Date: 20220223  
Docket: T-252-19  
T-254-19  
T-258-19  
T-259-19  
T-261-19  
T-262-19  
Citation: 2022 FC 236  
Ottawa, Ontario, February 23, 2022  
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Southcott  
BETWEEN:  
Docket: T-252-19  
Applicant  
THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL REVENUE  
and  
NADER GHERMEZIAN  
Respondent  
Docket: T-254-19  
Applicant  
AND BETWEEN:  
THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL REVENUE  
and  
MARC VATURI  
Respondent  
Page: 2  
AND BETWEEN:  
AND BETWEEN:  
AND BETWEEN:  
AND BETWEEN:  
Docket: T-258-19  
Applicant  
THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL REVENUE  
and  
GHERFAM EQUITIES INC  
Respondent  
Docket: T-259-19  
Applicant  
THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL REVENUE  
and  
PAUL GHERMEZIAN  
Respondent  
Docket: T-261-19  
Applicant  
THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL REVENUE  
and  
RAPHAEL GHERMEZIAN  
Respondent  
Docket: T-262-19  
Page: 3  
THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL REVENUE  
Applicant  
and  
JOSHUA GHERMEZIAN  
Respondent  
JUDGMENT AND REASONS  
I.  
Overview  
[1]  
This decision relates to six applications by the Minister of National Revenue [the  
Minister], seeking compliance orders under s 231.7 of the Income Tax Act, RSC 1985, c 1 (5th  
Supp) [the Act].  
[2]  
The Respondents are five individuals, all members of the Ghermezian extended family,  
and a related corporation, Gherfam Equities Inc. [Gherfam]. Nader Ghermezian (the Respondent  
in Court file number T-252-19) and Raphael Ghermezian (the Respondent in Court file number  
T-261-19) are brothers. Joshua Ghermezian (the Respondent in Court file number T-262-19) is  
the son of Raphael Ghermezian, and Paul Ghermezian (the Respondent in Court file number T-  
259-19) is the nephew of Nader Ghermezian and Raphael Ghermezian. Marc Vaturi (the  
Respondent in Court file number T-254-19) is the son-in-law of Nader Ghermezian.  
Page: 4  
[3]  
Each of the Minister’s applications seeks an order compelling the relevant Respondent to  
provide documents and/or information previously sought by the Minister under s 231.1 and/or s  
231.2 of the Act.  
[4]  
These six applications were heard together, by videoconference employing the Zoom  
platform, on January 24 to 27, 2022. As they raise many common issues, these Reasons address  
all six applications.  
[5]  
As explained in greater detail in the Reasons below, these applications are granted,  
subject to the remaining steps I have outlined for applying my conclusions surrounding the  
Respondents’ success in some of their defence arguments to the development of the form of  
compliance order in each application.  
II.  
Background  
[6]  
First, a few words about nomenclature. As set out in more detail later in these Reasons,  
most of these applications rely on both s 231.1 and s 231.2 of the Act. The issues in these  
applications include disputes between the parties on the scope of the powers granted to the  
Minister under s 231.1 and s 231.2. For purposes of these Reasons, I will adopt the language  
employed by the Minister in her written submissions, referring to the invocation of s 231.1 as a  
“Request” and the invocation of s 231.2 as a “Requirement”. I note this is consistent with the  
language employed by Justice Fuhrer in Tellza Inc v Canada (National Revenue), 2021 FC 853  
[Tellza], in relation to the comparable provisions of the Excise Tax Act, RSC 1985, c E-15  
[ETA]). However, I emphasize these terms are adopted solely to enhance the readability of these  
Page: 5  
Reasons and are not intended to be terms of art or to suggest that a Request issued under s 231.1  
gives rise to less compulsion than a Requirement issued under s 231.2. Similarly, without  
intending to ascribe any technical significance to it, I will employ the term “Demands” to  
encompass generically both Requests and Requirements.  
[7]  
The Minister commenced each of these six applications by a Notice of Summary  
Application dated February 7, 2019. In each application, the Minister asserts that: she issued  
Requests and/or Requirements to the relevant Respondent requiring the provision of documents  
and/or information related to the administration or enforcement of the Act; the Respondent has  
failed to provide all such documentation and/or information; and the Respondent has not asserted  
any claim for solicitor-client-privilege in relation thereto. The Minister asserts that she has  
therefore met the statutory conditions for the Court to issue a compliance order under s 231.7 of  
the Act, ordering the Respondent to provide the outstanding documents and/or information.  
[8]  
In each application, the Minister has filed an Amended Notice of Summary Application  
dated April 7, 2021 [Amended Notice], which specified the particular Demands, or portions  
thereof, that the Minister considered to be still outstanding. In the course of the hearing, the  
Minister further clarified or refined her Demands in each application, in some cases further  
reducing the Demands or portions thereof for which she is seeking a compliance order.  
[9]  
In each application, the Minister relies upon an affidavit sworn in July 2019 by Andrew  
Bowe, who was, at the time, an International and Large Business Case Manager with the Canada  
Revenue Agency [CRA] and had conduct of the audit matters in relation to the Respondents. In  
Page: 6  
T-254-19 (with Mr. Vaturi as the Respondent), Mr. Bowe also affirmed a Supplementary  
Affidavit on April 7, 2021 [the Supplementary Affidavit]. The Respondents have cross-examined  
Mr. Bowe on his affidavits, and the relevant transcripts have been included in the record in each  
application. The Respondents have not otherwise filed any evidence in these proceedings.  
[10] In opposing these applications, the Respondents rely in part on arguments surrounding  
the admissibility of or, alternatively, the weight that should be afforded to Mr. Bowe’s evidence.  
In the proceedings related to Nader Ghermezian, Raphael Ghermezian, and Marc Vaturi, the  
Respondents had previously filed motions to strike Mr. Bowe’s affidavits and dismiss the  
applications. By Order dated December 15, 2021, Prothonotary Aalto adjourned these motions,  
concluding that the issues raised therein should be argued at the hearing of the applications. The  
parties presented their arguments on these issues at the commencement of the hearings on  
January 24, 2021. This decision will address those arguments.  
[11] The Respondents also raise a number of other issues in support of their position that the  
applications should be dismissed. Most of the issues are common to some or all of the  
applications, although there are also a small number of issues specific to individual applications.  
These Reasons will first address the common issues and identify any general conclusions that  
can be reached without individually canvassing each application, as well as apply those  
conclusions to the applications, to the extent it is possible to do so. I will then turn to the  
individual applications, applying the general conclusions to each application where I have not  
done so already and addressing any additional issues specific to each application.  
Page: 7  
III.  
Issues  
[12] The following issues, common to some or all of the applications, have been raised for the  
Court’s adjudication:  
A. Whether the affidavits of Andrew Bowe should be struck out or, in the  
alternative, afforded little weight;  
B. Whether the Respondents were required to provide documents and/or  
information in response to a Request issued under s 231.1 of the Act;  
C. Whether the individuals who issued the Demands were authorized to do so;  
D. Whether the Respondents were properly given notice of the Demands;  
E. Whether the Demands provided a reasonable time for compliance;  
F. Whether the Demands relate to one or more unnamed persons, requiring the  
Minister to seek prior judicial authorization under s 231.2(3) of the Act;  
G. Whether the Demands raise ambiguity as to whether their recipient is the same  
as the Respondent;  
H. Whether the Demands improperly sought the production of foreign-based  
information or documents within the meaning of s 231.6 of the Act;  
I. If the Court determines that any compliance orders should be issued, whether  
such orders should contain an exclusion for documents and information  
protected by solicitor-client privilege;  
Page: 8  
J. If the Court concludes that a compliance order should not be issued in relation  
to a portion of a Demand, whether the Court has the authority to sever that  
portion and issue an order in relation to the remainder of the Demand; and  
K. Whether certain Requirements were ineffective because the Respondents are  
not residents of Canada.  
IV.  
Analysis  
A. General Principles Regarding Compliance Orders Under s 231.7  
[13] Before turning to the individual issues, it is useful to identify some general principles  
relevant to applications under s 231.7 of the Act, the text of which reads as follows:  
Compliance order  
Ordonnance  
231.7 (1) On summary  
231.7 (1) Sur demande  
application by the Minister, a sommaire du ministre, un juge  
judge may, notwithstanding  
subsection 238(2), order a  
peut, malgré le paragraphe  
238(2), ordonner à une  
person to provide any access, personne de fournir l’accès,  
assistance, information or  
document sought by the  
Minister under section 231.1  
or 231.2 if the judge is  
satisfied that  
l’aide, les renseignements ou  
les documents que le ministre  
cherche à obtenir en vertu des  
articles 231.1 ou 231.2 s’il est  
convaincu de ce qui suit :  
(a) the person was  
a) la personne n’a pas  
fourni l’accès, l’aide, les  
renseignements ou les  
documents bien qu’elle en  
soit tenue par les articles  
231.1 ou 231.2;  
required under section  
231.1 or 231.2 to provide  
the access, assistance,  
information or document  
and did not do so; and  
(b) in the case of  
b) s’agissant de  
information or a  
document, the information  
renseignements ou de  
documents, le privilège  
Page: 9  
or document is not  
des communications entre  
client et avocat, au sens  
du paragraphe 232(1), ne  
peut être invoqué à leur  
égard.  
protected from disclosure  
by solicitor-client privilege  
(within the meaning of  
subsection 232(1)).  
Notice required  
Avis  
(2) An application under  
subsection (1) must not be  
heard before the end of five  
clear days from the day the  
(2) La demande n’est entendue  
qu’une fois écoulés cinq jours  
francs après signification d’un  
avis de la demande à la  
notice of application is served personne à l’égard de laquelle  
on the person against whom  
the order is sought.  
l’ordonnance est demandée.  
Judge may impose  
conditions  
Conditions  
(3) A judge making an order  
under subsection (1) may  
impose any conditions in  
respect of the order that the  
judge considers appropriate.  
(3) Le juge peut imposer, à  
l’égard de l’ordonnance, les  
conditions qu’il estime  
indiquées.  
Contempt of court  
Outrage  
(4) If a person fails or refuses (4) Quiconque refuse ou fait  
to comply with an order, a  
judge may find the person in  
contempt of court and the  
person is subject to the  
défaut de se conformer à une  
ordonnance peut être reconnu  
coupable d’outrage au  
tribunal; il est alors sujet aux  
processes and the punishments procédures et sanctions du  
of the court to which the judge tribunal l’ayant ainsi reconnu  
is appointed.  
coupable.  
Appeal  
Appel  
(5) An order by a judge under (5) L’ordonnance visée au  
subsection (1) may be  
appealed to a court having  
appellate jurisdiction over  
paragraphe (1) est susceptible  
d’appel devant le tribunal  
ayant compétence pour  
decisions of the court to which entendre les appels des  
the judge is appointed. An  
appeal does not suspend the  
décisions du tribunal ayant  
rendu l’ordonnance. Toutefois,  
execution of the order unless it l’appel n’a pas pour effet de  
is so ordered by a judge of the suspendre l’exécution de  
court to which the appeal is  
made.  
l’ordonnance, sauf ordonnance  
Page: 10  
contraire d’un juge du tribunal  
saisi de l’appel.  
[14] As is evident from s 231.7(1), the Minister’s recourse to a compliance order is premised  
on the Minister previously having sought access, assistance, information or documentation under  
ss 231.1 or 231.2. The text of those sections (which, together with other provisions considered in  
these Reasons, are set out in full in Appendix “A”), will be canvassed later in this decision. For  
present purposes, it is sufficient to identify that, in the context of Canada’s self-assessment  
system for the collection of income tax under the Act, ss 231.1 and 231.2 form part of the broad  
suite of powers that Parliament has conferred on the Minister to obtain information and/or  
documentation from taxpayers and third parties to verify self-assessments (see R v McKinlay  
Transport Ltd, [1990] 1 SCR 627, 68 DLR (4th) 568 [McKinlay] at para 18 (referencing s  
231(3), which was the predecessor to s 231.2(1)).  
[15] When a person who is subject to a demand under ss 231.1 or 231.2 does not comply with  
that demand, s 231.7 entitles the Minister to apply to the Federal Court for an order compelling  
compliance. Consistent with the language of s 231.7(1), the Federal Court of Appeal explained in  
Minister of National Revenue v Lee, 2016 FCA 53 [Lee] at para 6 that the Court must be satisfied  
of three points before granting a compliance order:  
i)  
The person against whom the order is sought was required under section 231.1  
or 231.2 of the Act to provide the access, assistance, information or  
documents sought by the Minister;  
ii) Although the person was required to provide the information or documents  
sought by the Minister, he or she did not do so; and,  
iii) The documents or information sought is not protected from disclosure by  
solicitor-client privilege as defined within the Act.  
Page: 11  
[16] The Respondents refer the Court to Minister of National Revenue v Derakhshani, 2009  
FCA 190 [Derakhshani], in which the Federal Court of Appeal rejected the Minister’s argument  
that, when presented with an application under s 231.2(3) of the Act, a judge has no discretion to  
reject the application if the conditions prescribed by that section are met (at paras 17-19). While  
that case involved an application under s 231.2(3) to authorize the Minister to a serve a  
requirement related to an unnamed person, I agree with the Respondents’ submission that the  
Court’s analysis of whether it retains discretion even where the statutory conditions are met  
usefully informs the interpretation of s 231.7 as well. Both sections require that the judge be  
satisfied that the statutory conditions for the application are met and provide the judge granting  
an order the authority to impose any conditions the judge considers appropriate. As these are the  
factors that the Court in Derakhshani took into account in identifying the existence of its  
discretion, I agree that judicially exercised discretion exists under s 231.7 as well.  
[17] Indeed, I do not understand the Minister to dispute this point in the case at hand. In  
support of her position on the “severance” issue (canvassed later in these Reasons), that the  
Court has the authority to issue an order in relation to a portion of a Demand or application, the  
Minister refers to the Court’s discretion to impose such conditions as it considers appropriate.  
[18] Because of the potentially serious consequences flowing from the failure to obey a  
compliance order, including fines and/or imprisonment, the jurisprudence explains that the Court  
should be satisfied that the statutory conditions of s 231.7 have been “clearly met” before  
exercising its discretion to grant an order (see Minister of National Revenue v Chamandy, 2014  
Page: 12  
FC 354 [Chamandy] at para 35; Canada (Minister of National Revenue) v SML Operations  
(Canada), 2003 FC 868 [SML Operations] at para 15).  
[19] The Respondents also rely on Derakhshani (at paras 16-17) to support their position that  
the use of the phrase “if the judge is satisfied” in s 231.7 imposes on the Minister an onus to  
adduce and prove all the facts required to satisfy the conditions for the issuance of the  
compliance order. In my view, Derakhshani does not stand for this proposition. Paragraphs 16  
and 17 rely on that phrase to conclude that the judge has discretion in an application under s  
231.7, but do not speak to which party bears the onus in such an application.  
[20] The Respondents also rely on this Court’s decision in Ghermezian v Canada (Attorney  
General), 2020 FC 1137 [Ghermezian] at paras 24-25, to support their position that the Minister  
bears the burden of proof. Again, that authority does not stand for the proposition that the  
Respondents advance. Ghermezian involved a number of applications for judicial review,  
brought by some of the same parties who are Respondents in the present applications,  
challenging a number of Requirements issued by the Minister under s 231.2(1) of the Act. Those  
applicants relied on Capital Vision Inc v Minister of National Revenue, 2002 FCT 1317 [Capital  
Vision] to support their position that the Minister bore the burden of proving her compliance with  
s 231.2(1). This Court rejected that contention, observing that Capital Vision held that the  
Minister must comply with the Act but did not state a conclusion on the applicable burden of  
proof.  
Page: 13  
[21] That said, I do not understand the Minister to dispute that, as the party seeking a  
compliance order under s 231.7, she has the burden of satisfying the statutory conditions as set  
out in Lee, although she submits that whether the requested material is privileged is relevant to  
the analysis only if a respondent actually asserts a claim of privilege (see Lee at para 9). I accept  
that the overall legal burden in the application resides with the Minister, and I concur that  
privilege factors into the analysis only if raised by a respondent, who then bears the burden on  
that issue (see Redhead Equipment Ltd v Canada (Attorney General), 2016 SKCA 115 at para  
31; Minister of National Revenue v Atlas Tube Canada ULC, 2018 FC 1086 at para 32).  
[22] However, the location of the burden becomes more nuanced in connection with particular  
defence arguments raised by the Respondents in these applications. Which party bears the  
applicable burden is potentially relevant to several of the issues raised in the Respondents’  
arguments, including: (a) authority to issue the Demands; (b) proper notice of the Demands to  
the Respondents; (c) the reasonableness of the time given for compliance with the Demands; and  
(d) whether the Demands improperly sought the production of foreign-based material. The  
Respondents submit that the Minister bears the burden on all the issues. In contrast, the Minister  
urges the Court to be guided by a general evidentiary principle that the party who alleges a  
proposition, and with whom the evidence is likely to reside, bears the applicable burden. Where  
necessary, I will return to the question of the burden of proof when considering the individual  
issues.  
B. Whether the affidavits of Andrew Bowe should be struck out or, in the  
alternative, afforded little weight  
Page: 14  
[23] The Respondents in T-252-19 (Nader Ghermezian), T-254-19 (Marc Vaturi) and T-261-  
19 (Raphael Ghermezian) argue that the Court should strike the affidavits of the Minister’s  
deponent, Andrew Bowe, in each of these applications. Relying on the fact that the Minister  
bears the overall legal burden in these applications, the Respondents submit that, without these  
affidavits to support these three applications, the Court should dismiss these applications in full.  
In connection with other applications, the Respondents submit that Mr. Bowe’s evidence should  
be afforded little or no weight.  
[24] The Respondents’ principal arguments in support of these positions fall broadly into two  
categories. First, they submit that Mr. Bowe’s affidavits are outdated, incomplete and unreliable.  
Second, they submit that Mr. Bowe’s affidavits offend the hearsay rule by providing evidence as  
to facts that are outside his personal knowledge. However, particular issues are also raised with  
respect to Mr. Bowe’s Supplementary Affidavit in T-254-19. I will begin my analysis with the  
Supplementary Affidavit.  
(1) Supplementary Affidavit in T-254-19 (MNR v Marc Vaturi)  
[25] The Supplementary Affidavit is a relatively brief document, affirmed on April 7, 2021,  
which appears intended to update the evidence provided by Mr. Bowe in his original affidavit in  
T-254-19, sworn on July 27, 2019. Mr. Bowe states that, subsequent to service of the July 27,  
2019 affidavit, CRA received information and documentation from Mr. Vaturi and/or his  
representatives. Mr. Bowe then proceeds to identify, through attached exhibits, the information  
and documentation received and the items from the relevant Demands that CRA considered to be  
outstanding.  
Page: 15  
[26] The Respondent’s counsel refers to what he characterizes as two “bombshells” revealed  
through cross-examination of Mr. Bowe, conducted on November 17 and 18, 2021. First, in  
relation to a Demand identified as A-MV-0128, the Respondent notes Mr. Bowe’s evidence that,  
to the date of the Supplementary Affidavit, Mr. Vaturi had not provided the outstanding  
information and/or documentation identified in follow-up correspondence sent by CRA on  
March 10, 2020. In the course of cross-examination, Respondent’s counsel pointed out that Mr.  
Vaturi had, in fact, provided a response exceeding 150 pages on November 4, 2020.  
[27] The November 4, 2020 response was addressed to Mr. Bowe and copied to the Minister’s  
counsel. When presented with this response on the first day of his cross-examination, Mr. Bowe  
stated he did not recall seeing it and explained that he was transitioning out of his role at the  
relevant time. The Minister’s counsel subsequently investigated this issue and confirmed, on the  
second day of cross-examination, that Mr. Vaturi’s submission had been received but was  
misfiled and therefore missed in the preparation of Mr. Bowe’s Supplementary Affidavit. Both  
Mr. Bowe and the Minister’s counsel confirmed that they were not able to state whether there  
was still information or documentation outstanding in relation to A-MV-0128. The Minister  
subsequently withdrew her request for a compliance order with respect to this Demand.  
[28] The Respondent submits that these events demonstrate that Mr. Bowe affirmed the  
Supplementary Affidavit, attesting to facts essential to the Minister’s application, without  
knowing, or even making any effort to confirm, whether they were true. Relying on Canada  
(Board of Internal Economy) v Canada (Attorney General), 2017 FCA 43 [Board of Internal  
Page: 16  
Economy] at para 30, the Respondent submits that the affidavit should be struck, because it is  
“…so clearly out of bounds … that it ought to be stopped in its tracks.”  
[29] I find little merit to the Respondent’s position that the affidavit should be struck. The  
evidence suggests that Mr. Bowe was unaware of the November 4, 2020 submission due to an  
administrative error. However, even if I were to ascribe to Mr. Bowe a higher level of culpability  
in connection with this error, I would find no basis to strike the Supplementary Affidavit as  
inadmissible. Certainly, this error could cast doubt on the reliability of his evidence and, if there  
was a dispute as to whether Mr. Vaturi had submitted a particular document to CRA, I might  
therefore afford more weight to evidence adduced by the Respondent to establish the submission.  
However, there is no dispute of that sort raised in this application. Following her investigations,  
the Minister’s counsel confirmed that the November 4, 2020 submission had been overlooked,  
and the Minister subsequently withdrew her request for a compliance order in connection with  
the relevant Demand.  
[30] I agree with the Minister’s submission that Board of Internal Economy is distinguishable,  
as the affidavit that was struck in that case was found inadmissible because it amounted to a legal  
opinion on Canadian law.  
[31] The second issue that the Respondent raises in connection with the Supplementary  
Affidavit surrounds Mr. Bowe’s explanation during his cross-examination that, notwithstanding  
that the affidavit was affirmed in April 2021, it was prepared in June 2020, before he transitioned  
out of his role in November 2020. Because Mr. Bowe no longer had current personal knowledge  
Page: 17  
of CRA’s audit of Mr. Vaturi when he affirmed the Supplementary Affidavit, the Respondent  
again argues that it should be struck.  
[32] In response to this argument, the Minister explains that she was required to present a  
motion seeking an order allowing the filing of the Supplementary Affidavit. The Court issued the  
resulting Order on March 30, 2021, granting the motion and permitting the filing of the affidavit.  
It was then filed in largely the same form as presented in the motion and authorized by the  
Order—which included an appendix setting out the form of the Supplementary Affidavit—  
notwithstanding that several months had passed. The Respondent takes issue with this  
explanation, noting that the introductory paragraphs of the affidavit were updated to explain the  
change in Mr. Bowe’s role.  
[33] Again, I find little merit to the Respondent’s argument that the Supplementary Affidavit  
is inadmissible and should be struck. I accept that the affidavit is misleading, as it amounts to  
testimony by Mr. Bowe that, other than as identified in the updates set out in the affidavit, the  
information and documentation sought in the Demands issued to Mr. Vaturi was still outstanding  
as of April 2021. It appears to have been Mr. Bowe’s intention that his testimony to that effect  
apply as of June 2020 when the affidavit was prepared, but the affidavit does not read that way.  
If, in his cross-examination of Mr. Bowe, the Respondent’s counsel had not identified this  
irregularity, the Court could have been misled in relying on the Supplementary Affidavit. The  
benefit of his identification of this error obviously accrues to the Respondent and, to the extent  
there was a dispute between the parties on whether Mr. Vaturi had submitted additional  
documentation between June 2020 and April 2021, the Supplementary Affidavit would not assist  
Page: 18  
the Minister. However, there was no contention that Mr. Vaturi made additional submissions  
during this period and, in any event, these circumstances do not raise a basis for the Court to find  
the Supplementary Affidavit inadmissible.  
(2) Staleness of Affidavits  
[34] Turning to the Respondents’ principal inadmissibility arguments, related to the main  
affidavits sworn by Mr. Bowe in each of T-252-19, T-254-19 and T-261-19, they submit first  
that these affidavits are out of date and should be struck as inadmissible due to their staleness. As  
canvassed by the Respondents’ counsel in cross-examination, it is clear that (other than the  
Supplementary Affidavit in T-254-19) Mr. Bowe did not prepare additional affidavits to update  
his evidence after the original affidavits were sworn on July 27, 2019. Noting that  
noncompliance with the Minister’s Demands is one of the statutory conditions for issuance of  
compliance order under s 237.1(1), the Respondents submit that Mr. Bowe’s affidavits should be  
struck because they are stale. They rely on Fabrikant v Canada, 2017 FC 1115 [Fabrikant], in  
support of their argument.  
[35] Fabrikant involved an appeal of a prothonotary’s decision, which had refused to waive  
the Court’s filing fee for a self-represented vexatious litigant wishing to file an application for  
judicial review. The prothonotary dismissed the motion for waiver of the fee on the grounds that  
the applicant’s evidence of impecuniosity was prima facie deficient, being based on an affidavit  
nearly one year old. Justice Harrington upheld the prothonotary’s decision on several grounds,  
including that a motion should be accompanied by a current affidavit and that the prothonotary  
was entitled to reject the applicant’s affidavit as stale-dated (at paras 23-24).  
Page: 19  
[36] I agree with the Minister’s response that Fabrikant does not express a general principle  
that the passage of time alone stale dates affidavits, requiring them to be struck. Indeed, it is not  
clear from Fabrikant that either the prothonotary or Justice Harrington considered the affidavit to  
be inadmissible, as opposed to concluding that, because it was outdated, the evidence simply did  
not support the relief requested.  
[37] In the case at hand, the fact that Mr. Bowe did not file updated evidence does not make  
his original evidence inadmissible. Rather, the Court must consider whether Mr. Bowe’s  
evidence, including the date as of which it speaks, supports issuance of the requested compliance  
orders. In that respect, it is clear from the records before the Court, including the Amended  
Notices, that circumstances have evolved since Mr. Bowe swore his affidavits on July 27, 2019.  
The Respondents argue that it is improper for the Minister to simply amend her Notices of  
Summary Application, so as to reduce the scope of the Demands to take into account additional  
documentation or information that has been received, without filing updated evidence reflecting  
the receipt of that material.  
[38] I find nothing problematic in the Minister’s approach. Particularly with the significant  
scope of the Demands at issue in the present applications, and the length of time that has passed  
in bringing these applications to a hearing, it is perhaps not surprising that that the Minister has  
received additional material in response to certain Demands. In such circumstances, it is  
appropriate for the Minister to reduce the scope of the applications. If, for that reason or others,  
the Minister decides to abandon certain Demands or portions thereof, I see no basis for a strict  
requirement to file updated evidence explaining the reason for the reduction in scope.  
Page: 20  
[39] Of course, depending on the particular issues and supporting evidentiary basis raised by a  
respondent to a compliance application, the Minister may be unable to succeed without updated  
evidence. For instance, if the respondent had adduced evidence that particular responses had  
been provided subsequent to the filing of the compliance application, the Minister may be unable  
to resist that assertion without additional updated evidence of her own. However, I do not  
understand any of the Respondents’ arguments in these applications to be of that nature. As will  
be canvassed later in these Reasons, Mr. Vaturi argues in T-254-19 that he has fully complied  
with some of the outstanding Demands. However, the Court’s analysis of that argument involves  
consideration of the details of the relevant Demands and of the material Mr. Vaturi provided in  
response. That argument does not engage a dispute as to whether certain submissions were  
actually made or received after the Minister filed her application and therefore will not turn on  
the absence of updated affidavit evidence.  
[40] In each of the six applications before the Court, Mr. Bowe provided evidence as of July  
26, 2019, as to the then outstanding Demands, and swore that the Respondent had not provided  
the information and documents responsive to those Demands. As will be explained immediately  
below in my analysis of the Respondents’ arguments surrounding hearsay in Mr. Bowe’s  
affidavits, any conflict in the evidence including meaningful challenge of Mr. Bowe’s testimony  
would require the Court to consider the weight to be afforded to Mr. Bowe’s evidence. However,  
with the exception of the November 2020 submission identified earlier in these Reasons, the  
Respondents have not adduced evidence, through cross-examination of Mr. Bowe or otherwise,  
that they have provided responses to the Demands and portions thereof that the Minister is  
presently pursuing that have not been taken into account. The November 2020 submission  
Page: 21  
identified through cross-examination was addressed through the Minister’s subsequent  
withdrawal of the relevant Demand.  
[41] As previously noted, noncompliance with the Minister’s Demands is one of the statutory  
conditions for issuance of compliance order under s 237.1(1), and the Minister bears the onus of  
proof on this condition. However, in the absence of any conflicting evidence, I consider Mr.  
Bowe’s evidence sufficient to meet this onus, notwithstanding that it has not been updated.  
(3) Hearsay  
[42] The Respondents’ second argument in relation to Mr. Bowe’s original affidavits  
challenges their admissibility, or alternatively their weight, based on hearsay contained therein.  
[43] The first paragraph of each of these affidavits is materially identical, reading as follows:  
1. I am an International and Large Business Case Manager with  
the Canada Revenue Agency (“CRA”), in the Edmonton Tax  
Services Office. In the normal course of my duties I have conduct  
of audit matters in respect of the Respondent. I have reviewed the  
files and have personal knowledge of the matters hereinafter  
deposed to, save and except that which is stated to be based on  
information and belief, and where so stated, I verily believe it to be  
true.  
[44] In his cross-examination in each of T-252-19, T-254-19 and T-261-19, Mr. Bowe  
admitted that a large number of paragraphs in his affidavit contained facts that were not based on  
his personal knowledge. The Respondents also submit, correctly in my view, that in most cases  
the affidavits do not state that these paragraphs are based on information and belief. In his cross-  
Page: 22  
examination in T-252-19 (Nader Ghermezian), Mr. Bowe confirmed that, in some cases, his  
affidavit fails to identify which facts are based and information and belief.  
