(c) the party has waived its right to rescind. As Mr. Justice McKay, giving the
judgment of the Court of Appeal in Shaw v. Holmes, (1952), 1952 CanLII 285
(ON CA), 2 D.L.R. 330 (Ont. C.A.) said at 334 :
Time may be insisted upon as of the essence of the agreement by a litigant, (a)
who has shown himself ready, desirous, prompt and eager to carry out his
agreement: Mills v. Haywood (1877), 6 Ch. D. 196; (b) who has not been himself
the cause of the delay or in default; Snell v. Brickles (1914), 1914 CanLII 561
(SCC), 20 D.L.R. 209, 49 S.C.R. 360; rev’d. 1916 CanLII 417 (UK JCPC), 30
D.L.R. 31,  2 A.C. 599; and (c) who has not subsequently recognized the
agreement as still subsisting; he must not play fast and loose at his pleasure:
Springer v. Gray (1859), 7 Gr. 276; Cudney v. Gives (1890), 20 O.R. 500; Labelle
v. O’Connor (1908), 15 O.L.R. 519, and Harris v. Robinson (1892), 1892 CanLII
14 (SCC), 21 S.C.R. 390.
In response to Rosseau’s position that it was ready to close with money from other
corporations, 252 relies on the “corporate separateness principle.” The Court of Appeal for
Ontario addressed this in Chevron. 252 specifically referenced paras. 68, 76 and 77:
 The Supreme Court of Canada has protected the principle of corporate
separateness without suggesting a stand-alone just and equitable exception. In Sun
Indalex Finance, LLC v. United Steelworkers,  1 S.C.R. 271,  S.C.J.
No. 6, 2013 SCC 6, at para. 238, Cromwell J. rejected the submission that a
subsidiary should be liable for a breach of fiduciary duty committed by its parent
corporation, holding that "unless there is a legal basis for ignoring the separate
corporate personality of separate entities, those separate corporate existences must
be respected". See, also, Continental Bank Leasing Corp. v. Canada, 1998 CanLII
794 (SCC),  2 S.C.R. 298,  S.C.J. No. 63, at paras. 108-12.
 Not only is such an argument problematic from a policy standpoint, it comes
dangerously close to the adoption of the group enterprise theory of liability. That
theory holds that where several corporations operate closely as part of the same
"group" of corporations, they are in reality a single enterprise and should,
accordingly, be responsible for each other's debts. It has been consistently rejected
by our courts: Meditrust Healthcare Inc. v. Shoppers Drug Mart (2002), 2002
CanLII 41710 (ON CA), 61 O.R. (3d) 786,  O.J. No. 3891 (C.A.), at paras.
30-31; and Fairview Donut Inc. v. The TDL Group Corp.,  O.J. No. 834,
2012 ONSC 1252 (S.C.J.), at paras. 651-65, affd  O.J. No. 5775, 2012
ONCA 867, 225 A.C.W.S. (3d) 31, leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused 
S.C.C.A. No. 47.4 It has also been rejected in England: see Adams v. Cape, 
1 Ch. 433 (Eng. C.A.), at pp. 532 and 536-38.
 There is good reason for this rejection. There is a difference between
economic reality and legal reality. The fact that on an operational level corporate