TRIBUNALS ONTARIO  
TRIBUNAUX DÉCISIONNELS  
ONTARIO  
Commission d’étude des soins aux  
Animal Care Review Board  
animaux  
Citation: Windrift Adventures Inc. et al. v. Chief Animal Welfare Inspector, 2022  
ONACRB 24  
Date: 2022-08-18  
File Numbers: 13816/ACRB  
Appeals under s. 38 of the Provincial Animal Welfare Services Act, 2019, R.S.O. 2019,  
c. 13.  
Between:  
Windrift Adventures Inc., Adrienne Spottiswood, Thomas Pryde, Georgina Pierce,  
Clayton Cauchy, Renata Sauder, Jillian Pryde, and Cody Pryde  
Appellants  
and  
Chief Animal Welfare Inspector  
Respondent  
DECISION AND ORDER  
Adjudicator:  
Lindsay Lake, Vice-Chair  
Appearances:  
For the Appellant:  
Eric Gillespie, Counsel  
John May, Counsel  
Yasmeen Peer, Counsel  
Natasha Papulkas, Counsel  
Sarah Quildon, Legal Assistant  
For the Respondent:  
Court Reporters:  
Kateryna Toderishena, Counsel  
Jason Kirsh, Counsel  
Lindsay Bevan  
Barbara Pollard  
Heard by videoconference:  
February 7, 8, 16, 17, 2022  
March 3, 7, 9, 10, 11, 21-25, 29, 30, 2022  
April 4, 5, 6, 8, 2022  
Decision and Order  
13816/ACRB  
OVERVIEW  
[1] Windrift Adventures Inc. is a dog sledding and horse-riding business that operates  
out of two locations in Ontario – 5753 Line 8 N, Oro-Medonte (Moonstone) and  
2401 Telford Line, Severn (Severn). Windrift Adventures Inc., Adrienne  
Spottiswood, Thomas Pryde, Georgina Pierce, Clayton Cauchy, Renata Sauder,  
Jillian Pryde, and Cody Pryde,1 the appellants, all own dogs that were living at the  
two properties.  
[2] Following an inspection on September 23, 2021, all of the dogs from both  
properties were removed pursuant to s. 31(1) of the Provincial Animal Welfare  
Services Act, 2019 (Act).2 On September 30, 2021, the Chief Animal Welfare  
Inspector, the respondent, subsequently decided to keep all of the dogs in its care  
pursuant to s.31(6) of the Act.  
[3] Both the removal and the decision to keep in care were appealed to the Animal  
Care Review Board (Board). In Pryde, Spottiswood and Pierce v. Chief Animal  
Welfare Inspector,3 I found, amongst other things, that ordering the return of all but  
eleven puppies to the appellants would be returning them to a situation of distress  
such that they could only be returned after the appellants complied with my order  
regarding the dogs’ tethers and the dog houses.4  
[4] The respondent then issued a Statement of Account dated January 18, 2022 to the  
appellants in the amount of $1,114,720.27 (Statement of Account) in relation to  
approximately 111 dogs of various breeds, age, and sex removed from the Severn  
location, and approximately 118 dogs of various breeds, age, and sex removed  
from the Moonstone location.  
1 Another child of Adrienne Spottiswood and Thomas Pryde owns some of the dogs living at the two  
properties. Section 1(4) of the Provincial Animal Welfare Services Act, 2019, S.O. 2019, c. 13 provides  
that where the owner or custodian of an animal is a minor, the owner or custodian for the purposes of the  
Act is deemed to be the minor’s parents/guardians. Therefore, the name of this child is omitted from this  
decision.  
2 S.O. 2019, c. 13.  
3 2021 ONACRB 25 ().  
4 Ibid. at paras. 62-64.  
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[5] On January 24, 2022, the appellants filed an appeal of the Statement of Account to  
the Board. A hearing in this matter was commenced before the Board on February  
7, 2022 and concluded on April 8, 2022.  
ISSUE IN DISPUTE  
[6] The sole issue in dispute in this matter is whether the Statement of Account should  
be confirmed, revoked, or varied.  
RESULT  
[7] The Statement of Account is varied as follows:  
Transportation Costs:  
Boarding Costs:  
Veterinary Costs:  
Total Costs:  
$Nil  
$505,760.00  
$Nil  
$505,760.00  
ANALYSIS  
[8] Under s. 35(1) of the Act,5 the respondent may, from time to time, serve on the  
owner or custodian of an animal a statement of account if an animal welfare  
inspector (AWI) has provided an animal with necessaries to relieve distress and/or  
if the respondent has taken an animal into the respondent’s care. The statement of  
account is in respect of the costs of the necessaries provided and the owner or  
custodian is presumptively liable for the amount specified in the statement of  
account pursuant to s. 35(3).  
[9] An owner or custodian of an animal may appeal a statement of account to the  
Board.6 After a hearing, the Board may confirm, revoke, or vary a statement of  
account.7 An animal is forfeited to the Crown if, after the Board provides notice of  
5 S.O. 2019, c. 13.  
6 Section 38(2) of the Act.  
7 Section 38(9)3. of the Act.  
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its decision, the owner or custodian fails to pay the confirmed or varied amount of  
the statement of account within 10 business days.8  
Onus of Proof  
[10] At the outset, the parties did not agree whether the onus is on the appellants or the  
respondent to prove that the Statement of Account should be confirmed, revoked,  
or varied.  
[11] The appellants’ position is that while the ultimate onus rests with them, the  
respondent has an initial evidentiary burden to first prove the Statement of Account  
before the onus shifts to the appellants. To support their position, the appellants  
relied on the Board’s decision of Freeman v. Chief Animal Welfare Inspector  
(Freeman).9 In Freeman, the Board held:  
With respect to the SOAs, the respondent is required to show  
that the charges reflect the actual cost of necessaries provided  
to alleviate the distress of the animals and that the care provided  
is reasonable. Once the respondent meets its evidentiary  
burden, the onus will shift to the appellant to show…that the  
orders should be varied or revoked, and on what basis.10  
[12] In making its determination, the Board in Freeman followed the Ontario Superior  
Court of Justice decision of Ontario Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to  
Animals v. Straub (Straub).11 In Freeman, the Board compared the previous  
provision of the Ontario Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act  
(OSPCA Act)12 that addressed statement of accounts to the current sections of the  
Act and found that the provisions were similar, noting that the court in Straub held:  
Although s.15(1) provides that the owner or custodian is liable  
for the amount specified in the plaintiff’s statement of account, it  
does not relieve the plaintiff of the obligation to act reasonably  
and to justify the charges included in its account. Those charges  
8 Section 35(4) of the Act and s. 1(2) of O. Reg, 447/19, “Ministerial Prescriptions.”  
9 2022 ONACRB 12 ().  
10 Ibid. at para. 41.  
11 2009 25138 (ON SC).  
12 R.S.O. 1990, c. O.36.  
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must reflect the actual cost of caring for the animals and the care  
provided must be reasonable.13  
[13] In Freeman, the Board found no basis to distinguish between the liability of an  
owner to pay damages for an unpaid statement of account, as was the issue in  
Straub, and the respondent having to produce evidence to justify the statement of  
account that it was asking to be confirmed.14  
[14] The respondent disagreed that it bears any onus regarding the Statement of  
Account. The respondent submitted that this is the appellants’ appeal and, as  
such, they bear the entire onus as the moving party. The respondent submitted  
that this approach is consistent with the legislature’s use of the word “appeal” in  
the Act which suggests that “normal procedures” apply.  
[15] To support its position, the respondent first relied upon the Supreme Court of  
Canada decision in Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov  
(Vavilov).15 The respondent submitted that any such initial preliminary burden upon  
it would go against Vavilov, in which the court stated:  
More generally, there is no convincing reason to presume that  
legislatures mean something entirely different when they use the  
word “appeal” in an administrative law statute than they do in, for  
example, a criminal or commercial law context. Accepting that  
the word “appeal” refers to the same type of procedure in all  
these contexts also accords with the presumption of consistent  
expression, according to which the legislature is presumed to  
use language such that the same words have the same meaning  
both within a statute and across statutes: R. Sullivan, Sullivan on  
the Construction of Statutes (6th ed. 2014), at p. 217.16  
[16] The respondent also relied upon the Board’s decision in Shekhurdina v. Chief  
Animal Welfare Inspector (Shekhurdina).17 In Shekhurdina, the Board held that the  
13 Supra note 11 at para. 193.  
14 Ibid. at para. 194.  
15 2019 SCC 65 (), [2019] 4 SCR 653.  
16 Ibid. at para. 44.  
17 2021 ONACRB 15 ().  
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appellant in that matter had the onus to show that the statement of account should  
be varied.18  
[17] The respondent also submitted that Straub, followed by the Board in Freeman,  
was distinguishable. In Straub, the Ontario Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to  
Animals (OSPCA) was the moving party and, according to the respondent,  
correctly had the burden in that matter. Thus, the respondent submitted that the  
reasoning in Straub does not apply in this matter where the moving party is the  
appellants.  
[18] I find that the respondent’s position that the onus of proof is solely on the  
appellants untenable. In this matter, the Statement of Account was three pages in  
length. No invoices were attached to substantiate the amounts set out on the  
Statement of Account and no details were provided as to what the amounts were  
for aside from very broad categories (i.e., transportation costs, boarding costs, and  
veterinarian costs). When I asked the respondent how the appellants would know  
how the amounts claimed on the Statement of Account were established, the  
respondent stated that the appellants would know the case that they have to meet  
through the disclosure process. While this submission is certainly not evidence, it  
did indicate to me that the only time detailed information would be provided to the  
appellants was after they initiated their appeal. The respondent submitted that  
such information may be provided if requested from the respondent outside of the  
appeal process but, again, these submissions are not evidence.  
[19] In any event, several times during the hearing witnesses called to testify on behalf  
of the respondent identified certain amounts that were included on the Statement  
of Account that should not have been.19 Even in closing submissions upon my  
inquiry as to the total transportation amount listed on the Statement of Account, the  
respondent stated that at least one invoice included in the total transportation  
18 Ibid. at para. 19.  
19 For example, Dr. Kim Anderka, veterinarian, testified that the November 22, 2021 invoice from the  
Ilderton Pet Hospital should not have two amounts included on it for the dogs indenitied as 74 and 74A  
($106.72). Regional Supervisor Munoz also testified that a Noevmber 9, 2021 Invoice from the University  
of Guelph Laboratory Services should not have been included in the Statement of Account ($754.00).  
