ONTARIO LABOUR RELATIONS BOARD  
OLRB Case No: 2852-20-MR  
Labourers' International Union of North America, Local 183, Union v  
Mulmer Services Ltd., and SP Plus Corporation Canada/Standard  
Parking of Canada Ltd., Employers  
BEFORE: Kelly Waddingham, Vice-Chair  
APPEARANCES:  
Andrew Black, Ryan Ehrenworth, Manny Silva,  
Tameru Tesfaye, Mohammed Nasser, Kaled Abdulkader, Florence  
Abraham and Earl Douglas appearing for Labourers International Union  
of North America, Local 183; Gillian Howe, Dana Schott, John Latam,  
Paul Richey and Chelakara Srinivasan appearing for Mulmer Services  
Ltd.; and no one appearing for SP Plus Corporation Canada/Standard  
Parking of Canada Ltd.  
DECISION OF THE BOARD: August 5, 2022  
1.  
This decision flows out of a Ministerial Reference made pursuant  
to subsection 115(1) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995, S.O. 1995 c.1,  
as amended (the “Act” or the “LRA”). The Reference is in relation to a  
request to the Minister of Labour by the Labourers International Union  
of North America, Local 183 (“LIUNA” or the “Union”) for the  
appointment of an arbitrator pursuant to section 49 of the Act. The  
Reference seeks the Board’s advice with respect to the question of  
whether Mulmer Services Ltd. (“Mulmer”), the responding party on the  
Request for Appointment, is a successor employer as defined by the  
LRA.  
2.  
As this Ministerial Reference involves the applicability of section  
69.1 of the Act, the Board, in accordance with subsection 115(2) of the  
LRA, will address the matter as if an interested party had applied for a  
determination under that provision.  
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BACKGROUND  
3. On March 1, 2021, Mulmer Services Ltd. became the new  
provider of a shuttle bus service for University Health Network (“UHN”).  
The contract for the shuttle bus service (as well as parking services) had  
previously been held by SP Plus Corporation Canada (“SP+”). The  
employees of SP+ were represented by LIUNA, Local 183. LIUNA  
asserts that Mulmer is a successor employer to SP+ by virtue of section  
69.1 of the LRA, and is bound to the terms and conditions of the  
collective agreement between itself and SP+, in effect from January 1,  
2020 to December 31, 2022. Although the collective agreement covers  
all employees of SP+ in the province of Ontario, LIUNA seeks to bind  
Mulmer to the collective agreement only with respect to the employees  
of SP+ whose work was related to the operation of shuttle bus services  
at UHN.  
FACTS  
4.  
Dana Schott, UHN Director of Leasing, John Latam, UHN Leader  
of Retail Business Operations, Paul Richey, President of Mulmer, and  
Chelakara Srinivasan, bus driver for Mulmer testified on behalf of  
Mulmer. Manny Silva, LIUNA Business Representative, Tameru Tesfaye,  
SP+ Senior Manager, Mohammed Nasser, Kaled Abdulkader, Earl  
Douglas, bus driver for both SP+ and Mulmer and Florence Abraham  
(the last four are all bus drivers for SP+) testified on behalf of LIUNA.  
5.  
UHN is a “research hospital” fully affiliated with the University  
of Toronto. It encompasses Toronto General Hospital (“TGH”) (200  
Elizabeth Street), Toronto Western Hospital (“TWH”) (399 Bathurst  
Street), Princess Margaret Cancer Centre (610 University Avenue),  
Hillcrest Reactivation Centre (47 Austin Terrace), Lakeside Long-Term  
Care Centre (150 Dunn Avenue), Toronto Rehab (four locations) and  
The Michener Institute of Education (222 St. Patrick Street).  
6.  
Sunnybrook Health Sciences Centre is a “teaching hospital” fully  
affiliated with the University of Toronto. It is comprised of four sites:  
the Bayview Campus (2075 Bayview Avenue), Holland Centre (43  
Wellesley Street), St. John’s Rehab (285 Cummer Avenue), and  
Reactivation Care Centre (200 Church Street). Like UHN, it has a facility  
devoted to cancer treatment. The facility the Odette Cancer Centre –  
is located on the Bayview Campus.  
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7.  
UHN operates Princess Margaret Cancer Centre Lodge (545  
Jarvis Street). It provides accommodation for out-of-town patients  
receiving treatment at Princess Margaret Cancer Centre and the Odette  
Cancer Centre. Space permitting, it will also accommodate family  
members of cancer patients. The Lodge was closed on March 23, 2020  
due to the arrival of the COVID-19 pandemic.  
8.  
Plexxus is a not-for-profit health care supply chain organization  
that provides supply chain and “back office” services to Ontario  
hospitals. It presently serves approximately twenty hospitals, health  
care centres and health care networks.  
9.  
UHN provides a shuttle bus service for patients, staff and  
visitors of its facilities. UHN relies upon Plexxus to find a provider for  
the service. Plexxus does so through a tendering process initiated by a  
Request for Proposal (“RFP”). In June 2012, Plexxus issued an RFP for  
a shuttle bus service that would operate between Toronto General  
Hospital and Toronto Western Hospital (RFP No. 53882). The winning  
proposal for the service was submitted by Standard Parking of Canada  
Ltd on July 26, 2012. It provided for two shuttle buses one operating  
between the hours of 6:30 AM and 5:00 PM, the other operating  
between the hours of 8:00 AM and 8:30 PM.  
10.  
The “Pricing Schedule” that formed the bulk of Standard  
Parking’s response to the RFP was subsequently incorporated into the  
services agreement between Standard Parking and UHN. It contained  
the following provisions:  
Route Schedule/SLA Requirements  
The shuttle buses shall operate Monday through Friday,  
excluding the days defined in the Shuttle Bus  
Transportation Schedule which is included directly  
below.  
The Purchaser may specify “drop-off” locations along the  
route as required.  
It is probable that additional sites may require delivery  
services within the duration of the agreement. Standard  
Parking of Canada will be required to adapt to changes  
accordingly.  
Standard Parking of Canada may pick up Hospital Staff  
and drop off at locations listed below as required on  
route: Brunswick / Bellevue, St. George / College St. TTC  
Stop, McCaul / College St. TTC Stop, University / College  
TTC Stop.  
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The shuttle bus service will include patient/passenger  
pickup and drop off; light parcels and mail delivery.  
11.  
The services agreement between UHN and Standard Parking  
was signed in December/January 2012 (CW80171). It specified that the  
shuttle bus service would start on April 1, 2013. The agreement  
contained provisions authorizing Plexxus and/or UHN to add additional  
sites to the shuttle service.  
7.17 Future/Desired State  
It is probable that additional sites will require delivery services  
or changes to the Schedule within the duration of the  
agreement and Standard Parking of Canada Ltd. would be  
required to adapt accordingly.  
Plexxus reserves the right to add additional Plexxus Member  
Hospitals or health facilities to this agreement without  
proceeding to issue a subsequent RFP.  
If Plexxus Member Hospitals or health facilities are added after  
this Agreement is signed, Standard Parking of Canada shall  
supply the Services to the additional hospitals or health  
facilities, subject to the terms of this Agreement, on at least  
the same conditions and terms that they are being provided  
pursuant to this Agreement.  
12.  
In December 2014, the parties signed an “amending  
agreement” to expand the service hours for the shuttle bus. The  
effective date of the agreement was September 1, 2014. An appendix  
to the agreement (Appendix ‘A’) sets out schedules for the “new routes”,  
both of which operated between TGH and TWH. Route 1 operated from  
6:00 AM to 8:30 PM, and Route 2 operated from 6:15 AM to 8:15 PM.  
13.  
A second amendment to the services agreement was made in  
2018. The amendment effective April 1, 2018 extended the term of  
the agreement for three years (April 1, 2018 to March 31, 2021).  
14.  
A new route was added to the service which operated between  
Princess Margaret Cancer Centre, Princess Margaret Cancer Centre  
Lodge and Sunnybrook’s Odette Cancer Centre. Its primary purpose  
was to transport patients and their family members to and from the  
Lodge and the two treatment facilities. The route was suspended due  
to renovations at the Lodge that started before the beginning of the  
pandemic. According to Ms. Schott, the route will be restored once  
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renovations at the Lodge are completed. When the route was operating,  
drivers who usually drove the TGH-TWH route were sometimes called  
upon to drive Princess Margaret - Sunnybrook route.  
15.  
In May 2020, Plexxus issued a new RFP for shuttle bus services  
for UHN facilities (RFP No. CW557467). The “current state” of the  
service was explained in Article 1.6.1 of the RFP.  
1.6.1 Background and Current State  
The Shuttle Bus Service pick up and drop off patients /staff /  
passengers, including light parcels and mail delivery.  
The Toronto General Hospital service operates between  
Toronto General Hospital and Toronto Western Hospital.  
The Princess Margaret Shuttle Bus Service operates between  
Princess Margaret Lodge to Princess Margaret Hospital and  
Sunnybrook Campus.  
The Shuttle Bus Service schedule runs from Monday to Friday  
please refer to the Shuttle Bus RFP Response Schedule for full  
details and Shuttle Bus Transportation Schedule.  
[…]  
Lodge to Princess Margaret - Monday to Friday 07:30 to 18:45  
Princess Margaret to Lodge - Monday to Friday 07:45 to 19:00  
Lodge to Sunnybrook - Monday to Friday 08:30 to 17:45  
Sunnybrook to Lodge - Monday to Friday 08:55 to 18:10  
Toronto General to Toronto Western Hospital - Monday to  
Friday 06:30 to 20:30  
No weekends, no stat holidays.  
