Reece v. Canada (Attorney General)
Page 13
[14]
Interlocutory injunctions may offer only partial imperfect relief. First, as
mentioned, they may not capture the full obligation on the government
alleged by the Haida. Second, they typically represent an all-or-nothing
solution. Either the project goes ahead or it halts. By contrast, the alleged
duty to consult and accommodate by its very nature entails balancing of
Aboriginal and other interests and thus lies closer to the aim of reconciliation
at the heart of Crown-Aboriginal relations, as set out in R. v. Van der Peet,
[1996] 2 S.C.R. 507, at para. 31, and Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997]
3 S.C.R. 1010, at para. 186. Third, the balance of convenience test tips the
scales in favour of protecting jobs and government revenues, with the result
that Aboriginal interests tend to “lose” outright pending a final determination
of the issue, instead of being balanced appropriately against conflicting
concerns: J. J. L. Hunter, “Advancing Aboriginal Title Claims after
Delgamuukw: The Role of the Injunction” (June 2000). Fourth, interlocutory
injunctions are designed as a stop-gap remedy pending litigation of the
underlying issue. Aboriginal claims litigation can be very complex and require
years and even decades to resolve in the courts. An interlocutory injunction
over such a long period of time might work unnecessary prejudice and may
diminish incentives on the part of the successful party to compromise. While
Aboriginal claims can be and are pursued through litigation, negotiation is a
preferable way of reconciling state and Aboriginal interests. For all these
reasons, interlocutory injunctions may fail to adequately take account of
Aboriginal interests prior to their final determination.
[50] The availability of injunctive relief is also not diminished by the Supreme
Court’s decision in Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia, 2014 SCC 44. In addition
to significant holdings in relation to aboriginal title, the Court in Tsilhqot’in Nation
addressed the Crown’s obligations to the Tsilhqot’in prior to proof of title, and
whether the Crown breached its obligations.
[51] In Tsilhqot’in Nation, the Court referred to an injunction as a remedy available
to an aboriginal group where the Crown failed to discharge its duty to consult:
para. 89, citing Rio Tinto Alcan Inc. v. Carrier Sekani Tribal Council, 2010 SCC 43 at
para 37 [Rio Tinto]. In Rio Tinto, the Court was also considering remedies available
to an aboriginal group where the Crown failed to consult, referring back again to the
same passages in Haida Nation which I have cited above:
[37]
The remedy for a breach of the duty to consult also varies with the
situation. The Crown’s failure to consult can lead to a number of remedies
ranging from injunctive relief against the threatening activity altogether, to
damages, to an order to carry out the consultation prior to proceeding further
with the proposed government conduct: Haida Nation, at paras. 13-14.