31, 2006, in a policy covering the period from March 2011 to March 2012 clearly shows that ACE intended to include a true retroactive limitation date in some of its policies. The difference

894Main judgment at paras. 2173–2175.

895Main judgment at paras. 2161–2163.

896Main judgment at paras. 2159–2160.

897Main judgment at paras. 2177–2181.

898ACE defines a “Retroactive limitation date” as follows: [TRANSLATION] “The ‘retroactive date’ of a policy is therefore a ‘temporal limitation’ of the policy because it sets a limit on the period of time during which the insurer may be liable for claims made during the policy period. Accordingly, the retroactive date is a coverage trigger, and there is no coverage for alleged errors before that retroactive date”. A.B.-7 at para. 19. ACE’s Retroactive limitation date was expressed as follows in its policy covering the 2006–2007 policy period: “Retroactive date: March 31, 2006”. Exhibit DACE-2.1, 2006–2007, vol. 370 at 154966.

899 Exhibit DACE-2.1, 2006–2007, vol. 370 at 154966; Exhibit DACE-2.3, 2008–2009, vol. 370 at 154988; Exhibit P-13-4, 2009–2010, vol. 488 at 199129 and 199131; Exhibit P-14-4, 2010– 2011, vol. 488 at 199220; Exhibit P-14-5, 2011–2012, vol. 488 at 199326.

900Although the 2006–2007 policy contains a retroactive date, the 2007–2008 policy does not. Exhibit DACE-2.2, 2007–2008, vol. 370 at 154982.

901Exhibit P-15-4, 2011–2012, vol. 488 at 199326.

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between the date of March 31, 2006, and

that of the renewed policy of March

31, 2011, cannot be explained otherwise.

This conclusion requires no further

explanation.

 

[996]The question remains open, however. First, it requires considering the constraints imposed by the follow form system and verifying whether in this case that system authorized ACE to include a retroactive limitation date in its policies despite the fact that the reference policy did not have one. This discussion requires a brief consideration of this notion, referred to in some of the ACE policies as the “retroactive date”.

[997]Next, the issue that underlies the one set out above is whether the inclusion of a retroactive date in some of the ACE policies constitutes an inconsistency within the meaning of article 2400 C.C.Q. The answer lies in the evidence accepted by the judge.

[998]Finally, with respect to the retroactive date clause itself, it is necessary to verify the factual premises on which ACE’s argument is based.

The follow form system

What is follow form?

[999]The judge said he was of the view that the follow form concept prohibited ACE from stipulating a significant limitation in the nature of a retroactive date if it was not already set out in the [TRANSLATION] “underlying policy”. He considered that in the event of conflict between the reference policy and the ACE policy, the reference policy should prevail. In the Court’s view, the judge’s findings on this issue are supported by both the law and the facts presented as evidence.

Legal aspects of the follow form system

[1000] ACE submits that follow form is but a concept, and a vague one at that, that simply seeks to describe a practice used in the insurance industry, nothing more. This manner of rendering trivial and abstract a system intended to shape the content of an excess insurance policy to reflect the reference policy greatly underestimates the legal implications of the use of the follow form system.

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[1001] Contrary to what ACE submits, this system is sufficiently recognized such that it is defined in a legal dictionary in the following terms: “[a]n insurance policy that adopts the terms and conditions of another insurance policy”.902

[1002] The International Risk Management Institute, for its part, proposes this definition of follow form:

Excess insurance that is subject to all of the terms and conditions of the policy beneath it. In the event of a conflict, it is the underlying policy provisions that take precedence. Many excess liability policies state that they are follow form except with respect to certain terms and conditions. When this is the case, the excess liability policy is not truly on a follow form basis.903

[Emphasis added.]

[1003] There is a dearth of commentary in the insurance field on the concept of follow form. In one of the rare Quebec texts to deal with the subject, authors Sébastien Lanctôt, Julie Devroede, and Hugo Filiatrault state the following:

[TRANSLATION]

“Follow-form” excess policies provide the same coverage as primary insurance and usually repeat the terms of the primary policy. They are therefore generally subject to the same exclusions as the primary policy. However, these policies provide coverage for amounts exceeding the limits of liability of the primary insurance. Such coverage is not available until the amounts payable under the policy have been exhausted. In no case will an insurer under a “follow form” policy be required to provide primary coverage. In addition, the cancellation of the primary policy entails the cancellation of the “follow-form” excess policy at the same time.904

[Reference omitted.]

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902Bryan A. Garner & Henry Campbell Black, Black's Law Dictionary, 10th ed. (St. Paul: West, 2014) sub verbo “following-form policy” [emphasis added].

903International Risk Management Institute, “Excess Liability ‘Follow Form’ Policy” in Glossary of Insurance & Risk Management Terms [online].

904Sébastien Lanctôt, Julie Devroede & Hugo Filiatrault, “Les assurances primaires et excédentaires revisitées” (2010) 44:1 R.J.T. 51 at 62–63. A portion of this excerpt is reproduced in the Main judgment at para. 2143.

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[1004] Although foreign case law must be read with caution because of the codification of insurance law in Quebec, the judgment of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court rendered in Allmerica Fin. Corp. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London helps circumscribe the meaning of follow form:

Use of a follow form clause is advantageous in crafting such an insurance program because it makes an excess policy a carbon copy of the primary policy, with the only differences being the names of the parties and the coverage limitations. Follow form language thus allows an insured to have coverage for the same set of potential losses (and with the same set of exceptions) in each layer of the insurance program.905

[Emphasis added.]

[1005] The testimony of Pierre Parizeau, who was the director of financial risk services in SNC’s insurance department at the time of the facts in dispute,906 revealed that he had a understanding of this system similar to the one set out in the commentary and the case law:

[TRANSLATION]

Q.You have two (2) different policies attached to your proposal?

A.There’s a reason.

Q.O.K. Tell me what it is.

A. ... if I may explain, again, this has to do with the phenomenon of retention A, retention B underlying the reference policy. Retention B is the subject of this Chartis policy.

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905Allmerica Fin. Corp. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London (2007), 449 Mass. 621; 871 N.E. (2d) 418 (U.S.).

906In the corporate insurance department, Pierre Parizeau was responsible for overseeing the corporate insurance renewal process and coordinating the implementation of project insurance all over the world for the SNC group.

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The reference policy is — by definition, “reference” — it establishes the terms, conditions, limitations, exclusions, and also the premium basis that will be used for the other participants.907

[Emphasis added.]

[1006] ACE also adopts these definitions. Its employee Michael Trendler stated during his examination that “[f]ollowing form meaning, following the policy wording form”.908 His opinion is consistent with that of his colleague Andrew Choi, who expressed the same idea in the following terms:

Q.And what is your understanding of a straight-follow form as you mention here in this section?

A.My understanding of a straight-follow form is that the policy wording of the primary would be adopted by an excess insurance carrier.909

[Emphasis added.]

[1007] Thus, the foregoing indicates that underlying the follow form system is the idea of a certain homogeneity between the clauses in the reference policy and those in the excess policies. This homogeneity is usually achieved by a method whereby, in the words of Andrew Choi, the “policy wording of the primary would be adopted by an excess insurance carrier”.

[1008] The judge was therefore correct in stating:

[TRANSLATION]

[2145] First, the definitions of Follow Form all seem to point in the direction of the information that was provided to us by the various witnesses during the hearing, that the excess policies are subject to the terms and conditions of the reference policy. That is in fact the common meaning that can be given to this concept, which may be loosely translated by the French expression “formule concordante”.

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907Cross-examination of Pierre Parizeau (19 November 2013), vol. 482 at 196843.

908Examination of Michael Trendler (21 November 2013), vol. 483 at 197192.

909Examination of Andrew Choi (21 November 2013), vol. 483 at 197087.

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[2146] It is interesting to note that this definition reveals that not only would the underlying policy prevail in the event of conflict, but also and especially that an excess insurer cannot impose new terms or conditions to those of the reference policy, otherwise the policy would lose its “True” or “Pure” Follow Form nature.

[Emphasis added.]

[1009] In Quebec civil law, even if an obligation is not expressly stipulated in a contract, article 1434 C.C.Q. may supplement it. The contract binds the parties not only as to what they have expressed in it, but also as to what is incident to it according to its nature and in conformity with usage. This provision, which applies to insurance contracts,910 thus contemplates an obligational content that is implicit in the contract. Even if the contract is silent on a subject, it is important to address the deficiency using one of the tools specified in the provision: the law, usage, the nature of the contract, and equity.911

[1010] In this case, usage, the nature of a true follow form insurance contract, and the clearly expressed intention of the client allow us to infer an [TRANSLATION] “implicit obligational content”912 in the insurance contract entered into between each of the insurers under this type of excess policy and the client. Pursuant to this obligational content, an excess insurer cannot impose new terms or new conditions that are not found in the reference policy, to the detriment of the client.

[1011] In addition, this obligation includes the implicit guarantee that the insured will have consistent coverage according to which “the higher layers of coverage follow consistently the lower layers. In this way it is anticipated there are no unexpected ‘gaps’ in coverage when claim values ascend the layers or ‘tower’ of coverage”.913 This undertaking is essential because it provides the insured with the legal certainty related to the homogeneity of obligations contracted in its regard by the insurers, regardless of the position they occupy in the insurance tower.

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910 Intact, compagnie d'assurances (Compagnie d'assurances ING du Canada) c. Harvey, 2011 QCCA 712 at para. 41; Didier Lluelles & Benoît Moore, Droit des obligations, 3rd ed. (Montreal: Thémis, 2018) at 823–824, No. 1489.

911Ibid.

912Didier Lluelles & Benoît Moore, Droit des obligations, 3rd ed. (Montreal: Thémis, 2018) at 824, No. 1490.

913Marcus B. Snowden, “Dropping Umbrellas and Following to Excess – Part I” (2005) 23 Can. J.

Ins. L. 33 at 35.

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[1012] Witness Antonio Alfieri of SNC accurately described the importance of respect for the follow form system by the excess insurer:

[TRANSLATION]

Q.What was your reaction, Mr. Alfieri?

A.Well, I was very surprised about the existence of this “retroactive date” in the insurance policy and my reaction was to get to the bottom of it with our broker, to find out exactly what the situation was.

Q.In your own words, Mr. Alfieri, why were you surprised – can you explain it to the Court?

A.Because in the structure of the insurance program, the “follow form” for professional liability that we have in place, if we have a situation of an upper layer that is different than the Lloyd's reference policy, as we’ve been calling it, that means that I don’t have consistent coverage from the bottom to the top. So it’s unacceptable; it’s an insurance product that we would never have accepted or purchased. So that’s why I was very surprised, we could never have accepted the situation where an insurer of an upper level had different conditions from what we expected from the final product, all of which is described in the reference policy.

The reference policy, for us, is the place where all of our coverage is written, described, and established – the conditions, the exclusions, et cetera. The others are layers that follow for the upper limits.914

[Emphasis added.]

[1013] Moreover, the same witness explained the possible consequence of a lack of homogeneity among the policies making up the tower as follows:

[TRANSLATION]

Q.And the fact that there’s a retro date ... an alleged retroactive date, between two layers; does that have any particular effect for you, in your experience?

914Examination of Antonio Alfieri (20 November 2013), vol. 482 at 196982.

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A.Of course, because the uppermost layer says [TRANSLATION] “I’m not paying as long as the lower levels have fulfilled, have paid their share of the limits”.

So, if I have a “gap”, if I may use that word, between the layers, those at the top won’t pay as long as those below them are paying. It’s as simple as that.915

[Emphasis added.]

[1014] The excess insurer’s undertaking also prevents the insured from having to suffer the repercussions of a potential dispute between two excess insurers promoting inconsistent clauses within the same insurance tower to the detriment of a foreseeable and efficient compensation system.

[1015] In this case, the evidence shows that ACE accepted the broker AON’s invitation to participate in the insurance towers under the follow form system.916 The ACE analyst acknowledged that the broker had insisted on true follow form on behalf of SNC.917 The question that remains is therefore whether ACE complied with the obligations inherent to the use of that system.

The application of the true follow form system to the facts of this case

[1016] It has already been determined that some of the ACE policies contained a retroactive date. In principle, there is nothing prohibiting the inclusion of such a clause in a claims-made policy. In the context of a true follow form policy, however, it is necessary to consider whether such a clause is consistent with the fundamental elements of the reference policy. To answer this question, it is necessary to revisit the evidence.

[1017] In early 2006, the broker AON, on behalf of its client SNC, sent ACE an insurance application with no reference to any retroactive date.918 In a note to the insurer dated March 7, 2006, the broker AON stated the following: “NOTE: It is

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915Ibid. at 196983.

916Main judgment at para. 2139.

917Examination of Andrew Choi (21 November 2013), vol. 483 at 197087; Cross-examination of Andrew Choi (21 November 2013), vol. 483 at 197119–197120; Exhibit DACE-4 (13 March 2006), vol. 370 at 155048.

918Exhibit DSNC-151 (3 February 2006), vol. 322 at 135413 et seq.

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critical that markets sitting on top of these Lloyds layers also provide follow form coverage. Do you think your markets will be receptive to this”.919

[1018] In an internal document from ACE dated March 13, 2006, and titled “Underwriting Worksheet”, the insurer described the insurance services required by the broker as follows: “ACE INA will be ‘true follow form’ the primary Insurer, AIG for this insurance program”.920

[1019] In addition, a document titled “Quotation” dated March 6, 2006, provided to the broker AON by ACE contained the following information: “Policy Form: ACE INA Insurance True Excess Follow Form”.921 The documentation for the 2006–2007 policy period also shows that ACE was aware of the information inherent to the reference policy.922

[1020] In short, not only does the evidence show that SNC wanted a policy issued on a true follow form basis, but this same evidence also indicates that ACE accepted this requirement. The judge’s finding that SNC required the excess insurers to apply this system is therefore based on credible evidence and is not open to review.

The reference policy

[1021] In view of the implications arising from the obligation to comply with the true follow form system, it is now important to consider the reference policy in greater detail to determine the conditions with which the ACE policies had to comply.

[1022] At trial, there was a debate as to which policy was the actual reference policy for the various insurance towers concerned by the claimants in connection with the pyrrhotite cases. ACE alleged that the AIG policy had been presented to it as the reference policy, whereas the insured SNC and its insurers AIG, Lloyd’s, and Zurich claimed that it was the Lloyd’s policy that was the reference policy.923

[1023] The analysis of the grounds of challenge raised by the insurers at trial and repeated on appeal shows that the identification of the reference policy was not an

919Exhibit DACE-3 (7 March 2006), vol. 370 at 155047 [emphasis in original].

920Exhibit DACE-4 (13 March 2006), vol. 370 at 155048 [emphasis added].

921Exhibit DACE-2.1, 2006–2007, vol. 370 at 154955 [emphasis added]. See also the Binder 2006– 2007, which reiterates that the insurer undertakes to participate in a true excess follow form insurance system. Exhibit DACE-2-1, 2006–2007, vol. 370 at 154958.

922Exhibit DACE-2.1, 2006–2007, vol. 370 at 154966–154967.

923A.B.-7 at para. 3, footnote on page 2; Main judgment at paras. 1980–1983.

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unavoidable prerequisite preventing the judge from properly deciding the issues that were put to him.

[1024] In particular, the judge concluded that the identification of the reference policy among the two policies in question was not determinative because the AIG and Lloyd’s policies both contained almost identical wording:924

2.2The Insured may obtain separate insurance in respect of all or any part of the amount stated in paragraph B) of the Schedule, but the coverage provided by such separate insurance shall be identical to that as provided herein.925

[1025] In this case, the judge’s conclusion on this clause seems entirely reasonable. By agreeing to apply the true follow form system to its policies, ACE undertook to comply with the obligation set out in clause 2.2.

