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when he purchased his shares. He also testified that had he known that Lundin had such
information in its possession but had omitted it from the market at the time he purchased, he
would not have purchased his shares in the manner he did.
[246] However, Markowich’s evidence reflects the idiosyncratic nature of reliance as set out in
the case law. A purchaser who acquired shares based on an affirmative representation, which was
alleged to be untrue, could also lead evidence that the purchaser believed that (i) the price
reflected the market’s knowledge of that representation and (ii) the investor would not have
purchased the shares if the investor had known that the representation was not true. However, it
is that same evidence which settled law has found to be idiosyncratic and requires individual
evidence from each investor.
[247] In the same way, Markowich’s idiosyncratic evidence that he would not have purchased
his shares in the manner he did, if he had known about the Pit Wall Instability and Rock Slide,
would also have to be determined on an individual basis for each investor.
[248] Markowich also relies on the principle that deemed reliance may be appropriate in some
common law securities misrepresentation cases. By way of example, he relies on the comments
of the Court of Appeal in Green (CA), at para. 100:
Dealing first with whether the issue of reliance should be certified, in other cases
of negligent misrepresentation, such as Strathy J.'s recent decision in Cannon v.
Funds for Canada Foundation, 2012 ONSC 3009, 218 A.C.W.S. (3d) 264, the
facts allowed the court to certify certain common issues, including inferred
reliance. In that case, investors had invested in a tax shelter which was promoted,
in part, based on an opinion letter and a comfort letter from a defendant lawyer.
Strathy J. was prepared to certify common issues relating to reliance on the basis
that there were only two documents investors looked at, and the entire tax shelter
was premised on those documents being true. In those circumstances, inferred
group reliance could be certified as a common issue.
[249] In Cannon, the court certified a common issue on inferred reliance since there was a basis
in fact for a trial court to find that the only reason for an investor to acquire the security was to
obtain the charitable tax deduction, based on only two documents provided to investors, a
distinction relied upon in Green (CA), at para. 100.
[250] Markowich contends that deemed reliance can similarly be found here, because the
alleged omissions affected each investor equally, and investors “would not have invested in the
manner they did during that relevant time period” if they had been aware of the omissions.
However, no such inference can be made in the present case.
[251] As in Green, Kinross, Mask, and Peters, there is no basis to deem reliance by an investor
on the alleged omissions. There is no basis to find that any particular investor would have even
been aware of the Pit Wall Instability or Rock Slide if the representation had been made, or that
it would have affected the decision to purchase. For the reasons I discuss above, the “investor-