OFFICE OF RESIDENTIAL TENANCIES  
SASKATCHEWAN  
File #217588  
Citation:  
Pope v Robinson, 2022 SKORT 1774  
Date:  
7/7/2022  
Hearing Officer:  
Judicial Centre:  
Tyler J. Young  
Regina  
____________________________________________________  
BETWEEN:  
Stephanie Pope  
CLAIMANT/TENANT  
- and -  
Delayne Robinson  
RESPONDENT/LANDLORD  
Appearing:  
Stephanie Pope  
Delayne Robinson  
____________________________________________________  
NATURE OF APPLICATION AND ONUS:  
[1]  
The Tenant seeks an Order of compensation for monetarydamages from the Landlord pursuant  
to sections 70(6) of The Residential Tenancies Act, 2006 (the “Act”) in the amount of  
$5,321.07. The Tenant claims compensation for alleged statutory breaches.  
[2]  
The Tenant bears the onus of proving his claims on a balance of probabilities. The courts have  
interpreted this standard to mean that a decision-maker must be satisfied there is  
sufficiently clear, convincing and cogent evidence to support the claim and the value of the  
alleged damages (see Chief Justice M.D. Popescul’s comments at paragraph 20 of Hamilton  
v. Turner, 2018 SKQB 140 ()).  
HEARING DETAILS:  
[3]  
A hearing was held on three separate dates in Saskatoon, Saskatchewan: on  
March 23, 2022, for a half-day; on April 13, 2022 for a full day; and on May  
10, 2022, for a full day.  
[4]  
I note that I ended the hearing on the last date. We had advanced to the Tenant’s  
examination of the Landlord and were about an hour into the Tenant’s  
questioning, which would have been the final stage of the hearing. The Tenant  
was given direction three times about how to question the Landlord and each  
time returned badgering and repeatedly asking the same question multiple  
times. After the third instance of this, I deemed that it was appropriate to end  
the hearing at that juncture.  
PARTICIPANTS:  
[5]  
The Tenant appeared in person. For the first date the Tenant had two persons for support,  
Karen Spilchak and Elise Kuterbach, both of whom were later introduced as witnesses,  
which I will discuss below. Both Ms. Spilchak and Ms. Kuterbach were unavailable for  
May 10, 2022, despite previously confirming availability. My understanding this change  
occurred in a manner outside their control. In any event, I confirmed that the Tenant was  
comfortable to proceed in their absence.  
[6]  
The Landlord appeared by telephone. Although I had canvassed parties at the start, the  
Landlord’s mother, Sandra Robinson, was revealed to be on the line in the midst of the first  
date. The Tenant objected to Ms. Robinson’s involvement, but given the Landlord was  
appearing by phone, I did not see any direct concern. The Landlord’s mother did not make  
any submission nor was she called as a witness, but the Landlord did confer with her from  
time-to-time.  
SERVICE OF DOCUMENTS  
[7]  
All documents requiring service were properly served.  
[8]  
At the outset of the hearing, I canvassed all evidence filed by the parties with the  
participants. I described the evidence and gave each party opportunity to comment on the  
evidence and specifically asked whether they had received the opposite party’s evidence  
and whether all the evidence on which they were going to rely was present. Further,  
information was provided on the procedure respecting witnesses.  
ARGUMENTS, EVIDENCE AND FINDINGS:  
[9]  
The Tenant submitted oral, physical and audio evidence. The Tenant called ten witnesses.  
A couple of whom were further recalled. The witnesses were: Jessica Hoffort, Morgan  
Dominax, Corine Lubenow, Thayalin Duke, Laurence Wolfe, Jacob Daniel Fayad, Gen  
Berry, Laura Egler, Brett Davidson, Elise Kuterbach and Karen Spilchak.  
[10] As noted, Ms. Kuterbach and Ms. Spilchak both were present for the first date and then  
later were called as a witness. Despite the failure to sequester, for which the Tenant had  
been given direction on the first date, I allowed their involvement. I was mindful of their  
testimony given their previous involvement. However, both are professionals and there  
was no issue with their testimony.  
[11] I had issues with the credibility or reliability of every participant.  
[12] With respect to the witnesses, I had given the Tenant guidance and direction several times  
about how to examine a witness, specifically nearly every inquiry by the Tenant was done  
in the form of a leading question. After several efforts to insure this information and the  
Tenant’s refusal to conform, I gave-up. Further, the evidence as provided by the witnesses  
was so specific and so consistent that it was clear that they had largely been groomed. I  
note this matter was two years past the occurrences, yet every one of the Tenant’s witnesses  
had complete recollection that all corelated with the Tenant’s overall narrative. I believe  
the Tenant likely prepared the witnesses, not out of any bad faith, but rather out of  
misguided diligence. In any event, for these reasons, I discounted all of the witness  
testimony as unreliable, excepting Ms. Spilchak. Ms. Spilchak in testimony pushed back  
consistently against the leading questions by the Tenant and regularly moved-away from  
the narrative; she admitted several times to having difficulties with recollection given the  
time difference. As such, I found her to be both credible and reliable. However, the  
substance of her claim was largely to substantiate the text message record as provided by  
the Tenant in evidence.  