[1026] ACE submits, however, that the reference policy, whichever policy it is, contains the following clause in the declarations section:

1.INSURING CLAUSE: [AIG]

1.2Where a retroactive limitation date is specified in the Declaration this Policy will not apply to any Claim made against the Insured by reason of any error, omission, or negligent dishonest fraudulent criminal or malicious act, or breach, committed or alleged to have been committed (or loss or destruction or damage occurring or alleged to have occurred) prior to such retroactive limitation date.926

[Emphasis in original.]

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924Main judgment at paras. 1983 and 2141.

925Exhibit P-13-2, 2009–2010, vol. 488 at 199085 [Lloyd’s]. See also Exhibit P-13-1, 2009–2010, vol. 488 at 199054.

926Exhibit P-13-1, 2009–2010, vol. 488 at 199054.

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1.INSURING CLAUSE [Lloyd’s]

1.2Where a retroactive limitation date is specified in the Schedule this Policy will not apply to any Claim made against the Insured by reason of any error, omission, or negligent dishonest fraudulent criminal or malicious act, or breach, committed or alleged to have been committed (or loss or destruction or damage occurring or alleged to have occurred) prior to such retroactive limitation date.927

[Emphasis in original.]

[1027] ACE considers this clause to be an implicit authorization to stipulate a retroactive date in its own policies, even if, in fact, the reference policy contains no clause of that nature.

[1028] The obligation related to the true follow form system essentially implies that the excess insurer must respect the fundamental content of the reference policy. It is therefore not an implicit method of authorizing the excess insurer to stipulate a material condition not found in the reference policy. On the contrary, according to the true follow form system, the reference policy seeks to establish the content of the excess policy such that the excess policy cannot provide less coverage to the insured than the policy of which it is supposed to be a “carbon copy”.928

[1029] ACE agreed to apply the true follow form system to its policies. Accordingly, that insurer was required to stipulate fundamental clauses identical to those in the reference policy so as to follow “consistently the lower layers”.929 Its policies were

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927Exhibit P-13-2, 2009–2010, vol. 488 at 199085.

928Allmerica Fin. Corp. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London (2007), 449 Mass. 621; 871 N.E. (2d) 418 (U.S.).

929Marcus B. Snowden, “Dropping Umbrellas and Following to Excess – Part I” (2005) 23 Can. J. Ins. L. 33 at 35.

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therefore subject to the same terms and conditions930 as those stipulated in the reference policy.931

[1030] It appears from the foregoing that some of the ACE policies contain a retroactive date. According to the evidence, this reference is extraneous to the fundamental content of the reference policy. It is therefore necessary to determine now whether the retroactive date included in some of the ACE policies is a breach of this fundamental content.

The concept of a retroactive limitation date

[1031] The treatise Couch on Insurance states the following in regard to retroactive dates, which are quite often found in claims-made policies:

It is commonplace for issuers of claims-made policies to limit retroactive coverage by specifying a cut-off date, such as the date of the first claims-made policy issued by the insurer to this insured, so that claims based on occurrences before that date are excluded from coverage; for protection against old occurrences, the insured must look to his occurrence policies.932

[Emphasis added.]

[1032] In its appeal brief, ACE admits that a retroactive date is a [TRANSLATION] “temporal limitation” of the insurer’s liability.

[1033] Regardless of the label that is used to describe the consequences of including a retroactive date in an insurance contract, whether it be a limitation, a restriction, or even an exclusion, the effect is the same. In the context of a claims-made policy, any claim arising from a negligent act occurring before the retroactive date stipulated in a policy belonging to this category will not be covered.

[1034] Despite clause 1.2, the primary insurer waived its right to stipulate in its policy a limitation in the nature of a retroactive date. With the exception of ACE, the other

930International Risk Management Institute, “Excess Liability ‘Follow Form’ Policy” in Glossary of Insurance & Risk Management Terms [online].

931Bryan A. Garner & Henry Campbell Black, Black's Law Dictionary, 10th ed. (St. Paul, West, 2014)

sub verbo “following-form policy”. See also cross-examination of Pierre Parizeau (19 November 2013), vol. 482 at 196843.

932Lee R. Russ et al., Couch on Insurance 3d, 3rd ed., vol. 7, 1995 (looseleaf), Nos. 102-26, citing Edwards v. Lexington Ins. Co., 507 F (3d) 35 (1st Cir. 2007) (U.S.).

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insurers involved in the 2009–2010 tower acknowledged their obligations towards SNC for the claims related to the pyrrhotite cases. ACE, for is part, argues that none of these claims is covered by its policies because of the retroactive date they contain.

[1035] This contradictory application of the excess policies making up the 2009–2010 tower is evidence that the ACE policy does not provide its insured with identical coverage to that provided by the other members of the tower. We could even add without risk of error that the ACE policy provides less coverage compared with that provided by the other excess policies, which contain no reference to any retroactive date.

[1036] ACE undertook to comply with the true follow form system for the benefit of its insured and provide it with coverage consistent with that provided by the reference policy. The retroactive date stipulated in some of the ACE policies is incompatible with the content of the reference policy. Clearly, the insurer breached its obligations towards its insured by failing to provide it with coverage consistent with that provided by the reference policy.

[1037] To conclude on this first point, the evidence shows that ACE agreed to the true follow form system and that its policies diverged from the fundamental content of the reference policy by stipulating a retroactive date that limited the coverage provided to SNC.

[1038] The judge was therefore justified in concluding that in such circumstances, the reference policy must prevail.

The inconsistency (2400 C.C.Q.)

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[1039] Article 2400 C.C.Q. reads as follows:

2400. In non-marine insurance, the insurer is bound to deliver the policy to the client, as well as a copy of any application in writing made by or on behalf of the client.

In case of inconsistency between the policy and the application, the latter prevails unless the insurer has indicated in writing to the client, in a

2400. En matière d’assurance terrestre, l’assureur est tenu de remettre la police au preneur, ainsi qu’une copie de toute proposition écrite faite par ce dernier ou pour lui.

En cas de divergence entre la police et la proposition, cette dernière fait foi du contrat, à moins que l’assureur n’ait, dans un document séparé, indiqué par

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separate document, the particulars of

écrit au preneur les éléments sur

the inconsistency.

lesquels il y a divergence.

[1040] Despite the inherent constraints of using the true follow form system, ACE submits that it informed its insured in writing of the inclusion of a retroactive date in the initial 2006–2007 policy. In so doing, it implicitly acknowledges that SNC’s application contained no reference to such a limitation.

[1041] The issue of the insurer’s specific disclosure to its insured indicating an inconsistency between the application and the policy is eminently factual. In this case, the judge decided this issue as follows:

[TRANSLATION]

[2155] The witness Alfieri of SNC clearly established that he expected to obtain insurance coverage for the prior wrongful acts that SNC may have committed. In 2006, SNC had no knowledge of any specific circumstances likely to lead to a claim. Recall that in 2006, and long before that date, SNC was already covered by this type of “Claims Made” policy. Mr. Alifieri’s testimony was to the same effect.

[2156] In particular, the following elements, which became apparent from the testimony of SNC’s representatives and the documents adduced as evidence, warrant further consideration:

SNC was never informed by anyone about the presence of an alleged retroactive date in its insurance program before the issue was raised in the context of these proceedings.

In fact, in the insurance application for the 2009–2010 coverage period, it continued to state that its insurance program contained no retroactive date.

Had it known, it never would have agreed to insure the risk with ACE. Witnesses Parizeau and Alfieri were categorical in this regard.

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In addition, for as long as witness Parizeau can remember, SNC has never has a retroactive date in its insurance program or accepted that its professional liability insurers exclude claims arising from prior wrongful acts from its insurance coverage.

By requiring the excess insurers underwriting a layer in its insurance tower to agree to the Follow Form principle, SNC was reasonably entitled to expect that ACE could not impose in its policy such a significant limitation of coverage that was not specified in the underlying layers.

Despite the fact that after 2006, SNC was constantly adding layers to its insurance tower and increasing the amounts of its coverage, none of the insurers that underwrote those additional layers thought it was necessary to impose a retroactive date in its policy.

[2157] Thus, the evidence unequivocally shows that SNC never had the intention of negotiating or accepting a coverage limitation clause as significant as the prior act exclusion set out in the ACE policy.

[Reference omitted.]

[1042] ACE challenges these findings of fact and proposes its own interpretation of the evidence, which it invites the Court to adopt. This approach is inconsistent with the standard of review to which the Court is bound when reviewing the facts.933 ACE’s request to review the evidence adduced at trial anew must be denied. For further confirmation, suffice it to say that the judge’s findings are based on credible evidence and are not open to intervention.

[1043] The reference to a retroactive date revealed a considerable discrepancy between what SNC wanted and the policy that ACE in fact issued to it.934 The presence of such a reference in some of the ACE policies resulted in a significant inconsistency between the insured’s application and the material element that a retroactive date included in a claims-made insurance contract represents.

933Benhaim v. St-Germain, 2016 SCC 48, [2016] 2 S.C.R. 352 at para. 36; Housen v. Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 235 at paras. 10 and 19; M.G. c. Pinsonneault, 2017 QCCA 607 at para. 140; J.G. c. Nadeau, 2016 QCCA 167 at para. 79; P.L. c. Benchetrit, 2010 QCCA 1505 at para. 24.

934Groupe commerce compagnie d’assurances c. Service d’entretien Ribo inc., [1992] R.R.A. 959 at 962 (Qc. C.A.).

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[1044] The evidence also established that ACE did not bring its insured’s attention specifically to the reference to the retroactive date by sending a separate document specifically indicating this element at the origin of the inconsistency.935 Therefore, pursuant to article 2400 C.C.Q, this limitation cannot be set up against SNC.

[1045] In view of the foregoing there is no need to discuss the argument of changes to the contract (2405 C.C.Q.) in further detail to confirm the judge’s decision finding that the retroactive date clause invoked by ACE is not applicable. For the sake of consistency, however, the Court wishes to exclude certain premises on which ACE relies in support of this ground of appeal.

The validity of the factual premises of ACE’s argument

[1046] ACE’s argument on the application of the retroactive date is based on two premises. First, it presupposes that geologist Blanchette committed only one fault before March 1, 2006.936 Next, it rests on the proposition that Lafarge’s recommendation in March 2006 to stop using the B&B aggregate broke the chain of causation between the fault of the geologist in connection with his October 2006 report and the damage suffered.937

[1047] The validity of these two premises does not withstand an analysis of the evidence. During its consideration of Ground No. 1 concerning the faults of geologist Blanchette, the Court dismissed the argument raised at the hearing that the geologist committed only one fault. On the contrary, the Court found that he committed and repeated several faults, spread out from May 2003 to November 28, 2007.938

[1048] In addition, for the reasons set out by the Court in its analysis of Ground No. 2, Lafarge’s actions during the assessment of the quality of B&B’s aggregate did not act as a novus actus interveniens as SNC/Blanchette claimed.939 ACE’s argument based on the break in the chain of causation must also be rejected.

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935J.-A. Martin & Fils c. Hercules Auto Parts Inc., [1996] R.R.A. 332 at 335 (Qc. C.A.); Didier Lluelles, Droit des assurances terrestres, 6th ed. (Montreal: Thémis, 2017) at 94, No. 124.

936See para. [986], above.

937See para. [988], above.

938See subsection 8.1 of this judgment.

939See subsection 8.2 of this judgment.

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Conclusion

[1049] ACE undertook to comply with the true follow form system. It neglected to follow the clauses of the reference policy faithfully by incorporating a retroactive date into some of its policies. In so doing, ACE departed significantly from the fundamental elements of the reference policy by stipulating a limitation not set out in that policy. It thus breached the obligations inherent to the use of the true follow form system. The judge was therefore justified in finding that, in the event of conflict between the reference policy and the ACE policy, the wording of the reference policy must prevail.

[1050] In addition, by including a retroactive date, ACE introduced an inconsistency between SNC’s application, which required the use of the true follow form system, and some of the insurer’s policies, in which a limitation inconsistent with the reference policy was stipulated.

[1051] Because ACE did not establish in a separate document the constitutive element of the inconsistency introduced into its policy and even less so SNC’s acceptance of a retroactive date, the insurance application must therefore prevail (2400 C.C.Q.).

[1052] For these reasons, ground of appeal 61 must be rejected.

12.3Ground No. 62: the share of each of SNC’s insurers in the award of damages

[1053] The appellant ACE asks the Court to determine the respective contribution of each insurer involved in the various insurance towers concerned by the claims related to the pyrrhotite cases. It argues that the trial judgment failed to apportion the share of each insurer in the award of damages.

[1054] ACE adds that, to decide this issue, the judge should have identified the actual reference policy at the outset, which he did not do. It asks the Court to do so.

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Analysis

[1055] ACE complains that the trial judgment does not identify the actual reference policy or apportion the award of damages among all the defendants, contrary to what is set out in article 469 C.C.P.940

[1056] The conclusions sought by ACE in its amended notices of appeal are as follows:

[TRANSLATION]

IN THE ALTERNATIVE (II):

ALLOW ACE’s appeal on the issue of the application of the multi-layer insurance towers (section V of this inscription);

RECOGNIZE the validity of sections 4.1, 6.5, and 7.1.2 of the primary policy of

... AIG;

FIND that in view of these sections, only the 2009–2010 insurance tower is triggered;

ORDER that the case be returned to Superior Court to:

i.determine the erosion of the primary and excess policies underlying ACE in the 2009–2010 tower;

ii.characterize the $5,000,000 insurance policies of ... AIG as primary;

ii.determine the amount of the award of damages for each of the respondent SNC’s professional liability insurers underlying the ACE policy;

iv.determine the amount, if any, of damages awarded against ACE.941 [Underlining added; bold emphasis in original.]

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940CQLR, c. C-25.

941 For example, see: ACE’s Amended declaration of appeal, No. 200-09-108818-151 (15 September 2016).

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The reference policy

[1057] As discussed above with respect to ground 61, it was not necessary for the judge to identify the actual reference policy to rule on the dispute between the insurers of SNC and some of the parties involved.

[1058] In any event, the appeal files seem to indicate that the judge did not have the evidence necessary to determine which policy was the reference policy. The amended minutes of a case management conference dated December 4, 2013, in which an ACE representative participated, include the following passage:

[TRANSLATION]

After a discussion concerning the fact that it is not necessary for the Court to rule on which insurer among SNC’s liability insurers should bear legal costs, and considering that the Court agrees with this submission, the parties agreed that they would not adduce additional evidence.942

[1059] The conclusions in ACE’s amended declarations of appeal support this observation because that part asks the Court to order that the file be returned to the Superior Court in order to [TRANSLATION] “characterize the $5,000,000 insurance policies of ... AIG as primary” and to “determine the amount of the award of damages for each of the respondent SNC’s professional liability insurers underlying the ACE policy”.

[1060] In short, failing agreement, ACE itself acknowledged in its appeal proceedings that each insurer’s share in the award of damages should ultimately be determined by the Superior Court. That Court could then identify the reference policy to the extent necessary to permit a complete resolution of the dispute. This first ground must therefore fail.

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942Minutes dated December 4, 2013, vol. 447 at 183564. According to this document, Mtre Hubert

Larose, ACE’s representative, attended this case management conference.

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Allocation among the insurers of the damages awarded against

SNC

[1061] Article 469 of the Code of Civil Procedure943 in force at the time of trial provided the following with respect to the enforceability of a final judgment:

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469.Every judgment involving a condemnation must be susceptible of execution. Every judgment for damages must contain a liquidation thereof; if it contains a joint and several condemnation against the persons responsible for the injury, it shall, if the evidence permits, determine as between such persons only, the share of each in the condemnation.

469. Le

jugement

portant

condamnation doit être

susceptible

d’exécution. Celui qui condamne à des dommages-intérêts en contient la liquidation; lorsqu’il prononce une condamnation solidaire contre les

personnes responsables d’un préjudice, il détermine, pour valoir entre elles seulement, la part de chacune dans la condamnation, si la preuve permet de l’établir.