[45] The Respondents therefore argue that the affidavits should be struck as inadmissible, on  
the basis that they offend Rule 81 of the Federal Courts Rules, SOR/98-106, and, more  
generally, include substantial amounts of inadmissible hearsay. Rule 81 provides as follows:  
Content of affidavits  
Contenu  
81 (1) Affidavits shall be  
confined to facts within the  
deponent’s personal  
81 (1) Les affidavits se  
limitent aux faits dont le  
déclarant a une connaissance  
knowledge except on motions, personnelle, sauf s’ils sont  
other than motions for  
summary judgment or  
summary trial, in which  
statements as to the  
deponent’s belief, with the  
grounds for it, may be  
included.  
présentés à l’appui d’une  
requête – autre qu’une requête  
en jugement sommaire ou en  
procès sommaire – auquel cas  
ils peuvent contenir des  
déclarations fondées sur ce  
que le déclarant croit être les  
faits, avec motifs à l’appui.  
Affidavits on belief  
Poids de l’affidavit  
(2) Where an affidavit is made (2) Lorsqu’un affidavit  
on belief, an adverse inference contient des déclarations  
may be drawn from the failure fondées sur ce que croit le  
of a party to provide evidence déclarant, le fait de ne pas  
of persons having personal  
knowledge of material facts.  
offrir le témoignage de  
personnes ayant une  
connaissance personnelle des  
faits substantiels peut donner  
lieu à des conclusions  
défavorables.  
[46] In support of the inadmissibility of hearsay evidence, the Respondents rely on the  
following explanation in the recent decision by the Federal Court of Appeal in Canada (Attorney  
General) v Iris Technologies Inc, 2021 FCA 223 [Iris Technologies] at para 32:  
Page: 23  
32. The rules of evidence, both substantive and procedural,  
matter. They matter because they are the foundation of the truth-  
seeking role of the courts. They are also the foundation of fairness  
in the adjudicative process. They are not to be overlooked, and  
there are consequences if they are. Here, the affidavit was wafer  
thin. It did not comply with the Ares v. Venner exception to the  
hearsay rule, it did not measure up to the statutory exception  
specifically designed to facilitate the introduction of documents in  
the possession of the CRA and no notice was given under the  
Canada Evidence Act of an intention to rely on business records.  
Quite apart from the question of the admissibility of evidence in  
any individual case, courts have an over-arching concern to ensure  
that proceedings unfold in accordance with established laws of  
evidence and procedure. This is the foundation of fairness. This  
factor militates against admission of the affidavit.  
[47] In Iris Technologies, the Federal Court of Appeal ultimately held that the affidavit at  
issue was admissible under the common law exception to the hearsay rule based on reliability  
and necessity (at para 33). In the case at hand, the Minister does not rely on that particular  
exception but rather upon what it refers to as the corporate exception to the hearsay rule. The  
Minister refers the Court to Twentieth Century Fox Home Entertainment Canada Limited v  
Canada (Attorney General), 2012 FC 823 [Twentieth Century Fox], which considered the  
admissibility of an affidavit of a CRA official, filed in response to a judicial review of a decision  
under the ETA. Justice Phelan accepted into evidence the hearsay components of the affidavit,  
holding that the official’s evidence was in the nature of “corporate” evidence, in that he acted in  
a supervisory capacity, was responsible for his subordinates, and was therefore in a position to  
know if the facts in his affidavit were true (at paras 23, 26). Twentieth Century Fox was affirmed  
on appeal (2013 FCA 25), although without any commentary on this particular issue.  
[48] Subsequently, in O’Grady v Canada (Attorney General), 2016 FC 9 [O’Grady], Justice  
LeBlanc followed the approach of Twentieth Century Fox to the admissibility of hearsay  
Page: 24  
evidence, concluding that the affiant in O’Grady, a Director General with Statistics Canada, was,  
based on her sphere of responsibility, in a position to know that the facts sworn in her affidavit  
were true (at para 19). For similar reasons, Justice LeBlanc also concluded that the affiant was in  
a position to swear the affidavit without providing evidence of the persons having personal  
knowledge of the material facts (at para 20). The Court declined to draw an adverse inference  
under Rule 81(2) and concluded that whether the respondent had provided the best evidence  
went to the weight to be accorded to the affidavit by the judge on the hearing of the application  
(at para 22).  
[49] On appeal, in O’Grady v. Canada (Attorney General), 2016 FCA 221, the Federal Court  
of Appeal again relied on Twentieth Century Fox and found no error in Justice LeBlanc’s  
decision that the affidavit evidence was admissible, because the affiant, by virtue of her  
responsibilities in the Government of Canada, was in a position to depose to the matters in  
question without necessarily having personal knowledge (at para 10).  
[50] In support of her reliance on this jurisprudence, the Minister refers to Mr. Bowe’s  
affidavit and cross-examination evidence. In each of his affidavits, he swore that he was  
employed as an International and Large Business Case Manager with CRA. In his cross-  
examination in T-252-19 (Nader Ghermezian), he explained that this role involved the duties of a  
team leader in CRA’s Audit and Compliance Programs Branch. In his cross-examination in T-  
261-19 (Raphael Ghermezian), in the context of questioning about the mailing by a student  
employee of a particular Requirement, Mr. Bowe described himself as the supervisor of the  
employee, as the individual with the conduct of the audit, and as therefore possessing knowledge  
Page: 25  
of what happened within the audit file. In T-254-19 (Marc Vaturi), when questioned about  
Requirement A-NG-0127, addressed to Mr. Vaturi on June 27, 2018 under the signature of an  
individual named John Harasymchuk, Mr. Bowes referred to the Requirement being issued on  
his recommendation as the case manager with responsibility for the audit.  
[51] In my view, this evidence is sufficient to support the Minister’s reliance on the above  
jurisprudence for the admissibility of Mr. Bowe’s affidavits under the corporate exception.  
[52] In arriving at this conclusion, I have considered the Respondents’ submission that this  
case law supports only the ability of a manager to testify about tasks performed by subordinates.  
I disagree that the principle is as limited as the Respondents suggest. I note that, in Coldwater  
First Nation v. Canada (Attorney General), 2019 FCA 292 [Coldwater First Nation], the Federal  
Court of Appeal explained that evidence is admissible from departmental supervisors or similar  
individuals about the activities of their department, the conduct of their employees, and events  
taking place in relation to the department, where their knowledge is sufficiently direct and  
personal, without having to be directly involved in the conduct, activities, and events (at para  
42).  
[53] Coldwater First Nation also explains that there is no general “department head”  
exception to hearsay that would permit a departmental supervisor to introduce particular  
statements made by departmental personnel for the truth of their contents (at para 42). In that  
context, I note the Respondents’ submission that this principle does not permit Mr. Bowe to  
provide testimony about the various dealings of members of the Ghermezian family. However, I  
Page: 26  
find compelling the Minister’s submission that, in large measure, Mr. Bowe’s affidavits serve to  
set out his understanding of facts that provide relevant contextual background to the issuance of  
the Demands. As the Minister is in some respects a stranger to these facts, which are known  
principally to the Respondents themselves, CRA’s understanding of such facts may be of limited  
significance to the outcome of these applications.  
[54] Of course, some of the facts set out in Mr. Bowe’s affidavits could be determinative of  
particular issues in these applications. For instance, as will be canvassed later in these Reasons,  
the Respondents dispute whether the Demands were properly served upon them. Mr. Bowe’s  
evidence explaining how CRA sent the Demands to the Respondents will be significant to the  
outcome of this issue. However, his evidence on this issue of falls well within the principle that a  
manager can testify to tasks performed by employees.  
[55] Mr. Bowe’s evidence as to particular relationships among members of the Ghermezian  
family or entities in which they are interested, or their respective business dealings, does not  
necessarily have the same significance. As the Minister submits, this evidence may provide  
context that assists the Court in understanding the background to the audits underlying the  
Demands and in understanding the Demands themselves. However, if the understanding of  
certain background facts set out in Mr. Bowe’s affidavit were incorrect, this would not  
necessarily invalidate the Demand or a related application for a compliance order. Indeed,  
Demands represent a means of obtaining information or documentation from the Respondents,  
who are the best source of material that would enable CRA to either verify or change its  
understanding.  
Page: 27  
[56] The Respondents’ arguments in support of their efforts to strike Mr. Bowe’s affidavit  
challenge a large number of paragraphs, without identifying particular uses by the Minister of the  
evidence in those paragraphs that would offend the distinction identified in Coldwater First  
Nation. In the absence of such submissions, I find no basis to conclude that the affidavits, or  
particular portions thereof, are inadmissible as adduced for a hearsay purpose outside the scope  
of the jurisprudence upon which the Minister relies. Of course, the absence of direct and personal  
knowledge on the part of Mr. Bowe could affect the weight to be afforded to his evidence,  
particularly in the context of any compelling conflicting evidence or meaningful challenge to his  
testimony in cross-examination. However, any such determinations as to weight should be made,  
in relation to particular components of Mr. Bowe’s evidence upon which the Minister relies, in  
analyzing the individual issues in the applications.  
C. Whether the Respondents were required to provide documents and/or  
information in response to a Request issued under s 231.1 of the Act  
[57] One of the principal issues raised by the Respondents, which relates to most of the  
applications, involves the proper statutory interpretation of s 231.1(1) of the Act and the  
particular authority it affords to the Minister in her efforts to obtain information and  
documentation from the Respondents. As will be explained in more detail below, the  
Respondents submit that the Minister has conflated aspects of the authority provided by ss  
231.1(1) and 231.2(1). The Respondents argue that many or all of the Requests purportedly  
issued under s 231.1(1) sought information and/or documentation that the Minister was  
authorized to compel only through a Requirement issued under s 231.2(1). The Requests do not  
comply with certain technical requirements of s 231.2(1), and the Minister does not seek to rely  
Page: 28  
upon s 231.2(1) in support of those Requests. Therefore, the Respondents argue that the Requests  
are invalid and cannot support the issuance of a compliance order under s 231.7.  
[58] As a starting point, the Respondents again emphasize the Minister’s burden to satisfy the  
statutory conditions under s 231.7, one of which is that the person against whom a compliance  
order is sought was required under either s 231.1 or 231.2 to provide the access, assistance,  
information or documents sought by the Minister. The Respondents submit that, if a Request  
falls outside the authority provided by s 231.1, then the recipient was not required to comply, the  
statutory condition is not met, and a compliance order cannot be issued in relation to that  
Request. I find no basis to disagree with this aspect of the Respondents’ argument.  
[59] I therefore turn to the particular bases on which the Respondents argue that Requests are  
not authorized by s 231.1(1). Later in these Reasons, I will address other arguments surrounding  
limitations on the Minister’s authority to issue Requirements under 231.2(1) related to unnamed  
persons and foreign-based information. However, for purposes of the present issue, the  
Respondents accept that, through a Requirement properly issued and served under s 231.2(1), the  
Minister is authorized, for any purpose related to the administration or enforcement of the Act, to  
require any person to provide any information or document. In contrast, the Respondents submit  
that s 231.1(1) affords the Minister only an inspection power, i.e., authority (again, for any  
purpose related to the administration or enforcement of the Act) to attend at the premises of a  
taxpayer or other person to inspect books and records or other documents. The Respondents  
argue that s 231.1(1) does not grant the Minister power comparable to s 231.2(1), either to: (a)  
compel provision of documents outside the context of an inspection; or (b) compel the provision  
Page: 29  
of information other than information about the location or provenance of documentation sought  
in the context of an inspection.  
[60] As suggested by this explanation of the Respondents’ argument, there are two aspects to  
their position, both of which they say are offended by the Requests. First, the Respondents  
submit that, while an “authorized person” (the meaning of which will be canvassed later in these  
Reasons) can rely upon s 231.1(1) to enter business premises and inspect documents that are kept  
there, that section provides no authority for the authorized person to issue a written demand  
compelling the provision of such documents. Second, the Respondents submit that s 231.1(1)  
relates only to pre-existing documentation and does not authorize issuance of a written demand  
compelling the recipient to answer questions or otherwise provide substantive (but previously  
undocumented) information relevant to a taxpayer’s tax position. The Minister disputes both  
aspects of the Respondents’ position, arguing that there is overlap in the powers afforded by ss  
231.1 and 231.2 and that the Requests were all validly issued under s 231.1(1). In particular, the  
Minister relies on s 231.1(1)(a) as authority for the Requests.  
[61] While there is some overlap in the parties’ arguments in relation to these two aspects of  
this issue, and I am conscious that the legislation must be interpreted holistically, in my view the  
required analysis can be most easily explained by addressing these aspects individually. I will  
first consider the question whether s 231.1(1)(a) authorizes the compulsion of documentation  
through a written request, outside the context of a physical attendance at premises where an  
inspection is being conducted.  
(1) Compulsion of Documents  
Page: 30  
[62] As this issue is one of statutory interpretation, the outcome must be governed by the  
modern approach to statutory interpretation, which requires that the words of the statute be read  
in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense, harmoniously with the  
scheme of the statute, the object of the statute, and the intention of Parliament. This approach  
involves a textual, contextual and purposive analysis to find a meaning that is harmonious with  
the statute as a whole (see Canada Trustco Mortgage Co v Canada, 2005 SCC 54 at paras 10-  
11).  
[63] Starting with the text of the statutory provision at issue, described as the point of  
departure for any interpretive exercise (see eBay Canada Ltd v MNR, 2008 FCA 348 [eBay] at  
para 32), s 231.1(1) reads as follows:  
Inspections  
Enquêtes  
231.1 (1) An authorized  
231.1 (1) Une personne  
person may, at all reasonable  
autorisée peut, à tout moment  
times, for any purpose related raisonnable, pour l’application  
to the administration or  
enforcement of this Act,  
et l’exécution de la présente  
loi, à la fois :  
(a) inspect, audit or  
a) inspecter, vérifier ou  
examiner les livres et  
registres d’un  
contribuable ainsi que  
tous documents du  
contribuable ou d’une  
autre personne qui se  
rapportent ou peuvent se  
rapporter soit aux  
renseignements qui  
figurent dans les livres ou  
registres du contribuable  
ou qui devraient y figurer,  
soit à tout montant  
examine the books and  
records of a taxpayer and  
any document of the  
taxpayer or of any other  
person that relates or may  
relate to the information  
that is or should be in the  
books or records of the  
taxpayer or to any amount  
payable by the taxpayer  
under this Act, and  
payable par le  
Page: 31  
contribuable en vertu de  
la présente loi;  
(b) examine property in an  
inventory of a taxpayer and  
any property or process of,  
or matter relating to, the  
taxpayer or any other  
person, an examination of  
which may assist the  
authorized person in  
b) examiner les biens à  
porter à l’inventaire d’un  
contribuable, ainsi que tout  
bien ou tout procédé du  
contribuable ou d’une autre  
personne ou toute matière  
concernant l’un ou l’autre  
dont l’examen peut aider la  
personne autorisée à établir  
l’exactitude de l’inventaire  
du contribuable ou à  
determining the accuracy of  
the inventory of the  
taxpayer or in ascertaining  
the information that is or  
should be in the books or  
records of the taxpayer or  
any amount payable by the  
taxpayer under this Act,  
contrôler soit les  
renseignements qui figurent  
dans les livres ou registres  
du contribuable ou qui  
devraient y figurer, soit tout  
montant payable par le  
contribuable en vertu de la  
présente loi;  
and for those purposes the  
authorized person may  
à ces fins, la personne  
autorisée peut :  
(c) subject to subsection  
231.1(2), enter into any  
premises or place where  
any business is carried on,  
any property is kept,  
anything is done in  
connection with any  
business or any books or  
records are or should be  
kept,  
c) sous réserve du  
paragraphe (2), pénétrer  
dans un lieu où est  
exploitée une entreprise,  
est gardé un bien, est faite  
une chose en rapport avec  
une entreprise ou sont  
tenus ou devraient l’être  
des livres ou registres;  
(d) and require the owner  
or manager of the  
d) requérir le propriétaire,  
ou la personne ayant la  
gestion, du bien ou de  
l’entreprise ainsi que  
toute autre personne  
présente sur les lieux de  
lui fournir toute l’aide  
raisonnable et de  
property or business and  
any other person on the  
premises or place to give  
the authorized person all  
reasonable assistance and  
to answer all proper  
questions relating to the  
administration or  
répondre à toutes les  
questions pertinentes à  
Page: 32  
enforcement of this Act  
and, for that purpose,  
require the owner or  
manager to attend at the  
premises or place with the  
authorized person.  
l’application et  
l’exécution de la présente  
loi et, à cette fin, requérir  
le propriétaire, ou la  
personne ayant la gestion,  
de l’accompagner sur les  
lieux.  
[64] Focusing on this language, the Respondents emphasize that s 231.1(1)(a), upon which the  
Minister relies, empowers an authorized person to “inspect, audit or examine…” certain books,  
records and other documents. The mid-amble in s 231.1(1) then states that “…for those  
purposes…”, meaning the purposes set out in the preceding paragraphs including the right to  
inspect, audit or examine, the authorized person is given additional powers under ss 231.1(1)(c)  
and (d). Section 231.1(1)(c) entitles the authorized person to enter certain premises or places  
where business is carried on or where property, books or records are kept. Section 231.1(1)(d)  
requires the owner or manager of the property or business and any other persons at the premises  
or place to give the authorized person assistance and answer questions. For that purpose, s  
231.1(1)(d) also requires that the owner or manager attend at the premises or place with the  
authorized person.  
[65] Against that backdrop, the Respondents emphasize that the only obligation expressly  
imposed by the language of s 231.1(1) is found in s 231.1(1)(d), where the use of the word  
“require” mandates the provision of assistance, answering of questions, and attendance at the  
premises or place with the authorized person. There is no express obligation imposed upon a  
taxpayer or any other person to provide documents pursuant to a written demand in the nature of  
the Requests.  
Page: 33  
[66] The Respondents also note the reference, in the introductory language of s 231.1(1), to  
the powers of that section being exercisable “at all reasonable times,” which they submit is  
consistent with an inspection power but not a power to issue a written demand.  
[67] Turning to context, the Respondents’ argument compares s 231.1(1) to s 231.2(1), which  
reads as follows:  
Requirement to provide  
documents or information  
Production de documents ou  
fourniture de  
renseignements  
231.2 (1) Notwithstanding any 231.2 (1) Malgré les autres  
other provision of this Act, the dispositions de la présente loi,  
Minister may, subject to  
subsection (2), for any  
purpose related to the  
le ministre peut, sous réserve  
du paragraphe (2) et, pour  
l’application ou l’exécution de  
administration or enforcement la présente loi (y compris la  
of this Act (including the  
collection of any amount  
perception d’un montant  
payable par une personne en  
payable under this Act by any vertu de la présente loi), d’un  
person), of a listed accord international désigné  
international agreement or, for ou d’un traité fiscal conclu  
greater certainty, of a tax  
treaty with another country,  
avec un autre pays, par avis  
signifié à personne ou envoyé  
by notice served personally or par courrier recommandé ou  
by registered or certified mail, certifié, exiger d’une  
require that any person  
provide, within such  
reasonable time as is  
stipulated in the notice,  
personne, dans le délai  
raisonnable que précise l’avis  
:
(a) any information or  
additional information,  
including a return of  
income or a  
a) qu’elle fournisse tout  
renseignement ou tout  
renseignement  
supplémentaire, y  
compris une déclaration  
de revenu ou une  
déclaration  
supplementary return; or  
supplémentaire;  
Page: 34  
(b) any document.  
b) qu’elle produise des  
documents.  
[68] Section 231.2(1) expressly empowers the Minister, for purposes including those related  
to the administration or enforcement of the Act, to require any person to provide any information  
or any document. Unlike s 231.1(1), this language expressly imposes such an obligation upon the  
recipient of a Requirement under s 231.2(1). The Respondents submit this comparison suggests  
that, where Parliament intends to require a person to provide a document, it does so expressly  
and not by implication.  
[69] The Respondents also observe that the Minister’s power in s 231.2(1) is subject to a  
number of express limitations. As will be canvassed in more detail in relation to other issues later  
in these Reasons, these limitations on the Minister’s power include that it: (a) may be exercised  
only by the Minister (or a delegate duly authorized under s 220(2.01)); (b) cannot be exercised in  
relation to unnamed persons without prior judicial authorization; and (c) may be exercised only  
through a notice which specifies a reasonable time for compliance. The Respondents refer to  
these limitations as “guardrails” intended to protect taxpayers and other recipients of  
requirements issued under s 231.2(1). They submit that the express but somewhat circumscribed  
power to demand documentation and information under s 231.2(1), and the absence of similar  
guardrails in s 231.1(1), suggest that s 231.1(1) is not intended to authorize the issuance of  
demands in the same manner as s 231.2(1).  
[70] I note the Minister’s reliance on Redeemer Foundation v Canada (National Revenue),  
2008 SCC 46 [Redeemer], in which the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada rejected a  
Page: 35  
somewhat similar argument. There, the Court found that the limitation in s 231.2, preventing the  
Minister from obtaining information about unnamed persons without judicial authorization, did  
not prohibit the Minister from seeking the same information under s 231.1 (at paras 14-15).  
Nevertheless, in my view, there is logic to the Respondents’ submissions based on the text and  
context of the statutory provisions in issue and, in the absence of a purposive analysis, I might be  
persuaded by the Respondents’ arguments.  
[71] However, as emphasized by the Minister, eBay explains the importance of statutory  
interpretation examining the purpose of the provision in question and the statute as a whole so  
that, whenever possible, the text of the statute is interpreted in a manner which furthers that  
purpose (at para 32). In Minister of National Revenue v Cameco Corporation, 2019 FCA 67  
[Cameco], one of the leading authorities on the interpretation of s 231.1, the Federal Court of  
Appeal states that the purpose of s 231.1 is to facilitate the Minister’s unencumbered and  
immediate access to all books, records and information of the taxpayer (at para 27). More  
broadly, eBay explains that the Minister’s broad powers in supervising the regulatory scheme of  
the Act are a function of Canada’s self-reporting tax system (at para 34):  
34. The Supreme Court of Canada has provided additional  
guidance which is relevant to the interpretation of the Act’s  
enforcement powers. Thus, in R. v. McKinlay Transport Ltd.,  
[1990] 1 S.C.R. 627, a case involving a challenge under section 8  
of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms to the Minister’s  
power to require the production of documents, Justice Wilson  
noted (at 648) that the major drawback of a self-reporting tax  
system such as ours is that some taxpayers will attempt to evade  
tax, by failing to report income, for example. Accordingly, she  
said:  
[T]he Minister of National Revenue must be given  
broad powers in supervising this regulatory scheme  
to audit taxpayers’ returns and inspect all books and  
records which may be relevant to the preparation of  
Page: 36  
these returns. The Minister must be capable of  
exercising these powers whether or not he has  
reasonable grounds for believing that a particular  
taxpayer has breached the Act. … A spot check or a  
system of random monitoring may be the only way  
in which the integrity of the tax system can be  
maintained.  
[72] Cameco also recognizes that the legislative purpose, however important, cannot replace  
the language of the statute that Parliament has chosen (at para 27). However, the Minister argues  
that the words “inspect, audit or examine…” in s 231.1(1)(a) are broad terms encompassing a  
range of activities, which logically include requesting the provision of documents. This  
submission is consistent with the statutory interpretation analysis performed in Tellza, in relation  
to the comparable provision of the ETA (s 288(1)), which took into account not only the context  
and purpose of the ETA as part of Canada’s self-reporting and self-assessing taxation regime, but  
also the plain, grammatical, dictionary meaning of “inspect, audit, or examine” (at para 13). The  
Court concluded that the inspection power afforded by this provision necessarily entailed the  
power to request or require documents to be provided so that the authorized person can conduct  
an inspection, audit or examination effectively (at para 18).  
[73] Indeed, among the jurisprudence relied upon by both parties in support of their respective  
positions on the statutory interpretation issue, Justice Fuhrer’s recent decision in Tellza is the  
authority which most directly addresses this aspect of the issue. While Tellza involved an  
application for judicial review under the ETA, challenging a written request to obtain electronic  
accounting data, rather than a compliance application under the Act, it is apparent from the  
decision that the applicant in that case advanced a position essentially identical to that taken by  
the Respondents in the case at hand. Given the significance of this particular authority for the  
Page: 37  
issue now before the Court, it is worthwhile to reproduce a substantial portion of Justice Fuhrer’s  
description of the applicant’s position and her reasons for rejecting it (at paras 11-18):  
11. Contrary to Tellza’s position that the October 4, 2019 letter  
was a “requirement” and not a “request” and hence, should have  
issued under the ETA s 289(1), instead of the ETA s 288(1), I am  
not persuaded that it was unreasonable for the CRA to issue the  
letter under the latter provision instead.  
12. The parties do not disagree that the statutory interpretation of  
a provision must be consistent with the text, context and purpose of  
the provision: Vavilov, above at paras 117-120; see also Rizzo &  
Rizzo Shoes Ltd (Re), [1998] 1 SCR 27 at para 21. The role of the  
reviewing court, however, on a reasonableness review involving  
statutory interpretation is not to “undertake a de novo analysis of  
the question or ‘ask itself what the correct decision would have  
been’”: Vavilov, above at para 116, citing Law Society of New  
Brunswick v Ryan, 2003 SCC 20 at para 50.  
13. Taking into account the context and purpose of the ETA, as a  
self-reporting and self-assessing taxation regime, as well as the  
plain, grammatical, dictionary meaning of “inspect, audit, or  
examine”, in my view the CRA’s decision to rely on subsection  
288(1) as the basis for issuing the October 4, 2019 letter was  
justified. I add that Tellza did not adduce any evidence  
contradicting that the letter was issued by an “authorized  
person,” as contemplated in the relevant provision.  
14. Subsection 288(1) essentially permits the authorized person  
to “inspect, audit or examine the documents, property or  
processes” of persons with record keeping and reporting  
obligations under the ETA, including in connection with any  
claimed rebate or refund such as input tax credits or ITCs. Further,  
subsection 288(1) and the remainder of section 288 deal with the  
conditions under which the authorized person “may” enter business  
or commercial premises to carry out these functions.  
15. Tellza contends that the “inspection power” under subsection  
288(1) is more limited in scope than the “requirement power”  
under subsection 289(1) of the ETA, in that the authorized person  
is not empowered to request or require information to be provided.  
Although I do not disagree with the general proposition about the  
more limited scope of subsection 288(1), I cannot agree with the  
latter contention for several reasons.  
Page: 38  
16. First, the ability to inspect premises is permissive; the  
provision does not mandate in-person inspections, audits or  
examinations. In other words, the inspection power is not limited  
to a physical location or locations but rather, in my view, relates to  
the person or persons whose documents, property or processes can  
be inspected, audited or examined. The purpose of this activity also  
is more limited, as contrasted with subsection 289(1), to  
determining obligations under Part IX (GST) of the ETA or the  
amount of any rebate or refund to which a person is entitled.  
Subsection 289(1), on the other hand, operates “[d]espite any other  
provision of this Part” and applies more broadly to “any person”  
within the confines of the stated purpose. That purpose also is  
broader, however, and described as “…any purpose related to the  
administration or enforcement of a listed international agreement  
or this Part [i.e. Part IX (GST)], including the collection of any  
amount payable or remittable under this Part by any person…”  
17. Second, the applicable definitions of “document” and  
“property” in the ETA s 123(1) are not restricted to physical things.  
For example, a “document” is defined as including “money, a  
security and a record,” while a “record” is defined as including  
“…any other thing containing information, whether in writing or  
in any other form.” [Emphasis added.] In addition, “property” is  
defined as meaning “any property, whether real or personal,  
movable or immovable, tangible or intangible, corporeal or  
incorporeal, and includes a right or interest of any kind, a share and  
a chose in action, but does not include money.”  
18. I thus find that on a plain reading of the applicable definitions,  
within the context and purpose of the ETA, subsection 288(1)  
indeed grants an authorized person the power to request or require  
a taxpayer to provide information in any form. The inspection  
power necessarily entails, in my view, the power to request or  
require documents to be provided so that the authorized person can  
conduct the inspection, audit or examination effectively. I further  
find that the authorized person is not limited, in a modern,  
electronic era, to an inspection, audit or examination of the  
taxpayer’s documents and records at their premises.  
[74] I find this analysis compelling and see no reason to depart from it or to decline to apply it  
to the provisions of the Act at issue in the case at hand. In so concluding, I have considered the  
Respondents’ argument that, because Tellza involved a judicial review, it assessed the relevant  
Page: 39  
statutory interpretation on the standard of reasonableness, rather than arriving at a definitive  
interpretation on the standard of correctness. While the Respondents’ point is noteworthy, I agree  
with the Minister’s response, explaining that Tellza is accompanied by a related decision in  
Minister of National Revenue v Tellza, 2021 CarswellNat 3964, CanLII 76055 [Tellza No 2] on a  
compliance application.  
[75] The judicial review application and compliance application, in Tellza and Tellza No 2  
respectively, were argued on the same date, and both decisions bear the same date. In Tellza No  
2, the Court granted the compliance application, ordering the respondents in that matter to  
provide the electronic accounting data that was requested by CRA under s 288(1) of the ETA in  
what appears to have been a follow-up to the request that was under judicial review in Tellza.  
Tellza No 2 is a recitals-type decision and therefore does not include detailed reasons. However,  
it states the Court’s findings, including that, by requests made under s 288(1) of the ETA, the  
respondents were required to provide the electronic accounting data, and expressly describes the  
Court’s satisfaction that this condition has been met as having regard to the findings in Tellza.  
[76] I therefore agree with the Minister’s submission that the combination of these decisions  
demonstrates Justice Fuhrer concluding not only that the statutory interpretation set out in detail  
in Tellza was reasonable but also that it is the correct interpretation of the relevant provision.  
