r 13.5. In Lister v Calgary (City) (1997), 47 Alta LR (3d) 14, 193 AR 218, the Alberta Court of
Where a party seeks a significant time extension, it is expected to give evidence to
explain the delay, i.e. why prompt compliance did not occur. Maybe it would be
different if the extension sought was slight, but here the delay was over four and
one-half years. Evidence must be proper admissible evidence such as an affidavit,
not mere allegations by counsel.
… the onus of proof is on the City, which is the one which moved for leave to
issue a pleading four and one-half years late. The third party is not obliged to lead
any evidence at all, let alone evidence which excludes doubt. The onus is on the
City to lead evidence which justifies the late pleading by explaining the delay.
Lister at 16-17.
 In Flight v Dillon, 2001 ABQB 211, 284 AR 117, Justice Moreau, as she then was, said:
… I am of the view that the proper test for an application to strike a third party
notice is ... that prejudice is still a factor to be weighed along with the nature of
the delay and whether it can be reasonably excused, unless the delay is
significant. In that event, the absence of a reasonable excuse for the delay
effectively overpowers any need on the part of the third party to demonstrate
... a short delay would result in a different weighing exercise, focusing primarily
on the existence of any prejudice. As one moves further away from the six-month
deadline, the weighing exercise will focus more on whether the delay is
excusable. In the case of a significant delay … failure to advance a reasonable
excuse for the delay will, without more, be fatal to an application to extend time.
 As mentioned earlier, there is some artificiality to this Court's analysis, as the Additional
Parties, as proposed third parties, in the case at bar, are related to the Defendant FIL. As a result,
the Additional Parties are not objecting to be added as third parties, and will suffer no prejudice,
as a result. However, if this Court were to add them as third parties, they will make a claim as
against Mr. Breen, so any ruling that this Court makes affects indirectly, Mr. Breen's rights. As a
result, he has standing to make the arguments he is making in this application.
 FIL did not provide this Court with any proper admissible evidence as to why "prompt
compliance did not occur." Rather, it refers to the "technical argument raised by Plaintiff's
counsel for the first time at trial, namely: that the Counterclaim is flawed because the proper
parties are not named as Plaintiffs by Counterclaim to permit recovery for the claimed losses":
FIL's Brief dated June 3, 2022, at para 3. As well, it is FIL's onus to explain the delay.
 The delay spans over seven years. This goes far beyond a "slight" extension. It strikes
this Court as odd that this application was not made the moment it became clear to the
Additional Parties that Mr. Breen was allegedly receiving funds from Mr. Chernyk. There have
been days of questioning, and a separate lawsuit commenced against Mr. Chernyk. Surely,
something amiss would have appeared to the Additional Parties early in these proceedings. In
fact, it did not take long into this trial for this Court to realize from which of the entities Mr.