2020

[1062] In its current version, this provision reads as follows:944

328.A judgment rendered against a party must be capable of being executed. A judgment awarding damages must liquidate the damages; a judgment finding persons solidarily liable for injury must, if the evidence permits, determine the share of each of those persons in the award as between them only.

328. Le jugement qui porte condamnation doit être susceptible d’exécution. Ainsi, la condamnation

àdes dommages-intérêts en contient la liquidation et la condamnation solidaire contre les auteurs d’un préjudice détermine, pour valoir entre eux seulement, la part de chacun dans la condamnation si la preuve permet de l’établir.

[1063] To satisfy the criteria imposed by article 469 C.C.P., the conclusions of the final judgment must be drafted in such a way that does not require additional discussion between the parties:

It may be true that, with a certain amount of co-operation and goodwill on the part of appellant, this difficulty could be overcome, but a judgment that, to

943Code of Civil Procedure, CQLR, c. C-25.

944Code of Civil Procedure, CQLR, c. C-25.01.

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execute it, require co-operation and goodwill on the part of the party condemned is not, in my opinion, an executory judgment.945

[1064] It should also be kept in mind that article 469 C.C.P. provides that the share of each person found solidarily liable must be determined by the court only if the evidence permits. In such circumstances, the trial judge must act prudently when engaging in this type of exercise, in particular by keeping in mind that he or she is always bound to comply with the ultra petita rule.

[1065] In this case, ACE had to ensure that the conclusions sought in its proceedings at trial were clear and unequivocal. In its re-amended defence, it asked the Superior Court to render the following orders:

[TRANSLATION]

FOR THESE REASONS, MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT TO:

ALLOW the defence of SNC-Lavalin Inc.;

ALLOW the defence of ACE INA Insurance;

DISMISS the motions to institute proceeding of the various plaintiffs;

IN THE ALTERNATIVE, … in the event of a joint condemnation, and if the Court finds that each of the defendant Blanchette’s reports is a separate fault:

DETERMINE as between them the share of each of the defendants in accordance with the provisions of article 469 C.C.P.;

THE WHOLE with all costs.946

[Underlining added; bold emphasis in original.]

[1066] The judge’s conclusions in response were as follows:

[TRANSLATION]

945Baumgartner v. Carsley Silk Co. Ltd. (1971), 23 D.L.R. (3d) 255 at 256 (Qc. C.A.).

946Re-amended defence of the defendant ACE INA Insurance (18 November 2013), vol. 14 at 5231.

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[2289] FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT:

[2295] ORDERS the professional liability insurers of SNC Lavalin to apportion among themselves the damages in connection with the liability of their insured SNC Lavalin for each applicable tower as a result of the claims made and submitted by the plaintiffs in accordance with the order of the insurers in each tower, taking into account any applicable erosion, up to the amounts of coverage available;947

[Emphasis in original.]

[1067] The judge determined the share of each defendant when he ruled on the apportionment of liability, as ACE had asked him to do. In fact, 70% of liability was attributed to its insured SNC. In addition, the judge ruled on the applicable insurance towers. His judgment sets out the details of how the towers function, including the fact that each layer intervenes only when the layer below it is exhausted.948 The latter conclusion was not challenged on appeal.

[1068] In short, the judge ruled on ACE’s applications as that party chose to present them at trial.

[1069] It is also worth mentioning that SNC and its insurers, including ACE, did not participate in the preparation of the spreadsheets used to determine the amounts payable to all the defendants.949 That tool allowed the amounts owed by SNC to be determined comprehensively. That exercise was thus not intended to determine the respective share of each insurer that was a member of SNC’s insurance towers.

[1070] In addition, no satisfactory evidence was adduced regarding the priority claims likely to affect the amounts of coverage provided by the various insurance towers, except with respect to the Keystone case. During his examination, Antonio Alfieri of SNC stated in this regard that his employer had received several claims that occurred in the course of the proceedings, such that the amounts payable had not yet been established.950

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947An order of this nature, although slightly different, appears in the other trial judgments.

948Main judgment at paras. 1984–1985.

949Main judgment at paras. 2234–2236.

950Examination of Antonio Alfieri (20 November 2013), vol. 482 at 196979–196980.

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[1071] In short, the evidence does not establish the extent to which each tower is affected by the claims that have priority over those of the plaintiffs.

[1072] It is therefore not surprising that the other insurers involved in the various insurance towers concerned chose not to support ACE in its appeal on that issue. That being said, ACE had to have been aware of the problem related to the insufficient evidence, because it asks that the file be returned to the Superior Court to rule on this issue.

[1073] In this case, the solution applied by the Court in CNH Industrial Canada Ltd. c. Promutuel Verchères, société mutuelle d’assurances générales is appropriate:

[TRANSLATION]

[78]In conclusion, I find that the judge did not have before him the evidence to establish the shares of CNH and Joyal in the award of damages. In the event of a disagreement between CNH and Joyal in this regard following the execution of the judgment in favour of Promutuel, CNH and Joyal could apply to the Court to have their respective shares determined on the basis of adequate evidence.951

[1074] If the guidance provided in the Main judgment and that provided by this Court are not sufficient to resolve the internal issues raised by the insurers of SNC, those parties will unfortunately have to resign themselves to returning before a court of law to debate them. That exercise, which is altogether avoidable with a bit of astuteness by all parties, must not in any event delay payment of the compensation to which the plaintiffs are entitled, as confirmed by the judgments of this Court rendered today.

[1075] ACE’s second argument is also unfounded.

Conclusion

[1076] Ground 62 concerning the determination of the shares of each of the insurers who are members of the various insurance towers concerned by the claims in the pyrrhotite cases must therefore be rejected.

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951CNH Industrial Canada Ltd. c. Promutuel Verchères, société mutuelle d'assurances générales, 2017 QCCA 154 at para. 78.

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12.4Ground No. 64: Application of Ontario law to the Zurich policies

Background

[1077] The appellant Zurich agreed to participate as excess insurer in the various insurance towers put into place to cover SNC’s professional liability for several policy periods from March 2006 to March 2013.952

[1078] Zurich submits that the award against it at trial was unjustified because its policies are governed by Ontario law. According to this assertion, it is beyond the reach of direct actions brought by injured third persons, despite what Quebec law provides (2501 C.C.Q.).953 In addition, it argues that Ontario law authorizes it to subtract from the limit of insurance the costs related to the interest incurred on the amounts due, the payment of the additional indemnity, the costs payable to the plaintiffs and defendants, and other costs.954

[1079] The judge rejected Zurich’s submission primarily on the basis of the application of the follow form system. He stated:

[TRANSLATION]

14.8 Ontario jurisdiction set out in the Zurich policy

[2182] We have seen what the “follow form” policies imposed.

[2183] The Lloyd’s reference policy specifies that any dispute concerning the interpretation of the policy terms, conditions, limitations, or exclusions is subject to the laws of the province of Quebec.

[2184] Only Zurich indicated in its policy that, in the event of a dispute concerning the meaning or interpretation of the terms, conditions, definitions, or provisions of the policy, the whole is to be decided in accordance with the laws of Ontario.

952It should be noted, however, that the policies making up the 2012–2013 insurance tower were not filed into evidence.

953The direct action in Quebec law is set out in article 2501 C.C.Q. It is of directive public order: Jean- Louis Baudouin, Patrice Deslauriers & Benoît Moore, La responsabilité civile, 8th ed., vol. 2 (Cowansville, QC: Yvon Blais, 2014) at 601, No. 2-566. In Ontario, however, section 132(1) of the Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. I.8, does not generally permit such actions.

954A.B.-7 at paras. 158–160.

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[2185] Since there is no dispute to be decided by the Court, especially since the Court acknowledged the validity of the erosion of the 2009–2010 tower by the payment of costs, there is no need to delve further into this issue, which is at this time moot.

[2186] If need be, the parties will have the opportunity to have the validity of Zurich’s clause determined in the context of the policies in question.

[1080] Zurich argues on appeal that its policy expressly provides for the possibility of including clauses that are different from those set out in the reference policy.955 In other words, it submits that it is not bound by the true follow form system.

[1081] Zurich adds that the Choice of Law and Jurisdiction clause in all of the policies it has issued since 2006 contains no ambiguity with respect to the law applicable to those policies. It asserts that the judge should have acknowledged the validity of that clause.

[1082] Finally, Zurich says it is of the view that articles 2414, 2501, and 2503 C.C.Q. do not apply in this case because the connecting factors set out in article 3119 C.C.Q. were not established.956

[1083] The respondents reply that Zurich is trying to give the Choice of Law and Jurisdiction clause a scope that goes well beyond its wording. They add that the mandatory rules set out in the Civil Code of Québec cannot be set aside by this clause. In their view, both the follow form system and the application of article 3119 C.C.Q. defeat the insurer’s arguments.

[1084] Let us consider this.

Analysis

[1085] Zurich’s appeal seeks to make Ontario law applicable to its policies, with the following consequences:

deprive the Quebec claimants of a direct action against this insurer;

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955A.B.-7 at paras. 161–167.

956A.B.-7 at paras. 183–194.

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erode the limit of insurance by interest costs, the additional indemnity, costs payable, defence, and other costs.

[1086] Zurich does not challenge the judge’s jurisdiction to decide the disputes. However, the insurer faults the judge for not having applied the law stipulated in its policies.

[1087] The first consequence invoked by Zurich (absence of direct action) is procedural in nature. It is not contested that SNC could have forced the intervention of that insurer for the purpose of asserting the judgment resulting from the claims made by the plaintiffs. We can therefore assume that in Zurich’s view, what could not be done directly could in any event happen through its forced intervention. That being said, the issue of the law applicable to Zurich’s policies remains of interest and is worth consideration.

The follow form system

[1088] In this case, the judge did not err in finding that Zurich undertook to comply with the follow form system. For the purpose of deciding the issue in dispute, however, it is not necessary to decide whether a forum selection clause in an excess policy that differs from the one in the reference policy conflicts with the reasons for using the follow form or true follow form system. The solution to the issue raised by Zurich lies rather with the principled application of article 3119 C.C.Q.

The Choice of Law and Jurisdiction clause and 3119 C.C.Q.

[1089] Zurich claims that under Ontario law, it could not have been sued directly by the plaintiffs. The argument is surprising in view of the judicial contract entered into at trial in which Zurich agreed to limit itself to the rules of the game established by the parties, which do not challenge the direct action of the claimants.957 It is difficult to understand how it is possible to go back on this undertaking. Let us nevertheless consider the validity of Zurich’s argument on the merits.

[1090] The clause at issue in Zurich’s policies provides the following:

G. Choice of Law and Jurisdiction

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957Main judgment at para. 29.

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If a dispute arises over the meaning, interpretation or operation of any term, condition, definition or provision of this policy, the Named Insured and the Company agree that the law of the province of Ontario shall apply and that all litigation, arbitration or other form of dispute resolution shall take place in Ontario. …958

[Bold emphasis in original.]

[1091] The clause in the Lloyd’s reference policy959 reads as follows:

Choice of Law and Any dispute concerning the interpretation of the terms,

Jurisdictionconditions, limitations and/or exclusions contained in this Policy is understood and agreed by both the insured and the insurers to be subject to the law of the province of Quebec, Canada. Each party agrees to submit to the jurisdiction of Quebec, Canada and to comply with all requirements necessary to give such Court jurisdiction.960

[Emphasis in original.]

[1092] Article 3119 C.C.Q. deals with the jurisdiction of an insurance contract in the context of a conflict of laws and provides that it applies “notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary”. Accordingly, where applicable, any clause in a contract of insurance governed by Quebec law that has the effect of reducing the rights of the client, the insured, the beneficiary, or the policy holder or that infringes the rights of injured third persons will be annulled.961

[1093] The first paragraph of article 3119 C.C.Q. provides the following:

3119. Notwithstanding

any

3119. Malgré

toute

convention

agreement to the contrary, a contract

contraire, le contrat d’assurance qui

of insurance covering property or an

porte sur un bien ou un intérêt situé

interest situated in Québec, or that is

au Québec ou

qui est

souscrit au

958Exhibit P-13-3, 2009–2010, vol. 488 at 199111.

959The term “reference policy” in connection with the Lloyd’s policy is used in view of the admission made by Zurich in these cases: Exhibit DSNC-180 (December 2013), vol. 323 at 135626. It is not a finding made by the Court on the merits of that dispute; this issue was not decided.

960Exhibit P-13-2, 2009–2010, vol. 488 at 199081.

961Gérald Goldstein & Ethel Groffier, Droit international privé, vol. 2 (Cowansville, QC: Yvon Blais, 2003) at 663; Art. 2414 C.C.Q.

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subscribed in Québec by a person resident in Québec, is governed by the law of Québec if the policyholder applies for the insurance in Québec or the insurer signs or delivers the policy in Québec.

Québec par une personne qui y réside, est régi par la loi du Québec dès lors que le preneur en fait la demande au Québec ou que l’assureur y signe ou y délivre la police.

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[1094] The Court agrees with the following judgment of the Superior Court, which provides a summary of the rules governing the application of Quebec law to a contract of insurance:

[TRANSLATION]

[47]This provision requires the following evidence:

a.a contract of insurance:

1.covering property or an interest situated in Quebec; or

2.subscribed in Quebec by a person resident in Quebec;

b.if:

1.the policyholder applies for the insurance in Quebec; or

2.the insurer signs or delivers the policy in Quebec.

[48]In short, the evidence required in such a case relates exclusively to the presence, or lack thereof, of certain elements at the time the insurance contract was entered into. The subsequent conduct of the parties to the contract therefore has no relevance.962

[Emphasis in original.]

[1095] According to authors Goldstein and Groffier, article 3119 C.C.Q. sets out [TRANSLATION] “a unilateral, mandatory conflict rule covering all provisions of Quebec

962Widdrington (Succession de) c. Underwriters at Lloyd's, 2013 QCCS 103 at paras. 47–48.

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domestic law, regardless of whether they are mandatory.”963 The same authors are of the view that the objective of this provision is the protection of the insured. The authors Talpis and Castel, for their part, are of the view that the principal objective of this provision is to make foreign insurance companies subject to Quebec law.964

[1096] Authors Hardy-Lemieux and Roch also provide commentary on article 3119 C.C.Q. They state the following:

[TRANSLATION]

An insurance policy that meets the criterion of the domicile or residence of the policyholder in the province and the alternative criterion of the signature of the insurance application, the signature of the policy, or the delivery of the policy is, from that moment, automatically governed by the laws of our province. Even if the policyholder subsequently leaves the province of Quebec, so long as the contract remains in effect, it will always be subject to the laws of our province.965

[1097] It is also worth noting that several common law provinces have adopted a similar provision.966 Author Craig Brown explains the use of such legislation as follows:

For the types of insurance to which it does apply, the effect of the section is to make the law of that province the proper law of the contract, provided at least one of the criteria of the section is met. For example, if the policy is held by an Ontario resident, Ontario law applies even if the property is located elsewhere and the policy is issued by a foreign insurer. This would only be so in an Ontario court, however. If the same dispute came before a Manitoba court, for example, and involved property situated in that province, the court here would be bound by the identical section under Manitoba legislation and would be

963Gérald Goldstein & Ethel Groffier, Droit international privé, vol. 2 (Cowansville, QC: Yvon Blais, 2003) at 662 [reference omitted]. See also Gérald Goldstein, Droit international privé, vol. 1 (Cowansville, QC: Yvon Blais, 2011) at 577–578.

964Jeffrey Talpis & Jean-Gabriel Castel, “Le Code civil du Québec. Interprétation des règles du droit international privé” in Barreau du Québec et Chambre des notaires du Québec, La réforme du Code civil, t. 3 (Sainte-Foy, QC: P.U.L., 1993) 801 at 883.

965Suzanne Hardy-Lemieux & Alain Roch, L’assurance de personnes au Québec (Farnham, QC: CCH/FM, 1991) (looseleaf), No. 5-050.