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amount had neither been addressed at the hearing nor included in its Book of  
Documents of Boarding and Miscellaneous Invoices.20  
[20] The respondent’s concession in closing submissions after a 20-day hearing that it  
had not presented all of the evidence to support the transportation costs claimed  
on the Statement of Account is illustrative of the very issue. If I were to accept the  
respondent’s position that it has no preliminary evidentiary burden, it remains  
unclear to me how the appellants would be able to prove, for example, that the one  
invoice supporting a portion of the transportation amount which was not entered  
into evidence at the hearing by the respondent should be varied or revoked. In  
essence, if I were to accept the respondent’s position, the appellants would be  
liable for this unsubstantiated amount simply by the act of it being included in the  
amounts on the Statement of Account without anything further from the  
respondent.  
[21] I also find that imposing an initial evidentiary burden on the respondent would not  
conflict with the decision in Vavilov. The excerpt relied upon by the respondent in  
Vavilov pertains to determining the standard of review that applies when a court  
reviews the merits of an administrative decision, not regarding which party bears  
the onus in an administrative hearing. It is also not clear from the decision in  
Shekhurdina, which was also relied upon by the respondent, whether the issue of  
which party bears the onus was raised given that the only party who appeared for  
the proceeding was the respondent.  
[22] I do acknowledge the respondent’s position that the OSPCA commenced the  
proceeding in Straub, but this does not change the court’s statement that the  
charges on the statement of account in that matter must reflect the actual costs of  
caring for the animals and that the care provided must be reasonable. I am  
persuaded by and adopt the Board’s decision in Freeman and find that there is no  
significant difference between s. 35(1) of the Act and s. 15(1) of the OSPCA Act  
20 Book of Documents regarding the Boarding and Miscellaneous invoices, undated, Exhibit 7.  
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that would justify a departure from the requirement of evidence regarding a  
statement of account as required by the court in Straub.  
[23] For all of these reasons, I agree with the appellants and the Board’s decision in  
Freeman that the respondent has an initial evidentiary burden to prove on a  
balance of probabilities that the charges reflected on the Statement of Account  
reflect the actual cost of necessaries provided and that these costs are reasonable  
such that the Statement of Account should be confirmed. Only once the  
respondent meets its evidentiary burden will the onus shift to the appellants to  
prove that the Statement of Account should be varied or revoked on a balance of  
probabilities.  
The Statement of Account  
[24] The total amount of the Statement of Account that was served on the appellants in  
this matter was $1,114,720.27. The relevant excerpts of the Statement of Account  
are as follows:  
An Animal Welfare inspector has provided necessaries to:  
approximately 111 dogs of various breeds, age, and sex removed  
from 2401 Telford Line, Severn [and] approximately 118 dogs of  
various breeds, age, and sex removed from 5753 Line 8, Oro-  
Medonte to relieve the distress of the animal(s) as described  
below:  
Transportation Costs:  
Boarding Costs:  
$20,296.00  
$969,986.59  
$124,437.68  
Veterinary Costs:  
Animal Care Costs:  
Miscellaneous Costs:  
Total Costs:  
$1,111,720.27  
[25] On March 17, 2022, Ms. Toderishena, co-counsel for the respondent, provided the  
following amended amounts for the Statement of Account:  
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Transportation Costs:  
Boarding Costs:  
Veterinary Costs:  
Total Costs:  
$19,166.00  
$881,776.59  
$121,725.77  
$1,022,688.36  
[26] The respondent requested that the Board confirm the Statement of Account in the  
amount of $1,022,688.36. The appellants submitted that the Statement of Account  
should be varied to $Nil.  
[27] For the reasons that follow, the Statement of Account is varied as follows:  
Transportation Costs:  
Boarding Costs:  
$Nil  
$505,760.00  
$Nil  
Veterinary Costs:  
Total Costs:  
$505,760.00  
a) Transportation Costs  
[28] Four invoices for transportation amounts were entered as evidence during the  
hearing, the particulars of which are as follows:  
Invoice Date  
Invoicing Company  
Luckhart Transport Ltd.  
Shawn & Wendy Mack  
North Bay and District  
Humane Society  
Invoice Amount  
$12,260.50  
$4,666.90  
September 27, 2021  
September 29, 2021  
November 1, 2021  
$1,211.60  
November 10, 2021  
Luckhart Transport Ltd.  
$1,130.00  
Total:  
$19,269.0021  
21 The discrepancies between the total amount of the four invoices and the total transportation costs on  
the amended Statement of Account was not explained at the hearing.  
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[29] The respondent advised that the November 10, 2021 invoice from Luckhart  
Transport Ltd. (Luckhart) should not be included in the Statement of Account. As a  
result, the total amount of the invoices before me regarding transportation is  
$18,139.00.  
[30] For the reasons that follow, I find that the respondent failed to prove on a balance  
of probabilities that the amount of $20,296.00 or the amended amount of  
$19,166.00 for transportation costs on the Statement of Account represents the  
costs of necessaries such that either of the total transportation amounts should be  
confirmed. As a result, I vary the transportation amount on the Statement of  
Account to $Nil.  
[31] If I am wrong and transportation are “necessaries,” I still find in the alternative that  
the transportation amounts included on the Statement of Account are varied to $Nil  
because:  
(i) The care provided to the dogs during transport by Luckhart fell below the  
prescribed standards of care in Ontario; and  
(ii) The respondent has failed to prove on a balance of probabilities that the  
remaining transportation amounts are reasonable such that they should be  
confirmed.  
i)  
Transportation Amounts for the Removal are not Necessaries  
[32] The three invoices for transportation dated September 27, 2021, September 29,  
2021, and November 1, 2021 pertain to the removal of the dogs on September 23,  
2021 from the Severn and Moonstone properties.  
[33] The respondent submitted the Superior Court of Justice decision of Pryor v.  
OSPCA (Pryor)22 where the court found that trucking expenses for the removal of  
animals was not recoverable against the animal owners.23 The court held:  
22 2014 ONSC 6485 ().  
23 Ibid. at para. 51.  
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To begin with, the applicable provisions of the [OSPCA] Act  
differentiate between removal, on the one hand, and food, care  
and treatment on the other. For example, in section 14(1),  
removal is authorized for the purpose of providing the animal with  
food, care or treatment. Accordingly, the section contemplates  
that the provision of food, care or treatment follows removal.  
Section 14(1.2) allows a justice of the peace or provincial judge  
to make an order for payment of food, care or treatment to an  
animal pursuant to its removal, indicating again that the [OSPCA]  
Act regards removal and food, care or treatment as separate  
events. Section 17(6)(d) makes this same differentiation using  
these same words. In addition, the imposition of statutory liability  
should generally be clear and unequivocal. Indeed, it would have  
been an easy matter to provide specifically that an owner is liable  
for the costs of removal of animals. The failure to do so supports  
my view that costs of removal are not recoverable and are not to  
be included as costs of food, treatment or care. Accordingly, I  
would disallow the claim for removal costs.24  
[34] The respondent’s position was that Pryor did not apply in this matter because the  
legislature had expanded the types of costs that are recoverable by way of a  
statement of account in the Act by using the word “necessaries” instead of the  
former language of “food, care or treatment.”  
[35] “Necessaries” is not defined in the Act. The respondent, however, submitted that  
the definition of “necessaries” as set out in the Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed.  
2019) should be the one that is adopted by the Board which is as follows:  
necessaries (14c) 1. Things that are indispensable to living  
<an infant's necessaries include food, shelter, and clothing>. •  
Necessaries include whatever food, medicine, clothing, shelter,  
and personal services are usu. considered reasonably essential  
for the preservation and enjoyment of life, to the extent that a  
person having a duty of protection must furnish them. — Also  
termed necessities; necessities of life. 2. Things that are  
essential to maintaining the lifestyle to which one is accustomed  
<a multimillionaire's necessaries may include a chauffeured  
limousine and a private chef>. • The term includes whatever is  
24 Ibid.  
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reasonably needed for subsistence, health, comfort, and  
education, considering the person's age, station in life, and  
medical condition, but it excludes (1) anything purely  
ornamental, (2) anything solely for pleasure, (3) what the person  
is already supplied with, (4) anything that concerns someone's  
estate or business as opposed to personal needs, and (5)  
borrowed money.  
[36] Even if I agreed with the respondent and adopted any one of the definitions of  
“necessaries” as set out in the Black’s Law Dictionary and applied it to this matter,  
the explanation provided in Pryor as to why transportation amounts are not  
recoverable by way of a statement of account is not affected. For instance, the Act,  
similar to the OSPCA Act, differentiates between removal and necessaries.  
Section 31(1) of the Act uses the same wording as s. 14(1) of the OSPCA Act –  
i.e., that removal is authorized for “the purpose of” providing the animal with  
necessaries. Therefore, s. 31(1) of the Act contemplates that the provision of  
necessaries follows removal as was the case with s. 14(1) of the OSPCA Act.  
[37] Section s. 38(9)5. of the Act also uses the same phrasing as its predecessor  
legislation and allows the Board to order that the whole or any part of the cost of  
the respondent of providing necessaries to an animal “pursuant to its removal,”  
which, like the OSPCA Act, indicates that the legislature via the Act views removal  
and necessaries as separate events.  
[38] I endorse the Court’s statement in Pryor that it would have been an easy matter for  
the legislature to explicitly state that an owner or custodian is presumptively liable  
for costs of removal of animals, including costs for transportation, or included in  
the definition of “necessaries” transportation costs especially in light of the  
legislation being updated since the decision in Pryor was released. In this matter,  
as in Pryor, the failure of the legislature to do so supports a finding that  
transportation amounts for the removal of the dogs is not recoverable against the  
appellants because they are not “necessaries.”  
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ii)  
The September 27, 2021 Luckhart Invoice and Prescribed Standards of Care  
[39] Even if I am wrong and the transportation amounts are “necessaries,” I agree with  
the appellants’ submission that the transportation amounts from Luckhart are not  
payable because the transportation provided by Luckhart fell far below the  
prescribed standards of care for animals in Ontario.  
