invokes only s. 2-21 of the SEA. Any attempt by the union to reframe the grievance to reference
discrimination broadly is an attempt to shape the complaint into something substantively new. Any
allegation by the union that the employer has discriminated in any other manner must be dismissed as
being outside the scope of the grievance.
 Fundamentally, the employer takes the position that, under the guise of a discrimination
grievance, the union asks the board to confer the benefit of a higher overtime rate on casual
employees, when this was not obtained through bargaining. This is not permitted at law.
 Arbitration boards have long cautioned against conferring additional monetary benefits to a
collective agreement, unless the intention of both parties is clear and unambiguous.11 Unless a claim
is based on a specific term of the agreement, compensation is a matter of collective bargaining and
not for arbitration.12
 The heart of this grievance is cast in terms of an alleged violation of Section 2-21(1) of the SEA.
This is what the parties understood and addressed in their correspondence throughout the grievance
process, including the unusual two sets of actual hearings set out at Steps 1 and 2, and the referral to
Step 3, which is arbitration.
 CBA Article 8.1.5. requires that in making application for a Step 1 hearing by the Director of the
Department concerned, “the Union shall outline, in writing, the matter complained of and the
settlement sought.” Article 8.1.6. requires that in appealing a Step 1 decision to the City Manager for
a Step 2 hearing, “the union shall file with the City Manager or their designate, a written statement of
the claim along with the reasons for lodging the appeal.” Article 8.8 provides that any grievance not
settled by discussion or in Steps 1 and 2, may proceed to arbitration (Step 3).
 In short, there is no provision for expanding the scope of the grievance at Step 3. If the wishes of
the parties were not already clear that the scope of the grievance is not to expand before or at Step 3,
CBA Article 8.1.12 is explicit that “in no event shall the Board have the power to change this
agreement or to alter, modify or amend its provisions.”
 It is a fundamental principle of fairness that parties to an arbitration process have the right to
know the case they must meet, and to reply accordingly. Adding boilerplate language to a grievance
such as “and any other legislation and/or provisions applicable” is not sufficient to meet this test. The
employer cannot reasonably be expected to guess what, if any, other legislation is relied upon by the
union, particularly given the plethora of federal, provincial and municipal legislation upon which a
grievance could conceivably be founded. This is particularly so in this case, in which the grievance is
founded, not upon a specific article in the CBA, but rather on legislation impacting the collective
 We agree with the employer that, absent agreement or acquiescence (neither of which is alleged
here), arbitration boards are not vested with the jurisdiction enjoyed by superior courts to amend
Vancouver Hospital v H.E.U., Local 180 (1996), 43 CLAS 74 (BC Arb), para 46; SEIU, Locals 299 & 333 v
Extendicare (Canada) Inc. (2002), 69 CLAS 152 (Sask Arb), para 17; Saskatchewan Telecommunications and UNIFOR,
Locals 1-S (E.S.L. Top-up and Requalification), Re (2018), 141 CLAS 5 (Sask Arb), para 52
12 Brown and Beatty, Canadian Labour Arbitration, 5th ed., looseleaf (Rel. 2, March 2022), at §8.1