966Craig Brown, Insurance Law in Canada, 7th ed. (student edition) (Scarborough, ON: Carswell, 2010) at 1-24, No. 1.4. See e.g. Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. I.8, ss. 122–123.

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required to apply Manitoba law. As indicated above, this is not likely to be a substantial problem in practice since all the provinces having this section also have largely similar substantive rules under the uniform legislation for the resolution of contract disputes.967

[References omitted; underlining added.]

[1098] In this case, Ontario and Quebec insurance legislation contain significant differences in some regards and are opposed, in particular, on the issue of the direct action against the insurer and the protection in favour of the insured or injured third persons of the entire amount of insurance. These differences require us to perform an analysis of the connecting factors set out in article 3119 C.C.Q. accompanied by a review of the relevant evidence.968

A contract covering property or an interest situated in Quebec or that is subscribed in Quebec by a person resident in Quebec

[1099] During the appeal hearing, Zurich’s council acknowledged that the insurance contract covered an interest situated in Quebec. It is therefore unnecessary to conduct a detailed analysis of the applicable factors, other than to note the following elements.

[1100] Regarding the first factor, authors Baudouin, Deslauriers, and Moore state the following:

[TRANSLATION]

2-509 Concept – The concept of insurable interest is defined in regard to property insurance (art. 2481 C.C.Q.). It is not defined, however, in regard to liability insurance. In the latter case, the definition provided by that article applies subject to the fact that it is not necessary for the insured to have a real right in the object that may cause or sustain the damage. Because every person runs the risk of incurring civil liability for their contractual or extracontractual faults, they have the interest required to insure their own

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967Ibid. at 1-24 to 1-25, No. 1.4.

968The appellant relies on a list of admissions in support of the inapplicability of article 3119 C.C.Q. We cannot fault the judge for not considering it, however, because this list is irrelevant in this case. See admissions of the defendant Zurich Insurance Company Ltd. (18 November 2013), vol. 447 at 183671–183672.

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liability. It is generally possible, as a result of the rules governing stipulations for another, to enter into a insurance contract in favour of a third party, if there is a risk of incurring one’s own liability for the fact or the fault of that third party pursuant to the rules regarding liability for the fact or fault of another, such as the principal’s liability for the fault of his or her subordinates. On the other hand, if a person cannot incur his or her own liability, then it is not possible to insure against the faults committed by a third party. This is the case, for example, of a lessee who cannot insure against the faults of the lessor.969

[References omitted.]

[1101] SNC’s head office is in Quebec. That fact is not contested. Although it wishes to be covered “worldwide”,970 SNC undeniably retains an interest in the protection of its patrimony in Quebec. In addition, its address indicated in the Zurich policy is in Quebec.971

[1102] It appears from the foregoing that the insurance contract entered into between SNC and Zurich covers an interest situated in whole or in part in the territory of Quebec. In the circumstances, it is therefore unnecessary to consider the factor of the subscription of the contract.

The policyholder applies for the insurance in Quebec or the insurer signs or delivers the policy in Quebec

[1103] In this case, Zurich did not sign its policies in Quebec. The fact remains, however, that it delivered them in this province.

[1104] Pierre Parizeau of SNC stated during his testimony that the official documents, including the insurance policies, were first remitted to the broker AON before being provided to the insured:

[TRANSLATION]

Q.Am I to understand therefore that at SNC-Lavalin, the entire insurance team was necessarily … they were all in Montreal?

969Jean-Louis Baudouin, Patrice Deslauriers & Benoît Moore, La responsabilité civile, 8th ed., vol. 2 (Cowansville, QC: Yvon Blais, 2014) at 542, No. 2-509.

970Exhibit P-13-2, 2009–2010, vol. 488 at 199080.

971Exhibit P-13-3, 2009–2010, vol. 488 at 199104.

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A.

That’s correct.

Q.

That’s correct. Therefore, the binders were also provided to you in

 

Montreal?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And the policies too?

A.

Yes.

Q.

So, for each insurer in the tower, the binders, policies, etc. were sent to

 

Montreal?

A.

No, the official documents were sent to the broker.

Q.

Yes. Who forwarded them to you, correct …

A.

Correct.

 

Q.

So, all of that was sent to you for you to keep on your premises,

 

correct?

A.

That’s correct.

Q.

And that’s where the insurance policies were kept?

A.

That’s correct. 972

[1105] Under Quebec law, Zurich was bound to deliver the policy to the client (2400 C.C.Q.), in this case to SNC’s office in Montreal. It is true that Zurich’s practice was to remit its policies directly to the broker AON, whose offices are in Toronto.973 However, this manner of proceeding was accompanied by an express request from Zurich to AON to forward the policy to SNC in Montreal.974 In the circumstances, AON

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972Cross-examination of Pierre Parizeau (19 November 2013), vol. 482 at 196848–196849.

973Examination of Pierre Parizeau (19 November 2013), vol. 482 at 196811.

974For example, Exhibit DZ-5 (10 June 2009), vol. 371 at 155381.

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in reality became a mere intermediary pursuant to a mandate given by Zurich asking it to complete the process of delivering its policies to its insured.

[1106] In a judgment of this Court, the relationship between the insurer and the broker in regard to the obligation to deliver the policy was explained as follows:

[TRANSLATION]

[27]Article 2400 C.C.Q. imposes the obligation on the insurer to deliver the policy to the client. The policy evidences the existence of the contract of insurance (art. 2399 C.C.Q.). Article 2403 C.C.Q. adds that the insurer may not invoke conditions not stated in writing in the contract.

[28]The insurer must therefore deliver or ensure delivery of a policy to its insured, which policy contains all the conditions of the contract entered into by the parties. In practice, it can happen that the insurer does not fulfil this obligation directly with its insured and that such transmission or delivery takes place through the intermediary of an insurance broker.

[29]In my view, the insurance broker acts as the mandatary of the insurer in such cases. The broker must therefore deliver to each insured, as their mandator should have done, documentation containing all the conditions attached to each type of contract. Thus, the insurance broker does not act only as the mandatary of the insured in the performance of its duties. Depending on the action taken, the broker could bind the insurer in a given case.975

[1107] It is therefore clear that the broker AON, at the time the Zurich policies were delivered, was acting as the mandatary of that insurer for the purpose of fulfilling its obligation set out in article 2400 C.C.Q. Therefore, the delivery of the policies did indeed take place in Quebec, at SNC’s Montreal address.

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975Général Accident, compagnie d'assurances du Canada c. Genest, [2001] R.R.A. 15 at 19, paras. 27–29 (Qc. C.A.). See also Jean-Guy Bergeron, Les contrats d'assurance (terrestre) : lignes et entre-lignes, vol. 1 (Sherbrooke, QC: SEM, 1989) at 210.

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[1108] Because it appears that the Zurich policy was delivered in Quebec, it is not necessary to determine whether the “policyholder applie[d] for the insurance in Quebec”, although there is substantial evidence to support that hypothesis.976

[1109] The evidence shows that the relevant connecting factors set out in article 3119 C.C.Q. are met, such that this provision applies to the Zurich policies. The policies are governed by Quebec law, and the Choice of Law and Jurisdiction clause must accordingly be set aside and deemed unwritten with respect to both SNC and the injured third persons.

Conclusion

[1110] Under Quebec law, which applies in this case, the injured third persons were entitled to sue the insurers of SNC directly pursuant to article 2501 C.C.Q. Because this provision is of directive public order (2414, para. 2, C.C.Q.), there is no doubt that the plaintiffs have sufficient legal interest to bring proceedings against Zurich.

[1111] Similar considerations apply to defence costs, which under Quebec law (2503 C.C.Q.) may not be included in the amount of insurance. This Court has previously confirmed that articles 2500 and 2503 C.C.Q. are mandatory when the policy application criteria are met,977 which is the case here.978

[1112] Accordingly, Ground 64 must be rejected.

12.5 Ground No. 60: Erosion of the limits of the 2009–2010 tower

[1113] The judge rejected the interpretation proposed by the contractors and their insurers [the “contractors”] according to which [TRANSLATION] “article 2503 of the Civil Code of Québec applies to all claims received and handled by the insurers in the context of the policies making up the 2009–2010 tower, such that any amount paid by

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976The evidence shows that several actions were taken by the insured at its Montreal office. See in particular the examination of Pierre Parizeau (19 November 2013), vol. 482 at 196818. See also the Joint statement of facts regarding insurance issues (SNC) at paras. 24–30.

977Canadian National Railway Company c. Chartis Insurance Company of Canada (Commerce and Industry Insurance Company of Canada), 2013 QCCA 1271 at paras. 75–78. In that case, the parties had agreed on the jurisdiction of the Quebec courts and on the application of civil law.

978See also Ground 60 on this issue.

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an insurer as costs or expenses (claim expenses) would not erode the overall coverage provided by the tower”.979

[1114] Rather, he was of the view that SNC and its insurers had agreed to treat each claim in accordance with the law of its place of origin.980 The claim expenses incurred in regard to a dispute involving SNC in Alberta could therefore lawfully result in an equivalent reduction in the amount of insurance coverage available for the claims of the injured third parties in Quebec.981 The amount at issue is approximately $11 million.

[1115] The contractors, with the agreement of ACE, one of SNC’s insurers, contest this conclusion. Although they acknowledge the priority ranking of the Alberta claims, they reject the idea of a reduction in the insurance coverage available caused by costs incurred to settle those claims.

[1116] The issue is therefore whether SNC and its insurers could raise against the injured third persons a reduction in the insurance coverage of the 2009–2010 tower equivalent to the amount of costs incurred to settle the Alberta claims.

Background

[1117] SNC took out “Worldwide” insurance policies. It is not necessary to examine all the particularities of this type of policy to decide the issue. It is sufficient to note that one of its purposes is to provide the insured with coverage extending to all territories in which it reports to do business. In the event of a claim, regardless of its origin, the amount of annual coverage stipulated in the policy is reduced by the indemnities paid to priority claimants.

[1118] The evidence shows that, during the 2009–2010 policy period, SNC was dealing with significant claims out of Alberta [the “Keystone case”]. Those claims had the effect of reducing the total amount of insurance provided by the 2009–2010 tower

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979Main judgment at para. 2115.

980Main judgment at para. 2118.

981Main judgment at paras. 2125 and 2128–2129.

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by more than $23 million.982 According to the figures set out in the contractors’ brief, that amount includes claim expenses983 of over $11 million.

[1119] The final table describing the erosion of the 2009–2010 tower is presented as follows:984

Insurer or SIR

Policy

Amounts paid

Amounts

 

 

 

available

 

 

 

 

SLI (SIR)

——-

$2,000,000

$0

 

 

 

 

Chartis (SIR)

1729110

$5,000,000

$0

 

 

 

 

Lloyd’s

QC0900004

$15,000,000

$0

 

 

 

 

Zurich

8434261

$1,692,486.22

$18,307,513.78

 

 

 

 

ACE

EOX003732-004

$0

$10,000,000

 

 

 

 

Chartis

1729111

$0

$20,000,000

 

 

 

 

Total:

——-

$23,692,486.22

$48,307,513.78

 

 

 

 

[1120] This table shows that SNC, directly or through an insurance captive985 under its control, had to support a retention of $7 million because of its occupation of the first two levels of the 2009–2010 insurance tower.986

[1121] The judge found that SNC and its insurers had agreed to treat each claim under the law of its place of origin. That approach had the effect of restricting the rights that Quebec claimants would otherwise have had if the relevant provisions of the Civil Code of Québec had been applied in full to their claims. The judge in fact expressed the opinion that Quebec law could not neutralize the effects of Alberta law,

982The amount initially referred to in the Main judgment was corrected on July 31, 2014. The erosion, including claim expenses, is $23,692,486.22.

983The claim expenses include costs, extrajudicial professional fees, and experts' fees (clause 4.2 of the Lloyd’s policy).

984Corrected Main judgment (31 July 2014) at para. 36. For information purposes, SIR means Self- Insured Retention, while SLI refers to SNC-Lavalin Inc.

985An insurance captive is a retention vehicle. In this case, Chartis (SIR) transferred the risk to Equinox Indemnity Company Inc., an insurance captive wholly owned by SNC.

986It should be noted that the first layer of insurance of $2 million is coverage that applies per claim, while the insurance coverage provided by Equinox applies to all claims. See the Joint statement of facts regarding insurance issues (SNC) at paras. 15–20.

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which permits the erosion of insurance coverage by expenses incurred in Alberta. He also relied on clause 3.1 of the reference policy987 to confirm that the insurance contracts at issue authorized such erosion.

[1122] SNC and its insurers988 submit that these findings are well founded. Nevertheless, these parties, other than Zurich, agree that Quebec law governs the insurance contracts involved in the 2009–2010 tower. However, they argue that the Civil Code cannot have extraterritorial effect, such that Alberta law applies to the claims arising from the Keystone case. They add that in any event, clause 3.1 of the reference policy authorizes the erosion of the amount of insurance by claim expenses.

[1123] Zurich submits that its policy is governed solely by Ontario law. It asserts that the law of Ontario and of Alberta are consistent on the issue of erosion in that both legal systems authorize the reduction of the limits of insurance by claim expenses inherent to the settlement of a claim.989

[1124] The contractors challenge this argument, relying in particular on articles 2500 and 2503 C.C.Q. They submit that Quebec civil law applies to their situation without the possibility for Alberta law to interfere with domestic law.

[1125] Finally, it should be noted that in regard to the 2009–2010, 2010–2011, and 2011–2012 towers, other than for the Keystone case, the evidence adduced at trial did not permit the determination of the extent to which they had been monopolized by claims that had chronological priority over the claims related to the pyrrhotite cases, and, if applicable, the amount of claim expenses that contributed to the erosion of those insurance limits. The judge nevertheless stated the following in this regard:

[TRANSLATION]

[2131] The parties will have to apply the same logic to the subsequent towers as that described for the erosion of the 2009–2010 tower.

987To the extent that the clauses in dispute are essentially the same in Lloyd’s and in AIG’s policies, reference will be made to the Lloyd’s reference policy in the context of this ground to simplify the text.

988Except for ACE.

989This argument was rejected by the Court at the time of the discussion of ground of appeal 64.

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Analysis

[1126] The premise underlying the judge’s reasoning is based on the idea that Quebec law cannot have extraterritorial effect. This approach consists of asking whether articles 2500 and 2503 C.C.Q. apply to the Alberta claims for which SNC and its insurers decided to subtract the claim expenses from the amount of insurance.

[1127] This way of addressing the issue does not properly identify the rights of the injured third persons in Quebec. In fact, it wrongly equates the law applicable to the insurance policies of the 2009–2010 tower with the foreign law applicable where the claims related to the Keystone case originate. It also confuses the contractual rules dealing with the erosion of the insurance coverage applicable to the Alberta file with those applicable to the Quebec files.

[1128] To avoid these traps, it the legal context of the analysis must be extended to include a discussion of the rights of injured third persons in Quebec – in this case, those for whom the Court is asked to make a decision. Next, and in a supplementary manner, it is worth commenting briefly on clauses 3.1 and 3.2 of the reference policy to identify their scope and verify whether these clauses conflict with domestic law.

[1129] First, however, it is appropriate to the provisions of the Civil Code of Québec applicable in this case:

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2414. Any clause in a non-marine insurance contract which grants the client, the insured, the participant, the beneficiary or the policyholder fewer rights than are granted by the provisions of this chapter is null.

Any stipulation which derogates from the rules on insurable interest or, in liability insurance, from those protecting the rights of injured third persons is also null.

2414. Toute clause d’un contrat d’assurance terrestre qui accorde au preneur, à l’assuré, à l’adhérent, au bénéficiaire ou au titulaire du contrat moins de droits que les dispositions du présent chapitre est nulle.

