particular, s.3(1)(a)(iii) requiring that “the injury, assuming liability on the part of the defendant,
warrants bringing a proceeding” had not been established.
 Condominium Corporation 0812755 v IBI Group Inc, 2019 ABQB 75 (“IBI Group”)
addresses this requirement:
…If the harm does not justify bringing the proceedings, based on what the
plaintiff knows, the limitation has not yet run.
In my view, when there is no reason for a party to sue anyone, because the party
reasonably believes that someone who has an apparent liability has actually
assumed responsibility for addressing it, and is doing so, the injury does not
warrant bringing a proceeding. Requiring a party to sue in this circumstance
would encourage needless litigation. (at para. 51)
 In IBI Group, the Plaintiff brought a claim for construction deficiency against an
architect firm that designed the Plaintiff’s building and supervised its construction. Prior to the
statement of claim being issued, the Plaintiff had engaged in discussions with the developer and
the warranty provider in an effort to rectify the problems. When the efforts did not result in
solving the problems, and the Plaintiff had received a report implicating the architect firm, the
Plaintiff sued. The Master stated at paragraph 56:
If the plaintiff knows of the injury and knows that the defendant caused it, and
concludes that the cost of dealing with it is small and suing is not worth it, but
later finds out that the remedy is far more expensive than it reasonably believed at
the outset, that is a factor that might delay the running of the limitation period.
Here, if the Developer and new home warranty provider had actually solved the
problem, the costs to the plaintiff would have been effectively zero.
 The Plaintiffs say that they brought their action when they realized that a claim was
warranted. This occurred when Levesque realized that ERAA’s efforts to resolve the obstruction
issue were ineffective. The claim was not warranted prior to that date as he was having ongoing
discussions with ERAA about enforcing their rules and regulations prohibiting obstructions of
taxi lanes, and initially, they seemed to be taking steps that would resolve the issue. The
discussions led to ERAA sending emails to tenants reminding them about the prohibition against
obstructions to the taxi lane. As late as April 4, 2018, ERAA was indicating in a letter that it
would impose further restrictions if its regulations were not adhered to.
 I agree that Levesque admitted in Questioning that he lost a tenant in January or February
2016. If the entire claim was based upon the loss of that tenant, then ERAA’s argument here
would be much stronger.
 The problem, though, is that according to Sky and Levesque, the loss of the tenant is not
the basis for the claim. The admission about the timing of the departure of the old tenant and the
replacement of the old tenant has no bearing on the claim for diminution of value of the Leases
caused by ongoing obstructions as argued by Levesque and Sky.
 ERAA also argues that taxi lanes are not common areas such that Article 2.2 is engaged,
the implication being that there is no breach of Article 3.3 because there is no non-exclusive
licence to use the taxi lanes. Even if I accept that argument, that does not mean that there is no
breach of Article 3.3. That provision simply provides for “quiet enjoyment”, which is not an
obligation limited to the common areas. Arguably, failing to compel compliance with its own