[13] The Tenant’s credibility and reliability were largely suspect for the same reason the  
witnesses were at issue. I do not believe that the Tenant was acting in bad faith, but the  
Tenant clearly had put a lot of work and care into this application (which is commendable)  
but the narrative the Tenant had developed was intertwined with all of the evidence; the  
Tenant could not move outside the narrative or see the information objectively. Given the  
two-year window, it is implausible that the Tenant would have this detailed of a  
recollection. I am more inclined to see the narrative as the Tenant provide to be largely an  
evolved recollection of the events in play.  
[14] The Landlord was credible and reliable, except on one point where she dissembled. This  
one point had to do with her conduct in conjunction with provision of the Form 8. Her  
response seemed rote to me. When I asked her about why she did not simply just continue  
the tenancy after the Tenant clarified a misunderstanding, the Landlord provided no  
response: in my view, she did not want to lie and the only responses to the question would  
either undermine her position or be a lie. She was largely painted into a corner, in my  
view, by circumstances around this matter.  
[15] Lastly, I note that the Tenant filed audio information purporting to be recordings of  
conversations with certain persons of this Office. I have concern about information of this  
kind since these recordings were done surreptitiously. Our staff are public employees and  
may not have an expectation of a privacy, but I have a deep concern about anyone recording  
a person without their consent. In any event, the recordings were not consistent with the  
Tenant’s recollection: our staff provided correct information on the basis of the information  
provided by the Tenant. In these recordings the Tenant refers to previous information as  
being provided by the ORT. It is these referenced items of information, on which the  
Tenant based reliance, but as I will discuss further below, I do not accept that the Tenant  
was misinformed.  
[16] Further to this issue, I asked the Tenant explicitly if the Tenant was recording the hearing.  
The Tenant denied making any recording.  
[17] The Tenant’s alleges the following breaches of the Act:  
My landlord breached a term of the tenancy agreement  
Other breach of tenant’s rights  
Unlawful termination of a service or facility  
New or increased charges  
New or increased charges  
[18] The Tenant seeks compensation for these breaches and also for an award of the security  
deposit. The Tenant provided a break-down of this claim in the evidence:  
[19] With respect to the claims for monetary relief, I refer to the principles of sections 8 and 10  
of The Residential Tenancies Act, 2006 which says:  
“Liability for not complying with this Act or a tenancy agreement  
8(1) If a landlord or tenant does not comply with this Act, the regulations or their tenancy  
agreement, the non-complying landlord or tenant must compensate the other for any  
damage or loss, including loss of rent paid or payable, that results.  
(2) A landlord or tenant who claims compensation for any damage or loss that results  
from the other’s non-compliance with this Act, the regulations or their tenancy agreement  
must do whatever is reasonable to minimize the damage or loss.  
…
Common law applies  
10 Except as modified or varied by this Act or the regulations, the common law applies to  
tenancy agreements.”  
[20] In addition, I note and section 13 of The Residential Tenancies Regulations, 2007:  
Fees  
13(1) The fee for making an application:  
(a) pursuant to section 70 of the Act is $50;  
(b) pursuant to section 76 of the Act is $50.  
(2) If a hearing officer considers it appropriate and in the interests of justice to do so, the hearing officer  
may order a respondent to reimburse a successful applicant for the fee paid pursuant to this section.  
[21] In assessing the Landlord’s claim for cleaning and repairs to various damaged items, I refer  
to section 49 of the Act:  
“Landlord and tenant obligations to repair and maintain  
49(1) During the term of the tenancy agreement, a landlord must:  
(a) maintain the residential property in a good state of repair and fit for habitation,  
use and enjoyment notwithstanding that the state of non-repair of the residential  
property exists to the knowledge of the tenant before the tenancy agreement was  
entered into or came into existence after that date; and  
(b) subject to subsection (3), keep in a good state of repair for the use and  
enjoyment of the tenant all services and facilities that are supplied by the landlord  
under the tenancy agreement or that are added or substituted for those services  
and facilities.  
…
(4) Subject to subsection (6), a landlord is not exempt from the requirement to make  
repairs to services and facilities pursuant to clause (1)(b) whether the repairs are the result  
of reasonable wear and tear or any other cause.  
(5) A tenant must maintain reasonable health, cleanliness and sanitary standards  
throughout the rental unit.  
(6) A tenant must repair damage to the residential property or services and facilities that  
is caused by the actions or neglect of the tenant or a person permitted on the residential  
property by the tenant.  
(7) A tenant is not required to make repairs for reasonable wear and tear.”  
These subsections indicate that pre-existing damage and “reasonable wear and tear” are  
exempt from compensation.  