[40] Regional Supervisor Munoz testified that on September 23, 2021, 233 dogs were  
removed from the Severn and Moonstone properties following an inspection at the  
two locations by AWS on the same date. Regional Supervisor Munoz was only  
present at the Moonstone property and, therefore, only had first-hand knowledge  
of the events that occurred at that location. Similar to Straub, no witnesses with  
firsthand knowledge to the events that occurred regarding transportation from  
Severn on September 23, 2021 were called to testify at the hearing.25  
[41] Regional Supervisor Munoz testified that once it was determined that the dogs  
were going to be removed, the dogs were provided with an identification number  
for trucking purposes and then taken to a registration station at the Moonstone  
property where they were logged and photographed. All but three dogs26 were put  
into black-wire crates and loaded into a truck and trailer used to transport livestock  
species that was operated by Luckhart. Regional Supervisor Munoz initially  
testified that when the dogs were loaded into the truck that they were “secured for  
transport.”  
[42] After the dogs were loaded into the Luckhart truck at the Moonstone property,  
Regional Supervisor Munoz testified that they were taken to a rented space at the  
Toronto International Centre where they were unloaded, triaged, and provided  
access to water. The dogs were then reloaded into crates and then loaded back  
into vehicles for transport to boarding facilities.  
25 Supra not 11 at para. 42.  
26 The three dogs that were not transported by Luckhart were provided transportation via AWS vehciles.  
Regional Supervisor Munoz testified that one of the three dogs was in heat, the second was “identified as  
having an injury,” and she could not confirm the reason for the third dog being transported separately.  
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[43] In cross-examination, Regional Supervisor Munoz testified that the removal of the  
dogs at the Moonstone property began at 1:40 p.m. on September 23, 2021 and  
that when she arrived at the triage location at 8:25 p.m., the Luckhart truck from  
the Moonstone property was not fully unloaded. Regional Supervisor Munoz could  
not provide a time when the removal of the dogs began at the Severn property and  
could also not provide a time when the truck transporting animals from Severn  
arrived at the Toronto International Centre only stating that it “arrived shortly after  
her.”  
[44] Regional Supervisor Munoz could also not provide any information as to when the  
dogs started to leave the triage location to be transported to the boarding facilities.  
The only detail that she was able to provide was that at 2:32 a.m. on September  
24, 2021, the last vehicle left the Toronto International Centre to transport the last  
load of dogs. No evidence was provided as to when any of the dogs arrived at any  
of the boarding facilities which were located all across Ontario.  
[45] In cross-examination, Regional Supervisor Munoz confirmed that no water was  
provided to the dogs while they were in the Luckhart truck, she had no information  
on when the dogs had last received food prior to their removal as she deemed this  
information as not important, and that there was no way for any of the dogs to  
relieve themselves once loaded in the truck aside from doing so in their crates that  
were not lined with any absorbent material. Her testimony that the crates were  
cleaned at the triage centre so that the dogs were “not in their excrement at any  
time” leads me to conclude that at least some of the dogs had relieved themselves  
in their crates while held in the Luckhart truck.  
[46] Additionally in cross-examination, Regional Supervisor Munoz contradicted her  
earlier testimony that the crates were “secured for transport” when she confirmed  
that the crates were in fact not tied down or otherwise secured to the bed of the  
Luckhart truck. I also do not accept Regional Supervisor Munoz’s testimony that  
“there was no need to” have the crates tied down because they were loaded in a  
manner that was “quite tight” such that “they could not slide anywhere.” Regional  
Supervisor Munoz’s testimony is contradicted by a photo that was taken of the  
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dogs loaded in the Luckhart truck at the Moonstone property right before the doors  
on the Luckhart truck were closed. This photo shows that crates were stacked on  
top of each other with a large vacant space on the second row.27 Such void could  
easily allow the crates on the second row to shift in transport. I also do not accept  
Regional Supervisor Munoz’s testimony that “no crates shifted throughout  
transport” because she was not at the triage facility when the truck from the  
Moonstone property arrived to make such an observation.  
[47] Section 3 of O. Reg. 444/19, “Standards of Care and Administrative  
Requirements,” requires every animal in Ontario to be provided with adequate and  
appropriate food, water, and sanitary conditions, and that every animal be  
transported in a manner that ensures its physical safety and general welfare.  
[48] I find it alarming that Regional Supervisor Munoz, who arrived at the Moonstone  
property “early in the morning” on September 23, 2021, did not deem it important  
to know when the dogs were last fed (which was 2:00 p.m. on September 22, 2021  
according to Ms. Adrienne Spottiswood’s evidence) and provided no evidence as  
to when the dogs actually received any food at the boarding facilities.  
[49] The evidence that I do have before me indicates that the dogs that were loaded  
first at the Moonstone property were put on the Luckhart truck at approximately  
1:40 p.m. and still were not unloaded by 8:25 p.m. This is almost 7 hours without  
access to water and a washroom break. Regional Supervisor Munoz’s testimony  
that the crates were cleaned at the triage centre also leads me to conclude that the  
dogs were not provided with sanitary conditions during transport and no material,  
such as straw, was provided for absorption when an animal relieved themselves in  
their crates. Indeed, the dog identified as S-28 was reported to have been urine  
soaked28 as well as S-98 having bad diarrhea in its crate29 when they were triaged.  
[50] Further, while Regional Supervisor Munoz initially testified that the Luckhart trucks,  
which were generally used to transport livestock, were cleaned, and disinfected  
27 Exhibit 40.  
28 Examination Report Cards for Severn, page 28.  
29 Testimony of Dr. Jennifer Farr, veterinarian.  
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when they arrived on site at both properties (despite only being present at the  
Moonstone property), she later provided testimony the trucks had been removed of  
shavings and had no remnants of animal excrement – she only assumed that the  
trucks had been disinfected.  
[51] Most significantly, Regional Supervisor Munoz testified that taking the entirety of  
the situation into account, she had no concerns with how AWS handled the  
removal of the dogs from the two properties and the level of care provided to the  
dogs during this process, which included the subsequent events until the animals  
reached their final destinations. She did, however, agree that such level of care of  
animals would not be acceptable on a day-to-day basis.  
[52] O. Reg. 444/19 does not exempt AWS from the prescribed standards of care or  
state that AWS does not need to provide standards of care when animals are  
removed. There is simply no qualification provided in the regulation and, as  
submitted by the respondent in its closing submissions, laws are not suggestions.  
[53] As Regional Supervisor Munoz conceded that the care provided by AWS to the  
dogs during the removal was not acceptable on a day-to-day basis, it follows that  
the transportation amounts invoiced by Luckhart transportation costs are not  
reasonable and are not recoverable as against the appellants.  
iii) North Bay and District Humane Society November 1, 2021 Invoice  
[54] The November 1, 2021 invoice from North Bay and District Humane Society  
included mileage and costs for staff to drive the North Bay and District Humane  
Society’s truck and trailer to transport the removed dogs from the triage centre  
back to its location.  
[55] Regional Supervisor Munoz testified that the North Bay and District Humane  
Society offered to assist with the transportation of animals and, had it not, AWS  
would have had to provide a trailer to take certain animals to North Bay. Regional  
Supervisor Munoz also testified that if AWS provides transportation services, no  
fee would be included on the Statement of Account for such services.  
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[56] Therefore, I find that the respondent has failed to prove that the amount charged  
by the North Bay and District Humane Society for $1,221.60 for transportation is  
reasonable given that the AWS could have provided the service at no cost. Simply  
because a cost was incurred for AWS’s convenience does not equate to  
reasonableness such that it is recoverable against the appellants.  
iv) The Shawn and Wendy Mack September 29, 2021 Invoice  
[57] I also find that the respondent failed to prove on a balance of probabilities that the  
September 29, 2021 invoice from Shawn and Wendy Mack in the amount of  
$4,666.90 is reasonable and, therefore, it is not recoverable as against the  
appellants.  
[58] Regional Supervisor Munoz testified that Shawn and Wendy Mack supplied two  
trucks and trailers that were waiting at the Triage location to transport animals from  
the Triage to their boarding facilities. The invoice shows that 15 hours were  
charged for the first truck and trailer and 14.5 hours for the second truck and  
trailer. Regional Supervisor Munoz, however, did not provide a breakdown as to  
how much of the invoiced time was for transporting the dogs as opposed to  
“waiting” at the Triage location. No information was provided as to how many dogs  
were transported by Shawn and Wendy Mack or where they were transported to.  
[59] In addition to failing to provide sufficient particulars to support the amount of the  
Shawn and Wendy Mack invoice, I also find that these costs are not reasonable  
based on Regional Supervisor Munoz’s testimony that had AWS transported the  
dogs to the boarding facilities that this service would have been provided at no  
cost. Again, simply because a cost was incurred for AWS’s convenience does not  
equate to reasonableness such that it is recoverable against the appellants.  
b) Boarding  
[60] The largest portion of the Statement of Account is for boarding in the amount of  
$969,986.59, which was later reduced by the respondent to $881,776.59.  
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[61] For the reasons that follow, I vary the boarding costs on the Statement of Account  
to $505,760.00.  
i)  
Daily Fees  
[62] Similar to Straub,30 the respondent called no witnesses with firsthand knowledge  
as to the daily boarding fees.  
[63] Regional Supervisor Munoz was the only witness that testified to the kennel  
invoices. She testified that the invoices included charges that each boarding facility  
charged per day for each animal and that these daily amounts were determined by  
each facility. When asked why the facilities charged different daily rates, Regional  
Supervisor Munoz stated that she could only speculate as to why, suggesting that  
the daily rates were all “somewhat within reason of each other.” Regional  
Supervisor Munoz also testified that, to her knowledge, the rates charged to the  
respondent were the same rates charged to the public noting, without specific  
details, that some facilities elected to charge the respondent a lesser rate than  
what the public would pay.  
[64] I do not agree that the daily rates charged by the kennels were “somewhat within  
reason of each other” as suggested by Regional Supervisor Munoz. The daily  
rates charged by the kennels varied from $20.00 per day per dog at Animal Care  
Centre Lobo31 to $55.00 per day per dog at the Kennel Club Boarding.32 Daily  
boarding amounts that are more than double other facilities’ daily rates are not  
“within reason of each other.” Moreover, the appellants led evidence that the  
respondent was being charged more than the posted public rate at Shadowbrook  
Kennels,33 a discrepancy that Regional Supervisor Munoz could not explain.  
