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decision is entitled to the greatest respect, the discretionary jurisdiction possessed by a superior court trial judge cannot
be fettered in any way by the previous decision of the master. The superior court judge possesses that jurisdiction by
virtue of his federal appointment under the powers given the federal Crown by the British North ... [America] Act. His
status resulting from that appointment cannot be diminished by the decision of the master appointed by the provincial
Crown”); Menduk v. Gore Mutual Ins. Co., 67 W.W.R. 573, 574 & 577 (Alta. Sup. Ct. 1969) per Sinclair, J. (“Counsel
for the appellant says, in effect, that the appeal should be heard as though the application were being made de novo.
On the other hand, counsel for the respondent urges that the appeal be treated as though it were from a discretionary
order of a judge. .... [I]t is clear that an appeal to a judge of the supreme court from a discretionary decision of a master
is to be treated as a review and a rehearing. The judge is in no way fettered by the previous exercise of the master's
discretion, and is entitled to exercise his own discretion as though the matter came before him for the first time”);
Ontario v. Victoria Medical Building Ltd., [1960] S.C.R. 32, 38 (1959) per Kerwin, C.J. (“Notwithstanding the fact
that mechanics' liens were unknown at the time of Confederation, my view is that Pomeroy [in Equity Jurisprudence
ss. 1268-9] correctly stated the nature of the action given by The Mechanics' Lien Act [as ‘ordinary equitable actions
resulting in a decree for sale and distribution of the proceeds identical in all their features with suits for the foreclosure
of mortgages by judicial action’] and that ... the jurisdiction conferred upon the Master by subs. (1) of s. 31 of The
Mechanics' Lien Act broadly conforms to the type of jurisdiction exercised by the Superior, District or County Courts
at Confederation”), 41-42 per Judson, J. (“This is not a case where the Province has appointed a new judicial officer
to preside over a newly created court or tribunal but one where the Province has increased the jurisdiction of a judicial
officer already appointed by the Province. There is no question here of the use of a device to create a new s. 96 court
with a new s. 96 judge under another name. What is happening is that work is being redistributed within the s. 96 court
itself and new work assigned to a provincially appointed judicial officer. In a sense it is not even an exclusive
assignment when a judge of the court, on motion by one of the parties, has the power of removal under s. 31(2).
Nevertheless, it is my opinion that the judgment under appeal is well founded and that this legislation is in conflict
with the appointing power under s. 96 of the British North America Act, and I reach this conclusion for two reasons
— the nature of the jurisdiction which is conferred upon the Master and the fact that he is given the power of final
adjudication in these matters, subject to the usual right of appeal to the Court of Appeal as from a single judge”);
Polson Iron Works v. Munns, 24 D.L.R. 18, 22 (Alta. Sup. Ct. Chambers 1915) per Harvey, C.J. (“It is perfectly clear,
of course, that the legislature could not provide for the office [of master] either specifically or generally and leave the
executive or the Judges to give him a jurisdiction which would make him practically a Judge, but, in my opinion, that
has not been done here. The Judge's chief duty is to determine the rights of parties in the first instance by trial, and
subsequently on appeal. The practice and procedure is for the purpose of accomplishing these results, advantageously
and expeditiously. The work in Chambers is practically all leading up to trial and appeal. It is to this subsidiary work
that the Master's jurisdiction is confined. The order under consideration is perhaps the nearest approach to determining
the rights of parties by trial that the rules authorize the Master to make. But in reality, he is not trying the rights of the
parties. He is determining that there is no real issue to be tried. It is only when such a situation is found to exist that
the Master is authorized to give a judgment in favor of the plaintiff. When he gives a judgment in favor of the defendant
apparently all he does is to give effect to and enforce some rule of practice e.g. for failure to prosecute the action as
required by the rules. The Master has no jurisdiction in trials or in appeals and all of his acts are subject to review by
a judge. His office is essentially that of an officer preparing litigation for its legitimate purpose, viz. a trial of the rights
of the parties which is exclusively reserved for the judges to whom it essentially belongs. His duties, therefore, while
largely judicial in their character, do not constitute him a judge since from them are reserved the essential duties of a
judge”); Colonial Investment & Loan Co. v. Grady, 24 D.L.R. 176, 176, 178 & 179 (Alta. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1915)
per Stuart, J. (“the Legislative Assembly of Alberta provided a special method of procedure for the enforcement of
rights under mortgages, encumbrances and agreements of sale. Section 3 of that Act reads as follows: – ‘All
proceedings to secure or enforce any right, remedy or obligation under a mortgage, encumbrance or agreement of sale,
or in respect of the lands, moneys, covenants, conditions, stipulations or agreements described or contained therein,
shall be brought before a Master in Chambers in the Supreme Court of Alberta under the provisions of this Act and
as nearly as may be in accordance with the practice and procedure of the said Court.’ .... [T]he Master was ‘to have
jurisdiction to hear all evidence, adjourn all hearings, grant all orders, pronounce all judgments, and to do all other