[22] In a hearing respecting damages, I must do the best I can with the evidence provided, as  
supported in the cases of Kapeluck v. Yablonski (1997), 152 Sask.R. 231 (Sask. C.A.) and  
Lagroix v. Kroeker (2001), Q.B. Nos. 680, A.D. 2001 J.C.S. In Lagroix v. Kroeker, Foley J.  
wrote that in assessing damages “the Rentalsman is entitled to follow similar principles of  
assessment as would be used at common law”. Foley J. relied upon the case of Kapeluck v.  
Yablonski to support the principle that the hearing officer must do the best he or she can with  
the evidence.  
[23] In Kapeluck v. Yablonski the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal wrote:  
An examination of the evidence reveals that there was precious little evidence before the trial  
judge on the question of damages. There was, however, evidence on which the trial judge  
could base his calculation of damages. That, however, does not disentitle the plaintiff to  
recovery. The trial judge in those circumstances is required to do the best he can based on the  
evidence before him. The principle was well enunciated by the Supreme Court of Canada in  
Wood v. Grand Valley Railway Co. (1915) 51 S.C.R. 283 where Davies J. for the Court held  
that the difficulty of assessment of damages cannot “relieve the wrongdoer of the necessity of  
paying damages”. The Court also noted that a court must in those circumstances do “the best  
it can” and its conclusion will not be set aside even if the amount of the verdict is a matter of  
guess work.  
[24] As principle of common law, the claimant must be made whole, but should not, through an  
award of damages, be made better off by the award, unless provided for in statute or  
through a recognized basis in common law. In practice, extraordinary damages are rare in  
proceedings under the Act and, in any event, there has been no claim for such in this matter.  
As such, the Hearing Officer has responsibility to ensure that awards, if any, are based on  
market rates for such claims or can be specifically supported by the claimant’s evidence  
and are reasonable and prudent expenses.  
[25] The Yablonski decision referenced above states that the wrongdoer should not be cleared  
simply because a difficulty in determining damages and that I must do the best I can with  
the evidence before me.  
[26] In an unreported decision on appeal to the Court of Queen’s Bench from a decision of this  
Office in Oblacova v Olaniyonu. Madam Justince Krogan, the appellant tenant appealed  
on the basis that specific evidence had not explicitly been mentioned in the hearing  
officer’s decision. Madam Justice Krogan stated at paragraphs 8-9:  
“[8] That the Hearing Officer did not specifically advert to the evidence of the  
photograph does not lead this Court to the conclusion that a new hearing is  
necessary. The reasons provided by the Hearing Officer were sufficient. As  
noted in the Ontario Court of Appeal in Clifford v. Ontario Municipal Employees  
Retirement System, 2009 ONCA 670, 312 DLR (4th) 70:  
[29] R.E.M. emphasizes that where reasons are legally required, their  
sufficiency must be assessed functionally. In the context of administrative  
law, reasons must be sufficient to fulfill the purposes required of them,  
particularly to let the individual whose rights, privileges or interests are  
affected know why the decision was made and to permit effective judicial  
review. As R.E.M. held, at para. 17, this is accomplished if the reasons, read  
in context, show why the tribunal decided as it did. The basis of the decision  
must be explained and this explanation must be logically linked to the  
decision made. This does not require that the tribunal refer to every piece of  
evidence or set out every finding or conclusion in the process of arriving at  
the decision. To paraphrase for the administrative law context what the  
court says in R.E.M., at para. 24, the "path" taken by the tribunal to reach  
its decision must be clear from the reasons read in the context of the  
proceeding, but it is not necessary that the tribunal describe every landmark  
along the way.  
[9] The Hearing Officer explained the basis for his decision, which was linked to  
the decision made. Not every landmark was referenced, nor was it necessary to.”  
[27] I take this decision in Olaniyonu, along with its incorporated decisions of Clifford and  
R.E.M., to provide that I am not required to summarize all of the information and which I  
heard in the hearing, nor likewise make a determination on each and every detail or piece  
of evidence that was submitted. Rather, I am to be clear in my rationale and explain the  
basis for the decision.  
[28] The Act provides jurisdiction to award general and aggravated damages, see for instance  
the decision of the, Honourable Madam Justice B.L. Klatt in Sherwood Modular Homes  
(2012) Ltd. v Gregga, 2021 SKQB 298 () at paragraphs 46-55:  
[46]  
The Landlord objects to the aggravated damages award on  
the basis that it is pecuniary in nature, meant to punish the Landlord. The following  
are the hearing officer’s reasons for granting aggravated damages:  
[37] General or aggravated damages can therefore  
be awarded by this tribunal and will be granted in  
situations where the Landlord’s conduct was not just  
malicious, negligent or a breach, but involved a  
willful disregard for the Landlord’s obligation or the  
Tenant’s rights.  