[65] Additionally, no evidence was led by the respondent as to what the daily amounts  
invoiced for boarding actually included. The closest evidence to this was Regional  
30 Supra note 11 at para. 42.  
31 Supra note 20 at tab 1.  
32 Ibid. at tab 7.  
33 Ibid. at tab 14 and Exhibit 44, Shadowbrook Website Screen Shot.  
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Supervisor Munoz’s testimony that since the dogs were removed, they have  
received care at the kennels including grooming, food, potable water, indoor and  
outdoor housing, access to outdoors to relieve themselves, exercise, socialization,  
enrichment, run time, and play time. Regional Supervisor Munoz, however, also  
testified that she had no information when AWS had last inspected any of the  
kennels that dogs were boarded at and provided no evidence as to when, or if, she  
had ever attended at any of the locations.  
[66] Additionally, several, but not all, kennels invoiced separate amounts in addition to  
daily boarding rates for grooming,34 food,35 collars,36 blankets, toys, and bones.37  
Country Paws Boarding Inc. also charged a separate rate to provide “one-on-one”  
time for one of the dogs boarded at that facility.38 The respondent failed to provide  
34 Animal Care Centre Lobo charged $20.00 or $30.00 per dog once for “bath and nails” services from  
September 24, 2021 to January 27, 2022, whereas Kennel Club Boarding charged $50.00 per dog for  
“bath and brush” services on at least two occasions, and for 3 dogs three occasions, between September  
24, 2021 and January 31, 2022. Wenrick Kennels Inc. charged anywhere from $40.00 to $60.00 per dog  
for grooming, brush outs, nails, and flea baths and the only information provided on the Wenrick Kennels  
Inc. invoices as to why the rates varied was that the rates were based on “breed and coat condition.”  
Indeed, some kennels listed no fees on the invoices for grooming and bathing services.  
35 For those that did invoice separate amounts for food, no evidence was led as to why the food amounts  
varied for each kennel over the various months while the dogs were in their care when the number of  
dogs housed at the kennel did not change. For example:  
(i)  
Brooklin Kennel invoiced for “Food X 5” in the amount of $342.15 on its October 14, 2021  
invoice which was for “8 pets for 30 nights” but invoiced for “Food X 6” in the amount of $410.58  
for the same number of pets and nights on its November 15, 2021 invoice. The amount invoiced  
for food rose to $662.53 on Brooklin Kennel’s invoice dated January 12, 2022 which was again  
for the same number of dogs and nights as the previous invoices that I have referred to;  
The invoices at City Limits Dog Boarding Inc. show an invoiced amount of $439.95 for “our food  
charge” for 10 dogs for 29 days on the October 22, 2021 invoice and $791.91 for 9 bags of food  
for 10 dogs for 31 nights on its November 22, 2021 Invoice.; and  
(ii)  
(iii)  
Kennel Club Boarding also had an increase of 10 Hills Sensitive Stomach Dog Food for 18 dogs  
for 31 days in its October 31, 2021 invoice to 20 Hills Sensitive Stomach Dog Food for the same  
number of dogs for 30 days in its November 30, 2021 invoice.  
Additionally, no evidence was led as to why the food amounts varied for each kennel over the various  
months while the dogs were in their care when the number of dogs housed at the kennel did not change.  
Where there was an increase in dogs at the kennels, such increase was not proportionate to the increase  
in the amount of food that was invoiced for. For example, the amount of the food invoiced by Country  
Paws Boarding went from 6 bags of food for 30 dogs for 9 nights in the October 19, 2021 invoice for a  
total of $392.68, to 20 bags of food and 5 cases of canned food for a total of $1,709.75 for 56 dogs for 8  
nights in the November 3, 2021 invoice. While there was an increase in dogs between these two invoices,  
the number of dogs did not double but the amount invoiced for food more than quadrupled with no  
explanation.  
36 Kennel Club Baording October 31, 2021 invoice for $386.28 and the Rainbow District Animal Services  
October 27, 2021 invoice for $143.88.  
37 Kennel Club Boarding November 30, 2021 invoice in the amount of $384.77.  
38 Supra note 20 at at tab 5G.  
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an explanation to substantiate why only some of the kennels invoiced for such  
services and items over and above the daily boarding rates invoiced while other  
did not.  
[67] The respondent is aware that the costs it incurs for boarding animals is, pursuant  
to the Act, presumptively payable by owners or custodians of animals. If the Board  
finds that such amounts are not recoverable against owners or custodians, the  
amounts are ultimately paid by the taxpayers of Ontario. Therefore, it is incumbent  
upon the respondent to act responsibly when approving costs and invoices, and  
not simply provide free range for service providers, such as kennels, to charge  
whatever fee they see fit for services.  
[68] As such, I agree with the appellants that AWS failed to act responsibly in this  
matter by failing to:  
(i) Negotiate daily boarding rates and discounts for multiple dogs or for the  
length of stay. This includes:  
(a) Failing to negotiate a lower daily rate or request any rate reduction at  
any of the facilities before the dogs were boarded despite AWS  
informing the kennels in advance that it was likely that the dogs  
would be boarded for some period of time; and  
(b) Failing to negotiate a lower daily rate as of the hearing given that the  
dogs had been boarded at that time for several months;  
(ii) Investigate whether different types of “suites” were available that may have  
had a lower daily fee. For example, Regional Supervisor Munoz did not know  
if there were any other types of suites available at Winter Hill Canine Cottage  
which may have had a lower daily fee than “Deluxe Suites;”39  
(iii) Investigate whether two dogs could be boarded together in one suite to  
reduce boarding fees. Regional Supervisor Munoz testified that this was not  
39 Supra note 20 at tab 15.  
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done because AWS did not know the individual dogs, their personalities, and  
which dogs would do well kenneled together. As of the date of the hearing,  
however, Regional Supervisor Munoz confirmed that AWS has not consulted  
with the appellants at all since the dogs were removed which could have been  
a way to obtain such information; and  
(iv)Investigate whether there were any outdoor locations that could board the  
dogs, given Regional Supervisor Munoz’s acknowledgement that the dogs  
removed were outdoor dogs. Taking further steps could have included  
exploring, for example, whether another sled dog business or a farm could  
have assisted with boarding.  
[69] Nevertheless, more is required from the appellants than bald attacks on the  
practices of AWS to establish that amounts included on a statement of account are  
unreasonable. For example, evidence could have been called to demonstrate what  
a farm, outdoor kennel, or another sled dog company would have charged to  
board the dogs. No such evidence was before me.  
[70] Additionally, while the appellants relied upon the decision in Freeman to support  
their position that the Statement of Account, including daily boarding fees, should  
be varied to $Nil because there is no evidence to substantiate the amounts on the  
Statement of Account, Freeman is distinguishable on this issue. In Freeman, the  
respondent failed to submit any invoices to substantiate the boarding amounts  
included on the statement of account.40 Here, the respondent, at a minimum, has  
provided invoices regarding the daily boarding amounts.  
[71] I accept that it is reasonable that the respondent would incur fees to kennel the  
dogs once removed from the two properties. On the evidence before me, I find that  
the $20.00 per day per dog that was charged by Animal Care Centre Lobo is the  
most reasonable daily rate as the respondent failed to provide any evidence to  
substantiate the varying daily boarding rates of the kennels located all across  
Ontario. Applying the $20.00 per day boarding amount without any additional fees  
40 Supra note 9 at para. 199.  
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for grooming, food, etc., to 218 dogs (229 dogs listed on the Statement of Account  
less the 11 dogs that have died or been euthanized as of the end of this hearing)  
and multiply this by the 3 months and 24 days that the dogs have been kept in the  
care to the date of the Statement of Account (116 days total), the daily boarding  
fees total $505,760.00.  
ii)  
Transportation Costs Listed on the Boarding Invoices  
[72] There were also various amounts invoiced by the kennels for pick-up and drop-off  
services and transportation of dogs as follows:  
Kennel/Facility41 Invoice Date Service Description  
Amount  
Invoiced  
$150.00  
Kennel Club  
Boarding  
Kennel Club  
Boarding  
Kennel Club  
Boarding  
October 31,  
2021  
October 31,  
2021  
November  
30, 2021  
December  
22, 2021  
October 27,  
2021  
Pick up or Drop Off Service  
Pick up or Drop Off Service  
Pick up or Drop Off Service  
$100.00  
$90.00  
$35.40  
$87.98  
Oakville & Milton  
Humane Society  
Rainbow District  
Animal Services  
Mileage to Mississauga  
Oakville Emergency Hospital  
Transport S-12 to WAH42  
September 30th for emergency  
treatment  
26.5 km X 2 X 0.53/km  
2 hours @ $30.00 per hour  
Rainbow District  
Animal Services  
December 3, Transport of S-16 November  
2021  
$141.51  
$57.98  
19th to Grey Street for surgery  
76.9km X 2 X $0.53/km  
2 hours @ $30.00 per hour  
Transport of S-45 to WAH  
November 22nd for examination  
41 There is an invoice from Kennel Club Boarding dated January 31, 2022, which is dated outside of the  
scope of the Statement of Account, that has several pick up and drop off services as well as wait times  
listed on it along with associated fees which appear to be for appointments from January 5, 2022 to  
January 21, 2022. Unfortunately, I am unable to determine which amounts invoices apply to the date  
range covered by the Statement of Account and, therefore, I find that the amounts set out on Invoice  
#3520-KCB for pick up and drop off service including wait times to not be payable as against the  
appellants.  
42 Waldon Animal Hospital.  
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26.4km X 2 X $0.53/km  
1 hour @ $30.00 per hour  
Rainbow District  
Animal Services  
January 7,  
2022  
Transport S-42 to WAH  
$57.98  
December 22nd for examination  
26.4km X 2 X $0.53/km  
1 hour @ $30.00 per hour  
Pick up of S-42 December 23  
$57.98  
$57.98  
26.4km X 2 X $0.53/km  
1 hour @ $30.00 per hour  
Transport of S-42 to WAH  
December 27th for blood work  
26.4km X 2 X $0.53/km  
1 hour @ $30.00 per hour  
Transportation to Weldon  
Animal Hospital (WAH) for  
emergency treatment  
Wenrick Kennels  
Inc.  