[77] The Minister cites a number of other cases, including appellate authority, in support of  
her position on this aspect of the interpretation of s 231.1(1) of the Act. While those cases may  
contain language or involve facts that are arguably consistent with the Minister’s position, none  
Page: 40  
of them other than Tellza demonstrates the precise issue being raised by the parties and subjected  
to judicial analysis. However, I consider the conclusion in Tellza (at para 18), that the authorized  
person is not limited, in a modern, electronic era, to an inspection, audit or examination of the  
taxpayer’s documents and records at their premises, to be consistent with appellate authority  
identified by the Minister. Interpreting the compliance provisions of the Act in eBay (at para 42),  
the Federal Court of Appeal relied on Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of  
Canada v Canadian Assn of Internet Providers, 2004 SCC 45, in concluding that courts should  
interpret legislation in light of contemporary technology and, if necessary, “transpose” its terms  
to take into account the changed technological environment in which it is to be applied.  
[78] In conclusion on this aspect of the statutory interpretation issue, I am satisfied that s  
231.1(1) entitles an authorized person to demand provision of documentation without physically  
attending at a place or premises where the documentation is kept.  
(2) Compulsion of Information  
[79] I therefore turn to the second aspect of the statutory interpretation issue, whether s  
231.1(1) authorizes compulsion of only pre-existing documentation or whether it authorizes  
issuance of a demand compelling the recipient to provide, through written answers to questions,  
substantive information relevant to a taxpayer’s tax position.  
[80] Again, the Respondents’ submissions focus substantially upon the text of s 231.1(1) and  
in particular s 231.1(1)(a), which I will reproduce again for ease of reference:  
Page: 41  
231.1 (1) An authorized  
231.1 (1) Une personne  
person may, at all reasonable  
autorisée peut, à tout moment  
times, for any purpose related raisonnable, pour l’application  
to the administration or  
enforcement of this Act,  
et l’exécution de la présente  
loi, à la fois :  
(a) inspect, audit or  
a) inspecter, vérifier ou  
examiner les livres et  
registres d’un  
contribuable ainsi que  
tous documents du  
contribuable ou d’une  
autre personne qui se  
rapportent ou peuvent se  
rapporter soit aux  
renseignements qui  
figurent dans les livres ou  
registres du contribuable  
ou qui devraient y figurer,  
soit à tout montant  
examine the books and  
records of a taxpayer and  
any document of the  
taxpayer or of any other  
person that relates or may  
relate to the information  
that is or should be in the  
books or records of the  
taxpayer or to any amount  
payable by the taxpayer  
under this Act, and  
payable par le  
contribuable en vertu de  
la présente loi;  
[81] The Respondents emphasize that this text applies the power to inspect or examine to two  
categories of material. The first category is the books and records of the taxpayer, and the second  
category is any document of the taxpayer or of any other person that relates or may relate to  
certain types of information. While the language of this second category references information,  
the Respondents submit that reference cannot be read in isolation from the immediately  
preceding language. The second category of material that can be compelled is “…any document  
of the taxpayer or of any other person that relates or may relate to the information…” [Emphasis  
added].  
[82] The Respondents submit that it is not possible to interpret this language as authorizing  
compulsion of information other than information that is contained in a document. They also  
Page: 42  
compare this language with that of s 231.2(1), which expressly authorizes the Minister to require  
provision of information, as opposed to a document relating to information.  
[83] As with the first aspect of the statutory interpretation issue, the Respondents’ submissions  
do not particularly engage with the statutory purpose, which the Minister again emphasizes  
involves the provision of broad powers to audit taxpayers in supervising Canada’s self-reporting  
and self-assessing regulatory scheme. As with the first aspect, this purpose militates in favour of  
a generous interpretation of the scope of s 231.1(1)(a), but achieving the purpose cannot replace  
the language of the statute that Parliament has chosen (see Cameco at para 27). Under the first  
aspect, I agreed with the Minister that the words “inspect, audit or examine…” in s 231.1(1)(a)  
were sufficiently broad that, in keeping with the statutory purpose, they encompassed demands  
for the provision of documents. However, notwithstanding the importance of that purpose, I  
agree with the Respondents’ position that the words of s 231.1(1)(a) are not capable of being  
interpreted to encompass demands for information that is not contained in a document.  
[84] As the Respondents submit, Cameco provides strong jurisprudential support for their  
position. That case is not completely on point, as it addressed whether the Minister can compel  
oral answers to questions posed by CRA auditors (see para 1), as opposed to written answers as  
are at issue in the matters at hand. However, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the  
reasoning of the Federal Court of Appeal, rejecting the Minister’s position that s 231.1(1)(a)  
provides authority to compel oral answers (see paras 1 and 12), applies also to compelling  
written answers.  
Page: 43  
[85] As in in the present matters, the respondent in Cameco argued that, relying on the plain  
and ordinary meaning of the text in s 231.1(1)(a), the powers conferred under that section are in  
respect of documented information, not any information (see para 10). In response, the Minister  
argued that the ability to compel oral responses to questions was implicit in the use of the word  
“audit” in that section (see para 16). The Federal Court of Appeal rejected that submission,  
noting that the power is to “inspect, audit or examine” and that neither “inspect” nor “examine”  
suggests a power to compel a person to answer questions. The Court reasoned that, when two or  
more words that are capable of analogous meetings are coupled together, they take their colour  
from each other, the more general being restricted to a sense analogous to the less general (at  
para 18).  
[86] As part of its textual analysis, Cameco also references s 231.1(1)(d). The parties disagree  
on whether Cameco engages in analysis of s 231.1(1)(d). In reliance on paragraph 21 of the  
decision, the Minister argues that it does not. In paragraph 21, the Court emphasizes that the  
disposition of the appeal turns on the scope of the power in s 231.1(1)(a) and that the extent to  
which s 231.1(1)(d) served as an independent power to compel attendance and answer questions  
of the nature proposed by the Minister in that case was not argued in the appeal.  
[87] Similarly, in the case at hand, the Minister emphasizes that she relies on s 231.1(1)(a),  
not s 231.1(1)(d), in support of her position that she can compel written answers to questions.  
Thus, as in Cameco, the Court need not arrive at a definitive conclusion on the meaning of s  
231.1(1)(d). That said, I disagree with the Minister’s submission that Cameco did not engage in  
analysis of s 231.1(1)(d). Such an analysis is clearly present in the decision and to some extent  
Page: 44  
informed the Court’s interpretation of s 231.1(1)(a). For that reason, it is worthwhile to canvas  
briefly that analysis.  
[88] Section 231.1(1)(d) requires the owner or manager, and any other person on the premises  
or place where s 231.1(1) powers are exercised, not only to give the authorized person all  
reasonable assistance but also “…to answer all proper questions relating to the administration or  
enforcement of this Act…”. Cameco explains that this assistance is distinct from responding to  
general questions with respect to tax liability or issues arising from the audit. The obligation to  
assist is in aid of the inspection, search, examination or review of records (at para 22). Questions  
may be asked, and the assistance of the Court can be sought to compel answers, but this relates to  
the taxpayer’s knowledge of the provenance and location of records (at para 13). Cameco relies  
on this interpretation of s 231.1(1)(d) to support its conclusion that there is no implied  
requirement to answer questions in s 231.1(1)(a). It reasons that such an interpretation would  
render unnecessary the obligation in s 231.1(1)(d) to answer questions, even of the limited scope  
contemplated by that section, and interpretations that render any portion of the statute  
meaningless or redundant should be avoided (at para 23).  
[89] Turning to context, Cameco notes the significance of s 231.1 immediately following s  
230, which imposes an obligation to keep books and records at a person’s place of business. The  
Court reasons that the purpose of the two provisions when taken together is to allow the Minister  
to independently verify, based on such records, tax liability and compliance with the Act. The  
Court concludes that independent verification through an audit is different from compelling  
answers to questions (at para 24).  
Page: 45  
[90] In its purposive analysis, Cameco emphasizes the point (cited earlier in these Reasons)  
that, however important the statutory objective of empowering the Minister to verify information  
received in the context of Canada’s self-reported taxation system, that objective cannot replace  
the language of Parliament (at para 27). The Court also notes that s 231.1(1)(a) is not the only  
source of the Minister’s investigative powers, citing other portions of the compliance provisions  
including the Minister’s power to seek information and documents under s 231.2 (at para 29).  
[91] In countering the Respondents’ reliance on Cameco, the Minister notes that the Court’s  
purposive analysis includes a reference to the purpose of s 231.1 including the facilitation of  
access to information of a taxpayer (at para 27):  
27. The purpose of section 231.1 is to facilitate the Minister’s  
unencumbered and immediate access to all books, records and  
information of the taxpayer and, in section 231.7, to provide  
recourse to the authority of the Court in the face of a refusal.  
[Emphasis added]  
[92] However, I do not read this statement in Cameco as suggesting that s 231.1 affords the  
Minister access to undocumented information, as that interpretation would be inconsistent with  
the overall conclusion in Cameco, that the Minister cannot compel oral answers to questions.  
Similarly, at the commencement of its textual analysis, Cameco describes the focus of the  
powers in paragraphs 231.1(1)(a) and (b) as squarely on the ability of the Minister to access  
“…information that is documented, or ought to be documented, in the books and records of the  
taxpayer” (at para 15). Again, taken in context, I do not read this description as suggesting the  
Minister can access undocumented information. Indeed, immediately thereafter, the Court notes  
that references to “books and records” and “documents” course consistently through s 231.1(1)  
Page: 46  
and cites BP Canada Energy Co v Minister of National Revenue, 2017 FCA 61 [BP Canada] at  
para 58, describing the section as encompassing documents which relate or may relate to the  
information that is or should be in the records of the taxpayer.  
[93] The statutory interpretation in Cameco concludes with consideration of the legislative  
history of paragraph 231.1(1)(a), which the Court notes resulted from 1986 amendments  
intended to provide clear limits to CRA’s enforcement powers. At paragraph 32 the Court sets  
out portions of the predecessor to the current section 231.1(1) (then s 231) and focuses in  
particular on certain language in s 231(c):  
(c) require the owner or manager of the property or business and  
any other person on the premises or place to give him all  
reasonable assistance with his audit or examination and to answer  
all proper questions relating to the audit or examination either  
orally or, if he so requires, in writing, on oath or by statutory  
declaration and, for that purpose, require the owner or manager to  
attend at the premises or place with him, and  
[Emphasis in Cameco]  
[94] Referring to the language in s 231(c) that is no longer found in the current s 231.1(1)(d),  
Cameco concludes that its reasoning in rejecting the Minister’s position is supported by the  
elimination of the word “orally” from the duty to answer questions, as well as the elimination of  
the obligation to give answers under oath or by statutory declaration.  
[95] As previously noted, I appreciate that the issue before the Federal Court of Appeal in  
Cameco related to demands for information to be provided orally, not in writing, and that the  
Court’s analysis was undertaken, and its reasons written, in that context. However, the above  
analysis of the legislative history appears equally supportive of the conclusion that the Minister  
Page: 47  
cannot compel written answers to questions. The language that Parliament eliminated in the  
transition from s 231(c) to s 231.1(1)(d) included not only the word “orally” but also the words  
“in writing” and, as Cameco notes, the reference to answers by statutory declaration.  
[96] Moreover, the Minister has identified no point of principle that would militate in favour  
of a different result in the context of demands to answer questions in writing rather than orally.  
In my view, the distinction underlying the reasoning in Cameco is between documented and  
undocumented information. Section 231.1(1)(a) empowers the Minister to compel provision of  
the former but not the latter.  
[97] The Minister cites a number of authorities in support of her position that the section  
authorizes demands for information, as distinct from documentation, and therefore compels the  
recipient of a demand to answer questions in writing. However, as with the first aspect of the  
statutory interpretation of s 231.1(1), while those cases may contain language or involve facts  
that are arguably consistent with the Minister’s position, they do not (with one exception, which  
I will canvass shortly) demonstrate the issue presently before the Court having been raised by the  
parties and subjected to judicial analysis.  
[98] For instance, the Minister relies on the recent decision of the Federal Court of Appeal in  
Friedman v Minister of National Revenue, 2021 FCA 101 [Friedman], which involved a demand  
issued by the Minister under s 231.1(1), enclosing a questionnaire which asked for details of the  
appellant taxpayers’ property. The taxpayers sought judicial review of this demand, and the  
Page: 48  
Minister sought a compliance order. The Minister prevailed before the Federal Court, and the  
Federal Court of Appeal dismissed the taxpayers’ appeal (see paras 1-3).  
[99] The Minister cites Friedman, because it is apparent that the questionnaire that formed the  
basis of the Minister’s s 231.1(1) demand sought, at least in part, answers to questions, i.e.,  
information as distinct from documentation (see, e.g., para 9). I do not disagree with this  
interpretation of the facts underlying Friedman. However, there is no indication in the decision  
that the issue presently before this Court, whether s 231.1(1) authorizes the Minister to compel  
answers to questions, was raised or argued in that appeal. Friedman provides no analysis of this  
issue and therefore cannot be regarded as authority supporting the Minister’s position.  
[100] The Minister also relies on the decision in Redeemer, referencing language employed by  
the Supreme Court of Canada in its interpretation of s 231.1(1)(a) that she argues supports her  
position (at paras 13 and 24):  
13. On its face, this section covers the situation at bar. It  
authorizes the Minister to examine “information that is or should  
be” in the Foundation’s books. The information at issue regarding  
third party taxpayers who had contributed to the Foundation was  
either in the Foundation’s books, or “should” have been in its  
books pursuant to the broad record-keeping requirements created  
by s 230(2).  
….  
24. As mentioned above, s 231.1(1) is broadly worded. It allows  
access to “information that is or should be in the books or records  
of the taxpayer”. It thus gives access to information about third  
parties that is required to be kept by the taxpayer, as well as  
information that may not be required to be kept but happens to be  
in the taxpayer’s records.  
[Emphasis in Redeemer]  
Page: 49  
[101] As the Minister submits, Redeemer refers to the Minister having access to “information”  
and does not state that such information must be contained in a document to be compellable.  
However, again, I do not read this decision as providing any analysis of the particular issue now  
before this Court. Redeemer does not refer to the fact that, in the s 231.1(1)(a) description of  
what an authorized person may inspect, audit or examine, the phrase “information that is or  
should be in the books or records of the taxpayer” is only part of the longer phrase “any  
document of the taxpayer or of any other person that relates or may relate to information that is  
or should be in the books or records of the taxpayer”. Nor is there any indication in the decision  
that this issue was raised and argued before the Court.  
[102] Indeed, as pointed out by the Respondents at the hearing of these applications, the  
decision of the Federal Court of Appeal (Minister of National Revenue v Redeemer Foundation,  
2006 FCA 325 [Redeemer FCA]), which was under appeal in Redeemer, makes clear that this  
issue was not raised. The information at issue in Redeemer was a list of charitable donors to the  
appellant taxpayer. In Redeemer FCA, the Court explains as follows (at para 36):  
36. Section 231(2) requires the Foundation to maintain certain  
records to enable the Minister to ascertain if there are grounds for  
revoking the Foundation's registration as a charity, and to verify  
that the donations which are made to it are eligible for deduction.  
The Foundation is specifically required to maintain duplicates of  
all receipts which it issues to donors, including the name and  
address of the donor. (See Income Tax Regulations, C.R.C., c. 945  
at para. 3501(1)(g)). In short, the Foundation was required by law  
to maintain the information which the CRA auditor asked it to  
produce. As for whether the information was maintained in the  
form in which it was requested, i.e., a list, the demand was not  
resisted on that basis, perhaps because it is inconceivable that a  
charity would not maintain a list of its donors for various purposes  
related to fundraising.  
[Emphasis added]  
Page: 50  
[103] While it is not entirely apparent whether the list of donors was a pre-existing document  
when demanded by the Minister, it is clear that the appellant taxpayer was not raising the  
statutory interpretation issue that is presently before the Court in these applications.  
[104] As I noted above, the Minister relies on one authority that arguably supports her position.  
In the recent decision in Canada (National Revenue) v Miller, 2021 FC 851 [Miller], my  
colleague, Justice Walker, considered an argument similar to the one raised by the Respondents  
in the case at hand. Miller involved an application for a compliance order, related to outstanding  
information and documentation sought in a demand issued by CRA under s 231.1 of the Act.  
Among other arguments raised by the taxpayer, he relied on Cameco to resist the Minister’s  
submission that paragraph 231.1(1)(a) empowered her not only to access the taxpayer’s books  
and records but also to request written information relating to such books and records (see para  
24). The taxpayer emphasized the references in Cameco to the Minister being entitled to ask  
questions related to the provenance, location and maintenance of books and records. He argued  
that this authority limited the Minister’s ability to ask questions in reliance on s 231.1 to  
information relating to those concepts (see para 31).  
[105] The Court rejected this argument, concluding that it ignored two elements of the  
reasoning in Cameco. First, Cameco notes the importance of the words used by Parliament,  
including the reference in s 231.1(1)(a) to information that should be in the books and records of  
the taxpayer. Miller concludes that, if the information should be in the taxpayer’s books and  
records, the Minister must be able to gain access to that information in reliance on s 231.1(1) (at  
para 31). Second, Miller notes that Cameco reflects a concern as to the scope of the Minister’s  
Page: 51  
intended oral questions in that case, which did not relate to information that should have been set  
out in the taxpayer’s books and records (at paras 32-33).  
[106] Miller then applies its statutory interpretation analysis to the Minister’s particular  
requests for information at issue in that case, arriving at different results depending upon whether  
the particular information could be characterized as that which should have been documented in  
the taxpayer’s books and records. For instance, the Minister sought the terms and conditions of  
what appeared to be an oral contract to which the taxpayer was a party. Reasoning that this  
request related to information that the taxpayer should have documented in his records, the Court  
concluded that this information was proper subject matter for a compliance order (at paras 44-  
45). In contrast, the Court declined to include in the order a request for a narrative regarding the  
development of the taxpayer’s relationship with the other party to the contract, concluding that  
such a description is not information that should be in his books and records (at para 54).  
[107] The Respondents note that Miller is under appeal and submit that its reasoning is  
inconsistent with that of the Federal Court of Appeal in Cameco and fails to properly parse the  
language of s 231.1(1).  
[108] In my view, Miller correctly focused upon Cameco as the leading authority governing the  
statutory interpretation issue currently before the Court. However, I respectfully disagree with  
the conclusion in Miller that Cameco teaches that the governing consideration is whether the  
information sought by the Minister should have been in the taxpayer’s books and records. As  
noted earlier in these Reasons, Cameco (at para 15) cites the explanation in BP Canada (at para  
Page: 52  
58), consistent with the text of s 231.1(1), that the section encompasses documents which relate  
or may relate to the information that is or should be in the records of the taxpayer.  
[109] Cameco also notes the distinct references in s 231.1 to “books and records” and  
“documents” (at para 15). As I read the compliance provisions of the Act, the meaning of “books  
and records” is informed by s 230, which requires taxpayers to keep records and books of  
account in such form and containing such information as will enable determination of, inter alia,  
taxes payable under the Act. The term “document” is in turn defined by s 231 to include money,  
security and a record. Therefore, “document” is a broader term than “record” and, at least  
potentially, encompasses records within the meaning of s 230 as well as other forms of  
documentation that may not fall within that meaning.  
[110] Against that backdrop, if an authorized person seeks to compel the provision of  
documentation that does not qualify as “the books and records of the taxpayer”, and is relying on  
the potentially broader power to compel “any document of the taxpayer or of any other person  
that relates or may relate to the information that…should be in the books or records of the  
taxpayer”, then I would agree with the reasoning in Miller that it is essential to ask whether the  
nature of the information is such that it should be in the books or records. However, an  
affirmative answer to this question is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for reliance on  
that power. The authorized person must also be seeking a document that relates or may relate to  
this information, as it is clear from the language of s 231.1(1)(a) that it is a document that the  
person is empowered to inspect, audit or examine. To the extent that Miller concludes otherwise,  
I respectfully decline to follow it.  
Page: 53  
[111] Having considered the various arguments and authorities, my conclusion on the second  
aspect of the statutory interpretation issue is that the Respondents are correct in their position  
that s 231.1 of the Act does not authorize issuance of a demand compelling the recipient to  
provide, through written answers to questions, substantive information relevant to a taxpayer’s  
tax position.  
(3) Conclusion on Statutory Interpretation of s 231.1(1) of the Act  
[112] Before leaving this issue, I note that in some cases, the Respondents have framed their  
arguments on this issue as a submission that the Requests are in “pith and substance” in the  
nature of Requirements. The Respondents further argue that, if reframed as Requirements, they  
would nevertheless be invalid for various technical reasons (for instance, related to the authority  
of the issuing individual or the method of service). In my view, the appropriate analysis is not to  
identify the “pith and substance” of the Request and then potentially consider whether it  
complies with s 231.2 as a Requirement. Rather, the required analysis is that performed above,  
i.e., considering whether s 231.1 provides the authority for the Request. I note that I do not  
understand the Minister to be arguing that, to the extent she does not succeed in full on the  
statutory interpretation issue, the Requests can be rehabilitated by analysing them as  
Requirements. Therefore, to the extent a particular Request may be invalid because, consistent  
with my conclusions above, it demands provision of previously undocumented information, I do  
not intend to examine whether that Request would be validly issued if treated as a Requirement  
under s 231.2.  
Page: 54  
[113] As will be apparent from the above analyses and conclusions, the parties have met with  
divided success on the issue surrounding statutory interpretation of the scope of s 231.1(1). As  
will be explained later in these Reasons when addressing the “severance” issue, my conclusion is  
that, if certain Demands include both valid and invalid items, I have discretion to order  
compliance with the valid portions, notwithstanding the invalidity of other portions. It will  
therefore be necessary for the Court to decide how the conclusions on the statutory interpretation  
issue apply to individual items in the Requests and, as a result, which items are valid because  
they represent a demand for documentation and which are not valid because they represent a  
demand for undocumented information.  
[114] At the conclusion of the hearing, recognizing that some form of divided success on this  
issue was a possible result in these applications, I raised with counsel the question of whether the  
Court should perform this process, applying the statutory interpretation conclusions to the details  
of the individual items in the Requests, without receiving further submissions from the parties.  
There may be some items where this process is straightforward and others where it is less so, as  
there could be a debate on whether a particular item falls into the valid or invalid category.  
[115] The Minister’s counsel took no position on the process question but explained that the  
Minister was prepared to provide additional submissions if that would be of assistance to the  
Court. The Respondents’ counsel advised that they would prefer an opportunity to provide  
submissions. Now that the outcome of the statutory interpretation issue is known, my view is that  
seeking further submissions is appropriate and will be useful to the Court. As such, when I  
analyze the individual Requests and Requirements later in these Reasons, I will not be applying  
Page: 55  
the statutory interpretation conclusions in that analysis. At the end of these Reasons, after  
addressing the other issues before the Court, I will return to the process for seeking further  
submissions to progress these compliance applications to conclusion.  
D. Whether the individuals who issued the Demands were authorized to do so  
[116] There is a distinction between those who are authorized to issue Requests under s 231.1  
of the Act and those who are authorized to issue Requirements under s 231.2. Section 231.1(1)  
confers such authority upon an “authorized person”, a term which is defined by s 231 to mean “a  
person authorized by the Minister for the purposes of sections 231.1 to 231.5”. In contrast, s  
231.2 confers authority upon the Minister herself, although s 220(2.01) allows the Minister to  
authorize an officer or a class of officers to exercise powers of the Minister under the Act.  
[117] For each of the Requests and Requirements at issue in these applications, the  
Respondents submit that the applications must fail, because the Ministers failed to adduce  
evidence that the Request or Requirement was authorized in accordance with the provisions  
described above. Essentially, the Respondents take the position that the Minster bears a burden  
of proof on this point and has failed to meet that burden.  
[118] In response, the Minister relies on a rebuttable presumption of validity identified in  
applicable jurisprudence. This presumption was explained in Branigan v Canada (Minister of  
Citizenship & Immigration), 2004 FC 245, which considered an argument that a report under s  
44(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c-27 [IRPA] and s 44(2) referral  
to the Immigration Division for an admissibility hearing were invalid, because they did not  
Page: 56  
disclose that they were issued by persons designated by the relevant minister, or to whom the  
minister had delegated authority under IRPA. In rejecting this argument, Justice Lemieux held as  
follows (at para 9):  
9. There is no merit to this argument because there is a  
presumption of validity and the applicant has adduced no evidence  
to impugn the authority of those persons who issued the  
documents. I need only cite a few paragraphs of what Justice  
Létourneau said in Canada (Minister of Human Resources  
Development) v. Weimer [1998] F.C.J. 809 (C.A.).  
12. The approval of Mrs. Kukat's application for division of  
earnings was given on an official form issued by the Division  
of Unadjusted Pensionable Earnings ("Pension Credits")  
Canada Pension Plan and signed, in a section reserved to office  
use only, by a M. Ali under a heading called "Authorized  
Signature". As Walsh J. said in Kightley v. Registrar of Trade  
Marks et al. (1982), 65 C.P.R. (2d) 36, at p. 42 (F.C.T.D.), "it  
would certainly require great temerity and irresponsibility on  
the part of a party signing such a letter purporting to be signed  
on behalf of a senior officer if he did not have the authority to  
so act". [Emphasis mine]  
13. The fact is that a person who signs, or purports to sign, for  
a senior officer in a department benefits from a presumption  
that he or she has the authority that he or she purports to  
exercise until such time as the presumption is rebutted (Ali v.  
Minister of Manpower and Immigration, [1976] 1 F.C. 185, at  
pp. 188-89 (Fed. C.A.); Molson Companies Ltd. v. John Labatt  
Ltd. et al., (1984), 1 C.P.R. (3d) 329, at p. 334 (F.C.T.D.)).  
14. No evidence whatsoever has been adduced by the  
Respondent which could cast the slightest doubt that the person  
who signed was not authorized to sign the approval and which  
could have, if not rebutted, at least sufficiently undermined the  
presumption of validity which attaches to the signature of an  
official document so as to displace the burden and put on  
governmental officials the obligation to establish the validity of  
the signature as well as the existence of a proper authority  
vested in the signatory. Mere unsubstantiated allegations or  
speculations by the Respondent are not sufficient to displace  
the presumed authority under subsection 24(2) of the  
Interpretation Act and the presumption of validity of the  
signature.  
Page: 57  
[119] To the same effect, in the more recent decision, Lim v Canada (Citizenship and  
Immigration), 2019 FC 871, Justice Gleeson also relied on Canada (Minister of Human  
Resources Development) v Weimer [1998] FCJ 809 (CA), 228 NR 341 [Weimer] in recognizing  
that, where an authority is exercised, the person doing so benefits from a strong presumption of  
having acted with proper authorization until such time as that presumption is rebutted with  
convincing evidence that the decision-maker in fact lacked the required authority (at para 22).  
[120] I find that the Minister bears no evidentiary burden on this point, at least not in the  
absence of any evidence from the Respondents challenging the authority of those who issued the  
Requests and Requirements. In the words of Weimer, the Respondents’ position amounts to  
unsubstantiated allegations or speculations, which are not sufficient to displace the presumption  
of authority and validity from which the Minister benefits.  
[121] I note that, in relation to the Requirements and the delegation of the Minister’s authority  
under s 231.2 of the Act, the Minister also seeks to rely on what she describes as CRA’s  
delegation matrix, included in the Minister’s Book of Authorities. The Minister points out that,  
under the heading of s 231.2(1), the delegation matrix refers to a number of positions including  
Manager, Audit, which is significant as all the Requirements at issue in these applications were  
issued by an individual named John Harasymchuk, with the title Manager, Audit.  
[122] The Respondents oppose the Minister’s reliance on the delegation matrix, arguing that it  
does not have the status of a statutory instrument such that it can be included in a book of  
authorities without further proof. The Respondents take the position that, if the Minister wished  
Page: 58  
to rely on the delegation matrix, she was required to include it in the record as an exhibit to an  
affidavit. The Minister disputes this position, asserting that the delegations identified in the  
matrix are authorized by statute and that the delegation matrix is publicly available on CRA’s  
website.  
[123] I find the Respondents’ arguments on this subject somewhat inconsistent, as their own  
written submissions include an effort to rely on what appears to be an extract from the delegation  
matrix on CRA’s website. Those submissions assert that the website indicates the Minister has  
authorized only certain categories of persons for the purposes of s 231.1, all at the Director  
General, Director, or Assistant Director level. The Minister has convincingly refuted that  
argument, explaining that this portion of the delegation matrix identifies not those positions that  
are authorized to issue demands under s 231.1, but rather those positions to which the Minister  
has delegated the authority to authorize persons to issue such demands.  
[124] That said, as a matter of principle, in the absence of a more compelling legal argument  
from the Minister that the Court is entitled to rely upon the delegation matrix as a statutory  
authority, I agree with the Respondents’ position that the proper method to place this information  
before the Court, if necessary to address an issue in dispute, is through evidence. However, for  
purposes of the present applications, the Minister succeeds on this issue without needing to rely  
on the delegation matrix. In the absence of any evidence or meaningful argument by the  
Respondents challenging the authority of those who issued the Requests or Requirements, the  
Minister benefits from the presumption of validity, and I find that the persons who issued the  
Page: 59  
Demands were authorized to do so. Given the breadth of this conclusion, it will not be necessary  
for me to revisit this issue when addressing the individual Demands later in these Reasons.  
E. Whether the Respondents were properly given notice of the Demands  
[125] The Respondents take the position, in particular in relation to the Requirements at issue  
in these applications but also in relation to Requests, that they were not provided to them in  
manner which represents proper notice. Section 231.2(1) expressly provides that a Requirement  
must be served personally or by registered or certified mail. The Respondents take the position  
that the Minister has a burden to adduce evidence establishing proper service and that she has  
failed to do so. Section 231.1(1) does not prescribe particular methods of giving notice to the  
recipient of a Request. However, the Respondents again raise arguments that particular methods  
employed by the Minister were not adequate.  