[38] In this situation, my particular concern is that  
notwithstanding the decision rendered by this office  
in February, the Landlord did not revoke this levy or  
change course. Instead it persisted in charging the  
levy and late fees, threatening their tenants to  
comply, and further appeared at this hearing with  
substantially the same defence as they filed in their  
defence of the Rilkoff [Rilkoff v Sherwood Modular  
Homes, 2020 SKORT 581] matter.  
[39] To my mind this is a willful disregard of  
the Act and the jurisdiction of this Office, which  
persisted for a period of nearly six months from the  
date of the Rilkoff decision to this hearing, during  
which at any point the Landlord could have put  
themselves into compliance with the previous order  
of the office, relieved their tenants of these charges,  
and precluded the necessity of a hearing.  
[40] Like the matter in R.S.[R.S. v A.A., 2016  
SKORT 50 (), 2016 SKORT 050], I do not  
believe that this conduct on the part of the Landlord  
was done in bad faith. However, as in the case with  
the R.S., a breach of this nature is sufficient in and of  
itself.  
[47]  
The Landlord claims there was no evidence of threats to  
the Tenants if they did not comply with the demand for payment of the levy. The  
hearing officer had the benefit of the evidence given at the hearing as well as the  
numerous documents filed by the Tenants. The following are some examples.  
[48]  
In a letter to the ORT dated August 2, 2020, Paul and Kelli  
Engelhardt refer to the ultimatum given to them by the Landlord that if they agreed  
to pay the monthly levy fee, they would not be subject to a rent increase on  
November 1st. The Engelhardts felt this was bullying. They were also subject to  
$50 late fees charged to their account every month after refusing to pay the levy.  
[49]  
Michele Kraetzig attached a statement to her claim and  
stated she had been threatened with a rent increase if she did not consent to the levy.  
Specifically, she attached an email sent to her on April 15, 2019 from Randy Peckar  
on behalf of the Landlord, in which he stated they were asking for her consent in  
order to avoid a rent increase. He said, “How we collect that revenue can be  
disputed, but in the end, the reality is the revenue will be collected” and “If you  
wish to dispute the levy, you will have to file your case at the ORT, as it will  
continue to be charged and you will receive a rent increase notice on or before the  
1st of May”.  
[50]  
Ms. Kraetzig said her rent would increase from $805/month  
to $890/month unless she gave her consent to the levy. Ms. Kraetzig was also  
charged $50 late fees for every month she did not pay the levy. She said she was a  
low-income person, looking for employment. She said when she bought her home  
in 2016, the lot fees were $600 and have been going up every six months since then.  
She expressed her concern for the financial impact this has had on her and the loss  
of faith in dealing with the Landlord.  
[51]  
Elaine Metz also spoke of the duress she felt by the “sign  
or pay” attitude.  
[52]  
Under ss. 70(6)(c) of the Act, a hearing officer may award  
damages in any case where it is just and equitable in the circumstances to do so.  
The wording of this provision suggests the Legislature intended a broad exercise of  
discretionary authority having regard to the objects and purposes of the Act and to  
the facts presented in evidence. What is "just and equitable" depends in part on the  
context and in part on the facts: Hrycyk v Neves, 2007 SKQB 189, 300 Sask R 17.  
The discretion as to the nature of damages is fettered by the principle that the  
damages must not be punitive: Grover v Kozmyk (1995), 1995 5848 (SK  
QB), 139 Sask R 155 (Sask QB) [Grover]; Mubili v Colliers McClocklin Real  
Estate Corp., 2007 SKQB 375, 306 Sask R 5.  
[53]  
To be sure, the hearing officer found the Landlord had  
deliberately disregarded the Act and the previous adverse ruling of the ORT. But  
he was also concerned with the Landlord’s threatening conduct toward the Tenants,  
the proof of which was evident in the documents filed. In addition, the material  
filed in this case by the Tenants discloses their frustration with having to pursue a  
claim they thought had been settled by the previous ORT decision.  
[54]  
In the Grover decision, the hearing officer noted that the  
tenant had been subjected to considerable stress and time spent pursuing the claim.  
He then spoke of the landlord’s intimidating, censurable conduct. It was not an error  
for the hearing officer to fashion an award that would denounce the landlord’s  
conduct but compensate the tenant at the same time.  
[55]  
The finding of the hearing officer as to damages should be  
afforded deference. He heard the Tenants who did testify and read their claims. He  
was best situated to assess the impact the Landlord’s actions had on them. In all the  
circumstances, there was evidence upon which the hearing officer could grant a just  
and equitable award of aggravated damages.  
[29] However, the law of this province provides for a quantum of such awards to be within a  
range lower than might be found in other jurisdictions. In this province, awards have  
tended to run in the range of the hundreds of dollars. For instance, Gasparovic v  
Sutherland, [1996] 150 Sask R 51 (SKQB), which, although decided under the previous  
Act, is consistent with the foregoing in review of the lawfulness of aggravated damages.  