October 27,  
2021  
$87.98  
Wenrick Kennels  
Inc.  
December 3, Transportation for surgery to  
$141.50  
$57.98  
$57.98  
2021  
Grey Street  
Transportation to WAH for  
examination  
Wenrick Kennels  
Inc.  
January 7,  
2022  
Transportation to WAH for  
examination  
Pick-up from WAH  
Transportation to WAH for  
examination  
$57.98  
$57.98  
TOTAL  
$1,298.21  
[73] I find that the transportation costs set out above in paragraph [72] are not  
reasonable. In addition to the reasons set out above in paragraphs [32] to [38] that  
transportation amounts are not “necessaries” and, therefore, are not recoverable  
as against the appellants, Regional Supervisor Munoz testified that the  
transportation amounts set out in paragraph [72] were as a result of the boarding  
facility providing transportation for treatment and returning the dogs to the kennel.  
Regional Supervisor Munoz further testified that these transportation services were  
provided by the kennels when an AWS inspector may not have been available to  
provide transportation to take a dog to an appointment. Regional Supervisor  
Munoz, however, confirmed that there would be no amounts claimed on the  
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Statement of Account had AWS provided transportation for the dogs rather than  
having the kennels provide such service.  
[74] Absent more specific evidence about why AWS could not provide transportation  
services, especially for veterinary services booked well in advance, I find that it is  
not reasonable that the appellants bear the burden of fees invoiced as a result of  
convenience for AWS.  
iii) Amounts for Assisting Veterinarians on the Boarding Invoices  
[75] The invoices reflect various amounts for assistance provided to veterinarians at  
the kennels including:  
Kennel/Facility  
Invoice Date Service Description  
Amount  
Invoiced  
$406.80  
Animal Care  
Centre Lobo  
December  
23, 2021  
Two persons providing vet  
assistance at Countryside  
Kennel for 6 hours including  
transportation/drive time  
Country Paws  
Boarding Inc.  
January 12,  
2022  
Additional 2 staff assisting with $140.00  
vet care for 4 hours  
Rainbow District  
Animal Services  
October 27,  
2021  
Assist with vet visit to Animal  
Shelter October 3, 2021  
$60.00  
2 hours @ $30.00 per hour  
Assist with vet visit to Animal  
Shelter October 3, 2021  
Wenrick Kennels  
Inc.  
October 27,  
2021  
$60.00  
TOTAL  
$666.80  
[76] I find that the respondent failed to prove on a balance of probabilities that these  
amounts were reasonable and, as a result, they are not recoverable as against the  
appellants for the following reasons:  
(i) Regional Supervisor Munoz did not speak to the $406.80 amount on the  
Animal Care Centre Lobo invoice including why two persons from Animal  
Care Centre Lobo were required to travel to Countryside Kennel to provide  
assistance as opposed to having staff at Countryside Kennel provide  
assistance especially when the amount invoiced includes travel time;  
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(ii) Aside from reading the January 12, 2022 invoice from Country Paws  
Boarding Inc. into the record, Regional Supervisor Munoz provided no  
information as to when or why these services were provided;  
(iii) Similarly, Regional Supervisor Munoz read from the October 27, 2021  
invoice from Rainbow District Animal Services regarding the assistance  
provided to a veterinarian only adding that AWS had a veterinarian attend  
the boarding facility to make it easier to examine the animals and this  
$60.00 amount was related to this visit; and  
(iv) While Regional Supervisor Munoz testified that the amount invoiced by  
Wenrick Kennels Inc. on the October 27, 2021 invoice for providing  
assistance to a veterinarian on October 3, 2021 at the shelter, the only  
information that she provided in addition to the information set out on the  
invoice was that the veterinarian would come to the facility to make it  
easier to examine the animals and these charges were associated with it.  
No information was provided by Regional Supervisor Munoz as to which  
veterinarian came to the facility, why they required assistance, and what  
assistance was provided by the kennel staff.  
iv) Vaccine and Medicine Administration Amounts on the Boarding Invoices  
[77] The boarding invoices also reflect certain amounts for vaccines and medicine  
administration including:  
Kennel/Facility43 Invoice Date Service Description  
Amount  
Invoiced  
$248.00  
Brooklin Kennel  
December  
13, 2021  
AWS – DHPP 1 Year Vaccine  
X 8  
North Bay and  
District Humane  
Society  
November 1, Vaccines  
$200.00  
2021  
Prednisolone Eye Drops for M- $38.08  
17  
TOTAL  
$486.08  
43 There is an invoice dated February 1, 2022 from North Bay and District Human Society that includes  
amounts for individual veterinary exams, bloodwork, fecal test, and medication for M-19 (Metronidazole),  
M-1 (Metronidazole), and M-1 Drontal Plus. Regional Supervisor Munoz testified that this invoice was not  
included on the Statement of Account and, therefore, I have no jurisidiction to make any determination  
regarding it.  
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[78] Regional Supervisor Munoz testified that amount for vaccines on the December  
13, 2021 invoice from Brooklin Kennel were for booster vaccines for each of the  
dogs at the kennel. She also testified that she believed that the amount for  
vaccines included on the November 1, 2021 invoice from North Bay and District  
Humane Society were for booster vaccines because there were given three to four  
weeks “later,” and that the eye drops would have been prescribed by a  
veterinarian and staff at the kennel would administer them in accordance with the  
directions on the prescription.  
[79] I find that these amounts are not reasonable such that they are recoverable as  
against the appellants. In addition to my comments in paragraphs [89] to [93]  
below regarding amounts for vaccines, it is not clear what these vaccines are for  
and I place no weight on Regional Supervisor Munoz’s testimony that they are  
booster shots. If they were booster shots, why were some given in November and  
others almost six weeks later in December? Should they not have been given at  
the same time? Further, are these fees for the actual vaccine or for administration  
of the vaccines? Who is administering the vaccines? These questions all went  
unanswered at the hearing.  
[80] Additionally, there is no evidence before me what the eye drops for M-17 were for  
and if this amount was for the eye drops, or administration of the eye drops – it is  
simply not clear on the evidence before me.  
v)  
Intake/After-Hours Drop-off Amounts  
[81] I find that any amounts that appear on the kennel invoices for intake or after-hours  
drop off when the dogs arrived at their location to not be recoverable as against  
the appellants. AWS’ inability to transport the dogs to kennels during normal  
operating hours is not a necessary.  
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vi) Country Paws Boarding Inc.  
[82] Country Paws Boarding Inc. included various other amounts on their invoices as  
follows:  
Invoice Date Service Description  
Amount  
Invoiced  
$255.45  
November 3, Product items for Mom and  
2021  
new pups, heat lamp, pee  
pads  
December 1, One-on-one time for Honey for $209.79  
2021  
Depression and Lethargy –  
some improvement seen (S-  
110)  
December 7, Pee pads  
2021  
$251.68  
$13.99  
December  
17, 2021  
December  
31, 2021  
January 11,  
2022  
Greenie Pill pockets  
Additional Charges – Security  
for 5 nights  
Additional staffing for extra  
medications administration and  
care of dogs who underwent  
surgery  
$875.00  
$250.00  
January 25,  
2022  
Additional Charges for  
cleaning and extra care for  
dogs  
$500.00  
TOTAL  
$2,355.91  
[83] I find that none of the charges invoiced by Country Paws Boarding Inc. are  
recoverable against the appellants for the following reasons:  
(i) Regional Supervisor Munoz testified that the heat lamp could be optional  
and, therefore, it is not a necessity;  
(ii) The only explanation for the one-on-one time for S-110 provided by  
Regional Supervisor Munoz was that this dog seemed depressed in her  
kennel so the staff spent additional time with her to ease her comfort in the  
kennel. No evidence was led that S-110 was in distress or that these fees  
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were for necessaries provided to S-110 but were rather to provide greater  
comfort to the dog;  
(iii) Regional Supervisor Munoz testified that the fee for the Greenie Pill  
Pockets was to assist with the administration of medications provided to  
the dogs. No evidence was led as to what medication was being  
administered to the dogs and for what reason;  
(iv) The $875.00 fee for “Security for 5 nights” is not payable and is not a  
necessary. Only upon my questions about this fee did Regional Supervisor  
Munoz indicate that it should not be included on the Statement of Account.  
Regional Supervisor Munoz testified that Country Paws Boarding Inc. had  
a suspicious vehicle show up after hours at its location and hired security  
in response to this incident, which was not directly related to this matter;  
and  
(v) No further information was provided by Regional Supervisor Munoz in her  
testimony regarding the additional staffing for extra medications  
administration and the care of dogs who underwent surgery on the  
January 11, 2022 invoice as well as the additional charges for cleaning  
and extra care for dogs included on the January 25, 2022 invoice. In fact,  
Regional Supervisor Munoz simply read from the invoices and failed to  
provide details such as which dogs these fees pertained to, which  
medications were being administered and how often, what types of  
cleaning were required and why, etc. Simply listing items with no further  
explanation is not sufficient evidence to determine whether the amount  
amounts were reasonable.  
vii) Other Amounts Including on Kennel Invoices not being claimed by the Respondent  
[84] The respondent has also confirmed that it is not seeking recovery for the following  
amounts invoiced and, as such, they are not recoverable as against the  
appellants:  
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Kennel/Facility  
Invoice Date Service Description  
Amount  
Invoiced  
Country Paws  
Boarding  
October 19,  
2021  
Medications 28 dogs X 2 times $210.00  
a day for 5 days  
Country Paws  
Boarding  
December  
12, 2021  
Medication administered,  
dewormer, antibiotics, anxiety  
meds  
$163.50  
Peterborough  
Humane Society  
TOTAL  
September  
24, 2021  
Lodging/Parking expense and  
photocopying  
$585.30  
$958.80  
c) Veterinary Care  
[85] The total amount of veterinary care set out on the Statement of Account was  
$124,437.68 which was later amended by the respondent to $121,725.77.  