Est également nulle la stipulation qui déroge aux règles relatives à l’intérêt

d’assurance ou, en matière d’assurance de responsabilité, à celles protégeant les droits du tiers lésé.

2500. The proceeds of the insurance

2500. Le montant de l’assurance est

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are applied exclusively to the payment of injured third persons.

2501. An injured third person may bring an action directly against the insured or against the insurer, or against both.

The option chosen in that regard by the injured third person does not deprive him of his other recourses.

2503. The insurer is bound to take up the interest of any person entitled to the benefit of the insurance and assume his defence in any action brought against him.

Legal costs and expenses resulting from actions against the insured, including those of the defence, and interest on the proceeds of the insurance are borne by the insurer over and above the proceeds of the insurance.

3119. Notwithstandingany

agreement to the contrary, a contract of insurance covering property or an interest situated in Québec, or that is subscribed in Québec by a person resident in Québec, is governed by the law of Québec if the policyholder applies for the insurance in Québec or the insurer signs or delivers the policy in Québec.

affecté exclusivement au paiement des tiers lésés.

2501. Le tiers lésé peut faire valoir son droit d’action contre l’assuré ou l’assureur ou contre l’un et l’autre.

Le choix fait par le tiers lésé à cet égard n’emporte pas renonciation à ses autres recours.

2503. L’assureur est tenu de prendre fait et cause pour toute personne qui a droit au bénéfice de l’assurance et d’assumer sa défense dans toute action dirigée contre elle.

Les frais et frais de justice qui résultent des actions contre l’assuré, y compris ceux de la défense, ainsi que les intérêts sur le montant de l’assurance, sont à la charge de l’assureur, en plus du montant d’assurance.

3119. Malgré toute convention contraire, le contrat d’assurance qui porte sur un bien ou un intérêt situé au Québec ou qui est souscrit au Québec par une personne qui y réside, est régi par la loi du Québec dès lors que le preneur en fait la demande au Québec ou que l’assureur y signe ou y délivre la police.

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[Emphasis added.]

[1130] Next, there are the clauses of the reference policy related to this debate:

Principal Address of the

2 Place Felix-Martin

lnsured:

455 Rene-Levesque Boulevard Ouest

 

Montréal

 

Quebec H2Z 1Z3

 

Canada

 

And as stated in the proposal form

 

Limit of lndemnity (A)

CAD 15,000,000 any one claim and in the

 

aggregate (costs and expenses as per form)

 

in excess of

(B)

CAD 5,000,000 any one claim and in the

 

aggregate (costs and expenses as per form).

 

However in respect of SNC Lavalin Pro Fac Inc

 

the excess shall be CAD 7,000,000 any one claim

 

and in the aggregate (costs and expenses as per

 

form)

 

which in turn is excess of:

(C)

CAD 2,000,000 each and every claim. However in

 

respect of the activities of SNC Lavalin Pro Fac

 

Inc until the CAD 7,000,000 Aggregate shown

 

above is exhausted their self insured retention

 

shall be CAD 50,000 each and every claim. On

 

exhaustion of this aggregate their self insured

 

retention shall be CAD 2,000,000 each and every

 

claim.

Supplemental Clause

Agreed that the CAD 5,000,000 underlying limit of

 

liability may be self insured or separately insured

 

or reinsured through any of the lnsured's

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Captive(s) or any combination thereof.

Situation:

Worldwide

 

Choice of Law

Any dispute concerning the interpretation of the

and Jurisdiction:

terms, conditions, limitations and/or exclusions

 

contained in this Policy is understood and agreed

 

by both the insured and the insurers to be subject

 

to the law of the province of Quebec, Canada.

 

Each party agrees to submit to the jurisdiction of

 

Quebec, Canada and to comply with all

 

requirements necessary to give such Court

 

jurisdiction.

 

3. APPLICATION OF CLAIM EXPENSES

3.1For any Claim Expenses, excluding settlements and indemnity payments, incurred in connection with a Claim both within and outside the jurisdiction of Canada (unless otherwise required by applicable law)

3.1.1Such Claim Expenses contribute towards erosion of the amount stated in paragraphs B) & C) of the Schedule

3.1.2Such Claim Expenses are included within the amount of the Limit of liability as stated in paragraph A).

3.2For any Claim Expenses, excluding settlements and indemnity payments, incurred in connection with a Claim that is subject to the jurisdiction of any territory (other than the United States of America, its territories or possessions) in which the law requires this Policy to provide for such Claim Expenses to be in addition to the amount stated in paragraph A) of the Schedule, then the following shall apply

3.2.1Such Claim expenses do not contribute towards erosion of the amount stated in paragraph A) of the Schedule; but do contribute toward the erosion of the amounts stated in paragraphs B) and C) and;

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3.2.2lnsurers will pay such Claim expenses in addition to the Limit of Liability as stated in paragraph A) of the Schedule up to but not exceeding an amount equivalent to the Limit of Liability stated in paragraph A) of the Schedule for each such Claim.

Any such Claim Expenses incurred in respect of any such Claim which exceed the Limit of Liability available for Claim Expenses under this Policy shall be payable by lnsurers of the applicable policies in excess of this Policy in accordance with the terms and conditions of their respective policies.

ln the event that the Limits of Liability available for Claim Expenses under all such applicable policies in excess of this Policy are exhausted for any such claim then the balance of such Claim Expenses shall be payable hereunder but only in the same manner as provided for in this paragraph 3.2.2

4.2Claim Expenses

Means all fees costs and expenses incurred by lnsurers, or by the lnsured with the written consent of lnsurers, to investigate, defend, settle, arbitrate or litigate a Claim which is or would otherwise be indemnified by this Policy. This includes fees costs and expenses incurred in the hiring of investigators, adjusters, experts, consultants, arbitrators, mediators, ex employees and lawyers, and also court and arbitration costs and costs for the attendance of witnesses other than employees of the lnsured.

All reasonable out of pocket disbursements incurred by the lnsured shall form part of such Claim Expenses.990

[Bold in original; underlining added.]

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990Exhibit P-13-2, 2009–2010, vol. 488 at 199080–199081 and 199086–199087.

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The rights of injured third persons under domestic law and the insurance contract

[1131] According to the appellants, there are two sources that subject the 2009–2010 insurance tower to Quebec law. The first is of a legal nature and resides in the rule set out in 3119 C.C.Q. The second is of a contractual nature and arises from the clause declaring the applicable law and attributing jurisdiction, which is set out in the reference policy and is titled Choice of Law and Jurisdiction.991

[1132] It is worth taking a closer look at the scope of each of these two binding sources.

Articles 3119 and 2414 C.C.Q.

[1133] Some might see in the situation described by the parties an apparent conflict of laws belonging to different legal orders, in this case the law of Quebec and the law of Alberta. That is not the case.

[1134] Article 3119 C.C.Q. sets aside general conflict of law rules992 in favour of a specific rule that subjects insurance contracts to Quebec law if they meet one of the connecting factors set out in that provision.993

[1135] Author Claude Emanuelli explains the scope of article 3119 C.C.Q. as follows:

[TRANSLATION]

553.The first paragraph of article 3119 C.C.Q. essentially reiterates the provisions of articles 2496 to 2498 and 2500 C.C.L.C.: an insurance contract covering property or an interest situated in Quebec, or that is subscribed in Quebec by a person resident in Quebec, is governed by the law of Quebec if the policyholder applies for the insurance in Quebec or the insurer signs or delivers the policy in Quebec. These provisions apply notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary. The application of Quebec law in the conditions set out in the first paragraph of article 3119 is therefore mandatory. It cannot be

991Ibid. at 199081.

992Autorité des marchés financiers c. La Souveraine, 2008 QCCQ 10557 at para. 27, aff’d on other grounds by La Souveraine, Compagnie d’assurance générale v. Autorité des marchés financiers, 2013 SCC 63, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 756.

993See the Court’s analysis regarding article 3119 C.C.Q. in the context of its analysis of Ground 64.

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set aside by article 3082 C.C.Q. The application of Quebec law leads to the application of article 2414 C.C.Q., which renders null any clause in an insurance contract that “grants the client, the insured, the participant, the beneficiary or the policyholder fewer rights than are granted by the provisions” of the Civil Code.994

[References omitted.]

[1136] In this case, there is no possibility of a conflict between Alberta law and Quebec law in particular because of the undeniable existence of various connecting factors that have the effect of subjecting the rights and obligations of the parties to the dispute in Quebec to the Civil Code.

[1137] In support of this assertion, we note that the insurance policies making up the 2009–2010 tower concern insurable interests situated in whole or in part in Quebec, in this case those of SNC, an enterprise domiciled in this province that agreed to insure its own civil liability. Next, it was established that the insurers chose to give the broker AON the mandate to deliver a copy of their insurance policies to the principal establishment of their insured SNC, located in Montreal.995

[1138] It should also be noted that the claims in question all originate from Quebec residents and concern losses that occurred entirely within the territory of this province.

[1139] The main relevant connecting factors set out in article 3119 C.C.Q. have thus been established. That provision includes the mandatory formulation “[n]otwithstanding any agreement to the contrary”, which requires the parties to an insurance contract to make their agreement subject to Quebec law. It results from the foregoing that the application of article 3119 C.C.Q. leads to the exclusion from the insurance contract of any clause that is contrary to Quebec public order and the inclusion of the regulated minimum content set out in the domestic law.996

[1140] As stated by the author Emanuelli, article 3119 C.C.Q. leads directly to the application of article 2414 C.C.Q., which refuses to recognize the validity of a clause stipulated in a contract of non-marine insurance that grants fewer rights than are

994Claude Emanuelli, Droit international privé québécois, 3rd ed. (Montreal: Wilson & Lafleur, 2011) at 371–372, No. 553.

995Cross-examination of Pierre Parizeau (19 November 2013), vol. 482 at 196848–196849.

996Intact, compagnie d'assurances (Compagnie d'assurances ING du Canada) c. Harvey, 2011 QCCA 712 at paras. 35–36.

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granted by the rules of the Civil Code, in particular those that are specifically intended to protect the rights of injured third persons.997

[1141] The case law teaches us that, by the application of article 2414 C.C.Q., the rules of Chapter XV of the Civil Code covering insurance are included in insurance contracts as of right, on a suppletive basis.998

[1142] There is an important distinction, however, between the first and second paragraphs of article 2414 C.C.Q. According to authors Baudouin, Deslauriers, and Moore,999 the first paragraph of this provision gives the articles concerned the status of protective public order.1000 The second paragraph of article 2414 C.C.Q. deals with subjects of directive public order. A departure from the rule set out in that paragraph will be sanctioned by absolute nullity. The remedy is available, in particular, to injured third persons.

[1143] This distinction is essential because it confers legal interest on the party who wishes to raise a provision of public order in accordance with the nature of the nullity invoked. Only a party whom the rule is intended to protect may invoke nullity due to a violation of protective public order,1001 whereas absolute nullity (directive public order) may be invoked by any person with a present and actual interest. It may even be raised by the Court on its own initiative.

[1144] According to commentary, articles 2500 to 2502 C.C.Q. are of directive public order:

[TRANSLATION]

It is of absolute public order (art. 2414, para. 2) that the insurer pay the indemnity to the victim directly and not to the insured who will then pay it to the

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997Claude Emanuelli, Droit international privé québécois, 3rd ed. (Montreal: Wilson & Lafleur, 2011) at 371–372, No. 553.

998Intact, compagnie d'assurances (Compagnie d'assurances ING du Canada) c. Harvey, 2011 QCCA 712 at paras. 35–37. See also M.B. c. Financière Manuvie, 2016 QCCA 498 at para. 38, leave to appeal to SCC refused, 37017 (10 November 2016); Laurentienne-vie, Cie d'assurances inc. c. Empire, Cie d'assurance-vie, [2000] R.J.Q. 1708 at 1719–1720 (C.A.).

999Jean-Louis Baudouin, Patrice Deslauriers & Benoît Moore, La responsabilité civile, 8th ed., vol. 2

(Cowansville, QC: Yvon Blais, 2014) at 535–536, No. 2-502.

1000 A violation of this paragraph, clearly written for the benefit of the client, the insured, the participant, the beneficiary, or the policyholder, will be sanctioned by relative nullity.

1001 Didier Lluelles, Droit des assurances terrestres, 6th ed. (Montreal: Thémis, 2017) at 19, No. 34.

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victim (art. 2500): the purpose is to avoid placing the victim at the mercy of the insured or in competition with the insured’s creditors.1002

[1145] The commentary is correct to classify article 2500 C.C.Q. among the provisions of directive (absolute) public order, and there is no doubt that injured third persons have the interest required to claim the entire amount of insurance in payment of their legitimate claims.

[1146] It should also be added that the definition of injured third persons accepted by the case law is sufficiently broad to include the contractors whose interest to bring legal proceedings is based on their application for forced intervention. In concurring reasons, Beauregard J.A. defined the expression “injured third person” within the meaning of article 2501 C.C.Q. as follows:

[TRANSLATION]

[42]… The injured third person in this article is a person foreign to the insurance contract who is entitled to claim from the insured an indemnity for the injury caused by the fault of the insured. It is not necessary for the third party to be the one who initially sustained the injury. The third party may be the person called upon to indemnify the first victim and who is subrogated in that victim’s rights.1003

[1147] The plaintiffs, who are the injured third persons and primary victims in these cases, support the appeal of the contractors, and no party has questioned the legitimacy of this manner of proceeding.

[1148] That being said, some are of the view that article 2500 C.C.Q. is intended only to avoid the integration of the amount of insurance into the insured’s patrimony so that the indemnity does not become the common pledge of the insured’s creditors. Authors Odette Jobin-Laberge and Luc Plamondon express this opinion in the following terms:

[TRANSLATION]

1002 Ibid. at 392, No. 574. See also the same publication at 19, No. 34. In this case, the creditors of the defence costs incurred in Alberta were the creditors of SNC.

1003 CGU c. Wawanesa, compagnie mutuelle d'assurances, 2005 QCCA 320 at para. 42. It can also be confirmed without risk of error that the “injured third person” in article 2501 C.C.Q. is the same person as the one referred to in article 2500 C.C.Q.

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Although this rule of attributing the indemnity to the injured third person was the basis for the direct action in French insurance law, it has only one objective in Quebec law because the legislature has specifically codified the direct action against the insurer in other articles. In our view, article 2500 C.C.Q., like article 2602 C.C.L.C., is necessary to avoid one of the effects of the general principle that liability insurance is intended to protect the insured’s patrimony, a rule reiterated in article 2396 C.C.Q., which would have the effect of paying the indemnity to the insured, causing it to become the common pledge of all its creditors. Article 2500 C.C.Q. seeks to avoid that situation by allocating the proceeds of insurance solely to injured third persons.1004

[Reference omitted.]

[1149] Although generally consistent with the intention of the legislature, this statement is somewhat incomplete in that it does not describe the intensity of the rights granted to injured third persons. The regime of directive public order established by article 2500 C.C.Q.1005 has the specific objective of protecting their rights. LeBel J.A., as he then was, stated the following in regard to the legislative intention underlying this provision:

[TRANSLATION]

Article 2602 [C.C.L.C.] contains a first derogation from one of the basic rules of civil law, that is, the appropriation of all of a debtor’s property for the purpose of all of his or her creditors, in accordance with article 1981 C.C.L.C. This specific appropriation for a purpose is indicative of a legislative intention to protect the victim’s rights. Thus, in liability insurance, the legislature defines the function of liability insurance as not only the protection of the insured’s liability, but also the indemnification of the victim and the preservation of its claim for compensation, like in French law. Initially foreign to the traditional view of insurance, this interpretation corresponds to legislative evolution and is

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1004 Odette Jobin-Laberge & Luc Plamondon, “Les assurances et les rentes” in Barreau du Québec et Chambre des notaires du Québec, La réforme du Code civil, vol. 2 (Sainte-Foy, QC: P.U.L., 1993) 1093 at 1160.