[30] An instructive decision of this Office’s jurisdiction for aggravated damages can be found  
in R.S. v. A.A., 2016 SKORT 050. In that decision, my colleague wrote an analysis at  
paragraphs 131 to 139 as to the basis for an award of aggravated damages and various  
rationale in determining the amount of such an award.  
[31] Lastly, as noted by Matheson J. in Sutherland, referenced above, the award cannot be  
punitive in nature since such an award would not be appropriate:  
This being so, why would it be thought appropriate to allow  
the imposition of pecuniary damages when it is really a matter  
between two parties for which the Rentalsman is empowered to  
make any order the Rentalsman considers just and equitable?  
It may be just to impose punitive damages, but is it  
equitable to reward a tenant as punishment of the landlord?  
Take for example, a landlord who is incorrigibly at fault with  
a succession of tenants who seek redress through the  
Rentalsman. When the landlord is up before the Rentalsman,  
for say the fifth time, and the Rentalsman decides that it is  
necessary to stop the type of behaviour exhibited and decides  
to impose punitive damages based on the landlord's record of  
offence, should the imposed punitive damages end up all going  
to the fifth tenant who may have in fact incurred the least  
actual damage of all five?  
One also has to wonder what end would be served by giving  
the Rentalsman the right to impose punitive damages when  
generally speaking what really is at stake is a situation as  
between a landlord and a tenant and the settling of that  
dispute. If ordinary damages are not sufficient in any  
instance such as perhaps the present instance, aggravated  
damages keyed to the aggravated circumstances suffered by the  
particular tenant should surely suffice to redress the  
situation. If the conduct exhibited by a landlord goes beyond  
what it is felt can be properly redressed by damages and  
possibly aggravated damages one can turn to s. 55 of the Act  
which, it would appear, is intended for just such a purpose.  
It is when the conduct goes beyond affecting simply a tenant  
and becomes a matter of public concern that one turns to s. 55  
with a view to stopping not only the particular landlord but  
to sending a warning to all others.  
[32] Based on the foregoing considerations, I am of the view that the analysis for determination  
of aggravated damages should follow a process of analysis of this kind:  
1. what is the nature of the Landlord’s conduct, did they breach the Act, and was such  
a breach a matter of willful disregard or negligence?  
2. If such circumstances exist, I then look to the Tenant: what was the harm that  
followed? How long did this harm persist? Could the Tenant have reasonably  
avoided this harm?  
In situations of a willful breach, aggravated damages should usually be of a higher range  
than if the breach was one of the negligence or innocence, but not necessarily. As to the  
second question, the quantum of the award is dependent on the Tenant’s conduct: if the  
Tenant could fully or largely avoid the harm, but did not, then a nominal award would be  
appropriate. A material factor is the nature of the breach itself: if there is an abuse of the  
law or the proceedings pursuant to the Act. Although the Tenant cannot receive an award  
on a punitive basis; such conduct may also be an aggravating factor when considering the  
breach which warrants an award for aggravated damages. In such circumstances, when the  
Tenant has suffered an incidental injury, the law allows for the potential of a sizeable  
award.  
[33] In consideration of the foregoing precedents, I addressed in detail the question of  
determining aggravated damages in Maurice v 101273356 Saskatchewan Ltd., 2021  
SKORT 3227. In that decision, at paragraphs 21-23, I provided rationale as to what I  
believed to be an appropriate range, which I determined should be in line with precedents  
from Alberta, which range between $500 to $3,000.  
[34] Lastly, the Tenant filed on January 21, 2022. Section 71.1 of the version of the Act then in  
effect provided as follows:  
Time limit for applications  
71.1 An application for an order pursuant to this Act must be made within two  
years after the date of the act or omission giving rise to the claim.  
[35] As such, the Tenant is precluded from claims for damages prior to January 21, 2020,  
barring certain, limited circumstances. The Tenant was advised as early as February, 2020  
about the right to file a claim for breach of tenant’s rights. As such, there no reasonable  
argument which excuses the delay in filing and as such, I have held to the limitation  
window in coming to the following determinations.  
[36] Upon consideration of the foregoing, I will proceed to analysis of the parties’ submissions:  
[37] Part of the relief sought by the Tenant includes return of the security deposit. I do not have  
jurisdiction for this claim. Sections 32-34 govern the process for proceeding on a security  
deposit claim. The Tenant, under the version of the Act then in effect, has two years to  
make a claim for return of the security deposit. Judging from the text message  
correspondence, the Tenant was aware in a couple months that there was an issue for return  
of the security deposit. If the Tenant had initiated the security deposit dispute, then this  
matter would have been properly adjudicated. Given the explicit parameters as established  
by sections 32-34, I do not believe that I can apply the discretionary provision of subsection  
70(6) to the extent to allow this claim. Further, given this application was not brought  
properly, the Landlord was not in a position to properly respond. In my view there would  
be imbalance to allow this claim to stand, even if I am incorrect with respect to the  
provisions of section 32-34 and the limits of subsection 70(6).  