[86] For the reasons that follow, I:  
(i) Find that the respondent failed to prove on a balance of probabilities that  
the veterinary care amount of either $124,437.68 or $121,725.77 included  
on the Statement of Account is reasonable such that either amount should  
be confirmed; and  
(ii) Vary the veterinary amount included on the Statement of Account to $Nil.  
i)  
Amounts Invoiced for the Triage  
[87] Regional Supervisor Munoz testified that after the dogs were removed and loaded  
onto the Luckhart trucks, the dogs were taken to a rented space at the Toronto  
International Centre where they were unloaded and triaged. The triage included  
being examined by one of five veterinarians whose services were retained by AWS  
with any findings being recorded on triage Examination Report Card forms  
supplied by AWS. The majority of the dogs were then vaccinated, treated for fleas  
and ticks, and given dewormer. The dogs were then returned to their crates and  
transported to their boarding destinations.  
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[88] The following amounts were invoiced in relation to the triage:  
Veterinarian/  
Facility  
Invoice Date Service Description  
Amount  
Invoiced  
Whitney Rose,  
RVT  
October 5,  
2021  
RVT Services and Travel Fee $531.10  
Renee Fleming,  
DVM  
October 5,  
2021  
Veterinary Services and  
Travel Fee  
$1,375.00  
JB Robertson  
Veterinarian  
Medicine P.C.  
March 11,  
2021  
Various fees for medication,  
vaccines and dewormer at  
Triage  
Kilometers, preparation and  
stand-by time and  
professional services  
House call, mileage,  
examination, veterinary  
services, technical support;  
Dispensing fee, midazolam,  
and torbugesic for M-70  
Mileage (2 vehicles), staff  
support, fees for Dr. Farr and  
Dr. Rockx, fees for 4  
$23,920.74  
March 11,  
2021  
$2,296.6844  
$3,361.6245  
Georgina  
Veterinary Clinic  
October 29,  
2021  
Hamilton/Burlington October 13,  
SPCA  
$2,993.50  
2021  
additional staff members,  
fees for sedation for collar to  
be cut off of one dog, various  
medical supplies, and sharps  
disposal fee  
Fees for three staff to attend  
the triage as requisitioned by  
Dr. Robertson including  
mileage  
Peterborough  
Human Society  
September  
24, 2021  
$757.8846  
The International  
Centre  
September  
24, 2021  
Hall rental, set-up including  
tables and chairs, and  
“bundled services”  
$6,729.15  
TOTAL  
$41,965.67  
44 The March 11, 2021 Invoice from JB Robertson Veterinarian Medicine P.C. also included amounts for  
travel time, a per diem charge for meals, and hotel reimbursement. The respondent confirmed that it was  
not seeking these amounts as against the appellants. Thus, the $2,296.68 for the “amount invoiced” is the  
total amount of the invoice less these amounts not being claimed by the respondent.  
45 Note: there is a remaining fee for Clavaseptin medication on this invoice from the service date of  
October 8, 2021 that is not related to the triage.  
46 The original amount of this invoice was $1,343.18 which included amounts not longer being sought by  
the respondent including $165.88 for mileage, $545.30 for loding and parking expenses, and $40.00 for  
photocopies.  
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[89] I find that none of the amounts listed above regarding the triage are for providing  
necessaries or are reasonable and, as a result, they are not recoverable as  
against the appellants.  
[90] During the hearing, I inquired why the triage could not have taken place at the  
Severn and Moonstone properties as opposed to incurring substantial invoiced  
amounts for items such as the rental of the Toronto International Centre as well as  
veterinarian stand-by time. Regional Supervisor Munoz testified that the triage took  
place at the Toronto International Centre so that the dogs could be “examined in a  
controlled environment,” to not extend AWS’ time at the properties, and to  
essentially reorganize the dogs to disburse them according to which boarding  
location they were being transported to.  
[91] I do not accept that the triage could not have been completed at the Severn and  
Moonstone properties or that any reason was provided to support Regional  
Supervisor Munoz’s testimony that a “controlled environment” was required. The  
dogs were either tethered or housed in pens at the two properties47 and there is no  
evidence that they would not otherwise be “controlled.” Indeed, AWS inspectors  
went from dog to dog at both locations for the purpose of measuring the tethers,  
the dogs, and the dog houses,48 such that an examination could have taken place  
then or in a similar fashion after the decision to remove was made. Indeed, there  
was also a history of AWS having veterinary examinations of the dogs occur at the  
properties. Dr. J. Bruce Robertson, veterinarian, testified that he had attended the  
properties on at least one prior occasion in February 2021 to conduct an  
examination which he described as similar in nature to the brief examinations  
provided at the triage.49 Additionally, AWS’ failure to provide appropriate  
transportation for the dogs such that they would not have needed to be  
reorganized at the triage centre for transport to their boarding locations does not  
fall to the feet of the appellants. This is in addition to taking several hours to load  
47 Supra note 3.  
48 Ibid.  
49 See Pryde, Spottiswood and Pierce v. Chief Animal Welfare Inspector, 2021 ONACRB 12 () at  
para. 30.  
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the dogs at the property, then unloading them at the triage location, to simply  
reload them again for transport.  
[92] I further find that the purpose of the triage was not to provide necessaries to the  
dogs, but rather was to provide preventative treatment to house the dogs at indoor  
kennels. The triage examinations were described by Dr. Robertson as “rapid-  
paced,” lasting between 2 to 5 minutes per dog, and were not full physical  
examinations. Dr. Robertson’s evidence is consistent with the testimony of Dr.  
Renee Fleming, veterinarian, who was also present at the triage. Dr. Fleming  
testified that she examined approximately 80 dogs during the triage which would  
equate to her spending on average of just over 5 minutes per dog based on her  
October 5, 2021 invoice for 7 hours of time for providing veterinary services on  
September 23, 2021.50  
[93] The 2 to 5 minutes that the veterinarians spent with each dog at the triage not only  
included the “rapid-paced” examination but also administration of vaccinations,  
flea, and tick treatment, and dewormer. Regional Supervisor Munoz testified that  
these treatments were “standard” for animals to receive upon intake to a boarding  
situation. Dr. Fleming and Dr. Robertson also testified that such treatment was  
“routine” for animals entering a boarding situation. Moreover, no fecal float tests  
were performed at the triage location to determine if any of the dogs arrived with  
internal parasites and actually required deworming treatment. Further, Dr. Fleming  
confirmed that the vaccines administered at the triage were not mandatory in  
Ontario, and none of the triage forms reported seeing live fleas or ticks on the  
dogs that would warrant treatment. As a result, I find that the vaccinations, the flea,  
and tick treatment, and the dewormer were all for the purpose of the dogs entering  
the kennels and not for providing necessaries to treat any presenting illness or  
conditions. As such, I find these amounts neither to be for the purposes of  
providing necessaries nor reasonable or recoverable against the appellants  
especially given that AWS took no steps to investigate whether any outdoor  
50 Book of Documents regarding the veterinary invoices, undated, Exhibit 8, tab 8A.  
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boarding was available to accommodate the dogs as discussed above in  
paragraph [68](iv).  
[94] Additionally, medications were on-hand at the triage that were pre-ordered by AWS  
and went unused. This is further evidence that supports my finding that the triage  
was not for the purpose of proving necessaries to the dogs. In an invoice dated  
November 11, 2021, the following medicines were invoiced by JB Robertson  
Veterinary Medicine PC that Dr. Robertson testified were not used at all at the  
triage:  
Medication  
Invoiced  
Amount  
$24.25  
$813.45  
$740.00  
$21.50  
Prednisone  
Claro Otic  
Convenia  
Dexamethasone  
Epiclor  
$52.20  
Inhibit Ointment  
Total  
$53.00  
$1,707.40  
[95] I find that none of the amounts listed above in paragraph [94] are recoverable as  
against the appellant and it remains unclear why, even after Dr. Robertson’s  
testimony that all of the medications went unused, that these amounts were still  
included in the Statement of Account and being sought by the respondent.  
[96] Even if I am incorrect in my finding that the purpose of the triage was not to  
provide necessaries to the dogs such that some of the amounts invoiced for the  
triage would be reasonable (i.e., for the “rapid-paced” examinations), the  
veterinarians and other veterinarian technicians/staff failed to provide a breakdown  
or any information as to the time spent in on the examinations as opposed to the  
amount of time spent administering vaccines, flea, and tick treatment, and  
dewormer. As a result, there is no evidence before me upon which I could allocate  
any invoiced amounts for examinations as opposed to the pre-kenneling standard  
procedures such that I could determine what amounts would be reasonable and,  
therefore, recoverable against the appellants.  
33  
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[97] There were also two other types of amounts invoiced for the triage that I find are  
not recoverable against the appellants. First, there were amounts invoiced for  
animals that were sedated at the triage. Dr. Farr testified to an entry on the  
October 13, 2021 invoice from the Hamilton/Burlington SPCA for injectable  
sedation for a canine requiring collar to be cut off.51 Dr. Farr testified that a large  
male dog, that was described as aggressive, was reported by AWS inspectors to  
have an imbedded collar in his neck. Dr. Farr confirmed that the dog was sedated  
but that the collar was not imbedded. The triage examination report card for M-70,  
however, noted that the dog was “sedated for exam @ 8:55 pm due to aggressive  
temperament.” No report was made that the sedation was due to the collar and  
sedating a dog for temperament alone is not a necessary given that the collar was  
ultimately not imbedded. I place greater weight on the triage examination report  
card as to the reason for the sedation (i.e., the dog’s aggressive temperament) as  
opposed to Dr. Farr’s testimony because the triage examination report card was  
made contemporaneously with the event. As a result, these amounts are not  
recoverable as against the appellants.  
[98] Second, amounts for a dispensing fee, midazolam, and torbugesic for the dog  
identified as M-70 were listed on an October 29, 2021 invoice from the Georgina  
Veterinary Clinic where Dr. Lawrence Woodley, veterinarian, worked.52 The triage  
examination report card for M-70, however, was completed, and testified to, by Dr.  
Farr. The “M-70” also appears to have been added after the original invoice from  
Georgina Veterinary Clinic was created. In any event, it remains unclear which  
dog, if any, was sedated by Dr. Woodley as reflected on the Georgina Veterinary  
Clinic invoice and, as such, these amounts are not recoverable against the  
appellants.  
ii)  
Causation  
[99] In their closing submissions, the appellants raised the issue of causation. The  
appellants agreed that if a problem requiring veterinary care arose while the dogs  
51 Ibid. at tab 13A.  
52 Ibid. at tab 10A.  
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were in their care, then it is reasonable that they would be liable to pay for such  
veterinary amounts. If, according to the appellants, the condition requiring  
veterinary care was caused by something that happened while the animals were in  
the custody of the respondent, then the appellants should not have to pay for  
these amounts because the condition could not have been said to have been  
“caused” by the appellants.53  
[100]In its closing submissions, the respondent did not respond to or address the issue  
of causation as raised by the appellants.  