1005 Jean-Louis Baudouin & Patrice Deslauriers, La responsabilité civile, vol. 2, 8th ed. (Cowansville, QC: Yvon Blais, 2014) at 601, No. 2-566; Didier Lluelles, Droit des assurances terrestres, 6th ed. (Montreal: Thémis, 2017) at 19, No. 34.

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consistent with these texts and with the text of article 2586, which are intended to protect certain other categories of creditors.1006

[Emphasis added; reference omitted.]

[1150] The comments of the Minister on article 2500 C.C.Q. align with this opinion:

[TRANSLATION]

This article, which restates article 2602 C.C.L.C., allocates the amount of liability insurance exclusively to the indemnification of victims.1007

[1151] The rights granted by article 2500 C.C.Q. therefore have a dual objective. The first is to reserve the insurance coverage exclusively for injured third persons up to the amount of the proven claims. The second, just as important, seeks to protect the integrity of the indemnity by preventing it from being commingled with the insured’s patrimony and thereby becoming the common pledge of the insured’s creditors through an unfair amalgam.

[1152] The case law of this Court supports that interpretation:

[TRANSLATION]

[75]However, once the criteria for the application of the policy are met, that is, after the payment to third persons of $5 million excluding interest and legal costs, the policy is governed by the mandatory rules of the Civil Code. Thus, the duty to defend, which in Quebec is separate and distinct, has no effect on the limit of liability of $20 million (art. 2503 C.C.Q.), from which it is in fact independent. On this point, the intention of the parties to completely limit the amounts of insurance to 20 and 40 million, as the case may be, will be disregarded (arts. 2414, 2500, and 2503 C.C.Q.).

[76]Similarly, once the retention amount was paid to third persons, CN could have insisted that Chartis take up its defence, which Chartis could not have refused to do in view of art. 2503 C.C.Q., despite the terms of the policy. However, there was nothing prohibiting CN, in accordance with the policy,

1006 Aetna Casualty and Surety Company c. Groupe Estrie, mutuelle d’assurance contre l’incendie, [1990] R.J.Q. 1792 at 1810–1811 (C.A.).

1007 Ministère de la Justice, Commentaires du ministre de la Justice : Le Code civil du Québec, vol. 2 (Québec: Publications du Québec, 1993) art. 2500.

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from managing the claims, retaining counsel, entering into settlement agreements, and then asking Chartis to reimburse it, if it thought that was more appropriate. Once the retention amount was paid to third persons, Chartis could have participated in the defence in order to protect its interests.

[77]This also means that if there was a primary insurer, its duty to defend would have ended once the excess insurance coverage became applicable (that is, after the payment of the retention amount, or under endorsement No. 2, of the greater amount of insurance agreed to in the primary policy).

[78]In summary, the primacy of the provisions of the Civil Code applies to the duty to defend, to defence costs, and to interest, costs, and expenses paid to third persons (arts. 2500 and 2503 C.C.Q.). In the event of a major loss, Chartis could therefore be required to pay much more than the $20 million limit set out in the policy.1008

[Emphasis added.]

[1153] In addition, allowing the insurer to authorize itself not to apply the proceeds of the insurance exclusively to the payment of injured third persons because of the insured’s failure to enforce the application of a rule of protective public order would be tantamount to implicitly acknowledging that this obligation of the insurer towards injured third persons, created by legislative intent by the mere fact of the existence of a valid policy, could become dependent on the insured’s wishes to ensure its enforcement. The following remarks of author Emmanuelle Poupart take on their full meaning here:

[TRANSLATION]

Article 2503 C.C.Q. is of public order. Thus, any policy governed by Quebec law contains an underlying duty to defend, the costs of which are in addition to the amount of insurance. Any clause to the contrary is unlawful and deemed unwritten.

In common law, the duty to defend is strictly conventional. Very often policies provide that defence costs are included in the limits of insurance. When these same insurers underwrite insurance policies in Quebec, they must be aware

1008 Canadian National Railway Company c. Chartis Insurance Company of Canada (Commerce and Industry Insurance Company of Canada), 2013 QCCA 1271 at paras. 75–78.

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that they are subject to article 2503 C.C.Q. and that such clauses are invalid or at the least litigious.1009

[Emphasis added.]

[1154] In short, injured third persons in Quebec have a direct right of action1010 against the insurer in regard to the amount of liability insurance, which must be applied exclusively to the payment of their claim (2500 C.C.Q.).

[1155] Article 2503 C.C.Q., read together with the provision of absolute public order set out just three provisions earlier, establishes the principle that legal costs and expenses cannot reduce the amount of insurance coverage. Viewed from that perspective, although it is not the only one to consider, the second paragraph of article 2503 C.C.Q. simply elaborates on the rule set out in article 2500 C.C.Q. In view of the structure of the Civil Code, it would in fact be unusual if the protection provided by article 2503 C.C.Q. did not extend to injured third persons by necessary implication, considering that the preceding articles have the specific purpose of defining their rights.

[1156] It could be argued that this application of article 2500 C.C.Q. allows one to do indirectly what cannot be done directly under the second paragraph of article 2503 C.C.Q. In a dispute simultaneously raising both these obligations imposed on the insurer, it seems preferable that the interpretation of articles 2500 and 2503 C.C.Q. converge towards the same coverage, whether the plaintiff is the insured or an injured third person.1011

[1157] In short, the injured third persons in Quebec are correct to base their legal interest on the second paragraph of article 2414 C.C.Q. to avail themselves of the rights conferred by articles 2500 and 2503 C.C.Q.

The Choice of Law and Jurisdiction clause

1009 Emmanuelle Poupart, “L’obligation de défendre de l’assureur et l’allocation des frais de défense” in Sébastien Lanctôt & Paul A. Melançon, eds., Commentaires sur le droit des assurances, 3rd ed. (Montreal: LexisNexis, 2017) 225 at 226–227.

1010 Art. 2501 C.C.Q.

1011 On the importance of coherence in the interpretation of the Civil Code of Québec, see Pierre- André Côté, The Interpretation of Legislation in Canada, 4th ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 2011) at 328, of which the equivalent excerpt from the third French edition is cited with approval in Daimler Chrysler Financial Services (Debis) Canada inc. c. Axa Assurances inc., 2006 QCCA 420 at para. 27

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[1158] The reference policy explicitly provides that any dispute is to be resolved in accordance with Quebec law (see the clause titled Choice of Law and Jurisdiction).

[1159] Once the idea is accepted that the insurance coverage at issue applies to the insurable interest of SNC everywhere it does business, it is easer to understand that the drafters of the reference policy wanted to stipulate a law whose application was not dependant on the territory where the claim originated. The parties thus wanted to avoid the economic uncertainty that could result from having to refer to a foreign law arbitrarily chosen based on where the occurrence took place.

[1160] We can further understand the purpose of such a clause when we note that the parties agreed to subject their policies to the authority of the Quebec courts in regard to any interpretation problem resulting from their application, regardless of where the negligent act at the origin of the claim occurred. This precaution provides the contracting parties with the legal security indispensable to maintaining stable and predictable contractual relationships.

[1161] By incorporating the Choice of Law and Jurisdiction clause into their insurance policies, the insurers thus acknowledged that any dispute resulting from the interpretation of an exclusion or limitation set out in the policy could be resolved only in accordance with Quebec law (2414 C.C.Q.).

[1162] SNC and its insurers are trying to nuance this proposition by arguing that the clause applies only to disputes between the contracting parties and that there are none in this case.

[1163] First, the clause does not expressly provide that it is limited to disputes occurring among the signatories of the policy (“Any dispute concerning the interpretation …”). Next, it has already been confirmed that agreements between the insurer and the insured cannot be entered into at the expense of the rights of injured third persons1012 who have a direct interest in the insurance policy in accordance with article 2500 C.C.Q. The Court agrees with that approach. In addition, the insurers of SNC1013 admit that Quebec law applies to their insurance contract.

[1164] Finally, the excess insurer ACE is one of the signatory parties to the contractors’ written arguments on the ground in question. The divergent position on appeal of this insurer and that of its insured SNC and the other insurers who are

1012 Air liquide Canada inc. c. Canadian American Tank Lines Inc., 2011 QCCS 1108 at para. 110. 1013 Except for Zurich.

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members of the 2009–2010 insurance tower is a clear example of the conflict prevailing among these parties.

[1165] There is therefore no doubt that the Choice of Law and Jurisdiction clause applies to the dispute between the contractors and SNC and its insurers.

[1166] Article 3119 C.C.Q. and the Choice of Law and Jurisdiction clause have similar objects and supplement each other by their wording. Their convergence leaves no room for foreign law, unless it is argued that a violation of public order would result, which the parties did not raise on appeal.

[1167] In any event, foreign law cannot have an extraterritorial scope in the face of public order provisions applicable in Quebec, which favour the rights of injured third persons in the province. Yet that is the effect the judge gave it by prioritizing the application of a foreign law authorizing the erosion of the amount of insurance by something other than the payment of indemnities to injured third persons, hence his error.

[1168] Therefore, viewed through the lens of the rights of injured third persons and not through that of the rights of the contracting parties alone, it is irrelevant whether the insurer was justified in deducting these costs and expenses from the amount of insurance at the time and place that it did. More specifically, it matters little that it did so under the provisions of a foreign law, of clause 3.1 of the policy, or for any other reason.

[1169] There are two types of erosion at play in this case. The first concerns indemnities previously paid to priority claimants and the second is related to the payment of costs incurred to settle those claims.

[1170] The first type of erosion appears to be well founded under Quebec law. Article 2463 provides the following:

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2463. In damage insurance, the insurer is obliged to make reparation for the injury suffered at the time of the loss, but only up to the amount of the coverage.

2463. L'assurance de dommages oblige l'assureur à réparer le préjudice subi au moment du sinistre, mais seulement jusqu'à concurrence du montant de l'assurance.

[Emphasis added.]

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[1171] In any event, if there was any problem with respect to the first cause of erosion, it is resolved by the contractors’ admission that the Alberta claims have priority over theirs. The extent of coverage is thus defined in the insurance policies, from which is subtracted the claims of the injured third persons already indemnified.

[1172] The second cause of erosion invoked by SNC is inadmissible, however, because of the conflict it raises with the mandatory rule set out in article 2500 C.C.Q.

[1173] This free-standing rule, which is complete in itself, applies even without the precision provided by the second paragraph of article 2503 C.C.Q. It is sufficient that the amounts subtracted from the proceeds of the insurance (2500 C.C.Q.) are in fact “applied” to something other than the “payment of injured third persons” for this provision to be violated.

[1174] In short, the injured third persons in Quebec have rights that are distinct from those of SNC, including a direct right of action against its insurers, from the mere fact of the existence of a valid liability insurance policy and because of the mandatory rules establishing the extent of the insurers’ obligations towards them.

[1175] The appellants are therefore entitled to require that the contracting parties apply exclusively to their claim the amounts of insurance not previously allocated to the claims of injured third persons that have chronological priority. Therefore, the residual amount of coverage for the purpose of its assessment cannot include defence costs (or claim expenses, as the case may be). This conclusion makes available an additional $11 million to the limit of insurance under the 2009–2010 tower. It follows that, with respect to injured third persons in Quebec, this tower is eroded by only the amount of the indemnities already paid to previously indemnified claimants and that the remainder must be applied exclusively to the payment of indemnities owing to injured third persons in Quebec.

Clauses 3.1 and 3.2 of the reference policy

[1176] At trial, SNC and its insurers expended considerable energy arguing that clause 3.1 of the reference policy applies to reduce the amount of coverage available for claims of the injured third persons in Quebec.

[1177] The interpretation of clause 3.1 proposed by SNC and its insurers distorts the effect of the clause by isolating it from the rest of the insurance contract, conferring upon it a scope that it does not have. Rather, clause 3.1 must be interpreted in a

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manner that ensures consistency among the various provisions of the insurance contract and in particular with clause 3.2.1014

[1178] At the outset, we note in support of a comprehensive approach to the reference policy that it is not possible to identify any clear indication that clause 3.1 should be elevated to the status of a main clause or to classify it among the clauses declaring the applicable law or conferring jurisdiction.

[1179] Next, by combining clauses 3.1 and 3.2 as implicitly proposed by the drafters of the reference policy, the clearly distinct purposes of these provisions is revealed without much difficulty. The two clauses form a complimentary and consistent whole by considering the only two possible scenarios concerning the handling of claim expenses, that is, their inclusion or their exclusion, as the case may be, from the calculation of the amount of available insurance coverage.

[1180] As indicated by the title of section 3 of the reference policy (Application of Claim Expenses), clause 3.1 simply implements the mechanism by which claim expenses contribute towards the erosion of the coverage layers in situations where the clause applies.

[1181] It should also be added that this same clause contains a significant restriction that was not identified by the judge or by SNC and its insurers. It states: “unless otherwise required by applicable law”.1015 The law applicable to the claims here, as acknowledged by the contracting parties, is the law of Quebec. At the risk of repetition, Quebec law proscribes the possibility of including claim expenses and interest in the amount of coverage.

[1182] In contrast, clause 3.2 set out the manner in which the coverage layers are triggered when claim expenses do not contribute towards erosion.

[1183] Clause 3.2 is clearly consistent with Quebec domestic law in that it sets out the cases where claim expenses should not be taken into account for the purpose of establishing the amount of coverage available. This Court has in fact indicated that, as a result of articles 2500 and 2503 C.C.Q., insurers doing business in Quebec would be well advised to anticipate the scenario contemplated by these two

1014 Exportations Consolidated Bathurst v. Mutual Boiler & Machinery Insurance Co., [1980] 1 S.C.R. 888.

1015 It should be noted that despite similar wording, clause 3.2 does not include the following restriction set out in clause 3.1: “unless otherwise required by applicable law”.

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provisions that could lead to exceeding the insurance coverage limit stipulated in the policy:

[TRANSLATION]

[78]In summary, the primacy of the provisions of the Civil Code applies to the duty to defend, to defence costs, and to interest, costs, and expenses paid to third persons (arts. 2500 and 2503 C.C.Q.). In the event of a major loss, Chartis could therefore be required to pay much more than the $20 million limit set out in the policy.1016

[Emphasis added.]

[1184] In this case, a harmonized reading of clauses 3.1 and 3.2 of the reference policy indicates that they set out distinct, watertight, and separate mechanisms for concurrent claims from different territories and for which the applicable law provides different treatment with respect to claim expenses.

[1185] Assuming for the purpose of discussion, and without expressing an opinion on the subject, that notwithstanding contrary agreement, Alberta law allows the erosion of insurance coverage by claim expenses, the result would be to impose a double obligation on the insurers. Clause 3.1 allows the insurers to invoke a reduction in insurance coverage equivalent to the claim expenses they incurred against the Alberta claimants. At the same time, for the Quebec claimants, in accordance with article 2500 C.C.Q. and consequently under clause 3.2, the insurers must exclude the claim expenses from the calculation of the coverage available, regardless of the territory where they originated.

[1186] In short, the erosion caused by claim expenses cannot be raised against the injured third persons in Quebec even if the same reduction is accepted under Alberta law. The judge thus erred in considering clause 3.1 to be a clause declaring the applicable law, whereas it is instead a term of execution of the insurance coverage.

[1187] In any event, even assuming that the judge’s interpretation of clause 3.1 was reasonable, a hypothesis that the Court rejects, he nevertheless erred in law by refusing to allow article 2500 C.C.Q. to prevail over that clause.

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1016 Canadian National Railway Company c. Chartis Insurance Company of Canada (Commerce and Industry Insurance Company of Canada), 2013 QCCA 1271 at para. 78.

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Conclusion

[1188] Regardless of the perspective used to analyze the rights of third-party claimants, whether it be domestic law or the terms of the reference policy, the answer to this issue remains invariably the same: SNC and its insurers cannot raise against the injured third persons in Quebec a reduction in the amount of insurance coverage based on the erosion of that amount by claim expenses and legal costs, regardless of the origin of such amounts.

