Affinity Holdings Ltd. v Town of Shaunavon

Court of Appeal for Saskatchewan

Citation: Affinity Holdings Ltd. v

Shaunavon (Town), 2022 SKCA 83

Date: 2022-07-28

Docket: CACV3410

Between:

Affinity Holdings Ltd.

Appellant

(Respondent)

And

Town of Shaunavon and Saskatchewan Assessment Management Agency

Respondents

(Appellants)

Docket: CACV3411

Between:

Central Plains Co-operative Ltd.

Appellant

(Appellant)

And

Town of Rosetown and Saskatchewan Assessment Management Agency

Respondents

(Respondents)

Docket: CACV3412

Between:

Pioneer Co-operative Ltd.

Appellant

(Appellant)

And

Town of Maple Creek and Saskatchewan Assessment Management Agency

Respondents

(Respondents)

Before:

Jackson, Ottenbreit and Caldwell JJ.A.

Appeals dismissed

Disposition:

Written reasons by:

The Court

On appeal from:

Appeal heard:

2019 SKSMB 90, 2019 SKSMB 15, 2019 SKSMB 91,

December 8, 2020

Counsel:

Leonard D. Andrychuk, Q.C. for the Appellants

Dona-Lynn Morley for the Respondents

i

Table of Contents

I. INTRODUCTION................................................................................................................... 1

II. WHAT STANDARDS OF REVIEW APPLY IN ASSESSMENT APPEALS?.................... 3

A. How has this Court interpreted the legislative scheme? ..................................................... 7

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

What is an assessor? ..................................................................................................... 8

What is an assessment and how is one prepared? ...................................................... 11

What factors control the preparation of an assessment?............................................. 12

How are taxes calculated on the assessed value of a property?.................................. 13

How and when are assessments communicated to taxpayers and municipalities?..... 14

Who may appeal an assessment and what errors may be alleged?............................. 16

What is the role of the assessor in an appeal to a board of revision? ......................... 17

What is the role of the municipality in an appeal to a board of revision?.................. 17

What is the role of a board of revision?...................................................................... 18

10. What is the Committee’s role? ................................................................................... 23

B. What standards of review govern the decision making of boards of revision? ................ 24

1.

What standard of review should a board of revision employ with respect to the facts?

.................................................................................................................................... 24

2.

What standard of review does a board of revision apply to questions of assessment law?

.................................................................................................................................... 29

3.

4.

What standard of review applies to questions of assessment practice?...................... 30

What standard of review applies to questions of mixed fact and assessment law and to

questions of mixed fact and assessment practice? ................................................................ 31

5. What are the remedial powers of a board of revision?............................................... 39

C. What standards of review govern the decision making of the Committee? ..................... 39

1. What standard of review governs the Committee’s decision making on questions of

jurisdiction?........................................................................................................................... 40

2. What standard of review governs the Committee’s decision making on questions of

law? .................................................................................................................................... 41

3. What standard of review governs the Committee’s decision making on questions of

fact? .................................................................................................................................... 41

4. What standard of review governs the Committee’s decision making on questions of

mixed fact and assessment law and practice?....................................................................... 42

5. What are the remedial powers of the Committee? ..................................................... 43

D. What standard of review governs this Court’s decision making?..................................... 44

E. Summary of the standards of review in assessment appeals............................................. 44

ii

1.

2.

3.

Appeal to a Board of Revision ................................................................................... 44

Appeal to the Committee............................................................................................ 46

Court of Appeal for Saskatchewan............................................................................. 47

III. EQUITY IS ACHIEVED THROUGH THE APPLICATION OF THE MARKET

VALUATION STANDARD ........................................................................................................ 47

A. How is market valuation standard defined in the municipal Acts?.................................. 48

B. How has this Court interpreted the market valuation standard?....................................... 51

1.

What is meant by “prepared using mass appraisal”?.................................................. 51

2.

What is meant by “an estimate of the market value of the estate in fee simple in the

property”? ............................................................................................................................. 56

3.

What is meant by “reflects typical market conditions for similar properties”?.......... 61

4.

What is meant by “meets quality assurance standards established by order of the

agency”?................................................................................................................................ 70

C. Summary of the interpretation of market valuation standard ........................................... 71

IV. DID THE COMMITTEE ERR IN LAW IN THESE APPEALS?........................................ 72

A. 2018 Assessment Background.......................................................................................... 72

B. The issues in each appeal.................................................................................................. 75

C. CACV3410—Affinity Holdings Ltd. v Town of Shaunavon and SAMA........................... 75

1.

2.

3.

Appeal to the Shaunavon BOR................................................................................... 76

Appeal to the Committee............................................................................................ 77

Review of the Shaunavon Decision for errors of law................................................. 78

D. CACV3411—Central Plains Co-operative Ltd. v Town of Rosetown and SAMA........... 87

1.

2.

3.

Appeal to the Rosetown BOR .................................................................................... 87

Appeal to the Committee............................................................................................ 88

Review of the Rosetown Decision for error of law .................................................... 89

E. CACV3412—Pioneer Co-operative Ltd. v Town of Maple Creek and SAMA................. 92

1.

2.

Appeal to the Maple Creek BOR................................................................................ 92

Review of the Maple Creek Decision for error of law ............................................... 93

V. CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................... 95

APPENDIX A............................................................................................................................... 96

Page 1

The Court

I.

INTRODUCTION

[1]

Each of the appeals addressed under these reasons arises from the 2018 assessment of

non-regulated properties pursuant to The Municipalities Act, SS 2005, c M-36.1 [MA]. The

Saskatchewan Assessment Management Agency [SAMA] assessed each of the properties involved

under the cost approach to valuation by applying a market adjustment factor [MAF] derived from

sales data related to the same 53 commercial properties [Sales Array], which had been sold

throughout Saskatchewan. At bottom, the appellant taxpayers¹—each as lead appellant for other

taxpayers in the same municipality—say that equity has not been achieved in the assessment of

their properties because the MAF does not reflect “typical market conditions for similar properties”

and, therefore, the assessments do not meet the market valuation standard (see MA, s. 193(e.1)).

[2]

Before addressing the common, bottom-line issue in the three appeals, we explore—in

broad terms—the standards of review that should be employed at each level of the internal

assessment appeal regime that the Legislature has established under the MA, The Cities Act,

SS 2002, c C-11.1 [CA], and The Northern Municipalities Act, 2010, SS 2010, c N-5.2 [NMA], as

well as under The Municipal Board Act, SS 1988-89, c M-23.2 [MBA]. In keeping with this Court’s

role in that appeal regime (see TNC Mall 2022²at paras 20–28), we particularly look at the

standards of review that apply in an appeal to a board of revision because this Court has not

previously done so and there is apparent misapprehension in several quarters as to what the

Legislature intended in that regard. We also review and aggregate this Court’s jurisprudence on

the meaning of the term market valuation standard under the MA, CA and NMA [together, the

municipal Acts]. And, lastly, we answer the questions of law raised in these appeals as to whether

the Assessment Appeals Committee [Committee] of the Saskatchewan Municipal Board [SMB]

¹We use the term taxpayer for simplicity and breadth of reference, recognising that the issues in these appeals involve

the assessment appeals regime, not municipal taxation per se, and that persons other than the owner of a property may

also appeal its assessment.

²To facilitate reading and for easier reference to the case law cited in this judgment, we have set out in Appendix A

the full style of cause, the citation and an abbreviated name for each case.

Page 2

erred by misinterpreting or misapplying the standards of review or the market valuation standard

in its review of the decisions of the three boards of revision³[Boards].

[3]

As procedural background, in separate proceedings before the relevant Board, each

appellant taxpayer argued that the market valuation standard had not been met because the Sales

Array contained two warehouse properties that are not similar to the taxpayer’s property. Two of

the three Boards disagreed and upheld the assessments but the Shaunavon BOR accepted the

argument and ordered SAMA to further stratify the Sales Array to remove the two warehouses.

All three Board Decisions were appealed to the Committee.

[4]

The Committee overturned the Shaunavon BOR Decision (see Shaunavon (Town) v

Various (Altus), 2019 SKSMB 90 [Shaunavon Decision]), and upheld the Rosetown BOR Decision

(see Various (Altus) v Rosetown (Town), 2019 SKSMB 15 [Rosetown Decision]) and the Maple

Creek BOR Decision (see Various (Altus) v Maple Creek (Town), 2019 SKSMB 91 [Maple Creek

Decision]). In terms of overall result, this means the Committee confirmed the 2018 assessments

in all cases.

[5]

Although each is a separate appeal to this Court, these matters may be addressed together

because, as required under s. 33.1 of the MBA, the taxpayers allege that the Committee erred in

law in ways that do not turn on facts specific to each matter. In that regard, pursuant to their

respective grants of leave to appeal, the appellant taxpayers assert in common that the Committee:

(a)

erred in its selection of the standards of review to apply to a decision of a board of

revision or its application of the standards in its review of a board decision;

(b)

incorrectly found a Board had selected and applied the correct standards of review

of an assessment, including in respect of the breadth and scope of assessor

discretion and when deference is to be accorded to an exercise of discretion by an

assessor;

³We refer to the board of revision for the Town of Maple Creek as the “Maple Creek BOR”, for the Town of

Shaunavon as the “Shaunavon BOR”, and for the Town of Rosetown as the “Rosetown BOR”. We refer to their

respective decisions similarly, as the Maple Creek BOR Decision, the Shaunavon BOR Decision and the Rosetown

BOR Decision and collectively as the Board Decisions.

Page 3

(c)

incorrectly interpreted and applied the market valuation standard, particularly by

misinterpreting the phrases:

(i)

similar properties (MA, ss. 193(e.1)(iii) and 195(7));

allowing for statistical testing (MA, s. 193(e.3)); and

(ii)

(iii) quality assurance standards established by order of the agency (MA,

s. 193(e.1)(iv)); and

(d)

incorrectly interpreted and applied s. 195(7) of the MA and Imperial Oil 2016, when

addressing the issue of whether equity had been achieved in the assessment of non-

regulated property.

[6]

After considering these arguments, we find there is no basis in law for this Court to

intervene in these matters and we dismiss the appeals.

II.

WHAT STANDARDS OF REVIEW APPLY IN ASSESSMENT APPEALS?

[7]

The first two questions of law raised in these appeals—about standards of review—are of

general application to all assessment appeals, whether under the MA, the CA, or the NMA, and may

have application in other appeals taken to this Court under s. 33.1 of the MBA, whether pertaining

to decisions of the Committee or decisions of the SMB under other statutes. As such, it is worth

exploring the appropriate standards of review in broad terms before we address the questions of

law in these appeals that engage directly with the Committee’s analyses of the Board Decisions.

[8]

We begin with a general overview. An assessment is, at its most basic, a decision having

its source in the powers of the state and it is, therefore, subject to judicial oversight. As an

assessment appeal involves consideration of an exercise of statutory power, the analysis of which

standards of review apply at each level of the assessment appeal regime starts with, but quickly

departs from, Vavilov. In that case, the majority of the Supreme Court set out a revised framework

for determining the standard of review a court should apply when the merits of an administrative

decision are challenged. Under the Vavilov framework, the presumptive standard of review is

reasonableness in external—i.e., judicial—review of administrative decisions (at para 16).

Page 4

[9]

However, in the property assessment field, the Legislature has established an internal

appeal regime under the municipal Acts and within it the Committee and boards of revision are

not, of course, courts. They are internal appellate tribunals. As such, they apply internal standards

of review when deciding assessment appeals. As this Court concluded in E.Z. Automotive:

[69]

None of this [i.e., the Vavilov framework] applies to internal appellate review.

Administrative decisions are not subject to internal appellate review unless the legislation

provides for such a review. The presumption of reasonableness review does not apply, as

that presumption is rooted in the fact that judicial review is, by definition, review of

administrative action by a superior court. Accordingly, the provision for an appeal to an

administrative tribunal cannot be read, in and of itself, as sending a signal to depart from

the presumptive standard. Further, the appellate standards of review applied by courts,

which are shaped in large part by institutional considerations relating to courts, have no

parallel in correlation to internal appellate tribunals.

[10] While it does not address internal appellate tribunals, Vavilov recognises and respects the

role of legislative intent in determining the applicable standards of review (E.Z. Automotive at

paras 70–72). On the whole of it, the jurisprudence pre- and post-Vavilov supports an approach to

determining the internal standards of review for each level of assessment appeal that focusses on

the legislative scheme under the municipal Acts and the roles that the Legislature has assigned to

assessors, boards of revision, the Committee and this Court (see, e.g., Dunsmuir at para 30).

[11] This means that an appeal from an assessment or from the decision of a board of revision

does not presumptively invoke either traditional judicial appellate standards of review or the

judicial review standard of reasonableness (City Centre at paras 42–59). Rather, because the

Legislature is free to “design any type of multi-level administrative framework to fit any particular

context” (Huruglica at para 46), this Court’s task is to interpret the appellate scheme set out by the

Legislature under the municipal Acts, The Public Inquiries Act, 2013, SS 2013, c P-38.01, The

Assessment Management Agency Act, SS 1986, c A-28.1 [AMAA], the MBA, and The Court of

Appeal Act, 2000, SS 2000, c C-42.1, to determine the standards of review that should apply and

when they should apply at each level of appeal (City Centre at para 59). We must do this while

being mindful of the interpretive instructions in The Legislation Act, SS 2019, c L-10.2, s 2-10,

that the words of an Act and its regulations “are to be read in their entire context, and in their

grammatical and ordinary sense, harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act

and the intention of the Legislature” and that every Act and regulation “is to be construed as being

remedial and is to be given the fair, large and liberal interpretation that best ensures the attainment

Page 5

of its objects”. Given the jurisprudential history of property assessment law in Saskatchewan, this

Court has, to a great extent, already carried out this interpretive exercise (see, e.g., City Centre,

Redhead and TNC Mall 2022).

[12] There are four types of review that could apply at each level of the multi-tiered appeal

structure that the Legislature has established for property assessments. Moving from the least to

the most deferential, they are:

(a)

a de novo review, where the reviewing body would start afresh by making its own

findings without regard for any findings in the decision under review;

(b)

a correctness review, where the reviewing body would review the particular

findings (most often, on questions of law) in the decision under review for their

correctness, without deferring to the maker of that decision;

(c)

(d)

a reasonableness review, where the reviewing body would review the particular

findings in the decision under review while according a measure of deference to the

decision-maker, which depends on the principles that guide the decision; and

a review for palpable and overriding error, where the reviewing body would review

individual findings (most often, on questions of fact) for a palpable error that has

led to the wrong result.

[13] The markers of legislative intent that indicate which of these types of review apply in a

multi-tiered appellate regime are purpose, structure, function and expertise. In the property

assessment context, the Legislature has granted taxpayers, municipalities and others the right to

access three levels of appeal from the decision of an assessor (i.e., from an assessment) but it would

be an error to say that any one of these levels calls for a de novo review. There are many reasons

for this—all of which are derived from the municipal Acts and related legislation as has been

interpreted by this Court.

[14] Most critically, the Legislature has not directed a de novo review to occur at any level of

the assessment appeal regime. It has used the language of appeal throughout the municipal Acts.

Page 6

This choice of language itself implicates many aspects of how the review at each level of the

regime should be conducted.

[15] Another marker of legislative intent is timing. This Court has found that the Legislature

intended that the process of property assessment and taxation under the municipal Acts should

occur largely within a calendar year (Newell Smelski at para 38 and Corman Park at paras 14–30).

The time required to conduct a de novo review at any level is incompatible with the timelines

established under the municipal Acts for the annual assessment and taxation of property.

[16] The legislative limits imposed on the remedial powers exercisable by each level of

decision-maker confirm that the review at each level of the appellate regime is not de novo. We

will say more about the function of each decision-maker later in these reasons. It is sufficient to

mention at this preliminary stage that the controlling factor of equity (as defined in the municipal

Acts) binds all decision-makers from the assessor to the Committee:

(a)

“the dominant and controlling factor in the assessment of property is equity” (MA,

s. 195(5); CA, s. 165(3); NMA, s. 218(5)); and

(b)

“an assessment shall not be varied on appeal if equity has been achieved with

similar properties” (MA, ss. 240(3) and 256(3.1); CA, ss. 210(3) and 226(3.1);

NMA, ss. 261(4) and 277(4)).

[17] Lastly, the specialised nature of what an assessor does within the property assessment

regime further lends to the conclusion that the Legislature did not intend for de novo review of an

assessment to occur at any level of appeal. Assessors are professionals who must obtain levels of

qualification, certification and knowledge in order to practice their craft within the assessment

regime. This Court has long recognised that fact:

…Law and fact aside, the application of the body of appraisal principles and practice found

in the Manual entails, in turn, the exercise by the assessor of skill and judgment, even a

measure of discretion. What is called for in the exercise of that skill and judgment is the

structured formulation of consistent opinions as to fair and equitable value for the purposes

of property taxation in the municipality. This is what the Manual suggests, saying that

while the systematic application of the principles, rules, and formulas found in the manual

is necessary to achieve the ends of tax equalization, its use “cannot replace the personal

judgment of the valuator in his work. He is the backbone of local tax administration.”

(Laing at para 28)

Page 7

[18] Having determined that the Legislature did not intend for a de novo review to occur at any

level of appeal, the most significant question for this Court is what standard of review should a

board of revision apply to findings of fact and of mixed fact and law made by an assessor? These

are the only remaining issues of substance because, in appellate terms, questions of law are almost

invariably resolved on a correctness standard—and, as we confirm below, that standard applies to

questions of law at each level of the assessment appeal regime.

[19] We explain the applicable standards of review in greater depth throughout the course of

these reasons. At the outset, it is important to note that the structure of the property assessment

regime not only dictates that the Legislature did not intend a de novo review at any level but that

structure also sheds light on what standard of review each level of decision-maker should apply in

its review. For example, if the Legislature had intended to isolate an assessor’s decision from

review, it would not have established a hierarchy of appeals under the municipal Acts or it would

have specified a standard of review designed to achieve that end. Further, because the Legislature

established three levels of appeal, it must be taken as an intention that a meaningful review occur

at each level, which would be impeded by a review for palpable and overriding error. The

Legislature knows that assessors are professionals who hold expertise in their field but still

provided for multiple levels of appeal from assessments and, therefore, the application of the

palpable and overriding error standard of review would not be appropriate.

[20] As we explain below, a reasonableness review that respects the legislated mandate of

assessors and that conveys the appropriate level of deference to their expertise, while recognising

that review by a board of revision must be meaningful, best accords with the appellate regime the

Legislature has chosen to establish under the municipal Acts. As the majority of the Supreme Court

indicated in Vavilov, a reasonableness review takes its contours from context and purpose, all of

which we explore in these reasons.

A.

How has this Court interpreted the legislative scheme?

[21] As this Court observed in City Centre, there are three internal, decision-making roles under

the statutory property-assessment regime: (i) the assessor; (ii) the board of revision; and (iii) the

Committee. This Court, as well, plays a supervisory role in the statutory scheme (see TNC Mall

Page 8

2022). While each of these roles must be examined, the analysis begins with a rudimentary

explanation of the assessment regime.

1.

What is an assessor?

[22] In this Court’s jurisprudence, the person who prepares an assessment has usually been

referred to as the assessor. However, when SAMA carries out its role, it does so as an assessment

appraiser (AMAA, ss. 2(c) and 13(2)).

[23] An assessment appraiser is someone appointed by a municipality to physically inspect

properties and to estimate assessed values for purposes of taxation (AMAA, ss. 2(c) and 13(2)). As

professionals, assessment appraisers are governed by and are subject to discipline under The

Assessment Appraisers Act, SS 1995, c A-28.01. An assessor is someone appointed by a

municipality to compile the assessment roll (MA, s. 2(1)(c); CA, s. 174(1); NMA, s. 2(1)(b)). The

conflation of these roles likely results from two statutory facts. First, the functions of an assessment

appraiser for some cities may be carried out by the city’s assessor, without the engagement of

SAMA (AMAA, ss. 12(2)(a), 22(2) and 22(3)). Second, where that does not occur, SAMA, qua

assessment appraiser, has the powers and duties of, and is deemed to act in the place of, the

municipality’s assessor for the purpose of defending (in an appeal) the assessed value of a property

(AMAA, s. 22(15)).

[24] As the roles of assessor and assessment appraiser often converge in an appeal, the word

assessor has been used in the jurisprudence and is used in these reasons; however, where they will

not overlap, the term assessment appraiser is used in these reasons to refer to the person who

physically inspects properties, classifies them and estimates their assessed values.

[25] In City Centre, this Court described the role of the assessor under the CA in these terms:

[63]

An assessor is a person appointed by a city (s. 163(c.1) of The Cities Act).

Assessors must determine to which class (established by the regulations) any property

belongs (s. 166(3)), calculate the assessment of property that belongs to a class of property

established under s. 166(1), and determine the taxable assessment of the property by

multiplying the assessment by the percentage of value applicable to the class of property

to which the property belongs (s. 167). An assessor may request information from persons

to exercise this role (see s. 171 for details).

[64]

Further, an assessor is responsible for preparing the annual assessment roll for all

assessed property (s. 174), making that roll available for the public’s inspection (s. 183(1)),

Page 9

and, unless a city council dispenses with the requirement, preparing annual assessment

notices (s. 184(1)).

[65]

There is a presumption that assessments prepared by an assessor are correct: see

[Walmart 2018 at para 69]. However, while this presumption exists, the discretion of an

assessor is not unlimited. I will return to this issue below. At this point, all that need be

said is that where an assessor errs, the Board may intervene to address this error.

[26] Given the nature and importance of property assessment to municipalities and to taxpayers,

each municipal Act states that no assessor shall wilfully:

(a)

(b)

make a fraudulent assessment;

enter in the assessment roll the name of a person who should not be so entered or

a fictitious name;

(c)

(d)

omit the name of a person who should be entered in the assessment roll; or

neglect any duty required of the assessor by this Act.

(MA, ss. 211(3); CA, s. 181(3)); NMA, ss. 232(3))

[27] The AMAA also provides as follows with respect to the powers and duties of assessment

appraisers (and assessors who carry out that function):

Right of entry, etc.

23(1) An assessment appraiser may, after making reasonable efforts to notify the owner

or occupier of any property to be entered for the purpose of carrying out a valuation, enter

that property at any reasonable time and carry out the valuation.

(1.1) The assessment appraiser shall display or produce on request identification

showing that he or she is authorized to make the entry.

(2)

If a person refuses to allow or interferes with a valuation, or if a person fails to

respond to an assessment appraiser’s reasonable requests for access to a property for the

purposes mentioned in subsection (1), the assessment appraiser may apply ex parte to a

justice of the peace or a provincial court judge for a warrant authorizing a person named in

the warrant to enter the property and to carry out the valuation.

(2.1) On an application pursuant to subsection (2), the justice of the peace or provincial

court judge may issue the warrant sought, on any terms and conditions that the justice of

the peace or the provincial court judge considers appropriate.

(3)

Every person who has property that is liable to assessment shall, either personally

or through an agent:

(a)

provide an assessment appraiser with the particulars required by the assessment

appraiser for the purpose of making a valuation of the real property or the fixtures,

machinery or other equipment valuation; and

(b)

if required by the assessment appraiser, deliver to the assessment appraiser a

written statement, signed by the person or his or her agent, containing the particulars

mentioned in clause (a).

(4)

Notwithstanding subsections (1) to (3), an assessment appraiser shall not enter any

place that is a private dwelling without:

Page 10

(a)

(b)

the consent of the owner or occupier of the private dwelling; or

a warrant issued pursuant to subsection (2.1) from a justice of the peace or a

provincial court judge authorizing the entry.

Disclosure of information

24(1) This section applies to:

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)

every assessment appraiser;

every assessor;

every member of a board of revision or the Saskatchewan Municipal Board;

every party to an appeal or agent of a party; and

every other person employed by the agency, a board of revision, a municipality or

the Saskatchewan Municipal Board.

(2) Subject to subsection (3), every person mentioned in subsection (1) is guilty of an

offence if that person:

(a)

in the course of his or her duties, acquires or has access to information furnished

by any person:

(i)

that is not required to be entered on the assessment roll; and

that relates in any way to the determination of:

(ii)

(A)

the value of any property subject to assessment and taxation or the

amount of assessment of property; or

(B)

and

the actual income and expenses related to an individual property;

(b)

wilfully discloses or permits to be disclosed any information mentioned in clause

(a) to any person who is not entitled pursuant to this Act or any other Act to acquire or

have access to that information.

(3)

Nothing in this section shall be construed as preventing the disclosure of the

information mentioned in clause (2)(a) by any person if that person is being examined as a

witness in an assessment appeal, arbitration, action or other court proceeding.

SAAA to certify persons

24.1(1) The SAAA [defined in s. 2(o.2) of the AMAA as meaning the Saskatchewan

Assessment Appraisers’ Association] shall certify whether persons who propose to

undertake valuations for assessment purposes meet the standards for competency and

proficiency prescribed in the regulations made pursuant to subsection 18(2) of The

Assessment Appraisers Act.

(2)

The SAAA may certify a person pursuant to subsection (1) who produces evidence

satisfactory to the council that the person meets the requirements for registration as a

member of the SAAA prescribed in the regulations made pursuant to subsection 18(2) of

The Assessment Appraisers Act.