[101]Neither the Act nor O. Reg. 444/19 contain guidance as to the grounds that the  
Board may consider in varying a statement of account. Such considerations will  
likely also vary on a case-by-case basis. On the evidence before me in this matter,  
I agree with the appellants that in order for the veterinary amounts included on the  
Statement of Account that are dated after the triage to be found to be reasonable,  
the respondent must prove on a balance of probabilities such amounts did not  
53 As an example, the appellants referred to the dog identified by the respondent as M-35. On the  
Examination Report Card for M-35, which is undated and has no information regarding the veterinarian  
that completed this card, the dog’s ears are noted as infected, having a narrow canal, having an  
odor/discharge, and inflamed. The appellants suggest that M-35’s ear issues did not rise to the level of  
distress at the time of the removal such that any amounts respecting the cost of necessaries invoiced for  
M-35’s ear issues can be recovered against them for the following reasons:  
1. No medications were provided to M-35 at the triage despite having ear infection medication on  
hand. The appellants submitted that the respondent’s actions of allowing M-35 to continue on  
with its transport to its boarding facility without any veterinary intervention at the triage  
suggested that M-35 did not have a serious ear infection at that time and that he was not in  
distress;  
2. Ms. Spottiswood testified that a “Master List” was provided to AWS approximately 8 days after  
the dogs were removed that set out protocols, if any, for each the dogs such as checking for  
health issues, eating habits, etc. This Master List indicated that the dog identified as M-35  
should have his ears checked daily, cleaned, and treated as necessary;  
3. Dr. Farr testified in relation to an invoice from the Hamilton/Burlington SPCA dated October 15,  
2021. This invoice was for veterinary services provided to M-35 in the total amount of $675.46.  
Dr. Farr testified that M-35 had a severe ear infection such that he was required to be sedated  
so that a culture could be taken and to allow for his ears to be cleaned; and  
4. It was not until 22 days after the removal that M-35 received veterinary care for his ear which,  
by that time, was so severe that he required sedation for treatment and half day hospitalization.  
Further, no evidence was presented that M-35’s ears were cleaned every day as outlined by  
Ms. Spottiswood in the Master List.  
Based on the facts set out above, it is the appellants’ position that they did not cause M-35’s condition  
that ultimately required sedation some 22 days after M-35 was in the care of the respondent such that the  
amounts for M-35’s veterinary care set out in the October 15, 2021 Hamilton/Burlington SPCA invoice  
would be recoverable against them.  
35  
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arise as a result of the care, or lack thereof, provided by the respondent or any of  
its agents.  
[102]I make this finding as none of the 233 dogs were removed from the appellants due  
to any health issues. Regional Supervisor Munoz testified that AWS did not identify  
“anything significant” from a health perspective regarding the dogs on September  
23, 2021 prior to their removal. This testimony is consistent with the evidence from  
AWS Inspectors in the Pryde, Spotswood and Pierce v. Chief Animal Welfare  
Inspector54 matter that the dogs were removed as a result of non-compliance with  
Compliance Orders that addressed tether lengths and insulation of dog houses.55  
Indeed, no evidence was presented that there were any compliance orders  
outstanding regarding any health issues at the time of the removal. Given this  
information alone, a claim for over $120,000.00 as against the appellants for  
amounts invoiced for veterinarian care is “not supportable by any standard of  
reasonableness.”56  
[103]Following the release of my decision in Pryde, Spotswood and Pierce v. Chief  
Animal Welfare Inspector,57 some dogs were returned to the appellants. Regional  
Supervisor Munoz conceded that when the dogs were returned, there were  
concerns about the dogs’ health as their stool samples showed that some of the  
returned dogs were suffering from Giardia. Indeed, a Giardia outbreak was  
subsequently identified at one kennel, two dogs were injured at a kennel, and  
there was a streptococcus zooepidemicus kennel outbreak as well. Further, an  
additional photograph of the dog identified as S-49 which was taken upon being  
returned to the appellants was described as “underweight” by the Regional  
Supervisor Munoz when it was put to her that the dog was emaciated by  
appellants’ counsel.  
[104]It was also clear that at least one kennel, Countryside Kennels, was not providing  
adequate care for the dogs. Regional Supervisor Munoz testified that AWS  
54 Supra note 3.  
55 Ibid. at paras. 54-56.  
56 Supra note 11 at para. 41.  
57 Supra note 3.  
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relocated the dogs that were initially boarded at Countryside Kennels to other  
facilities because Countryside Kennels was neither providing adequate bedding  
which could have led to potential safety issues nor sufficient outdoor/exercise time  
for the dogs.  
[105]It is also not lost on me that as of the end of the hearing, 11 dogs had either been  
euthanized or died while in the custody of the respondent.  
[106]The appellants also brought a motion at the outset of this hearing seeking  
permission for a veterinarian and/or veterinarian technician hired by the appellants  
to inspect each of the removed dogs’ general health and living conditions. The  
respondent opposed this motion.  
[107]Orally to the parties on February 17, 2022, and in a Motion Decision and Order  
dated February 25, 2022,58 I granted the appellants’ request to allow a veterinarian  
accompanied by a veterinarian technician to conduct an inspection of each of the  
living dogs that were removed from the two properties on September 23, 2021  
regarding their general health and living conditions on certain conditions.59 In the  
Motion Decision and Order, I stated:  
Moreover, the Respondent has been clear that it is maintaining its  
position that it can bill by way of an [statement of account] for any  
necessaries provided to the dogs, including the necessaries that it  
became aware of after the dogs were removed, and that it is not  
restricted to bill only for what its inspectors saw in the field without  
the assistance of a veterinarian on September 23, 2021…if the  
Respondent is successful in advancing its position, I find that  
fairness, as well as my obligation under r. 3.1(a) to facilitate a fair  
process that allows for effective participation by all parties, dictates  
that that the Appellants should also have an opportunity to have the  
dogs inspected by their own experts.60  
[108]For various reasons, which I elaborated orally on later in the hearing, I ordered the  
inspection to take place at the locations where the dogs were being housed.  
58 Windrift Adventures Inc. et al. v. Chief Animal Welfare Inspector, 2022 ONACRB 11 ().  
59 Ibid. at para. 6(d).  
60 Ibid. at para. 27.  
37  
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[109]As a result of my Motion Decision and Order, the appellants sought to have a  
representative inspection of four kennels (totaling 120 dogs), but no inspections  
ever occurred.  
[110]Regional Supervisor Munoz testified that she personally contacted all of the  
kennels that were housing the appellants’ dogs on February 18, 2022 and  
indicated that while she could not provide legal advice or direction regarding my  
Motion Decision and Order, she nonetheless stated that it was each facility’s  
prerogative on how to respond to the inspection requests.  
[111]Each of the four kennels that the appellants sought to inspect later refused the  
inspection as I ordered for various grounds including insurance coverage issues.  
[112]In light of all of the events in this matter, if I did not agree with the appellants’  
position that causation is something that the respondent needs to prove on a  
balance of probabilities, how would the appellants discharge their onus of proving  
that the veterinary bills dated after the triage on the Statement of Account should  
be varied? The dogs were not removed for any health reasons and the appellants,  
despite taking active efforts, had no access to inspect the dogs or their living  
conditions. Indeed, while the four representative kennels refused the appellants’  
inspection of the dogs, veterinarian after veterinarian who testified on behalf of the  
respondent at the hearing confirmed they attended kennels where they were not  
employed to inspect the appellants’ dogs and/or to provide veterinary services.  
The access issues related to the dogs is illustrative of the inequity of this situation  
as against the appellants to be able to meet their burden of providing that the  
veterinarian amounts dated after the triage should be varied or revoked. As a  
result, I agree with the appellants and find that, as part of the reasonableness of  
the veterinarian amounts dated after the triage date and included on the Statement  
of Account, the respondent must prove on a balance of probabilities that such  
amounts did not arise as a result of the care, or lack thereof, provided by the  
respondent or any of its agents.  
[113]In this matter, no evidence was led by the respondent that any of the conditions for  
which the dogs received subsequent veterinary care after the triage were present  
38  
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prior to their removal. No veterinarian was present during the removal and the  
Examination Report Cards that were completed at the triage were completed after  
the dogs had been held for several hours without food and water and were  
transported to the triage in a manner which I found fell far below the prescribed  
standards of care for animals in Ontario as discussed above in paragraphs [39] to  
[53]. Indeed, none of the veterinarians called as witnesses for the respondent  
testified as to the cause of any of the conditions or provided evidence that the  
animal’s post-triage veterinary needs arose from latent issues from when the dogs  
were in the appellants’ care.  
[114]Even if I accepted that at least the conditions identified on the Examination Report  
Cards completed at the triage were pre-existing or, at a minimum, not attributable  
to the care provided by the respondent and/or its agents during the removal, which  
I do not, only two of the invoices for veterinary services have a temporal  
relationship with the date of the removal of the dogs – a September 24, 2021  
invoice from Walkers Line Veterinary Hospital and a September 27, 2021 invoice  
from the Ilderton Pet Hospital. Aside from these two invoices, all of the other  
invoices reflect service dates of October 9, 2021 to dates into January 2022.  
There is no evidence before me that any of the veterinary services provided from  
October 9, 2021 and onward were to relieve any distress or conditions caused by  
the appellants as the dogs had not been in their care for, at a minimum, 16 days.  
iii)  
The September 24 and 27, 2021 Invoices  
[115]The September 24, 2021 invoice from Walkers Line Veterinary Hospital in the  
amount of $1,447.21 was for veterinary services provided to the dog identified as  
S-80 and a puppy identified as “S 80 Puppy.” S-80 was noted on the Examination  
Report Card at triage as having suspected congenital heart failure due to  
untreated dental disease.  