[1189] Therefore, with respect for the judge’s opinion, it was not open to him to find that the contracting parties chose to subject their contractual relationship to the law of the place where the claim originated. A proper application of articles 2414 and 3119 C.C.Q. combined with the clause titled Choice of Law and Jurisdiction support the theory that Quebec law, with all its mandatory aspects, applies to the insurance policies of SNC, at least with respect to the situation of the injured third persons in Quebec.

[1190] The contractors, supported in this regard by the plaintiffs, are thus entitled to avail themselves of article 2500 C.C.Q., and consequently of the second paragraph of article 2503 C.C.Q. They have the necessary legal interest to insist that the insurers exclude the claim expenses incurred in the Keystone case from the calculation of the amount of insurance coverage available under the 2009–2010 tower.

[1191] Moreover, on appeal, the parties did not raise the possible erosion of the 2010–2011 and 2011–2012 towers. Their silence on this issue leads us to adopt the judge’s solution and to encourage them to conduct themselves in regard to these towers, and if applicable, in regard to the 2012–2013 tower, in accordance with the applicable law determined for the 2009–2010 tower.

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS ON THE 8788 FILES

[1192] IN VIEW OF the splitting of proceedings ordered in these judgments;

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[1193] IN VIEW OF the Court’s conclusions on the apportionment of liability and the applications for forced intervention;

[1194] IN VIEW OF the fact that it is necessary to render the judgments that should have been rendered on the proceedings in forced intervention;

[1195] IN VIEW OF the fact that it is necessary in all the cases to specify the type of solidarity among the various defendants found liable;

[1196] IN VIEW OF the fact that it is necessary to confirm, as between them, that the shares of liability of CYB and of B&B are divided equally;

[1197] IN VIEW OF the fact that on appeal, none of the parties raised any deficiencies in the trial proceedings, namely the conclusions of the defences and applications for forced intervention, as an argument against Ground of appeal No. 19, and accordingly, the Court will rely on the notices of appeal and the conclusions contained therein to render this judgment, with certain exceptions;

[1198] IN VIEW OF the fact that Quebec law applies to SNC’s insurance policies in regard to the situation of the injured third persons in Quebec, and that accordingly, the claim expenses incurred in the Keystone case must be excluded from the calculation of the amount of insurance coverage available under the 2009–2010 tower;

[1199] IN VIEW OF the fact that the insurers concerned in these conclusions are those named in the designations of the parties contained in each of the files whose numbers appear in these judgments;

[1200] IN VIEW OF the fact that the plaintiff owners of sequence 249 did not appeal the conclusion concerning the 5% reduction, and consequently, the trial judgment is final in this respect;

[1201] IN VIEW OF the fact that there are no conclusions against the liability insurers of SNC/Blanchette in the notices of appeal of CYB, St-Paul (as the insurer of CYB), and B&B;

[1202] IN VIEW OF the mixed outcome of the appeals of CYB, St-Paul (as the insurer of CYB), and B&B, each party will pay its own legal costs in the context of the appeals filed against the respondents and impleaded parties–defendants with respect to the judgment refusing to specifically rule on the proceedings in forced intervention;

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[1203] IN VIEW OF the mixed outcome of the appeals of ACE, that party will pay the legal costs;

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT:

File No. 200-09-008788-140

[1204] CORRECTS the designations of the parties in the trial judgment in accordance with the designations appearing in this judgment;

[1205] ORDERS the splitting of proceedings to calculate the allocation of pecuniary compensation and RESERVES jurisdiction to render any order necessary after these judgments have been filed;

[1206] DISMISSES the appeals, in regard to both the principal appeal and the appeals between the co-defendants, the whole with legal costs;

File No. 200-09-028788-153

[1207] CORRECTS the designations of the parties in the trial judgment in accordance with the designations appearing in this judgment;

[1208] ORDERS the splitting of proceedings to calculate the allocation of pecuniary compensation and RESERVES jurisdiction to render any order necessary after these judgments have been filed;

[1209] DISMISSES the appeals from the judgment rendered in the main action in favour of the respondents–principal plaintiffs, the whole with legal costs against the appellant;

[1210] ALLOWS in part, each party paying its own costs, the appeals filed against the respondents and impleaded parties–defendants, with respect to the judgment refusing to rule specifically on the proceedings in forced intervention for the sole purpose of rendering the judgment that should have been rendered, and proceeding to do so:

DISMISSES, without costs, the action in forced intervention of St. Paul Insurance Company (as the insurer of 9312-1994 Québec inc.) against Carrière B&B inc.;

2020 QCCA 495 (*)

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DISMISSES, without costs, the action in forced intervention of St. Paul Insurance Company (as the insurer of 9312-1994 Québec inc.) against Béton Laurentide inc.;

MAINTAINS, without costs, the action in forced intervention of St. Paul Insurance Company (as the insurer of 9312-1994 Québec inc.) against SNC- Lavalin Inc. and Alain Blanchette;

CONDEMNS SNC-Lavalin Inc. and Alain Blanchette to reimburse St. Paul Insurance Company (as the insurer of 9312-1994 Québec inc.) for any amount paid by it exceeding the share of liability attributed to 9312-1994 Québec inc. in the order rendered in the main action;

File No. 200-09-038788-151

[1211] CORRECTS the designations of the parties in the trial judgment in accordance with the designations appearing in this judgment;

[1212] ORDERS the splitting of proceedings to calculate the allocation of pecuniary compensation and RESERVES jurisdiction to render any order necessary after these judgments have been filed;

[1213] DISMISSES the appeals from the judgment rendered in the main action in favour of the respondents–principal plaintiffs, the whole with legal costs against the appellant;

[1214] ALLOWS in part, each party paying its own costs, the appeals filed against the respondents–defendants with respect to the judgment refusing to rule specifically on the proceedings in forced intervention for the sole purpose of rendering the judgment that should have been rendered, and proceeding to do so:

MAINTAINS, without costs, the action in forced intervention of Carrière B&B inc. against SNC-Lavalin Inc.;

CONDEMNS SNC-Lavalin Inc. to reimburse Carrière B&B inc. for any amount paid by it exceeding the share of liability attributed to the tandem in the order rendered in the main action;

2020 QCCA 495 (*)

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File No. 200-09-048788-159

[1215] CORRECTS the designations of the parties in the trial judgment in accordance with the designations appearing in this judgment;

[1216] ORDERS the splitting of proceedings to calculate the allocation of pecuniary compensation and RESERVES jurisdiction to render any order necessary after these judgments have been filed;

[1217] DISMISSES the appeals, the whole with legal costs;

File No. 200-09-058788-156

[1218] CORRECTS the designations of the parties in the trial judgment in accordance with the designations appearing in this judgment;

[1219] ORDERS the splitting of proceedings to calculate the allocation of pecuniary compensation and RESERVES jurisdiction to render any order necessary after these judgments have been filed;

[1220] DISMISSES the appeals from the judgment rendered in the main action in favour of the respondents–principal plaintiffs, the whole with legal costs against the appellant;

[1221] ALLOWS in part, each party paying its own costs, the appeals filed against the respondents and impleaded parties–defendants, with respect to the judgment refusing to rule specifically on the proceedings in for the sole purpose of rendering the judgment that should have been rendered, and proceeding to do so:

DISMISSES, without costs, the action in forced intervention of 9312-1994 Québec inc. against Carrière B&B inc.;

DISMISSES, without costs, the action in forced intervention of 9312-1994 Québec inc. against Béton Laurentide inc.;

MAINTAINS, without costs, the action in forced intervention of 9312-1994 Québec inc. against SNC-Lavalin Inc. and Alain Blanchette;

CONDEMNS SNC-Lavalin Inc. and Alain Blanchette to reimburse 9312-1994 Québec inc. for any amount paid by it exceeding the share of liability attributed to the tandem in the order rendered in the main action;

2020 QCCA 495 (*)

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File No. 200-09-068788-154

[1222] CORRECTS the designations of the parties in the trial judgment in accordance with the designations appearing in this judgment;

[1223] ORDERS the splitting of proceedings to calculate the allocation of pecuniary compensation and RESERVES jurisdiction to render any order necessary after these judgments have been filed;

[1224] DISMISSES the appeals, the whole with legal costs;

File No. 200-09-108788-156

[1225] CORRECTS the designations of the parties in the trial judgment in accordance with the designations appearing in this judgment;

[1226] ORDERS the splitting of proceedings to calculate the allocation of pecuniary compensation and RESERVES jurisdiction to render any order necessary after these judgments have been filed;

[1227] ALLOWS the appeals in part, the whole with legal costs against the appellant in continuance of proceeding, for the sole purpose of declaring the grounds and conclusions set out in paragraphs 2128 and 2129 of the Main judgment unfounded;

[1228] RENDERS the judgment that should have been rendered, and proceeding to do so:

DECLARES that the 2009–2010 tower is eroded only by the payments in capital made for the benefit of the injured third persons in the settlement of the Keystone case, to the exclusion of costs and expenses including claim expenses;

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File No. 200-09-118788-154

[1229] CORRECTS the designations of the parties in the trial judgment in accordance with the designations appearing in this judgment;

[1230] ORDERS the splitting of proceedings to calculate the allocation of pecuniary compensation and RESERVES jurisdiction to render any order necessary after these judgments have been filed;

[1231] DISMISSES the appeals, the whole with legal costs;

File No. 200-09-128788-152

[1232] CORRECTS the designations of the parties in the trial judgment in accordance with the designations appearing in this judgment;

[1233] ORDERS the splitting of proceedings to calculate the allocation of pecuniary compensation and RESERVES jurisdiction to render any order necessary after these judgments have been filed;

[1234] DISMISSES the appeals, the whole with legal costs;

File No. 200-09-158788-155

[1235] CORRECTS the designations of the parties in the trial judgment in accordance with the designations appearing in this judgment;

[1236] ORDERS the splitting of proceedings to calculate the allocation of pecuniary compensation and RESERVES jurisdiction to render any order necessary after these judgments have been filed;

[1237] DISMISSES the appeals, the whole with legal costs;

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[1238] STRIKES paragraph [2291] from the corrected judgment in first instance and replaces it with:

CONDEMNS 9312-1994 Québec inc. and Carrière B&B inc. solidarily and SNC-Lavalin Inc. and Alain Blanchette with them in solidum to pay the plaintiffs the amount of $289,456.85.

2020 QCCA 495 (*)

FRANÇOIS PELLETIER, J.A.

LORNE GIROUX, J.A.

GUY GAGNON, J.A.

Mtre Mario Welsh

Mtre Marie-Julie Lafleur

Mtre Jean-François Bienjonetti

BCF LLP

Counsel for SNC-Lavalin Inc. and Alain Blanchette

Mtre Olivier Truesdell-Ménard Mtre Stéphanie Robillard Donati Maisonneuve

Counsel for SNC-Lavalin Inc. and Alain Blanchette (insurance aspects)

Mtre Valérie Lemaire

Mtre Samuel Gagnon Langlois lawyers LLP

Counsel for St. Paul Insurance Company (as the insurer of 9312-1994 Québec inc.)

PAGE: 353

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Mtre André Mignault

Mtre Ann-Sophie B. Lamontagne

Tremblay Bois Mignault Lemay LLP

Counsel for Carrière B & B inc.

Mtre Xavier Mondor

Weidenbach, Leduc

Counsel for Carrière B & B inc.

Mtre Ruth Veilleux

Mtre Francis C. Meagher Mtre Paul A. Melançon Mtre Hassan Chahrour

Lapointe Rosenstein Marchand Melançon, LLP

Counsel for Zurich Insurance Company Ltd. (as the insurer of SNC-Lavalin Inc. and Alain Blanchette)

Mtre Hugues Duguay

Langlois lawyers LLP

Counsel for 9312-1994 Québec inc.

Mtre Antoine St-Germain Mtre Catherine Chaput Gasco Goodhue St-Germain

Counsel for Northbridge General Insurance Corporation (as the insurer of Carrière B

&B inc.) and Northbridge General Insurance Corporation (as the insurer of 9312- 1994 Québec inc.)

Mtre Claude A. Roy

Mtre Alain Gervais

Roy Gervais Beauregard

Counsel for Béton Laurentide inc.

Mtre Richard R. Provost Mtre Vikki Andrighetti

Mtre Pascale Boucher Meunier Langlois lawyers LLP

Counsel for ACE INA (as the insurer of SNC-Lavalin Inc. and Alain Blanchette) and Chubb Insurance Company of Canada (as the insurer of SNC-Lavalin Inc. and Alain

2020 QCCA 495 (*)

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Blanchette)

Mtre Yvan Houle Mtre Gabriel Lefebvre Mtre James Woods Borden Ladner Gervais LLP

Counsel for AIG Insurance Company of Canada (as the insurer of SNC-Lavalin Inc. and Alain Blanchette)

Mtre Yvan Houle Mtre Gabriel Lefebvre Mtre James Woods Borden Ladner Gervais LLP

Counsel for Lloyd's Underwriters (as the insurer of SNC-Lavalin Inc. and Alain Blanchette)

Mtre Miguel Bourbonnais

Mtre Bertrand Cossette

McCarthy Tétrault LLP

Counsel for Raymond Chabot administrateur provisoire inc., in its capacity as the provisional administrator of the warranty program formerly administered by APCHQ inc.’s Garantie des bâtiments résidentiels neufs.

Mtre Ian Rose

Mtre Maude Lafortune-Bélair Lavery, de Billy

Counsel for AIG Insurance Company of Canada (as the insurer of Carrière B & B inc.)

Mtre Pierre Soucy

Mtre Richard Lambert

Mtre Ghislain Lavigne

Lambert Therrien

Counsel for Lise Deguise and Christian Yard

Mtre Audrey-Ann Fex

Mtre François Daigle

Daigle, avocats fiscalistes inc.

Counsel for Francois Montminy

2020 QCCA 495 (*)

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Dates of hearing: Week of October 30, 2017

Week of November 20, 2017

Week of December 11, 2017

Week of January 15, 2018

Week of February 5, 2018

Week of March 19, 2018

Week of April 9, 2018

Week of April 30, 2018

May 25, 2018

2020 QCCA 495 (*)

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SCHEDULE 1

(200-09-028788-153)

ST. PAUL INSURANCE COMPANY (as the insurer of 9312-1994 QUÉBEC INC. (formerly known as CONSTRUCTION YVAN BOISVERT INC.))

APPELLANT – Defendant / Intervener

v.

LISE DEGUISE AND CHRISTIAN YARD

RESPONDENTS – Plaintiffs

and

SNC-LAVALIN INC. (formerly doing business as TERRATECH INC. and SNC- LAVALIN ENVIRONMENT INC.) and ALAIN BLANCHETTE, AIG INSURANCE COMPANY OF CANADA (formerly known as CHARTIS INSURANCE COMPANY OF CANADA) (as the insurer of SNC-LAVALIN INC. and ALAIN BLANCHETTE), LLOYD'S UNDERWRITERS as the insurer of SNC-LAVALIN INC. and ALAIN BLANCHETTE), ZURICH INSURANCE COMPANY LTD. (as the insurer of SNC-LAVALIN INC. and ALAIN BLANCHETTE), ACE INA INSURANCE (as the insurer of SNC-LAVALIN INC. and ALAIN BLANCHETTE), CARRIÈRE B & B INC., AIG INSURANCE COMPANY OF CANADA (as the insurer of CARRIÈRE B & B INC.), NORTHBRIDGE GENERAL INSURANCE CORPORATION (as the insurer of CARRIÈRE B & B INC.), BÉTON LAURENTIDE INC., NORTHBRIDGE GENERAL INSURANCE CORPORATION (as the insurer of 9312-1994 QUÉBEC INC.), FRANCOIS MONTMINY

RESPONDENTS – Defendants and / or defendants in warranty

and

CHUBB INSURANCE COMPANY OF CANADA (as the insurer of SNC-LAVALIN INC. and ALAIN BLANCHETTE)

RESPONDENT IN CONTINUANCE OF PROCEEDING – Defendant

and

9312-1994 QUÉBEC INC.