(3)

Licensed members of SAAA are deemed to be certified for the purposes of this

section.

Page 11

(4)

On or before February 1 in each year, the SAAA shall file with the agency a list,

certified by the registrar to be a true list, showing the names of all persons certified pursuant

to this section as at January 1 of that year.

Immunity

24.2

No action lies or shall be commenced against the agency, a member of the board

or an employee or agent of the agency for any loss or damage suffered by a person by

reason of anything in good faith done, caused, permitted or authorized to be done,

attempted to be done or omitted to be done by any of them pursuant to or in the exercise or

supposed exercise of any power conferred by this Act or the regulations or in the carrying

out or supposed carrying out of any duty imposed by this Act, the regulations, the municipal

Acts or the regulations made pursuant to those Acts.

2.

What is an assessment and how is one prepared?

[28] An assessment is an estimate of the value of a property as at a certain date.

[29] The term market value refers to the amount that a property should be expected to realize if

the estate in fee simple were sold in a competitive and open market by a willing seller to a willing

buyer, each acting prudently and knowledgeably, and assuming that the amount is not affected by

undue stimuli (MA, s. 193(e.2); CA, s. 163(f.2); NMA, s. 215(g)).

[30] All assessments must be prepared using mass appraisal only (MA, s. 195(1); CA, s. 165(1);

NMA, s. 218(1)), which refers to the process of preparing assessments for a group of properties as

of a base date using standard appraisal methods, employing common data and allowing for

statistical testing (MA, s. 193(e.3); CA, s. 163(f.3); NMA, s. 215(h)).

[31] An assessment must reflect the facts, conditions and circumstances affecting the property

being valued as at January 1 of each year as if those facts, conditions and circumstances existed

on the applicable base date (MA, s. 195(4); CA, s. 165(3.1); NMA, s. 218(4)).

[32] Subject to s. 22(12.1) of the AMAA, an assessment must also “reflect any decision of [the

Committee] that has been issued with respect to the property” in question, unless the decision has

been appealed pursuant to s. 33.1 of the MBA (MA, s. 195(4.1); CA, s. 165(3.2); NMA, s. 218(4.1)).

Where SAMA acts as the assessment appraiser, the AMAA provides:

22(12.1) If the appeal board has issued a decision with respect to a property, an assessment

appraiser:

(a)

shall apply the decision of the appeal board in subsequent valuations and

revaluations of that property; and

Page 12

(b)

in applying the decision pursuant to clause (a), may make any necessary

modification to reflect any change in the facts of the decision, in the conditions or

circumstances of the property or in market value as defined in the municipal Act.

3.

What factors control the preparation of an assessment?

[33] The dominant and controlling factor in the assessment of property is equity (MA, s. 195(5);

CA, s. 165(3); NMA, s. 218(5)).

[34] There are two types of property assessments. A regulated property assessment is an

estimation of the value of agricultural land, resource production equipment, railway roadway,

heavy industrial property or pipelines (MA, s. 193(h); CA, s. 163(h.1); NMA, s. 215(l)). A

non-regulated property assessment is an estimation of the market value of a property that is not a

regulated property (MA, s. 193(e.4); CA, s. 163(f.4); NMA, s. 215(i)).

[35] Equity in regulated property assessment is achieved by applying the regulated property

assessment valuation standard uniformly and fairly (MA, s. 195(6); CA, s. 165(4); NMA, s. 218(6)).

Equity in non-regulated property assessment is achieved by applying the market valuation standard

so that assessments bear a fair and just proportion to the market value of similar properties as of

the applicable base date (MA, s. 195(7); CA, s. 165(5); NMA, s. 218(7)). SAMA has adopted

guidelines that call for the application of the market valuation standard under the regulated

property assessment valuation standard (MA, s. 193(i); CA, s. 163(h.2); NMA, s. 215(m); see also

CCRL 2020 at para 46).

[36] Nonetheless, the achievement of equity through the application of the market valuation

standard differs in each type of property assessment by reason of the different ways equity is

achieved—i.e., in regulated-property assessment, equity is achieved by applying the regulated

property assessment valuation standard uniformly and fairly; and, in non-regulated property

assessment, it is achieved by applying the market valuation standard so that the assessments bear

a fair and just proportion to the market value of similar properties as of the applicable base date.

See Imperial Oil 2016 at para 9 and CCRL 2020 at paras 44–48.

a.

What does the market valuation standard entail?

[37] The term market valuation standard refers to the standard achieved when the assessed

value of a property is prepared using mass appraisal, is an estimate of the market value of the estate

Page 13

in fee simple in the property, reflects typical market conditions for similar properties, and meets

quality assurance standards established by SAMA. This standard is explained in greater detail

below (at paragraphs [153] to [234]).

[38] While the municipal Acts define the phrase market valuation standard, the full meaning of

that term is derived from the AMAA, the existing jurisprudence of this Court, as well as the

Saskatchewan Assessment Manual (2019 Base Year) (Regina: SAMA, 2019) [Manual], the Market

Value Assessment in Saskatchewan Handbook, ver 3 (Regina: SAMA, 2019) [Handbook], SAMA’s

2019 Cost Guide, ver 1.1 (Regina: SAMA, 2019) [Cost Guide], and other guidelines adopted by

SAMA [SAMA Guidelines]. The Manual is used by assessors in the assessment of regulated

property. The Handbook is used by assessors in the assessment of non-regulated property. The

Cost Guide is used in both regulated and non-regulated property assessments.

4.

How are taxes calculated on the assessed value of a property?

[39] Property assessment and the assessment appeal regime (see MA, Part X—Property

Assessment; CA, Part X—Assessment; NMA, Part X—Property Assessment) stand apart from the

taxation of properties by municipalities (see MA, Part XI—Taxation; CA, Part XI—Property Tax;

NMA, Part XI—Taxation), but property assessment forms the basis for municipal taxation. Before

the property taxes payable to a municipality can be calculated, an assessment appraiser (or the

assessor in some cities) must first determine to which class of property, if any, a property belongs

(MA, s. 196(3); CA, s. 166(3); NMA, s. 219(3)). After the assessment appraiser (or assessor)

estimates the market value of a property (i.e., the assessed value), the assessor determines the

taxable assessment of the property by multiplying the assessed value by the percentage of value

applicable to the class of property to which the property belongs (MA, s. 197; CA, s. 167; NMA,

s. 220).

[40] The classes of property and the percentages of value that are applicable to each class are

set forth in the regulations under each municipal Act (MA, ss. 196 and The Municipalities

Regulations, RSS c M-36.1 Reg 1, Part V; CA, s. 166, and The Cities Regulations, RRS c C-11.1,

Part III; NMA, ss. 219 and The Northern Municipalities Regulations, RSS c N-5.2 Reg 1, Part V).

Page 14

5.

How and when are assessments communicated to taxpayers and

municipalities?

[41] In Corman Park (at paras 15–30), this Court reviewed the timelines established under the

municipal Acts for the assessment and taxation of property and for appeals against assessments.

Most notably, this Court observed, referring to the MA, that:

[16]

Under the current statutory scheme, a municipality must prepare an annual

assessment roll no later than May 1 of a year (s. 204(1)). The assessor must make the

assessment roll available for public inspection immediately upon its completion (s. 213(1))

and the municipality must send out its assessment notices within 15 days after its

completion (s. 216(1)), at which time a 30-day appeal period begins to run (s. 226(1)(a)).

The municipality must also publish the assessment roll in The Saskatchewan Gazette within

15 days of its completion (s. 217(1)), at which time a parallel 30-day appeal period begins

to run in circumstances where a notice of assessment has not been mailed to a person

(s. 226(1)(b)). A board of revision may extend the 30-day appeal period by two weeks, but

only if the notice of appeal does not comply with s. 225 (s. 226(3)). The board of revision

also has discretionary authority to relieve against strict adherence to the statutory timeline

in cases of procedural defect that does not affect the substance of the appeal: Marose

Investments at paras 22–24.

[17]

Alongside this aspect of the statutory scheme, SAMA is required to confirm the

assessment roll for a municipality on the basis of returns by assessors (s. 258(2)). SAMA

undertakes this process in respect of each municipality for which it acts as the assessment

agent and it involves each property not subject to a tax exemption within each such

municipality. The importance of this process to this appeal lies in the statutory time marks

for preparation and completion of the assessment roll and in the effect of its confirmation

by SAMA.

[18]

The process starts with assessors, who may make their returns to SAMA on or after

January 1 of the year (s. 258(1)). Importantly, the assessors’ returns will show the

particulars of any alterations to the municipality’s assessment roll since it was last

confirmed, which would necessarily include alterations that may have resulted from orders

of a board of revision, the Committee or this Court. But, SAMA is not obliged to wait for

those decisions and SAMA may confirm an assessment roll “[n]otwithstanding that there

may be further appeals pending” (s. 258(2)).

[19]

The order of things is highlighted here because s. 241 of The Municipalities Act

provides that assessors must make “any changes” to an assessment roll that are “necessary

to reflect the decision” of a board of revision or an agreement entered into pursuant to

s. 228 (see also s. 228(3)), each of which occurs before July 31 of the year of assessment.

However, under s. 256(5), an assessor must make “any changes” to an assessment roll that

are “necessary to reflect the decision” of the Committee, only where “the assessment roll

has not been confirmed.” Reinforcing this limitation, s. 305(1) provides that, if an

assessment roll has been confirmed before appeals to the board of revision, the Committee

or this Court have been concluded, no amendment or alteration may be made to the

assessment roll. There are only two exceptions to this statutory prohibition in s. 305(1).

[20]

The first exception is that, if an “error or omission in any of the information shown

on the assessment roll is discovered or if a corrective action is required as a result of an

assessment audit”, the assessor may “correct the assessment roll”, but only for the current

year (s. 208(1)), with the correction taking effect January 1 of that year (s. 208(3)). Where

Page 15

this is done, and if the correction affected the assessment class of the property (s. 205(d)),

the assessed value of the property (s. 205(e)), the assessed value after applying a property

class multiplier (ss. 196(1) and 205(f)) or a notation of tax exemption (s. 205(h)), then the

assessor must send an amended notice of assessment to the persons affected (s. 208(2)).

Furthermore, where the assessor has issued an amended notice of assessment, the

Legislature has expressly granted the same rights to appeal against that amended notice of

assessment as it has granted against an original notice of assessment. The Legislature has

also extended the timelines for such an appeal to accommodate the later date of an amended

notice of assessment (s. 208(2.2)).

[21]

The notable points here are that the Legislature has thought about and provided

extended appeal rights in the circumstances of s. 208 (see also s. 219 regarding

supplemental assessments). It has done so in a way that does not disrupt the time marked

for the finalisation and confirmation of the assessment roll. And, the Legislature has used

the issuance of a new or amended notice of assessment to trigger the appeal process.

However, the Legislature has not made provisions for an assessor to issue a new, amended

or revised notice of assessment in circumstances where the Committee has set aside the

original assessment and ordered a reassessment. Given the scheme of the relevant

legislation, this absence of a statutory appeal provision would seem to preclude a finding

that remittal by the Committee for reassessment refreshes the appeal process.

[22]

The second exception under s. 305(1) arises under s. 209, which requires an

assessor to add a person’s name to the assessment roll after verifying a request to do so

received from a person whose name is already on the roll. This type of amendment to the

assessment roll does not affect the assessed value of the property and, presumably for that

reason, the Legislature has not granted a right to appeal against this type of amendment nor

has it extended the timeline of the appeal process in this circumstance.

…

[30]

As mentioned at the outset, the assessment and appeal timelines are important

because the assessment process underpins the calculation and recovery of the municipal

property taxes payable in respect of all taxable property within a municipality. The tax rates

and calculations themselves are neither relevant nor material to this appeal, but it is material

that each municipality must, on or before August 15 of a year, prepare a tax roll (s. 263),

which date is about two weeks after the last day on which boards of revision are permitted

to decide assessment appeals (s. 240(4)). Municipalities must send out their tax notices

before September 1 of the year in which the taxes are imposed (s. 267(1)). Property taxes

are deemed due at January 1 of each year (s. 266) and a municipality must, by law, impose

penalties on taxpayers who do not pay their municipal property taxes before December 31

(s. 280). Through other provisions, The Municipalities Act sets out various mechanisms

and processes for enforcing the payment of municipal tax. Importantly, however, taxes

levied on assessments are not recoverable until the assessment roll has been confirmed by

SAMA (s. 258(6)). All of this demonstrates the Legislature’s intention that the process of

property assessment and taxation should occur largely within a calendar year, as Cameron

J.A. concluded in Newell Smelski.

(Emphasis in original)

[42] As noted, assessors must prepare an assessment roll for each year for all assessed property

in a municipality (MA, s. 204; CA, s. 174; NMA, s. 225). The assessment roll must show for each

assessed property: (a) the location of the property; (b) the contact information of the assessed

Page 16

person, if known; (c) whether the property is a parcel of land, an improvement or a parcel and the

improvements to it; (d) the assessment class or classes; (e) the assessed value of the property;

(f) the assessed value of the property after applying the applicable percentage of value set by

regulation; (g) whether the property is assessable for public school purposes or separate school

purposes; (h) if the property is exempt from taxation, a notation of that fact; and (i) any other

information considered appropriate by the municipality.

[43] Based on the assessment roll, the assessor must annually prepare assessment notices for all

assessed properties (MA, s. 214; CA, s. 184(1); NMA, s. 235). Each assessment notice must contain

the same information that is required to be shown on the assessment roll as well as, among other

information, the date by which an appeal is required to be made and the contact information of the

municipality to enable an assessed person to discuss the notice of assessment or a potential appeal

(MA, s. 215(1); CA, s. 185(1); NMA, s. 236(1)).

6.

Who may appeal an assessment and what errors may be alleged?

[44] Persons who have an interest in any property affected by the valuation or classification of

any property may appeal an assessment if they believe that an error has been made in the valuation

or classification of the property or in the preparation or content of the assessment roll or assessment

notice (MA, s. 225(1); CA, s. 197(1); NMA, s. 246(1)).

[45] A municipality, other taxing authority or SAMA may appeal an assessment on the grounds

that an error has been made in the valuation or classification of any property in the preparation of

the relevant assessment roll or assessment notice or in the content of the assessment roll or

assessment notice (MA, s. 225(3); CA, s. 197(3); NMA, s. 246(3)).

[46] SAMA must be made a party to an appeal if it prepared the valuation or classified any

property being appealed—i.e., if it acted as the assessment appraiser—or if the appeal has been

brought by a municipality or other taxing authority (MA, s. 225(4); CA, s. 197(4); NMA, s. 246(4)).

[47] In every case, the notice of appeal must be in writing and must set out “the specific grounds

on which it is alleged that an error exists” (MA, s. 225(6)(a); CA, s. 197(6)(a); NMA, s. 246(6)(a))

and, in summary form, “the particular facts supporting each ground of appeal” (MA, s. 225(6)(b);

CA, s. 197(6)(b); NMA, s. 246(6)(b)). If the appellant knows the change to the assessment roll that

Page 17

it desires, that change must also be set out in the notice of appeal (MA, s. 225(6)(c); CA,

s. 197(6)(c); NMA, s. 246(6)(c)).

7.

What is the role of the assessor in an appeal to a board of revision?

[48] Although the assessor is the decision-maker who determines the assessed value of the

property in question, the assessor plays a continuing role within the appeal regime whenever an

assessment is appealed. For example, the assessor has its own filing requirements in an assessment

appeal before a board of revision and, in this way, the assessor stands apart from the municipality,

regardless of whether the municipality is an appellant or a respondent:

(4) At least 10 days before the date set for the appeal hearing, the assessor shall file with

the secretary of the board of revision and serve a copy on all parties to the appeal:

(a) a complete assessment field sheet; and

(b) a written explanation of how the assessment was determined, including:

(i) a statement indicating whether the assessor considered any decisions of

the appeal board pursuant to [MA, s. 195(4.1); CA, s. 165(3.2); NMA,

s. 218(4.1)] in determining the assessment; and

(ii) if the assessor did consider one or more decisions of the appeal board

in determining the assessment, a statement indicating whether the assessor

decided to apply, to apply in part, to apply with modification or not to

apply the decision of the appeal board to the assessment and the reasons

for that decision.

(MA, s. 230(4); CA, s. 200(4); NMA, s. 251(5))

[49] The materials filed by assessors are the “record relating to the assessment” which “stands

apart from the advocacy and evidentiary material that are expected from the taxpayer and

municipality” (GFL Environmental at para 49). However, as noted, when SAMA acts as the

assessment appraiser, it assumes the powers and duties of, and is deemed to act in the place of, the

municipality’s assessor for the purpose of defending the assessed value of a property (AMAA,

s. 22(15)). In practical terms, this means that, while SAMA places the “neutral record explaining

the basis for the assessment” before the board of revision (GFL Environmental at para 50), it also

advocates in defence of the assessment on the basis of that neutral record and other evidence

adduced by or through another party to the appeal.

8.

What is the role of the municipality in an appeal to a board of revision?

[50] A municipality, or other taxing authority, may be an appellant or a respondent to an

assessment appeal made to a board of revision. Whether appellant or respondent, the municipality

Page 18

has a pre-appeal obligation to discuss the assessment with the taxpayer. This obligation is not

expressed in the municipal Acts but is derived from the statutory requirements for notices of

assessment and of appeal. A notice of appeal must:

(d) include:

(i) a statement that the appellant and the respondent have discussed the appeal,

specifying the date and outcome of that discussion, including the details of any

facts or issues agreed to by the parties; or

(ii) if the appellant and the respondent have not discussed the appeal, a statement

to that effect specifying why no discussion was held; …

(MA, s. 225(6); CA, s. 197(6); NMA, s. 246(6))

9.

What is the role of a board of revision?

[51] A board of revision is an administrative tribunal, typically consisting of three individuals

appointed by the council of a municipality, that hears appeals against property assessments (MA,

Part X, Divisions 5 and 6; CA, Part X, Divisions 5 and 6; NMA, Part X, Divisions 5 and 6).

Commencing with the 2023 taxation year, all boards of revision must be certified by the Office of

the Registrar of boards of revision, which may occur where the Registrar is satisfied that each

member of a board of revision and its secretary have completed “the relevant training approved by

the minister with respect to property assessment appeals” and the board has otherwise met all other

certification requirements set by the minister (The Municipalities Regulations, Part V.1; The Cities

Regulations, Part III.1); The Northern Municipalities Regulations, Part V.1).

[52] In City Centre, this Court described how boards of revision fit within the statutory appeal

regime:

[66]

Boards of revision are established pursuant to s. 192 of The Cities Act. A board of

revision hears a taxpayer’s appeal from the decision of an assessor, and is required to pay

appropriate deference to an assessor’s decision when hearing such an appeal (see Walmart

2018).

…

[71]

As noted in Corman Park, “Even though the Legislature has constrained when and

how a first-level assessment appeal may be commenced, boards of revision have fairly

broad discretion to determine the procedure for an appeal hearing, subject to procedural

fairness or the rules of natural justice” (at para 42). The proceedings before a board of

revision are governed by s. 203 of The Cities Act:

Proceedings before board of revision

203(1) Boards of revision are not bound by the rules of evidence or any other law

applicable to court proceedings and have power to determine the admissibility,

relevance and weight of any evidence.

Page 19

(2)

Boards of revision may require any person giving evidence before them to

do so under oath.

(3)

All oaths necessary to be administered to witnesses may be administered

by any member of the board of revision hearing the appeal.

(4)

A board of revision may make rules to govern its proceedings that are

consistent with this Act and with the duty of fairness.

A board of revision may also compel the attendance at the hearing of persons “having

charge of the assessment roll” or “of any books, papers or documents relating to the matter

of an appeal” (s. 203.1)).

[72]

Before the board of revision, witnesses may also be called in accordance with

s. 205. Parties to the appeal may testify and may call witnesses to testify at the hearing

(s. 205(1)). Parties may request that the secretary issue a subpoena to any person to (a)

appear before the board, (b) to give evidence, or (c) to “produce any documents and things

that relate to the matters” at issue in the appeal (s. 205(1)). Further, any party to an appeal

must “tender all of the evidence on which he or she relies at or before the board revision

hearing” (emphasis added, s. 206).

[53] Although City Centre summarised some of the procedural, evidentiary and fact-finding

powers that the Legislature has granted to boards of revision, for the purposes of the analysis that

follows it will be helpful to identify and set out the specifics of those powers, as taken from the

MA:

Production of assessment roll

234

If directed by the board of revision, the person having charge of the assessment

roll, or any person having charge of any books, papers or documents relating to the matter

of an appeal, shall:

(a)

appear; and

(b)

produce the assessment roll and all papers and writings, or books, papers

or documents, in his or her custody connected with the matter of appeal.

Witnesses

235(1) A party to an appeal may testify, and may call witnesses to testify, at the hearing

of the appeal before the board of revision.

(2)

For the purposes of a hearing before a board of revision, a party may request the

secretary of the board of revision to issue a subpoena to any person:

(a)

(b)

(c)

to appear before the board;

to give evidence; and

to produce any documents and things that relate to the matters at issue in

the appeal.

(3)

For the purposes of hearing and deciding an appeal, a board of revision may, by

order, summons a person:

(a)

(b)

to appear before the board;

to give evidence; and

Page 20

(c)

to produce any documents and things that relate to the matters specified in

the order.

(4)

The party requesting the secretary of a board of revision pursuant to subsection (2)

to issue a subpoena, or any party that the board of revision making an order pursuant to

subsection (3) specifies in the order, shall serve the subpoena or summons on the person to

whom it is directed.

(5)

For the purposes of subsection (4), service of a subpoena or summons is to be

effected by:

(a)

(b)

personal service on the person to whom it is directed; or

registered mail sent to the address of the person to whom it is directed.

(6)

Subject to subsection (7), no person who is served with a subpoena or summons

pursuant to subsection (4) shall:

(a)

(b)

without just excuse fail to attend at the time and place specified in the

subpoena or summons; or

refuse to testify or produce documents as required pursuant to the

subpoena or order.

(7)

If a person who is not a party is required by a subpoena or summons to attend at a

hearing of an appeal, the person is relieved of the obligation to attend unless, at the time of

service of the subpoena or summons, attendance money calculated in accordance with

Schedule IV of The Queen’s Bench Rules is paid or tendered to the person.

(8)

Unless the board of revision otherwise orders, the party responsible for service of

a subpoena or summons is liable for payment of attendance money pursuant to subsection

(7).

Parties to tender all their evidence

236

Any party to an appeal shall tender all of the evidence on which the party relies

either at or before the board of revision hearing.

…

Recording of hearing or testimony

238(1) If, at least two days before the day scheduled for the hearing of an appeal to the

board of revision, a party to the appeal requests that the hearing or part of the hearing or

the testimony of a witness testifying at a hearing be recorded, the chairperson of the board

or panel shall order that the hearing or a part of the hearing or the testimony of a witness

be recorded by a person appointed by the board.

(2)

If an order is made pursuant to subsection (1), the chairperson of the board of

revision or panel may, at the time of making the order or after deciding the appeal, charge

against the party who requested the recording or a transcript the costs or a part of the costs

of:

(a)

recording the hearing, a part of the hearing or the testimony of a witness,

including the cost of the services of the person appointed to make a

recording;

(b)

producing a transcript by a court reporting service of a recording or part

of a recording; or

Page 21

(c)

The secretary of the board of revision may withhold the recording or transcript

until the costs charged pursuant to subsection (2) are paid.

(4) The secretary of the board of revision shall forward a transcript of the recording to

the appeal board if:

making copies of a recording or a transcript.

(3)

(a)

pursuant to this section, a transcript of the recording or part of a recording

is made by a court reporting service of a hearing or of part of a hearing or

of the testimony of a witness testifying at a hearing;

(b)

(c)

the matter that is the subject of the hearing is subsequently appealed to the

appeal board; and

the party to the appeal who requests the transcription has paid the costs of

producing the transcript.

[54] In GFL Environmental, this Court described the function of a board of revision under the

CA in these terms:

[54]

Section 240(1) gives the Board broad remedial powers, including to either increase

or decrease an assessment:

Decisions of board of revision

240(1) After hearing an appeal, a board of revision or, if the appeal is heard by a

panel, the panel may, as the circumstances require and as the board or panel

considers just and expedient:

(a)

confirm the assessment; or

(b)

change the assessment and direct a revision of the assessment roll

accordingly:

(i)

subject to subsection (3), by increasing or decreasing the

assessment of the subject property;

(ii) by changing the liability to taxation or the classification

of the subject property; or

(iii)

by changing both the assessed value of the subject

property and its liability to taxation or its classification.

[55]

Section 240(2) states that the Board “shall not exercise a power pursuant to

subsection (1) except as a result of an appeal” (emphasis added). In Prince Albert,

Gerwing J.A. described the power to adjust up or down as one that was “necessary” but

immediately went on to state that “there is no indication that the specificity of the appeal

proceeding is in any way displaced to give the Board authority to correct any assessment

on any appeal” (at para 9, emphasis added). In other words, the power to increase or

decrease an assessment must be linked back to the issue raised in the notice of appeal that

confers the Board with its jurisdiction.