[126] In relation to the Requirements, the Minister’s position is that all Requirements in all six  
applications were sent to the relevant Respondent by registered mail, a method that complies  
with s 231.2. The Minister relies on the evidence of Mr. Bowe in each application to establish  
that service was properly effected in this manner. In response, the Respondents raise a particular  
argument based on s 244(5) of the Act, which prescribes as follows a method of proving service  
by mail:  
Proof of service by mail  
Preuve de signification par  
poste  
244(5) Where, by this Act or a 244(5) Lorsque la présente  
regulation, provision is made loi ou son règlement prévoit  
for sending by mail a request  
for information, notice or  
demand, an affidavit of an  
l’envoi par la poste d’une  
demande de renseignements,  
d’un avis ou d’une demande  
Page: 60  
officer of the Canada Revenue formelle, un affidavit d’un  
Agency, sworn before a fonctionnaire de l’Agence  
commissioner or other person du revenu du Canada,  
authorized to take affidavits, souscrit en présence d’un  
setting out that the officer has commissaire ou d’une autre  
knowledge of the facts in the  
particular case, that such a  
personne autorisée à  
recevoir les affidavits,  
request, notice or demand was indiquant qu’il est au  
sent by registered letter on a  
named day to the person to  
whom it was addressed  
courant des faits de l’espèce,  
que la demande, l’avis ou la  
demande formelle en  
(indicating the address) and  
that the officer identifies as  
exhibits attached to the  
question a été adressée, par  
lettre recommandée, à une  
date indiquée, à la personne  
à qui elle a été adressée  
affidavit the post office  
certificate of registration of  
(fournissant cette adresse) et  
the letter or a true copy of the qu’il identifie comme pièces  
relevant portion thereof and a attachées à l’affidavit, le  
true copy of the request,  
certificat de  
notice or demand, shall, in the recommandation de la lettre  
absence of proof to the  
contrary, be received as  
fourni par le bureau de poste  
ou une copie conforme de la  
evidence of the sending and of partie pertinente du certificat  
the request, notice or demand. et une copie conforme de la  
demande, de l’avis ou de la  
demande formelle, doit être  
reçu comme preuve, sauf  
preuve contraire, de l’envoi  
ainsi que de la demande, de  
l’avis ou de la demande  
formelle.  
[127] The Respondents take the position that compliance with s 244(5) is mandatory, i.e., that  
this is the only means by which the Minister can prove by affidavit service by registered mail for  
purposes of Requirements issued under s 231.2(1). To the extent Mr. Bowe’s evidence does not  
comply with s 244(5), for instance by failing to attach as an exhibit the post office certificate of  
registration of the registered letter, the Respondents argue that the Minister has not met her  
burden to prove service and a compliance order cannot be issued in relation to the relevant  
Requirement.  
Page: 61  
[128] In response, the Minister refers to court to Boroumend v The Queen, 2016 TCC 256, in  
which the Tax Court described s 244(5) as a simple mechanism by which the Minister can prove  
mailing by registered mail (at para 8), but also stated that the fact the Minister does not have the  
evidence to rely upon s 244(5) does not mean that the Minister cannot prevail. Rather, it means  
that the Minister must use other means to prove, on a balance of probabilities, that the relevant  
notice was mailed (at para 10).  
[129] In support of their position, the Respondents rely on Luxury Home Landscape  
Construction Inc v The Queen, 2021 TCC 4 [Luxury Home] at para 24, in which Justice Russell  
of the Tax Court considered the Minister’s efforts to prove through affidavit evidence service of  
a notice of confirmation of an excise tax assessment. That evidence did not met the requirements  
of the ETA provision (s 355(1)) comparable to s 244(5), because it failed to attach the post office  
certificate of registration. The Court confirmed that the use of that provision was not the only  
means to prove that the relevant notice had been sent by registered mail, noting that the Minister  
could have called one or more witnesses to provide viva voce evidence based on personal  
knowledge. However, as the Minister had chosen the option of adducing the necessary evidence  
by affidavit, the Court held that s 335(1) was engaged, as this provision specifies what  
Parliament intended to be required in order to prove by affidavit that a notice has been sent by  
registered mail (at para 24).  
[130] The Respondents therefore argue that, as the Minister seeks to rely on affidavit evidence  
in the applications at hand in order to prove service of the Requirements, that evidence is not  
sufficient unless it complies with s 244(5). However, I agree with the Minister’s response that  
Page: 62  
the analysis in Luxury Home must be considered in the context of the particular proceeding and  
issue that was before the Tax Court. That case involved a motion to quash a notice of appeal on  
the basis that it was filed out of time. As such, the date that CRA sent the notice of confirmation  
to the taxpayer was the date the appeal period began to run, and thus was essential to the  
determination of the issue before the Court.  
[131] Following his observation that s 335(1) specified what Parliament intended to be required  
to prove by affidavit that a notice had been sent by registered mail, Justice Russell referred to the  
importance of this evidence, because it commences, effective the “sent” date, the running of the  
appeal period (at para 24). The taxpayer had adduced evidence that it never received CRA’s  
notice of confirmation. In addition, the affidavit adduced by the CRA appeals officer assigned to  
the matter included correspondence with Canada Post that raised questions as to what happened  
to the intended registered letter. It is therefore not surprising that, in dismissing the Minister’s  
motion to quash the appeal, the Court was concerned that CRA’s affidavit failed to include the  
post office certificate of registration as required by s 335(1) of the ETA.  
[132] Against that factual backdrop, I do not read Luxury Home as a statement of general  
principle that, if the Minister chooses to establish service of a Requirement through affidavit  
evidence, that evidence will invariably be insufficient if it does not comply with s 244(5) of the  
Act, regardless of the other evidence or particular issue before the Court. Rather, in my view, it  
is necessary to consider the particular evidence upon which the Minister relies in these  
applications, in the context of the arguments raised by the Respondents that the applications  
should fail based on the service issue.  
Page: 63  
[133] I agree with the Respondents’ submission that, in a compliance application, whether  
based on a Request or a Requirement, the Minister should bear the onus to prove service of the  
relevant Demand. As identified earlier in these Reasons, the statutory conditions include the  
existence of an obligation under ss 231.1 or 231.2 of the Act. This obligation does not exist  
unless the recipient has notice of the Demand.  
[134] As noted above, the Minister relies upon the evidence of Mr. Bowe to establish service of  
the Requests and Requirements in all six applications. With respect to the Requests, the methods  
of service upon which the Minister relies vary somewhat in different applications. As such, I will  
address the service issue in connection with the Requests later in these Reasons, when  
considering other issues specific to the individual applications and Demands. However, with  
respect to the Requirements, the Minister relies upon service by registered mail in all  
applications, and the evidence of Mr. Bowe is relatively consistent across all matters. It is  
therefore efficient to address the service issue in relation to the Requirements at this juncture.  
[135] In each application, and in relation to each Requirement that is the subject of the  
application, Mr. Bowe swears in his affidavit that CRA sent the Requirement to the relevant  
Respondent by registered mail, noting the date of the Requirement and attaching a copy as an  
exhibit to the affidavit. The Respondents cross-examined Mr. Bowe in each of the applications  
and, in some cases, focused specifically upon his knowledge of CRA’s service of the relevant  
Requirements. For instance, as emphasized by both parties at the hearing, the Respondents’  
counsel cross-examined Mr. Bowe in T-261-19 (Raphael Ghermezian) on his knowledge of the  
two Requirements at issue in that application, identified as A-RUST-0103 and A-GDT-0101.  
Page: 64  
[136] In relation to A-RUST-0103, Mr. Bowe confirmed that he did not witness the document  
leaving CRA’s mailroom or going to Canada Post, i.e., he did not witness the physical mailing of  
the letter. However, he also testified that A-RUST-0103 was sent by registered mail, delivered  
on January 24, 2019, and accepted at what he referred to as the “Triple Five head office” at the  
address shown on the copy of the Requirement attached as an exhibit to his affidavit (i.e., 3000,  
8882 - 170 Street, Edmonton, Alberta, T5T 4M2 [the Edmonton Address]). He also testified that  
he has in the audit file a registered mail confirmation and the outgoing mail request form,  
although he realizes that this documentation was not attached to his affidavit.  
[137] When challenged that he did not know for a fact whether the registered mail was  
delivered to or signed for by Raphael Ghermezian, Mr. Bowe noted that the initials on the  
registered mail delivery slip were “R.G.” (Raphael Ghermezian’s initials) although he  
acknowledged he had no confirmation that R.G. was actually Mr. Ghermezian.  
[138] When challenged as to his personal knowledge of the mailing of A-RUST-0103, Mr.  
Bowe testified that his student employee sent the letter to the mailroom with a registered mail  
request slip attached to it. He explained that, as the employee’s supervisor, he has personal  
knowledge of what happened within the audit file, but he did not personally send it from the  
mailroom.  
[139] When challenged as to his knowledge whether the registered mail was received by Mr.  
Ghermezian, Mr. Bowe responded that he believed Mr. Ghermezian received it, because he  
subsequently filed a judicial review application with respect to A-RUST-0103.  
Page: 65  
[140] I note that, in re-examination on the subject of A-RUST-0103, the Minister’s counsel  
asked Mr. Bowe whether he or CRA had received a confirmation of the registered mail and  
sought to introduce into evidence a document purported to be a delivery confirmation for A-  
RUST-0103. The Respondent’s counsel objected to this line of questioning, on the basis that it  
was not appropriate for re-examination, and the delivery confirmation was marked as an exhibit  
on the basis that the Court would be asked to rule on the objection at the hearing of the  
applications. I will return to this point shortly.  
[141] The Respondent’s counsel similarly cross-examined Mr. Bowe on his knowledge of the  
service of the Requirement identified as A-GDT-0101. He testified that one of his employees  
prepared a mailing slip, which would have come to his desk and was then placed in the outgoing  
mail slot and made its way to the mailroom, where they prepared a registered mail slip. Mr.  
Bowe explained that the copy of A-GDT-0101 attached as an exhibit to his affidavit includes a  
copy of the mail slip as well as the delivery confirmation from Canada Post.  
[142] When asked what personal knowledge he had of whether A-GDT-0101 was received by  
registered mail by Raphael Ghermezian, Mr. Bowe explained his belief that Mr. Ghermezian had  
received it, because he filed an application for judicial review of the Requirement on November  
28, 2018. However, he confirmed that he did not have personal knowledge of whether the  
registered mail was delivered to Mr. Ghermezian, on or about October 30, 2018, or otherwise.  
[143] Turning to the above-noted objection, I agree with the Respondent that it was not  
available to the Minister to introduce the delivery confirmation for A-RUST-0103 into evidence  
Page: 66  
as an exhibit through the re-examination of Mr. Bowe. I appreciate that re-examination can be  
used to clarify, and in some circumstances respond to, evidence that is adduced through cross-  
examination. The relevant subject did arise on cross-examination, as Mr. Bowe referred to the  
delivery confirmation and the fact that it was not attached to his affidavit. However, the re-  
examination cannot be characterized as pursuing clarification, and re-examination should not  
serve as an opportunity for a party to bolster its case through evidence that could have been  
adduced, and could have been anticipated to be required, when presenting its case in chief. Mr.  
Bowe testified in cross-examination that he inadvertently failed to attach to this document to his  
affidavit. Clearly, it could have been included with his evidence in chief, and introduction of this  
document through re-examination deprives the Respondent of an opportunity to cross-examine  
on it.  
[144] I therefore find that the delivery confirmation for A-RUST-0103, currently attached to  
the transcript of Mr. Bowe’s cross-examination in T-261-19 as an expanded version of Exhibit  
“O” to his affidavit, should not form part of the record in that application.  
[145] However, little turns on this conclusion. In his cross-examination evidence, Mr. Bowe  
testified as to the existence of the delivery confirmation, and that evidence still has some  
probative value. This is not a situation where the Respondent challenges this evidence or has  
otherwise introduced evidence or taken a position to the effect that Mr. Ghermezian did not  
receive A-RUST-0103. Indeed, I do not understand the Respondents in any of the applications to  
be asserting that the Requirements were not received by registered mail when sent by CRA as  
Mr. Bowe deposes in his affidavits. Certainly, the Respondents have not sworn affidavits to that  
Page: 67  
effect. Rather, the Respondents’ position is that Mr. Bowe’s evidence is insufficient to  
affirmatively establish that the Requirements were sent by registered mail as and when they  
purport on the face of the documents attached to his affidavit.  
[146] In that context, I have considered Mr. Bowe’s evidence and find that it is sufficient to  
meet the Minister’s burden. To be clear, I consider the evidence to be weak, not only because of  
the failure to consistently attach to Mr. Bowe’s affidavits documentation confirming the  
registered mailings that would satisfy s 244(5) of the Act, but also because of Mr. Bowe’s lack of  
direct involvement in the mailing process and the lack of detail as to the process employed by  
CRA to effect the mailings. I explained earlier in these Reasons that the absence of direct  
knowledge on the part of Mr. Bowe could affect the weight to be afforded to aspects of his  
evidence, particularly in the context of any compelling conflicting evidence or meaningful  
challenge to his testimony in cross-examination. However, on the service issue, there is no such  
conflicting evidence or meaningful challenge to that of Mr. Bowe. Therefore, notwithstanding its  
shortcomings, it is sufficient to meet the Minister’s burden.  
[147] This finding applies to all the Requirements at issue in the six applications. The evidence  
is not identical across all applications and Requirements. For instance, as noted above, for some  
Requirements, Mr. Bowe’s affidavit evidence is somewhat bolstered by including or referencing  
a delivery confirmation. Also, in relation to each of the Requirements, the Respondent  
commenced an application for judicial review of the Requirement within the 30-day limitation  
period. While this does not constitute evidence of the precise date on which a Requirement was  
sent or received, the commencement of a judicial review does suggest that the Minister’s service  
Page: 68  
was effective in giving the Respondent notice of the relevant Requirement. However, even  
unassisted by this additional evidence, in the absence of conflicting evidence from the  
Respondents, I find the affidavits attesting to CRA serving the Requirements by registered mail  
are sufficient to meet the Minister’s burden.  
[148] As previously noted, I will return later in these Reasons to the sufficiency of the evidence  
regarding the manner in which CRA gave the Respondents notice of the Requests.  
F. Whether the Demands provided a reasonable time for compliance  
[149] The Respondents take the position that the Minister has the burden to establish that the  
time period specified for the recipient’s compliance in a Requirement is reasonable. In relation to  
the Requirements in the applications, the Respondents argue that the Minister has not met this  
burden and that the specified time periods were not reasonable.  
[150] The issue surrounding reasonable notice results from the language of s 231.2(1), which  
requires the recipient of notice under that section to provide the specified information or  
documentation “…within such reasonable time as is stipulated in the notice…”.  
[151] The Respondents reference R v MacDonald, 2005 BCPC 398 [MacDonald], in which the  
British Columbia Provincial Court addressed a prosecution under s 238(1) of the Act for failing  
to provide information required under s 231.2. Among his defences, the defendant argued that  
the 30-day period afforded by the s 231.2 requirement was not a reasonable timeframe within  
which to provide the volume of documents demanded. The Court concluded that the Crown had  
Page: 69  
the onus to show that the time period was reasonable, which would depend on the relevant  
circumstances, including the nature, volume and custodial status of the documents or information  
demanded (at para 31). Absent any evidence from the Crown that 30 days was reasonable, and  
based on an objective review of the nature and volume of documents demanded, the Court found  
that the time was not reasonable and acquitted the defendant (at paras 34 and 36).  
[152] However, I agree with the Minister’s submission that MacDonald is no longer good law,  
as it was overruled by the British Columbia Court of Appeal in R v Sedhu, 2015 BCCA 92  
[Sedhu]. The Court of Appeal (at para 21) noted the reasoning in MacDonald that the  
reasonableness of the time stipulated for compliance was an element of the actus reus of the  
offence but rejected that analysis and the positon that the Crown bore the burden of proof on that  
issue (at paras 36-37).  
[153] I note that the Respondents also rely on Sedhu, but in support of a proposition that, if the  
time for compliance stipulated in a Requirement is not objectively reasonable, a taxpayer is  
under no obligation to even attempt to comply. I find this proposition troubling, particularly  
when considered in the context of the Respondents’ position on the burden of proof and the time  
frames in the present applications. The Respondents argue that time periods such as 30 days were  
unreasonable. However, they are asserting those arguments years after the Requirements were  
served. They submit that, when serving a Requirement, the Minister is to perform an assessment  
of the time required for compliance and provide the recipient with an objectively reasonable  
period to reply, based on the volume and details of the demand and circumstances then known to  
the Minister. I take no issue with that particular interpretation, which is consistent with the  
Page: 70  
conclusions in Sedhu (at para 33). However, it would follow from the Respondents’ broader  
position that, even in the absence of any affidavit evidence from the Respondents explaining why  
a number of days or weeks afforded for compliance was unreasonable, the Minister may be  
unable to compel compliance even years after the Requirement was served.  
[154] I do not read Sedhu to support that position. Like MacDonald, that authority addressed a  
prosecution for failure to comply with demands under s 231.2 of the Act and the comparable  
provision of the ETA. The Respondents rely on the emphasized language in the following  
passage, in which Sedhu explained defences that may be available in responding to a prosecution  
(at para 28):  
28. Second, because of the way they are worded, s. 231.2(1) of  
the ITA and s. 289(1) of the ETA may be read as affording a  
defence to those who can establish that the time stipulated for  
compliance is not objectively reasonable (considering, for  
example, the questions posed by Stromberg-Stein P.C.J. in Tait)  
regardless of whether or not they have used their best efforts to  
comply with the demand. In the absence of the reference to  
“reasonable time” in the statutes defendants would, of course, be  
able to avail themselves of a due diligence defence but would have  
to adduce evidence of diligence.  
[Respondents’ emphasis]  
[155] This language must be read in the context of additional analysis in the decision (at paras  
33 and 36-37):  
33. In their grammatical and ordinary sense, the words used in  
these statutes suggest that the Minister is directed by Parliament,  
when making a demand, to stipulate a reasonable time for  
compliance. The offence, as described by the statute, is not failure  
to comply with a demand within a reasonable time (although that  
was the case in relation to one of the notices considered in  
Richardson where the Minister did not stipulate a date for  
compliance), but, rather, failure to comply with the demand. It  
Page: 71  
does not state the individual must comply with a notice that  
contains a reasonable time to comply, but rather within the time  
specified in the notice. It does not express that the individual has  
an entitlement to a reasonable time to respond to the notice.  
….  
36. Nor, in my view, was it Parliament’s intention to require the  
Crown to establish objective reasonableness of the demand as an  
element of the actus reus. The scheme is consistent with a  
requirement that the Minister consider an objectively reasonable  
time for compliance on the basis of information in the hands of the  
Minister when the notice is served. In my view, it cannot have  
been the intention of Parliament to require evidence of the manner  
in which that period was determined or proof beyond a reasonable  
doubt that the time specified was reasonable at the time of the  
issuance of the notice in every case. The intention to do so might  
have been signaled by reference to “reasonableness” in the sections  
of the Acts creating the offences, or by specific reference in the  
Acts to factors for consideration when assessing the reasonableness  
of the timeline imposed, such as the factors enumerated for  
determining reasonableness under ss. 25.1 and 34 of the Criminal  
Code.  
37. For those reasons, I agree with the conclusion reached by the  
summary conviction appeal judge that convictions under s.  
231.2(1) of the ITA and s. 289 of the ETA must rest upon proof  
beyond a reasonable doubt of identity, jurisdiction, service of the  
notice, and failure to comply with the notice. Once those are  
established on the evidence, an accused person must have an  
opportunity to demonstrate due diligence; that the time provided to  
comply with the requirement was unreasonable; or that the demand  
was not made for purposes related to the administration or  
enforcement of the Act.  
[156] In my view, it is clear from these passages that, if the Respondents wish to assert that the  
time afforded for compliance with the Requirements was either objectively or subjectively  
unreasonable, they bear the burden of proof on that issue.  
Page: 72  
[157] In support of their position that the deadlines afforded for compliance with the  
Requirements in the various applications were unreasonable, the Respondents rely in part on Mr.  
Bowe’s inability to explain in cross-examination the factors that were used to establish these  
deadlines. As the burden of proof on this issue resides with the Respondents, I do not find this  
argument compelling.  
[158] More significantly, none of the Respondents has provided any evidence to support their  
position. They rely on the nature of the information and documentation sought in the various  
Requirements, inferences that could be drawn as to the overall volume of material involved, as  
well as the fact that, in some cases, multiple Requirements are engaged during the same time  
frame. Against that backdrop, the Respondents refer the Court to authorities that identify  
particular time periods for the production of particular sets of information and documentation  
(see, e.g., Lee, rev’g Canada (National Revenue) v Lee, 2015 FC 634; Canada (National  
Revenue) v 2276230 Ontario Inc, 2021 FC 242; R v Tait, [1992] BCJ No 2693).  
[159] I find little value in the Respondents’ reference to these authorities, which are necessarily  
fact-specific and, for the most part, do not actually speak to the issue currently before the Court. I  
do not disagree with the Respondents’ submission that many of the Requirements, on their face,  
appear to seek large volumes of documentation and information. However, the Court does not  
have a sufficient evidentiary foundation to understand with any precision how much material is  
sought or, more importantly, how challenging or time-consuming the assembly of that material  
would be. It may be that the task would be a very significant one or, as the Minister’s counsel  
submits hypothetically, it may be that the information exists or has already been assembled on  
Page: 73  
one USB drive. The point is that the answers to these questions are available to the Respondents,  
but they have adduced no evidence on this issue. As they bear the burden of proof on the issue, I  
find no basis to conclude that the time periods specified in any of the Requirements are  
unreasonable.  
[160] Section 231.2(1), the statutory provision on which the Respondents’ argument is based,  
applies expressly only to Requirements. However, to the extent the Respondents similarly argue  
that the time periods afforded for responding to Requests was unreasonable, the above analysis  
and finding again apply.  
G. Whether the Demands relate to one or more unnamed persons, requiring the  
Minister to seek prior judicial authorization under s. 231.2(3) of the Act  
[161] The Minister’s power to issue a Requirement under s 231.2(1) is subject to subsection  
(2). Subsections (2) and (3), which relate to “unnamed persons,” provide as follows:  
Unnamed persons  
Personnes non désignées  
nommément  
(2) The Minister shall not  
(2) Le ministre ne peut exiger  
impose on any person (in this de quiconque — appelé « tiers  
section referred to as a “third  
party”) a requirement under  
» au présent article — la  
fourniture de renseignements  
subsection 231.2(1) to provide ou production de documents  
information or any document  
relating to one or more  
unnamed persons unless the  
Minister first obtains the  
prévue au paragraphe (1)  
concernant une ou plusieurs  
personnes non désignées  
nommément, sans y être au  
authorization of a judge under préalable autorisé par un juge  
subsection 231.2(3).  
en vertu du paragraphe (3).  
Judicial authorization  
Autorisation judiciaire  
(3) A judge of the Federal  
(3) Sur requête du  
Court may, on application by  
ministre, un juge de la  
Page: 74  
the Minister and subject to  
any conditions that the judge  
considers appropriate,  
authorize the Minister to  
impose on a third party a  
requirement under subsection  
(1) relating to an unnamed  
person or more than one  
unnamed person (in this  
section referred to as the  
“group”) if the judge is  
satisfied by information on  
oath that  
Cour fédérale peut, aux  
conditions qu’il estime  
indiquées, autoriser le  
ministre à exiger d’un tiers  
la fourniture de  
renseignements ou la  
production de documents  
prévues au paragraphe (1)  
concernant une personne  
non désignée nommément  
ou plus d’une personne  
non désignée nommément  
— appelée « groupe » au  
présent article —, s’il est  
convaincu, sur  
dénonciation sous serment,  
de ce qui suit :  
(a) the person or group is  
a) cette personne ou ce  
ascertainable; and  
groupe est identifiable;  
(b) the requirement is  
made to verify  
compliance by the  
person or persons in the  
group with any duty or  
obligation under this Act.  
b) la fourniture ou la  
production est exigée  
pour vérifier si cette  
personne ou les  
personnes de ce groupe  
ont respecté quelque  
devoir ou obligation  
prévu par la présente loi;  
(c) and (d) [Repealed,  
c) et d) [Abrogés, 1996,  
1996, c. 21, s. 58(1)]  
ch. 21, art. 58(1)]  
[162] As set out therein, when the unnamed persons provisions are engaged, the Minister must,  
before issuing a Requirement under s 231.2(1), apply for judicial authorization from the Federal  
Court under s 231.2(3), which prescribes the test to be employed by the Court when considering  
such an application.  
Page: 75  
[163] The Respondents argue that there are Requirements in certain of the applications that  
engage the unnamed persons provisions. As the Minister has not sought judicial authorization  
under s 231.2(3) in relation to these Requirements, the Respondents submit that they are invalid.  
The merits of this argument can be assessed only by considering it in the context of each  
individual Requirement where it is raised. However, at a higher level it is useful to set out at this  
juncture some general jurisprudential guidance that will inform this analysis.  
[164] As noted in the Respondents’ written submissions in T-259-19 (Paul Ghermezian) and T-  
262-19 (Joshua Ghermezian), this Court in Ghermezian reviewed principles applicable to the  
unnamed persons provisions, including by way of background (at para 31) the following  
explanation by Justice Roy in Canada (National Revenue) v Hydro-Québec, 2018 FC 622  
[Hydro-Québec] of the purpose of the unnamed persons provisions (at para 68):  
68. It is obvious upon examination of the context in which  
subsections 231.2 (2) and (3) are found that Parliament wanted to  
limit the scope of the Minister’s powers, extensive as they are. The  
purpose of the provision is to limit the scope of requests for  
information that can be issued. Thus, the fear of abuse that could  
be generated by the case law of Canadian Bank of  
Commerce, Richardson, McKinlay and Jarvis is seen in the  
obligation of judicial intervention in the case where the targeted  
individuals cannot be identified by name. Parliament wants to  
protect unnamed persons ex ante, so as to avoid undue invasions  
and not to remedy them later. The protection that Parliament wants  
to grant is based on a request made to administer or enforce the  
Act, which case law had interpreted as requiring a genuine and  
serious inquiry in the case of previously identified individuals, but  
especially, in the case of people who cannot even be named, that  
they be identifiable and that we want to verify whether this  
unnamed but identifiable person has respected duties and  
obligations outlined in the Act. It is clear that Parliament is seeking  
a certain specificity if a request related to people who are unnamed  
may be targets. In this case, we are searching in vain for a criterion  
connected to the Act that would turn the group into an  
ascertainable group for the purpose of administering or enforcing  
Page: 76  
the Act and for which it would be permissible to seek information  
to thereupon verify compliance with the Act.  
[165] After canvassing the leading authorities in Canada (Customs and Revenue Agency) v  
Artistic Ideas Inc, 2005 FCA 68 [Artistic Ideas] and Redeemer, this Court in Ghermezian  
concluded as follows as to the effect of those authorities (at para 39):  
39. The effect of Artistic Ideas was to clarify that the unnamed  
persons provisions are not engaged if the Minister serves a  
requirement seeking to identify unnamed persons who are not  
themselves being investigated as to their compliance with the Act.  
Although not relying on Artistic Ideas, the Supreme Court  
subsequently confirmed this interpretation in Redeemer (see Chief  
Justice McLachlin and Justice LeBel for the majority at para 22  
and Justice Rothstein in dissent, although not on this issue, at para  
48).  
[166] The Minister also emphasizes the explanation in Redeemer that judicial authorization is  
not required where the requested information is needed to verify compliance of the taxpayer  
being audited, regardless of whether the information obtained in the audit would include  
information about unnamed persons and potentially lead to investigation of those persons (at  
para 22):  
22. The s. 231.2(2) requirement should not apply to situations in  
which the requested information is required in order to verify the  
compliance of the taxpayer being audited. Regardless of whether  
or not there is a possibility or a probability that the audit will lead  
to the investigation of other unnamed taxpayers, the CRA should  
be able to obtain information it would otherwise have the ability to  
see in the course of an audit. …  
[167] The Respondents draw the Court’s attention to the recent decision in Zeifmans LLP v  
Canada (National Revenue), 2021 FC 363 [Zeifmans], in which Justice Walker addressed an  
Page: 77  
application for judicial review by an accounting firm, challenging a Requirement that sought  
information related to clients of the firm, including two of the Respondents in the present  
applications, Marc Vaturi and Nader Ghermezian. In that case, the information sheets underlying  
the Requirement referred to CRA wishing to verify whether unnamed offshore entities were  
managed and controlled from Canada by the taxpayers under audit. Based thereon, the applicants  
argued that, because CRA intended to use information obtained via the Requirement to  
determine whether unnamed persons were subject to taxation, judicial authorization was  
required.  
[168] Zeifmans adopted (at paras 42 and 44) the principles canvassed above from Artistic Ideas  
and Redeemer. Justice Walker concluded that the applicant had not established that CRA was  
engaged in an investigation of the unnamed persons’ compliance with the Act and, applying the  
principles from Artistic Ideas and Redeemer, held that the possibility that one or more unnamed  
persons may be subject to audit in the future was not sufficient to require judicial authorization  
for the Requirement (at para 59).  
[169] I will apply these principles when considering the Respondents’ unnamed persons  
arguments, in relation to specific Requirements, later in these Reasons.  
