Second, did the lawyer have relevant important information about the negotiation or
litigation process it failed to share with the client that probably would have caused the client to
come to a contrary conclusion?37 If so, the information deficit would be extremely problematic.
 These two questions do not emphasize the merits or demerits of the contingency fee
 If a determination is made that a client did not have sufficient skills to make a prudent
decision and a lawyer failed to advise a client with these deficiencies to seek independent legal
advice on the advisability of the client signing the contingency fee agreement or suffered from an
unacceptable information deficit, the default mechanism set out in rule 10.2(1) of the Alberta Rules
of Court applies.38 This requires a review officer to take into account the six listed factors and
make a decision as to what is a “reasonable fee”. This is a challenging task. Rule 10.2(1) does not
Collet, 51 Eng. Rep. 1171, 1173 (Ch. 1854) (“the settlement of a solicitor’s bill by the client for a fixed sum is valid,
and will not be disturbed ... where it has been entered into fairly, and with proper knowledge on both sides”).
37 Almalki v. Canada, 2019 ONCA 26, ¶¶ 39-40; 431 D.L.R. 4th 357, 369, leave to appeal ref’d,  S.C.C.A. No.
79 (“the motion judge acknowledged that contingency fee agreements were subject to closer scrutiny than purely
commercial contracts. She went on, after a review of the relevant evidence, to hold, at para. 21: ‘In this case however,
there is no evidence of fraud, duress, mistake of fact or unconscionability. There is no evidence of Mr. Almalki's
failure to understand the fee agreement or specifically the effect of the language of paragraph 16 [providing that, if
exceptional circumstances arise, the fee will include a portion of legal costs paid by the Attorney General, and parties
will jointly apply to obtain Court approval of this, as required by the applicable legislation].’ There is no evidence that
the plaintiffs were misled by Stockwoods. The record fully supports these findings and I would defer to them”); Re
Stuart ex p. Cathcart,  2 Q.B. 201, 204-05 (C.A.) per Lord Esher, M.R. (“By s. 9 [of The Attorneys' and
Solicitors' Act] the Court may enforce an agreement if it appears that it is in all respects fair and reasonable. With
regard to the fairness of such an agreement, it appears to me that this refers to the mode of obtaining the agreement,
and that if a solicitor makes an agreement with a client who fully understands and appreciates that agreement that
satisfies the requirement as to fairness. But the agreement must also be reasonable, and in determining whether it is
so the matters covered by the expression ‘fair’ cannot be re-introduced. As to this part of the requirements of the
statute, I am of opinion that the meaning is that when an agreement is challenged the solicitor must not only satisfy
the Court that the agreement was absolutely fair with regard to the way in which it was obtained, but must also satisfy
the Court that the terms of that agreement are reasonable. If in the opinion of the Court they are not reasonable, having
regard to the kind of work which the solicitor has to do under the agreement, the Court are bound to say that the
solicitor, as an officer of the Court, has no right to an unreasonable payment for the work which he has done, and
ought not to have made an agreement for remuneration in such a manner”); Stedman v. Collet, 51 Eng. Rep. 1171,
1173-74 (Ch. 1854) per Sir John Romilly, M.R. (“the settlement of a solicitor’s bill by the client for a fixed sum is
valid, and will not be disturbed ... where it has been entered into fairly, and with proper knowledge on both sides. ....
[P]rovided the transaction be open and fair and without pressure, a solicitor and his client may ... agree that a fixed
sum shall be paid to the solicitor, in liquidation of his bill of costs”) & Zipchen v. Bainbridge, 2008 SKCA 87, ¶ 64;
 12 W.W.R. 397, 416 per Wilkinson, J.A. (“Freedom of contract must be respected, it is true, and lawyers must
have fair opportunity to set the conditions under which they are willing to offer their services. The courts are loath to
interfere in contingency arrangements, freely and fairly negotiated, but a solicitors' retainer is not, and never has been,
a purely commercial engagement. The so-called ‘helping professions’ are not unaccustomed to meeting higher
expectations, and in the particular circumstances of this case, those higher expectations were found to exist”).
38 Alberta Rules of Court, Alta. Reg. 124/2010, r. 10.18(4) (“If a contingency fee agreement is disallowed, the amount
payable to the lawyer for the lawyer’s charges must be determined under rule 10.2”).