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 It is agreed by all parties that the Associate Judge did not err at the first stage of the test.
Yardistry’s position is that she erred at the second stage of the test.
 As set out in Yaiguaje, the second stage of the test is to consider the justness of the order
sought in all the circumstances of the case. The Associate Judge did that. While it is true that she
did not make specific findings with respect to the factors set out in paragraph 10 of her
endorsement, this was not strictly required. The Court of Appeal stated in Yaiguaje that there was
no utility in imposing rigid criteria to be used in all cases in determining the justness of a security
for costs order. The correct approach is for the court to consider the justness of the order
holistically, examining all the circumstances of the case and guided by the overriding interests of
justice to determine whether it is just that the order sought be made. The Associate Judge adopted
such an approach in this case.
 One of Yardistry’s main complaints with respect to the application of the test is that the
Associate Judge did not make any finding as to whether PGI’s claim had “a good chance of
success”. This complaint cannot be given any weight in light of Yaiguaje. In that case, the motion
judge followed the test that Yardistry argues the Associate Judge should have followed in this case.
The motion judge made an order for security for costs as she found that (a) impecuniosity had not
been established, and (b) the appellants had not met their onus to show that their claim had a good
chance of success. Nevertheless, her order was set aside by a full panel of the Court of Appeal
because she was found not to have considered all the circumstances of the case and not to have
conducted a holistic analysis. Thus, a finding as to whether a claim has a good chance of success
is not determinative and, consequently, the failure to make such a finding does not constitute in
itself an error.
 In this case, the Associate Judge discussed the issue of the merits of the claim and
considered that factor. The extent to which she could perform an analysis of the merits was rather
limited: while Ms. Jackson gave evidence in her affidavit regarding her claims and allegations,
albeit briefly, Yardistry, in contrast, refused to engage on this issue and only included a short denial
in its evidence by an affiant who had practically no involvement in the relevant events. In the
circumstances, it would not have been appropriate for the Associate Judge to make a decisive
assessment of the merits: see AAD Investments Inc. v Casboro Industries Limited, 2017 ONSC
3041 at para. 7.
 I also find that, contrary to Yardistry’s allegation, the Associate Judge did not shift the
burden of proof onto Yardistry at the second stage of the test. The Associate Judge clearly states
in paragraph 10 of her endorsement that once the first step of the test is satisfied, the onus shifts to
PGI to establish that an order for security for costs would be unjust. Yardistry complains about
the statement of the Associate Judge in paragraph 16 of her endorsement to the effect that
“[s]ecurity for costs are intended to protect defendants from unmeritorious claim”. Yardistry
submits that this is an incorrect statement of the purpose of security for costs. While that may be
the case, this statement in itself does not indicate that the Associate Judge shifted the burden of
proof onto Yardistry. I also note that in the following paragraph of her endorsement (paragraph
17), the Associate Judge correctly refers to the interests engaged on a motion for security for costs,
including the defendant’s interest in being protected from the risk of not being able to collect an