H. Whether the Demands raise ambiguity as to whether their recipient is the  
same as the Respondent  
[170] The Respondents invoke a principle they refer to as the “same person principle”,  
identified in relevant jurisprudence as providing that the Minister can obtain a compliance order  
Page: 78  
against a person under s 231.7, in relation to an unsatisfied Demand under 231.1 or 231.2, only if  
it was the same person who was required to comply with the Demand. Justice Boswell explained  
and applied this principle in Minister of National Revenue v Lin, 2019 FC 646 [Lin] at para 32,  
and found as a result that the Minister was not entitled to a compliance order:  
32. The Court must be satisfied that the person against whom a  
compliance order is sought is one who was required under section  
231.1 or 231.2 to provide the access, assistance, information or  
document sought by the Minister. Because it is not at all clear  
whether the Letter was directed to the Respondents individually or  
their connected entities, the first requirement of section 231.7 (as  
noted above) for obtaining a compliance order has not been  
satisfied by the Minister (Chamandy at para 30, and Canada  
(Minister of National Revenue) v SML Operations (Canada) Ltd,  
2003 FC 868 at para 16).  
[171] As identified in this passage, this principle has also been applied in Chamandy and SML  
Operations, both cases in which the Court concluded that it was not clear whether the relevant  
Demand was directed to a corporation or its director. As is evident from the Court’s analysis in  
Chamandy, which applied SML Operations, the uncertainty in both cases surrounded whether the  
Demand was directed to an individual in his personal capacity or as a representative of the  
corporation, i.e., whether the recipient of the Demand was actually the individual or the  
corporation.  
[172] This principle flows from the statutory conditions that must be met to obtain a  
compliance order under s 231.7. As explained earlier in these Reasons, the Court must be  
satisfied that the person against whom the order is sought was required under ss 231.1 or 231.2  
of the Act to provide the access, assistance, information or documents sought by the Minister  
Page: 79  
(see Lee at para 6). It follows that the respondent to the Minister’s application for a compliance  
order must be the same person to whom the relevant Demand was directed.  
[173] In applications now before the Court, not including T-258-19 (involving the corporate  
Respondent, Gherfam), the Respondents argue that certain of the Demands offend this principle  
because, in the Respondents’ submission, it was not the individual Respondents, but rather a trust  
or corporation, to whom certain Demands were directed.  
[174] As is evident from the recent decision in Canada (National Revenue) v Friedman, 2019  
FC 1583 (affirmed 2021 FCA 101), in which Justice Pamel declined to follow Lin  
notwithstanding very similar facts, the analysis required to consider this sort of argument is very  
fact-specific. I will therefore analyze this issue later in these Reasons in connection with  
individual Demands for which it is raised.  
I. Whether the Demands improperly sought the production of foreign-based  
information or documents within the meaning of s 231.6 of the Act  
[175] In relation to many Demands, the relevant Respondent submits that the Demand  
improperly sought the production of foreign-based information or documents within the meaning  
of s 231.6 of the Act. The complete text of s 231.6 is set out in Appendix “A”. This Court  
addressed arguments surrounding s 231.6 in Ghermezian and provided the following general  
explanation of the operation of its provisions (at paras 84-85):  
84. These provisions relate to requirements to provide a “foreign-  
based information or document,” which s 231.6(1) defines as any  
information or document that is available or located outside  
Canada and that may be relevant to the administration or  
Page: 80  
enforcement of the ITA, including the collection of the amount  
payable under the ITA by any person.  
85. When the Minister serves a requirement under s 231.6, that  
section operates to afford the person served with certain  
protections. Under s 231.6(3), the requirement must afford the  
person no less than 90 days for the production of the information  
or document, provide a description of the information or document  
being sought, and set out the consequences of failing to comply.  
Under s 231.6(4), the person served has the right, within 90 days of  
service, to apply to the Court for a review of the requirement.  
Section 231.6(5) provides that the Court may then confirm the  
requirement, vary it as the judge considers appropriate in the  
circumstances, or set aside the requirement if the judge is satisfied  
that the requirement is unreasonable.  
[176] The Respondents argue that the Minister cannot compel the production of foreign-based  
information or documents, within the meaning of s 231.6, other than through s 231.6. They  
therefore take the position either that Demands that seek such material are invalid or that they  
must be read so as to exclude such material. The Respondents urge the Court, if granting any  
compliance orders, to expressly exclude their application to foreign-based information and  
documents.  
[177] The Respondents rely significantly on Ghermezian, in which this Court was required to  
consider somewhat similar arguments by the applicants, surrounding whether the Requirements  
at issue in the relevant applications for judicial review were unreasonable, because they sought  
documents and information that were prima facie located or available outside Canada and  
therefore subject to s 231.6. In responding to those arguments, the Minister took the position that  
the recipients of the Requirements were required to produce any information or documents  
requested that was in their power, possession or control, even if they were located outside  
Canada. That is, independent of the foreign-based information regime, if the information or  
Page: 81  
documentation was within the applicants’ power, possession or control, they were required to  
produce it, regardless of where it was located (see para 87). The following excerpts from  
Ghermezian explain the Court’s rejection of the Minister’s position:  
95. Turning to more recent jurisprudence, the Respondent also  
relies on the decision of the Federal Court of Appeal in eBay. This  
case is closer to addressing the point in issue, as it considered an  
argument by the appellant, eBay Canada Inc [eBay Canada], that  
the Minister was unable to require production of information under  
s 231.2 because the information was located outside Canada and  
thus constituted foreign-based information under s 231.6. The  
Federal Court found, and Federal Court of Appeal affirmed, that  
the Minister was not required to resort to s 231.6, notwithstanding  
that the required information was stored on computer services  
located outside Canada. The Respondent refers in particular to  
paragraphs 50 to 53 of this decision, which the Respondent  
submits demonstrates the Federal Court of Appeal relying on a  
conclusion that the information was within eBay Canada’s power,  
possession and control.  
96. Again, I disagree that this authority supports the Respondent’s  
position. The result in eBay turned on the Federal Court’s finding,  
affirmed by the Federal Court of Appeal, that the relevant  
information was located in Canada, because eBay Canada was able  
to access it from its computers in Canada. Indeed, the Federal  
Court of Appeal concludes its analysis by stating that, because the  
facts of that case did not engage s 231.6, it was unnecessary to  
consider whether the presence of that section in the statutory  
scheme reduced the Minister’s powers under s 231.2 when the  
requirement related to foreign-based information (at para 53). I  
read this statement as expressly confirming that the Court was not  
addressing the proposition the Respondent is advancing in the  
present case.  
….  
99. With the benefit of the parties’ respective submissions on  
Pierlot, I conclude that it does not assist the Respondent. It does  
not stand for the proposition advanced by the Respondent that the  
Minister can obtain foreign-based information through a  
requirement issued under s 231.2, provided it is in the possession,  
power or control of the recipient of the requirement. Rather,  
somewhat like eBay, this case turned on a factual determination  
that the relevant information was available to the recipient in  
Canada. In other words, these authorities support the conclusion  
Page: 82  
only that, if foreign-based information is also located in Canada, it  
can be compelled under s 231.2 by virtue of its Canadian location.  
They do not support a conclusion that information which is located  
only outside Canada can be compelled under s 231.2 because it is  
within the power, possession or control of the recipient of the  
requirement.  
100.Taking into account the parties’ respective arguments on the  
point, the Respondent has not convinced me that the statutory  
scheme of the ITA permits the Minister to require production of  
foreign-based information through s 231.2(1). However, my role is  
not to arrive at a definitive conclusion on this point, and I need not  
do so in order to decide these applications for judicial review, as  
another argument advanced by the Respondent (canvassed next in  
these Reasons) satisfies me as to the reasonableness of the  
decisions to issue the RFIs without recourse to s 231.6.  
[178] As explained at the conclusion of the above excerpts, Ghermezian did not make a  
definitive finding on the Minister’s argument because, regardless of the outcome of that  
argument, the reasonableness of the Requirements turned on another argument advanced by the  
Minister. The Minister argued that the possibility the requested material may be outside Canada  
did not translate into a conclusion that the Requirements issued under s 231.2(1) were invalid  
(see para 101). The Court accepted the Minister’s submission that, when seeking information and  
documentation through its powers under the Act, the Minister cannot necessarily be expected to  
know where the material is located. Nor must the Minister necessarily accede to the taxpayer’s  
representation as to such location (at para 104).  
[179] Ghermezian explained that this does not mean that a Requirement issued under s 231.2  
has extra-territorial application, only that the determination of the location of the requested  
material need not take place before the Requirement is issued. If the Minister concludes that a  
recipient has failed to comply with a Requirement, for instance by failing to disclose material  
Page: 83  
that the Minister believed to be located in Canada, the Minister can bring a compliance  
application, which would afford an opportunity for the parties to adduce evidence relevant to the  
location of the material, to equip the Court to decide whether the compliance order should be  
issued.  
[180] This brings us to the present applications. While, as noted above, Ghermezian did not  
reach a definitive conclusion on the Minister’s position that the recipient of a Requirement is  
required to produce any material requested that is in its power, possession or control, even if  
located outside Canada, the Minister is not advancing that position in the current applications.  
Rather, relying on eBay (at paras 50-53), the Minister takes the position that the Requirements  
oblige the Respondents to provide the documents and information in their power, possession and  
control, if accessible from Canada. I consider that position to be consistent with eBay and the  
reasoning in Ghermezian.  
[181] However, much like in Ghermezian (see para 104), the Court is again without sufficient  
evidence to support a conclusion on the location of the information and documentation sought in  
the Requirements or whether it is accessible from Canada. While Ghermezian identified that a  
compliance application under s 231.7 would afford parties an opportunity to adduce such  
evidence, neither party has particularly availed itself of that opportunity in the present  
applications. As on many of the issues in these applications, the parties disagree about who bears  
the burden of proof on this issue.  
Page: 84  
[182] The Minister’s evidence on the subject is very limited. For instance, in T-254-19 (Marc  
Vaturi), in relation to Requirement A-MV-0136 that sought banking records for certain Hong  
Kong registered companies, Mr. Bowe’s affidavit states that information obtained by CRA  
showed that some of the statements for the bank accounts held by these companies were  
addressed to Mr. Vaturi’s home address in Ontario or to his attention at what Mr. Bowe refers to  
as the Ghermezian Group’s office address at the West Edmonton Mall. In relation to  
Requirement A-MV-0136, seeking documentation related to certain Gibraltar companies and  
their subsidiaries, Mr. Bowe testified on cross-examination as to his belief that the documents  
would be located in Canada, because one of the Gibraltar companies provided an Edmonton  
address to its corporate service providers in Hong Kong.  
[183] In T-261-19 (Raphael Ghermezian), in relation to Requirement A-RUST-0103,  
requesting original United States [US] tax returns, Mr. Bowe testified in cross-examination as to  
his belief that the “Triple Five head office” in Edmonton would have possession of business and  
business operations documentation. He noted that CRA had obtained documentation from this  
office relating to trusts and other business operations. However, Mr. Bowe later confirmed that  
he did not know one way or another whether the US tax returns were located within Canada. (I  
also note that the Minister is no longer seeking the US tax returns).  
[184] In T-252-19 (Nader Ghermezian), in relation to Request NUST-22, which sought  
accounting data for entities in the Mall of America Group and related entities that transacted with  
that group, the Respondents’ counsel asked Mr. Bowe in cross-examination whether he recalled  
receiving advice that the accounting records for the Mall of America Group were located in the  
Page: 85  
US. Mr. Bowe noted a reference in Request NUST-22 (which he had issued personally) to an IT  
interview on April 21, 2017, and explained that he had been told by a member of the IT staff at  
the West Edmonton Mall address that they had access to the Mall of America accounting data  
from within Edmonton and that it was stored on their server network.  
[185] The Respondents argue that this evidence is hearsay and inadmissible for purposes of  
establishing the location of the relevant records. The Minister responds that this evidence is  
admissible to demonstrate that the relevant statement was made by IT staff in Edmonton, arguing  
that the Minister cannot be expected to prove the location of the Respondents’ documentation  
through first-hand knowledge.  
[186] As previously noted, the Minister’s evidence on the location of the Respondents’  
documents is limited. The above examples relate to only a small portion of the overall volume of  
documentation at issue in these applications and certainly do not serve to establish that all the  
documentation and information sought in these applications is located in or accessible from  
within Canada. However, the parties’ positions on the above hearsay point illustrate the strength  
of the Minister’s position that the burden of proof on this issue rests with the Respondents.  
Ghermezian did not address the burden of proof on this issue. However, in my view it is an  
inescapable conclusion that the Respondents must bear the burden. The location or accessibility  
of the material sought through the Demands is not one of the statutory conditions in s 231.7.  
Rather, it is a defence argument raised by the Respondents and, more significantly, it is the  
Respondents who would be privy to the evidence relevant to the argument.  
Page: 86  
[187] However, as previously noted, the Respondents have not filed affidavit evidence in  
response to the compliance applications. In advancing their arguments that the Minister is  
seeking to compel foreign-based material, the Respondents rely principally on the fact that, on  
the face of the Demands, many of them relate to foreign-based corporations, trusts, filings and  
business operations. As in Ghermezian¸ this is not sufficient evidence to support a conclusion on  
the location of the material. Certainly, this evidence does not allow the Court to assess whether  
the material is accessible from within Canada.  
[188] In T-258-19 (Gherfam), the Respondents also rely on a letter dated August 17, 2017 from  
Mr. Dan McKinley of the accounting firm Grant Thornton [GT] to CRA, attached to and  
referenced in Mr. Bowe’s affidavit. Mr. McKinley’s letter references Request GEI-17, seeking  
documentation with respect to an “Agreement of Partnership of Mall of America Associates”,  
and points out that Mall of America Associates is located in the US and that the accounting for  
that entity is performed there. He further states that the documents are not maintained in Canada.  
However, the record before the Court includes no affidavit from Mr. McKinley that would  
support reliance on this letter to meet the Respondents’ burden.  
[189] In conclusion on this issue, in the absence of evidence sufficient to meet the  
Respondents’ burden, their arguments surrounding foreign-based information and documents  
raise no basis for resisting any of the applications. I note the alternative position expressed by the  
Respondents that, if the Court is prepared to issue any compliance orders in these matters, they  
should be expressly limited to information located in Canada and should exclude foreign-based  
information as described in s 231.6. I am not convinced that any orders issued in these matters  
Page: 87  
should include language intended to expressly tailor the orders to a defence argument that has  
not been made out on the evidence before the Court.  
J. If the Court determines that any compliance orders should be issued, whether  
such orders should contain an exclusion for documents and information  
protected by solicitor-client privilege  
[190] The outcome of this issue surrounding solicitor-client privilege turns on an analysis  
similar to my above analysis of the Respondents’ position that any compliance order should  
expressly exclude foreign-based information. As explained earlier in these Reasons, the  
Respondents bear the burden of proof on any invocation of privilege. As with many other issues  
they raise in these applications, they have not adduced evidence to support a conclusion by the  
Court that any of the material sought by the Minister, in the Demands in any of the applications,  
is privileged.  
[191] The Respondents have raised limited privilege arguments in relation to particular  
language in particular Demands. For instance, in T-261-19 (Raphael Ghermezian), in relation to  
Request BUST-20v2, the requested documentation includes “wire transfer confirmations,  
confirmation of the deposit to Mr. Lamoreux’s account, and any correspondence to Mr.  
Lamoreux discussing or explaining the transfers.” Elsewhere in the record, the Respondent  
points out that the title “ESQ” is employed after Mr. Lamoreux’s name, indicating that he is a  
lawyer. On this basis, the Respondent submits that the request for correspondence to Mr.  
Lamoreux seeks privileged documentation. I agree with the Minister’s response that, even if the  
Court were to infer that Mr. Lamoreux is a lawyer, the Respondent has not adduced evidence of  
Page: 88  
the nature of Mr. Lamoreux’s role, or the particular communications described in BUST-20v2,  
which would allow the Court to conclude that these communications are privileged.  
[192] Similarly, in T-259-19 (Paul Ghermezian) and T-262-19 (Joshua Ghermezian),  
Requirements A-GDT-0103 and A-GDT-0102, respectively, demanded the production of various  
categories of documentation and information for a list of companies, including “Minutes,  
resolutions, memorandums and agreements in respect of any changes, whether direct or indirect,  
in the membership/ownership of the entity”. The Respondents note the reference to  
“memorandums” and argue that any compliance orders issued in these applications should  
expressly exclude any memoranda that may have been prepared by counsel. Again, there is no  
evidence to support a conclusion that there is privileged documentation that would otherwise be  
responsive to this item in these Requirements.  
[193] I am not convinced that any orders issued in these matters should include language  
intended to expressly tailor the orders to a defence argument surrounding privilege that has not  
been made out on the evidence before the Court.  
K. If the Court concludes that a compliance order should not be issued in  
relation to a portion of a Demand, whether the Court has the authority to  
sever that portion and issue an order in relation to the remainder of the  
Demand  
[194] The Respondents take the position that, if any part of a Demand is invalid, based on any  
of the defence arguments raised in these applications, the entire Demand is invalid. The  
Respondents further argue that the Minister has attempted to pre-empt scrutiny of her Demands  
Page: 89  
by selectively removing invalid items from her compliance applications. The Respondents  
submit that the Minister may withdraw items from a Demand only after it has been determined  
that every item in the Demand is valid.  
[195] In support of these positions, the Respondents rely on Ghermezian, in which this Court  
addressed as follows the possibility of “severance” in relation to a Requirement, one item of  
which was found unreasonable on judicial review (at paras 164-165):  
164. However, in relation to T-1501-18, I have found one  
component of the Gherfam RFI unreasonable, which raises the  
question of the appropriate remedy to impose. I find no basis to  
consider any of the heads of relief other than the possibility of  
quashing the RFI. The alternative to quashing the Gherfam RFI  
could possibly be some form of severance, in which the  
problematic paragraph four of the RFI is excised from the  
document, with the rest to remain in effect. I note that Justice  
Fothergill adopted such an approach in Bayer (at paras 49-52).  
However, that case involved an application under s 231.6 of the  
ITA. Section 231.6(5) expressly provides that, on such an  
application, the Court has various powers including varying the  
requirement as the judge considers appropriate in the  
circumstances.  
165. It may be that the Court could impose a similar remedy in a  
matter, such as the case at hand, involving judicial review of a s  
231.2(1) requirement. However, at the hearing, I sought from the  
Respondent’s counsel the Respondent’s position on the appropriate  
remedy in the event I were to find a component of an RFI  
unreasonable. The Respondent took the position that the  
appropriate result was to quash the RFI, with supporting reasons. I  
understand it would then be the Minister’s intention to re-issue the  
RFI without the unreasonable component or with the basis for the  
finding of unreasonableness otherwise addressed. As the  
Respondent has not sought severance, and neither party has made  
submissions in support of the availability or appropriateness of  
severance, my Judgment will quash the Gherfam RFI and return  
the decision to issue that RFI to the decision-maker to be re-  
determined in accordance with these Reasons.  
Page: 90  
[196] The Respondents note the point identified in Ghermezian that, in an application under s  
231.6 challenging a foreign information requirement, s 231.6(5) expressly provides that the  
Court has various powers including varying the requirement as the judge considers appropriate in  
the circumstances. The Respondents submit that the absence of such language in s 231.7 suggests  
that the Court does not have comparable power in a compliance application. The Respondents  
also argue that policy considerations favour their position, as recipients of Requirements should  
have the certainty of knowing that they face no obligations in relation to invalid Requirements.  
[197] In response to the Respondents’ reliance on Ghermezian, the Minister notes that case  
involved an application for judicial review, in which the Minister did not consider the Court to  
have authority to set aside a Requirement only in part and therefore did not seek severance. The  
Minister argues that the Court has broader remedial authority in compliance applications,  
because s 231.7(3) expressly provides that a judge making an order under s 231.7(1) may impose  
any conditions in respect of the order that the judge considers appropriate. The Minister therefore  
takes the position that, with the benefit of its discretion in addressing compliance applications,  
the Court may grant a compliance order in relation to valid items in a Demand, even if it finds  
other items in the same Demand to be invalid. The Minister also relies on Miller, in which the  
Court granted the Minister’s compliance application in part and issued an order in respect of  
certain of the requested items, notwithstanding that others were found invalid.  
[198] As I read Miller, the issue whether the Court had authority for “severance” was not  
argued and was not expressly addressed in the decision. I am therefore reluctant to rely on this  
authority for this purpose. However, I find the Minister’s position on this issue more compelling  
Page: 91  
than that of the Respondents. For the reasons the Minister argues, Ghermezian does not represent  
a precedent adverse to her position. As noted earlier in these Reasons, the Court has discretion in  
addressing an application under s 231.7, including as informed by s 231.7(3), and I see no reason  
why this discretion would not extend to granting an order compelling compliance with a Demand  
in part. From a policy perspective, the interest in certainty advocated by the Respondents is  
equally accommodated if recipients can operate on the basis that they must comply with valid  
items in Demands, even if other items are questionable.  
[199] Therefore, after I have considered all the arguments raised by the Respondents in  
challenging the various Demands or portions thereof in these applications, if I conclude that  
certain Demands include both valid and invalid items, I will exercise my discretion to order  
compliance with the valid portions.  
L. Whether certain Requirements were ineffective because the Respondents are  
not residents of Canada  
[200] Unlike the issues canvassed above in these Reasons, which relate to many or all of the  
applications, the Respondents raise this residency issue only in relation to T-259-19 and T-262-  
19, as they argue that the Respondents thereto, respectively Paul Ghermezian and Joshua  
Ghermezian, are not residents of Canada and therefore are not subject to the Requirements at  
issue in those applications or to the compliance orders that the Minister seeks.  
[201] The applications against Paul and Joshua Ghermezian involve just one Requirement each  
(on materially identical terms) and no Requests. These Respondents submit that s 231.2 does not  
Page: 92  
authorize the Minister to compel production of documents and information from non-residents  
and that s 231.7 does not authorize the Court to issue compliance orders against non-residents.  
The Respondents assert that they are US residents and take the position that, if the Minister  
wishes to obtain information from them for the purposes of administering and enforcing the Act,  
then she must follow the procedure set out in Article XXVII of the Canada-United States  
Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital, 26 September 1980 (entered into  
force 16 August 1984) as amended [the US Treaty]. The Respondents submit that the Minister’s  
efforts to obtain compliance orders against them through these summary applications is contrary  
to Canada’s international obligations.  
[202] In their written submissions in support of these positions, the Respondents rely  
principally on R v Hape, 2007 SCC 26 [Hape], in which the Supreme Court of Canada  
considered whether s 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms applied to searches  
conducted by the RCMP in the Turks and Caicos Islands in conjunction with local police. The  
Respondents’ submissions refer, inter alia, to the Supreme Court’s identification of the principle  
that a state cannot act to enforce its laws within the territory of another state absent either the  
consent of the other state or, in exceptional cases, some other basis under international law (at  
para 65).  
[203] The Respondents also refer to the Court to an excerpt from CRA’s administrative  
directives, CRA Directives, AD-19-02R, which notes that the Minister cannot seek a compliance  
order under s 231.7 to compel compliance with a requirement under s 231.2 “…issued to a  
person outside of Canada unless the person is in Canada.”  
Page: 93  
[204] The Respondents explain their position that Article XXVII of the US Treaty provides a  
framework that allows the Minister to seek information from US revenue officials, including  
having them obtain depositions from witnesses in the US or original documents located in the  
US. Article XXVII sets out the terms and conditions under which such assistance may be  
obtained, as well as restrictions on how the Minister may use any information or documents so  
procured. The Respondents submit that, in the context of a treaty of this nature containing  
exchange of information provisions, the Minister’s pursuit of the compliance applications in  
these matters represent an effort to bypass the treaty and subvert the procedural protections  
available to foreign residents.  
[205] Supported by these arguments, the Respondents take the position that Parliament could  
not have intended ss 231.2 and/or 231.7 to apply extraterritorially and that, if that had been the  
legislature’s intention, it would have stated so expressly in those sections. The Respondents  
supplemented these arguments in oral submissions, taking the position that the word “person”,  
employed in ss 231.2 and 231.7, is implicitly limited to persons in Canada. They referred the  
court to jurisprudence finding implicit jurisdictional limitations in Canadian taxation legislation  
(see, e.g., Oroville Reman & Reload Inc v Canada, 2016 TCC 75; Oceanspan Carriers Ltd v  
Canada, [1987] 2 FC 171 (FCA), FCJ No 126; Holiday Luggage Manufacturing Co v Minister  
of National Revenue, [1987] 2 FC 249, 86 DTC 6601 (FCTD); Canada (National Revenue) v  
Stanchfield, 2009 FC 99; Marino v The Queen, 2020 TCC 50).  
[206] The Minister takes the position that, based on a textual reading of the compliance  
provisions in the Act, whether the Respondents are resident or non-resident for income tax  
Page: 94  
purposes is irrelevant for purposes of ss 231.2 and 231.7, as both sections apply to any “person”  
and neither section expresses any limitation based on residency. The Minister argues that, if  
Parliament had intended to narrow the scope of these components of the compliance provisions,  
it would have done so explicitly as it has done in numerous other provisions of the Act. For  
instance, the provisions of s 231.6, related to the power to gather foreign-based information and  
documentation, expressly take residency into account in prescribing the scope of that power.  
[207] The Minister relies on the purpose of the Act’s compliance provisions, to give the  
Minister broad powers to investigate and audit taxpayers (see McKinlay at para 35-36), and  
emphasizes that non-residents of Canada can be subject to Canadian tax. The Minister argues  
that Parliament cannot have intended that individuals who are present in Canada can simply  
declare themselves non-resident for Canadian tax purposes and thereby deprive the Minister of  
any ability to verify that declaration through her compliance powers. The Minister also submits  
she is not bound by the Respondents’ reported residency status (see Ludmer v Canada, [1995] 2  
FC 3 (FCA) at paras 12-14).  
[208] Against the backdrop of those general principles, the Minister also emphasizes that the  
Requirements were served on Paul and Joshua Ghermezian in Canada, employing a method of  
service authorized by s 231.2 of the Act, and that they have led no evidence to support their  
position that they are no longer residents of Canada or that they are resident in the US. The  
Minister submits that the Respondents’ position should be rejected on the want of evidence alone  
as, despite being best placed to prove their residency, neither Respondent has filed an affidavit in  
Page: 95  
these applications. Rather, the Respondents attempt to rely on evidence obtained from Mr. Bowe  
in cross-examination.  
[209] Turning to the evidence, the Respondents rely on Mr. Bowe’s cross-examination, in  
which he confirmed that, according to CRA’s records at the time of the cross-examination,  
neither Paul nor Joshua Ghermezian is currently a resident of Canada. They also note Mr.  
Bowe’s confirmation that the Edmonton Address to which the Requirements were sent was a  
business address and not the home address of either of the Respondents. The Respondents’  
counsel referred Mr. Bowe to a December 11, 2015 letter from GT to CRA, which provided a  
residential address for each of Paul and Joshua Ghermezian in New York City.  
[210] The Respondents also refer to a contrast, related to their residency for Canadian tax  
purposes, between the Requirement served on Paul Ghermezian and that served on Joshua  
Ghermezian. The former, Requirement A-GDT-0103 dated October 30, 2018, states that,  
according to records obtained by CRA, Paul Ghermezian had been filing the T1 Income Tax and  
Benefit Return for Canadian tax purposes for the last 10 years (the last being for the 2017 tax  
year), indicating that he was a Canadian resident. The Requirement further states that Paul  
Ghermezian had never reported to CRA an emigration from Canada or filed a form NR73,  
Determination of Residency Status (Leaving Canada). The Requirement describes these as  
significant factors that lead CRA to consider Paul Ghermezian to be a current Canadian resident  
for Canadian tax purposes.  
Page: 96  
[211] In contrast, Requirement A-GDT-0102, also dated October 30, 2018, and served on  
Joshua Ghermezian, does not refer to him having previously made T1 tax filings indicating that  
he was a Canadian resident. Rather, the Requirement states that, according to records obtained  
by CRA, his birthplace is Edmonton and he currently holds a Canadian passport and an Alberta  
driver’s license. The Requirement further states that Joshua Ghermezian had never reported to  
CRA an emigration from Canada and, when asked by CRA in May 2017 to complete form  
NR73, Determination of Residency Status (Leaving Canada) if he had left Canada, no form was  
filed. The Requirement explains that CRA has accordingly concluded that Joshua Ghermezian  
has been maintaining residential ties with Canada and is considered a Canadian resident for  
Canadian tax purposes. I also note that Mr. Bowe’s affidavit in the application against Joshua  
Ghermezian states that, on May 14, 2019, he filed his 2018 T1 personal income tax return, which  
reported that he had emigrated from Canada on December 21, 2018. Mr. Bowe states that, prior  
to May 14, 2019, Mr. Ghermezian had not informed CRA that he was not a resident of Canada.  
[212] Relying on the contrasts between the Requirements, the Respondents emphasize the  
absence of any statement that Joshua Ghermezian has ever filed taxes as a Canadian resident, and  
they submit that maintaining residential ties and being a Canadian resident for Canadian tax  
purposes are not consistent with being a factual resident of Canada. In relation to Paul  
Ghermezian, the Respondents note that, while the relevant Requirement attached to Mr. Bowe’s  
affidavit refers to past tax filings as a Canadian resident, Mr. Bowe provides no direct evidence  
of this fact in his affidavit. They also submit that, even if Paul or Joshua Ghermezian was  
resident in Canada at the time the relevant Requirement was served upon him, this does not  
Page: 97  
necessarily establish that he was resident at the time the Minister commenced her summary  
applications or at the time these applications are being heard or decided.  