[38] The Tenant made a length and detailed submission, including calling the foregoing  
mentioned witnesses. The Tenant’s submission took all but about an hour to two hours of  
the hearings time. The Tenant provided a lot of personal detail in the Tenant’s submission.  
I have distilled the Tenant’s submission to relevant information in my review. This has  
been done because much of this information was not relevant to the actual issues at hand  
(but some served to support the Tenant’s position) and for the sake of the Tenant’s privacy,  
I believe it is prudent to exclude this information.  
[39] The Tenant first commenced occupancy of the rental property in April, 2019. The Tenant  
and a certain MF occupied the property. The Tenant argued that the Tenant was party to  
this tenancy. As I will discuss below, this was not accurate: the Tenant initially was in a  
position of a subletter, renting from MF, who alone was party to the tenancy agreement  
with the Landlord. Practically, the issue is moot, as I will discuss below. The Tenant and  
MF then had a serious falling-out in the fall of 2019: the Tenant was forced to leave the  
property for November, December and part of January due to these issues. The Tenant was  
housed in various shelters and the residences of a friend. The Tenant alleges during this  
time, some personal property was stolen and that a police report was filed (although there  
seems to have been no further police response).  
[40] Following these troubles in November, the Tenant and the Landlord begin to directly  
communicate and there is a general concession between these two and MF that MF will  
vacate the rental property, resulting in the voidance of a rent-to-own agreement between  
the Landlord and MG; further, the Tenant and Landlord agree that the Tenant can continue  
to reside in the property, subject to two conditions: first, that the Tenant actively seek a co-  
tenant or subletter to share the tenancy with going forward; and, second, failing finding a  
satisfactory co-tenant/subletter, that the Tenant would vacate by April 1, 2020. At this  
time, the Landlord sought to impose a new rate for the rent, which the Tenant argued was  
an illegal change in the tenancy agreement. Again, I do not agree with the Tenant: at this  
juncture, for the first time, the Tenant was engaged in contracting with the Landlord: this  
was a successor to the previous agreement between MF and the Tenant, with the primary  
aim of allowing the Tenant to continue the tenancy at the Tenant’s own behest. In any  
event, this issue is outside the limitation period, so it is a moot issue. The material point is  
that I do accept the Tenant’s submission that an agreement was entered at this juncture,  
which in my view was the tenancy agreement to which the Tenant and Landlord are party  
and about which this hearing pertains.  
[41] The Tenant submitted details of the efforts to find a co-tenant/subletter which commenced  
in January and continued through February. The Landlord did not dispute these efforts nor  
that she was being proffered prospective tenants; the Landlord provided no reason as to  
why these prospects did not result in a satisfaction of the aforesaid condition.  
[42] I will reproduce the text message correspondence here a selection of the text messages  
between the Landlord and the Tenant which run from December 11, 2019 to February 4,  
2020. This information comes from the Tenant’s evidence 3.20-3.31. The Landlord did  
not dispute that this was an accurate record of their communication. They had included  
the parties’ phone numbers and notations, which I have redacted:  
[43] On both parties’ information, the following agreement arose over the course of a month  
and was verbal in nature. There is no dispute per se from either party about the material  
terms of this arrangement. The Landlord argued that it was not a formal agreement and as  
such that she was not subject, but the Act allows for oral agreements. I am of the view that  
the material elements of a tenancy agreement were stipulated between the parties, that they  
had a consensus ad idem, and consideration was present. This agreement seems to have  
been confirmed near the end of January by both the Landlord and Tenant.  
[44] MF was to vacate the property in January and did so. On the Tenant’s information,  
however, he did not return the garage door opener nor the key to the property. The Tenant  
alleged that this was the Landlord’s duty to retrieve and that MF subsequently entered the  
rental property and stole or manipulated the Tenant’s property. The Tenant further alleged  
that the Landlord had disclosed to MF that the Tenant was intending to continue occupancy,  
which disclosure the Tenant alleged increased the harassment received from MF. The  
Tenant submitted that the Landlord had been told to not disclose this information to MF.  
However, this complaint is again outside the limitation window and was clearly discovered  
in January, 2020; I heard no reasons which otherwise affect the limitation window and as  
such, I cannot allow for this claim, even if proven.  
[45] The Tenant and friends left for a short trip to Manitoba at the end of January. Prior to that  
departure, the Tenant had provided the Landlord with a Form 6. Based on this text message  
correspondence, the Tenant was under the impression that it was needed to formally end  
the prior tenancy. This was manifestly unnecessary: either, as I have found, there was no  
prior tenancy and the Landlord and Tenant were here entering a tenancy property, or,  
alternatively, the Act allows parties to enter a new tenancy or modify a current tenancy  
voluntarily at any time. Based on this correspondence, it seems the Tenant took a cue from  
the Landlord providing a Form 13/14 to MF.  