[56]

In [Sasco], Cameron J.A. stated that “the function of the Board of Revision is to

review the valuation for error by the assessor – error as specifically alleged in the notice of

appeal – and, if such error be found to exist, to give effect to it subject to the limitations

imposed upon the Board’s remedial powers” (at para 35, emphasis added, citing [Laing]).

Page 22

[55] A board of revision, therefore, hears evidence and argument and then makes findings and

draws conclusions relevant to the specific allegations of error set out in the notice of appeal brought

before it (MA, ss. 233 and 235; CA, ss. 203, 205 and 206; NMA, ss. 254 and 256). This Court has

held that a board of revision must approach each appeal with the presumption that the assessment

is correct (Macleod at 189; Omemee at 548; and Estevan Coal at para 31). The board interprets

assessment law and assessment practice as it relates to the errors alleged in the notice of appeal,

and in some cases makes findings of facts, and then applies its conclusions in that regard to the

facts and decides whether the assessment is the product of error (Corman Park at para 48; MA,

s. 240(1); CA, s. 210(1); NMA, s. 261(1)). As the circumstances require, and as it considers just

and expedient, a board may confirm the assessment or “change the assessment and direct a revision

of the assessment roll accordingly”:

(i)

subject to [MA, s. 240(3); CA, s. 210(3); NMA, s. 261(4)], by increasing or

decreasing the assessment of the subject property;

(ii)

by changing the liability to taxation or the classification of the subject property; or

by changing both the assessed value of the subject property and its liability to

(iii)

taxation or its classification.

(MA, s. 240(1); CA, s. 210(1); NMA, s. 261(1))

[56] A board of revision may not, however, grant a remedy that varies an assessment unless the

appellant has persuaded it that the assessment was founded on a material error such that equity

has not been achieved with similar properties (CP Reit at para 24; Imperial Oil 2016 at para 52;

Sasco at para 41; HDL Investments at para 32; Cadillac Fairview at para 37; Estevan Coal at

paras 17 and 34; Husk at 77; Laing at 22; MA, s. 240(3); CA, s. 210(3); NMA, s. 261(4)).

[57] In administrative law, a decision-maker that stands in a position akin to an assessor assesses

and evaluates the evidence before it under the governing law and, absent circumstances that satisfy

the appropriate standard of review, a reviewing court will not interfere with the decision made. An

assessment appeal is an internal statutory appeal, not judicial review, but the role of a board of

revision is nonetheless to review an assessment for error. Assessors, however, generally make their

decisions in the absence of any fresh input, evidence or argument from taxpayers or the owners of

the properties being assessed or, presumably, municipalities. This means an assessment appeal

before a board of revision is often the first opportunity for a person challenging an assessment to

put their evidence and their arguments before a tribunal for consideration, i.e., the board of

Page 23

revision. In this light, the statutory appeal framework within which assessment appeals occur is

not fully analogous to either judicial review of an administrative tribunal’s decision or appellate

review of a judicial decision. Nor does the framework establish a de novo hearing. The function of

a board of revision is most akin to that of a first-level fact-finder and decision-maker as it relates

to the facts and assessment principles put in issue. However, given that there is a presumption that

an assessment is correct in an appeal to a board of revision, the onus is on the appellant to establish

error in the assessment, as has been alleged in the notice of appeal. In this regard, boards of

revision apply standards of review when deciding whether an error has occurred and whether an

error is material enough to require intervention in the assessment. Error and the materiality of an

error are established by satisfying a board of revision that the applicable standard has been met.

10.

What is the Committee’s role?

[58] In City Centre, this Court conducted a thorough review of the relevant legislation, its

evolution and prior jurisprudence with a view to determining the Committee’s role and the internal

standards it should apply when reviewing a board of revision decision. There is no need to

paraphrase the analysis in City Centre, which was:

[97]

Thus, this Court has consistently found that the Committee fulfils a traditional

appellate role. Instead of rehearing a matter, the Committee reviews the Board’s decision

for error. Error has previously been defined as “material error” (see Laing, Estevan Coal,

or Sasco). Once such an error is found, the Committee has the remedial power to correct

it.

[98]

It is clear from the foregoing that the Committee fulfills a traditional appellate role

and, therefore, should give deference to the Board on questions of fact. What is not clear

is what standard of review the Committee should apply. As seen in the jurisprudence cited

above, the standard of review has been referred to as correctness (Imperial Oil 2016) and

material error that so affects the decision of the Board that it cannot stand (Sasco). It has

also been said that the Committee may correct any error in the assessment (Laing).

However, this jurisprudence did not canvass the standard of review issue and did not

determine the standard of review with respect to questions of fact. It falls to this Court to

do so now.

[99]

The Committee’s role within the assessment regime supports a deferential standard

of review on questions of fact. The Committee is an appellate tribunal charged with hearing

and determining appeals. Unlike the Board, it is not a tribunal of first instance. The Board

receives evidence and hears witnesses. The Committee reviews the record of the Board and

only hears new evidence in narrow circumstances, not unlike the role of an appellate court.

Consequently, it fulfills a traditional appellate role in that it determines appeals on the

record. Its function is not to conduct trials de novo, but to review for error and if an error

has been found, to correct it.

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[100] Both tribunals serve specialized roles that have been created by the Legislature. It

is clear that the legislative intent remains that the Committee fulfil an appellate role such

that it gives deference to the Board’s findings of fact.

[101] Ultimately, based on the Legislature’s intention regarding the role of the

Committee, I am of the view the most appropriate standard of review to be applied by the

Committee to the Board’s factual findings and to questions of mixed fact and law where

there is no extricable question of law, expressed in traditional terms, is reasonableness. I

say this because a standard of palpable and overriding error, the most deferential standard

of review and one that applies in the appellate context, would limit the Committee’s role

beyond what the Legislature intended. While deference must be afforded to the Board’s

findings of fact, the Committee must be empowered to intervene where such findings are

unreasonable or unsupported by the evidence. Expressing the standard of review in this

way is consistent with the approach taken by this Court in Redhead.

(Emphasis in original)

[59] With that basic background in place, we turn to consider the standards of review at each

level of the assessment appeal regime.

B.

What standards of review govern the decision making of boards of

revision?

[60] Boards of revision are tasked with ascertaining whether assessments are the product of

material error, which requires that they review the assessment field sheet and the written

explanation of how the assessment was determined that are filed by the assessor, testimony from

the assessor and other evidence adduced in the hearing in the light of the allegations of error set

out in the notice of appeal. Since assessments are made on the basis of particular facts and specific

principles of assessment law and practice, those facts, the interpretation of the governing

assessment law and practice, or the application of that law and practice to those facts must be

challenged by the appellant in the notice of appeal (MA, s. 225(6); CA, s. 197(6); NMA, s. 246(6)).

1.

What standard of review should a board of revision employ with

respect to the facts?

[61] The facts that an assessor has relied upon when preparing an assessment are presumed to

be correct. If a relied-upon fact has not been put in issue under a notice of appeal to a board of

revision, the fact is not subject to review because the board (and the parties) must accept it as being

correct. Moreover, facts that are put in issue in a notice of appeal are not subject to an appellate

standard of review per se. When a relied-upon fact is alleged in a notice of appeal to be in error,

the existence of error is determined by a board of revision on the civil standard of proof on a

Page 25

balance of probabilities (Estevan Coal at para 29; Sasco at para 35; CP Reit at para 24; McDougall

at para 49). This requires some explanation.

a.

What is necessary to establish an error of fact?

[62] Under the municipal Acts, each assessment must reflect the “facts, conditions and

circumstances” affecting the property as of January 1 of each year “as if those facts, conditions

and circumstances existed on the applicable base date” (MA, s. 195(4); CA, s. 165(3.1); NMA,

s. 218(4)).

[63] To identify what is necessary to establish an error of fact in a property assessment appeal,

it is important to understand that an error of fact could include any error as to the “facts, conditions

and circumstances” affecting a property as of January 1 of each year.

[64] It is also necessary to distinguish questions of mixed fact and law from questions of fact.

The explanation that follows has no application to questions of mixed fact and law (which are

sometimes referred to as questions involving the exercise of assessor discretion). What follows

only addresses in broad terms how a board of revision should handle allegations of purely factual

error in an assessment.

[65] It is important to have a thorough appreciation of the relationship between the burden of

proof and the presumption that an assessment is correct in the context of an assessment appeal.

Two fundamental principles of that relationship are that a board of revision must:

(a)

accept as correct all facts used by the assessor in the preparation of an assessment

unless they have been put in issue by the appellant in the notice of appeal and, if so

challenged, unless they are shown to be in error; and

(b)

accept as correct the governing assessment law and practice identified and applied

by the assessor in the preparation of an assessment unless put in issue by the

appellant in the notice of appeal and, if so challenged, unless they are shown to be

in error.

[66] A justification for the presumption of correctness in appeals is that an appellant knows or

has the means of knowing the facts and law relevant to the appeal. However, because property

Page 26

assessment is predicated on mass appraisal, taxpayers may not have ready access to the evidence,

or to the principles of assessment law and practice, that might govern the preparation of their

assessment (see Estevan Coal at paras 46-49). Nonetheless, one justification for the maintenance

of the presumption of correctness in a mass appraisal regime is that assessors disclose the basis in

fact and the assessment law and practice that gave rise to an assessment, i.e., the assessment field

sheet and written explanation of how the assessment was determined (MA, s. 230(4); CA,

s. 200(4)(b); NMA, s. 251(5)(b)) and, arguably, during discussions conducted prior to the filing of

a notice of appeal (MA, s. 225(6)(d); CA, s. 197(6)(d); NMA, s. 246(6)(d)) or, implicitly, pursuant

to a request for that information (MA, s. 203; CA, s. 173; NMA, s. 224).

[67] Where disclosure has occurred, whether as part of the appeal process or otherwise, the

presumption of correctness is maintained and, when coupled with the burden of proof, it means

that boards of revision must accept as correct every fact that an assessor has relied upon and every

principle of assessment law and practice that has been employed by the assessor in preparing the

assessment unless it has been put in issue by the appellant in the notice of appeal and has been

proven to be erroneous (GFL Environmental at paras 39–61; Corman Park at paras 37–39).

Axiomatically, where the assessor has not disclosed a relied-upon fact, or a principle upon which

an assessment was prepared, a taxpayer would be unable to put that fact or the interpretation or

application of that principle in issue under a notice of appeal and, in that circumstance, the taxpayer

would have no onus to rebut its correctness in an appeal hearing. This understanding of the appeal

regime is supported by the provisions of the municipal Acts that permit an appellant “appearing

before” a board of revision to apply to amend the notice of appeal “so as to add a new ground on

which it is alleged that error exists” (MA, s. 239; CA, s. 209; NMA, s. 260). That phrasing confirms

that notices of appeal may be amended after the parties have disclosed their evidence and after the

assessor has filed its assessment field sheet and written explanation of how the assessment was

determined (MA, s. 230; CA, s. 200; NMA, s. 251).

[68] In this context, it is important to understand that, although SAMA is a party to certain

assessment appeals (MA, s. 225(4); CA, s. 197(4); NMA, s. 246(4)) and may itself appeal against

some assessments (MA, s. 225(3); CA, s. 197(3); NMA, s. 246(3)), SAMA qua assessment

appraiser is not the respondent in an assessment appeal (MA, s. 225(6); CA, s. 197(6); NMA,

s. 246(6)). As the municipal Acts provide, a municipality qua respondent has the right to lead

Page 27

evidence to support the facts and assessment law and practice relied upon and disclosed by the

assessor, even though the board must take those facts as correct.

[69] If a party, whether a municipality or a taxpayer, intends to rely on a fact, condition or

circumstance that was not relied upon by the assessor, or something that has not been admitted or

established by evidence adduced by the other party or the assessor, the party seeking to rely on

that fact, condition or circumstance must adduce sufficient evidence to support its existence on a

balance of probabilities. This does not, however, involve a shifting of the burden of proof, which

always remains with the appellant (Estevan Coal at para 46; Corman Park at paras 37–39). Even

where the assessor is said to have omitted to take account of a fact, condition or circumstance, the

burden of proof remains on the appellant because it is appealing against the correctness of the

assessment. An overlooked fact, condition or circumstance affecting a property can have no

bearing on the outcome of an assessment appeal until evidence is adduced that is accepted by the

board of revision as proof of that fact, condition or circumstance.

[70] An appellant, furthermore, is not required to prove a fact or to lead evidence to support a

fact (even though it may be alleged in its notice of appeal) if the alleged fact is no longer in issue

in the appeal. The appellant’s initial burden is simply to displace the presumption that the facts

relied upon by the assessor are correct. As such, an appellant may choose for tactical reasons not

to adduce evidence addressing different or other facts pleaded in its notice of appeal and instead

directly address the facts stated in the assessment field sheet and written explanation of how the

assessment was determined that have been put in issue under the notice of appeal. Moreover, an

appellant may not be required to lead evidence to disprove a fact on which an assessment is based

if neither the assessor nor the respondent have adduced or intend to adduce evidence to establish

the existence of that fact. There may be circumstances where the absence of evidence in relation

to a fact put in issue by a notice of appeal is, in and of itself, sufficient for the appellant to discharge

the burden of proof. The relationship between the presumption of correctness and the burden of

proof should not require an appellant to prove a negative.

[71] As to the fact-finding process itself, the civil standard of proof (balance of probabilities)

requires boards of revision to scrutinise the evidence with care to decide whether it is more likely

than not that an alleged fact, condition or circumstance exists (i.e., is true) (McDougall at para 49).

Page 28

An alleged fact, condition or circumstance is either a fact (i.e., is true) or it is not—there is no

middle ground. A board cannot find that something might be a fact. If a board is left in doubt by

the evidence, the doubt is resolved by resorting to the burden of persuasion.

[72] As explained in Mi-Sask (at paras 30–34), there is a substantive difference between an

evidential burden and a persuasive burden. The party that bears the evidential burden of proving a

fact must either adduce its own evidence or point to other evidence on the record that is sufficient

to raise the issue. However, just because the evidential burden has been satisfied, it does not mean

that a board of revision must find a fact in favour of the party that bore that burden. Rather, if the

evidence meets the evidential burden, it means the board can decide the issue in accordance with

the civil standard of proof. However, if the party bearing the evidential burden does not meet that

burden, that party will have failed to prove the fact in issue. It is for the board to decide what

evidence is relevant and can properly be considered in relation to a fact, regardless of its source.

[73] In Mi-Sask, this Court explained the persuasive burden, which in a civil case is to prove a

fact on a balance of probabilities. If the party with the persuasive burden fails to prove to the board

of revision that something is on a balance of probabilities a fact, then the party has not met its

burden of persuasion. However, the question of which party bears the persuasive burden is

generally unimportant. If the board of revision makes a finding of fact, the persuasive burden does

not play any part in the fact-finding process. The burden of persuasion only plays a role in fact-

finding when a board cannot reach a conclusion because the evidence is evenly balanced. In those

circumstances, the party that bears the persuasive burden will have failed to discharge it and the

fact will not be proven (Mi-Sask at para 24). Properly understood, the burden of persuasion is the

tie-breaking mechanism that boards of revision should apply when left with uncertainty about

whether a fact exists. More aptly, if a board of revision is left with uncertainty about whether a

fact, condition or circumstance that the assessor has relied upon is erroneous, then the tie goes to

the relied-upon fact, condition or circumstance because the appellant has failed to persuade the

board that it is erroneous.

[74] In sum, to prove that an alleged fact, condition or circumstance is a fact (i.e., true), there

must be evidence adduced in the hearing that is sufficient to satisfy the standard of proof on a

balance of probabilities. If the decision-maker is not satisfied that standard has been met, then the

Page 29

allegation is not a fact for the purposes of the proceeding. If the decision-maker is satisfied, then

the allegation is a fact. If the evidence is evenly balanced, then the party who bears the burden of

proof has failed to discharge its burden of persuasion and the allegation is not a fact.

[75] While this addresses how boards of revision should make findings of fact, it does not

address how they should decide whether an assessment is the product of an error of fact. As noted,

an assessment must reflect the “facts, conditions and circumstances” affecting the property as of

January 1 of each year “as if those facts, conditions and circumstances existed on the applicable

base date” (MA, s. 195(4); CA, s. 165(3.1); NMA, s. 218(4)). On this basis, an error of fact will

arise where a fact, condition or circumstance that the assessor has found to have affected the

property has been disproved or has been proven not to have affected the property as of January 1

of the year in question. That is, where a board makes a finding of fact that differs from the

assessor’s apprehension of the facts, conditions and circumstances affecting a property, then the

board has found error in the assessment.

b.

When is an error of fact a material error?

[76] An error of fact is a material error only if the board of revision concludes that—on a balance

of probabilities—equity has not been achieved with similar properties by reason of the assessor’s

reliance on the erroneous fact. In other words, the identified error in the assessment must have

affected the achievement of equity.

2.

What standard of review does a board of revision apply to questions of

assessment law?

[77] Questions of assessment law are determined by boards of revision on the standard of

correctness.

a.

What is assessment law?

[78] Assessment law is:

(a)

(b)

the CA, the MA, the NMA, the AMAA, and their respective statutory instruments;

this Court’s jurisprudence;

Page 30

(c)

(d)

the decisions of the Committee with respect to the property in question (AMAA,

s. 22(12.1); MA, s. 195(4.1); CA, s. 165(3.2); NMA, s. 218(4.1)); and

the Manual, as adopted pursuant to s. 12(1)(d) of the AMAA.

b.

What is necessary to establish an error of assessment law?

[79] If a board of revision identifies or interprets the governing assessment law differently than

did the assessor, then the board has found an error of assessment law.

c.

When is an error of assessment law a material error?

[80] An error of assessment law is a material error only if the board concludes that—on a

balance of probabilities—equity has not been achieved with similar properties due to the assessor’s

erroneous identification or interpretation of the particular assessment law in question. In other

words, the identified error in the assessment must have affected the achievement of equity.

3.

What standard of review applies to questions of assessment practice?

[81] Questions of assessment practice are determined by boards of revision on the standard of

correctness.

a.

What is assessment practice?

[82] Assessment practice refers to the principles of property assessment that do not have the

status of being recognised as assessment law but nevertheless direct the practice of assessors in

the preparation of assessments. This includes (without limitation) the directing principles set forth

in:

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)

decisions of the Committee, other than those in respect of the property in question;

decisions of boards of revision;

the Handbook;

the Cost Guide and other SAMA Guidelines;

publications of the International Association of Assessing Officers [IAAO],

including Assessment Administration (Chicago: IAAO, 2003), Property

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Assessment Valuation (Chicago: IAAO, 2010), Fundamentals of Mass Appraisal

(Chicago: IAAO, 2011), and Glossary for Property Appraisal and Assessment

(Chicago: IAAO, 1997);

(f)

the Marshall & Swift Valuation Service (CoreLogic Inc.); and

the Marshall & Swift Residential Cost Handbook (CoreLogic Inc.).

(g)

[83] Questions of assessment practice are, therefore, those that involve the identification and

interpretation of the principles of property assessment that do not have the status of being

assessment law but are nevertheless authoritative and govern the practice of assessors in the

preparation of the assessment in question.

b.

What is necessary to establish an error of assessment practice?

[84] If a board identifies or interprets the governing principles of assessment practice differently

than did the assessor, then the board has found an error of assessment practice.

c.

When is an error of assessment practice a material error?

[85] An error of assessment practice is a material error only if the board concludes that—on a

balance of probabilities—equity has not been achieved with similar properties due to the assessor’s

erroneous identification or interpretation of the applicable principles of assessment practice. In

other words, the identified error in the assessment must have affected the achievement of equity.

4.

What standard of review applies to questions of mixed fact and

assessment law and to questions of mixed fact and assessment practice?

[86] Questions of mixed fact and assessment law are determined by boards of revision on the

standard of reasonableness.

[87] Questions of mixed fact and assessment practice are determined by boards of revision on

the standard of reasonableness.

Page 32

a.

What is necessary to establish error on a question of mixed fact

and assessment law and practice?

[88] The standard of reasonableness applies to questions about the application of both

assessment law and assessment practice (hereafter referred to as assessment law and practice) to

the facts, including those issues sometimes described as involving an exercise of assessor

discretion. This is because the standard of reasonableness best gives effect to the Legislature’s

intent to leave certain decisions with professional assessment appraisers while fulfilling the

constitutional requirements of ensuring that exercises of state power over the citizenry are subject

to the rule of law (Dunsmuir, at paras 27, 28 and 48; Vavilov at para 82). This requires some

explanation in the context of an assessment appeal to a board of revision.

[89] As noted, neither the Committee nor a board of revision is a court and, therefore,

assessment appeals before those administrative bodies are not conducted like a judicial review.

Further, the reasonableness standard described in Vavilov does not presumptively apply in an

internal, statutory appeal regime such as that established for property assessments under the

municipal Acts and related legislation. Nonetheless, the Vavilov standard of reasonableness may

be readily adapted for use by boards of revision in this specialised administrative-decision-making

context.

[90] The adaptation of the Vavilov standard of reasonableness begins with the understanding

that assessment law and practice often affords assessors with the discretion to choose a course of

action from among two or more available options based on their skill, judgment, knowledge and

experience applied in the context of the relevant facts, conditions and circumstances affecting the

property in question (Husk at 77; Laing at 28). An exercise of assessor discretion is, therefore, the

informed, professional judgment of an assessor as to a reasonable course of action in a given set

of circumstances. Such discretion is not, however, unbounded; it must be exercised reasonably and

subject to the constraints of assessment law and practice.

[91] Administrative bodies typically give reasons for a decision that explain how and why the

decision was made, thereby showing the affected parties that it was made in a fair and lawful

manner. Where they are provided, reasons shield against arbitrariness as well as the perception of

arbitrariness in the exercise of public power (Congrégation des témoins de Jéhovah, at paras 12

Page 33

and 13; Baker at para 39). In property assessment, however, the process of public justification of

an exercise of state power is tempered because assessors are arguably not required to give reasons

outside the confines of an assessment appeal.

[92] Nonetheless, in applying the reasonableness standard, the role of a board of revision is to

consider the assessor’s reasoning process and its outcome to determine whether the errors that are

alleged in the notice of appeal have occurred. Although no reasons are given initially for an

assessment, an assessor is required to disclose ex post facto the reasoning that led to the assessment

at least 10 days before an appeal hearing (MA, s. 230(4); CA, s. 200(4); NMA, s. 251(5)) and the

assessor usually testifies at that hearing. This allows the board of revision to review the assessor’s

reasoning and justification for an assessment in the context in which it was made and under the

framework of assessment law and practice in which assessors must operate.

[93] However, when assessing the reasonableness of an assessor’s decision on a question of

mixed fact and assessment law and practice, boards of revision must refrain from remaking that

decision themselves. A board applying the reasonableness standard to such decisions does not

stand in the assessor’s shoes and ask what decision it would have made. A board should not attempt

to identify the possible approaches or decisions that were open to the assessor. Nor should a board

conduct the decision-making afresh or seek to determine the correct decision. Instead, a board must

consider only whether the appellant has established that the disclosed rationale for the decision

that the assessor actually made or its outcome is unreasonable. In this way, the application of the

standard of reasonableness involves consideration of both the assessor’s decision itself and the

assessor’s reasoning process.

[94] A reasonable decision has two aspects in this context. It is a decision that is (a) based on

an internally coherent and rational chain of analysis; and (b) justified in relation to the facts,

circumstances and conditions affecting the property in question as well as the assessment law and

practice that constrains the assessor (see Laing at para 28). The reasonableness standard requires

that a board of revision defer to a decision that has those characteristics. To be clear, the assessor’s

decision must be justified by the assessor’s reasoning process as disclosed pursuant to MA,

s. 230(4), CA, s. 200(4) or NMA, s. 251(5), on the record, or through testimony, as the case may

Page 34

be. Even though a decision may seem reasonable on the assessor’s explanation of it, it may not be

so once the other evidence adduced before the board is taken into account.

[95] This Court’s jurisprudence recognises that assessors have the authority under assessment

law and practice to decide the way in which to approach an issue or a question. That is, there is

often some leeway or latitude in assessment law and practice that applies in the context of the facts,

conditions and circumstances affecting a property. The assessor’s reasons may demonstrate that

the assessor made a given decision by bringing institutional expertise and experience to bear on

the issue. Boards of revision must be attuned to the application of an assessor’s specialized

knowledge, if that is demonstrated by their explanation for how the assessment was determined

(MA, s. 230(4); CA, s. 200(4); NMA, s. 251(5)). Put another way, respectful attention to the

institutional knowledge and an assessor’s expertise may reveal that an ostensibly puzzling or

counterintuitive decision or approach was nevertheless supported by the governing assessment law

and practice and by the practical realities of property assessment and, therefore, represents a

reasonable decision or approach. Boards must also bear in mind that an assessor’s explanation is

not measured against a standard of perfection.

[96] This means boards of revision must develop an understanding of the assessor’s reasoning

process to determine whether an assessor’s exercise of discretion is reasonable. The board must be

satisfied that there are sufficiently serious shortcomings in the assessor’s reasoning process, in the

outcome of it, or in the evidence such that the decision cannot be said to be reasonable. The alleged

error must be more than a misstep in reasoning or peripheral to the outcome. The board must be

convinced that the shortcomings or flaws affected the assessor’s reasoning process or undermined

the soundness of the outcome so as to render the decision unreasonable.