[213] I should note that I have concerns about this Court’s jurisdiction to make a finding as to  
the Respondents’ residency. As observed in Lin, by virtue of s 18.5 of the Federal Courts Act,  
RSC 1985, c F-7, determining residency for purposes of the Act lies within the jurisdiction of the  
Tax Court of Canada (at para 29). Leaving that point aside, I accept the Respondents’ position  
that there is little evidence that would support a finding that Paul and/or Joshua Ghermezian is or  
was a resident of Canada at any potentially relevant time. However, there is similarly little  
evidence that would support a finding that Paul and/or Joshua Ghermezian is not or was not a  
resident of Canada. This outcome of any determination of this issue (if this Court had the  
necessary jurisdiction) would turn on the burden of proof that, in my view, would have to rest  
with the Respondents. The Respondents’ residency is not one of the statutory conditions in s  
231.7. Rather, it is a defence argument raised by the Respondents and, more significantly, it is  
the Respondents who would be privy to the evidence relevant to the argument.  
[214] In the absence of a finding that the Respondents are not residents of Canada, their  
arguments surrounding the statutory interpretation of ss 231.2 and 231.7, including the potential  
relevance of the US Treaty and principles of international law, cannot affect the outcome of these  
applications. Therefore, exercising judicial restraint, I decline to make findings on those  
arguments.  
V.  
Applications  
Page: 98  
[215] I now turn to the individual applications. The following section of these Reasons provides  
a brief summary of the nature of the documentation and/or information sought in each  
application. Together, the applications arise from a large number of Demands. I will summarize  
these under headings that employ the same identifiers used by the parties. To the extent that my  
general conclusions on the issues canvassed earlier in these Reasons have not already included  
findings as to the outcome of those issues for purposes of the applications, my analysis below  
will apply those conclusions to the individual Demands. I will also address other arguments that  
the Respondents have raised in relation to specific Demands.  
A. T-252-19 – MNR v Nader Ghermezian  
(1) Request A-NG-0105  
[216] This Request, dated August 14, 2015, is addressed to Nader Ghermezian and states that it  
relates to an audit of his personal income tax returns for the years 2011-2014. It asks him to  
provide various categories of documentation and/or information pertaining to a number of  
principally foreign corporations.  
[217] Mr. Bowe’s affidavit in this application explains the history of CRA’s audit of Mr. Nader  
Ghermezian and his brothers that, together with other related or economically connected  
individuals and entities, he refers to as the “Ghermezian Group”. Mr. Bowe explains that, in the  
course of this audit, CRA made a number of requests of Mr. Ghermezian in the form of letters  
and queries for information and documents in connection with various entities related or  
Page: 99  
economically connected to him. The first such letter he identifies is Request A-NG-0105, a copy  
of which is attached to Mr. Bowe’s affidavit.  
[218] The letter purports to have been have been sent to Mr. Ghermezian by registered mail at  
the Edmonton Address on August 14, 2015, and Mr. Bowe deposes that he received some  
responsive documentation and information from Mr. Ghermezian’s counsel on December 21,  
2015 and May 5, 2017. While this is not strong evidence that use of the Edmonton Address was  
an effective means for CRA to communicate with Mr. Ghermezian and that he received proper  
notice of this Request, there is no evidence to the contrary. I therefore find that he received  
proper notice.  
[219] Other than the broad issues canvassed earlier in these Reasons, the Respondent has raised  
no defence arguments specific to this request.  
[220] The Minister asserts that Mr. Ghermezian provided some, but not all, of the requested  
documents and information and therefore seeks a compliance order in relation to a subset of the  
items originally specified in the Request. Subject to any portions of the Request that I may  
conclude to be invalid, following receipt of the parties’ further submissions on application of my  
conclusions surrounding the statutory interpretation of s 231.1, I find that a compliance order  
should issue against Mr. Ghermezian in relation to the items in the Request that the Minister is  
still seeking.  
(2) Request NG-06  
Page: 100  
[221] This Request, dated August 5, 2016, is addressed to Nader Ghermezian to the attention of  
Dan McKinley of GT. It seeks documents and information regarding companies and other  
entities outside of Canada where Mr. Ghermezian or any of his family members was a  
shareholder, officer, director, trustee, or beneficiary of a trust.  
[222] The Respondent takes issue with the fact that this Request was sent to GT, arguing that it  
is untenable for the Minister to seek a compliance order with respect to a demand that was not  
even sent to him. However, Mr. Bowe’s affidavit in this application refers to GT as the  
Respondent’s authorized representative and identifies information provided by CRA to GT and  
vice versa in the course of CRA’s audit. In the absence of any evidence from Mr. Ghermezian to  
the effect that GT was not his authorized representative, or evidence or argument from him that  
he was not aware of the Request being sent to his representative at GT, I find that he received  
proper notice of it.  
[223] The Respondent also asserts that the Minister has failed to prove that this Request was  
issued for the purpose of the administration and enforcement of the Act as contemplated by s  
231.1(1).  
[224] In Ghermezian (at paras 112-115), in considering a similar argument albeit in the context  
of s 231.2(1), this Court canvassed jurisprudence establishing relevant general principles,  
commencing with the explanation by the Supreme Court of Canada in Canadian Bank of  
Commerce v Attorney General of Canada, [1962] SCR 729 at 739, that obtaining information  
Page: 101  
relevant to the tax liability of a specific person or persons, whose liability to taxes is under  
investigation by CRA, is a purpose related to the administration or enforcement of the Act.  
[225] In Saipem Luxembourg SA v Canada (Customs and Revenue Agency), 2005 FCA 218 at  
para 25, the Federal Court of Appeal observed that the required purpose is met even if much of  
the information requested ultimately turns out to be irrelevant. In Tower v Minister of National  
Revenue, 2003 FCA 307 at para 29, the Federal Court of Appeal further explained that a  
requirement is valid if the requested information may be relevant in the determination of the tax  
liability of the named taxpayer, which the Court described as a low threshold. As noted in Nadler  
Estate v Canada (Attorney General), 2005 FC 935 [Nadler Estate] at para 9, the Act does not  
require that the person from whom information is sought be given any details as to the purpose  
of the Demand.  
[226] As noted above, this Request seeks documents and information regarding companies and  
other entities outside of Canada where Mr. Ghermezian or any of his family members were  
shareholders, officers, directors, trustees, or beneficiaries of a trust. Mr. Bowe’s affidavit  
explains that CRA’s audit included exploring foreign and domestic corporations under the  
control of Mr. Ghermezian or other persons not dealing with him at arm’s length. Applying the  
jurisprudential principles canvassed above, and in the absence of any more detailed submissions  
from the Respondent in support of this argument, I find it to be without merit.  
[227] Finally, I note the Respondent’s observation that this Request does not expressly identify  
the provision of the Act under which it was issued. Taking this into account, I have considered  
Page: 102  
the significance of the explanation in Nadler Estate (at para 9) that the Requirement, which was  
the subject of an unsuccessful stay motion in that case, properly indicated the name of the  
taxpayer concerned, referred to the appropriate enabling provisions, and provided a description  
of the information required sufficient for the recipient to be able to prepare a response [Emphasis  
added].  
[228] I understand the Respondents’ argument, in relation to this and a limited number of other  
Requests, to be that the absence of an express reference to an enabling provision supports an  
analysis the Request is in “pith and substance” a Requirement. As explained earlier in these  
Reasons, I do not consider it necessary to conduct such an analysis in these applications.  
Regardless, I do not regard Nadler Estate to stand for a general proposition that the absence of an  
express reference to the relevant enabling provision necessarily invalidates a Demand.  
[229] The Minister asserts that Mr. Ghermezian has not responded to this Request. Subject to  
any portions of the Request that I may conclude to be invalid, following receipt of the parties’  
further submissions on application of my conclusions surrounding the statutory interpretation of  
s 231.1, I find that a compliance order should issue against Mr. Ghermezian in relation to this  
Request.  
(3) Request A-NG-0125  
[230] This Request, dated May 30, 2018, is addressed to Nader Ghermezian. It refers to a trust  
identified as the Ghermezian Family Trust [97GFT] in a trust deed dated February 15, 1997, and  
a determination by CRA that 97GFT has been factually resident in Canada since its settlement in  
Page: 103  
1997. The Request demands, for the period between 1997 and 2016, provision of various  
categories of documentation and/or information regarding 97GFT.  
[231] Request A-NG-0125 is appended as an exhibit to Mr. Bowe’s affidavit in the form of a  
letter purporting to have been have been sent to Mr. Ghermezian by registered mail at the  
Edmonton Address on May 30, 2018. While this is not strong evidence that Mr. Ghermezian  
received notice of this Request, there is no evidence to the contrary. I therefore find that he  
received proper notice.  
[232] Other than the broad issues canvassed earlier in these Reasons, the only additional  
argument raised by the Respondent, specific to this Request, is to note that it includes a demand  
for the filing of tax returns and other forms. I understand the Respondent’s position to be that s  
231.1 does not authorize this component of the demand. However, the Minister seeks a  
compliance order in relation to only a subset of the items originally specified in the Request,  
which I understand does not include the demand for these filings.  
[233] Subject to any portions of the Request that I may conclude to be invalid, following  
receipt of the parties’ further submissions on application of my conclusions surrounding the  
statutory interpretation of s 231.1, I find that a compliance order should issue against Mr.  
Ghermezian in relation to the items in the Request that the Minister is still seeking.  
(4) Request 97GFT-02  
Page: 104  
[234] This Request, dated May 31, 2018, is addressed to Nader Ghermezian and asks him to  
provide, for the 1997 to 2016 period, provision of various categories of documentation or  
information regarding 97GFT and a company called Triple Five Worldwide Limited [T5WW].  
[235] Request 97GFT-02 is appended as an exhibit to Mr. Bowe’s affidavit in the form of a  
letter to Mr. Ghermezian at the Edmonton Address. Mr. Bowe deposes that this letter was sent to  
Mr. Ghermezian. Again, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, I find that he received proper  
notice.  
[236] Other than the broad issues canvassed earlier in these Reasons, the Respondent has raised  
no defence arguments specific to this request.  
[237] The Minister asserts that Mr. Ghermezian has not provided any of the requested  
documents and information. Subject to any portions of the Request that I may conclude to be  
invalid, following receipt of the parties’ further submissions on application of my conclusions  
surrounding the statutory interpretation of s 231.1, I find that a compliance order should issue  
against Mr. Ghermezian in relation to this Request.  
(5) Request BUST-20v2  
[238] This Request, dated September 8, 2017, is addressed to Mr. Nader Ghermezian, as well  
as his brothers, Raphael, Bahman and Eskander Ghermezian [all together, the Brothers], “As  
Trustees, Protectors, Beneficiaries and/or Contributors”. It requests from them, in their capacity  
as trustees, various categories of information and documentation related to four trusts settled on  
Page: 105  
February 14, 2000 [referred to by the Minister in these applications as the V-Day Trusts] and a  
subsidiary company named Royce Holdings LLC [Royce Holdings].  
[239] Mr. Bowe’s affidavit explains that, although dated September 8, 2017, Request BUST-  
20v2 was delivered by facsimile to GT on May 24, 2018. The Respondent argues that this  
delivery to GT does not represent proper notice to him. However, the history of this Request, as  
set out in Mr. Bowe’s affidavit, demonstrates that this Request was issued as part of a series of  
Demands related to the V-Day Trusts and Royce Holdings, to which GT had been responding,  
and that Request BUST-20v2 itself was issued as a result of information provided at a meeting  
with GT. In the absence of any evidence or argument from Mr. Ghermezian that he was not  
aware of the Request being sent to his representatives at GT, I find that he received proper notice  
of it.  
[240] I understand that the Respondent also invokes the “same person principle” in relation to  
this Request. He submits that the Request demanded that he produce information and documents  
in his purported capacity as a trustee, protector, beneficiary and/or contributor (presumably of or  
to the relevant trusts), not in his personal capacity. I find little merit to this argument. The  
reference in the Request to it being directed to Mr. Ghermezian (and the other Brothers) as  
trustees, etc. represents an explanation of the basis on which CRA considered him to be in a  
position to respond to the Request. However, the Request was clearly directed to him, and he is  
the Respondent to the compliance application before the Court. Also, while this Request seeks  
information and/or documentation from Mr. Ghermezian about the V-Day Trusts and Royce  
Page: 106  
Holdings, rather than about him personally, I note that it is not improper to require that  
information be provided about a third party (see Lee at para 8).  
[241] The Minister asserts that Mr. Ghermezian failed to provide most of the items in this  
Request and therefore seeks a compliance order in relation to those items. Subject to any portions  
of the Request that I may conclude to be invalid, following receipt of the parties’ further  
submissions on application of my conclusions surrounding the statutory interpretation of s 231.1,  
I find that a compliance order should issue against Mr. Ghermezian in relation to the items in the  
Request that the Minister is still seeking.  
(6) Request BUST-21  
[242] This Request, dated January 4, 2018, was addressed to the Brothers as trustees and to  
Gherfam, to the attention of the trustees and Michael Oseen of GT. It requests that, in their  
capacity as trustees of the V-Day Trusts and four other trusts settled on August 15, 2002  
[referred to elsewhere in the record before the Court as the Royce Trusts], and in their capacity  
as directors of Gherfam, they provide certain documentation and/or information regarding the  
source of funds contributed to the trusts.  
[243] The Respondent takes issue with the fact that this Request was sent to GT, arguing that it  
is untenable for the Minister to seek a compliance order with respect to a demand that was not  
even sent to him. Again, Mr. Bowe’s affidavit that demonstrates that Request BUST-21 forms  
part of a series of inquiries in which GT was involved. In the absence of any evidence or  
Page: 107  
argument from Mr. Ghermezian that he was not aware of the Request being sent to his  
representatives at GT, I find that he received proper notice of it.  
[244] The Respondent also argues that this Request demanded that he produce information and  
documents in his purported capacity as a trustee and as a director of Gherfam, not in his personal  
capacity. This Request is directed to five recipients, i.e., the four Brothers and Gherfam. The  
reference in the Request to it being directed to Mr. Ghermezian (and the other Brothers) as  
trustees represents an explanation of the basis on which CRA considered him to be in a position  
to respond to the demands related to the trusts. In that respect, the Request was clearly directed  
to him, and he is the Respondent to the compliance application before the Court. As such, it does  
not offend the “same person principle.”  
[245] In relation to its reference to Gherfam, I note that Gherfam is the Respondent in T-258-  
19, in which the Minister again seeks a compliance order in relation to Request BUST-21, and I  
will address later in these Reasons whether an order should be issued against the corporation in  
relation to this Request. However, the information that the Request seeks from the Brothers and  
from Gherfam is the same. Therefore, the fact that the Request is also directed to Gherfam does  
not represent a basis for Mr. Ghermezian to defend the compliance application against him.  
[246] The Minister asserts that Mr. Ghermezian has not provided any of the requested  
documents and information. Subject to any portions of the Request that I may conclude to be  
invalid, following receipt of the parties’ further submissions on application of my conclusions  
Page: 108  
surrounding the statutory interpretation of s 231.1, I find that a compliance order should issue  
against Mr. Ghermezian in relation to this Request.  
(7) Request GG-24  
[247] This Request, dated June 26, 2018, was addressed to Nader Ghermezian, as well as to the  
other Brothers. It references the Royce Trusts and four trusts settled on September 1, 2002  
[referred to as the Regent Trusts] and requests that, in their capacities as “trustees, protectors  
and/or default beneficiaries” of the Royce Trusts and Regent Trusts, they provide certain  
information and/or documents. The Minister is now seeking compliance with only item 7 of this  
Request.  
[248] The Respondent again takes issue with the fact that this Request was sent to GT, arguing  
that it is untenable for the Minister to seek a compliance order with respect to a demand that was  
not even sent to him. However, again Mr. Bowe’s affidavit demonstrates GT’s involvement on  
behalf of the Respondent in relation to CRA’s inquiries. In the absence of any evidence or  
argument from Mr. Ghermezian that he was not aware of the Request being sent to his  
representatives at GT, I find that he received proper notice of it.  
[249] The Respondent argues that, as this Request demanded that he produce information and  
documents in his purported capacity as a trustee, protector and/or beneficiary, the Minister’s  
application offends the “same person principle”. For the same reasons explained above in  
connection with other Requests in this application, I find no merit to this position.  
Page: 109  
[250] In relation to this particular Request, the Respondent also raises an additional argument,  
that the Request included demands that were not sufficiently precise for Mr. Ghermezian to  
know what information and/or documentation he was required to provide. He refers to item 7(a),  
which demanded that he provide certain information and/or documentation related to trusts or  
similar arrangements in which he, a member of his family, or an entity controlled by them were  
involved in one of several capacities. One of those capacities was that of a “contributor”, a term  
which the Request further references by a footnote that states as follows:  
3. For trusts or similar arrangements outside of Canada  
“contributor” is a defined term in section 94 of the Income Tax Act.  
For the purpose of this questionnaire, whether or not a contribution  
has been made to a trust or similar arrangement is to be determined  
in the context of that definition but without regard to “arm’s length  
transfers.” The deeming provisions of section 94 must also be  
taken into account. These encompass indirect transfers and other  
means of shifting value from Canada to the trust or similar  
arrangement.  
[251] This submission is similar to the argument that this Court considered in Ghermezian in  
concluding that one paragraph of one of the Requirements under review in that case was  
unreasonable. As Ghermezian explained (at paras 160-162):  
160. However, there remains one argument advanced by the  
Applicant, which, while not one of its principal submissions,  
resonates with me as undermining the reasonableness of a  
component of the Gherfam RFI. The last operative paragraph of  
GEI-29 sets out the following requirement:  
4. Provide any additional information or  
explanations that are relevant in determining  
whether or not the rules of former section 94 of the  
Act (for taxation years before 2007) applies to the  
Royce and Regent Trusts in respect of the  
transaction described in the background of this  
query.  
Page: 110  
161. The Applicant argues that this paragraph is not sufficiently  
precise for the Applicant to understand what it is required to  
provide in response. The paragraph requires the Applicant to  
undertake a legal analysis surrounding the operation of former s  
94, including potentially speculating on how the Minister would  
propose to invoke that section, and then make a determination as to  
what information could be relevant to informing that analysis.  
162 I agree that this paragraph is problematic. As previously  
explained, the Respondent relies on the analysis in Nadler (at para  
9), in which Justice Gauthier found no serious issue with the  
requirement in that case, because it properly indicated the name of  
the taxpayer concerned, referred to the appropriate enabling  
provision, and gave a description of the information required  
which was sufficient to enable the recipient to prepare its response.  
In my view, paragraph 4 of GEI-29 does not give a description of  
the information required which is sufficient to enable the Applicant  
to prepare its response to that paragraph. I therefore find that the  
Gherfam RFI is unreasonable in this respect.  
[252] Superficially, there are similarities in the paragraph challenged in Ghermezian and the  
footnote that the Respondent references in the application at hand, as both engage the meaning of  
s 94 of the Act. However, I am not convinced that the concern identified in Ghermezian applies  
in the case at hand. In Ghermezian, the lack of precision turned on the impugned paragraph  
asking the recipient of the Demand to provide unspecified information, the relevance of which to  
s 94 the Minister expected the recipient to determine, without the Minister having explained how  
she might propose to invoke that section. In contrast, in the case at hand, the Minister is simply  
drawing the Respondent’s attention to certain statutory definitions and deeming provisions in s  
94, to assist the Respondent in understanding the meaning of the term “contributor” as employed  
in the Request. I do not find this item in Request GG-24 to suffer from a lack of precision that  
undermines its validity.  
Page: 111  
[253] Finally, the Respondent raises an unnamed persons argument in relation to this Request.  
As an initial point in considering this argument, I note that the Demand in relation to which the  
Respondent is presently raising this argument is a Request, not a Requirement. There were  
references at the hearing to the possibility that the limitations on seeking information about  
unnamed persons, which arise from s 231.2(2), do not apply in the context of a Request.  
However, the Minister has not presented any substantive submissions in support of a position  
that she can avoid the need for s 231.2(3) judicial authorization, that would apply to a  
Requirement issued under s 231.2, by instead issuing a Request under s 231.1. I will therefore  
analyse this issue on the basis that the Request is problematic if it conflicts with the limitations  
on seeking information related to unnamed persons as reflected in the jurisprudence. I note that,  
in Redeemer, the Supreme Court performed an analysis of such principles, notwithstanding that  
the Demand in that case was issued under s 231.1.  
[254] The Respondent submits that in cross-examination Mr. Bowe admitted that this Request  
demanded information about unnamed persons so that the Minister could investigate their tax  
liability. This submission turns on counsel’s questioning of Mr. Bowe on item 7 of the Request.  
Counsel referred Mr. Bowe to that item’s request for identification of arrangements that could be  
considered trusts under the laws of Canada and then asked if CRA was seeking that disclosure so  
that it could investigate such entities as to their residency and potential tax liability. The  
transcript records this evidence as follows:  
Q. You were asking for that disclosure so that you could  
investigate that entity to make determinations regarding its  
residency and potential tax liability; correct?  
A. As well as the tax liability of Mr. Ghermezian and his spouse  
and his minor child.  
Page: 112  
Q. So all of them; correct?  
A. Well, the primary purpose -- yes, all of them, Mr. Sood.  
[255] Counsel then asked Mr. Bowe whether the identities of these other arrangements were  
known to the Minister when the Request was issued. Mr. Bowe responded by referencing  
paragraph 105 of his affidavit, explaining that this paragraph listed trusts of which the Minister  
was aware, including several in relation to which the Minister had not obtained information from  
the Ghermezian family.  
[256] On the basis of this evidence, the Respondent submits that this Request seeks information  
and documentation related to unnamed persons, for purposes of determining the tax position of  
those unnamed persons, and is therefore invalid without prior judicial authorization.  
[257] In response to this argument, the Minister emphasizes that the analysis whether judicial  
authorization is required, when information or documentation is sought related to unnamed  
persons, is fact-dependent. Relying principally on Redeemer and Artistic Ideas, she submits that  
judicial authorization is required only when the record demonstrates that the information sought  
in relation to unnamed persons will be used primarily for purposes of verifying those persons’  
obligations under the Act. The Minister submits that the Respondent’s argument based on Mr.  
Bowe’s evidence would lead to an absurd result, i.e., that the Minister cannot, without judicial  
authorization, obtain information about an unnamed person, even if that information is relevant  
to the audit of a named person.  
Page: 113  
[258] The jurisprudence canvassed earlier in these Reasons clearly establishes that the fact  
documents and information may, once provided, lead to investigations of other taxpayers does  
not invoke a need for judicial authorization. However, the analysis is not entirely straightforward  
when the record in a matter, such as the evidence elicited from Mr. Bowe on cross-examination,  
suggests that CRA has a present intention, when serving a Demand, to investigate the tax  
position of both entities that are known to the Minister and potentially unknown entities. The  
situation is further complicated in the case at hand by Mr. Bowe’s explanation of the list of  
entities that were known to the Minister and which it appears could be the subject of at least  
components of the questions posed in item 7. That item is clearly not problematic to the extent it  
relates to known entities.  
[259] In my view, the jurisprudence and policy considerations favour the Minister’s position on  
this matter. Based on Mr. Bowe’s cross-examination evidence and the explanation in his  
affidavit of the overall context of CRA’s audit initiatives of which Request GG-24 forms a part,  
it was CRA’s intention to investigate the tax position of Mr. Nader Ghermezian and his family,  
and CRA considered information and documentation related to possible unknown trusts or  
similar arrangements to be relevant to that investigation. As the Minister submits, Redeemer  
explains that the s 231.2(2) requirement should not apply to situations in which the requested  
information is required in order to verify the compliance of the taxpayer being audited (at para  
22). I agree with the Minister’s position that the fact that the information may also be relevant to  
investigation of an unnamed person does not warrant departure from that reasoning.  
Page: 114  
[260] As noted above, item 7 is the only portion of this Request for which the Minister seeks a  
compliance order. Subject to any portions of that item that I may conclude to be invalid,  
following receipt of the parties’ further submissions on application of my conclusions  
surrounding the statutory interpretation of s 231.1, I find that a compliance order should issue  
against Mr. Ghermezian in relation to item 7 of the Request.  
(8) Requests NUST-22 and NUST-23  
[261] These Requests, both dated April 5, 2018, are addressed to Nader Ghermezian at the  
Edmonton Address. Mr. Bowe attaches these Requests as exhibits to his affidavit and states that  
they were sent as letters to Mr. Ghermezian. In the absence of any evidence or argument from  
Mr. Ghermezian that he did not receive notice of the Request, I find that he did receive proper  
notice.  
[262] NUST-22 refers to Mr. Ghermezian as a trustee of one of the Regent Trusts and asserts  
that CRA has found the trust to be factually resident in Canada since the date of its formation.  
The Requests demands filing of certain tax forms and seeks documents and/or information  
related thereto. NUST-23 is largely identical to NUST-22, except that it relates to one of the  
Royce Trusts.  
[263] The Respondent takes issue with the items in the Requests demanding the filing of tax  
forms. However, the Minister is pursuing only certain items (items 8 to 23) in the Requests,  
which do not include those demands.  
Page: 115  
[264] The Respondent also raises a precision argument in relation to item 23 these Requests,  
seeking accounting databases. The Respondent asserts that references therein to the “Ghermezian  
Group” and “Mall of America Group” were not sufficiently precise for him to know what  
information and documentation he was required to provide in response. Item 23 reads as follows:  
23. In addition to the above noted requests, we request a copy of  
each complete and unaltered electronic accounting database  
maintained for the Ghermezian Group that contains accounting in  
respect of:  
a. Each of the trusts, partnerships and corporations held directly  
or indirectly by each of the trusts;  
b. Triple Five MOA Holdings, LLC;  
c. Triple Five MOA Investments, LLC  
d. MOA Management, LLC;  
e. MOA Investments, LLC;  
f. Triple Five Minnesota, Inc.;  
g. Manchester Leasing Inc.;  
h. Gherfam Equities Inc.;  
i. GL data for any non-arm’s length entity that maintains an  
intercompany account with one of the entities identified above;  
For clarity, we are requesting GL data for all entities in the Mall of  
America Group and any related entity that transacts with the Mall  
of America Group.  
[265] Neither “Ghermezian Group” nor “Mall of America Group” is defined in either of these  
Requests. While Mr. Bowe’s affidavit defines the term “Ghermezian Group” to mean the  
Brothers and other related or economically connected individuals and entities, the affidavit and  
therefore this particular definition of the term were not in the Respondent’s possession when he  
received the Requests. However, I agree with the Minister’s submission that, while the undefined  
Page: 116  
term “Ghermezian Group” appears in item 23, the necessary precision is afforded by the  
subsequent paragraphs (a) to (i), which identify the particular entities for which the accounting is  
sought. I do not find that the use of the term “Ghermezian Group” precludes the Respondent  
knowing what information or documentation is requested.  
[266] I have more concern with the use of the term “Mall of America Group” in the final  
sentence of item 23. Mr. Bowe’s affidavit states what I understand to be CRA’s understanding  
that the Mall of America is owned 100% by the Ghermezian Group (as defined in his affidavit)  
via the Royce Trusts, the Regent Trusts, and Gherfam. In that context, the Minister relies on  
Zeifmans, in which Justice Walker explained that CRA cannot be expected to know the structure  
of a taxpayer’s holdings (at para 78). While I agree with this principle, I note that the Demand  
language challenged as imprecise in Zeifmans was “entities owned, operated, controlled or  
otherwise connected” with certain named persons (see para 77). Justice Walker concluded that  
concepts such as “otherwise connected” or “operated by” were not easily defined and that, as it  
was the applicant taxpayer that had knowledge of the group’s business structure, the Demand  
was intelligible (at para 81-82).  
[267] In my view, the term “Mall of America Group” does not benefit from the same level of  
intelligibility as the language considered in Zeifmans. While one might speculate as to the  
meaning of the term, as broadly encompassing all entities in some manner connected with the  
Mall of America, in my view the requirement for such speculation demonstrates that this portion  
of the Request is not sufficiently precise for the Respondent to respond. As such, I find the final  
Page: 117  
sentence set out above from item 23 of the Request to be invalid. To be clear, I find the rest of  
item 23 to be valid.  
[268] Subject to those findings, and subject to any other portions of these Requests that I may  
conclude to be invalid, following receipt of the parties’ further submissions on application of my  
conclusions surrounding the statutory interpretation of s 231.1, I find that a compliance order  
should issue against Mr. Ghermezian in relation to the portions of these Requests that the  
Minister is still pursuing.  
(9) Request NUST2-01  
[269] This Request, dated October 11, 2018, is addressed to the attention of Nader Ghermezian  
and the other Brothers, under cover of a registered letter to Nader Ghermezian at the Edmonton  
Address. Mr. Bowe’s affidavit states that CRA issued this Request, which is appended as an  
exhibit to his affidavit. In the absence of any evidence or argument from Mr. Ghermezian that he  
did not receive notice of the Request, I find that he did receive proper notice.  
[270] This Requests demands that, in their capacity as trustees, protectors, and/or default  
beneficiaries of one or more of the V-Day Trusts, the Brothers provide various categories of  
information and/or documentation pertaining to the trusts, to be used to determine if the trusts are  
resident in Canada for income tax purposes.  
[271] Because the Request seeks information from him in his capacity as trustee, etc., the  
Respondent raises the “same person principle” as a defence. I find no merit in this argument, as  
Page: 118  
the Request was clearly directed to Mr. Ghermezian (and the other Brothers) and he is the  
Respondent to this application. The reference to his capacity as trustee, etc. merely identifies the  
basis for CRA’s expectation that he would have access to the information or documentation  
sought.  
[272] The Minister asserts that Mr. Ghermezian has not provided any of the requested  
documents and information. Subject to any portions of this Request that I may conclude to be  
invalid, following receipt of the parties’ further submissions on application of my conclusions  
surrounding the statutory interpretation of s 231.1, I find that a compliance order should issue  
against Mr. Ghermezian in relation to this Request.  