[46] The Landlord then responded to this Form 6 by providing a Form 8, effective February 29,  
2020, which on her own information is acknowledged to be improperly formed – the  
Landlord rather states she intended it solely to be an acknowledgment of the Tenant’s  
notice. I, frankly, cannot believe how complicated the parties made this situation or utterly  
confused they both apparently were. None of this was necessary; further, even in response  
to one parties’ misstep, a simple request for clarification would have been a reasonable  
response: instead once misstep lead to another misstep, and then everything fell apart.  
[47] During the course of this journey to Manitoba, the Tenant learned that the Landlord had  
provided the Form 8. The Tenant was understandably shocked by this notice. The Tenant  
contacted this Office and alleges the advice received was not to execute the dispute note,  
rather being directed to filing a breach of tenant’s rights claim. The reason for this advice,  
as understood by the Tenant, was that by executing the dispute note the Tenant would  
“legitimize” the blatantly invalid Form 8. I have my doubts that this information would  
have been provided by this Office, but I will allow that this was the Tenant’s understanding  
of whatever information that was received: I believe that the Tenant was extremely affected  
by the Landlord’s change in course and was not fully understanding the information which  
was provided. In any event, as we will see, this misinformation ultimately did not affect  
the outcome.  
[48] Notwithstanding the fact that parties had an agreement to continue this tenancy and a small  
degree of reasonability on both sides would have clarified this mess; instead things  
catapulted in a completely different direction. I am comfortable making an assumption as  
to the cause in the Landlord’s radical change in position: her mother, Ms. Robinson,  
became involved. The Landlord’s volte-force is only explainable by the insertion of a new  
decision-maker. Given her later conduct, I accept the Tenant’s position that Ms. Robinson  
was calling the shots. My assumption is that at some point around the end of January, Ms.  
Robinson learned of the circumstances, the relatively  
[49] The Tenant’s response, after consultation with supports, friends and this Office, was to  
neither to dispute the Form 8 nor file a breach claim, but rather to acquiesce to the  
Landlord’s notice, although it was contrary to the Tenant’s actual intention and the Form  
8 was clearly invalid.  
[50] Nevertheless, regardless of the Tenant’s failure to sign the dispute note, given the  
contention that the Form 8 was invalid and the tenancy agreement in place with the  
Landlord, there was no legal obligation for the Tenant to vacate the rental property. The  
Tenant could have stayed; the Landlord would then have had two options: either resolve  
the situation with the Tenant or apply to this Office for an order of possession. Without an  
order of possession or an agreement to end the tenancy, the tenancy would continue. I note  
the parties tenancy agreement included the two conditions, the second of which ended this  
tenancy as of March 31, 2020. As such, the parties had a contingent end of tenancy in  
sight. Again, I am flummoxed that the parties’ confusion at the end of January resulted in  
the end of the tenancy. The only reasonable deduction is that the Tenant acquiesced to the  
Landlord’s representation. Logically, there is no other rationale to the parties’ joint radical  
change of course.  
[51] After their communications in earlier February about the exchanged notices, the parties, on  
the Tenant’s information, this is the next text exchange:  
This is not the correspondence of a Tenant being illegally evicted. There is no sign of  
refusal, resistance, or duress. This the correspondence of parties jointly ending a tenancy.  
[52] The Tenant submitted that the move-out had been a “traumatic” experience. The Tenant  
describes bring friends for support and assistance. However, at some point the Tenant was  
“cornered” in the basement by Ms. Robinson. Whatever the exact situation, it is  
uncontested that Ms. Robinson was with the Tenant in the basement when the Tenant did  
not have any friends present. The Tenant contended that Ms. Robinson who spoke to the  
Tenant in an aggressive and demeaning manner. The Landlord largely disputed the  
Tenant’s characterization, but some conversation occurred between Ms. Robinson and the  
Tenant, which was both unexplained and unnecessary. The fact that the conversation  
occurred implies to me an intention on Ms. Robinson’s part to engage the Tenant and, as  
such, an indication of some degree of malice in her conduct towards the Tenant.  
[53] I have largely incorporated the Landlord’s submissions in the foregoing summary. In  
addition to the information above, the Landlord’s position was fairly straight-forward: she  
believed that the Tenant wanted to be released from the tenancy when she received the  
Form 6 and acted accordingly The Landlord submitted that her belief from discussions with  
this Office, was that she should use the Form 8. Again, I have doubts that this information  
was accurate to the circumstances. She denied outright that she had ever disclosed any  
details about the Tenant to MF, which I accept.  
[54] The Tenant made substantial claims and provided much detail with respect to the hardship  
which followed this end of the tenancy. I can well appreciate that the Tenant was seriously  
affected. The Tenant’s health concerns alone would have led to complications, then we  
factor that this was occurring at the time that this province was moving towards the initial  
COVID-19 lockdowns. Circumstances were quickly changing during those first couple  
months, which would only have aggravated the Tenant’s precarious situation.  