[97] To be reasonable, on the other hand, an assessor’s decision must be based on reasoning

that is both rational and logical. A decision is reasonable if the conclusion reached follows logically

from the analysis undertaken. A decision is reasonable if the written explanation of how the

assessment was determined read in conjunction with the record and the evidence adduced make it

possible to understand the assessor’s reasoning on a critical point. A decision is, however,

unreasonable if the explanation of it exhibits logical fallacies, such as circular reasoning, false

dilemmas, unfounded generalizations, or an absurd premise.

Page 35

[98] To be clearer about this, discretionary decisions made by assessors must be and are

presumed to be reasonable; that is, they are presumed to be justified in relation to the governing

assessment law and practice and the facts that are relevant to the decision. However, in assessment

appeals, boards of revision should keep in mind the principle that an exercise of public power must

be justified, intelligible and transparent to the citizens who are subject to it, not in the abstract.

Therefore, where the assessor has filed a written explanation of how the assessment was

determined that fails to justify the assessment on a material matter put in issue, it would be

unacceptable for a board of revision to uphold that assessment on the basis of facts or assessment

principles that had not been made available or disclosed to the appellant. The onus is on the

appellant to prove that the assessor’s decision is based on reasoning that is either illogical or not

rational or that it does not follow from the analysis undertaken. If the appellant persuades the board

that it is not possible to understand the assessor’s reasons on an essential point when read in

conjunction with the record and the evidence adduced, then the assessor’s decision on that point

is unreasonable.

[99] Elements of the legal and factual contexts of a decision also constrain the exercise of the

powers delegated to assessors. These constraints will vary in significance depending on context.

At bottom, an assessor’s decision must recognise that the dominant and controlling factor in

property assessment is the achievement of equity. For non-regulated properties, this means that,

although assessors may have discretion, they must apply the market valuation standard so that

assessments bear a fair and just proportion to the market value of similar properties as of the

applicable base date. For regulated properties, this means assessors must apply the regulated

property assessment valuation standard uniformly and fairly. When assessment law and practice

affords an assessor with discretion, the assessor is nonetheless bound by the rule of law to exercise

that discretion in accordance with the set of legal and assessment principles that pertain to the

matter in issue and by properly taking into account the evidence relevant to that matter.

[100] An appellant may, therefore, rely upon the contextual criteria that bound an exercise of

discretion to persuade a board of revision that it should have no confidence in the outcome reached

by the assessor. That is, the appellant may persuade the board to find that an assessor’s decision is

unreasonable when examined against contextual considerations, particularly because the criteria

necessarily interact with one another. For example, an assessor’s decision to stratify certain

Page 36

properties for the purposes of developing a MAF would be unreasonable if it were not justified

under the principles prescribed by the relevant assessment law and practice, considering the nature

of the property being assessed and the nature of the other properties used to develop the MAF.

[101] However, this Court’s jurisprudence recognises that the factual realities of an assessment

may require an assessor to apply assessment law and practice to an incomplete factual matrix. For

this reason, a board of revision may find that a decision or choice by an assessor is reasonable, or

does not give rise to a remediable error, when the assessor has respected the requirements of the

governing assessment law and practice, including its dominant and controlling factor, and has

justified the decision made to the extent reasonably possible given the contextual realities of the

assessment (TNC Mall 2020 at para 43; CCRL 2020 at paras 98 and 106).

[102] If, for example, assessment law and practice calls for the application of a MAF but the

information available to an assessor about similar properties is insufficient for that purpose, the

assessor must nonetheless prepare an estimate of market value and, to do so, the assessor may have

to use that insufficient data or bring additional, less-satisfactory data into play. On that basis, the

assessor must estimate the market value of the subject property to the best of their skill and ability

by adhering to the requirements of assessment law and practice as closely as is reasonably possible.

This must be done, of course, in furtherance of the overarching, statutory duty to achieve equity

with similar properties. In this scenario, a reasonable decision is one where the board of revision

can follow the assessor’s reasoning without encountering fatal flaws in the assessor’s overarching

logic and where the board is satisfied that the line of analysis reasonably leads, under the relevant

assessment law and practice and having regard for the limitations on the available data, to the

conclusion reached by the assessor.

[103] As this suggests, whether an assessor’s application of assessment law and practice is

justified will depend on the context, including the language describing the limits and contours of

the assessor’s authority. For example, an assessor’s discretion may be precisely circumscribed

using narrow language that delineates the discretion in detail, thereby tightly constraining the

assessor’s ability to exercise that discretion. Conversely, a principle of assessment law and practice

may be broadly worded or open-ended, granting assessors greater flexibility in interpreting the

Page 37

meaning of that language and in the exercise their discretion. Other principles of assessment law

and practice will fall somewhere between these two edges.

[104] This means that certain language relating to the scope of an assessor’s authority or

discretion may support more than one interpretation of it, while other language may support only

one interpretation. What matters to a board of revision is whether the exercise of discretion or the

application of an assessment principle results from an internally coherent and rational chain of

analysis and is justified in the light of the surrounding context, which is framed by the assessment

field sheet and the written explanation of how the assessment was determined as well as the other

evidence adduced in the appeal hearing. It will, of course, be impossible for an assessor (or a

respondent) to justify a decision that has strayed beyond the limits set by the assessment law or

practice that was applied. For example, an assessor cannot ignore assessment principles and assess

the value of a property based on an arbitrarily created and fictitious theory of assessment. Assessors

must interpret assessment law and practice in a manner consistent with its text, context and

purpose, applying the assessor’s expertise and experience with the institutional framework of the

assessment scheme. An assessor cannot adopt, however, a plausible interpretation they know to be

inferior merely because it appears to be available and is expedient. Lastly, and it should go without

saying, assessors must not reverse-engineer an assessment. This means, as a general rule, that

assessors (and respondents) cannot ex post facto preserve a decision rendered unreasonable by

serious shortcomings in the assessor’s reasoning process through argument that the outcome or

decision would have been reasonable if the assessor had applied different assessment law and

practice.

[105] Assessor discretion is always subject to limits or constraints (CCRL 2020 at paras 80–82;

TNC Mall 2020 at paras 37–38; Harvard 2017 at para 28; Sasco at para 61; 959630 Alberta at

para 25; GMRI Canada at paras 50–55; Estevan Coal at para 23; Cadillac Fairview at para 37;

Husk at 77; Laing at paras 28–29). When assessment law and practice affords assessors with

discretion, they are bound by law to exercise that discretion in accordance their professional

judgment and the set of rules that pertains to the matter in issue and by properly taking into account

the evidence relevant to that matter. In Walmart 2018, this Court wrote:

[116] It is clear that an assessor’s discretion is an important and necessary aspect of the

assessment process. Property assessment is a complex undertaking that demands assessors

make difficult decisions based on their specialized knowledge of the market and its

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influences. Therefore, appellate bodies should begin their review of assessor’s decisions in

relation to these sorts of matters from a position of deference. That said, an assessor’s

discretion is constrained by the requirements of the legislation. If an assessment is not in

accordance with The Cities Act or is founded upon some other material error of fact or law

or of assessment principle and practice, then appellate bodies are no longer required to

defer to the assessor. As indicated by this Court, the avoidance of the application of an

enactment, which has the force of law, is an abuse of discretion (see Sasco at para 61).

[106] In short, because an assessment is presumed to be correct in an appeal to a board of

revision, assessors are presumed to have reasonably exercised their discretion (i.e., to have made

reasonable decisions on questions of mixed fact and assessment law and practice) unless the

appellant can establish error. An exercise of discretion or the application of assessment law and

practice to the facts may give rise to a free-standing error of fact or in the identification or

interpretation of assessment law and practice, which the board would address on a balance of

probabilities (for questions of fact) or the correctness standard (for questions of law). However,

error on a question of mixed fact and assessment law and practice will be established where the

board of revision is persuaded that the assessor’s exercise of discretion (i.e., the choice or decision

made by the assessor) is itself unreasonable given the relevant assessment law and practice and

the facts, circumstances and conditions affecting the property being assessed.

[107] No deference can be shown to an assessor who has made an unreasonable decision or who

has unreasonably exercised the discretion afforded to assessors under assessment law and practice.

b.

When is a finding of error on a question of mixed fact and

assessment law and practice a material error?

[108] An unreasonable decision on a question of mixed fact and assessment law and practice (or

an unreasonable exercise of discretion) does not constitute a material error unless the appellant

can also establish—to the satisfaction of the board of revision on a balance of probabilities—that

equity has not been achieved with similar properties by reason of the unreasonable decision or

exercise of discretion. In other words, the identified error in the assessment must have affected the

achievement of equity. Where an appellant has established a material error by reason of an

unreasonable decision or exercise of discretion, no deference is owed to the assessment and the

board must intervene.

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5.

What are the remedial powers of a board of revision?

[109] As a bottom line, if a board of revision is persuaded that no error has occurred or, if an

error has occurred but equity has nonetheless been achieved with similar properties, then the board

may confirm the assessment (MA, ss. 240(1)(a) and (3); CA, ss. 210(1)(a) and (3); NMA,

ss. 261(1)(a) and (4)).

[110] Where a board of revision finds that material error has occurred in an assessment (i.e., such

that equity has not been achieved), the board may “change” the assessment and direct a revision

of the assessment roll accordingly:

(i)

subject to [MA, s. 240(3); CA, s. 210(3); NMA, s. 261(4)], by increasing or

decreasing the assessment of the subject property;

(ii)

by changing the liability to taxation or the classification of the subject property; or

by changing both the assessed value of the subject property and its liability to

(iii)

taxation or its classification.

(MA, ss. 240(1)(b) and (3); CA, ss. 210(1)(b) and (3); NMA, ss. 261(1)(b) and (4))

[111] It is important to understand that, when boards of revision exercise these remedial powers,

they too must act reasonably and in accordance with assessment law and practice and they are

constrained by the requirements of equity (as defined in the municipal Acts) because “the dominant

and controlling factor in the assessment of property is equity” (MA, s. 195(5); CA, s. 165(3); NMA,

s. 218(5)). Further, boards of revision may not vary assessments of non-regulated property using

“single property appraisal techniques” (MA, s. 240(1.1); CA, s. 210(1.1); NMA, s. 261(2)).

C.

What standards of review govern the decision making of the

Committee?

[112] Parties to an appeal before a board of revision enjoy a further right of appeal to the

Committee “respecting a decision of a board of revision” and “against the omission, neglect or

refusal of a board of revision to hear or decide an appeal” (MA, s. 246; CA, s. 216; NMA, s. 267).

In such an appeal, the Committee has the “authority to hear and determine any question of fact or

law as to matters within its jurisdiction” (MBA, s. 20(1)).

[113] When reviewing a board decision, the Committee does not undertake a de novo analysis of

the grounds of appeal posed to the board of revision or ask itself what the correct decision would

have been at the board of revision (City Centre at para 99; Corman Park at para 57). Rather, the

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Committee fulfils a traditional appellate role whereby it reviews the board decision under appeal

for the errors that are alleged in the grounds of appeal set forth in the notice of appeal to it (TNC

Mall 2022 at paras 20–28; GFL Environmental at paras 59–61; City Centre at para 96; Corman

Park at paras 34–36; Sasco at para 35).

[114] Like an assessment, decisions of boards of revision are presumed to be free of error or

correct until an appellant establishes one of the errors alleged in its notice of appeal. In this regard,

an appellant may assert that a board has erred in relation to jurisdictional matters, its identification

or interpretation of the governing assessment law and practice, its handling of questions of mixed

fact and assessment law and practice, or the remedy given by the board.

1.

What standard of review governs the Committee’s decision making on

questions of jurisdiction?

[115] The Committee will review questions of jurisdiction on the standard of correctness.

[116] We include questions of jurisdiction for the sake of completeness, recognising that such

questions should rarely arise in appeals to the Committee. Nevertheless, under the MBA, the

Legislature granted this Court judicial oversight on questions of law and jurisdiction arising from

decisions of the SMB (MBA, s. 33.1). For this Court to effectively exercise its supervisory

function, the Committee itself must be empowered to review for correctness all questions of

jurisdiction arising in an appeal from the decision of a board of revision (E.Z. Automotive at

para 94).

[117] A board of revision has jurisdiction over an issue only to the extent granted by the

Legislature. In an appeal to the Committee, a ground of appeal will give rise to a question of

jurisdiction where an appellant asserts that a board of revision has omitted, neglected or refused to

hear or decide an appeal or an issue raised in an appeal. The Committee’s regulatorily-mandated

expertise and its supervisory role over boards of revision support the conclusion that the

Legislature intended the Committee to also intervene whenever it determines that a board has

exceeded its jurisdiction by breaching the principles of natural justice. To be clear, however,

questions of jurisdiction in this sense do not include issues as to the correct interpretation of a

statutory instrument, which give rise to questions of law.

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2.

What standard of review governs the Committee’s decision making on

questions of law?

[118] The Committee will review questions of law on the standard of correctness.

[119] A ground of appeal will raise a question of law where an appellant asserts that a board of

revision has erred in its identification or interpretation of the governing assessment law (Freeborne

at para 20; Pettigrew at paras 45–47; City Centre at para 99; and Laing at para 29). A question of

law also arises where a board of revision is alleged to have erred in its identification or

interpretation of governing assessment practice (HDL Investments at para 26; Sasco at 50; Laing

at 29).

[120] In addition, although administrative decision-makers are not usually bound by their own

prior decisions (Vavilov at para 20), the nature of the assessment regime under the municipal Acts

and the attendant process for appealing against those decisions (see E.Z. Automotive and City

Centre) means that boards of revision must, in the absence of distinguishing features, have court-

like regard for the consistency of their own decisions and the consistency of their decisions with

decisions of the Committee. Whether a particular board decision is consistent with its own past

decisions, or with those of the Committee, is a question of law. In this regard, the Committee may

resolve issues of stare decisis and settle differences in the interpretation of assessment law and

practice arising as between the decisions of different boards of revision.

[121] Furthermore, an allegation that a board of revision has erred by making a finding of fact or

drawing an inference of fact based on irrelevant evidence or no evidence at all may also give rise

to a question of law, even though the allegation is about the fact-finding process. A board must, as

a matter of law, determine the facts in controversy in an assessment appeal on the basis of the

relevant evidence (PSS Professional at para 67). A board will run afoul of its statutory and

common law duties to determine the facts in a procedurally fair way if it makes a finding based on

no evidence or irrelevant evidence, or on an unfounded or irrational inference (PSS Professional

at paras 67–69).

3.

What standard of review governs the Committee’s decision making on

questions of fact?

[122] The Committee will review all questions of fact on the standard of reasonableness.

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[123] The Committee is empowered to intervene where a finding or inference of fact made by a

board of revision is unreasonable or unsupported by the evidence (City Centre at paras 99–101;

see also, Freeborne at para 17; E.Z. Automotive at para 98; Brandt Properties at para 24; Wal-

Mart 2019 at para 54; HDL Investments at para 32; Victory Majors at paras 44 and 58 to 66).

[124] The findings of fact made by a board of revision are presupposed to be reasonable and

supported by the evidence, which places the burden of proof of error on the appellant in an appeal

to the Committee.

[125] The reasonableness of a finding of fact will be called into question where a board has

misapprehended or failed to account for the evidence adduced before it. A finding of fact will be

unreasonable where the Committee is persuaded of that, having considered the civil standard of

proof (i.e., balance of probabilities) and having regard for the whole of the evidence bearing upon

the matter in dispute. In simple terms, it is unreasonable for a board to have found on a balance of

probabilities that something is a fact if the finding is not supported by the evidence, or the board

overlooked relevant evidence or took into account irrelevant evidence when making the finding.

4.

What standard of review governs the Committee’s decision making on

questions of mixed fact and assessment law and practice?

[126] The Committee will review how a board of revision has handled questions of mixed fact

and assessment law and practice on the standard of reasonableness.

[127] Because the Committee fulfills a traditional appellate role by reviewing board of revision

decisions for error, it employs the standard of reasonableness when reviewing a board’s decision

on questions of mixed fact and law where there is no extricable question of law (City Centre at

paras 98–101; see also, Wal-Mart 2019 at para 54; Freeborne at para 17; E.Z. Automotive at

para 61; TNC Mall 2020 at paras 22–23; HDL Investments 2009 at para 32).

[128] A ground of appeal that impugns the handling by a board of revision of an issue of assessor

discretion can invoke errors of law, fact, and mixed fact and law. At a high level, a question as to

whether a board has properly evaluated an exercise of assessor discretion is reviewed by the

Committee on a standard of reasonableness. However, where the ground of appeal involves an

extricable question of law, that question attracts the standard of correctness.

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[129] In terms of its functions, the Committee should rarely be required to directly assess an

exercise of assessor discretion. An appeal to the Committee does not involve a review of an

assessment itself or an exercise of assessor discretion for error or for its reasonableness or

correctness. The Committee’s task is to review decisions of boards of revision for error.

Accordingly, on issues involving an exercise of assessor discretion, the Committee will review a

board’s decision to determine whether the board erred in its handling of the issue of assessor

discretion—e.g., by deciding whether a board intervened where and when it should not or failed

to intervene where and when it should have. This may be established where the Committee is

satisfied that a board failed to apply or incorrectly applied the standard of reasonableness in its

review of the exercise of assessor discretion for error. The Committee may also determine that a

board erred because the board’s decision was based on its own:

(a)

incorrect identification or interpretation of assessment law and practice relevant to

the exercise of discretion in question;

(b)

(c)

unreasonable finding of fact or inference of fact; or

unreasonable application of the governing assessment law and practice to the

relevant factual framework.

5.

What are the remedial powers of the Committee?

[130] If the Committee is persuaded either that a board of revision has not erred or, if the board

has erred, that equity has nonetheless been achieved with similar properties by way of the board’s

decision, then the Committee may confirm the decision of the board (MA, s. 256(1)(a) and (3.1);

CA, s. 226(1)(a) and (3.1); NMA, s. 277(1)(a) and (4)).

[131] Where the Committee is persuaded that a board of revision has erred such that equity has

not been achieved with similar properties under the board’s decision, then the Committee may:

(b)

modify the decision of the board of revision to ensure that:

(i)

errors in and omissions from the assessment roll are corrected; and

(ii)

an accurate, fair and equitable assessment for the property is placed on the

assessment roll; or

(c)

set aside the assessment and remit the matter to the assessor to ensure that:

(i)

errors in and omissions from the assessment roll are corrected; and

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(ii)

an accurate, fair and equitable assessment for the property is placed on the

assessment roll.

(MA, ss. 256(1) and (3.1); CA, ss. 226(1) and (3.1); NMA, ss. 277(1) and (4))

[132] The Committee is constrained in its exercise of these remedial powers by the requirements

of equity (as defined in the municipal Acts) and because it may not vary non-regulated property

assessments using “single property appraisal techniques” (MA, ss. 195(5) and 256(3); CA,

ss. 165(3) and 226(3); NMA, ss. 218(5) and 277(3)).

D.

What standard of review governs this Court’s decision making?

[133] It has long been settled that an appeal pursuant to s. 33.1 of the MBA, under which the

Legislature has provided a right of appeal only with leave and only on questions of law or

jurisdiction, invokes the standard of correctness (Redhead at paras 5 and 22 to 88; see also: TNC

Mall 2022; Cadillac Fairview at para 26; Corman Park at 3; Freeborne at para 22; Pettigrew at

para 43; E.Z. Automotive at para 31; and see Vavilov at para 37).

E.

Summary of the standards of review in assessment appeals

1. Appeal to a Board of Revision

a. Questions of fact

[134] A board of revision should review the facts put in issue in an assessment appeal under the

civil standard (i.e., balance of probabilities). The civil standard requires boards to scrutinise the

evidence with care to decide whether it is more likely than not that a fact put in issue is a fact.

[135] An error of fact in an assessment arises where a fact, condition or circumstance that the

assessor has found to have affected the property in question has been disproved or has been proven

not to have affected the property. Where a board makes a finding of fact that differs from the

assessor’s apprehension of the facts, then the board has found an error of fact.

b.

Questions of law

[136] A board of revision should review questions of assessment law on the standard of

correctness.

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[137] Questions of assessment law include those as to the interpretation of a municipal Act, this

Court’s jurisprudence, decisions of the Committee with respect to the property in question, and the

Manual. If a board identifies or interprets the governing assessment law differently than did the

assessor, then the board has found an error of assessment law.

c.

Questions of assessment practice

[138] A board of revision should review questions of assessment practice on the standard of

correctness.

[139] Questions of assessment practice include those about whether the assessor correctly

identified or interpreted the principles of property assessment that direct the practice of assessors

in the preparation of assessments. Such principles may be found in decisions of the Committee

and boards of revision, the Handbook, the Cost Guide and other SAMA Guidelines, IAAO

publications, and the Marshall & Swift publications. If a board identifies different applicable

principles or interprets applicable principles differently than did the assessor, then the board has

found an error of assessment practice.

d.

Questions of mixed fact and assessment law and practice

[140] A board of revision should review questions of mixed fact and assessment law and

questions of mixed fact and assessment practice on the standard of reasonableness.

[141] Questions of mixed fact and assessment law and practice are those that involve the

application of assessment law and practice to the facts. They include questions as to whether an

assessor has reasonably exercised discretion when applying assessment law and practice to the

facts. An assessment will have been founded on an error of mixed fact and assessment law and

practice where the board finds that an assessor unreasonably exercised its discretion given the

relevant assessment law and practice and the facts, circumstances and conditions affecting the

property being assessed.

e.

Material error

[142] Even though a board of revision may find error in an assessment, it may not intervene and

change the assessment or direct a revision of the assessment roll unless it also concludes on a

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balance of probabilities that equity has not been achieved with similar properties by reason, as the

case may be, that the assessor:

(a)

(b)

(c)

relied on an erroneous fact;

erroneously identified or interpreted applicable assessment law and practice; or

made an unreasonable decision on a question of mixed fact and assessment law and

practice or unreasonably exercised a discretion granted to assessors under

assessment law and practice.

2.

Appeal to the Committee

a. Questions of jurisdiction

[143] The Committee should review questions of jurisdiction on the standard of correctness.

[144] A question of jurisdiction may arise where a ground of appeal alleges that a board of

revision has omitted, neglected or refused to hear or decide an appeal or an issue raised in an appeal

to the board.

b.

Questions of law

[145] The Committee should review questions of law on the standard of correctness.

[146] A question of law will arise where an appellant asserts that a board of revision has erred in

its identification or interpretation of the governing assessment law and practice.

c.

Questions of fact

[147] The Committee should review questions of fact on the standard of reasonableness.

[148] It is unreasonable for a board of revision to have found on a balance of probabilities that

something is a fact if the finding is not supported by the evidence, or the board overlooked relevant

evidence or took into account irrelevant evidence when making that finding. This may occur where

a board has misapprehended or failed to account for evidence adduced before it. It may occur

where the Committee concludes that a board’s finding or inference is unreasonable having regard

for the whole of the evidence bearing upon the matter in dispute.

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d.

Questions of mixed fact and assessment law and practice

[149] The Committee should review the decision of a board of revision on a question of mixed

fact and assessment law and practice on the standard of reasonableness.

[150] A question of mixed fact and assessment law and practice may arise where an appellant

alleges that a board of revision has mishandled an issue of assessor discretion or mishandled the

application of assessment law and practice to the facts. This may be established where the

Committee is satisfied that a board failed to apply or incorrectly applied the standard of

reasonableness in its review of the exercise of assessor discretion for error. An error of this nature

may involve:

(a)

the incorrect identification or interpretation by the board of the assessment law and

practice that is relevant to the exercise of discretion in question;

(b)

(c)

an unreasonable finding of fact made, or inference of fact, drawn by the board; or

the unreasonable application by the board of the governing assessment law and

practice to the relevant factual framework.

e.

Material error

[151] Even though the Committee may find error in a board of revision decision, it may not

intervene or modify that decision unless it also concludes on a balance of probabilities that equity

has not been achieved with similar properties under the board’s decision.

3.

Court of Appeal for Saskatchewan

[152] This Court will review questions of law and questions of jurisdiction on the standard of

correctness.

III. EQUITY IS ACHIEVED THROUGH THE APPLICATION OF THE

MARKET VALUATION STANDARD

[153] Under the third ground of appeal, the appellant taxpayers allege that the Committee

incorrectly interpreted and applied the market valuation standard by misinterpreting the phrases:

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(a)

(b)

(c)

similar properties (MA, ss. 193(e.1)(iii) and 195(7));

allowing for statistical testing (MA, s. 193(e.3)); and

quality assurance standards established by order of the agency (MA,

s. 193(e.1)(iv)).

[154] Allegations of this nature arise in many assessment appeals because equity, which is the

statutorily mandated goal of all non-regulated property assessment, is achieved through the

application of the market valuation standard. As such, a clear understanding of what is meant by

the term market valuation standard is critical in the assessment of non-regulated property and in

appeals from that type of property assessment.