16.  
The intent of the RFP and the right of Plexxus to add sites to  
the service were explained in Article 1.6.2.  
1.6.2 Future/Desired State  
The intent with this RFP is to make the following awards:  
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A single transportation company to manage the Services of  
both sites or two separate companies. One to manage the UHN-  
Toronto Western/Toronto General route and one to manage the  
Princess Margaret/Sunnybrook route.  
It is possible that additional sites will require delivery services  
or changes to the Schedule within the duration of the  
agreement and the Preferred Proponent would be required to  
adapt to changes accordingly.  
Plexxus reserves the right to add additional Plexxus Member  
Hospitals or health facilities to the award of or the requirements  
of any Agreements that results from this RFP without  
proceeding to issue a subsequent RFP.  
If Plexxus Member Hospitals or health facilities are added after  
the Agreements are signed, the Proponent shall supply the  
Services to the additional hospitals or health facilities, subject  
to the terms of the Agreements, on at least the same conditions  
and terms that they are being provided pursuant to this RFP.  
17.  
The addresses of “delivery locations” were set out in a schedule  
to the RFP. The delivery locations are those set out in Article 1.6.1  
(above). The schedule also states:  
The Services will be provided directly to the Purchasers. Many  
of the Purchasers have more than one site. During Agreement  
negotiations with each individual Purchaser the appropriate  
Purchaser locations will be confirmed.  
18.  
Standard Parking / SP+ did not submit a response to the RFP.  
The winning proposal was submitted by Mulmer Services Ltd. A services  
agreement between UHN and Mulmer (Agreement #CW557467) was  
signed in January 2021. The agreement was scheduled to take effect  
on March 1, 2021, and run until February 28, 2027.  
19.  
Article 2.3 of the services agreement concerned “changes to  
schedules”. It provides (in part):  
2.3.1 General  
If the Purchaser requests changes in the scope of any of the  
Services or if the Supplier determines in its opinion that  
modification to the scope of the Services are required, then in  
either case,  
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(a)  
(b)  
prior to proceeding with such changes, the scope of and  
compensation for the changes shall be mutually agreed  
in writing by the parties; and  
the Purchaser shall not be liable for any costs incurred  
by the Supplier for such changes unless prior  
authorization has been given by the Purchaser in  
accordance with this section.  
20.  
Between January 20 and January 22, 2021, there were  
communications between Jeffrey Marchand, Manager of Facility Services  
for Plexxus and Ms. Schott of UHN, between Mr. Marchand and Mr.  
Richey, President of Mulmer, and between Mr., Marchand and Hamza  
Abdilkader, Managing Director of Business Development for SP+  
regarding the transition of the shuttle service from SP+ to Mulmer and  
the fate of the four SP+ drivers who were at that time driving the UHN  
shuttle buses. The exchanged e-mails make repeated reference to “Bill  
7”, which appears to be the parties’ shorthand for the Labour Relations  
Act, 1995. The first of this series of e-mails (as produced for this  
hearing) was sent by Ms. Schott to Mr. Marchand at 11:39 AM on  
January 20. It reads:  
Hi Jeffrey,  
Please see the attached executed agreements for the Shuttle  
Bus.  
Please prepare the Notice of Termination for SP+ shuttle  
services with the effective termination date of February 28,  
2021. Could you please request Bill 7 information from SP+ if  
you have not already received.  
Thank you,  
Dana  
21.  
At 1:14 PM on January 20, Mr. Marchand made the following  
request to Mr. Abdilkader:  
Hello Hamza,  
Can you please provide me with Bill 7 information for the  
Shuttle service contract?  
Thank you,  
Jeffrey  
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22.  
Mr. Abdilkader sent the requested information to Mr. Marchand  
at 4:10 PM, as an attachment to his e-mail. The document identified  
Kaled Abdulkader, Earl Douglas and Mohammed Nasser as full-time  
shuttle bus drivers, and Florence Abraham as a part-time driver. It also  
provided their date of hire, their hourly wage rates, and their average  
weekly hours.  
23.  
At 10:37 AM on January 21, Mr. Marchand sent the following  
query to Mr. Richey:  
Morning Paul,  
Quick thought that I don’t believe we or UHN spoke about. The  
implications of Bill 7, the incumbent had 4 employees on the  
contract. Will you be taking these employees?  
Thanks,  
Jeffrey  
24.  
At 12:53 PM on January 21, Mr. Marchand sent an e-mail to Ms.  
Schott. The key text of the e-mail is as follows:  
Morning Dana,  
Bill 7 information is attached. Can we share the attached with  
Mulmer?  
As I understand the continuity of employment act, I believe  
Mulmer will have an obligation to take these people. […]  
The Bill 7 attached has 4 folks working this contract. I believe  
Mulmer will be operating with 3 employees. The question  
which will arise is if Mulmer doesn’t take these folks the  
employee will be eligible for severance. Is severance an  
obligation of the outgoing company or the new company?  
Regards,  
Jeffrey  
25.  
Ms. Schott replied to the e-mail at 1:04 PM.  
Hi Jeffrey,  
I would recommend Mulmer and SP+ come to an agreement  
with each other as it wouldn’t involve UHN. I’d recommend  
connecting them to finalize the details.  
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Thank you,  
Dana  
26.  
At 1:35 PM, Mr. Marchand sent the following e-mail to Mr.  
Abdilkader (in response to an e-mail from Mr. Abdilkader confirming the  
transition date for the shuttle bus service):  
Thanks Hamza,  
How do we deal with the current staff? Do you want me to  
connect you to the incoming contractor?  
Regards,  
Jeffrey  
27.  
Mr. Abdilkader replied to Mr. Marchand’s e-mail at 1:41 PM. His  
e-mail directed as follows:  
The incoming vendor can contact Tameru Tesfaye (Senior  
[SP+] Manager at UHN) for transition.  
Thanks  
Hamza Abdilkader  
28.  
At 2:30 PM, Mr. Marchand sent the following e-mail to Mr.  
Richey:  
Hi Paul,  
Here’s the Bill 7 information we spoke about. I spoke to SP+,  
the incumbent supplier, if you want to reach out directly to  
Tameru regarding the employees they currently have or  
anything else regarding the transition, feel free. Speaking to  
UHN, they say you have no obligation to taking [sic] any SP+  
employees. SP+ have been notified that you’ll be taking over  
the contract March 1, 2021.  
[…]  
Thanks  
Jeffrey  
29.  
In an e-mail sent at 2:32 PM, Mr. Marchand informed Mr.  
Tesfaye:  
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I gave Paul Richey at Mulmer your contact information; he’ll  
reach out to you directly.  
30.  
On February 5, 2021, SP+ sent a letter to employees on the  
UHN shuttle bus contract informing them that SP+ would no longer be  
operating the shuttle service, and advising them of their options. As  
well as advising the employees of their bumping rights under the  
collective agreement, it advised them:  
If you choose to remain at your current location, your  
employment with SP+ will end as of March 1st and your last day  
of employment with SP Plus will be February 28, 2021. Any  
wages owed and any accrued vacation up to February 28th will  
be paid out on the first day following this date. Mulmer Service  
[sic] would be responsible for any severance and separation  
payment obligations if they choose not to hire you.  
31.  
Mr. Richey testified that prior to Mulmer becoming the new  
service provider he was contacted by Mr. Tesfaye, who asked if Mulmer  
intended to hire the SP+ drivers. Mr. Richey told Mr. Tesfaye that the  
SP+ drivers could contact the company and that Mulmer would be  
happy to interview them. According to Mr. Richey, three SP+ drivers  
applied to Mulmer, and two were interviewed. The third driver failed to  
return the company’s phone calls to schedule an interview, Mr. Richey  
said.  
32.  
One of the SP+ applicants, Mr. Douglas, was hired through the  
regular interview process. In addition to Mr. Douglas, two drivers who  
had worked elsewhere for Mulmer were hired for the UHN shuttle bus  
service. Mr. Richey explained that when a services contract ends,  
Mulmer undertakes to reassign its drivers to another contract.  
33.  
The shuttle bus service was not intended to be used by  
members of the general public. Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, the  
shuttle bus was used by patients, staff and volunteers. According to Mr.  
Latam, the shuttle is used for a variety of reasons for example,  
patients might take the shuttle bus to travel between sites for medical  
tests, and staff might use the shuttle bus to travel to a different site to  
attend meetings or to cover staff shortages.  
34.  
Ms. Schott and Mr. Latam acknowledged that theoretically”  
UHN employees could use the shuttle bus as part of their commute (i.e.,  
to get them close to a subway stop or to their home). Ms. Schott  
testified that there is no requirement that passengers using the shuttle  
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service actually proceed into the destination facility when they get off  
the bus. Mr. Latam stated that at one time the shuttle bus used to make  
a number of stops between the TGH and TWH, including at a subway  
station on University Avenue. Mr. Latam acknowledged that the Change  
of Service provision in the Service Agreement between UHN and Mulmer  
would allow for a revision in the bus schedule such that buses could  
make stops at subway stations. In cross-examination, however, Mr.  
Latam reiterated that the purpose of the UHN shuttle was to transport  
people from one UHN site to another UHN site, not to facilitate  
commuting.  
35.  
In March 2020, with the arrival of the pandemic, UHN decided  
to restrict use of the shuttle bus to its staff and contractors. UHN also  
implemented a requirement that riders show UHN photocard  
identification before boarding a shuttle bus. The Princess Margaret -  
Sunnybrook route was suspended before the UHN-Mulmer services  
agreement took effect (thus, before the onset of the pandemic).  
However, pursuant to the agreement, UHN had the right to restore the  
route at any time during the term of its contract with Mulmer.  
36.  
Shuttle bus drivers are authorized to enter UHN facilities to  
make deliveries, to access food services and to use washrooms.  
However, they must show their UHN identification in order to enter the  
facilities. The shuttle bus drivers testified that they typically did not go  
into the facilities to pick up or drop off packages and other items. They  
said that in most cases where they were required to deliver an item from  
one hospital to another, someone from the originating hospital would  
bring the item to the bus, and someone from the receiving hospital  
would come out to collect it. Mr. Douglas stated that on occasions when  
no one came to the bus to receive an item, he would deliver it to a  
security person at the entrance to the facility. Mr. Nasser testified that  
he sometimes delivered packages to reception at the receiving facility.  
Ms. Abraham said that if no one came out to the shuttle bus to pick up  
a package, she would leave it at the Standard Parking office of the  
receiving hospital (located in the garages of TGH and TWH). All of the  
drivers testified that in order to stay on schedule, their stops at the UHN  
facilities typically lasted no more than five minutes. This was usually  
enough time, they said, to drop off and pick up passengers.  
37.  
Under the services agreement between UHN and Mulmer,  
Mulmer was required to operate two shuttle buses on the TGH-TWH  
route. The first bus operated Monday to Friday from 6:00 AM to 8:00  
PM. The second bus was originally scheduled to operate Monday to  
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Friday from 7:00 AM to 9:00 AM, and from 4:00 PM to 6:00 PM.  
However, the schedule for that bus was ultimately revised to Monday to  
Friday from 6:00 AM to 8:00 AM, and from 5:00 PM to 8:00 PM. The  
pickup and drop off location for TWH is at the Leonard Street Entrance,  
on Leonard Street (a public street) between Nassau Street and Wales  
Avenue. The pickup and drop off location for TGH is at 585 University  
Avenue (in a vehicle loop on hospital property). The shuttle bus travels  
along public streets.  
38.  
SP+ used 32-passenger buses to provide shuttle service on the  
TGH-TWH route. According to Mr. Richey, shuttle bus ridership dropped  
at the onset of the pandemic, and Mulmer and was permitted to use 24-  
passenger buses on the route. Mulmer was at that time in the process  
of procuring new 32-passenger buses.  
39.  
On April 13, 2021, UHN issued a Termination Notice indicating  
that it was terminating its contract with Mulmer pursuant to Article 6.3.2  
of the services agreement (Termination by Purchaser). According to the  
Notice, the parties agreed that the contract would end May 31, 2021.  
Ms. Schott testified that the services agreement was terminated because  
UHN senior management determined that Mulmer “was not a good fit”  
for UHN. As of the date of the hearings into this case, the UHN shuttle  
bus service is operated by Voyago.  
ARGUMENT  
Mulmer’s submissions  
40.  
Mulmer submits that it does not meet the requirements of  
subsection 69.1 so as to be deemed a “successor employer” for the  
purposes of the Labour Relations Act. It asserts that it does not “provide  
services directly or indirectly to a building owner or manager that are  
related to servicing [a] premises”. Mulmer contends that UHN is not a  
“building or premises” and, furthermore, that the services it provides  
are not related to servicing a premises. It further maintains that its  
employees do not perform services at a “principal place of work” and  
that its services are not substantially similar to those performed by SP+.  
Mulmer points out that the Board need only accept one of the  
aforementioned assertions in order for the Application to fail. It also  
points out that if the requirements of subsection 69.1(1) are not met,  
subsection 69.1(3) is not triggered.  
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41.  
Mulmer notes that the services that are expressly included in  
subsection 69.1(1) are building cleaning, food service and security.  
While it acknowledges that the enumerated services are not exhaustive,  
Mulmer submits that the Board should not expand the scope of  
subsection 69.1(1) to include shuttle bus services. It points out that the  
enumerated services are all directly related to the operation of the  
associated premises itself. The shuttle bus is not. Mulmer points out  
that the shuttle bus is simply one among many means of moving people  
between sites. It is ancillary, Mulmer insists, to the operation of a  
premises. To interpret subsection 69.1(1) to include shuttle bus  
services, Mulmer says, would be to give the provision too broad an  
interpretation, taking it beyond the scope of what it was designed to  
protect. It points out that section 69.1 has never before been applied  
to a shuttle bus service, and only once has it been applied to a service  
beyond those enumerated in subsection 69.1(1) (Imperial Parking  
Canada Corporation c.o.b. Impark, 2020 48241). Mulmer  
asserts that the instant case can be distinguished from Imperial Parking,  
as the parking lot employees in that case were, at all times, engaged in  
services related to a “building” (the parking structure).  
42.  
Mulmer maintains that the shuttle bus is a service provided to  
patients and employees of and visitors to UHN facilities. It is not,  
Mulmer says, a service provided to the owner or manager of those  
facilities. It points out that while the service’s principal purpose is to  
transport riders from one UHN site to another, travel on the shuttle is  
not limited to destinations that are on its intended route. Mulmer  
asserts that the route between Princess Margaret Hospital, Princess  
Margaret Cancer Centre Lodge and Sunnybrook Hospital should be  
considered part of the shuttle bus service for the purposes of this  
inquiry. It points out that although service on the “Sunnybrook Route”  
was suspended, it was included in the 2020 RFP for the shuttle bus  
service. Mulmer maintains that the Sunnybrook Route is a part of the  
shuttle service’s “regular operation”, and is likely to be restored when  
the Cancer Centre Lodge is reopened. It notes that SP+ drivers were  
either exclusively assigned the Sunnybrook Route or when operational  
needs demanded – were “intermingled” between the TGH-TWH and  
Sunnybrook routes.  
43.  
Mulmer observes that the words “premises” and “building” are  
not defined in the LRA. It provided definitions of the terms from several  
sources, including the Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, Black’s Law  
Dictionary (11th ed., 2019) and the Canadian Abridgment Words &  
Phrases (W&P 20523). Mulmer points out that “premises” is typically  
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defined as “lands and structures”. While it acknowledges that the Board  
has accepted that “premises” extends beyond a building to a “broader  
geographical area” (Medieval Times Dinner & Tournament (Toronto)  
Inc., 1994 9840 (ON LRB)), it asserts that inherent in the  
definition are limits to how far that geographical area can extend. The  
word “premises”, Mulmer contends, cannot be interpreted so as to  
encompass city streets on which the shuttle buses travel, and lands and  
properties that have no connection to UHN (such as public property  
owned by the City of Toronto, or private property owned by Sunnybrook  
Hospital).  
44.  
Mulmer submits that even if it could be concluded that there is  
a premisesto which the shuttle bus service is connected, the shuttle  
service is not related to servicing that premises. Mulmer maintains that  
the shuttle bus is a service provided to passengers (that is, people), not  
to a building or premises. The provision of that service, it says, does  
not involve and is not related to the operation of any hospital  
building(s). The shuttle bus service, Mulmer asserts, is distinct from the  
services enumerated in subsection 69.1(1), all of which relate to the  
operation of a building. Mulmer points out that without services such as  
cleaning, food services, and even parking services, a building or  
premises might cease to operate properly. It insists that the same  
cannot be said of a shuttle bus service. The shuttle bus service, it says,  
is not essential to the operation of UHN facilities. Mulmer notes that  
shuttle bus drivers do not enter hospital buildings for the purpose of  
performing their duties (although they may occasionally be asked to  
take mail or packages from one facility to another).  
45.  
Mulmer points out that shuttle bus passengers have many  
alternatives to the shuttle to travel to and between UHN facilities. It  
also notes that prior to the pandemic, passengers were not required to  
show any identification to board a shuttle bus.  
Consequently,  
passengers could use the shuttle for reasons other than travelling  
between UHN facilities for example, as part of their commute or to get  
them close to other destinations in the city. These facts, Mulmer says,  
further support the conclusion that the shuttle bus service is not related  
to “servicing a premises”.  
46.  
Mulmer submits that the language of the RFP further supports  
its position. It points out that the RFP (at Article 1.6.2) reserved to UHN  
the right to add additional sites to shuttle bus routes, and that provisions  
of the service agreements (namely, Articles 2.3 and 7.17) authorized  
UHN to make changes to schedules and drop-off locations, including  
- 15 -  
locations that are not part of UHN (such as buildings associated with the  
University of Toronto). Mulmer asserts that if UHN is able to add stops  
to the service that are not at UHN facilities, there is no “premises”, and  
the shuttle bus service is not related to servicing a premises.  
47.  
As it concerns the meaning of “building services” (also not  
defined in the LRA), Mulmer directs the Board to the definition set out  
at subsection 1(1) of the Employment Standards Act, 2000, S.O. 2000,  
c. 41 (the “ESA”). There, “building services” are expressly defined as  
“services for a building with respect to food, security and cleaning”. It  
notes that while Ontario Regulation 287/01 prescribes further services  
for the purposes of the definition, the prescribed services are limited to  
those relating to the operation of a parking garage, a parking lot or a  
concession stand, or to managing the property. All of the services must  
relate to the “building” and its occupants and visitors, Mulmer says.  
Mulmer points out that a shuttle bus service would not fall within the  
definition of “building services” for the purposes of the ESA. Mulmer  
acknowledges that in Imperial Parking, the Board rejected the  
Responding Party’s proposition that the definition of “building services”  
in the ESA could assist it in defining the word “building” as it is used in  
the LRA. However, it submits that the determination to be made in the  
instant case is different than the determination that was made in the  
earlier case. It says that in Imperial Parking, the Board was required to  
determine whether a parking garage constituted a “building”, whereas  
in the instant case the Board is being called upon to determine the scope  
of the term “building services”, so as to decide whether the shuttle bus  
service is related to servicing a premises.  
48.  
Mulmer submits that it cannot be the case that the ESA is never  
helpful in interpreting the LRA. Mulmer maintains that the two statutes  
must be read together, and their provisions interpreted in a manner that  
“makes sense”. Mulmer refers the Board to R. v. Ulybel Enterprises Ltd.,  
2001 SCC 56 (), Bell ExpressVu Limited Partnership v. Rex, 2002  
SCC 42 () and Durham District School Board, Rainbow District  
School Board and Peel District School Board, 2015 30160 (ON  
LRB) for the proposition that statutes dealing with the same subject  
matter should be interpreted in a manner that is consistent and  
harmonious, and that minimizes conflict between statutes. In view of  
this principle, Mulmer contends, the LRA and the ESA must be read  
together so as to ensure congruence and harmony between them.  
49.  
Mulmer points out that the definition of “building services” in  
the ESA is limited to food, security and cleaning services, and that  
- 16 -  
additional services can be added to the definition only by way of a  
regulation. Mulmer maintains that while the LRA does not provide an  
exhaustive list of building services, any expansion of the list beyond the  
enumerated services should be informed by the definition set out in the  
ESA. It would offend the principle of “harmonization”, Mulmer says, to  
adopt a broader definition for the purposes of the LRA than exists in the  
ESA. Mulmer points out that including shuttle bus services in the  
definition under the LRA would create a situation in which a unionized  
shuttle service operator would be subject to the successor employer  
provisions of the Act, whereas a non-unionized operator would not be  
subject to the continuity of employment, and termination pay and  
severance pay provisions of the ESA. Excluding shuttle bus services  
from building services for the purposes of the LRA, Mulmer submits,  
would ensure that the Act remains consistent with the ESA. Mulmer  
contends that this is a different situation than was present in Imperial  
Parking, as in that case accepting a parking service as a building service  
did not render the LRA inconsistent with the ESA, given that a parking  
service falls within the definition under the latter statute by virtue of O.  
Reg. 287/01.  
50.  
Mulmer submits that the legislature could have chosen to  
include other services amongst those to which it extended successor  
rights by way of section 69.1 of the LRA. However, it limited the services  
to those expressly identified in the “Changing Workplaces Review”  
undertaken for the Ministry of Labour, Training and Skills Development.  
The authors of the report arising out of the review The Changing  
Workplaces Review: An Agenda for Workplace Rights, Final Report,  
issued May 2017 recommended that successor rights under the LRA  
be applied to “building services industries”, specifically security, food  
services and cleaners, and to home care funded by the government.  
The authors expressly confined their recommendation to “a few sectors  
where employees are particularly vulnerable” (pp. 410-411). Mulmer  
points out that the authors identified other sectors in which there are  
“unskilled and vulnerable workers performing precarious work” (such as  
bus drivers working for school boards), but went only as far as  
recommending that those sectors be subject to “further examination”,  
and that the LRA be amended to allow the government to extend  
successor rights protections to other services and sectors by way of  
regulation (p. 412). Mulmer maintains that as section 69.1 was added  
to the LRA in response to the Review report, it should be inferred that it  
was the legislature’s intention to exclude shuttle bus services from the  
services included in the new provision.  
- 17 -  
51.  
In the alternative (should the Board decide that shuttle bus  
services are related to servicing a premises), Mulmer submits that  
requirements (a) and (c) of subsection 69.1(3) are not met in the  
circumstances of this case. Mulmer contends that shuttle bus drivers  
do not “perform services at premises that are their principal place of  
work” as they drive between buildings and locations, and have only brief  
and peripheral contact with UHN “premises”. It asserts that the shuttle  
bus itself is the drivers’ principal place of work. With respect to the  
requirement at (c), Mulmer maintains that the shuttle bus service it  
provided to UHN is not substantially similar to that provided by SP+. It  
points out that SP+ operated a 32-passenger shuttle bus on the TGH-  
TWH route, while it operated a 24-passenger shuttle bus on the route.  
It also points out that the SP+ and Mulmer shuttle services operated on  
different schedules SP+ operated two buses throughout the day, while  
Mulmer operated one bus through the day, and a second bus only during  
peak use periods.  
52.  
In addition to the decisions cited above, Mulmer also refers the  
Board to: McIntosh Limousine Service Ltd., 2000 10874 (ON  
LRB); G.N. Johnston Equipment Co., 2018 63934 (ON LRB); and,  
Black & McDonald Ltd., 2015 78248 (ON LRB).  
LIUNA’s submissions  
53.  
LIUNA submits that this case is about a shuttle bus service that  
operates between two particular buildings operated by UHN: Toronto  
General Hospital and Toronto Western Hospital. Other UHN facilities,  
the Union notes, are not included in the shuttle bus service. LIUNA  
points out that prior to March 1, 2021, UHN directly or indirectly  
contracted with SP+ to provide the shuttle service. SP+ employed five  
drivers to provide the service. LIUNA maintains that when the contract  
for the shuttle service was taken over by Mulmer on March 1, 2021, the  
service continued uninterrupted. However, the drivers employed by  
SP+ found themselves out of work. Mulmer, the Union insists, refused  
to comply with subsection 69.1, despite the fact that the circumstances  
of the transfer of the shuttle bus service fell within the ambit of the  
provision. LIUNA contends that the employees at issue performed  
“building services”, that UHN was their place of work, and that the  
services they performed are substantially similar to those subsequently  
performed by Mulmer employees. LIUNA asserts that section 69.1 was  
introduced into the Act to protect workers in circumstances such as this.  
The SP+ employees, it says, were unlawfully displaced.  
- 18 -  
54.  
LIUNA maintains that interpretation of section 69.1 is a “matter  
of definition”, requiring the Board to focus on the specific wording of the  
provision. LIUNA reminds the Board that the legislature intended the  
language of the LRA to be “as broad as possible”. The Union also refers  
the Board to section 64 of the Legislation Act, 2006, S.O. 2006, c. 21,  
Sched. F, which directs that legislation “be interpreted as being  
remedial” and “be given such fair, large and liberal interpretation as best  
ensures the attainment of its objects”.  
55.  
LIUNA asserts that there is no question that Mulmer provided  
services directly to “a building owner or manager”, UHN being both the  
owner and manager of UHN buildings and premises. The Union contends  
that the phrase “services provided […] by or to a building owner or  
manager” is meaningfully broader than “services provided to a building”.  
The phrase, LIUNA says, captures any services rendered by or for the  
owner or manager, not just those pertaining to a building. The only  
condition, the Union notes, is that the services must be related to  
“servicing the premises”. LIUNA further contends that the phrase  
“related to servicing the premises” is broader than “servicing the  
premises”.  
56.  
LIUNA submits that the question of whether pursuant to  
subsection 69.1(3) a sale of a business is deemed to have occurred  
ultimately requires the Board to address seven questions. According to  
the Union, the first question is whether the hospitals are buildings, the  
second question is whether the shuttle bus service is a “service”, the  
third question is whether SP+ ceased to provide services at UHN  
premises, and the fourth question is whether the shuttle service is a  
service provided by or to a building owner or manager. All of these  
questions, the Union asserts, can be readily answered in the affirmative.  
The remaining questions, LIUNA allows, require more fulsome  
consideration.  
57.  
The fifth question to be determined, according to LIUNA, is  
whether the shuttle bus service is related to servicing UHN premises.  
The Union asserts that this question, too, can be answered in the  
affirmative. First, the Union reiterates that section 69.1 is not confined  
to a buildingand to services related to operating a building. It  
encompasses any services related to servicing a premises. Second, the  
Union submits that the use of the phrase “services related to servicing  
the premises” is not a “circular drafting error” on the part of the drafters  
of the provision. The repetition, it says, is intended to ensure that the  
provision captures all services in any way related to servicing the  
- 19 -  
premises. Third, the Union contends that cleaning, food and security  
are services that are ultimately provided to peoplerather than to a  
premises. Seen in this light, the Union says, the shuttle bus service  
is analogous to the enumerated services and, consequently, is related  
to servicing the premises. Finally, LIUNA points out that the shuttle bus  
service would not exist absent UHN premises. Accordingly, the Union  
maintains, it is a service that can only be related to UHN premises and,  
further, that it is related to servicing UHN premises “as a matter both of  
fact and of definition”.  
58.  
Under the rubric proposed by LIUNA, the sixth question is  
whether shuttle bus drivers “perform services at premises that are their  
principal place of work”. The Union maintains that it is not asking the  
Board to find that “premises” includes city streets or the city itself.  
LIUNA contends that subsection 69.1(3) is concerned not with “every  
premises” that an employee might visit in the course of their work but,  
rather, with the premises that are their “principal place of work”. The  
Union insists that TGH and TWH are the shuttle bus drivers’ principal  
place of work, and that the roadways the shuttle buses travel to get  
from one facility to another are “incidental” to the shuttle service. It is  
the facilities themselves, the Union says, that are the “end” or “point”  
of the service. The roads, it says, are simply “a means to an end”. The  
Union asserts, further, that if “principal” means “a matter or thing of  
primary importance” (Merriam-Webster Dictionary, online), the UHN  
premises are the sites that are of primary importance to the shuttle bus  
drivers (as well as to users of the shuttle service). It is “at” UHN  
premises that shuttle bus drivers pick up and drop off passengers, take  
breaks and use the restrooms, the Union points out. The Union stresses  
that “primary importance” in relation to premises is not a function of the  
amount of time the employee spends at the location. LIUNA also insists  
that it cannot be concluded that shuttle bus drivers do not work at a  
premises” simply because their work involves moving from one location  
to another. Imposing such a condition on shuttle bus drivers, the Union  
maintains, would be the same as requiring a “building” to have enclosed  
walls or windows a proposition rejected by the Board in Imperial  
Parking, supra (at para. 132).  
59.  
According to LIUNA, the seventh and final question to be  
answered is whether the services provided by Mulmer are “substantially  
similar” to the services formerly provided by SP+. The Union asserts  
that this question must also be answered in the affirmative. LIUNA  
maintains that the shuttle service operated by Mulmer is “all but  
identical” to the service provided by SP+. The “who, what, where, when  
- 20 -  
and why” of the Mulmer service, it says, is identical to the service  
operated by SP+. It involves the same routes, is for the same  
owner/manager, is contracted for through the same agent (Plexxus),  
and employs (at least in part) the same employees. LIUNA contends  
that the only changes to the shuttle service as operated by Mulmer were  
slight “tweaks” to capacity and scheduling, and different uniforms for  
drivers – changes it describes as “window dressing”. The Mulmer  
service, it insists, clearly meets the standard of “substantially similar”.  
60.  
LIUNA submits that section 69.1 is intended to protect  
incumbent unions in sectors in which re-tendering of contracts is the  
norm. The Union points out that in most circumstances bargaining  
rights do not attach to particular work, particular employees, a particular  
location or a particular contract. However, the Union says, the  
legislature (on the recommendation of the Changing Workplaces  
Review) has undertaken to bolster the sale of business provisions of the  
Act to protect service workers whose employment is made especially  
precarious by regular re-tendering of contracts. Accordingly, the Union  
submits, section 69.1 is present to ensure that unions are not ousted  
and employees are not dismissed because a service contract changes  
from one provider to another. LIUNA contends that there is no good  
basis for distinguishing shuttle bus drivers at issue here from the parking  
lot attendants at issue in Imperial Parking. Shuttle bus drivers, it says,  
are subject to the same re-tendering processes and, hence, the same  
precariousness regarding their employment. The Board, the Union  
submits, should adopt the interpretation of section 69.1 it applied in the  
Imperial Parking case and find that they, like parking lot attendants, are  
captured by the provision.  
61.  
LIUNA directs the Board to paragraph 80 of McIntosh Limousine  
Service Ltd., supra, for the proposition that the Labour Relations Board  
is a specialized tribunal having particular expertise in labour relations  
matters, and “particular sensitivity to developments in the labour  
relations community”. This includes, in the Union’s view, understanding  
the reasons behind changes to its home legislation. The Union points  
out, further, that pursuant to subsection 69(12) of the LRA, the Board  
has the power to determine whether a business has been sold. In view  
of these circumstances, LIUNA submits, the Board has the mandate and  
the authority to “make the call” to include shuttle bus drivers within the  
ambit of section 69.1, just as it included parking lot attendants. The  
Union maintains that it is not asking for a “novel” interpretation of  
section 69.1. It is, it insists, simply asking for an interpretation that is  
- 21 -  
consistent with the Board’s interpretation of the provision in Imperial  
Parking.  
62.  
LIUNA contends that the factual matrix in this case is  
“substantially identical” to that present in the Imperial Parking case, in  
that the building owner/manager is a large hospital, and the service at  
issue is intended to be used by hospital staff and visitors (but may be  
used by others). As in the earlier case, the Union is asking that a group  
of employees not expressly enumerated in section 69.1 be included  
under the provision. LIUNA point out that in Imperial Parking, the Board  
effectively rejected Impark’s argument that as they are not expressly  
enumerated in section 69.1, parking lot attendants should be excluded  
from the provision. LIUNA asserts that the language of section 69.1 –  
whether given a plain meaning or a purposive interpretation is  
sufficiently broad to extend to shuttle bus drivers, just as it now does to  
parking lot attendants.  
63.  
In response to Mulmer’s claim that the definition of “building  
services” set out in the Employment Standards Act (in conjunction with  
O. Reg. 287/01) ought to inform the Board’s interpretation of section  
69.1 of the LRA, the Union submits that the Board in Imperial Parking  
has already rejected such a proposition. The Union asserts that the ESA  
and its regulations (which are not passed by the legislature, it points  
out) address issues that are very different from those addressed by the  
LRA. The LRA, the Union says, is concerned with conferring and  
preserving bargaining rights. LIUNA contends that provisions such as  
section 69.1 have broader impact than do the building services  
provisions of the ESA, which concern the narrow issue of which employer  
(outgoing or incoming) is responsible for termination and severance pay  
owed to displaced employees. The Union also points out that unlike in  
the ESA, the term “building services” does not appear in any of the  
provisions of the LRA, including section 69.1. It appears only in the  
heading of 69.1. The Union directs the Board to section 70 of the  
Legislation Act, 2006, which provides that headings are “for convenience  
of reference only” and do not form part of an Act or regulation.  
Accordingly, the Union asserts, the phrase “services related to servicing  
the premises” can, and should, be interpreted more broadly than the  
term “building services”.  
64.  
LIUNA submits that while “harmonization” of statutory  
interpretations may make sense in some circumstances, it does not  
here. Adhering to that principle in this case, the Union asserts, would  
“fly in the face of the plain and purposive meaning of the words” used  
- 22 -  
in the LRA, the “express intention of the legislature” and the “labour  
relations expertise of the Board”. The Union submits that it would be  
“odd indeed” if benefits-conferring legislation such as the ESA were to  
constitute a “shield” against successorship under the LRA. LIUNA  
further submits that by adopting an interpretation of section 69.1 that  
is “dictated” by the ESA, the Board would be making a decision that is  
contrary to its decision in Imperial Parking, thereby offending the  
principle of stare decisis and creating confusion in the labour relations  
community.  
65.  
LIUNA describes the Sunnybrook Route as a “red herring”. The  
Union asserts that the route is not relevant to this application, as it was  
not part of the shuttle service at any material time. It points out that  
at the time of the transfer, SP+ had not provided service on the route  
in a year, and that following the transfer, Mulmer did not provide service  
on the route. LIUNA notes, further, that even Mulmer’s successor  
(Voyago) has not provided service on the route. The Union submits that  
the Board should consider the service only as it existed at the time of  
the transfer. The fact that the service agreement authorizes UHN to add  
locations, the Union contends, is immaterial to the Board’s  
determination. The Board, it says, should not concern itself with “facts”  
that may or may not materialize as a result of a contractual provision.  
LIUNA submits that were it the case that contract terms such as those  
identified by Mulmer could affect a factual determination in cases like  
this one, companies would simply add terms to service agreements  
reserving the right to “do any and all things that, if done, would change  
the factual matrix” so as to avoid being subject to successor rights.  
66.  
In addition to the decisions referred to above, LIUNA refers the  
Board to the following authorities: Bell ExpressVu Limited Partnership,  
supra; Imperial Parking Canada Corp. c.o.b Impark, supra; Medieval  
Times Dinner & Tournament (Toronto) Inc., supra; The Changing  
Workplaces Review: An Agenda for Workplace Rights, Final Report,  
supra; Interforce International Inc., 2019 44136 (ON LRB); and,  
Lawrence v. Maple Trust Co., 2007 ONCA 74 .  
Mulmer’s reply  
67.  
Mulmer submits that to interpret the phrase “services related to  
servicing the premises” more broadly than the (hypothetical) phrase  
services servicing the premises” would be to interpret section 69.1 in a  
manner that is both improper and overly broad. Mulmer contends that  
interpreting “services related to servicing the premises” in the manner  
- 23 -  
proposed by LIUNA would result in the phrase capturing others who  
happen to work at the hospitals, including doctors and nurses. Mulmer  
also asks the Board to reject the Union’s claim that UHN’s ability to add  
locations to the shuttle service should not bear upon the question of  
whether the service is related to servicing a premises.  
Mulmer  
maintains that adding stops to a shuttle bus route is a “natural” part of  
providing such a service, not merely a means of avoiding the operation  
of section 69.1. It reasserts its position that UHN’s ability to add stops,  
in fact, demonstrates that the shuttle service does not service a  
premises. Shuttle bus stops, it insists, are not tied to and do not  
collectively create a “premises”.  
68.  
Mulmer disputes LIUNA’s contention that the roads travelled in  
the course of providing the shuttle bus service are “incidental” to the  
service and not significant to the question of whether it is related to  
servicing a premises. Mulmer asserts that the roads are central to the  
service because the travel of these roads is the service being provided.  
Mulmer also disputes the Union’s assertion that the employment of  
shuttle bus drivers is precarious. In any event, Mulmer says, the Union  
did not call any evidence in support of the assertion, and it is not  
something that can be inferred from the evidence that was adduced.  
69.  
Mulmer also disputes the Union’s contention that the heading to  
section 69.1 cannot inform the interpretation to be given the provision.  
Mulmer points out that the term “building services” appears not only in  
the heading, but in the “Contents” section of the Act. According to  
Mulmer, these are “significant indicia” that section 69.1 is only intended  
to apply to building services. Mulmer reiterates its proposition that  
because section 69.1 expressly identifies the same services that are  
identified as “building services” in the ESA, section 69.1 must be  
regarded as a “building services provision”. Mulmer reminds the Board  
that the Changing Workplaces Review Report focused on successor  
rights in the “building services industries”.  
70.  
Finally, Mulmer submits that finding that shuttle bus services  
are not captured by section 69.1 would not violate the principle of stare  
decisis. Mulmer contends that Imperial Parking is distinguishable, and  
that its finding is limited to the circumstances of that case. The analysis  
in the case, Mulmer says including its finding as to the value of the  
ESA as an interpretive aid was directed solely to determining the  
meaning of the word “building”. Mulmer directs the Board to paragraph  
136 of the decision which, it says, sets out the “narrow inquiry” of the  
Board, and effectively limits the scope of the Board’s comments  
- 24 -  
regarding the value of the ESA to the question of whether or not the  
parking garage was a “building” for the purposes of section 69.1.  
ANALYSIS  
71.  
The primary issue in this case is whether or not the shuttle bus  
service operated by SP+ (and, subsequently, by Mulmer) is a service to  
which section 69.1 of the LRA applies. It was not argued by Mulmer  
that the shuttle bus service is among the services to which section 69.1  
by virtue of subsection 69.1(2) does not apply. If section 69.1 does  
apply to the shuttle bus service, the Board must then determine if the  
requirements of subsection 69.1(3) are met, such that a sale of a  
business from SP+ to Mulmer occurred on March 1, 2021. The  
applicable provisions of the LRA are as follows:  
Sale of business  
69 (1) In this section,  
“business” includes a part or parts thereof; (“entreprise”)  
“sells” includes leases, transfers and any other manner of  
disposition, and “sold” and “sale” have corresponding  
meanings. (“vend”, “vendu”, “vente”)  
Successor employer  
(2) Where an employer who is bound by or is a party to a  
collective agreement with a trade union or council of trade  
unions sells his, her or its business, the person to whom the  
business has been sold is, until the Board otherwise declares,  
bound by the collective agreement as if the person had been  
a party thereto and, where an employer sells his, her or its  
business while an application for certification or termination of  
bargaining rights to which the employer is a party is before  
the Board, the person to whom the business has been sold is,  
until the Board otherwise declares, the employer for the  
purposes of the application as if the person were named as  
the employer in the application.  
Successor rights, building services  
69.1 (1) This section applies with respect to services provided  
directly or indirectly by or to a building owner or manager that  
are related to servicing the premises, including building  
cleaning services, food services and security services.  
Exclusions  
(2) This section does not apply with respect to the following  
services:  
1. Construction.  
- 25 -  
2. Maintenance other than maintenance activities related to  
cleaning the premises.  
3. The production of goods other than goods related to the  
provision of food services at the premises for consumption on  
the premises.  
Services under contract  
(3) For the purposes of section 69, the sale of a business is  
deemed to have occurred,  
(a) if employees perform services at premises that are their  
principal place of work;  
(b) if their employer ceases, in whole or in part, to provide the  
services at those premises; and  
(c) if substantially similar services are subsequently provided  
at the premises under the direction of another employer.  
Interpretation  
(4) For the purposes of section 69, the employer referred to  
in clause (3) (b) of this section is considered to be the  
employer who sells the business and the employer referred to  
in clause (3) (c) of this section is considered to be the person  
to whom the business is sold.  
72.  
The authorities provided by the parties set out (or make  
reference to) a number of principles of statutory interpretation that are  
germane to the interpretive exercise that the Board must undertake  
here. I will attempt to set out those principles as succinctly as possible.  
73.  
In Bell ExpressVu Limited Partnership v. Rex, supra, the  
Supreme Court began its review of the principles of statutory  
interpretation with a passage that is routinely relied upon by Canadian  
courts and tribunals. The Court went on to note that in the case of  
federal statutes, regard must also be had to the directives of the  
Interpretation Act.  
26. In Elmer Driedger’s definitive formulation, found at p. 87  
of his Construction of Statutes (2nd ed. 1983):  
Today there is only one principle or approach,  
namely, the words of an Act are to be read in their  
entire context and in their grammatical and  
- 26 -  
ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of  
the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of  
Parliament.  
Driedger’s modern approach has been repeatedly cited by this  
Court as the preferred approach to statutory interpretation  
across a wide range of interpretive settings: see, for example,  
Stubart Investments Ltd. v. The Queen, [1984] 1 S.C.R. 536,  
at p. 578, per Estey J.; Québec (Communauté urbaine) v.  
Corp. Notre-Dame de Bon-Secours, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 3, at p.  
17; Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27, at para.  
21; R. v. Gladue, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688, at para. 25; R. v.  
Araujo, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 992, 2000 SCC 65, at para. 26; R. v.  
Sharpe, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 45, 2001 SCC 2, at para. 33, per  
McLachlin C.J.; Chieu v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and  
Immigration), [2002] 1 S.C.R. 84, 2002 SCC 3, at para. 27. I  
note as well that, in the federal legislative context, this Court’s  
preferred approach is buttressed by s. 12 of the Interpretation  
Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-21, which provides that every  
enactment “is deemed remedial, and shall be given such fair,  
large and liberal construction and interpretation as best  
ensures the attainment of its objects”.  
74.  
Ontario’s Legislation Act, 2006 (S.O. 2006, c. 21, Sched. F)  
contains the same provision as the federal Interpretation Act.  
Rule of liberal interpretation  
64 (1) An Act shall be interpreted as being remedial and shall  
be given such fair, large and liberal interpretation as best  
ensures the attainment of its objects.  
The effect of the provision (as it appeared in predecessor legislation, the  
Interpretation Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. I.11) was commented on by the  
Board in Medieval Times Dinner & Tournament (Toronto) Inc., supra, in  
the course of interpreting an earlier iteration of section 69.1 (section  
64.2 of the Labour Relations Act, S.O. 1990, c. L.2):  
52. Section 64.2 of the Act should, of course, be given a large  
and liberal interpretation, in accordance with section 10 of the  
Interpretation Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. I-11. It is the role of the  
Board to ensure that the intention of the Legislature in enacting  
section 64.2 of the Act is fully effected. However, determining  
the full extent and scope of the intention of the Legislature  
when enacting section 64.2 of the Act is not an easy task. The  
concept of legislative intent is amorphous and, in any particular  
- 27 -  
case, the full scope of the intent of the Legislature may be  
incapable of exhaustive determination.  
75.  
In Durham District School Board, supra, the Board provided an  
extensive review of the principles of statutory interpretation (starting at  
paragraph 29 of the decision). In addition to quoting from Bell  
ExpressVu Limited Partnership, the Board also quoted from Rizzo &  
Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re), 1998 837 (SCC). The passage quoted  
from that case includes the following principle:  
27 […] It is a well established principle of statutory  
interpretation that the legislature does not intend to produce  
absurd consequences. According to [Pierre-André] Côté, supra,  
an interpretation can be considered absurd if it leads to  
ridiculous or frivolous consequences, if it is extremely  
unreasonable or inequitable, if it is illogical or incoherent, or if  
it is incompatible with other provisions or with the object of the  
legislative enactment (at pp. 378- 80). Sullivan echoes these  
comments noting that a label of absurdity can be attached to  
interpretations which defeat the purpose of a statute or render  
some aspect of it pointless or futile (Sullivan, Construction of  
Statutes, supra, at p. 88).”  
76.  
In the course of discussing the use of legislative history and the  
evolution of legislation as interpretive tools (and the effect of the  
Interpretation Act on such exercises), the Board in McIntosh Limousine  
Service Ltd., supra, made the following comments regarding the Board’s  
“adjudicative expertise” and the approach it should take to interpreting  
its “home statute”:  
79. The “adjudicative expertise” to which the Board refers in  
the last sentence of paragraph 15 [of International  
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 1996 11186 (ON  
LRB)] has a particular resonance when applied to a tribunal like  
the Labour Relations Board, with the exclusive jurisdiction to  
interpret and apply its home statute. What the Board is getting  
at here, is the tribunal’s obligation to apply its labour relations  
expertise an expertise gleaned not only from the words of  
the statute itself, but also from the Board’s own experience and  
understanding of the law and the labour relations environment.  
80. As an independent, quasi-judicial tribunal, the Board must  
operate at arm's length from both the legislative and executive  
branches of government. However, the Board is also a  
specialized tribunal, with particular labour relations expertise  
and particular sensitivity to developments in the labour  
- 28 -  
relations community including the policy debates and policy  
shifts, that are implicit in legislative change. The Board cannot,  
and in my view should not, set aside that specialized  
knowledge, and read its home statute like some wholly  
uninformed reader of words, with a dictionary in one hand and  
copy of Driedger in the other.  
81. On the contrary, the Board has to adopt an interpretation  
which is fair to both the language and policy of the statute, to  
the general labour relations background, and to the particular  
context under review.  
77.  
In Bell ExpressVu Limited Partnership, the Supreme Court  
explained the role that “context” should play in the interpretation of  
statutes:  
27. The [Driedger] approach recognizes the important role  
that context must inevitably play when a court construes the  
written words of a statute: as Professor John Willis incisively  
noted in his seminal article “Statute Interpretation in a  
Nutshell” (1938), 16 Can. Bar Rev. 1, at p. 6, “words, like  
people, take their colour from their surroundings”. This being  
the case, where the provision under consideration is found in  
an Act that is itself a component of a larger statutory scheme,  
the surroundings that colour the words and the scheme of the  
Act are more expansive. In such an instance, the application of  
Driedger’s principle gives rise to what was described in R. v.  
Ulybel Enterprises Ltd., [2001] 2 S.C.R. 867, 2001 SCC 56, at  
para. 52, as “the principle of interpretation that presumes a  
harmony, coherence, and consistency between statutes  
dealing with the same subject matter”. (See also Stoddard v.  
Watson, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 1069, at p. 1079; Pointe-Claire (City)  
v. Quebec (Labour Court), [1997] 1 S.C.R. 1015, at para. 61,  
per Lamer C.J.).  
78.  
As adverted to in the above passage, the principle of  
“harmonization” of statutes (or harmony between or amongst statutes)  
was articulated in R. v. Ulybel Enterprises Ltd. At paragraph 30 the  
Supreme Court stated:  
30. Because of the interaction in this case between the in  
personam jurisdiction of the Newfoundland Supreme Court  
under the Fisheries Act and the in rem admiralty jurisdiction of  
the Federal Court under the Federal Court Act, in considering  
the "entire context" of s. 72(1) and the intent of Parliament, it  
is important to keep in mind the principles for harmonizing  
- 29 -  
different statutes. Professor Ruth Sullivan expressed these  
principles as follows, in R. Sullivan, Driedger on the  
Construction of Statutes (3rd ed. 1994), at p. 288:  
The meaning of words in legislation depends not only  
on their immediate context but also on a larger context  
which includes the Act as a whole and the statute book  
as a whole. The presumptions of coherence and  
consistency apply not only to Acts dealing with the  
same subject but also, albeit with lesser force, to the  
entire body of statute law produced by a legislature. ...  
Therefore, other things being equal, interpretations  
that minimize the possibility of conflict or incoherence  
among different enactments are preferred.  
79.  
As was pointed out by the Union, the Legislation Act, 2006  
contains a provision explaining the role and status of tables of contents  
and headings in Ontario’s statutes.  
Reference aids  
70 Tables of contents, marginal notes, information included to  
provide legislative history, headnotes and headings are  
inserted in an Act or regulation for convenience of reference  
only and do not form part of it.  
80.  
In Medieval Times Dinner & Tournament, the Board made the  
following observations regarding the wording of section 64.2 (which was  
introduced into the LRA in June 1992, but repealed in November 1995).  
The Board (here) notes that the wording of section 69.1 is identical to  
the wording of section 64.2.  
55. […] It is noteworthy to observe the broad language utilized  
by the Legislature throughout section 64.2(1) of the Act. The  
inclusive language adopted by the Legislature when referring  
to the enumerated services specifically identified by that  
subsection makes it clear that the enumerated services are not  
exhaustive of the entire range of services which may be  
captured by the section. The use of the broad phrase "related  
to servicing the premises" reflects the intention of the  
Legislature to encompass various other types of services which  
may be provided by or to building owners or managers. It is  
also noteworthy that the phrase "provided, directly or  
indirectly, by or to a building owner or manager" is also wide-  
sweeping in scope. It is manifest from the language of section  
64.2 that the Legislature intended this provision of the Act to  
- 30 -  
have broad applicability, and to encompass a wide range of  
commercial circumstances.  
81.  
As pointed out by the parties, the “building services” provisions  
of the LRA were restored to the Act as a result of the Changing  
Workplaces Review, undertaken between 2015 and 2017 at the behest  
of the Ministry of Labour. In the context of this Reference, Mulmer has  
invited the Board to use the report arising out of the Review as an aid  
to interpreting section 69.1 of the Act. More specifically, Mulmer has  
proposed that comments and recommendations made by the Report’s  
authors form the basis not only of the restoration of the provisions to  
the Act, but also the Legislature’s intention to limit the scope of services  
captured by the provisions to cleaning, food and security services or  
services that are closely similar absent explicit expansion of the  
“building services” by way of regulation(s). Key remarks and  
recommendations (set out in section 13.4 of the Report, at pages 409-  
413) provide as follows:  
The issue here is whether and how to address the  
precariousness that exists for vulnerable workers when  
services such as security, food services, cleaning and others  
are contracted out and retendered.  
[…]  
The basis for this difference in treatment [of unionized security  
guards employed under a contract for services] is that  
contracting out is generally not considered to constitute a sale  
of a business. Whether or not this is just a technical distinction  
or a substantive one, there are reasons to allow for the  
efficiencies that can be achieved through contracting out and  
to not have a rule of general application providing that a  
collective agreement is binding on a new contractor. Certainly,  
in the case of a contracting out by a lead employer for some  
parts of its business, perhaps there is justification, from time  
to time, for the difference in treatment between contracting out  
and a permanent sale. We are not suggesting, as part of this  
review, that this general approach should change.  
[…]  
It should be clear, however, that our recommendation is not  
intended to be a rule of general application applying to all re-  
tendering or contracting out. Our recommendation is confined  
to a few sectors where employees are particularly vulnerable  
and, in those sectors, we recommend that existing bargaining  
- 31 -  
rights and collective agreements be binding on the new  
“successor” employer when contracting out and re-tendering  
occur.  
[…]  
As noted above, an intrusion into the contracting out process,  
where all contracting out or re-tendering would be subject to  
the successor employer rule, is an unwarranted and unwise  
step. However, in a few sectors, it is important to take steps  
that benefit society and help reduce the precarious nature of  
employment for employees by protecting the improvements  
achieved through collective bargaining and the stability and the  
security of employment.  
[…]  
The law currently protects the bargaining rights of unions and  
the terms and conditions of employment of employees when  
businesses are sold. In the building service sector, contracting  
out and re-tendering is the equivalent of a sale and should be  
treated in the same way. Accordingly, we recommend in the  
interests of protecting negotiated gains, stability and security  
for employees that successor rights should be applied to the  
building services industry.Whether this recommendation  
should apply to other sectors is discussed below.  
In what sectors of the economy should successor rights pass  
to a new employer on re-tendering or contracting out?  
Certainly, they should apply to building services where  
cleaning, food services and security contracts are commonly  
performed by third parties. We would add to building services  
home care funded by the government, where there appear to  
be approximately 25,000 unionized employees. […]  
There are likely unskilled and vulnerable workers performing  
precarious work in other areas, such as bus drivers working for  
school boards where constant re-tendering produced such low  
wages that, last year, employers apparently had difficulty  
finding sufficient employees to perform the work. We  
recommend further examination to determine whether the  
same approach recommended for building services and the  
home care sector should apply to other sectors as well.  
There are likely other areas of the economy comprised of  
unskilled, vulnerable workers in precarious work where  
successor rights should apply in cases of re-tendering to  
- 32 -  
preserve existing collective agreements, either now or in the  
future. We recommend that the legislation should provide  
government with the flexibility to apply this same provision by  
regulation, where necessary.  
We make the following recommendations:  
Recommendation:  
168. Successor rights should be applied to the building services  
industries (security, food services, cleaning) and home care  
funded by the government.  
169. A regulation-making authority should be added to the  
Labour Relations Act, 1995 to allow for the possible expansion  
of coverage to other services or sectors in the future.  
82.  
In Medieval Times Dinner & Tournament, the Board undertook  
a thorough examination of the word “premises” as it appeared in section  
64.2 (now section 69.1). It concluded that all of Exhibition Place in  
Toronto constituted the “premises” for the purposes of section 64.2.  
60.  
We agree with counsel for Board of Governors that the  
word "building" in section 64.2(1) of the Act must be read in  
conjunction with the word "premises" contained in that same  
subsection of the Act. A reading of that subsection, in a  
perfectly natural manner, can lead us to no other conclusion.  
In fact, the word "premises" in that subsection is meaningless  
unless it refers to the word "building" which appears earlier in  
the subsection. That result does not, however, lead us to the  
further conclusion that the word "premises" should be  
interpreted as equating to the word "building" and therefore  
must mean, on the facts of this case, the Arts, Crafts and  
Hobbies Building.  
61.  
There is merit to the applicant's position that the  
Legislature, had it intended the word "premises" to equate to  
the word "building", could just as easily have substituted the  
word "building" for that of "premises" in the section.  
Furthermore, there is nothing contained in section 64.2(1)  
which precludes the conclusion that the "premises" referred to  
could be smaller or larger in geographical size than the  
"building" referred to in that subsection. Utilizing the office  
tower example referred to in argument, should a building  
owner contract out only six floors of a multi-floor tower to a  
building cleaning contractor, it is not clear why these six floors  
are not "premises" for the purposes of section 64.2 of the Act,  
- 33 -  
notwithstanding that they are not identical in concept to "the  
building" in which the floors are located. As was amply  
demonstrated by the definitions of the term "premises"  
provided to the Board during argument, common law  
interpretation of that term has extended the meaning of the  
word beyond that of merely a building, and can include  
reference to a broader geographical area.  
83.  
In view of the foregoing, the proper approach to questions of  
statutory interpretation may be summarized as follows. By virtue of  
subsection 64(1) of the Legislation Act, 2006, the fundamental principle  
of statutory interpretation (in Ontario) is that all legislation is to be  
regarded as “remedial”, and be given “such fair, large and liberal  
interpretation as best ensures the attainment of its objects”. In applying  
this principle, courts and tribunals must, however, consider the  
additional “qualifying” principles articulated by Professor Driedger and  
Professor Sullivan, and by the Supreme Court in decisions such as Rizzo  
& Rizzo Shoes Ltd. and R v. Ulybel Enterprises Ltd. It is on this basis  
that the Board will address the interpretive question(s) at issue here.  
84.  
In order to fall within subsection 69.1(1), services must meet  
two requirements: they must be provided directly or indirectly by or to  
a building owner or manager, AND they must be related to servicing the  
premises. The Board has no difficulty finding that the first requirement  
is met in this case. The Board rejects Mulmer’s proposition that the  
shuttle bus service is not provided to a building owner or manager,  
but is instead provided to UHN staff and patients. Patients and staff of  
UHN are undoubtedly the “beneficiaries” of the service. However, the  
service only exists because UHN contracts for it. It may be regarded in  
either of two ways. It is either provided to UHN (indirectly, through its  
“agent”, Plexxus) or it is provided by UHN (indirectly, by SP+ or another  
provider) for the use and convenience of its patients and staff.  
Whichever way it is regarded, the shuttle bus service is a service  
“provided by or to a building owner or manager”.  
85.  
The more difficult (and consequential) question at issue here is  
whether the shuttle bus service is “related to servicing the premises”.  
In view of the “rule” of liberal interpretation prescribed by the Legislation  
Act, 2006, the appropriate starting point for consideration of this  
question is the analysis set out in Medieval Times Dinner & Tournament  
(to date, the most fulsome analysis of the language of section 69.1). As  
was noted by the Board in that decision (at para. 55), section 69.1(1)  
contains “broad” and “inclusive” language, demonstrating an intention  
by the Legislature that the provision “have broad applicability” and  
- 34 -  
“encompass a wide range of commercial circumstances”. “The inclusive  
language adopted by the Legislature”, the Board declared, “makes it  
clear that the enumerated services are not exhaustive of the entire  
range of services which may be captured by the section”. This Board  
stands by that assessment of the provision. Subsection 69.1(1) is  
clearly intended to capture services other than building cleaning, food  
service, and security.  
86.  
A second consideration is the absence of regulation-making  
authority in the LRA. Despite being encouraged to do so by the authors  
of the Changing Workplaces Review Report, the Legislature declined to  
add to the Act a regulation-making authoritythat would enable a  
governing party to expand coverage of section 69.1 to “other services  
or sectors”. Accordingly, in the Board’s view, it has entrusted any such  
expansion of coverage to the Board. Such authority would not be  
improperly conferred (or assumed), given that the LRA is the Board’s  
“home statute”, and that the Board (as observed in McIntosh Limousine  
Service Ltd., supra) is obliged to apply its “labour relations expertise”  
(including its “sensitivity to developments in the labour relations  
community”) to interpreting the Act. Expansion of coverage would, of  
course, only take place in circumstances (as in the present case) where  
the Board is called upon to interpret section 69.1 in the context of a  
particular factual scenario.  
87.  
The Board is mindful that the authors of the Changing  
Workplaces Review Report did not identify as “building services” any  
services beyond building cleaning, food service and security, and  
declined to recommend that school bus drivers be accorded the same  
protections as employees working in such services.  
The Board  
acknowledges that there are similarities between a shuttle bus service  
(of the kind at issue here) and a school bus service. Both carry  
passengers to and from specific locations for (generally) specific  
purposes. However, it might be pointed out that a shuttle bus (typically)  
travels back and forth between two (or more) designated sites multiple  
times over the course of its daily operating period. While it may make  
other stops en route, its primary function is to transport passengers  
from one designated site to another designated site. In any event,  
shuttle bus drivers in circumstances like those of the SP+ drivers (that  
is, whose employment is subject to the regular re-tendering of services  
contracts) certainly qualify as “vulnerable workers performing  
precarious work”. It is the Board’s view that a “large and liberal  
interpretation” of the phrase “services related to servicing a premises”  
could include a shuttle bus service. It is also the Board’s view that such  
- 35 -  
an interpretation would not be “unreasonable”, “illogical or incoherent”,  
or “incompatible” with other provisions of the Act or with the object of  
the Act.  
88.  
Mulmer has pointed out that the Employment Standards Act,  
2000 and O. Reg. 287/01 between them set out a definition of “building  
services” that would exclude shuttle bus services. It urges the Board to  
interpret subsection 69.1(1) in a manner that accords with that  
definition. The Board acknowledges that finding that a shuttle bus  
service falls within subsection 69.1(1) of the LRA will have the effect of  
expanding the scope of the LRA’s “building services” provision beyond  
the ESA’s definition of that term. However, as the Board sees it, the  
principle of “harmonization” does not compel it to use the definition of a  
term set out in the ESA (and the Regulation) to determine the scope of  
a provision contained in the LRA. The Board also notes that the term  
“building services” is defined in the ESA for the purpose of defining  
another term – “building services provider”. It does not otherwise  
appear in the ESA. The LRA uses neither the term “building services”,  
nor the term “building services provider” in the operational text of  
section 69.1. Accordingly, while the LRA and the ESA are both  
“employment-related statutes”, there is no basis for confining “services  
related to servicing a premises” to “building services” as defined in the  
ESA. To do so would circumscribe the Board’s jurisdiction to interpret its  
home statute, in particular a provision that on its very wording is  
intended to capture services other than those expressly enumerated  
therein.  
89.  
In light of the above, the Board finds that the shuttle bus service  
is related to servicing UHN premises. The shuttle service exists because  
UHN determined that it needed to provide such a service to its patients  
and staff. The principal route of the service is the route between Toronto  
General Hospital and Toronto Western Hospital (It was, in fact, the only  
route operating at the time of the change in the provider of the shuttle  
service). Both hospitals are UHN facilities. In view of the interpretation  
of “premises” adopted in Medieval Times Dinner and Tournament, the  
hospitals can certainly be regarded as “the premises” of UHN for the  
purposes of section 69.1. Furthermore, the shuttle bus service was  
clearly conceived to “service” those premises. That is its primary  
function. The fact that the shuttle buses travel between premises on  
public roads, and load and unload passengers (at one end of the route)  
on a public street bordering the premises does not preclude a finding  
that the shuttle buses “service” UHN premises.  
- 36 -  
90.  
Admittedly, the Princess Margaret Cancer Centre Sunnybrook  
Hospital route was formerly part of the service under UHN’s contract  
with SP+ and, pursuant to the May 2020 RFP, could have been  
reinstated under the contract between UHN and Mulmer. However, the  
fact that that route also serviced a Sunnybrook premises does not mean  
that it was not servicing UHN premises. Two of the three destinations  
on the route were UHN sites. As the primary function of the shuttle bus  
service is to transport passengers between the UHN facilities, the service  
is, even in that circumstance, nonetheless related to servicing UHN  
premises.  
91.  
As the Board has found that the shuttle bus service falls within  
the ambit of subsection 69.1(1), it must now determine if a sale of a  
business occurred by the operation of subsection 69.1(3). Pursuant to  
that provision, a sale of a business in respect of services captured by  
subsection (1) is deemed to have occurred if (a) employees perform  
services at premises that are their principle place of work, (b) their  
employer ceases (in whole or in part) to provide services at those  
premises, and (c) substantially similar services are subsequently  
provided at the premises under the direction of another employer.  
92.  
Admittedly, this is a different kind of service than the services  
enumerated in subsection 69.1(1). Those services will always take place  
exclusively on the premises in question. In contrast, the shuttle bus  
service essentially operates between two premises. Nonetheless, it is  
still a service provided at UHN premises. It is at UHN premises that the  
shuttle buses pick up and drop off passengers (passengers who for  
the most part have a connection to UHN). Accordingly, shuttle bus  
drivers perform services at UHN premises.  
93.  
There remains, however, the question of whether the UHN  
premises can be considered the drivers’ “principal place of work”.  
Mulmer argued that as the drivers have only “brief and peripheral  
contact” with the facilities on their shuttle route, the shuttle bus rather  
than UHN premises is their principal place of work. LIUNA argued that  
as the shuttle bus drivers pick up and drop of passengers at UHN sites,  
UHN premises are of “primary importance” to their work and,  
accordingly, must be considered their principal place of work. The Board  
agrees with LIUNA’s position. One need only consider the question from  
the perspective of the drivers themselves to reach such a conclusion.  
While the drivers would identify themselves as someone whose job it is  
to drive between two sites, they would nonetheless identify UHN as the  
place where they work. They would not say that they work on the  
- 37 -  
shuttle bus or that they work between two hospitals. They would tell  
others that they work at UHN. Consequently, it is reasonable to regard  
UHN as their “principal place of work”. In the final analysis, the Board  
sees no reason to distinguish shuttle bus drivers from employees (such  
as cleaners, cooks or security guards) who perform services entirely on  
the premises. The service they perform is similarly connected to the  
premises. In the result, the Board finds that UHN shuttle bus drivers  
perform services at premises that are their principal place of work.  
94.  
Mulmer does not dispute that the second requirement for a sale  
of a business has been met, and the Board so finds. SP+, the employer  
of the employees at issue, ceased to provide shuttle bus services at UHN  
on February 28, 2021.  
95.  
Finally, the Board finds that the third requirement for a sale of  
a business under subsection 69.1(3) is also met. The shuttle bus service  
provided at UHN by Mulmer is (was) “substantially similar” to the shuttle  
bus service provided by SP+. The Mulmer-operated service was  
intended to be a continuation of the service provided by SP+ (In fact,  
SP+ might have continued to provide the service had it responded to  
the May 2020 RFP). That Mulmer ran smaller buses than SP+, on  
different schedules than SP+, is not enough to distinguish its service  
from that of the former provider. The service provided by Mulmer  
served the same purpose as the service provided by SP+, that being to  
convey staff and patients from one UHN site to another UHN site. While  
it was not “identical” to the SP+ service, it was “substantially similar”.  
96.  
As all three requirements of subsection 69.1(3) are met, a sale  
of a business from SP+ to Mulmer Services Ltd. occurred on March 1,  
2021. The Board declares that Mulmer Services Ltd. is bound by the  
collective agreement between LIUNA and SP+ with respect to shuttle  
bus drivers who were employed by SP+ at UHN on February 28, 2021.  
"Kelly Waddingham"  
for the Board  
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