(10) Requirement A-NG-0126  
[273] This Requirement, dated June 27, 2018, is addressed to Nader Ghermezian at the  
Edmonton Address and requires him to provide, for a number of companies identified in the  
subject line, various categories of information and documents pertaining to the period from  
January 1, 1997 to April 30, 2018. This includes: a list of all known accounts; copies of all bank  
statements for certain listed accounts and for accounts held at any other banks; and identification  
of the source of all deposits made to the accounts and the destination of all outgoing transfers.  
[274] Other than arguments canvassed earlier in these Reasons, the only additional argument  
raised by the Respondent in relation to that this Requirement is an assertion that the Minister has  
failed to prove that the Requirement was issued for the purpose of the administration and  
enforcement of the Act as contemplated by s 231.2(1).  
Page: 119  
[275] Mr. Bowe’s affidavit explains that most of the information sought in this Requirement  
relates to the banking records of companies understood by CRA to be controlled by the  
Respondent. He states that the Requirement was prepared for purposes related to the  
administration and enforcement of the Act, namely the audit of the residency and reported assets  
and income of 97GFT and T5WW (entities identified earlier in these Reasons). Applying the  
jurisprudential principles canvassed earlier in these Reasons, and in the absence of any more  
detailed submissions from the Respondent in support of this argument, I find it to be without  
merit.  
[276] The Minister seeks to obtain all information and documentation requested in this  
Requirement. I find that a compliance order should issue against Mr. Ghermezian in relation to  
this Requirement.  
(11) Requirement A-NG-0127  
[277] This Requirement, dated June 28, 2018, is addressed to Nader Ghermezian at the  
Edmonton Address and requires him to provide, for a number of companies and other entities  
identified, various categories of information and documents pertaining to the period from  
January 1, 1997 to April 30, 2018. This includes: the minute books including director  
resolutions, share register, financial reports, agreements, and contacts for the listed entities, and  
all bank statements for the listed entities.  
[278] In addition to arguments canvassed earlier in these Reasons, the Respondent argues that  
the Minister has failed to prove that this Requirement was issued for the purpose of the  
Page: 120  
administration and enforcement of the Act as contemplated by s 231.2(1). In relation to this  
Requirement, Mr. Bowe’s affidavit explains that CRA believes that 97GFT holds, or may have  
held, shares in corporations other than T5WW, and that the Requirement was prepared for  
purposes related to the administration and enforcement of the Act, namely the audit of the  
residency and unreported assets and income of 97GFT and T5WW. Applying the jurisprudential  
principles canvassed above, and in the absence of any more detailed submissions from the  
Respondent in support of this argument, I find it to be without merit.  
[279] The Respondent also notes that the subject line in this requirement employs the term  
“Gibraltar entities” and argues that, as the term is undefined, it is insufficiently precise for the  
Requirement to be enforceable. I find no merit to this argument. As the Minister submits, the  
body of the Requirement details the entities in relation to which the relevant information and  
documentation is sought.  
[280] The Minister seeks to obtain all information and documentation requested in this  
Requirement. I find that a compliance order should issue against Mr. Ghermezian in relation to  
this Requirement.  
(12) Requirement A-NUST-0103  
[281] This Requirement, dated January 23, 2019, is addressed to Nader Ghermezian at the  
Edmonton Address. It notes that he is a trustee, protector, and/or beneficiary of one of each of  
the V-Day Trusts, the Royce Trusts, and the Regent Trusts and requires him to provide various  
documents and information in relation to those trusts, including: US tax returns and tax  
Page: 121  
schedules for the three trusts at both the federal and state level; the books and records relied upon  
to prepare those US tax returns; and all Schedule K-1 Forms received by the trusts.  
[282] Noting the reference to being a trustee, protector, and/or beneficiary of the trusts, the  
Respondent invokes the “same person principle”. However, I read this reference as explaining  
the basis for CRA’s belief that Mr. Ghermezian has access to the relevant information and  
documentation. The Requirement is directed to Mr. Ghermezian, and he is the Respondent to this  
application. Therefore, the “same person principle” represents no impediment to the validity of  
the Requirement.  
[283] The Respondent also raises another argument specific to this Requirement. He notes that  
it was issued on January 23, 2019, and, as it specified 30 days for response, that response was  
due on February 22, 2019, the day after the Minister commenced this summary application. He  
argues that he is prejudiced thereby and that it represents an abuse of process for the Minister to  
attempt to sweep this particular Requirement into this application, when the Respondent was not  
in default of his compliance obligation when the application was commenced.  
[284] I agree that these circumstances represent an irregularity. However, the Respondent has  
not explained how he is prejudiced thereby, particularly as the Court is examining his lack of  
compliance years after the Requirement was issued. I find that this irregularity does not warrant  
dismissing the application in relation to this Requirement.  
Page: 122  
[285] The Minister seeks to obtain all information and documentation requested in this  
Requirement, with the exception of the US tax returns of the V-Day Trust. I find that a  
compliance order should issue against Mr. Ghermezian in relation to the remaining items sought  
by the Minister under this Requirement.  
(13) Requirement A-GRDT-0100  
[286] This Requirement, dated January 21, 2019, is addressed to Nader Ghermezian at the  
Edmonton Address. It refers to him as the manager (director) of corporations ultimately held by  
the Ghermezian Royal Discretionary Trust [GRDT] and requires him to produce various  
categories of information and documents pertaining to such corporations, their related  
corporations and shareholders, including certain categories of transactions.  
[287] Noting the reference to being a manager or director of the relevant corporations, the  
Respondent invokes the “same person principle”. However, I read this reference as explaining  
the basis for CRA’s belief that Mr. Ghermezian has access to the relevant information and  
documentation. The Requirement is directed to Mr. Ghermezian, and he is the Respondent to this  
application. Therefore, the “same person principle” represents no impediment to the validity of  
the Requirement.  
[288] The Respondent also raises the argument that the Court canvassed above in relation to  
Requirement A-NUST-0103. Requirement A-GRDT-0100 was issued on January 21, 2019, and,  
as it specified 30 days for response, that response was due on February 20, 2019, i.e., after the  
Minister commenced this summary application. He argues that he is prejudiced thereby and that  
Page: 123  
it represents an abuse of process for the Minister to attempt to sweep this particular Requirement  
into this application, when the Respondent was not in default of his compliance obligation when  
the application was commenced. For the same reasons as explained above in relation to  
Requirement A-NUST-0103, I find that this irregularity does not warrant dismissing the  
application in relation to this Requirement.  
[289] The Minister seeks to obtain all information and documentation requested in this  
Requirement. I find that a compliance order should issue against Mr. Ghermezian in relation to  
this Requirement.  
B. T-254-19 – MNR v Marc Vaturi  
(1) Request A-MV-0144  
[290] This Request, dated October 3, 2018, and addressed to Marc Vaturi at 357 Cortleigh  
Boulevard, Toronto, Ontario, M5N 1R4 [the Toronto Address], indicates that he has been  
selected for an audit for the 2016 and 2017 taxation periods and requests various categories of  
information and/or documentation. The only outstanding portions of this request are aspects of  
item 1 (regarding sources of Mr. Vaturi’s worldwide income) and item 8 (a list of all foreign and  
domestic personal banking accounts and certain information and/or documentation pertaining to  
such accounts).  
[291] In relation to notice, Mr. Bowe attaches a copy of this Request including a Canada Post  
delivery receipt. Mr. Bowe explained in cross-examination that the Toronto Address, to which  
Page: 124  
this Request was sent, was Mr. Vaturi’s home address at the time he had conduct of the audit. In  
the absence of any evidence or argument from Mr. Vaturi that he did not receive notice of the  
Request, I find that he received proper notice.  
[292] In addition to broader arguments canvassed earlier in these Reasons, the Respondent also  
argues, in relation to this particular Request, that he has already provided sufficient responses  
thereto. It appears that the remaining dispute between the parties on this subject surrounds the  
following information or documentation that the Minister maintains is outstanding, representing  
a small subset of material requested in a March 10, 2020 letter from Mr. Bowe to Mr. Vaturi  
following up on Request A-MV-0144:  
Question 1 – Information regarding sources of worldwide  
income (including details such as the type of income  
(investment, employment, business, etc.), dates when the  
income was earned and any supporting documentation (pay  
stubs, statement of wages, etc.))  
We require supporting documentation for each of the sources of  
income listed below. Acceptable documentation may include  
contracts, agreements, pay stubs, statements of wages, invoices,  
etc.  
Sources of income:  
- The consulting fees received by [you] from [Triple Five World  
Properties Limited] in 2016 and 2017;  
- The interest collected from Royal Bank of Canada in 2016 and  
2017.  
….  
Question 8 – A list identifying all foreign and domestic  
personal banking and investment accounts, held solely, jointly  
or otherwise, that have been operated by you, or on behalf of  
you. In addition to this, please include:  
a) Accounts held in trust for minors;  
Page: 125  
b) Loan accounts and lines of credit;  
c) Credit card statements;  
d) Monthly statements that note all entries in respect to the  
period requested above for all accounts;  
e) Authorizations, powers of attorney for any account; and,  
g) A statement setting out the particulars of any safety deposit  
box rentals.  
- Monthly statement from RBC Account [details redacted] for the  
period of May 24, 2017 to June 23, 2017 are missing.  
- Monthly statements for World Alliance Consulting Limited, a  
Hong Kong company controlled by you.  
- Monthly statements for any other accounts operated or controlled  
by you or on your behalf.  
[293] In relation to Question 1, the Respondent takes issue with the request for “acceptable”  
documentation, noting Mr. Bowe’s acknowledgement in cross-examination that he meant  
acceptable to him. The Respondent argues that this does not provide a sufficient description of  
the information required to allow him to prepare his response. I disagree with this position. The  
request is for supporting documentation for the two specified sources of income. The March 10,  
2020 letter provides examples of the sort of documentation that could serve this purpose. Mr.  
Vaturi is in the best position to know what sort of documentation he may have to satisfy the  
request. The language of this follow-up letter does not present a basis to resist this outstanding  
portion of the Request.  
[294] Also in relation to Question 1, the Respondent refers to an August 19, 2019 response  
from his counsel to one of the Minister’s other Requests (MV-08, which is no longer being  
Page: 126  
pursued). That response explained that the consulting arrangements between Mr. Vaturi and  
Triple Five World Properties Limited were oral and not reduced to writing. He submits that it  
follows from that response that there are no supporting documents to provide. I find little merit  
to this position, as the fact that the consulting arrangement itself is not documented does not  
mean that there is no supporting documentation for the resulting payments.  
[295] In relation to the reference in Question 1 to interest from the Royal Bank of Canada  
[RBC], the Respondent submits that supporting documentation is presumably found within the  
monthly statements for the RBC account referenced under Question 8. While that may be the  
case, the Respondent has not presented evidence that would allow the Court to reach that  
conclusion.  
[296] Turning to Question 8, I note that counsel for both parties confirmed at the hearing that  
the missing monthly RBC statement has been provided. It therefore appears that the only  
outstanding aspect of this question relates to the monthly statements for World Alliance  
Consulting Limited [WACL]. In challenging this request, the Respondent relies on Mr. Bowe’s  
acknowledgement in cross-examination that he does not know for a fact that Mr. Vaturi  
controlled WACL. The Respondent also points out Mr. Bowe’s statement in his affidavit that the  
Respondent has submitted documentation to CRA denying ownership of WACL.  
[297] In response, the Minister relies on evidence in Mr. Bowe’s affidavit, which she submits  
represents information acquired by CRA suggesting that Mr. Vaturi does control WACL. He has  
Page: 127  
adduced no evidence to the contrary, and I find no basis for him to resist responding to this  
outstanding element of the Request.  
[298] Subject to any portions of the Request that I may conclude to be invalid, following  
receipt of the parties’ further submissions on application of my conclusions surrounding the  
statutory interpretation of s 231.1, I find that a compliance order should issue against Mr. Vaturi  
in relation to this Request.  
(2) Requirement A-MV-0136  
[299] This Requirement, dated June 27, 2018, is addressed to Mr. Vaturi at the Toronto  
Address and requires him to provide, in relation to a number of companies identified in the  
subject line, various categories of information and documents pertaining to the period from  
January 1, 1997 to April 30, 2018.  
[300] The Respondent advances a “same person principle” argument. He submits that, in  
contrast with Request A-MV-0144, which referenced in its subject line Mr. Vaturi’s personal tax  
returns, Requirement A-MV-0136 references various foreign corporations and seeks information  
relevant to their tax position. The Respondent asserts that any access he may have to the  
requested information and documents would arise from his role, if any, in decision-making in  
relation to these corporations. On this basis, the Respondent takes the position that the  
Requirement was in fact directed to the corporations, not to him personally.  
Page: 128  
[301] I find no merit to this position. The Requirement was addressed to and clearly directed to  
Mr. Vaturi, as is this application. The fact that the Requirement seeks information and  
documentation relevant to the tax position of the referenced corporations does not mean that it  
was directed to the corporations.  
[302] The Minister seeks to obtain all information and documentation requested in this  
Requirement. I find that a compliance order should issue against Mr. Vaturi in relation to this  
Requirement.  
(3) Requirement A-MV-0137  
[303] This Requirement, dated June 28, 2018, is addressed to Mr. Vaturi at the Toronto  
Address and requires him to provide, in relation to a number of companies and other entities  
identified, various categories of information and documents pertaining to the period from  
January 1, 1997 to April 30, 2018.  
[304] In response, Mr. Vaturi raises the “same person principle” argument on the same basis as  
in relation to Requirement A-MV-0136. For the same reasons set out above, I reject that  
argument.  
[305] The Minister seeks to obtain all information and documentation requested in this  
Requirement. I find that a compliance order should issue against Mr. Vaturi in relation to this  
Requirement.  
Page: 129  
C. T-258-19 – MNR v Gherfam Equities Inc  
[306] Although this application initially sought a compliance order related to a larger number  
of Requests, as well as one Requirement, the Minister advises that the Requirement (which was  
set aside in Ghermezian) is no longer being pursued and that the application now relates to only  
four of the Requests.  
(1) Request GEI-20  
[307] This Request, dated December 7, 2017, is addressed to Gherfam, to the attention of  
Michael Oseen of GT. It requests provision of certain information and documentation related to a  
list of entities of which Gherfam is asserted to have an indirect ownership or membership  
interest.  
[308] I note that CRA provided this Request to Gherfam through GT as its representative. To  
the extent the Respondent is raising any concern about notice, I note that Mr. Bowe’s affidavit in  
this application refers to GT as the Respondent’s authorized representative and identifies  
information provided by CRA to GT and vice versa in the course of CRA’s audit. In the absence  
of any evidence or argument that Gherfam did not receive this request, I find that proper notice  
has been given.  
[309] The Minister seeks all documents and/or information that are the subject of this Request.  
Subject to any portions of the Request that I may conclude to be invalid, following receipt of the  
parties’ further submissions on application of my conclusions surrounding the statutory  
Page: 130  
interpretation of s 231.1, I find that a compliance order should issue against Gherfam in relation  
to this Request.  
(2) Request GEI-21  
[310] This Request, dated December 7, 2017, is addressed to Gherfam, again to the attention of  
Michael Oseen of GT. It requests provision of certain information and documentation (including  
minute books) related to Royce Holdings and other entities.  
[311] Again, I find no issue surrounding CRA’s provision of notice of the Request to Gherfam  
through GT as its representative.  
[312] The Respondent also raises a precision argument, in relation to an item in the Request  
that reads as follows:  
4) For entities that also maintain a “branch” or that have  
registered as a “foreign person” in other jurisdictions (ie. the LLC  
maintains registrations in DE, NY, FA, NJ …), please also provide  
the Minute Books for that entity for each of those jurisdictions.  
[313] The Respondent argues that this item is not precise enough for it to be able to respond, as  
neither “branch” nor “foreign person” is defined. While the use of those terms in the Request  
could perhaps benefit from further precision, the term “branch” is understandable through its  
ordinary meaning, and the Request gives examples to assist with the understanding of the  
meaning of a foreign person registration in another jurisdiction. I do not find this item in the  
Request invalid for want of precision.  
Page: 131  
[314] The Respondent also argues that the Minister has failed to prove that this Request was  
issued for the purpose of administration or enforcement of the Act. Mr. Bowe’s affidavit explains  
that this Request was issued to Gherfam, as one of the previously identified members of Royce  
Holdings, to obtain information and documents about Royce Holdings and its subsidiaries.  
Applying the jurisprudential principles canvassed above, and in the absence of any more detailed  
submissions from the Respondent in support of this argument, I find it to be without merit  
[315] The Minister seeks all documents and/or information that are the subject of this Request.  
Subject to any portions of the Request that I may conclude to be invalid, following receipt of the  
parties’ further submissions on application of my conclusions surrounding the statutory  
interpretation of s 231.1, I find that a compliance order should issue against Gherfam in relation  
to this Request.  
(3) Request GEI-28  
[316] This Request, dated June 28, 2018, is addressed to Gherfam, to the attention of its  
directors. It requests provision of certain information and documentation related to the  
investments and/or accounts of a company called Regent New York Fund Corporation [RNY],  
described as a controlled foreign affiliate of Gherfam.  
[317] The Respondent notes that this Request was addressed to the attention of unnamed  
directors of Gherfam and submits that the Minister has failed to prove that the Request was  
actually served on Gherfam. In response, the Minister relies on Mr. Bowe’s affidavit, which  
attaches a copy of the Request as an exhibit to his affidavit and deposes that it was sent by fax to  
Page: 132  
GT. The exhibit includes a copy of the fax transmission sheet. Noting my above conclusions as  
to GT’s role as Gherfam’s representatives, I find that Gherfam received appropriate notice of this  
Request.  
[318] The Respondent also argues that the Minister has failed to prove that this Request was  
issued for the purpose of administration or enforcement of the Act. Mr. Bowe’s affidavit explains  
that this Request was issued to Gherfam to obtain information about investments of RNY  
(described as a controlled foreign affiliate of Gherfam) and its subsidiaries, as part of CRA’s  
examination of Gherfam’s reporting of its income. Applying the jurisprudential principles  
canvassed above, and in the absence of any more detailed submissions from the Respondent in  
support of this argument, I find it to be without merit.  
[319] The Respondent also raises imprecision arguments. It notes that the Request employs the  
undefined term “Ghermezian Group”. In my view, this is not problematic, as this term appears in  
a description of CRA’s activities, not in the delineation of the information or documentation  
requested.  
[320] The Respondent also raises imprecision surrounding the phrase commencing with “…and  
any other relevant documents…” in item 1(b) of the Request:  
1. For each of the general ledger account listed in Appendix A:  
….  
b. In the event that any of these investments were transferred or  
disposed of, please provide an explanation to why the transfer  
or disposition was not recorded in the general ledger. In  
addition, please provide documentation to support the transfer  
or disposition. The documentation should include trading slips,  
Page: 133  
purchase and sale agreements, correspondence, bank  
statements, cancelled checks, wire transfers, and any other  
relevant documents that would provide a clear audit trail to  
verify the transfer or disposition and any tax consequences  
resulting from the transaction.  
[Emphasis added]  
[321] The Respondent submits that it cannot be expected to know what to provide in response  
to the language highlighted above. I agree with this submission, as this language would require  
the Respondent to perform an analysis of unspecified tax consequences. Any compliance order  
issued in relation to this Request should exclude this language.  
[322] Subject to that point and to any other portions of the Request that I may conclude to be  
invalid, following receipt of the parties’ further submissions on application of my conclusions  
surrounding the statutory interpretation of s 231.1, I find that a compliance order should issue  
against Gherfam in relation to this Request.  
(4) Request BUST-21  
[323] As noted above in relation to the application against Nader Ghermezian, this Request,  
dated January 4, 2018, was addressed to the Brothers as trustees and to Gherfam. It requests  
certain documentation and/or information regarding the source of funds contributed to the V-Day  
Trusts and the Royce Trusts.  
[324] I need not canvass again the arguments that have been addressed above in relation to the  
application against Nader Ghermezian. However, to the extent that Gherfam raises the “same  
Page: 134  
person principle” in the context of its role as Respondent, I note that, while the Request was  
directed to the Brothers, it was also directed to Gherfam. As Gherfam was a recipient of the  
Request and is now a Respondent to this application, the “same person principle” is not an  
impediment to the validity of the Request.  
[325] The Respondent raises an imprecision concern about the fact that the Request seeks  
information not only about the identified trusts but also “their subsidiaries”, which term is not  
defined in the Request. I do not find that term lacking in intelligibility.  
[326] The Respondent also raises an unnamed persons concern arising from this Request  
seeking information about the trusts’ subsidiaries, noting that the Request refers to CRA  
reviewing the contributions to the US trusts “and verifying the subsidiaries of the trust.” I do not  
read this language as suggesting that CRA intends to use information derived from the Request  
primarily for purposes of verifying the tax position of unnamed subsidiaries of the trusts  
referenced in the Request. Applying the principles governing the unnamed persons provisions  
canvassed above in these Reasons, I do not find this aspect of Request BUST-21 problematic.  
[327] The Minister asserts that Gherfam has not provided any of the requested documents and  
information. Subject to any portions of the Request that I may conclude to be invalid, following  
receipt of the parties’ further submissions on application of my conclusions surrounding the  
statutory interpretation of s 231.1, I find that a compliance order should issue against Gherfam in  
relation to this Request.  
Page: 135  
D. T-259-19 – MNR v Paul Ghermezian  
[328] This application relates solely to one Requirement.  
(1) Requirement A-GDT-0103  
[329] This Requirement, dated October 30, 2018, refers to Paul Ghermezian as one of the  
trustees of The Ghermezian Dynasty Trust [GDT] and seeks information and documents related  
to GDT. It also requests identification of any additional, separate trusts created under the terms  
of the GDT trust agreement, as well as various categories of information and documentation for a  
list of limited liability companies referred to as “Investee Corporations”.  
[330] I have addressed earlier in these Reasons the Respondent’s arguments surrounding Paul  
Ghermezian’s residency. I have also addressed his arguments surrounding the effectiveness of  
service under s 231.2(1) of the Act. For the sake of good order, I also note Mr. Bowe’s cross-  
examination evidence that the Edmonton Address, to which the Requirement was sent, was the  
address used on Paul Ghermezian’s prior tax filings with CRA.  
[331] The Respondent raises a “same person principle” argument, noting that the Requirement  
references his role as a trustee for GDT. I find no merit to this argument. While the Requirement  
seeks information related to GDT and reflects CRA’s understanding that, as a trustee of GDT,  
Mr. Ghermezian would have access to that information, the Requirement is directed to Mr.  
Ghermezian, as is the Minister’s compliance application.  
Page: 136  
[332] The Respondent also raises an unnamed persons argument. In cross-examination, the  
Respondent’s counsel asked Mr. Bowe questions about the Requirement’s inquiries regarding  
“additional, separate trusts” created under the terms of the trust agreement for GDT. Mr. Bowe  
confirmed that CRA did not know the identities of any such trusts. He also stated that, while the  
primary purpose for issuing the Requirement was to determine the Canadian residency and tax  
liability of GDT, there may be secondary uses for that information such as determining the  
residency and tax liability of the additional and separate trusts. Relying upon the analyses earlier  
in these Reasons of the principles surrounding Demands related to unnamed persons, there is no  
basis for an invalidity finding in connection with Requirement A-GDT-0103, as Mr. Bowe’s  
evidence is clear that the primary purpose of the Requirement relates to the tax position of the  
named entity, GDT.  
[333] The Minister seeks only certain portions of the documents and information originally  
requested in this Requirement. I find that the Minister is entitled to a compliance order in relation  
thereto.  
E. T-262-19 – MNR v Joshua Ghermezian  
[334] This application relates solely to one Requirement.  
(1) Requirement A-GDT-0102  
[335] This Requirement, dated October 30, 2018, is addressed to Joshua Ghermezian at the  
Edmonton Address, which Mr Bowe confirmed in cross-examination was the address that Mr.  
Page: 137  
Ghermezian had provided to CRA in his most recent tax filings. The information and  
documentation sought in this Requirement appear to be materially identical to that in  
Requirement A-GDT-0103 issued to Paul Ghermezian. I also understand the Respondent to raise  
the same defence arguments in this application as in application T-259-19 against Paul  
Ghermezian. My reasoning rejecting the arguments in that application therefore applies in the  
present application as well.  
[336] The Minister seeks only certain portions of the documents and information originally  
requested in this Requirement. I find that the Minister is entitled to a compliance order in relation  
thereto.  
F. T-261-19 – MNR v Raphael Ghermezian  
(1) Request GG-24  
[337] As noted above in relation to the application against Nader Ghermezian in T-252-19, this  
Request, dated June 26, 2018, was addressed to both Nader and Raphael Ghermezian, as well as  
the other Brothers. Raphael Ghermezian raises the same arguments in relation to this Request as  
did Nader Ghermezian in T-252-19. With one brief exception, I need not repeat my analysis of  
those arguments above.  
[338] The one exception is that, in the present matter, the Respondent refers the Court to  
different cross-examination testimony from Mr. Bowe. When asked to name the entity or entities  
that were under investigation through this Request, he referred to the four Brothers and other  
Page: 138  
members of the Ghermezian family being under review to confirm the accuracy of their tax  
liabilities and identification of previously undisclosed trusts as detailed in items 7. He also stated  
that the item 7 request was to ascertain whether there were any trusts that at that time were  
unknown to the Minister.  
[339] This evidence does not depart from the cross-examination evidence, considered in my  
analysis of the unnamed person argument in T-252-19, in a manner that would be material to the  
outcome of that argument. For the same reasons as given above, I arrive at the same conclusion.  
[340] As noted above, item 7 is the only portion of this Request for which the Minister seeks a  
compliance order. Subject to any portions of the Request that I may conclude to be invalid,  
following receipt of the parties’ further submissions on application of my conclusions  
surrounding the statutory interpretation of s 231.1, I find that a compliance order should issue  
against Raphael Ghermezian in relation to item 7 of the Request.  
(2) Request BUST-20v2  
[341] Again, this Request, dated September 8, 2017, is addressed to both Nader and Raphael  
Ghermezian, as well the other Brothers. Raphael Ghermezian raises the same arguments in  
relation to this Request as did Nader Ghermezian in T-252-19. I need not repeat my analysis of  
those arguments above.  
[342] The Minister asserts that Mr. Ghermezian failed to provide most of the items in this  
Request and therefore seeks a compliance order in relation to those items. Subject to any portions  
Page: 139  
of the Request that I may conclude to be invalid, following receipt of the parties’ further  
submissions on application of my conclusions surrounding the statutory interpretation of s 231.1,  
I find that a compliance order should issue against Raphael Ghermezian in relation to the items  
in the Request that the Minister is still seeking.  
(3) Request BUST-21  
[343] This Request, dated January 4, 2018, was also addressed to all the Brothers. Raphael  
Ghermezian asserts the same arguments in this matter as did Nader Ghermezian in T-252-19, and  
my analysis is the same.  
[344] The Minister asserts that Mr. Ghermezian has not provided any of the requested  
documents and information. Subject to any portions of the Request that I may conclude to be  
invalid, following receipt of the parties’ further submissions on application of my conclusions  
surrounding the statutory interpretation of s 231.1, I find that a compliance order should issue  
against Raphael Ghermezian in relation to this Request.  
(4) Requests RUST-22 and RUST-23  
[345] These Requests, both dated April 5, 2018, and addressed to Raphael Ghermezian at the  
Edmonton Address are materially identical to NUST-22 and NUST-23, addressed to Nader  
Ghermezian and analyzed above in relation to T-252-19. The present application raises the same  
arguments, and my analysis is the same. For the sake of good order, I note Mr. Bowe’s testimony  
Page: 140  
in cross-examination that the Edmonton Address is the address Mr. Ghermezian provided on his  
T1 tax return.  
[346] I find that the final sentence of item 23 of Requests RUST-22 and RUST-23 is invalid,  
because it uses the imprecise term “Mall of America Group”. I find the rest of item 23 to be  
valid.  
[347] Subject to those findings, and subject to any other portions of these Requests that I may  
conclude to be invalid, following receipt of the parties’ further submissions on application of my  
conclusions surrounding the statutory interpretation of s 231.1, I find that a compliance order  
should issue against Raphael Ghermezian in relation to the portions of these Requests that the  
Minister is still pursuing.  
(5) Request RUST2-01  
[348] This Request, dated October 11, 2018, is issued to the attention of Raphael Ghermezian  
and the other Brothers, under cover of a registered letter to Raphael Ghermezian at the Edmonton  
Address. It is materially the same as Request NUST2-01 issued to Nader Ghermezian and  
analyzed above under T-252-19. The arguments are the same, as is my analysis.  
[349] Subject to any portions of this Request that I may conclude to be invalid, following  
receipt of the parties’ further submissions on application of my conclusions surrounding the  
statutory interpretation of s 231.1, I find that a compliance order should issue against Raphael.  
Ghermezian in relation to this Request.  
Page: 141  
(6) Requirement A-RUST-0103  
[350] This Requirement, dated January 23, 2019, is addressed to Raphael Ghermezian at the  
Edmonton Address. This Requirement is materially the same as A-NUST-0103, issued to Nader  
Ghermezian and analyzed above under T-252-19. Raphael Ghermezian raises the same  
arguments, and my analysis is the same.  
[351] The Minister seeks to obtain all information and documentation requested in this  
Requirement, with the exception of the US tax returns of the V-Day Trust relevant to Raphael  
Ghermezian. I find that a compliance order should issue against Mr. Ghermezian in relation to  
the remaining items sought by the Minister under this Requirement.  
(7) Requirement A-GDT-0101  
[352] This Requirement, dated October 30, 2018, is addressed to Raphael Ghermezian at the  
Edmonton Address and appears to have contents largely identical to Requirement A-GDT-0103  
issued to Paul Ghermezian and Requirement A-GDT-0102 issued to Joshua Ghermezian  
(described earlier in these Reasons).  