[155] To briefly explain the statutory basis for this, the dominant and controlling factor in

property assessment is equity (MA, s. 195(5); CA, s. 165(3); NMA, s. 218(5)). In non-regulated

property assessment, equity is achieved through the application of the market valuation standard

“so that the assessments bear a fair and just proportion to the market value of similar properties as

of the applicable base date” (MA, s. 195(7); CA, s. 165(5); NMA, s. 218(7)). An assessment may

not be varied on appeal if equity has been achieved with similar properties (MA, ss. 240(3) and

256(3.1); CA, ss. 210(1.1) and 226(3); NMA, ss. 261(2) and 277(3)).

[156] This Court has previously interpreted the meaning of the statutory term market valuation

standard in the entire context in which it is used, and in accordance with the scheme of the

municipal Acts, the objects of those Acts and the intention of the Legislature. Setting the factual

circumstances of these appeals to one side for the moment, what follows is an aggregation of the

relevant provisions of the municipal Acts and this Court’s explanation of their meaning and the

meaning of the market valuation standard.

A.

How is market valuation standard defined in the municipal Acts?

[157] The term market valuation standard is defined in the municipal Acts as follows:

“market valuation standard” means the standard achieved when the assessed value of

property:

(i)

is prepared using mass appraisal;

(ii)

is an estimate of the market value of the estate in fee simple in the property;

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(iii)

(iv)

reflects typical market conditions for similar properties; and

meets quality assurance standards established by order of the agency;

(MA, s. 193(e.1); CA, s. 163(f.1); NMA, s. 215(f))

[158] This Court has previously outlined the statutory framework for the assessment of property

in Saskatchewan (see, for examples, Corman Park at paras 11–70, Newell Smelski; Sasco; and

Estevan Coal, etc.). In Corman Park, this Court summarised the MA in the following way, while

recognising (at para 7) that the summary applied to all municipal Acts:

[11]

In general terms, The Municipalities Act provides for annual assessment and

taxation of real property in a municipality, although the Act also addresses municipal

governance and other matters. Local government authorities, such as municipalities, school

boards and libraries, depend upon municipal property taxes as their primary source of

revenue. Municipalities establish annual mill rates or tax rates on the basis of their

projected fiscal requirements and the aggregate assessed value of all taxable property

within the municipality. For reasons of certainty in terms of amount and receipt of tax

revenue, The Municipalities Act sets out steps that municipalities and assessors must take

annually to assess properties and it establishes deadlines for the completion of those steps.

It also establishes rights of appeal and deadlines for taxpayers, municipalities and SAMA

to appeal against property tax assessments. …

[159] Beginning with that base description, it is important to understand three other statutorily

defined terms that are themselves used in the statutory definition of market valuation standard

under the municipal Acts, namely:

(d)

“base date” means the date established by the agency for determining the value of

land and improvements for the purpose of establishing assessment rolls for the year in

which the valuation is to be effective and for each subsequent year preceding the year in

which the next revaluation is to be effective;

…

(e.2) “market value” means the amount that a property should be expected to realize if

the estate in fee simple in the property is sold in a competitive and open market by a willing

seller to a willing buyer, each acting prudently and knowledgeably, and assuming that the

amount is not affected by undue stimuli;

(e.3) “mass appraisal” means the process of preparing assessments for a group of

properties as of the base date using standard appraisal methods, employing common data

and allowing for statistical testing;

(MA, s. 193; CA, s. 163; NMA, s. 215)

[160] There are also other provisions in the municipal Acts that affect, or that are affected by, the

term market valuation standard, including:

“assessor” means a person appointed by a municipality as an assessor or, in the absence of

an appointment by the municipality, the administrator;

(MA, s. 2(1)(c); CA, s. 163(c.1); NMA, s. 2(1)(b))

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“agency” means the Saskatchewan Assessment Management Agency established pursuant

to The Assessment Management Agency Act;

(MA, s. 193(a); CA, s. 163(a); NMA, s. 215(a))

Quality assurance standards reports

(1)

An assessor shall provide to the agency in the form and at the times required by

the agency any information that the agency considers necessary for the purposes of

reviewing the municipality’s compliance with the quality assurance standards mentioned

in subclause [MA, s. 193(e.1)(iv); CA, s. 163(f.1)(iv); NMA, s. 215(f)(iv)].

(2)

The agency shall post on its website notification of compliance with the standards

pursuant to subclause [MA, s. 193(e.1)(iv); CA, s. 163(f.1)(iv); NMA, s. 215(f)(iv)] for each

municipality in which compliance has been achieved.

(MA, s. 193.1; CA, s. 163.1; NMA, s. 215.1)

[161] While the municipal Acts lay out the basic contextual framework for the interpretation of

the phrase market valuation standard, the entire context for the purposes of statutory interpretation

includes the AMAA. In that regard, in addition to the terms market valuation standard and market

value being defined in the municipal Acts, s. 2(1)(s) of the AMAA introduces a definition for

valuation to the interpretive context:

“valuation” means the determination of the value of property for assessment purposes in

accordance with a municipal Act, as of a base date established by the agency in accordance

with this Act and the regulations, by methods that may include the inspection or

reinspection of property to determine the physical characteristics and condition of the

property.

[162] Furthermore, the Manual, the Handbook, the Cost Guide and other SAMA Guidelines also

lend interpretive guidance to the meaning of market valuation standard. Under the preface to the

Handbook, SAMA explained the contextual relevance of these publications:

The primary function of the Handbook is to provide guidance for the assessment of

properties valued using the Market Valuation Standard. The Handbook provides a general

outline of the market value-based assessment process as well as individual Valuation

Guides on multi-residential, manufactured home communities, warehouses, general

commercial properties, office buildings, enclosed shopping centres, gas stations,

hotels/motels, golf courses, special purpose properties and grain elevators. The Handbook

describes the three approaches to value but primarily focuses on the income approach.

The Handbook is intended to effectively integrate with the [Cost Guide] and Marshall and

Swift’s Marshall Valuation Service and Residential Cost Handbook. For the application of

the cost approach, the [Cost Guide], Marshall Valuation Service and Residential Cost

Handbook, or any other applicable cost guide can be used for the assessment of residential

and commercial property. The Marshall Valuation Service is used for the majority of

commercial properties valued using the cost approach. It is an authoritative guide for

developing replacement costs of buildings and other improvements. The Residential Cost

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Handbook can be used for estimating replacement costs for both single and multi-family

residences, including costs for manufactured housing, and yard and unit-in-place costs.

In summary, the Handbook provides guidance for determining the market value-based

assessment of property that is subject to the Market Valuation Standard, but does not have

the force of law. The [Cost Guide], as well as Marshall Valuation Service and Residential

Cost Handbook, are publications used in the application of the cost approach to value; they

also do not have the force of law. The Manual applies to property subject to the Regulated

Property Assessment Valuation Standard as per legislation and has the force of law. Use

of the above noted or any other publication must still be in conjunction with relevant

Saskatchewan legislation and accompanying regulations and SAMA Board Orders.

B.

How has this Court interpreted the market valuation standard?

[163] There are four constituent elements to the definition of market valuation standard.

Interpreting that standard in the entire context in which it is used, and in accordance with the

scheme of the municipal Acts, the objects of those Acts and the intention of the Legislature, this

Court has explained the meaning of each element of the standard and of the standard itself.

[164] In CP Reit, this Court identified the elements of the standard and its importance:

[16]

As [the CA] plainly indicates, the market valuation standard is the “standard

achieved when the assessed value of [a non-regulated] property” meets the four conditions

set forth in s. 163(f.1), of which “an estimate of the market value of the estate in fee simple

in the property” is but one condition (s. 163(f.1)(ii)). The satisfaction of the standard is

fundamental to the achievement of equity (s. 165(5)), which is the dominant and controlling

factor in the assessment of property (s. 165(3)). That is, equity is presumptively not

achieved if an assessment fails to meet the market valuation standard.

[165] We turn now to identify how this Court has interpreted each of the four requirements that

must be met to achieve the market valuation standard in non-regulated property assessment.

1.

What is meant by “prepared using mass appraisal”?

[166] The market valuation standard requires that the assessed value of property be “prepared

using mass appraisal”. The statutory definition of mass appraisal is straightforward: it is “the

process of assessing the market values of a group of properties as of a base date using standard

appraisal methods, employing common data and allowing for statistical testing”. This definition

has four parts to it, which are explained below. However, by way of a “summary” of all of its

statutory elements, the term mass appraisal may be understood as:

The process of assessing the market values of a group of similar properties, as of

the first day of January in the first year of a four-year property valuation cycle,

Page 52

using one of the income, cost or comparable sales methods of appraisal,

consistently employing complete, accurate and current data obtained about the

market values of other similar properties and about the relevant marketplace

conditions affecting those similar properties, where the chosen appraisal method

allows for the confirmation or disconfirmation of the reliability of the estimates of

market value it produces and for the determination of whether there are

modifications to the appraisal method or the data that might produce more reliable

estimates.

[167] The full meaning of mass appraisal is, obviously, better grasped by separately examining

how this Court has interpreted its constituent elements.

a.

What does “a group of properties” mean?

[168] A group of properties is simply a number of properties that are classed together for a

particular purpose. In Sasco, this Court interpreted the statutory reference to “a group of

properties” in this way:

[12]

Mass appraisal is defined in section 163 to mean the process of preparing

assessments for a group of properties using standard appraisal methods, employing

common data and allowing for statistical testing. Read in context, the term “a group of

properties” may be taken on application to mean a group of “similar” properties. And the

term “common data” may be taken to mean pieces of information in the form of facts and

statistics pertaining to market value and common to a group of similar properties.

(Emphasis added)

[169] Accordingly, mass appraisal involves assessment of the market values of a group of similar

properties.

b.

What is a “base date”?

[170] Under the municipal Acts, the base date is the date SAMA establishes, from time to time,

“for determining the value of land and improvements for the purpose of establishing assessment

rolls for the year in which the valuation is to be effective and for each subsequent year preceding

the year in which the next revaluation is to be effective” (MA, s. 193; CA, s. 163(d); NMA,

s. 215(d)). The concept of a base date is straightforward, even though its statutory definition may

seem abstruse.

Page 53

[171] All assessable property in every municipality is revalued once every four years (AMAA,

s. 22(1)). In the matters at hand, which involve 2018 assessments, the base date was January 1,

2015.⁴For property assessments for the years 2021 to 2024, the base date for determining assessed

values of properties is January 1, 2019⁵and, for the years 2025 to 2028, it will be January 1, 2023.⁶

[172] Assessments are conducted annually as of the applicable base date (MA, s. 195(2); CA,

s. 162(2); NMA, s. 218(2)). That is, annual property assessments must reflect the facts, conditions

and circumstances affecting a property as of January 1 of the year of assessment as if those facts,

conditions and circumstances had existed on the applicable base date (MA, s. 195(4); CA,

s. 165(3.1); NMA, s. 218(1)).

[173] The base date is, therefore, the first day of January in the first year of each four-year

property valuation cycle, as determined by order of SAMA under s. 12(1)(d) of the AMAA.

c.

What are the “standard appraisal methods”?

[174] In CCRL 2020, this Court said that the Manual and the Cost Guide serve to delineate what

is meant by standard appraisal methods, which is an incomplete statement. In Sasco, this Court

identified three such methods, namely, (1) the income method, (2) the cost method, and (3) the

comparable sales method. These are the three “approaches” to property valuation set out in the

Handbook (at 10–11), although they are also referenced in the Manual. The Cost Guide further

delineates subordinate “methods” for determining assessed value but only under the cost

approach—i.e., there are different ways to go about assessing value under the cost approach.

[175] The decision in Sasco may also be taken as standing for the proposition that the term

standard appraisal methods does not include “single property appraisal techniques” and other

approaches to valuation or methods of valuation that have no application in mass appraisal (at

paras 52–58; see also Cadillac Fairview at para 34; MA, ss. 240(1.1) and 256(3.1); CA, ss. 210(1.1)

and 226(3); NMA, ss. 261(2) and 277(3)).

⁴https://www.sama.sk.ca/sites/default/files/2018-11/Order-2017BaseDateDec2013.pdf.

5

https://www.sama.sk.ca/sites/default/files/2018-11/MinistersOrder2021BaseDate.pdf. The term base date is also

defined in the Cost Guide as January 1, 2019 (at 1).

⁶https://sama-prod.zu.com/sites/default/files/2022-02/Board%20Order%20-

%202025%20Revaluation%20Base%20Date.pdf

Page 54

[176] In short, the recognised standard appraisal methods are:

(a)

(b)

(c)

the income method—which produces an estimate of the market value of a property

based on the owner’s anticipated income from it and the known incomes derived

from similar properties;

the cost method—which produces an estimate of the market value of a property by

quantifying its replacement cost and by assuming that a potential purchaser would

pay no more than the cost of replacement; and

the comparable sales method—which produces an estimate of the market value of

a property by comparing it to similar properties that have sold within a defined time

frame.

d.

What does “employing common data” mean?

[177] The process of assessing the market values of a group of similar properties as of a base

date under the income method, the cost method or the comparable sales method must be done by

“employing common data”. In Sasco, this Court interpreted the statutory reference to “common

data” in this way:

[12]

Mass appraisal is defined in section 163 to mean the process of preparing

assessments for a group of properties using standard appraisal methods, employing

common data and allowing for statistical testing. Read in context, the term “a group of

properties” may be taken on application to mean a group of “similar” properties. And the

term “common data” may be taken to mean pieces of information in the form of facts and

statistics pertaining to market value and common to a group of similar properties.

(Emphasis added)

[178] In West Coast, this Court explained that the use of current and accurate data is required to

achieve the market valuation standard:

[10]

As the statute suggests, to assess the market value of any particular non-regulated

property, an assessor must have common data as at a certain base date about the market

values and typical market conditions for other properties that are similar to the subject

property. Furthermore, since equity is the dominant and controlling factor in the assessment

process, assessors have a duty to use accurate and current information in the mass appraisal

process. Put another way, if an assessor uses inaccurate or out-of-date information to

calculate the market value of a non-regulated property under the mass appraisal process,

then the market valuation standard will not have been met and equity will not have been

achieved.

Page 55

[11]

Therefore, to ensure that assessors have or can obtain accurate and up-to-date

information, the Legislature has given assessors the power to require persons to provide

them with information relating to the market value of property: [citing CA, s. 171]

[179] Under the municipal Acts, assessors may, at any time, request any information or document

that relates to or might relate to the value of any property from any person who owns, uses,

occupies, manages or disposes of the property (MA, s. 201; CA, s. 171; NMA, s. 222), including

information respecting: (a) the persons who are carrying on business on the property; (b) the nature

of the business being carried on; (c) the income generated or expected to be generated by any

property; (d) the expenses incurred or expected to be incurred with respect to any property; and

(e) any additional information that SAMA, by order, may require.

[180] Under the same statutory provisions, property owners and others have a duty to provide

assessors with the information they need along with a corresponding duty to ensure that any

information so provided is “complete, true and accurate” to the best of the knowledge of the person

providing it. This is because the completeness, accuracy and currency of market value data

underpins the integrity of mass appraisal since equity cannot be achieved without it (see, West

Coast at paras 7–13 and 74–75; Boardwalk Reit at 11–12; and HDL Investments at paras 30–32).

[181] Extrapolating from the scheme of the municipal Acts, Sasco and West Coast, the term

employing common data means that the assessor must carry out valuations by consistently

employing the same complete, accurate and current facts and statistics obtained about the market

values of properties and the relevant marketplace conditions as at the base date to estimate the

market value of similar properties in each year of an assessment cycle.

e.

What does “allowing for statistical testing” mean?

[182] The final aspect of mass appraisal is that it must allow for statistical testing. In Harvard

2017, this Court wrote:

[25]

… In developing a capitalization rate, an assessor must begin by selecting the

properties to be considered in the analysis. This must be done by having resort to factors

properly bearing on comparability. When this bridge has been successfully crossed, and a

group of comparable properties identified, statistical analyses can then be used to

determine the quality of the stratifications in issue.

(Emphasis added)

Page 56

[183] Assessment involves the estimation of the market value of similar properties under a

standard appraisal method that entails a deductive, theory-derived, modeling technique, i.e., an

assessment model. By employing common data in an assessment model, assessors may investigate

the causal relations among known or observed property variables and characteristics and the

market value of properties. The statistical testing of any technique recognised in assessment law

and practice will give assessors (and others) information about the fit of the common data in the

model, point to weaknesses and strengths in the market value estimations that the model produces,

or identify potential modifications to the common data or to the model to address identified

weaknesses. The overall idea of statistical testing is, therefore, to confirm or disconfirm the

reliability of the estimates of market value produced by an assessment model and to ascertain

whether there are potential modifications to the model or to the common data employed in it that

might produce more reliable estimates.

[184] However, to satisfy the express statutory requirements of mass appraisal, the standard

appraisal methods and any assessment modeling technique used thereunder need only allow for

assessors or someone else to confirm or disconfirm the reliability of the estimates of market value

produced and to ascertain whether there are modifications to the model or the common data

employed in it that might produce more reliable estimates.

2.

What is meant by “an estimate of the market value of the estate in fee

simple in the property”?

[185] The market valuation standard requires that the assessed value of property be “an estimate

of the market value of the estate in fee simple in the property” (MA, s. 193(e.1)(i); CA,

s. 163(f.1)(i); NMA, s. 215(f)(i)).

a.

What is an “estate in fee simple”?

[186] Although the Handbook contains a definition of estate in fee simple taken from an appraisal

text (at 7), that legal term of art has longstanding significance and a well-understood meaning in

the law of real property. In William Blackstone, Esq., Commentaries on the laws of England, Book

the Second (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1766), the learned Solicitor General to Her Majesty

commented (at 104):

Page 57

Estates of freehold then are divisible into estates of inheritance, and estates not of

inheritance. The former are again divided into inheritances absolute or fee-simple; and

inheritances limited, one species of which we usually call fee-tail.

I.

Tenant in fee-simple (or, as he is frequently stiled, tenant in fee) is he that hath

lands, tenements, or hereditaments, to hold to him and his heirs for ever; generally,

absolutely, and simply; without mentioning what heirs, but referring that to his

own pleasure, or to the disposition of the law. …

[187] This ancient definition is not, however, dissimilar to that which is found in the IAAO

Glossary for Property Appraisal and Assessment (at 52):

Estate in Fee Simple—An inheritable, possessory interest in land that may endure until

the extinction of all lineal and collateral heirs of the first owner and that may be freely

conveyed by its owner; the largest possible estate in land.

[188] The Legislature also used the term of art in The Land Titles Act, 2000, SS 2000, c L-5.1

[LTA], in a way that remains true to Blackstone’s explanation of it.⁷It is part of the description of

what title to real property in Saskatchewan entails, namely, “[e]very title that is issued pursuant to

this section is for an estate in fee simple in the surface parcel, mineral commodity or condominium

unit to which the title refers” (LTA, s. 12(7)). It is also found in s. 157(1) of the LTA in

counter-distinction to limited fee estates and fee tail estates.

[189] To understand what the term estate in fee simple means in the property assessment context,

it is helpful to refer to the definitions of improvement, land and property under the municipal Acts

and to the definition of land under the LTA:

“improvement” means, subject to the regulations:

(i)

a building or structure erected or placed on, over or under land or over or under

water but does not include machinery and equipment unless the machinery and equipment

is used to service the building or structure;

(ii)

anything affixed to or incorporated in a building or structure affixed to land but

does not include machinery and equipment unless the machinery and equipment is used to

service the building or structure;

(iii)

(iv)

the resource production equipment of any mine or petroleum oil or gas well; and

any pipeline on or under land;

(MA, s. 2(1)(q); CA, s. 2(1)(p); NMA, s. 2(1)(s))

“land” does not include improvements;

(MA, s. 2(1)(t); NMA, s. 2(1)(v))

⁷See also The Conservation Easements Act, SS 1996, c. C-27.01, s. 5(1); The Crown Minerals Act, SS 1984-85-86,

c. C-50.2, s. 23(1)(e); and The Condominium Properties Act, 1993, SS 1993, c. C-26.1, s. 5(1).

Page 58

“property” means, for the purposes of sections 9 and 39 and Parts X and XI, land

or improvements or both;

(MA, s. 2(1)(gg); CA, s. 2(1)(aa); NMA, s. 2(1)(qq))

“land” means:

(i)

the surface;

(ii)

mines and minerals; and

(iii)

unless the context requires otherwise, the condominium units and common

property included in a condominium plan;

(LTA, s. 2(1)(u))

[190] In its assessment law jurisprudence, this Court has explained the meaning of estate in fee

simple in cases like Sasco, where this Court wrote that “The [new assessment] scheme

contemplates estimating the market value of ‘the estate in fee simple’ in property, a term that is

taken in the work-a-day world of assessment to mean the land and building, or the real estate” (at

para 7). Coming at it from the opposite perspective in West Coast, this Court described what types

of assets are not included in an estate in fee simple, writing that “In simple terms, the estate in fee

simple of a property does not include such things as equipment, inventory, goodwill and other

business assets that are not land or improvements” (at para 9).

[191] When this is all pulled together, the term estate in fee simple has a clear meaning in the

context of assessment law and practice. It is a property owner’s titled interest in the land and the

improvements made to the land.

b.

What does “market value” mean?

[192] The term market value is statutorily defined to mean “the amount that a property should be

expected to realize if the estate in fee simple in the property is sold in a competitive and open

market by a willing seller to a willing buyer, each acting prudently and knowledgeably, and

assuming that the amount is not affected by undue stimuli” (MA, s. 193(e.2); CA, s. 163(f.2); NMA,

s. 215(g)).

[193] In the context of the income method of assessment, this Court explained the definition of

market value and its application to a sale, writing in CP Reit:

[21]

The characteristics that define the term market value under s. 163(f.2), namely, a

“competitive and open market”, a “willing seller” and a “willing buyer”, each “acting

prudently and knowledgeably”, and the absence of “undue stimuli” affecting the purchase

Page 59

price, are not characteristics of the property that was sold. They are those of the parties to

a sale, the marketplace in which a property was sold, and the sale transaction. While they

may address the “typical market conditions” requirement of the market valuation standard,

these characteristics do not speak to whether the properties in question are “similar

properties” (s. 163(f.1)(iii)) or are “similar properties as of the applicable base date”

(s. 165(5)). When the characteristics that s. 163(f.2) describes are present, it simply means

that a sale has reliably established the market value of the property that was sold.

[22]

Once the market value threshold has been met, The Cities Act, the Handbook and

the jurisprudence dictate that the sold property may be included in a sales array to be used

in the income approach to valuation—i.e., where its sale price and rental data will be used

to estimate the market values of other properties in an assessment array—but only if it is

similar to the properties grouped in the assessment array (see, The Cities Act, ss. 163 and

165; and see, for case law examples, Walmart at para 94; [Harvard 2017]; [Harvard 2004

at paras 20–26]; [Sasco at paras 4 and 12]; see also, for example, [the Cost Guide at 13]).

[194] In HDL Investments, this Court specifically addressed the meaning of open market in the

definition of market value, where it wrote:

[88]

Viewed in this context, the phrase “in an open market” may be seen to have been

intended in significant part to ensure that a sale “in a restricted market” is not used for

MAF calculation purposes. Why? Because the sale price of a property sold in a restricted

market, in contradistinction to an open market, is not apt to be sufficiently indicative of the

market value of that property to be relied upon for the purpose of determining a market

adjustment factor by the sales comparison method. A restricted market, it might be noted,

would include one confined to a limited class of potential purchaser, as for example a

market confined to members of a certain sect, let us say, or of a certain fraternal

organization or family or some such limited class of potential purchasers.

[195] In City Centre, this Court considered the meaning of in a competitive and open market,

observing that, even though the parties to the property sale in issue in that case had “freely arrived

at the terms and conditions of the sale” (at para 148), the sale did not “satisfy the requirement that

it be arrived at as a result of a free, competitive, and open market” (at para 149). This Court

explained its conclusion in this way:

[149] … The property was not sold and was never intended to be sold to anyone other

than SaskPen. The terms of the Co-Ownership Agreement would have been triggered if it

were to be sold to anyone else. The purpose of the sale was to allow for reinvestment of

SGI funds. Neither SGI nor SaskPen were seeking to get the highest possible price. They

used the appraisal as a method of setting a price that could withstand scrutiny. In my view,

this cannot be viewed as a sale in an open and competitive market. Property does not have

to be listed for sale in order to meet the open and competitive requirement, but there must

be some underlying market force informing the sale price. None existed in this instance.

The market was restricted to SaskPen and SaskPen alone.

[196] This Court also noted in City Centre that the concepts formerly employed in property

assessment of an arm’s-length sale and a non-arm’s-length sale had been supplanted under the

Page 60

municipal Acts by the requirement that, to meet the definition of market value, a sale must occur

in a “competitive and open market” (at paras 152–156).

[197] On this basis, the term market value has one meaning and two functions under the

assessment scheme established by the municipal Acts. First, because the goal of property

assessment is to accurately estimate the market value of a property for purposes of municipal

taxation, the constituent elements of the term market value establish the basic parameters for

determining whether an assessment is an accurate estimate of “the amount that a property should

be expected to realize” if it were sold. Second, the term market value sets the basic parameters for

determining when a property sale may be used in mass appraisal to reliably estimate the market

value of other similar properties.

c.

What is an “estimate” of the market value of a property?

[198] Assessed value is an “estimate of the market value of a property” (CCRL 2020 at para 10).

That is, an assessment is “a principled approximation of what a property would sell for based on

the actual sale prices of comparable properties adjusted for the specific characteristics of the

subject property” (CCRL 2020 at para 12).

[199] In City Centre, this Court observed that where a sale has not taken place “in a competitive

and open market”, it may not be used to estimate market value (at para 155). In Domtar, the

Committee noted that an estimate of market value cannot be based on an opinion about the value

of a single property. In North Prairie Developments, the Committee observed that market value

and market conditions are “revealed by sales prices, not estimates of what values should be based

on [what] an Assessor believes is ‘typical’” (at para 25).

[200] As this indicates, an estimate of market value involves the principled approximation of

what a property would sell for, if it were sold in a competitive and open market by a willing seller

to a willing buyer, each acting prudently and knowledgeably, and assuming that price is not

affected by undue stimuli, where that estimate is based on the prices of similar properties that were

in fact sold at market value, adjusted for the specific characteristics of the subject property.

Page 61

3.

What is meant by “reflects typical market conditions for similar

properties”?

[201] The market valuation standard requires that the assessed value of property reflect “typical

market conditions for similar properties” (MA, s. 193(e.1)(iii); CA, s. 163(f.1)(iii); NMA,

s. 215(f)(iii)).

[202] Critically, the dominant and controlling factor in the assessment of property is equity (MA,

s. 195(5); CA, s. 165(3); NMA, s. 218(5)) and equity is achieved in non-regulated property

assessments by applying the market valuation standard so that the assessments bear a fair and just

proportion to the market value of similar properties as of the applicable base date (MA, s. 195(7);

CA, s. 165(5); NMA, s. 218(7)).

[203] In CP Reit, this Court observed that the characteristics that define the term market value

are “those of the parties to a sale, the marketplace in which a property was sold, and the sale

transaction” and that they address the typical market conditions requirement of the market

valuation standard (at para 21). When the characteristics of market value are present, it should

mean that a sale price has reliably established—or that an estimate of what the sale price of the

property would be (if it were sold) has reliably predicted—the market value of the property. In this

way, market conditions would include any factors or stimuli that could affect the amount a property

would be expected to realize if the estate in fee simple in the property were sold.

[204] In addition to the market-related requirements of market value, this Court in CP Reit drew

on the assessment principles set out in the Handbook to identify property-related traits or

characteristics that inform what the typical market conditions are for a property. The identified

traits or characteristics address different conditions or stimuli that affect the marketplace for sale

of a property and its value in that marketplace. See also, CCRL 2020, where this Court, when

speaking to the issue of similarity, identified property size, location, zoning, primary land use, and

available services as market conditions (at para 103); and L & L Lawson, where this Court

described issues of similarity as including an examination of “the nature of the building in

question” and determining “comparability on the basis of factors that affect price, or how the

building would react in the market place” (at para 35). This Court in CP Reit also wrote that the

market valuation standard “does not apply to property sales” (at para 13); rather, it “relates to the

Page 62

assessed value of a property—not the sale price of a property or its market value” (at para 15,

emphasis in original).

[205] Adopting the language of the Handbook, this Court in CP Reit described all such traits or

characteristics as the “value-generating characteristics” of a property:

[54]

Looking at this from the assessment principles perspective, the Handbook

repeatedly instructs that properties with similar traits and similar value characteristics

should be grouped together to achieve homogeneity. Axiomatically, properties that do not

share traits or value characteristics, or enough of them, should not be grouped together.

The reason for this is straightforward because equity is achieved only when assessments

“bear a fair and just proportion to the market value of similar properties” (The Cities Act,

s. 165(5); emphasis added).

[55]

Even though two properties may have some points of similarity (such as functional

efficiency or appearance), if they are sufficiently disparate (e.g., in location or square

footage), they will likely have disparate or non-comparable market values. More critically,

even if two disparate properties happen to have equivalent market values, those market

values would have been derived, at least in part, from different market conditions based on

each property’s distinguishing value-generating characteristics. That is, where two

properties do not have similar value-generating characteristics, the market value of one will

not “reflect typical market conditions” of the other (s. 163(f.1)(iii)), thereby making it

impossible to satisfy the market valuation standard in an assessment (s. 163(f.1)) and,

accordingly, making it impossible to achieve equity (s. 165(5)).

[206] This Court concluded in CP Reit that, since the assessed value of the property in that case

was an estimate of its market value based on its rental income generating capacity (i.e., market

value was a function of rental income), “any factor that affects the rental income potential of a

property is relevant to the issue of similarity” (at para 60).

[207] As this suggests, the phrase typical market conditions cannot be disassociated from the

phrase for similar properties because the latter informs the content of the former and vice versa.

[208] Using the same language as was used in CP Reit, where two properties do not have similar

value-generating characteristics, the market value of one will not reflect the typical market

conditions of the other. There is an interpretive nexus between the two phrases—i.e., typical

market conditions for a property means those market conditions that were typically present or that

have typically arisen for similar properties when they were sold in a competitive and open market

by a willing, prudent and knowledgeable buyer to a willing, prudent and knowledgeable seller. As

this Court observed in Cadillac Fairview, property similarity “is the root of every step of the

process, and from which each succeeding step grows” (at para 35).

Page 63

[209] However, “the statutory requirement of market value has no bearing on whether one

property is similar to another for the purposes of mass appraisal” (CP Reit at para 13, emphasis in

original). As this Court explained, when determining whether two properties are similar:

[20]

…the validity of a sale has nothing to do with the similarity of a property that has

been sold to the properties being assessed as a group under mass appraisal. There is no

dispute that a median CAP rate must be derived from an array of properties whose sales

satisfy the market value requirement of The Cities Act. This is because a median CAP rate

would not be trustworthy if the data that underpinned it did not reflect “typical market

conditions” (s. 163(f.1)(iii); see [City Centre at paras 138–140]). However, that

requirement is a data reliability threshold ([Walmart 2018 at para 94]); it is not a

benchmark for including a property in an array of “similar properties”.

…

[22]

Once the market value threshold has been met, The Cities Act, the Handbook and

the jurisprudence dictate that the sold property may be included in a sales array to be used

in the income approach to valuation—i.e., where its sale price and rental data will be used

to estimate the market values of other properties in an assessment array—but only if it is

similar to the properties grouped in the assessment array (see, The Cities Act, ss. 163 and

165; and see, for case law examples, Walmart at para 94; [Harvard 2017]; Regina (City) v

Harvard Developments Ltd., 2004 SKCA 103 at paras 20–26 [Harvard 2004]; Sasco

Developments Ltd. v Moose Jaw (City), 2012 SKCA 24 at paras 4 and 12, 385 Sask R 287

[Sasco]; see also, for example, SCP Guide at 13).

[23]

This is because, if the property that has been sold is not similar to the property that

is being assessed, then the assessed value will—by definition—not reflect “typical market

conditions for similar properties” (s. 163(f.1)(iii), emphasis added) and, therefore, the

market valuation standard will not have been met (City Centre at para 153). Moreover,

where this occurs, equity will—prima facie—not have been achieved in the assessment

because equity “is achieved by applying the market valuation standard so that the

assessments bear a fair and just proportion to the market value of similar properties as of

the applicable base date” (s. 165(5), emphasis added; Walmart at para 105; City Centre at

para 138).

(Emphasis in original)

[210] The determination of whether one property is similar to another is a factual matter

involving the consideration of the individual, objective characteristics of the two properties

(Harvard 2017 at para 23). Statistics alone cannot determine the similarity of two or more

properties; statistics are relevant in an inquiry into the quality of the stratifications or groupings

made based on property similarity (Harvard 2017 at para 25). As this Court observed in 994552

NWT:

[41]

Assessors must gather and analyze the data necessary to determine value. Page 16

of chapter 2 [of the Handbook], Valuation Parameters, discusses the sorting and

classification of property and states that “[p]erhaps the most difficult part of the valuation

parameter development process is to divide properties into groups that have similar traits

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and value characteristics. However, this step is the key to a successful market value-based

assessment analysis”.

[42]

The objectives of classification (also referred to as stratification) are set out in

chapter 2 at page 17:

• To enable the valuation of a number of properties easily and efficiently.

• To stratify the properties into specific classes so that comparisons are meaningful.

• To have a broad enough definition of classes so that there are sufficient numbers

within the group to establish valuation parameters and values.

[43]

Page 18 of the chapter on Valuation Parameters identifies classification or

stratification of properties into groups with similar physical characteristics and similar

value-driven characteristics as “the most important step in the mass appraisal valuation

process”. …

a.

The Manual and similarity in regulated-property assessment

[211] The question of similarity of properties does not often arise in regulated property

assessment. The Manual sets out the formulae, rules and principles assessors must use to determine

the assessed value of agricultural land, heavy industrial improvements, resource production

equipment and transmission pipelines. It states that the assessed value of regulated property “shall

not be determined by any procedure which takes into consideration income or benefits attributable

to the property” (at 1). Regulated properties are assessed under a formula based on their

property-type classification, e.g., agricultural land is split into three classes of property, namely,

arable agricultural land, non-arable agricultural land except waste land, and non-arable agricultural

waste land, each with a separate formula for determining assessed value. Under the formula for

arable agricultural land, assessed value is the product of its productivity rating, economic factors,

a provincial factor and the number of land units. As such, the question of similarity, when it arises,

would be addressed by assessors under these factors.

b.

The Cost Guide and similarity under the cost approach

[212] Assessors apply the Cost Guide when using the cost approach to valuing non-regulated

properties. It provides assessors with guidance regarding urban land valuation, replacement cost

new [RCN] rates and procedures for residential improvements, RCN rates and procedures for

selected commercial improvements, and procedures for the application of depreciation. It advises

that the Marshall & Swift Valuation Service is the primary source for commercial replacement

costs and the Cost Guide integrates with the Handbook, the Marshall & Swift Valuation Service

and the Marshall & Swift Residential Cost Handbook.

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[213] Because the Cost Guide provides guidance on the valuation of non-regulated property

under the cost approach, the factors (or valuation parameters) that assessors are to consider when

classifying and valuing non-regulated property are those that are relevant to the determination

under the cost approach of whether property is similar, particularly where the sales comparison

method is employed. There is no practical value in addressing this concept in any detail because it

would entail repeating the entire Cost Guide in these reasons and require fabricating a factual

context in which to apply the Cost Guide since similarity is inherently contextual.

[214] Straightforwardly, if something is relevant to determining the value of a property under the

cost approach, then it is relevant to determining whether properties are similar for the purposes of

that approach and, thereby, for achieving equity through the application of the market valuation

standard.

c.

The Handbook and similarity

[215] As it states in its preface, “The primary function of the Handbook is to provide guidance

for the assessment of properties valued using the Market Valuation Standard” (at 2). The

Handbook outlines the market-value-based-assessment process and valuation guides for

multi-residential, manufactured home communities, warehouses, general commercial properties,

office buildings, enclosed shopping centres, gas stations, hotels and motels, golf courses, special

purpose properties, and grain elevators. As noted, it describes the three approaches to assessing

the value of a non-regulated property (i.e., cost, income and sales comparison); however, its focus

is the income approach. Although the Manual is not prescriptive, it provides (at 3):

• Assessors with a general guide to determining fair and equitable market value based

assessments using mass appraisal methodology in accordance with the requirements of

provincial legislation;

• Assessors with information regarding preferred approaches for valuing various property

types using the Market Valuation Standard in accordance with the requirements of

provincial legislation;

• Assessment appeal tribunals and public officials with the background and basis of how

market value based assessments are determined in Saskatchewan; and

• Property owners and the general public with a summary of the assessment valuation

process and a general understanding of how market value based assessments are

determined.

[216] The Handbook is essentially a series of guides for valuing different non-regulated property

types. It sets out the analysis of the income, cost and sales-comparison approaches to valuation for

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each property type and recommends one or more of these approaches. It identifies the steps and

calculations in each valuation process—e.g., collecting data, establishing valuation parameters,

and determining capitalisation rates, etc.—as well as how to test the results of each process.

[217] Important to the issue of property similarity, chapter 2 of the Handbook is a “Valuation

Parameters Guide”. In that chapter, the term valuation parameters is described as “the property

characteristics determined through market analysis to influence value for a group of properties as

of a given base date” (at 2). This concept is further described within the context of the statutory

requirements of the market valuation standard as follows (at 2–3):

The assessor is required to estimate the fee simple value of real estate in accordance with

the legislated requirements of the market valuation standard. To achieve this end, the

valuation process should reflect the actions of participants in the marketplace. The

valuation process should be applicable to all properties and should have enough flexibility

to reflect the variations and market conditions encountered as of a given base date.

In modelling the actions of the participants in the marketplace, variables and their

respective valuation parameters are identified, researched and analysed by local assessors.

For each variable, a valuation parameter (or a value) is developed using standard mass

appraisal methodology.

During model development, the assessor collects and analyses property characteristics

which, based upon mass appraisal analysis, add or detract from property value. At times,

the assessor relies on his professional knowledge of the market. The final model will reflect

typical market conditions as of a given base date.

Once the valuation model is developed, the assessor applies the model uniformly to all

properties represented in the model. Equity is achieved when the valuation model is applied

uniformly to all similar properties.

Appropriate statistical measures (median, mean, range, etc.) can be determined for each

valuation parameter. When the assessor applies these valuation parameters to all similar

properties, then the market value based assessments will be fair and consistent.

[218] The Handbook summarises the appropriate variables to consider in a valuation process,

stating (at 3):

The market value based assessment of every type of property is guided by and relates to a

number of common characteristics or variables:

1. The physical characteristics of the property:

• Property use;

• Building size/area;

• Construction style/materials;

• Condition of improvements;

• Building configuration;

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• Site size, and;

• Location.

2. The supply and demand conditions in the market place.

3. Legal restrictions (i.e. zoning, etc.).

[219] The Handbook further summarises the relevant “valuation parameters in a valuation

process” as follows (at 3–4):

The valuation parameters outlined in each valuation process are guides to indicate

appropriate variables to consider in the analysis of values (i.e. the valuation formula) and

the values that would be appropriate to use in the valuation models. The following are

examples of the types of factors that may be considered in developing valuation

parameters:

1. The costs of construction.

2. The income characteristics of the real estate:

• Rents;

• Other income; and

• Operating expenses, etc.

3. The market place:

• Risk profiles (i.e. capitalization rates); and

• Market sales prices.

[220] Of course, the foregoing are merely summaries. Each of the various property types have

their own specific valuation guide that provides a broader explanation of the valuation parameters

that are used to determine market-value-based assessments.

[221] Because the Handbook provides assessors with guidance on the valuation of non-regulated

property, the variables, factors or valuation parameters they are to consider when classifying and

valuing non-regulated property are the variables, factors and valuation parameters that are relevant

to a determination of whether property is similar. Again, there is no practical value in addressing

this concept in any detail for each property type because that would entail repeating each chapter

of the Handbook in these reasons.

[222] If something is relevant to determining the value of a property under the Handbook, then

it is relevant to determining whether properties are similar for the purposes of the approach taken

to valuation and, thereby, for achieving equity through the application of the market valuation

standard.

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d.

The Marshall & Swift Valuation Service

[223] The Handbook is designed to integrate with the Cost Guide, the Marshall & Swift Valuation

Service and the Marshall & Swift Residential Cost Handbook in the application of the cost

approach to assessing the value of non-regulated property. Assessors use the Marshall & Swift

Valuation Service in most commercial property valuations conducted under the cost approach. In

the Handbook, SAMA states that the Marshall & Swift Valuation Service is “an authoritative guide

for developing replacement costs of buildings and other improvements” (at 2). Assessors use the

Marshall & Swift Residential Cost Handbook for estimating replacement costs for both single and

multi-family residences, including costs for manufactured housing, and yard and unit-in-place

costs. It, therefore, lends somewhat to the issue of property similarity under the cost approach. The

Marshall & Swift services are only available by paid subscription.

e.

IAAO Publications

[224] The IAAO publications address the general principles of mass appraisal in more detailed

terms, including by identifying the variables, factors and parameters that affect the market value

of property and how they interrelate. For example, Fundamentals of Mass Appraisal provides this

high-level description of stratification (at 140–141):

Thus, stratification in mass appraisal involves assigning properties to a group that reflects

a real estate market segment or that identifies the characteristics that make properties

competitive in the market. That is, sorting is used to assign properties to one or more

categories or groups by means of categorical and binary variables. Common bases for

stratification include use, location, size and other characteristics. Stratification can be based

on combinations of variables, such as use and location. Thus, stratification can be used to

define the scope of a mass appraisal model. The creation of substrata can improve the

performance of mass appraisal models. Stratification is a key step in a ratio study. Strata

also are used to identify comparable properties.

…

The approach to value used in mass appraisal modeling can affect stratification decisions.

The sales comparison and income approaches generally place great importance on

stratification by submarket and location. Sample size issues pertain more to direct sales

comparison and income capitalization models than to the cost approach. The cost approach

generally emphasizes stratification according to structural categories, with location being

important in valuing land, estimating external (economic) obsolescence, and determining

the need for so-called economic adjustment factors. …

Thus, stratification needs to be employed judiciously. Over-stratification in mass appraisal

models causes sales sample sizes to be too small to produce reliable statistics. In the case

of defining model groups, over-stratification increases workloads without offsetting

advantages in model accuracy. As noted, each stratum should be large enough to ensure

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that sufficient sales normally would occur during the period of interest (usually a year or

more). As a guideline, a stratum, submarket, or neighbourhood in which fewer than 15

sales normally occur is too small. A better benchmark is 30 or more sales. This implies that

a stratum should have several hundred members if only 1 year of sales is used for analysis.

[225] Additionally, the IAAO publication Property Assessment Valuation provides, for example,

a detailed identification of the criteria (or data) involved the assessment of similarity for the

purposes of property valuation in mass appraisal (at 66–67):

Data to be collected, analyzed and processed can be divided into three categories:

 General

 Specific

 Comparative

General data include trends that affect value and may occur on the national, regional, and

neighborhood levels. These data also include physical (environmental), economic,

governmental, and social forces that affect value. Specific data consists principally of site

and improvement data. Comparative data consist of cost, recent sales, and income

information.

Assessors collect data using many methods. Cost, sales, and income and expense data can

be gathered through either interviews or questionnaires. A field visit, with a thorough

inspection of the property, is required to capture the neighborhood characteristics and site

and off-site improvement data. Recorded deeds and/or other transfer of ownership

documents also are meaningful tools for the assessor to consider. Data are generally

recorded on a property record form. When improvement data are collected, special

attention is given to physical condition and functional utility. Using cost data, the assessor

must develop cost manuals and depreciation schedules. The cost data may also be used as

historical cost for individual properties and as a basis for developing cost-factor tables to

make historical costs current. From sales data, the assessor develops gross rent multipliers

and basic adjustments, such as those for changing market conditions and location. As a

result, benchmark properties for comparison purposes are established. From income and

expense statements, the assessor may develop economic rents, vacancy and collection loss

allowances, operating expense allowances, discount rates, effective tax rates, and recapture

rates. …

[226] Building on the general description of the criteria, Property Assessment Valuation

describes stratification under the different approaches to valuation. For example, in respect of the

sales comparison approach, it states (at 69–70):

Based on the concept of value in exchange, the sales comparison approach to value

compares the property being appraised with similar properties that have recently sold. The

characteristics of the sold properties are analyzed for their similarity to those of the subject

of appraisal. Because no two parcels are exactly alike, the prices of the sold properties must

be adjusted for any differences between the sold properties and the subject property.

Value indications derived from the sales comparison approach are usually considered

particularly significant, because they express the reactions of buyers and sellers in the real

estate market. The sales comparison approach can be used to value any property, whether

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improved or vacant, as long as that type of property is being exchanged periodically in the

market. The steps in the sales comparison approach are as follows:

 Data collection and verification

 Analysis of market data to develop units of comparison and select attributes

for adjustment

 Development of reasonable adjustments

 Application of adjustments to comparable sales.

The sales comparison approach is most applicable when sufficient sales data are available

for similar properties. This approach is widely used to appraise single family residences

and vacant land. It is also widely used to appraise multifamily residential and commercial

properties, when sales data are available.

[227] This leads to the inexorable conclusion that the process of determining similarity—i.e., of

stratifying property into groups on the basis of variables, factors and parameters that affect market

value—is a fluid exercise that involves weighing and reweighing the degrees of similarity among

properties under multiple, intertwined criteria, all of which is benchmarked by a requirement that

the process, and ultimately the stratifications it arrives at, produce statistically reliable estimates

of market value.

[228] While there are principles and identifiable criteria at play in the process of determining

whether properties are similar for the purposes of the market valuation standard and the

achievement of equity in non-regulated property assessment, that process—at root—involves the

exercise of professional judgment in the proper application of assessment law and practice to the

facts, circumstances and conditions affecting the properties as of a base date.

4.

What is meant by “meets quality assurance standards established by

order of the agency”?

[229] The market valuation standard requires that the assessed value of property meet “quality

assurance standards established by order of [SAMA]” (MA, s. 193(e.1)(iv); CA, s. 163(f.1)(iv);

NMA, s. 215(f)(iv)).

[230] SAMA publishes its quality assurance standards orders on its website

(http://www.sama.sk.ca). By orders made under ss. 12(1)(d) and (q) of the AMAA, SAMA

determines the standards, the property groups and the calculation procedure that assessors must

use to test for each quality assurance standard. Assessors are, in turn, required to conduct the tests

and to provide the quality assurance standard calculation results to SAMA, such that SAMA is in

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a position to post those results on its website no later than the date that a municipality’s initial

assessment roll is made open to the public (MA, s. 193.1; CA, s. 163.1; NMA, s. 215.1).

[231] For the 2018 assessment year⁸, SAMA’s Quality Assurance Standards Order dated

December 15, 2017, applied and it provided:

The following quality assurance standards are established:

1. The acceptable range for the median assessed value to adjusted sale price ratio for all

residential property in a municipality shall be 0.950 - 1.050, provided that the municipality

shall strive to achieve a median assessed value to adjusted sale price ratio of 1.000; and

2. The acceptable range for the median assessed value to adjusted sale price ratio for all

other property valued using the market valuation standard in a municipality shall be 0.950

- 1.050, provided that the municipality shall strive to achieve a median assessed value to

adjusted sale price ratio of 1.000.

The median assessed value to adjusted sale price ratio for a property group for a

municipality shall be calculated as follows:

a) identify all vacant and improved sales used to develop the assessed value for vacant and

improved properties in the property group in the municipality;

b) determine for each sale in (a) the assessed value (100%) of the property which reflects

the property characteristics on the sale date, and the adjusted sale price;

c) for each sale in (a), divide the assessed value by the adjusted sale price to calculate the

assessed value to sale price ratio (ASR);

d) array the ASRs from lowest to highest; and

e) select the median ASR of the sales in (a).

For certainty, where sales from outside a municipality are used to develop the assessed

value for property in the municipality, such sales shall be used in determining the median

assessed value to adjusted sale price ratio for the relevant property group.

[232] Accordingly, the phrase “meets quality assurance standards established by order of

[SAMA]” means that the market valuation standard must be applied such that the median assessed

value to adjusted sale price ratio [ASR] for all residential and other property in a municipality falls

between 0.950 and 1.050, but the goal is to achieve a median ASR of 1.000.

C.

Summary of the interpretation of market valuation standard

[233] The market valuation standard is achieved when the assessed value of a property (or a

group of properties):

⁸As of January 1, 2022, SAMA’s Quality Assurance Standards Order dated December 10, 2021, came into force. It

contains the same quality assurance standards as the 2017 order. See https://www.sama.sk.ca/sites/default/files/2022-

02/Board%20Order%20-%202021%20to%202024%20Quality%20Assurance%20Standards.pdf

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(a)

(b)

is an estimate of the market value of the estate in fee simple in the property as of

the first day of January in the first year of a four-year property valuation cycle;

is determined under a process of assessing the market values of a group of

properties using one of the income, cost or sales-comparison methods of appraisal

and by consistently employing complete, accurate and current data in the chosen

method of appraisal in a way that allows for the statistical confirmation or

disconfirmation of the reliability of the estimates of market value it produces and

that allows for the determination of whether there are modifications to the appraisal

method or to the data that might produce more reliable estimates;

(c)

(d)

reflects the typical market conditions for properties with similar physical

characteristics and similar value-driving characteristics; and

has a median assessed value to adjusted sale price ratio [ASR] that falls between

0.950 and 1.050.

[234] The improper application of the market valuation standard is a material error that prima

facie means equity has not been achieved in an assessment and the assessor then bears the onus of

demonstrating otherwise (Walmart 2018 at para 71). It is worth repeating that every remedy for a

material error that is ordered by a board of revision or by the Committee must achieve equity with

similar properties.

IV. DID THE COMMITTEE ERR IN LAW IN THESE APPEALS?

[235] With the standards of review identified and explained and the interpretation of the statutory

term market valuation standard in place, we turn to consider the last of the issues raised in these

appeals and directly with respect to the Committee Decisions. We begin with some general

background on the 2018 assessments.

A.

2018 Assessment Background

[236] In these matters, SAMA assessed the taxpayers’ properties in 2018 under the cost approach

to valuation, whereby the market value of a property is estimated by calculating the replacement

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cost new less depreciation [RCNLD] of the property and then multiplying that figure by a market

adjustment factor [MAF].

