In Ironside, the panel accepted an expert "in the area of securities law" (at para. 78), and
another "on the issue of materiality in the securities industry" (at para. 300), despite the fact that
both were squarely within its own expertise.
 At least one earlier OSC panel decision suggested a similar approach. In Re Biovail
Corporation, 2010 ONSEC 21, the panel admitted expert evidence it concluded was not required
or necessary on the basis that it may have been "relevant or useful" (at paras. 80, 201, 213, and
 Even if admitted, an ASC panel is not bound by the expert evidence tendered. In Workum
and Hennig, the panel specifically noted that the evidence was not determinative of the issues it
had to decide and that it was not bound to accept all of the expert's opinions (at paras. 105 and
108). In De Gouveia, the panel found that it was not bound by the expert's opinion on the ultimate
issue, and that it remained the panel's task to consider and weigh that evidence along with all of
the other relevant evidence (at paras. 66 and 71). The panel explained (at para. 104):
We found Stewart [the expert] to be a credible witness. We gave great weight to her explanations
of various trading practices and their consequences, and her testimony was of considerable
assistance to us in our review of some of the documentary trading evidence. That said, we were not
bound to accept her conclusions. Rather, we considered and analyzed all the evidence and reached
our own conclusions, taking into account, but not dictated by, Stewart's opinions and conclusions.
Although her conclusions did not dictate our findings, we regard the parallels between them as
important corroboration of our analysis.
 In view of the foregoing principles, we decided to exercise our discretion to admit the Puri
Affidavit into evidence as Exhibit #19. While not strictly necessary given this panel's expertise
and experience, we found Puri qualified to express her opinions and found some of those opinions
both helpful and relevant to the issues before us. We did not consider ourselves bound by her
evidence, but as will become apparent later in these reasons, we took her evidence on certain
matters into account and gave it commensurate weight where we concluded it was appropriate and
useful to do so, and where it corroborated our own independent conclusions. We gave her evidence
little to no weight where her opinions were more in the nature of legal argument or policy
 As for the Castaldo Affidavit and the Quinn Affidavit, we agreed that both expressed
opinions and even addressed some of the opinions given by Brookfield's expert witness, Osler, in
a manner somewhat reminiscent of rebuttal expert reports. However, we also agreed with IPL that
as its financial advisors at the relevant time, in recounting the facts of their involvement, Castaldo
and Quinn necessarily referred to the advice and opinions they had given. That they confirmed
their advice and opinions in their affidavits – including by way of contrast with Osler's opinions –
did not make the affidavits expert opinion evidence in the usual sense. Indeed, most of the fact
witnesses expressed their personal views on the events that occurred and the issues raised.
 In weighing their evidence on the matters at issue, we took into account the roles Castaldo
and Quinn played in the events under consideration, as well as their M&A experience, the basis of
their evidence, and its consistency with other reliable evidence. We took the same approach with
all of the witnesses whose evidence was tendered at the Hearing, especially where one or more of
the parties raised concerns about that evidence.