[55] I do not, however, accept that the Tenant’s submission that the Landlord is responsible for  
injuries incurred from this end of tenancy. As I have stated above, this was not an illegal  
eviction. The Tenant acquiesced. the Tenant had multiple options, solid ground on which  
to assert rights, and no obligation to leave that property. The Tenant made these choices,  
and the Tenant is responsible for those choices.  
[56] That said, there is inside the Tenant’s position a complaint with merit: on the foregoing  
evidence, I am of the view that the Landlord deliberately breached the tenancy agreement.  
Let us review the following facts:  
1. The Landlord and MF had a tenancy agreement, which was ended by consent.  
The Landlord was consistent with this by provision of the Form 13/14 to MF.  
2. In conjunction, the Landlord clarified to the Tenant in late January that the  
notice only ended the MF-tenancy agreement. This was in conjunction with  
representations and direct assents to the tenancy agreement between the Tenant  
and Landlord.  
3. The tenancy agreement was that the Tenant would have until March 31/April 1,  
2020 to find a co-tenant/subletter and rent would be $750 per month for the  
Tenant. In the event that the Tenant was unable to find a co-tenant/subletter,  
the Tenant would vacate on March 31/April 1, 2020.  
4. The Tenant provided a Form 6, which both on the form and then in subsequent  
clarification was purported to be a follow-up to #1 on the misunderstanding that  
the Tenant needed to likewise end the prior tenancy.  
5. The Landlord then provide a Form 8 as method of accepting the Form 6 as  
notice.  
6. The Landlord, notwithstanding both the notation on the form and subsequent  
clarification, insisted the forms had effect and that the tenancy would end on  
February 29, 2020.  
[57] In my view, when the Landlord refused to accept the clarification she, in effect,  
intentionally aimed to break the tenancy agreement in place. The Form 6 is not absolute.  
There is no requirement on the Landlord to accept it. In fact, given the existence of a  
contract at that time and the apparent act of the Tenant to end that contract, the reasonable  
person would have sought clarification. Instead, the Landlord immediately provided an  
invalid Form 8 with a contrived explanation (the form is clearly not intended for the  
purported use). As I noted above, the Landlord’s conduct changed instantly at the end of  
January and I believe this was due to the interjection of her mother. I believe her mother  
wanted to use the Tenant’s error in providing the Form 6 to get the Tenant out of the  
property as soon as possible and thought a clever way of addressing this would be by using  
the semblance of an official process and one of this Office’s forms. An email would have  
sufficed; yet the decision was made to use a form. Effectively, by doing this the Landlord  
abused the process as established by the Act: Ms. Robinson, by using the semblance of this  
Office’s authority, intended to get out of the contract; the later justification by the Landlord  
and then Ms. Robinson’s conduct, both in presence and in action at the move-out supports  
my finding because, again, if she was operating in good faith she could have simply  
responded “oh, ok…” and then allowed for the tenancy to continue when the Tenant  
explained the misstep; instead, the response was in sum: “good riddance, this is on you”.  
[58] Because of the convoluted circumstances, the Tenant effectively agreed to move-out. But  
the fact of the matter is that the Tenant seems to have accepted this principally because I  
think the Tenant either intuited or inferred from the Landlord’s position in early February  
that the Landlord was avoiding the contract and any effort on the Tenant’s part to continue  
this tenancy would be contentious. Therefore, in my view, there are no damages that  
following from this breach of contract given the tenant acquiesced.  
[59] However, this breach of contract was illegal and contrary to the Act. For the foregoing  
reasons I am of the view that a basis for aggravated damages is proven. Further, given the  
Landlord’s bad faith conduct in conjunction with the use of this Office’s form, which as I  
noted was an abuse of process, I am of the view that there is a material, aggravating factor  
in determining an award for this breach. As such, based on the foregoing decisions and the  
range for such awards, as referenced above, I am of the view that an award in the amount  
of $2,500.00 is proven and awarded payable to the Tenant.  
[60] To be clear, this conduct is not directly attributable to the Landlord herself, who I find  
actually acted very generously towards the Tenant and was extremely accommodating  
given the peculiar circumstances. The Tenant seemed to take personal affront to the  
Landlord’s conduct, but all I could see from the history as provided by the Tenant, was that  
the Landlord was exceptionally kind towards the Tenant and attempted to help the Tenant  
to the limits of the Landlord’s ability. The Landlord, however, is responsible for the  
conduct done in her name and the decisions made, even at the behest of another.  
ORDER:  
[61] Accordingly, I hereby Order pursuant to section 70(6) of The Residential Tenancies Act,  
2006 that the Landlord, Delayne Robinson, shall pay the sum of $2,500.00 to the Tenant,  
Stephanie Pope, forthwith.  
Dated at Saskatoon, Saskatchewan this 7th day of July, 2022.  
____________________  
Tyler J. Young  
Hearing Officer  


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