[237] Under the cost approach, the RCN of commercial improvements is determined by

calculating the cost of construction using one of four methods: (i) calculator method, (ii) unit-in-

place cost-method, (iii) segregated cost-method, or (iv) trended-original-cost method. These

methods are applied in accordance with the valuation procedures in the Marshall & Swift Valuation

Service. The taxpayers in these appeals do not impugn SAMA’s handling of this aspect of the 2018

assessments. In each of these matters, the taxpayers have challenged how SAMA determined the

MAF under the sales-comparison method, which the Cost Guide explains as follows (at 3.10):

Summary

This section contains the valuation procedures for determining the market adjustment

factor (MAF) for residential and commercial buildings and structures valued by the cost

approach.

The market adjustment factor accounts for all economic obsolescence and any loss or gain

in value of the building or structure due to any difference in replacement costs and any

difference in the amount of physical deterioration or functional obsolescence, that have not

already been taken into account.

The market adjustment factor can be determined by the sales comparison method,

condominium unit method, comparable neighbourhood method, or mixed buildings and

structures method.

Sales Comparison Method

The sales comparison method is used where there are sufficient improved property sales to

establish a market adjustment factor.

The market adjustment factor is determined by application of the following calculation

procedure:

1.

2.

Identify improved properties with comparable buildings or structures that are sales.

Determine the market ratio for each improved property sale:

i.

Determine the improved property sale price.

Determine the assessed value of the land.

ii.

iii.

Determine the replacement cost new less physical deterioration and

functional obsolescence of the buildings or structures.

iv.

v.

Calculate the residual building value by subtracting the assessed value of

the land from the improved property sale price.

Calculate the market ratio by dividing the residual building value by the

replacement cost new less physical deterioration and functional

obsolescence.

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3.

Determine the market adjustment factor for the comparable buildings and

structures.

[238] Under the first step of the sales comparison method, SAMA identifies and stratifies (or

groups together) properties that have been sold into an array [sales array] according to their

similarity to the properties that SAMA has grouped together for assessment purposes [assessment

array]. SAMA then determines the market ratio for each property in the sales array by calculating

the ratio that its sale price bears to its depreciated replacement cost. By way of example, if a

property sold for $250,000 but its improvements had a depreciated replacement cost of $500,000,

then the market ratio is 0.50. SAMA then uses the median of the market ratios of all properties in

the sales array to estimate the market value of each property in the assessment array.

[239] For quality control purposes, SAMA will statistically test the assessments that were

determined under the sales comparison method by applying a MAF against actual sales prices

using what is called an assessment-to-sales ratio [ASR]. For example, if SAMA had assessed a

property at $500,000 but it sold for $250,000, then the ASR is 2.0—i.e., the assessed value is twice

the market value. On this basis, the closer the ASR is to 1.0, the more accurate the assessment is

likely to be. Some inaccuracy is, however, tolerated. As noted, the Quality Assurance Standards

Order that applied to 2018 assessments required a median ASR of between 0.95 and 1.050. The

Standard on Mass Appraisal of Real Property (Chicago: IAAO, 2017) [IAAO Mass Appraisal

Standard], states that a median ASR of properties in a sales array should fall between 0.90 and

1.10.

[240] A MAF may also be statistically examined for its reliability under a coefficient of

dispersion [COD] analysis (see Harvard 2017 at para 8; IAAO Mass Appraisal Standard at 11).

The COD indicates how far individual ASRs in a group diverge from the median ASR. Under this

test, the lower the COD the more likely the median ASR accurately reflects the relationship

between assessed value and market value.

[241] In these matters, SAMA calculated a MAF of 0.61 from 53 commercial properties that had

been sold in eight municipalities in Saskatchewan. SAMA described the Sales Array as including

“all commercial improvements in Clusters 41 and 42 including warehouses, retail and

hotel/motels” (2015 Base Year Cost Market Report, Clusters 41 & 42 (Regina: SAMA, 2015)).

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[242] Under statistical testing, SAMA determined that the Sales Array produced a median ASR

of 1.01 and a COD of 58.97. The appellants argue that this means that, even though the ASRs

seemed quite accurate overall, the ASRs of the individual properties in the Sales Array deviated

significantly from the median ASR and, therefore, the assessments based thereon are unreliable

estimates of the fair market value of the properties in the assessment array.

B.

The issues in each appeal

[243] The reasons in this judgment have addressed the standards of review to be applied in the

appeal process and the interpretation of the term market valuation standard under the municipal

Acts. It remains to apply those standards in the contexts at hand. In each of the appeals before the

Court, the Committee is alleged to have erred:

(a)

(b)

(c)

in its selection of the standards of review to apply to a decision of a board of

revision or in its application of the standards in its review of a board decision;

when it found the board of revision had selected and applied the correct standards

of review;

in its interpretation and application of:

(i)

the market valuation standard;

(ii)

s. 195(7) of the MA; and

(iii) Imperial Oil 2016.

[244] Although separately set out in the respective notices of appeal, as these questions are

intertwined, we have addressed them together in the reasons below in respect of each appeal.

C.

CACV3410—Affinity Holdings Ltd. v Town of Shaunavon and SAMA

[245] In CACV3410, Affinity Holdings Ltd. [Affinity] is the lead appellant of seven retail

property owners who dispute the 2018 assessment of their commercial properties in the town of

Shaunavon, Saskatchewan.

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1.

Appeal to the Shaunavon BOR

[246] Affinity appealed to the Shaunavon BOR alleging the 2018 assessment of its property

under the cost approach was in error because the MAF did not meet the market valuation standard

due to the inclusion of the two warehouses in the Sales Array.

[247] In an effort to establish error in the assessment model, Affinity adduced evidence of

physical differences between warehouses and non-warehouse properties. Based on its own

calculations, Affinity asserted that SAMA’s assessment model had undervalued warehouses by a

median of 27% and overvalued non-warehouse properties by a median of 34%.

[248] Although SAMA acknowledged it could further stratify the Sales Array for the age of

improvements, it said that it would be too complex and time consuming to do so. It argued that,

notwithstanding it was possible to stratify further, the 2018 assessment had met the market

valuation standard and had achieved equity because it was based on the same model and the same

MAF as the other properties in the assessment array.

[249] In allowing Affinity’s appeal, the Shaunavon BOR found:

[22]

The Board is convinced an error exists in the assessment of the subject property.

A COD of 60% is simply too far outside the boundaries of the standards established by the

IAAO. While these standards do not have the force of law within Saskatchewan legislation,

they form a part of each licensed appraiser’s training, qualifications, and certification. To

ignore this standard would be akin to disregarding the principles with which every

appraiser has been certified.

[23]

The Board also makes note that, by the Appraiser’s own admission, they “could

have” stratified by EYB to achieve better statistical results including a COD of 33%. The

Board does not understand why, when the Respondent is clearly aware that stratification is

necessary, they would choose not to do so except that it would be “too complex” to

implement.

[24]

The Board considers the Respondent’s suggestion that stratification by warehouse

versus general commercial is only performed in Cities, and is not performed in

municipalities (RM’s, towns, or villages). The Board is aware that stratification by general

commercial and warehouse properties, and potentially other factors, occurs in the RM of

Corman Park No. 344. The Board therefore disregards this argument by the Respondent. It

is clear to the Board that the Respondent frequently stratifies general retail/commercial

properties from warehouse properties, whether in cities or municipalities, throughout the

province. The Respondent’s effort to suggest they only do this in cities is clearly an

inaccurate statement.

[25]

In the result, the Appellant has proven their prima facie case that an error exists in

the failure of the Respondent to stratify sales despite their own acknowledgement that a

COD of 60% should be considered alarming.

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[26]

As the Respondent did not address the stratification by property type directly in

defense of their assessment, and instead deferred to other options for stratification to defend

their lack of stratification by any measure, the Board accepts the stratification proposed by

the Appellant. It seems clear to the Board that some level of stratification is required.

[27]

The Board accepts that, while the Appellant’s suggested stratification may not be

ideal, it uses a method frequently employed by SAMA throughout the province, and it

improves the statistical performance of the assessment model. The Board acknowledges

that the model may be improved further, should SAMA choose to do so and accept the

effort associated to implement a better model. However, until they invest such time and

effort required, the Board believes the results suggested by the Appellant substantially

improve the assessed values when compared to those previously suggested by the

Appraiser.

[250] As to remedy, the Shaunavon BOR applied a 0.46 MAF and estimated that the market

value of the improvements to Affinity’s property was $718,200, which it added to the assessed

value of Affinity’s land (which had not been appealed) to result in a revised assessed value for the

subject property of $739,700.

2.

Appeal to the Committee

[251] SAMA appealed the Shaunavon BOR Decision to the Committee alleging that the

Shaunavon BOR had erred by:

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

not considering that the subject properties were “slightly undervalued when

compared to the most similar of properties”;

concluding that the subject properties “were comparable to other cluster analysis

groups that used the same proposed grouping split purposed [sic] by [Affinity]”;

concluding that the “IAAO standards for a COD were applicable to deducing if an

error had been made”;

“adopting [Affinity’s] solution that would assess the value of the subject properties

below the MVS, to correct a perceived problem for properties not under appeal”;

and

(e)

“implementing a solution based on one alternative purposed [sic] by [Affinity],

while realizing other factors had been demonstrated to affect [sic] a better grouping

of the whole of the neighborhood”.

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[252] In the Shaunavon Decision, the Committee reframed SAMA’s grounds under a single

question and then answered it, in summary terms, as follows:

[6]

Did the Board make a mistake by concluding the assessments of the subject

properties were in error?

[7]

The Committee finds the Board did make a mistake by concluding the assessments

of the subject properties were in error. The Committee finds the Board made a mistake

when it changed the property valuations.

[253] The Committee addressed the broad question of whether the Shaunavon BOR had “made

a mistake” under four headings in its reasons: (a) property valuation, (b) assessment, (c) MAF, and

(d) alternate methodology. The root question under each of these headings was, however, whether

the Shaunavon BOR had erred when it concluded that the failure to stratify the 53 sales in Cluster

41/42 by property type was a material error.

3.

Review of the Shaunavon Decision for errors of law

[254] Although Affinity’s appeal to this Court is founded on allegations that the Committee erred

in law with respect to standards of review and the interpretation and application of the market

valuation standard, etc., the issues are all intertwined because, as noted, the Committee’s root

determination was that the Shaunavon BOR had improperly set aside the 2018 assessment on the

basis that SAMA had erred by failing to further stratify the Sales Array. Even though intertwined,

we begin the analysis of this appeal with the allegation that the Committee selected an incorrect

standard of review when it reviewed the Shaunavon BOR Decision.

[255] The question of which standards of review to apply in the review of the decision of a board

of revision was among the first issues the Committee addressed in the Shaunavon Decision,

writing:

[9]

Based on the Court of Appeal’s direction in [City Centre at paras 98–101], we

review the Board’s findings of fact, and of mixed fact and law on a reasonableness

standard. If the findings of fact are supported by the evidence or are not otherwise

unreasonable, this Committee will not interfere with the Board’s factual conclusions.

[10]

This standard is consistent with the Court of Appeal’s decision in [Corman Park

2018]. In that case, the Court determined the Board was the finder of facts and this

Committee sits in review as a true appellate tribunal on those findings.

[256] The foregoing paragraphs from the Shaunavon Decision correctly identify that the standard

of reasonableness applies when the Committee addresses questions of fact and issues as to how a

board has handled questions of mixed fact and law. The Shaunavon Decision does not contain

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reference to the standard of correctness, which applies when the Committee considers questions

of assessment law and practice, but that appears to be the standard it applied. At the bottom line,

the Committee did not err in its identification of the applicable standards of review.

[257] In the Shaunavon Decision, under the heading of “Valuation”, the Committee first

considered whether the Shaunavon BOR had erred in its interpretation and application of the

market valuation standard and, when explaining that standard and what the Shaunavon BOR had

said about it, the Committee wrote:

[16]

The [MA] states the application of the Market Valuation Standard (MVS) achieves

equity for non-regulated property assessments when assessments “bear a fair and just

proportion to the market value of similar properties as of the applicable base date”

[s. 195(7)].

[17]

The application of the [market valuation standard] occurs when the assessment

meets the requirements of the legislation.

[18] The cost approach used to value the subject property requires the use of vacant

land sales. The Assessor applied the same method to all properties in the Town. The

valuation of similar properties must meet the MVS and be treated the same because

property assessment must be equitable [s. 195(5) of the MA].

[19]

[Affinity] believed the Assessor should have grouped the subject properties into a

separate retail stratification and suggested there are alternatives to the single Commercial

grouping used by the Assessor.

[20]

[The Cost Guide (at 1)] indicates those alternatives are only relevant if there are

insufficient land sales for SAMA to determine a rate. The Assessor groups neighbourhoods

based on discretion and market data. In this case, the Assessor believed 53 sales were

sufficient. We agree.

[21]

We find there is no evidence to indicate the Assessor used incorrect groupings.

(Emphasis in original)

[258] As to the Committee’s own interpretation of s. 195(7) of the MA, while Affinity takes issue

with the language the Committee used to describe how equity is achieved in non-regulated

property assessment, we are not persuaded that it misinterpreted (at para 16) that provision, which

states: “Equity in non-regulated property assessments is achieved by applying the market valuation

standard so that the assessments bear a fair and just proportion to the market value of similar

properties as of the applicable base date”.

[259] Although the Committee appears to have imported a principle that expressly underpins the

achievement of equity in regulated-property assessment (i.e., uniformity), the application of that

principle in non-regulated property assessments does not constitute a legal error unless it is allowed

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to override the consideration of whether equity has been achieved under s. 195(7) of the MA (see

TNC Mall 2020 at para 48; Imperial Oil 2016 at para 9), which it did not in this case.

[260] Nor are we persuaded that the Committee misunderstood what is required to achieve equity

in non-regulated property assessments through a misinterpretation of the market valuation

standard. Only two aspects of that standard were engaged in the appeal to the Committee, i.e.,

“reflects typical market conditions for similar properties” (MA, s. 193(e.1)(iii)) and “meets quality

assurance standards established by order of [SAMA]” (MA, s. 193(e.1)(iv)). We find no

substantive error in the Committee’s interpretation of those aspects of the market valuation

standard in its Shaunavon Decision.

[261] This is not to say that the Shaunavon Decision is without legal error. We do not, for

instance, read the Committee’s reasons under the heading “Valuations” as applying any standard

of review whatsoever or as otherwise considering whether the Shaunavon BOR had erred in its

analysis. Rather, the Committee merely stated the positions of the parties, observed that the Cost

Guide required the exercise of discretion on the part of an assessor, and expressed agreement with

the assessor’s position that 53 sales in the Sales Array “were sufficient”. As such, we find that the

Committee erred in law by failing to review this aspect of the Shaunavon BOR Decision for error.

Nonetheless, we conclude that the Committee’s bottom-line determination—that the BOR was not

entitled to interfere with the assessment on the basis that the Sales Array could have been further

stratified—is correct.

[262] Perhaps obliquely, the Committee correctly observed that the issue before the Shaunavon

BOR involved whether SAMA had erred in the exercise of its discretion when stratifying sales to

create the Sales Array. As noted above, a decision made by an assessor in the exercise of discretion

is presumptively reasonable in an appeal hearing before a board of revision unless and until it has

been shown to be in error on the standard of reasonableness. In this regard, the Committee also

correctly interpreted Imperial Oil 2016 when it wrote:

[33]

[Affinity] suggested a different way to determine an assessed value. The

assessment is presumed correct unless an assessor makes an error of fact, law or assessment

principles [Imperial Oil Limited v Regina (City), 2016 SKCA 107 at para [52]].

[34]

We find [SAMA] did not make any errors of fact, law or assessment principles.

[35]

We find the Board did make a mistake in their interpretation of the facts, their

interpretation of assessment data, and interpretation of assessment principles.

Page 81

[263] That is, in the assessment appeal before it, the Shaunavon BOR had to accept the

stratification of sales to establish the Sales Array as correct unless and until Affinity established

that, in creating it, sales had been stratified through error. The Committee reviewed the Shaunavon

BOR Decision for error in the BOR’s handling of this question of mixed fact and law and

concluded that the BOR had erred by intervening where it was not entitled to do so. The correctness

of the Committee’s bottom-line conclusion is explained through analysis of the three aspects of

the Shaunavon BOR’s reasons for finding error in the stratification of the Sales Array, which do

not support the finding that SAMA had unreasonably exercised its discretion when stratifying sales

to create the Sales Array.

[264] Taking each of its reasons in turn, the Shaunavon BOR was first “convinced an error exists

in the assessment” because the COD of 60 was “simply too far outside the boundaries of the

standards established by the IAAO” to which it found assessment appraisers must adhere (at

para 22). For reference, the BOR understood a COD of 25 is the IAAO standard for “smaller

markets” (at para 12).⁹That is, paraphrased in the language of error, the Shaunavon BOR found

that SAMA had erred either in its interpretation of relevant assessment practice or by failing to

adhere to the principles of assessment practice because it had accepted a COD of 60 when IAAO

recommends a lower COD for smaller markets. As the Committee understood, the BOR’s finding

of error in the assessment resulted from its incorrect interpretation of assessment law.

[265] While the IAAO may identify certain standards to be achieved by professional assessment

appraisers, those standards have different qualities to them, are dependent on context, and are

largely interrelated or correlated with other standards and assessment practises—that is, they are

elastic standards, not rigid benchmarks. Some may be mandatory in certain contexts and not in

others. Some are simply advisory in nature, others are recommended practises, and others may set

out guidance as to best practises for assessment appraisers. In any event, there was no evidence in

this case that assessment appraisers, as regulated professionals, are required to adhere to IAAO

standards as a “standards regarding the manner or method of practice” under The Assessment

Appraisers Act (s. 14(2)(d)). Moreover, regardless of what the IAAO might have to say about a

subject, the Legislature has said that the market valuation standard is the standard achieved when,

⁹Standard on Mass Appraisal of Real Property (Chicago: IAAO, 2013) states that the COD standard for “income

producing properties” in areas other than “larger, urban areas” is 5 to 20 (at 13).

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among other criteria, the assessed value of property “meets the quality assurance standards

established by order of [SAMA]” (MA, s. 193(e.1)(iv)). In that regard, SAMA has established only

one such standard, namely, that an ASR must fall between 0.950 and 1.050¹⁰(Quality Assurance

Standards Order).

[266] In short, the Committee correctly found that the Shaunavon BOR had erred in its

interpretation of assessment law because there is no recognised, mandatory principle of assessment

law or practice that requires assessment appraisers to achieve a COD of 25 or less in small markets.

Somewhat ironically, the Shaunavon BOR adopted, as a solution for addressing the COD of 60,

Affinity’s proposal for further stratification of the Sales Array that produced a COD of 44—which

is also well outside what the BOR thought was the mandatory IAAO standard.

[267] The second reason the Shaunavon BOR intervened was that it took issue with the fact that,

although SAMA had admitted that it could do so and could thereby have improved the COD,

SAMA had said it would be “too complex” to further stratify the Sales Array. While “too complex”

does not excuse assessors from following assessment law and practice, that is not truly what

SAMA had argued.

[268] SAMA had certainly acknowledged that further stratification of the Sales Array would

produce a better COD. However, it submitted that the most important factor in the 2018

assessments was the MAF. In that regard, SAMA had, through statistical testing of the common

data, identified the relevant valuation parameters affecting the MAF as being effective year built

[EYB], quality class, location and building type. However, SAMA said it could not, with

reliability, determine which of these factors would produce—if the Sales Array were further

stratified on that basis—a better grouping of similar properties. It was for this reason that SAMA

said it only stratified the sales based on property use (commercial) and location (Cluster 41/42).

That is, SAMA’s witness appears to have used “too complex” as a euphemism for “it can be done

but not reliably”—i.e., it could not be done with any confidence that the result would achieve

equity.

¹⁰Albeit assessment appraisers are encouraged, in the Quality Assurance Standards Order, to “strive to achieve a

median assessed value to adjusted sale price ration of 1.000”.

Page 83

[269] To prove its point, SAMA had adduced evidence that sales of warehouse and non-

warehouse properties were affected by similar market conditions once they were stratified by

building age. That is, even though SAMA found EYB, property type and quality class were too

intertwined to reliably sub-stratify the Sales Array (after sales had been stratified for property use

and location), if it had in fact sub-stratified for EYB, then that would have produced a statistically

superior result¹¹to a sub-stratification based on property type alone. Put another way, SAMA had

demonstrated that, as a factor that influenced the MAF, EYB was more relevant than property type,

i.e., EYB was more relevant than the basis upon which Affinity had proposed sub-stratification.

[270] As we read the Shaunavon Decision, the Committee did not interpret this evidence and

argument as SAMA proposing an alternative stratification or assessment model. It was, rather,

SAMA demonstrating why its decision not to further stratify the Sales Array based on property

type was not in error—i.e., was not unreasonable. In that regard, SAMA’s decision is based on an

internally coherent and rational chain of analysis that is justified in relation to the facts,

circumstances and condition affecting the properties in question as well as the assessment law and

practice that constrained its decision.

[271] That is, although Affinity had satisfied the Shaunavon BOR that the Sales Array could have

been further stratified, the Committee found it had not proven that SAMA had erred by failing to

do so. Affinity had failed to establish that the shortcoming or flaw it had identified in the

stratification was so central to SAMA’s reasoning process or so undermined the soundness of the

2018 assessments that it rendered the decision not to further stratify unreasonable. In the

Committee’s view, SAMA had established that it had respected the requirements of assessment

law and practice when deciding not to further stratify the Sales Array and, thereby, had justified

its decision not to do so in the contextual realities of the 2018 assessments (TNC Mall 2020 at

para 43; CCRL 2020 at paras 98 and 106).

[272] While the Committee might have explained its findings in more detail, the Shaunavon

Decision correctly identified the reasonableness standard as being applicable to a board’s handling

of questions of mixed fact and assessment law and practice—i.e., to questions relating to the

exercise of assessor discretion. The full reasoning of the Committee in this regard was:

¹¹The ASR would have been 1.000.

Page 84

[28]

The Board made a mistake interpreting assessment principles of assessor

discretion. SAMA acknowledged they could have stratified properties using other

variables. The Board incorrectly concluded that just because the Assessor said that

stratification could be done, does not translate into it must be done. The Assessor presented

data on several groupings by a variety of characteristics. While the Assessor is required to

examine a variety of property groupings, ultimately, the Assessor applies discretion. The

onus was on Altus to show the Assessor discretion was in error. The Board was mistaken

when it concluded some stratification was required and, therefore, accepted the

stratification proposed by Altus.

[273] We acknowledge that the Shaunavon Decision could be read as suggesting that “assessor

discretion” is a panacea answer to all allegations of error in an assessment—when it is not—but

we do not read it that way. Albeit that the Committee omitted to explain why the Shaunavon BOR’s

interference with the exercise of discretion in the stratification of sales to create the Sales Array

was in error (i.e., why the decision to intervene was unreasonable), it correctly concluded that the

BOR had erred when it intervened. The proper approach would have been for the Committee to

have indicated in what way the Shaunavon BOR had failed to review the assessor’s exercise of

discretion for reasonableness. This is, however, an error without consequence in the context of this

appeal.

[274] Under its third reason for intervening, the Shaunavon BOR took account of its own belief

that SAMA had, in the past, grouped other commercial properties separately from warehouse

properties for the purposes of assessing properties located in the Rural Municipality of Corman

Park, No. 344. Given this understanding of SAMA’s past practice, the BOR “disregard[ed]”

SAMA’s argument that warehouse properties were properly included in the Sales Array and, later

in the Shaunavon BOR Decision, it explained the remedy it had chosen in these terms:

[27]

The Board accepts that, while the Appellant’s suggested stratification may not be

ideal, it uses a method frequently employed by SAMA throughout the province, and it

improves the statistical performance of the assessment model. The Board acknowledges

that the model may be improved further, should SAMA choose to do so and accept the

effort associated to implement a better model. However, until they invest such time and

effort required, the Board believes the results suggested by the Appellant substantially

improve the assessed values when compared to those previously suggested by the

Appraiser.

[275] As the Committee recognised, the BOR’s reasoning in this regard for interfering with the

2018 assessments in the way it did is fundamentally flawed or, at best, fatally under-developed in

the Shaunavon BOR Decision. The Committee said that the BOR had “made a mistake in its

interpretation of the facts”. It found that the transcript and other evidence did not support the

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BOR’s finding that SAMA’s effort to suggest that it only stratified by property type in cities is

“clearly an inaccurate statement” (at para 22). The Committee further found that the BOR had

“made a mistake in its interpretation of assessment data”. This error of fact refers to the BOR’s

conclusion that a COD of 60 was prima facie evidence of material error when the BOR had, under

the Committee’s finding, failed to consider the evidence that SAMA had “reviewed the COD,

recognized it was high and, therefore, reviewed other variables such as [EYB], location and quality

class, in addition to retail/warehouse building type” (at para 26).

[276] In its review of the findings of fact made by the BOR, the Committee properly applied the

standard of reasonableness. To be clear, as we interpret the Committee’s language of “mistake”,

the errors of fact found by the Committee include the “mistake in its interpretation of the facts”

and the “mistake in its interpretation of assessment data”. In the course of its reasoning in this

regard, the Committee reiterated an aspect of the reasonableness standard identified in City Centre

(at para 10) and observed that the BOR’s “findings of facts are not supported by the evidence” (at

para 25). In short, the Committee committed no error of law in its handling of the review of the

BOR’s findings of fact and its fact-finding process.

