95 B.C.L.R. (3d) 260, at paras. 10-12 and 25; Keays, at paras. 54-55). Proceeding
directly to an examination of contractual terms divorces the question of damages
from the underlying breach, which is an error in principle.
 Moreover, the approach in Paquette respects the well-established
understanding that the contract effectively “remains alive” for the purposes of
assessing the employee’s damages, in order to determine what compensation the
employee would have been entitled to but for the dismissal …
 Courts should accordingly ask two questions when determining whether the
appropriate quantum of damages for breach of the implied term to provide
reasonable notice includes bonus payments and certain other benefits. Would the
employee have been entitled to the bonus or benefit as part of their compensation
during the reasonable notice period? If so, do the terms of the employment contract
or bonus plan unambiguously take away or limit that common law right?
 The first question is whether Mr. Matthews would have been entitled to the
LTIP payment as part of his compensation during the reasonable notice period.
Since the Realization Event was triggered within the 15-month reasonable notice
period, Mr. Matthews argues that he is prima facie entitled to damages for the lost
LTIP payment as part of his common law damages.
 Ocean argues that Mr. Matthews cannot satisfy the first stage of the analysis.
It points this Court to Singer v. Nordstrong Equipment Limited, 2018 ONCA 364,
47 C.C.E.L. (4th) 218, where the Court of Appeal for Ontario presented the first
question by asking whether the bonus was “an integral part of his compensation
package” (para. 21). Relying on this formulation, Ocean contends that, under the
first step, Mr. Matthews has a common law entitlement to damages for all
compensation and benefits that are integral to his compensation. Ocean maintains
that the LTIP payment was not integral to Mr. Matthews’ compensation since he
did not have a vested right at the date of termination.
 The trial judge confronted this submission and concluded that Ocean was
attempting to introduce an extra requirement into the analysis that is not supported
by the jurisprudence (para. 387). I agree. The test of whether a benefit or bonus is
“integral” to the employee’s compensation assists in answering the question of what
the employee would have been paid during the reasonable notice period (see, e.g.,
Brock v. Matthews Group Ltd. (1988), 20 C.C.E.L. 110 (Ont. H.C.J.), at p. 123,
aff’d (1991), 34 C.C.E.L. 50 (C.A.); Paquette, at para. 17). Thus, in Paquette and
Singer, where the bonuses at issue were discretionary, the Court of Appeal for
Ontario considered this so-called “integral” test since there was doubt as to whether
the employee would have received those discretionary bonuses during the
reasonable notice period.
 This case is different. The purpose of damages in lieu of reasonable notice
is to put the employee in the position they would have been in had they continued
to work through to the end of the notice period. It is uncontested that the Realization
Event occurred during the notice period. But for Mr. Matthews’ dismissal, he would