[353] With one exception, the Respondent’s submissions in relation to this Requirement raise  
arguments that I have previously canvassed in these Reasons, and my analysis remains the same.  
[354] The additional argument raised in this matter relates to the fact that the Requirement  
demanded that Raphael Ghermezian provide information and documents in his capacity as  
Page: 142  
Joshua Ghermezian’s father. This argument notes the following explanation in the Requirement,  
referencing the trust agreement for GDT:  
…The Trust Agreement states in Article 4.2 that “[a]n Investment  
Committee Member who is under the age of thirty (30) years must  
consult with his father regarding any decision as a Committee  
Member.” According to the records obtained by CRA, Mr. Joshua  
Ghermezian is currently under 30 years of age and that he is a  
trustee and member of both the Investment Committee and the  
Approval Committee of GDT. The terms of the Trust Agreement  
indicate that you are privy to investment decisions made by GDT  
as a result of your consultative and father-and-son relationship  
with Mr. Joshua Ghermezian.  
[355] The Respondent raises this point both as a “same person principle” argument and in  
support of the position that the Minister has failed to prove that Raphael Ghermezian was  
actually privy to the material sought under this Requirement. As to the latter position, the  
Respondent has cited no authority to support a conclusion that the Minister was required to prove  
that Mr. Ghermezian is privy to the material. The Requirement explains the basis for CRA’s  
belief that he has such access, and I see no resulting basis for the Court to find the Requirement  
invalid.  
[356] As for the same person principle, the Requirement is directed to Raphael Ghermezian,  
and he is the Respondent to this compliance application. The fact that the Requirement explains  
the basis for CRA’s belief that he has access to the requested material related to GDT does not  
offend this principle.  
Page: 143  
[357] The Minister seeks only certain portions of the documents and information originally  
requested in this Requirement. I find that the Minister is entitled to a compliance order against  
Raphael Ghermezian in relation thereto.  
VI.  
Conclusion  
[358] As will be apparent from the above analyses and conclusions, the Minister has been  
largely successful in resisting the defence argument raised by the Respondents in these  
applications. However, I have accepted the Respondents’ imprecision arguments in relation to  
particular portions of a small number of Requests. More significantly, the parties have met with  
divided success on the issue surrounding statutory interpretation of the scope of s 231.1(1). As  
previously noted, it will therefore be necessary for the Court to decide how the conclusions on  
the statutory interpretation issue apply to individual items in the Requests or portions thereof  
and, as a result, which items are valid because they represent a demand for documentation and  
which are not valid because they represent a demand for undocumented information.  
[359] As also noted above, my view is that, now that the outcome of the statutory interpretation  
issue is known, it will be appropriate and useful for the parties to provide further submissions on  
the application of that outcome. My Judgment will provide the parties an opportunity to confer in  
an effort to reach agreement on a proposed form of compliance order, individually for each of  
the six applications, capturing the items required to be provided by the relevant Respondent as a  
result of the outcome of these applications. Such draft order should take into account the  
outcome of the broad statutory interpretation issue, the more minor points resulting from the  
Page: 144  
Respondents’ successful imprecision arguments, and the reduction in the items sought by the  
Minister in many of the Demands.  
[360] I will afford the parties 60 days to complete this process and either provide the Court with  
mutually agreed draft orders or advise the Court that agreement has not been achieved or has not  
been achieved in relation to particular applications or individual Demands or portions thereof. At  
a minimum, the Court will expect the parties to identify, and substantially narrow, any areas of  
disagreement between them. If any disagreement remains at the end of the 60 days, the Minister  
will have an additional 14 days to serve and file its proposed forms of compliance orders,  
accompanied by written submissions identifying all remaining areas of disagreement and the  
Minister’s positons on those disagreements. The Respondents will then have 14 days to respond,  
with its proposed forms of compliance orders accompanied by written submissions on their  
positons on those remaining areas of disagreement.  
[361] Following conclusion of the above, the Court will issue compliance orders in the forms it  
considers appropriate. In the meantime, these applications remain subject to case management  
and, if the parties require any further direction surrounding the completion of this process, they  
can contact the Registry to request a case management conference.  
[362] Finally, the Court notes the Respondents’ positon in these applications that, if the Court  
were to determine that any compliance orders should be issued, the 10 days proposed by the  
Minister in the draft orders accompanying her application records does not represents reasonable  
time for the Respondents to comply with the orders. The Court will reserve its conclusion on this  
Page: 145  
issue, for determination when issuing the orders following completion of the process explained  
above.  
VII. Costs  
[363] At the hearing, the parties requested that they have a further opportunity to provide  
submissions on costs, following receipt of the Court’s decisions on the substantive issues in these  
applications. My Judgment will therefore reserve the disposition of costs until after the parties  
have been afforded that opportunity. By way of initial process to address costs, with the benefit  
of knowing the outcome of the substantive issues explained in these Reasons, the parties shall  
attempt to reach agreement on costs in the 60 day period identified above and shall advise the  
Court of the outcome of those efforts when advising whether agreement has been reach on the  
draft compliance orders.  
[364] The Court recognizes that, if agreement on costs cannot be not reached, the parties may  
wish to make submissions thereon after knowing the determination of any disagreements on the  
form of the compliance orders. Therefore, my Judgment will provide that, if agreement on costs  
is not reached, the parties will be afforded that opportunity.  
Page: 146  
JUDGMENT IN T-252-19, T-254-19, T-258-19,  
T-259-19, T-261-19, and T-262-19  
THIS COURT’S JUDGMENT is that:  
1. Subject to the remaining steps set out in this Judgment, these applications for  
compliance orders are granted.  
2. The parties to each application shall confer in an effort to reach agreement,  
taking into account the Court’s Reasons, on:  
a. a proposed form of compliance order; and  
b. the disposition of costs of the application.  
3. Within 60 days of the date of this Judgment, the parties to each application  
shall jointly:  
a. either provide the Court with the agreed proposed form of  
compliance order or advise the Court that agreement has not  
been achieved or has not been achieved in full; and  
b. either advise the Court as to the agreed disposition of costs or  
advise the Court that agreement has not been achieved.  
4. If the parties to any application advise the Court, in accordance with  
paragraph 3(a), that agreement on a proposed form of compliance order has  
not been achieved or has not been achieved in full, the Minister shall, within  
14 days of so advising the Court, serve and file her proposed form of  
Page: 147  
compliance order, accompanied by written submissions identifying all  
remaining areas of disagreement and the Minister’s positons on those  
disagreements. The Respondent shall then, within 14 days of such service,  
serve and file his or its proposed form of compliance order accompanied by  
written submissions identifying positions on the remaining areas of  
disagreement.  
5. If the parties to any application advise the Court, in accordance with  
paragraph 3(b), that agreement on the disposition of costs has not been  
achieved, the resulting compliance order will reserve the disposition of costs  
pending further submissions from the parties in accordance with a process to  
be set out therein.  
"Richard F. Southcott"  
Judge  
Page: 148  
APPENDIX “A”  
Definitions  
Définitions  
231 In sections 231.1 to 231.8,  
231 Les définitions qui suivent s’appliquent  
aux articles 231.1 à 231.8  
authorized person means a person authorized personne autorisée Personne autorisée par le  
by the Minister for the purposes of sections  
231.1 to 231.5; (personne autorisée)  
ministre pour l’application des articles 231.1 à  
231.5 (authorized person)  
document includes money, a security and a  
record; (document)  
document Sont compris parmi les documents  
les registres. Y sont assimilés les titres et les  
espèces. (document)  
judge means a judge of a superior court  
having jurisdiction in the province where the  
matter arises or a judge of the Federal Court.  
(juge)  
juge d’une cour supérieure compétente de la  
province où l’affaire prend naissance ou juge  
de la Cour fédérale. (judge)  
dwelling-house means the whole or any part  
of a building or structure that is kept or  
occupied as a permanent or temporary  
residence and includes  
maison d’habitation Tout ou partie de  
quelque bâtiment ou construction tenu ou  
occupé comme résidence permanente ou  
temporaire, y compris :  
(a) a building within the curtilage of a  
dwelling-house that is connected to it  
by a doorway or by a covered and  
enclosed passageway, and  
a) un bâtiment qui se trouve dans la  
même enceinte qu’une maison  
d’habitation et qui y est relié par une  
baie de porte ou par un passage couvert  
et clos;  
(b) a unit that is designed to be  
mobile and to be used as a permanent  
or temporary residence and that is  
being used as such a residence;  
(maison d’habitation)  
b) une unité conçue pour être mobile et  
pour être utilisée comme résidence  
permanente ou temporaire et qui est ainsi  
utilisée. (dwelling-house)  
Inspections  
Enquêtes  
231.1 (1) An authorized person may, at all  
231.1 (1) Une personne autorisée peut, à tout  
reasonable times, for any purpose related to  
moment raisonnable, pour l’application et  
the administration or enforcement of this Act, l’exécution de la présente loi, à la fois :  
(a) inspect, audit or examine the books  
and records of a taxpayer and any  
document of the taxpayer or of any  
other person that relates or may relate  
a) inspecter, vérifier ou examiner les  
livres et registres d’un contribuable ainsi  
que tous documents du contribuable ou  
d’une autre personne qui se rapportent  
Page: 149  
to the information that is or should be  
in the books or records of the taxpayer  
or to any amount payable by the  
taxpayer under this Act, and  
ou peuvent se rapporter soit aux  
renseignements qui figurent dans les  
livres ou registres du contribuable ou  
qui devraient y figurer, soit à tout  
montant payable par le contribuable en  
vertu de la présente loi;  
(b) examine property in an inventory  
of a taxpayer and any property or  
process of, or matter relating to, the  
taxpayer or any other person, an  
examination of which may assist the  
authorized person in determining the  
accuracy of the inventory of the  
taxpayer or in ascertaining the  
information that is or should be in the  
books or records of the taxpayer or  
any amount payable by the taxpayer  
under this Act,  
b) examiner les biens à porter à  
l’inventaire d’un contribuable, ainsi que  
tout bien ou tout procédé du contribuable  
ou d’une autre personne ou toute matière  
concernant l’un ou l’autre dont l’examen  
peut aider la personne autorisée à établir  
l’exactitude de l’inventaire du contribuable  
ou à contrôler soit les renseignements qui  
figurent dans les livres ou registres du  
contribuable ou qui devraient y figurer, soit  
tout montant payable par le contribuable en  
vertu de la présente loi;  
and for those purposes the authorized person  
may  
à ces fins, la personne autorisée peut :  
(c) subject to subsection 231.1(2),  
enter into any premises or place where  
any business is carried on, any  
property is kept, anything is done in  
connection with any business or any  
books or records are or should be kept,  
c) sous réserve du paragraphe (2), pénétrer  
dans un lieu où est exploitée une entreprise,  
est gardé un bien, est faite une chose en  
rapport avec une entreprise ou sont tenus  
ou devraient l’être des livres ou registres;  
(d) and require the owner or manager  
of the property or business and any  
other person on the premises or place  
to give the authorized person all  
reasonable assistance and to answer all  
proper questions relating to the  
administration or enforcement of this  
Act and, for that purpose, require the  
owner or manager to attend at the  
premises or place with the authorized  
person.  
d) requérir le propriétaire, ou la personne  
ayant la gestion, du bien ou de l’entreprise  
ainsi que toute autre personne présente sur  
les lieux de lui fournir toute l’aide  
raisonnable et de répondre à toutes les  
questions pertinentes à l’application et  
l’exécution de la présente loi et, à cette  
fin, requérir le propriétaire, ou la personne  
ayant la gestion, de l’accompagner sur les  
lieux.  
Prior authorization  
Autorisation préalable  
(2) Where any premises or place referred to in (2) Lorsque le lieu mentionné à l’alinéa (1)c)  
paragraph 231.1(1)(c) is a dwelling-house, an est une maison d’habitation une personne  
authorized person may not enter that  
autorisée ne peut y pénétrer sans la  
dwelling-house without the consent of the  
permission de l’occupant, à moins d’y être  
Page: 150  
autorisée par un mandat décerné en vertu du  
occupant except under the authority of a  
warrant under subsection 231.1(3)  
paragraphe (3).  
Application  
Mandat d’entrée  
(3) Where, on ex parte application by the  
Minister, a judge is satisfied by information  
on oath that  
(3) Sur requête ex parte du ministre, le juge  
saisi peut décerner un mandat qui autorise une  
personne autorisée à pénétrer dans une  
maison d’habitation aux conditions précisées  
dans le mandat, s’il est convaincu, sur  
dénonciation sous serment, de ce qui suit :  
(a) there are reasonable grounds to  
believe that a dwelling-house is a  
premises or place referred to in  
paragraph 231.1(1)(c),  
a) il existe des motifs raisonnables de  
croire que la maison d’habitation est  
un lieu mentionné à l’alinéa (1)c);  
(b) entry into the dwelling-house is  
necessary for any purpose relating  
to the administration or  
b) il est nécessaire d’y pénétrer pour  
l’application ou l’exécution de la  
présente loi;  
enforcement of this Act, and  
(c) entry into the dwelling-house  
has been, or there are reasonable  
grounds to believe that entry will  
be, refused,  
c) un refus d’y pénétrer a été opposé,  
ou il existe des motifs raisonnables de  
croire qu’un tel refus sera opposé.  
the judge may issue a warrant authorizing an  
Dans la mesure où un refus de pénétrer dans  
authorized person to enter the dwelling-house la maison d’habitation a été opposé ou  
subject to such conditions as are specified in  
the warrant but, where the judge is not  
satisfied that entry into the dwelling-house is  
necessary for any purpose relating to the  
pourrait l’être et où des documents ou biens  
sont gardés dans la maison d’habitation ou  
pourraient l’être, le juge qui n’est pas  
convaincu qu’il est nécessaire de pénétrer  
administration or enforcement of this Act, the dans la maison d’habitation pour l’application  
judge may  
ou l’exécution de la présente loi peut  
ordonner à l’occupant de la maison  
d’habitation de permettre à une personne  
autorisée d’avoir raisonnablement accès à  
tous documents ou biens qui sont gardés dans  
la maison d’habitation ou devraient y être  
gardés et rendre tout autre ordonnance  
indiquée en l’espèce pour l’application de la  
présente loi.  
(d) order the occupant of the dwelling-  
[LANK]  
house to provide to an authorized  
person reasonable access to any  
Page: 151  
document or property that is or should  
be kept in the dwelling-house, and  
(e) make such other order as is  
appropriate in the circumstances to  
carry out the purposes of this Act, to  
the extent that access was or may be  
expected to be refused and that the  
document or property is or may be  
expected to be kept in the dwelling-  
house.  
[BLANK]  
Requirement to provide documents or  
information  
Production de documents ou fourniture de  
renseignements  
231.2 (1) Notwithstanding any other  
231.2 (1) Malgré les autres dispositions de la  
présente loi, le ministre peut, sous réserve du  
paragraphe (2) et, pour l’application ou  
l’exécution de la présente loi (y compris la  
perception d’un montant payable par une  
personne en vertu de la présente loi), d’un  
provision of this Act, the Minister may,  
subject to subsection (2), for any purpose  
related to the administration or enforcement  
of this Act (including the collection of any  
amount payable under this Act by any  
person), of a listed international agreement or, accord international désigné ou d’un traité  
for greater certainty, of a tax treaty with  
another country, by notice served personally  
fiscal conclu avec un autre pays, par avis  
signifié à personne ou envoyé par courrier  
or by registered or certified mail, require that recommandé ou certifié, exiger d’une  
any person provide, within such reasonable  
time as is stipulated in the notice,  
personne, dans le délai raisonnable que  
précise l’avis :  
(a) any information or additional  
information, including a return of  
income or a supplementary return;  
or  
a) qu’elle fournisse tout renseignement  
ou tout renseignement supplémentaire, y  
compris une déclaration de revenu ou  
une déclaration supplémentaire;  
(b) any document.  
b) qu’elle produise des documents.  
Unnamed persons  
Personnes non désignées nommément  
(2) The Minister shall not impose on any  
person (in this section referred to as a “third  
party”) a requirement under subsection  
231.2(1) to provide information or any  
document relating to one or more unnamed  
persons unless the Minister first obtains the  
authorization of a judge under subsection  
231.2(3).  
(2) Le ministre ne peut exiger de quiconque  
— appelé « tiers » au présent article — la  
fourniture de renseignements ou production  
de documents prévue au paragraphe (1)  
concernant une ou plusieurs personnes non  
désignées nommément, sans y être au  
préalable autorisé par un juge en vertu du  
paragraphe (3).  
Page: 152  
Judicial authorization  
Autorisation judiciaire  
(3) Sur requête du ministre, un juge de la  
(3) A judge of the Federal Court may, on  
application by the Minister and subject to any Cour fédérale peut, aux conditions qu’il  
conditions that the judge considers estime indiquées, autoriser le ministre à  
appropriate, authorize the Minister to impose exiger d’un tiers la fourniture de  
on a third party a requirement under  
subsection (1) relating to an unnamed person  
or more than one unnamed person (in this  
renseignements ou la production de  
documents prévues au paragraphe (1)  
concernant une personne non désignée  
section referred to as the “group”) if the judge nommément ou plus d’une personne non  
is satisfied by information on oath that  
désignée nommément — appelée « groupe »  
au présent article —, s’il est convaincu, sur  
dénonciation sous serment, de ce qui suit :  
(a) the person or group is  
a) cette personne ou ce groupe est  
ascertainable; and  
identifiable;  
(b) the requirement is made to verify  
compliance by the person or persons  
in the group with any duty or  
b) la fourniture ou la production est  
exigée pour vérifier si cette personne  
ou les personnes de ce groupe ont  
respecté quelque devoir ou obligation  
prévu par la présente loi;  
obligation under this Act.  
(c) and (d) [Repealed, 1996, c. 21, s.  
c) et d) [Abrogés, 1996, ch. 21, art.  
58(1)]  
58(1)]  
….  
….  
Definition of foreign-based information or  
Sens de renseignement ou document  
document  
étranger  
231.6 (1) For the purposes of this section,  
231.6 (1) Pour l’application du présent article,  
foreign based information or document means un renseignement ou document étranger  
any information or document that is available s’entend d’un renseignement accessible, ou  
or located outside Canada and that may be  
relevant to the administration or enforcement être pris en compte pour l’application ou  
of this Act, including the collection of any l’exécution de la présente loi, y compris la  
d’un document situé, à l’étranger, qui peut  
amount payable under this Act by any person. perception d’un montant payable par une  
personne en vertu de la présente loi.  
Requirement to provide foreign-based  
information  
Obligation de fournir des renseignements  
ou documents étrangers  
(2) Notwithstanding any other provision of  
this Act, the Minister may, by notice served  
personally or by registered or certified mail,  
require that a person resident in Canada or a  
non-resident person carrying on business in  
(2) Malgré les autres dispositions de la  
présente loi, le ministre peut, par avis signifié  
à personne ou envoyé par courrier  
recommandé ou certifié, exiger d’une  
personne résidant au Canada ou d’une  
Page: 153  
personne n’y résidant pas mais y exploitant  
une entreprise de fournir des renseignements  
ou documents étrangers.  
Canada provide any foreign-based  
information or document.  
Notice  
Contenu de l’avis  
(3) The notice referred to in subsection  
(3) L’avis doit :  
231.6(2) shall set out  
(a) a reasonable period of time of not  
less than 90 days for the production  
of the information or document;  
a) indiquer le délai raisonnable, d’au  
moins 90 jours, dans lequel les  
renseignements ou documents étrangers  
doivent être fournis;  
(b) a description of the information or  
b) décrire les renseignements ou  
document being sought; and  
documents étrangers recherchés;  
(c) the consequences under subsection  
231.6(8) to the person of the failure to  
provide the information or documents  
being sought within the period of time set  
out in the notice.  
c) préciser les conséquences prévues au  
paragraphe (8) du défaut de fournir les  
renseignements ou documents étrangers  
recherchés dans le délai-ci dessus.  
Review of foreign information requirement Révision par un juge  
(4) The person on whom a notice of a  
requirement is served under subsection  
(4) La personne à qui l’avis est signifié ou  
envoyé peut, dans les 90 jours suivant la date  
231.6(2) may, within 90 days after the service de signification ou d’envoi, contester, par  
of the notice, apply to a judge for a review of requête à un juge, la mise en demeure du  
the requirement.  
ministre.  
Powers on review  
Pouvoirs de révision  
(5) On hearing an application under  
subsection 231.6(4) in respect of a  
requirement, a judge may  
(5) À l’audition de la requête, le juge peut :  
(a) confirm the requirement;  
a) confirmer la mise en demeure;  
(b) vary the requirement as the judge  
considers appropriate in the  
circumstances; or  
b) modifier la mise en demeure de la  
façon qu’il estime indiquée dans les  
circonstances;  
(c) set aside the requirement if the  
judge is satisfied that the  
requirement is unreasonable.  
c) déclarer sans effet la mise en  
demeure s’il est convaincu que celle-ci  
est déraisonnable.  
Page: 154  
Idem  
Précision  
(6) For the purposes of paragraph 231.6(5)(c), (6) Pour l’application de l’alinéa (5)c), le fait  
the requirement to provide the information or que des renseignements ou documents  
document shall not be considered to be  
unreasonable because the information or  
document is under the control of or available  
étrangers soient accessibles ou situés chez une  
personne non-résidente qui n’est pas contrôlée  
par la personne à qui l’avis est signifié ou  
to a non-resident person that is not controlled envoyé, ou soient sous la garde de cette  
by the person served with the notice of the personne non-résidente, ne rend pas  
requirement under subsection 231.6(2) if that déraisonnable la mise en demeure de fournir  
person is related to the non-resident person.  
ces renseignements ou documents, si ces deux  
personnes sont liées.  
Time period not to count  
Suspension du délai  
(7) The period of time between the day on  
which an application for review of a  
requirement is made pursuant to subsection  
(4) and the day on which the application is  
(7) Le délai qui court entre le jour où une  
requête est présentée conformément au  
paragraphe (4) et le jour où la requête est  
définitivement réglée ne compte pas dans le  
finally disposed of shall not be counted in the calcul :  
computation of  
(a) the period of time set out in the  
a) du délai indiqué dans l’avis  
notice of the requirement; and  
correspondant à la mise en demeure qui  
a donné lieu à la requête;  
(b) the period of time within which an  
assessment may be made pursuant to  
subsection 152(4).  
b) du délai dans lequel une cotisation  
peut être établie conformément au  
paragraphe 152(4).  
Consequence of failure  
Conséquences du défaut  
(8) If a person fails to comply substantially  
(8) Si une personne ne fournit pas la totalité,  
with a notice served under subsection  
ou presque, des renseignements ou documents  
231.6(2) and if the notice is not set aside by a étrangers visés par la mise en demeure  
judge pursuant to subsection 231.6(5), any signifiée conformément au paragraphe (2) et  
court having jurisdiction in a civil proceeding si la mise en demeure n’est pas déclarée sans  
relating to the administration or enforcement  
of this Act shall, on motion of the Minister,  
effet par un juge en application du paragraphe  
(5), tout tribunal saisi d’une affaire civile  
prohibit the introduction by that person of any portant sur l’application ou l’exécution de la  
foreign-based information or document  
covered by that notice.  
présente loi doit, sur requête du ministre,  
refuser le dépôt en preuve par cette personne  
de tout renseignement ou document étranger  
visé par la mise en demeure  
Page: 155  
Compliance order  
Ordonnance  
231.7 (1) On summary application by the  
Minister, a judge may, notwithstanding  
subsection 238(2), order a person to provide  
any access, assistance, information or  
document sought by the Minister under  
231.7 (1) Sur demande sommaire du ministre,  
un juge peut, malgré le paragraphe 238(2),  
ordonner à une personne de fournir l’accès,  
l’aide, les renseignements ou les documents  
que le ministre cherche à obtenir en vertu des  
section 231.1 or 231.2 if the judge is satisfied articles 231.1 ou 231.2 s’il est convaincu de  
that  
ce qui suit :  
(a) the person was required under  
section 231.1 or 231.2 to provide the  
access, assistance, information or  
document and did not do so; and  
a) la personne n’a pas fourni l’accès,  
l’aide, les renseignements ou les  
documents bien qu’elle en soit tenue  
par les articles 231.1 ou 231.2;  
(b) in the case of information or a  
document, the information or  
document is not protected from  
disclosure by solicitor-client privilege  
(within the meaning of subsection  
232(1)).  
b) s’agissant de renseignements ou de  
documents, le privilège des  
communications entre client et avocat,  
au sens du paragraphe 232(1), ne peut  
être invoqué à leur égard.  
Notice required  
Avis  
(2) An application under subsection (1) must  
(2) La demande n’est entendue qu’une fois  
not be heard before the end of five clear days écoulés cinq jours francs après signification  
from the day the notice of application is  
served on the person against whom the order  
is sought.  
d’un avis de la demande à la personne à  
l’égard de laquelle l’ordonnance est  
demandée.  
Judge may impose conditions  
Conditions  
(3) A judge making an order under subsection (3) Le juge peut imposer, à l’égard de  
(1) may impose any conditions in respect of l’ordonnance, les conditions qu’il estime  
the order that the judge considers appropriate. indiquées.  
Contempt of court  
Outrage  
(4) If a person fails or refuses to comply with (4) Quiconque refuse ou fait défaut de se  
an order, a judge may find the person in conformer à une ordonnance peut être  
contempt of court and the person is subject to reconnu coupable d’outrage au tribunal; il est  
the processes and the punishments of the  
court to which the judge is appointed.  
alors sujet aux procédures et sanctions du  
tribunal l’ayant ainsi reconnu coupable.  
Appeal  
Appel  
(5) An order by a judge under subsection (1)  
(5) L’ordonnance visée au paragraphe (1) est  
may be appealed to a court having appellate  
susceptible d’appel devant le tribunal ayant  
Page: 156  
jurisdiction over decisions of the court to  
which the judge is appointed. An appeal does décisions du tribunal ayant rendu  
not suspend the execution of the order unless l’ordonnance. Toutefois, l’appel n’a pas pour  
compétence pour entendre les appels des  
it is so ordered by a judge of the court to  
which the appeal is made.  
effet de suspendre l’exécution de  
l’ordonnance, sauf ordonnance contraire d’un  
juge du tribunal saisi de l’appel.  
….  
….  
Proof of service by mail  
Preuve de signification par poste  
244(5) Where, by this Act or a regulation,  
244(5) Lorsque la présente loi ou son  
provision is made for sending by mail a  
règlement prévoit l’envoi par la poste d’une  
request for information, notice or demand, an demande de renseignements, d’un avis ou  
affidavit of an officer of the Canada Revenue d’une demande formelle, un affidavit d’un  
Agency, sworn before a commissioner or  
other person authorized to take affidavits,  
setting out that the officer has knowledge of  
the facts in the particular case, that such a  
request, notice or demand was sent by  
fonctionnaire de l’Agence du revenu du  
Canada, souscrit en présence d’un  
commissaire ou d’une autre personne  
autorisée à recevoir les affidavits, indiquant  
qu’il est au courant des faits de l’espèce,  
registered letter on a named day to the person que la demande, l’avis ou la demande  
to whom it was addressed (indicating the  
address) and that the officer identifies as  
exhibits attached to the affidavit the post  
formelle en question a été adressée, par  
lettre recommandée, à une date indiquée, à  
la personne à qui elle a été adressée  
office certificate of registration of the letter or (fournissant cette adresse) et qu’il identifie  
a true copy of the relevant portion thereof and comme pièces attachées à l’affidavit, le  
a true copy of the request, notice or demand,  
shall, in the absence of proof to the contrary,  
certificat de recommandation de la lettre  
fourni par le bureau de poste ou une copie  
be received as evidence of the sending and of conforme de la partie pertinente du certificat  
the request, notice or demand.  
et une copie conforme de la demande, de  
l’avis ou de la demande formelle, doit être  
reçu comme preuve, sauf preuve contraire,  
de l’envoi ainsi que de la demande, de l’avis  
ou de la demande formelle.  
FEDERAL COURT  
SOLICITORS OF RECORD  
T-252-19, T-254-19, T-258-19, T-259-19,  
T-261-19, T-262-19  
DOCKET:  
MINISTER OF NATIONAL REVENUE V NADER  
GHERMEZIAN; MINISTER OF NATIONAL  
REVENUE V MARC VATURI; MINISTER OF  
NATIONAL REVENUE V GHERFAM EQUITIES INC;  
MINISTER OF NATIONAL REVENUE V PAUL  
GHERMEZIAN; MINISTER OF NATIONAL  
REVENUE V RAPHAEL GHERMEZIAN; MINISTER  
OF NATIONAL REVENUE V JOSHUA  
STYLE OF CAUSE:  
GHERMEZIAN  
HEARD BY VIDEOCONFERENCE VIA MONTREAL  
JANUARY 24-27, 2022  
PLACE OF HEARING:  
DATE OF HEARING:  
SOUTHCOTT J.  
JUDGMENT AND REASONS:  
DATED:  
FEBRUARY 23, 2022  
APPEARANCES:  
Rita Araujo  
FOR THE APPLICANT  
Peter Swanstrom  
Jesse Epp-Fransen  
Allene Kilpatrick  
Bobby J. Sood  
FOR THE RESPONDENTS  
Stephen S. Ruby  
Michael H. Lubetsky  
Sarah Cormack  
SOLICITORS OF RECORD:  
Attorney General of Canada  
Toronto, Ontario  
FOR THE APPLICANT  
Davies Ward Phillips  
& Vineberg LLP  
Toronto, Ontario  
FOR THE RESPONDENTS  


© 2022 IncJournal is not affiliated with or endorsed by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission