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ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of
the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of
Driedger’s modern approach has been repeatedly cited by this
Court as the preferred approach to statutory interpretation
across a wide range of interpretive settings: see, for example,
Stubart Investments Ltd. v. The Queen,  1 S.C.R. 536,
at p. 578, per Estey J.; Québec (Communauté urbaine) v.
Corp. Notre-Dame de Bon-Secours,  3 S.C.R. 3, at p.
17; Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re),  1 S.C.R. 27, at para.
21; R. v. Gladue,  1 S.C.R. 688, at para. 25; R. v.
Araujo,  2 S.C.R. 992, 2000 SCC 65, at para. 26; R. v.
Sharpe,  1 S.C.R. 45, 2001 SCC 2, at para. 33, per
McLachlin C.J.; Chieu v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration),  1 S.C.R. 84, 2002 SCC 3, at para. 27. I
note as well that, in the federal legislative context, this Court’s
preferred approach is buttressed by s. 12 of the Interpretation
Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-21, which provides that every
enactment “is deemed remedial, and shall be given such fair,
large and liberal construction and interpretation as best
ensures the attainment of its objects”.
Ontario’s Legislation Act, 2006 (S.O. 2006, c. 21, Sched. F)
contains the same provision as the federal Interpretation Act.
Rule of liberal interpretation
64 (1) An Act shall be interpreted as being remedial and shall
be given such fair, large and liberal interpretation as best
ensures the attainment of its objects.
The effect of the provision (as it appeared in predecessor legislation, the
Interpretation Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. I.11) was commented on by the
Board in Medieval Times Dinner & Tournament (Toronto) Inc., supra, in
the course of interpreting an earlier iteration of section 69.1 (section
64.2 of the Labour Relations Act, S.O. 1990, c. L.2):
52. Section 64.2 of the Act should, of course, be given a large
and liberal interpretation, in accordance with section 10 of the
Interpretation Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. I-11. It is the role of the
Board to ensure that the intention of the Legislature in enacting
section 64.2 of the Act is fully effected. However, determining
the full extent and scope of the intention of the Legislature
when enacting section 64.2 of the Act is not an easy task. The
concept of legislative intent is amorphous and, in any particular