IMPLEADED PARTY – Defendant

(200-09-038788-151)

2020 QCCA 495 (*)

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CARRIÈRE B & B INC.

APPELLANT – Defendant

v.

LISE DEGUISE AND CHRISTIAN YARD

RESPONDENTS – Plaintiffs

and

SNC-LAVALIN INC. (formerly doing business as TERRATECH INC. and SNC- LAVALIN ENVIRONMENT INC.) and ALAIN BLANCHETTE, AIG INSURANCE COMPANY OF CANADA (formerly known as CHARTIS INSURANCE COMPANY OF CANADA) (as the insurer of SNC-LAVALIN INC. and ALAIN BLANCHETTE), LLOYD'S UNDERWRITERS (as the insurer of SNC-LAVALIN INC. and ALAIN BLANCHETTE), ZURICH INSURANCE COMPANY LTD. (as the insurer of SNC-LAVALIN INC. and ALAIN BLANCHETTE), ACE INA INSURANCE (as the insurer of SNC-LAVALIN INC. and ALAIN BLANCHETTE), AIG INSURANCE COMPANY OF CANADA (as the insurer of CARRIÈRE B & B INC.), NORTHBRIDGE GENERAL INSURANCE CORPORATION (as the insurer of CARRIÈRE B & B INC.), 9312-1994 QUÉBEC INC. (formerly known as CONSTRUCTION YVAN BOISVERT INC.), NORTHBRIDGE GENERAL INSURANCE CORPORATION (as the insurer of 9312-1994 QUÉBEC INC.), ST. PAUL INSURANCE COMPANY (as the insurer of 9312-1994 QUÉBEC INC.), FRANCOIS

MONTMINY

RESPONDENTS – Defendants

and

CHUBB INSURANCE COMPANY OF CANADA (as the insurer of SNC-LAVALIN INC. and ALAIN BLANCHETTE)

RESPONDENT IN CONTINUANCE OF PROCEEDING – Defendant

2020 QCCA 495 (*)

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(200-09-048788-159)

ZURICH INSURANCE COMPANY LTD. (as the insurer of SNC-LAVALIN INC. (formerly doing business as TERRATECH INC. and SNC-LAVALIN ENVIRONMENT INC.) and ALAIN BLANCHETTE)

APPELLANT – Defendant

v.

LISE DEGUISE AND CHRISTIAN YARD

RESPONDENTS – Plaintiffs

v.

RAYMOND CHABOT ADMINISTRATEUR PROVISOIRE INC., as the provisional administrator of the warranty program formerly administered by APCHQ INC.’s

GARANTIE DES BÂTIMENTS RÉSIDENTIELS NEUFS RESPONDENT – Plaintiff in continuance of proceeding

and

SNC-LAVALIN INC. and ALAIN BLANCHETTE, AIG INSURANCE COMPANY OF CANADA (formerly known as CHARTIS INSURANCE COMPANY OF CANADA) (as the insurer of SNC-LAVALIN INC. and ALAIN BLANCHETTE), LLOYD'S UNDERWRITERS (as the insurer of SNC-LAVALIN INC. and ALAIN BLANCHETTE), ACE INA INSURANCE (as the insurer of SNC-LAVALIN INC. and ALAIN BLANCHETTE), CARRIÈRE B & B INC., AIG INSURANCE COMPANY OF CANADA (as the insurer of CARRIÈRE B & B INC.), NORTHBRIDGE GENERAL INSURANCE CORPORATION (as the insurer of CARRIÈRE B & B INC.), 9312-1994 QUÉBEC INC. (formerly known as CONSTRUCTION YVAN BOISVERT INC.), NORTHBRIDGE GENERAL INSURANCE CORPORATION (as the insurer of 9312-1994 QUÉBEC INC.), ST. PAUL INSURANCE COMPANY (as the insurer of 9312-1994 QUÉBEC INC.), FRANCOIS MONTMINY

RESPONDENTS – Defendants

and

CHUBB INSURANCE COMPANY OF CANADA (as the insurer of SNC-LAVALIN INC. and ALAIN BLANCHETTE)

RESPONDENT IN CONTINUATION OF PROCEEDING – Defendant

2020 QCCA 495 (*)

PAGE: 359

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(200-09-058788-156)

9312-1994 QUÉBEC INC. (formerly known as CONSTRUCTION YVAN BOISVERT INC.)

APPELLANT – Defendant

v.

LISE DEGUISE AND CHRISTIAN YARD

RESPONDENTS – Plaintiffs

and

SNC-LAVALIN INC. (formerly doing business as TERRATECH INC. and SNC- LAVALIN ENVIRONMENT INC.) and ALAIN BLANCHETTE, AIG INSURANCE COMPANY OF CANADA (formerly known as CHARTIS INSURANCE COMPANY OF CANADA) (as the insurer of SNC-LAVALIN INC. and ALAIN BLANCHETTE), LLOYD'S UNDERWRITERS (as the insurer of SNC-LAVALIN INC. and ALAIN BLANCHETTE), ZURICH INSURANCE COMPANY LTD. (as the insurer of SNC-LAVALIN INC. and ALAIN BLANCHETTE), ACE INA INSURANCE (as the insurer of SNC-LAVALIN INC. and ALAIN BLANCHETTE), CARRIÈRE B & B INC., AIG INSURANCE COMPANY OF CANADA (as the insurer of CARRIÈRE B & B INC.), NORTHBRIDGE GENERAL INSURANCE CORPORATION (as the insurer of CARRIÈRE B & B INC.), BÉTON LAURENTIDE INC., NORTHBRIDGE GENERAL INSURANCE CORPORATION (as the insurer of 9312-1994 QUÉBEC INC.), FRANCOIS MONTMINY

RESPONDENTS – Defendants and / or defendants in warranty

and

CHUBB INSURANCE COMPANY OF CANADA (as the insurer of SNC-LAVALIN INC. and ALAIN BLANCHETTE)

RESPONDENT IN CONTUNUANCE OF PROCEEDING – Defendant

and

ST. PAUL INSURANCE COMPANY (as the insurerof 9312-1994 QUÉBEC INC.) IMPLEADED PARTY – Defendant / Intervener

(200-09-068788-154)

2020 QCCA 495 (*)

PAGE: 360

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NORTHBRIDGE GENERAL INSURANCE CORPORATION (as the insurer of

CARRIÈRE B & B INC.), NORTHBRIDGE GENERAL INSURANCE CORPORATION (as the insurer of 9312-1994 QUÉBEC INC. (formerly known as CONSTRUCTION YVAN BOISVERT INC.))

APPELLANTS – Defendants

v.

LISE DEGUISE AND CHRISTIAN YARD

RESPONDENTS – Plaintiffs

and

SNC-LAVALIN INC. (formerly doing business as TERRATECH INC. and SNC- LAVALIN ENVIRONMENT INC.) and ALAIN BLANCHETTE, AIG INSURANCE COMPANY OF CANADA (formerly known as CHARTIS INSURANCE COMPANY OF CANADA) (as the insurer of SNC-LAVALIN INC. and ALAIN BLANCHETTE), LLOYD'S UNDERWRITERS (as the insurer of SNC-LAVALIN INC. and ALAIN BLANCHETTE), ZURICH INSURANCE COMPANY LTD. (as the insurer of SNC-LAVALIN INC. and ALAIN BLANCHETTE), ACE INA INSURANCE (as the insurer of SNC-LAVALIN INC. and ALAIN BLANCHETTE), CARRIÈRE B & B INC., AIG INSURANCE COMPANY OF CANADA (as the insurer of CARRIÈRE B & B INC.), 9312-1994 QUÉBEC INC., ST. PAUL INSURANCE COMPANY (as the insurer of 9312-1994 QUÉBEC INC.),

FRANCOIS MONTMINY RESPONDENTS - Defendants

and

CHUBB INSURANCE COMPANY OF CANADA (as the insurer of SNC-LAVALIN INC. and ALAIN BLANCHETTE)

RESPONDENT IN CONTINUANCE OF PROCEEDING – Defendant

2020 QCCA 495 (*)

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(200-09-108788-156)

ACE INA INSURANCE (as the insurer of SNC-LAVALIN INC. (formerly doing business as TERRATECH INC. and SNC-LAVALIN ENVIRONMENT INC.) and ALAIN BLANCHETTE)

APPELLANT – Defendant

and

CHUBB INSURANCE COMPANY OF CANADA (as the insurer of SNC-LAVALIN INC. and ALAIN BLANCHETTE)

APPELLANT IN CONTINUANCE OF PROCEEDING – Defendant

v.

LISE DEGUISE AND CHRISTIAN YARD

RESPONDENTS – Plaintiffs

and

SNC-LAVALIN INC. and ALAIN BLANCHETTE, AIG INSURANCE COMPANY OF CANADA (formerly known as CHARTIS INSURANCE COMPANY OF CANADA) (as the insurer of SNC-LAVALIN INC. and ALAIN BLANCHETTE), LLOYD’S UNDERWRITERS (as the insurer of SNC-LAVALIN INC. and ALAIN BLANCHETTE), ZURICH INSURANCE COMPANY LTD. (as the insurer of SNC-LAVALIN INC. and

ALAIN BLANCHETTE), CARRIÈRE B & B INC., AIG INSURANCE COMPANY OF CANADA (as the insurer of CARRIÈRE B & B INC.), NORTHBRIDGE GENERAL INSURANCE CORPORATION (as the insurer of CARRIÈRE B & B INC.), 9312-1994 QUÉBEC INC. (formerly known as CONSTRUCTION YVAN BOISVERT INC.), NORTHBRIDGE GENERAL INSURANCE CORPORATION (as the insurer of 9312- 1994 QUÉBEC INC.), ST. PAUL INSURANCE COMPANY (as the insurer of 9312-1994

QUÉBEC INC.), FRANCOIS MONTMINY RESPONDENTS – Defendants

2020 QCCA 495 (*)

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(200-09-118788-154)

AIG INSURANCE COMPANY OF CANADA (formerly known as CHARTIS INSURANCE COMPANY OF CANADA) (as the insurer of SNC-LAVALIN INC. (formerly doing business as TERRATECH INC. and SNC-LAVALIN ENVIRONMENT INC.) and

ALAIN BLANCHETTE) APPELLANT – Defendant

v.

LISE DEGUISE AND CHRISTIAN YARD

RESPONDENTS – Plaintiffs

and

SNC-LAVALIN INC. and ALAIN BLANCHETTE, LLOYD’S UNDERWRITERS (as the insurer of SNC-LAVALIN INC. and ALAIN BLANCHETTE), ZURICH INSURANCE COMPANY LTD. (as the insurer of SNC-LAVALIN INC. and ALAIN BLANCHETTE), ACE INA INSURANCE (as the insurer of SNC-LAVALIN INC. and ALAIN BLANCHETTE), CARRIÈRE B & B INC., AIG INSURANCE COMPANY OF CANADA (as the insurer of CARRIÈRE B & B INC.), NORTHBRIDGE GENERAL INSURANCE CORPORATION (as the insurer of CARRIÈRE B & B INC.), 9312-1994 QUÉBEC INC. (formerly known as CONSTRUCTION YVAN BOISVERT INC.), NORTHBRIDGE GENERAL INSURANCE CORPORATION (as the insurer of 9312-1994 QUÉBEC INC.), ST. PAUL INSURANCE COMPANY (as the insurer of 9312-1994 QUÉBEC INC.), FRANCOIS MONTMINY

RESPONDENTS – Defendants

and

CHUBB INSURANCE COMPANY OF CANADA (as the insurer of SNC-LAVALIN INC. and ALAIN BLANCHETTE)

RESPONDENT IN CONTINUANCE OF PROCEEDING – Defendant

2020 QCCA 495 (*)

PAGE: 363

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(200-09-128788-152)

LLOYD’S UNDERWRITERS (as the insurer of SNC-LAVALIN INC. (formerly doing business as TERRATECH INC. and SNC-LAVALIN ENVIRONMENT INC.) and ALAIN BLANCHETTE)

APPELLANT – Defendant

v.

LISE DEGUISE AND CHRISTIAN YARD

RESPONDENTS – Plaintiffs

and

SNC-LAVALIN INC. et ALAIN BLANCHETTE, AIG INSURANCE COMPANY OF CANADA (formerly known as CHARTIS INSURANCE COMPANY OF CANADA) (as the insurer of SNC-LAVALIN INC. and ALAIN BLANCHETTE), ZURICH INSURANCE COMPANY LTD. (as the insurer of SNC-LAVALIN INC. and ALAIN BLANCHETTE), ACE INA INSURANCE (as the insurer of SNC-LAVALIN INC. and ALAIN BLANCHETTE), CARRIÈRE B & B INC., AIG INSURANCE COMPANY OF CANADA (as the insurer of CARRIÈRE B & B INC.), NORTHBRIDGE GENERAL INSURANCE CORPORATION (as the insurer of CARRIÈRE B & B INC.), 9312-1994 QUÉBEC INC. (formerly known as CONSTRUCTION YVAN BOISVERT INC.), NORTHBRIDGE GENERAL INSURANCE CORPORATION (as the insurer of 9312-1994 QUÉBEC INC.), ST. PAUL INSURANCE COMPANY (as the insurer of 9312-1994 QUÉBEC INC.), FRANCOIS MONTMINY

RESPONDENTS – Defendants

and

CHUBB INSURANCE COMPANY OF CANADA (as the insurer of SNC-LAVALIN INC. and ALAIN BLANCHETTE)

RESPONDENT IN CONTINUANCE OF PROCEEDING – Defendant

2020 QCCA 495 (*)

PAGE: 364

200-09-008788-140 200-09-028788-153 200-09-038788-151 200-09-048788-159 200-09-058788-156 200-09-068788-154 200-09-108788-156 200-09-118788-154 200-09-128788-152 200-09-158788-155

(200-09-158788-155)

AIG INSURANCE COMPANY OF CANADA (formerly known as CHARTIS INSURANCE COMPANY OF CANADA) (as the insurer of CARRIÈRE B & B INC.)

APPELLANT – Defendant

v.

LISE DEGUISE AND CHRISTIAN YARD

RESPONDENTS – Plaintiffs

and

SNC-LAVALIN INC. (formerly doing business as TERRATECH INC. and SNC- LAVALIN ENVIRONMENT INC.) and ALAIN BLANCHETTE, AIG INSURANCE COMPANY OF CANADA (as the insurer of SNC-LAVALIN INC. and ALAIN BLANCHETTE), LLOYD’S UNDERWRITERS (as the insurer of SNC-LAVALIN INC. and ALAIN BLANCHETTE), ZURICH INSURANCE COMPANY LTD. (as the insurer of SNC-LAVALIN INC. and ALAIN BLANCHETTE), ACE INA INSURANCE (as the insurer of SNC-LAVALIN INC. and ALAIN BLANCHETTE), CARRIÈRE B & B INC., NORTHBRIDGE GENERAL INSURANCE CORPORATION (as the insurer of CARRIÈRE B & B INC.), 9312-1994 QUÉBEC INC. (formerly known as

CONSTRUCTION YVAN BOISVERT INC.), NORTHBRIDGE GENERAL INSURANCE CORPORATION (as the insurer of 9312-1994 QUÉBEC INC.), ST. PAUL INSURANCE COMPANY (as the insurer of 9312-1994 QUÉBEC INC.), FRANCOIS MONTMINY

RESPONDENTS – Defendants

and

CHUBB INSURANCE COMPANY OF CANADA (as the insurer of SNC-LAVALIN INC. and ALAIN BLANCHETTE)

RESPONDENT IN CONTINUANCE OF PROCEEDING – Defendant

2020 QCCA 495 (*)



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