[277] As to whether assessors are required to follow past practices, in Laing, this Court wrote

that “What is called for in the exercise of [SAMA’s] skill and judgment is the structured

formulation of consistent opinions as to fair and equitable value for the purposes of property

taxation in the municipality” (at para 28). It is true, therefore, that SAMA cannot whimsically

depart from the assessment practices that it has employed in the past, particularly those it has used

to previously assess the property in question. Nonetheless, the principle explained in Laing does

not prevent SAMA from taking a different path in the assessment of a property provided it can

justify any material departure from or inconsistency with its prior assessments of the property.

This was not, however, the circumstance before the Shaunavon BOR.

[278] In its defence of the 2018 assessments, SAMA had explained its approach to assessing the

subject properties and justified its decision not to further stratify the Sales Array based on property

type. Fundamentally, that stratification, and the assessments themselves, were presumptively

correct unless and until error had been established. This means SAMA was under no obligation to

dispel an allegation of error in the assessment of Affinity’s property in 2018 by explaining or

Page 86

justifying why it might have approached an issue of stratification differently in respect of other

properties, in another municipality, in other contexts, and in what was presumably a different

assessment year. The Committee correctly found that the Shaunavon BOR had erred in law when

it thought otherwise (see Shaunavon Decision at paras 27–28).

[279] Finally, the Shaunavon BOR remedied the stratification error it had found by accepting

Affinity’s suggested sub-stratification of the Sales Array by property type. The BOR stated that

this was the appropriate remedy because the Town of Shaunavon (as respondent) had not defended

the 2018 assessments by addressing Affinity’s proposal and had “instead deferred to other options

for stratification to defend [the] lack of stratification by any measure” and it “seems clear to the

[BOR] that some level of stratification is required” (Shaunavon BOR Decision at para 26).

[280] As noted, we do not interpret SAMA’s evidence and argument as proposing an alternative

stratification to justify the 2018 assessments. Rather, SAMA adduced this evidence to show why

its decision not to further stratify the Sales Array based on property type was not in error.

Moreover, SAMA’s evidence established that it had, in fact, stratified sales on the basis of property

use and location—i.e., the BOR erroneously found that there was a “lack of stratification by any

measure”. Lastly, although it is free to do so, a municipality, as the respondent, has no burden to

prove that an appellant’s proposed remedy for an alleged material error, if it were established, is

incorrect or inappropriate.

[281] In sum, we find the Committee correctly approached the issues that had arisen in the appeal

before it under the standards of review and correctly applied those standards. On the whole of it,

the Committee’s bottom-line conclusion that “The [BOR] was mistaken when it concluded some

stratification was required and, therefore, accepted the stratification proposed by [Affinity]” is

correct (at para 28). It is clear from the Shaunavon BOR Decision that, by misinterpreting the

relevant assessment law and practice and misapprehending the evidence, the Shaunavon BOR

committed material errors in setting aside SAMA’s stratification of the Sales Array.

[282] There is no basis in law for this Court to intervene and set aside the Shaunavon Decision.

Page 87

D.

CACV3411—Central Plains Co-operative Ltd. v Town of Rosetown and

SAMA

[283] In CACV3411, Central Plains Co-operatives Ltd. [Central Plains] is the lead appellant of

seven retail property owners in the town of Rosetown, Saskatchewan.

1.

Appeal to the Rosetown BOR

[284] Central Plains appealed to the Rosetown BOR alleging the 2018 assessment of its property

under the cost approach was in error because the MAF did not meet the market valuation standard

due to the inclusion of the two warehouses in the Sales Array. It submitted to the Rosetown BOR

that further stratification of the Sales Array was required because, if warehouses were removed

from it, the median MAF for the non-warehouse properties would be 0.46 with a COD of 49.96

and the median ASR would be 1.00. Central Plains further argued that, stratified as a separate

group, the median MAF for warehouses would be 0.82 with a COD of 44.10 and a median ASR

of 1.01. It adduced evidence that something called the Mann Whitney Test confirmed its hypothesis

that non-warehouse and warehouse properties were not similar and should not be stratified

together.

[285] In defence of the 2018 assessments, SAMA acknowledged that the COD was high and did

not dispute that further stratification of the Sales Array to exclude warehouses would improve the

statistical reliability of assessed values. However, it maintained that the 2018 assessments met the

market valuation standard and had achieved equity. Although it acknowledged that its own

statistical testing had shown that the Sales Array could be stratified by EYB, SAMA argued that

it would not be feasible to do so. At bottom, it said that the 2018 assessments were equitable

because they had been based on the same assessment model and MAF as other properties in the

assessment array.

[286] In the Rosetown BOR Decision, the BOR agreed that Central Plains had made a “good and

valid point” regarding the non-comparability of warehouse and non-warehouse properties;

nonetheless, it concluded there were not enough properties in the Sales Array to exclude warehouse

properties from it. The BOR’s full reasons are brief:

The Board ruled in favour of [SAMA] on the following:

Page 88

The Board finds the difference of 0.01 from the 0.61 MAF to the 0.60 MAF, which

[SAMA] agreed exists, is not enough reason to change the MAF because their legislated

parameters and their guidelines are met.

As to the issue of comparability, the Board finds that [Central Plains] has a good and valid

point and that would work well in a much larger community, but when the Board looked

at the size of the sales pool for Rosetown, we realized that approach cannot work as the

sales pools are too small.

When the Board discussed the possibility of stratifying using warehouse to non-warehouse,

the Board thought it would be possible to stratify further into multiple classes, which would

make the system cumbersome and too complicated and not feasible.

In the Board’s opinion, [SAMA’s] present approach is the most equitable solution to

assessing these properties.

[287] The Rosetown BOR therefore denied the appeal and upheld the 2018 assessments.

2.

Appeal to the Committee

[288] In its appeal from the Rosetown BOR Decision, Central Plains argued before the Committee

that the BOR had erred by upholding assessments that had not met the market valuation standard

or achieved equity because the Sales Array contained properties that were not similar to its

property. In particular terms, Central Plains’ grounds of appeal were that the Rosetown BOR had

erred by:

(a)

(b)

(c)

“finding the application of a 0.61 MAF, when the actual MAF is 0.60, met the

‘legislated parameters and [SAMA’s] guidelines were met’”;

“finding the sales were not comparable, [and deciding] that it could not make a

change due to ‘the size of the sales pool for Rosetown’”;

“dismissing the appeal after finding that it would be possible to stratify into multiple

classes but did not because that it [sic] would make ‘the system cumbersome and

too complicated and not feasible’”; and

(d)

“finding that equity was achieved even though non-comparable properties were

used which offends the market valuation standard”.

[289] As a remedy for these alleged errors, Central Plains asked the Committee to find that the

Rosetown BOR “was unreasonable in its finding that the assessment was correct”, that “the sales

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should be stratified by warehouse sales and non-warehouse sale [sic]” and that “the correct MAF

of 0.44 should be applied to the properties under appeal”.

[290] In the Rosetown Decision, the Committee reframed Central Plains’ grounds under a single

question and then answered it, in summary terms, as follows:

ISSUE:

[6] Did the Board make a mistake by when it upheld the assessments of the subject

properties?

DECISION:

[7] The Committee finds the Board did not make a mistake by upholding the assessments

of the subject properties.

[291] The Committee addressed the broad question of whether the Rosetown BOR had “made a

mistake by upholding the assessments” under four headings in its reasons: (a) property valuation;

(b) demonstration of a mistake in the assessment; (c) MAF; and (d) alternate methodology.

However, as the Committee recognised, the root question under each of these headings was

whether the Rosetown BOR had erred when it concluded that Central Plains had failed to establish

material error in the 2018 assessments on the basis that the 53 sales in Cluster 41/42 could have

been further stratified.

[292] In the end, the Committee dismissed Central Plains’ appeal, concluding that the Rosetown

BOR’s findings were supported by the evidence and were not otherwise unreasonable.

3.

Review of the Rosetown Decision for error of law

[293] Even though the Rosetown BOR Decision addressed the same stratification issues with

respect to the Sales Array as had been addressed in the Shaunavon BOR Decision, the Committee

had to approach the Central Plains’ appeal differently because the Rosetown BOR had upheld

assessments whereas the Shaunavon BOR had set them aside. This difference in result at the

board-level, coupled with the presumption that a board of revision decision is error-free,

transposed the analysis required of the Committee into a review to determine whether the

Rosetown BOR had erred when it found there was no material error in the 2018 assessments.

[294] Although that difference in approach may appear slight, in practical terms it meant that

Central Plains bore the onus of establishing that the Rosetown BOR had erred in confirming the

Page 90

2018 assessments. In terms of assessment law, Central Plains’ appeal put in issue whether the

Rosetown BOR had erred when it found that SAMA had properly applied the market valuation

standard and, particularly, when it found (implicitly) that the 2018 assessments “relflect[ed] typical

market conditions for similar properties” (MA, s. 193(e.1)(iii)).

[295] In the Rosetown Decision, as it had under its Shaunavon Decision, the Committee first

identified the standards of review that applied in the appeal. In doing so, it used language identical

to that which it had used in the Shaunavon Decision. We find the Committee correctly stated that

the standard of reasonableness applies when it addresses questions of fact and, in this case,

questions as to how the Rosetown BOR had handled questions of mixed fact and assessment law

and practice. Although the Committee did not identify the standard of correctness as applying to

questions of assessment law and practice, it nevertheless appears to have applied that standard in

its Rosetown Decision. At bottom, we are not persuaded that the Committee erred in its

identification of the applicable standards of review.

[296] In considering the evidence that was before the Rosetown BOR on the issue stratification

error, the Committee stated:

[16]

[Central Plains] believed [SAMA] should have grouped the subject properties into

a separate retail stratification and suggested there are alternatives to the single Commercial

grouping used by [SAMA].

[17]

[The Cost Guide at 1] indicates those alternatives are only relevant if there are

insufficient land sales for SAMA to determine a rate. [SAMA] groups neighbourhoods

based on discretion and market data. In this case, [SAMA] believed 53 sales were

sufficient. We agree.

[18]

We find there is no evidence to indicate [that SAMA] used incorrect groupings.

[297] In the foregoing paragraphs the Committee appears to have looked past the Rosetown BOR

Decision to make its own findings of fact on the basis of the evidence. If that is the case, it would

amount to an error of law. The boards of revision are the triers of fact in the assessment appeal

regime established under the MA. The Committee’s role in that regime is appellate, which requires

it to review a board’s findings of fact to ensure they are not unreasonable. While it seems that the

Committee incorrectly approached the question, its own findings of fact are the same as those of

the Rosetown BOR, which establishes—albeit through the backdoor—that the Committee did not

consider the Rosetown BOR’s findings to be unreasonable. Viewed in that light, the Committee’s

finding that “there is no evidence to indicate [that SAMA] used incorrect groupings” represents its

Page 91

conclusion that Central Plains had failed to rebut the presumed the correctness of the 2018

assessments and of the Rosetown BOR Decision.

[298] We find support for this conclusion later in the Rosetown Decision, when the Committee

considered, in a different context, whether the BOR had erred in fact or had misinterpreted the

governing assessment law and practice. In that regard, the Committee wrote under the heading

“Demonstration of Mistake in the Assessment”:

[19]

The Board noted as fact [that SAMA] had used the Cost Approach to Value and

had applied a single 0.61 MAF to all Commercial properties in eight communities in all

Cluster 41/42 towns. The Board found that although [Central Plains] made a valid point

for stratifying properties into warehouse and retail groups, it agreed with [SAMA] that

stratification could not work because the sales pool in the Town is too small.

[20]

The Board recognized that stratification into warehouse and non-warehouse was

possible as well as further groupings into multiple classes; however, the Board found the

stratifications would make the system cumbersome, too complicated, and not feasible.

[21]

We applied the standard of review defined in paragraph [9] for City Centre Equities

and reviewed the Board’s findings of fact, and of mixed fact and law on a reasonableness

standard. We concluded the Board’s findings of facts are supported by the evidence and

are not otherwise unreasonable.

[22]

[Central Plains] presented evidence to show the Coefficient of Dispersion (COD)

is lower when properties are stratified into two groups. SAMA examined the COD,

recognized it was high and, therefore, reviewed other variables such as effective year built,

location and quality class, in addition to retail/warehouse type. The Board did not make a

mistake in its interpretation of assessment data. The Board correctly recognized SAMA is

required to have an Assessment to Sales Ratio (ASR) of 95 to 105 for the entire

Commercial property group. The Board noted SAMA uses many tools, including COD,

but only the ASR is legislated.

[23]

The Board did not make a mistake interpreting assessment principles of assessor

discretion. SAMA acknowledged they could have stratified properties using other

variables. The Board discussed stratification and correctly concluded SAMA’s approach is

the most equitable solution to assessing these properties. [SAMA] presented data on several

groupings using a variety of characteristics. While [SAMA] is required to examine a

variety of property groupings, ultimately, [SAMA] applies discretion. [Central Plains] did

not meet the onus to show [SAMA’s] discretion was in error. The Board did not make a

mistake when it accepted the model used by SAMA.

[299] As can be seen, the Committee correctly approached the issues before it from the

perspective of ascertaining whether the Rosetown BOR had erred, re-identified and applied the

correct standard of review to questions of fact and to the BOR’s handling of questions of mixed

fact and assessment law and practice, and concluded that the BOR had not erred. We find no error

of law in this approach to the appeal or in the Committee’s treatment of the issues in that appeal.

Moreover, for the reasons given above in the appeal under CACV3410 (Affinity Holdings Ltd. v

Page 92

Town of Shaunavon), we are not persuaded that the Committee erred in its interpretation or

application of the relevant assessment law and practice when it dismissed Central Plains’ appeal.

[300] There is no basis in law for this Court to intervene and set aside the Rosetown Decision.

E.

CACV3412—Pioneer Co-operative Ltd. v Town of Maple Creek and

SAMA

[301] In CACV3412, Pioneer Co-operative Ltd. [Pioneer] is the lead appellant of four retail

property owners in the town of Maple Creek, Saskatchewan.

1.

Appeal to the Maple Creek BOR

[302] Pioneer appealed to the Maple Creek BOR alleging the 2018 assessment of its property

under the cost approach was in error because the MAF did not meet the market valuation standard

due to the inclusion of the two warehouses in the Sales Array. Pioneer argued in its appeal to the

Maple Creek BOR that a further stratification of the Sales Array to exclude warehouses was

necessary. As they were represented by the same tax agent, the argument mirrored Central Plains’

argument before the Rosetown BOR. Pioneer adduced evidence that a stratified median MAF of

0.46 for non-warehouses resulted in a median ASR of 1.00 and a COD of 49.96 and that the median

MAF of 0.82 for warehouses resulted in a median ASR of 1.01 and a COD of 44.10. It said these

revised MAFs produced a median ASR for the combined group of 1.01, with a COD of 48.36.

[303] SAMA also responded similarly to Pioneer’s appeal, acknowledging that the COD was

high and not disputing that further stratification would improve the statistical reliability of assessed

values. Nonetheless, SAMA argued that this did not mean that Pioneer’s property had been over-

assessed in 2018. Rather, SAMA took the position that statistical testing showed that, even though

it could have stratified the Sales Array by EYB, it would not have been feasible to do so. At bottom,

SAMA said that the 2018 assessment was equitable because it had been based on the same

assessment model and MAF as other properties in the assessment array.

[304] The Maple Creek BOR dismissed the appeal without much in the way of findings or

analysis of the issues that had been placed before it. The BOR simply found that, if the “sales pool”

was based only on sales in Maple Creek, it would not have provided enough information for

Page 93

SAMA to make its calculations. The BOR acknowledged that warehouse and non-warehouse

properties could be divided from each other but it felt that this was not feasible (at 2):

The Board recognizes that warehouse and non-warehouse properties could possibly be split

into separate sales types, however, when looking at the size of the sales pool in larger

communities compared to that of Maple Creek (ie., North Battleford), the Board does not

feel that it would be feasible to do so, as this would provide a limited market base. This

would also make the system more complex.

[305] The Maple Creek BOR concluded that SAMA had been “utilizing the best approach, based

on appraisal discretion and their understanding of achieving equity when assessing these

properties” (at 2).

2.

Review of the Maple Creek Decision for error of law

[306] Pioneer appealed the Maple Creek BOR Decision to the Committee, arguing that the Maple

Creek BOR had erred by upholding assessments that did not meet the market valuation standard

and that had not achieved equity, principally because non-comparable properties had been included

in the Sales Array. As it had under the Rosetown Decision, the Committee dismissed Pioneer’s

appeal by stating: “The Board found that although [Pioneer] made a valid point for stratifying

properties into warehouse and retail groups, it agreed with [SAMA] that stratification could not

work because the sales pool in [Maple Creek] is too small” (at para 20).

[307] Using language identical to the Rosetown Decision, the Committee interpreted the Maple

Creek BOR Decision as including conclusions by the BOR that, while further stratifications were

possible, they would make the assessment process “cumbersome, too complicated, and not

feasible” and that, if the “sales pool” had been based only on sales in Maple Creek, the Sales Array

would not contain enough properties to be reliable. In its Maple Creek Decision, the Committee

characterised these conclusions as findings of fact or of mixed fact and law and determined that

they were supported by the evidence and not otherwise unreasonable. The Committee then

concluded that:

[24]

[Pioneer] presented evidence to show the [COD] is lower when properties are

stratified into two groups. SAMA examined the COD, recognized it was high and,

therefore, reviewed other variables such as effective year built, location and quality class,

in addition to retail/warehouse building type. The Board did not make a mistake in its

interpretation of assessment data. The Board correctly recognized SAMA is required to

have an [ASR] of 95 to 105 for the entire Commercial property group. The Board noted

SAMA uses many tools, including COD, but only the ASR is legislated.

Page 94

[25]

The Board did not make a mistake interpreting assessment principles of assessor

discretion. SAMA acknowledged they could have stratified properties using other

variables. The Board discussed stratification and correctly concluded SAMA’s approach is

the most equitable solution to assessing these properties. The Assessor presented data on

several groupings using a variety of characteristics. While the Assessor is required to

examine a variety of property groupings, ultimately the Assessor applies discretion.

[Pioneer] did not meet the onus to show the Assessor’s discretion was in error. The Board

did not make a mistake when it accepted the model used by SAMA.

[308] Nothing in the facts, law, assessment practices, or arguments made before the Committee

leading to its Maple Creek Decision serves to distinguish that decision from the Rosetown

Decision. Each is predicated on almost identical factual circumstances and on identical allegations

of error and contains identical reasons for dismissing the allegations of error.

[309] Having fully reviewed the Rosetown Decision, we summarily conclude that the Committee

correctly approached the issues before it in Pioneer’s appeal from the perspective of ascertaining

whether the Maple Creek BOR had erred. The Committee correctly identified and applied the

standards of review in the Maple Creek Decision. Most importantly, the Committee concluded,

without committing legal error, that the Maple Creek BOR had not erred in its handling of the

questions that Pioneer had put in issue in the appeal before the Committee. That is, we are not

persuaded that the Committee erred in its approach to, or in its handling of, the issues in the appeal

or that it erred in its interpretation of the relevant assessment law and practice when it dismissed

Central Plains’ appeal.

[310] There is no basis in law for this Court to intervene and set aside the Maple Creek Decision.

Page 95

V.

CONCLUSION

[311] We find there is no basis to intervene in these matters or to set aside the Committee’s

Decisions. The appeals are dismissed. The respondent municipalities shall each have their costs in

their respective appeal.

“Jackson J.A.”

Jackson J.A.

“Ottenbreit J.A.”

Ottenbreit J.A.

“Caldwell J.A.”

Caldwell J.A.

Page 96

APPENDIX A

JURISPRUDENCE

Style of Cause

959630 Alberta Inc. v Regina (City)

Citations

Abbreviated Case Name

2010 SKCA 136

362 Sask R 177

959630 Alberta

994552 N.W.T. Ltd. v Kindersley (Town) 2019 SKCA 77

994552 NWT

Baker

Baker v Canada (Minister of Citizenship [1999] 2 SCR 817

and Immigration)

Big River (Rural Municipality) v

Pettigrew

2021 SKCA 30

Pettigrew

13 MPLR (6th) 175

Brandt Properties Ltd. v Saskatoon (City) 2021 SKCA 19

Brandt Properties

Cadillac Fairview

Cadillac Fairview Corp. v Saskatoon

(City)

2000 SKCA 84

[2000] 11 WWR 89

Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v 2016 FCA 93

Huruglica

Vavilov

Huruglica

[2016] 4 FCR 157

Canada (Minister of Citizenship and

Immigration) v Vavilov

2019 SCC 65

441 DLR (4th) 1

City Centre Equities Inc. v Regina (City) 2018 SKCA 43

City Centre

75 MPLR (5th) 179

Congrégation des témoins de Jéhovah de 2004 SCC 48

Congrégation des témoins

de Jéhovah

St-Jérôme-Lafontaine v Lafontaine

[2004] 2 SCR 650

(Municipality)

Consumers Co-operative Refineries

Limited v Regina (City)

2020 SKCA 111

CCRL 2020

Corman Park (Rural Municipality) v

618421 Saskatchewan Ltd.

2018 SKCA 29, 73 Corman Park

MPLR (5th) 1

CP REIT S Real Estate Limited v

Saskatoon (City)

2021 SKCA 100

CP REIT

Page 97

Style of Cause

Citations

Abbreviated Case Name

Domtar Pulp & Paper Products Inc. v

Prince Albert (City)

2014 SKMB 49

Domtar

Dunsmuir v New Brunswick

2008 SCC 9

Dunsmuir

[2008] 1 SCR 190

E.Z. Automotive Ltd. v Regina (City)

2021 SKCA 109

E.Z. Automotive

Estevan Coal

McDougall

[2022] 4 WWR 55

Estevan Coal Corp. v Estevan (Rural

Municipality No. 5)

2000 SKCA 82

199 Sask R 57

F.H. v McDougall

2008 SCC 53

[2008] 3 SCR 41

Freeborne Developments Ltd. v Corman 2021 SKCA 48

Freeborne

Redhead

Park (Rural Municipality)

Gary L. Redhead Holdings Ltd. v Swift 2017 SKCA 47

Current (Rural Municipality)

[2017] 9 WWR 296

GFL Environmental Inc. v Edenwold

(Rural Municipality)

2020 SKCA 89

GFL Environmental

GMRI Canada

GMRI Canada Inc. v Saskatoon (City)

2009 SKCA 145

343 Sask R 1

Harvard Property Management Inc. v

Saskatoon (City)

2017 SKCA 34

Harvard 2017

HDL Investments Inc. v Regina (City)

2009 SKCA 138

HDL Investments

[2010] 3 WWR 249

Husk v City of Regina

(1996), 141 Sask R Husk

74 (CA)

Imperial Oil Limited v Regina (City)

2016 SKCA 107

408 DLR (4th) 46

Imperial Oil 2016

In re Canadian Pacific R.W. Co. v

Macleod School District

(1901), 5 Terr LR Macleod

187 (NWT Trial Div)

Page 98

Style of Cause

Citations

Abbreviated Case Name

L & L Lawson Enterprises Ltd. v Regina 2008 SKCA 43

L&L Lawson

(City)

310 Sask R 29

North Prairie Developments Ltd. v

Martensville (City)

2019 SKMB 78

North Prairie Developments

PSS Professional

P.S.S. Professional Salon Services Inc. v 2007 SKCA 149

Saskatchewan Human Rights

[2008] 5 WWR 440

Commission)

Re Canadian Northern Railway v

Omemee School District

(1906), 4 WLR 547 Omemee

(NWT Trial Div)

Regina (City) v Laing Property Corp.

(1994), 128 Sask R Laing

29 (CA)

Regina (City) v Newell Smelski Ltd.

(1996), 152 Sask R Newell Smelski

44 (CA)

Sasco Developments Ltd. v Moose Jaw 2012 SKCA 24

Sasco

(City)

385 Sask R 287

Saskatoon (City) v Boardwalk Reit

Properties Holdings Ltd.

2008 SKCA 174

314 Sask R 290

Boardwalk Reit

Saskatoon (City) v Victory Majors

Investments Corporation

2020 SKCA 59

Victory Majors

Walmart 2018

Wal-Mart 2019

Saskatoon (City) v Walmart Canada

Corp.

2019 SKCA 2

Saskatoon (City) v Wal-Mart Canada

Corp.

2019 SKCA 3

430 DLR (4th) 697

Saskatoon (City) v West Coast Reduction 2019 SKCA 48

West Coast

Ltd.

SBLP Town N Country Mall Inc. v Moose 2022 SKCA 10

TNC Mall 2022

TNC Mall 2020

Jaw (City)

T N C Mall Property Holdings Inc. v

Moose Jaw (City)

2020 SKCA 99

451 DLR (4th) 671

Page 99

Style of Cause

Citations

Abbreviated Case Name

Mi-Sask

Yorkton (City) v Mi-Sask Idustries Ltd. 2021 SKCA 43

[2021] 6 WWR 18