In Reference Re Milk Industry Act (British Columbia),67 the Province of British Columbia
legislated a milk marketing scheme that fixed prices and specified a levy in which milk producers’
revenues from the sale of milk and milk products were pooled and then after deducting the
expenses of the marketing board, the revenues were allocated among the milk producers in
accordance with a formula. Distinguishing Lower Mainland Dairy Products Sales Adjustment
Committee v. Crystal Dairy, Ltd., supra, the Supreme Court of Canada upheld the marketing
scheme and the pooling arrangement as matters of a merely local or private nature in the province
under sections 92(13) and 92(16) of the Constitution Act, 1867. Thus, the Supreme Court agreed
with the Province of British Columbia’s argument that the legislation did not impose any tax.
 In Reference respecting the Agricultural Products Marketing Act, R.S.C. 1970, s. A-7,68 the
Federal Government enacted legislation to assist the provinces to get around the restrictions of
Lower Mainland Dairy Products Sales Adjustment Committee v. Crystal Dairy, Ltd., supra. The
federal legislation attempted to offer this assistance by delegating to provincial marketing boards
the power to impose regulatory levies that otherwise could be considered to be indirect taxation.
The Supreme Court, however, struck down the Federal legislation as being in pith and substance
about trade within a province, and thus ultra vires the Federal Government. In making this ruling,
the Supreme Court characterized what had been characterized in the Crystal Dairy case as an
indirect tax as charges forming an integral part of an interprovincial marketing scheme and thus
not taxes at all. Thus, in Reference respecting the Agricultural Products Marketing Act, the Federal
Government’s assistance was not required, and it was encroaching on provincial jurisdiction. In
this result, the Supreme Court overturned Lower Mainland Dairy Products Sales Adjustment
Committee v. Crystal Dairy, Ltd., supra. And, the Supreme Court recognized that levies that were
in other respects indirect taxation were nevertheless intra vires pursuant to sections 92(13) and s.
92(16) of the Constitution Act, 1867.
 In Re Exported Natural Gas Tax,69 the Federal Government levied on natural gas owned
by the Province of Alberta and exported to the United States a tax on each gigajoule of marketable
pipeline gas. The levy was ruled a tax and not a regulatory charge. The levy was ultra vires as
offending s. 125 of the Constitution Act, 1867, which prohibits intergovernmental taxation. In a
dissenting judgment, Chief Justice Laskin (MacIntyre and Lamer, JJ. with him in dissent)
concluded that the Federal Government’s tax was a part of a regulatory scheme and could be
imposed on the Provincial Government and was not a tax caught by s. 125 of the Constitution Act,
 In Allard Contractors Ltd. v. Coquitlam (District),70 municipalities in British Columbia
charged gravel pit operators an annual fee based on the volume of gravel extracted. The gravel pit
operators challenged the annual fee as ultra vires as an indirect tax. The Supreme Court agreed
that the fee had the characteristics of an indirect tax, but the Court held that the variable fee was
67  S.C.R. 346. (Kerwin, C.J, and Taschereau, Locke, Cartwright, Fauteux, Abbott, Martland, Judson, and
68  2 S.C.R. 1198. (Martland,. Ritchie, Pigeon, Beetz and de Grandpré, JJ.; Laskin, C.J. and Judson, Spence,
and Dickson, JJ.).
69  1 S.C.R. 1004. (Martland, Ritchie, Dickson, Beetz, Estey and Chouinard, JJ.; Laskin, C.J., McIntyre and
Lamer, JJ., dissenting.).
70  4 S.C.R. 371. (Lamer C.J. and La Forest, L'Heureux-Dubé, Sopinka, Gonthier, Cory, McLachlin, Iacobucci
and Major JJ.)