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Dans l’affaire Aetna Financial Services c. Feigelman, la Cour suprême a précisé
qu’au Québec, l’injonction de type Mareva trouvait sa source dans le dernier paragraphe
de l’article 752 de l’ancien Code de procédure civile, lequel correspond maintenant au
premier alinéa de l’article 511, portant sur l’injonction interlocutoire.
Ainsi, au Québec, les critères devant être satisfaits pour obtenir le prononcé
d’une injonction de type Mareva sont les mêmes que ceux de l’injonction interlocutoire,
c’est-à-dire : (1) l’apparence de droit; (2) le préjudice sérieux et irréparable et (3) la
balance des inconvénients. S’ajoute à ces critères celui de l’urgence, s’il s’agit d’une
demande injonctive de type provisoire.
 The parties agree on the requirements necessary to the issuance of a Mareva
order. These requirements have been refined through court decisions, and have been
summarized, in their applicability to Quebec disputes, by the Court of Appeal in
Marciano10, penned by Justice Dalphond:
(…) As a general rule, an obligation of full and frank disclosure applies in Quebec
in connection with any ex parte orders because counsel for the applicant is asking the
judge to engage in a procedure that runs counter to the fundamental principle of justice
that all sides of a dispute should be heard. In my view, it follows that in cases where
opposing interests are certain to exist, the moving party "is under a super-added duty to
the court" (Canadian Paraplegic Association, supra) to state its own case fairly and to
inform the Court of any points of fact or law known to it which favour the other side that
may have a bearing on the outcome of the application. This obligation should be
considered according to an objective standard: what would a reasonably qualified lawyer
have done in the same circumstances?
 The parties disagree on the respect of the requirements in the case at bar.
 The Court of Appeal defined the template for the exercise to which the Court is
convened in Marciano, after choosing which approach should be adopted in light of an
Under the first approach, the failure to disclose a material or relevant fact, even
inadvertently, causes a judgment setting aside or dissolving the ex parte injunction
possibly with solicitor and client costs and even damages. Under the second, the courts
found that notwithstanding material non-disclosure there was a residual discretion to
continue the injunction.
In my view the second approach should be adopted in Quebec as well. When
there is material non-disclosure, the following factors should be considered by the judge
hearing a motion to rescind or annul an ex parte order:
- the importance of the omitted facts to each of the issues decided by the judge;
- whether the omission was inadvertent, its relevance was misconstrued or
whether the omission was made with the intent to mislead the judge;
- the prejudice occasioned to the party affected by the ex parte order;
Marciano (Séquestre de), 2012 QCCA 1881.