[116]The only witness who provided testimony regarding the September 24, 2021  
invoice, however, was Regional Supervisor Munoz who simply read the contents of  
the invoice into the record and offered no further explanation. As a result, I find that  
the respondent failed to prove on a balance of probabilities that this invoice was  
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13816/ACRB  
reasonable because no further evidence was provided as to the services rendered,  
if there were a diagnosis, or if any further follow-up treatment was required. It is  
also unclear what dog “S 80 Puppy” is referred to as there is no corresponding  
Examination Report Card with such identifier and, therefore, any amounts on this  
invoice for “S 80 Puppy” are not confirmed.  
[117]The September 27, 2021 invoice from the Ilderton Pet Hospital was for the total  
amount of $475.84. It shows that seven puppies and the dog identified as S-50  
were administered Revolution ($192.57) and that the following veterinary care was  
provided to the dog identified as S-49:  
Service Description  
Amount Invoiced  
Consultation/exam (including ear  
cleaning and ear cytology)  
Tonopen Tonometry/Alcaine  
Fluorescein Stain  
Prednisolone Ophth 1% 5ML  
Advantage Multi 55 Pkg6  
TOTAL  
$93.00  
$55.00  
$35.00  
$21.74  
$23.79  
$228.53  
[118]Dr. Kimberly Anderka, a veterinarian who works at the Ilderton Pet Hospital,  
testified as to the care provided to the appellants’ dogs at that location by her and  
her colleagues. Dr. Anderka testified that S-49 was diagnosed with an  
inflammation inside the eye, prescribed Prednisolone (steroid eye drops), and had  
a flea infestation. S-49’s ears were also cleaned and checked for mites and yeast,  
which were both negative. Dr. Anderka explained that the Tonopen Tonometry was  
an instrument used to measure interocular pressure, the fluorescein stain is used  
to look at organisms found on the skin, and that Advantage was a treatment for  
fleas as well as for heartworm and deworming. Dr. Anderka also testified that the  
seven puppies were found to have fleas “by the kennel” and, due to their age,  
were administered Revolution, which is also a flea treatment.  
[119]The Examination Report Card for S-49 noted that S-49’s eye needed to be  
checked “ASAP” for suspected uveitis, but S-49’s ears were noted as appearing  
normal. S-49’s coat and skin were also reported as appearing normal and there  
was no note of any fleas. None of the Examination Report Cards for the seven  
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13816/ACRB  
puppies or for S-50 noted any fleas. Dr. Anderka did not testify as to when the flea  
infestation arose.  
[120]As the dogs had been under the care of the respondent for 4 days, and the  
Examination Report Card for S-49 was completed after the removal of the dogs, I  
find that the respondent has failed to prove on a balance of probabilities that both  
the flea infestation and S-49’s eye infection for which these dogs received  
treatment did not arise from the care provided by the respondent or any of its  
agents.  
[121]For all of these reasons, I find that the respondent has failed to prove on a balance  
of probabilities that the amounts invoiced for veterinary services after the removal  
did not arise as a result of the care, or lack thereof, provided by the respondent or  
any of its agents. As a result, these amounts are not confirmed and are varied to  
$Nil.  
iv)  
Dog identified as M-42  
[122]I would be remiss to not comment on AWS’ actions regarding the dog identified as  
M-42. The following are the invoices submitted by the respondent in relation to  
M-42:  
Veterinarian/  
Facility  
Princess Animal  
Hospital  
Princess Animal  
Hospital  
Ontario Veterinary November 3, Various  
Invoice Date Service Description  
Amount  
Invoiced  
$3,879.39  
October 12,  
2021  
October 15,  
2021  
Various  
Various  
$3,325.13  
$10,799.42  
$18,003.94  
College  
TOTAL  
2021  
[123]Dr. John-Paul Settimi, veterinarian, attended the hearing and testified about the  
care that he and his team provided to M-42 at the Princess Animal Hospital. Dr.  
Settimi testified that M-42 received care at the Princess Animal Hospital from  
October 10, 2021 to October 14, 2021 as his diabetes mellitus was not regulated.  
M-42 also had severe abdominal pain and a severe ocular infection with yellow  
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discharge coming from his eyes. Further testing revealed that M-42 also had  
Cushing’s Disease. As a result of questions that I put to Dr. Settimi, he confirmed  
that there were inconsistencies in the dates of care provided to M-42 verses what  
was recorded on the invoices that he could not reconcile.  
[124]Dr. Aleksandra Milaszewska, veterinarian, also testified at the hearing regarding  
the treatment that she and her team provided to M-42 at the Ontario Veterinary  
College (OVC). Dr. Milaszewska testified that M-42’s case was “unusual,” and that  
he was transferred to the OVC for further testing to diagnose the extent of his  
illness. Dr. Milaszewska testified that M-42 was in extreme pain and further testing  
showed that he had liver pathology. Dr. Milaszewska testified that M-42 was  
suspected to have hyperadrenocorticism and that she could not comment on the  
cause of this condition. M-42 received care at OVC for 8 days and was euthanized  
on October 21, 2021.61  
[125]The Examination Report Card for M-42, which is undated and has no information  
regarding the veterinarian that completed this card, noted no health concerns  
aside from a neck wart and recommended that he be groomed/receive a medical  
bath. M-42 also had a pain score of 0.  
[126]The total amounts invoiced for M-42’s care exceeded $18,000.00. In comparison,  
the cost of euthanasia of another dog as set out on the December 6, 2021 invoice  
from the Hamilton/Burlington SPCA was $265.15. While it may have been  
reasonable to allow some amounts for an investigation into M-42’s condition at the  
outset rather than opting for euthanasia immediately, approval by AWS for  
veterinary care in excess of $18,000.00 for one dog far exceeds any realm of  
reasonableness.  
61 Medical Record – OVC Ultrasound report for the dog identified as “Hickory” dated October 17, 2021,  
Exhibit 35, page 1.  
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v)  
Other Veterinary Amounts Invoiced that are not being claimed by the Respondent  
[127]The respondent has also confirmed that it is not seeking recovery for the following  
veterinary amounts invoiced and, as such, they are not recoverable as against the  
appellants:  
Veterinarian/  
Facility  
404 Veterinary  
Emergency and  
Referral Hospital  
P.C.  
Invoice Date Service Description  
Amount  
Invoiced  
$1,243.50  
December  
29, 2021  
January 6,  
2022  
January 6,  
2022  
Various charges for S-104  
Various charges for S-104  
Medipaw Boot for S-104  
Various charges for M-36  
$1,454.13  
$78.40  
Cranberry Hill  
Animal Hospital  
JB Robertson  
Veterinarian  
September  
25, 2021  
$255.98  
$2,051.36  
November 3, Mileage, travel time, and  
2021  
professional services re:  
Kennel visit  
Medicine PC  
London Regional October 6,  
Various charges for S-73  
$1,348.09  
$497.20  
$13.56  
Veterinary  
2021  
Emergency and  
Referral Hospital  
October 8,  
2021  
Various charges for S-33  
October 8,  
2021  
Plasma-Lyte A Injection for S-  
33  
Mississauga-  
Oakville  
October 14,  
2021  
Various charges for S-73  
$4,618.41  
Veterinary  
Emergency  
Hospital  
Niagara  
Veterinary  
Emergency Clinic  
October 14,  
2021  
October 16,  
2021  
Various charges for S-5  
Various charges for S-6  
Various charges for S-6  
Various charges for S-33  
$8,594.12  
$12,424.49  
$1,055.22  
$977.00  
Oxford County  
Veterinarian Clinic 2021  
University of  
Guelph  
October 29,  
October 25,  
2021  
Laboratory  
Services  
TOTAL  
November 9, Various charges for M-42  
2021  
$754.00  
$35,365.46  
43  
Decision and Order  
13816/ACRB  
The Appellants’ Ability to Pay  
[128]As part of their closing submissions, the appellants’ requested that I consider the  
reasonableness of the amounts charged in the context of the appellants’ ability to  
pay which has been considered in previous Board decisions relied upon by the  
appellants.62  
[129]In response, the respondent submitted that an ability to pay is not a proper  
consideration when determining whether a statement of account should be varied  
or revoked given that such consideration would undermine the objective of the Act.  
The respondent also objected to consideration of the appellants’ ability to pay as  
this ground of appeal, in its opinion, was not articulated in advance of the hearing.  
[130]I do not need to reconcile whether consideration of an appellant’s ability to pay is a  
proper consideration as to whether a statement of account should be varied or  
revoked or if the appellants’ provided proper notice of their ability to pay as a  
ground of an appeal because no financial evidence was submitted as evidence for  
the hearing. While I appreciate Ms. Spottiswood’s testimony on this issue, there is  
simply no documents to support her position that the appellants are unable to pay  
the Statement of Account.  
[131]As a result, even if I agreed with the appellants that ability to pay is a relevant  
consideration as to whether I should vary or revoke the Statement of Account, I  
find that the appellants have failed to prove on a balance of probabilities that they  
are unable to pay the varied amount of the Statement of Account.  
The Appellants’ Request for no Further Statement of Accounts to be Issued  
[132]In their closing submissions, the appellants requested that I make an order that no  
further statement of accounts be issued by the respondent to the appellants in  
relation to their dogs that remain in the care of the respondent. The appellants  
rightly noted that while this appeal has commenced until the release of this  
62 For exmaple, see: Jackson v. Chief Animal Welfare Inspector, 2021 ONACRB 4 () at paras. 21-  
23 and 33-37; and Ishankova v. Chief Animal Welfare Inspector, 2022 ONACRB 3 () at paras. 13-  
23.  
44  
Decision and Order  
13816/ACRB  
decision, other invoices are accruing regarding the dogs. The appellants submit  
that there is no escape from endless statements of accounts being served upon  
them as the cycle simply repeats itself.  
[133]While I appreciate the appellant’s frustration, the Board is a creature of statute and  
I only have the powers conferred upon me under s. 38 of the Act. None of these  
powers include the ability to preclude the respondent from issuing any further  
statements of accounts. As a result, I find that I have no jurisdiction to grant the  
appellant’s request to order that no further statements of accounts are issued  
against them by the Chief Animal Welfare Inspector in relation to this matter.  
ORDER  
[134]Pursuant to the powers of the Board under s. 38(9) of the Act, I order that the  
Statement of Account is varied as follows:  
Transportation Costs:  
Boarding Costs:  
Veterinary Costs:  
Total Costs:  
$0.00  
$505,760.00  
$0.00  
$505,760.00  
Released: August 18, 2022  
___________________________  
Lindsay Lake, Vice-Chair  
45  
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