since made it abundantly clear in those sections of the Criminal Code dealing with
the form of indictments and informations, that the punctilio of an earlier age is no
longer to bind us and that the courts must look for substance and not petty
formalities [emphasis is mine below]:
As with included offences, the fundamental principle which governs the
interpretation of the information or indictment is that the accused must be provided
with enough information to make full answer and defence. At common law, and
particularly by the beginning of the 19th century, the indictment had become a
highly technical document. Strictly proper language was required when framing the
charges against an accused and all the facts and circumstances of the offence,
including the intent, were required to be set out in the indictment in great detail and
with meticulous certainty (see E. G. Ewaschuk, Criminal Pleadings & Practice in
Canada (2nd ed. (loose-leaf)), vol. 1, at p. 9-5; R. E. Salhany, Canadian Criminal
Procedure (6th ed. (loose-leaf)), at paras. 6.800 to 6.840). There are examples of
cases from this period where the failure to include the age of the complainant, or
even of the accused, was considered fatal (see, e.g., R. v. Connolly (1867), 26
U.C.R. 317; R. v. Loftus (1926), 45 C.C.C. 390 (Ont. S.C., App. Div.); R. v.
MacDonald (1952), 102 C.C.C. 337 (N.S.S.C.)).
The classic statement of the standard against which the sufficiency of the indictment
was to be measured was articulated by this Court in Brodie v. The King, [1936]
S.C.R. 188. Rinfret J., writing for the Court, discussed the requirements of then s.
852 of the Code as follows:
If section 852 be analysed, it will be noticed the imperative requirement ("shall
contain") is that there must be a statement that the accused has committed an
indictable offence; and such offence must be "specified." It will be sufficient if the
substance of the offence is stated; but every count must contain such statement
"in substance." In our view, this does not mean merely classifying or characterizing
the offence; it calls for the necessity of specifying time, place and matter ... of
stating the facts alleged to constitute the indictable offence. [p. 193]
He outlined the justification for this degree of required particularity as follows:
... the statement must contain the allegations of matter "essential to be proved,"
and must be in "words sufficient to give the accused notice of the offence with
which he is charged." Those are the very words of the section; and they were put
there to embody the spirit of the legislation, one of its main objects being that the
accused may have a fair trial and consequently that the indictment shall, in itself,
identify with reasonable precision the act or acts with which he is charged, in order
that he may be advised of the particular offence alleged against him and prepare
his defence accordingly. [p. 194]
Since Brodie, however, there has been an increased tendency for Canadian courts
to reject such arguments on the basis that, in the words of Wilson J. in R. v. B. (G.),
[1990] 2 S.C.R. 30, "they are overly technical and an unnecessary holdover from
earlier times" (p. 42). In R. v. City of Sault Ste. Marie, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 1299, this
Court distanced itself from an approach whereby even the slightest defect made an
indictment a nullity. Writing for the Court, Dickson J. stated that "Parliament has
made it abundantly clear in those sections of the Criminal Code having to do with
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